

**THE
KÂVYA-PRAKÂSH, OF, MAMMATA
ULLÂSAS I. & II.**

**WITH
THE CORRESPONDING PORTIONS
OF
THE KÂVYA-PRADÎPA OF GÔVINDA
AND
THE UDYÔTA OF NÂGÔJÎ-BHATTA.**

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Publishers' Note.

After the death of Prof. D. T. Chandorkar, his excellent notes on काव्यप्रकाश were never reprinted and as there has been a pressing demand for them during the past few years, we undertook the work of publishing them with the permission of the son of the late Prof. Chandorkar. This edition is only a reprint of the original one owing to the fact that it had to be got through the press in a hurry, so as to bring it out in time for the beginning of the college term. We, however, hope to bring out the next edition in a revised form, after making additions to the present one and bringing it up-to-date. With this object in view we have entrusted the work of revising the book to several able Sanskritists and hope that the student world and the general public will encourage us in our endeavour to bring out the revised edition soon, by finding a ready sale for the present edition.

INTRODUCTION.

The Kāvya-prakāśha is a work on Rhetoric. Its study is calculated to enable one to criticise Poetry and to write pure and faultless Poems. What is Grammar to Literature in general, Rhetoric is to Poetry in particular.

The Sanskrit word अलंकार has two meanings: (1) That which adorns—an Ornament, and (2) Adorning or Ornamentation. In the first sense, it is what in English is called a Figure of Speech. In the second, it is the Science of Rhetoric. The specific name अलंकारशास्त्र given to the Science of Rhetoric in general is due to the fact that this Science treats of अलंकारs which, although a mere part of the whole, are yet considered as principally contributing to the Adorning of Poetry.

In the Sudhāsāgara—a commentary on the Kāvya-prakāśha, it is stated that Mammata was an inhabitant of Kashmir, that he was a son of a man named Jayanta, that he had two younger brothers named Kaiyata—the author of a commentary on the Malābhāshya of Patanjali, and Uvata—a scholiast on the four Vedas.

Ānandakavi in his commentary, called the Nidarshana, says that the Kāvya-prakāśha was composed by Mammata up to परिकरालंकार Ullāsa X. and that the remaining portion was written by a man named Allata.

There is another work also written by Mammata by name 'शब्दव्यापारविचार'. A manuscript of this work is deposited in the Deccan College Library, and is available even at present.

Mammata was a great Grammarian. There are various indications of his proficiency in Grammar in the Kāvya-prakāśha.

About the date of Mammata, nothing definite can be said here except that he flourished before 1160 A. D. in which year Mānikyachandra wrote his commentary, called the Sanketa, on Mammata's Kāvya-prakāśha.

The Kāvya-prakāśha consists of three parts: Kārikās, Vritti and Examples. The Kārikās and the Vritti are the work of Mammata himself. That the author of the Vritti is the same as the author of the Kārikās is clear from a reference to the Kārikā गाला तु पूर्ववत् in the figure रूपक, where the word पूर्ववत् refers to गालोपमा which has been mentioned in the Vritti on उपमा. Mammata, however, did not compose all the Kārikās anew. Some of them he borrowed from Bharata and some from Vamana, sometimes intro-

during some changes into them, and sometimes keeping them intact. The Examples consist of verses from various poems and dramas most of which are current even at the present day.

The whole of the Kāvya-prakāśha has been divided into 10 chapters called Ullāsa. The subjects treated in the various chapters have all been indicated in the fourth Kārikā of the first Ullāsa. Thus in the first Ullāsa, he states the definitions of Poetry and the different divisions which Poetry admits of. In the second and third, he states and defines the various divisions and functions of शब्द and अर्थ which constitute Poetry. In the fourth he enumerates and exemplifies the various sub-divisions of a चरितकव्य and in this connection explains the natures of रस, भाव, विभाव &c. In the fifth and sixth, he illustrates the various sub-divisions of a मध्यम and an अधम कव्य, respectively. In the seventh, he declares the 'faults' and in the eighth the 'excellences' of Poetry. The ninth and the tenth, he devotes to the treatment of figures—the former to the treatment of शब्दालंकार which according to him are six in number, and the latter to the treatment of अर्थालंकार which according to him are sixty-one.

One distinguishing characteristic of the School of Rhetoricians and especially of the present work is the establishment of a third function of a शब्द called व्यञ्जना in addition to the two functions called अभिप्राय and लक्षणा which are admitted by all the other Schools of philosophy in India. Mammata was by no means the first proponent of this new function. That credit is due to आनन्दवर्धन who composed his work called the ध्वन्यालोक for the deliberate object of establishing this new function of a शब्द. After the lapse of some time, a man named महिममदु arose, who composed a work called अन्विषेक in which he showed that this new function was no other than अनुमान itself. It was, therefore, the business of Mammata to refute this view of महिममदु and the Naiyāyaks and Mīmāṃsaks in general, and to establish व्यञ्जना,—a business which he has satisfactorily done in the fifth Ullāsa.

Mammata's work although very learned, is yet very difficult. In some places, he is quite obscure and unintelligible. Hence it is that many passages of the Vritti have been variously interpreted by various commentators. Hence also the great number of commentaries on his work. Out of these commentaries, however, the काव्यदीप of गोविन्द has been selected here for publication for reasons stated in the Preface to my edition of the Seventh Ullāsa.

A LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE BOOK

- 1 Pr.—Prabhā by Vaidya-nātha Tatsat.
- 2 Ja.—Jayantī by Jayanta.
- 3 Sen.—Sanketa by Mānikya-Chandra.
- 4 Śar.—Śārabōdhinī by Ś'rīvatsa-lānchhana.
- 5 Su.—Sudhā-Sāgara by Bhīmasena.
- 6 Kam.—Kamalākari by Kamalākara.
- 7 Nar.—Narasinha-manishā by Narasinha Thakkura.
- 8 Cha.—Vistārikā by Chakravarti.
- 9 K. P.—Kāvya-prakāsha by Mammata.
- 10 S. D.—Sāhitya-darpana by Vishwanātha.
- 11 R. S. }
R. G. } —Rasa-gangādhara by Jagannātha.
- 12 Vām.—Vāmana-Sūtra-Vritti by Vāmana.
- 13 Dan.—Kāvya-darśana by Dandin.
- 14 Ru.—Kāvya-lankāra by Rudrata.
- 15 Vag.—Vagbhata-lankāra by Vagbhata.
- 16 Nam.—\ Gloss on the Kāvya-lankāra by Nami-sādhu.
- 17 Dhvani.—Dhvanyaloka by Ananda-varādhana.
- 18 M. }
Mukula. } —Abhidhā-matrikā by Mukula.
- 19 M. B.—Mahā-bhāshya of Patanjali.
- 20 Bhattoji.—Siddhānta-kanmudī by Bhattoji Dixit.
- 21 L. M.—Laghu-manjushā by Nāgoji-bhatta.
- 22 V. S.—Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa-sāra by Kōṇḍa-bhatta.
- 23 V. S.—Vaiśeṣika Sūtras by Kaṇāda.
- 24 M.—Muktāvali by Vishwanātha.
- 25 T. S.—Tarka-saṅgraha
- 26 T. D. }
Dīpikā. } —Tarka-dīpikā } by Annambhatta.
- 27 Nil.—Nīlkanthī on the Tarka-dīpikā.
- 28 N. B.—Nyāya-bōdhinī by Gōvardhana.
- 29 T. K.—Tarka-kanmudī by Laṅgākṣhi-bhāṣaka.
- 30 T. B.—Tarka-bhāṣhā by Keśava-mi'sra.
- 31 N. K. Nyāya-kōsha by Bhīmāchārya.
- 32 S. S.—Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha by Mādhava.
- 33 S. P.—Shabda-shakti-prakāśhikā by Jagadīśha-bhatta-
chārya.
- 34 Amara.—Amara-kōsha by Amara-sinha.

शुद्धिपत्रकम्.

पृष्ठ	ओळ	शुद्ध
४	२१	विधिनिर्देश
४	२८	युक्तमिति
१५	१०	कीटादीति
१६	१७	वैखर्या
२१	१०	संरम्भात्
२२	२४	इति भावः
२२	२६	प्रभूतममरावती
२३	१५	तथा स एव
२८	१६	व्यज्यत इति
३०	२१	तत्र शक्य
३३	२०	नेति भावः
३४	१७	रंजनेन च
३८	२५	तथा सति
४०	३	प्रयोजनान्यतरच्चेति

पृष्ठ	ओळ	शुद्ध
४०	२६	तात्पर्यविषयेऽच्छत्रि- गमने छत्रिणामन्वय- बाधात्
४०	३०	शक्यसंबंधरूप-
४१	७	प्रतिपत्तिरेव.
४५	२८	बोधानंगमुपस्थापयति
५३	१६	दर्शनादिनाऽप्युत्कृष्ट
५४	१७	तद्दोषतादवस्थ्यादिति
५६	१३	विजृम्भणमित्यति
५९	२२	लक्षणाहेतुः
६३	१७-१९	षानवकाश इत्यर्थः । ननु यष्टीः प्रवेशयेत्यादि
६५	१२	इत्यभिधाने
६६	२४	परेः कर्मप्रवचनीयस्य
(Notes) ३८ १० excellences are like bravery and the like, faults are like one-eyedness.		

अथ काव्यप्रकाशः ॥

प्रथमोल्लासः ।

ग्रन्थारम्भे विज्ञविधाताय समुचितेष्टदेवतां ग्रन्थकृत् पद्यावृष्टति—
नियतिकृतनियमरहितां ह्लादैकमयीमनन्यपरतन्त्रां ।
नवरसरुचिरां निर्मितिमादधती भारती कवेर्जयति ॥१॥

अथ काव्यप्रदीपे प्रथम उल्लासः—

सोनोदेव्याः प्रथमतनयः केशवस्यात्मजन्मा
श्रीगोविन्दो रुचिकरकवेः स्नेहपात्रं कनीयान् ।
श्रीमन्नारायणचरणयोः सम्यगाधाय चित्तं
नत्वा सारस्वतमपि महः काव्यतत्त्वं व्यनक्ति ॥

वचनसंदर्भविशेषरूपस्य ग्रन्थस्य प्रारिप्सितत्वेन स्तोतुमुचितायाः सेव्यमा-
नायाश्च वाग्देव्या आस्पदभूतां कविभारतीं तदभिन्नत्वेनाव्यवसितां प्रारिप्सित-
प्रतिबन्धकदुरितशान्तये ग्रन्थकृत्सस्तौति—नियतीति ।

अथोद्योते प्रथम उल्लासः—

श्रीगणेशाय नमः । याचकानां कल्पतरोररिकक्षहुताशनात् । शृंगवेरपु-
राधीशाद्रामतो लब्धजीविकः ॥ १ ॥ नागेशभट्टः कुस्ते प्रणम्य शिवया
शिवम् । काव्यप्रदीपकोद्योतमतिगूढार्थसंविदे ॥ २ ॥ स्तोतुमौचित्ये हेतुः—
वचनेत्यादि । विशेषश्च तांत्रिकाणां व्यवहारादुल्लेखः । प्रारंभ आद्या
कृतिः । सना तदव्यवहितपूर्वकालत्वं मंगलस्य सूचितम् । सादृश्या अग्नि-
वैरिदेवतात्वे फलादातृत्वादाह—सेव्यमानायाश्चेति । ग्रन्थकृता इति शेषः ।
कविबाण्या देवतात्वाभावादाह । तदभिन्नत्वेनेति । ग्रन्थकृत् । मम्मटः । कवे-
र्भारती काव्यं वाग्देवीरूपभारत्यभिन्नम् । निर्मितिं मुखादावनिर्वचनीयकाममपि

नियतिशक्त्या नियतरूपा, सुखदुःखमोहस्वभावा, परमाण्वाद्युपा-
दानकर्मादिसहकारिकारणपरतन्त्रा, षड्रसा, न च हृद्यैव तैः, ब्रह्मणो

नियम्यन्ते सौरभादयो धर्मा अनेनेति नियतिरसाधारणः पद्मत्वा
दिरूपो धर्मोऽदृष्टं वा । ह्लादैकमयीमिति । ह्लादेनैकमयीमेकस्वभावाम् । ह्ला-
दमात्रस्वभावामिति यावत् । अनन्यपरतन्त्रामिति । कवेस्तत्प्रतिभाया-
श्चान्यो य आत्मनः परस्तदायत्तत्वरहितम् । परतन्त्रशब्द एवायत्तवचन
इति कश्चित् । नवरससंचिरामिति कर्मधारयः । वृत्तौ ' षड्रसा न च हृद्यैव
निर्माणं कुर्वती जयतीत्यन्वयः । (गीतिश्छन्दः ।) पद्मत्वादिरूप इति ।
तत्कृतनियमश्च कमलादौ जलाद्ययोगव्यवच्छेदरूपः सौरभविशेषाद्ययोगव्यव-
च्छेदरूपश्च । नियमे तत्कृतत्वं स्वाश्रयनिरूप्यत्वेन । पद्म एव पद्मपदप्रयो-
गात् पद्मत्वरूपव्याप्यप्रतीतौ व्यापकीभूतसौरभविशेषावगम इत्येवंरूपश्च
नियमः । तद्राहित्यं च कविनिर्मितौ । प्रियामुखसंनिधाने तेष्वापि तदभाव-
दर्शनात् । मुखादावपि पद्मपदप्रयोगाच्च । पद्मादिसादृश्येन प्रतीतादपि सौ-
रभविशेषावगतेश्च । कमलादौ जलाद्ययोगव्यवच्छेदरूपनियमराहित्यमपि
कवेः कमलाद्यात्मकनिर्माणे मुखादावव्याहृतम् । अदृष्टं वेति । व्यावहारिक-
कमलादिहेत्वदृष्टानपेक्षत्वं बोध्यम् । पूर्वकालैकेति समासे एकह्लादेति स्यादत
आह । ह्लादेनेति । अभेदे तृतीया । धान्येन धनमय इतिवत् । प्राचुर्ये
मयट् । तत्फलितमाह—ह्लादमात्रस्वभावामिति । प्राचुर्यमत्रापरिच्छिन्नत्व-
रूपमिति भावः । मात्रपदेन दुःखमोहयोर्व्यवच्छेदः । सुप्सुपेति समासः ।
न च प्राचुर्ये मयटि प्राचुर्यस्य समानाधिकरणविरोध्यल्पतासापेक्षत्वेन दुःखा-
नुवृत्तिरपि प्रतीयेतेति वाच्यम् । तदल्पत्वस्य कृत्रिदेव सति तात्पर्यं पश्चात्तन-
मानसबोधविषयत्वेन क्षत्यभावात् । अत एव प्रचुरप्रकाशः सूर्यश्चिन्मयं
ब्रह्मेत्यादौ न दोषशंका । अन्यपरशब्दयोः पौनरुक्त्यं परिहरन्नाह—कवेरिति ।
आत्मन इति । भारत्या इत्यर्थः । तदायत्तत्वेति ब्रह्मनिर्मितौ यद्यदन्यपा-
रतन्त्र्यं तच्छून्यत्वमत्रेति तात्पर्यम् । तेनान्ततः प्रतिबंधकात्यंताभावादीनां हेतु-
त्वेऽपि न दोषः । वस्तुतः प्रतिबंधकात्यंताभावादीनां प्रतिभायामेव हेतुत्वं
बोध्यम् । रसविशेषावसरानुरूपा प्रतिभाया काव्यत्वेन प्रसिद्धमते । अत एव
रसोक्तत्वमागत इति रामायणे उक्तमिति बोध्यम् । कर्मधारय इति ।

निर्मितिर्निर्माणम्, एतद्विलक्षणा तु कविचाङ्गिर्निर्मितिः, अत एव जयसिः
तैः ' इति व्यतिरेकद्वयदर्शनात् । न चैवं ' हृद्यैव तैः ' इति हेतुपददर्शनवै-
यर्थ्यम् । तैस्तिच्चादिसाधारणैः षड्रसैरुपलक्षिता यतोऽतो न च हृद्यैवेति तद-
र्थत्वात् । अस्तु वा तृतीयातत्पुरुष एव । न चैवं नवरसीति रूपप्रसङ्गः ।
त्रिगुणसचिव इत्यादिवदुपपत्तेः । न च वृत्तिविरोधः । नवरसरुचिरस्वरूप
विशिष्टधर्मव्यतिरेकस्तत्रत्यरसेषु नवत्वाभावेनायोगव्यवच्छेदिहृद्यत्वप्रयोज-
कत्वविरहेण चेति वृत्तिप्रतिपाद्यत्वात् । निर्मितिमादधतीति तृणोलपन्त्यायेन
सामान्यविशेषभावेनान्वयाच्च पुनरुक्तिः । अत्र निर्माणव्यतिरेकमुखेन चतुर्मु-
खात्कविभारत्या व्यतिरेकालंकारो व्यङ्ग्यः । तथा हि नियतेः शक्त्या नियतरूपा,
मुखदुःखमोहात्मकसत्त्वरजस्तमोलक्षणगुणत्रयात्मकत्वाद्धिश्चस्य मुखदुःखमोह-
स्वभावा, परमाण्वादि यत्समवायिकारणं तदीयश्च यः स्पन्दस्तत्प्रभृतिसहका-
रिपरतन्त्रा, मधुरादिषड्रसा च, न च मनोरमैव तैः, निर्मितित्वादिसाह-

नवरसरुचिरपदयोर्द्वयोर्बहुव्रीहिर्गर्भकर्मधारय इत्यर्थः । तदर्थेति । एवं चार्ध-
हेतुत्वस्य श्लोकोक्तस्य व्यतिरेकप्रदर्शनामिति भावः । तृतीयेति । द्विगुपूर्व-
पदक इत्यथः । न चेति । अकारांतोत्तरपदद्विगोः स्त्रीत्वादिति भावः । इत्या-
दिबदिति । व्ययवो गुण इतिवन्नवावयवो रस इति मध्यमपदलोपी समासः
रसपदेन उद्धृतावयवभेदस्तत्समुदायो विवक्षित इति भावः । न चेति ।
' षड्रसा ' इत्युक्त्येति भावः । अयोगव्यवच्छेदीति । तेन मधुरादिभि-
स्तस्या अपि हृद्यत्वमित्युपास्तम् । व्यंग्य इति । निर्माणव्यतिरेको विशेषण-
द्वारा स्फुटव्यंग्यः अयं तु गूढव्यंग्य इति भावः । नियतिनिरूप्यत्वं च निय-
तिव्यापकतादिनिरूप्यत्वेनेत्याह । नियतेः शक्त्येति । तृतीयार्थः नियत-
पदार्थैकदेशे नियमेऽन्वेति—नियतिनिरूप्यो यो नियमः जलकमलादावेव कमल-
सौरभादिरित्येवंरूपस्तदाश्रयस्वरूपेत्यर्थः । सुखादिजनकत्वेन सत्त्वादीनां तदा-
त्मकत्वम् । (प्रभृतीति निमित्तसंग्रहः । समवायिकारणेऽपि सहकारित्वम् ।)
मधुरादिषड्रसेति । रसशब्दश्लेषमहिम्ना तेषामेषां च रसानामभेदप्रतीत्य-
ब्रह्मनिर्मितिरसानां तत्राप्तत्वेऽपि नाधिक्यहानिः । न वा व्यतिरेकप्रदर्शन-
विरोधः । मनोरमैवेति । एतेन ब्रह्मनिर्मितिरपि मधुराद्यैर्हृद्येति परास्ताम् ।
हृद्यैकेत्यनेन चालंकाराधीनाह्लादजनकत्वमुक्तमिति न पौनरुक्त्यम् ।

जयत्यर्थेन च नमस्कार आक्षिप्यते इति तां प्रत्यस्मि प्रणत इति लभ्यते । इयवती च ब्रह्मणो निर्मितिरिति सुप्रसिद्धमेव । एतद्विलक्षणनियतिकृत-
निबन्धनरहितत्वाद्विधर्मवत्त्वेन तु कविभारती निर्दिष्टेति व्यक्तो व्यतिरेकः ।
वैदेतादृशधर्मशास्त्रिणी, अत एव जयत्युत्कर्षेण वर्तते, न तु वर्ततामित्यर्थः ।
तथा सत्युत्कर्षस्यासिद्धत्वेन नमस्काराक्षेपकत्वानुपपत्तेः । नन्वेतादृशे गुरु-
कर्मणि प्रेक्षावतामिष्टदेवतानतिरवश्यं दृश्यते युक्तिमती च । तदनेन स्तु-
तिमात्रमाचरता यन्न कृता तदवलेपादज्ञानाद्वा । उभयथाप्यनवधेयवचनता
प्रसक्ता । अथ कृतैव, तर्हि स्तुतिवन्नोपनिबद्धा, विशेषाभावात्सैव वा किं
नोपनिबद्धेति चेत्, उच्यते—न खलु नतिमात्रोपनिबन्धे स्तुतिर्निबद्धा
भवति । स्तुतिर्निबन्धे त्वर्थान्नतिरपि निबद्धैव । यतो जयत्यर्थेन वक्तुर्विष-
यस्य च वैशिष्ट्यान्नमस्कार आक्षिप्यते । तेन तां प्रत्यस्मि प्रणत इति

सादृश्यवती चेति । उपमानोपमेययोरेव व्यतिरेकेऽपि न क्षतिरिति भावः ।
ब्रह्मणो निर्मितिरिति । उत्कर्षप्रतियोग्यनुपादानेऽपि प्रसिद्धत्वादियमेव
तदुपेति भावः । अत्र ब्रह्मनिर्मित्यपेक्षया भारतीनिर्मितौ यो व्यतिरेकस्तन्मू-
लको ब्रह्मापेक्षया भारत्यां व्यतिरेक इति लक्ष्यक्रमव्यंग्यध्वनिः । कविभारती-
निर्मितिर्निर्दिष्टेति पाठः । व्यक्त इति । विशेषणद्वारा स्फुटव्यंग्य इत्यर्थः ।
एतादृशधर्मेति । धर्मश्च निर्मितिरूपः । निर्मितिर्निर्माणम् । मुख्यपद्माद्युत्पत्त्य-
नुकूले व्यापारः । आदधतीत्यस्यार्थः शास्त्रिणीति । शिल्पोत्कर्षे शिल्प्यु-
त्कर्षस्यार्थसिद्धत्वादिति भावः । यद्वा निर्मितिरिति कर्मणि क्तिन् । न तु
वर्ततामिति । वर्तमाननिर्देश एवोचितो न तु विधिर्निर्देश इति भावः ।
युक्तिमती चेति । नतिमात्रनाश्यविघ्नस्य शक्तित्वेन तन्नाशार्थमवश्यापेक्ष-
णीयेत्यर्थः । नतिरपि निबद्धैवेति । जयत्यर्थ उत्कर्षः । स च विशेषानुपादा-
त्सर्वप्रतियोगिको लभ्यते इति भारत्यां सर्वोत्कृष्टत्वज्ञाने तुल्यवित्तवैद्यत्व-
न्यायेन भारत्यपेक्षया सर्वस्यापकृष्टत्वज्ञाने सर्वातःपातिनि स्वस्मिन्नप्याराध्या-
पेक्षयाऽपकृष्टत्वज्ञानं व्यञ्जनया वृत्तमेवेति भावः । तदेवाह—यत इति । आक्षिप्य-
त इति । व्यज्यत इत्यर्थः । वक्तुर्वैशिष्ट्यं च स्वापेक्षयापि भारत्युत्कृष्टत्वज्ञाने उप-
युक्तिमिति बोध्यम् । ननु सर्वः प्रणत इति लामेऽप्यहं प्रणत इति न लब्धं तथा प्रण-
त इति सर्वैर्निबध्यते अत आह—तेनेति । व्यञ्जनेनेत्यर्थः । प्रणत इति कर्तरि क्त-

इहामिधेयं सप्रयोजनमित्याह—

काव्यं यशसेऽर्थकृते व्यवहारविदे शिवेतरक्षतये ।

सद्यः परनिवृत्तये कान्तासंमिततयोपदेशयुजे ॥ २ ॥

कालिदासादीनामिव यशः, श्रीहर्षादेर्धावकादीनामिव धनम्, राजादिगतोचिताचारपरिज्ञानम्, आवित्यादेर्मयूरादीनामिवानर्थनिवा-
लभ्यते । यत्तु 'उत्तमकाव्यत्वसिद्धये व्यङ्ग्यं दर्शयति जयत्यर्थेन चेत्यादि'
इति वृत्त्यवतारणं तदयुक्तम् । प्रणामरूपव्यङ्ग्यस्यानतिशयितत्वेन ध्वनित्वाप्र-
योजकत्वात् । तदर्थं चातिशयिनो व्यतिरेकालंकारस्यैवोपन्यासौचित्यादिति ।

इहामिधेयं ग्रन्थरूपमङ्गिनः काव्यस्य फलेन सफलमिति प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्त्यर्थं
प्रतिपादयितुमाह— काव्यमिति ।

अत्र कृत-विद्-युज्-शब्दा भावे किञ्चिन्ताः । काव्यं लोकोत्तरवर्णनानि-
पुणस्वरूपस्य कवेरसाधारणं तादृग्वर्णनात्मकं कर्म । तत्कवेस्तावत्कालिदासा-
दीनामिव यशः, श्रीहर्षादेरपादानाद्भावकादीनामिव धनम्, मयूरशर्मादीना-
मिवानिष्टनिवारणं च करोति । सहृदयस्य तु काव्यश्रवणानन्तरमेव सकल-
दर्शनेन धातोरकर्मकत्वात्तामिति प्रतियोगे द्वितीयेत्याशयेनाह—तां प्रतीति । ल-
भ्यते इति । सर्वान्तर्गतोऽहमप्यपकृष्ट एव इत्यपि व्यञ्जनयैव लभ्यत इत्यर्थः ।
व्यतिरेकालंकारस्यैवेति । आन्तरालिकव्यङ्ग्यमादायेदम् । तेन पार्येति कदेवता-
विषयकभावेनापि ध्वनित्वे न क्षतिः । अभिधेयम् । वक्ष्यमाणमित्यर्थः । तदाह—
ग्रन्थरूपमिति । न चेहेत्यस्यासंगतिः । इह ग्रंथे इत्यर्थात् । अभिधेयं च तददोषा-
वित्यारम्य बोध्यम् । नन्वभिधेयप्रयोजनेन नाभिधायकस्य प्रयोजनवत्त्वम् । वह्नि-
रित्याद्यभिधानस्यातत्त्वादित्यत आह—अंगिन इति । किञ्चिन्ता इति । तादर्थ्ये
चतुर्थी इत्यपि बोध्यम् । व्यवहार आचारः । शिवेतरत् दुरितम् । उप-
देशयुजे उपदेशनिर्माणायेत्यर्थः । उपदेशश्च योग्यतावशात्सदुपदेश एव
प्राप्तः । लोकोत्तरेति । चमत्कारिबोधजनकेत्यर्थः । तादृग्बोधजनकज्ञानवि-
षयतावच्छेदकधर्मवत्त्वं च वक्ष्यमाणामुपहसनीयकाव्यलक्षणस्य लक्ष्यतावच्छे-
दकमित्यनेन दर्शयति । वर्णना । मुखादेः कमलत्वादिरूपेण कथनादि । यश
इत्यादिकर्मणां करोतीत्यनेनान्वयः । धावकः कविः । स हि श्रीहर्षनाम्ना
रत्नावलीं कृत्वा बहुधनं लब्धवानिति प्रसिद्धम् । मयूरशर्मा सूर्यशतकेन
कुष्ठाभिस्तीर्ण इति च प्रसिद्धम् । कारिकास्यसद्यःपदं व्याचष्टे । अत्राप्यनन्तर-
मेवेति । न तु यागादिवहेहांतरापेक्षेत्यर्थः । परपदार्थमाह—सकलेति । सत्र

रणम्, सकलप्रयोजनमौलिभूतं समनन्तरमेव रसास्वादनसमुद्भूतं विग-
 हितवेद्यान्तरमानन्दम्, प्रभुसंमितशब्दप्रधानवेदाविशाखेभ्यः सुह-
 त्संमितार्थतात्पर्यवत्पुत्राणादीतिहासेभ्यश्च शब्दार्थयोगेणभावेन रसा-
 कभूतव्यापारप्रवणतया विलक्षणे यत् काव्यं लोकोत्तरवर्णनानिपुणक-
 प्रयोजनेषूत्तमं स्थायिभावास्वादनसमुद्भूतं वेद्यान्तरसंपर्कशून्यं रसास्वादरू-
 पमानन्दम्, राजादिगतपृथिवीपालनादिसमुचिताचारपरिज्ञानम्, रामादि-
 वद्वर्तनमिष्टसाधनं न तु रावणादिवदित्युपदेशं च निर्मिमीते । काव्यास्वादन-
 काले कवेरपि सहृदयान्तःपातित्वाद्रसास्वादः । ननुपदेशार्थं नीतिशास्त्राण्येव
 सन्ति किं तत्र काव्येनेत्यत उक्तं कान्तासंमिततयेति । शब्दस्तावन्निविधः—
 प्रभुसंमितः, सुहृत्संमितः, कान्तासंमितश्च । तत्राद्यः शब्दप्रधानो वेदादिः
 शासनाप्राधान्येन विधिलक्षणः । स हि प्रभुरिव 'त्वमेवं कुरु' इति समाज्ञा-
 पयति । ततश्च नियुक्तः संध्यावन्दनादौ निष्फलेऽपि प्रवर्तते । द्वितीयस्त्वर्य-
 तात्पर्यवान्सिद्धार्थरूपः पुराणेतिहासादिः । स हि सुहृदिव 'एवं कृते
 इदमिष्टं भवति, एवं च कृते इदमनिष्टम्' इत्येतावन्मात्रं बोधयति न त्वाज्ञा-
 पयति । तृतीयस्तु ताम्यां विलक्षणो रसप्रधानः काव्यलक्षणः । तत्र हि रसा-
 हेतुमाह—स्थायिभावेति । आस्वादनं च विभावादिभिस्तस्य संयोजन-
 मित्यर्थः । तावन्मात्रापेक्षित्वादेव चाविलंब इति भावः । शब्दार्थविषयसम्बन्ध-
 व्यासंगाद्विलम्बः स्यादत आह—वेद्यान्तरेति । स्वस्वविषयातिरिक्तवेद्यान्तरे-
 त्यर्थः । स्वस्यैव वेद्यवेदनोभयरूपत्वमिति स्पष्टं चतुर्थे । आनन्दमित्यस्य
 निर्मिमीते इत्यनेनान्वयः । व्यवहारविदे इत्यंशं व्याचष्टे—राजादिगतेति ।
 दुष्टाचारनिवृत्तये समुचितेति । उपदेशयुजे इति व्याचष्टे—रामादिब-
 द्धिति । हितकर्तव्यत्वाहिताकर्तव्यत्वपरमेतत् । तेन रामकृतवालिवधसदृश-
 स्याप्यकर्तव्यत्वं रावणकृतहरपूजादेश्च कर्तव्यत्वं बोध्यम् । नन्वेवं कवेः
 किं रसास्वादो नास्त्येव तत्राह—काव्येति । शब्दप्रधान इति । तत्त्वं
 च समाहितार्थलाभायात्यज्यमानमुख्यार्थकत्वम् । उपदेशकविधेयांशस्य लक्ष-
 नादिनाऽन्यथान्वयनाऽभावादिति भावः । आदिना स्मृतिः । शासना । प्रवर्तना ।
 निष्कलेऽस्मिन् । अकरणप्रसक्तप्रत्यवायपरिहारातिरिक्तफलरहितेऽपीत्यर्थः ।
 नीत्यादेस्तेऽश्रयतया तदनुरोधेन शब्दस्य लक्षणा-
 न्नादिसंनतमिति भावः । सिद्धार्थेति । अर्थवादरूप इत्यर्थः । इति-
 काव्यः । अर्थवत्कर्तव्यम् । आदिनाऽऽख्यानादिः । वैलक्षण्ये हेतुः—रसेति ।

विकर्म, तत् कान्तेव सरसतापादनेनाभिमुखीकृत्य, रामादिबद्ध-
तितव्यं न रावणादिवदित्युपदेशं च यथायोगं कथं सहृदयस्य च
करोतीति सर्वथा तत्र यतनीयम् ।

एवमस्य प्रयोजनमुक्त्वा कारणमाह—

शक्तिर्निपुणता लोकशास्त्रकाव्याद्यवेक्षणात् ।

काव्यज्ञशिक्षयाम्यास इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे ॥ ३ ॥

ङ्गभूतो यो व्यापारो विभावादिसंयोजनात्मा व्यञ्जनारूपो वा तन्निष्पाद्यरसा-
दिव्यक्तिनिष्पादकतया शब्दार्थयोर्द्वयोरपि गुणत्वाद्वसस्यैव प्राधान्यम् । स च
कान्तासंमितत्वेनोपदेशं करोति । तेनैतदुक्तं भवति—ये सुकुमारमतयोऽति-
सुखिस्वभावा राजकुमारादयो नीरसे नीतिशास्त्रे प्रवर्तयितुमशक्यास्तान्काव्यं
कान्तेव सरसतापादनेनाभिमुखीकृत्योपदेशं ग्राहयति । गुडजिह्विकया शिशू-
निबोधयति । यदाहुः—

‘स्वादुकाग्नरसोन्मिश्रं वाक्यार्थमुपभुञ्जते ।

प्रथमालीढमधवः पिबन्ति कटु मेषजम् ॥’

यत एवमिश्रं काव्यम्, अतः सर्वथा तद्वेतुरुपादेयः ।

नन्वेवमप्यभिधेये किमायातम्, किं च हेतुमज्ञात्वा तदुपादानं कथं
स्यादित्याकांक्षायां काव्यज्ञशिक्षारूपतया काव्याङ्गत्वं ग्रन्थस्य प्रतिपादयन्नेव
कारणान्तरमप्याह—शक्तिरिति ।

अङ्गभूतः । उपायभूतः । रसादिव्यक्तिनिष्पादकत्वं च विभावादिसंयोजनफल-
कविभावाद्युपस्थापनद्वारा बोध्यम् । संयोजनम् । मेलनम् । तस्यापि
स्वतोऽसंभवादाह—व्यञ्जनारूपो वेति । गुणत्वादिति । एवं च गुणी-
भूतशब्दार्थोभयकत्वमेव काव्ये वैलक्षण्यमिति भावः । अभिमुखीकृत्येति ।
स्वप्रतिपाद्यार्थबोधानुकूलयत्नाश्रयीकृत्येत्यर्थः । सरसतेत्यादिना कान्तासादृश्यं
दर्शितम् । उपदेशम् । रामादिवदिति प्रागुक्तम् । कान्ता यथा स्वाभिमुखीकृत्य
स्वार्थं प्रवर्तयति एवं काव्यं उपदेशरूपस्वार्थं प्रवर्तयतीति भावः । एवं-
विशिष्टम् । एतावदिष्टविशिष्टमित्यर्थः । साक्षात्काव्यविषयकयत्नासंभवा-
दाह—तद्वेतुरिति । तस्य काव्यस्येत्यर्थः । अभिधेये इति । प्रकृतग्रन्थे
इत्यर्थः । किमायातमिति । श्रोतॄणां प्रवृत्तिप्रयोजकं किमायातमित्यर्थः । का-

१ ट. श्रे शास्त्रमप्युपभुञ्जते । प्रथमं लीढमधवः पिबन्ति कटुकोषजम् ॥

२ मुं. पु. एतावदिष्टवि. ३ स्वमिन्.

प्रथम उद्धारः

शक्तिः कवित्वबीजकपः संस्कारविशेषः, यां विना काव्यं न प्रसरेत् प्रवृत्तं वा उपहसनीयं स्यात्, लोकस्य स्थावरजङ्गमात्मकलोकवृत्तस्य, शास्त्रार्थां लक्ष्णोप्याकरणाभिधानकोशकलाचतुर्धर्गगतुरगलक्षणादिलक्षण-प्रस्थानाम्, काव्यानां च महाकविनिर्बन्धानाम्, आदिग्रहणादिति-हासादीनां च विमर्शनाद्व्युत्पत्तिः, काव्यं कर्तुं विचारयितुं च ये

शक्तिः कवित्वबीजभूतो देवताप्रसादादिजन्मा संस्कारविशेषः प्रतिभा-व्यपदेश्यः । तस्याः कारणतायां किं मानमिति चेत्, निपुणतादिकारणान्त-रसद्भावेऽप्यनुपहसनीयकाव्यप्रसरस्य कार्यस्य व्यतिरेकः । स च विशेष्यस्य काव्यप्रसरस्य विशेषणस्यानुपहसनीयत्वस्यः वा व्यतिरेकात्सर्वत्रैवा-विशिष्टः । न चैवं कारणान्तरं किंचिदायातु न तु शक्तिरिति वाच्यम् । प्रसि-द्धातिरेकिण्येव तद्धेतौ शक्तिव्यपदेशात् । लोकः स्थावरजङ्गमात्मकलोकस्य वृत्तम् । योगादुपचाराद्वा । धर्ममात्रपरामर्शस्य व्युत्पत्त्यनाघायकत्वात् । शास्त्रं छन्दःशास्त्रादि । काव्यं महाकविप्रणीतं रघुवंशादि । आदिग्रहणादितिहा-सादि । तेषां विमर्शनाद्व्युत्पत्तिर्निपुणता । काव्यज्ञशिक्षा काव्यं कर्तुं

व्यागत्वम् । हेतुत्वेनेत्यर्थः । बीजेति । जलादिकमिव व्युत्पत्त्यादिसहकार्यासा-द्यग्नीह्यादिभिरंकुरस्येव कवित्वस्य तया जननात् बीजत्वम् । संस्कारविशेषः । देवताराधनादिजन्यं विलक्षणादृष्टम् । शक्नोति काव्यनिर्माणायाऽनयेति योगा-च्छक्तिरित्युच्यते । तत्तद्रसादिवासना वा । प्रतिभाव्यपदेश्यः । प्रतिभा-पदव्यपदेश्यः । अनुपहसनीयकाव्यप्रसरस्येति । उपहसनीयं च दोषवै-शिष्ट्यादिना । ननु वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणानुसारात्तस्य काव्यत्वमेव नेति चेत् न । तददोषावित्यस्य लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकमप्येतदेवेत्यदोषात् । लोक्यत इति योगस्य धर्मसाधारणत्वादाह—उपचाराद्वेति । तेन वृत्तानत्यादनंतवर्णनानिर्वाहः । अन्यथा लोकानां नियतत्वेन पूर्वरेव वर्णितत्वादाधुनिकवर्णना एकधर्माव-च्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपितकारणत्वविषयैव स्यात् । इतिहासादीति । आदिना व्याकरणकोशाचतुर्गणिकलाधर्मार्थकाममोक्षाणां प्रतिपादकस्य स्त्रीपुंलक्षणा-दीनां च विमर्शनात् । मुहुर्महस्तत्तत्पदार्थरसादिगोचरानुसंधानात् । व्यासनाम्नोपपात्तानां तात्पर्यविषययथार्थगोचरो दृढतरः संस्कारः । तदु-

शक्तिः कवित्वं न. २ च. तं चोप. ३ छ. इ. विसंबंधिनाम्.
पदस्य अर्थेन तद्वद्वत्. ६ क. ग. पूर्वोक्तगोचरो ।

जानन्ति तदुपदेशेन करणे योजने च पौनःपुन्येन प्रवृत्तिरिति भ्रमः समुदिताः न तु व्यस्तास्तस्य काव्यस्योद्भवे निर्माणे समुल्लासे च हेतुर्न तु हेतवः ।

एवमस्य कारणमुक्त्वा स्वरूपमाह—

तद्दोषौ शब्दार्थौ सगुणावनलंकृती पुनः कापि ।

रसानुगुणतया प्रबन्धादौ घटयितुं च ये जानन्ति तदुपदेशः । तया करणे योजने च पौनःपुन्येन प्रवृत्तिरभ्यासः । इतिशब्दो मिलितोपस्थापनाय । अन्यथा तद्वैयर्थ्यमेव स्यात् । तथा च काव्यस्योद्भव उत्कृष्टोत्पत्तिः । तथा कार्येण मिलितानामुपधानम् । दण्डचक्रादीनामिव घटेन । न तु मिलितत्वेन कारणतैवेति भ्रमः कार्यः । एवं कारणमुक्त्वा काव्यस्य लक्षणमाह— तद्दोषाविति ।

पदेश इति । एतद्रूपतया च प्रकृतग्रंथोपयोग इति बोध्यम् । तया । शिक्षया । मिलितोपेति । पूर्वोक्तसमुदायपरामर्शकत्वेनेति भावः । अन्योन्यापेक्षत्वेन मिलितत्वम् । उत्कृष्टोत्पत्तिः । उपहासाकरणीभूतकाव्यस्योत्पत्तिः । इदमुपलक्षणं उत्कृष्टबोधस्यापि । अत एव घटयितुं च ये जानन्तीति पूर्वोक्तस्य न वैयर्थ्यम् । शक्तिपदेन च करणशक्तिबोद्धृत्वशक्तिश्चोच्यते । वस्तुतो बोद्धृत्वशक्तिरपि वाक्यार्थज्ञानद्वारा दोषाभावादिवैशिष्ट्यप्रयोजकतया कवित्वस्यैव बीजम् । प्रकाशे समुल्लासे चेत्यस्य अनुपहसनीयत्वे चेत्यर्थः । तदुक्तमुत्कृष्टोत्पत्तिरिति । रसानुगुणतया योजयितुमुपदेशस्याप्यत्रैव कारणता उक्तरीत्या । उपधानम् । कारणत्वेन ज्ञानम् । मिलितस्य दण्डचक्रादीनामिव कारणत्वं न तु तृणारणिमणीनामिवेति ध्वनयितुमेव हेतुरित्येकवचनम् । एकधर्माच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपितकारणत्वबोधकत्वात् । मंत्राद्यधीनकाव्येऽपि निपुणतायाः पदतदर्थ्यादिवासनारूपायाः पदतदर्थस्मारकतयास्त्येवोपयोगः । परंतु तत्र जन्मातरीया सा । अभ्यासोऽपि अन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानसिद्धौ जन्मातरीयः कल्प्य इति भावः । मंत्राद्यनधीनशिशुकाव्ये शक्त्यंशोऽप्येवमेवेति दिक् । कारणतैवेति । कारणतैव मिलितत्वेनेति । न भ्रमः । मिलितत्वं कारणतावच्छेदकमिति न भ्रमः । कार्य इति । किं तु मिलितानां परस्परसहकृतानां फलोपधायकत्वमित्येवेति बोध्यम् ।

दीपयुक्तालंकार इत्यस्ते । क्वापीत्यनेनैतदाह—यत् सर्वत्र सालंकारो

निर्दोषत्वादिविशेषणविशिष्टौ शब्दार्थौ काव्यमिति व्यवहर्तव्यौ । गुण-
स्य रसनिष्ठत्वेऽपि तद्व्यञ्जकपरं गुणपदम् । नन्वनलंकारेऽतिव्याप्तिः सालं-
कारस्वविशेषणानुपादानादिति न वाच्यम् । यतः क्वापीत्यनेनैतदुक्तम्—
यत्सर्वत्र सालंकारौ शब्दार्थौ काव्यम्, क्वचित्तु स्फुटालंकारविरहेऽपि न
काव्यत्वहानिः । ननोऽस्वार्थत्वात् । अल्पत्वस्य चात्रास्फुटत्व एव विश्रामात् ।
वीरसेऽप्यस्फुटालंकारे काव्यत्वमिष्टमेवेति ऋजुः पन्थाः । वयं तु पश्यामः—
वीरसे स्फुटालंकारविरहिणि न काव्यत्वम् । यतो रसादिरलंकारश्च द्वयं चम-
त्कारहेतुः । तथा च यत्र रसादीनामवस्थानं न तत्र स्फुटालंकारापेक्षा ।
अत एव ध्वनिकारेणोक्तम्—“ अ (स्व)त एव रसानुगुणार्थविशेषनिबन्धनम-
लंकारविरहेऽपि छायातिशयं पुष्पाति । यथा—

‘ मुनिर्नयति योगीन्द्रो महात्मा कुम्भसंभवः ।

येनैकचुलके दृष्टौ दिव्यौ तौ मत्स्यकच्छपौ ॥ ’

अत्र ह्यद्भुतरसानुगुणमेकचुलके मत्स्यकच्छपदर्शनं छायातिशयं पुष्पा-

इतरभेदकम् । इष्टतावच्छेदकं च । तत्प्रकारकज्ञानस्य प्रवर्तकत्वादिति
बोध्यम् । शब्दार्थाविति । अर्थाश्रयत्वाच्छब्दस्य प्रागुक्तिः । आस्वादव्यंज-
कत्वस्योभयत्राप्यविशेषात् । प्रागुक्तलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकत्वस्य व्यासज्यवृत्ति-
त्वाच्च । काव्यं पठितं श्रुतं काव्यं बुद्धमित्युभयविधव्यवहारदर्शनाच्चेति भावः ।
तत्काव्यमित्येकवचनेन काव्यत्वस्य व्यासज्यवृत्तितां ध्वनयति । काव्यं यशस
इति सूत्रस्थकाव्यपदमनुवर्तते इति भावः । तत्पदार्थो वा काव्यमिति । एकै
कस्मिन् प्रयोगस्तु लक्षणयेति भावः । वस्तुतस्तु काव्यत्वं प्रत्येकपर्याप्तेमेव ।
अत एवैको न द्वाविति वत् शब्दो न काव्यमित्यादिव्यवहारो नेति द्रष्टव्यम् ।
व्यञ्जकेति । मूर्ध्नि वर्गीत्यगा इत्यादिना वक्ष्यमाणवर्णघटनादीत्यर्थः ।
तेन वीरसेऽव्याप्तिरपि नेति बोध्यम् । ऋजुः पन्था इति । एवं हि सालं-
कारावित्येव वदेदित्यरुचिः । अरुच्यन्तरमप्याह—वयं त्विति । चमत्कारहेतु-
रिति चमत्कारनिदानस्यैव काव्यत्वादिति भावः । स्वत एवेति । अलंकारनि-
र्दोषमित्यर्थः । छायातिशयं पुष्पातीत्यनेनान्वेति । ‘अलंकारविरहेऽपि’ इति अ-
नर्थक्यम् । क्वचित्तु अत एवेति पाठः । मत्स्यकच्छपदर्शनं छायातिशयं

क्वचित् स्फुटालंकारविरहेऽपि न काव्यत्वहानिः । यथा—
यः कौमारहरः स एव हि वरस्ता एव चैत्रक्षपा—
स्ते चोन्मीलितमालतीसुरभयः प्रीढाः कदम्बानिलाः ।
सा चैवास्मि तथापि तत्र सुरतव्यापारलीलाविधौ
रेवारोधसि वेतसीतरुतले वेतः समुत्कण्ठते ॥ १ ॥

ति । ” इति । नीरसे तु यदि न स्फुटोऽलंकारः स्यात्तत्किंकृतश्चमत्कारः
स्यात् । चमत्कारसारं च काव्यमित्यवश्यं स्फुटालंकारापेक्षा । अनलंकृती
पुनः क्वापीत्यनेनाप्यस्फुटालंकारस्य क्वचिदेव काव्यत्वम्, यत्र रसादिः
स्फुटः, न तु सर्वत्रेत्येतदेव प्रतिपाद्यते । तस्मात्सालंकारत्वमात्रं न विशेषणम् ।
किं तु स्फुटालंकाररसान्यतर (व) त्वम् । न चैवमपि रसवत्यनलंकारे
काव्यत्वप्रसङ्गो दोषाय इष्टापत्तेः । यथोदाहृते ‘ मुनिर्जयति ’ इत्यादौ ।
यदि तु श्रद्धानाड्येन तत्रापि न काव्यत्वक्षमा, तदा अलंकारवत्त्वे सती-
त्यपि पूरणीयमिति ।

स्फुटालंकारविरहे काव्यत्वं यथा—यः कौमारेति ।

पुष्पातीत्यंतो ध्वनिग्रंथः । छाया चमत्कारः । रसान्यतरत्वमिति ।
रसान्यतरशब्द अर्शआद्यजंतः । रसपदं च भावादीनामप्युपलक्षणम् । क्वचित्तु
रसान्यतरवत्त्वमित्येव पाठः । यथोदाहृते इति । न चात्र जयहेतोर्योगी-
द्रत्वादेरेकत्र चुलके मत्स्यकच्छपदर्शनहेतोर्माहात्म्यादेरुपादानात्काव्यल्लिगम-
स्तीति वाच्यम् । तस्याद्भुतरसाननुगुणत्वात् । माहात्म्यानुपादानेऽपि तादृश-
दर्शनस्यैवाद्भुतरसव्यञ्जकत्वात् । योगीद्रो महात्मेति पदद्वयमद्भुतविरोध्ये-
वेत्यपरे । एकचुलके मत्स्यकच्छपयोर्विरोधाभासस्तु सन्नपि न स्फुट इत्याहुः ।
यदि त्विति । अत एव वृत्तौ क्वचित्स्फुटालंकारविरहेऽपि न काव्यत्वहानिरि-
त्यत्र स्फुटेत्युक्तम् । चमत्कारिबोधजनकत्वे सतीत्यपि पूरणीयम् । अत एव
‘ अद्रावत्र प्रज्वलत्यग्निश्चैः प्राज्यः प्रोद्यन्नुल्लसत्येष धूमः ’ इत्यादौ न काव्यत्वं
सत्यप्यनुमानालंकारे इत्याहुः । स्वाधीनपतिका क्वचिदसकृदुपभुक्तेष्वपि वरो-
पकरणादिषु उत्कटासक्त्या तेषामत्यंतोपादेयतां सूचयंती सखीमाह—यः
कौमारेति । अत्र तच्छब्दा उपभुक्तत्वार्थकाः । हिशब्दो यद्यप्यर्थकः ।
१ च सर्वत्रावेति । अस्तिक्रियाध्याहारश्च । यः कौमारहरः वरः यश्चपि

१ क. मंदाशकपादे.

२ क. सविरोधत्वात्. ३ क. अलंकारत्वं च चमत्कारिबोधजनकत्वमनर्थकमित्युक्तम्.

अत्र स्फुटो न कश्चिद्वलंकारः । रसस्य हि भाषाभ्यालालंकारता ।

अत्र रूपकादीनामसंभव एव । अस्मीत्यस्य विभक्तिविपरिणामादस्तु दीपकमिति चेत् । अस्मीत्यस्याहमर्थकान्वयत्वात् । 'अत्रास्मि करोमि सस्यः' इ-
स एवास्ति चैत्रक्षपा यद्यपि ता एव संतीत्यादिक्रमेणान्वयः । कौमारं बाल्यं
परस्परसिक्तया तत्रापि संभोगेच्छोत्पादनेन हृतवान् । कौमारं अभिनवयौ-
वनमित्यर्थो न चारुः । निषिद्धलक्षणापत्तेः । त्रियते प्रियत्वेन स्वयमंगीक्रियत
इति वरः । एतेनोभयानुरागः । स एव उपभुक्त एव । नानुपभुक्तैत्वसंबंधवा-
नित्यर्थः । उन्मीलिताः विकसितास्तेन यौवनलाभः । कलिकावस्थायामेव शैशवात् ।
मालती वासंतिकलता । न तु जातिः । चैत्रे तस्या असंभवात् । प्रौढा इत्युद्दीप-
नादिप्रागल्भ्यशालिनः । अतो मंदत्वेऽप्यविरोधः । कदंबो धूळीसमूहः । सर्व-
दिवसचारित्वेन कदंबाकारा अनिला इति वायुविशेषणं वा । तेन चैत्रक्षपा
इत्यनेनाविरोधः । वसंते सकलपुष्पाणि वर्णयंत इति कविसंप्रदाय इत्यपि
कश्चित् । यत्तु भाद्रक्षया इति पाठकल्पनं तन्निर्बीजम् । यत्तु तद्गुणं वर्षासु नदी-
कच्छे रतस्यावर्णनादिति । तत्र । कच्छे कच्छनिकुंजे तदनौचित्येऽपि तीरनिकुंजे
तदनौचित्याभावात् । यथा मेघैर्भेदुरमित्यादाविति दीपिका । चोवधारणे । ते एवे-
त्यर्थः । अत्र प्रौढा युवान इति श्लिष्टविशेषणबलात् अनिलमालत्थोर्नामक-
नायिकात्वप्रतीतिः । सुरमित्वेन चास्याः पद्मिनीत्वलाभः । चकारोऽप्यर्थोऽ-
स्मीत्यहमर्थकान्वयानंतरं योज्यः । अस्मीत्यस्य तिङन्तत्वे हि सैवेत्यस्य शाब्दो-
द्देश्यलाभो न स्यात् । तथा चाहमपि सैव । उत्कंठाहेत्ववस्थांतरं न प्राप्ते-
त्यर्थः । स एवेत्यादेरप्ययमेवार्थ इत्यन्ये । तथापि । तत्तदसकृदुपभुक्तसकलसा-
मग्रीसत्त्वेऽपि । तत्रेत्युपभुक्त इत्यर्थकं सुरतेत्यादिसप्तम्यंतत्रयेऽप्यन्येति ।
तेन सर्वेषामुपभुक्तत्वलाभः । तेन सुरतलीलाविधिरपि नान्यादृशो येन क्रीडा-
स्यानैक्येऽप्युत्कंठा स्यादिति व्यज्यते । रेवायाः नर्मदायाः रोधस्तीरम् । वेतसी
लता । विशालतया लतान्तराश्रयत्वेन सैव तरुस्तस्य तलमबोधेशस्तस्मिन् । सुरत-
हेतुर्यो व्यापारो गमनविस्तृतसंबंधिनी लीला वेषविन्यासादिः । आत्मनः प्रकृ-
तिविशेषो बहुधाकृत्यवधानं वा तेषामत्यंतोपादेयत्वं वा रत्युत्कंठया विभा-
ननीयमिति । अत्र धूपलविभावनालंकार इति दीपिका । तत्र प्रकृतिविशेष
इत्यस्य अतुरजनविलक्षणः प्रकृतिविशेष इत्यर्थः । एतेन प्रकृतिविशेष इत्य-
र्थः । अत्रास्मीत्यनेन परिहृतत्वादिति परास्तम् । (शार्दूलविक्रीडितं छन्दः) ।

अत्र स्फुटो न कश्चिद्वलंकारः । रसस्य हि भाषाभ्यालालंकारता ।

तिवत् । क्रियापदत्वेऽपि न दीपकत्वम् । तदन्वितानां सर्वेषां प्राकरणिक-
त्वात् । दीपकस्य तु प्राकरणिकाप्राकरणिकविषयत्वात् । सादृश्याप्रतीतिश्च न
तुल्ययोगिता । समुच्चयोऽपि वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणो न संभवत्येव । अतादृशश्च न
चारुत्वहेतुः । विशेषोक्तिविभावेन विद्यमाने अपि न स्फुटे । कथमिति चेत्,
इत्थम्—विशेषोक्तिस्तावत्कारणसत्त्वेऽपि कार्याभाववचनम् । अत्र चानुत्क-
ण्ठाकारणं वरोपकरणयोरुपभुक्तता । तत्सत्त्वे यद्यप्यनुत्कण्ठाभाव उत्कण्ठा-
रूपो निर्दिष्ट एव तथापि नानुत्कण्ठाभावत्वेन, किं तुत्कण्ठात्वेनैव । तस्माद-
स्फुटत्वमस्याः । यदि चेतोऽनुत्कण्ठितं नेत्याभिधीयते तदा स्फुटत्वं भवेत् । एवं
कारणाभावेऽपि कार्योत्पत्तिवचनं विभावना । अत्र चोत्कण्ठाकारणं वरोपक-
रणयोरतत्ता । तदभावश्च यद्यप्युक्त एव तथापि नातत्ताविरहत्वेन, किं तु
तत्तारूपेणैव । अभावाभावस्य तत्त्वात् । अतोऽस्या अप्यस्फुटत्वमेव । न च
स एवेत्येवकारेणातत्ताभावप्रतीतिरतत्ताभावत्वेन प्रतीतौ कथमस्फुटत्वमिति
वाच्यम् । विशेषणसंगतैवकारेण विशेष्ये विशेषणायोगस्य व्यवच्छेदो हि
प्रत्याख्यते, न तु विशेषणाभावाभाव एवाहत्य । पयवसानं तु तत्रेत्यस्फुटत्व-
मेव । एवं विशेष्यसंगतेनाप्येवकारेण विशेष्यभिन्ने विशेषणाभाव एव
नाहत्य प्रत्याख्यते, किं तु विशेषणयोगाभाव इति द्रष्टव्यम् । अत एव
' शङ्खः पाण्डुर एव ' इत्यादौ ' नापाण्डुरः ' इति, ' पार्थ एव धनुर्धरः '
इत्यादौ च ' नान्यो धनुर्धरः ' इत्यादिः कदाचित्स्फुटत्वार्थं प्रयुज्यते ।
दण्ड्यप्याह—' त्वन्मुखं त्वन्मुखेनैव तुल्यं नान्येन केनचित् ' इति ।

अतत्ता । अनुपभुक्तता । विशेषणायोगस्येति । विशेषणसंबन्धाभावस्ये-
त्यर्थः । विशेषणशब्देनात्र विधेयमुच्यते । एवं विशेष्यशब्देनोद्देश्यम् । ननु स
एव वर इति यथाश्रुते तत्त्वावच्छिन्नमुद्देश्य वरत्वस्य विधेयत्वप्रतीतिर्विशेष्य-
संगत एवायमेवकारः । तत्र चान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदोऽर्थ इति उपभुक्तभेदाभावस्य
वरे प्रतीत्या स्यादेव विभावना । उपभुक्तत्वाभावस्येव उपभुक्तभेदस्याप्युत्कण्ठा-
कारणत्वादित्यत आह—एवं विशेष्येति । किं च नयमते सर्वत्रैवकारस्या-
न्यत्वव्यवच्छेद एवार्थः । धनुर्धरे पार्थान्यत्वव्यवच्छेदस्य शङ्खे प्राण्डुरान्यत्वव्यव-
च्छेदस्य च प्रतीतिः । एवं च प्रकृतेऽपि वरे उपभुक्तान्यत्वव्यवच्छेदस्य उपभुक्ते
च वरान्यत्वव्यवच्छेदस्य वा प्रतीतिः शाब्दीति तत्रोपभुक्तस्वप्रतीतिरार्थिकत्वेना-

तत्रेवाह कमेजाह—

अन्यथा पुनर्लक्षितस्तत्र स्यादिति । अनयोरस्फुटत्वे च संदेहरूपसंकरो-
ऽप्यस्फुट इति विभावनीयम् । शृङ्गाररूपरसस्य स्फुटत्वाद्वसवदलंकारः स्फुट
एवेति चेन्न । रसस्यात्र प्राधान्यात् । अप्राधान्य एव तस्यालंकारत्वोपगमात् ।

अर्वाचीनास्तु—“यथोक्तस्य काव्यलक्षणत्वे काव्यपदं निर्विषयं प्रविरलविषयं
वा स्यात् । दोषाणां दुर्वारत्वात् । तस्मात् ‘वाक्यं रसात्मकं काव्यम्’ इति तल्लक्ष-
णम् । तथा च दुष्टेऽपि रसावगमे काव्यत्वमस्त्येव । परं त्वपकर्षमात्रम् । तदुक्तम्—

स्फुटत्वम् । त्वन्मुखेनैवेति । अत्र सादृश्यस्य विधेयत्वेन तृतीयांतमुखपदा-
र्थस्याप्युद्देश्यत्वमिति अभिमानः । नव्यमते तु सम्यगेव । वस्तुतस्तु प्रमाणां-
तरेण प्राप्तस्य वस्तुनः पुनः शब्देन प्रतिपादनं प्रयोजनांतराभावादन्यव्यवच्छेदं
गमयतीति न वाच्यवृत्त्या कथमप्यनुपभुक्तव्यवच्छेदप्रतीतिः । एवकारोऽप्येतदर्थ-
द्योतक एव । न तु तत्समाभिव्याहारेऽपि शाब्दबोधे तद्भानम् । तत्समाभिव्याहारेण
स्फुटं मनसा बुध्यमानत्वमपि द्योतकत्वमिति मंजूषायां परिसंख्यालंकारनिरूपणे
च विस्तरः । न चेदृशमस्फुटत्वमर्कित्वात् । फलाभावत्वकारणाभावत्वाभ्यां
प्रतीतिः कल्प्यतया पुरःस्फूर्तिकत्वाभावेन चमत्कारानाघायकत्वात् इति भावः ।
किं च विप्रलंभे नायकादेर्गुणस्मरणस्थैवोद्दीपकत्वं न तु विशेषोक्त्यादिप-
र्यवसितवरोपकरणादेरुपभुक्तत्वेनार्कित्वात्त्वस्येति रसाननुगुणत्वमप्येतयोर्बो-
ध्यम् । सदृशदर्शनाप्रयोज्यत्वात्स एव हीत्यादेः प्रत्यभिज्ञाशरीरत्वाच्च न स्मर-
णालंकारः । यतः सुरमयोऽतः प्रौढाः स्वकार्यसमर्था इति काव्यलिंगमप्यस्फुटम् ।
अशाब्दत्वात् । रेफवृत्त्यनुप्रासस्यापि विप्रलंभीयमाधुर्यगुणाननुगुणाभ्यां
सविसर्गतया गुरुभ्यां रेफाभ्यां घटितत्वादचमत्कारित्वमिति बोध्यम् । शृङ्गा-
रेति । विप्रलंभेत्यर्थः । अप्राधान्ये इति । इतररसोपपादकत्वे इत्यर्थः ।
पार्थितिकात्सादहेतुश्चात्र विप्रलंभः । स्वाधीनपतिकाया अपि गुरुसांनिध्या-
दिना क्रीडास्थानाप्रप्त्या खंजनमिधुनस्य निःस्थानाप्राप्त्येव मुरतप्रतिबंधे
तत्संभवात् । अत एव चात्र विधेयाविमर्शादयो न दोषाः । दुःखितकविनिबद्धोक्तौ
दुःखितकवियव्यवस्थेन गुणत्वात् इति दिक् । दोषाणां दुर्वारत्वादिति ।
अर्थः भावः । अदोषत्वं यत्किंचिद्दोषाभाववत्त्वं यावद्दोषाभाववत्त्वं वा । नाद्यः ।
अन्यथा स्यात् । नास्त्यः । काव्यत्वस्य प्रविरलविषयत्वापत्तेः । इदं काव्यं

दुःखितकवि.

