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AFTER THE DELUGE
A STUDY OF COMMUNAL PSYCHOLOGY
VOL. II

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AFTER THE DELUGE

A STUDY OF COMMUNAL PSYCHOLOGY

LEONARD WOOLF

VOL. II
1830 & 1832



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PREFACE

THE first volume of this book, which was published eight years ago, dealt with the origins of the communal psychology of democracy, its general nature and its relation to the French Revolution of 1789. The present volume examines the first attempts of the 19th century in France and Britain to translate the ideas and principles of democracy into practice. In the third volume I hope to deal with the subsequent history of democracy and democratic psychology between 1830 and 1914.

L. W.

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PART II
COMMUNAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY

SECTION I
POLITICAL COMMUNAL PSYCHOLOGY
(Continued)

CHAPTER IV

THE REFORM ACT OF 1832

At the end of the previous volume of this book, I had reached a point at which it seemed to me possible to say with some definiteness and clearness what democracy was at the time of its birth, or rebirth, in the eighteenth century. It was an intricate psychological phenomenon, an attitude towards society, a complicated network of ideas and ideals relating to government and happiness, equality, and liberty. These ideas and ideals were inconsistent with the social structure of the eighteenth century and with the communal psychology of what we now call the *ancien régime*. The social conflict, which is inevitable where the inconsistency between men's ideas and institutions is great and growing, can be traced in *cet esprit de mutinerie*, which Maria Teresa and many others saw spreading through Europe during the second half of the eighteenth century. The conflict came to a head in the French Revolution, which remains, therefore, even for those who would like to forget it, a landmark in history.

The French Revolution was the first attempt in Europe to translate democratic ideas into democratic institutions. It was a conscious and deliberate

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attempt, and it was violent because it was made by the politically dispossessed and unprivileged, and was resisted by those into whose hands the laws and dead men had given privilege and political power. If the scale of time against which you measure the events of this revolution be a generation or even two, it was a complete failure. The revolutionary effort to change a society and political system based upon privilege into one based upon the principles of the *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme*, which I have analysed in the previous volume, lasted for ten years. They were years in which the confusion of events and the confusion in men's heads continually increased, years of civil and foreign war, of revolution and counter-revolution, of invasion and counter-invasion, of constitution building, anarchy, and massacre. For democracy and for democrats in the end they proved to be years of failure, complete failure. The French Revolution ended in 1799, and if the history of the French Revolution had ended in the same year, we should merely have to record that the attempt to establish a political system on the primary importance of the happiness of ordinary men and upon liberty and equality had proved to be fantastically impossible. The first effort to translate democratic ideas into democratic institutions failed, if only because French democrats failed to establish any stable form of government.

I do not propose to say anything here about this failure or about the events of 1789 to 1799. They are, no doubt, politically and historically of immense interest and importance; but they have no bearing upon the communal psychology of democracy, for they are relevant only to the psychology and

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political dynamics of violent revolution. The Revolution gave way to Napoleon. The military dictator and conqueror is a phenomenon perpetually recurring throughout human history. So long as society remains comparatively simple and human relations, whether of individuals or communities, are largely determined by violence, the military dictatorship as a political system has some foundation in facts and reason. But in societies such as modern, economic civilization has developed in Europe—in which human relations rest upon an elaborate system of social and international organization, and this in turn requires a complicated system of agreements, customs, rules, regulations, and laws, and assumes a large measure of individual equality and liberty—force or conquest is an irrelevant and irrational anachronism. That is why war in the fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and even eighteenth centuries did occasionally settle a problem of political development and historical importance, whereas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries wars have settled nothing except such questions as that the Germans were more successful in killing Frenchmen in 1870 and Frenchmen more successful in killing Germans in 1918. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the question of the relative ability of Frenchmen and Germans to kill one another, and the question whether Alsace was incorporated in a French or German State, were still relevant to the life that men actually lived and to the social structure of Europe. The whole of society, and therefore individual lives from the cradle to the grave, were organized on the assumption that force and the ability to kill had their recognized places as

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instruments for regulating the political, economic, and personal relations of human beings, just as in a different era of the world's history the whole of society was organized on the assumption that ceremonies to remove communal sin had their recognized, and an extremely important, place in the ordering of human relations. Neither of these assumptions had any longer a meaning in the European society of the nineteenth century, and to-day it is no more possible to "settle" anything by war than by the Archbishop of Canterbury putting our sins upon the head of a live goat and sending it away by the hand of a fit man into the wilderness.

Force and war can only settle such questions as the relative military power of two states or the "possession" of certain territory. The first question has no relevance in the lives which we live to-day and the second, as we shall see later in this book, would be irrelevant if we adapted our political psychology and institutions to the kind of social structure which facts and events have begun to develop and which the form of our civilization actually assumes. Napoleon and the events of 1799 to 1815 were, therefore, a vast anachronism and they had practically no historical effects except upon the memory of survivors and the imagination of posterity. When the great congress met in Vienna, the political structure of Europe had to be rebuilt and the lines of its frontiers redrawn. The work was in the hands of a few men of rank or distinction: the Emperor Alexander of Russia, Count Metternich, the Duke of Wellington, Viscount Castlereagh, Prince de Talleyrand, and Prince Hardenberg. These men had no contact, except that of horror and

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repulsion, with the democratic conception of happiness, equality and liberty; they belonged entirely, in spirit and intellect, to the *ancien régime* and they had no understanding of any political idea or social ideal which was to have life and meaning for Europe during the next fifty years. The dead hand, as we have seen, dominates history and it is characteristic of the human insect in its political development that, when at a great crisis in its history, it has to build the foundations for the future, it nearly always chooses as builders men whose sympathies and interests are wholly with the dead and the past. Those who in 1815 built the political framework for the nineteenth century had in the main only one idea—to return to the eighteenth century and the world of 1789. In so far as it is possible for the statesman to succeed in this Sisyphean task, which he is so often imposing upon himself, and make history go backwards, these statesmen of 1815 succeeded. Little was left of Napoleon and his empire but a Bernadotte in Scandinavia and a codification of the law in France. Of the Revolution even less was left. The principle of reconstruction was legitimacy, which meant a return to the *status quo* of 1789, and the symbol was the restoration of a Bourbon and the brother of Louis XVI. to the throne of France.

We who are able to examine the Europe which emerged from the Congress of Vienna in the light of a hundred years of subsequent history know that the statesmen responsible for the reconstruction were completely deluded. There was no possibility of any permanent return to the *status quo*, and the notion that the world of 1815 could somehow or other be

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thrust back forcibly into the matrix of 1750, into political ideas and institutions which even a hundred years before had proved to be antiquated and unworkable, was as impracticable as would be an attempt to squeeze a man of twenty-one into the clothes which he had already found to be too small for him at the age of seven. Both the social and economic fabric which men like Wellington and Metternich assumed as the basis of their political constructions had ceased to exist. The Europe of George, Frederick, Catherine, and Louis had passed away, and in its place there was already a new Europe of Robert Owen and William Cobbett; the Rothschilds, Richard Cobden, and John Bright; Karl Marx, Bismarck, and Herr Stinnes; Tolstoi, Lenin, and Stalin; M. Thiers, Napoleon III., and M. Clemenceau. One of the geological ages of human society had just disappeared under a new accretion, and the feudal stratum of history was on the point of being overlaid by the industrial revolution, the middle classes and the proletariat, railways, steamships, and telegraphs.

From the first the attempt to confine this new world in the political institutions of the eighteenth century proved a failure. Within a few years of the Congress of Vienna it began to be clear that no permanent equilibrium had been established between those three factors which have somehow or other to be balanced and reconciled in every society, if there is to be stability, peace, and progress: political institutions, the economic structure of society, and the political and social ideas inside men's heads. The sign that that equilibrium had not been attained was the fact that the strains and

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stresses and struggles which had appeared in the eighteenth century were almost immediately renewed. The French Revolution began all over again. Contemporaries themselves soon became aware of this, and in 1848 in France men talked and acted as if they were taking part in a revolution which had begun sixty years before.

The French Revolution, as I have said, was an unsuccessful attempt to translate democratic ideas into democratic institutions. The history of the years from 1815 to 1870 in Europe and the United States of America is the history of a series of similar attempts. Here, perhaps, we are beginning to see some explanation of that curious fact to which attention was drawn on page 78 of the first volume of this book, that in the great social convulsion of the eighteenth century men felt themselves moved to fight for or against the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and that 125 years later, in the even greater convulsion of the twentieth century, there stood the civilized world again with millions of men feeling a compulsion to fight and die in defence of or opposition to the same ideas. The communal psychology which produced the French Revolution did not consist of ideas in a vacuum or of ideas personal to individuals like the preference of one man for blue eyes and of another for grey. It consisted of an attitude of mind in a vast number of different people to such questions as the kind of life which civilized men should lead, the relations which should exist between individuals and classes, the objects which government and Governments should pursue. The concern of hundreds of thousands of politicians, agitators, revolutionaries, and ordinary

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men with these questions was not perverse or academic, as we are asked to believe by many who opposed democracy in the past or are disillusioned with it in the present. Their attitude was in part an immediate reaction to their environment, an attempt to adapt political institutions to the new framework of society, the enormous industrial cities, the factories, the intricate machinery of modern finance and commerce, this new civilization or barbarism which no man had it in his power to affect or control, which every man could feel to be impinging upon his own personal existence, and which was in fact destroying the Europe of Wellington and Metternich under their eyes.

In 1815 there was a new economic and social rhythm in the life of Europe. It is clear to us, now looking back over history, in the enormous increase of populations. It was felt instinctively in the actual lives of hundreds of thousands of middle-class and working-class men and women. These people were themselves a new phenomenon; you might already have seen their hordes beginning to appear in the streets of London and Manchester, Paris, Lyons, and Berlin, but had you stepped back sixty years in time, the streets of these towns would have been almost empty of them. To say this is but to say that the world had moved on from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century and that a gulf had opened between the two. People did not and could not live in the England of Cobbett and Francis Place or the France of Monsieur Thiers, as they had lived in the England of Horace Walpole or the France of Marie Antoinette. The rhythm of this new life had entered not only the lives of these new men, but their heads.

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Compare the reactions of Stendhal and Balzac to their environment, the rhythm and tempo of their minds, with those of Voltaire and Diderot; compare those of Shelley and Hazlitt with those of Gray, Gibbon, and Johnson. It was fantastic to believe that the minds of Stendhal, Balzac, Shelley, and Hazlitt could be made to live in the Paris and London of Madame du Deffand and Horace Walpole; yet that is what Wellington and Talleyrand were trying to effect by means of political contrivances. In 1825 Stendhal was forty-two, Balzac twenty-six, Hazlitt thirty-seven, and Shelley had already been dead three years; and in 1825 Europe was still rigidly imprisoned in the political institutions of the eighteenth century by Wellington, Villèle, Metternich, and the Tsar of Russia. The psychology of these writers and thinkers was not essentially different from thousands of their contemporaries, now nameless and forgotten. They may have been great poets or great novelists, but their outlook upon life was that of the age in which they were living, and they were living in 1825, not 1750.