इदमुत्तममतिशयिनि व्यङ्ग्ये वाच्याहुनिर्बुधैः कथितः ॥४॥
इदमिति काव्यम्, बुधैर्वैयाकरणैः प्रधानभूतस्फोटकपद्यव्यञ्जकस्य

‘ कीटांनुबिद्धरत्नादिसाधारण्येन काव्यता ।

दुष्टेष्वपि मता यत्र रसाद्यनुगमः स्फुटः ॥ ’ इति ।

एवं चालंकारादिसत्त्वे उत्कर्षमात्रम् । नीरसे तु चित्रादौ काव्यव्यवहारो
गौणः ” इत्याहुः । -

अथास्य भेदांस्तल्लक्षणानि चाह— इदमिति ।

इदं काव्यं वाच्यादतिशयिन्यधिकचमत्कारकारिणि व्यङ्ग्ये उत्त-

दुष्टमिति व्यवहारानापत्तेश्चेति । कीटादिति । अत एव तथाभूतामित्यादेर्न्यून-
पदत्वदोषेण वक्ष्यमाणदोषवतोऽपि काकुसहकृतार्थव्यन्मध्वनित्वं वक्ष्यमाणं संग-
च्छते । अन्यथा स्वलक्षणलक्षितकाव्यस्यैव ध्वन्यादिभेदवत्त्वेन तदसंगतिः स्पष्टैव ।
इत्याहुरिति । अत्राकचिजीजं तु लक्षणे दोषपदं स्फुटदोषपरम् । स्फुटत्वं च रसो-
द्बोधविरोधित्वम् । एवं च तथाभूतामित्यादौ प्रतिपदनीवातुव्यंग्यवैचित्र्यप्रतीत्या
दोषज्ञानतिरोधानाद्रसोद्बोधस्य सत्त्वेन काव्यत्वं तद्विशेषध्वनित्वं चाव्याहृत-
मेव । यस्य तु व्यंग्यवैचित्र्यप्रतीतिविरहस्तं प्रति दुष्टत्वमेवेति दोषोदाहरण-
मप्यविरुद्धम् । एकस्यैव सामाजिकभेदेन काव्यत्वमकाव्यत्वं चेष्टमेव । यथाऽ-
प्रतीतस्य तत्तच्छास्त्रज्ञं प्रत्यदुष्टत्वेन काव्यत्वमितरं प्रति अकाव्यत्वं तद्वत् ।
वक्ष्यति हि ‘वक्त्राद्यौचित्यवशात् दोषोऽपि कचिद्गुणः’ इति । कीटादीत्यस्याप्यय-
मर्थः । यथा प्रतिभातिशयेन दोषतिरोधानात् रत्नस्वरूपभंगः । तथा काव्येऽपि
व्यंग्यवैचित्र्येणेति । वस्तुतस्तु अनुपहसनीयकाव्यत्वरूपलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकाकां-
सस्य हीदं लक्षणम् । दोषवत्युपहसनीयत्वस्य दुर्वारत्वात् । तथाभूतामित्यादेर्दु-
ष्टस्यापि तादृशव्यंग्योदाहरणत्वे न क्षतिः । न हि तत्र ध्वन्युदाहरणप्रस्तावोऽ-
स्ति । सामान्यकाव्यलक्षणं तु अदोषाघटितमेव । अत एव दुष्टं काव्यमित्या-
देरुपपत्तिरित्याहुः । भेदानिति । भेदो विभागः । अत्रौत्तमत्वादिना तत्स-
मनियतध्वनित्वादिना च विभागः । शेषं लक्षणम् । ननु निःशेषेत्यादौ वक्ष्या-
माणदूतिसंभोगरूपव्यंग्यस्य पार्यतिकविप्रलम्बरूपव्यंग्यापेक्षया गुणीभा-
वादाह—वाच्यादिति । शक्तिलक्षणाभ्यां बोधविषयादित्यर्थः । वाच्यार्था-
पेक्षयांतरालिकव्यंग्योत्कर्षानुत्कर्षाभ्यां ध्वनिगुणीभूतव्यंग्यस्वव्यवस्थेति भावः ।

शब्दस्य ध्वनिरिति व्यवहारः कृतः, तथा तन्मतानुसारिभिरन्यैरपि न्य-
भाभिः शब्दार्थस्य ध्वन्यजननक्षमस्य शब्दार्थयुगलस्य । यथा—

निःशेषच्युतचन्दनं स्तनतटं निर्बृहदानीऽधरो

नेत्रे दूरमनजने पुलकिता तन्वी तथेयं तनुः ।

मिथ्यावादिनि दूति बाणध्वजनस्याह्लातपीडागमे

वापीं स्नातुमितो गतासि न पुनस्तस्याधमस्यान्तिकम् ॥२॥

मम् । पटादिभिः पदैः स्फोटरूपं शब्दब्रह्म व्यज्यते । तस्मादभिव्यक्ता-
वर्षप्रत्ययः । तादृशस्य स्फोटव्यञ्जकस्य पटादिशब्दस्य ध्वनिरिति संज्ञेति वै-
याकरणानां सिद्धान्तसराणिः । अतः प्रधानीभूतव्यञ्ज्यव्यञ्जकत्वसाधर्म्या-
दुणीभूतवाच्यं यद्व्यञ्ज्यं तद्व्यञ्जनक्षमस्य शब्दार्थयुगलरूपस्योत्तमकाव्यस्य
बुधैर्ध्वनिपण्डितैर्ध्वनिरिति संज्ञा कृता । यथा—निःशेषेति ।

षडादिभिः पदैरिति । क्रमोपलभ्यमानंतद्वटकैर्ध्वनैरित्यर्थः । स्फोटरूप-
मिति । अलंढमेकं वाचकमित्यर्थः । अयं भावः । एकस्मात्पदादयमर्थो बुद्ध
इति व्यवहारात् एकमलंढं मध्यमावस्थं वाचकम् । पराख्यस्य ब्रह्मणो नाभौ
पश्यत्याख्यो विवर्तस्ततो हृदयावच्छेदेन मध्यप्राख्यः स एव पटादिपदात्म-
कमैस्वर्या ध्वनिरूपया स्वरूपरूपितत्वेनाभिव्यजितो वाचकः । वैस्वर्यात्मकस्य
अनुविनाशित्वादर्थप्रलपकत्वेन ध्वनितुल्यतेति ध्वनित्वव्यवहार इति वैया-
करणमतं मंजूषायां प्रतिपादितमस्माभिः । व्यंग्यव्यंजकत्वेति । एतेन वैया-
करणानामपि व्यंजनाभ्युपगमो दर्शितः । गुणीभूतवाच्यमिति । बहुव्रीहिः ।
निःशेषेति । वापीज्ञानध्याजेन नायकसंभोगचिह्नानि गोपयंतीं दूतीं प्रति
मिद्वच्छेत्तनायिकाया उदासीनप्रतारणाय ज्ञानकार्यत्वप्रतिपादनमुखेनैव
संभोगचिह्नोद्घाटिकेयमुक्तिः । एतेन ज्ञानस्य दूत्यभ्युपगतत्वे दूतीनिवेदि-
तयोः ज्ञानतदंतिकममनयोरन्यतरस्य सत्यत्वेऽपरस्थापि सत्यत्वापत्तौ तदंति-
कममने मिथ्यात्वोपन्यासो निर्बाज इत्यपास्तम् । असत्येऽपि स्नाने सत्यत्वारो-
पस्थाविदध्वजनप्रतारुणोपयोगित्वात् । एवं तदंतिकममने मिथ्यात्वप्रतिपादन-
स्यापि । मिथ्यावादिनि । तदंतिकमगत्त्वैव मया गत्वा बहुधा प्रसाधितोऽपि
नागत इति वादिनि । दूति । न तु साखि । मत्प्रतारणादिकर्तृत्वात् । बाणध-
्वनस्य । महलक्षणस्य । पीडाजनकं तदुद्देश्यासंपादनादीति ज्ञानशून्ये । इतः ।
मत्प्रतारणात् । वापीमिति । स्नानकालातिक्रममयात् नदीमदीयप्रिययोरंतिक-

अत्र तदन्तिकमेव रन्तुं गतासीति प्राधान्येनाधमपदेन व्यज्यते ।
 अत्र तदन्तिकमेव रन्तुं गतासीति प्राधान्येनाधमपदेन व्यज्यते ।
 मगत्वैवेत्यर्थः । तस्य । परवेदनानभिज्ञस्य । पुनरेवार्थे । नैवेत्यर्थः । अधमस्य ।
 बहुधा कृतापराधस्य । स्वशरणारक्षकस्य वा । स्नानोपपादकमाह—निरिति ।
 यतस्तव स्तनयोस्तटं प्रांतदेशः निःशेषं यथा स्यात्तथा च्युतं स्खलितं
 चंदनं यस्मात्तथा । न तु उरस्थलं नापि संध्यादिरूपनिर्घोषतभागोऽपि ।
 बाण्या गंभीरजलाशयत्वात् पिच्छिलतीरत्वात् तद्रूतबहुलयुवजनत्रपापारवश्याद-
 सद्रयलगाप्रस्वस्तिकीकृतभुजलतायुगलेन तटस्यैवोन्नततया परामर्शात् । अत
 एव च्युतं न तु च्यावितं क्षालितं वा । व्यंग्यपक्षे तु तत्रैव मर्दनाधिक्यात् ।
 संध्यादौ नायकपरामर्शायोगाच्च । एवमुत्तानतया बहलजलसंबंधाद्रदनशो-
 धनांगुल्यादीनामधिकसंमर्दवहनाच्चाधर एव नितरां मृष्टरागः । नत्कीपत्
 न तूत्तरौष्ठः । न्युब्जतया तत्संबंधमांघ्यात् । त्वरया सम्यगक्षालनाच्च ।
 व्यंग्यपक्षे तु तत्रैव चुंबनविधेः उत्तरोष्ठे तन्निषेधाच्च तत्रैव तत्कृतं तथात्वम् ।
 नेत्रे दूरं प्रांतभाग एवानंजने । स्नानकाले मुद्रणात् मध्ये जलसंबंधाभावात् ।
 व्यंग्यपक्षे प्रांत एव चुंबनविधेः मध्ये तन्निषेधाच्च तत्रैवानंजनत्वम् ।
 दूरमत्यर्थमिति त्वयुक्तमेव । इयं तव तनुः तन्वी कृशा स्नानोत्तरम-
 भोजनात् । अत एव पुलकिता जनभयादंगजलादूरीकरणात् । पुलको रोमो-
 द्रमः । व्यंग्यपक्षे काश्यं सुरतश्रमात् । पुलकश्च तत्रानुभूताद्भुतरसस्मरणात् ।
 असंपूर्णरतत्वाद्वा । स्नानसाधारण्यसंपादनाय वापीमित्युक्तम् । न तु गृहं
 सर इति वा । (शार्दूलविक्रीडितं छन्दः ।) अत्र यदकृतज्ञायां बांधवबुद्धिर्यच्च
 तस्मिन्नधमे तथा प्रेम तद्युक्तमेवमप्येवंविधवचनापात्रत्वमितीर्ष्याहेतुकविप्रलंभसं-
 चारिनिर्वेदध्वनिः । तदनुगुणश्च दूतीभोगः । चंदनचयवनादीनां च वाच्यानां
 व्यंग्यानां च परिरिभञ्जनाद्यनुभावानां संभोगोत्कर्षद्वारेणैर्ष्याया उत्तेजकानां नि-
 र्वेदोत्कर्षकत्वमित्यन्यत्र विस्तरः । प्राधान्येनेति । तृतीयाथो वैशिष्ट्यम् । इति-
 पदार्थे व्यंग्येऽनेति । प्राधान्यं चेतरेनाविकासंभोगस्य विप्रलंभोद्दीपकत्वेन वाच्या-
 पेक्षयाऽतिशयितत्वात् । प्राधान्यविशिष्टेनाधमपदेनेति तु न युक्तम् । तत्कथ-
 नानुपयोगात् । अधमपदेनेत्युक्तञ्चैव तल्लाभाच्च । ध्वनिस्त्वोपपादकतया व्यंग्य-
 प्राधान्यस्यैव प्रकृतत्वाच्चेत्याहुः । अधमपदेनेति । अयं भावः । विदधाया मू-
 लतत्पर्ययाऽनया बाधोयुक्त्या स्नानसाधारण्येनैतरेष्वर्षेष्वधमपदेन

नन्वत्र मुख्यार्थबाधाद्विपरीतलक्षणाया तदन्तिकमेव गतासीति लक्ष्यमेव
युज्यते, न तु व्यङ्ग्यम् । अन्यथा ' साहेन्ती ' इत्यादिवक्ष्यमाणलक्षणा-
मूलव्यञ्जनोदाहरणेऽपि विपरीतलक्षणा न स्यात्, विशेषाभावादिति । अत्र
कोचित्—' सत्यमत्र विपरीतलक्षणा । वृत्तिग्रन्थस्तु तदन्तिकमेव गतासी-
त्यत्र लक्ष्यत इति शेषकल्पनया योजनीयः । व्यज्यत इति रन्तुमि-
त्यनेनैवान्वीयते ' इत्याहुः । परमार्थतस्तु न खलु मुख्यान्वयायोग्यत्वं स्वरू-
पसल्लक्षणाबीजम्, किं तु ज्ञातम् । तथा च यत्र सख्यादेः प्रसाध्य-
कामुकादिसंभोगः प्रमाणान्तरेण श्रोतुः प्रतीतिमुपगतस्तत्र मुख्यार्थबाधादस्तु
लक्षणा । तदभिप्रायेण ' साहेन्ती सहि सुहअं, ' ' उपकृतं बहु नाम '
इत्युदाहृतम् । यत्र तु प्रमाणान्तरं न तज्ज्ञापकमवतरतिः तद्वाक्यजनितप्रत्य-
यमहिम्नैव तु तत्प्रत्ययस्तत्र कथं लक्षणा । बाधाभावात् । उत्पन्नेऽपि
वाक्यार्थबोधे भवन्नपि बाधोऽकिंचित्कर एव । तदभिप्रायेण ' वापीं स्नातुम् '
इत्युदाहृतम् । अत एवोक्तं ' अधमपदेन व्यज्यते ' इति । अत एव च
यत्र सख्यादेस्तादृशत्वं न प्रमाणान्तरेणावगतं तत्र न ' साहेन्ती ' इत्यादौ
विपरीतलक्षणा व्यङ्ग्यार्थप्रतीतिर्वा । वापीं स्नातुमित्यादौ तु बाधानवतारेऽप्य-

दिवौशिष्टचबलात् दुःखप्रयोजककर्मशीलत्वरूपाधमपदार्थघटककर्मपदार्थो वाच्य-
तादृशार्था कर्मान्तरसाधारण्येनावस्थितोऽपि व्यंजनया दूतीसंभोगरूपतादृश-
कर्माकारेण पर्यवस्यतीति । इदमेवाधमपदस्य अधमपदेनेत्युक्तिध्वनितं
प्राधान्यम् । झटिति इतरानपेक्षतया व्यंग्यबोधकत्वाच्च । चन्दनचयवनादीनां
तु स्नानकार्यतया निबद्धानां योग्यतया संभोगांगभूताश्लेषचुंबनादिकार्यत्वस्यापि
प्रतिसंधाने सति तद्व्यञ्जनद्वारा तत्साहित्येनैव संभोगगमकत्वमिति विशेषः ।
एतेन नीचकर्मकारित्वस्याधमपदवाच्यस्य साधकं व्यंग्यमित्यपास्तम् । दूतीप्रेषण-
सापेक्षत्वेन विस्मृतप्रेमतयाऽपि तत्संभवात् । अत्र विप्रलम्भस्य प्रधानतया निःशेषे-
त्वादिवक्तव्येषु तवेत्यध्याहारेऽपि न न्यूनपदतादोषः । उक्तचसामग्र्यस्य निर्वेदा-
तिशयव्यञ्जकत्वेन गुणत्वात् । अत एव विधेयाविमर्शोऽपि न दोष इति दिक् ।
मुख्यार्थबाधादिति । स्नानस्यावास्तवत्वाद्बाधः इति भावः । किं तु ज्ञात-
मिति । व्यङ्ग्यार्थेऽङ्गते बाधज्ञानं त्वकिंचित्करम् । बाधाभावादिति । च-
न्दनचयवनादीनां स्नानप्रकारादित्यर्थः । उत्पन्ने चेति । उत्पन्ने स्थित्यर्थः ।

अतादृशि गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यं व्यङ्ग्ये तु मध्यमम् ।

अतादृशि वाच्यादनतिशयिनि । यथा—

ग्रामतरुणं तरुण्या नववज्रुलमञ्जरीसनाथकरम् ।

पश्यन्त्या भवति मुहुर्नितरां मलिना मुखच्छाया ॥ ३ ॥

अत्र वज्रुललतागृहे दत्तसंकेता नागतेति व्यङ्ग्यं गुणीभूतम् । तदपेक्षया

धमपदार्थपर्यालोचनया यथोक्तं व्यङ्ग्यं प्रतीयत एव इत्येव प्राधान्यमधमप-
दस्य । तस्मात् 'साहेन्ती' इत्यादौ यदि व्यञ्जना तदा लक्षणामूलैव । वाणी
स्नातुमित्यादौ तु न नियमः । अतादृशीति ।

अतादृशि वाच्यादनतिशयिनि अतिशयितचमत्कारानाधायके व्यङ्ग्ये
मध्यमं काव्यम् । तदुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यम् । कथितमित्यनुषज्यते । अत्र व्यङ्ग्ये
स्फुटव्यङ्ग्य इत्यर्थः । तेन नाधमकाव्यातिव्याप्तिरिति केषांचिन्मतमयुक्तम् ।
'अगूढमपरस्याङ्गम्' इत्यादिना गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यप्रभेदत्वेन प्रतिपादयिष्यमाण-
स्यास्फुटव्यङ्ग्यस्यासंग्रहापत्तेः । किं त्वस्फुटतरातिरिक्तव्यङ्ग्यचपरं व्यङ्ग्यचपदम् ।
गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्ये चास्फुटमात्रं व्यङ्ग्यम् । अधमकाव्ये त्वस्फुटतरं तद्विरह
एव वेति न काचिदनुपपत्तिः । उदाहरणम्—ग्रामेति ।

अत्र वज्रुललतागृहे दत्तसंकेता तरुणी नागतेति व्यङ्ग्यम् । तच्च

न च तात्पर्यविषयतर्दतिक्रमनान्वयानुपपत्त्या लक्षणोति वाच्यम् । विदग्धाया
वैदग्ध्यरक्षायै अविदग्धजनप्रतारणाय च स्नानप्रतीतिमुखेन तत्प्रकाश एव
तात्पर्यात् । अनतिशयिनीति । अनतिशयश्च न्यूनत्वेन तुल्यत्वेन चेति
बोध्यम् । संकेतस्थले व्यासंगवशेनानागतां स्वीयतत्स्थलगमनं ज्ञापयितुं तत्र-
त्यवज्रुलमञ्जरीमादायोपस्थितं नायकं दृष्ट्वा विषण्णाया विप्रलम्बवर्णनमिदं—
ग्रामतरुणमिति । ग्रामे एकस्तरुणः । तेन ग्रामस्थसकलयुवतिजनप्रार्थ्यमानतया
दुर्लभत्वं व्यज्यते । तरुण्या इति । द्वयोस्तरुणत्वेन परस्परानुरागोत्कर्षो व्यज्यते ।
नवेत्यादि मलिनीभावोपपादकं विशेषणम् । वज्रुलोऽशोकः । नवेत्यनेन नूतन-
वस्तुनः करग्रहणस्यौचित्येनावितर्कणीयता । सनाथो युक्तः नाथसहितः ।
तेनातिशोभाशक्तितया नायिकया दर्शनेऽपि अवितर्कणीयता । मुहुः बारंवारम् ।
जनतामयेन दर्शने सातत्यविरहात् । पश्यन्त्या भवतीति वर्तमाननिर्देशात् ।
दर्शनमलिनीभावयोरविरामः सूच्यते । ग्रामतरुणं मुहुः पश्यन्त्या भवतीति ।
च्छाया मलिना भवतीति संबन्धः । छाया कतिः (आया छन्दः) । दत्तसंकेतेति ।

वाच्यस्यैव चमत्कारित्वात् ।

शब्दचित्रं वाच्यचित्रमव्यङ्ग्यं त्ववरं स्मृतम् ॥ ५ ॥

चित्रमिति गुणालंकारयुक्तम् । अव्यङ्ग्यमिति स्फुटप्रतीयमानार्थरहितम् । अवरम् अधमम् । यथा—

गुणीभूतम् । तदपेक्षया वाच्यस्यैव चमत्कारित्वात् । यतः पश्यन्त्या नितरां मुखच्छाया मलिना भवतीत्यनेन दर्शनकाल एव तत्कार्यं मालिन्यं तस्यातिशयः संतन्यमानता चेति वाच्यं प्रतीयत इति । शब्दचित्रमिति ।

अत्र चित्रमित्यध्याहार्यम् । तेनाव्यङ्ग्यं काव्यमवरमधमम् । तच्चित्रमिति काथितमित्यर्थः । अव्यङ्ग्यं अस्फुटतरातिरिक्तव्यङ्ग्यचराहितम् । तादृश चास्फुटतरव्यङ्ग्यसद्भावे व्यङ्ग्यमात्राभावे वा । चित्रं गुणालंकारयोगि ।

स्वयमेव संकेतं कृत्वा विफलीकृत इत्यनुज्ञापातिशयो मालिन्यकारणम् । गुणीभूतत्वे हेतुमाह—तदपेक्षयेति । चमत्कार आस्वादः । तस्यातिशय इति । पौर्वापर्यविपर्ययलक्षण इत्यर्थः । तदुपपादकं दर्शनकाले एव तत्कार्यं मालिन्यमिति । तद्रूप इत्यर्थः । यद्वा नितरांपदप्रतिपाद्यो मालिन्यस्यातिशय इत्यर्थः । वाच्यं प्रतीयत इति । अत्र व्यंग्येन संकेतभगेन वाच्यमुखमालिन्यातिशयरूपानुभावमुखेनैव विप्रलंभाभासपोषणं न केवलेन । संकेतमंगस्याकर्तव्यत्वबुद्ध्याऽपि संभवादिति तदनतिशायित्वं व्यंग्यस्येति भावः । निःशेषेत्यत्र तु बोध्यदूर्तावैशिष्ट्येनाधमपदेन च व्यक्तसंभोगेनैव निर्वेदद्वारा विप्रलम्भपोषकत्वमिति बोध्यम् । पर्यन्तव्यंग्यविप्रलंभाभासेन तु अस्यापि ध्वनित्वमेव । वाक्यार्थरसयोरंतरालभवव्यंग्योत्कर्षापकर्षाम्यमेव ध्वनिगुणीभूतव्यंग्यत्वव्यवस्थितेः । पार्यतिकरसादिमादाय ध्वनित्वं तु सर्वत्रेष्टमेवेति दिक् । अध्याहार्यमिति । अन्यथा पूर्वयोरिवास्य संज्ञान्तराकरणाव्ययनता स्यादिति भावः । ननु व्यंग्यरहितकाव्यमप्रसिद्धम् । पार्यतिकरसादिव्यंग्यशून्यस्य प्रहेलिकात्वादत आह—अस्फुटतरेति । ईषत्त्वस्य तत्र वर्ण्यत्वात् । अव्यंग्यं अस्फुटतरव्यंग्यमित्यर्थ इत्येके । गुणालंकारयोकीति । तस्मात् न तु रसादिरूप आत्मा काव्यस्यास्ति इति भावः । तदुक्तम्—रसादिरूपं गुणः शौर्यादिषत् दोषाः काणत्वादिवत् अलंकाराः कटकादिषत् शरीराणि च शरीरमिति । अत्राहुः—अर्थो ह्यंतरंगं शरीरं तत्रैव कवि-
कल्पितं । अत्र कविकल्पितो न कविदशस्तत्राकाव्यत्वं वर्द्धति सह-

स्वच्छन्दोच्छलदच्छकच्छकुहुरच्छातेतराम्बुच्छटा-
मूर्छन्मोहमहर्षिहर्षविहितस्नानाङ्गिकाङ्गाय वः ।

भिद्याबुधबुवारदुर्दुरदरी दीर्घादरिद्रुम-

द्रोहोद्रेकमयोर्मिमेदुरमदा मन्दाकिनी मन्दताम् ॥ ४ ॥

शब्दचित्रं यथा—स्वच्छन्देति ।

वृत्त्यनुप्रासोऽत्र शब्दश्लंकारः । ननु कथमेतदव्यङ्ग्यमुच्यते । मन्दाकि-
नीविषयाया प्रीतेरभिव्यक्तेः । किं च नास्त्येव स काव्यार्थो यस्य न
व्यङ्ग्यत्वमन्ततो विभावत्वेनापीति चेत्, सत्यम् । किं तु तदव्यङ्ग्यम-
स्फुटतरम् । यद्वा तत्र न कवेस्तात्पर्यम् । अनुप्रासमात्र एव तस्य सरम्भात् ।

दयाः । शब्दस्तु तेन विनार्थस्य स्थापयितुमशक्यत्वात् उपचारितं शरीरम् इति ।
इदमेव च चित्रसाम्यम् । चित्रलिखिततुरगादौ तुरगबुद्धिवत् अस्यापि काव्यत्व-
बुद्धिरित्यवमत्वमिति । स्वच्छन्देति । मन्दाकिनी गंगा वः युष्माकं मन्दतां अज्ञानं
पापं वा अह्माय इष्टिति भिद्यादिति योजना । तीर्थान्तराद्व्यतिरेकं दर्शयितुं वि-
शिनाष्टि स्वच्छन्देति । स्वच्छन्दं स्ववशं न तु वात्यादिपरतन्त्रं यथा स्यात्तथा
उच्छलत् उद्गच्छत् अंबुविशेषणम् । तेनांबुबाहुल्याद्वांभीर्यलाभः । अच्छं
निर्मलम् । कच्छस्य जलप्रायदेशस्य । कुहरे तरंगकृतबिले । छातं दुर्ब-
लम् । तदितरत् वेगातिशयेन बलवत् । इदमप्यम्बुविशेषणम् । अंबुन-
श्छटा परम्परा तथा मूर्छन् विनश्यन् मोहोऽज्ञानं येषाम् । अत एव हर्षः ।
स्नानस्याङ्गिकत्वेन लाभेऽपि प्राधान्यात्पृथगुपन्यासः । नद्यन्तराद्व्यतिरेकं
दर्शयितुं पुनर्विशिनाष्टि—उद्यतः प्रकाशमानाः उदारा महान्तो दुर्दुरा भेका
यासु एवंविधा दर्यः कंदरा यस्यां सा तथा । दीर्घा आयताः अदरिद्राः
शाखादिबाहुल्येनाकृशा ये द्रुमास्तेषां मदन्योऽपि दीर्घ इति द्रोहः पातनकारणं
तेन उद्रेकः ऊर्ध्वप्रसरणं तद्युक्ता ये तरंगास्त एव मेदुरमदो निबिडाहंकारो
यस्याः । महोर्मोति पाठे तेन उद्रेको येषामीदृशा ये महोर्मय इति व्याख्ये-
यम् । (शार्दूलविकीर्णितं छन्दः ।) प्रीतेरभिव्यक्तेरिति । अत्र मन्दा-
किनी आलंबनम् । तद्गुणा उद्दीपनम् । स्तवोऽनुभावः । स्पृष्टौत्सुक्यादयः
संचारिणः । इदमुपलक्षणम् । महर्षिसेवनादिना तीर्थान्तराद्व्यतिरेकोऽपि व्यङ्ग्यो
बोध्यः । विभावत्वेनापीति । उद्दीपनविभावत्वेनापीत्यर्थः । अस्फुटतर-
मिति । उद्गद्यलंकारकृतोत्कर्षेण चित्तपकर्षोत्तमतीतिव्यपदिष्टमिति

विनिर्गतं मानदमात्ममन्दिराङ्गवत्युपभृत्य यदृच्छयापि यम् ।

ससंभ्रमेन्द्रुतपातितार्गला निमीलिताक्षीव मियाऽमरावती ॥ ५ ॥

ज्ञात्पर्यविषयीभूतव्यङ्ग्यविरहवत्त्वमेव चान्यङ्ग्यपदेन विवक्षितम् । यदुक्तं ध्वनिकृता—

‘रसभावादिविषयविवक्षाविरहे सति ।

अलंकारनिबन्धो यः स चित्रविषयो मतः ॥’ इति ।

अत्र पक्षे मध्यमकान्वयलक्षणे व्यङ्ग्यचपदं विवक्षितव्यङ्ग्यचपरं द्रष्टव्यम् । अर्थचित्रं यथा—विनिर्गतमिति ।

अत्रोत्प्रेक्षालंकार इति प्राञ्च उदाहरन्ति । परं तु रसादौ कथं तात्पर्यविरहोऽस्फुटतरत्वं वा तत्र ज्ञायते । हयग्रीवस्य वर्णनीयतया तत्प्रभावस्य स्फुटं प्रतीतेः । मदीयं तु पद्यमुदाहरणीयम् । यथा—

त्वादिति अभिमानः । न चायमनुप्रासो न मंदाकिनीविषयकभावानुगुणः । स्वच्छन्दोच्छलदुदरददुरेत्यादिश्रुतिकटुपुष्टार्थपदनिष्ठत्वात् इति वाच्यम् । तटभंगादिगम्यगंगानिष्ठौजःप्रकाशकतया श्रुतिकटुपुष्टार्थपदघटितविकटवर्णदीर्घसमासादेर्गुणत्वेन तदनुप्रासस्याऽपि भावानुगुणत्वादिति दिक् । पार्यतिकं व्यंग्यमादाय ध्वनित्वस्य सर्वत्रेष्टतया मध्यमव्यंग्यमादायैव त्रैविध्यस्योपपादनीयत्वेऽपि व्यतिरेकं व्यंग्यमादाय शब्दचित्रमात्रोदाहरणत्वं चित्यम् । विनिर्गतमिति । यं प्रकृतं हयग्रीवं मानदं शत्रुमानखण्डकं मित्रमानदातारं विनिर्गतं न तु प्रस्थितं नाप्यमरावत्यां प्रविष्टम् । यदृच्छया । अमरावती-विजयाविषयिण्याऽपि यथा कयाचिदिच्छया । उपश्रुत्य कर्णोपकर्णिकया श्रुत्वा न तु दूतमुखेन । ससंभ्रमेण सभयेन इन्द्रेण अव्याहतैश्वर्येणापि स्वयमेव । दौषारिकाह्वाने विलंबासहत्वात् । द्रुतं शीघ्रं पातिता यथा कथंचिन्निक्षिप्ता न तु विश्रब्धं निहिता । अर्गला न तु कपाटफले एव लापिते एव भावः । उपश्रुत्येति पातनक्रियया समानकर्तृकम् । अत्र मरावतीत्यश्लीलम् । (वंशस्थं वृत्तम् ।) अत्रोत्प्रेक्षेति । नायकैर्द्रव्यप्रदर्शनप्रभूतमरावतीस्त्रीभयमपि वीररसपोषकदित्यस्या अलंकारत्वं बोध्यम् । एतेन संशयरूपाया उत्प्रेक्षाया अंशसो भयाभावप्रापकत्वस्यापि सत्त्वाच्च वीररसानुगुणत्वमित्यपास्तम् । भावोऽपि सौम्यकटोटिकत्वेनादोषात् । रसादाविति । अत्र वीररसः । तस्य हयग्रीवं आलम्बनम् । प्रतिपक्षैर्द्रव्यमुद्दीपनम् । मानखण्डनमनुभावः यदृच्छासं-

इति काव्यप्रकाशे काव्यप्रयोजनकारणस्वरूपविशेषनिर्णयो नाम
प्रथम उल्लासः ।

मध्येव्योम स्फुरति सुमनोधन्वनः श्यानचक्रं
मन्दाकिन्या विपुलपुलिनाभ्यागतो राजहंसः ।
अह्लश्छेदे त्वरितचरणन्यासमाकाशलक्ष्म्याः
संसर्पन्त्याः श्रवणपतितं पुण्डरीकं मृगाङ्कः ॥

अत्र रूपकमर्थालंकारः । तन्मात्रे तात्पर्यं न रसादौ ।

इति महामहोपाध्यायश्रीगोविन्दकृते काव्यप्रदीपे काव्यलक्षणनिर्णयः प्रथम
उल्लासः ।

चरणगम्या धृतिः संचारिणी । आदिना प्राक्श्लोकीयभावपरिग्रहः । मध्ये-
व्योमेति । व्योम्नो मध्ये इत्यर्थः । सुमनोधन्वा कामः । श्यानचक्रं चक्रा-
कारं शस्त्रतैक्षण्यसंपादकं पाषाणजयंत्रमुच्यते । पुलिनं तीरम् । तत्राभ्यागत
इत्यर्थः । अह्लश्छेदे सायंसमये । (त्वरितः चरणन्यासो यस्मिन्कर्मणि तथा
संसर्पन्त्याः ।) स्त्रीत्वेन भयवशात्त्वरितगमनम् । (मृगाङ्कः चन्द्रः स एव
श्यानचक्रमित्यर्थः । तथा स एव राजहंसः पुण्डरीकं चेत्यर्थः । मन्दाकांता
छन्दः ।) इति शिवभट्टसुतसतीगर्भजनागोजीभट्टकृते काव्यप्रदीपोद्योते
प्रथम उल्लासः ।

द्वितीय उल्लासः ।

क्रमेण शब्दार्थयोः स्वरूपमाह—

स्याद्वाचको लाक्षणिकः शब्दोऽत्र व्यञ्जकस्त्रिधा ।

अत्रेति काव्ये । एषां स्वरूपं वक्ष्यते ।

वाच्यादयस्तदर्थः स्युः,

वाच्यलक्ष्यव्यङ्ग्याः ।

तात्पर्यार्थोऽपि केषुचित् ॥ १ ॥

आकाङ्क्षा-योग्यता-सन्निधि-वशाद्दृश्यमाणस्वरूपाणां पदार्थानां स-

अथ काव्यलक्षणपदार्थेषु स्वरूपलक्षणादिभिर्विवेकलक्ष्येषु शब्दार्थयोः प्राधान्यात्प्रथमं तयोः स्वरूपं निरूपयिष्यन्विभागमाह—स्याद्वाचक इति शास्त्रे व्यञ्जकः शब्दो न प्रसिद्ध इत्यत उक्तमत्रेति । अत्रेति काव्ये शब्दस्वरूपमप्रतिपाद्यैव लाघवादर्थं विभजते—वाच्यादय इति ।

वाच्यादयो वाच्यलक्ष्यव्यङ्ग्याः क्रमेण तेषां वाचकादीनामर्थः स्युः । केषुचिन्त्यायादिनयेषु । न तु मीमांसकादिमतेष्वपि । लाघवात्पदानां पदार्थ-

स्वरूपलक्षणादिभिरिति । यथा 'योऽभिधत्ते स वाचक इति' स्वरूपम् । तथ अभिधातृत्वं लक्षणम् । एवमन्यत्राप्युक्तम् । आदिना विभागः । प्राधान्यादिति । काव्यत्वाश्रयत्वेन लक्षणघटकेतरपदार्थमपेक्ष्य तयोः प्राधान्यम् । अर्थस्य व्यञ्जकत्वेऽपि शब्दसंस्कारितयैव तस्य तत्त्वलक्षणवाक्ये शब्दस्य प्रथमं निर्देशस्तस्य प्राधान्यसूचनाय । स्वरूपमिति । विभागानन्तरं तन्निरूपणस्य सांप्रदायिकत्वादिति भावः । सामान्यलक्षणं तु शब्दत्वजातिमत्त्वं शब्दस्य तदभिधेयत्वं चार्थस्य प्रसिद्धमेव । एकवचनं सामान्याभिप्रायेण । सामान्यं च वाचकादिस्वरूपेष्वन्ततोऽन्यतमत्वं बोध्यम् । तत्र लाक्षणिकव्यञ्जकयोर्वाचक उपजीव्यः । व्यञ्जकस्य वाचकलाक्षणिकाविति उपजीव्यक्रमेणोपन्यासः । त्रिधेति । वाचकत्वाद्युपाधौ त्रित्वं बोध्यम् । शास्त्रे । वैशेषिकादौ । लाघवादर्थमिति । प्रकरणलाघवानुरोधादित्यर्थः । अन्यथा प्रकरणचतुष्टयापत्तेरिति परमानन्दचक्रवर्ती । वाच्यलक्ष्येति । वाचकत्वादिव्यापारेण वक्ष्यमाणवाचकादिप्रतिपाद्यत्वं च तल्लक्षणं बोध्यम् । एतेनाग्रे एषां लक्षणानुक्तेरन्यनतेति परास्तम् । अनुमेयाद्यर्थानां तु अप्रकृतत्वात् विभाग इति बोध्यम् । न्यायादीति । आदिना माट्टमीमांसकाः । न त्विति । प्राभाकरेति शेषः ।

१ क. ग. स्वरूपलक्षणादिभिरिति । स्वरूपं विशेषलक्षणम् । लक्षणं सामान्यलक्षणम् । आदिनोद्देशः ।

मन्वये तात्पर्यार्थो विशेषवपुरपदार्थोऽपि वाक्यार्थः समुल्लसतीत्यभिहितान्वयवादिनां मतम् । वाच्य एव वाक्यार्थ इत्यन्विताभिधानवादिनः ।

मान्ने शक्तिः, न त्वन्वयांशेऽपि । गौरवादन्वयलभ्यत्वाच्च । तदंशो हि तात्पर्यार्थो वाच्याद्यर्थविलक्षणशरीर आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासन्निधिवशादपदार्थोऽपि प्रतीयते । न चापदार्थप्रतीतावातिप्रसङ्गः । स्वरूपसतः शक्यान्वयत्वस्य निर्यामकत्वात् । इत्यभिहितान्वयवादिनां मतम् । *By their very existence & entering into an & in the logical connection of the several c.*

अन्वयरूपे वाक्यार्थेऽपि पदानां शक्तिः । व्यवहारेणान्वितस्यैवोपस्थापनात्तत्रैव शक्तिप्रज्ञात् । किं चान्वयभागस्याशक्यत्वेऽनुभवविषयत्वं न स्यात् । तद्विषये शक्यत्वस्य प्रयोजकत्वात् । अशक्यस्याप्यनुभवप्रवेशेऽतिप्रसङ्गात् । इत्यन्विताभिधानवादिनां मतम् ।

तात्पर्यार्थ इति । आकांक्षादिवशाद्भासमानस्य हि तात्पर्यार्थत्वेन व्यवहारः । तस्यापि पदतात्पर्यविषयत्वात् । तदुक्तं भट्टपादैः । 'न विमुंचन्ति सामर्थ्यं वाक्यार्थेऽपि पदानि नः । वाक्यार्थो लक्ष्यमाणो हि सर्वत्रैवेति च स्थितिः । साक्षाद्यद्यपि कुर्वन्ति पदार्थप्रतिपादनम् । वर्णास्तथापि नैतस्मिन्पर्यवस्यन्ति निष्कर्षः । वाक्यार्थमितये तेषां प्रवृत्त्या नांतरीयकम् । पाके ज्वालेव काष्ठानां पदार्थप्रतिपादनम्' इति । अभिधानापर्यवसानरूपाऽऽकांक्षा । एकपदार्थेऽपरपदार्थस्य प्रकृतसंसर्गवत्त्वं योग्यता । अव्यवधानेनान्वयप्रतियोग्युपस्थितिश्च सन्निधिः । वशात् । तद्रूपात्प्रयोजकात् । अपदार्थः । प्रत्येकं पदवृत्त्यविषयः । अनेन तस्य वाक्यवशात् सूचयति । आकांक्षावशाद्धि तस्य शक्यताकल्पनम्, प्रमाणानामसंबद्धार्थबोधकत्वाभावादिति वैयाकरणाः । अतिप्रसंग इति । अशक्यार्थान्वयभानरूप इत्यर्थः । षट्पदभूतलमित्यत्र पटीयसंयोगस्य भानापत्तिः । अस्ति हि तस्यापि संयोगत्वेन योग्यतेत्यभिमानः । शक्यान्वयत्वस्येति । तेषामपि नानात्वसंभवे तु तात्पर्यज्ञानकारणतयाऽतिप्रसंगो वारणीय इति बोध्यम् । तद्वल्लाभासमानानां संबंधानामनेकत्वसंभवेन तद्भावे एतद्व्यवसायसंसर्गो बोध्य इति इच्छारूपतात्पर्यज्ञानस्य कारणत्वावश्यकत्वादिति श्रवः । अतिप्रसंगादिति । गोपदादध्मादेरपि बोधापत्तिरिति भावः । अन्विताभिधानवादिनामिति । अन्वितमेवाभिधत्ते इति वादिनामित्यर्थः ।

सर्वेषां प्रायशोऽर्थानां व्यञ्जकत्वमपीष्यते ।

तत्र वाच्यस्य यथा—

माए घरोवभरणं अज्ज तु ण त्थिस्सि साहिअं तुमए ।

ता भण किं करणिज्जं एमेअ ण वासरो ठाह ॥ १ ॥

व्यञ्जकत्वं न केवलं शब्दस्य, किं तु तदर्थस्यापि । तत्रापि नैकतरस्य, किं तु सर्वस्यापीत्यभिधादिवैधर्म्यसिद्धये प्रतिपादयति—सर्वेषामिति ।

अत्र वाच्यस्य यथा—माए इति ।

अत्रारुचिबीजं तु विधिवाक्यात्कार्यान्वितत्वेन बोधेऽपि कार्याशत्यागवदन्व-
यांशत्यागस्याप्यन्यलभ्यत्वन्यायेनौचित्यात् । किं चान्वितत्वेन शक्तावपि
अन्वयविशेषभानायाकांक्षादिकमवश्यं कारणं वाच्यम् । एवं च विशेषरूपे-
णाशक्यस्यैव भानमिति त्वयाप्यवश्यं वाच्यम् । किं च संसर्गस्यापि प्राक्प-
देनोपस्थितावगृहीतग्राहित्वरूपप्रामाण्यं शब्दस्य न स्यात् । अन्वयव्यतिरे-
काभ्यां तस्यान्यलभ्यत्वाच्च । संबंधेन शाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति शक्यत्वस्य
प्रयोजकत्वान्नातिप्रसंग इति । सर्वस्यापीति । वाच्यलक्ष्यः व्यंग्यस्येत्यर्थः । एवं
च वाच्यादिज्ञानं विना तस्या निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्प्रथमतो वाचकाद्विनि-
रूपणमिति भावः । अभिवादीति । अभिचालक्षणापेक्षया व्यंजनाया वैधर्म्य-
सिद्धये इत्यर्थः । प्रधानस्य रसादेरव्यञ्जकत्वादाह—प्रायश्च इति । व्यञ्ज-
कत्वमपीति । अपिना व्यञ्जकतादशायामपि वाच्यत्वाद्यप्रच्यवः सूचितः ।
शब्दव्यंजनायाः सकलसंमतत्वेनार्थव्यंजनायामसांष्टिकत्वशंकावारणाय शब्द-
व्यंजनामनुदाहृत्यैव तां प्रथमत उदाहरति—माए इति । काचिदुपनायक-
संगमार्थिनी नहिर्गन्तुं मातरमाह—‘मातर्गृहोपकरणमद्य खलु नास्तीति साधितं
त्वया । तद्गण किं करणीयमेवमेव न वासरः स्थायी ।’ अत्र मातरित्यनेनादे-
शयोम्यत्वमलंघनीयाज्ञात्वं च ध्वन्यते । गृहेत्यनेनावश्यकता । उपकरणम-
त्रेन्धनशाकादिसामग्रीत्यर्थकम् । तेन साकल्यम् । तेनान्यथासिद्धिपरीहारः ।
एकैकस्येधनादेरसत्त्वे तु पार्श्ववासिनोऽपि ग्रहणसंभवः । अद्येत्यनेनाद्यैव सं-
वाद्यत्वम् । साधितं प्रतिपादितमिति सत्त्वशंकाराहित्यम् । त्वया इत्यनेन स्वकल्प-
नाराहित्यम् । तदित्यनेन हेत्वर्थकेनावश्यकत्वव्यवस्था । किं करणीयं कर्तव्यम् ।
मणेत्यनेन स्वप्रेरणम् । एवमेव । अधुना दृश्यमानावस्थ एव । तेन विनावस्थ

अत्र स्वैरविहारार्थिनीति व्यज्यते ।

लक्ष्यस्य यथा—

साहेन्ती सखि सुहृदं क्षणे क्षणे दूमिभासि मञ्जकप ।

सम्भावणेहकरणिजसरिसमं दाव विरहं तुमए ॥ २ ॥

अत्र वाच्येनैवार्थेन वक्तुर्वैशिष्ट्यात्स्वैरविहारार्थित्वम्, गृहोपकरणत्वादिना चावश्यविधेयत्वादिकं व्यज्यते ।

लक्ष्यस्य यथा—साहेन्तीति ।

त्वत्प्रेरणयाऽपि कुलंगनया मया न गन्तव्यमिति द्योत्यते । स्थायी न । स्थिरो नेत्यर्थः । अत्र वाच्येनैवेति । वाच्यसंसर्गरूपेणैव वाक्यार्थेनेत्यर्थः । संसर्गो वाक्यशक्य इत्याशयः । यथेष्टविहारेच्छायां वाक्यार्थग्रहोत्तरं प्रतीयमानायां शब्दस्य न व्यापारो विरतत्वात् । अर्थस्य च व्यापारान्तरासंभवाच्चजनैवेति भावः । न च वाक्यार्थस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वे वाच्यस्य यथेत्यसंगतम् । संबंध्यमाने संसर्गमानस्य वक्तुमशक्यतया तस्य व्यञ्जकत्वे पदार्थस्यापि व्यञ्जकत्वमित्यदोषात् । एवं लक्ष्यस्येत्यपि । एतेन तात्पर्यार्थस्य व्यञ्जकत्वं स्वातन्त्र्येण नोदाहृतमिति न्यूनतेत्यपास्तम् । व्यञ्जत इति । स्वैरविहारार्थिनी एषेति सामाजिकैर्व्यंजनया बुद्धयत इत्यर्थः । प्रियानुनयार्थं प्रहितां तमुपभुज्यामतां दूतीं प्रति नायिका आह—साहेतीति । 'साधयन्ती सखि सुभगं क्षणे क्षणे दूनासि मत्कृते । सद्भावस्नेहकरणीयसदृशं तावद्विरचितं त्वया ।' मत्कृते मय्यर्थे सुभगं सुंदरं तं नायकं साधयन्ती अनुनयंती त्वं क्षणे क्षणे प्रवेक्षणं दूनासि खिन्नासि । त्वया तावदेवं सद्भावः साधुत्वं स्नेहः मद्विषयः तयोः करणीयं कार्यं सदृशमुचितम् । तथा च सद्भावस्य यत्कार्यं स्नेहस्य च यदुचितं तद्विरचितमित्यर्थः । द्वंद्वे साहित्यमानवादिमते प्रथमतः समुदायस्य समुदायेऽवयवः । ततो यथासंख्येन बोधः पार्थिको बोध्यः । तद्धवनयन्व्याख्यास्यति—सद्भावस्नेहाकरणीयविसदृशमिति । कश्चित्तु सद्भावस्नेहकरणीयविसदृशमिति पाठः । तदा श्लोके ताभ्यां यत्करणीयं तेन सदृशं कार्यं त्वया विरचितमित्युच्यते बोध्यः । परं त्वाद्य एव युक्तः । लक्षणां मूलीभूतवाच्यस्य कृतमित्यस्यैव वक्तुं युक्तत्वादिति दिक् । अत्र वाच्येनैवार्थेन वक्तुर्वैशिष्ट्यात्स्वैरविहारार्थित्वम्, गृहोपकरणत्वादिना चावश्यविधेयत्वादिकं व्यज्यते ।

अत्र वाच्येनैवार्थेन वक्तुर्वैशिष्ट्यात्स्वैरविहारार्थित्वम्, गृहोपकरणत्वादिना चावश्यविधेयत्वादिकं व्यज्यते ।

अत्र मत्प्रियं रमयन्त्या त्वया शत्रुत्वमाचरितमिति लक्ष्यते । तेन च कामुकविषयसापराधत्वप्रकाशनं व्यङ्ग्यम् । व्यङ्ग्यस्य यथा—
उअ निश्चलनिष्पन्दा बिसिनीपत्तिम् रेह बलाका ।
निर्मलमरगतभाभणपरिष्ठिता सङ्गसुसिद्ध ॥ ३ ॥

अत्रापकारिण्यां बाधावतारान्मुख्यार्थः श्रोत्रा प्रत्येतुं न शक्यत इति सद्भावस्नेहकरणीयविसदृशं मत्प्रियरमणेन शत्रुत्वाचरणरूपं विरचितमिति मुख्यविपरीतं लक्ष्यते । तेन च कामुकविषयसापराधत्वप्रकाशनं व्यङ्ग्यम् ।
व्यङ्ग्यस्य यथा—उअ इति ।

भ्रमणयोरविरोधादिति दीपिकायां स्पष्टम् । अत्रापकारिण्यामिति । ज्ञाता-
पकारिण्यामित्यर्थः । मत्प्रियरमणेनेति । इदं न लक्ष्यान्तर्गतम् । किन्तु प्रति-
पाद्यसखीवैशिष्ट्यबोधनद्वारा व्यंग्यप्रकटनायोक्तम् । ज्ञाप्यत्वं तृतीयार्थः ।
तेन चेति । लक्ष्यार्थघटितवाक्यार्थेनेत्यर्थः । प्रकाशनं व्यंग्यमिति ।
कामुकविषयसापराधत्वमेषा प्रकाशयतीति सहृदयैर्व्यजनया गम्यत इति
भावः । उअ इति । पश्येत्यर्थेऽव्ययमुअ इति । ' पश्य निश्चलनिष्पन्दा
बिसिनीपत्रे राजते बलाका । निर्मलमरगतभाजनपरिस्थिता शंसशुक्तिरिव । '
कस्याश्चिन्नायिकाया उपनायकं प्रति इयमुक्तिः । बिसिनी पद्मिनीलता
चलनं शरीरक्रिया । स्पन्दस्त्ववयवक्रिया । स्पदि किञ्चिच्चलन इति धात्व-
नुसारात् । कर्मधारयसमासः । पुंवत्कर्मधारयेति पुंवत् । यद्वा निश्चल
जनशंकया विहारव्यापारनिरुद्योगेति कामुकसंबोधनम् । यत्तु निश्चल
अचल पृथ्वी तद्वन्निष्पन्देत्यर्थ इति । तत्र । अचलापदस्यैव तत्र प्रयोगात् ।
पृथ्वीवाचकस्य नित्यस्त्रीलिंगत्वेन भाषितपुंस्कत्वाभावात्पुंवद्भावनुपपत्तेश्च ।
मरकतो नीलमणिः । भाजनं पात्रम् । शंसशुक्तिः शुक्त्याकारं शंसघटितं
पात्रम् । न तु मुक्ताशुक्तिः । तस्या बलाकावत् श्वेतत्वाभावात् । शंसशुक्तिप-
दस्य तत्रासामर्थ्याच्च । अत्र चाचेतनोपमया लेशतोऽपि शोभाभावः । तेन
निर्जनत्वं गम्यते । केचित्तु 'नायिकाया विरहवेदनां कामुकं प्रति निगूढं नि-
वेदयन्त्याः सख्या इयमुक्तिः । निष्पन्दा सा नायिका बलाकापांडुतातिशयात्
बलाकात्वेनाध्यवसिता बिसिनीपत्रे तापाच्छयिता राजते । अत्र निश्चल अल-
सेति कामुकसंबोधनमेव । अचेतनोपमया निश्चेष्टत्वातिशयस्तेन च विप्रलम्भा

१ क. लक्ष्यवाक्यार्थेनेत्यर्थः । लक्ष्यघटितवाक्यार्थो लक्ष्य एवेति भाष्यम् ।
२ क. न. जनोपरि.

अत्र निष्पन्दत्वेन आश्वस्तत्वम्, तेन जनराहितत्वम्, अतः संकेत-
स्थानमेतदिति कयाचित् कंचित्प्रत्युच्यते । अथवा, मिथ्या वदसि न
त्वमत्रागतोऽभूरिति व्यज्यते ।

वाचकादीनां क्रमेण स्वरूपमाह—

साक्षात्संकेतितं योऽर्थमभिधत्ते स वाचकः ॥ ३ ॥

इहागृहीतसंकेतस्य पुरुषस्य शब्दार्थविशेषप्रतिपत्तेरभावात्संकेत-
सदृशं एव शब्दोऽर्थविशेषं प्रतिपादयतीति यस्य यत्राव्यवधानेन
संकेतो गृह्यते स तस्य वाचकः ।

अत्र निष्पन्दत्वेनाश्वस्तत्वम्, तेन निर्जनत्वम्, अतः संकेतस्थानमेतदिति
कयाचित्कंचित्संकेतस्थानाभिलाषिणं प्रति व्यञ्जनया प्रतिपाद्यते । अथवा
निष्पन्दत्वेनाश्वस्तत्वम्, तेन जनागमनाभावः, अतो न त्वमत्रागत इति
मिथ्या वदसीति कयाचिद्वत्संकेता त्वं नागता अहं त्वागत इति वादिनं
प्रति व्यज्यते ।

एवमर्थ विमज्ज्य वाचकादीनां स्वरूपं क्रमेणाह—साक्षादिति ।

अभिधत्ते प्रतिपादयतीत्यर्थः । अतो न विशेषणान्तरवैयर्थ्यम् । संकेतितं
गृहीतसंकेतम् । इदं चेष्टायां साक्षादर्थप्रतिपादिकायामतिव्याप्तिवारणाय,
माधुर्यादिव्यञ्जकस्पर्शादिवर्णेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय वा । न च साक्षादित्यधिकम् ।
'यन्नामा यत्र चैत्यादिर्विषयोऽपि स तादृशः' इत्यादिव्यवहितसंकेतसत्त्वेऽपि
चैत्यादिनामके चैत्यादियोगिनि विषये प्रतिपाद्ये चैत्यादिपदेऽतिव्याप्तिवारक-
त्वात् । अत्र शक्यसंकेतव्यवहितसंकेतत्वात् । न च तत्र शक्तिरेवेति सम्यक् ।

शयो न्यम्यः' इत्याहुः । संभोगाद्विप्रलम्भस्य अतिमधुरत्वेन तत्र योजयति—अथवा
निष्पन्देति । स्वरूपमिति । लक्षणमित्यर्थः । अतो नेति । अभिधया प्रतिपादय-
तीत्यर्थे वैयर्थ्यं स्पष्टमेव । इदं चेष्टायामिति । पदघटितः संकेत इत्यभिमानः ।
इत एव तादृशसादाह—स्पर्शादिवर्णे इति । माधुर्यादिनिरूपितवाचकत्वापत्ति-
रिति भावः । चेष्टातिव्याप्तिस्तु विशेष्यतया शब्दनिवेशाद्वारणीयेति बोध्यम् ।
विषयः । देशः । तत्रेति । तदीयसंकेत इत्यर्थः । अत्र च व्यवहितसंकेतत्वा-
दिति स्पष्टः । संकेतमुत्पत्तिरिति भावे तु तत्रेत्यस्य देशे इत्यर्थः । व्यवहितत्वं
तत्रागतसंकेतस्योपपत्तिरिति व्यपयत्वम् । स चेत्वं वृत्तविशेषचैत्यपदादोध्यः ।

२ मं. प. चेष्टादि. ३ मं. प. चेष्टादिनामके चेष्टा.

तद्योगिनि तत्पदप्रयोगस्य लक्षणयैवोपपत्तेः । न च साक्षात्संकेतवान्वाचक इत्ये-
तावतैव स्वस्थत्वे अभिपद्यते इत्यस्य वैयर्थ्यम् । संयोगादिनाऽभिधायां नियमि-
तायां वाच्यार्थव्यञ्जकतादशायामतिव्याप्तेर्वारणीयत्वात् । न च तथापि तत्रा-
तिव्याप्तिरेवेति वाच्यम् । यस्य शब्दस्य यत्राव्यवहितसंकेतग्रहो यदर्थग्रह
उपयुज्यते तत्र स तदर्थवाचक इति हि लक्षणार्थः । अथ संकेतग्रहस्य शब्द-
सहकारितायां किं मानमिति चेत्, अगृहीतसंकेतस्य शब्दादर्थप्रत्ययाभावः ।
इदं च 'यत्राव्यवधानेन संकेतो गृह्यते' इत्यादिवृत्तिदर्शनात्संकेतविशेषणत-
या साक्षात्पदं व्याख्यातम् । वस्तुतस्तु संयोगादिनाऽभिधायां नियमितायां
यत्र शक्यान्तरध्वननं तत्र वाचकत्वं मा प्रसाङ्गीदित्यभिधानक्रियाविशेषणं
साक्षादिति । तत्र तु वाक्यार्थप्रतीतिव्यवधानेन तत्प्रतीतिरित्यप्रसङ्गः । न च

तद्योगी देशश्च तत्पदाद्बोध्य इति । रूढिलक्षणायाः शक्तिरुल्लेखत्वात्संकेतस्य
तत्रानुभूयमानत्वाच्च तत्रैव प्रत्युदाहृतम् । लक्षणयैवेति । तद्वृक्षच्छेदेऽपि यथा-
कथंचित् शक्यसम्बन्धोऽस्त्येव । तादृशस्यैव लक्षणाप्रयोजकत्वादिति भावः ।
वाच्यार्थेति । द्वितीयवाच्यार्थेत्यर्थः । यस्य शब्दस्य यत्रेति । काले इति
शेषः । अपभ्रंशादौ वाचकत्वस्येष्टत्वेन तत्रातिव्याप्तिर्न शक्या । अन्यथा
वाच्यव्यञ्ज्यतायां माए इत्यादेरनुदाहरणत्वापत्तेरित्याहुः । संकेतो गृह्यत
इति । वृत्तौ गृह्यते इत्यस्य 'यदर्थप्रतिपत्तये' इत्यादिः । साक्षात्संकेतग्रहसह-
कारेण यदा यदर्थप्रतिपत्तिरिति फलितोऽर्थः । संकेतपदेन च शक्तिरुच्यते ।
संकेतग्राह्यत्वात्तस्याः । सा च बोधजनकत्वरूपेति पञ्चमशेषे वक्ष्यते । अत्र
च वाचकव्यवहारविषयत्वं लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकम् । अतो न लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकल-
क्षणायोर्भेदः । ननु लक्षणास्थले तत्तत्पदात्तत्तल्लक्ष्यार्थो बोद्धव्य इत्यादीच्छा-
याः संकेतत्वमेव नास्ति । शक्यसम्बन्धेनैव तद्बोधात् । एवं च तद्व्यावृत्त्यर्थं
संकेतविशेषणं साक्षात्पदं व्यर्थमित्युच्यते-वस्तुतस्तस्मात् । संकेति-
तं इति तु साक्षादेव माधुर्यादिव्यञ्जके स्पर्शादिवर्णनेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय । अने-
नैव चैत्यादियोगिदेशबोधकचैत्यादिपदे नातिव्याप्तिः । संकेतपदस्य शक्ति-
प्रस्थात् । न च तत्र तस्य साऽस्ति । वृक्षसम्बन्धेनैव तद्बोधादिति बोध्यम् ।

१. अ. व्यञ्जकतायां. २. अ. शक्तिप्राप्तिः समर्थः । स वाच्यार्थव्यञ्ज्यार्थ-
व्यञ्जकः । अस्य अर्थं वाच्योऽस्यायं वाचकोऽप्यव्यञ्ज्यमिति वाच्यमिति वाच्य-
व्यञ्जकतायां प्रतिपदितम् । अथ.

संकेतितश्चतुर्मेदो जात्यादिर्जातिरेव वा ।

अक्षय्यार्थकियाकाप्रतिप्रत्ययप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तियोग्या। व्यक्तिरेव तथाप्यानन्त्याद्वय-
विभासाच्च तत्र संकेतः कर्तुं न युज्यते इति गौः शुक्लमलो डित्थ इत्या-
संकेतितपदवैयर्थ्यम् । लक्ष्यप्रतीतावपि वाच्यप्रतीतिव्यवधानाभावात् । स्वर्शा-
दिवर्णानां साक्षादेव माधुर्यादिन्यञ्जकत्वाच्च ।

भास्करस्तु—“ लक्ष्यस्याप्यन्विताभिधाननये संकेतितत्वात्तत्रातिव्याप्तिवा-
रण्याय साक्षादिति विशेषणम् । तदनभ्युपगमे तु ‘ साक्षमदभिधत्ते ’ ‘ संकेति-
तमभिधत्ते ’ इति लक्षणद्वयम् । न चाद्यस्य चेष्टायामतिव्याप्तिः । शब्दत्वस्य
प्रकरणादेव लाभात् ” इत्याह । तत्तु ‘ साक्षात्संकेतो गृह्यते ’ इत्यादि-
वृत्तौ साक्षात्त्वस्य संकेतितविशेषणतया व्याख्यानेन विरोधादुपेक्षणीयम् ।
किं च प्रथमे माधुर्यादिव्यञ्जकस्पर्शादिवर्णेष्वतिव्याप्तिः । तेषां साक्षादेव
शृङ्गारादिव्यञ्जकत्वात् । द्वितीयं तु वाच्य एव व्यञ्ज्यतादशायामतिव्या-
प्तम् । न च तत्रेष्टापत्तिः । संकेतवान्वाचक इत्यस्यैव तदा सम्यक्त्वेन शेष-
वैयर्थ्यात् । संकेतित इति ।

नन्वयं विभागोऽनुपपन्नः । जात्यादेरसंकेतितत्वात् । आद्यसंकेतग्रहस्य
व्यवहारमात्राधीनतया प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तियोग्यायां व्यक्तावेव तदौचित्यादिति । मै-
त्रम् । किं हि व्यक्तिषु सर्वासु संकेतग्रहो व्यवहाराङ्गमस्ति, उत यस्यां कस्यां चित् ।
व्यवधानाभावादिति । गंगापदादपि साक्षात्तीराद्युपस्थितिरित्यभिमानः ।
इत एव वाऽश्वेराह—स्पर्शादीति । वस्तुतो न च संकेतितपदवैयर्थ्यमित्यादि-
स्पर्शादिवर्णानां साक्षदेव माधुर्यव्यञ्जकत्वाच्चेत्यंतग्रन्थो बहुषु पुस्तकेषु न
दृश्यते । रुक्षस्याप्यन्वितेति । इतरान्विते शक्तौ इतरत्वेन तीरस्याभि-
मानादिति अभिमानः । विशेषणमिति । अभिधानक्रियाया इत्यर्थः ।
साक्षात्त्वं च पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितिविशेष्यत्वमिति बोध्यम् । शृंगारविशेष-
कत्वादिति । तद्गतमाधुर्यव्यञ्जकत्वादित्यर्थः । अतो न पूर्वविरोधः ।
अत्राप्युक्त्यामिति । तद्वोधके शब्दे इति शेषः । श्लेषेति । अभिप्राय इति
त्यर्थः । आस्तादिरिति । आदिना मुष्णक्रियासंज्ञाः । संकेतग्रहस्य । तत्प्रयो-
गोक्तिरिति । योग्यायां व्यक्तावेवेति । नयमानयमाधुनमिततत्तद्वोध-
कत्वाच्च । अत्राप्युक्त्यामिति । तद्वोधके शब्दे इति शेषः । श्लेषेति । अभिप्राय इति

॥ अथ शिवसंज्ञायाः प्रमाणम् ॥

दीनां शब्दानां विषयविभागो न प्राप्नोतीति च तदुपाधावेव संकेतः ।
उपाधिश्च द्विविधः । वस्तुधर्मो वक्तुयदृच्छासन्निवेशितश्च । वस्तु-
धर्मोऽपि द्विविधः । सिद्धः साध्यश्च । सिद्धोऽपि द्विविधः । पदार्थस्य
प्राणप्रदो विशेषाधानहेतुश्च । तत्राद्यो जातिः । उक्तं हि वाक्यपदीये-

नाद्यः । आनन्त्यात् । नान्त्यः । व्यभिचारप्रसङ्गात् । यतोऽगृहीतसंकेतगो-
पिण्ड इव घटादेरपि गोपदात्प्रतीतिः प्रसक्ता । अगृहीतसंकेतत्वस्य तुल्यत्वात् ।
किं च न यत्र संकेतग्रहस्तस्यापि प्रतीतिरिति व्यभिचारात् व्यक्तौ संकेतः ।
अपि च व्यक्ति-संकेतपक्षे 'गौः' 'शुक्लः' 'चलः' 'हित्यः' इत्यादि-
शब्दानामर्थभेदो न प्राप्नोति । किमेवमनिष्टमिति चेत्, सहप्रयोगानुपपत्तिः ।
तस्मादुपाधावेव संकेतः । स च द्विविधः—स्वभावतो वस्तुवृत्तिर्घटत्वादित्ये ।
वक्तुयदृच्छया संनिवेशितो नामरूपः । तत्राद्यो द्विविधः—सिद्धः साध्य-
श्चेति । सिद्धोऽपि द्वेधा—पदार्थस्य प्राणप्रदः विशेषाधानहेतुश्च । प्राण-
प्रदत्वं च यावत्स्थितिसंबन्धित्वम् । यद्यपि शुक्लत्वादेर्नित्यत्वाम्युपगमे

द्विरुचितेति भावः । आनन्त्यादिति । तथा च शक्तिग्रहासंभवः ।
सामान्यलक्षणा तु निरस्तैव तन्त्रान्तरे इति भावः । यतोऽगृहीतेति ।
तद्विषयकशब्दबोधे सामान्यतो गृहीतसंकेतपदज्ञानं कारणमित्यङ्गीकारे
इत्यर्थः । तद्विषयसंकेतवत्पदज्ञानं कारणमित्यङ्गीकारेऽप्याह—किं च
न यत्रेति । व्यभिचारात् । तथा व्यक्तिपक्षे कार्यकारणभावस्य वक्तुमश-
क्यत्वात्तत्र संकेत एव नेति भावः । समानप्रकारकत्वेनैव कार्यकारण-
भावाङ्गीकाराच्चायं दोष इत्यत आह—अपि चेति । व्यक्तावेवेति पक्षेऽयं दोषः ।
सहप्रयोगानुपपत्तिरिति । इदं चिन्त्यम् । व्यक्तिविशेषोपस्थितये तेषां सह-
प्रयोगात् । तद्विषयव्यक्तिमात्रबोधकत्वस्यैव पर्यायत्वात् । विशिष्टशक्तौ तु
नागृहीतविशेषणान्यायेन व्यक्तौ शक्तेर्जात्यादौ तदवच्छेदकत्वस्य च स्वीकारे
गौरवेण च विशेषण एव सोचितेत्याह—तस्मादुपाधावेवेति । विशेषणे जात्या-
दावेवेत्यर्थः । व्यक्तिबोधैस्त्वासेपात् । अनुमानसहकृतपदेनैवेति केचित् । लक्षण-
येत्यन्ये । व्यञ्जनयेति परे । विशेषणशक्तिग्रहस्यैव विशिष्टस्मृतित्वं विशिष्टशब्दत्वं
च कार्यत्ववच्छेदकमित्यपरे । सन्निवेशितः । संकेतसंबन्धेन तत्तत्तत्तत् स्थ-
पितः । नामरूप इति । हित्यदपित्यादिशब्दरूपः । संज्ञाशब्दादेव च प्राप्नोतीति

१ स. वः । व्यक्तावेव शक्तिरिति पक्षे दूषणान्तरमाह—अपि चेति ।
तु व्यञ्जनया निर्वाहः । संनि.

गौः स्वरूपेण न गौर्नाप्यगौः गोत्वाभिसंबन्धात्तु गौः ' इति । द्वितीयो गुणः । शुक्लादिना हि लब्धसत्ताकं वस्तु विशिष्यते । साध्यः पूर्वापरी-
युक्तव्यवहारक्रियारूपः । डित्यादिशब्दानामन्त्यबुद्धिनिर्वाहं संहतक्रमं
 स्वरूपं वक्त्रा यदृच्छया डित्यादिष्वर्थेषूपपाधित्वेन सन्निवेश्यते इति
 गोत्वादिना समकालमेव संबन्धित-म्, तथापि तस्य संबन्धः कदाचिदपैत्यपि,
 न तु गोत्वादेरिति विशेषः । तत्र प्राणप्रदो जातिः । उक्तं हि वाक्य-
 पदीये— ' न हि गौः स्वरूपेण गौः, नाप्यगौः, गोत्वाभिसंबन्धात्तु गौः ' इति ।
 अस्यार्थः— ' गौः स्वरूपेण न गोव्यवहारस्य नाप्यगोव्यवहारस्य
 विषयः । गोत्वाभिसंबन्धात्तु गोव्यवहारस्य विषयः ' इति । तथा च प्राण-
 प्रदत्वमस्य सिद्धमिति । विशेषाधानहेतुस्तु गुणः । गोत्वादिना लब्धसत्ताकं
 हि वस्तु शुक्लत्वादिना विशिष्यते । साध्यस्तु पूर्वापरीभूतैकदेशत्वेन विवक्षितः
 क्रियारूपश्छेदनादिः । यदुक्तम्—

‘ यावत्सिद्धमसिद्धं वा साध्यत्वेन प्रतीयते ।

आश्रितक्रमरूपत्वात्सा क्रियेत्यभिधीयते ॥ ' इति ।

वक्तृयदृच्छासंनिवेशितस्तु शब्दरूपः । डित्यादिशब्दानां प्रथमवर्ण-
 संज्ञाविशिष्टधर्मिबोध इति बोध्यम् । कदाचिदपैत्यपीति । पाकेन रंजनेन च
 वर्णान्तरकरणे इत्यर्थः । क्रियासमवायस्य नित्यत्ववादिमते तदन्यत्वं निवे-
 श्यम् । गौः स्वरूपेणेति । अज्ञातगोत्वकेन धर्मिस्वरूपमात्रेणेत्यर्थः । ना-
 प्यगोव्यवहारस्येति । अभावज्ञाने प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकप्रकारकप्रतियोगि-
 ज्ञानस्य कारणत्वादिति भावः । गोत्वाभिसंबन्धात्त्विति । एवं च यावद्गो-
 व्यवहारं तत्र पिण्डे गोत्वस्य सत्त्वात्प्राणप्रदत्वमिति भावः । विशेषाधान-
 हेतुरिति । तत्त्वं च यावदाश्रयस्थितिसंबन्धकमिन्नत्वे सति द्रव्यक्रियान्यत्वम् ।
 साध्यस्त्विति । साध्यत्वेन विवक्षितः । तदेव दर्शयति—पूर्वापरेति ।
 अधिश्चर्याद्यवतारणान्तर्व्यापारसमूहो हि पाकक्रिया । विहित्यनुकूलत्वेन तेषा-
 मनुगमनात् नानार्थता । तत्र सर्वप्रागभावे भविष्यत्वम् । सर्वध्वंसे भूतत्वम् ।
 कस्यचिद्वर्तमानत्वे वर्तमानत्वम् । एवं च भासमानपौर्वापर्यकाव्यवकत्वसमाना-
 धिकरणौ धर्मविशेषः साध्यत्वमिति फलितम् । क्रियारूप इति । घातवाच्य
 इति वक्तुम् । तथा च पाचकादीनां प्रकारिभूतक्रियायां शक्तिः ।

कृत्स्नत्वेन कर्तार्याभावांगीकारादिति स्पष्टमस्मत्कृतवैवाक्यकरणसि-
 द्धौ च अन्तरः शब्दः सि । बौद्धोपधि. ३ स. रणमुत्पाद्यस्वरूपं साध्य. ४ स.
 क्रियायां.