The psychology of millions of people who in 1825 had reached the age of thirty or forty was widely and profoundly different from that of people living in 1750. Part of this difference was due to their changed attitude towards the problems of government and society, which is connected with democracy and was discussed in the previous volume. There were now millions of men in businesses, shops, and factories who believed—though they might not be able to express that belief—that government should exist for the benefit of free and equal citizens, politically united in a common purpose—the happi-

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ness of each and all.¹ When therefore the statesmen at Vienna and the Governments of the decade that followed 1815 attempted to put Europe back politically a quarter of a century, there was an immediate and instinctive resistance from those who felt the political institutions to be incompatible with their political beliefs. That is why, as we shall see, in so many different places there were the same political reactions, the same attempts to translate democratic ideas into democratic institutions complicated by the same social and psychological problems. In this European renewal of the French Revolution there were certain definite periods of crisis and struggle in which the latent discord between the structure of society and men's social ideas and ideals rose to the surface and gave rise to such events as the French Revolution of 1830, the Reform Bill agitation in England in 1831 and 1832, the revolutions of 1848, and the Paris Commune. In order to understand the development of political communal psychology and of democracy in nineteenth-century Europe, one must examine the ideas underlying these periods of crisis and their relation to events. I propose therefore now to proceed to the examination of the communal psychology of (1) The Reform Bill agitation in Great Britain, (2) the French crises of 1830, 1848, and 1871, and (3) the period in Great Britain from 1832 to the retirement of Gladstone.

The Reform Act of 1832 is an extraordinarily important and strange event in English history. Everyone knows that English political history is a history of political evolution and not of revolution, and that Englishmen, unlike many of their neigh-

¹ See Vol. I. p. 338.

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bours, dislike revolutions. But 1832 was a real revolution, an English revolution, and therefore muddled, compromised, snugly wrapped up, and safely constitutionalized by the intellectual cotton-wool which we call English common sense. I do not propose to retell its history in detail, for that is not necessary to my purpose. My object is to get at the political and social ideas that underlay the struggle, and the events themselves can therefore be treated summarily. The point at issue was the reform of the House of Commons. Between 1750 and 1825, despite the changes which had come over the face of Europe and the surface of men's minds, over the deeper rhythms in their living and thinking, the British Constitution had suffered no change of any sort. The House of Commons and the method of its election remained therefore in 1825 what they had been in 1750. In theory the House was elected, in practice the distribution of seats and the franchise ensured that the majority of its members owed their election to a complicated system of nomination and corruption. The right to nominate and buy the votes of the small number of electors was mainly in the hands of the aristocracy and landed gentlemen. The "owner" of a pocket borough regarded the seat as his property; in this respect it did not differ for him in any way from his house or his land; he sold or leased the right to return a member of parliament just in the same way as he might sell or lease one of his fields, and there were many people in England who therefore held that, if any system of Reform destroyed or decreased the value of such rights, their owners should be compensated in money for the loss.

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As a result, the membership of the House consisted mainly of the relations or nominees of Peers, landed gentlemen or their nominees, and wealthy men who had purchased seats. The social complexion of the legislature was naturally reflected in the government of the country. For three-quarters of a century the executive had been composed alternately of Whig or Tory Peers and landlords, but the policy of a Whig Government did not differ essentially either in principles or practice from that of a Tory Government. During this period it is hardly possible to point to a single important legislative measure or act of the executive which was not dictated by the interests of those who composed or controlled the Cabinet and Parliament. The British Constitution, the political organization of the country, and the policy and outlook of the governing classes remained absolutely unchanged through the psychological revolution which swept over Europe during the French Revolution, through the Napoleonic wars, and through the industrial revolution. In other words, politics and the machinery of government were used to protect and promote the interests of the aristocracy and landed gentlemen and the interests of the new classes of mine-owners, manufacturers, and merchants, in so far as they did not seriously conflict with those of the landlords.

The movement for the reform of the House of Commons had already existed before the French Revolution and had temporarily had the support even of Pitt. The revolution at first gave to it a new impetus and vigour in the country, but later the fear for their power and property which events in

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France inspired in the English governing classes made them more than ever determined to resist any political change. Their own absolute control of the political and judicial machinery and twenty years of war helped them easily to consolidate their position. Under these circumstances, as is almost always the case, patriotism became the synonym for reaction and the interests of those in power, and a "reformer" in the eyes of the aristocracy and the mob became identified with Jacobinism and Terrorism. If the reformer were a poor man, he was lucky if he escaped sentence of death, transportation, or imprisonment; if, like Fox or Grey, he were rich and himself a member of the governing classes, he was of course in no danger of losing his life or his liberty, but he lost all chance of political power. During all those years of reaction, the movement for reform was never completely suppressed in the country and never completely died out of Parliament. Grey, Fox, and those Whigs who remained Whigs never abandoned it as an integral part of the party programme, and even in 1797 Grey moved in the House to bring in a Reform Bill which would have enfranchised all householders paying church rate and poor rate. Among the people, the movement was kept alive, if in a state of suspended and suppressed animation, by enthusiasts like Major Cartwright and by the few who felt intensely the rhythm of the new century and from whose minds war, Pitt, Castle-reagh, and Wellington could not eradicate the new ideas connected with democracy.

In order to understand the psychology of 1832, it is important to understand the psychology of the Reform Movement as it manifested itself before

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1825. In those years the question was felt by both sides to the controversy to be largely academic, for there was no real chance of change. But in large political questions, during the apparently academic period before they become acute "questions of practical politics", before both sides seize upon any argument prompted by passion, the fear of imminent failure, or the hope of immediate success, it is often possible to catch a clearer glimpse of the real motives working in the communal psychology. In the period before 1825 one can distinguish in the arguments of reformers three different motives for desiring a change in the parliamentary system. There were first a number of people who objected to the corruption inherent in the existing system. Many of them had no more sympathy with the new democratic ideas than a Tory squire and some of them would have been content that Members of Parliament should be virtually the nominees of Peers or country gentlemen. Their political psychology was, therefore, still that of the eighteenth century and completely different from that of any one alive to-day. But they disliked political corruption; they objected to the system of buying and selling seats and votes, which seemed, as time went on, to become more prevalent or at any rate more notorious. The practices by which George III. had temporarily acquired power in the House of Commons during the years 1770-1782 were not essentially different from those by which the rival aristocratic "bosses" normally managed elections and secured majorities, but they were widely unpopular, particularly among the governing classes, and they drew attention to the ease with which

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under the existing system political power could be purchased either by money or by place. Another thing which drew attention to the same fact and offended conservative feeling was the influx of *nouveaux riches*, especially of the Indian nabobs, whose competition for seats in the House of Commons was said enormously to have raised their price. As the eighteenth century waned and premonitions of the nineteenth century began to stir in the communal psychology, a quickened sense of morality—of which a notable instance was the Methodist Revival—made its appearance throughout England, and many people felt suddenly that things were shocking which their fathers had thought natural. In 1797, when Fox spoke in support of Grey's motion to bring in a Reform Bill, he urged a moderate increase of electors to a total of 600,000 on the ground that such a franchise would give "independent voters". There were many people who did not hold Fox's views and who were nevertheless beginning to be shocked by the fact that seats and votes were openly bought and sold and that a contested election was more often than not an orgy of violence, drunkenness, and bribery. Such people were half-way on the road to our own views of political morality, and were therefore inclined to listen to the reformer's argument that by increasing the electorate you would get independent voters and so check bribery and corruption.

The second motive for reform was entirely different and had to do with the distribution of seats. In the latter part of the eighteenth century the distribution of seats had little relation to the population or to the social and economic development of the

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country. Nothing was done to make the political system reflect the change from an agricultural to an industrial society, and so, as is well known, boroughs in which the population had dwindled to a handful still returned members, while many large towns had no representation at all. Here we have a striking example of that process, referred to in Chapter II., Part I., by which the political framework of society becomes obsolete owing to gradual economic changes in the social structure, and the dead hand of history resists adjustment. If in the constitution and political machinery of Britain the House of Commons was to remain a "representative" body and the population have some influence upon legislation and the executive through members elected for local constituencies, it was ridiculous that dead and dying villages should continue to have representatives and great, new cities should have none. Even before the French Revolution the effects of the economic and industrial revolution in England were apparent; the ancient domestic industrial system had already in many places disappeared before the new inventions and the concentration in factories and towns had begun.¹ By the third decade of the eighteenth century the population of Manchester was about 50,000. Within a few generations the political problems of Great Britain would inevitably be almost entirely concerned with this new population, the new economic classes, and the new industries—with foreign trade, finance, the relations between employer and employed, the conditions of employment, strikes, trade unions, communications, housing, health, and the building and administration of the new towns.

¹ *E.g.* by 1788 jenny spinning in cottages had ceased.

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The question of what classes should have the political power to deal with the political aspects of these problems was bound up with this question of the distribution of seats, and naturally those actively engaged in building the new industrial society, the nascent middle classes, were in favour of reform in so far as it concerned the distribution of seats. It was in fact inconceivable, as anyone can see now, that it should be left to a handful of country gentlemen and aristocrats to make the laws required by the complicated economic system and the vast urban populations of the nineteenth century. Yet so tenacious is the dead hand, so blind the passions of conservatism and the instinct to resist all change in those who possess property or power, that the House of Lords and the country gentlemen opposed reform until they were swept aside by the mere force of events. Historians and biographers, as well as the rest of the world, seem usually not to observe the lessons which might be drawn from the obstinate resistance of the classes who possess power and property to inevitable political and social changes. If anyone proposed that the mode of life normally imposed upon children of three should also be imposed upon men and women of thirty, we should conclude that he was either a satirist or an imbecile; but when the Duke of Wellington, the House of Lords, and the Tory country gentlemen maintained that the political machinery of the early eighteenth century was the best possible for the industrialized England of the nineteenth century, the Duke was made Prime Minister and the Tory position was and still is considered politically rational.

The third motive for reform sprang directly from

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political and social ideas. The view that great historical events, the political history of peoples, and the flowering and withering of civilizations are determined mainly by material or economic causes, or mainly by political causes, or mainly by psychological causes, has been advanced at one time or another by the different schools of political thought, and these various interpretations of history are passionately attacked or defended by passionate partisans. A detailed investigation of any hundred years of modern human history will show that there is no truth in these interpretations and theories, at any rate in the form in which they are usually accepted. The kind of lives which men live and therefore the kind of civilization which they enjoy are determined to a very large extent over any fairly considerable period of time by the equilibrium or disequilibrium between three factors, political institutions, the economic structure of society, and social ideas and ideals. The crisis which culminated in the Reform Act of 1832 was due to a violent disequilibrium between these three factors. The second motive for Reform which I have just examined reflects the disequilibrium between the economic structure of Great Britain and the political institutions. But to end the analysis there and to give a purely economic interpretation to the history of 1832 would be to over-simplify and distort it. In addition to the disequilibrium between economic facts and political institutions, there was a violent disharmony between men's political and social ideas and the political institutions, and what is more, as we shall soon see, this disharmony involved not only the political institutions of the country, but the new

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economic structure. The ideas with regard to liberty, equality, and happiness, which were examined in the previous volume, were just as inconsistent and incompatible with the existing parliamentary system as was the growth of Manchester and the other great manufacturing towns. In consequence the reform of the House of Commons was demanded, not only in the name of economics, but in the name of democracy.