सोऽयं संज्ञारूपो यदृच्छात्मक इति । 'गौः शुक्लमलो दित्थ इत्यादौ प्रतीत्या किञ्चित्प्रकाशितमन्त्यवर्णबुद्ध्या निःशेषतो ग्राह्यं नानावर्णात्मकष-टादिपदवद्वर्णक्रमशून्यं स्फोटाख्यं शब्दस्वरूपं दित्थादिष्वर्थेषूपधाधित्वेन वक्त्रा यदृच्छया कल्प्यत इति संज्ञारूपयदृच्छात्मको दित्थादिशब्दः ।

चण्डीदासस्तु—' अन्त्यं स्वलक्षणं बुद्ध्या निःशेषतो ग्राह्यं यस्य तत् जातिप्रताप्यनन्तरं व्यक्तिप्रतापिरिति क्रमशून्यं च दित्थादीनां शब्दानां स्वरूपं दित्थादिष्वर्थेषूपधाधित्वेन पदार्थोपस्थित्यनुकूलतया संकेत्यते । उपा-
द्धान्तमंजूषायाम् । किञ्चित्प्रकाशितमिति । अल्पावयवावच्छेदेन चक्षुःस-
न्निकर्षे पटस्येवेत्यर्थः । अन्त्यवर्णबुद्धयेति । पूर्वपूर्ववर्णानुभवजनितसंस्कारस-
हकृतयेत्यर्थः । निःशेषत इति । सर्वावयवावच्छेदेन तत्सन्निकर्षे संपूर्णपट-
स्येवेति भावः । घटादिपदवदिति । मतांतरसिद्धस्य व्यतिरेके दृष्टान्ततेति
बोध्यम् । वर्णक्रमशून्यमिति । वर्णक्रमग्रहशून्यमित्यर्थः । यथा पटप्रत्यक्षे
न तंतुक्रमभानं तद्वदित्यर्थः । एकः पट इतिवदेकं पदमिति व्यवहारात्
अवयवातिरिक्तोऽवयवी स्फोटाख्यः स्वीक्रियत इत्यर्थः । अत एव तत्र
तत्त्वियत्तावत्पदज्ञानेऽपि न तत्र गणनां विना वर्णयत्ताज्ञानमिति भावः ।
तदाह—स्फोटाख्यमिति । एतेन नानावर्णतत्तदव्यवहितोत्तरत्वादिक्रमघटित-
पदत्वस्य शक्ततावच्छेदकत्वे गौरवमानन्त्यं चेत्यपास्तम् । यदृच्छयेति ।
दित्थादिपदं तादात्म्यसंबन्धेन दित्थादिनामविशिष्टतत्तदर्थबोधकं भवत्वित्या-
कारयेच्छयेत्यर्थः । यदृच्छाकल्पितत्वाच्च यदृच्छाशब्द इति व्यवहारस्तदाह-
यदृच्छात्मक इति । अयमेव संज्ञाशब्दो द्रव्यशब्द इति च व्यवह्रियते ।
आवणज्ञानस्य शाब्दबोधे हेतुत्वांगीकारान्नात्माश्रय इति बोध्यम् । चण्डी-
दास इति । अन्त्यं व्यवच्छेद्यं तच्च स्वलक्षणं धर्मिस्वरूपं बुद्ध्या तदद्वारा
निर्ग्राह्यं यस्य शब्दरूपस्य । शब्दज्ञानेन धर्मिप्रत्ययनात् । गवादिपदे हि
विशेषणप्रतीत्यनन्तरं व्यक्तिप्रत्यय इति क्रमः तच्छून्यम् । आहत्यैव धर्मि-
प्रत्यायनमिति भावः । उपाधित्वेनेत्यस्य व्याख्या—पदार्थोपस्थित्यनुकू-
लतयेति । संकेत्यते । केवले धर्मिण्येवेति शेषः । अयं भावः । तदुपाध्यु-
पलक्षिते शुक्लवासा देवदत्त इत्यादाविव शक्तिग्रह इति न लक्षणबोधे भानम् ।
शुक्लवास्तत्त्ववदर्थं लज्जिवेशस्तु निर्धर्मितावच्छेदकशक्तिग्रहासंभवात्तत्सौकर्य-
येति । तदेवाह—उपाध्यन्तरमिति । पदार्थोपस्थित्यनुकूलतया आकांक्षाविना

चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः' इति महाभाष्यकारः । परमाण्वादीनां तु गुणमव्यपाठात् पारिभाषिकं गुणत्वम् ॥ गुणक्रियायदृच्छाशब्दानां ध्यन्तरं तेषां नास्ति । किं तु धर्मिमात्रं ततः प्रतीयते' इति वृत्त्यर्थमाह । तच्च भाष्यविरुद्धम् । तत्र शब्दस्यैवोपाधित्वेन व्यवस्थापनात् । इत्यादि-
शब्दादित्यादिनामायमिति प्रतीतेः । एवं हि 'गौः' 'शुक्लः' 'चलः' 'इत्यः' इत्यादौ चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः इति महाभाष्यकारः । नन्वेवं परमाण्वादिशब्दानां जातिशब्दत्वं स्यात्, न गुणशब्दत्वम् । परमाण्वादीनां प्राणप्रदत्वेन जातित्वादिति चेत्, सत्यम् । जातिशब्दा एव ते । वैशेषिक-
नयानुसारेण तु तत्र गुणशब्दव्यवहारः । ननु पटादिनिष्ठानां शुक्लादिगुणानाम्, गुडतण्डुलादिनिष्ठानां पाकादिक्रियाणां च भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षतः सिद्धौ व्यक्ति-संकेतपक्षोक्तदोषः समान इति चेत्, न । गुणादीनां स्वरूपतदाविष्टमेव । अत एवास्य द्रव्यशब्दत्वेन व्यवहार इति तद्भावः । यद्वा अन्त्यं अन्त्यवर्णप्रत्यक्षेण ग्राह्यं स्वलक्षणं शब्दरूपं यस्यार्थस्य बुद्ध्या ज्ञानेन निःशेषतः स्वरूपतोऽर्थतश्च ग्राह्यम् । अर्थबोधकत्वं हि पदस्वरूपम् । पद्यते बोध्यतेऽनेन इति व्युत्पत्तेः । तादृशं इत्यादिपदानां स्वरूपं त्वेन इत्यादिपदेन रूप्यते बोध्यत इत्यर्थरूपं तत् । इत्याद्यर्थेषु पदार्थोपस्थित्यनुकूलतया तादात्म्येन तदवच्छेदकतयेत्यर्थः । तच्च भाष्येति । किं च पक्षद्वयेऽप्यन्त्येत्यादि व्यर्थम् । सर्वेषामेव शब्दानां स्वज्ञानद्वाराऽर्थज्ञानजनकत्वात् । अर्थज्ञानानन्तरमेव स्वरूपतोऽर्थतो बोधाच्च । अन्त्यशब्दस्य प्रागुक्तार्थे शक्त्यभावाच्च । अपि च बहु-
मीहौ बुद्धिनिर्ग्राह्यान्त्यकमिति स्यात् । विशेषणत्वात् । किं चाद्यव्याख्याया-
मुपाधित्वेनेत्यसमंजसम् । सर्वेषामेव शब्दानां तथात्वेनास्य वैलक्षण्यानापत्तेः । पक्षद्वयेऽपि लक्षणापत्तेश्चेति दिक् । तत्र इत्यादिपदं इत्यादिपदवति शक्तमित्याकारः शक्तिग्रहः । न चैतादृशशक्तिग्रहात्पूर्वं इत्यादिपदवत्त्वेनाज्ञाना-
त्कं तदवच्छिन्ने शक्तिग्रहः । संबन्धसामान्येन वैशिष्ट्यस्यैव तत्र निवेशात् । यद्वा गुणगुणिनोरिव वाच्यवाचकयोरपि तादात्म्याङ्गीकाराददोषः । वाचक-
त्वाख्यसंबन्धविशेषग्रहस्तु पश्चादेवेति बोध्यम् । चतुष्टयीति । उपाधेर्विशे-
षणस्य चातुर्विध्यादित्यर्थः । प्रवृत्तिरित्यास्य उवाचेति शेषः । प्रवृ-
त्तिः । प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । परमाण्वादीति । अदिना परममहच्छब्दसंग्रहः ।
परमाण्वशब्दः परिमाणविशेषे तद्वति च । उक्तदोषः । आनन्त्यव्यभिचार-

वस्तुत एकरूपाणामप्याश्रयभेदाद्भेद इव लक्ष्यते । यथैकस्य मुखस्य खड्गमुकुरतैलाद्यालम्बनभेदात् । हिमपयःशङ्खाद्याश्रयेषु परमार्थतो भिन्नेषु शुक्लादिषु यद्वशेन शुक्लः शुक्ल इत्यादिरभिज्ञाभिधानप्रत्ययो-
त्पत्तिस्तत् शुक्लत्वादि सामान्यम् । गुडतण्डुलादिपाकादिष्वेवमेव पाकादित्वम् । बालवृद्धशुकाद्युदीरितेषु डित्थादिशब्देषु च, प्रतिक्षणं । भिद्यमानेषु डित्थाद्यर्थेषु वा डित्थादित्वमस्तीति सर्वेषां शब्दानां

एकरूपाणामाश्रयभेदाद्भेद इव लक्ष्यते । यथैकस्यैव मुखस्य खड्गमुकुरा-
द्यालम्बनभेदात् ।

अपरे तु—“हिमपयःशङ्खादिषु शुक्लादिगुणः परमार्थतो भिन्न एव । पाकाच्छुक्लं रूपं नष्टं श्याममुत्पन्नमिति प्रतीतिः । न चेयं भ्रान्तिः । बा-
धकाभावात् । न चोत्पादविनाशौ समवायस्य प्रतीयेते इति युक्तम् । तदनुल्लेखात् । तथा चानुगतप्रत्ययानुरोधेन तत्रापि शुक्लत्वादिजातिः । ला-
घवाच्च तत्रैव संकेत इत्यभ्युपेयम् । एवं गुडतण्डुलपाकादिष्वपि पाकत्वा-
दिकम् । तथा तारत्वादिविरुद्धधर्माध्यासाद्बालवृद्धाद्युदीरितडित्थादिशब्दे-
ष्विव डित्थाद्यर्थेष्वपि बालाद्यवस्थापरिणतनानपरिमाणरूपविरुद्धधर्माध्या-
साद्भिन्नेषु डित्थत्वादिकं जातिः । सैव च डित्थादिपदशक्या । एकत्वात् ।
इत्यङ्गीकर्तव्यम् । एतेन ‘बालवृद्धशुकाद्युदीरितेषु डित्थादिशब्देषु च प्रतिक्षणं
भिद्यमानेषु डित्थाद्यर्थेषु वा डित्थादित्वमस्ति’ इति व्याख्यातम् । इवार्थेन
वाशब्देन चशब्दस्य स्थानविनिमयात् । यद्वा सर्वेष्वेव वाच्येषु सामान्य-
मस्तीत्यत्र तद्वाक्यतात्पर्यम् । अथवा भाष्यकारमते डित्थादिशब्द एवोपा-
धिरिति तन्मतोऽपि शब्दस्य नानात्वात्तन्निष्ठा जातिरेव शक्याऽङ्गीकार्येति
तत्तात्पर्यम् । तस्मात्सर्वशब्दानां जातिरेव संकेतविषयः ” इत्याहुः । येषां

रूपः । भेद इवेति । प्रत्यभिज्ञालाघवादिभिः शुक्लादीनामैक्यसिद्धौ भेदप्र-
तीतिराश्रयभेदौपाधिकी । तत्संबन्धस्यैव च नाशोत्पादाविति भावः । आलं-
बनम् । प्रतिबिम्बाश्रयः । प्रतीतेरिति । अबाधिततारतम्यप्रतीतिश्चेत्यपि बो-
ध्यम् । अनुगतः । एकाकारः । प्रत्ययेत्यभिधानस्याप्युपलक्षणम् । अभि-
धानं शाब्दव्यवहारः । एवम् । अनुगतप्रत्ययाभिधानाभ्याम् । शब्देष्वपि
भेदस्य साध्यतयोपमानत्वायोगादाह—यद्वेति । सर्वेष्वेव वाच्येष्विति पाठः ।
शब्दपरेषु शब्देषु शब्दस्यैव वाच्यत्वादिति भावः । अथवेति । बालवृद्ध-

जातिरेव प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमित्यन्ये । तद्वान् अपोहो वा शब्दार्थः कैश्चिदुक्त इति ग्रन्थगौरवमयात् प्रकृतानुपयोगाच्च न दर्शितम् ।

मते संज्ञाशब्दानां शब्दो नोपाधिस्तेषां मते आकाशादिशब्दानां कथं जातौ संकेत इति चिन्त्यम् । *If we take Sky to be vacuum then this meaning not. But Sky is no vacuum it is aether, air etc. & so it Charles.*

नैयायिकादयस्तु—‘न व्यक्तिमात्रं शक्यम्, न वा जातिमात्रम् । आद्ये आनन्त्याद्व्यभिचाराच्च । अन्ये व्यक्तिप्रतीत्यभावप्रसङ्गात् । न चाक्षेपाद्व्यक्तिप्रतीतिः । तस्माद्विशिष्ट एव संकेतः । न चानन्त्यादशक्यता व्यभिचारे वा । गोत्वादि-
सामान्यलक्षणया सर्वव्यक्तीनामुपस्थितौ सर्वत्र संकेतग्रहसौकर्यात्’ इत्यादिछन्ते ।

सौगतास्तु—‘व्यक्तावानन्त्यादिदोषाद्भावस्य च देशकालानुगमाभावात्तदनुग-
तायामतद्व्यावृत्तौ संकेतः’ इत्यादिमतानि प्रकृतानुपयोगान्न सूत्रकृता दर्शितानि ।

तनु वाच्यलक्ष्यव्यङ्ग्याः पदार्था इति विभागोऽनुपपन्नः । मुख्यत्वेन

दीरितानां तेषामनेकत्वात्तद्भेदेन व्यंग्यस्यापि भेद इत्याशयः । शब्दो नोपाधिरिति । किं तु निर्विकल्पक एव बोध इति भावः । तेषां मते इति । धर्मिमात्रस्य ततो बोधाङ्गीकर्तृणां मते जातेर्बोधविषयत्वादिति भावः । आ-
काशादिपदानां चेति । एकव्यक्तिमात्रवृत्तिजात्यनङ्गीकारादित्यर्थः । आ-
नन्त्यव्यभिचाराभावेन व्यक्तावेव शक्त्यौचित्यमिति भावः । चिन्त्यमिति । चिन्ता-
बीजं तु शब्दाश्रयत्वेनैव ततो बोधस्यानुभविकत्वेन शब्दवृत्तिजातिरेव प्रवृत्ति-
निमित्तम् । न चाकाशः शब्दाश्रय इति सहप्रयोगानुपपत्तिः । पदवाच्यत्वपर-
तया परिहारादिति बोध्यम् । केचित्तु जातिपदं अखण्डोपाधिपरम् । तेना-
काशत्वाभावत्वादिरिग्रह इत्याहुः । जातिरेवेति पक्षे शुक्लादिपदैः शुक्लत्वजत्या-
स्वाश्रयाश्रयत्वपरंपरया पटादेराक्षेप इति बोध्यम् । एतेन गोत्वादिभिः स्वस-
मवाय्यवयवाक्षेपः स्यादिति निरस्तम् । साक्षात्स्वाश्रयेऽन्वयासंभवे एव परंपर-
या आश्रयस्याक्षेपात् । तच्छक्तपदस्य तादृशशब्दबुद्धित्वं कार्यतावच्छेदक-
मिति पक्षे तु दोषशक्येव नेति दिक् । न चाक्षेपादिति । तया सति वृत्त्याऽ-
नुपस्थितत्वेन शाब्दबोधविषयत्वानुपपत्तिरिति भावः । सर्वत्र सौकर्यादिति ।
संकेतग्रहस्येत्यर्थः । अनुगमाभावादिति । क्षणभङ्गवादिनः स्थिरसामान्या-
भावादित्यर्थः । प्रकृतानुपयोगादिति । उपाधिज्ञातौ हि विशेष्यस्य व्यंग्य-

१. मते मतिः किं तु धर्मिमात्रप्रतीतिलेखा. २ पदानां इत्युद्योतसंमतः पाठः.
३. न वाऽऽक्षे. ४ सर्वत्र सौकर्यात् इत्युद्योतसंमतः पाठः ५ स. पक्षे स्वाश्रय-
प्रत्ययान्तरस्य व्यञ्जनया बोधसात्वर्षवशादिति न दोषः । न वा.

स मुख्योऽर्थस्तत्र मुख्यो व्यापारोऽस्याभिधोच्यते ॥३॥

स इति साक्षात्संकेतितः । अस्येति शब्दस्य ।

मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रूढितोऽथ प्रयोजनात् ।

अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत्सा लक्षणाऽऽरोपिता क्रिया ॥४॥

प्रसिद्धस्य तुरीयस्यापि भावादित्यत आह—स इति ।

साक्षात्संकेतित एवार्थो मुख्यत्वेन प्रसिद्ध इत्यर्थः । कथमसौ तथेत्यत आह—तत्रेति ।

अस्य शब्दस्य तत्रार्थे योऽभिघारूपो व्यापारः स मुख्यो यत उच्यते इत्यर्थः । यद्वा अभिघाव्यवहारस्य नाभिघा समयाभावादित्यादौ दर्शनात्तां लक्षयति—तत्र मुख्य इत्यादि । तत्र यो व्यापारः सोऽभिधेत्युच्यत इत्यर्थः । मुख्यत्वोत्कीर्तनं च वक्ष्यमाणस्य लक्षणायास्तद्वाधपुरःसरत्वस्योपपत्तये ।

यत्तु—‘मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योग इत्यादिकारिकोपयुक्ततया वाच्यस्य संज्ञान्तरं करोति—स मुख्य इत्यादि’ इति सूत्रावतारणं तदयुक्तम् । वाच्यार्थबाधे तद्योग इत्येवमेव तत्रोपपत्तौ तदर्थं संज्ञान्तरकरणस्य गौरवेणानौचित्यात् । वाचकं निरूप्य लक्षणिकं लक्षयितुं लक्षणां लक्षयति—मुख्यार्थेति ।

रूढिः प्रसिद्धिः । प्रयोजनं व्यङ्ग्यार्थप्रतिपादनरूपम् । क्रिया व्यापारः । अत्रान्योऽर्थो यल्लक्ष्यते सा लक्षणेति लक्षणम् । लक्ष्यते प्रतिपाद्यत इत्यर्थः ।

त्वसंभवात्तत् प्रकृतोपयोगि । नैवमुपहितशक्त्यादिमतमिति भावः । अभिघारूपो व्यापार इति । ज्ञायमानवृत्तेर्व्यापारत्वमित्यभिमानः । सोऽभिधेत्युच्यत इति । एवं च संकेतितार्थबोधजनकव्यापारत्वं अभिघालक्षणम् । मुख्यत्वमिति । ‘स मुख्योऽर्थः’ ‘तत्र मुख्यः’ इत्यनेनेत्यर्थः । कारिकया ‘संकेतं ग्राह्यं शक्त्या-रूपपदार्थान्तरमभिघा’ ‘तादृशं शब्दार्थयोस्तादात्म्यमभिघा’ इति भीमांसकपातंजलमतमुपनिबद्धमिति बोध्यम् । पातंजलमतं वैयाकरणासिद्धांतमंजूषायामस्माभिरुपपादितम् । तद्वाधपुरःसरेति । अस्य मुख्यत्वे एतदभावेऽन्याश्रयणमित्यर्थोऽस्म्यते । लोकेऽपि ग्रामे कस्यचिन्मुख्यत्वे कृते तदभावे गौण आयाति । तद्योगे । शक्यार्थयोगे । अथेति । चार्थे । प्रयोजनादिति । प्रयोजनाभिधेत्यर्थः । प्रयोजनाभिधेर्निर्बुद्धं लक्षणिकशब्दप्रयोगे क्तुः प्रयोजनमिति

कर्मणि कुशल इत्यादौ दर्मग्रहणाद्ययोगात् गङ्गायां घोष इत्यादौ च अतो नात्माश्रयः । मुख्यार्थबाधः शक्यसंबन्धो रूढिप्रयोजनान्यरतच्चेति हेतुत्रयवचनम् । व्यञ्जनायां शक्तिस्मृतौ चातिव्याप्तिवारणाय तद्योग इति लक्षणेऽपि प्रवेशनीयम् । योगस्य च हेतुत्वं विवक्षितम् । अतो न मुख्यार्थसंबन्धिव्यञ्जनायामप्यतिव्याप्तिः । मुख्यस्याप्यभिधारूपमुख्यार्थसंबन्धेन प्रतिषादनं संभवतीति तद्वारणायान्य इत्युक्तम् । अन्योऽमुख्यः । यदिति गुणीभूतलक्षणक्रियामात्रपरामर्शः । तेन ' शक्यसंबन्धेनाशक्यप्रतिपत्ति-लक्षणा ' इति प्राचीनमतेनैतल्लक्षणम् । ' तद्धेतुः शक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा ' इति तस्य लक्षणाप्रयोजकत्वं बोध्यम् । व्यञ्जनायाम् । तज्जन्यबोधे । शक्ति-स्मृताविति । शक्तेः शक्यार्थादन्यत्वादिति भावः । सा च न मुख्यार्थसंबन्धेनेति तद्योग इत्यनेन तद्वचावृत्तिः । योगस्य च हेतुत्वमिति । न च संबन्धस्याव्यावर्तकतया तात्पर्यमेव तदर्थभासकमस्तु किं संबन्धज्ञानेनेति वाच्यम् । अनुपस्थिते पदार्थे तात्पर्यस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् । संबन्धग्रहश्च प्रागेव कदाचिज्जातः । एवं च प्राग्ग्रहीतसंबन्धेन पुंसा तेन संबन्धेन तदादिस्मृतौ पश्चात्तत्र तात्पर्यग्रहे तच्छब्दबोधः । अनुपपत्तिप्रति-संधानस्यापि तात्पर्यग्रह एवोपयोगो बोध्यः । गुणीभूतेति । कर्तृविशेष्यकबोधनये इदम् । क्रियाविशेष्यकबोधनये तु न कश्चिद्दोषः । तेन शक्यसंबन्धेनेति । अननुगततज्ज्ञानहेतुकेत्यर्थः । पदात् शक्यस्मृतिः तथा च शक्यसंबन्धिलक्ष्यस्मृतिरिति तन्मतम् । अत्र नव्याः । मुख्यार्थबाधज्ञानकालिकत्वमपि शक्यसंबन्धज्ञाने देयम् । तेन मुख्यप्रवाहार्थबाधज्ञानकालिकतीरादि-स्मृतौ नातिव्याप्तिः । गुणो द्रव्यमित्यादौ गुणपदेन स्वकारणत्वेन ज्ञातगगनोप-स्थितौ च नातिव्याप्तिः । वस्तुगत्या गुणस्य गुणपदशक्यत्वेऽपि शक्यत्वेन तदाऽग्रहात् । मुख्यार्थबाधे इत्यस्य च तात्पर्यविषये इतरपदार्थे मुख्यार्थतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नबाधज्ञानकालीनेत्यर्थः । तेन छत्रिणो यांतीत्यादौ नाव्याप्तिः । तात्पर्यविषयेऽछत्रिबाधात् । निर्हेतुकलक्षणाभासेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय रूढित इत्यपि लक्षणे निवेश्यम् । एवं च शक्तित्वेन शक्तिज्ञानजन्यशक्य-स्मृतिविषयशक्यसंबन्धज्ञानजन्या तात्पर्यविषयेतरपदार्थतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्ने मुख्यार्थतावच्छेदकरूपेण तदवच्छिन्नान्वयबाधज्ञानकालीना रूढिप्रयो-जनाद्वितरहेतुका अशक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिस्तज्जनकज्ञानविषयशक्यसंबन्धरूपव्या-

गङ्गादीनां घोषाद्यधिकरणत्वासम्भवात् मुख्यार्थस्य बाधे, विवेचकत्वादौ सामीप्यादौ च संबन्धे, रूढितः प्रसिद्धेः, तथा, गङ्गातटे घोष इत्यादेः प्रयोगात् येषां न तथा प्रतिपत्तिः तेषां शैत्यपावनत्वादीनां धर्माणां तथाप्रतिपादनात्मनः प्रयोजनाच्च मुख्येन अमुख्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत् स आरोपितः शब्दव्यापारः सान्तरार्थनिष्ठो लक्षणा ।

परमार्थः । प्रतिपत्तिहेतुर्हि वृत्तिः, न तु प्रतिपत्तिरिव । यत्तु यदित्यस्य यत् इत्यर्थकतया संबन्धपरतयैव सूत्रव्याख्यानं तदयुक्तम् । ‘ नाभिधा समयाभावाद्धेत्वभावान्न लक्षणा ’ इत्यत्र ‘ मुख्यार्थबाधादित्रयं हेतुः ’ इति व्याख्यानविरोधात् । न हि संबन्धरूपत्वे लक्षणायाः संबन्धो हेतुर्घटते । ननु प्रतिपादनं चेन्नलक्षणा न तर्हि शब्दधर्मः । गङ्गादिशब्दानां नीरादिकमुपस्थाप्य विरामे नीराद्यर्थेनैव संबन्धेन तीराद्यर्थप्रतिपादनादित्यत आह—आरोपिता कियेति । शक्यव्यवाहितलक्ष्यार्थविषयत्वाच्छब्दे आरोपित एव स व्यापारः । वस्तुतोऽर्थनिष्ठ एवेत्यर्थः । तदेतदुक्तम्—‘ सान्तरार्थनिष्ठः ’ इति । रूढिता यथा—‘ कर्मणि कुशलः ’ इत्यादौ । अत्र दर्भग्रहणायोग्यत्वान्मुख्यार्थबाधः । विवेचकत्वं च संबन्धः । एवमन्यत्राप्यूह्यम् । तथा च तैलङ्गादि-

व्यापारो वा लक्षणेत्याहुः । न तु प्रतिपत्तिरिति । यदि त्वन्वयबोधरूपप्रतिपत्तिहेतुर्वृत्तिरियं तु स्मृतिरित्युच्यते तदा मूलोक्तमपि सम्यक् । हेतुर्घटत इति । शाब्दबोधजनकशक्यसंबन्धस्यैव लक्षणात्वेन तद्विशेषणलक्ष्यार्थशाब्दबोधसामग्रीप्रदर्शनपरत्वाद्धेतुपदस्य च लक्षणाविशेषणांशप्रयोजकपरत्वान्न कल्प्यसंगतिरिति चिंत्यमेतत् । प्रतिपादनं चेदिति । भावल्युद्धतं करणल्युद्धतं वा । आरोपित एवेति । स्वहेतुसंबन्धप्रतियोगिशक्तत्वसंबन्धरूपपरंपरया शब्दनिष्ठत्वमात्रेणारोपितत्वोक्तिः । तादृशसंबन्धसत्त्वात्तत्रारोप इत्यर्थो वा । वस्तुत इति । साक्षात्संबन्धेनेत्यर्थः । सांतरार्थनिष्ठ इति । साक्षादर्थनिष्ठः सांतरा परंपरया शब्दनिष्ठ इत्यर्थः । विभक्त्यर्थान्वये प्रकृतिजन्योपस्थितेर्हेतुत्वात् स्वशक्यसंबन्धेन गंगादिपदजन्यैव तीराद्युपस्थितिरित्येव युक्तमिति । शक्यसंबन्धस्यैव लक्षणात्वेऽपि तस्यापि परंपरयैव शब्दनिष्ठत्वं बोध्यम् । तथा च तीरादिरूपोऽर्थः स्वशक्यसामीप्यादिसंबन्धेन गंगापदवानिति ज्ञानमेव लक्षणाज्ञानम् । तदेव च शाब्दबोधे हेतुः । एवं च लक्षणाजन्यशाब्दबोधे तादृशज्ञानजन्योपस्थितित्वेन हेतुत्वमिति तीरं प्रवाहसंबन्धीति ज्ञानस्य न हेतुत्वेन शक्तिज्ञानजन्यस्मृतित्वेन हेतुत्वं वाच्यमित्यतिगौरवम् । एवं च यत्र

स्वसिद्धये पराक्षेपः परार्थं स्वसमर्पणम् ।

उपादानं लक्षणं चेत्युक्ता शुद्धैव सा द्विधा ॥ ५ ॥

जनपदशब्दा जने, त्वक्शब्दस्त्वगिन्द्रिये । प्रयोजनाद्यथा—‘ गङ्गायां घोषः ’ इत्यादौ । अत्र हि गङ्गातीरे घोष इति मुख्यशब्दात्तादृशं पावनत्वं न प्रतीयते यादृशं ‘ गङ्गायां घोषः ’ इति लाक्षणिकात् ।

लक्षणा तावद्विविधा—शुद्धा गौणी च । तत्राद्या द्विविधा—उपादान-लक्षणा लक्षणलक्षणा च । ते अपि प्रत्येकं सारोपा साध्यवसाना चेति द्विविधे । इति शुद्धाभेदाश्चत्वारः । गौणी तु द्वेधा—सारोपा साध्यवसाना च । इति षड्विधत्वं लक्षणायाः कारिकात्रयेण प्रतिपादयति—स्वसिद्धये इति ।

स्वसिद्धये स्वार्थस्यान्वयप्रवेशसिद्धये पराक्षेपः परलक्षणम् । स्वार्थ-परित्यागेन परार्थलक्षणमुपादानमित्यर्थः । अतः ‘ काकेभ्यो दाधि रक्ष्यताम् ’ इत्यस्य न तृतीयभेदत्वम् । एवं परार्थं स्वसमर्पणं परस्यान्वयप्रवेशसिद्धयर्थं स्वसमर्पणं स्वार्थसमर्पणं स्वार्थपरित्यागः । स्वार्थपरित्यागेन परार्थलक्षणं लक्षणमित्यर्थः । एताभ्यामुपाधिभ्यां शुद्धैव द्विविधोक्ता, न तु

कचित् तादृशपदसंबन्धाग्रहस्तीरादौ, किन्त्वर्थसंबन्धग्रह एव तत्रापि मानसतादृशग्रहोत्तरमेव लक्षणाजन्यबोध इति न व्यभिचारोऽपीत्याहुः । विवेचकत्वमिति । तद्रूपं सादृश्यमित्यर्थः । विवेचकत्वं च सतो ग्रहणमसतः परित्यागरूपं कुशग्राहिणि दक्षे च वर्तत इति भावः । कर्मणि कुशलः लावण्यं मंडपः कुण्डलमित्यादौ दक्षत्वादेः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वात् व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तस्य च झटित्यप्रतीतेर्बाधप्रतिसंधानं विनाऽपि तत्प्रतीतिश्च कुशोः कलचि कुशलपदस्य बैयकारणैः साधनाच्च रुद्धिशक्तिरेवात्रेति केचित् । इत एव वाऽस्वरसादाह—त्वगिति । एवं तैलपदस्य तिलविकारे द्रवे शक्तस्य सार्धपे निरुद्धलक्षणा । घोषः । आभीरपल्ली । अर्थांतरसंक्रमितवाच्यध्वन्यादिव्यवस्थायै लक्षणां विभजते—लक्षणेति । ते अपीति । उपादानलक्षणलक्षणे इत्यर्थः । तत्रोपादानलक्षणा सारोपा यथा । कुंताः पुरुषाः प्रविशन्ति । साध्यवसाना यथा । कुंताः प्रविशन्तीति । लक्षणलक्षणा तु तद्रूपा उदाहरिष्यते मूल एवेति बोध्यम् । ~~कर्मणोऽपि~~ कर्मपदसत्त्वासत्त्वमात्रेणारोपाध्यवसानव्यवहार इति बोध्यम् । ~~कर्मणोऽपि~~ कर्मपदसत्त्वासत्त्वमात्रेणारोपाध्यवसानव्यवहार इति बोध्यम् । ~~कर्मणोऽपि~~ कर्मपदसत्त्वासत्त्वमात्रेणारोपाध्यवसानव्यवहार इति बोध्यम् ।

१. परार्थं इति वा पाठः

कुन्ताः प्रविशन्ति यद्यः प्रविशन्ति इत्यादौ कुन्तादिभिरात्मनः प्रवेश-
गौण्यपीत्यर्थः । एते एवान्यत्र जहत्स्वार्थजहत्स्वार्थे इत्युच्येते । ननु
शुद्धैवेत्यनुपपन्नम् । गौण्या अपि तथात्वसंभवात् । तथा हि—‘गौर्वा-
हीकः’ इत्यादौ लक्षणलक्षणा तावत्स्फुटैव । उपादानलक्षणा तु गोवाही-
कोभयविषये गाव एते समानीयन्तामित्यादाविति चेत्, भैवम् । अत्रोपचा-
रबीजं संबन्धः सादृश्यमन्यो वा । आद्ये शक्यसादृश्यस्य शक्यावृत्तितया
कथं शक्यस्य अपि लक्ष्यता । येनोपादानलक्षणा स्यात् । अन्त्ये कथं गौणी ।
सादृश्यसंबन्धप्रयुक्तलक्षणाया एव गौणीत्वात् । तत्रोपादानलक्षणा यथा—
‘कुन्ताः प्रविशन्ति’ ‘यष्टीः प्रवेशय’ इत्यादौ । अत्र कुन्तादयः स्वतोऽसंभ-
वत्प्रवेशास्तत्सिद्धये स्वसंयोगिपुरुषल्लक्षयन्ति । यथा च ‘काकेभ्यो दधि
तिसत्त्वेऽपि शाब्दबोधेऽप्रवेशमात्रमित्याहुः । शक्यावृत्तितयेति । सादृश्यस्य
भेदघटितत्वादिति भावः । सादृश्यसंबन्धयुक्तलक्षणाया एव गौणीत्वा-
दिति । साधारणधर्मप्रकारेणेत्यादिः । एतेन कुन्ताः पुरुषा इत्यादौ सादृश्य-
संबन्धेन कुंतपदस्य कुंतवत्पुरुषलक्षणायां कुंतानुप्रवेशसत्त्वादुपादानत्वं दुर्वा-
रमित्यापास्तम् । एवं गंगैव घोषवतीत्यादौ शैत्यपावनत्वादिप्रकारलक्षणायां
कुन्ताः प्रविशन्तीत्यादावपि पीडाकारित्वादिना लक्षणायां च गौणत्वं संभवत्येव ।
लक्षणलक्षणात्वं तु गौण्या इष्टमेवेति भावः । नन्यास्तु यदा यत्किंचिद्गोसद-
शत्वेन गोवाहीकसमुदायप्रतिपिपादयिषया गाव एते यांतीति प्रयुक्तं तदा गौ-
ण्यप्याद्या दुर्वारैव । वस्तुतो रूपके भेदघटितसादृश्यस्यैव संबन्धतया वक्ष्य-
माणत्वेन सा दुर्वारैवेत्याहुः । केचित्तु पंकजं कुमुदमित्यादौ पंकजादिपदानां
योगार्थमात्रे लक्षणास्थले जहदजहल्लक्षणा तृतीयाऽपि । न च योगमात्रेण नि-
र्वाहे किमत्र लक्षणया । एकपदोपस्थाप्यत्वप्रत्यासत्त्या प्रथमं रूढ्यर्थे योगार्थ-
स्यान्वयेन जनितान्वयबोधतया निराकांक्षत्वेन पुनरनुसंधानकल्पने मानाभावेन
च कुमुदतात्पर्यग्रहस्य तद्वाधप्रतिसंधानपूर्वकं नियमेन ग्रहाच्च लक्षणाया
एवौचित्यात् । रूढ्यर्थविशेष्यकयोगार्थबोधस्यैव व्युत्पन्नत्वाच्चेत्याहुः ।
वस्तुतस्तु इयं जहत्स्वार्थैव । परार्थ स्वसमर्पणमिति तल्लक्षणात् । तत्र स्वसम-
र्पणं स्वार्थत्यागः । स च स्वार्थत्वावच्छिन्नस्य यस्य कस्यचित् अवच्छेदकाव-
च्छिन्नस्य वेत्यन्यदेतत् । असंभवत्प्रवेक्षाः । असंभवत्प्रवेशान्वयाः ।
तत्सिद्धये । स्वीयशक्यार्थस्य प्रवेशान्वयसिद्धये । कुंतसंयोगित्वं लक्ष्यत्वाव-

सिद्ध्यर्थं स्वसंयोगिनः पुरुषा आक्षिप्यन्ते, तत उपादानेनेयं लक्षणा
'गौरनुबन्धः' इत्यादौ श्रुतिचोदितमनुबन्धनं कथं मे स्यादिति जात्या
व्यक्तिराक्षिप्यते न तु शब्देनोच्यते 'विशेष्यं नाभिधा गच्छेत् क्षीणशक्ति-
विशेषणे' इति न्यायादित्युपादानलक्षणा तु नोदाहर्तव्या । न ह्यत्र प्रयोज-
नमस्ति । न वा रूढिरियम् । व्यक्त्यविनाभावित्वात् जात्या व्यक्तिराक्षि-

रक्ष्यताम् ' इत्यादि संग्रहस्तथोक्तम् । अन्ये पुनर्जातिपदार्थवादिन उपादान-
लक्षणामन्यामुदाहरन्ति । यथा—'गौरनुबन्धः' इति श्रुत्या प्रतिपादितमनुबन्धनं
गोपदार्थस्य जातेर्मम कथं स्यादिति जात्या अवच्छेदकतया कथंचित्स्वा-
वयसिद्धये व्यक्तिर्लक्ष्यते । ननु व्यक्तिरभिधेयैव न तु लक्ष्येति चेत्, न ।
तौ केवलायामेवाभिधा जातिविशिष्टायां वा । आद्ये आनन्त्यव्यभिचारौ ।
न्ये नागृहीतविशेषणान्यायेन जातावेवाभिधा । व्यक्तिप्रतीतिराक्षेपादेव
जात् । तदुक्तम्—'विशेष्यं नाभिधा गच्छेत्क्षीणशक्तिर्विशेषणे' इति ।
तद्विशेषलम् । प्रयोजनस्य रूढेर्वा तृतीयलक्षणाहेतोरभावात् । जातिव्य-
क्तिपदैदासीन्येन हि लोकप्रसिद्धिमाश्रित्य रूढिविचारः । कथं तर्हि भट्ट-

च्छेदकम् । अङ्गीकृतत्वप्रतीतिः प्रयोजनम् । यष्टीः प्रवेशयेत्यत्र च तात्पर्य-
विषयीभूतभोजनाद्यर्थप्रवेशाद्यन्वयानुपपत्तिर्द्रष्टव्या । रूढौ तु श्वेतो धावतीति ।
यत्तु शक्त्योपस्थितकृतस्य लक्षणयोपस्थितसंबन्धिन्यन्वयाद्विशिष्टलाभ इति ।
तत्र । एकपदार्थयोर्भेदेन परस्परमन्वयस्य एवकारातिरिक्तस्थलेऽस्वीकारात् ।
अत एव हरिर्धावतीत्यत इन्द्रसंबन्धी अश्वो धावतीति न बोधः । विद्वन्मानसेत्यादौ
अभेदेन बोधश्चेत्याहुः । अन्ये इति । मण्डनमिश्राः । स्यादिति त्यंतेन मुख्यार्थ-
बाधसूचनम् । अवच्छेदकतया । स्वनिष्ठपरिच्छेदकतानिरूपकत्वेन । अनेन लक्ष-
णामूलयोगप्रदर्शनम् । कथंचित् । परंपरया स्वान्वयिवृत्तित्वरूपया । स्वान्वय-
सिद्धये । स्वस्यानुबन्धनान्वयसिद्धये । नागृहीतेति । एवं च लाघवाज्जातावेव श-
क्तिरिति तद्भावः । आक्षेपादेवेति । आक्षेपोऽत्र लक्षणा । क्षीणशक्तिर्विशेषण
इति । उभयत्रापि शक्तिरिति मते इति भावः । तृतीयेति । तृतीयत्वं लक्षणाहेताव-
न्वेति । लोकप्रसिद्धीति । लक्ष्यार्थेन विनाकृतः शक्त्यर्थो यस्य तादृशे पदे य-
लक्ष्यार्थबोधकप्रयोगबाहुल्यं सा रूढिः । यथा देशमात्रे प्रयुक्तस्य कलिगपदस्य
तद्भासि । मवादपदस्य तु व्यक्तिं विना न कापि प्रयोग इति भावः ।

प्यते, यथा क्रियतामित्यत्र कर्ता, कुर्वित्यत्र कर्म, । प्रविश पिण्डीमित्यादौ
गृहं भक्षयेत्यादि च । पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते इत्यत्र च रात्रिभोजनं
न लक्ष्यते । श्रुतार्थापत्तेरर्थापत्तेर्वा तस्य विषयत्वात् । गङ्गायां घोष इत्यत्र
तटस्य घोषाधिकरणत्वसिद्धये गङ्गाशब्दः स्वार्थमर्पयति इत्वेवमादौ
लक्षणेनैषा लक्षणा । उभयरूपा चेयं शुद्धा । उपपत्तेरप्यभिधितत्वात् ।

मते व्यक्तिप्रतीतिः । जात्या आक्षेपात् । व्यक्तिं विना तस्या अभावात् ।
यथा क्रियतामित्यत्र क्रियया कर्तुः, कुर्वित्यत्र कर्मणः ।

अपरे तु—“पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते इति वाक्यमभोजी पीन इतिवत्पी-
नत्वान्वयप्रयोजकस्य भोजित्वस्याप्रतीत्या योग्यतामलभमानमन्वयं न बोधयति ।
तेन तत्सिद्धये रात्रिभोजनं लक्ष्यते । तथा च दिवा न भुङ्क्ते इति । मुख्यमर्थमादायैव
तल्लक्षणेन्युपादानलक्षणाय” इत्याहुः । तदप्यसम्यक् । शब्दाध्याहारनये श्रुतार्था-
पत्तेः, अर्थाध्याहारनयेऽर्थापत्तेरेव रात्रिभोजनप्रत्ययेन लक्षणानङ्गीकारात् । लक्षण-
लक्षणा तु ‘गङ्गायां घोषः’ इत्यादौ । अत्र तटोद्घोषाधिकरणत्वसिद्धये गङ्गादिशब्दाः
स्वार्थमर्पयन्ति । स्वार्थं परित्यज्य तत्रैव वर्तन्ते । उभयरूपा चेयमुदाहृता शुद्धा

जात्याऽऽक्षेपादिति । आक्षेपोऽत्रानुमानम् । व्यक्तिं विना इत्यनेन व्यासिर्दिशिता ।
अनुमानसहकृतपदेनैव व्यक्तिबोधः । पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितिहेतुहेतुमद्भवे
वृत्त्येत्यस्य गौरवेणाप्रवेश इति भावः । प्रकृत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्ति-
रपि प्रकृतितात्पर्यविषयान्वितत्वविषयेति न विभक्त्यर्थान्वयानुपपत्तिरिति भावः ।
एवं चान्यलभ्यत्वादपि न लक्षणेति बोध्यम् । वस्तुतो लक्षणायामपि नोपादान-
त्वं जातेरनुबन्धनाद्यन्वयाभावेन विशेष्यान्वयिना तथान्वयादिति तत्त्वम् ।
यथेति । कृतिः साश्रया गुणत्वात्, सविषया कृतित्वादित्यनुमानेन तयोर्लभः
इति भावः । अत्र भट्टमते कथं व्यक्तिप्रतीतिरिति वदता स्वमते व्यंजनया सा
इति सूचितम् । श्रुतार्थापत्तेरिति । श्रुतं शब्दः तत्कल्पकार्थापत्तेरित्यर्थः ।
श्रुतशब्दादन्वयबोधानुपपत्तौ शब्दकल्पनं श्रुतार्थापत्तिः । अर्थापत्तेरिति ।
प्रत्यक्षादिना प्रमितस्य दिवा अभोजिसंबन्धिपीनत्वस्य तद्विनाऽनुपपत्तेरिति
भावः । घोषादिकरणत्वसिद्धये इति । तदन्वयसिद्धये इत्यर्थः । स्वार्थम् ।
स्वशक्यं प्रवाहरूपम् । अर्पयति । अन्वयबोधनांगमुपस्थापयति । तत्रैव
वर्तते । तद्विषयमेव बोधं जनयतीत्यर्थः । शुद्धैवेति व्याचष्टे—उभयेति ।

१ सः ता । वृत्तिप्रयोज्योपस्थितिश्च शाब्दादौ कारणम् । यथेति । कृतिर्जातिर्वा
साध्या धर्मत्वात् इति अनुमानेन ।

अनयोर्भेदयोर्लक्ष्यस्य लक्षकस्य च न भेदरूपं तादस्थम् । तटादीनां गङ्गादिशब्दैः प्रतिपादने तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तौ हि प्रतिपिपादयिषितप्रयोजनसंप्रत्ययः । गंगासंबन्धमात्रप्रतीतौ तु गङ्गातटे घोष इति मुख्यशब्दामिधानाल्लक्षणायाः को भेदः ।

न तु गौणी । उपचारमिश्रा हि गौणीत्युच्यते । उपचारश्च सादृश्यसंबन्धेन प्रवृत्तिः । सादृश्यातिशयमहिम्ना भिन्नयोर्भेदप्रतीतिस्थगनं वा । न चोक्तयोस्तत्संभवः ।

केचित्पुनराचक्षते—“ उपचारामिश्रत्वं न शुद्धाया मिश्रातो भेदकम्, किं तु तदस्थत्वम् । तच्च लक्षकस्य मुख्यार्थस्य लक्ष्यस्य च भेदप्रतीतिः । तथा हि ‘ गौर्वाहीकः ’ ‘ गौरयम् ’ इत्यादौ भेदेऽपि शक्यलक्ष्ययोरभेदः प्रतीयते, न तु ‘ गङ्गायां घोषः ’ इत्यादौ । तत्र भेदमात्रप्रतीतिः ” इति ।

अन्ये तु—“ गङ्गायां घोषः ’ ‘ यष्टीः प्रवेशाय ’ इत्यनयोरेव परस्परभेदहेतुस्तदस्थत्वम् । गङ्गायामित्यत्र तत्सत्त्वात् । यष्टीरित्यत्र तदभावात् ” इति मन्यन्ते । तदुभयमप्यसत् । अस्ति हि प्रतिगङ्गादिपदैस्तीरादिप्रतिपादने गङ्गादिनिष्ठपावनत्वादिरूपप्रतिपिपादयिषितप्रयोजनसंप्रत्ययः । तत्र गङ्गात्वादप्रतीतिरेव बीजम्, न तु तीरत्वादिप्रतीतिरेव । ‘ तीरे घोषः ’ इत्यापि तत्प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गात् । अथ गङ्गाशब्देन तदप्रतिपादने गङ्गासंबन्धस्तत्र प्रतीयते । तदेव च तद्वीजमिति चेत्, न । एवं हि ‘ गङ्गातटे घोषः ’ इति मुख्यशब्दप्रयोगेऽपि तत्प्रतीतिः स्यात् । तत्संबन्धप्रतीतौ विशेषाभावात् । अथ बाधे जागरुके कथं गङ्गाशब्दादिभिर्गङ्गात्वादिकं तीरे बोध्यत इति चेत्, उच्यते । शब्देन लक्ष्येऽर्थे प्रतिपादिते तत्र मुख्याभेदो व्यञ्जनया प्रतिपाद्यते । तदेतदुक्तम्—“ तटादीनां गङ्गादिशब्दैः प्रतिपादने तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिपिपादयिषितप्रयोजनसंप्रत्ययः ” इति । अत्र

गौणीभेदः साध्यः । उपचारामिश्रत्वं हेतुः । न चोक्तयोरिति । शक्याभेदप्रतीत्यापि भेदस्थगनं नास्तीति भावः । शुद्धायाः । उक्तद्विविधायाः । मिश्रातः । गौणीतः । भेदप्रतीतिरिति । भेदमात्रप्रतीतिरित्यर्थः । अभेदः प्रतीयत इति । फलतयेति शेषः । एवं हि गंगातटे इति । गंगादिपदजन्यतटत्वादिविशिष्टशब्दबोधत्वमेव तद्विषयमकमस्तु किमभेदप्रत्ययेन । त्वामस्मि वच्मि, कमलानि कम्पयन्ति, उपकृतं बहु नाम, साहेन्तीत्यादौ वाच्यार्थाभेदप्रत्ययस्य प्रकृताननुगुणत्वमिति नञ्याः । गंगादिशब्दैः । गंगादिबोधकशब्दैः । तत्त्वेति । गंगात्वेत्य-

सारोपाऽन्या तु यत्रोक्तौ विषयी विषयस्तथा ।

आरोप्यमाणः आरोपविषयश्च यत्रानपहृतभेदौ सामानाधिकरण्ये-
न निर्विश्येते सा लक्षणा सारोपा । *is not gone*

प्रतिपादने इति सतिसप्तम्या प्रत्ययस्यानन्तर्यं बोध्यते । न च व्यञ्जने बाधः प्रतिबन्धक इति काव्यविदां पन्थाः । वक्ष्यति हि—‘ सारोपसाध्यवसानयोगौ-
णभेदयोर्भेदेऽप्यभेदावगमः सर्वथैवाभेदप्रतीतिश्च फलम् ’ इति । किं बहुना बाधित एव पावनत्वादिविशेषस्तटादौ प्रतीयते । यत्सूत्रयिष्यति—‘ योगः फलै नो ’ इति । नन्वेवं कथं गौण्यामेवाभेदप्रत्ययं प्रयोजनं वक्ष्यति, शुद्धभेदयोस्तु प्रयोजनान्तरमिति चेत्, न । गौण्यां तन्मात्रस्य प्रयोजनत्वात् । शुद्धभेदयोस्तु मुख्यस्य प्रयोजनान्तरस्यापि भावात्, न तु शुद्धायामभेदप्रत्ययस्याभावादिति संक्षेपः । गौणीभेदौ लक्ष्यत्रेव विभजते—सारोपेति ।

अन्या अर्थाद्वौणी आरोपाध्यवसानाम्यां भिद्यते, न तूपादानलक्षणाभ्यामिति तुशब्दार्थः । विषयी आरोप्यमाणो गवादिः, विषय आरोपस्य बाहीकादिश्च यत्र तथा अनपहृतभेदौ सामानाधिकरण्येनोक्तौ शब्दप्रतिपाद्यौ सा

र्थः । गंगाऽभेदेति यावत् । न च व्यञ्जने इति । बाधितार्थबोधकतयैव तस्या धर्मिग्राहकमानसिद्धत्वादिति भावः । येषां तु बाधज्ञानं न बोधे प्रतिबन्धकं तन्मते व्यञ्जने इत्यस्य तज्जन्यबोधे प्रामाण्यग्रहे इत्यर्थः । व्यञ्जनायां बाधस्याप्रतिबन्धकत्वे संमतिमाह—वक्ष्यति हीति । द्वितीयमपि न युक्तम् । यष्टीरित्यस्य गंगायामित्यतो विशेषाभावादिति दिक् । संक्षेप इति । नव्यास्तु शक्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकलक्ष्यबोध एव लक्षणाज्ञानस्य कार्यम् । एवं च गंगात्वादिनैव तीरस्य बोध इति । शैत्यपावनत्वादिप्रतीतये मध्ये शक्याभेदविषयकं ज्ञानांतरं नांज्जीकार्यम् । न चैवं प्रवाहत्वविशिष्टे घोषाभावज्ञानेन तीरादौ प्रवाहत्वाभावज्ञानेन च प्रतिबन्धात्कथं लक्ष्यार्थबोध इति वाच्यम् । बाधबुद्धेः शाब्दबोधाप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् । न चैवमपि जायमानबोधे अप्रामाण्यशङ्काजनने ततश्चमत्कारानापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । विषयतासंबन्धेन शक्यतावच्छेदकतत्सामानाधिकरणधर्मे तदन्यतरविषयकबाधग्रहजन्याप्रामाण्यज्ञानं प्रति जनकतारूपविषयनिष्ठप्रत्यासत्त्या लक्षणाज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वाच्च दोष इत्याहुः । सामानाधिकरण्ये-
भोक्ताधिति । समानविभक्तिरूपदोषस्थाप्यत्वादभेदसंसर्गकान्वययोगावुक्ता-

विषय्यन्तःकृतेऽन्यास्मिन्सा स्यात्साध्यवसानिका ॥६॥

विषयिणाऽऽरोप्यमाणेनान्तःकृते निगीर्णे अन्यस्मिन्नारोपविषये सति सा साध्यवसाना ।

भेदाविमौ च सादृश्यात्संबन्धान्तरतस्तथा ।

गौणौ शुद्धौ च विज्ञेयौ,

इमावारोपाध्यवसानरूपौ सादृश्यहेतुकभेदौ गौर्वाहीक इत्यत्र गौरय-
मित्यत्र च । अत्र हि स्वार्थसहचारिणो गुणा जाड्यादयो लक्ष्यमाणा अपि
गोशब्दस्य परार्थाभिधाने प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वमुपयान्ति इति केचित् ।

लक्षणा सारोपा । विषयविषयिणोर्भेदेनोपन्यासस्यात्रारोपपदार्थत्वात् ।
विषयीति ।

विषयिणा आरोप्यमाणेनान्यस्मिन्नारोपविषयेऽन्तः कृते निगीर्णे । भेदे-
नानुपस्थित इति यावत् । विषयिमात्रं यत्र निर्दिश्यते, न तु विषयोऽपि
सा साध्यवसाना । विषयिणा विषयतिरोभावस्यात्राध्यवसानपदार्थत्वात् ।

एतौ भेदौ शुद्धाभेदेऽपि भवत इति प्रतिपादयन्नेव शुद्धाया गौण्याश्च
लक्षणमाह—भेदाविति ।

इमावारोपाध्यवसानरूपौ भेदौ । तौ यदि सादृश्यसंबन्धात्तदा गौणौ ।
अथ संबन्धान्तरात्तदा शुद्धौ । तत्र सादृश्याद्यथा—‘गौर्वाहीकः’ इति
सारोपः । ‘गौरयम्’ इति साध्यवसानः । यद्यपि वाहीकस्य वाहीकत्वेन
इदंतया वोपस्थितौ सारोपत्वमेवोचितम्, तथापीदं त्वस्यारोप्यविशेषणतया
तदुदाहरणं द्रष्टव्यम् । अत एव वक्ष्यते अनिश्चयरूपसंकरावसरे—“नयना-
नन्ददायीन्दोर्बिम्बमेतत्प्रसीदति’ इत्यत्रैतदिति बिम्बविशेषणतया किमियमति-
शयोक्तिः किं वैतदिति वक्तुं निर्दिश्य बिम्बमित्यारोपाद्रूपकम् ” इति ।

अत्र केचित्—‘गोशब्दस्य मुख्यतो गोत्वं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम्, लक्षणया
तु गोशब्दार्थगतं जाड्यमान्धादि तथा भवतीति गोशब्देन जडत्वेन रूपेण

वित्यर्थः । अतीतत्वमविवक्षितम् । तदाह—शब्दप्रतिपाद्याविति । एवं च तदन्वये
वाचाल्लक्षणाप्रसर इति भावः । विषयतावच्छेदकरूपेण शब्दजन्यविषयप्रति-
पत्तिकालिकी विषयिणो साधारणवर्मादिप्रकारिकोपस्थितिः सारोपेत्यर्थः । एवं
साध्यवसानाः विषयविषयप्रतिपत्त्यकालिकी सेति बोध्यम् । मुख्यत इति ।
लक्षणया गोशब्दार्थप्रतिपादकत्वे इत्यर्थः । लक्षणया वाहीकरूपार्थप्रतिपादने

स्वार्थसहचारिणुणाभेदेन परार्थगता गुणा एव लक्ष्यन्ते न तु परार्थो-
ऽभिधीयते इत्यन्वे । साधारणगुणाभ्यन्तरेण परार्थ एव लक्ष्यते इत्यपरे ।

वाहीक उच्यते ।' तदुक्तम् । अशक्यस्याशक्यवृत्तेश्च धर्मव्याप्रवृत्तिनिमि-
त्तत्वात् । शक्यत्वे शक्यवृत्तित्वे स्वभिन्नशक्यानधिकरणत्वस्य तत्त्वात् ।

अपरे तु—' न गवादिशब्देन वाहीकादिः प्रतिपाद्यते । किं तु गवादिग-
तस्य जाड्यादिगुणस्याभिन्नतया वाहीकादिगता जाड्यादयो गुणा एव लक्ष्य-
न्ते ' इत्याहुः । तदप्यसम्यक् । गौर्वाहीक इत्यादिसामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तेः ।

इदं पुनरत्र तत्त्वम्—साधारणं जाड्यमान्यादि लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकमाश्रित्य
वाहीकादिर्लक्ष्यत इति । तेन ' जडो वाहीकः ' इत्यादि वाक्यार्थो भवति ।

तु लक्षणयोपस्थितं गोवृत्तिजाड्यादि तथा प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । उच्यत इति ।
शक्यता बोध्यत इत्यर्थः । अशक्यस्येति । जाड्यस्य लक्ष्यत्वात् वाहीके
संकेतविरहेण तस्य गोपदाशक्यत्वाच्च गोवृत्तिजाड्यस्य तदवृत्तित्वाच्चेति भावः ।
शक्यवृत्तिद्रव्यत्वादावतिप्रसंगवारणाय शक्यत्वे इति । व्यक्तिमात्रबोधका-
काशादिपदबोध्याकाशादिव्यक्तावतिप्रसंगवारणाय शक्यवृत्तित्वे इति । न
च तत्र स्वभिन्नशक्याप्रसिद्ध्या तृतीयदलभावः । स्वभिन्नशक्याधिकरणं
यद्यत् तद्भेदस्यैव विवक्षणात् । कचित्पुत्रादावाकाशादिपदसंकेते तत्प्रसिद्धेश्च ।
अवयवसंयोगरूपाकृतेरपि शक्यत्ववादिनां मते तत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय वा तत् ।
अवयवभूतद्वयतिप्रसंगवारणाय शक्यानधिकरणत्वे इति । तस्य शक्यत्वे
स्वावयवरूपशक्यवृत्तित्वे सत्यवयवविरूपशक्याधिकरणत्वात् । प्रमेयपदप्र-
वृत्तिनिमित्ते प्रमेयत्वेऽव्याप्तिवारणायः स्वभिन्नेति । प्रमेयत्वस्यापि प्रमाविषय-
त्वात् । येन संबन्धेन शक्यवृत्तिता तेन संबन्धेन स्वभिन्नशक्यानधिकरणत्वस्य
विवक्षणादेकार्थसमवायेनः सत्पदशक्यैकत्वस्य सत्पदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तसत्तायां स-
त्त्वेऽपि तत्र नाव्याप्तिः । स्वभिन्नपदे च प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं तत्समानियतधर्मभिन्नत्वं
विवक्षणीयम् । तेन प्रमेयत्वे स्वभिन्नवाच्यत्वसत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिरित्यन्यत्र विस्तरः ।
आभिन्नतयेति । साजात्येन वेत्यपि बोध्यम् । गुणा एवेति । न गुणि-
न इत्यर्थः । तेषां वाहीकशब्ददेव लभादिति भावः । अनुपपत्तेरिति । न च
जातिशक्ताविव अनुमानसहकृतपदेन व्यक्तिबोधानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् ।
अवयवानुपपत्त्या प्रसरन्त्या लक्षणायाः साक्षादन्वययोग्यार्थबोधकतैर्बोधितैस्त्वानि-

उक्तं चान्यत्र—“अभिधेयाविनाभूतप्रतीतिर्लक्षणोच्यते । लक्ष्यमाणगुणैर्योगादवृत्तेरिष्टा तु गौणता” इति । अविनाभावोऽत्र संबन्धमात्रं, न तु नान्तरायकत्वम्, तत्त्वे हि मन्त्राः क्रोशन्तीत्यादौ लक्षणा न स्यात्, अविनाभावे चाक्षेपेणैव सिद्धेर्लक्षणाया नोपयोग इत्युक्तम्, आयुर्घृतम्, आयु-

तदुक्तमन्यत्र—

‘मानान्तरविरोधे तु मुख्यार्थस्यापरिग्रहे ।

अभिधेयाविनाभूतप्रतीतिर्लक्षणोच्यते ।

लक्ष्यमाणगुणैर्योगादवृत्तेरिष्टा तु गौणता ॥’ इति ।

लक्ष्यमाणगुणैरिति लक्ष्यमाणा ये गुणा जाड्यादयस्तैरेव यदि योगः शक्यसंबन्धस्तदा गौणी वृत्तिरिति । अविनाभावश्चात्र संबन्धमात्रमभिम-
तम् । न तु व्याप्तिः । ‘मन्त्राः क्रोशन्ति’ इत्यादावभावात् । दशाविशेष-
विशिष्टस्य तत्रापि सास्त्येवेति चेत्, तर्हि आक्षेपादेव व्यापकप्रतीतिरस्तु
किं लक्षणयेत्युक्तं ‘गौरनुबन्धः’ इत्यत्र । संबन्धान्तरात्सारोपो यथा—

प्रायात् । अभिधेयाविनाभूतेति । अविनाभावः संबन्धः । तद्ग्रहश्च लोके
धर्मिण्येवेति तदाशयः । एतेन गौणी अतिरिक्ता वृत्तिरित्यपास्तम् । लक्ष्य-
माणगुणैरिति । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकैरित्यर्थः । गुणलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकिका लक्षणा
गौणीति भावः । अनेन लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकेऽपि लक्षणां सूचयति । प्रतीतिरिति
उपस्थितेर्लक्षणात्वे भावे किन् । पक्षांतरे तु करणे इति बोध्यम् । तैरेव
यदि योग इति । तद्द्वारको यदि योग इत्यर्थः । आह्लादयति मुखेदुरित्यादौ
धर्मत्वेनैवावृत्तिधर्मस्य लक्षणान्न पौनरुक्त्यम् । धर्मत्वेन च प्रत्यासत्त्योपात्त-
धर्मस्यैव भानमित्याहुः । केचित्तु सदृशत्वेनैव सदृशो लक्ष्यते । शक्यसंबन्धोऽ-
प्येतदेव । न चैवं सादृश्यस्य शब्दोपात्तत्वे चंद्र इव मुखमित्यादाविवोपमैव
स्यादिदुर्मुखमित्यादौ । किं च वाहीकोऽयं न गोसदृशोऽपि तु गौरैवेत्यादौ
सादृश्यव्यतिरेकमिश्रिते सादृश्यबुद्ध्ययोग इति वाच्यम् । भेदगर्भसादृश्यप्र-
तीतौ हि उपमा । तदेव च सदृशादिपदवाच्यम् । तदगर्भसादृश्यं च लक्ष्य-
तावच्छेदकम् । न गोसदृश इत्यादिना निषेधोऽपि भेदगर्भस्यैवेति न दोष
इत्याहुः । दशाविशेषेति । क्रोशनिशेषेत्यर्थः । आक्षेपादेव व्यापकप्रतीति-
रिति । आक्षेपोऽनुमानम् । तथा च शब्दसहकृतानुमानेनोपस्थिते तटादौ
बोधयितुं शक्यत्वात् । प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यर्थान्वयव्युत्पत्तिः प्रकृतिसहकृता-
नुमानेनोपस्थितत्वात् । व्यापकत्वरूपसंबन्धस्य लक्षणाबीज-

रेवेदमित्यादौ सादृश्यादन्यत् कार्यकारणभावादि संबन्धान्तरम् । एवमादौ च कार्यकारणभावादिलक्षणेपूर्वे आरोपाध्यवसाने । अत्र गौणभेदयोर्भेदोऽपि तादृष्यप्रतीतिः सर्वथैवाभेदावगमश्च प्रयोजनम् । शुद्धभेद-

‘ आयुर्धृतम् ’ इति । साध्यवसानो यथा—‘ आयुरेवेदम् ’ इति । एवमादौ सादृश्यादन्यो यः कार्यकारणभावादिः संबन्धस्तत्पूर्वके आरोपाध्यवसाने । अत्र गौणभेदे सारोपे भेदोऽपि तादृष्यप्रतीतिः । साध्यवसाने सर्वथैवाभेदावगमः प्रयोजनम् । शुद्धभेदे तु सारोपे अन्यवैलक्षण्येन कार्यकारित्वादेः, साध्यवसाने त्वव्यभिचारेण कार्यकारित्वादेः प्रतीतिः फलम् । तदुभयं

त्वे मानाभावाच्च । व्यापकत्वाग्रहेऽपि लक्षणाप्रसरात् । आयुर्धृतमिति । आयुरत्र दीर्घकालजीवनम् । जनकत्वं संबन्धः । स एव च लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकम् । भेदोऽपि तादृष्येति । भिन्नधर्मप्रकारकोपस्थितावपि सादृश्यातिशयमहिम्ना तादृष्यप्रत्यय इत्यर्थः । तत्र प्रथमतो जडगवोरेकशब्दबोधयतयाऽभेदप्रतीतौ व्यञ्जनया गङ्गाभिन्नजडाभेदस्य वाहीके प्रतीत्या तदुपपत्तिः । इयं चाहार्या । शब्दतो भेदस्याप्युपस्थितेः । वस्तुतो लक्षणया सादृश्यबोधे तन्महिम्ना गोत्ववाहीकत्वयोः सामानाधिकरण्यसंभावनया ज्ञातस्यापि भेदज्ञानस्य वाच्यबोधकालिकस्य तिरोधानादनाहार्यैव सा । तस्याः वैयञ्जनिकत्वेन तस्यां बाधबुद्धेरप्रतिबन्धकत्वाच्च । सर्वथैवेति । वाच्यार्थबोधवेलायामपि शब्दजभेदकधर्मानुपस्थितेरिति भावः । एतेन मुख्यार्थबाधज्ञानविधया भेदस्योपस्थितिरस्त्येवेति परास्तम् । एवं च शुक्तौ रजतत्वारोपे शुक्तित्वेनैव वाहीकत्वेन तदनुपस्थितिरिवेति बोध्यम् । नव्यास्तु साध्यवसानास्थले गोत्वेनैव वाहीकस्य बोधः । शक्यतावच्छेदकातिरिक्तरूपेण शक्यबोधे लक्षणाया इव शक्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण शक्यान्यबोधोऽपि तत्प्रसरादित्याहुः । अव्यभिचारेणेति । कारणात्कार्यस्य भेदग्रहे सति व्यभिचारसंभावनासंभवेन सारोपायां नेदं प्रयोजनम् । साध्यवसानायां तु भेदतिरस्कारात् अभेदग्रहेण व्यभिचारशंकाया अपि अयोग इति भावः । लक्षकगतधर्मप्रतीतिरेव प्रयोजनमिति त्वश्रद्धेयम् । उपकृतमित्यादौ व्यभिचारात् इत्याहुः । परे तु शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपेण शक्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारक एव तीरादिबोधो लक्षणायामिति गौतमसूत्रे पुंयोगादिति सूत्रे महाभाष्ये च स्पष्टमिति निरूपितं मंजूषायाम् । एवं च गंगात्वादिनैव तीरबोधः । न चारोपितगंगा-