The real cause of an insurrection, revolution, or other event which depends upon a mass movement, and the reason why it does not happen at one moment and does happen at another, are subjects of endless dispute among historians and political theorists. The crisis which led to Earl Grey becoming Prime Minister in 1830 and passing the Reform Act in 1832 was essentially one which depended for its existence and successful momentum upon a mass movement, and at first sight the suddenness and violence with which the crisis appeared and developed seems to be so mysterious that people are inclined to explain it as a mere erratic and irrational explosion in the communal psychology. Why for instance, it is asked, if the demand for Reform in 1830 was rooted in the three motives described above, was the vast mass of the country indifferent in 1825 and "at the boiling point" in 1830? It is not possible to discover any particular event or events during the years 1825 to 1830 which made the need for reform more urgent than it had been in the previous five years or which were of the kind to convince large numbers of people of its urgency. How, then, can the philosophic historian pretend to explain such a movement as the result of political

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ideas and economic motives operating rationally in people's minds, and would it not be better to admit at once that the popular movement was merely an erratic and temporary outburst of discontent which a small group of theorists and party politicians successfully canalized into the channel of their own political programme?

The question which I have raised here is not an academic one. It is a fundamental question about our modern society, which every believer in authority and oligarchical dictatorship no less than every believer in democracy ought to face, and the more intimately connected a man is with the art of government and the practice of politics the more important it is to him to answer the question correctly. How far are "the people" in a modern democracy capable of forming and expressing a reasoned opinion upon great political issues? What is public opinion and how far can a modern Government safely go in ignoring it? Is it really true that a Government cannot fool all the people all the time? These are vital questions which continually confront the practical politician and the historian ever since 1789, and nowhere are you more likely to find an answer to them than in a study of the communal psychology of revolutions. For in revolutions and mass movements generally you can observe public opinion and the mind of democracy in their most naked forms, and you can note actual occasions upon which Governments have failed to ignore public opinion or fool the masses with impunity.

It is significant that those who in modern times have been most concerned with revolutions and most successful as revolutionaries have given serious

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attention to such "theoretical" questions. From Marx and Bakunin to Lenin and Trotsky they have endlessly analysed and argued about the political communal psychology of masses and its relation to social change, and the conclusions of many of them who have had the opportunity to test their theories by practice are well worth study. The historian who has had no personal experience of active revolution but who wishes to understand the events and psychology of 1832 may, for instance, learn a good deal from Trotsky's account in his *History of the Russian Revolution*, of the way in which events led from the revolution of March 1917 to the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917. Here is Trotsky's general description of the way in which a successful revolution happens:¹

The fundamental premise of a revolution is that the existing social structure has become incapable of solving the urgent problems of development of the nation. A revolution becomes possible, however, only in case the society contains a new class capable of taking the lead in solving the problems presented by history. The process of preparing a revolution consists of making the objective problems involved in the contradictions of industry and of classes find their way into the consciousness of living masses, change this consciousness and create new correlations of human forces.

The ruling classes, as a result of their practically manifested incapacity to get the country out of its blind alley, lose faith in themselves; the old parties fall to pieces; a bitter struggle of groups and cliques prevails; hopes are placed in miracles or miracle workers. All this constitutes one of the political premises of a revolution, a very important although a passive one.

¹ Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, vol. iii. p. 173, English edition, 1933.

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A bitter hostility to the existing order and a readiness to venture upon the most heroic efforts and sacrifices in order to bring the country out upon an upward road—this is the new political consciousness of the revolutionary class, and constitutes the most active premise of a revolution.

Such is Trotsky's analysis of the general psychology of revolutions, and it throws considerable light, as we shall see, upon the communal psychology and the events of 1830. But before examining it from this point of view, it will be useful to observe what he says about the psychological development in the masses between the first Russian Revolution in March 1917 and the Bolshevik Revolution of October.

The revolution of March developed from an insurrection. This was a spontaneous mass movement occasioned by widespread and deep-seated discontent. The Tsar's Government had proved itself incompetent to deal with the situation created by a prolonged war on a gigantic scale. The moment came when large numbers of soldiers at the front and civilians in the capital were no longer willing to bear the miseries which the Government was imposing on them. The machinery of obedience, which the cynic might call the machinery of foolery, had broken down. The ordinary and often silent appeals to patriotism, allegiance, religion, and habit no longer worked either in the trenches or in the streets of Petrograd. The soldier had discovered that peace, and the worker that bread, meant more to him than the objects of a world war as explained to him by his Tsar and Protopopov, by the German Emperor, President Wilson, and Mr. Lloyd George.

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Here was Trotsky's "fundamental premise of a revolution" — the existing social structure, the Government, had become incapable of solving an urgent social problem. The ruling classes had lost faith in themselves, and, as soon as the workers and soldiers came out into the streets of Petrograd, the old regime broke in pieces and disappeared.

The mass movement of March was an insurrection, but not a revolution guided "by a new class capable of taking the lead in solving the problems presented by history". The immediate motives of the workers and soldiers, the ideas which lay behind their revolutionary action, were clear and quite simple; they were peace and food. But there were other ingredients in the communal psychology of the Russian people in 1917 which were just as important as the immediate motives which brought them into the streets and out of the trenches, and these ingredients made it possible for a sudden insurrection to be guided into the channels of a gigantic social revolution. In the first place, there was a long history of violent struggle between one of the most autocratic and reactionary Governments of Europe with middle-class democrats and revolutionary socialists. It is probably true that when the war broke out, the mass of the Russian people were neither democrats nor socialists, but it is also true that the Tsarist regime, by its cruel suppression of all movements for political liberty or social equality and particularly by its methods of dealing with the 1905 revolution, had itself helped to spread the ideas of Western democracy and Marxian socialism among the urban population in their most revolutionary forms. Thus there already existed in the middle-

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class intelligentsia and the "politically conscious" urban workers a considerable body of opinion convinced of the necessity for introducing into Russia Western democracy or even socialism.

But the revolts in the Poltava and Kharkov provinces in 1902 and the revolution of 1905 had shown that in the peasants there was another element which threatened danger to the stability of the *ancien régime* in Russia and had revolutionary ideas with regard to society and its economic organization. Where the peasants are prepared to attack the landlords and their property as they did in Russia in 1902 and 1905, it is clear that there is something radically wrong in the depths of society and some deep-seated dissatisfaction in the communal psychology and that here too the soil is prepared for social revolution. And in Russia in 1917 the soil was not only prepared, there were people and parties ready and able to sow the seed. That seed consisted of political, economic, and social ideas, from the democratic programme of the Kadets on the Right to the Communist programme of the Bolsheviks on the Left. The important thing to notice in Trotsky's account of the interval between the February and November revolutions is the interaction between these revolutionary ideas and programmes on the one side, and the generalized social discontent which was the motive power behind the original insurrection on the other. Take for instance the relation between the demonstration or abortive insurrection of July in Petrograd and the November revolution. In July large numbers of workers and soldiers came out into the streets against the Provisional Government; for a day the city was practi-

cally in their hands and it was only the arrival of "loyal" regiments and Cossacks from the front which enabled the Government to regain control. The opponents of the Bolsheviks allege that this insurrection was an abortive Bolshevik rising, but the Bolsheviks themselves, both at the time and afterwards, have always maintained that they did their best to prevent it. The question is, however, of no importance to my present purpose. The point is that in July the workers and soldiers of Petrograd came out into the streets against the Provisional Government in favour of the programme of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. The rising failed, but four months later a similar rising was completely successful: the Provisional Government fell, the Bolshevik Government came into power and immediately began to put into practice that programme and those ideas which Lenin had been preaching to the people of Petrograd and Russia ever since he made his first speech in the railway station on his arrival on April 16.

The Bolshevik programme was immediate peace, power to the Soviets, and socialism in place of the middle-class democratic regime. By July these ideas had commended themselves to a sufficient number of the workers and soldiers in Petrograd to cause the insurrection against the Provisional Government. But Trotsky maintains that the movement in public opinion at that time, though it might have gone far enough to put the Bolshevik party in power, had not yet reached the point, particularly outside Petrograd, at which it would have been strong enough to keep the Party in power. In the next four months the expectations of the people were still

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further disappointed by the vacillations of Kerensky's Government, and the attempt of Kornilov made many fear a revival of the old regime. The movement of opinion towards Lenin's programme was therefore greatly increased. On the other side, the Kadets and Kerensky were psychologically now in the position in which the Tsarist Government had been in February; they had shown themselves to be "manifestly incapable of getting the country out of its blind alley" and they had lost faith in themselves. The deep-seated discontent which had broken out in the March insurrection, the political and social ideas which had been working in Russia for twenty years, the hostility of the peasant to the landlord, and the stimulus to political thought which comes from the intolerable miseries of a long war fought by an incompetent and corrupt Government now combined to produce a bitter hostility to the existing order and a readiness to support a party which had already shown its determination to put a revolutionary programme into practice. As a result in the November revolution the Kerensky Government fell and the Bolsheviks succeeded them almost without a struggle.¹

¹ It is worth while noting that Trotsky's explanation of the psychology of successful insurrection and revolution is similar to that of Lenin's. In *On the Road to Insurrection* Lenin is discussing the difference between insurrection or Blanquism and revolution or Marxism. "In order to be entirely victorious," he says, "insurrection must depend not on a conspiracy or a party, but on a revolutionary class. That is the first point. Insurrection must depend on the revolutionary pressure of all the people. That is the second point. Insurrection must break out at the apogee of the rising revolution, that is, at the moment when the activity of the vanguard of the people is greater, when the fluctuations among the enemy and among the weak and indecisive friends of the revolution are strongest. That is the third point. It is in bringing these three conditions to the consideration of the question of insurrec-

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I propose now to examine the events of 1830 to 1832 in the light of this analysis of the psychology of mass movements which lead to successful revolutions or revolutionary changes in the fabric of society. The passing of the Reform Act was a revolutionary change of this kind, and it only stopped short of being a violent revolution, because at the last moment the governing classes decided to surrender their position without fighting and to allow political power to be taken from them by constitutional methods. The struggle was recognized on both sides to be one for parliamentary democracy; the question which, with great suddenness, produced an acute constitutional crisis was whether a system of parliamentary democracy should be substituted for the eighteenth-century system which reserved political power as a privilege of the aristocracy and landed gentry. And behind the immediate issue lay the much larger question, dimly recognized by both sides, whether the whole machinery of government and the fabric of eighteenth-century society should be remoulded according to the primary principles of democracy, which we have examined in the previous volume.

It will be observed that there were ingredients in the communal psychology of 1815 to 1827 which were preparing the ground for revolution in exactly the same way as ingredients in the communal psychology of Russia between 1902 and 1917 prepared the ground for the Russian Revolution. In

tion that Marxism differs from Blanquism. . . . No great revolution has happened, or can happen, without the disorganization of the army. . . . The new social class which aspires to power has never been able, and is even to-day unable, to assure and maintain its authority without the complete dislocation of the army."

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1825 the mass of the English people were not democrats or Jacobins; there was no sign of any mass movement in favour of political liberty and equality; but there already existed in the middle classes and in the "politically conscious" urban workers a considerable body of opinion convinced of the necessity of introducing into the British constitution the democratic principles of liberty and equality. What the democrats and socialists did for Russia in the early twentieth century, Bentham, Francis Place, Cobbett, Robert Carlile, Tom Paine, Shelley, Hazlitt, and many less famous men had done for Britain in the early nineteenth century. The teachings and social philosophies of these men were different, but they were all looking and pointing in the same direction and they produced in the minds of thousands of ordinary people a kind of composite image of what society should be and how the country should be governed. That image was the result partly of the changes in the economic structure of society and partly of the new democratic ideas regarding happiness, liberty, and equality. No doubt the image was a vague one in the minds of the thousands of "journeymen and labourers" who read Cobbett's twopenny *Register* in 1816, or the men and women who bought Tom Paine, Palmer's *Principles of Nature*, and the *Republican* from Carlile's shop in Fleet Street. But vague though it might be, a vision had been given to them of the kind of lives which they wished to live and of a political, economic, and social structure, which was very different from that approved by Castlereagh and Wellington, but could alone make such lives possible. In other words the heads of many ordinary Englishmen began, for the

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first time, to contain political ideas.¹ A dangerous phenomenon at all times, but still more dangerous and significant in 1820, because if you examine the vague vision of society which the journeymen and labourers were getting from the writings of Paine, Cobbett, and John Hunt, you will find that it inevitably foreshadowed the passing away of Castle-reagh's and Wellington's world and the creation of mid-Victorian England.

There is also another important fact to notice regarding the communal psychology of the period 1815-1830. During those years the vision of society in the minds of the mass of the "lower orders" and the middle class may have been vague, and there was no sign of any irresistible mass movement in favour of great political changes. But there was an active minority whose ideas and vision were clear, and embodied in contemporary dress the theories and ideals of eighteenth-century democracy. They included Benthamites, Democrats, Radicals, Reformers. The Government and governing classes, the professional politicians of the two political parties, called them hopeless visionaries or dangerous extremists, as is usual in such cases in which the vision of the extremist, when sufficiently sterilized to have lost most of its power for good, is to become the authorized political version of future Governments and governing classes. Parliamentary reform was in the forefront of these men's programme. In the years 1815-1819 there was a real movement for reform, which bore the same relation to the reform movement of 1830 which the Russian revolutionary movement of 1905 bore to the Russian Revolution

¹ See Vol. I. pp. 114 and 115.

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of 1917. Cobbett and Hunt were the leaders of the movement in the country during those years, and it was they who educated the working class to think politically. But Francis Place, the tailor, sitting in the room behind the shop in Charing Cross, was in his own way an equally important force in these embryonic stirrings of English democracy. Place was such a remarkable man and such an active force in the transition from the *ancien régime* to democracy that it is easy to overlook the fact that he was himself an effect as well as a cause of that transition. Like Paine, the son of a staymaker, and Cobbett, the son of a farm labourer, the two other men from whom the common people of England learned to think politically and democratically, Place came from the common people. The son of a sponging-house keeper, himself a breeches maker, mainly self-taught—the temper of his mind, the colour of his convictions and ideals, the course of his career were all determined by those psychological forces and economic changes which had produced the French Revolution and were producing the transition to capitalist democracy. Place was eighteen years old at the time of the French Revolution; four years later he was out of employment for eight months, and he and his wife starved on bread, water, and an occasional herring, but while he starved he read Adam Smith, Locke, and Hume. The spectacle of a breeches maker starving in London, victimized by the employers because of his leadership in a strike, and reading political economy and political science, would not have been possible before the eighties and nineties of the eighteenth century. At the age of twenty the mind of Francis Place had already begun

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to be moulded by the spirit of the age, or in other words by contemporary economics and communal political psychology. In 1794 he had become an active trade unionist, and in the same year he became a member of the London Corresponding Society, a working-class organization with a "Plan of Radical Reform", the reform being universal suffrage, annual Parliaments, and the payment of members. By 1815 Place had ceased to be a journeyman tailor; he was now an employer, a fairly rich man with a prosperous tailoring business in Charing Cross. He was a man who very rarely appeared in the limelight on the political stage; he sat in the wings, but there he was already a power, a great manipulator of politics and political puppets, one of the earliest and most powerful of democratic organizers. He was a friend of Bentham, James Mill, Owen, and Godwin, and he had already made the acquaintance of Joseph Hume, the M.P., who was to become in Place's hands an extraordinarily efficient instrument for forcing liberal measures through a reactionary House of Commons. Though Place was now a prosperous Benthamite radical, unlike most of the men of great ability who have struggled up painfully from the lower levels of the proletariat into the stuffy security of the bourgeoisie, he never lost his working-class outlook and sympathy either in economics or in politics. He always felt that he understood and was the spokesman of the workers, particularly throughout the reform crisis. From 1794 onwards he was convinced of the importance of parliamentary reform. It was, however, not before 1807 that he found time to take a serious part in politics. In that year, largely through his organizing

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powers, Burdett was at the top of the poll in the famous Westminster election. The result was a portent, for Burdett stood as an independent radical reformer and practically no money was spent on his candidature. From that moment Westminster, under the guidance or tutelage of Place, became the home of an active and influential movement for parliamentary reform. From 1807 to 1818 the reformers were so strong that neither Whig nor Tory contested an election against their candidates.

Thus, when the great war ended in 1815, the movement towards great changes already existed, in London and Manchester and in every village and town of England, the impetus coming from economics and the new ideas inside men's heads. From 1816 to 1819 there was an agitation among the working classes, led by Cobbett and Hunt, throughout the country for parliamentary reform. The English governing classes adopted precisely the same attitude to this movement as the Tsarist regime displayed to the similar movement in Russia between 1900 and 1914—they tried to suppress it. The more closely one studies the history of the years 1815–1825 the more clearly does one see that it was really a period of latent struggle, a period in which the governing classes proved that they had lost faith in themselves and were incapable of leading the country out of the blind alley of the past, in which a new class emerged capable of taking the lead and solving the problems presented by history, and in which public opinion was being educated to support a mass movement for reform. The course of events between 1815 and 1830 bears a remarkable resemblance to the struggle between revolution and

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repression in Russia between 1905 and 1914. The Government employed two weapons against the spread of "dangerous ideas": the "massacre" of civilians by police or troops and the imprisonment or transportation of those who expressed political or social ideas which the Government considered "dangerous". Thus the Peterloo "massacre",¹ which shocked many people even at that time, answered closely, both in its psychology and its effects, to the "massacre" at the Winter Palace in Petersburg on "Red Sunday" of 1905. Such massacres—the shooting down, sabring, or clubbing by Government troops of large numbers of unarmed citizens who have met to petition or protest against their rulers—is a corollary of the theory of "strong government" and is always defended as an unfortunate but extremely salutary necessity by the devotees of that curious form of administration. Amritsar, Peterloo, and "Red Sunday" have all had their eulogists or apologists, but it is noticeable that the further we get from the "massacres" the fewer we find to praise or defend them. A paternal Government which shows its strength and efficiency by killing a considerable number of its unarmed subjects, merely because they have met to express views which the governing classes consider wrong or dangerous to themselves, unless it immediately provokes an armed insurrection, is usually successful in temporarily intimidating the survivors and silencing most of its opponents. But the memory of such massacres in the minds of the loyal subjects is often long and bitter,

¹ The meeting on August 16, 1819, dispersed by the Hussars, who killed eleven and wounded four or five hundred persons, was a reform meeting at which Hunt was the principal speaker.

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and the ultimate psychological effect is not unlike that which can be observed in the case of children whose parents have used flogging as an important instrument of education. The subsequent history of the governments responsible for Peterloo, Red Sunday, and Amritsar is a poor recommendation for the belief that massacre is a sign of governmental efficiency or a good method of inducing people to change their political beliefs and desires. History lends little support to the idea, now so popular in Europe, that sensational exhibitions of force and acts of violence are signs of strength and stability in governments.

The second method adopted by the Tory ruling classes to prevent political change was precisely similar to that adopted a hundred years later by the Tsarist government in Russia. It is a method characteristic of "strong" governments and uncivilized people and is to-day once more being used with enthusiasm, as if it were a new political discovery and a kind of patent pill for curing national debility in Germany, Italy, and Russia. In fact it is one of the simplest and most ancient of human political contrivances by which the rulers make it a criminal offence for anyone to hold beliefs which they consider untrue, undesirable, or dangerous. For many thousands of years now, rulers, from primitive medicine-men and savage chiefs to Stalin, Signor Mussolini, and Herr Hitler, have been attempting unsuccessfully to establish their own delusions and hallucinations as eternal truth by hanging, burning, shooting, torturing, imprisoning, or banishing all those who refuse to agree with them. So the Tory rulers between 1816 and 1825 made it a

criminal offence for anyone to express those ideas about democracy and government and human society which in a few years' time were to become the truisms and commonplaces of politics, and the Courts were busily engaged in fining or sending to jail anyone who sold a book, pamphlet, or newspaper containing these "dangerous thoughts".

The Government's attempt to establish eternal truths in politics and religion by law and by legal penalties against anyone who questioned its infallibility was a failure, and this failure in a remarkable struggle, ending in what has been called "the freedom of the Press"¹ in England, was an important factor in creating the Reform agitation of 1830 and in ensuring its success. It was one symptom of the Tory ruling classes' "incapacity to get the country out of its blind alley"; it was the beginning of their losing faith in themselves. It is necessary to understand its main features not only from this point of view, but because it had an immense influence upon the development of democratic psychology in Britain and upon the characteristic interpretation of democracy which we know as nineteenth-century English liberalism. In 1816 Cobbett brought out his twopenny *Register*. He was the first to recognize that a new reading public had made its appearance in England. That "the lower orders" should be educated was an idea which was repugnant and dangerous in the minds of the upper classes and remained so for half a century and more, but in the latter part of the eighteenth century many of them had become convinced that it would be a good

¹ For the detailed facts regarding this, reference may be made to *The Struggle for the Freedom of the Press*, by William H. Wickwar, 1928.