त्वेन बोधेऽपि तस्य ज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वात् शास्त्रज्ञानवतां सर्वथा तत्त्वेन
 ग्रहणं तदुत्तरं गंगागतशैत्यपावनत्वप्रतीतिरूपं प्रयोजनं न सिध्येत् । अतः
 एव शुक्तिरजतज्ञाने भ्रमत्वग्रहे तत्र न प्रवर्तते इति वाच्यम् । मध्ये व्यंज-
 नया मुख्यगंगापदार्थाभेदस्य प्रतीतिः । व्यंजनाजन्यज्ञाने च बाधज्ञानेन
 नाप्रामाण्यग्रह इति न दोषः । तदुक्तम्—तटादीनां गंगादिशब्दैः प्रति-
 पादने तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिपिपादयिषितप्रयोजनसंप्रत्यय इति । तत्त्वेत्यस्य
 मुख्यगंगाऽभेदेत्यर्थः । न च लक्षणामूलतया गंगासंबन्धप्रतीत्या तत्सिद्धिः ।
 गंगातटे बोध इत्यतोऽपि तत्प्रतीत्यापत्तेः । तदुक्तम्—गंगासंबन्धमात्रप्रतीतौ तु
 गंगातटे बोध इति मुख्यशब्दाल्लक्षणायाः को भेद इति । कुंताः प्रविशंती-
 त्यादावपि कुंतत्वादिना कुंतयुक्तपुरुषप्रतीतिः । अत एवात्र न मतुप् । तेषु च
 मुख्यकुंताभेदप्रतीत्या कुंतगततैक्ष्ण्यादिप्रतीतिरूपप्रयोजनसिद्धिः । तदुक्तम्—
 कुंतादिभिरात्मनः प्रवेशान्वयसिद्ध्यर्थं स्वसंयोगिनः पुरुषा आशिष्यन्ते इति ।
 आशिष्यन्ते इत्यस्य स्वगतकुंतत्वाद्याश्रयत्वेन बाध्यन्ते इत्यर्थः । गौर्वाहीक
 इत्यत्र साधारणगुणरूपसादृश्याश्रयणेन वाहीकस्यैवारोपितगोत्वेन बोधस्ततो
 व्यंजनया मुख्यगवाभेदप्रतीतिः प्रयोजनम् । तत एव चमत्कारः । आद्यबोधेन
 तु न चमत्कारः । तस्मिन् भ्रमत्वज्ञानात् । अत एव गौर्वाहीको जड
 इत्यादौ न पौनरुक्त्यम् । आयुर्वृतमित्यादौ कार्यकारणभावसंबन्धादा-
 युष्ट्येन घृतबोधः । ततो व्यंजनयाऽन्यवैलक्ष्ण्येनायुःकारित्वरूपप्रयोजनप्र-
 तीतिः । तदुक्तम्—साधारणगुणाश्रयणेन परार्थो लक्ष्यते इत्यपरे । लक्ष्य-
 माणगुणैर्योगाद्वृत्तेरिष्टा तु गौणता । गौणभेदे भेदेऽपि ताद्रूप्यप्रतीतिः
 प्रयोजनं शुद्धभेदयोस्त्वन्यवैलक्ष्ण्येन तत्कार्यकारित्वादिप्रतीतिरिति । लक्ष्य-
 माणगुणैरित्यस्य ज्ञायमानगुणैरित्यर्थः । यदुणज्ञानपूर्वकं वाहीके गोशब्दप्र-
 योगस्तद्वृत्तरूपात्संबन्धादिति यावत् । साधारणगुणाश्रयणेनेत्यस्य तद्रूपसंबन्धेने-
 त्यर्थः । अत्रत्यप्रदीपस्तु मतांतरपरतया कथंचिन्नेयः । लक्ष्यमाणगुणैरित्यत्र
 प्रकृत्यादित्वाद्युत्तीया । अनया रीत्याऽन्योऽपि प्रकाशग्रंथो योज्यः । एतेन
 रूपके न लक्षणं समानविभक्तिकत्वेन नामार्थयोरभेदान्वयोपपत्त्या लक्षणा-
 फलभाववृत्त्यादि दीक्षितादिनव्योक्तं परास्तम् । गौर्न वाहीक इत्यादिबाध-
 ज्ञानेन तद्बोधे अप्रामाण्यग्रहजननात्ततश्चमत्कारानापत्तेः । मम तु तस्य
 लक्षणामूलव्यंजनाजन्यत्वेन तत्र बाधज्ञानेनाप्रामाण्यग्रहाजननात्
 इति वदति । इदमेव युक्तम् । अन्यथा गंगादिपदजन्यतटादिशब्दबो-

योस्त्वन्यवैलक्षण्येनाव्यभिचारेणैव कार्यकारित्वादि । क्वचित् तादृश्या-
नुपचारः । यथा इन्द्रार्था स्थूणा इन्द्रः । क्वचित् स्वस्वामिभावसंबन्धात् ।
यथा राजकीयः पुरुषो राजा । क्वचिदवयववाक्यविभावात् । यथा अग्रहस्त
इत्यत्राग्रमात्रेऽवयवे हस्तः । क्वचित् तात्कर्म्यात् । यथा अतक्षा तक्षा ।

चाभेदप्रतीतिपूर्वकमित्युक्तम् । क्वचित्प्रयोजनकत्वेनोपचारः । यथा इन्द्रार्था
स्थूणा इन्द्रः । क्वचित्स्वस्वामिभावतः । यथा राजकीयः पुरुषो राजा । क-
चिदवयववाक्यविभावात् । यथा कर्मधारये अग्रहस्त इत्यत्रावयवेऽग्रमात्रे
हस्तोपचारः । क्वचित्दीयकर्मशालित्वात् । यथा अतक्षा तक्षा ।

धस्यैव प्रयोजनप्रतीतिनियामकत्वेन गंगातटे इत्यादितस्तदभावोपपत्तौ मध्येऽ-
भेदप्रतीतिः प्रकाशाद्युक्ताऽसंगता स्यात् । मम तु यथा तदुपयोगस्तदुक्तं
तद्बोधे भ्रमत्वग्रहादिति दिक् । क्वचित्प्रयोजकत्वेनेति । इन्द्रपूजाप्रयो-
जके तत्प्रयोजकत्वव्यवहारो गौणः । स्थूणा । स्तम्भः । अग्रमात्रे इति ।
विजातीयसंयोगं प्राप्तोऽवयवपुंज एवावयवीति मते अवयवान्तरव्युदासाय मात्र-
पदम् । एवं गंगा तु हरते पापं दृष्ट्वा पीतावर्गाहितेत्यादौ पीतेत्यंशे गंगापदस्य
तदवयवे लक्षणा । दर्शनादिनाऽत्युकृष्टधर्मजनकतावच्छेदकजातेः प्रवाहमात्र-
वृत्तेरेव गंगापदशक्यत्वात् गंगाजलवत्यपि नात्र गंगेति प्रतीतिः । गंगायां
जलमिति तु गवि साक्षा वृक्षे शास्त्रेतिवद्बोद्धव्यम् । तप्तेति । इदं जातिविशे-
षावच्छिन्ने रूढम् । अत्र वदन्ति । सारोपायां चंद्रो मुखमित्यादौ न लक्षणा । फल-
भावात् । नामार्थयोरभेदस्य वाक्यविधयैव प्रतीत्युपपत्तेः । प्रसिद्धत्वादिनौप-
स्थितसादृश्येन पूर्वोक्तरीत्याऽप्रामाण्यज्ञानानास्कंदितानाहार्याभेदबुद्ध्युपपत्तेः ।
बाधबुद्धिप्रतिबद्धचतावच्छेदककोटौ अनाहार्यत्वस्येव शाब्दान्यत्वस्थापि
निवेशाद्वा न दोषः । योग्यताज्ञानं च न शाब्दे कारणं अपि तु प्रामाण्यग्रहे
एवेति न दोषः । भेदकधर्मोपस्थितिकालिकाभेदप्रतीतौ रूपकं अन्यथाऽति-
शयोक्तिरिति व्यवस्थासंभवेन मुखं चंद्र इत्यादौ अतिशयोक्तिरेव स्यादिति
निरस्तम् । न चैवं सारोपलक्षणा किं नास्त्येव । अस्ति वाहीकोऽपरो गौरित्यादौ ।
तत्र ह्यपरादिपदैः प्रसिद्धगोभेदप्रतिपादनेन विरोधान्न वाच्ययोरभेद-
प्रतीतिः । किं तु तत्सदृशे लक्षणैव । लक्षणायाश्च न शक्याभेदबुद्धिः
फलम् । किं तु सादृश्यातिशयबुद्धिः । एवं च सकलतत्कार्यकारित्वं फलति ।
एवमपूर्वो गौरिति वाहीकामिप्रायेण प्रयुक्तेऽपि बोद्धव्यम् । तत्रापि न प्रसि-

लक्षणा तेन षड्विधा ॥ ७ ॥

आद्यभेदाभ्यां सह । सा च

लक्षणा तेनेति ।

उपादानलक्षणरूपशुद्धभेदाभ्यां सह । रूढिप्रयोजनाभ्यां भेदे संभवत्यपि । ते विभाजकत्वेनोक्ते किं तु हेतुत्वेनेति न तत्कृतो भेदो गणितः । अतः
द्वयभावेदो लक्षणाफलम् । अपूर्वपदेन तिरस्कारात् । बाहीकत्वाद्यप्रतीतिकृत-
वाधिकचमत्कारः । न चैवमुपमाया अपि रूपकत्वापत्तिः । यत्र सादृश्यप्रती-
तेकृतश्चमत्कारस्तत्रोपमा, यत्र त्वभेदप्रतीतिकृतः सादृश्यातिशयप्रतीति-
कृतश्च तत्र रूपकमिति स्वीकारात् । इदमेवाभिप्रेत्य गौर्वाहीक इत्यादौ
प्रभेदरूपकतिशयोक्ती, बाहीकोऽयमपरो गौरित्यादौ च ताद्रूप्यरूपका-
तिशयोक्ती इति कुवलयानन्दकृतः । यत्तु रूपके लक्षणायां राजना-
यणं लक्ष्मीस्त्वामालिंगति निर्भरमित्यादौ विशेषणसमासायत्तं रूपकमु-
मितसमासायत्तोपमा वेति संदेहे यद्यत्रोपमा स्यात् तर्हि नारायणस-
दृशो राजेत्याद्यर्थे नारायणसदृशे लक्ष्मीकर्तृकालिंगनसंसर्गबाध इति
रूपकमेवेत्यालंकारिकोक्तं विरुध्येत । रूपकेऽपि साधारणधर्मादिप्रकारेण
लक्षणायां तद्दोषतादवस्थादिति । तत्र रूपके साधारणधर्मादिप्रकारेण लक्ष-
णायां लक्ष्यार्थे व्यञ्जनया वाच्यार्थाभेदप्रतीतेस्तद्वारोपमेयेऽपि तत्प्र-
तीतिश्चादोषात् । न चैवमुपमितसमासेऽपि लक्षणायाः सत्त्वेन तत्फलतया
तत्राप्यभेदप्रत्ययसत्त्वेनोपमायामपि न दोष इति वाच्यम् । तत्र निरू-
पलक्षणाङ्गीकारेण प्रयोजनाभावात् । न च सदृशत्वेन रूपके लक्षणे-
ति मते सादृश्यस्य शब्दोपात्तत्वादुपमापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । तन्मते भेदकरं-
वेतत्वाकरंवेतत्वाभ्यां भेदादित्युक्तं प्राक् । अन्ये तूपमितसमाभोपमा-
नसमासयोरपि सादृश्यमूकतयोपमानतावच्छेदकधर्मस्योपमेये आरोपे-
गाभेदान्वयस्वीकारे बाधकाभावेन तत्रापि रूपकेऽक्षतिरेव । यदा तु
न्योन्यजनवशात्तत्रापि सदृशलक्षणिकेन समासस्तदोपमाऽपीत्याहुः । स्पष्टं
वेदमुपमानादित्यत्र कैयटे । षड्विधेति । शुद्धा-गौणी-सारोपा-साध्य-
वसा-उपादानलक्षणैः षड्भेदेत्यर्थः । न च गौण्यां लक्षणलक्षणात्वाङ्गीकारेण
उपादानत्वमुचितमिति वाच्यम् । अत्रोपादानलक्षणाभ्यामर्थान्तरसंक्रामितात्यन्त-
विपर्ययवाच्यौ, सारोपासाध्यवसानाभ्यां रूपकप्रथमातिशयोक्ती, शुद्धाभ्यां

व्यङ्ग्येन रहिता रूढौ सहिता तु प्रयोजने ।
प्रयोजनं हि व्यञ्जनव्यापारगम्यमेव ।

तच्च गूढमगूढं वा,
तच्चेति व्यङ्ग्यम् । गूढं यथा—

एव पश्चात् ' व्यङ्ग्येन रहिता ' इत्यादिना तत्कृतं भेदं दर्शयिष्यति ।
अन्यथा पुनरुक्तिप्रसङ्गात् । एवं च यथोक्तव्याख्यानेन षड्विधत्वे निर्व्यूढे यत्
' षड्विधेति । रूढिप्रयोजनोपादानलक्षणारोपाध्यवसानरूपैः षडभिरुपाधिभिः
कल्पिता त्रिधाः प्रकारा यस्यामिति षड्विधा ' इति चण्डीदासव्याख्यानं तत्
' शुद्धैव सा द्विधा, सारोपाज्या तु ' इति एवतुशब्दयोरनालोचनवि-
जृम्भितत्वादानादेयम् ।

एवमारोपादिकृतं प्रकारषट् प्रतिपाद्य व्यञ्जनकृतं प्रकारत्रयमाह-व्यंग्येनेति ।

लक्षणेत्यनुवर्तते । ननु प्रयोजनस्थले कथं व्यङ्ग्यसाहित्यनियम इति चेत् ।
प्रयोजनस्य व्यञ्जनामात्रगम्यत्वात् । तदिदमुक्तम्—' प्रयोजनं हि व्यञ्जना-
व्यापारगम्यमेव ' इति ।

यत्तु—' ननु लक्ष्यप्रयोजनयोर्द्वयोरपि लक्षणयैव प्रतीतौ किमत्र व्यञ्जन-
येत्यत आह—प्रयोजनं हीति । ' इति तत्फक्किनावतारणं तदज्ञानविजृम्भित-
म् । अत्र व्यञ्जनस्थापनस्याप्रस्तुतत्वात्, तत्प्रकरणे च ' व्यञ्जनाच्चापरा
क्रिया ' इति सूत्रेणैव प्रतिपादनात् । तच्चेति ।

तदिति व्यङ्ग्यम् । लक्षणाभेदप्रयोजक आरोपादिर्यथा भिद्यते तथा तत्प्र-
योजकं व्यङ्ग्यमपीति चस्यार्थः । वाशब्दः समुच्चये । काव्यभावनापरिपक्वबुद्धिः
सहृदयः । तन्मात्रवेद्यं गूढम् । तत्तदितरवेद्यमगूढम् । तत्र गूढं यथा—

च ताभ्यां हेत्वलंकारं निरूपयिष्यतीति षड्भेदकथनमेव सफलम् । गौण्या
लक्षणायास्तु न कापि विशिष्य नियामकत्वमिति न तद्गणनमिति भावः ।
एवं चेति । पौनरुक्त्यप्रसंगेनेत्यर्थः । अनालोचनेति । एवतुशब्दाभ्यां
गौण्या उपादानलक्षणरूपभेदद्वयाभावबोधनेन लक्षणाभात्रस्य रूढिप्रयोजनव-
त्तद्भेदद्वयकथने तेन विरोधस्य स्पष्टत्वादिति भावः । व्यञ्जनकृतमिति ।
लक्षणायास्तत्फलकत्वादिति भावः । तत्तदितरेति । सहृदयासहृदयेत्यर्थः ।

मुखं विकसितस्मितं वशितवक्त्रिणं प्रेक्षितं
समुच्छलितविभ्रमा गतिरपास्तसंस्था मतिः ।
उरौ मुकुलितस्तनं जघनमंसबन्धोद्धरं
बतेन्दुवदनातनौ तरुणिमोद्गमो मोदते ॥ ४ ॥

मुखमिति ।

अत्र विकासः पुष्पधर्मः स्मितेऽनुपपन्न इति प्रसृतत्वं लक्ष्यता विकसित-
वदेव लोकोत्तरमणीयतातिशयो व्यज्यते । स च गूढः । एवं वशितसमुच्छ-
लितापास्तसंस्थामुकुलितोद्धरमोदतेशब्दैरायतत्वोच्छसितत्वानेकविषयसंचारित्वो-

मुखमिति । इदं लक्षणामूलध्वनेरुदाहरणम् । इन्दुवदनायास्तनौ शरीरे
रुक्मिणि उद्गम आविर्भावो मोदते स्फीतो भवतीत्यर्थः । उत्कृष्टवस्तु-
संबन्धत् स्वयमप्युत्कर्षं प्राप्त इत्यर्थः । प्रकृत्यैवेयमिन्दुवदना तत्राप्येवंवि-
धनयसौवनविजृम्भणामित्यतिकष्टमापतितं विदग्ध्युवजनस्येत्येवं खेदे बतेति ।
अहो रमणीयतातिशय इति विस्मये च । अहो भाग्येन संपन्नं परमो-
त्तमाख्यातं युवजननयनानामिति हर्षे वा । बतार्मत्रणसंतोषखेदानुको-
शविस्मय इति नानार्थकोशात् । स्फीततौचिह्नं अनेकस्थानेऽनेकविधका-
र्यमनुरूपं दर्शयति—मुखमिति । यतो मुखं विकसितं प्रसृतं स्मितं स्मितं
स्यात्संदिताधरमित्युक्तलक्षणं हास्यविशेषरूपं यत्र तथाभूतं । प्रेक्षितं
प्रेक्षितः स्वाधीनः कृतः वक्त्रिणं तिर्यग्गामित्वं येन तथा । गतिः गमनं
समुच्छलिताः निरंतरमतिशयेन प्रादुर्भूता विभ्रमा यत्र तथाभूता । मति-
बुद्धिः त्यक्तपरिमितविषयिका । उरः वक्षःस्थलम् । मुकुलितौ मुकुलाकारौ
इन्दुवदौ स्तनौ यत्र । जघनं ऊरुमूलभागः । अंसबंधेनावयवानां दृढबंधेन
उद्धरं विलक्षणरतियोग्यम् । यद्वांसबंधो रतिबंधविशेषस्तत्र समर्थम् । तथा
आसन्नारणस्मिताद्युन्मेषः स्फुटमेव यौवनोद्गममवमयतीति भावः । अत्र च
विकासस्य पुष्पधर्मस्य स्मिते वशीकरणस्य चेतनधर्मस्य दृष्टौ उर्ध्वगति-
विशेषरूपसमुच्छलनस्य मूर्तद्रव्यधर्मस्य विभ्रमे संस्थाया मर्यादायास्त्यागस्य
चेतनधर्मस्य मूर्ते मुकुलितत्वस्य पुष्पधर्मस्य स्तनयोरुद्धरत्वस्योत्कृष्टधुरावत्त-
त्वाच्च चेतनधर्मस्य जघने मोदस्य हर्षस्य चेतनधर्मस्य यौवनोद्गमे बाधित-
त्वाच्च विकसितादिपदैरुपदर्शितपदार्था लक्ष्यन्ते । तत्र विकासेनासंकुचितत्व-
संबन्धेन सतिशयत्वं लक्ष्यम् । सौरभादि व्यंग्यम् । वशीकरणेन स्वाधीनत्वं

यत् स्फुरितौ. २. क. तातिशयमने.

अगूढं यथा—

श्रीपरिचयाज्जडा अपि भवन्त्यभिज्ञा विदग्धचरितानाम् ।
उपदिशति कामिनीनां यौवनमद् एव ललितानि ॥ ५ ॥

द्विजत्वयोम्यत्वानियन्त्रितत्वानि लस्यद्भिर्युक्तानुरागित्वसकलवशीकारित्वानु-
रगातिशयालिङ्गनयोम्यत्वरमणीयत्वस्पृहणीयत्वानि गूढानि व्यज्यन्ते ।

यथा वा मम—

‘ चकोरीपाण्डित्यं मलिनयति दृग्भङ्गिमहिमा
हिमांशोरद्वैतं कवल्यति वक्रं मृगदृशः ।
तमोवैदग्ध्यानि स्थगयति कचः किं च वचनं
कुहूकण्ठीकण्ठध्वनिमधुरिमाणं तिरयति ॥ ’

अत्र क्रियापदानामात्यन्तिकविच्छाद्यत्वादि व्यङ्ग्यानि गूढानि । अगूढं
यथा—श्रीपरिचयादिति ।

लक्ष्यते । अभिमतविषयप्रवृत्तिः संबंधः । युक्तानुरागित्वं व्यंग्यम् । समुच्छ-
लनेन बाहुल्यं लक्ष्यते । प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकभावः संबंधः । बहुलं हि समुच्छलति ।
सकलमनोहारित्वं व्यंग्यम् । संस्थाया असनेनाधीरत्वं लक्ष्यते । हेतुहेतुमद्भावः
संबंधः । पूर्वं मुग्धतया गुरुजनसन्निधौ प्रियतमेऽप्यङ्गीकृतमर्यादा मतिरा-
सीत् । इदानीं तु मौग्ध्यत्यागान्न तथेत्यनुरागातिशयो व्यंग्यः । मुकुलितत्वेन
काठिन्यं लक्ष्यते । निबिडावयवत्वं संबंधः । कठिनं हि तद्भवति । यद्भेद्विजत्वं
लक्ष्यम् । आलिङ्गनयोम्यत्वं व्यंग्यम् । उद्धुरत्वेन योग्यत्वं लक्ष्यते । भारसह-
नक्षमत्वं संबंधः । रमणीयत्वं व्यंग्यम् । मोदेनोत्कर्षो लक्ष्यते । जन्यजनकभावः
संबंधः । स्पृहणीयत्वं व्यंग्यम् । अनिर्यत्रितत्वमुत्कर्ष एवेति । (पृथ्वी छन्दः ।)
लस्यद्भिरिति । वशीकरणद्रवद्रव्योच्छलननिर्मर्यादत्वकलिकायत्तत्त्वोत्कृष्ट-
धुरावत्त्वरूपमुख्यार्थबाधादिति भावः । (चकोरीति । दृग्भङ्गिमहिमा दर्शन-
प्रकारमाहात्म्यम् । कवल्यति प्रसति । कुहूकंठी कोकिला । शिखरिणा छन्दः ।)
आत्यन्तिकविच्छाद्यत्वादीति । आदिना वक्रप्रतियोगिकसादृश्यवत्त्व-
लिङ्गवश्यामत्वश्रुतिकटुत्वानि । श्रीपरिचयादिति । जडा अनभिज्ञा
अपि जनाः श्रीपरिचयात् । प्रथमसंबंधः परिचयः । तस्मादेव चतुरजन-
चरितानां ज्ञातारो भवन्ति । तत्रार्थीतरन्यासमाह—उपदिशतीति । कामिनीनां
यौवनमद्ः स्वयमेव ललितानि उपदिशति । तथा च विदग्धजनवर्णितस्वरूपान-
भिज्ञानामपि विनैवोपदेशं सहस्रसंबंधात्तदवयवः । तर्हि वक्रव्यं तत्संज्ञाभि-

ज्ञापकः

तत्र व्यापारो व्यञ्जनात्मकः ।

कुत इत्याह—

यस्य प्रतीतिमाधानं लक्षणा समुपास्यते ॥ ९ ॥

फले शब्दैकगम्येऽत्र व्यञ्जनाच्चापरा क्रिया ।

प्रयोजनप्रतिपिपादयिषया यत्र लक्षणया शब्दप्रयोगस्तत्र नान्व-
तस्तत्प्रतीतिरपि त तस्मादेव शब्दात् । न चात्र व्यञ्जनादतेऽन्यो व्यापारः
तथाहि—

नाभिधा समयाभावात्

गङ्गायां घोष इत्यादौ ये पावनत्वादयो धर्मास्तदादौ प्रतीयन्ते न तत्र
गङ्गाविशब्दाः संकेतिताः ।

हेत्वभावाच्च लक्षणा ॥ १० ॥

मुख्यार्थबाधाविश्रयं हेतुः । तथा च

त्वाल्लक्षणायाः प्रकृतत्वाच्च तन्मूलमेव प्रथमं निरूपयति—तत्रेति ।

तत्र लक्षणिकशब्दे । व्यापारो व्यञ्जकप्रकाशानुकूलः । लक्षणादिनैव
तत्प्रतीतिं किं तयेत्यत आह—यस्येति ।

यस्य पावनवादेः फलस्य प्रतीत्यर्थं लक्षणाश्रयशब्दप्रयोगस्तत्फलं तस्मा-
देव शब्दाद्गम्यते न तु प्रमाणान्तरात् । व्याप्तिस्मृत्यादेरनपेक्षणात् । न च
तत्र शब्दस्य व्यञ्जनं विना अन्या क्रिया व्यापारः । तथा हि—नाभिधेति ।

पावनत्वादौ फले संकेतग्रहाभावात् । अभिधा हि संकेतग्रहसहायैवोपयु-
ज्यते न तु स्वरूपसतीति वक्ष्यते । हेत्वभावादिति ।

मुख्यार्थबाधस्तद्योगो रूढिप्रयोजनान्यतरादिति त्रयं लक्षणाहेतुः । तदभा-

त्वादिति भावः । लक्षणिकशब्दप्रतिपाद्यत्वं च लक्ष्यस्यार्थस्य लक्षणमपि अर्थत
उक्तमेवेति बोध्यम् । आधातुम् । जनयितुम् । समुपास्यते । सत्यपि वाचकश-
ब्दे तं विहायाद्रियते । व्याप्तिस्मृत्यादेरिति । आदिना संनिकर्षादि । नाभिधा
समयाभावादिति । शक्तिरतिरिक्तः पदार्थस्तद्ग्राहकः संकेत इति न साध्या-
विशेषो हेतोरिति बोध्यम् । संकेतग्रहसहायेति । अभिधाग्राहकत्वमेव सहा-
यत्वमिति बोध्यम् । तद्विशेषाह— न स्वरूपसतीति । ज्ञाप्यार्थबाध

लक्ष्यं न मुख्यं नाप्यत्र बाधो योगः फलेन नो ।

न प्रयोजनमेतस्मिन् न च शब्दः स्वलङ्घतिः ॥ ५१ ॥

यथा गङ्गाशब्दः स्रोतसि सबाध इति तटं लक्षयति, तद्वत् यदि तटेऽपि सबाधः स्यात् तदा प्रयोजनं लक्षयेत् । न च तटं मुख्योऽर्थः । नाप्यत्र बाधः । न च गङ्गाशब्दार्थस्य तटस्य पावनत्वाद्यैर्लक्षणीयैः संबन्धः । नापि प्रयोजने लक्ष्ये किञ्चित् प्रयोजनम् । नापि गङ्गाशब्दस्तटमिव प्रयोजनं प्रतिपादयितुमसमर्थः । ✓

वमेवोपपादयति—लक्ष्यामिति ।

यथा गङ्गाशब्दस्य नीरं मुख्योऽर्थः, तत्र च बाधः, तीरे च तत्संबन्धः, तीरस्य च लक्षणयोपस्थापनम्, मुख्यशब्देन प्रतिपादयितुमशक्यस्य पावनत्वादेः प्रतीतिश्च प्रयोजनमिति गङ्गाशब्देन तटं लक्ष्यते । तद्वद्यदि तटमपि मुख्यं स्यात्तत्र च बाधो भवेत्, प्रयोजनस्य च गङ्गादिगतपावनत्वादिविशेषस्य तटेन संबन्धः स्यात्, लक्षणया प्रयोजनप्रतिपादनस्य च प्रयोजनान्तरं संभवेत्, तदा गङ्गाशब्दः प्रयोजनं लक्षयेत् । न चैतदेकमप्यत्रेत्यर्थः ।

न केवलं मुख्यार्थबाधादीनामभावमात्रम्, किं तु तेषामपेक्षापि नेत्याह—न च शब्द इति ।

मुख्यार्थबाधादित्रयमपेक्ष्य बोधकत्वं स्वलङ्घित्वम् । एवं ' नापि गङ्गाशब्दस्तटमिव प्रयोजनं प्रतिपादयितुमसमर्थः ' इत्यादिवृत्तौ ' बाधादिकमनपेक्ष्य ' इति शेषो द्रष्टव्यः । ' समर्थः ' इति पाठे तु ' बाधादित्रयमपेक्ष्यैव ' इति शेषः ।

नन्वस्ति प्रयोजनेऽपि लक्ष्ये प्रयोजनान्तरमिति किं व्यञ्जनयेति-

तद्दीनं स्यादत आह—नाप्यत्रेति । काकेभ्यो दर्षात्पादाविव तात्पर्यार्थबाधएव तद्दीनमत आह—योग इति । साक्षात्संबन्ध एव लक्षणाप्रयोजक इति भावः । परंपरासंबन्धोऽस्त्येवेत्यत आह—न प्रयोजनमिति । अनपेक्ष्येति शेष इति । गङ्गाशब्दस्तटं यथा बाधादिकमनपेक्ष्य प्रतिपादयितुमसमर्थस्तथा प्रयोजनं नेत्यर्थः । गङ्गादिशब्दः प्रयोजनांशे तदपेक्षो नेत्यतः प्रयोजनं न

एवमप्यनवस्था स्याद्या मूलक्षयकारिणी ।

एवमपीति प्रयोजनं चैल्लक्ष्यते तत् प्रयोजनान्तरेण तदपि प्रयोजनान्तरेणेति प्रकृताप्रतीतिकृत् अनवस्था भवेत् । ननु पावनत्वादिवर्गयुक्तमेव तदं लक्ष्यते, 'गङ्गायास्तटे घोषः' इत्यतोऽधिकस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपत्तिश्च प्रयोजनमिति विशिष्टे लक्षणा । तत्किं व्यञ्जनेत्यत आह—

प्रयोजनेन सहितं लक्षणीयं न युज्यते ॥ १२ ॥

कुत इत्याह—

ज्ञानस्य विषयो ह्यन्यः फलमुन्यदुवाकृतम् ।

प्रत्यक्षादेर्नालादिविषयः, फलं तु प्रकटता संवित्तिर्वा ।

चेद्वैयात्याद्यदि ब्रूयात्तत्राह—एवमपीति ।

मूलं प्रकृतार्थप्रतीतिः ।

ननु पावनत्वादिविशिष्टमेव तीरं लक्ष्यतामिति किं व्यञ्जनया । न चैवं प्रयोजनस्यापि लक्ष्यकोटौ प्रवेशाल्लक्षणाप्रयोजनं नास्तीति वाच्यम् । 'गङ्गा-तटे घोषः' इत्यतोऽधिकस्यार्थस्य प्रतीतेरेव प्रयोजनत्वादित्यत आह—
प्रयोजनेनेति ।

कुत इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह—ज्ञानस्येति ।

ननु विषयफल्योर्भेद इति सूत्रार्थः, स चायुक्तः । फलत्वं हि जन्यत्वं वा जन्यप्रतीतिविषयत्वं वा । आद्ये पावनत्वादौ तदभावः । तज्ज्ञाने विषयाद्भेद एव । अन्त्ये 'प्रत्यक्षादेर्नालादिविषयः । फलं तु प्रकटता संवि-

लक्ष्यमिति भावः । वैयात्यम् । वैतडिकता । मूलक्षयेति । प्रयोजनपरंपरायां लक्षणास्वीकारे यल्लक्षणाप्रयोजने विषयसंचारादिना लक्षणानिवृत्तिस्तस्याग्नि-मल्लक्षणानिवृत्तौ मूलभूतलक्षणाप्रयोजनप्रतीतिरपि न स्यादिति भावः । एतेन बीजाङ्कुरादिवदनवस्था न दूषणमित्यपास्तम् । मूलक्षतिकरी चाहुरनवस्थां हि दूषणमित्युक्तेः । अधिकस्यार्थस्येति । पावनत्वादिवैशिष्ट्यरूपस्येत्यर्थः । प्रयो-जनेनेति । प्रयोजनीभूतज्ञानविषयेणेत्यर्थः । तथा सति लक्षणाजन्यज्ञानस्यैव फल-ज्ञानात्मकत्वात्तज्ज्ञानस्य लक्षणाजन्यज्ञानफलत्वं न स्यादित्याह—ज्ञानस्येति । विषयान्भेद एवेति । एवं चोक्तसूत्रार्थस्य न तत्र फलवन्व्याघातकतेति भावः । मृदुष्योपादानमितीश्वरगतोपादानप्रत्यक्षफले घटादौ तद्विषयभेदासत्त्वाद्ब्र-ह्मिभिरित्तश्च सूत्रार्थ इति बोध्यम् । वृत्तिविरोध इति । स्वजन्यप्रतीतिविषय-

तिर्वा ' इति वृत्तिविरोधः । प्रकटज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षजन्यत्वाभावात् । न च ज्ञानजन्यत्वस्यैव साध्यत्वमस्तीति । अत्र ब्रूमः—ज्ञानस्य जनकीभूतो विषयो यथा ज्ञानादन्वस्तथा फलमपि तस्य स्वतो भिन्नम् । कारणस्यैव कार्यस्यापि भिन्नकालत्वनियमात् । शैत्यादौ तु क्वचित्फलपदमौपचारिकं दृश्यते । तथा च लक्ष्यज्ञानमेव यदि शैत्यज्ञानं तदा प्रयोजनं न स्यादित्यर्थः । ननु लक्ष्यप्रतीतिर्न शैत्यप्रतीतिः फलम्, किं तु शक्यसंबन्धरूपलक्षणायाः । तथा न किंचिदूषणमिति । अत्राहुः—

अन्वयानुपपत्त्या हि लक्षणा प्रसरन्ती यावदन्वयोपपादकं तावदेव विषयीकरोति न त्वनुपपादकमपीति कथं तटे पावनत्वमपि विषयीकुर्यात् । नन्वन्वयानुपपत्त्या कल्प्यमानापि साऽनुद्देश्यमपि शैत्यं विषयीकरोति । यथा तापोपशमायोपादीयमानं चन्दनं शैत्यमपि जनयतीति चेत्, न । चन्दनस्य संनिधिमात्रेण शैत्यजनकत्वम् । लक्षणायास्त्वनुपपत्तिप्रसारितयेति वैषम्यात् ।

यत्तुक्तं यथाश्रुते चण्डीदासेन—' ज्ञानस्य विषयातिरिक्तं फलमात्रं विवक्षितम्, ज्ञेयगतं वा । आद्ये प्रकृतेऽप्यस्ति गोस्वामिमतप्रीतिः । अन्त्ये प्रयोजनज्ञान एव व्यभिचारः । तेन हि गोस्वामिसंतोषमात्रं जन्यते न तु तद्वतं किंचिदिति । तस्माद्धेतुफलयोस्तत्प्रतीतिफलप्रतीत्योर्भिन्नकालत्वेनाभिन्नव्यापारविषयत्वमसमीचीनमेवेति व्यञ्जनासिद्धिरित्यत्र तात्पर्यम् ' इति । तदबोधविजृम्भितम् । न ह्यनेन सूत्रेण यथाश्रुतेनापि ज्ञानत्वस्य विषयान्यफलकत्वव्याप्यत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते, किंतु ज्ञानफलत्वस्य विषयान्यत्वव्याप्यत्वम् । तथा च शैत्यादेर्लक्षणाजन्यप्रतीतिविषयत्वे तत्प्रयोजनं न स्यादित्यर्थे दोषानवकाशः ।

रूपे फले स्वविषयाद्भेद इत्यत्र नियमे विशिष्टज्ञानविषये तज्जनकविशेषणज्ञानविषयभेदासत्त्वेन व्यभिचारश्चेत्यपि बोध्यम् । तत्र न्यायमते संवित्तिर्वैति अनुव्यवसायः । प्रकटतेति मीमांसकमते । चक्षुरादीनां ज्ञानद्वारा विषये प्राकट्यजनकत्वमिति तेषां सरणिः । जनकीभूत इति । विषयतासंबन्धेन ज्ञानं प्रति तादात्म्येन विषयस्य हेतुत्वादिति भावः । स विषयो बौद्ध इति योगवृत्तावस्थाभिरुपपादितम् । तदा सामानाधिकरण्येनैव हेतुत्वं बोध्यम् । फलम् । शैत्यादिप्रतीतिरूपम् । नन्वेति शङ्का न सूत्रमते, किं तु शक्यसंबन्धे लक्षणेति स्वव्याख्यातमते इति बोध्यम् । लक्षणायास्त्वनुपपत्तिप्रसारिताया इति पाठः । न तु तद्वतामिति । स्वविषयगतमित्यर्थः । दोषानवकाश इति । त्वदुक्तविकल्पप्रयुक्तदो-

विशिष्टे लक्षणा नैवम्

निगदेनैव व्याख्यातम् ।

विशेषाः स्युस्तु लक्षिते ॥ १३ ॥

तटादौ ये विशेषाः पावनत्वादयस्ते चाभिधातात्पर्यलक्षणाभ्यो व्यापा-

वयं तु ब्रूमः—विशिष्टं लक्ष्यं तदा भवेद्यदि विशिष्टत्वं लक्ष्यताव-
च्छेदकं पूर्वप्रतीतं संभवेत् । न त्वेवम् । पावनत्वादिविशेषवैशिष्ट्यस्य
तटे प्रमाणान्तरागोचरत्वात् तत्र तस्याभावात् । यदुक्तवान्—‘योगः
फलेन नो’ इति । अथ पावनत्वादिसामान्यवैशिष्ट्यमेव लक्ष्यतावच्छेद-
कमस्तु तस्य प्रतीतत्वादिति चेत्, तर्हि पावनत्वादिविशेषो न प्रती-
येतेति । किं बहुना, गौर्वाहीक इत्यत्र गवाभिन्नजडस्य लक्ष्यत्वे सैवान्व-
यानुपपत्तिः ।

उपसंहरति—विशिष्टे इति ।

एवं उक्तयुक्त्या ।

तटादौ लक्षिते सति पावनत्वादयो विशेषाः प्रतीतिविषयाः स्युः । ते च

षानवकाश इत्यर्थः । ननु यष्टी नन्वितिशंका न सूत्रभेदे, किंतु शक्यसंबंधो
लक्षणेति स्वव्याख्यातमते इति बोध्यम् । लक्षणायास्त्वनुपपत्तिप्रसारिताया
इति पाठः । ननु यष्टीः प्रवेशयेत्यादिवत्तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिरेव तद्बीजमस्ति त्वत्यत
आह—वयं त्विति । पावनत्वं न लक्ष्यम् । किं तु तटत्वादिवल्लक्ष्यतावच्छे-
दकं वाच्यम् । न चैतत्संभवतीत्याह—यदि विशिष्टत्वमिति । सामाना-
धिकरण्यसंबंधेन गंगागतपावनत्वादिविशिष्टतटत्वमित्यर्थः । संभवेदिति ।
बाधेन प्रत्यक्षाद्यसंभवात् तदवाच्छिन्ने शक्यसंबंधाग्रहादिति भावः ।
भ्रमात्मकोऽपि शाब्दबोधो वक्तुमशक्यः । बाधनिश्चयसत्त्वात् । वयंजानिके
तु बोधे बाधज्ञानं न प्रतिबंधकमिति तत्त्वम् । सैवान्वयानुपपत्तिरिति ।
वाहीको न गौरिति बाधज्ञानस्य विरोधिव्याप्यदर्शनविधया गवाभिन्नजडो वा-
हीक इति बोधेऽपि प्रतिबंधकत्वादिति भावः । किं च वाहीकत्वविशिष्टे
गवाभेदप्रतीतेः सर्वसिद्धायास्तावताऽपि लक्षणयोपपादयितुमशक्यत्वमिति
व्यंजनैवावश्यमास्थेयेति बोध्यम् । केचित्तु लक्षणावृत्तेः फलं लक्ष्यार्थबोध एव ।
न तु पावनत्वादिप्रतीतिर्नापि लक्षणाज्ञानस्य । किं तु लक्षणया तीरबोधस्यैव
तत्फलमिति मूलेऽपि न दोष इत्याहुः । लक्षिते । लक्षणया बोधिते । अतिरि-

रास्त्ररेण मय्याः । तच्च व्यञ्जनध्वननयोतनादिशब्दवाच्यमवश्यमेवित-
व्यम् । एवं लक्षणासूत्रं व्यञ्जकत्वमुक्तम् । अभिधामूलं त्वाह-

‘अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे नियन्त्रिते ।

संयोगाद्यैरवाच्यार्थधीकृद्वापुतिरञ्जनम् ॥ १४ ॥

प्रसिद्धातिरिक्तव्यापारगम्या एव । स च व्यापारो व्यञ्जनध्वननादिशब्दवा-
च्योऽवश्यमेवितव्यः कथमन्यथा विशेषप्रतीतिरिति । एवं लक्षणासूत्रं व्यञ्ज-
कत्वमुक्तम् । अभिधामूलं त्वाह—अनेकेति ।

अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे संयोगाद्यैर्नियन्त्रिते सति अवाच्यार्थधी-
हेतुव्यापारोऽञ्जनम् । व्यञ्जनमित्यर्थः । अनेकार्थोऽनेकाभिधानशक्तिः । अर्थ-
भेदेन शब्दभेद इति नये तु अर्थान्तराभिधानशक्तशब्देन सदृशस्तदभेदभ्रम-
विषयो वा । वाचकत्वमभिधा । अवाच्यार्थस्तदाभिधाव्यापारविषयः ।
नियन्त्रणं नियमनमेकतरमात्रस्मरणानुकूलत्वम् । यदाहुः—‘ शब्दार्थस्या-

क्तव्यापारेति । शक्तिलक्षणयोः प्रागेव निरस्तत्वात् तात्पर्यस्य च संसर्गबो-
धमात्रजनकत्वादिति भावः । एवं च लक्ष्ये तीरादौ व्यञ्जनयोपस्थिताः
शैत्यादयो भेदेनान्वयबोधविषयाः । व्यङ्ग्यस्य भेदेनापि अन्वयादिति बोध्यम् ।
लक्षणिकस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वमिति भ्रमनिरासायाह—एवमिति । मूलम् ।
तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायि । अभिधामूलमिति । अस्यां च व्यङ्ग्यार्थवि-
शिष्टोपस्थितिः शंकापदमपि नेति भावः । अनेकाभिधानशक्तिरिति ।
गृहीतानेकार्थप्रतिपत्तिजनकानेकशक्तिमानित्यर्थः । गृहीतद्वितीयाभिधा-
विषय एव व्यञ्जनास्फुरणात् तत्र द्वितीयाभिधाग्रहोऽपि नियामकः ।
मुख्यार्थाबाधाच्च न लक्षणेति भावः । तदभेदभ्रमेति । तद्वीजं च साह-
स्यमेव । नन्वेवं श्लेषवदभिधात एव द्वितीयाग्रहः स्यादत उक्तं वाचकत्वे
इति । अवाच्यार्थस्तदाभिधया प्रतिपादयितुमशक्यः । एकतरमात्रेति ।
सत्यपि संबंधग्रहे संयोगादिज्ञानस्य तज्जनितप्रथमार्थतात्पर्यग्रहस्य वा प्रति-
बंधकत्वाच्च द्वितीयाग्रहस्मरणमिति भावः । वस्तुतोऽनेकार्थे शक्तिज्ञानज-
न्यस्तदर्थसृष्टौ संयोगादिज्ञानजन्यतदर्थतात्पर्यनिश्चयस्य हेतुत्वात्कारणभाव-
मात्रेण द्वितीयाग्रहस्मरणमात्रः । नियन्त्रणं च द्वितीयाग्रहस्मारकासमवधानमेव ।
न च संयोगादिज्ञानाभिधावत् व्यञ्जनमपि नियन्त्र्यताम् । संयोगादिकमतिक्रम्य
बोधकत्वेनैव तत्सिद्धेः । अन्यथा सुगंधिमांसभोजनप्रकरणे सुरभि मांसं भुंक्ते

‘संयोगो विप्रयोगश्च साहचर्यं विरोधिता ।

अर्थः प्रकरणं लिङ्गं शब्दस्यान्यस्य संनिधिः ॥

सामर्थ्यमौचित्यं देशः कालो व्यक्तिः स्वरादयः ।

शब्दार्थस्यानवच्छेदे विशेषस्मृतिहेतवः ॥’

इत्युक्तविशा

सशङ्खचक्रो हरिः अशङ्खचक्रो हरिरित्युच्यते । रामलक्ष्मणाविति

नवच्छेदे विशेषस्मृतिहेतवः’ इति । ‘एतेन नियमनमेतस्मिन्नेवार्थे वक्तुस्तात्पर्यमिति तात्पर्यग्रहः’ इत्यबोधप्रलापः । संयोगाद्यैरित्याद्यपदसंक्राष्टं विप्रयोगादि । यदुक्तमभियुक्तैः—संयोग इति ।

तत्र संयोगः प्रसिद्धार्थस्य गुणविशेषरूपः संबन्धः । तेनाभिधानियमनम् ।

इत्यभिधाने गोमांसानुपस्थितौ विदग्धस्य जुगुप्सानापत्तेः । अनवच्छेदः । अनिश्चयः । स्मृतिरत्र ज्ञानमात्रम् । अत एव शब्दार्थसंदेहपराकरणद्वारा नियतार्थावसायहेतुत्वाद्विशेषस्मृतिहेतवो निर्णयहेतव इति पुंजराजादिभिर्व्याख्यातम् । एतेनेति । विशेषस्मृतिहेतव इत्यभियुक्तवाक्यविरोधेनेत्यर्थः । प्रथमार्थं प्रत्याख्य पदानां विरामेऽपि प्रथमार्थप्रतीतेरेव व्यापारत्वमाश्रित्य द्वितीयार्थधरूपपाद्या । शब्दस्य पर्यायपरिवृत्त्यसहत्वाच्च शब्दत्वं व्यञ्जनाया बोध्यम् । वस्तुतोऽनवच्छेदो नाम संबंधिज्ञानाद्युपस्मृतानेकार्यमध्ये कतमोऽर्थस्तात्पर्यविषय इति तात्पर्यसंदेह एव । तात्पर्यज्ञानं च शब्दबोध एव हेतुः, न स्मृतौ । अन्यथा किंविषयं तात्पर्यं गृह्येत । अर्थानुपस्थितेः । विशेषस्मृतिपदेन प्रकृतार्थतात्पर्यनिश्चय एवोच्यते । स्मृतिविषयत्वाच्च तत्र स्मृतिपदं गौणं इति चिंत्यमेतत् । न च नानार्थपदात्मकसंबंधिज्ञानात् आपाततः स्मृतेष्वर्थेषु तात्पर्यसंदेहे तात्पर्यग्राहकसंयोगादिज्ञाने तत्सहकृतात् पुनरनुसंहितात् पदात् प्रकृतार्थस्मृतिः सैव शब्दोपयोगिनीति तत्तात्पर्यमिति वाच्यम् । गौरवात् । मानाभावाच्च । वाचकत्वे नियंत्रिते इत्यस्यायमर्थः—शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे इतरवाच्यार्थविषयकशब्दबोधजनकत्वे नियंत्रिते एकतरार्थमात्रं विषयकतया संकुचिते सति अवाच्यार्थस्य तदा शक्त्या शब्दबोधविषयतया बोधयितुमशक्यस्य शब्दबोधकृद् व्यञ्जनमिति । एवं च तदाऽस्मिन् वाच्यत्वं व्यंग्यत्वं चेति द्विविधोऽपि व्यवहार इति यदभिवाक्ष्यमाणप्रस्तावे तदाऽस्य वाच्यत्वव्यवहारवारणाय यत्नः सोऽपि व्यर्थ एवेत्यलम् । अभियुक्तैः । भर्तृहरिभिः । प्रसिद्धार्थस्येति । तदर्थमात्रवृत्तितया प्रसिद्ध इत्यर्थः । अतः इत्या-

दाशरथौ । रामार्जुनगतिस्तयोरिति मार्गवक्तृत्ववीर्ययोः । स्थाणुं भज भवच्छिदे इति हरे । सर्वं जानाति देव इति युष्मदर्थे । कुपितो मकर-
यथा 'सशङ्खचक्रो हरिः' इत्यत्र शङ्खादिसंयोगेनानेकार्थस्य हरिशब्दस्या-
च्युतेऽभिधा नियम्यते । अन्यहरिपदार्थे तत्संयोगाभावात् ।

विप्रयोगस्तादृशसंबन्धध्वंसः । तेन यथा—'अशङ्खचक्रो हरिः' इत्यच्यु-
ते । ध्वंसस्य प्रतियोगिपूर्वकत्वात् ।

साहचर्यं सहचरता । तेन यथा—'रामलक्ष्मणौ' इति रामपदस्य लक्ष्म-
णसाहचर्येण दाशरथौ ।

विरोधः सहानवस्थानम्, वध्यघातकभावश्च । तेन यथा—'छायातपौ'
इति छायापदस्यातपाभावे । विरोधिनाः कयोश्चित्तत्त्वोपमायां 'रामार्जुन-
गतिस्तयोः' इत्यत्र रामार्जुनपदयोर्मार्गवक्तृत्ववीर्ययोः ।

अर्थः प्रयोजनम् । तेन यथा—'स्थाणुं भज भवच्छिदे' इत्यत्र भव-
च्छेदरूपप्रयोजनवशात्स्थाणुशब्दस्य भवे ।

प्रकरणं वक्तृश्रोतृबुद्धिस्थिता । तेन यथा—'सर्वं जानाति देवः' इत्यत्र
देवशब्दस्य राजानि । यत्तु 'युष्मदर्थे' इति व्याख्या तस्या अपि प्रकृते
दिभिः कदाचिच्चक्रधारणेऽपि न दोष इत्याहुः । तत्संयोगाभावादिति । तत्सं-
योगमप्रसिध्यभावात् । ध्वंसः । संबन्धध्वंसः । किं च सर्वाऽप्यभावप्रतीतिः प्रतियो-
गिसमानदेशैव । प्रतियोगिज्ञानमारोपितमनारोपितं वेत्यन्यत् । सहचरतेति ।
यत्र कचिदेकस्मिन्नर्थे प्रसिद्धपरस्परसापेक्षत्वमित्यर्थः । वस्तुतस्तु सहचरता
सादृश्यम् । सदृशयोरेव प्रायेण सहचरणदर्शनात् । शब्दयोरपि सदृशार्थयोः
सहप्रयोग इत्युत्सर्गाच्च । स्पष्टं चेदं भाष्यकैयटहेलाराजीयादिषु । अत एव ए-
तत्कारिकाव्याख्याने पंचम्यपाङ्गपरिभिरिति साहचर्ये उदाहृतं हेलाराजादिभिः ।
तत्र वर्जनार्थपसाहचर्यात्तदर्थस्यैव परे । कर्मप्रवचनीयस्य ग्रहणमिति चोक्तम् ।
महामाष्यकारोऽप्येवमेवादीत् । कांतावपि शक्तत्वाच्छायापदं नानार्थम् ।
कयोश्चिदिति । एतेन द्वयोरपि नानार्थत्वात्परस्परश्रयग्रस्तमिदमुदाहरणमि-
त्यपास्तम् । प्रकरणसहकारेण रामार्जुनपदयोर्द्वयोरपि परस्परविरोधिद्वये युग-
पदेव तात्पर्यग्रहात् । असंकीर्णोदाहरणं तु रामरावणावितीत्याहुः । प्रयोजनम् ।
अनन्यसाध्यमित्यर्थः । हरे इति । शिवे इत्यर्थः । देवपदस्य राजत्वेन वृन्दार-
कत्वेन च शक्तेर्नानार्थत्वम् । राजा भट्टारको देव इत्यादिकोशात् । अत्र राज-

ध्वज इति कामे । देवस्य पुरारतेरिति शंभौ । मधुना मत्तः कोकिल इति

राजादावित्यर्थः । किं वा संबोध्ये राजादावित्यर्थः । संबोध्यस्यैव युष्मदर्थत्वात् ।

लिङ्गं संयोगातिरिक्तसंबन्धेन परपक्षव्यावृत्तौ धर्मः । तेन यथा—‘कुपितो मकरध्वजः’ इत्यत्र मकराकारध्वजसमुद्राभ्यां व्यावृत्तेन समवायसंबन्धवता कोपेन मकरध्वजशब्दस्य कामे । यत्तु ‘लिङ्गं चिह्नम्’ इति, तन्न । कोपस्य कामचिह्नत्वाभावात् । असाधारणधर्मस्य चिह्नत्वात् । सशङ्खचक्र इत्यत्राति-
व्याप्तिप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

शब्दस्यान्यस्य संनिधिर्नियतार्थकशब्दान्तरसामानाधिकरण्यम् । अतो ‘भवच्छिदे’ इत्यादावप्रसङ्गः । न च ‘सशङ्खचक्रो हरिः’ इत्यत्राति-
व्याप्तिः । शङ्खचक्रसामानाधिकरण्याभावात् । यद्वा हरौ शङ्खचक्रे इति संयोगोदाहरणे तात्पर्यम् । तेन यथा—‘देवस्य त्रिपुरारातेः’ इत्यत्र त्रिपुरा-
रातिशब्दसामानाधिकरण्याद्देवशब्दस्य शंभुरूपेऽमरे । अन्यस्य देव-
शब्दार्थस्य राज्ञस्त्रिपुरारातित्वाभावात् । यत्तु ‘देवतान्तरस्यातयाभावा-
च्छंभौ शक्तिनियमनम्’ इति, तन्न युक्तम् । देवतान्तरे देवशब्दस्य श-
क्तिभेदाभावादुदाहरणासामञ्जस्यापत्तेः ।

सामर्थ्यं कारणत्वम् । तेन यथा—‘मधुना मत्तः कोकिलः’ इति । अत्र मधुशब्दस्य वसन्ते । अन्यस्य मधुशब्दार्थस्य कोकिलमादनासामर्थ्यात् ।

औचित्यं अर्हता । तया यथा—‘पातु वो दयितामुखम्’ इति । अ-
त्रोत्कण्ठितमनोरथसाधनौचित्येन मुखशब्दस्य सामुख्ये । न तूपायादौ ।

संबोध्यकदूतकथारूपं प्रकरणम् । नियतार्थकेति । नियतत्वं च नानार्थपदीयै-
कार्थमात्रसंसर्ग्यैवाचकत्वम् । अतो न सशङ्खचक्र इत्यादावतिव्याप्तिः । हरिप-
दार्थेन्द्रेणापि कदाचित् शङ्खचक्रधारणादित्याहुः । अतः । सामानाधिकरण्य-
विवक्षातः । शङ्खचक्रेति । तद्वाचकसामानाधिकरण्याभावादित्यर्थः । निषधं पश्य
भूमृतमित्यत्रापि अनेनैवाभिधानियमनं द्रष्टव्यम् । त्रिपुरारातिपदं पुरारातिपदं
च शंभौ योगरूढम् । मादनासामर्थ्यादिति । कोकिलमादनसमर्थत्वेनाप्रासिद्ध-
त्वादित्यर्थः । सामुख्ये इति । असंमुखीनदयितावदनस्य वैरस्याघायकत्वेन
त्राणजनकत्वौचित्याभावादिति भावः । न तूपायादाविति । मुखं निःसरणे

यकैः प्रारंभोपाययोरपीति कोशादुपायेऽपि मुखशब्दवृत्तेरिति भावः । परमेश्वर-
पदस्य विष्णुत्वेनापि शक्तेर्नानार्थत्वं बोध्यम् । अत्र वदति—यद्यपि नानार्थ-
पदसमभिव्याहृतपदान्तरार्थस्य प्रसिद्धः संबंधः साहचर्यम्, स चैकजन्यत्वदां-
पत्यजन्यजनकभावस्वामिमृत्युभावस्वस्वामिभावादिवत् चक्रादिसंयोगादिरपि
अहीतमुचित इति सशंखचक्र इत्यादेरपि साहचर्योदाहरणतैव युक्ता तथापि
यत्र शब्दोपात्तं प्रसिद्धं संबंधसामान्यं शक्तिनियामकं तत्संयोगस्य, यत्र तु
द्वंद्वदिगतः संबंध्येव केवलस्तथा तत्साहचर्यस्येत्याशयान्न दोषः । एवं च सगां-
डीवोऽर्जुन इति संयोगस्य, गांडीवार्जुनाविति गांडीवमर्जुन इति च साहचर्य-
स्योदाहरणं बोध्यम् । रामरावणावित्यपि साहचर्यस्योदाहरणम् । भ्रातृत्वादि-
संबंधवद्विरोधसंबंधस्यापि लोकेप्रसिद्धत्वात् । एवं स्थाणुं भज भवच्छिदे इति
प्रयोजनोदाहरणे यद्यपि लिंगादविशेषः । न च लिंगमनन्यसाधारणस्तद्धर्मः
प्रयोजनं तु भजनादेः कार्यं न तु तद्गतो धर्म इति भेद इति वाच्यम् । भव-
च्छेदजनकभजनकर्मत्वस्य काष्ठावृत्तिभवधर्मत्वात् । तथापि उक्तस्य विशिष्टध-
र्मस्य शाब्दबोधोत्तरभाविमानसंबोधविषयत्वेन प्रकृतशाब्दबोधविषयत्वाल्लिंगतो
वैलक्षण्यमिति । एवं च नानार्थपदशक्यांतरावृत्तिरेकशक्यगतः साक्षाच्छब्दवेद्यो-
धर्मो लिंगमिति बोध्यम् । एवं शब्दस्यान्यस्य संनिधिः नानार्थपदैकार्थमात्रसं-
सर्ग्यधीतरवाचकपदसमभिव्याहार एव । न तु सामानाधिकरण्यनिवेशः । अत एव
'क्रेण राजते नागः' इत्यत्र वैयधिकरण्येऽपि करपदस्य नागपदमादाय नागपदस्य
च करपदमादाय शृङ्गायां गजे च शक्तिनियमनम् । अत्रैकशब्दशक्तिनियमनायाऽ-
परशब्दशक्तिनियमनस्य नापेक्षा । किं तु करनागशब्दयोरधीतरग्रहणेऽन्यथा-
नुपपत्त्या युगपदेव शक्तिनियमनमतो नान्योन्याश्रयः । किं च कुपितो मकरध्वज
इति लिंगोदाहरणेऽतिव्याप्तिः । सामानाधिकरण्यघटितस्य त्रिपुरारातेरिति प्रका-
शोदाहृते त्रिपुरामुरखैरित्वस्य लिंगतया लिंगोदाहरणत्वमेवोचितम् । यदि तु यत्रैव
पदार्थः कोपादिः पदार्थान्तरेणानन्वित एव यः प्रकृतशक्यधर्मतां शक्यांतरव्या-
वृत्ततां च भजते तत्र लिंगत्वमित्युच्यते । तर्हिस्तु यथाकथंचिदुदाहरणसामं-
जस्यम् । सामानाधिकरण्यनिवेशस्त्वयुक्त एवेति बोध्यम् । एवं च कारणता-
परपर्यायसमर्थ्यमपि मधुना मत्तः कोकिल इत्यादौ उदाहृतम् । तत्र लिंगत्वं
यद्यपि वक्तुं शक्यं कोकिलमादनसामर्थ्यस्य वसंतासाधारणतया लिंगत्वा-
त्तथापि शब्दशब्दशाब्दत्वाभ्यामेकानेकपदार्थत्वाभ्यां वा विशेषो बोध्यः ।

वसन्ते । पातु वो दक्षितामुखमिति सांमुख्ये । भात्यत्र परमेश्वर इति राजधानीरूपादेशाद्वाजनि । चित्रभानुर्विभातीति दिने रवौ, राज्ञी यद्यप्यत्रापि सामर्थ्यं संभवत्येव तथापि मधुनेत्यत्र तृतीययेव तद्बोधाभावेऽप्यौचित्यमात्रज्ञानादेव शक्तिनियमनमसंकीर्णमिति ।

देशेन यथा—‘ भात्यत्र परमेश्वरः ’ इति । अत्रात्रेति राजधानीरूपादेशात्परमेश्वरपदस्य राजनि ।

कालेन यथा—‘ चित्रभानुर्विभाति ’ इति । अत्र चित्रभानुपदस्य दिवा दिवाकरे, रजन्यामाशुशुक्लौ ।

वस्तुतः संयोगादीनामर्थोत्तरसाधारणत्वे नानार्थशब्दस्यार्थविशेषे शक्तेः संकोच एव न संभवति । नियामकस्यासंकुचितत्वात् । अथ प्रसिद्धत्वादिना तेषामसाधारणताबुद्धिस्तर्हि प्रायो छिन्नाभेदा एवैते न तु सर्वथैव ततः स्वतंत्रा इति बोध्यम् । यदप्युक्तं संयोगाद्यैरभिधानियमने सुरभि मांसं भुंक्ते इत्यादौ शालकादिप्रयुक्ते द्वितीयार्थबोधो व्यंजनयेति । तदसंगतम् । यतो नियंत्रणं नामापरार्थस्य प्रथमतः शाब्दबोधजननं तदनंतरमपरस्यापि शक्त्यैव । न च द्वयोर्बोधे तात्पर्यज्ञानस्य कुत्रोपयोगः । अत्रार्थेऽयं शब्दः प्रमाणं अयमर्थः प्रमाणवेद्य इति निर्णयद्वारा प्रवृत्तौ तदुपयोगो न तु बोधे इति गृहाण । अत एवास्मादर्थबोधद्वयं जायते वक्तुः परं क तात्पर्यमिति न विद्म इत्यनुभवः । एवं च द्वितीयार्थबोधाय व्यंजना नावश्यकी । यत्र तु द्वितीयार्थस्य नैव बोधस्तत्र तदीयशक्त्यंशेऽनुद्बुद्धसंस्कारत्वात् दोषः । किं च व्यंजनावादिनाऽपि सर्वस्य द्वितीयार्थबोधवारणाय वक्तृबोद्धव्यादिवैशिष्ट्यप्रतिभादीनामवश्यं व्यंग्यप्रतिभाहेतुत्वमंगीकार्यम् । अस्माभिश्च तेषां द्वितीयार्थशक्त्युद्बोधकत्वमंगीकार्यमिति न दोषः । यदि तु योगरूढिस्थले रूढिज्ञाने योगापहारित्वस्य सर्वतंत्रसिद्धतया रूढ्यनधिकरणयोगार्थाल्लिङ्गितार्थोत्तरस्य प्रतीतिर्विना व्यक्तिं दुरुपपादा । यथा “ अबलानां श्रियं हृत्वा वारिवाहैः सहानिशम् । तिष्ठति चपला यत्र स कालः समुपस्थितः ” इत्यादौ अशक्तानां द्रव्यमपहत्य जलवाहकैः सह पुंश्चरस्योऽभिरमते इत्यर्थोत्तरं नैतैः शब्दैर्योगरूढ्या बोधयितुं शक्यते । मेघस्वविद्युत्वाद्यवटितस्यैव प्रतीतिः । अन्यथा चमत्कारो न स्यात् । अत एव न योगशक्त्याऽपि केवलरूढ्यर्थसंवलितार्थबोधकत्वस्य तस्या रूढिसमानाधिकरणत्वात् असंगतेः पुंश्चरत्वादेः सर्वथैव तद्विषयत्वाच्चेति तत्र व्यंजनाऽऽवश्यकीत्युच्यते । तर्हस्तु तत्र तथा । न तु सर्वत्र ऽ बद्धात्मन इत्यादेर्व्यभिचारेण नु

मित्रो । मित्रं भातीति सुहृदि, मित्रो भातीति रवी । इन्द्रशत्रुरित्वादौ वेदे
एव न काव्ये स्वरोऽर्थविशेषप्रतीतिकृत् ।

आदिग्रहणात्

एहहमेतत्थणिआ एहहमेतोहिं अच्छिवतोहिं ।

व्यक्तिर्लिङ्गं पुंस्त्वादि । तथा यथा—‘मित्रं भाति’ इति । अत्र नपुंस-
करूपालिङ्गान्मित्रपदस्य सुहृदि । ‘मित्रो भाति’ इत्यत्र पुल्लिङ्गात्सूर्ये ।

स्वरस्तूदात्तादिवेदे बाहुल्येन । तेनार्थप्रतीतिर्दृश्यते । यथा—‘इन्द्रशत्रु-
वर्धस्व’ इति । अत्रेन्द्रशत्रुः इत्यस्यान्तोदात्तत्वे षष्ठीतत्पुरुषव्यक्ताविन्द्रस्य
शातनकर्मत्वं लभ्यते । पूर्वपदान्तोदात्तत्वे च इन्द्रः शातयिता यस्येति
बहुव्रीहिहाभादिन्द्रस्य शातनकर्तृत्वं लभ्यते । काव्ये तु नैवं बाहुल्यम् ।
ननु ‘दृष्टे प्रसीद’ इत्यादौ स्वरेण संबोधनं प्रकाश्यते । तेन चार्थविशेष-
भिधा नियम्यते न तु साक्षात्स्वरेणैव । काकुत्स्थले तु न नानार्थाभिधानि-
यमनं किं त्वपदार्थस्यैव व्यञ्जनम् । यद्वा स्वरशब्देनोदात्तादित्रयं विवक्षितम् ।
अतः काव्ये स्वरस्याभिधानियामकत्वं नास्त्येवेति व्यर्थं बाहुल्येनेति विशेषण-
मिति । मैवम् । ‘सुधाकरसुहृद्वक्त्रं दृष्टिः पङ्कजवैरिणी’ इत्यादाविन्द्रशत्रुरिति
न्यायेनाभिधानियमनस्य काव्येऽपि दुर्वारत्वात् ।

स्वरादय इत्यादिग्रहणादभिनयापदेशौ गृह्येते । अन्ये चोक्तान्तर्भूताः । अभि-
नयश्च साक्षादिगार्थाकारादिप्रदर्शिका हस्तादिक्रिया । तथा तथा—एहहेति ।

उपमानोपमेयभावं व्यंग्यमादायैवेति वदन्ति । अर्थप्रतीतिरिति । बाहुल्यका-
त्करणे क्तिन् । प्रतीतिकृदिति वा पाठः । षष्ठीतत्पुरुषेति । इन्द्रस्य शत्रु-
सिति शातयितेत्यर्थकः । नैवमिति । काव्ये उदात्तादिस्वरकृतार्थभेदे समास-
विषये श्लेषभङ्ग एव स्यादिति भावः । लोके ऐकश्रुत्येनैव प्रायः प्रयोगाच्चे-
त्यपि बोध्यम् । सुधाकरसुहृदिति । अन्तोदात्तत्वे षष्ठीसमासेनोपमा । अन्यथा
बहुव्रीहौ प्रतीपमिने भावः । वस्तुत इदं चिन्त्यमेव । अभियुक्तैः कापि तथाऽ-
कथनात् । अत एव प्रकाशे इन्द्रशत्रुरित्यादौ वेदे एव न काव्ये स्वरोऽर्थविशे-
षप्रतीतिकृदित्येव बहुषु पुस्तकेषु पाठः । बाहुल्येनेति पाठेऽपि वेदे एव
बाहुल्येन सोऽर्थप्रतीतिविशेषकृत् न तु लोके कश्चिदपीति व्याख्येयमिति दिक् ।
एहहेति । चिरप्रवासिनि नायके नायिकावस्थां बोधयन्त्याः कस्याश्चिदुक्तिरियम् ।

१ व. अथ बाहुल्येन स्व. २ मु. पु. बाहुल्येनार्थप्रतीतिकृद्भूयते. बाहुल्येनार्थ-
प्रतीतिर्दृश्यते इत्युच्यतेसंमतः पाठः इति ज्ञाति.

एहमेसावत्या एहमेसेहिं दिव्यहिं ॥ ६ ॥

इत्यादावभिनयादयः । *the meaning would*

इत्थं संयोगादिभिरर्थान्तराभिधायकत्वे निवारितेऽप्यनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य यत् क्वचिदर्थान्तरप्रतिपादनम् तत्र नाभिधा । नियमनात्तस्याः । न लक्षणा । मुख्यार्थव्याघादभावात् । अपि त्वञ्जनं व्यञ्जनमेव व्यापारः । यथा—

भद्रात्मनो दुरधिरोहतनोर्विशाल-

अत्र विकसितमुकुलितभिनयविशेषसाहित्येन स्तनस्य पीनत्वमुकुलितत्वा-
द्यर्थविशेषेऽभिधा नियम्यते । एवं शेषपादत्रयेऽपि ।

अपदेशोऽभिमतनिर्देशः । तेन यथा—

‘ इतः स दैत्यः प्रासश्रीर्नेत एवार्हति क्षयम् ।

विषवृक्षोऽपि संवर्धे स्वयं छेतुमसांप्रतम् ॥ ’

अत्रापदेशेनेदं शब्दस्याभिधा वक्तुरि नियम्यते ।

इत्थं संयोगादिनार्थान्तराभिधायकत्वे निवारितेऽपि यदनेकार्थशब्देन क्वचि-
दर्थान्तरस्य प्रतिपादनं तत्र नाभिधा शब्दस्य व्यापारः । नियमनात्तस्याः ।
नापि लक्षणा । मुख्यार्थव्याघादिविरहात् । किं त्वञ्जनं व्यञ्जनमेव व्यापारः ।
यथा—भद्रेति ।

‘एतावन्मात्रस्तनिका एतावन्मात्राभ्यामाक्षिपत्राभ्याम् । एतावन्मात्रावस्था एता-
वन्मात्रैर्दिवसैः ।’ परिमाणे दहप्रत्ययः । अक्षिपत्राभ्यामित्युपलक्षणे तृतीया ।
दिवसैरिति करणे । (गाथा छन्दः ।) विशेषेऽभिधेति । बुद्धिस्थिततत्तदर्थशक्त-
तया नानार्थानामेतावन्मात्रादिशब्दानां शक्तिः स्तनादिगतपरिमाणविशेषरूपेऽर्थे
नियम्यते इत्यर्थः । अभिनयोऽत्र स्तनप्रदर्शने मुकुलाकारः, अक्षिप्रदर्शने पद्म-
पत्राशायाकारः, अवस्थाप्रदर्शने उच्चताप्रदर्शकः, दिवसप्रदर्शनेऽगुल्यप्रचारण-
दिः । अभिमतनिर्देश इति । स च हृदये हस्तनिक्षेपः । अर्थाकारप्रदर्श-
कत्वाभावाज्जायमभिनयः । इतः स दैत्य इति । (कुमारसंभवे द्वितीयसर्गे
पद्यमिदम् ।) स्पष्टम् । अपदेशेन हि अत्र इतःशब्दद्वयस्यैकात्मपरता
रूप्यते । निवारितेऽपीति । अर्थांतरं निवार्य प्रकृतार्थबोधनेऽपीत्यर्थः ।
क्वचित् । वक्तृवैशिष्ट्यादिसाहाय्यवतीत्यर्थः । भद्रेति । अत्र क्वचित् प्र-

वंशोन्नतेः कृतशिलीमुखसंग्रहस्य ।

यस्यानुपप्लुतगतेः परवारणस्य

दानाम्बुसेकसुभगः सततं करोऽभूत् ॥ ७ ॥

अत्र प्रकरणे न भद्रात्मन इत्यादिपदानां राज्ञि तदन्वययोग्ये चार्थे अभिधानियंत्रणेऽपि गजस्य तदन्वययोग्यस्य चार्थस्य व्यंजनयैव प्रतीतिः ।

करणिकराजपरः । तत्पक्षे यस्य प्रकृतस्य राज्ञः करः पाणिर्निरंतरं दानार्थं गृहीतांबुसेकशोभनोऽभूत् । भद्रात्मनः । कल्याणरूपस्य । दुरिति । अनभि-
भवनीयं शरीरं यस्य । वंशः कुलं तत्रोन्नतिराधिक्यं यस्य । शिलीमुखाः नारा-
चाः । संग्रहोऽस्यासदादर्घ्यम् । अनुपप्लुतेति । अबाधितज्ञानस्येत्यर्थः । अवा-
रितगतेर्वा । अदुष्टहितकर्तुर्वा । परेति । शत्रुनिवारकस्य । गजपक्षे भद्रजा-
तायस्य अत्युन्नत्वात् दुःखाधिरोह्यशरीरस्य । विशाला वंशस्य पृष्ठदंडस्योन्नति-
र्यस्य । कृतभ्रमरसंग्रहस्य । अनुद्धतधीरगमनस्य । परस्योत्कृष्टस्य वारणस्य
गजस्य करः शुंडादंडः मदजसेकसुभगोऽभूदिति । राजा वाच्यः । हस्ती
प्रतीयमानः । (वसंततिलका छन्दः ।) अत्र प्रकरणेनेति । न चात्र विद्व-
न्मानसेतिवत् एकशब्दोपस्थितार्थद्वयस्यांतरंगत्वात्परस्परमभेदान्वयपूर्वकमेव
वाक्यार्थबोध इति श्लिष्टरूपकमेवेदमिति वाच्यम् । भेदानवबोधात् ।
तथाहि, यत्र द्वयोरर्थयोः परस्परान्वयबोधं विना इतरान्वयानुपपत्ति-
विशेष्यमश्लिष्टं च तत्रैव श्लिष्टरूपकांगीकारात् यथा विद्वन्मानसेत्यत्र ।
प्रकृते तु न तथा । किं च प्रकरणेन विशेष्यपदात् प्रकृतार्थस्य तत एव
विशेषणपदैरपि तदन्वययोग्यार्थस्यैवोपस्थितौ आकांक्षायाः सत्त्वेन वाक्यार्थ-
बोधे प्रतिबंधकाभावेन द्वितीयार्थोपस्थितिप्रतीक्षाया अयुक्तत्वात् । अत एव
श्लिष्टपरंपरितमेव रूपकभेदेषु गणितं न तु केवलं श्लिष्टमपि । यत्र तु न वि-
शेष्ये श्लेषः सति द्वितीयार्थोपस्थितिं विनाऽन्वयानुपपत्तिः, तत्र प्रस्तुतान्वय-
बोधोत्तरं विशेषणश्लेषमात्रमाहात्म्येन अप्रस्तुतवृत्तौ उपस्थिते व्यंजनया तद-
भिधानप्रकारोपकारोपः प्रकृते तत्र समासोक्तिः । न चैवाऽपि रीतिः प्रकृते ।
इत्येव प्रस्तुतत्वाभावाच्च न श्लेषालंकारः । अतिशयोक्तेस्तु श्लिष्टे उक्तिसं-
ज्ञायाः अतिशयोक्तिः भावः । गजस्येति । अस्य तात्पर्यविषयस्यापि तदग्राहकप्रकर-
णस्य अतिशयोक्तिः व्यंजनबोधविषयमेवेति बोध्यम् । उपमानोपमेयभावकल्पना-

तद्युक्तो व्यञ्जकः शब्दः,

तद्युक्तो व्यञ्जनयुक्तः ।

यत्तोऽर्थान्तरयुक् तथा ।

ननूपमानोपमेयभावकल्पनाच्छब्दश्लेषेतो भेदेऽपि 'योऽसकृत्परगोत्राणां—
इत्याद्यर्थश्लेषतः कुतोऽस्य भेदः । अर्थश्लेषे चोभयत्र शक्तिरेव न व्यञ्जनेति
चेत्, उच्यते । यत्रोभयोरर्थयोस्तात्पर्यं स श्लेषः । यत्र त्वेकस्मिन्नेव तत्,
सामग्रीमहिम्ना तु द्वितीयार्थप्रतीतिः, सा व्यञ्जनेति ।

एवं व्यञ्जनां निरूप्य तथा शब्दं लक्षयति—तद्युक्त इति ।

अञ्जनमिति प्रस्तुतेऽप्यर्थगत्या तच्छब्देन व्यञ्जनं परामृश्यते । तेन व्यञ्ज-
नयुक्तो व्यञ्जक इति संपद्यते । अन्यथाऽञ्जनयुक्तोऽञ्जक इति स्यात् । तदेत-
दुक्तं 'व्यञ्जनयुक्तः' ।

ननूक्तस्थलेष्वर्थस्याव्यञ्जकत्वे कथं शब्दार्थयुगलरूपस्य काव्यस्य ध्वनित्वं
स्यादित्यत आह—यत्स इति ।

दिति । प्रकृते भद्रात्मन इत्यत्रोक्तविशेषणविशिष्टहस्तिप्रतीतौ द्वयोरर्थयोर्मि-
थोऽसंबद्धत्वे वाक्यभेदापत्तेरुपमाकृतास्वादानुमवाच्च तेन सह राज्ञ उपमाया
अपि प्रतीतेरित्यर्थः । शब्दश्लेषत इति । सर्वदो माधव इति सभंगश्लेषत
इत्यर्थः । तत्र हि द्वयोरपि प्रकृतत्वान्नोपमाकल्पना । अर्थश्लेषत इति ।
अभंगश्लेषोऽर्थश्लेष इति सर्वस्वकारादिमतेनेदम् । असकृत्परगोत्राणामित्यादौ
देवेंद्रराज्ञोरुपमाप्रतीतिरपि सर्वसिद्धेति ततोऽस्य भेदाभावात् । तत्र शक्ताव-
त्रापि सैव स्यादिति भावः । तात्पर्यमिति । युगपत् तद्ग्राहकप्रकरणाद्यव-
तार इत्यर्थः । स श्लेष इति । स श्लेषविषय इत्यर्थः । एकस्मिन्नेव तत् ।
तात्पर्यग्राहकं प्रकरणादि । यत्र तु क्रमेणोभयतात्पर्यग्राहकप्रमाणावगमः
तत्रावृत्तिरिति बोध्यम् । सा व्यञ्जनेति । सा तज्जन्येत्यर्थः । 'तदुक्तं तद्युक्तो

अथोऽपि व्यञ्जकस्तत्र सहकारितया मतः ॥ १५ ॥
तथेति व्यञ्जकः ।

इति श्रीकाव्यप्रकाशे शब्दार्थस्वरूपनिर्णयो नाम द्वितीय उल्लासः ।

सइति शब्दः । तथेति व्यञ्जक इत्यर्थः ।

इति श्रीमहामहोपाध्यायश्रीगोविन्दकृते काव्यप्रदीपे काव्यशरीरभूतश-
ब्दार्थविभागो द्वितीय उल्लासः ।

व्यञ्जनयुक्तः ' इति पाठः । अर्थातरयुगिति । स्वशब्दप्रकृतार्थबोधानन्तरमेव
व्यङ्ग्यार्थबोधात् तस्य सहकारित्वमिति भावः । शब्दस्य परिवृत्त्यसहत्वाच्च
शब्दमूलकत्वेन व्यपदेशः ।

इति शिवभट्टसुतसतीर्गर्भजनागोत्रीभट्टकृते काव्यप्रदीपोद्योतेः द्वितीय उल्लासः ।

NOTES.

ULLÂSA I.



*At the outset of his work,*¹ which is nothing but a particular arrangement of sentences with unity of purpose, *the author, with a view to avert the evils* that might obstruct its completion, *extols* the Speech of the Poet which (by metonymy) is looked upon as identical with the Goddess of Speech who presides over it. The author extols this Goddess particularly, because, she being the constituted authority in the province of poetry, is *the most appropriate* Deity to be extolled on the present occasion, *and* because, she being *his favourite tutelary Deity*, is sure to lend a favourable ear to his praise:—

Victorious is the Poet's Speech which puts forth a creation that is free from (subjection to) the Laws made by Destiny, that consists of pure joy, that does not depend on another, and that possesses the charm of nine flavours.

निवृत्ति may here etymologically mean 'a property by which such other properties as ' fragrance, ' pleasantness ' &c. are determined² as invariably associated with itself; such a property, for instance, as ' lotusness, ' which makes a lotus what it is, and distinguishes it from what it is not.

Or निवृत्ति may here customarily mean ' Fate, Destiny—popularly supposed to be a Goddess who, by her power, fixes the order of things in the universe.' This Fate, determining and conditioning all

1 वचनेत्यादि । उच्यते प्रतिपाद्यतेऽर्थो येस्तानि वचनानि वाक्यानि । तेषां संदर्भो रचनम् । संदर्भ्यमाणानि वाक्यानीति यावत् । विशेषश्च विवाहितार्थ-प्रतिपत्त्यनुकूलत्वे सति निबद्धत्वम् । Pr.

2 निवृत्त्यन्ते इति । स्वादिनाभाषित्वेन व्यवस्थाप्यन्ते इत्यर्थः । Pr.

existence, is recognised as a distinct principle¹ in the S'aiva system of philosophy, and the ancient commentators² of Mammata say that the word **नियति** here refers to this principle of the S'aiva system.

नियम—Such a law as the law of invariable concomitance; such, for instance, as that a 'lotus' should always be called by the name 'lotus,' that it should invariably be found as growing in water and in no other place, and as associated with a particular kind of fragrance.

This Law which is seen to govern the actual world does not, however, obtain in the world of the poet, where the name 'lotus' is seen to be given to a woman's face, where, in the presence of that face, a lotus is seen to be devoid of fragrance, and something else (fancied as a lotus) is seen to emit it, and where a lotus in the form of a 'face' is also seen as existing without water. In fact all the Laws of Nature are found suspended in poetry.

Thus, when we take the word **नियति** in its etymological sense, **नियतिकृतनियमरहिताम्** means—'Devoid³ of the relation of invariable association which has for one of its terms (**निरूपित**) such a property (**नियति**) as 'lotu-ness' and for the other, such a property as 'fragrance.'

But when we take the word in its customary sense, **नियतिकृत** &c. means—'Free from (subjection to) the Laws made by Destiny.'

The second meaning of **नियति** should, however, be preferred, for, it being the customary⁴ meaning is more powerful (i. e. more readily comes to the mind) than the etymological meaning, and again, if we adopt the first meaning, we are required to understand the word **कृत** in the unwarranted sense of **निरूपित**.

1 तथा चोक्तम्—ईश्वरः शुद्धविद्या च कालश्च नियतिस्तथा । Ja.

2 नियतिः । सर्वपदार्थानां निजनिजसंस्थानमानवर्णोद्भव्यवस्थानियमहेतु-
द्वैपयान्तरेण शेषशास्त्रोक्तपद्विशतत्त्वमध्योक्तं तत्त्वान्तरम् । San.

3 नियतिकृतः तन्निरूपितः यो नियमः व्याप्तिस्तद्गहितामित्यर्थः । Pr.

4 रुढेर्यलवत्त्वादाह—अदृष्टं वेति ।

ह्लादेकमयीम्—is not a Karmadhāraya compound; for, in that case, the word एक, according to Pāṇini's' Sūtra, ought to precede ह्लाद्. The instrumental case of ह्लादिन shows identity between the things signified by ह्लाद् and एक as in the example धान्द्वेन धनमयो ज्ञानः. The affix मयद् (मय) means—'consisting of.' Thus, the whole compound means—'consisting of joy only.' The word 'only' excludes grief and delusion which afflict the actual world. Poetry is the fountain of nothing but delight. Even things² that ordinarily produce grief and delusion become, when consigned to the transcendental world of poetry, a source of inexpressible delight to a man of poetic sensibility.

अनन्यपरतन्त्रात्—Not depending on another (than itself). The following objections are brought against this interpretation:—

1. The Amarakośha³ gives परतन्त्र as a synonym of पराधीन and not of अधीन simply. Thus, the word परतन्त्र itself meaning 'depending upon another,' the word अन्य becomes tautologous.

2. According to this interpretation, the adjective अन्यपरतन्त्रा would be inapplicable to निर्मिति itself, since Poetic Speech is necessarily dependent upon the poet and the poet's genius, two things which are other than itself.

To obviate these objections, Pradīpā interprets अनन्यपरतन्त्रात् as 'not depending upon another (अन्य) than the poet and the poet's genius, and another (पर) than itself.

Pradīpā's interpretation, however, appears to me artificial. It does not seem natural that Mammata should have deliberately employed the word अन्य to imply the fact that कवि and कविमतिभा are

1 पूर्वकालेकसर्वजरत्नपुराणनवकेवलाः समानाधिकरणेन । (II. I. 49.) स्नातानुलितः । एकनाथः । सर्वयाज्ञिकः । जरन्नेयायिकाः । पुराणमीमांसकाः । नवपाठकाः । केवलवेद्याकरणाः । Bhattôji.

2 कविचण्ड्यमानविद्योगशोकादरेष्यलौकिकानन्दहेतुत्वात् । Pr.

3 ' परतन्त्रः पराधीनः ' इति कोशावाक्यात् पराधत्तवचनः परतन्त्रशब्दः नाय-
त्तवचनः । भारतीभिन्नकवितत्पतिभाधीनत्वेनासंभवश्च इत्यन्तः । कश्चिदित्यनेन
सूचितः । Pr.

excluded from the things of which poetry is independent. The word **परतंत्र** may imply the fact of the exclusion of these two things as it does the fact of the exclusion of itself i. e. poetry, from things of which poetry is independent. There is no speciality about **कवि** and **कविप्रतिभा** justifying the implication of the fact of the exclusion of them by such a special word as **अन्व**. Again, there is no unanimity of opinion among the commentators of Amara that the word **परतंत्र** is a synonym of **पराधीन** only and not of **अधीन**. According to some¹, all the nine words that are grouped together bear an identical signification. Again, the word **परतंत्र** occurs in the **Vritti परमाख्यानुपादान** &c. (Vide Text p. 2) where it is obviously used in the sense of 'dependent.' This shows that the word is used in the same sense in the **Kārikā** also.

नवरसरुचिराद्य—is a बहुव्रीहिसमर्कर्मधारय² compound meaning 'possessed of nine flavours and pleasant.' The compound must be taken as a कर्मधारय, since the word **च** in³ the **Vritti षड्ज्ञान च द्वयैव तैः** shows that the adjective **नवरसरुचिरा** suggests the absence of two distinct things from **Brahma's** creation.

But it may be urged⁴ that if the point here is simply to suggest the fact of the absence of invariable pleasantness from **Brahma's** creation, and not to give the reason of that absence also then the word **तैः** in the instrumental case and denoting a reason is useless. The use of **तैः**, on the contrary, tends to show that the absence of, not two distinct things (**नवरसत्त्व** and **रुचिरत्त्व**), but of a single aggregate thing (**नवरसरुचिरत्त्व**) is intended to be pointed out.

1 एके तु नवभिः पर्यायमाहुः । **Bhānuji Dixit** on the **Amarakosha**. The nine words are:—**परतंत्रः पराधीनः परवान्नाथवानपि । अधीनो निघ्न आयत्तोऽवच्छन्दो गृहकोऽप्यसौ ॥ Amara.**

2 कर्मधारय इति । नव रसाः यस्यां सा नवरसा सा चासौ रुचिरा चेत्येवं बहुव्रीहिसमर्कर्मधारय इत्यर्थः । **Pr.**

3 वृत्ताविति । 'न च' इति चकारेण व्यतिरेकद्वित्वावगतेरित्यर्थः । **Pr.**

4 न चैवमिति । नियतद्वयत्वं मात्रव्यतिरेककथने तैरिति व्यर्थम्, प्रत्युत व्यतिरेकबोधकतया विरुद्धार्थकमेवेत्यर्थः । **Pr.**

To this objection, it may be replied that the instrumental¹ case of तैः does not denote a 'reason' but a 'characteristic.' Thus, what is meant by the expression न हृद्यैव तैः is—'since Brahmā's creation is characterised by the six flavours 'pungent &c.,' it is not invariably pleasant.

But² even though we take the word तैः in this sense, still, inasmuch as it implies, although it does not as before express, a reason, it is useless. We may, therefore, take the compound as a तृतीयातत्पुरुष, solving it as नवरसैः रुचिरा.

If it be urged that, in this case, we must take the compound नवरस to be a द्विगु, and that then the form of the word would be नवरसी, since, on the authority of Kātyāyana's Vārtika, a Dwigu whose latter member is a noun ending in ण is feminine, in which case, it takes the affix ई; we reply that we can account for the form नवरस in the manner in which we do such forms as त्रिगुण- (सन्निध) &c., that is, by taking the compound as a मध्यमपदलोपी, solving it as नवावयवो रसः

If it again be urged that, in this way, the expression नवरसरुचिरा, bringing out the fact of the absence of only one thing, becomes inconsistent with the Vritti वज्रसा न च हृद्यैव तैः which brings out the fact of two things being absent; we reply that the Vritti suggests the absence of two distinct things, because³ it wants to show that the absence of two distinct things (नवरसत्व and रुचिरत्व) —which are parts, is a necessary cause of the absence of the one thing (नवरसरुचिरत्व)—which is the whole. Thus, what the Vritti shows is this, that there is an absence of the charm of nine flavours (विशिष्टव्यतिरेक) from Brahma's creation, because, there is an absence of the number nine (विशेषणव्यतिरेक) from the flavours found in Brahma's creation, and also because, there is an absence from

1 तैरिति न करणे तृतीया किंतुपलक्षणे । अतो न विशिष्टव्यतिरेके तात्पर्यमिति नोक्तदोष इत्याह—तैरिति । Pr.

2 एवमपि तैरित्यस्य हेतुगर्भत्वादनुपयोग इत्यस्वरसादाह—अस्तु वेति ।

3 नवेति । विशेषणविशेष्ययोर्यतिरेकद्वयस्य प्रदर्शनं विशिष्टव्यतिरेके द्वयो-
रपि प्रयोजकत्वमस्तीति प्रदर्शयितुमित्यर्थः । Pr.

them of that property which makes Poet's creation always charming, it being necessarily concomitant with the number nine(विशेष्यव्यतिरेक).

निर्मितिमादधती—' Making or putting forth a creation. The tautology involved in the use of the words निर्मिति and आदधती in the same sense (i. e. of creating), may be removed by taking आदधती in the sense of 'making' in general, and निर्मिति in the sense of a 'particular kind of making' i. e. 'creating', according to the principle involved in the expression तृणोलप where तृण means 'grass' in general and उलप a 'particular kind of grass, i. e. soft grass'.

The verse, by means of the adjectives employed in it, suggests the superiority (व्यतिरेकालंकार) of the Poet's creation over Brahmā's. This superiority again implies the superiority of the Poet's Speech over Brahmā, just as the exquisite quality of a work of art implies the exquisite skill of the artisan who executes it. The superiority of the Poet's creation may be thus shown:—*Brahmā's creation is of a definite and fixed nature, in virtue of the power of Destiny.*

It consists of pleasure, pain, and delusion, in consequence of the whole world being made up (according to the Sāṅkhyas) of the three qualities, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, which being the causes of pleasure, pain, and delusion, are (by metonymy) said to be identical with them.

It is dependent on such material causes (उपादानकारण) as atoms (dyads) &c., and such auxiliary causes (सहकारिकारण) as motion (असम्बाधिकारण) and others such as a rod, potter, loom, a weaver, shuttle &c. (निमित्तकारण).

It consists of six flavours, Sweet (मधुर), Bitter (क्रुद), Saline (लवण), the Sour or Acid (अम्ल), Astringent (कषाय), Fiery (तिक्त), and according to the modern scientists¹, of the seventh flavour Alkaline also, and by these, again, it is not invariably pleasant, although it may be so occasionally as by the flavour Sweet, for instance.

1 Vide Bains' Book 'The Senses and the Intellect'.
page 145.

The tautology involved in the use of the two words **ह्लादैकमयी** and **रुचिरा** in an identical meaning in the *Kārikā* may be removed by taking the words to refer to two distinct kinds of pleasure, **ह्लाद** referring to the pleasure yielded by a 'figure' and **रुचिरत्व** referring to the pleasure yielded by a 'flavour'.

Quite different from this, however, is the creation of the Poet's Speech, possessed as it is of the attributes **नियमरहितत्व** &c. mentioned in the verse. Thus the superiority of the Poet's creation over Brah-mā's is clearly suggested by the verse.

Because the Poet's Speech is endowed with the function of creating in the abovementioned manner, *therefore it is victorious, i. e.,* supremely excellent.

जयति must be taken as a verb in the Indicative mood and not in the Imperative; for, the Imperative (**जयतु**) would show that the supremacy of the Goddess of Speech is not an accomplished fact; thus this supremacy would not, as it otherwise might, imply that the author makes a bow to the Goddess.

If it be said: Experience shows that all intelligent men before engaging in such arduous undertakings as the composition of the present work, find it incumbent upon them to pay homage to their favourite Deities. That they should do so is again quite reasonable since without that act, a successful carrying out of those undertakings is impossible. This being the case, we ask you, why has the present author dispensed with this necessary and reasonable practice? Has he done so through pride or ignorance? In either case, his utterances do not deserve to be attended to. But if you say that he has paid homage to his Deity, we further ask you, why has he not expressed it in the verse as he has done the praise, or rather why has he not expressed the homage [**नति**] itself instead of the praise [**स्तुति**], since there is no special reason why he should express the latter and not the former.

To this objection we reply: The expression of mere homage does not imply an act of praise on the part of the author. For, one may do reverence to another through some motive without deeming that another in any way worthy of praise. But the expression of praise

does imply an act of homage on his part. The verb जयति in this verse expresses praise, since it brings out the fact of the excellence of the Goddess of Speech. Now this excellence, inasmuch as no limitation is mentioned in connection with it, must be understood as universal. *This fact (of the universal excellence of the Goddess) brought out by (the verb) जयति implies that she is worthy of universal homage and especially of the homage of the author who¹ is her devout worshipper. And this fact² further implies that the author too has a consciousness of this implication, which he expresses in these words:—‘I am, like all others, vastly inferior to the Goddess of Speech and as such must pay homage to her. I, therefore, make a bow to her’.*

As for those who say that in the Vritti beginning with जय-स्वर्येन च &c., Mammata wishes to point out the sense that is suggested by the verse निवति &c., because he wants to show that the verse in question is an example of Suggestive poetry, they are wrong ; for, the suggested sense of the verse [i. e. the act of paying homage to the Goddess] is not more striking than the expressed sense of it, and as such does not entitle the verse to be ranked as Suggestive poetry. To constitute the verse as Suggestive poetry, the figure स्वतिरेक alone must be taken as the suggested sense. it being more striking than the expressed sense of the verse.

Udyota remarks here that the verse is shown to be Suggestive poetry from the point of view of the intermediate suggested sense (i. e. of the figure स्वतिरेक). But the verse ultimately suggests another sense also, i. e. the love of the author for the Goddess of Speech. Thus, the verse may be shown to be Suggestive poetry from the point of view of this ultimate suggested sense also.

The author now wishes to state the fruits of Rhetoric ; for unless those fruits are set forth, he knows that no sane man would bestow any the slightest labour upon it ; and *thinking that* the science which is the subject-matter of this work is fruitful only by the fruits

1 वैशिष्ट्यम् । उपास्योपासकत्वरूपम् । Pr.

2 नन्वस्मदादीन् प्रति तद्वर्जने वक्तुः किमायातमत आह-तेनेति । इति
अस्मदादीन् प्रति तद्वर्जने वक्तुः किमायातमत आह-तेनेति । Pr.

of poetry to which that science is ancillary, *he declares* the fruits of poetry in the following Kârikâ.

There are others, however, who take the word अभिधेय as referring to poetry and interpret the Vritti simply thus :—‘ He states the fruits of poetry the subject treated in this book’. The fact that the following Kârikâ mentions the fruits of poetry itself, appears to lend support to their interpretation. The difficulty caused by the fact that what is treated in the book is not ‘poetry’ but ‘criticism of poetry’ and that therefore the word अभिधेय cannot mean poetry, they remove by supplementing the meaning of अभिधेय thus:—poetry¹ as a subject of criticism.

This interpretation is not, however, acceptable for the following reasons :—

1. The supplementing of the meaning of such an important word as अभिधेय is itself not proper.

2. If what is intended to be expressed here had been simply this :—‘He states the fruits of poetry’, the following simple construction would have been used by the author:—अभिधेयस्य² प्रयोजनमाह । The present construction is inappropriate for the expression of this simple thought, the word ‘इति’ in it being quite useless for that purpose.

Kârikâ II.

Poetry aims at fame, the acquisition of wealth, practical wisdom, the removal of evils, instantaneous and exquisite bliss, and offering (good) advice in the manner of a wife.

The words कृत्, विद् and बुज् in the Kârikâ are here abstract nouns expressive of purpose.

1 अभिधेयं काव्यम् । परीक्षणीयतया इति शेषः । तेन काव्यफलप्रदर्शनं नानुपयुक्तम् । Sâr.

2 Vide similar constructions : एवमस्य प्रयोजनमुक्त्वा कारणमाह । एवमस्य कारणमुक्त्वा स्वरूपमाह । further on in this very Ullâsa.

3 यथाश्रुते अभिधेयस्य प्रयोजनमाहेति वाच्ये ‘ सप्रयोजनमित्याह ’ इति इतिशब्दानर्थक्यमपि बोध्यम् । Pr.

A poet is one who is skilled in (producing) descriptions of an extraordinary (i. e. highly imaginative) kind. Poetry is the peculiar act of making such highly imaginative compositions on the part of such a one.

(This) poetry brings in fame as (it did) in the case of (such poets as) Kālidāsa and others.

It procures wealth as (it did) in the case of (such poets as) Dhāvaka and others from (such kings as) Sri-harsha and others.

It brings destruction of evil as (it did) in the case of (such poets as) Mayūra and others from such Gods as the Sun and others.

It is well known that the poet Mayūra was cured of white leprosy by means of the composition of a hundred verses in praise of the Sun.

It yields to a man of taste, immediately after its perusal that crowning¹ fruit of poetry—that primary end of man—i. e. the joy which springs from the relishing of a flavour and in which consciousness of everything else is lost.

The language of Mammata here is a little loose, not precise. Strictly speaking, poetical delight does not spring from the relishing of a flavour but is 'flavour'² itself. Flavour again is nothing distinct from the relishing of it: it is the 'being relished' itself. Thus, रस, आस्वाद and आनन्द are synonymous words. Even though we follow ³Pradipa in taking रस to mean literally 'that which is tasted'—a स्थायिभाव, still that does not solve the difficulty; for, poetical delight or, what is the same thing, a flavour, does not spring even from the relishing of a स्थायिभाव. The true nature of flavour may be thus stated:—'A स्थायिभाव such as the feeling of love or the like brought out into

1 उत्तमत्वं च सुखस्य खतः पुमर्थत्वात् । Pr.

2 अलौकिकानन्दमयः चर्च्यमाणतैकप्राणो रसः । K. P. V. रस्यमानतामात्र-सारः असृष्टः स्वप्रकाशानन्दचिन्मयो ब्रह्मास्वादसहोदरो रसः । S. D. III.

3 For this meaning vide K. P. VII. p. 155.

4 विभावेनानुभावेन व्यक्तः संचारिणा तथा । रसतामेति रत्यादिः स्थायिभावः सचेतसाम् ॥ प्रतीयमानः प्रथमं प्रत्येकं हेतुरुच्यते । ततः संवलितः सर्वो विभावादिः

manifestation by विभाव, अनुभाव &c. separately, and relished along with the same विभाव &c. collectively, attains to the condition of a flavour in the man of a poetical sensibility.

It imparts knowledge of the appropriate duties of kings (ministers, subjects) &c. It tells us, for instance, that it is the appropriate duty of kings to protect their subjects.

It imparts advice (such for instance) that we should imitate the conduct of Rāma and the like, as in the main wholesome, and not that of Rāvana and the like, as in the main unwholesome.

Although ethical and political treatises offering instruction on moral and political subjects, exist in abundance, still poetry is not useless, since it imparts instruction on these subjects, in a manner different from that pursued by those sciences.

To explain: Hortatory sentences may be divided into three kinds. The first kind resembles a master, the second a friend, and the third a wife. Of the first kind are the sentences of *such sciences as the Vedas, and others such as the Smiritis, in which the letter or the literal meaning is predominant, i. e.* is to be observed without a regard to the consequences resulting from that observance. They are always in the form of 'injunctions' whose chief function is to enjoin a person to do a certain (religious or moral) action. They issue commands in the form 'Do thou this' which are peremptory like those of a master to his slave. Enjoined by these, a man proceeds to do such actions as 'Sandhyâ adoration' and others, although he derives no positive¹ fruit (as the attainment of heaven &c.) from the performance of them.

सचेतसाम् । प्रपाणकरसन्ध्यायुच्चव्यमाणो रसो भवेत् । S. D. III. What the स्थायिभाव, विभाव, अनुभाव and संचारि or व्यभिचारिभाव are may be learnt from the following Kârikâs:—अविरुद्धा विरुद्धा वा यं तिरोधातुमक्षमाः । आस्वादाकुरकन्दोऽसौ भावः स्थायीति संमतः । रत्यायुद्धोषका लोके विभावाः काव्यनाट्ययोः उद्बुद्धं कारणैः स्वैः स्वैर्बहिर्भावं प्रकाशयन् । लोके यः कार्यरूपः सोऽनुभावः काव्यनाट्ययोः । विशेषादाभिमुख्येन चरणात् व्यभिचारिणः । S. D. III. Vide also introduction to my edition, Kāvya-Prakāśh, Ullāsa VII.

1 निष्फलेऽपीति । स्वर्गादिफलरहितेऽपीत्यर्थः । Pr.

Of the second kind are the sentences of *the Purāṇas, Histories, Legends &c. in which the spirit* (as opposed to the letter) *is to be observed*, i. e. in which words may be understood metaphorically (i. e. in secondary senses) so as to make them yield the lessons intended to be preached by the writer. They are always in the form of commendatory passages *which are mainly* 'concerned with the statement that the adoption of one course of conduct is profitable and that of another unprofitable. *Like friends*, they simply advise, do not command; simply persuade, do not compel.

Quite different from these, are the sentences of poetry (which constitute the third kind of hortatory sentences), *because, here, the literal and the metaphorical meanings* (शब्द and अर्थ or शब्दार्थ and लाक्षणिकार्थ) *are thrown into the background, and full play is given to the operation which is a means to the manifestation of a flavour, and in consequence of which, a flavour* (poetical delight—स्वैन्द्यार्थ) *is predominant in poetry.*

The operation in question is either the union of विभाव, अनुभाव &c. which lead to the apprehension of a flavour, or Suggestion itself through which that union produces that apprehension. The literal and metaphorical meanings are here said to be subordinate, because they contribute to the manifestation of a flavour, only indirectly, i. e. by bringing out विभाव, अनुभाव &c. upon the union of which that manifestation is directly dependent, or through the medium of their function called Suggestion which directly suggests a flavour.

Thus it is shown that poetry combines instruction with pleasure. Poetry may be said to impart its instruction *in the manner of a wife*. Just as a wife prevails upon her husband to grant her the desires² such as ornaments, garments &c. by first winning his heart by her blandishments, so poetry makes a man accept its teachings *by first attracting him to them with the graces of its style*.

There is a class of men such as the sons of kings and rich men—persons of slender capacities and easy-going dispositions whom it is

1 अर्थतात्पर्यवान् । इष्टानिष्टार्थबोधनमात्रपरः । Pr.

2 कान्तोपदेशस्तु स्वसमीहितवसनालङ्कारादिसंपादनरूपः । Pr.

अभिप्रेक्षणीकृत्य । आस्वादाने सादरीकृत्य । Pr.

very difficult to persuade to a study of such dry sciences as those of Ethics and Politics. Poetry which conveys instruction on these subjects in a winning manner is particularly useful to this class. Through the bait of pleasure, its instruction is made acceptable to these persons—as through the bait of molasses, medicine is made acceptable to children. As it is said:—

‘Men read a work written in the graceful style of poetry as children drink a bitter medicine when it is preceded by the sweet taste of honey.’

All the abovementioned advantages poetry accords to the poet and the reader of taste according to fitness. Three of these, for instance, i. e. ‘wealth, fame, and the warding off of evils’ accrue to the poet only; and the remaining three accrue to the reader only. Although a poet may experience delight from a poem composed by himself, still the moment he begins to enjoy his poetry, he ceases to be a poet and becomes a reader (of taste). /

Such being the advantages resulting from poetry, *we should by all means exert ourselves for its production*, and as an essential preliminary, strive for the acquisition of all the means which lead to that production.

But it may be said: The fact that the composition of poetry is attended with advantages is admitted; but that fact does not prove the necessity for the study of the present book which professes to be a work on Rhetoric. Besides, advice has been given that we should endeavour to acquire the means which would enable us to compose poetry. But this advice is useless; for our complete ignorance of those means makes any endeavour on our part to acquire them impossible.

To obviate these objections, the author, after having stated the motives to poetry in the aforesaid manner, now proceeds to state that the present work, in the shape of ‘instruction under one who knows poetry,’ is a means to the production of poetry, thus furnishing a reason why the book deserves to be studied; and while stating this means to poetry, he is led to state the other means to it also.

Kârikâ III.

✓ A (peculiar) faculty; the skill derived from a study of the ways of the world, of sciences, and poems ; a repeated, practice under the instruction of those who know poetry: these¹ constitute the means to its production.

शक्ति = *A peculiar (mental) power* called (according to the ancient Rhetoricians) ' poetic inspiration ' (i. e. that² by which thoughts and words adapted to poetry readily come to the poet's mind); a *peculiar cast of the mind*, the result of merit in past births or of the favour of a deity &c.; and the *seed³ of (the sprout of) poetry*; that *without which poetry cannot be produced at all, or if produced, would only excite ridicule.*

That this faculty is a cause of poetry is evidenced from the fact that in its absence, a poem such as will not be the laughing-stock of the people is not produced, even though all the other causes such as ' skill &c. ' are present. Now the absence of the production of such a poem is possible in two ways : either when no poem is produced or when a poem being produced is ridiculed by the people.

If it be said that the production of a poem of the abovementioned character may be supposed as due not to the exercise of this faculty which is a divine gift, but to the operation of some other cause⁴ such

1 नैसर्गिकी च प्रतिभा श्रुतं च बहुनिर्मलम् । अमन्दुश्चाम्भियोगोऽस्याः कारणं काव्यसंपदः । Dan. तस्यासारनिरामात्सारग्रहणाच्च चारुणः करणे । त्रितयमिदं व्या-प्रियते शक्तिर्व्युत्पत्तिरभ्यासः । Ru. लक्ष्यज्ञत्वमभियोगो वृद्धसेवाऽवेक्षणं प्रतिभानमवधानं च प्रकीर्णम् । Vâm.

2 काव्यघटनानुकूलशब्दार्थोपास्थितिः प्रतिभा । Pr. Comp. मनसि सदा सुसमाधिनि विस्फुरणमनेकधाभिधेयस्य । अङ्गिष्ठानि पदानि च विभान्ति यस्यामेसां शक्तिः । Ru. प्रसन्नपदनव्यार्थयुक्त्युद्बोधविधायिनी । स्फुरन्ती सत्कवेर्बुद्धिः प्रतिभा सर्वतोमुखी । Vâg.

3 (प्रतिभानं) कवित्वस्य बीजं जन्मान्तरागतसंस्कारविशेषः कश्चित् यस्माद्भिना काव्यं न निष्पद्यते, निष्पन्नं वा अवहास्यायतनं स्यात् । Vâm.

4 कारणान्तरस्य । विजानां यव्युत्पत्तिपरम् । Pr.

as extraordinary learning or the like, we reply that this supposed other cause which is different from the well-known ordinary causes is what we appropriately designate शक्ति (faculty) which literally means 'that which enables a man to compose a poem.'

Some commentators² hold that the Vritti यां विना &c. refers to two powers—the power of creating and the power of understanding poetry. Without the former, a poet will not be able to make poetry at all, and without the latter, a poem although produced by the creative power of the poet will be ridiculed by the reader on account of its beauty not being understood by him.

This view is however wrong; for the pronoun अस्व (in एवमस्व प्रयोजनमुक्त्वा &c.) obviously refers to poetry which (and not the understanding of it) is the subject under consideration, since it is motives to poetry (and not to the understanding of poetry) that have been intended to be stated in the preceding Kārikā. Hence it is the power which produces poetry that deserves to be mentioned. The mention of the power of understanding it on the part of the reader would be quite irrelevant here. Besides, the words of the Vritti would lose all their propriety, if they be taken to refer to two powers.

Really speaking, the power of understanding also is a cause of the production of poetry; for, this power enables the poet to know what is good poetry and thus to make an exertion for producing the same.

लोक—*The* ~~worlds~~ *of the world both moveable and immoveable.* The word लोक—customarily means 'The worlds'. But this meaning would not do here, for the worlds are fixed and definite, and being once described by ancient poets cannot be described anew by modern

1 शक्नोत्यनया काव्यं कर्तुमिति व्युत्पत्तेः । Pr.

2 केचिच्च यां विनेति ग्रंथं शक्तिद्वयामिप्रायेण व्याचक्षते—यां निर्माणशक्तिं विना काव्यं न प्रसरेत् न भवेत् । यां च बोद्धृशक्तिं विना निर्माणशक्त्या प्रसृतमप्युद्भूतं न स्थितम् । चमत्कृतेरसंपत्तेरिति । तदयुक्तम् । अस्येति प्रकृतकाव्यपगमशक्तिप्रकारणशक्तेरेव वक्तव्यतया बोद्धृशक्तिकथनस्यासंगत्वात् । शक्तिद्वयपरत्वे शब्दम्बारस्य संगच्छ P.

ones. We must, therefore, take the word in its etymological sense of 'that which can be observed—the ways of the world', which being endless, endless descriptions of them by past and present poets are possible.

But inasmuch as the etymological sense of the word लोक includes 'the worlds' also, they also being things that can be observed, we should understand the word as used not in its etymological but in a metaphorical (लक्षणात्मिक) sense.

१ लक्ष^१—*Sciences i. e. works which treat of Prosody* such as those written by Pingala and others ; *of Grammar* such as those written by Pāṇini and others ; *which are styled Dictionaries*, such as the works compiled by Amara and others ; *which treat of the arts of dancing, singing &c.*, such as those composed by Bharata and others ; *which treat of the four ends of man*, and include 1 works on religious and moral Duty such as the Parva Mīmāṃsā by Jaimini, and the Smritis of Manu and others, 2 works on Politics and Political Economy composed by Gārgya, Bhārgava and others, 3 works on the Erotic science composed by Vātsyāyana and others, and 4 works on Liberation composed by Vyāsa, Kapila and others ; *which treat of elephants, horses, swordsmanship, and others*³ such as bowmanship &c. by such authors as Śhalihōtra and others.

क्राःय—*poems—the compositions of such celebrated poets as Vālmiki, Kālidāsa and others.* आदि includes such other works as *Histories (Epics) and others*⁴ such as Purāṇas, Tales &c.

1 शब्दस्मृत्यभिधानकोषच्छन्दोविचितिकलाकामशास्त्रदण्डनीतिपूर्वा विद्या (काव्यांगम्) । Vām.

2 अभिधानकोश—lit. a glossary of words ; a lexicon. For अभिधानकोश being one word, compare यत्नादधीत्य विविधानाभिधान-कोशान् श्लेषं महाकविरिमं निपुणो विदध्यात् । Ru. IV:

3 सङ्गादीत्यादिपदेन धनुरादि ग्राह्यम् । Su.

4 इतिहासादीति । आदिना पराजयवहन्कथावित्तमहः । Pr.

विदुषस्त¹—*Skill or adeptness acquired by a close study (of these).*

काव्यप्रशिक्षा—*Training received under those who know how to make and harmonize poetry, i. e. who know how to make detached poetical pieces and introduce² them in a poetical composition in consonance with the various emotions intended to be depicted in it. This training is given by the present work, the study of which is thus a means to the production of poetry.*

अभ्यास³—*Repeated practice in making⁴ separate poetical pieces and turning them into a harmonious⁵ whole, under the instruction of the men abovementioned.*

The word **इति** and the singular number of the word **हेतु** in the **Kārikā** show that these three things, when taken together, and not separately, constitute the cause, not causes, of the production and excellence of a poem, i. e. of the production of such a poem as will not be ridiculed by the people.

The operation of these three things in the production of a good poem is like that of a wheel, rod &c. which produces a jar only by taking each other's aid and unlike that of grass, pieces of wood, sun-stone &c. which produce fire, each independently of the others. But although the actual production" of the effect belongs

1 छन्दोव्याकरणकलालोकस्थितिपदपदार्थविज्ञानात् । युक्तायुक्तविवेको व्युत्पत्तिरियं समासेन ॥ Ru. शब्दधर्मार्थकामादिशास्त्रेष्वाम्नायपूर्वका । प्रतिपत्तिरसामान्या व्युत्पत्तिरभिधीयते ॥ Vāg.

2 रसानुगुणतयेति । यो रसः प्रक्रान्तस्तदानुगुण्येन वर्णनात्मकं काव्यं तत्प्रक्रमे निवेशनीयम् अन्यथा रसव्याघातापत्तेरित्यर्थः । Pr.

3 अनारतं गुरुपान्ते यः काव्ये रचनादरः । तमभ्यासं विदुस्तस्य क्रमः कोऽप्युपादिश्यते ॥

4 करणे योजने चेति । विशकलितरूपे प्रबंधादीनां गुम्फरूपे च San. योजने चेति । प्रबंधरूपतया संघटने । Ja.

5 On Harmony as an essential of poetry, Vide Bain's Rhetoric, pages 219-221.

6 हेतुत्वं फलोपधायकत्वरूपम् । Pr.

to the three things taken collectively, still the causal capacity¹ belongs to each separately. It would be a mistake to suppose that the causal capacity also is collective; for, such a supposition² would not be warranted by experience which shows that the causal capacity is possessed by such things as ईदृ, चक्र &c. individually.

These three causes contribute to the production of good poetry in the following manner:—words³ and thoughts come to the mind by शक्ति, their propriety is judged by व्युत्पत्ति, and the poetic power is strengthened by अभ्यास; or according⁴ to others, poetry is made by शक्ति, is beautified by व्युत्पत्ति, and is multiplied by अभ्यास.

According to Jagannāth,⁵ poetry is the outcome of poetical genius only. This poetical genius is sometimes due to a peculiar mental cast acquired through the favour of a Deity &c. and sometimes to exceptional learning and practice of making poetry. Thus, these three are not the joint cause of poetical genius as Mammata says. For, a child is sometimes seen to manifest poetical genius even through the mere favour of a saint, although he possesses no learning and has no practice of making poetry. Nor can the mental cast also be said to be the cause of poetical genius by itself. For, a man who attempts poetry for a long time but unsuccessfully, is

1 कारणतेव स्वरूपयोग्यतेव । स्वरूपयोग्यत्वं । Pr. (जनकत्वम्) तद्वच्छेद-
कधर्मवत्त्वम् । यथा अरण्यस्थस्यापि दंडस्य घटं प्रति जनकत्वम् । N. K.

2 मानामावात् । दंडादिष्वपि तथात्वापत्तेः । Pr.

3. शब्दा शब्दार्थौ मनसि संनिधीयेते । तयोः सागमारग्रहणानिरासौ
व्युत्पत्त्या क्रियते । अभ्यासेन शक्तेरुत्कर्ष आधीयते इति शक्त्यादिव्यापारः । Vide
Nam. and Jar.

4. कवित्वं जायते शक्तेर्वर्धतेऽभ्यासयोगतः । अस्य चारुवनिष्पत्तौ व्युत्पत्ति-
स्तु गरीयसी । Vide Kam. प्रतिभा कारणं तस्य व्युत्पत्तिस्तु विभूषणम् । भृशो-
त्पत्तिरुदभ्यास इत्याद्यकवित्वकथा । Vāg.

5 तस्य (कारणस्य) च कारणं कविगता केवला प्रतिभा । तस्याश्च हेतुः
काचिद्वैवतामहापुरुषप्रसादादिजन्यमदृष्टम् । कचिच्च विलक्षणव्युत्पत्तिकारणव्यकारणा-
भ्यासौ । न तु त्रयमेव । शालादेस्तौ विनापि केवलान्महापुरुषप्रसादादपि प्रतिभोत्पत्तेः ।
नपि केवलमदृष्टमेव कारणमित्यपि शक्यं वदितुम् । कियन्तचित्कालं काव्यं कर्तु-
मशक्नुवतः कथमपि संजातयोर्व्युत्पत्त्यभ्यासयोः प्रतिभायाः प्रादुर्भावस्य दर्शनात् ।

R. S. P. S.

seen to display the divine faculty after he has somehow or other acquired learning and practice.

Having thus stated the means to poetry, the author (now) proceeds to state the definition¹ of it.

Kārikā IV.

It is a word and a sense, with qualities, without faults and sometimes without figures even.

The pronoun तत् refers to the noun काव्य in the kārīkā काव्यं यज्ञते &c. The singular number of तत् shows that a word and a sense together constitute poetry, since both of them equally contribute to the production of poetical relish. The mention of the word 'शब्द' first is simply due to the fact of its being the abode of अर्थ.

Thus, both a word and a sense together, when possessed of the attributes 'faultlessness &c.' should be called poetry. *What the 'faults,' 'qualities' and 'figures' are, will be declared in the VII. VIII. IX. and X. Ullāsas, respectively.* Although 'qualities' are the attributes² of a flavour in which they directly reside, still, inasmuch as they are suggested by words and senses, they are only secondarily said to be attributes of those words and senses. Thus, this interpretation of the word सगुण³ makes the definition of a काव्य apply to flavourless poetry also.

If it be said: This definition is still faulty; for, inasmuch as the attribute 'possessed of figures' is not put in, the definition may faultily extend to a poem which is without figures. We reply: *The words अनलंकृती पुनः क्वापि of the kārīkā are intended to show that a poem, to deserve the name, must always be possessed of figures, except in very rare cases, where a poem is allowed to be called a poem even though*

1 स्वं रूप्यते अनेन इति स्वरूपं लक्षणम् । Pr.

2 ये रसस्यागिनो धर्मं शौर्यादय इवात्मनः ।

उत्कर्षहेतवस्ते स्युरचलास्थितयो गुणाः ॥

गुणवृत्त्या पुनस्तेषां वृत्तिः शब्दार्थयोर्मता ॥ K. P. VIII.

distinct figures are absent from it. The negative particle in *अनलङ्कृती* has the sense of 'slight' which here means 'indistinct.' Thus, a piece, although without a flavour, but with indistinct figures, deserves to be admitted as a poem. This is a view of those men who interpret Mammata's Vritti literally. But this view is not proper. For, in the first place, had Mammata intended to express this view, he would have simply used the adjective *सालंकारी*. Secondly, a piece without a flavour and without distinct figures cannot be admitted to be a poem. For, a flavour &c. and a figure are two sources of delight; and whatever is a source of delight is a poem. Thus, when a flavour is present in a verse, there is no necessity of the presence of a distinct figure to constitute it a poem. Hence, the author of the *Dhwani* has said:—A composition favourable to the manifestation of a flavour yields great delight, by itself, *i. e.* even in the absence of a figure; as in the verse *सुनिर्जयति* &c., the statement of "the seeing of the Fish and Tortoise incarnations of Vishnool by Agasthi in one hollow of the hand" yields great delight, as it produces a feeling of wonder in the reader's mind and is thus favourable to the manifestation of the Marvellous (flavour).

A flavourless poem, on the other hand, does not yield delight, if there is no distinct figure in it. The presence of a distinct figure is quite essential to a poem whose very essence is 'pleasure.' What is meant by the Vritti *अनलङ्कृती पुनः क्वापि* is also this: A verse which contains indistinct figures is a poem in some cases only, *i. e.* in those cases only where a flavour or any other sentiment (भाव) is prominently apprehended, and not always. From this, it is clear that the proper attribute of a poem is not 'the possession of figures only,' but 'the possession of either a flavour or a distinct figure.' Thus, according to this view, the verse *सुनिर्जयति* &c. which has a flavour but no figures (distinct or indistinct), deserves to be called a poem. If, however, through a blind adherence to the literal interpretation of the Vritti, you wish to deny the title of a poem to such a verse as *सुनिर्जयति* &c. then another qualification *i. e.* 'which are possessed of figures' should be added to the definition.

Thus, the most correct and complete definition of a poem is as follows:—A poem is (both) a word and a sense, 1 which manifest 'qualities,' 2 which possess no 'faults,' and 3 which are

According to some	}	A	with a figure either distinct or indistinct
or		B	with a flavour (a figure distinct or indistinct may be present or absent) or a distinct figure (if the flavour is absent.)
According to Pradipa	}		
or		O	With a distinct figure (a flavour may be present or absent), or an indistinct figure (if the flavour is present.)
According to others	}		

A verse constituting a poem, even though a distinct figure is absent (a flavour being, of course, present) may be instanced in यः कौमार &c.:—Here, the figures' उपमा &c. are impossible in consequence of the particles इव &c. expressive of comparison being absent. So the figures रूपक &c. are also impossible. Nor can it be said that inasmuch as the verb भस्मि can be connected with the various subjects of the compound sentence by being changed into अस्ति, सन्ति &c., this is कारकदीपक;² for, अस्मि is not a verb here, but an indeclinable used in the sense of 'I' as in अस्मिन्' &c. Even though we take अस्मि as a verb here, still this is not दीपक, since all the subjects connected with it are here things in question: whilst दीपक requires that some of them should be things in question and the others, things not in question. तुल्ययोगिता³ is also impossible here owing to the absence of resemblance. समुच्चय⁴ of the two kinds described afterwards (i. e. in the X. Ullāsa) is also impossible. समुच्चय of a third kind, although possible here, cannot be admitted as a figure, as being void of all charm.

1 इवायमावेनोपमाया असंभवः स्पष्ट इति रूपकादीनामित्युक्तम् । Pr. तदूप-
कमभेदो य उपमानोपमेययोः ॥ K. P. X.

2 सहसृत्तिस्तु धर्मस्य प्रकृताप्रकृतात्मनाम् । सेव क्रियासु बह्वीषु; कारकस्येति
दीपकम् ॥ K. P. X.

3 अन्यत्र यूयं कुसुमावचार्यं कुरुध्वमन्नास्मि करोमि सख्यः ॥ K. P. III.

4 निश्चतानां सहसृर्धर्मः सा पुनस्तुल्ययोगिता ॥ K. P. X.

5 तत्तिद्धिहेतावेकस्मिन् यत्रान्यत तत्करं भवेत् ।

समुच्चयोऽसौ न तुल्यो युगपया गुणक्रिया : ॥ K. P. X.

✓ विशेषोक्ति¹ and विभावना² although present are not yet distinct. Their indistinctness may be shown in the following manner:—विशेषोक्ति is the statement that an effect is absent even though the cause of it is present. { Here, the fact of 'the husband and other things having been frequently enjoyed before' is the cause of the effect i. e. the 'woman's not having a longing for the re-enjoyment of them.' The absence of this effect, i. e. her having a longing for re-enjoyment is here stated even in the presence of the cause, i. e. the frequent enjoyment of the husband &c. in the past. Thus, the figure विशेषोक्ति is present in the verse. But it is not distinct; for, the absence of the effect is stated in the form:—'Still my mind has a longing' and not in the form:—'Still my mind is not without longing.' It is only when the latter language would be employed, that the figure would be distinct. ?

Similarly, विभावना is the statement of an effect being produced even in the absence of its cause (or causes). Here, the cause of the woman's longing for the re-enjoyment of the husband &c. is the fact of her not having enjoyed them before. { The absence of this cause, i. e. the fact of her having enjoyed them before is here stated along with the presence of the effect, i. e. her longing for the re-enjoyment of them. Thus, the figure विभावना is present in the verse. But it is not distinct; for, the absence of the cause is stated in the form:—'Although the husband &c. have been frequently enjoyed by me before,' and not in the form:—'Although the husband &c. have not been frequently un-enjoyed by me before.' Thus, like विशेषोक्ति, विभावना also is indistinct.

If it be said that inasmuch as the particle एव in the sentence वरः स एव intimates that the husband is the same i. e. not un-enjoyed before, we apprehend the absence of the cause (i. e. absence of the non-enjoyment of the husband &c.) here in the same manner in which we ought to apprehend it in विभावना, and that thus it cannot be said that विभावना is here indistinct; we reply that the particle एव, when connected with the predicate, directly intimates the exclusion from the subject, of the absence of the connection of the predicate (with it). From this, the apprehension of the exclusion, from the subject,

1 विशेषोक्तिरस्येतेषु कारणेषु कलावचः ॥ K. P. X.

2 कियायाः प्रतिषेधेऽपि कल्यक्तिर्विभावना ॥ K. P. X.

of the absence of the predicate itself results no doubt, but only indirectly. In the present example, for instance, the particle एव in connection with the predicate सः directly intimates that the absence of the connection of उपपुक्तत्वं (the predicate) is excluded from वरः (the subject). From this the apprehension that the absence of उपपुक्तत्वं itself is excluded from वरः results no doubt, but only indirectly. Thus विभावना is but indistinct here.

If it however be said:—‘We may read the sentence as स एव वरः and not as वरः स एव. Thus here the particle एव becomes connected with the subject and intimates that the husband is the same, i. e. not different from the one enjoyed before. Now the cause of longing may be ‘the husband being different from the one enjoyed before’ as well as ‘the husband that is enjoyed before being absent.’ Thus, inasmuch as the absence of this cause (i. e. the absence of the husband being different from the one enjoyed before) is here apprehended in the manner required for विभावना, it cannot be said that विभावना is here indistinct,’ we reply that the particle एव, when connected with the subject, directly intimates the absence of the connection of the predicate from what is different from the subject. From this the apprehension of the absence of the predicate itself from what is different from the subject results no doubt, but only indirectly. In the present example, for instance, एव in connection with the subject सः directly intimates that the connection of वरत्वं (the predicate) is absent from what is different from उपपुक्तः (the subject). From this, the apprehension that वरत्वं itself is absent from what is different from उपपुक्तः results no doubt, but only indirectly. Thus विभावना is but indistinct here.

That the intended meaning is here indirectly and therefore indistinctly obtained from the particle एव is supported by the fact that in other sentences similar to the one analysed above, certain phrases are added, to render the meaning clear. For instance, the sentence ‘A conch-shell is but white’ is for the sake of clearness supplemented by the phrase ‘and not unwhite’; and the sentence ‘Pārtha only is an archer,’ by the phrase ‘and no other.’ For the same object, Dandin also has used such a sentence as this:—‘your face resembles your face only, and nothing else.’ Here if ‘clearness’ were not the object aimed at, the latter part of the sentence (i. e. ‘and nothing else’) would be redundant.

Pradipa Here follows the ancient writers according to whom एव has got two significations. When connected with the predicate, एव signifies अवयववच्छेदः, i. e. exclusion, from the subject, of the absence of the connection of the predicate; and when connected with the subject, एव signifies अन्यवयववच्छेदः, i. e. exclusion of the connection of the predicate from what is different from the subject. According to the modern writers, however, एव has everywhere got only one meaning, i. e. exclusion of one thing from being different from another. Thus, from the sentences 'Partha only is archer,' and 'a conch-shell is but white,' what is directly apprehended is this that the archer is not different from Partha, and that a 'conch-shell' is not different from 'white'. Similarly, from the sentence, 'The husband is the same,' what is directly apprehended is this that the husband is not different from 'one who is enjoyed' or that one who is enjoyed is not different from the 'husband.' The apprehension that the husband is the same as has been enjoyed before is but indirect.

Thus it is proved that the figures विभावना and विशेषोक्ति although present in the verse are yet indistinct. These being indistinct, the union of these, which constitutes a separate figure called सहसंकर¹ is also indistinct.

Alliteration, too, though present in the verse, is not striking, because it consists of the letters र, र, which are unfavourable to the manifestation of Sweetness, a quality of the Erotic Flavour.

Thus it is clear from the above that *there is no distinct figure in the present verse.*

If it be said (by the followers² of Bhāmaha and others) that inasmuch as the Erotic flavour is distinct in the verse, the figure रसवत् is also distinct in it, we reply that *the figure (रसवत्) is not possible, owing to the Erotic flavour being principal here. It is only when a flavour is reduced to a subordinate position (i. e. is made to heighten another), that the figure रसवत् is admitted to occur.*

This definition of a 'poem' given by Mammata has been criticised by Jagannāth and Vis'wanāth, two of Mammata's successors

1 एकस्य च ग्रहे न्यायदाषोभावादानिश्चयः । K. P. X.

2 रसवदलंकार इति । वस्त्वलंकाररसवत्स्य त्रिविधस्यापि व्यंग्यस्य वाच्योप-
कारकतया लंकाररसमेवति भाग्यद्वयप्रभृतिचिरंतनालंकारिकमतेनेयं शंका । Pr.

Jagannāth: thus criticises it for instance:—A word and a sense are not what is denoted by the name 'poem,' since there is no evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary, the universal use of such expressions as 'A poem is read but its meaning is not understood' &c. shows that a particular kind of words only is what is denoted by the name 'poem.' If it be said that what constitutes poetry is 'capability of producing a relish' and that inasmuch as both a word and a sense have got this capability, both constitute poetry and deserve to be called by that name, it may be replied that according to this view, musical tones, theatrical gestures &c. also would have to be called poetry; for, they too are admitted by all rhetoricians to produce a relish.

Again, 'poetry' cannot signify words and senses, either, collectively or separately. For, if we accept the former alternative—a sentence of a verse, inasmuch as it is a collection of words only, cannot be called poetry—a fact opposed to experience. If we accept the latter, then a verse which consists of one वाक्य and one वाक्यार्थ, will have to be called two poems.

Again, the attributes सगुणौ, सालंकारौ &c. also should not be inserted in the definition of a 'poem:' for, otherwise, the definition would not include such sentences as उदितं मण्डलं विधौ: , गतोऽस्तमर्कः &c., which although they contain no 'qualities,' 'figures' &c. are yet admitted to be poetry of a highly suggestive character.

1. यत्तु प्राचः "अदोषौ सगुणौ सालंकारौ शब्दार्थौ काव्यम्, इत्याहुः, तत्र विचार्यते—शब्दार्थयुगलं न काव्यशब्दवाच्यम् । मानाभावात् । 'काव्यमुच्चैः पठ्यते'—'काव्यादर्थोऽपगम्यते.' 'काव्यं श्रुतमर्थो न ज्ञातः,' इत्यादिविभजनीनव्यवहारत-
प्रत्युत शब्दविशेषस्यैव काव्यपदार्थत्वप्रतिपत्तेश्च...। यत्तु आस्वादोद्बोधकत्वेमेव काव्य, त्वप्रयोजकं तच्च शब्दे चार्थे चाविशिष्टमित्याहुः, तन्न । रागस्य (चेष्टादीनां रसव्यञ्जः कताया ध्वनिकारादिसकलालंकारिकसंमतत्वेन प्रकृते लक्षणीयत्वापत्तेः । ...अपिच काव्यपदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं शब्दार्थयोर्व्यासकं प्रत्येकपर्याप्तं वा । नायः । एको न द्वाविति व्यवहारस्यैव श्लोकवाक्यं न काव्यामिति व्यवहारस्यापत्तेः । ...न द्वितीयः । एकस्मिन्-पदे काव्यद्वयव्यवहारपत्तेः । लक्षणे गुणालंकारादिनिवेशोऽपि न युक्तः । 'उदितं मण्डलं विधौः' इति काव्ये 'गतोऽस्तमर्कः' इत्यादौ च अव्यापत्वापत्तेः । R. G.

The following objection has been raised against the definition by Viswanath¹ :—'Faultlessness' has been declared to be the characteristic of poetry. Now what does faultlessness mean? If it means 'a little faultiness,' then this absurdity would follow that a poem, which is absolutely faultless, would not be called poetry. If it means 'complete faultlessness,' then inasmuch as faults are inevitable in a poem, however excellent it may be, poetry would have no province or at best, a very limited province of its own. We should, therefore, define a poem as 'a sentence the essence of which is a flavour.' Thus, faulty sentences also would become poems if a flavour be apprehended from them. The circumstance of 'faultiness' would only render these sentences inferior poems, but would not repel their claim to the name of poetry. As it is said :—The nature of poetry is held to reside even in faulty compositions where a flavour or the like is distinctly recognised, in like manner as the character of a jewel is held to belong to such a thing as a jewel perforated by insects.

In the same manner, qualities, figures &c. also do not form the essence of poetry, but only contribute to its elevation. As for the name poetry that is given to flavourless compositions, it is only figurative.

These criticisms of Jagannāth and Viswanāth have, however, been met by Mammata's commentators. Thus, for instance, Jagannāth's view that the name poetry belongs to words only is shown by Prabha to be wrong in the following manner² :—Poetry, as Mammata has said before, consists of descriptions. Now descriptions consist of both words and senses and not of words only. 2. Poetry is the product of imagination. Now imagination is a creative faculty—a faculty that constructs or recombines the materials furnished by experience. It consists in taking parts of our conceptions and com-

1 Vide S. D. pages. 8-17

2 प्रागुक्तस्य वर्णनात्मकलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकस्य शब्दार्थोभयाश्रितत्वात्, कविप्रौढो-
क्ताल्पितत्वस्य चार्थे एव सद्भावात्, अर्थचित्रस्याभ्यर्हितत्वाच्च, अर्थविशिष्टशब्दस्यैव
तत्त्वानौचित्यादुभयोपादानम् । तत्र शब्दप्रयोजनावेचित्ये शब्दः काव्यम्, अर्थ-
प्रयोजनावेचित्ये अर्थः, उभयवेचित्ये द्वयमपि । Pr.

ining them into new forms. But these conceptions—these materials—are in the form of senses and not of words. 3. The strikingness of sense is superior to the strikingness of words. This superiority is not brought out by the definition that poetry means words possessed of senses, since in it prominence is given to words not to senses which are made subordinate.

These considerations clearly show that the word 'poetry' according to Mammata denotes senses as well as words. Where strikingness is due to words, words should be called poetry; where it is due to senses, senses should claim that title; and where it is due to both, both words and senses should deserve that appellation.

Although Mammata is right so far, still he is wrong in the view which he seems to hold from the use of तत् in the singular number, that the word 'poetry' denotes words and senses taken together. His view is open to the following objections :—

1. A poem' especially involves the production of harmony. Figures &c. also are an essential characteristic of poetry. Now harmony and figures &c. do not reside in words and senses collectively, but separately. There is a harmony of words and there is a harmony of senses, but not a harmony of both taken together. So also there are figures of words and there are figures of senses, but generally no figures of words and senses taken together.

2. According to Mammata's view, a sentence of a verse will have to be called 'no poem' since it consists of words only—a fact opposed to experience.

From this it will be clear that the word 'poetry' signifies sometimes words, sometimes senses and sometimes both. As for the

प्रयोजनावैचित्र्ये अर्थः, उभयवैचित्र्ये द्वयमपि । Pr.

1 न तु काव्यत्वमुभयपर्याप्तम् । योजनारूपस्य अलंकारादिवैशिष्ट्यरूपस्य वा व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वायोगात् । एको न द्वाविति वन् श्लोकवाक्यं न काव्यमिति व्यवहारापत्तेः । Pr.

objection; that according to this view, a verse in which both words and senses are striking will have to be called two poems, we reply that such a verse will be called one poem only, for, the strikingness of the one, although different from that of the other, yet being combined with it, will give rise to a third strikingness which will be but one. The use of such expressions as 'A poem is loudly recited,' 'a poem is read but its meaning not understood,' can now be accounted for, since we hold that 'poetry' is sometimes the name of words only. If strikingness is here due to senses, then the name 'poem' although belonging really to senses, should be understood as here given to words, only metaphorically. The use of such an expression as 'A poem is understood' only supports our contention that poetry sometimes expresses senses only.