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thing for the lower orders to learn to read the Scriptures. Sunday schools and subscription societies were therefore started and considerable numbers of working-class men and women learned to read the Bible and other innocuous reading matter provided by Religious Tract and Bible Societies.¹ Unfortunately the man who can read the Bible and the social opiate contained in tracts can also read Tom Paine or criticism of the Government, defined by law as seditious libel. It was Cobbett who first saw the possibility of making these new readers think politically as well as religiously, of making the masses politically conscious and so of laying the foundations for an educated democracy. His *Register* was a cheap political weekly deliberately written for this new class of reader in order to convince them of the evils of the existing system of government and the necessity of reforming it. Cobbett's example was quickly followed and between 1816 and 1819 a large number of cheap political weeklies were started in London and the provinces, their programmes varying from mild Reform through Radicalism to revolution.

The Government immediately adopted a policy of suppression, but their first attempts were singularly unsuccessful. The ill-advised prosecutions of Thomas Wooler for attacking the Ministry in his *Black Dwarf* and of William Hone for blasphemous libel only encouraged the critics, and the process of popular political education by means of weeklies and pamphlets was actively pursued for the next two years. The Government already had at its disposal an extremely severe law against criminal libel

¹ See Wickwar, *op. cit.* p. 52.

which made it an offence punishable with fine or imprisonment for anyone "to make the people discontented with the Constitution under which they live", "to make the people dissatisfied with the Government", or to deny the truth of what the governing classes considered should be the religious beliefs of the common people.¹ It also had at its disposal a form of legal proceedings, recently revived by the National Government in England,² by which, on the mere filing of an information for political libel, a man might be arrested on warrant and kept in jail for months without trial unless he found sureties for his "good behaviour" which satisfied the judge or magistrates. All this penal machinery for preventing the dissemination of thought, considered undesirable by the ruling classes, was vigorously used by them, and many well-known and unknown men suffered imprisonment for criticizing the Government or expressing opinions which are now innocuous platitudes perpetually on the lips of all respectable politicians in those countries in which the respectable politician still professes a belief in democracy. But the Tory Ministers, seeing with alarm the spate of cheap *Weekly Registers* and *Black*

¹ The first quotation is from the summing-up of L.C.J. Kenyon in *K. v. Perry and Others* (1792), the second from that of Baron Wood in *K. v. Drakard* (1811): see Wickwar, *The Struggle for the Freedom of the Press*, pp. 26 and 27. Baron Wood's words are worth quoting in full: "Is the libeller", he said, "to come and make the people dissatisfied with the Government under which he lives? This is not to be permitted to any man: it is unconstitutional and seditious." It will be noticed that the theory and practice of Communism and Fascism with regard to liberty of political thought and speech is a reversion to the last days of the eighteenth and early days of the nineteenth centuries.

² Recently Mr. Tom Mann was sent to jail for failing to give security for good behaviour, though he had not been found guilty or even accused of any offence.

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Dwarfs and their thousands of working-class readers, came to the conclusion that the legal machinery at their disposal for preventing political and religious thought in the lower orders was not enough. The Lord Chancellor Eldon and the Home Secretary, Lord Sidmouth, were both convinced that new laws were required against the Press, "at present a most malignant and formidable enemy of the Constitution to which it owed its freedom",¹ and the Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, agreed that Parliament ought to consider "what measures could be adopted for averting the evils threatened . . . by the outrageous licentiousness of the Press". Accordingly Parliament was summoned for an autumn session in November 1819, and at its opening the following sentence in the Regent's speech showed exactly what the political psychology of the ruling classes was in the period just before the Reform Bill:²

¹ Pellew, *Life of Lord Sidmouth*, p. 283, quoted by Wickwar, p. 130.

² Quoted by Wickwar, *The Struggle for the Freedom of the Press*, p. 131. Mr. Wickwar also quotes the popular parody of the Regent's speech, *Man in the Moon, a Speech from the Throne to the Senate of Lunataria*. Its appearance and popularity showed that a new spirit was already working in the political psychology of the subjects of the ruling classes; note for instance how clearly the voice of the nineteenth century sounds in the following passage:

"'Tis pity that these cursed State Affairs
Should take you from your pheasants and your hares
Just now;
But lo!
Conspiracy and Treason are abroad!
Those imps of darkness, gender'd in the wombs
Of spinning-jennies, winding-wheels, and looms,
In Lunashire—
O Lord!
My L—ds and G—tl—n, we've much to fear!
Reform, Reform, the swinish rabble cry—
Meaning of course rebellion, blood, and riot—
Audacious rascals! you, my Lrds, and I,
Know 'tis their duty to be starved in quiet."

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Upon the loyalty of the great body of the people I have the most confident reliance: but it will require your utmost vigilance and exertion to check the dissemination of the doctrines of treason and impiety, and to impress upon the minds of all classes of His Majesty's subjects that it is from the cultivation of the principles of religion, and from a just subordination to lawful authority, that we can alone expect the continuance of that Divine favour and protection which have hitherto been so signally experienced in this Kingdom.

The measures taken by the Government to deal with what Lord Sidmouth described as "a conspiracy for the subversion of the Constitution and of the rights of property" were passed by both Houses of Parliament in a month and are known in history as the Six Acts. Of these only two were directed against the Press and were intended to prevent the "dissemination of the doctrines of treason and impiety". The first strengthened the hands of the judges against persons convicted of Criminal Libel and provided that those convicted of a second offence might be banished or transported; the other, by subjecting the cheap weeklies and pamphlets to the same stamp duties as newspapers, aimed at making dangerous thoughts too expensive for the lower orders.

The sequel, which was played out in the political comedy of the years 1820 to 1830, is well worthy of attention for the student of the strength of strong Governments, the efficacy of suppressing thought, and possible methods of eliminating democratic aspirations since 1789 in a population which has acquired the troublesome habit of reading. The Government was autocratic, aristocratic, and reac-

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tionary. Its power to suppress a handful of wretched journalists, disreputable pamphleteers, and half-educated booksellers must have seemed impregnable to any contemporary contemplating its complete control of governmental machinery, and the eminent careers and great ability of individual Ministers. The Duke of Wellington was a member of the Cabinet; Castlereagh, a statesman who combined subtlety and tenacity with intelligence, was Foreign Secretary and leader of the House of Commons; Eldon, reputed to be one of the great English lawyers and the most determined opponent of all political innovations, was Lord Chancellor; Henry Addington, now Lord Sidmouth, who conveyed the thanks of the Government to the magistrates and troops responsible for the massacre of Peterloo, had already for seven years as Home Secretary shown his ability and determination to treat all discontent among the lower orders "with unwavering sternness". The Government, which the talents of these Ministers adorned, had been in power, with Liverpool as Prime Minister, since 1812. It had to its credit the winning of a great war; it controlled a victorious army and a subservient magistracy; its parliamentary position was completely secure, for it had to reckon with no serious opposition either in the Lords or the Commons, while, so long as the House of Commons remained unreformed, it could count upon a comfortable majority at any election and had no need to consider "public opinion" in the constituencies. But its advantages as an engine of suppression were not limited to power and privilege. In its determination to deal sternly with what the Regent called "treason and impiety" it certainly

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had behind it the support and approval of the aristocracy, the clergy, the country gentlemen, the bulk of the middle class, and indeed all those who prided themselves on possessing the fundamental British virtues of loyalty and respectability. The extent and reality of this support are shown by the formation of such societies as the Constitutional Association and the Society for the Suppression of Vice, which seconded the efforts of the Government by instituting proceedings against the writers and publishers of "seditious and blasphemous" literature.

And yet, despite the great strength of their position, the Government failed. The rapidity and completeness of this failure were very remarkable. Mr. Wickwar, in his history of the freedom of the Press, shows by his chapter headings that in his judgment the Government itself had failed by the end of 1820, that its supporters in the Constitutional Association and in the Society for the Suppression of Vice had failed and had been discredited by the end of 1822, and that "free discussion" finally triumphed with the release of Carlile from prison in 1825. Now that the forcible suppression of opinion and discussion has once more become a major occupation of State to the governing classes in many European countries, it is important to understand, if possible, why a hundred years ago the English governing classes, with so much power and so many cards in their hands, were almost immediately defeated. The reasons for their defeat are to be found partly in certain defects and weaknesses inherent in the ruling classes of the early nineteenth century, and partly in communal psychology. Wellington,

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Castlereagh, Sidmouth, Eldon, and Liverpool sound very well in historical retrospect as the members of a Cabinet charged with the humdrum duties of a Government, to maintain law and order, protect privilege, and sit safely upon the *status quo*. But unfortunately for aristocracies and dictators, government cannot be confined merely to the art of *beati possidentes*, of imprisoning or executing one's opponents, of suppressing those whom the rulers dislike, of keeping things as they are, and of sitting upon safety-valves. Particularly in times of economic evolution or instability, those who exercise political power will be continually brought up against problems in which social and political adjustments are obviously required to meet the changing conditions, and if they cannot or will not make those adjustments, the Government is not only blamed for economic dislocations and disasters, but it also begins to be paralysed by its own feeling of political inefficiency. And if at the same moment, as is extremely probable, the economic changes are accompanied by profound changes in communal psychology, a Government which refuses to adapt itself either to economic or to psychological changes and relies solely upon suppression and repression may well find itself confronted by a revolutionary attitude in its subjects at the very moment when it is becoming conscious of its own "incapacity to get the country out of its blind alley".

This is what happened in fact to the apparently all-powerful Government of Lord Liverpool between 1820 and 1827. It is interesting to observe the stages by which the people's confidence in the ruling classes

and the ruling classes' confidence in themselves rapidly disintegrated. The first blow was struck when, on July 5, 1820, Lord Liverpool, the Prime Minister, introduced into the House of Lords a Bill "to deprive her Majesty Queen Caroline Amelia Elizabeth of the title, prerogative rights, privileges and exemptions of Queen Consort of this realm, and to dissolve the marriage between his Majesty and the said Caroline Amelia Elizabeth". The Queen's Trial and the passionate popular hostility which it aroused against the King, the King's Ministers, and the House of Lords form a historical incident which throws much light upon the working of communal psychology. "Since I have been in the world", wrote Greville in his Diary on October 15, 1820, "I never remember any question which so exclusively occupied everybody's attention, and so completely absorbed men's thoughts and engrossed conversation. In the same degree is the violence displayed. It is taken up as a party question entirely, and the consequence is that everybody is gone mad about it." In this "party question" the sympathies of the vast majority of ordinary persons were violently on the Queen's side and against the King. Much of this passionate interest in the question whether her Majesty Queen Caroline Amelia Elizabeth had or had not committed adultery with Bergami had, of course, nothing to do with political psychology. The modern newspaper proprietor has taught us how easily the attention of millions of people may become absorbed in the details of a *cause célèbre*, particularly if the details are concerned with the sexual adventures of titled persons. But it is a superficial view of history to treat profound movements in the political

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psychology of the masses as absurd and irrational because they are intimately connected with popular interest in royal adulteries. The reality and importance of the French Revolution in the political psychology of the masses are not influenced by the fact, if it be a fact, that the masses learned their democracy from *Le Mariage de Figaro* rather than from *L'Esprit des Lois* or *Le Contrat social*, and the Reform agitation of 1830 does not lose its political significance because we can trace it back to the agitation, ten years before, about the adulteries of Caroline, George, Bergami, Lady Hertford, and Lady Conyngham. The abstract and rational element in politics has to be dramatized or at least to be translated into the concrete terms of some dramatic event before the ordinary man can understand its full significance or feel passionately about it. Hence the importance of symbols in political psychology; in the history of all mass movements or of great changes in mass psychology one comes upon events which assumed an importance out of all proportion to their actual nature, because they symbolized or dramatized for the mass of ordinary men revolutionary political ideas or profound social conflicts.

The passionate support which the populace of London and indeed the people of England gave to the cause of Queen Caroline, the odium which the new King, his Ministers, the House of Lords, and the governing classes incurred by the Queen's trial, immediately acquired this symbolic or dramatic quality. There is in England a standard of conduct which would be difficult to define, but which everyone understands by tradition and instinct—"fair

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play"—a standard which has had a considerable effect upon English law and British justice, *e.g.* the rules governing the procedure in our courts and the law of evidence, which differ so remarkably from Continental systems mainly because they attempt to translate into law and legal procedure this peculiarly British instinct for "fair play". This instinct was almost universally outraged by the spectacle of an old and obese king, notorious for his adulteries,¹ attempting for no useful purpose, except rancour, and without any regard for public decency or dignity, to fasten upon his wife the charge of adultery in order to deprive her of her royal rights and privileges. It was outraged by the spectacle of the King using his power to cut the Queen's name out of the Liturgy, so that his subjects were forced to pray for a king whom they disliked and not allowed to pray for a queen whom they liked. That the Government and the House of Lords not only acquiesced in the injustice, but used the whole machinery of power and law to accomplish it, involved them in the King's unpopularity. But it did more than that. When Creevey, on August 17, 1820, only five years after the battle of Waterloo, as he walked through St. Margaret's Churchyard on his way to the House of Lords, heard the crowd hiss and hoot Wellington, he was listening to something more than a passing hiss of the fickle masses. There is abundant evidence in contemporary memoirs and letters that the trial assumed a deeper political significance, becoming for large numbers of ordinary people a dramatization or symbol of the way in

¹ The fact that George IV. had committed bigamy as well as adultery was, of course, not known at the time.

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which their rulers ruled. That was why there immediately appeared in the people a temper very nearly revolutionary; it was shown by the immense crowds which demonstrated in the Queen's favour, from the day on which she landed in England to the day, fourteen months later, when thousands gathered on the beach at Harwich to see her dead body embarked for Brunswick, and it was shown in the hostile demonstrations against the King and his Ministers and the sporadic indiscipline in the army.

Contemporaries were aware of this semi-revolutionary attitude. The diarist Creevey writes on October 12, 1820:

By Jove, my dear, we are coming to critical times, such as no man can tell the consequences of. It is quite understood that the Lords—at the suit of the Ministers—are resolved to pass the Bill, upon the sole point of the Queen being admitted to have slept under the tent on board the polacre, while Bergami slept there likewise. . . . I predict with the most perfect confidence, that commotion and bloodshed must follow this enormous act of injustice, should it be committed.

Faced by this dangerous temper in the people, the attitude of the governing classes was admirably calculated to encourage dangerous political thinking and prepare the ground for revolution. Their whole handling of the case was indecent, undignified, and incompetent. But when a ruling class becomes really incompetent and undignified it seems to acquire an additional measure of provocative arrogance which makes it blind to all consequences and its own doom inevitable. This was true of the *ancien régime* in France and of the Tsarist regime in Russia. The

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same psychology of class suicide appeared in the English aristocracy after Waterloo. One can observe it in Lady Harrowby's conversation with the diarist Greville, recorded by him exactly three days after Creevey had written to Miss Elizabeth Ord the passage which is quoted above:

The Duke of Portland told me that he conversed with the Duke of Wellington upon the subject, and urged as one of the reasons why this Bill should not pass the House of Lords the disgrace that it would entail upon the King by the recrimination that would ensue in the House of Commons. His answer was "that the King was degraded as low as he could be already". The vehemence with which they pursue this object produces a corresponding violence in their language and sentiments. Lady Harrowby, who is usually very indifferent upon political subjects, has taken this up with unusual eagerness. In an argument which I had with her the day before yesterday, she said that if the House of Lords was to suffer itself to be influenced by the opinions and wishes of the people, it would be the most mean and pusillanimous conduct, and that after all what did it signify what the people thought or what they expressed if the army was to be depended on? I answered that I never had expected the day would come when I should be told that we were to disregard the feelings and wishes of the people of this country, and to look to our army for support.

In the ordinary individual two psychological states, which are almost exactly opposites, may be observed: the first is a generous and sympathetic attitude of pity for an unfortunate, and particularly an injured, person; the second is the attitude of angry self-pity, when we are unfortunate or injured, in which we blindly seek a scapegoat upon whose head we can place the cause of our misfortunes and

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in whose person we can find a convenient and comforting object of our hatred. The masses are composed of individuals, and it is therefore not surprising to find both these attitudes reappearing in communal psychology, particularly since the French Revolution and the growth of democracy, which have made the influence of communal psychology more obvious and more persistent. Both these psychological states, which are politically dangerous because they are coloured by powerful emotions and lend themselves to symbolization and dramatization, were operative in the popular reaction to the Queen's trial. The pity motif was, however, the dominant one, for Caroline, an unattractive and disagreeable woman and a most unqueenly queen,¹ somehow or other won the passionate sympathy of the English people. It is probable that where we feel acute sympathy for another person, we usually identify ourselves to some extent, unconsciously, with the object of our

¹ The vulgarity of the Queen and of her aristocratic supporters was, however, not unnoticed by the lower orders. Francis Place noticed at the time how the disillusionment of her lowly supporters helped to discredit the monarchy and ruling classes: "Multitudes of all ranks below the Peerage, even to the barelegged sailors along shore below London Bridge, costermongers, and common porters, went in processions to Brandenburg House, saw the Queen, and heard her converse. She was the very woman herself, beyond all other women, to satisfy the inquisitive people that the distinction claimed by high rank was merely fictitious. She was vulgarly familiar and commonplace in her language and deportment, much less genteel than many of the well-dressed women who went to her in the processions. . . . Those of the aristocracy who attended the Queen had little either in their manners or appearance to produce any favourable impression on the multitude whom, day after day and hour after hour, they had to introduce to the presence of the Queen. Royalty was judged by the Queen, and aristocracy by the noblemen and the ladies in her suite, and both fell amazingly in the estimation of the people" (quoted in Graham Wallas, *The Life of Francis Place*, 1898, p. 151).

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sympathy, and anyone who studies the strange outbursts of emotion in communal psychology will not dismiss as impossible the hypothesis that this element of identification was active in communal psychology during the trial. The people themselves were fellow victims with the Queen of the ruling classes, as Paine and Cobbett and many other "agitators" had been pointing out; the Queen's wrongs both symbolized and dramatized the people's wrongs. Hence the violence of popular emotion. But it was here too that the other motif, the eternal motif of the scapegoat, began to be heard. There is a very thin line between sympathy for the victim of misfortune and hatred of the cause of his misfortunes, and when people looked round for a scapegoat, an object whom they could hate as the cause of the Queen's (and their own) wrongs, they found it at once in the King and the ruling classes. When the crowd hoots and hisses, it is always about to put iniquities and transgressions upon the head of some scapegoat, and unless the ruling classes are very powerful or intelligent, they are in danger of finding themselves the scapegoat and in the wilderness.

The Queen's trial was, thus, a turning point in the history of British democracy. It discredited the monarchy and the ruling classes—which at that time constituted a society rarely equalled in history for vulgarity, coarseness, and stupidity—and it symbolized and dramatized for the masses and the middle classes the enormous privileges and political power which the Constitution placed in the hands of the King and the aristocracy and their inability to use them competently, decently, or justly. It is

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significant that this spectacle was closely followed not only by a drastic limitation of the political power of the aristocracy, but also by the final steps in the process of curtailing the prerogatives of the Crown and of establishing nineteenth-century limited monarchy. But it did something more than dramatize the incapacity and unworthiness of those who held the power. It was a powerful instrument in breaking their power to suppress criticism and freedom of opinion. If ever "the Press" in newspapers and pamphlets had shown "outrageous licentiousness" in attacking the King, the Lords, and the Government, it was in 1820 during the Queen's trial, but the Government did not and could not attempt to use against it those Six Acts which only a few months before they had passed for the very purpose of suppressing such "licentiousness". The absurd spectacle of a Government, heavily armed against the disseminators of "treason and impiety", using its mighty engines of suppression against Tom Paine's works and Carlile and his bookshop and obscure artisans and women, but afraid of using them against their real opponents on the main field of battle, reacted immediately both upon the Government and its critics. The battle for the freedom of the Press was fought and won during the Queen's trial.

We shall often have to return to the question of the Press in this volume, for the relation between newspapers and democracy is close and the effects of a popular press upon popular psychology will require investigation. Here we shall merely note the significant fact that the Reform Act, the first stage in the establishment of political democracy in Eng-

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land, was immediately preceded by this unsuccessful attempt on the part of an anti-democratic Government to curtail the free expression of political opinion in newspapers and pamphlets. The Queen's trial is a much more important event in English history than it appears to be in historical text-books, not only because of its effects upon the position of the ruling classes and upon communal psychology, but because that extraordinary concomitant of democracy, the nineteenth-century newspaper, owes to it both its existence and its freedom.

We must now return to our survey of the stages by which, between 1820 and 1830, the confidence of the people in the ruling classes and the confidence of the ruling classes in themselves disintegrated. Two events, the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828 and the granting of Catholic Emancipation in 1829, were of immense importance, for they revealed the extraordinary vacillation and incompetence of the existing regime. They were both concerned with demands which raised questions fundamental to democracy and political equality, demands which had been long resisted by the governing classes. The sudden and complete *volte-face* of a Tory Government under Wellington and Peel in both these cases puzzled their contemporaries and have provided their biographers and historians with an opportunity for exercising ingenuity, for in histories and biographies the inconsistencies and stupidities of statesmen, so frequent in real life, have somehow or other to be transformed into wise and consistent statesmanship. The political somersaults of the Wellington Government and the events of the years 1827-1830 will, indeed, repay a short

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investigation as the prelude and incitement to the Revolution of 1832.