The objection raised by Vis'wanâth against the insertion of the adjective अदोषी in the definition is thus answered by Udyota:—The word दोष in the definition is to be understood in the sense of 'a palpable fault.' The palpability of a fault is its being opposed to the apprehension of poetical beauty. Thus, in such a verse as तयाभूतां &c. the apprehension of the strikingness of the suggested sense does take place after that of the fault. Hence, the apprehension of poetical beauty arises; and the verse is entitled to the name not only of poetry but of the best kind of poetry. To one who does not perceive the strikingness of the suggested sense on account of the presence of the fault, the verse is faulty, and it is in reference to such a man that the verse is cited as an example of a faulty poem by Mammata. (What is meant by the verse क्रीडादि &c. is also this:—Just as a jewel does not lose its character as a jewel, all its defects being eclipsed by the dazzling lustre it possesses, so a poem also does not cease to be a poem, all its faults being eclipsed by the overpowering strikingness of its suggested sense.)

Really speaking, however, says Udyota, the definition given in the text is the definition not of a poem in general, but of such a poem

1 उभयवैचित्र्ये काव्यद्वयमिति व्यवहारः स्यादिति चेन्न । विजातीयैकचमत्कृतजिनकत्वेनैकत्वस्यैव व्यवहारात् । 'काव्यमुक्तेः पठ्यते', 'काव्यं श्रुतमर्थो न ज्ञातः' इत्यादिव्यवहारश्च शब्दशिनोपपन्न एव । अर्थमात्रवैचित्र्ये तु काव्यशब्दस्य शब्दमात्रप-
रतयोपपन्नः । 'काव्यं बुद्धम्' इत्यादिव्यवहारश्च अर्थस्य काव्यत्वसाधको ज्ञेयः । Pr.

as does not deserve to be ridiculed. Now when a poem possesses faults, it is sure to be ridiculed. A poem in general, if it contains a flavour or a distinct figure, is allowed to be faulty, and hence is not intended to be defined as 'faultless.' This can account for the use of such an expression as 'A poem is faulty.'

He now states in order the divisions of poetry, giving at the same time, the definitions of them.

Kârikâ IV (Continued.)

This, when the suggested sense predominates* over the expressed sense, is of the best kind and is called suggestive¹ poetry by the wise.

The word² भेद in the Vritti means both a division (भेदनं भेदः) and a definition (भियते अनेन इति भेदः). The word इदम् refers to 'poetry'. Thus, poetry is of the best quality when the suggested sense is more striking than the expressed (or indicated) sense (of a verse).

The word स्फोट in Maxmata's Vritti here introduces us to the celebrated tenet of the Grammarians about 'an eternal (ideal) sound (or word) called स्फोट, which they admit to exist as an entity distinct from an ordinary sound (or word), and which, according to them, is the cause why we apprehend the meaning of a word as soon as that word is heard.

The arguments by which they prove the existence of this स्फोट may be summarised as follows:—

1 यत्रार्थः शब्दो वा तमर्थमुपसर्जनीकृतस्वार्थो । व्यक्तः काव्यविशेषः स ध्वनिरिति सूरिभिः कथितः ॥ Dhvani.

2 प्रकाशे भेदपदं भावकरणव्युत्पत्तिभ्यां विभागविशेषलक्षणोभयपरं व्याख्यातम् । Pr.

Such a thing as स्फोट must be admitted to exist, as, otherwise, cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of a word. This cognition cannot arise from an ordinary word which is a mere combination of letters. For, the letters can produce this cognition only in their united or individual capacity. The first alternative is impossible; for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore cannot form a united whole at all. When, for instance, the letter च is pronounced, ट does not exist, and when ट is pronounced, च does not exist. Thus inasmuch as the two parts of the word चट do not exist at one and the same time, cognition of the meaning of it is impossible, since this cognition is dependent upon the simultaneous co-existence in the mind of these two parts. The second alternative also is impossible; since the single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning conveyed by the word. Now there is no conceivable alternative other than their united or single capacity; and therefore it follows (say the wise in these matters) that as the letters cannot cause the cognition of a word's meaning, there must be a स्फोट by means of which arises the knowledge of that word's meaning. Now this स्फोट is an eternal (ideal) sound (or word) distinct from the letters (of which an ordinary word is composed) and revealed by them, which causes the cognition of the word's meaning. It is disclosed or revealed by the letters, or from it is disclosed the meaning, hence it is called स्फोट as revealed by the letters and as caus-

1 पदार्थप्रतीत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्याऽपि स्फोटोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । न च वर्णैभ्य एव तत्प्रत्ययः प्रादुर्भवतीति परीक्षाक्षमम् । विकल्पास्तद्वत्वात् । किं समस्ता व्यस्ता वा अर्थप्रत्ययं जनयन्ति । नाद्यः । वर्णानां क्षणिकानां समूहासम्भवात् । नान्त्यः । व्यस्तवर्णैभ्योऽर्थप्रत्ययासम्भवात् । न च व्याससमासाभ्यामन्यः प्रकारः समस्तीति । तस्माद्वर्णानां वाचकत्वानुपपत्तौ यद्वलादर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स स्फोट इति वर्णानिरिक्तो वर्णाभिव्यङ्ग्योऽर्थप्रत्यायको नित्यः शब्दः स्फोट इति तद्विदो वदन्ति । अत एव स्फुट्यते व्यज्यते वर्णैरिति स्फोटो वर्णाभिव्यङ्ग्यः, स्फुटीभवत्यस्मादर्थ इति स्फोटोऽर्थप्रत्यायक इति स्फोटशब्दार्थमुभयथा निराहुः । ...तथाहि-अभिव्यञ्जकोऽपि प्रथमो ध्वनिः स्फोटमस्फुटमभिव्यनक्ति, उत्तरोत्तराभिव्यञ्जकक्रमेण स्फुटं स्फुटतरं स्फुटतमम्, यथा स्वाध्यायः सक्त्युत्थमानो नावधार्यते, अभ्यासेन तु स्फुटावसायः, यथा प्रा रत्नतत्त्वं प्रथमप्रतीतो स्फुटं न चकास्ति, चरमे चेतसि यथावदभिव्यज्यते ।

B. S. and its Translation.

ing the knowledge of the word's meaning. These are the two etymologies to explain the meaning of the word स्फोट. The mode in which स्फोट is revealed by the letters is as follows:—The first letter by its manifesting power reveals स्फोट partially, each successive letter makes this स्फोट more and more manifest, just as the Veda after one reading is not grasped, but is made sure by repetition, or as the real nature of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely manifested at the final examination. Thus, in the case of ordinary words such as चट, पट &c., which are composed of letters, the last letter¹ accompanied by the impression left on the mind by each preceding letter reveals this eternal word called स्फोट which is the Brahman² of the Grammarians, possessed of the उपाधि 'letter'.

From this स्फोट, thus revealed, arises the knowledge of the word's meaning. Now *the (ordinary) word which suggests (or reveals) (this eternal word) स्फोट* which is so important for the knowledge of the word's meaning, and which, because it is suggested by the ordinary word, is called by Mammata the सङ्ग (something suggested) is technically called ध्वनि by the wise, i. e. the grammarians³. Hence other (wise) men also, namely, the rhetoricians such as Anandawardhana and others following the view of the grammarians, have given the name ध्वनि to (the best kind of) poetry consisting of words and meanings which are capable of conveying such a suggested sense as has reduced the expressed sense to a subordinate position, on the ground of similarity between the ordinary word and the best kind of poetry. The similarity consists in the fact that both of them suggest something important, the former suggesting स्फोट which is important inasmuch as it leads to the acquisition of the knowledge of the word's meaning, and the

1 पटादिभिरिति । पदशब्देन पूर्वपूर्ववर्णसंस्कारसहकृतोऽन्त्यवर्ण एवोच्यते । पय-
तेऽनेनेति व्युत्पत्तेः । Pr.

2 स्फोटोति । स च तावद्गुणोपाध्यनुगतब्रह्मरूप इत्यर्थः । Pr.

3 प्रथमे हि विद्वांसो वैयाकरणाः । व्याकरणमूलत्वात् सर्वविद्यानाम् । ते च
श्रूयमाणेषु वर्णेषु ध्वनिरिति व्यवहरन्ति । तथैवान्येस्तन्मतानुसारिभिः सूरिभिः काव्य-
तत्त्वार्थदर्शिभिः वाच्यवाचकसंमिश्रः शब्दात्मा काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्यो व्यञ्जकत्वसाम्या-
न् ध्वनिरित्युक्तः । Dhvani.

latter suggesting a sense which is important inasmuch as it subordinates the expressed sense to itself.

The best kind of poetry may be instanced in निःशेष &c.

Here the fact 'you went but to dally with my husband' is suggested by the word अचन in the fourth line in a prominent manner.

If it be said : Here the fact 'you went but to dally with my husband' is not conveyed by Suggestion, but by what is called Indication of the Contrary (विपरीतलक्षणा). लक्षणा must be resorted to here, for, here the expressed¹ meaning of the verse is incompatible with the true fact of the case i. e. that the maid instead of going to the well for bathing, went to the husband for dallying with him. If we reject विपरीतलक्षणा here, we shall have to reject it in the verse सहिन्सी &c. also, since there is no reason why we should reject it there and admit here. But there we cannot reject it, since that verse is cited by Mammata as an example of लक्षणाभूलब्धमना. Therefore, we cannot reject it here also.

To this objection some make the following reply :—We admit विपरीतलक्षणा here and interpret the Vritti thus :—The fact that you went but to my husband is indicated (लक्ष्यते). The word अचन only suggests 'enjoyment'—the motive of her going to him.

The reply of these men is not, however, correct, since it is based upon an objectionable interpretation of the Vritti. The objections to that interpretation are the following² :—

- 1 We are required to take the word लक्ष्यत as understood.
- 2 The construction of the Vritti becomes preposterous.
- 3 The suggested sense being founded on Indication (लक्षणा), the statement that it is conveyed by the expressed sense of the word अचन is unintelligible.

1 मुख्यार्थबाधादिति । वापीनानगमनरूपवाच्यार्थबाधादित्यर्थः । Pr.

2 अप्याहारोऽन्यत्वेनो न्ययस्य लक्षणामुल्लासदधमपदेनेत्युक्तेरसामंजस्य चे-
वद्वाचिः केचित् इत्यत्र बोध्या । Pr.

The correct reply is the following :—The fact that the literal sense is incompatible with the true fact of the case is not a cause of Indication, by itself, but by its being known. Thus, for instance, where the fact of the husband's amour with the maid is known by the reader from other sources of information, there Indication may be admitted, the literal sense being incompatible. Such is the case in the verse साहेन्ती &c. and उपकुतै &c. But where the incompatibility of the literal sense is apprehended from the knowledge of the sense of the verse itself, and from no other independent source of information, there Indication cannot be admitted, since the literal sense is not known to be incompatible before the sense of the verse is understood. After the sense of the verse is grasped and the suggested sense understood, the fact that the literal sense is incompatible is known no doubt. But this knowledge is then insignificant. This is the case in बापी स्नातुं &c. Hence¹ Mammata has said that the sense of dalliance is suggested by the word अश्वत्. Hence also, when the fact of the maid's amour is not known by the reader from other sources of information, there is no विपरीतलक्षणा and with it no apprehension of the suggested sense based upon that लक्षणा, even in such a verse as साहेन्ती &c. In बापी स्नातुं &c., however, although the incompatibility of the literal sense is not known from other sources of information, the suggested sense above-mentioned is apprehended by our simply looking at the meaning of the word अश्वत्.

The suggested sense is brought out by the word अश्वत् in the following manner :—The various things stated in the verse have been so dexterously expressed by the heroine, that they may as well be taken to be marks of 'bathing,' as of 'dalliance'. The word अश्वत् also, by itself, simply means 'one who does a painful act', and thus brings out the simple fact that the husband is a doer of painful acts in general. But when we look to the fact that the speaker is a clever and virtuous wife and the person spoken to is a go-between, another sense suddenly flashes on the mind, i. e. that the husband is on the present occasion guilty of a particular painful act i. e. dalliance with the maid, and that the heroine, in the epithet अश्वत्, is alluding to this particular guilt of the husband. The word अश्वत् inasmuch as

1 अत एव । एवमभिप्रायादेव । अन्यथा लक्षणयेव प्रयोजनीभूतव्यङ्ग्य-
सीतेरिति भावः । Pr.

it suggests this sense without delay and independently of any other word of the verse, is said to do it prominently. This prominence it is that is hinted by the use of the specific word अधमपदेन in the Vritti. As for चंदनच्यवन &c.—the other things mentioned in the verse, they too suggest 'dalliance', but only when we consider that although they are stated in the verse as marks of bathing, they are also fit marks of 'embracing' 'kissing' &c.—acts which are subsidiary to dalliance. They thus suggest these subsidiary acts first, and through these, and along with these, suggest 'dalliance' afterwards. This is the reason why निःशेषच्युतचंदन &c. are subordinate, whilst the word अधम is said to be predominant here.

Thus it is shown that in साहेन्ती &c. if there is suggestion, that suggestion is necessarily founded on Indication But in चारु स्नातुं &c. this is not necessarily the case. For, in it there is a possibility of the sense of dalliance being suggested by the word अधम itself.

Pradīpa connects प्राधान्येन with अधमपदेन, understanding प्राधान्येन in the sense of प्राधान्यावशिष्टेन.

Udyota however remarks that, this construction of the Vritti is not satisfactory ; for, the idea of prominence being obtained from the use of the word अधमपदेन itself, the use of the word प्राधान्य again for that purpose is useless. Besides, it is the prominence of the suggested sense that is under discussion here ; for, we are talking of a अज्ञानकाव्य here. He therefore proposes to construe प्राधान्येन with इति taking प्राधान्य in the sense of 'possessed of prominence' and इति as referring to the sense of dalliance. Thus, the sense of the whole Vritti, according to this construction, is : " The fact ' you went but to dally with him ' which is prominent is suggested by the word अधम. " The suggested sense is here said to be prominent, because the fact of dalliance, when known by the heroine, enhances the bitterness of her state of isolation. Thus the suggested sense, inasmuch as it contributes to the ~~सुखदुःख~~ (love in separation), is more striking than the expressed sense and is hence said to be prominent here.

१ क. निश्चय इति । लक्षणावधारणेऽप्यधमपदेनेव सर्वजनसंज्ञक इति भावः ।

Pr.

Kārikā V.

But when the suggested sense is not so, it is of a middling kind called Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion.

When the suggested sense is not so, i. e. does not predominate over, i. e. is not more striking than, the expressed sense, the poetry is of a mediocre quality.

The suggested sense is not more striking than the expressed sense in two ways: - when the suggested sense is (a) less striking than or (b) equally striking with the expressed sense. The present verse is an example of the first kind. It is an example of that variety of Middling Poetry which Mammata has afterwards named असुन्दरव्यंग्य.¹ The second kind² will be instanced in Ullāsa V. under तुल्यप्राधान्यव्यंग्य.

Here some say that, by the word व्यंग्य in the Kārikā, we must understand only such a suggested sense as is distinct. Thus the definition will exclude the 'Lowest kind of poetry' where the suggested sense is not distinct but obscure. This view is wrong, however; for, according to it, the definition will not include Poetry of Obscure Suggestion (अस्फुटव्यंग्य) which, however, has been reckoned by Mammata as one of the eight³ divisions of the Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion. The व्यंग्य meant here is that which is not 'very obscure' or which is 'intended.' In an अधमकाव्य, the व्यंग्य is either 'very obscure' or 'not intended.'

The Middling Kind of Poetry may be instanced in चामतरुणं &c.

1 अगूढमपरस्त्राणं वाच्यसिद्धयंगमस्फुटम् । संदिग्धतुल्यप्राधान्ये काकाक्षि-
ममसुन्दरम् । व्यंग्यमेवं गुणीभूतव्यंग्यस्याष्टौ भिदा मत्राः ॥ K. P. V.

2 ब्राह्मण्यतिक्रमत्सामो भवतामेव भूतये । जामदग्न्यस्तथा निजमन्त्रा दुर्म-
न्वायते । K. P. V. अत्र जामदग्न्यः सर्वेषां वसिष्ठापामिव रक्षसां क्षणत् स्तब्धं
कलियस्तीति व्यंग्यस्य जामदग्न्यः च समं जामदग्न्यम् । Vṛtti.

3 Vide foot-note 1 above.

Here the suggested sense is: you did not come to the bower of Ashoka creepers, although you had made an appointment (with me to meet me there). The suggested sense is here subordinate because the expressed sense is more striking than it. The fact expressed by the verse is that the paling of the maid's countenance is simultaneous with the sight of her lover (thus giving rise to the figure (भक्ति-चोदक) and (as shown by the present tense of भवति and by the adverb द्रुतः) continuous¹. This fact² is striking here because it heightens the विप्रलम्भ which is the flavour of the piece. The suggested sense i. e. 'the failure on the maid's part to keep the engagement through causes over which she had no control' heightens this विप्रलम्भ no doubt, but only through the expressed sense i. e. the paling of the countenance—which is one of the external manifestations of that विप्रलम्भ. The suggested sense cannot heighten विप्रलम्भ independently, because failure on the maid's part to keep the engagement may proceed even from a desire not to meet her lover. Hence the suggested sense is here said to be less striking than the expressed sense.

As regards dejection (विषाद) on the maid's part consequent on her failure to keep the engagement—which is another स्वंग्य conveyed by the verse, it too is subordinate. It too heightens विप्रलम्भ only through the expressed sense, and not independently, because 'dejection' may proceed from such other causes also as 'indifference to the world &c.'

If it be said:—This verse deserves to be called Suggestive Poetry, because it ultimately suggests विप्रलम्भाभास चुंगार. How then has it been cited by Mammata as an example of Middling Poetry?

We reply³: Although the verse is an उत्तमकाव्य in respect of the स्वंग्य विप्रलम्भाभास, still, it has been cited by Mammata as an example

1 सन्तन्यमानता । चिरकालानुवृत्तिः । सा च भवतीति वर्तमाननिर्देशात्, सुहृर्मलिना भवतीत्यन्वयाच्चेति ज्ञेयम् । Pr.

2 वाच्यमेव तु विप्रलम्भपोषकतया चमत्कारे प्रधानम् । Pr.

3 यद्यपि स नास्ति कश्चिद्विषयः यत्र ध्वनिगुणीभूतव्यंग्ययोः स्वप्रभेदादिभिः सह संकरः संसृष्टिर्वा नास्ति, तथापि प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्तीति कश्चित् केनचि-
व्यवहारः । K. P. V.

of a मध्यमकाव्य, because the स्वर्ग्य विप्रलम्भाभास is subordinate, whilst the स्वर्ग्य सकेतभेग is predominant (i. e. more striking than the expressed sense). And it is a proverb, which Mammata will refer to afterwards, that things are named after their predominant features.

The विप्रलम्भ¹ here is called विप्रलम्भाभास, because the love here is between a woman and a man not her husband. The विप्रलम्भ proper requires that love should be between wife and husband.

Kārikā V. (Continued).

That, however, which is void of the suggested sense is said to be 'Of the Lowest Kind,' called also the Fanciful, and is of two varieties: (a) The Fanciful in sound and (b) the Fanciful in sense.

In the Kārikā, the word चित्र must be taken as understood; for in the first place, uniformity requires that, as a distinct name has been given to each of the first two kinds of poetry, a distinct name should be accorded to the third kind also; and secondly, two species of चित्र. . e. शब्दचित्र and अर्थचित्र are recognised in the Kārikā, and, it is but proper² that the recognition of the species should be preceded by the recognition of the genus to which they belong.

शब्दचित्र³ is not that where words only are picturesque and senses are not, but that where the picturesqueness of words is predominant and that of the senses subordinate. Similarly, अर्थचित्र is not that where senses only are picturesque and words are not, but that where the picturesqueness of senses is predominant and that of words subordinate.

1 अनौचित्यप्रवृत्तत्वे आभासो रसभावयोः । उपनायकसंस्थायां... रतो भृंगारेऽनौचित्यम् । S.D. III.

2 चित्रतामान्योक्त्यनन्तरमेव तद्विभागकथनौचित्यादिति भावः । Pr.

3 शब्दार्थचित्रं यत्पूर्वं काव्यद्वयमुदाहृतम् । गुणमाधान्यतस्तत्र स्थितिभिन्नार्थ-शब्दयोः । K. P. VI. न तु शब्दचित्रे अर्थस्य अचित्रत्वम्, अर्थचित्रे वा शब्दस्य । Vritti.

A poem 'void of the suggested sense' means—a poem void of such a suggested sense as is 'distinct' or rather, according to Pradīpa, as is different from 'very indistinct' or as is 'intended.' Such a poem is possible either when the suggested sense is 'very indistinct' or when it is 'unintended.'

The 'Fanciful' poetry means—poetry possessed of excellences and figures.

The 'Fanciful' poetry does not suggest a flavour (रस) which constitutes the soul of poetry; as is said by the author of the Dvānī:—A flavour is the soul, excellences are like one-eyedness and the like, figures are like bracelets and the like, and words and meanings are merely the body of poetry. Thus a चित्र although it contains no flavour which is the soul of poetry, is yet called a poem, only metaphorically as the horses &c. drawn in a picture, although without the soul, are yet called horses &c., only metaphorically.

The Fanciful in sound is exemplified in स्वच्छन्दो &c.

Here there is a word-figure called Harmonious Alliteration² consisting in a similarity of a number of consonants.

If it be objected: How is this verse said to be void of a suggested sense? For, the verse suggests the feeling of love (रति) for the river Ganges. This feeling is excited in the poet's mind by the Ganges herself, is enhanced by the various qualities she possesses, and is externally manifested by the eulogy bestowed upon her by him.

Again, a poem that suggests no feeling is impossible; since whatever object it may describe, it is sure to excite or at least to heighten some one of the feelings of love, joy, grief, courage, pity, wonder &c., or to speak technically, is sure to be an आलम्बनविभाव or at least an उद्दीपनविभाव of some one of the flavours गुणार, वीर, करुण, &c.

1 Vide Text page 22 line 3.

2 अनेकव्ययैकधा साम्यमसरुद्वाप्यनेकधा । एकस्य सरुदप्येष वृत्त्यनुप्रास उच्यते ॥ S. D. X.

Besides, the fact that a poem is a poem shows that strikingness is invariably associated with it. Now, strikingness is nothing but wonder. Therefore, a poem, if it deserves the name, must describe certain things suggestive of this feeling, or of what is technically called the Marvellous Flavour (अद्भुतरस).

We reply:—True, there is a suggested sense here; but inasmuch as it is 'very obscure,' being eclipsed by the strikingness of Alliteration which forcibly draws the mind to itself, the verse is said to be void of a suggested sense. Or, if you do not admit this, understand that the strikingness of the suggested sense, although present here, is not yet intended by the poet, his main object being only to produce alliterative excellence. The word अद्भुतरस should in this case be taken to mean 'that which is void of such a suggested sense as is intended by the poet'. As it is said by the author of the Dhwani:—

That is the province of the 'Fanciful' where there is a composition of figures and where intention to delineate a flavour or any other sentiment is absent.

Out of these two replies given by Pradipa, the first² is better; for, if, according to the second reply, we are to consider the present verse as an अधमकाव्य simply on the ground that the sense suggested by it, although striking, is not yet intended by the poet, then any other verse which the poet may have unconsciously succeeded in making pre-eminently striking, will have to be considered as an अधमकाव्य on the ground that the pre-eminent strikingness of the verse happens to be unintended by the poet.

Udyota however remarks that this verse is not a good example of a चित्रकाव्य; for, although it may be laid down as a rule that (the presence of the ultimate व्यंग्य making every verse a चित्रकाव्य) the determination that a certain verse is either उत्तम or मध्यम or अधम

1 विभाववेनापीति । चमत्कारनेयत्येनाद्भुतस्यालंबनत्वे तद्व्यंजकत्वस्यावश्यंभावादित्यर्थः । Pr

2 वस्तुतस्तु चमत्कृतेऽपि व्यंग्ये कदाचित्कवेरनात्यर्यसंभवादतिप्रसंग इति प्रथम एव पक्षः साधुरिति बोध्यम् । Pr.

is dependent on the nature of the intermediate स्वर्ग only, still, even according to this rule, there is no reason why we may not look upon this verse as a चरित्रकाव्य even in respect of the intermediate स्वर्ग which the verse contains i. e. the superiority of the river Ganges over every other holy place.

Mammata¹ however would answer that although an intermediate स्वर्ग is present, still it is not prominent.

The Fanciful in sense may be exemplified in विनिर्गतं मानसं &c.

Mammata cites this verse as an example of the figure उत्प्रेक्षा. But, according to Pradīpa, this is an example of the Heroic Flavour. Indra (not² Hayagrīva as Udyota says) is the Substantial Excitant of this flavour. Fear on the part of Indra is its Enhancing Excitant. The act of quelling the enemies' pride is its Ensuant. 'Now it is impossible for us', says Pradīpa, 'to determine that this flavour is not intended by the poet or that it is very obscure here, since Hayagrīva being the object of description, the greatness of his prowess is clearly apprehended from the verse. Thus, this is not a good example of the Fanciful in sense. The following may be given as a better example.' मध्येन्दोम &c.

Here there is the sense—figure called मालारूपक,³ the 'moon' being successively identified with the 'whetstone' 'swan' &c. The poet's intention is to bring out this figure, not a flavour or any other sentiment.

Jagannāth⁴ divides poetry into the following four kinds:—उत्तमोत्तम, उत्तम, मध्यम, and अधम. Out of these, the first⁵ two correspond to Mammata's उत्तम and मध्यम respectively. The third⁶ i. e.

1 Vide foot-note 3, page 36.

2 वीररसस्य इयमीव आलम्बनमिति केषांचिदुक्तेरभिप्रायं न विद्यः । इन्द्रायालंबनो हि इयमीवगतो वीररस इति वक्तुमुचितम् । Pr.

3 रूपकम् । मालारूपकम् । Pr.

4 तच्च उत्तमोत्तम-उत्तम-मध्यम-अधम-भेदाश्चतुर्धा । R. G.

5 शब्दार्थौ यत्र गुणीभावितात्मानौ कमप्यर्थमभिव्यक्तस्तदाद्यम् । यत्र व्यंग्यम-अज्ञानमेव सत्त्वमत्कारकारणं तद्वितीयम् । R. G.

6 यत्र व्यंग्यमत्कारासमानाधिकरणौ वाच्यमत्कारस्तत्तृतीयम् । R. G.

मधन corresponds to Mammata's मधन, if the र्वङ्ग is अस्तुट, and to अर्थचित्र, if the र्वङ्ग is अस्तुनतर. The fourth¹ i. e. अग्न corresponds to Mammata's शब्दचित्र. He objects to the equality of rank which Mammata has assigned to शब्दचित्र and अर्थचित्र, classing both of them under one division i. e. अधनकाव्य. Says² he:—शब्दचित्र does not deserve to stand on a par with अर्थचित्र; for, a difference is plainly discernible between them. Every man of taste perceives the difference, between such verses as विनिर्गतं मानह &c. and स्वच्छन्दोच्छलच्छल &c. If however, in spite of this difference between them, they be ranked equally, then there is no reason why we should not class under one division both धनि and गुणीभूतर्वङ्ग which are but slightly different from each other.

The above criticism of Jagannāth is just, and Mammata is certainly wrong in classing both शब्दचित्र and अर्थचित्र under one division i. e. अधनकाव्य. We may, therefore, following Jagannāth, divide शब्दचित्र and अर्थचित्र as follows:—In the first place, शब्दचित्र and अर्थचित्र together constitute three divisions:—1 शब्दचित्र equal to अर्थचित्र 2 शब्दचित्र inferior to अर्थचित्र and 3 शब्दचित्र superior to अर्थचित्र. Now we may put the first two of these divisions under अधनकाव्य and make the last a separate division to be called अधनाधन काव्य.

1 यत्र अर्थचित्रमस्तुपस्कृता शब्दचित्रमस्तुतिः प्रधानं तदधनं चतुर्थम् । R. G.

2 तत्रार्थचित्रशब्दचित्रयोरविशेषेणाधनत्वमयुक्तं वक्तुम् । तारतम्यस्य स्फुटमुपलब्धेः । को ह्येष सहृदयः सन् 'विनिर्गतं मानदमात्ममन्दिरात्' 'स च्छिन्नमूलः क्षतजेन रेणुः' इत्यादिभिः काव्यैः 'स्वच्छन्दोच्छल' इत्यादीनां पामरश्लाघ्यानामविशेषं ब्रूयात् । सत्यपि तारतम्येऽप्येकमेदत्वं कस्तर्हि धनिगुणीभूतर्वङ्गयोरविशेषदन्तरयोर्विभिन्नमेदत्वे दुराग्रहः । R. G.

ULLĀSA II.



In the first Ullāsa, the definition of 'poetry' has been given and the various divisions which it admits of have been stated and defined. Now the various terms occurring in the definition of poetry are to be expounded. Of these terms, वृत्त and अर्थ are the most important. The author, therefore, first proceeds to state the definitions¹ of these terms i. e. वृत्त and अर्थ in order. But as it is the usual practice first to divide and then to define, he, in conformity with this practice, first states the divisions of these वृत्त and अर्थ :—

Kārikā I.

Words are here threefold : Expressive or Denotative, Indicative, and Suggestive.

The word अर्थ in the Kārikā means 'In poetry.' The word has been specially put in here to show that Suggestive words occur in poetry only, and not in sciences such as Logic, Metaphysics &c.

The author, now seeing that he is engaged in dividing, wishes to keep up the uniformity of the context, and accordingly proceeds to state the divisions of अर्थ without stating the definitions of the three divisions of वृत्त, although the latter was the natural course for him to follow. The definitions of these divisions he will state further-on.

Kārikā I. (Continued).

The expressed &c. are the senses of these.

The senses of these, i. e. of the words that are Expressive, Indicative, and Suggestive are the expressed &c., that is, the Expressed, the Indicated, and the Suggested, respectively.

1 स्व रूप्यते अनेन इति स्वरूपं लक्षणम् । Pr.

Kārikā I. (Continued).

According to some, the Drift also (is another sense).

This sense belongs to a sentence, whereas the above three senses belong to a word. This sense consists of a connection among things, whereas the above three senses consist of things themselves. This sense is admitted by the Naiyāyiks and Bhatta Mīmāṃsaks, and not by the Guru Mīmāṃsaks.

The view of the former may be stated as follows :—Words must be admitted to have the power of denoting things only, and not the connection among those things also. For, firstly, the supposition that words have a power to express both things and connection among them is cumbrous. Secondly, the supposition is unnecessary ; for, the connection among things, even though it may not be supposed as denoted by the words, may yet be apprehended otherwise.

The connection among things may be thus apprehended :—*When the senses of words, whose nature will be determined hereafter,¹ are connected together in virtue of (their possessing) Expectancy, Compatibility and Justa-position, a (new) sense arises, which is (called) the Drift or Purport, which (inasmuch as it is but a connection² among things) has a form distinct from that of any of the above-mentioned three senses, (they not being connections among things but things themselves) and which, although not the sense of any of the words (forming a sentence), is yet the sense of that sentence, (being the sense of those very words but taken collectively).*

Expectancy is a word's³ being used along with another word without which the first word does not give us a connected sense. The word गौः, for instance, has an expectancy with reference to the word गच्छति ; for, the word गौः unless used along with the word गच्छति, does not give us a connected sense. Compatibility is the absence⁴ of

1 Vide Kārikā III. of this Ullāsa.

2 वाच्यादर्थविलक्षणं संसर्गतात्पर्यं शरीरं यस्य सः । Pr.

3 यत्पदस्य यत्पदमावप्रयुक्तं अन्वयबोधजनकत्वं तत्पदसमन्वितादृततत्पदत्वं आकांक्षा । Nilkanath on S.

4 पदार्थानां परस्परसम्बन्धे बाधाभावः योग्यता । S. D.

absurdity in the mutual connection of things signified by words. The word *सिञ्चति*, for instance, is incompatible with the word *वह्निना*, because connection between 'fire' and the act of 'sprinkling' is absurd. Juxtaposition is the utterance of words without delay.

If it be said² that in case the Drift is admitted as apprehended from a sentence although it is not a thing conveyed by any of the words of that sentence, any other thing such as 'heaven' brought to our mind somehow or other, may be apprehended from that sentence, we reply that such a contingency will not arise, because, a thing, although not expressed by any of the words of a sentence, becomes apprehended from that sentence, only when³ that thing is in the shape of a connection among the things expressed by the words of that sentence. And since the thing 'heaven' is not in the shape of such a connexion, it cannot be apprehended from that sentence.

Such in brief is the opinion of these latter philosophers who are known by the appropriate name of अनिहितान्वयवादिनः, i. e. those who say that senses bear connection with each other only after they have been expressed by the respective words of a sentence.

The construction... पदार्थानां समन्वये तात्पर्यार्थः..... समुल्लसति appears to me to be faulty. It leads us to suppose that समन्वय and तात्पर्यार्थ are two different things. But, as a matter of fact, समन्वय and तात्पर्यार्थ are identical, both meaning one and the same thing i. e. संसर्गः. A better construction would be the following :—

पदार्थानां आकांक्षायोज्यतासंनिधिवशात् समन्वयस्तात्पर्यार्थः..... समुल्लसति
(Vide Mammata K. P. Ullāsa V.)

1 पदानामविलम्बेनोच्चारणं संनिधिः । T. S.

2 अतिप्रसंग इति । पदवृत्त्यविषयस्यापि शाब्दबोधविषयत्वे कथंचिदुपस्थितस्य गगनादेरपि तद्विषयत्वप्राप्तिरित्यर्थः । Pr.

3 शब्दान्वयत्वस्येति । वृत्तिविषयान्वयत्वस्येत्यर्थः । नियामकत्वात् । वृत्तिविषयस्य शाब्दबोधविषयतायां योजकत्वात् । तथा च आकाशादेरतथात्वान्न शब्दबोधविषयत्वमित्यर्थः । Pr.

4 अनिहितानां पदोपस्थितानामन्वयः संसर्ग इति वादिनः । Kam.

Others, however, such as the Prabhākara (or Guru) Mīmāṃsaka, hold that words have a power to denote not only things, but along with them, the Drift or connexion among those things also. A glance at the mode in which language is learnt by children shows that words convey things not separately but as having a connection with each other.

A child, for instance, after hearing the sentence 'गानान्न' uttered by the master, and seeing the servant employ himself in bringing a cow determines that the act of bringing a cow is the meaning of the sentence गानान्न. Afterwards, hearing the sentences 'गो बधान' 'अन्नान्न' and seeing the servant engaged in fastening the cow and bringing the horse, the child reflects that because in the sentence गो बधान the word गो was present, therefore, he saw the cow, but that because the word अन्न was absent, therefore, he did not see the act of bringing in connection with the cow; and that because in the sentence अन्नान्न, the word गो was absent, therefore, he did not see the cow, but because the word अन्न was present, therefore he saw the act of bringing in connection with the horse; thus, through the insertion and omission of the two words of the sentence गानान्न (which it as yet understands only in the lump) in such other sentences as गो बधान, अन्नान्न the child ascertains that the word गो means a cow but as connected with some act such as the act of bringing, fastening &c. and that the word अन्न means the act of bringing but as connected with some individual such as a cow, a horse &c.

The above illustration of the child shows that words have a power to denote things but as having a connection with some other things. Thus, the Drift also along with things must be admitted as expressed by the words of a sentence.

Again, if the Drift be not admitted as expressed by the words of a sentence, it would not be apprehended from that sentence at all. For, the rule is that whatever is apprehended from the sentence as a whole must be expressed by the various words composing that sentence. And if the Drift be admitted as apprehended from the sentence, although not expressed by the various words composing it, then, as said above, any other thing such as 'heaven' coming to mind by chance may also have to be regarded as apprehended from that sentence—a fact which is opposed to experience.

Such, in short, is the opinion of the Prabhākara-Mimāṃsaks who are fitly called अन्वितानिधानवादिन्, i. e. those who say that words express things but only as connected with each other; that, in other words, the Drift or what is expressed by the sentence is nothing but what is expressed (by the various words of that sentence).

Against the second of these views, the following objections may be urged :—

1 Although we may admit that words have a power to express things as having a general connection with each other, still the particular connection holding among these things can be apprehended by means of Expectancy &c. alone. Thus, inasmuch as even the Prabhākaras cannot escape the admission of a fourth sense in the shape of 'a particular connection,' it is better to admit that this fourth sense is 'connection' (both general and particular).

2 As for what is said that a child learns the meanings of words but only as connected with each other, it may be replied that although this is true when the child is in the early stage of learning the language, till the same child learns the meanings of words as unconnected with each other, when it is in an advanced stage of learning (as for instance, when it learns the meanings of words from a dictionary).

✕ Some commentators hold that the view which finds favour with Mammata is the first one, on the ground¹ that he uses the word अन्वितानिधानवादिन् in the singular number, thus indicating that he does not hold the advocates of the second view in very high esteem; and also on the ground that in the other places² of the book where he has had an occasion to speak of the various functions of a word, he has named this function (i. e. the Drift) also along with the others.

1 अस्वरसम्भ 'वादिनः' इत्येकवचनेन प्रकृतो ध्वनित इति हेतुम् । Pr. एकवचनेनागौरवं शोभ्यते. L.Nar.

2 अत एवत्ये-वदन्ति, ते वाचिधा-तात्पर्य-लक्षणाभ्यां व्यापारान्तरेण गम्याः (K. P. II.) इति, 'अभिधा-तात्पर्य-लक्षणात्मकव्यापारप्रवृत्तिवर्ती ध्वननादि-व्यपारोऽनपह्नवनीय एव' इति च । Vide Yāmanāchārya's First Edition of K. P., page 22.

These grounds do not appear to me to be satisfactory, however. For, in the first place it is not necessary to take the word अन्विताभिधानवादिनः as a noun in the genitive case and in the singular number and connect it with वृत्तस् supplied from the preceding sentence. We can very well take it as a noun in the nominative case and in the plural number, and connect it with such a verb as वदन्ति, मन्यन्ते &c. understood. But even granting that the word is here used as a noun in the genitive singular, the singular number cannot be supposed to indicate that Mammata thinks lightly of these men and therefore does not accept their view. For, in the fifth Ullāsa¹ where Mammata has again referred to this view, he has used the word अन्विताभिधानवादिनः as a noun in the nominative plural. The plural number there may, with an equally good reason, be supposed to indicate that Mammata thinks highly of these men and therefore accepts their view.

Secondly, the mention of the तात्पर्यवृत्ति along with अभिधा and लक्षणा in other places of the book cannot be said to show that Mammata accepts that Vritti. It there simply shows that just as रसजनन is different from अभिधा and लक्षणा which are admitted by all, so it is different from तात्पर्य also which is admitted by some such as the Bhattas and the Naiyāyiks.

× There is in fact no indication in the book that Mammata either accepts or rejects तात्पर्यवृत्ति. It is a secret which he has kept to himself and does not wish to disclose to his reader.

It has been said above that words are Suggestive. Our author now states that the various kinds of senses also admit of this division.

Kārikā II.

All the senses also are generally Suggestive.

This is not a distinct division of senses. A sense which is Denoted, Indicated, or Suggested is the sense which is Suggestive.

1 वेदवि-आहुः....अन्विताभिधानवादिनः, रसजननमते &c.

This Kārikā is quite necessary here for the following reasons :—(1) By¹ mentioning that senses are suggestive also, it completes the division of senses. (2) It² establishes a connection between this Ullāsa and the third which takes up for further handling a subject which is introduced here only. Incidentally, the Kārikā serves the purpose of pointing out a distinction³ between भविष्य and लक्षणा on the one hand, and स्वयंज्ञाना on the other, i. e. that the former belong to words only, whilst the latter belongs to both words and senses. Although⁴ लक्षणा may be held to belong to a sense, still it does not belong to the suggested sense and is thus distinct from स्वयंज्ञाना.

The word प्रावचः in the Kārikā shows that all the senses are Suggestive; that, for instance, a suggested sense which is prominent and ultimate, such as a flavour and the like, is not Suggestive; or it shows that the three kinds of senses are not always suggestive, that, for instance, when such circumstances as the speciality⁵ of the speaker &c. (mentioned in the third Ullāsa) are absent, none of them is Suggestive.

Pradīpa and Prabhā connect अपि with अर्थानाम् and say that it shows that not only are words Suggestive but senses also. Udyota however, construes अपि with स्वयंज्ञकत्वम् and says that it shows that senses, whilst becoming suggestive, do not lose the character of being Expressed or Indicated or Suggested.

Mamūta now proceeds to exemplify the Suggestiveness of senses. The suggestiveness of words is admitted on all hands; hence its exemplification is unnecessary. But many there are who entertain a doubt as to whether senses are suggestive or not. To

1 अर्थगतव्यञ्जकत्वानुक्तौ न्यूनतापत्तेः । Pr.

2 अये ' अर्थव्यञ्जकतोच्यते ' इत्यादिना तन्निरूपणस्य असंगतत्वापत्तेः । Pr

3 वैषम्येति । अभिबाललक्षणायाः शब्दमात्रगतत्वात् Pr.

4 लक्षणाया अर्थगतत्वनयेऽपि व्यञ्जगतत्वामावात् । Pr.

5 शब्दवाच्यकाङ्क्षां वाच्यवाच्यान्यसंनिधेः ।

प्रस्तावदेशकालादेर्वैशिष्ट्यात् प्रतिभाजुषाम् ।

बोध्यत्वाभ्यार्थवैशिष्ट्योपायो व्यक्तिरेव सा ॥ K. P. III.

remove this doubt, Mammata here gives a few examples of the suggestiveness of senses. Full examples of it will be given in the third Ullāsa. The first example is of the suggestiveness of the Expressed sense : माए परोवभरणं &c.

Here, in virtue of the speciality of the speaker (being an unchaste woman), the literal sense of the verse suggests to the reader that the woman is desirous of wanton enjoyment. The apprehension of this desire on her part which is yielded by the verse after its literal meaning is understood, is due to no function of the words; because the function of the words has ceased with giving the literal sense of the verse. (The words here have function of अभिधा only not of लक्षणा or द्योतना; for, the conditions of the latter functions are not here fulfilled). The apprehension must therefore be due to the function of the sense; and inasmuch as no other function is possible (the functions of अभिधा and लक्षणा being admitted to be the functions of words only and not of senses), this function must be admitted to be no other than Suggestion.

If it be said that inasmuch as it is the sense of the verse or what is called the Drift (तात्पर्य) that is suggestive here, this is inconsistent with Mammata's statement that the verse is an example of the suggestiveness of the Expressed sense, we reply that, according to the Prabhākara, the Expressed sense of the words is the same as the sense of the verse or the Drift, and that thus there is no inconsistency; that according to the Bhattas too, the purport being suggestive, the expressed sense is necessarily so; for, the apprehension of the connection among expressed senses of the words is impossible unless the connected senses (i. e. expressed senses) are apprehended. Thus, the apprehension of the expressed senses of the words may well be said to give rise to the suggested sense. This refutes the charge brought by some against Mammata, i. e. that inasmuch as he does not give a separate example of the suggestiveness of the Drift or Purport, he is open to the fault of Deficiency.

Pradīpa,¹ however, shows that, like the purport, the expressed sense also is suggestive here. The expressed sense of the word गृहोपकरण, for instance, suggests that inasmuch as such domestic materials as fuel, corn, vegetables &c. are wanting, and that inas-

1 केवलवाक्यस्यापि द्योतकत्वमिदं दर्शयति-गृह्येति । Pr.

much, as all of them cannot be supplied by the neighbours, the mother-in-law must necessarily order the speaker to go out for fetching them.

The second example of the suggestiveness of the Indicated sense
सहिन्ती &c.

Here the reader knows that the maid has done an injury to the speaker ; with this knowledge, he finds the literal sense of the verse incompatible, and therefore, does not believe it as really intended by the speaker. Hence he understands that the verse means quite the contrary of what it expresses, that the verse indicates: ' *By dallying with my husband, you have done an act quite inconsistent with goodness and friendship, and have thus proved hostile to me. This indicated sense further suggests to him that the speaker brings out the fact of the guiltiness of her husband.* The indicated sense here is simply that the maid has done an hostile act. The fact that she has dallied with the speaker's husband is no part of the indicated sense, but is mentioned along with it, in order that it may bring out the speciality of the person addressed, (i. e. that the maid is a woman of a bad character), and that, through this means, it may help the indicated sense to suggest that the husband is guilty.

The third example is of the suggestiveness of the Suggested sense:
उर &c.

Here, by stating the fact that the crane is sitting motionless, a certain woman suggests to a certain man (her lover) who is anxious to learn the place of meeting, that the crane is enjoying undisturbed repose. Through this (she further suggests to him) that the place is lonely and quiet and that therefore that is a nice place for their meeting. Or, by stating that the crane is sitting motionless, a certain woman ultimately suggests to her lover who charges her with violating her engagement to meet him at that place, that he is telling a lie and that he did not go to that place at all.

Two संज्ञा have been pointed here : the first संज्ञा relates to संयोगसंगार^१ (love in union), and the second to विमलेनसंगार^२ (love

१ दर्शनस्पर्शनादीनि निषेवेते विलासिनौ । यत्रानुरक्तान्बन्धं संयोगोऽय-
मुदाहृतः । S. D. III.

२ यत्र तु रतिः प्रकृष्टा नाभीरुपेति विमलेनोऽसौ । S. D. III.

in separation). The reason why the second is pointed out is that it is more charming than the first.

Mammata now states the definitions of the various kinds of words, Denotative, Indicative &c. in order.

Kārikā II. (Continued.)

A Denotative or Expressive word is that which conveys a sense which is attached to it by a direct convention.¹

The word अभिवक्षि here means simply 'conveys', and not 'expresses' or 'denotes'. Thus² the adjective साक्षात्संकेतितं is not tautologous. संकेतित means that (sense) which is attached to a word by a convention. The word संकेतित is put in to exclude 'Gestures' which also directly convey senses but which have no convention in respect of those senses. This propriety of the word संकेतित is in accordance with the view that it is only a word that has a convention in respect of a certain sense. But inasmuch as a gesture also may have a convention in respect of a certain sense, it may as well be called Denotative on that ground, as a word itself. Therefore the propriety of the word संकेतित is to exclude those letters³ (from क to न) which are suggestive of the qualities of Sweetness, Vigour &c. These letters are excluded, because, although they directly convey the qualities of Sweetness &c., yet they have no convention in respect of those qualities. As for 'Gestures', they may be excluded by supposing that the Kārikā states the definition of a Denotative word (the pronoun सः being taken to refer to the noun शब्द occurring in the first line of the first Kārikā). The word साक्षात् also is not re-

1 संकेत means the will of God(and, according to some, of man also) that such and such a word should mean such and such a thing (Vide N. K.).

2 विशेषणान्तरेति । अभिवक्ष्या प्रतिपादयतीत्युक्तौ साक्षात्संकेतितमित्यस्य वैयर्थ्यं स्पष्टित्वार्थः । Pr.

3 माधुर्यादीति । ' मूर्ध्नि वर्गान्त्वगाः स्पर्शाः ' इत्यादिना वर्णविशेषाणां माधुर्यादिगुणव्यञ्जकत्वस्य (अष्टमोहाते) वक्ष्यमाणत्वादिति भावः । Pr.

dundant; for, it excludes such a word as *वैख* which, when it means a country abounding in *वैख* trees, is an Indicative not a Denotative word. The word *वैख* is excluded because although it has a convention in respect of the sense of 'a country abounding in *वैख* trees', still that convention is indirect, the direct convention of the word being in respect of the sense of a tree by name *वैख*. It is not necessary to regard the word *वैख* as Denotative of the sense of a country; for we may well regard it as Indicative of that sense. If it be said that, in that case, when all the *वैख* trees which that country possesses are cut off, the sense of that country will not be obtained from the word *वैख* by means of लक्षणा, for, one of the conditions of लक्षणा, i. e., the connection between the वाच्यार्थ—the *वैख* tree and लक्ष्यार्थ—the *वैख* country will then be absent; we reply that लक्षणा will still be possible on the basis of a past connection between the *वैख* trees and the *वैख* country (a past connection being as good for लक्षणा as a present one).

If it be said that the definition of a Denotive word may be stated simply as *साक्षात्संकेतवान् वाचकः*, and that thus the word *अभिधत्ते* is superfluous; we reply that the word *अभिधत्ते* is not superfluous; for, it serves the purpose of excluding such a word as *कर* when it means the trunk in the verse *भद्रात्मनः*¹ &c. In that verse, the word *कर*, although it has a direct convention in respect of the sense of the trunk, still, in consequence of its denotation² being restricted to the 'hand' by means of such circumstances as *संयोग* &c., is regarded as Suggestive (not Expressive) of that sense. This word, when it means the trunk, is excluded because although it has a direct convention in respect of the sense of the trunk, still it does not express (*अभिधत्ते*) that sense in the verse *भद्रात्मनः* &c. If it be further urged that inasmuch as the word *अभिधत्ते* has been taken to mean 'conveying' simply, the word *कर* is still not excluded; for, it does convey the sense of the trunk (suggesting being a mode of conveying); we reply: No. What the definition is intended to mean is this:—When a word has a direct convention in respect of a certain sense, and when that word conveys that sense in virtue of that direct convention, then that word is said to be Expressive of that sense. According to this meaning of

1 Vide Text pages 71-72.

2 Vide Kārikā XIV. of this Ullāsa.

the Kārikā, the word trunk is excluded, because although it has a direct convention in respect of sense of the 'trunk', still it does not convey that sense (in the verse मृगस्त्वय्य &c.) in virtue of that direct convention, but conveys it in virtue of the function called Suggestion (संज्ञना). Corrupt words must also be included in the definition, otherwise such verses as¹ नाप्यवरोक्ष्य अवरोक्ष्य would not be examples of the suggestiveness of the Expressed sense (the senses of corrupt words cannot be considered as Expressed senses when corrupt words themselves are not considered as Expressive words).

If it be said : what evidence is there to show that the ascertainment of a convention is an auxiliary to a word in expressing a certain sense? We reply that the evidence is the fact that if the convention of a word in respect of a certain sense is not ascertained, that sense is not apprehended from that word. Thus, *the fact that, in ordinary life, the particular sense which a word bears is not apprehended by man unless he ascertains that the word has a convention in respect of that particular sense, shows that word expresses a particular sense only when it is assisted by the ascertainments of its convention in respect of that particular sense. Hence a word is (said to be) Expressive of a certain sense when it is ascertained to have a direct convention in respect of that sense and when it conveys that sense in virtue of that ascertainment.*

In the above explanation of the Kārikā, the word साक्षात् has been construed as an adverb to संकेतित. That this is the construction meant by Mammata is clear from his Vritti बद्ध अव्यवधानेन संकेतो गृह्यते (where अव्यवधानेन standing for साक्षात् is construed with गृह्यते).

But a better construction would be to connect साक्षात् with अभिधत्ते. The word साक्षात् as an adverb to संकेतित is really speaking useless; for, words like चैत्य and others, to exclude which साक्षात् has been employed as an adverb to संकेतित, are excluded by the word संकेतित itself. The word चैत्य, for instance, indicates a particular country. Now the desire that such a word as चैत्य should indicate such a sense as a particular country called चैत्य is not a convention at all. The sense of the country, even though no convention is present, is understood from the word चैत्य in virtue of the connection of that

1 Vide Text page 27.

sense with the expressed sense (i. e. the चैत्वं tree) itself. Thus the words चैत्वं &c. being excluded by the adjective संकेतित itself, the word साक्षात् as an adverb to संकेतित is unnecessary for that purpose.

The word साक्षात् should, therefore, be construed with अभिधत्ते. Then the propriety of the word would be to exclude such a word as कृत् which, although it conveys in the verse मृत्तल्लवः &c. the sense of the 'trunk' in respect of which it has a convention, yet conveys it not directly but indirectly i. e. only after the sense of the whole verse is apprehended.

The word संकेतित also is not superfluous, according to this construction. For, it serves the purpose of excluding the letters (from क् to ख) which although they convey the qualities of Sweetness &c. directly, yet have no convention in respect of them. The words चैत्वं &c., also are, as has been shown just now, excluded by this very word.

Pradīpa says that the word संकेतित serves the purpose of excluding such a word as गङ्गा also when it indicates the bank of the Ganges. For, this word too, according to him, conveys the sense of the bank, directly i. e. not through the medium of the expressed sense (i. e. the current of the water).

Pradīpa is wrong here, however. Such a word as गङ्गा never conveys the sense of the bank without the medium of the expressed sense i. e. प्रवाह. It is better, therefore, to regard this passage as an interpolation (Vide Udyota).

Bhāskar interprets the Kārikā thus:—The word साक्षात् is an adverb modifying the verb अभिधत्ते and is put in to exclude the possibility of such a word as घोष being Expressive of the sense तट in the example गङ्गायां घोषः. In this example, the word घोष, according to the अम्बिकाभिधानवादिनः, has a convention in respect of घोष as connected with तट which is the indicated sense of the word गङ्गा. Thus, the word घोष inasmuch as it has a convention in respect of तट may become expressive of it. This contingency is, however, prevented by the word साक्षात्. For, although the word घोष has a convention in respect of तट, still it conveys that sense subordinately as a विशेषण (विशेषणविशेष) and not prominently (साक्षात्) i. e. as a विशेषण.

'If we do not, however, admit the view of the अन्वितमभिधत्ते-
दिन्, then the Kārikā,' says Bhāskar, 'should be understood as
stating two definitions of an Expressive word: साक्षात् अभिधत्ते and
संकेतितमभिधत्ते. 'The first definition,' says he, 'does not extend to
'gestures': for, the context shows that we are talking of Expressive
words (and gestures are not words).'

This interpretation of Bhāskar should, however, be rejected on
the ground that it is inconsistent with Mammata's Vritti which
construes साक्षात् with संकेतित and not with अभिधत्ते.

Moreover, the first definition साक्षादभिधत्ते is faulty inasmuch as
it extends to the letters (क् to न) which also directly convey Sweet-
ness' &c.—the qualities of the Erotic flavour &c.

The second definition संकेतितमभिधत्ते is also faulty inasmuch as
it extends to such words as कर &c. which, under certain circum-
stances, suggest senses although they are their conventional senses.

It should not be said that this extension is desirable; for, in
that case, the definition संकेतवान् (वाचकः) alone sufficing, the re-
maining word अभिधत्ते would become useless.

It has been said that Expressive words are those which directly
convey senses settled by convention. Mammata now states the
divisions of these conventional senses:—

Kārikā III.

Conventional senses are fourfold:—Universals and
others, or (onefold : i. e.) simply Universals.

According to the Grammarians, conventional senses are of four
kinds: Universals, and others,² i. e. Qualities, Actions and Proper

1 आह्लादकत्वं माधुर्यं शृंगारे वृत्तिकारणम् । दीप्त्यात्मविस्तृतेर्हेतुरोजो वीर-
रसास्थिति । K. P. VIII. चित्तं व्याप्नोति यः क्षिप्रं शृङ्गेन्धननिवानलः । स
प्रसादः समस्तो रसेषु रचनास्तु च ॥ S. D. VIII.

2 जात्यादिरित्यादिपदेन गुणक्रियासंज्ञानां संग्रहः । Pr.

Names. According to the Mimāṃsāks, however, they are of one kind only i. e. Universals.

If it be said : This fourfold division of senses is improper, since conventions are never made in respect of Universals &c. All original conventions in respect of the meanings of words have been made in the world of practice. Now, in the world of practice, we concern ourselves with individuals only. For instance,¹ we approach a cow if she gives us milk, but avoid her if she strikes us with her horns. All our practical actions being thus in reference to individuals, it is proper to admit that conventions are made in respect of individuals and not of Universals.

We reply : No. For, *although it is true that individuals only are fit objects of our practical activity, since they alone are capable of serving all the practical purposes of our life, still it is not right to admit that conventions are made in respect of these individuals. For, such an admission would be open to the two faults of Endlessness and Violation.*

If the convention of a word be admitted as made in respect of all the individuals of a species, then inasmuch as the individuals of a species are infinite, it would be impossible to ascertain the conventional meaning of that word. If, however, the convention of a word be admitted as made in respect of one particular individual of that species, then just as another individual of that species is seen by us to be apprehended from that word, although, according to your admission, the word has no convention in respect of that individual, so a water-jar also would be apprehended from that word, since, in regard to it also, the word has no convention. Besides, any other individual of that species, in respect of which the word has no convention, would not be apprehended from that word—a fact opposed to experience. You thus violate the Law of invariable association between cause and effect, expressed in the form : where the cause is, the effect is. To

1 प्रवृत्तीति । दोहनादीष्टाधनत्वं हि प्रवृत्तियोग्यत्वं भृंगाघातादनिष्ट-
साधनत्वं च निवृत्तियोग्यत्वं गोभ्यकावेव न तु जातावित्यर्थः । Pr.

explain :—When a word is held as having a convention in respect of one individual of a species only, then the fact that another individual of that species is apprehended from that word can be explained by you on the assumption of such a rule as the following :—If a certain individual (say a black bull) is to be apprehended from a certain word (say the word गौ), that word must have a convention in respect of some one individual. Now by your admission that a word has a convention in respect of some one individual (say a red bull) you violate this rule. For although the word गौ has a convention in respect of a red bull (which is some one individual) still, a water-jar (which is a certain individual) is not apprehended from that word, although, according to your rule, it ought to be apprehended from it. You thus violate the Law of invariable association between cause and effect (the cause being present and yet the effect being absent).

But if to avoid the contingency of a water-jar being apprehended from the word गौ, you modify the rule thus :—If a certain individual (say a black bull) is to be apprehended from a certain word (say गौ), that word must have a convention in respect of that very individual (i. e. a black bull), you still violate the rule even in this modified form. For, although a black bull is actually apprehended from the word गौ, still the word गौ has no convention in respect of that black bull, the word being admitted by you to have a convention in respect of a red bull only. Thus, the Law of invariable association between cause and effect is violated in this case also¹ (the effect being present and yet the cause being absent).

But if to avoid the contingency of a black bull not being apprehended from the word गौ, you still further modify the rule thus :—If a certain individual (say a black bull) is to be apprehended from a certain word (say गौ), it must have a convention in respect of a similar individual (such as a red bull, a white bull &c.), your theory that words have a convention in respect of individuals only would still be open to the further objection i. e. that the words गौः, कृत्तः, चलः and दित्यः, inasmuch as all of them denote but individuals,

1 एवं च 'व्यभिचाराच्च' इति प्रकाशयन्तः प्रकारद्वयेन व्याख्यात इति बोध्यम् । Pr.

will not get distinct provinces of their own. All these words express one and the same thing i. e. individuals, and are thus synonymous ; and being synonymous, cannot be used together in a sentence.

Udyota however remarks that this objection raised against the व्यक्तिवैक्यवादी is not a sound one. The words गौः, घोः, चरः, रित्यः, although each denotes an individual, do not yet become synonymous. These words would become synonymous only when each of them would denote the same individual as is denoted by any of the others. But they do not denote the same individuals necessarily. The word गौ, for instance, denotes a black bull as well as a white one and the word घोः denotes a white horse as well as a white bull. Thus the provinces of the two words are not necessarily identical. All these words may, therefore, be used together in a sentence to denote a particular individual, i. e. an individual belonging to the Bovine species, of a white color, in motion, and named Dittha.

From the above it is clear that words must (be admitted to) have a contention in respect of the general attributes of individuals and not of individuals themselves.

A (general) attribute is of two kinds :—1 An inherent attribute, i. e. an attribute which pertains to an individual thing naturally, such as jariness; whiteness &c. ; and 2 An adventitious attribute, i. e., an attribute which is imposed upon a thing by the will of the speaker, such as a proper name. An inherent attribute is also two-fold :—(A) An attribute that is fully accomplished, and (B) an attribute that is in course of accomplishment.

An attribute that is fully accomplished is also two-fold :—(a) An attribute which gives life to a thing, i. e. an attribute¹ which by its connection with a thing renders it a fit subject of our (thought and) speech ; and (b) an attribute which is a means of distinguishing one thing from all others.

Of these last the first (1 A a) is a Universal. As is said by Bhartṛihari in the *Vâkyapadîya* :—A bull is not a bull, because of its

1 यावत्स्थितितीति । पदार्थस्य स्थितिर्व्यवहारयोग्यता । तावत्पर्यन्तं तत्प्र-
माणतया संबन्धितम् । Pr.

being, an individual, nor is it a not-bull also for that reason. But it is a bull because of its invariable connection with bullness. What the passage means is this :—A bull is not called a bull because it has the form of an individual ; for otherwise,² a water-jar also will have to be called a bull, because it too has the form of an individual. Nor is a bull called a not-bull, because it has the form of an individual ; for otherwise³ a bull also, inasmuch as it has the form of an individual, will have to be called a not-bull. Besides, it would be impossible to call a bull a not-bull unless we know what thing we are to call a bull. But a bull is called a bull, because it is known⁴ to be invariably connected with the universal 'bullness.' Thus, inasmuch as bullness is present in the bull as long as it is made the subject of our thought and speech, bullness is proved to be a vital attribute of the bull.

The second general attribute (1 A b) i. e., that which is a means of distinguishing⁵ one thing from all others is a quality. A thing which has become⁶ the subject of our thought and speech in virtue of its connection with a universal is further differentiated⁷ from others of its class by means of a quality such as 'white', 'black' &c. Although, according to the Grammarians, qualities also like universals have a permanent existence, still, qualities are not identical with universals. They may be distinguished thus :—a quality is found sometimes to leave its connection with a substance, as for instance, when that substance is made to change its color by the application of heat, but a universal is never found to leave its connection with a substance as long as the substance lasts.

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- 1 स्वरूपेण । व्यक्तिमात्रेण । Pr. जातिरहितव्यक्तित्वेन । Kam.
 - 2 अन्यथा घटोऽपि गौः स्यात्, स्वरूपाविशेषात् । Kam. & R. G.
 - 3 तथा सति गौरप्यगोः स्यादितिभावः Kam. & R. G.
 - 4 गोत्वामिसंबंधात् । गोत्ववत्तया ज्ञानात् । R. G.
 - 5 विशेषाधानम् । इतरव्यावृत्तिबोधः । Pr.
 - 6 लब्धस्तत्ताकम् । प्राप्तव्यवहारयोग्यताकम् । Pr.
 - 7 विशिष्यते । इतरेभ्यो व्यावर्त्यते । अनेन प्रकाशगतस्य 'शुक्लादिना' त्यस्य ' विशिष्यते ' इत्यनेनान्वयो दर्शितः । Pr.

A quality has been thus defined in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali :— 'A quality¹ is that which resides in a substance, which leaves it and is found in substances of a different class, which is sometimes produced (as by heat) and sometimes not (as in the case of other), and which is different from a substance.'

A quality is thus different from a universal which never leaves the substance in which it once resides, and which is never found in substances of a different class. A quality is different from an action also, the latter being always produced.

An attribute (1 B) which is in course of accomplishment is an Action (supposed) to consist of parts which appear as occupying successive portions of time. Such an action is the action of cutting, for instance, since it is supposed² to consist of a series of operations beginning with the lifting up of the axe and ending with the splitting up of the wood, some of which are in the past time, some in the present and others in the future. As is said by Bhartṛihari :—

When all past and future operations are apprehended as in course of accomplishment, in consequence of their extending over successive portions of time, that is said to be an Action.

The (ideal) forms of such words as *Dittha*, *Dapittha* &c.. called the *Sphota*, which are manifested partially by the hearing of each preceding letter and completely grasped by the hearing of the last letter, which are void of succession in time unlike the physical forms of these very words which consist of various successive letters, are imposed as (distinctive) attributes (or designations) upon such (definite) individuals as *Dittha*, *Dapittha* &c. by the speaker at his own sweet will. These are the attributes which are called proper names and which, being the product of an arbitrary will, are said to be of an arbitrary nature.

1 सत्त्वे निविशतेऽपीति पृथक् जातिषु दृश्यते । आधेयश्चाक्रिबाजश्च सोऽसत्त्वर्द्धतिर्गुणः । M. B.

2 द्वैधीभावनफलकोयमनादिव्यापारसमूहो द्विचिद्विधानुवाच्यः कल्प्यते इति साङ्ख्यिकव्यापाराणां तदेकदेशत्वं काल्पनिकमेवेत्यर्थः । Pr.

Chandīdāsa thus interprets the last passage of the Vṛtti:—The physical forms of such words as *Dittha* and others, the knowledge of which alone leads to the knowledge of individuals, which are void of the order that is seen in the case of such common names as *गौ*, *अश्व* &c. (i. e. that the universals *गौत्व*, *अश्वत्व* &c. are apprehended first and the individuals *गौ*, *अश्व* &c. are apprehended afterwards,—which are void of this order, because from these words, individuals are apprehended directly i. e. without the media of universals), are admitted to have a convention in respect of individuals themselves such as *Dittha* and others and not of universals, since these forms are favourable to the apprehension of individuals merely. These words i. e. *दृश्य* and others, have no convention, therefore, in respect of such attributes as *दृश्यत्व* &c., individuals alone being apprehended from them.

Chandīdāsa's interpretation is to be rejected however for the following reasons:—(a) It is at variance with the *Mahābhāṣya*. Patanjali has there laid down that in the case of such individuals as *दृश्य* &c. the proper name itself is the attribute; since when the word *दृश्य* is uttered, an individual having (the attribute of) the proper name *दृश्य* is apprehended from it. (b) According to it, the word *अन्त्यबुद्धिनिर्माह* is superfluous; for, all names (not only proper names) denote individuals, only when they themselves are known. Thus there is nothing peculiar to proper names in this, and the word therefore ought not to form part of the definition of *संज्ञासम्बन्ध*. (c) The word *अन्त्य* cannot express an individual. (d) The compound *अन्त्यबुद्धिनिर्माह* is ungrammatical. The word *बुद्धिनिर्माह* being an adjective ought to be the first member since the compound is *Bahuvrīhi*. (e) The word *उपाधित्वेन* is required to be understood in a metaphorical sense. (f) And even with this metaphorical sense the word *उपाधित्वेन* is superfluous. For, with this sense, all names (not only proper names) are *उपाध्या*, i. e. are favourable to the apprehension of their respective senses.

It is thus shown that there are four kinds of (general) attributes. The conventions of words are in respect of these four kinds of (general) attributes. (To this effect) the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has said:—*The principles which determine the uses of words are four, as instanced in (such words as) गौः, शूद्रः, चतः, दृश्यः.* With reference to these four principles, words have been classified

in a four-fold manner:—1 words expressive of universals or common names; 2 words expressive of qualities; 3 words expressive of actions (both these classes may be included in the general class of attributives); and 4 words expressive of single individuals or singular names.

If it be said: In accordance with what is stated above, such words as परमाणु, परममहत् &c. are words expressive of a universal and not words expressive of a quality. For these words have a convention in respect of the attributes परमाणुत्व, परममहत्त्व &c. which are universals. परमाणुत्व, परममहत्त्व¹ &c. are universals because these attributes render the individuals परमाणु, परममहत् &c. capable of being spoken of and thought of in ordinary life.

We reply : true, (the words) परमाणु (परममहत्) &c. are words expressive of a universal. But, in consequence of (the attributes परमाणुत्व &c.) being ranked in the list of qualities by Kanāda, these words are but technically called words expressive of a quality.