In February 1827 the long-lived Government of Lord Liverpool was brought to a natural end by an apoplectic stroke of the Prime Minister. On the surface there was no visible reason why the passing away of an undistinguished Prime Minister by apoplexy should have disturbed in any way the peaceful course of English history. A little coming and going in high places, a good deal of personal intrigue one might reasonably expect, and then another Tory Premier at the head of another Tory administration, entrusted by George IV. with the welcome duty of keeping things exactly where they were and where they had been since 1780. But one must look underneath the surface of politics and history for the forces of events and communal psychology which change inexorably the course of both. The economic structure which the industrial revolution was rapidly imposing upon society and the democratic psychology which accompanied it were, as we have remarked, incompatible with the political framework, which the ruling classes were stubbornly striving to maintain. Beneath the placid surface of the Liverpool regime the strains and stresses of this hopeless struggle to maintain the *status quo* had already by 1827 made themselves felt upon the cohesion of the ruling classes themselves. The first sign of their disintegration was in fact the complete disintegration of the old political parties, which immediately became manifest on the death of Liverpool.

Within the Liverpool Government itself there were two influential statesmen who had already felt

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in their bones, and set their political sails to, the winds of the nineteenth century. It was the economic winds that had impinged upon William Huskisson; under their influence he pursued a commercial policy at the Board of Trade which was anathema to many of his own colleagues and to the majority of Tories in the country, and by 1827 he was already pledged to what were known as "Liberal measures".¹ The position of Canning was more important, but more difficult to judge accurately. It is possible to represent him as opposed to democracy, and in a recent biography of Sir Robert Peel it is asserted that Canning "abhorred democratic movements".² Yet in his conduct of foreign affairs, in his attitude towards public opinion, and in the general lines of his policy he is the first Prime Minister who was definitely affected by, rather than opposed to, the currents of nineteenth-century democracy. That was why he was hated by the Ultra-Tories and always viewed with suspicion by the majority of his own party. And that was why a keen-sighted contemporary political observer, writing after Canning's death in the middle of the Reform crisis of 1830, could reflect:³

If Canning was now alive we might be able to steer through these difficulties, but if he had lived we should probably never have been in them. He was the only statesman who had the sagacity to enter into and comprehend the spirit of the times, and to put himself at the head of that movement which was no longer to be arrested. The march of Liberalism (as it is called) would not be stopped, and this he knew, and he resolved to govern and

¹ See Greville, *Journal*, January 28, 1828.

² A. A. W. Ramsay, *Sir Robert Peel*, 1928.

³ Greville, *Journal*, August 31, 1830.

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lead instead of opposing it. The idiots who so rejoiced at the removal of this master mind (which alone could have saved them from the effects of their own folly) thought to stem the torrent in its course, and it has overwhelmed them.

Canning was much the ablest and most popular minister in the Liverpool Cabinet and he was the Prime Minister's obvious and natural successor. But his succession was opposed by all the extreme Tories, headed by Wellington and those who were resisting every proposal for political or economic change. A crucial question was that of Catholic emancipation, the demand, which came with overwhelming force from Ireland, that the disabilities of Roman Catholics to hold office or sit in Parliament should be removed. Canning was in favour of emancipation; George IV., like his father, was a fanatical "protestant" and, therefore, for some time stood out against the unpleasant necessity of summoning Canning to form a Government. There followed a curious struggle between the forces of reaction under Wellington and those of progress under Canning. Its exact course is even still somewhat obscured by the network of Court and aristocratic intrigue, but in the end Canning won.

The victory of Canning and his death, which so quickly followed, revealed the break-up of parties and the confusion and vacillation of the governing classes. The alignment of parties which would have reflected the realities of the situation would have been a division between those who opposed and those who supported what Greville called the march of Liberalism in economics and politics. In economics the industrialization of Great Britain demanded a

transition from the system of the eighteenth century, which protected the vested agricultural interests of a landed aristocracy and a landed gentry, to a more or less free trade system protecting the vested interests of the middle class, the capitalists, industrialists, merchants, financiers, and the ever-growing hordes of the bourgeoisie dependent upon them. In politics the communal psychology of democracy and the march of Liberalism demanded that the aristocrats and landed gentry should lose their vested political interests in addition to their vested economic interests, and that the principle of political equality should be substituted for that of political privilege. The old English party system of Whigs and Tories no longer at the death of Liverpool reflected these realities and the fundamental differences in principle and policy. It is possible that, if Canning had lived, he would have brought about a new alignment of parties actually reflecting these real differences, for his Cabinet was composed partly of Tories and partly of Whigs, while the bulk of those opposed to him consisted mainly of the extreme Tories and those who, like George III., were determined to have no innovations in their time. That is probably what Greville meant by his melancholy speculation in 1830 upon what might have been.

But when Canning died there was no one among his adherents who had the necessary powers or understanding to put himself at the head of a liberal movement and weld the rather ramshackle party of Canningites and Whigs into its instrument. The ineptitude of the existing regime was shown by the farcical Goderich Government, but no less clearly by the Wellington Cabinet which followed it. The

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confusion of policies and parties is shown by the fact that Wellington included in his Government a group of Canningites of whom the survivors two years later were the natural supporters and colleagues of Lord Grey in forcing through the Reform Bill against the opposition of Wellington, the House of Lords, and the Crown. If only the coalition between Wellington and Grey, which at the time seemed to their contemporaries highly probable, had taken place in 1828, the logic of events during the next two years would have uncovered still more ruthlessly the futility of the ruling classes and their complete ignorance of what was happening in the world about them.

As soon as Lord Goderich had made his exit in tears and the Duke of Wellington had succeeded him, the collapse of the existing regime began. Its prelude was a small and ludicrous, but characteristic incident. In the first session of Parliament Lord John Russell, who on March 1, 1831, was to introduce the famous Reform Bill in the House of Commons, brought forward a motion to repeal the Test and Corporation Acts. The proposal raised, but in a somewhat academic form, the whole question of political privilege and equality. The Acts were designed to prevent dissenters from holding public office, but in practice they had become to a great extent inoperative owing to the practice of annually passing an Indemnity Act which absolved those who had broken the law. But the presence of such Acts on the statute book was intolerable in a democratic society and there was a considerable movement for their repeal. Peel, the leader of the House, opposed Russell's motion on behalf of the Government, but on a vote the Government was beaten. Peel lost his

head and his temper, and refused to accept the verdict of the House, but in a subsequent debate had to admit his own political incompetence and the feebleness of the Government by announcing that they would withdraw their opposition to repeal.

This little incident was significant, because it was a victory for democratic principles and ideas in a question closely related to the two major political issues, Catholic Emancipation and Parliamentary Reform. In less than twelve months the removal of the political disabilities of Dissenters was followed by the removal of the political disabilities of Roman Catholics. The passing of the Catholic Relief Bill marked a further and much more important stage in the collapse of the ruling classes and their surrender to the forces of democracy. For the student of communal psychology and of political history it is a highly curious and interesting event. At first sight the sequence of events and the motives and actions of the protagonists seem to be fortuitous, inconsistent, and illogical, and to try to explain them as the result of rational ideas and historic "forces" rather than as merely erratic exhibitions of human stupidity and cupidity seems to be a waste of time. Yet if they are more carefully examined, though the actions and motives of the individual statesmen or politicians were muddled and inconsistent owing to weakness, stupidity, and ambition, one has a certain satisfaction in seeing that the larger historical pattern in which they find their proper place was inevitably determined by the interaction of facts and ideas. In history the political careers of the puppets, like the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, or Lord Grey, appear to be a rather uninteresting series of

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spasmodic jerks; they become much less spasmodic and more interesting if one observes that facts and communal ideas were moving the strings.

The prelude to the granting of political equality to Catholics was a squabble in Wellington's government, which on the surface had nothing to do with the question and seemed to make the grant of relief by the Cabinet much less likely. Yet it was, in fact, an appropriate prelude both to Catholic emancipation and to parliamentary reform, for the hand which was making the puppets dance in this political squabble was really the hand of political and economic realities. It is significant from this point of view that the quarrel between the Canningites and the rest of the Cabinet came over the question whether the parliamentary seat of the disfranchised village of East Retford should be transferred to the town of Birmingham. Here was a concrete question raised directly by that disequilibrium between the new economic structure of Great Britain and its political institutions, which on pages 17-20 we noted as an important cause of the demand for parliamentary reform. The proposal to give the seat to Birmingham was supported by all those who had the slightest understanding of these economic and political realities; it was resisted by all those whose only policy was a determination to keep everything exactly as it was. The House of Lords, ever foremost in this determination, forced the issue by insisting that the franchise of another disfranchised borough, Penrhyn, should be given to a Cornish village rather than to Manchester, a great town which in 1829 did not return a member to Parliament. It was this kind of action on the part of the "idiots", as Greville called

them, which made a revolutionary reform movement inevitable. At the moment the Lords' refusal to give representation to Manchester brought the support of all reasonable people behind the Whigs' demand in the House of Commons that the franchise of East Retford should be transferred to Birmingham. The Cabinet appear to have vacillated, but in the end the forces of reaction within it triumphed, and Peel in the House of Commons resisted the Whig proposal. This was too much for Huskisson and the Canningites, and they voted against the Government. Huskisson went still further; he resigned, probably not believing that his resignation would be accepted. But Wellington accepted the resignation, and the other Canningites followed Huskisson.

The result of this incident was to bring back the alignment of parties nearer to political realities. Wellington was now at the head of a purely Tory Government; on the Catholic question, on parliamentary reform, on the corn laws and economic policy, it presented on the surface a solid front of conservatism, and it had behind it the support of all the classes and forces resisting change. If the ruling classes were able to rule, they now had the golden opportunity of showing their ability. They immediately showed their complete incompetence and loss of faith in themselves. Their trial and failure arose directly and appropriately from the resignation of the Canningites. Wellington had to fill Charles Grant's place in the Cabinet and at the Board of Trade, and Vesey Fitzgerald, who sat in the House of Commons as member for the Irish seat of Clare, was chosen to succeed him. This meant that Fitzgerald would have to stand for re-election. There seemed no danger of

his losing his seat, since his family dominated the constituency and he was himself a supporter of Catholic emancipation. But the English ruling classes—not for the last time—by refusing all the Irish demands and opposing any changes, had brought the Irish very near to open revolution. In 1825 the House of Commons had passed Burdett's Catholic Relief Bill, but the House of Lords rejected it after a speech by the Duke of York in which he said that he would always oppose Catholic emancipation, "whatever may be my station in life, so help me God". In 1827 after a general election, in which the influence of the monarchy and aristocracy had been vigorously exerted to obtain an anti-Catholic majority in the House of Commons, Burdett reintroduced his Relief Bill and it was defeated by four votes. It must be remembered that the Irish demands could not possibly have been refused in any country or period in which the most elementary principles of democracy or even political common sense were accepted. There was no sense or meaning in a political system which, in the third decade of the nineteenth century, in a predominantly Catholic country, contained what to contemporaries seemed "an ultra-popular franchise"¹ and yet refused to Catholics the right to hold office or sit in Parliament. Just as the refusal of the English governing classes to give a seat to Manchester and Birmingham was a blind and futile resistance to irresistible economic forces, so their attitude towards Ireland and the Catholics was a blind and

¹ The 40s. franchise granted to Catholics in 1793. Greevey, who was, of course, strongly in favour of Catholic emancipation, calls it "an ultra-popular franchise" and gives an extremely interesting account of its origin. See *The Greevey Papers*, 1923, chapter xx. pp. 519-522.