The Vaisheshiks say that परमाणुत्व &c. cannot be admitted as जाति, because जाति are either पर (more extensive) or अपर (less extensive). ब्रह्मत्व, for instance, is a परजाति and पृथ्वीत्व an अपरजाति with reference to it. Now when two जाति are found together in a thing, one of them as a rule is पर, the other अपर. When one of these two जाति is not known to be either पर or अपर with reference to the other, it cannot be admitted as a जाति. Thus परमाणुत्व is no जाति because when it resides in पार्थिवपरमाणु along with पृथ्वीत्व, it is impossible to determine whether it is पर or अपर with reference to पृथ्वीत्व. If it be regarded as पर and पृथ्वीत्व as अपर, then a घट also would become a परमाणु, for the rule is that if an अपरजाति i. e. पृथ्वीत्व resides in a घट, then the परजाति i. e. परमाणुत्व must reside in it. As a matter of fact, however, घट is not a परमाणु, therefore परमाणुत्व is not a परजाति. If परमाणुत्व be regarded as अपर and पृथ्वीत्व पर, then तेजःपरमाणु also would be पृथ्वी; for, the अपरजाति i. e. परमाणुत्व residing in तेजःपरमाणु,

1 पार्थिवपरमाणौ पृथ्वीत्वपरमाणुत्वयोः परापरव्यवस्थाया अभावात् । यदि पृथ्वीत्वमपरं तदा घटेऽपि परमाणुत्वप्रसंगः । अपरसद्भावे परस्य सद्भावप्रतिपादनात् । अथ परमाणुत्वमपरं तदा तेजःपरमाणुष्वपि पृथ्वीत्वप्रसंगः । तस्मान्न जातिशब्दत्वम् ।
Sankarā.

the परजाति i. e. पृथ्वीत्व, in accordance with the above rule, must reside in them. But as a matter of fact त्रैजःपरमाणुs are not पृथ्वी, therefore परमाणुत्व is not an अपरजाति. This shows that it is impossible to determine whether परमाणुत्व is either पर or अपर with reference to पृथ्वीत्व. Hence परमाणुत्व cannot be admitted as a जाति. Similarly, परमहत्व also cannot be admitted as a जाति. Hence they are said to be गुणs (they being subdivisions¹ of परिमाण (Extension) which is reckoned as a गुण).

According to the Grammarians, however, whose view Mammata appears to accept, परमाणुत्व is a जाति. They do not admit the rule that if two जातिस reside in a thing, they must be related to each other as पर and अपर. They say² that just as two जातिस (पृथ्वीत्व and घटत्व) related to each other as पर and अपर reside in a thing (घट), so two जातिस, which are not related to each other as पर and अपर may also reside in a thing, the only condition in the case of the latter two जातिस being that they must generally be known as not residing in distinct things. Thus, परमाणुत्व and पृथिवीत्व although not related to each other as पर and अपर may reside in पार्थिवपरमाणुs. for they are generally known as not having distinct abodes (पार्थिव-परमाणुs being generally known to be the common abodes of both). Only those two जातिस do not reside in a thing, which are generally known to have distinct abodes. Thus, मनुष्यत्व and सिंहत्व do not reside in नृसिंह, because these two जातिस are generally known to reside in distinct substances (मनुष्यत्व residing in men and सिंहत्व residing in lions).

The Virtti परमाणुवाचीनां गुणमध्यपाटात् पारिभाषिकं गुणत्वम् presents a difficulty. परमाणुवाचिस are words expressive of the qualities परमाणु-

1 रूपरसगंधस्पर्शाः परिमाणानि..... प्रयत्नाश्च गुणाः । V. S. I. 1. 6 (परिमाणं) चतुर्विधम्— अणु, महत्, दीर्घम्, ह्रस्वं चेति । T. S.

2 ययोः (जात्योः) सामानाधिकरण्येन सिद्धित्ययोः सांकर्यस्य व्याप्यव्यापकभावापन्नजात्योः सांकर्यस्यैवादोषत्वात् । ययोजात्योस्तु परस्परसामानाधिकरण्येनैव सिद्धिः परस्परमाश्रयभेदकता च लोकसिद्धा, तयोः सांकर्यस्यैव दोषत्वात् । आश्रययोर्भेदमग एव हि सांकर्यदूषकतापीजम् । तादृशजात्योर्बन्धे सांकर्यप्रसंगस्तत्रोभयवैलक्षण्यं स्वीकार्यम् । यथा नृसिंहोऽनतरे वा Laghu-Manjusha, page 7.

त्वादि, and not qualities themselves ; and therefore they cannot be ranked in the list of qualities, and cannot be said to have गुणत्व. Pradipa has taken गुणत्व to mean गुणवाचकत्व. Still, the difficulty is not solved ; for परमाण्यादीनां being words cannot be mentioned in the list of qualities. Therefore, the word परमाणुत्वादीनां must be taken as understood before the word गुणवाचकत्वाद्. The difficulty would be avoided, if following the old commentators Mānikyachandra and Jayanta, we read परमाणुत्वादीनां for परमाण्यादीनां. With the Vritti that is present before us, however, I think it preferable to take (as Kamalākara does) परमाण्यादीनां as standing for परमाणुत्वादीनां than to take (as Pradipa has done) गुणत्व to mean गुणवाचकत्व. In fact, the words¹ अणु, महत् &c. have been used by the writers on the Nyāya for अणुत्व, महत्त्व &c.

If it be said : The quality 'white' is different in different substances. White snow, for instance, is different from white milk. Thus, inasmuch as the 'whites' are numerous, there being as many whites as there are white substances, the word शुद्ध cannot be said to have a convention in respect of the quality 'white.' For, here the question would arise : whether the word शुद्ध has a convention in respect of one white, or all whites. The word cannot have a convention in respect of one for, in that case, another white, in respect of which the word has no convention, cannot be called white. Thus, the fault, as has been remarked already, would be Violation of the law of invariable association between cause and effect. Nor again can the word शुद्ध have a convention in respect of all whites. For, the whites, being infinite, it would be impossible to bring all of them together and then to fix the convention of the word शुद्ध in respect of them.

What has been said of words expressive of a quality applies to words expressive of an action and words expressive of single individuals.

These words also cannot be said to have a convention in respect of actions and proper names. For, an action also is different in

1 (परिमाणं) चेति । भावप्रधानो निर्देशः । अणुत्वं महत्त्वं दीर्घत्वं ब्रह्मत्वं चेत्यर्थः । Dipikā.

different substances. The cooking, of molasses, for instance, is different from the cooking of rice. Similarly, a proper name also is different with reference to different persons who utter it. The proper name *विद्यु*, for instance, when uttered by a child, is different from the proper name *विद्यु*, when uttered by an old man or a parrot.

Thus, inasmuch as all these kinds of words denote innumerable objects, having common attributes such as *गुणत्व*, *क्रियात्व* &c., it is proper to consider these kinds of words also as having conventions in respect of these common attributes and thus to call them connotative words or words expressive of universals.

We reply : what you say is not right. The quality 'white' is but one, not many. Although white snow is different from white milk, yet we recognise both the whites to be but white. Similarly, when it is said that one 'white' is produced (as in a white-washed wall) and another 'white' is destroyed (as in a turban colored red) it is not really that one white is produced and another destroyed. 'White' is but one and eternal. What is really produced is connection of 'white' with one substance (such as a wall); what is really destroyed is also connection of 'white' with another substance (such as a turban).

The above arguments prove that the quality 'white' is but one, not many. Similarly, cooking is also but one and *Dittha* also is but one. But these things i. e. *qualities, actions and proper names, although really one (each), appear to be different owing to the difference of their abodes i. e. of the substances in which they reside or of the persons who utter them.* Thus, for instance, the white quality of snow appears to be different from the white quality of milk, because the abodes of 'white' (which is but one) are different; just as the face of a man although one, (appears to be different) owing to the difference of the substances in which it is reflected, appearing long when reflected in a sword, big or small when reflected in a mirror big or small, glossy in oil and so forth.

Such is the view held by the Grammarians. But there are others i. e. the *Mīmāṃsāks* who hold that there is only one general attribute instead of four as admitted by the Grammarians, and that that general attribute is a universal. All words, therefore, are words expressive of a universal, or in other words, connotative names.

The Mīmāṃsāks thus argue:—(1) The 'whites', residing in snow, in milk, in a conchshell &c., are really different from each other. For, we perceive that the white color of a jar is destroyed and a black color is produced in it through the application of heat. Now this perception cannot be called erroneous, because it is not seen to be superseded by any right one. Nor can it be said that what is really produced or destroyed in the case of a jar is not the white or black color, but the connection of that color with the jar, called co-inherence (समवाय); for as a matter of fact, co-inherence is not seen to be either produced or destroyed in this case. (2) Moreover, the fact that 'white' admits of degrees which is attested by the use of such expressions as 'this is whiter than that', 'this is the whitest of all' also proves that there are different 'whites'. Now that, in virtue of which there arises one identical consciousness and one identical form of expression, 'This is white', 'this is white' when the 'whites' are really different in the (different) substances snow, milk, a conchshell &c., is the universal. Whiteness (शुक्लत्व). And it is simpler to admit that the word शुक्ल has a convention in respect of this universal 'Whiteness'. Similarly, the cookings of (such objects as) molasses, rice etc. which are really different have one attribute—common to them i. e. the universal cookingness (पाकत्व), in virtue of which we are uniformly conscious of one thing and uniformly speak of one thing i. e. 'This is cooked,' 'This is cooked'. In the same manner, one common attribute i. e. the universal 'Ditthatwa' is possessed by the individual Dittha, who is different at different periods of time (being fat at one time and lean at another); or (even according to Patanjali who says that the proper name itself is an उपाधि in the case of words expressive of single individuals) the universal Ditthatwa is possessed by the proper name or स्फोटरूप Dittha which is different because the ordinary word 'Dittha' which suggests it is different, being (differently) uttered by a child, an old man, a parrot, etc. This Ditthatwa which is really possessed by the word Dittha is then attributed to the individual denoted by that word. Thus the individual Dittha is indirectly said to possess the universal Ditthatwa.

1 यदुक्ताशब्दानां तु दिव्यादीनां शुक्लसारिकामनुभ्यामुदीरितेषु निक्षेपे दि-
 त्वादिशब्देषु समवेतं दिव्यशब्दत्वादिकं सामान्यमेव यथायोगं संक्षिप्तं अभ्यस्तमवधेयम् ।
 Mukula and L. M.

Pradīpa has given three interpretations of this part of the Vṛtti. The one given above is his third interpretation. He appears to be dissatisfied with this natural interpretation, however, because, as said by Prabhā,¹ he appears to think it improper to admit that the word Dittha has a convention in respect of that Ditthatwa also which is indirectly possessed by the individual Dittha, instead of admitting that it has a convention in respect of that Ditthatwa simply which is directly possessed by the individual Dittha. He, therefore, offers another which is as follows:—The universal Ditthatwa is possessed by the individual named Dittha who although one is regarded as different on account of the attribution to him of such opposite properties as smallness bigness &c. due to infancy, youth &c. just as the universal Ditthatwa is possessed by the word although one is regarded as different on account of the attribution to it of such opposite properties as loudness, gentleness &c. due to its being uttered by an old man, a child &c. Pradīpa is not satisfied with this interpretation also, probably thinking it to be artificial. For, here² the particles च and ए have been made to exchange places and ए has been taken in the unusual sense of इव. Again, the difference of the word Dittha is not an established fact and therefore the individual Dittha cannot be compared to it in point of this difference. Pradīpa, therefore, tries to interpret the Vṛtti thus:—The universals Ditthatwa &c. are possessed by the individuals Dittha &c. (which are denoted by the words Dittha &c.) and by the words³ Dittha &c. which are also denoted by the words Dittha &c. in such expressions as 'I hear the words Dittha &c. But Pradīpa is dissatisfied with this interpretation also; for this interpretation⁴ also cannot be obtained unless the words are subjected to a strained construction.

1 व्याख्यातमिति । साक्षार्थगतजातिं विहाय शब्दगतजातौ शक्तिकल्पनानौचित्येन यथाश्रुतासंगतेरिति भावः । Pr.

2 वाशब्दस्य इवार्थत्वस्य स्थानविनिमयस्य च क्लृप्ता कल्पना इत्युच्येतादयमेति । Pr.

3 इत्थिशब्दं शृणोमीत्यादौ शब्दस्यैव वाच्यत्वात्तद्वत्तेव जातिस्तदर्थ इति भावः । Pr.

4 अत्रापि संदर्भात्सारस्यादाह-अथवेति । Pr.

'It is thus proved', say the Mimāṃsaka, *that all (kinds of) words have but one general attribute i. e. the universal as the cause of their being used in ordinary life; that in other words, all words are expressive of a universal*¹.

Pradīpa here incidentally points out another objection against Chāṇḍīdāsa's interpretation of the Vṛtti अन्त्यबुद्धिनिर्माह &c. Chāṇḍīdāsa holds that in the case of such words as Dittha &c. which are expressive of single individuals, there is no उपाधि such as the proper name Dittha &c. Now, on this view, such words as आकाश &c. cannot be shown to be expressive of a universal. For, the word आकाश, for instance, cannot have a convention in respect of आकाशत्व since आकाशव्यक्ति is but one and a जाति cannot reside in one व्यक्ति. Nor can आकाश like द्रव्य be regarded as different owing to the difference of the limiting adjuncts such as time, place, condition &c. For, आकाश unlike द्रव्य is perceived to be one and the same at all time, in all places, in all conditions &c. Thus the word आकाश can in no way be shown to be expressive of a universal by Chāṇḍīdāsa. Hence 'if we accept Chāṇḍīdāsa's interpretation of the Vṛtti अन्त्यबुद्धि &c., the word सर्वेषां here becomes inconsistent.

Some philosophers (i. e. the Naiyāyiks and the Buddhists) have said that the meaning of a word is either an individual possessed of a universal, or the difference of an individual from what it is not. What the Naiyāyiks say is as follows :—A word does not denote an individual simply, for, in that case there would arise the faults of Infinity and Violation. Nor does a word can note a universal simply, for, in that case, the individual would not be apprehended from the word at all. It cannot be said that the individual can be apprehended from the word by means of implication; for, the individual² is actually apprehended from the word, even though there may be no implication. Beside, even though there may be implication, still the individual which is apprehended by means of that implication will not form part of the meaning of a sentence, since it is not conveyed by any of the words forming that sentence in virtue of any of its well-known

1 तथा च 'सर्वेषाम्' इत्यसंगतं स्यादिति भावः । Pr.

2 अस्मिन्निति । अनुमानस्य अर्थापत्तेर्वा आक्षेपपदार्थस्य अनवतारोऽपि व्यक्त्यपत्तिः, आक्षेपनियमेऽपि वृत्त्यनुपस्थितत्वेन शाब्दप्रतीत्ययोगाच्चेति भावः । Pr.

functions Denotation &c. From this it is clear that a word must be admitted as expressing an individual possessed of a universal; in other words, as denoting an individual and connotating a universal. It should not be said that, even in this view, the व्यक्ति (of course जातिविशिष्ट) denoted by a word being admitted to be one or many, the faults of Violation and Infinity still arise. For, we admit¹ that all (जातिविशिष्ट) individuals are denoted by a word; and although some individuals only are open to our observation, all the individuals are regarded by us as observed by means of an extraordinary perception (called by us सामान्यलक्षण प्रत्यासत्ति) by which when an individual is perceived as possessed of a universal, all the other individuals possessed of that universal are (regarded as) perceived. All the individuals being thus perceived, it is very easy to fix the convention of a word in respect of them all. Thus, according to the Naiyāyiks, each word is both denotative and connotative.

The Buddhists, however, say that words cannot have a convention in respect of any of the above-mentioned attributes,—a universal, (singly or as connected with an individual), quality, action &c. They argue thus:—A word cannot be admitted to have a convention in respect of व्यक्ति (either one or many); for, such an admission would occasion the two faults of Infinity and Violation. Nor can a word be admitted to have a convention in respect of such an attribute as a universal, a quality &c. These attributes² are admitted by the above philosophers as possessed of unity and eternity. They cannot, therefore, be regarded as positive and real things. Individuals alone are positive and real things. Individuals alone are positive things, and positive things alone are real things. Now every positive or real thing is momentary, i. e. has no duration either in time or place. Universals, qualities &c. inasmuch as each of them is one and eternal, have a duration in time and in place and hence cannot be admitted as positive and real things. The universal गौत्व, for instance, is not something positive but negative. गौत्व means Difference of a गो from not-गो (i. e. भ्रूव, महिष &c.). Similarly,

1 विशिष्टशक्तिपक्षेऽपि सर्वत्र कचिद्वा इति विकल्पानिश्चयेण दोषद्वयमाशङ्क्य
आद्यपक्षोपकारेण समाधत्ते-सामान्येति । Pr.

2 नित्यमेकमेकसमवेतं सामान्यम् । T. K. शुद्धादिगुणानामेकत्वनित्यत्व-
स्वीकारात् । L. M.

the quality¹ 'white' is negative. It means Difference of white from not-whites (i. e. black, yellow &c.). What accompanies the individual गो, therefore, is not गोत्व a positive but अगोऽव्यावृत्ति a negative thing. And words must be admitted to have a convention in respect of such a negative (and unreal) thing as अगोऽव्यावृत्ति, अगुह्यव्यावृत्ति &c.

(But the views of these) and many other philosophers have not been referred to in the Kārikā, firstly because of the fear that (a reference to all these views) would swell the bulk of the book, and secondly because, the object² in the Kārikā being to point out the divisions of conventional senses, (a reference to all these views) becomes useless for that object, since that object is sufficiently served by the pointing out of those divisions according to two well-known and authoritative opinions on the matter.

Udyota and some other commentators explain प्रकृतानुपयोगात् thus:—These and other opinions on the subject have not been referred to in the Kārikā, because they are not useful to the subject under treatment (i. e. the Science of Rhetoric). For according to these views, words have a convention in respect of individuals. Thus individuals cannot be obtained by Suggestion which however is the principal feature of the Science of Rhetoric. When (as in the opinion of the Grammarians and Mīmāṃsaka) words have a convention in respect of attributes, individuals possessing these attributes may be obtained by Suggestion. Thus those views are useful to the subject under treatment.

This explanation appears to me wrong, however; for, according to it, the Buddhist view though not the Naiyāyik one, ought to have been referred to in the Kārikā; since, according to them, words have a convention in respect of but an attribute (स्वावृत्ति), and not of an individual.

It may here be objected that the division of senses into the three kinds i. e. the Expressed, the Indicated and the Suggested is improper, since a fourth kind of sense known as the 'principal' or 'primary' sense also exists. To remove this objection the author states:—

1 नीलत्वादिधर्मोऽनीलव्यावृत्तिरूपः । Vide N. K. P. 51.

2 प्रामाणिकोक्तमतानुसारेणैव प्रकृतार्थविभागसिद्धौ मतान्तरकथनानुपयोगात् ।

Kārikā III. (Continued).

That is the 'primary' sense and the primary function of this (i. e. a word) in regard to that (i. e. sense) is called Denotation.

The word सः refers to the sense in respect of which a word has a direct convention, i. e. to the conventional sense. The conventional sense itself is known as the 'primary' sense. It is called 'primary' because it first comes to the mind when a word is heard. What this 'primary' sense is must be stated here, for this reason also that, unless we know the 'primary' sense, we cannot understand 'inapplicability of the primary sense'—a term occurring in the definition of लक्षणा given in the next Kārikā. In the Sūtra तत्र मुख्यः &c., Mammata states the definition of अभिधा—a term occurring in the 10th Kārikā. The definition is : The principal function of a word in regard to the principal sense is called Denotation. The word अस्य means 'of a word'. The word मुख्य is put in to exclude the function which such a word as कर for instance in the verse भद्रात्मनः &c. has in regard to the primary sense of the 'trunk' which function is not principal and therefore is not called Denotation, but Suggestion.

Pradipa interprets this Sūtra in another way also : —That is the principal sense ; so called because the function of Denotation which a word has in regard to that sense is called principal. But this interpretation³ is objectionable on the ground that according to it, the word यतः is required to be taken as understood in the Sūtra.

As for those who say that Mammata's object in this Kārikā is to assign another name to the Expressed sense since he has employed that name in the next Kārikā, they are not right; for, the procedure of giving another name to the Expressed sense and then making use of that name elsewhere is cumbrous and therefore improper. Mammata might have saved all this trouble by using the word वाच्यार्थ itself in-

1 प्रथमं प्रतीयमानत्वेनैवार्थस्य मुख्यत्वोपपत्तेः Pr.

2 नानार्थव्यञ्जनावारणाय मुख्य इति । Cha.

3 यत इत्यध्याहारकृत्वा पक्षान्तरमाह-यद्वेति । Pr.

stead of the coined name सुख्यार्थ, since all purposes are as well served by the use of the former as by that of the latter.

अभिधा then may be defined as 'a function which produces the apprehension of a conventional sense'. In thus defining अभिधा, Mammata appears to follow the Mīmāṃsāks who hold that अभिधा is a distinct thing (called वृत्ति also) which is apprehended by means of a convention (संकेत). According to the Naiyāyiks, however, अभिधा (or वृत्ति) and संकेत are identical things.

The author, after declaring the nature of an Expressive word, now proceeds to declare the nature of an Indicative word, and, for that purpose, first states the nature of Indication:—

Kārikā IV.

When the primary sense is inapplicable, when there is connection with that (primary sense), and when there is usage or (some) motive, another sense is conveyed; that is Indication which is an adventitious function (of a word).

रुटि—Usage,—the established practice of a word being used in a particular sense.

प्रयोजन—Motive,—the object which a man has in view in using a word in some particular sense. According to Mammata, the words अयं भन्दीऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यन् alone constitute the definition of indication. The three things mentioned in the first line of the Kārikā i. e. सुख्यार्थबोध, तद्योग, रुटि or (अयं² means or) प्रयोजन are the three conditions upon which Indication is dependent. These three things cannot be regarded as forming part of the definition; for, otherwise³ the statement that these things are the conditions of Indication (in the Kārikā इत्यभावात् लक्षणा) would be contradicted.

1. अस्मात्पदाद्यमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरसंकेतः शक्तिः । T. S.

2. 'अन्यतरच्च' इत्यनेन अयंशब्दोऽप्यवैयर्थ्यको दर्शितः । Pr.

3. लक्षणान्तर्गतत्वे हि 'इत्यभावात् लक्षणा' इत्यत्र लक्षणाहेतुत्वं वक्ष्य-
मिति स्यादिति भावः । Pr.

The word **अन्व** in the definition is put in to exclude the primary sense itself, which, although connected with the word by the relation called Denotation and thus having **मुख्यार्थबोधः**, is yet not different from the primary sense. The word **लक्ष्यते** in the definition must mean 'is conveyed' and not 'is indicated'. Otherwise, there would arise the fault of 'self-dependence,' since the definition would contain the very word that is to be defined. The pronoun **वत्** must be taken as referring simply to the act of 'conveying' which is subordinate (according to the Naiyāyikas who say that it is the agent of the action and not the action that is the subject) in a sentence.

According to the Moderns, however, all these three things form part of the definition of Indication. Thus, according to Pradīpa, **तद्योगे** is included in the definition, in order that the definition may not apply to **व्यंजना**¹ (Suggestion—a distinct function, in virtue of which, a sense of 'excess of injury' is suggested to the mind by the verse **उपकृतं बहु नाम** &c **व्यंजना** in this verse is excluded because although the sense of 'excess of injury' is different from the primary sense of the verse i. e. 'excess of obligation,' still the sense of 'excess of injury' is not directly connected with (**तद्योग**) that primary sense, but only indirectly through the secondary sense of 'obligation'. The word **तद्योग** must be understood as **तद्योगहेतुक** in order to exclude² **व्यंजना** in virtue of which the properties, sanctity &c. pertaining to the stream—the primary sense of the word **गंगा**—are apprehended as existing on the bank of the Ganges from the expression **गंगायां घोषः**, and also⁴ to exclude the recollection of a word's convention which arises after a word is heard and before its meaning is understood. The **व्यंजना** in the expression **गंगायां घोषः** is excluded, because although the

1 **व्यंजनायामिति** । 'उपकृतं' इत्यादिव्यंग्यापकारातिशयादिवोधे इत्यर्थः । अतिशयादेरुपकारादिमुख्यार्थसंबन्धान्नातिव्याप्तिः । Pr.

2 **उपकृतं बहु नाम** किमुच्यते **मुजनता** प्रथिता भवता परम् । विदधद्दी-
दृशमेव सदा सत्ते **बुद्धितमास्त्व** ततः शरदां शतम् ॥ K. P. IV.

3 **मुख्यार्थसंबन्धीति** गंगादिसंबन्धिपावनत्वादिवोधे इत्यर्थः । Pr.

4 **अविशब्देन** शक्तिस्मृतिसमुच्चयः । शक्तेर्मुख्यार्थसंबन्धित्वेऽपि तत्स्मृते-
मुख्यार्थसंबन्धान्नाजम्बत्वात् । Pr.

sense of **स्रोतप्रवाह** नदी is different from the primary sense—the stream, and has a (direct) connection with that sense, still that sense is not apprehended because of (the knowledge of) that connection (it being apprehended through other causes such as the speciality of the speaker, hearer &c.). **चक्षुस्त्वृति** is also excluded, because although the sense of convention is different from the primary sense of a word and has a connection with that sense (it being in respect of that sense), still it is not recollected because of (our knowledge of) that connection, but because of the word being heard &c.

The word **मुख्यार्थबाध** is inserted in the definition to exclude the recollection of the 'bank' at the hearing of such a sentence as **गंगायां स्नानं**. The bank is excluded, because although the bank may be recollected here by chance, still the recollection of the bank is not accompanied by the consciousness that the primary sense (i. e. **प्रवाह**) is inapplicable in the sentence **गंगायां स्नानं**.

Inapplicability of the primary sense (**मुख्यार्थबाध**) must be understood as 'incompatibility of the primary sense (of a word) with the purport or the sense intended in the sentence in which that word occurs (**तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिः**)' and not as 'incompatibility of the primary sense (of a word) with the sense of the other word (or words of the sentence) logically connected with it (**अन्वयानुपपत्तिः**).' Thus the definition will include such an example as **छत्रिणो गच्छन्ति** where the primary sense of the word **छत्रिणः**, although it is compatible with the sense of **गच्छन्ति**, is yet incompatible with the purport of the sentence,—the purport being that both men with the umbrellas and men without the umbrellas are going.

The words **रुदितोऽथ प्रयोजनान्** must also be put in the definition in order to show that Indication which is based upon neither usage nor motive is no Indication at all. Thus the full definition is : Indication is the apprehension of a secondary sense which is due to the knowledge that that sense is connected with the primary sense, which is accompanied by the consciousness that the primary sense is incompatible with the sense intended in the sentence, and which is based upon either usage or motive.

1 तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिर्लक्षणाबीजम् । T. D. अन्वयानुपपत्तेर्लक्षणाबीजमे
 टीः प्रवेश ' इत्यादौ लक्षणानुपपत्तिः । Nil. See R. S. P. 146.

In defining Indication, Mammata appears to follow the Ancients¹ who hold Indication to be the apprehension of the secondary sense in virtue of its connection with the primary sense.

Upon this Pradīpa remarks, however, that Indication is connection of the secondary sense with the primary sense leading to the apprehension of that secondary sense. 'For', says he, 'Indication is a function and a function is the cause of apprehension, not apprehension itself.'

As for those who by taking वत् in the sense of वतः interpret the Kārikā so as to make it express Pradīpa's view of the definition of Indication, they are not right. For, that interpretation would be inconsistent with the Vṛtti सुखार्थबाधाविम्वरं हेतुः which says that connection with the primary sense is one of the three conditions of Indication. Now if Indication (as according to the Naiyāyiks) is connection with the primary sense, that connection cannot be the condition of Indication.

If it be said : if Indication is 'conveying' (प्रतिपादन), it cannot be the function of a word. For, the sense of the 'bank' is conveyed not by the word गङ्गा which after conveying the sense of the 'stream' ceases, but by the sense of the stream itself in virtue of its connection² (of proximity) with that sense.

We reply: true what you say. The function of Indication really belongs to the sense and not to the word. Hence, it is that the Kārikā says that Indication is an extrinsic function of a word. The function, although belonging to the sense directly, is said to belong to the word indirectly, because it is connected with that word indirectly, being connected with it through the medium of the primary sense. Hence, the Vṛtti also says that the function of Indication is सान्त्वयार्थविद्, i. e. has for its object the secondary sense which is separated from the word by the primary sense. A word³ is said to

1 Vide Kumārila's Kārikā अभिधेयाविनाभूतप्रतीतिर्लक्षणाच्यते approvingly quoted by Mammata on page 50.

2 स्वबन्धेन । स्वसंबन्धेन सामीप्यादिना । Pr.

3 तथा च शब्दस्य लक्ष्यार्थविषयत्वं लक्षणाधीनमित्यतः शब्दे लक्षणा-
ति भावः । Pr.

be Indicative, with respect to the secondary sense. But this is possible only when the function of Indication belongs to a word. Therefore, this function is attributed to a word which does not possess it really.

The above explanation¹ of सान्तरार्थनिष्ठ is according to Prabhā which renders निष्ठ as विषयक on the authority of the Mimāṃsaka Prabhākara who uses such a sentence as सर्वे वाक्यं कार्यनिष्ठम् where निष्ठ obviously means विषयक. The same is the explanation given by the old commentators माणिक्यचन्द्र² and जयन्त. Vide Mukula also Mammata's predecessor.

Udyota separates the word into two—सान्तरा and अर्थनिष्ठः and interprets it as 'directly belonging to the sense but indirectly belonging to the word.' But this is a forced interpretation and should therefore be rejected.

Vritti:—In the examples कर्मणि कुशलः and गंगायां घोषः, the primary senses of the words कुशल and गंगा are inapplicable, since the act of 'gathering kusha grass' has nothing to do with 'business' (say³ the business of painting, for instance), and since the stream of the Ganges cannot be the abode of a herd-station. There is connection also between the primary and the secondary senses in these examples. The connection between 'gathering kusha grass' and 'expertness' is (resemblance in the point of) discrimination, since discrimination—the power of separating the good from the bad is required both for gathering kusha grass and for being expert in business. Similarly, the connection between the stream and the bank of the Ganges is proximity. There is usage also in the first example, the word कुशल being by general practice used in the sense of 'expert.' Similarly, there is motive in the second example. The motive for using such an indirect mode

1 सान्तरः शक्यव्यवहितो योऽर्थो लक्ष्यार्थस्तन्निष्ठः । तद्विषय इत्यर्थः ।
'सर्वे वाक्यं कार्यनिष्ठम्' इतिगुरुकिवत् Pr.

2 एवं निरन्तरार्थनिष्ठः शब्दव्यापारोऽभिधा, सान्तरार्थनिष्ठस्तु लक्षणा ।
San. एवमयं मुख्यलाक्षणिकात्मविषयोपवर्णनद्वारेण शब्दस्याभिधाव्यापारो द्विविधः
प्रतिपादितो निरन्तरार्थविषयः सान्तरार्थनिष्ठश्च । Mukula

3 कर्मणीति । विप्रकर्मणीत्यर्थः । Pr.

of expression गजायां घोषः by abandoning the expression गजातटे घोषः : which directly expresses the fact that there is a herd-station on the bank of the Ganges, consists in this that the (former mode of) expression suggests to the hearer the idea that the properties of coolness, purity &c. not only exist on the bank but exist on it in that full state in which they exist in their natural home—the stream or the Ganges,—an idea which could not have been obtained from the use of the (latter mode of) expression i. e. ‘There is a herd-station on the bank of the Ganges.’ Thus the three conditions of Indication being satisfied in the two examples above given, the secondary senses of ‘expert’ and the ‘bank’ are respectively conveyed by the primary senses of ‘gatherer of kusha grass’ and the ‘stream.’ This (conveying) is what is called Indication which is said to be an extrinsic function of a word, inasmuch as it has reference to a sense (of course secondary) which is connected with the word through the medium of the primary sense.

There are others² however who do not regard कर्मणि कुशलः as an example of निरुद्धलक्षणा. According to the view which these men prefer, the primary meaning of the word कुशल is simply that of ‘expert,’ notwithstanding that the sense of ‘gatherer of kusha grass’ might be gathered from the etymology. The etymological meaning is not necessarily the primary meaning; for, if that were so there would be Indication in the example गौः क्षेते also; for, the etymological meaning of the word गौ is ‘something moving’ which cannot be logically connected with the sense of क्षेते. The word कुशल is therefore an example of Customary Denotation (रुढिशक्ति).

Other examples of निरुद्धलक्षणा are the words तैलङ्ग and त्वक्—the former of which indicates by custom ‘an inhabitant of the country called Tailanga,’ although its primary meaning is the country Tailanga simply, and the latter indicates by custom ‘the sense of touch,’ although its primary meaning is the ‘skin’.

1 तादृशम् । साक्षाद्गगतम् । Pr. तथेति । अपरिमितत्वेन San.

2 तदन्ये न मन्यन्ते । कुशाग्रहिरूपार्थस्य व्युत्पत्तिलभ्यत्वेऽपि दक्षरूपस्यैव मुख्यार्थत्वात् । अन्यद्वि शब्दानां व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमन्यच्च प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । व्युत्पत्तिलभ्यस्य मुख्यार्थत्वे ‘गोः शेते’ इत्यत्रापि लक्षणा स्यात् । ‘गमेर्गोश्’ इति गमिषातोर्गोशप्रत्ययेन व्युत्पादितस्य गोशब्दस्य शयनकालेऽपि प्रयोगात् । S. D.

Mammata now proceeds to state the divisions of Indication :—

According to Pradīpa these divisions are as follows :—लक्षण is first two-fold : शुद्धा and गौणी. शुद्धा again is two-fold: उपादान and लक्षण. Each of these again is two-fold: सारोपा and साध्यवसाना. Thus शुद्धा admits of four divisions. गौणी also has one division i. e. लक्षण, which is subdivided into सारोपा and साध्यवसाना. Indication is thus six-fold.

The next Kārikā states the definitions of उपादान and लक्षण—the two divisions of शुद्धा.

Kārikā V.

The conveying of another (sense) in order to get itself established, and the giving up of itself for the sake of another, are (respectively) Inclusion¹ and Indication. Thus Pure Indication only is declared to be two-fold.

उपादानलक्षणा occurs when a word conveys another sense in order to get its own (i. e. the primary) sense logically connected with the sense of the other word of the sentence of which it forms part. This definition however is too narrow, inasmuch as it does not include such examples of उपादानलक्षणा as काकेभ्यो हृदि रक्षयताम् where the word काक has its primary sense (i. e. crows) logically connected with the sense of रक्षयताम्. The definition should, therefore, be changed thus :—उपादानलक्षणा occurs when a word conveys another sense without giving up its own sense. The example काकेभ्यो हृदि रक्षयताम् is now included in the definition, because the word काक conveys the sense of 'other batter-injuring creatures' without giving up its own sense of 'crows'.

Similarly, लक्षणलक्षणा occurs when a word gives up its own sense in order that another sense may get itself logically connected with

1 Vide Mukula's Kārikā which Mammata appears to follow here '—स्वसिद्धमर्थतयाऽक्षेपो यत्र वस्तुवन्तरस्य तत् । उपादानं लक्षणं तु तद्विपर्ययोक्तव्यम् ॥

the sense of the other word of the sentence of which it forms part. In other words, it occurs when a word conveys another sense by giving up its own sense. Thus वृद्धा लक्षणा is declared to be two-fold. The word एव (in वृद्धेव) shows that these two divisions are possible in वृद्धा only and not in गौणी. उपादानलक्षणा and लक्षणलक्षणा are by other philosophers called अजहल्लक्षणा¹ and जहल्लक्षणा or अजहत्त्वार्था² and जहत्त्वार्था respectively.

If it be urged : It is improper to say that these divisions are possible in वृद्धा only ; for, they are possible in गौणी also. The sentence गौर्वाहीकः (Vāhika is a bull) for instance, is clearly an example of गौणी लक्षणलक्षणा. The word गौः gives up its own sense i. e. that of a bull and conveys the sense of a stupid fellow. Similarly, the sentences गाव एते समानीयन्ताम् (let these bulls and (stupid) Vāhikas be brought) is an example of उपादानलक्षणा. The word गावः conveys the sense of (stupid) Vāhikas without giving up its own sense of bulls.

We reply:—लक्षणलक्षणा is possible in गौणी, we admit. But we do not admit that उपादानलक्षणा also is possible in गौणी. For, we ask you, what is the connection upon which Indication³ is based in the example गाव एते समानीयन्ताम् ? Is it resemblance or other than resemblance ? It cannot be resemblance; for, resemblance presupposes difference and cannot, therefore, exist between bulls—the primary sense and bulls—a part of the secondary sense (they being identical with each other). Thus, 'bulls'—the primary sense, cannot be (a part of) the secondary sense. But if this does not take place, उपादानलक्षणा is impossible in गौणी. The connection again cannot be other than resemblance. For, in that case, गौणीलक्षणा itself would be impossible, the basis of resemblance being quite essential to it. Thus, according to Pradīpa's view (which is that of Mammata also) उपादानलक्षणा is not possible in गौणी. According to the Moderns, however, उपादानलक्षणा is quite possible in गौणी. In the example गाव एते समानीयन्ताम्, there can be resemblance, they say, between 50 bulls—a part of the secondary sense and bulls other than those 50—the primary sense

1 यत्र वाच्यार्थस्याप्यन्वयः तत्र अजहल्लक्षणा । यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्वयवामासः तत्र जहल्लक्षणा । T. D. N. B. & M,

2 न जहति पदानि स्वार्थं यस्यां सा साजहत्त्वार्था । S. P. and V. S.

3 अशक्ये शब्दप्रयोगः उपचारः । Pr. .

Besides, resemblance does not necessarily presuppose difference. It may be based upon identity as in the line रामरावणयोर्बुद्धे रामरावणयोरिव which is an example of the figure अनन्वयः.

Some men such as the author of the Tarkadipikā, for instance, admit a third division of (गुह्य) लक्षणा called जहदजहलक्षणा and instance it in such a sentence as पंकजं कुकुब्जं (intended to mean a mud-born night-lotus'). In this sentence, पंकजं which is a बौद्धशब्द word means² a mud-born day-lotus (etymologically 'mud-born' and customarily 'day-lotus'). A part of this primary sense i. e. 'day-lotus' must be given up, because it cannot be logically connected with a night-lotus (since the property day-lotusness (पद्मत्व) does not exist on a night-lotus). The other part i. e. 'mud-born' is retained because it can be logically connected with a night-lotus. Thus this is an example of जहदजहलक्षणा. Really speaking, however, this is but लक्षणलक्षणा; for here the primary sense is required to be given up. Whether the primary sense to be given up wholly or in part is a matter of little significance.

उपादानलक्षणा based upon a motive may be instanced in कुन्ताः प्राविशन्ति (The lances enter) and यष्टयः प्राविशन्ति (The staffs enter) &c. Here the primary senses of the words कुन्ता and यष्टि i. e. lances &c. cannot get themselves logically connected with the act of entering (they being inanimate things and the act of entering being the property of animate beings), and so, with a view to the establishment of the logical connection between themselves and the act entering, these senses convey (the senses of) men connected with themselves i. e. of lancers and ascetics. Hence this is उपादानलक्षणा, because³ in this (the primary sense also) is taken in or included. This लक्षणा is गुह्य because the connection between the primary and secondary senses here is conjunction which is other than resemblance. It is again based upon a motive. The motive for speaking of lances and staffs instead of lan-

1 Vide मुकावली-शब्दप्रमाण in reference to this example.

2 पंकजपद्मप्रवक्ष्यशक्त्या पंकजनिकर्तृरूपमर्थं बोधयति । समुदायशक्त्या च पद्मत्वेन रूपेण पदं बोधयति । M.

3 उपादानं स्वार्थापरित्यागः । Cha. and Kam. स्यादात्मनोऽप्युपादानादेर्बोधजनलक्षणा । अत्र च मुख्यार्थस्यात्मनोऽप्युपादानम् । लक्षणलक्षणायां तु परस्परौपलक्ष्येणानित्यनयोर्भेदः । S. D.

cers and ascetics is to direct attention to the extreme denseness of the phalanx of lancers and ascetics. The sentences काको-यो सधि रक्ष-
ताम् & छविषो वाप्ति have been already shown to be examples of उपादान-
लक्षणा.

Other rhetoricians such as Mukula¹ &c., following the Mimán-
saka view that all words are connotative, cite गौरनुबन्धः as an ex-
ample of उपादानलक्षणा. What they say is this :—The conventional
sense of the word गो is the universal गोत्व. Now the universal गोत्व
cannot enter into a logical connection with the act of killing although
such a connection is ordained by the scriptural text (गौरनुबन्धः) indicates
the individual गो. By means of this Indication the logical connec-
tion between the universal गोत्व and the act of killing becomes possi-
ble indirectly i. e. through the individual गो. The connection be-
tween the primary and secondary senses गोत्व and गो is here the rela-
tion of the determinant and the determined. Along with गोत्व the
individual गो is not denoted by the word गो, because there is a rule of
Bhartrihari that (the function of) Denotation does not extend to the
expressing of the subject i. e. an individual its capacity being exhaust-
ed in expressing the attribute i. e. a universal.

These rhetoricians are wrong, however. गौरनुबन्धः cannot be
cited as an example of लक्षणा, in the first place, much less can it be
cited as an example of उपादानलक्षणा. There is no लक्षणा here because
although the two conditions of लक्षणा i. e. मुख्यार्थबाध and तद्योग are
here satisfied, still the third condition i. e. रुढि or प्रयोजन is not satis-
fied. There is no motive which may lead a man to use the word गो
here in the secondary sense of the individual गो. Nor is there usage
also in the case of this word. The question of usage depends upon
the general practice of mankind and not upon the views held by phi-
losophers as to whether a word expresses a universal or an individu-
al. The general practice of mankind obtains when a word which is
used in the primary meaning singly is frequently found to be used in
the secondary meaning. Such a general practice is found in the case
of such a word as कलिंग. Although the primary meaning of this
word is the country 'Kalinga' singly, still the word is generally found

2 तथा 'गौरनुबन्धः' इति । अत्र हि गोत्वस्य यागं प्रति साधनत्वं शाब्दं
व्यक्त्याक्षेपमन्तरेण गोपयते इति तत्तिद्वयार्थतया व्यकेराक्षेपः । Mukula.

to be used in the secondary sense of an 'inhabitant of कलिङ्ग'. Such a general practice¹ is not, however, found in the case of the word गो; for, it is invariably found to be used in the sense of the 'individual गो possessed of गोत्व'. It is never found to be used in the sense of गोत्व singly. Therefore the word गो cannot be said to have usage in reference to the sense of the individual गो.

If it be said: if the individual (गो for instance) is not apprehended by means of Indication, how is it apprehended in the opinion of the Mimāṃsaks? We reply: *The individual is apprehended (according to Kumārila) by means of inference in virtue of the mark of the universal (गो for instance), being invariably associated with the individual (गो for instance), just as in the example क्रियताम् the agent is inferred (from the act of doing), and in the example कुरु the object is inferred, and in the example प्रविश the world 'house' is inferred and in the example पिण्डीम् the word 'eat' is inferred.*

The first two illustrations are according to Prabhākara who says that one sense (the agent for instance) is inferred from another sense (the action for instance). The latter two examples are according to Kumārila who says that a word ('house' for instance) is inferred from a word ('enter' for instance). The last two examples² although they may be viewed as illustrating inference of one thing from another thing in general are not, however, very appropriate here because the subject to be illustrated is here the inference of sense from sense and not of word from word, and hence have been omitted by Pradīpa.

Thus inasmuch as the individual can be obtained by means of inference expressed in the form जातिः साध्या धर्मत्वात्, it cannot be said that there is लक्षणा in the example गौरनुबन्धः. But even granting that गौरनुबन्धः is an example of लक्षणा, still it cannot be an example of उपादानलक्षणा. For, the primary sense of the word गो i. e. गोत्व cannot get itself logically connected with the sense of अनुबन्धन even

1 गवादिपदानामुत्तर्गतो व्यक्तिसाहित्येनैव जातिबोधकत्वेन तत्र लोकप्रसिद्धे-
रूपेक्षणात् । Pr.

2 'प्रविश', 'पिण्डीम्' इति शब्दाभ्याहारस्य विषयः इति वैषम्यान्नोपन्य-
स्यम् । अत्रासौ त्वाक्षेपसामान्यमात्रेणोक्तमिति ज्ञेयम् । Pr.

though it indicates the sense of the individual *ये* (since the universal *गोत्व* is eternal and cannot, therefore, be destroyed.)

The sentence *पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते* is also cited by Mukula¹ as an example of *उपादानलक्षणा*. His view may be stated as follows :— In the sentence *पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते* the fact that Dewadatta does not eat by day cannot be logically connected with the fact that he is fat. The fatness of Dewadatta can be logically connected only with the fact that he eats. But this fact of his eating is not apprehended from the given sentence as it is not apprehended from such a sentence as *अभोजी पीनः*. Hence the clause *दिवा न भुङ्क्ते* indicates the fact that he eats by night, in order to get its own sense logically connected with the sense of *पीनः*. Thus inasmuch as the primary sense also is taken in, this is *उपादानलक्षणा*.

This view is not right, however. The fact of Dewadatta's eating by night is not indicated by the clause *दिवा न भुङ्क्ते*. The apprehension of this fact is the province of (i. e. is obtained by means of) *Implication Verbal or Simple*. When certain words are required to be understood in order to render intelligible certain other words that are heard, that is Verbal Implication. In the example *पीनो देवदत्तो &c.* the words 'The fat Dewadatta does not eat by day— which are heard, are unintelligible unless the words 'Therefore he must eat by night' are understood. Thus this is an example of *श्रुतार्थापत्ति* (according² to Kumârila). Implication Simple is when in order to account for one fact which is ascertained by means of some kind of evidence, another fact is required to be understood. The fact of Dewadatta's eating by night must be understood in order to account for the fact of his being fat and yet not eating by day—a fact which is ascertained by means of Perception or Testimony. Thus this is an example of *अव्योपत्ति* (according to Prabhākara).

लक्षणलक्षणा may be instanced in *गंगायां घोषः*. Here the word *गंगा* gives up its own sense of *प्रवाह* in order to render the fact of ' the bank

1 यथा च 'पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते' इति । अत्र हि पीनत्वं दिनाधिक-
रणभोजनाभावविशिष्टतयाऽवगम्यमानमेव कार्यत्वात् स्वसिद्धयथेत्वेन कारणभूतं रात्रि-
भोजनाभाक्षेपादभ्यन्तरकिरोति । (इति) उपादानत्वमुपपद्यते । Mukula.

2 शब्देति । भट्टादिमतं इत्यर्थः । अर्थमात्राध्याहार इति गुरुनये त्वर्थ-
कल्पनमात्रमित्यर्थः । Pr.

being an abode of a herd-station' possible i. e. in order to render the logical connection of the bank with the herd-station possible.

The word गङ्गा in fact gives up the sense of the 'stream' and conveys the sense of the 'bank'. Hence this is लक्षणलक्षणा because there is pure indication of the sense of the bank and nothing more.

This two-fold Indication is Pure because there is no admixture of Metaphor in it and is thus distinguished from the Qualitative where there is an admixture of Metaphor. Metaphor consists in the use of a word in a secondary sense due to resemblance between it and the primary sense. But² if we accept this meaning of उपचार, कुन्ताः प्रविशन्ति would become an example of गोणी. For, the sense of 'lancers' may be apprehended from the word कुन्ताः on account of resemblance (in point of cruelty) between that sense and the primary sense of 'lances'. Thus, the sense 'lancers' may be apprehended as logically connected with 'the act of entering'—the sense of प्रविशन्ति.

उपचार therefore should be taken to mean 'concealment of the apprehension of the difference of two things owing to extreme resemblance between them'. In गोवाहीकः, for instance, although गो and वाहीक are distinct things, still the apprehension of this distinctness is hidden on account of their being fancied as identical with each other through a close resemblance between them. This Metaphor is absent in the two varieties of शुद्धा. In कुन्ताः प्रविशन्ति, for instance, although there may be resemblance between lances and lancers, still we do not apprehend them as resembling each other so greatly as to make us lose sight of the difference between them (what we apprehend from the word कुन्त being lancers as distinct from lances).

Some however say:—What distinguishes गोणी from शुद्धा is not that, in the former there is admixture of Metaphor, whilst in the latter there is not, but that, in the former there is no apprehension

1 लक्षणमुपलक्षणम् । इतरपरिचायकत्वमात्रम् । Cha. and Kam. उपलक्षणहेतुत्वादेवा लक्षणलक्षणा । S. D.

1. ननु 'कुन्ताः प्रविशन्ति' इत्यादौ सादृश्यसम्बन्धेन कुंतधरोपस्थित्या कुंत-
सादृश्यमिति चेन्न गोणीत्वं स्यादत आह—सादृश्यातिशयेति ।

of difference between the primary and secondary senses, whilst in the latter there is. In गोर्वाहीकः, गौरयस्, for instance, गो (the primary sense) and वाहीक (the secondary sense) are apprehended as identical with each other, although they are really different from each other. But in गंगायां घोषः, प्रवाह and तद are apprehended as but different from each other.

Others, on the other hand, say that the apprehension of difference above referred to is what distinguishes लक्षणलक्षणा (गंगायां घोषः) from उपादानलक्षणा (यटीः प्रवेद्य), it being present in the former and absent in the latter,

Both these views are however wrong. *In these two divisions of लक्षणा i. e. in उपादानलक्षणा & लक्षणलक्षणा, there is no तादृश्य consisting in (the apprehension of) difference between the sense that indicates (i. e. primary sense) and the sense that is indicated (i. e. the secondary sense)* For, in the example गंगायां घोषः, for instance, when the word गंगा indicates the sense of the bank, there is the apprehension of the motive intended to be conveyed by the speaker, i. e. that the bank is possessed of the properties sanctity, coolness &c. which really pertain to the Ganges. Now this apprehension can be produced only when the bank is apprehended from the word गंगा as possessed of the nature of the Ganges (गंगात्वं) itself and not as possessed of the nature of the bank (तीरत्वं) simply. In other words, the transference of the properties of the Ganges to the bank is possible only when there is a transference of the nature of the Ganges to the bank. If, however, the motive be regarded as apprehended from गंगायां घोषः because the bank is apprehended as possessed of the nature of the bank simply, then that motive would become apprehended from the sentence तीरे घोषः also. For, in that sentence also, the bank is apprehended as possessed of the nature of the bank simply. If again the motive be regarded as apprehended from गंगायां घोषः because the bank is apprehended as simply connected with the Ganges, then there is no reason why that motive should not be apprehended from the sentence गंगातटे घोषः where also simple connection is apprehended between the bank and the Ganges. There would, in this manner, be no difference between the use of the direct mode of expression गंगातटे घोषः and the use of the indirect one गंगायां घोषः.

If it be said : How can the word गंगा convey तीर as possessed of गंगात्वं, this being incompatible with the actual fact that तीर is pos

seated of तीरत्व ? We reply that when a word conveys a secondary sense, identity between it and the primary sense is brought out by Suggestion. To this effect runs the Vritti : तदादीनां &c. In this Vritti, the locative absolute प्रतिपादने shows that the properties sanctity &c. are apprehended as existing on the bank immediately after the bank is conveyed by the word गंगा. As for the incompatibility with the actual fact which is referred to above, it does not come in the way of Suggestion ; so say men versed in Rhetoric. Mammata himself has said afterwards :—In the two varieties of गौणी लक्षणा i. e. सारोपा and साध्यवसाना, the motive is the apprehension of simple identity in the one and the apprehension of complete identity in the other. What more need be said ! The properties coolness &c. are apprehended as existing on the bank for this very reason that they are not actually found to exist on the bank. To the same effect is the Sūtra :—The secondary sense has no (direct) connection with the fruit (coolness, sanctity &c.)

It is thus proved that in लक्षणलक्षणा there is no apprehension of difference but of identity between the primary and secondary senses. Similarly in उपादानलक्षणा also there is no apprehension of difference but of identity between the primary and secondary senses. In कुन्ताः प्रविशन्ति, for instance, 'extreme density'—which is a property of कुंत can be transferred to कुन्तधर only when the nature of कुन्त is transferred to कुन्तधर.

Thus Mukula's view is refuted. From the refutation of his view the refutation of the second view also follows ; since as far as तादस्थ is concerned, it is not found in गंगायां घोषः also as it is not found in कुन्ताः प्रविशन्ति, यहीः प्रवक्ष्य &c.

If it be said that, if the apprehension of identity is present in both the kinds of लक्षणा i. e. शुद्धा and गौणी, how it is that Mammata speaks of that apprehension as being the motive in गौणी only, whilst he speaks of a different motive being present in शुद्धा ; we reply that Mammata speaks in that manner because in गौणी the apprehension of identity is the only motive, whilst in शुद्धा there is another motive also in addition to, and more important than, this (i. e. द्वैत्यपावनत्वप्रतीति, and not because this motive is not at all present in शुद्धा.

Mammata now states the divisions of गौणी लक्षणा along with the definitions of them :—

Kārikā VI.

The other, however, is the superimponent when the object superimposed and the object superimposed upon are stated in their distinct natures.

‘The other’ means गौणी (according to Pradīpa), since the one which has been described above is शुद्धा. गौणी is divided into सारोपा and साध्यवसाना and not into उपादान and लक्षणा also-divisions which belong to शुद्धा only. This is shown by the word नु in the Kārikā.

विषयी—An object which is superimposed upon another, such, as गो which is superimposed upon वाहीक. विषय—An object upon which another object is superimposed, such as वाहीक upon which गो is superimposed. The superimponent Indication then occurs when the object superimposed and the object superimposed upon are expressed with their distinctive natures not hidden, i. e. expressed by (distinct) words having an agreement in case. The word¹ सारोपा cannot be taken in its ordinary meaning of ‘that which is accompanied by a superimposition’. For, in गौवाहीकः Vāhika as possessed of attributed गोत्व cannot be the indicated sense; for it is incompatible with the actual fact that गोत्व (either natural or attributed) is not possessed by वाहीक. If गोत्व be regarded as possessed by वाहीक, then लक्षणा itself would be impossible. Nor can the word सारोपा be taken in the modified meaning of ‘accompanied by a superimposition which is the fruit of लक्षणा.’ For, the fruit of लक्षणा in the sentence आयुर्धृतम् is not superimposition but अन्यदेवलक्षण्येन कार्यकारित्वादि. The word सारोपा must, therefore, be taken to mean ‘that in which the object superimposed upon and the object superimposed are expressed by distinct words.’

Kārikā VI. (Continued.)

It is Introsusceptive when the object superimposed altogether takes in what is different from it (i. e. the object superimposed upon).

1 ननु सारोपेत्यस्य आरोपयुक्त्यर्थः । न च स्वमते बाह्यके गोरारोपो लक्षणा-विषयः । बाधात् । अन्यथा लक्षणाया एवासंभवात् । नापि लक्षणाकलीभुतारोपसाहित्यमर्थः । ‘ आयुर्धृतम् ’ इत्यादिशुद्धसारोपायां तदसंभवादित्याशङ्क्याह—विषयेति

That is Introsusceptive Indication when one thing is swallowed up by another with which it is identified, in other words, when the विषय and the विषयी are not expressed by distinct words, the विषय being expressed by the same word which expresses the विषयी. साध्यवसाना literally means that in which there is introsusception i. e. the eclipsing of the विषय by the विषयी.

The author now proceeds to show that these two divisions occur in शुद्धा also, and at the same time to state the definitions of शुद्धा and गोणी.

Kârikâ VII.

The divisions are Qualitative, if they are due to resemblance. Similarly, they are Pure, if they are due to a different relation.

These divisions i. e. the superimponent and the Introsusceptive belong to गोणीलक्षणा when the relation between the primary and secondary senses is likeness (of qualities), and to शुद्धा when that relation is other than that of likeness. सारोपा and साध्यवसाना based upon resemblance are instanced in गोवोहीकः (Vâhika is a bull) and गोरयम् (Here is a bull). In these examples, the primary sense of गो i. e. a bull cannot be logically connected with वाहीक and therefore conveys the sense of a dull and stupid fellow. The relation between गो & वाहीक is similarity; therefore लक्षणा here is गोणी. In the former example both the विषय and the विषयी are expressed by the distinct words गो and वाहीक which are in the same case. Therefore लक्षणा there is सारोपा. In the latter example, both the विषय and the विषयी are expressed by one and the same word i. e. गो. Therefore लक्षणा there is साध्यवसाना. Although it may be said that गोरयम् is but an example of सारोपा because वाहीक is here expressed (although indirectly) by the pronoun अयम्, still it is given as an example of साध्यवसाना because अयम् is taken as an adjective of गो and not as expressing वाहीक. (Vide Notes to my edition of Kâvyaprakâsha Ullâsa X. page 161).

Here some say: In the example गोवोहीकः &c., the word गो does not indicate Vâhika but the properties dulness, stupidity &c. (belonging to the individual गो.) which are associated with its primary sense

i. e. गौत्वं. Then these properties *although* thus indicated become the reason why the word गौ denotes another sense i. e. Vāhika, just as गौत्वं is the reason why the word गौ denotes the individual गौ. Thus the word गौ denotes Vāhika.

This view is wrong ; for, (according to Vis'wanātha) the word गौ cannot denote the thing called Vāhika in respect of which the word has no convention. The word गौ denotes an animal possessed of a dewlap only. Here the denotative power of the word is exhausted and the power thus exhausted cannot now be resuscitated so as to enable the word to denote Vāhika ; or, according to Pradīpa, the attributes dulness, stupidity &c. inasmuch as they do not constitute the primary sense of the word गौ and do not reside in the primary sense (which according to your views is Vāhika), do not constitute the reason why the word गौ denotes Vāhika. The reason why the word गौ denotes the individual गौ is गौत्वं because गौत्वं is the primary sense of the word गौ, resides in the primary sense (which is गोच्यवृत्ति also, according to the Naiyāyika) and is not the abode of the primary sense (गोच्यवृत्ति) of the word different from itself (गौत्वं).

The word शक्यत्वं is put in, in the above definition of a प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त in order to prevent such a thing as द्रव्यत्वं from being the प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त of the word गो. द्रव्यत्वं is excluded because although it resides in गो which is a द्रव्य, still it is not the primary sense of the word गो. The word शक्यवृत्तित्व is put in to exclude आकाशवृत्ति from being the प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त of the word आकाश. आकाशवृत्ति is excluded because although it is the primary sense of the word आकाश, still it does not reside in the primary sense i. e. आकाशवृत्ति (since a thing cannot reside in itself). The word शक्यवानधिकरण is put in to exclude a part of वृद्धि from being the प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त of the word वृद्धि. The part of वृद्धि is excluded because although it is the primary sense of the word वृद्धि and although it resides in the primary sense i. e. its own part¹ still it is the abode of वृद्धि (of which it is the part) which is the primary sense of the word वृद्धि. The word स्वमित्र is put in to include प्रमेयत्वं in the definition of a प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त (i. e. to make प्रमेयत्वं the प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त of the word प्रमेय). प्रमेयत्वं is included in the defini-

1 Just as the अवयवी वृद्धि is the primary sense of the word वृद्धि, so the अवयव of that वृद्धि and the अवयव of the अवयव of that वृद्धि are also the primary senses of the word वृद्धि.

tion, because although it is the primary sense of the word *प्रमेय*, although it resides in the *प्रमेय*—also the primary sense of the word *प्रमेय*, and although it is the abode of *प्रमेयत्व* which inasmuch as it is a *प्रमेय* is also the primary sense, still it is not the abode of the primary sense which is different from itself (*प्रमेयत्व* not being different from itself i. e. *प्रमेयत्व*).

Others say:—(The word गो) indicates the properties dullness &c. not belonging to the individual गो—its own sense (as in the first view), but belonging to Vāhika—another thing, on account of their being (similar to and hence looked upon as) identical with the properties dullness &c. which co-exist with its own primary sense (i. e. गोत्व). (The word गो) does not, however, indicate another thing i. e. Vāhika which is apprehended from the word वाहीक itself.

This view also is not right. For, according to it, the agreement in case of the words गो and वाहीक, which the sentence गोवाहीकः exhibits, becomes impossible, since the two words do not signify one and the same thing,—गो signifying the properties dullness &c. and वाहीक signifying an inhabitant of the Punjab.

If it be urged that although the word indicates 'stupidity' and not 'a stupid fellow', still the sense of a stupid fellow may be obtained from the word गो by means of an inference (as in the *Mīmāṃsaka* view व्यक्ति is inferred from जाति) and thus the agreement in case of the words गो and वाहीक may become possible; we reply that लक्षणा is resorted to only for the purpose of removing impossibility of a logical connection between two things. Therefore, it must enable a word to convey such a thing as would directly be logically connected with the other thing. Thus the word गो must indicate a stupid fellow; for, this sense only would become logically connected with the sense of Vāhika.

Others again say that another thing itself (i. e. Vāhika) is indicated by the word गो in virtue of the possession by it of the properties stupidity, sluggishness &c which are common to both Vāhika and the bull. Thus the sentence गोवाहीकः means: Vāhika is a dull and stupid fellow. As it is said elsewhere (i. e. in the Vṛitti—Vārtika of Kumārila):—

When the primary senses is inapplicable on account of its being opposed to some other kind of evidence, there is an apprehension

(from the word) of another sense connected with that primary sense —which (apprehension) is called *Indication*. The function however is called *Qualitative* if the connection of the secondary sense with the primary sense is through qualities which constitute the reason why the word conveys another sense by *Indication*; or according to Udyota, if the connection is in the form of the qualities, the knowledge of which enables one to use the word गौ in the sense of Vāhika (the instrumental युजैः showing identity between गुण and यौग)

From his explanation of लक्ष्यमाणयुजैः. Pradīpa appears to hold that the properties dullness &c. which constitute the reason of the word गौ being used in the sense of a Vāhika are also indicated along with Vāhika, just as गौत्व is also denoted by the word गौ along with the individual गौ.

प्रतीति means ' apprehension (of the secondary sense ' —प्रतीयते यत्), according to Mammata's definition of लक्षणा; but, according to Pradīpa's definition of it, प्रतीति means ' the cause of the apprehension of the secondary sense '—प्रतीयते अनया).

अविनाभाव expressed by the word भविनाद्युक्त means here simply ' connection,' not ' invariable association ' as it usually does. For, if it would mean the latter, मंचाः क्रौञ्चान्ति (children in the bed are crying) would not be an example of *Indication*, since there is no invariable association either in time or place between the bed and children. If it again be said that invariable association exists between the bed and children as long as the latter are crying, we reply that if invariable association be admitted to exist here in this way, then (the apprehension of the ' children ') would be effected by means of an inference. Thus लक्षणा would be useless in this case. This we have already demonstrated whilst criticising Mukula's example of उपादानलक्षणा. If it be further said that invariable association is a condition of *Indication*, we reply that there is no evidence to prove this fact, लक्षणा being found to be present even in the absence of invariable association.

घृद्धा सारोपा and घृद्धा साध्यवसाना may be instanced in आहुर्धूमन् (Ghee is life) and आहुरेवेदन् (Here is life). In these examples, there is another connection between ghee and the prolonger of life, i. e. that of cause and effect; which is other than that of resemblance. Hence in these and similar other examples, *Superimponence* and *Introspection*.

tion are based upon the relation called the 'relation of cause and effect' or any other relation different from that of resemblance. In these varieties of Qualitative Indication, the motive in the former (गौरीहीकः for instance), is to convey the notion of identity between गौ the primary and बाहीक the secondary sense although their distinctive¹ natures are (not lost sight of), owing to their being expressed by distinct words, and in the latter (गौरवम् for instance) is to convey the notion of complete identity between गौ the primary and बाहीक the secondary sense,—complete² because गौ and बाहीक being expressed by one and the same word गौः, their distinctive natures are lost sight of.

But when these varieties belong to the Pure, the motive in the former (आयुर्वृत्तम् for instance), is to direct attention to the fact that the thing 'ghee' causes the effect 'longevity' differently from (i. e. in a manner superior to) anything else—no other article of our diet being so nutritious,—and in the latter (आयुर्वेदम् for instance), is to direct attention to the fact that the thing 'Ghee' causes the effect 'longevity' invariably—Ghee as a prolonger of life being reckoned infallible.

The fact of 'Ghee producing longevity invariably' cannot be the motive in आयुर्वृत्तम्, because in this sentence the cause घृत and the effect आयुः are expressed by distinct words and are, therefore, apprehended as different from each other. Hence a doubt is here possible as to whether these cause and effect always co-exist. In आयुर्वेदम्, however, this doubt is absent, because the cause and effect being here expressed by one and the same word आयुः, they are apprehended as identical and hence co-existing always.

Sometimes, Indication³ is based upon the relation called 'Serving the purpose of', as when a sacrificial post is called Indra, so called because it serves the purpose of (worshipping) Indra. Sometimes, it is based upon the relation called 'the master and servant,' as when a king's officer is called the king, so called because he is the servant and the king is his master. Sometimes, it is based upon the relation

1 मेवेऽपि । बाहीकादिपदप्रयोगाद्भेदे भासमानेऽपि । Pr.

2 सर्वथैव । बाहीकादिपदानुपादानेन भेदामिषितः । Pr.

3 उपचारः । लक्षणया सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रयोगः । Pr.

of 'whole and part' as in the example अग्रहस्तः where the word हस्त indicates a part (of the arm) i. e. the fore-part only (the compound being solved as अग्रं च सस् हस्तश्च). The word नाम is put in to prevent any other part of the arm from being called 'the arm'. Sometimes, it is based upon the relation called 'doing the work of' as when (a Brahmin) is called a carpenter so called because he does the work of a carpenter although he does not belong to the carpenters' caste.

The motives in these examples of Indication are the following in order :—The fact that the pillar is as adorable as Indra himself; the fact that the king's officer is to be obeyed as implicitly as the king himself; the fact that the forepart of the arm is able to do the work of the whole arm; and the fact that Brahmin is as proficient in the business of a carpenter as a carpenter (by caste) himself.

Kārikā VII. (Continued.)

Indication is thus six-fold.

Thus, these four divisions शुद्धसारोपा, शुद्धसाधवसाना, गौणसारोपा & गौणसाधवसाना, together with the first two divisions शुद्धउपादान and शुद्धलक्षण constitute the six-fold लक्षणा. Although there are two other principles of division i. e. रुद्धि and प्रयोजन, making in all 12 divisions of लक्षणा, still these divisions are not here noted because रुद्धि and प्रयोजन have been mentioned before not as principles of division but as conditions for the occurrence of लक्षणा. Hence it is that Mammata will divide लक्षणा on the basis of these two principles afterwards in the Kārikā चान्वेन रहिता &c. If लक्षणा be divided on the basis of those principles here also, there would be redundancy in dividing it on that basis again.

As for Chandidāsa who interprets the word वक्त्रिणा as 'possessed

1 क्रमेण नमस्यत्व-अनतिक्रमणीयत्व-कार्यसमर्थत्व-कर्मवैगुण्यप्रयोजनानि हेयानि । Pr.

of 16 kinds¹ on account of its being divided on the basis of the six principles of division i. e. रुढि, प्रयोजन, उपादान, लक्षण, आरोप, and आध्यवसान, he is wrong. In interpreting चङ्किका in this manner, he has over-looked the force of the words एव and तु in the Kārikās शुद्धे वा द्विधा and सारोपाऽन्या तु &c. These words clearly show that उपादान and लक्षण are possible in शुद्धा only and not in गौणी also. Thus two divisions only are due to the principles उपादान and लक्षण and not four. Thus there is no possibility of there being more than six divisions of लक्षणा, to preclude which, he has resorted to the artificial interpretation of चङ्किका. It has been shown above how the natural interpretation of चङ्किका is free from objection.

A Table giving the divisions of लक्षणा according to Pradīpa:—
Examples.

लक्षणा	शुद्धा-	उपादान-	1 सारोपा — कुन्ताः पुरुषाः प्रविशन्ति
			2 साध्यव — कुन्ताः प्रविशन्ति
	लक्षण —		3 सारोपा — आयुर्धृतम्
			4 साध्यव. — आयुरवेदम्
गौणी-	लक्षण —		5 सारोपा — गौर्वाहिकः
			6 साध्यव. — गौरयम्.

The above classification of the divisions of लक्षणा is according to Pradīpa. But this does not appear to me to be the classification intended by Mammata. Mammata's divisions of लक्षणा may be classified as follows :—

रुढि	शुद्धा-	1 उपादान	प्रयोजन	शुद्धा-	1 उपादान
		2 लक्षण			2 लक्षण
		3 सारोपा			3 सारोपा
		4 साध्यवसाना			4 साध्यव०
	गौणी-	5 उपादान		गौणी-	5 उपादान
		6 लक्षण			6 लक्षण
		7 सारोपा			7 सारोपा
		8 साध्यवसाना			8 साध्यव०

A Table giving the divisions of लक्षणा as intended by Mammata :—

लक्षणा—	{	शुद्धा—	{	-----	{	1 उपादान
						2 लक्षण
	{	उपचारमिश्रा—	{	शुद्धोपचारमिश्रा	{	3 सारोपा
						4 साध्यव.
			{	गौणोपचारमिश्रा	{	5 सारोपा
						6 साध्यव.

That these are the divisions intended by Mammata is clear from the following :—

1 Mammata in his Vritti¹ on page 45 clearly says that the two divisions उपादान and लक्षण belong to शुद्धा because there is no admixture of उपचार in them.

This statement obviously implies that in the other four divisions to be mentioned afterwards, there is an admixture of उपचार. Pradīpa identifies उपचारमिश्रा with गौणी because he takes उपचार in the sense of 'resemblance' or rather of 'the concealment of difference owing to close resemblance.' But he appears to be wrong in this. उपचार simply means 'the attribution of the nature of one thing to another'. Thus the attribution of आहुत to घृत in the example आहुतेतम् is as good an उपचार as the attribution of गोरव to वाहीक in the example गौवाहीक. That Mammata uses उपचार in this very sense is clear from his Vritti on page 53 where उपचार is said by him to be sometimes based on तादृश्य. This shows that according to Mammata उपचार is two-fold : गौण when it is based on resemblance as in गौवाहीक; शुद्ध when based on a relation other than that of resemblance as in आहुतेतम्.

Thus Pradīpa's statement that the idea of resemblance is necessarily connected with उपचार is wrong.

2. The word अन्धा in the Kārikā सारोपाऽन्धा तु &c. refers to उपचारमिश्रा—the other broad division of लक्षणा hinted in the Vritti on page 45. Pradīpa says that अन्धा refers of course to गौणी. But he ap-

1 उभयस्याप्येवं शुद्धा उपचारेणामिहितत्वात् ।

pears to be wrong in this also. For if अन्वा would refer to गौणी, it would be inconsistent with the Kārikā भेदाविनौ च सादृश्यात् &c. where सारोपा is declared to be a division not of गौणी only but of शुद्धा also. There is no inconsistency however when अन्वा is taken to refer to उपचारमिथा. For सारोपा would then become a division of शुद्धोपचारमिथा which is distinct from शुद्धा.

3. The word तु again in this Kārikā (i. e. सारोपाऽन्वा तु &c.) must be taken to imply that उपचारमिथा alone is सारोपा but शुद्धा is not. According to Pradīpa the implication of तु is that सारोपा and साध्वसना are the divisions of गौणी also, but उपादान and लक्षण are not. The implication of तु however requires one more word i. e. अपि in the Kārikā. But it is not present in it. Hence Pradīpa's view about the implication of तु is wrong.

4. Mukula¹ whom Mammata appears to follow closely in this matter also divides लक्षण in the manner indicated just now.

5. The ancient commentators² माणिक्यचन्द्र and जयंत also give these very six divisions as those intended by Mammata.

It is thus clear from the above that Mammata divides लक्षण into शुद्धा (Pure or non-appositional) and उपचारमिथा (Appositional). उपचारमिथा occurs when identity is stated to exist between the two things expressed in the sentence. In गौर्वाहीकः आडुर्धृतः for instance, identity is stated to exist between गौ and वाहीक and आडुः and धृतः, or in other words, the nouns गौ and वाहीक stand in apposition to each other, so also आडुः and धृतः. शुद्धा on the other hand occurs when no identity is stated to exist between the things expressed in the sentence. In गङ्गायां घोषः, for instance, no identity is stated to exist between गङ्गा and घोष, or in other words, the two nouns गङ्गा and घोष do not stand in apposition to each other. उपचारमिथा is further

1. शुद्धोपचारमिथाऽल्लक्षणा द्विविधा मता ॥ आरोपाध्यवसानान्यां शुद्ध-
गौणोपचारयोः । प्रत्येकं नियमान्मादुपचारभुविषः ॥ M.

2 सा च लक्षणा द्विधा । शुद्धा उपचारमिथा च । ...शुद्धा द्विधा उक्त्वा उ-
पचारमिथा सारोपायाह--सारोपाऽन्येति । San. शुद्धा लक्षणा द्विमकारमुक्त्वा
इदानीं उपचारमिथां चतुर्मेदत्वेन निरूपयितुमाह--सारोपाऽन्येति । Ua.

divided into शुद्धोपचारनिष्ठा and गौणोपचारनिष्ठा. गौणोपचारनिष्ठा is when identity is based upon resemblance and शुद्धोपचारनिष्ठा is when identity is based upon a relation other than that of resemblance. Each of these two divisions has further two sub-divisions i. e. सारोपा and साध्यवसाना. लक्षणा according to Mammata is thus six-fold.

This classification of Mammata is, however, faulty. The six divisions of लक्षणा are not mutually exclusive. Pradīpa has shown that लक्षणलक्षणा occurs in साध्यवसाना also. Thus गंगायां घोषः which is an example of लक्षणलक्षणा is an example of साध्यवसाना also, since the विषयी and the विषय-गंगा and तीर—are expressed by one and the same word गंगा. Similarly, सारोपा occurs in लक्षणलक्षणा also. In गौर्वाहीकः which is an example of सारोपा, गो gives up its own sense i. e. a bull and conveys the sense of a stupid fellow. गौर्वाहीकः is thus an example of लक्षणलक्षणा also. Thus लक्षण and सारोपा and साध्यवसाना overlap each other. Similarly, as has been shown by Udyota, उपादान and सारोपा and साध्यवसाना overlap each other. गाव एते सभानीबन्साव् is an example of both उपादान and सारोपा. Thus it is shown that the six-fold classification of Mammata (according to Pradīpa as well as according to the ancient commentators) is faulty. A better classification of the divisions of लक्षणा has been given by the author of the साहित्यदर्पण which is as follows :—

A Table of divisions according to the author of the Sāhitya-darpaṇa :—

लक्षणा	शुद्धा-	{ उपादान-	1 सारोपा — कुन्ताः पुरुषाः प्रविशन्ति
			2 साध्यव० — कुन्ताः प्रविशन्ति
		{ लक्षण—	3 सारोपा — आयुर्धृतम्
			4 साध्यव० — आयुर्वेदम्
	गौणी-	{ उपादान-	5 सारोपा — एते गावः यान्ति
			6 साध्यव० — गावः यान्ति
		{ लक्षण—	7 सारोपा — गौर्वाहीकः
			8 साध्यव० — गौरयम्

Having thus divided लक्षणा on the basis of the principles आरोप, अन्वयवसान &c., Mammata now divides it on the basis of the Motive, the suggestion of which is the fruit of लक्षणा

Kârikâ VIII.

Indication when based upon a Usage is without the suggested sense, but when based upon a Motive is with the suggested sense.

Both these¹ divisions are here said to be due to Suggestion because Suggestion is present in the one and absent from the other.

In an Indication based upon a Motive, the Suggested sense is invariably present because the motive to an Indication is conveyed through the function of Suggestion only, and is hence called the suggested sense. The word एव shows that the motive is conveyed through Suggestion and through no other function as will be proved afterwards.

In the opinion of some, the Vritti प्रवृत्तिर्न हि &c. aims at the refutation of those men who say that both the secondary sense and the motive being apprehended by means of लक्षणा, the admission of a distinct function called Suggestion for the purpose of producing the apprehension of the motive is useless. But this opinion is wrong. The establishment of Suggestion as a distinct function (and the refutation of the arguments advanced against its admission) is not here the topic under discussion. That topic will be handled later on, being introduced by the Sûtra व्यञ्जनाभापरा क्रिया itself.

Kârikâ VIII. (Continued.)

It also is Abstruse and Obvious.

'It' means 'the suggested sense'. Just as the other principles of division आरोप, अव्यवसान &c. are of various kinds, so this principle also i. e. the suggested sense (or the motive) is of various kinds. This is the force of the particle च. The particle वा means 'and.' An Abstruse व्यङ्ग्य is one which can be understood only by a man of a cultivated poetical sensibility; and an Obvious व्यङ्ग्य is one which can be understood not only by a man of a refined poetical taste but also by a man who is not such.

1 व्यञ्जनकृतमिति । व्यङ्ग्यराहित्येऽपि प्रतियोगिनिरूप्यतया व्यञ्जनप्रयुक्तं बोध्यम् । Pr.

An Abstruse व्यंग्य is instanced in मुखं विकसित &c.

Here विकसित (blooming) which is the property of a flower, cannot be connected with a smile. The word, therefore, indicates 'dilating' and suggests that the face is possessed of an extraordinary beauty—a fact which is very abstruse. Similarly, the words वक्षित, ससुच्छलित, भवास्तसंस्थ, मुकुलित, उद्धुर and मोक्षते, inasmuch as their primary senses are inapplicable here, indicate आद्यत्तत्त्व (being at her command), उल्लसितत्त्व (abundant display), अनेक-विषयसंचारित्व (instability), उद्भिन्नत्त्व (jutting out), योग्यत्त्व (fitness), and अनियन्त्रितत्त्व (taking full possession of) respectively. The facts suggested by the above words are 'the woman's love for a proper man, the all—ravishing charms of her body, great ardour of her love, fitness for being embraced, charmingness, and desirableness', respectively.

An Abstruse व्यंग्य may be instanced in चक्री &c. also.

Here the verbs मलिनयति, व्रसति, स्थगयति and तिरयति suggest 'throwing into the shade completely, great resemblance to the moon, extreme glossiness and blackness, and comparative harshness of the sound of the cuckoo',—facts which are abstruse.

An Obvious व्यंग्य is instanced in श्रीपरिचयात् &c.

Here (the word) उपदिशति¹ (is an example of an Obvious व्यंग्य). The primary meaning of the word is 'employment of words for the communication of knowledge to others.' This primary meaning cannot be logically connected with the sense of यौवनमद् (the latter being an inanimate thing). The wording, therefore, indicates simple 'displaying' and suggests the fact that young women are naturally trained in gestures. This fact is apprehended from the word even by an ordinary reader as clearly as if it had been expressly stated instead of being suggested by the word उपदिशति.

Kârikâ VIII. (Continued.)

It is therefore three-fold.

1 Or we may take उपदिशतीति अनायासेन &c. as one sentence.

Indication may, therefore, be divided into the following three kinds :—(a) *That which is without a suggested sense* ; (b) *That which is with an abstruse suggested sense* and (c) *that which is with an obvious suggested sense.*

The Tables which have been given already illustrate the divisions of a प्रबोधनवती लक्षणा only. The following Table illustrates the divisions of a निरुद्धलक्षणा according to S. D. :—

Examples.

लक्षणा- (निरुद्ध)	युद्धा-	उपादान-	1 सारोपा —अश्वः श्वेतो धावति
			2 साध्यव० —श्वेतो धावति
	लक्षण-		3 सारोपा —कलिंगः पुरुषो युध्यति
			4 साध्यव० —कलिंगः साहसिकः
गौणी-	उपादान-		5 सारोपा —एतानि तैलानि ¹ हेमन्ते सुखानि
			6 साध्यव० —तैलानि हेमन्ते सुखानि
	लक्षण-		7 सारोपा —राजा गौडेन्द्रं कण्टकं ² शोधयति
			8 साध्यव० —राजा कण्टकं शोधयति

Thus, 8 divisions of अव्यङ्ग्य लक्षणा together with 8 divisions of गूढाव्यङ्ग्यलक्षणा and 8 of भगूढाव्यङ्ग्य make up in all 24 divisions. According to Mammata they are only 18.

Having treated of Indication in this manner, Mammata now defines an Indicative word by means of it.

Kârikâ IX.

The abode of that is an Indicative (word).

1 तैल which originally means 'oil expressed from the seeds of the Sesameum' is now customarily applied to other oils also such as that expressed from mustard seed &c.

2 कण्टक which primarily means 'a thorn' is customarily used in the sense of a 'paltry foe' also.

(The word) शब्द is to be supplied from the Kārikā स्वाहाचको &c. तद् means 'the abode of that i. e. Indication'. It does not mean 'sprung from that'; for an Indicative word is not sprung from Indication.

Now a Suggestive word is to be defined. For that, the nature of Suggestion must be explained. This Suggestion is two fold : Suggestion abiding in a word, and Suggestion abiding in a sense. The treatment of Suggestion abiding in a sense is out of place here since we are here treating of the various kinds of words. The nature of this Suggestion will be explained in the third Ullāsa.

Suggestion abiding in a word is two-fold: 1 Suggestion based upon Denotation and 2 Suggestion based upon Indication. Of these the former ought to be treated before the latter; because Denotation is the primary function of a word and a function to which the function of Indication owes its existence. Still the latter is treated here first, because it is well known as bringing about the motive to an Indication and because we are at present engaged in treating of the subject of Indication itself.

Kārikā IX. (Continued.)

The function therein consists of Suggestion.

The operation, therein i. e. in an Indicative word, which is instrumental in bringing out the Suggested sense, is Suggestion itself.

Some² take तच्च as विषयसप्तमी meaning 'in the matter of (the conveying of) the motive such as sanctity, coolness &c.' But this meaning is wrong, since the word cannot refer to प्रयोजन which is not mentioned before.

If it be said: The suggested sense (i. e. the motive) can be apprehended by means of Indication itself. Whence is it then that Suggestion is said to be the operation in question?

(The author) replies :—

-
- 1 सुप्रसिद्धत्वादिनि लक्षणाप्रयोजननिर्वाहकतया सुबोधत्वादित्यर्थः । Pr.
 - 2 तत्रेति । तत्र प्रयोजने गूढागूढे व्यंजनात्मा व्यापारः । तत्रेति विषय-सप्तमी । तेन शब्दस्य व्यंग्यविषये व्यंजनव्यापार इत्युक्तं स्यात् । San.

Kârikâs IX and X.

The fruit, for conveying the knowledge of which Indication is resorted to, is known from the word itself ; and in regard to this, the word has no other function than Suggestion.

When with a view to convey the knowledge of a certain motive—the knowledge, for instance, that the properties sanctity &c. exist on the bank, one uses a word in a secondary sense, that motive which is the fruit or result of Indication is apprehended from that word (i. e. the evidence of Testimony) itself, and from no other kind of evidence. The knowledge of such a प्रयोजन (or फल) शैत्यपावनत्वादि, for instance, cannot be had by means of perception, because this knowledge is independent of sense-contact which is with शैत्य° as existing not on the bank but on the stream of the Ganges. Nor can this knowledge be had by means of inference ; this knowledge is independent of the recollection of व्याप्ति expressed in the form : यत्र यन्नेव शब्दप्रयोगस्तत्र तत्र तद्वर्त्ययोगः। (Vide अभिनवगुप्त on ध्वन्यालोक p. 17)

It is thus clear that the motive (शैत्य°) can be apprehended from the indicative word (गंगा) itself. *Now the operation in virtue of which this word conveys the knowledge of the motive can be no other than Suggestion. For, (that operation).*

Kârikâ X. (Continued).

Cannot be Denotation because of the absence of a convention.

The word गंगा has no convention in respect of the properties Sanctity &c. which are apprehended as existing on the bank from the use of the expression गंगायां घोषः. Hence the apprehension of these properties is not due to Denotation.

(That operation again)

Kârikâ X (Continued).

Cannot be Indication because of the absence (i. e. non-fulfilment) of the condition (of Indication).

The conditions (of Indication) are the three things *सुखार्थबोधः*, *लक्षण*, and *रूपि* or *प्रयोजन*. The singular number of *हेतुः* shows that these three things produce the effect i. e. *लक्षणा*, when taken collectively.

The three conditions are here said to be not fulfilled *because*

Kârikâ XI.

The secondary sense is not the primary sense ; nor is that primary sense inapplicable here ; nor is the secondary sense connected with the fruit ; nor is there a motive to this ; nor is the word powerless.

Just as the word गंगा indicates the bank because (the primary) sense i. e.) stream is inapplicable, so if (the sense of) the bank also be inapplicable, the word गंगा would indicate the motive (i. e. the properties sanctity &c.). But the bank is not the primary sense of the word गंगा. If it be said that the condition of लक्षणा is not 'inapplicability of the primary sense' but 'inapplicability of any sense that is conveyed by the word',—be it primary or secondary we reply that even the secondary sense i. e. the bank is not inapplicable here ; for, the bank can be the abode of a herd-station and can, therefore, be logically connected with बोध. If it be further said : The condition of लक्षणा is not 'impossibility of the logical connection of the primary or secondary sense', but 'incompatibility of the primary or secondary sense with the intended sense of the sentence', as in the example काकेभ्यो हवि रक्ष्यताम्. Now this condition is satisfied in the present case ; for, the sense of the bank is incompatible with the intended sense of the sentence which is that the properties sanctity &c. should be apprehended from it. We reply : Although the first condition may be satisfied in this way, still the second is not. For, the bank which is the secondary sense of the word गंगा has no direct connection with the properties sanctity &c. which (according to you) are to be indicated by the word गंगा. (Direct connection is possible only between

the stream and those properties). If it be further said that an indirect connection still exists between the bank and the properties, and that thus the second condition is satisfied in the present case, we reply that although the second condition may be satisfied, still the third is not. For, *there is no motive to this indication of a motive*. Thus, in consequence of the third condition not being satisfied, the word गङ्गा cannot indicate the motive (क्षैत्यपावनत्वादि). Not only is it that the conditions of लक्षणा are not satisfied, but it is not even necessary that they should be satisfied. For, the conditions of लक्षणा must be fulfilled only when the word has no power to convey a sense independently of those conditions. *But it is not that the word गङ्गा has no power to convey the motive (i. e. क्षैत्यपावनत्वादि) if these conditions are not satisfied; as (it has no power to convey the sense of) the bank if these conditions are not satisfied.* With सवर्त्यः as the reading, the Vritti means:—But it is not that the word गङ्गा has power to convey the motive, only when the conditions of लक्षणा are satisfied, as it has power to convey the bank, only when these conditions are satisfied. The reading सवर्त्यः does not appear to be right as it does not represent the idea expressed by स्खलद्गतिः—a word which it professes to explain.

It is thus proved that the motive cannot be indicated on account of the absence of a motive to this indication. If, however, one would venture to assert that there is another motive to the indication of this motive, (the author) replies :—

Kârikâ XII.

Even in this way there would be a regress to infinity which would strike at the very root of the matter.

Even in this way, i. e. even if the first motive be supposed to be indicated on account of the supposed presence of a second motive, still inasmuch as this second motive also may be supposed to be indicated on account of the supposed presence of a third motive and that too, on account of the supposed presence of a fourth and so forth, there would be a regress to infinity which would bar the apprehension of the very first motive which is the motive under consideration. For, if this process of supposing the indication of one motive as due to the presence of another motive, be continued for a sufficiently long time, the

mind would become tired of harping upon the same subject i. e. the motive, and would pass on to another. Thus no motive being present in the mind, the last Indication of a motive would cease; the ceasing of the last Indication would lead to the ceasing of each preceding Indication till the very first Indication would cease. Thus the very first motive (i. e. *सैवसाधनत्वादि*) which is the basis of the Indication of the bank would cease to be apprehended.

If it be said : The word *संग* indicates not the bank simply but the bank as possessed of the properties sanctity &c., the motive to the indication being the apprehension of something additional to that which is apprehended from the direct mode of expression *संगतदे चोषः*. Thus inasmuch as Indication leads to the apprehension of such a qualified thing as the bank possessed of sanctity &c. there is no necessity of admitting Suggestion as a distinct function.

To this (our author) replies :—

Kârikâ XII. (Continued.)

The thing to be indicated should not be something attended with the motive (to that indication).

What is to be indicated by the word *संग* should not be the bank attended with the properties sanctity &c. (which constitute the motive to the Indication of the bank).

Whence this rule ? (The author) answers :—

Kârikâ XIII.

Because the object of a cognition is declared to be one (thing, and) the fruit (of it) another.

For example, the object of a perceptive cognition is a blue (jar) and the like. The fruit of it, however, is either ' knownness ' or ' self-consciousness '.

The fruit of a perceptive cognition, according to Kumārila, is the production of a property called 'knownness' (*प्रकृत्य* or *संगत*). It is

the stream and those properties). If it be further said that *bar*... indirect connection still exists between the bank and the properties, and that thus the second condition is satisfied in the present case, we reply that although the second condition may be satisfied, still the third is not. For, *there is no motive to this indication of a motive*. Thus, in consequence of the third condition not being satisfied, the word गंगा cannot indicate the motive (हेत्यपावनत्वादिति). Not only is it that the conditions of लक्षण are not satisfied, but it is not even necessary that they should be satisfied. For, the conditions of लक्षण must be fulfilled only when the word has no power to convey a sense independently of those conditions. But it is not that the word गंगा has no power to convey the motive (i. e. हेत्यपावनत्वादिति) if these conditions are not satisfied; as (it has no power to convey the sense of) the bank if these conditions are not satisfied. With समर्थः as the reading, the Vritti means:—But it is not that the word गंगा has power to convey the motive, only when the conditions of लक्षण are satisfied, as it has power to convey the bank, only when these conditions are satisfied. The reading समर्थः does not appear to be right as it does not represent the idea expressed by स्वलक्षति—a word which it professes to explain.

It is thus proved that the motive cannot be indicated on account of the absence of a motive to this indication. If, however, one would venture to assert that there is another motive to the indication of this motive, (the author) replies :—

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mind would become tired of harping upon the same subject - i. e. the motive, and would pass on to another. Thus no motive being present in the mind, the last Indication of a motive would cease; the ceasing of the last Indication would lead to the ceasing of each preceding Indication till the very first Indication would cease. Thus the very first motive (i. e. शैश्यावन्त्वादि) which is the basis of the Indication of the bank would cease to be apprehended.

If it be said : The word शङ्गा indicates not the bank simply but the bank as possessed of the properties sanctity &c., the motive to the indication being the apprehension of something additional to that which is apprehended from the direct mode of expression शङ्गात्ते घोषः. Thus inasmuch as Indication leads to the apprehension of such a qualified thing as the bank possessed of sanctity &c. there is no necessity of admitting Suggestion as a distinct function.

To this (our author) replies :—

Kārikā XII. (Continued.)

The thing to be indicated should not be something attended with the motive (to that indication).

What is to be indicated by the word शङ्गा should not be the bank attended with the properties sanctity &c. (which constitute the motive to the Indication of the bank).

Whence this rule? (The author) answers :—

Kārikā XIII.

Because the object of a cognition is declared to be one (thing, and) the fruit (of it) another.

For example, the object of a perceptive cognition is a blue. (jar) and the like. The fruit of it, however, is either ' knownness ' or ' self-consciousness '.

The fruit of a perceptive cognition, according to Kūṇḍīnī, is the production of a property called 'knownness' (प्रकृत्य or ज्ञानम्).

he says is briefly this¹ :— When a jar is perceived by us, we are conscious that we have perceived a jar. From the fact of this consciousness of the perception, we conclude that a certain property called *ज्ञातत्व* or *प्रकटता* must have been produced in the jar after the jar is perceived by us and we further ascertain that inasmuch as the property *ज्ञातत्व* is absent from the jar before the jar is perceived, but is present in it after it is perceived, the production of this *ज्ञातत्व* in the jar must be the result of our perception of that jar.

The fruit of a perceptive cognition, according to *Murārimishra*,² however, is *संविद्धि* (self-consciousness). When a jar is perceived by us, we are conscious that we have perceived a jar. This consciousness of the perception which is produced after the jar is perceived by us is called *संविद्धि* or *अनुव्यवसाय* (self-consciousness³), and is expressed in the form 'I have perceived a jar.' From the fact of this self-consciousness we conclude that we must have got the perception of the jar. Thus *अनुव्यवसाय* is the result of our perception of the jar. *अनुव्यवसाय*³ is a property inherent in the soul, whereas *प्रकटता* is a property inherent in the thing (such as a jar).

Now what the *Kārikā* says is this :—The object of a cognition is different from the fruit of that cognition. For example, a blue jar—(the object of a perception) is different from 'knownness' or 'self-consciousness'—the fruit of that perception. Inasmuch as Indication (according to *Mammata*) is a cognition, the object of Indication also ought to be different from the fruit of that Indication. But it is not (according to the advocate of a *विशिष्टलक्षणा*). According to him, the bank possessed of sanctity &c. is the object of Indication i. e. is the thing to be indicated by the word *संज्ञा*. This object is not different from the fruit 'the properties sanctity &c'. Thus, inasmuch as he violates the rule above laid down, his theory must be rejected.

1 अत्रायमाशयः—घटादिविषये ज्ञाने जाते 'मया ज्ञातोऽयं घटः' इति घटस्य ज्ञातत्वं प्रतिर्लक्ष्यते । तेन ज्ञाने जाते सति 'ज्ञातता नाम कश्चिद्धर्मो जातः' इत्यनुमीयते । ज्ञातं च ज्ञानात्पूर्वमजातत्वात्, ज्ञाने जाते जातत्वाच्च, अन्वयव्यतिरेकान्वा 'ज्ञानेन प्रकटता' इत्यवधार्यते । T. B.

2 मुरारिमते संविद्धिरनुव्यवसायो व्यवसायजन्यः । Cha.

3 अनुव्यवसाये प्रत्यक्षधर्मः संविद्धिस्त्वात्मनः । San.

I have followed the ancient¹ commentators of Maṃmata in giving the above interpretation which has the merit of being natural. But this natural interpretation is found fault with by Pradīpa in the following manner :—The word फल used in the Kārikā has got two meanings. It means either ' what is produced (from Indication) ' or ' what is the object of a cognition produced (from Indication) '. If the word be taken in the first meaning, the properties कैस्वपावनत्वादि would be no fruit; for, these properties are not produced from Indication. What is produced from Indication is the apprehension of these properties, and if the word फल would mean this apprehension, the Kārikā would fail to refute the advocate of a विशिष्टलक्षणा; for even according to him, the object of Indication (कैस्वपावनत्व-विशिष्टतः) is different from the fruit of Indication (कैस्वपावनत्वज्ञान). If however the word फल be taken in the second meaning, it would be inconsistent with the Vṛtti below in which फल is taken in the first meaning of जन्य. The Vṛtti mentions प्रकटता or संवित्ति as the fruit of a perceptive cognition. Now inasmuch as the cognition of प्रकटता is not what is produced from a perceptive cognition (but simply प्रकटता), प्रकटता cannot be said to be the object of such a cognition. Similarly, since the cognition of अनुव्यवसाय is not what is produced from a perceptive cognition (but simply अनुव्यवसाय), अनुव्यवसाय also cannot be said to be the object of such a cognition. Thus neither प्रकटता nor संवित्ति can be said to be the fruit in the second sense. If it be said that the word फल has got both the meanings जन्य and ज्ञाप्य (or what is the same thing, जन्यप्रतीतिविषय) and that the word is sometimes (as in the Vṛtti) used in the first meaning and sometimes (as in the Kārikā) in the second, we reply that this will not do, because the word फल cannot be shown to have one प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त common to both जन्य and ज्ञाप्य which belong to two distinct classes of things—one being ' that which is produced ' and the other ' that which is made known '. Thus the natural interpretation of the Kārikā is objectionable as shown above. Pradīpa then offers another interpretation of the Kārikā which is as follows:—just as the object of a cognition is different from that cognition, so the fruit of that cognition is different from that cognition

1 विषयप्रयोजनयोरन्तर्गतं मेदादित्याह-ज्ञानस्येति । Ja. सिद्धस्य विषय-
त्वाज्जन्यस्य च फलत्वात्तैकत्वमिति भावः । Cha.

These are different because there is a rule that just as a cognition and its cause must exist at two different times, so a cognition and its effect (fruit) must also exist at two different times. Thus just as तद् (the object of indication) is different from तदज्ञान (indication), so कैश्यज्ञान (the fruit of indication) must also be different from तदज्ञान (indication). If कैश्यज्ञान is identical with indication which, according to the विशिष्टलक्षणवादी, is कैश्यविशिष्टज्ञान, it cannot be the fruit of or motive to indication. But inasmuch as कैश्यज्ञान is the fruit of or motive to indication, the theory of the विशिष्टलक्षणवादी must be rejected.

A glance at the Kārikā will show that Pradīpa's interpretation, of it is very artificial. Pradīpa is led to this artificial interpretation in order to make Mammata consistent. Mammata is inconsistent in using the word फल as ज्ञाप्य in the Kārikā and as जन्य in the Vritti. This inconsistency is removed by Pradīpa's interpretation. For, according to his interpretation, कैश्यज्ञान is the fruit. Now कैश्यज्ञान is the fruit in the sense of जन्य. Really speaking, a fruit is always जन्य. A ज्ञाप्य thing is a fruit only metaphorically. It should be noted that Mammata has used the words फल and प्रयोजन indiscriminately in this Ullāsa. Sometimes¹ he has used them in a real sense; at other times² he has used them in a metaphorical sense.

Ohandidāsa thus criticises the natural interpretation of the Kārikā above given:—When it is said that cognition has a fruit which is different from the object of that cognition what kind of fruit is meant in the statement? Is it any kind of fruit whatever,

1 तथाप्रतिपादनात्मनः प्रयोजनाच्च । p. 41 तादृष्यप्रतीतिः सर्वथैवाभेदाव-
गमश्च प्रयोजनम् । p. 51 अधिकस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपत्तिश्च प्रयोजनम् । p. 61 फलं तु
प्रकटता संवित्तिर्वा । p. 61.

2 प्रतिपिपादयिषितप्रयोजनसंप्रत्ययः । p. 46 अन्यवैलक्षण्येन अङ्गमि-
चारेण च कार्यकारित्वादि । p. 53 प्रयोजनं हि व्यंजनव्यापारगम्यमेव । p. 55 फले
शब्देकगम्येऽत्र । p. 59 प्रयोजनप्रतिपिपादयिषया यत्र लक्षणया शब्दप्रयोगः तत्र
नान्यतस्तत्प्रतीतिः । p. 59 बाधो योगः फलेन नो । p. 60 तदा प्रयोजनं लक्ष-
येत् । नापि प्रयोजने लक्ष्ये । तदमिव प्रयोजनं प्रतिपादयितुम् । p. 60 एवमपीति
प्रयोजनं चेद्वक्ष्यते । p. 61 प्रयोजनेन साहितं लक्षणीयं न युज्यते । ज्ञानस्य विषयो
लक्ष्यः फलमन्यदुदाहृतम् । p. 61 विशेषाः स्युस्तु लक्षिते । तदादौ ये विशेषाः
याननत्वादयः । p. 63.

or that kind of fruit only which is connected with the object of indication? If the fruit meant is of the first description, then even in the विशिष्टलक्षणा theory there is such a fruit i. e. the joy felt by a cow-herd when he hears the घोष word uttered by some body. This fruit is different from the object of indication i. e. शैत्यविशिष्टतट. Thus the Kārikā cannot be said to rebut the विशिष्टलक्षणा theory. If the fruit meant is, however, of the second description, then the rule laid down in the Kārikā would not be universally true. For it would not hold good in the case of the indication of the motive. Indication of the motive is a cognition. The object of this cognition is शैत्यपावनत्वादि (the motive) and the only fruit of it is joy on the part of a cow-herd at hearing the word घोष. This fruit is different from the object of indication शैत्यपावनत्वादि, but is not connected with शैत्यपावनत्वादि, (since it belongs to the cow-herd). Thus the rule laid down in the Kārikā is violated in this case. For these reasons, the natural interpretation must be rejected. Ohandidāsa then gives the purport of the Kārikā thus :—the apprehension of the bank (indication) and the apprehension of the fruit (शैत्यपावनत्वादि) inasmuch as they are related to each other as cause and effect must exist at different times (and must, therefore, be different from each other). It is thus wrong to hold as the विशिष्टलक्षणवादी holds that both the apprehensions can be the result of one and the same operation i. e. विशिष्टलक्षणा. This proves the necessity of admitting such a distinct function as व्यञ्जना.

This is substantially Pradīpa's interpretation. But Ohandidāsa's criticism of the natural interpretation of the Kārikā is wrong. It is (as observed by Pradīpa) based upon a misapprehension of that natural interpretation. The Kārikā even in its natural meaning does not aim at showing that every cognition must have a fruit which is different from the object of a cognition; but at showing that if a cognition has a fruit, that fruit must be different from the object of that cognition. Thus if शैत्यपावनत्वादि should (as according to the विशिष्टलक्षणवादी) form part of the object of indication (शैत्यपावनत्वविशिष्टतट), then शैत्यपावनत्व could not be the fruit of indication. Hence such dilemmas as ' whether the fruit meant is फलभाव or ज्ञेयगत फल ' are idle.

The answer to the विशिष्टलक्षणवादी which has been given in the Kārikā presupposes that he accepts the opinion of Mammata that Indication is the apprehension of a secondary sense. If he however

holds that Indication is not the apprehension of a secondary sense, but is connection (of the secondary) with the primary sense, which is the cause of the apprehension of the secondary sense, the answer of the Kārikā will not do. For, even according to the विशिष्टलक्षणादी the fruit of indication i. e. शैत्यज्ञान is different from indication i. e. connection of the bank with the stream of the Ganges. Some, therefore, give a different answer which is as follows :—Indication which comes into being only for the purpose of removing impossibility of a logical connection, must aim at the removal of this impossibility. This being the case, indication should give to the word only that sense which would render the above logical connection possible. It should not give to that word any other sense which does not achieve this purpose. Thus in the present case, the sense given to the word गंगा by indication should be तट only since तट only is able to render logical connection (between तट and घोष) possible. But पावनत्व which has nothing to do with this business should not also be (as it is in the विशिष्टलक्षणा theory) the sense given to the word by indication. If it be said by the विशिष्टलक्षणावादी that indication although mainly engaged in giving to the word गंगा the sense of तट only may incidentally furnish it with the sense of पावनत्व also, just as a sandal ointment although mainly applied by a man to his body to remove the effects of heat incidentally yields him sensations of cold also in virtue of its peculiar nature; we reply : The instance of the sandal ointment is not parallel to the case in hand. For, Sandal produces sensations of cold in virtue of mere proximity. Such is its peculiar nature. But indication cannot make शैत्यपावनत्व known in virtue of proximity since its nature (which is that of removing impossibility of a logical connection) is different from that of the sandal ointment.

But this answer too is insufficient; for, indication may come into being for the purpose of removing impossibility of the purport of the sentence, as in the example छत्रिणो यान्ति. Thus indication may give to the word गंगा the sense of पावनत्व also to bring out the purport of the sentence गंगायां घोषः. Pradiipa therefore gives a third answer which is as follows :—पावनत्वविशिष्टतट would be indicated by the word गंगा only if पावनत्वविशिष्टतट could be apprehended before-hand as the लक्ष्यतावच्छेदक i. e. as the reason of the word गंगा being used to indicate पावनत्वविशिष्टतट. But this is impossible. The particular kind of पावनत्व is a property of the stream and can, there-

fore, by no means be apprehended as existing on the bank of the Ganges. As Mammata has said before:—‘ There is no connection between the bank and the fruit शैत्यपावनत्व’. If it be said that inasmuch as the bank may be apprehended before-hand as possessed of some kind of शैत्यपावनत्व although not of the particular kind of शैत्यपावनत्व belonging to the stream, let this general शैत्यपावनत्व be the लक्ष्यतावच्छेदक of the word गंगा, we reply that still the particular kind of शैत्यपावनत्व belonging to the stream—which constitutes the motive—would not be apprehended by means of indication. What more need be said! Indication would be useless in the example गौर्वाहीकः, if the theory of a विशिष्टलक्षणा be admitted. In this example, a dull and stupid fellow is the sense indicated, and the apprehension of identity between गौ and वाहीक is the motive to indication. Now according to the विशिष्टलक्षणा theory, the indicated sense would be a dull and stupid fellow identical with a bull. But this indicated sense also like the primary sense (गौ) cannot be logically connected with the sense of वाहीक; for, the apprehension that वाहीक is a dull and stupid fellow identical with a bull is as opposed to the actual fact as the apprehension that वाहीक is a bull. Thus impossibility of a logical connection remains as it is even though we accept the विशिष्टलक्षणा theory. But every body understands from the sentence गौ वाहीकः that वाहीक is a bull. This general experience can be accounted for only on the admission of a distinct function called Suggestion. The fact that the apprehension of identity between गौ and वाहीक is opposed to the actual fact does not, as has been remarked before, come in the way of the Suggestion of that identity.

The author now sums up:—

Kârikâ XIII. (Continued.)

Indication is thus not in respect of something attended (with properties).

The mere reading of the Sûtra carries its explanation.

Kârikâ XIII. (Continued.)

But the properties are on the thing indicated.

The properties 'sanctity &c.' pertaining to the stream which are apprehended (as existing) on the bank after the bank is indicated, are apprehended by means of a function different from the well-known functions of Denotation, Drift and Indication. That they cannot be apprehended by means of Denotation and Indication has been shown. That they cannot be apprehended by means of the Drift is also clear from the fact that the Drift aims at conveying the apprehension of a mere logical connection among the meanings of the various words of a sentence, and that the properties Sanctity &c. are not in the form of a logical connection. Thus inasmuch as the apprehension of the properties वाचनस्वार्थ cannot be had by any of these functions, a distinct function must necessarily be admitted (as the cause of this apprehension) which may be called by the various names of 'Suggestion' 'Intimation' 'Hinting' &c.

Thus Suggestion based upon Indication has been treated of. Now the author expounds Suggestion based upon Denotation :—

Kārikā XIV.

The operation which, after the denotation of a word having many meanings, is restricted by Conjunction and the like, causes one to think of a sense other than the denoted is Suggestion.

The word अनेकार्थ means (a word) having more meanings than one.

This is according to the view that one and the same word has various meanings. But there are others who hold that for every distinct meaning there is a distinct word, that, in other words, a word having many meanings is not one word but as many words as there are meanings. According to this view, the word अनेकार्थ means 'a word which looks like another having another meaning.' But² this

1 विशेषा इति । तीरादिव्यावृत्ताः । केवलं गंगगता इत्यर्थः । Pr.

2 सदृशत्वेऽपि भेदपदे अन्यत्र अभिधाया अप्रवृत्तेस्तन्निर्वचनायोगादाह-
तत्त्वेनेति । Pr.

meaning of अनेकार्थ will not do; for, the fact that a word looks like another shows that it is different from that another. Thus inasmuch as the denotation of one word cannot extend to the meaning of another, it is idle to speak of that denotation as 'restricted.' The word अनेकार्थ must, therefore, be taken to mean 'a word which is capable of being mistaken for another.'

अवच्छाद्य means 'a sense other than the denoted, i. e. a sense which cannot be said to be denoted by a word at the time when another sense is denoted by it.'

नियमन is the circumscription that out of the several meanings of a word, only one is brought to the mind of the hearer. The other meanings of the word are not brought to the mind owing to the presence of such deterrents as the knowledge of Conjunction and the like or as the ascertainment effected by this knowledge i. e. that it is the first sense only that is intended by the speaker.

The restrictive circumstances are thus summarised by Bhatihari:—

Conjunction, Disjunction, Association, Dissociation,¹ Motive, Context, Attribute,² Juxtaposition of another word, Power, Congruity, Place, Time, Gender, Accent &c. are the causes of one's recollecting one out of the several³ meanings which a word has got.

The last line has been literally interpreted according to Pradīpa and Prabhā.

Udyota however interprets the last line thus:—When there is no determination as to which of the many meanings of a word is intended by the speaker, (Conjunction &c.) are the causes of that determination. According to him, अनवच्छेद means तात्पर्यसंदेह and विशेषस्तृति means तात्पर्यनिश्चय. He says that Conjunction and the

1 Dissociation includes want of co-existence and enmity (Vide infra).

2 लिंग does not mean any attribute but a special kind of attribute not peculiar (Vide infra).

3 अनवच्छेदे । अनेकत्वे । Pr.

like are the causes of the determination of the speaker's intention and not (as Prabhá says) of the recollection of one particular meaning to the exclusion of the others. 'For', he argues, 'in the case of a sentence which contains a word having two meanings—one usual and the other rare—the word however being used in the rare meaning,—the usual meaning by the mere fact of its being usual is first recollected notwithstanding Conjunction and the like. These circumstances must here be admitted as determining that the word has been used in the rare meaning. For, unless this is determined, the particular meaning of the sentence cannot be understood. It is therefore useless to suppose (as Pradipa does) that these circumstances cause the recollection of the rare meaning and prevent the recollection of the usual ; for, the usual meaning has been already recollected. The determination of the intended meaning is called स्मृति only figuratively on account of the meaning which is determined being one that is recollected.

Prabhâ² thus justifies the literal interpretation of the last line:— In saying that Conjunction and the like are the causes of the recollection of one particular meaning to the exclusion of all the others, it is not meant that the recollection of the other meanings is everywhere excluded; for, in the above case cited by you, the other sense (i.e. the usual sense) is certainly recollected. But there are other cases where Conjunction and the like do exclude the recollection of the other senses of a word. Thus, for instance, where a word has two senses neither of which is more usual than the other, the experience

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2 न हि वयं सर्वत्र इतरार्थस्मृत्यभावनियमं वदामः, किंतु यत्र प्रसिद्धिबाहुल्यादेरभावस्तत्रोत्सर्गतः संयुक्तार्थोपस्थितिरेवेति सहृदयसाक्षिकम् । न हि साहचर्यज्ञस्य 'रामलक्ष्मणौ' इत्यतो राघवातिरिक्तोपस्थितिः, न वा भोजनप्रकरणे सैन्धवशब्दश्रवणात् लवणातिरिक्तोपस्थितिर्हाटिनि जायते । अपि तु राघवादेरेव तथा इत्यनुभवबलात्संयोगादेरितरार्थोपस्थितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वमिति प्राचामाशयात् । स्मृतिशब्दस्य तात्पर्यनिश्चयपरत्वेऽतिक्लिष्टतापत्तेः । Pr.

of all men of taste is that only one sense is recollected by means of Conjunction and the like, and the other is not. When, for instance, the word रामलक्ष्मणे is uttered, the hearer who is aware of the companionship between Rāma and Lakshmaṇa does not immediately recollect the Sense of the son of Jamadagni but of the eldest son of Dasharatha only, although the word राम has both the senses. Similarly, when the sentence सैन्धवनानय is uttered, the hearer who knows that the speaker of the sentence is taking his meals, immediately recollects the sense of 'salt' only and not of the 'horse' also, although the word सैन्धव means the latter as well as the former. It is from an observation of such instances as these that the Ancients appear to have been led to formulate the theory that Conjunction and the like exclude the recollection of the other senses of a word. Besides, to say that स्मृति means the determination of the speaker's intention is to stretch the meaning of स्मृति too far.

If it be said: just as the apprehension of the other expressed senses of a word is excluded by Conjunction and the like, so let the apprehension of the Suggested sense also be excluded by these very circumstances; we reply:—This is not possible, since the nature of the function of Suggestion is to work even in defiance of Conjunction and the like. If this were not its nature, then at the hearing of the sentence सुरभि मांसं भुंक्ते, a clever man of taste although he knows that the sentence is uttered with reference to one who is eating fragrant flesh (the expressed sense of the word सुरभि मांसं) would not feel disgust, the idea of cow's flesh (the Suggested sense of सुरभिमांसं) not coming to his mind on account of 'Context,' one of the restricting circumstances.

If it again be said: The word having denoted one sense, its operation has ceased. How can it now be said to be Suggestive of another sense? We reply that in suggesting another sense the operation of the word consists in the apprehension of the primary sense itself. Hence¹ Mammata would declare just below that the primary sense also is on account of its co-operation said to be Suggestive.

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It has been said above that the denotation of a word is restricted by Conjunction and the like. The restriction of denotation by these circumstances may be thus exemplified in order :—

1 In the sentence *संखचक्रो हरिः* (Vishṇu with a conchshell and a discus), the denotation of the word *हरि* is restricted by संयोग (Conjunction). संयोग means, a connection between two things such as is generally known to exist between those two things only. This संयोग restricts the word *हरि* to the sense of Vishṇu only (although the word has various other meanings such as Indra, a lion, a monkey &c.), because a conchshell and a discus are generally known to be connected with Vishṇu only. Indra may sometimes bear a conchshell and a discus, still Indra would not be thought of here, because the fact that he bears these things is not a generally-known fact.

2 In the sentence *अखचक्रो हरिः* (Vishṇu without a conchshell and a discus), the denotation¹ of the word *हरि* is restricted by विप्रयोग (Disjunction). विप्रयोग means absence from two things (lit. destruction) of a connection that is generally known to exist between them. This विप्रयोग restricts the word *हरि* to the sense of Vishṇu only in this way :—In the sentence *अखचक्रो हरिः*, absence of *ख* and *चक्र* is predicated of the person denoted by the word *हरि*. The predication of this absence however would be unmeaning if the person denoted by *हरि* were never conjoined with a conchshell and a discus. This shows that the word *हरि* must denote Vishṇu only who inasmuch as he is generally known to bear a conchshell and a discus may sometimes be said to be without them. The word *हरि* must denote Vishṇu only for this reason also that *ख* and *चक्र* are not generally found in Indra although the absence of them is here said to be found in the person denoted by *Hari*—the rule being that a thing and its absence occupy one and the same place.

3 In the word *रामलक्ष्मणौ* the denotation of the word *राम* is restricted by साहचर्य (Association). साहचर्य means companionship. This साहचर्य restricts the word *राम* to the sense of the eldest son of *Dasharatha* only (although the word means *परशुराम* also), because the former was the companion of *Lakshmaṇa* and not the latter.

If it be said : the example of संयोग also comes under साहचर्य. For, साहचर्य means a connection that is generally known to exist

1 'अव्युत्पत्ते' इत्यनन्तरं 'अभिधा नियम्यते' इत्यनुषज्यते । एवमप्येऽपि । Pr.

between two things. शंखचक्र and विष्णु may be said to have this connection as well as राम and लक्ष्मण. For, there is no reason why conjunction should not be admitted as a connection like the relation of brothership, of the husband and wife, of father and son, of master and servant, of the owner and the owned &c. Thus, सशंखचक्रो हरिः is as good an example of साहचर्य as रामलक्ष्मणौ सीतारामौ रामदशरथौ रामहनुमन्तौ रामाद्योऽप्ये &c. is संयोग in fact is but a mode of साहचर्य and not different from it.

We reply: True what you say. But the principle which has guided the Ancients in regarding संयोग as different from साहचर्य appears to be this:—When any generally-known connection which restricts the denotation of a word is expressed by a distinct word of its own, that connection is said to be संयोग; as in सशंखचक्रो हरिः the connection between शंखचक्र and विष्णु is संयोग because it is expressed by a distinct word स in the sentence. But when only one term of that connection restricts the sense of the other term by forming a Dwandwa compound with it or by some such way, that is said to be साहचर्य; as in रामलक्ष्मणौ where the connected things only are expressed and not the connection also. Thus सगांडीवोऽर्जुनः is an example of संयोग, but गांडीवानुनौ and गांडीवमर्जुनः are examples¹ of साहचर्य.

4 In the word छायातपौ (light and shade) the denotation of the word छाया is restricted by विरोध (absence of co-existence). This विरोध restricts the word छाया to the sense of shade only, although the word means 'lustre' also, on account of the former being seen to exist apart from light and not the latter. विरोध means 'hostility' also. By विरोध in this sense the denotations of both the words राम and अर्जुन are restricted in the sentence रामार्जुनगतिस्तयोः (those warriors act towards each other like Rāma and Arjuna). Here the fact that those two warriors who, from the context, are known to be hostile to each other, are² compared to Rāma and Arjuna leads us to determine at once that राम means परशुराम and अर्जुन means सहस्रार्जुन because they and not the eldest son of Dasharatha and the brother of Bhīma were hostile to each other.

1 Vide R. G. Page 121.

2 Vide R. G. Pages 121—122.

This is not a good example. For, here विरोध by itself does not restrict the denotation of राम and अर्जुन, but only when assisted by 'Context'—another restricting circumstance. Thus this is a mixed example. A pure example is रामरावणौ.

Really speaking, examples of विरोध (like रामरावणौ &c.) go under साहचर्य. For, साहचर्य as has been said above, is a generally known relation. Now the relation of enmity is as generally known as the relation of brothership, of friendship &c.

5 In the sentence स्थापुं भज भवच्छिदे (Worship Shiva for the purpose of getting yourself freed from the bondage of this mundane existence) the word स्थापुं is restricted by अर्थ (Motive or Purpose) to the God *Shiva*; for, the desired purpose is to be served by worshipping Shiva and not a 'post' although the word means the latter also.

6 In the sentence सर्वे जानानि देवः (Your Majesty knows all), the denotation of the word देव is restricted by प्रकरण (Context). प्रकरण means 'being in the mind of the speaker and the hearer'. This प्रकरण restricts the word देव to the 'king' only because he only is addressed by his messenger. Mammata says that the word देव is here restricted to the sense of 'you'. But 'you' must ultimately mean the king under description or rather the king who is addressed; for, the second personal pronoun is used only with reference to one who is addressed.

7 In the sentence कपिता मकरध्वजः (The God of love is angry) the denotation of the word मकरध्वज is restricted by लिंग (Attribute). लिंग means an attribute connected with a thing (denoted by a word, by means of a relation other than Conjunction and disconnected from every thing else denoted by that word. This लिंग restricts the word मकरध्वज to the sense of the God of love only; for, the attribute of anger is intimately connected with the God of love and disconnected from every thing else denoted by the word मकरध्वज such as a fish-shaped banner, the ocean &c.

Some interpret लिंग as a peculiar attribute or a mark. But this interpretation is not right; for, the attribute of anger is not peculiar to the God of love. Again, according to this interpretation, the sentence सर्वायुधक्रो हरिः would be an example of लिंग also. For, बाण and चक्र are attributes peculiar to Vishnu. According to

Our interpretation, this sentence is excluded because शंख and चक्र although attributes of Vishnu are not connected with him by समवाय relation. If it be said : The sentence स्थाणुं भज भवच्छिदे is but an example of लिंग. It cannot be urged that लिंग is but a peculiar attribute of मकरध्वज, whilst अर्थ is but an effect of Shiva's worship, not an attribute of Shiva, and that लिंग is thus different from अर्थ. For, 'being the object of a worship which will cause freedom from worldly bondage' is but an attribute which is peculiar to Shiva since it is not possessed by a pillar (another sense of स्थाणु). Thus अर्थ is the same thing as लिंग. We reply that अर्थ is different from लिंग because the fact that Shiva possesses the attribute of the nature described above, comes to the mind only after the meaning of the sentence is apprehended and cannot, therefore, be said to be directly expressed by that sentence; whilst the fact that Cupid possesses the attribute of anger is directly expressed by the sentence. अर्थ is thus different from लिंग. लिंग may, therefore, be defined as an attribute belonging to one thing denoted by a word, not belonging to any other thing denoted by the same word and directly apprehended from the sentence in which that word occurs. अर्थ is thus excluded because it is not an attribute that is directly apprehended from the sentence. संयोग is also thus excluded because the attributes शंख and चक्र may sometimes belong to Indra—another thing denoted by the word हवि.

8 In the phrase देवस्य पुरारानः (or त्रिपुरारानः) the denotation of the word देव is restricted by शब्दस्यान्यस्य संनिधिः (the juxtaposition of another word). शब्दस्यान्यस्य संनिधिः means agreement in case with another word having one fixed meaning. This restricts the word देव to the sense of a god i. e. Shiva. For, the word देव agrees in case with the word पुरारानि (or त्रिपुरारानि) which denotes the enemy of the three Cities or of the Demon Tripura. Now the enemy of the three Cities or of the Demon Tripura is a god i. e. Shiva and not a king although the word देव means the latter also.

As for those who say that देव means here the God Shiva only, no other god being the enemy of Pura or Tripura, they are not

1 न चासौ लिंगान्तर्गत इति मन्तव्यम् । शक्यान्तरे नियमेनावृत्तेष्वेव प्रकृते लिंगत्वात् । शंसचक्रयोस्त्विन्द्रादिनाऽपि कदाचिद्धारणसंभवात् । R. G. page 119.

right. For, although देव may mean another god such as Vishṇu &c., still the denotation of the word is but one and the same (i. e. a god). Thus the denotation being one, we cannot speak of its being restricted. Thus this would be no example if we accept their view.

The definition of शब्दस्यान्यस्य संनिधिः above given excludes the sentence स्थाणुं भज भवच्छिदे; for although the word स्थाणु in it is in juxtaposition with the word भवच्छिदे, still the two words do not agree in case (one being in the Accusative case and the other in the Dative). It excludes the sentence सर्वाखचक्रो हरिः also. For, the word सर्वाखचक्रे which has a definite meaning does not agree in case with the word हरि although in juxtaposition with it. (‘A conchshell and a discus are Hari’ would be an unmeaning sentence). If it be objected that the word सर्वाखचक्रः agrees in case with हरि (although सर्वाखचक्रे does not), we reply that the example of संयोग is meant to be हरो सर्वाखचक्रे and not सर्वाखचक्रो हरिः.

The above definition of शब्दस्यान्यस्य संनिधिः given by Pradīpa is wrong. A better definition is as follows :—juxtaposition is the utterance of one word along with another word having a meaning logically connected with only one meaning out of many of the first word. Pradīpa’s definition is wrong for the following reasons :—

(a) It does not include such an example of संनिधि as करेण राजते नागः (The elephant shines with its trunk). For, in this sentence, the words कर and नाग have no agreement in case (कर being in the Instrumental case and नाग in the Nominative), and yet the denotations of both the words are restricted. It should not be said that there is argument in a circle here since both the words having indefinite meanings, the meaning of each restricts the meaning of the other. For, in this sentence, the restriction of the meaning of one does not depend upon the restriction of the meaning of the other. But the meanings of both the words कर and नाग are simultaneously restricted to the ‘trunk’ and the ‘elephant’ respectively by the fact that the acceptance of any other meanings of the words (कर and नाग) does not give any connected meaning to the sentence. Thus the example करेण राजते नागः which is free from the fault of the argument in a circle, is not included in Pradīpa’s definition of संनिधि.

(b) His definition extends to the examples of लिङ्ग. In कुपितं

मकरध्वजः, for instance, the word कृपित has a definite signification and the word मकरध्वज agrees with it¹ in case.

Some say that देवस्य पुरारतेः (त्रिपुरारतेः) becomes an example of लिंग also. The word त्रिपुरारतेः (which agrees in case with देवस्य) means an enemy of the Demon Tripura. Now this enmity with Tripura may serve as a mark of the God Shiva. Others however justify Mammata by distinguishing संनिधि from लिंग in the following manner :—That is लिंग when a word restricts the sense of another word by not depending upon a third word; as the word कृपित restricts the sense of मकरध्वज by itself i. e. by not depending upon a third word. That is संनिधि however, when a word restricts the sense of another word by depending upon a third word; as² the word अराति restricts the sense of देव by depending upon the word त्रिपुर.

9 In the sentence मधुना मत्तः कौकिलः (The cuckoo is intoxicated with the spring) the word मधु is restricted to the sense of the spring by सामर्थ्य (Power of production or causality) ; for, the 'spring' and not 'wine' is known to be the cause of intoxication in the cuckoo.

सामर्थ्य and लिंग also may be distinguished from each other on the principle above given. For, although the power of producing intoxication in the cuckoo may be considered as a mark of the spring, still मधुना मत्तः कौकिलः is not an example of लिंग because (as said above) the word मत्तः restricts the sense of मधु only by depending upon the word मधुना, whereas कृपितः restricts the sense of मकरध्वज by itself.

10 In the sentence पानु वो दयितुमुत्सृज्य (Let the favour of your beloved protect you), the word मुत्सृज्य is restricted to the sense of favour by औचित्य (Congruity or Fitness). For, it is the favour of the beloved (neither remedy nor even the face of the beloved if she is angry) that is fit to protect i. e. to gratify the desire of the husband. This sentence cannot be an example of सामर्थ्य also ; for, although मुत्सृज्य (favour) has the power of producing gratification, still that

1 Vide R. G. page 123.

2 मरुते च वैरित्वं त्रिपुरासुरान्वितमेव शक्यान्तरव्यावृत्तम् । Nagoji on R. G. Page 123.

power is not clearly brought out here as it is in मधुना वसः कोकिल by the Instrumental case of मधुना.

Really speaking¹ अर्थ, सामर्थ्य and औचित्य are not three distinct restrictive circumstances. All of them intimate the relation of cause and effect, the first by a word in the Dative case for instance, the second by a word in the Instrumental case, and the third by an inherent fitness of the object. It is this relation of cause and effect that really restricts the denotation of the word in every one of these cases. And this relation is but one. The Ancients have declared these to be three restricting circumstances, because although the relation of cause and effect is but one, still the modes of intimating this relation are three.

11 In the sentence मात्यन् परमेश्वरः, the word परमेश्वर is restricted to the sense of a king by देश (Place). The देश here referred to by the word अत्र is the capital and a king only can be appropriately said to reside in the capital, not the² Lord who resides everywhere.

12 In the sentence विज्जभातुर्विभाति, the denotation of the word विज्जभातु is restricted by काल (Time). When the time is day, the word is restricted to the sense of the Sun; for the Sun only shines by day; and when the time is night, the word is restricted to the sense of fire; for, fire only burns by night.

13 In the sentence मित्रं भाति, the word मित्र is restricted to the sense of a friend by its Neuter Gender, and in the sentence मित्रो भाति, it is restricted to the sense of the Sun by its Masculine Gender.

14 Accent gives a determinate meaning to a word generally in the Vedas only, not in poetry. In the Vedic sentence इन्द्रश्चतुर्विधस्त्वि, for instance, if the उदात्त accent be on the last letter of the compound word इन्द्रश्चतुः, it would show that the compound is षड्विधत्पुरुष, and then the meaning would be 'The killer of Indra'. If the उदात्त accent be however on the last letter of the first member of the compound, it

1 अर्थसामर्थ्यौचित्यानामुदाहरणेषु चतुर्थ्याद्यैस्तृतीयाद्यैरर्थसामर्थ्येन च बो-
रणभाव एव नियामकः । न तु वस्त्वन्तरम् । बोधकवैचित्र्याच्च निया-
ज्ययोक्तिः प्राचाम् । R. G. p. 125.

रमात्मनस्तु सर्वगम्य व्यावर्त्तमानात्मनस्त्वैवैवार्थान्वयेः । R. G. 125.

would show that the compound is बहुव्रीहि, and then the meaning would be 'He whose killer is Indra'. In poetry this determination of the meaning by Accent is *not* common. For, if difference of meaning due to Accent be admitted *in poetry*, a compound of paronomastic words would be impossible, as the compound being restricted in its sense by Accent would not convey two senses. Besides, the common practice of people is to utter all ordinary words (words of poetry included) in *one accentless monotonous tone*.

If it be urged: Accent does not determine the sense of a word in poetry even rarely. In the sentence वृष्टे प्रसीद, the उदात्त accent of वृष्टे in वृष्ट shows that the word वृष्टे is in the Vocative case, and it is this Vocative that restricts the word वृष्टे to the particular sense of 'sight'. The Accent does not do this directly. Even though Accent is understood in the sense of a 'change of voice', still it does not restrict the (primary) sense of the word but suggests something which is not the primary sense of the word at all. Thus, understand स्वर in any sense (उदात्त, अनुदात्त, &c. or काकु) the word बाहुल्येन in Mammata's Vritti is useless.

To this objection Pradipa replies :—Your view is untenable ; for, in the poetic example सुधाकरसुहृद् &c., Accent can determine the sense of the compound word सुधाकरसुहृद् as it does in the analogous Vedic example इन्द्रसन्तुः. If the उदात्त accent is on the last vowel हृ then the compound becomes सन्तुसुहृद् and the figure becomes उपमा ; but if the उदात्त accent is on the last vowel of the first member of the compound (i. e. on र) the compound becomes सुहृत्सुहृद् and the figure becomes प्रतीक.

Pradipa appears to read बाहुल्येन in the Vritti. Hence his defence of the necessity of that word. But our text of the Vritti does not contain the word बाहुल्येन. Nor is the word necessary. Pradipa's assertion that Accent determines the sense of a word in poetry rarely is not supported by any man of authority. But even though we suppose that the Vritti does contain the word बाहुल्येन, still the Vritti does not mean what Pradipa has made it to mean, but the following :—Accent determines the sense of a word generally in the Vedas only, but never in poetry.

By the word आदि in स्वराद्यः we should understand Gestures &c. Gesture is a motion of the hand &c. conveying to the mind of one

the idea of the particular size of an object in such a manner as if that one saw the object with his own eyes. Gesture restricts the sense of a word in such an example as एहमेतत्.

Here, by means of appropriate Gestures, the word एतावन्मात्र is restricted to the sense of the particular size of the breasts &c. intended to be pointed out by the speaker. Thus, by the fingers being opened in the manner of an expanded or a contracted lotus, the speaker indicates that the breasts are as big as an expanded lotus or as small as a contracted one.

The word आदि in अभिनयादयः may include अपदेश. अपदेश means 'designating the desired person or thing by a motion of the hand.' It restricts the sense of a word in such an example as इतः स दैत्यः &c.

Here inasmuch as by placing his hand upon his chest, the speaker designates himself, the word इदम् is restricted to the sense of 'the speaker'.

It should be borne in mind that most of the restrictive circumstances संबोध, विप्रबोध &c. are more or less varieties of लिंग and are not absolutely different from it.

Although a word having more senses than one is thus prevented from conveying any of its other primary senses on account of its being restricted to one primary sense only by Conjunction and the like, the word still conveys another sense sometimes (i. e. when the speciality of the speaker &c. are present). This another sense is not due to the function of Denotation, because that function has been already restricted. Nor is it due to Indication, because the three conditions of Indication i. e. Inapplicability of primary sense &c. are absent. It is due to nothing but Suggestion as in भद्रात्मनो &c.

Here a 'king' is under description. In virtue of this Context, all the words in the verse are restricted to the senses of the 'king' and the attributes which can be fitly connected with him. Although this is the case, still other senses of the 'elephant' and his appropriate attributes are apprehended from the words. This apprehension is due to no other function than that of Suggestion.

If it be said : This verse is exactly like विद्वन्मानस &c. where also such words as मानस &c. are each capable of two senses. अभिधामूलव्यंजना is therefore not distinct from निदृष्टपरम्परितरूपक.

We reply: No. There is a difference between the two. निदृष्टपरितरूपक occurs where a paronomastic word cannot be logically connected with the other words of the verse unless its two senses are identified with each other, and where the विशेष्य is not paronomastic as the विशेषण are. Thus in the verse विद्वन्मानस &c. unless one sense (i. e. the मानस lake) of the word मानस is identified with its other sense (i. e. the mind), the word मानस cannot be logically connected with the words विद्वत् and हंस ; and the विशेष्य, 'वरवीर' is also not paronomastic. Quite different is the case, in ब्रह्मात्मनो &c. Here when in virtue of the Context the king and his appropriate attributes are apprehended from the verse, the meaning of the whole verse is understood, there being nothing to prevent this understanding. The apprehension of this meaning does not depend upon the apprehension of the words of the verse. The विशेष्य (यस्य) also here is paronomastic.

Nor is this i. e. अभिधामूलव्यंजना the same as श्लेष, because in श्लेष both the senses are in question, whilst here one only is in question as shown by the Context.

Although the sense of the elephant with his attributes may have been intended by the poet, still inasmuch as there is no circumstance such as Context &c. to determine this we must admit that that sense is suggested by the verse. We must further admit that a comparison between these two senses is also suggested by the verse. For, if we do not admit the suggestion of this comparison, these two senses would remain unconnected with each other ; there would thus arise the fault of one's expressing two unconnected thoughts in one sentence. Moreover, the peculiar pleasure arising from comparison which is experienced from the verse by every man of taste cannot otherwise be accounted for. If it be said : The suggestion of comparison distinguishes अभिधामूलव्यंजना from सर्मगश्लेष (instanced in सर्वशोभाधवः¹) where comparison is not suggested on account of both

1 Vide K. P. VII. There is सर्मगश्लेष (Coalescence with division) in सर्वशोभाधवः which when the sense refers to विष्णु is to be divided as सर्वः भाधवः and when the verse refers to शिव as सर्वशोभाधवः. This is श्लेष because here two distinct words सर्वः and सर्वशोभा coalesce in analogy to the lac and wood.

the senses being in question. But how is अभिधामूलव्यञ्जना different from अभंगशेष called by the author of अलंकारसर्वस्व, अर्थशेष? In योऽसकृत्परगोत्राणां¹ &c. which is an example of अभंगशेष (or अर्थशेष), comparison between Indra and the King is suggested as in भद्रात्मनो &c. Now why is it that the second sense is there admitted as conveyed by Denotation and here by Suggestion?

We reply : The difference between the two is as follows :— Where circumstances are present or absent in order to determine that both the senses are simultaneously intended, there is अभंगशेष. Where however, circumstances are present in order to determine that only one sense is intended, and the second sense is apprehended in virtue of the speciality of the speaker &c., there is अभिधामूलव्यञ्जना.

It is thus clear that the various words of the verse being restricted to one primary sense each, the other primary senses that are apprehended from those words are due to Suggestion. This is the opinion of Mammata and his predecessors. But the Modern rhetoricians such as Appa Dixit and Jagannāth differ from this opinion. What they say may be thus given in the words of Udyota :—Conjunction and the like determine not that a word denotes one sense first and another afterwards. The knowledge of the speaker's intention also serves the purpose of determining not that one sense alone is understood and not another, but that one sense alone is the right one and thus leading a man to activity. Such circumstances also are the speciality of the speaker, of the hearer &c. which are admitted by the advocates of Suggestion as the special causes of the apprehension of the suggested sense are admitted by us as the special causes of the recollection of the second sense.

1 योऽसकृत्परगोत्राणां पञ्चच्छेदकणक्षमः । सतकादिभिर्वा विभक्तिबुधेभ्यः स राजते ॥ K. P. IX. In this verse there is अभंगशेष (Coalescence without a division) in the word असकृत्परगोत्राणां, for instance ; because the coalescing words are not here different (पर and पर, गोत्र गोत्र) but one and the same. According to अलंकारसर्वस्वकार, this is अर्थशेष because here the meanings coalesce or are bound together analogously to a couple of fruits supported by the same footstalk. (Vide अलंकारसर्वस्व page 96. Also K. P. IX.)