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futile resistance to irresistible psychological forces. Even contemporaries of some intelligence could see this, for Greville at the moment of the Clare election made the following entry in his diary:¹

The Duke of Wellington's speech on the Catholic question is considered by many to have been so moderate as to indicate a disposition on his part to concede emancipation, and bets have been laid that Catholics will sit in Parliament next year. . . . I do not believe he means to do anything until he is compelled to do it, which if he remains in office he will be; for the success of the Catholic question depends neither on Whigs nor Tories, the former of whom have not the power and the latter not the inclination to carry it. The march of time and the state of Ireland will effect it in spite of everything, and its slow but continual advance can neither be retarded by its enemies nor accelerated by its friends.

O'Connell was the leader of the Irish Catholics and he had a very efficient political organization in the Catholic Association. They had already successfully contested an election at Waterford. It was decided that O'Connell himself, though a Catholic, and not, therefore, eligible for election, should stand against Fitzgerald. The result astonished and paralysed the Government, for it showed that not only the electors of Clare, but the whole country, were now behind the demand for emancipation. The customary disorder of an election was absent, and the electors marched in order, like soldiers, led by the priests into the polling-booths to vote for O'Connell. It was, as Peel said, a "fearful exhibition of sobered and desperate enthusiasm".²

The exhibition was presumably "fearful" to Sir

¹ Greville, June 18, 1828.

² Parker, *Peel*, vol. ii. p. 99, and Ramsay, *Sir Robert Peel*, p. 108.

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Robert Peel, because it was one of the first exhibitions in this country of democratic psychology translated into action. The attitude of the Government, of which Peel was one of the most important members, to this exhibition was remarkable. It was a Government pledged individually and collectively against Catholic emancipation. Peel himself only a year before, when the King had wished him to join the Canning Government, had refused on the ground that he "could not continue in any government the head of which was a supporter of Catholic Emancipation".¹ Yet the loss of this one unimportant Irish seat in Clare instantly caused Peel, Wellington, and the other members of the Cabinet to throw over the political opinions and principles of a lifetime and to execute one of the most rapid and complete political somersaults in English history. The election took place in June 1828. On August 11 Peel wrote a letter to the Prime Minister saying that, though his views on the Catholic question had not materially changed, he thought that it should be finally settled by giving to Roman Catholics "equality, equal capacity with other classes for the enjoyment of the offices and distinctions of the State". He added that "I must at the same time express a very strong opinion that it would not conduce to the satisfactory adjustment of the question, that the charge of it in the House of Commons should be committed to my hands", and he therefore offered his resignation with the assurance that he would support the Government if it brought forward "a measure of ample concession and relief".² Within five months

¹ Greville, September 1, 1827.

² Parker, *Sir Robert Peel*, vol. ii. pp. 54-61 (1899).

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of writing this letter Peel had come to the conclusion that he should not only support from outside the Government the measures of relief which he had opposed throughout his life, but that he would remain a member of the Government which carried them and would himself propose them in the House of Commons. By this time Wellington and the other members of the Government were unanimously in favour of Catholic emancipation. On March 6 Peel introduced the Catholic Relief Bill in the Commons; on March 30 it went to the Lords; on April 13, only nine months after the Clare election, it became law.

There are two points of great interest for the student of political psychology in this curious incident: first, the real reasons of the Tory leaders' *volte-face*, and second, its effect upon the communal psychology of Great Britain. The real reasons appear very clearly in Peel's letter and memorandum of August 11, and in the defence of his conduct which he subsequently made in his memoirs. The Government were frightened that they would no longer be able to rely upon military force and govern Ireland in defiance of the wishes of the vast majority. Peel is quite explicit on this subject. In his memoirs he considers, only to reject, the proposal that the Government might have tried, in the existing Parliament or in a new Parliament after a dissolution, to abolish the Irish franchise, which had caused them all the trouble in Clare. But, he continues, if they could not abolish the right of the Catholics to vote and if they took no steps to satisfy the Catholics' demands for the right to hold office and sit in Parliament, the Government would have to "trust for the maintenance of its authority to the extreme exercise of its

ordinary powers, supported in the case of necessity by the organized and disciplined force at its command, namely, the constabulary and military force".¹ And Peel and his colleagues were no longer convinced that they could rely for the government of the Irish upon the constabulary and military forces. "I deliberately affirm," he says,

that a Minister of the Crown, responsible, at the time of which I am speaking, for the public peace and the public welfare, would have grossly and scandalously neglected his duty if he had failed to consider whether it might not be possible that the fever of political and religious excitement—which was quickening the pulse and fluttering the bosom of the whole Catholic population, which had inspired the serf of Clare with the resolution and energy of a freeman, which had in the twinkling of an eye made all consideration of personal gratitude, ancient family connection, local preferences, the fear of worldly injury, the hope of worldly advantage, subordinate to one absorbing sense of religious obligation and public duty—whether, I say, it might not be possible that the contagion of that feverish excitement might spread beyond the barriers which, under ordinary circumstances, the habits of military obedience and the strictness of military discipline oppose to all such external influences.

The reason, therefore, why Peel and the other Tory ministers decided to grant the Irish demand for Catholic emancipation was that they no longer felt confidence in the police and military force upon which they had to rely in their government of Ireland. But there was another reason. The 40s. freeholders, who had the franchise in Ireland, were in fact "small tenants at a rack rent". The tenants were Catholics, the landlords Protestants, but the

¹ Parker, vol. ii. p. 49.

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Protestant landowning minority had relied for its political supremacy upon the economic hold which the landowner possesses over this kind of tenant. It is a form of economic power—this relationship of agricultural landlord to his tenants and labourers—which has played and still plays an extremely important part throughout most countries of Europe in keeping political power in the hands of privileged minorities. The Clare election came as a tremendous and unpleasant shock to the governing classes in England, themselves a magnificent example of such a minority, because it showed them that, with an “ultra-popular franchise” and under the influence of new ideas, the economic hold of the landlord over what Peel called his serfs might fail in the future to ensure him his political supremacy. Peel is quite explicit about this point too. The election, he says,¹

afforded a decisive proof, not only that the instrument on which the Protestant proprietor had hitherto mainly relied for the maintenance of his political influence [the 40s. franchise for tenants] had completely failed him, but that through the combined exertions of the agitator and the priest—or I should rather say through the contagious sympathies of a common cause among all classes of the Roman Catholic population—the instrument of defence and supremacy had been converted into a weapon fatal to the authority of the landlord.

I said in the first volume of this book that, particularly in the nineteenth century, you have only to scratch the surface of politics and you will find economics. Here is an illuminating example. Here at the first sign of democratic ideas influencing the balance and distribution of political power, we see

¹ Parker, vol. ii. p. 47.

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the intimate connection between economic and political privilege, and the immediate and alarmed recognition by those who possessed both that if tenants voted contrary to the wishes of their landlords, the landlord might lose his "supremacy" and authority. The sequel and the solution are also illuminating, for they show how, even at this early stage in the struggle of democratic psychology to translate itself into action, the governing and possessing classes, though they had lost their competence and confidence to rule, were able instinctively, in yielding, to find a line of maximum resistance to any inroad upon either their economic or political powers. Wellington and Peel, and their Tory colleagues, were prepared to yield—what they had always refused to yield on principle—Catholic emancipation, but what they yielded to democracy in the shape of civil equality for Catholics, they took from democracy by abolishing the 40s. franchise. The *quid pro quo* was considerable, and it is by no means certain that, after the transaction, the account of democracy showed a credit or that of the landlords and governing classes a debit, for, as Peel had noticed, the 40s. franchise had become "a weapon fatal to the authority of the landlord". It might be unpleasant to yield the supremacy of the Protestant religion, but it was some consolation to recover in exchange the supremacy of the landlords.

So much for the motives of those who introduced and passed the Catholic Relief Bill; let us examine briefly the effect of this incident upon the political psychology of Great Britain. The effect was profoundly disturbing. Greville, in the entries in his diary during February 1929, shows this very clearly,

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and he is a good witness in this case, because his attitude towards Wellington and Peel throughout was singularly fair and open-minded. On February 6, when Parliament met, after listening to Peel's speech announcing the measure which would be introduced, he wrote:

However, all discontent was removed by Peel's speech, which was deemed (as to the intentions of Ministers) perfectly satisfactory even by those who were most prejudiced against Government. I was in the House of Commons. Peel was very feeble, and his case for himself poor and ineffective; all he said was true enough, but it was only what had been said to him over and over again for years past, and he did not urge a single argument for acquiescing now which was not equally applicable to his situation two years ago. . . . I sat next to Fitzgerald in the House. . . . He owned as Peel was speaking that he was not doing it well. . . . However, thank God, the event is now accomplished, no matter how; probably it could not have been done without the concurrence of these Tories, who have, I think, certainly lost their character by their conduct; and there is this evil in the history of the measure, that a blow will have been given to the reputation of public men in general which will, I strongly suspect, have an important though not immediate effect upon the aristocratic influence in this country, and tend remotely to increase the democratic spirit which exists. In all these proceedings there has been so little of reason, principle, or consistency; so much of prejudice, subserviency, passion, and interest, that it is impossible not to feel a disgust to parties in general.

And again on February 22 he writes:

Too great a noise is made about Peel and his sacrifices, but he must be supported and praised at this juncture. It is not for those who have been labouring in this cause, and want his assistance, to reject or treat him uncivilly

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now that he tenders it. But as to the body of High Tories, it is impossible not to regard their conduct with disgust and contempt, for now they feel only for themselves, and it is not apprehension of those dangers they have been constantly crying out about that affects them, but the necessity they are under of making such a sudden turn, and bitter mortification at having been kept in ignorance, and consequently, having been led to hold the same violent language up to the last moment. If Canning had lived, God knows what would have happened, for they never would have turned round for him as they are now about to do for the Duke. The circumstances of the case are just the same; since 1825 the same game has been going on in Ireland, and in the same manner, and the Clare election was only what had happened at Waterford before. All this has given a blow to the aristocracy, which men may laugh at now, but of which the effects will be felt some day or other.

These extracts from the diary show what a quick and sensitive judge of political events and of their ultimate effects Greville could sometimes be. It is not easy during a great political crisis, particularly if one is personally interested in its causes and results and intimately acquainted with party protagonists, as Greville was, to grasp at once its historical instead of its ephemeral significance. The history of the next five years showed that Greville's judgment was entirely right, except that he rather overestimated the time which would be required before the governing classes felt the blow which they had directed against themselves. The effect was indeed almost instantaneous. The *volte-face* of men like Peel and Wellington was so sudden and complete, the secrecy with which it had been prepared between the Clare election and the meeting of Parliament

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was so profound, that it seemed inexplicable to ordinary persons. Even to-day the reasons offered for this extraordinary performance seem to be extremely inadequate. If Wellington and Peel had resigned in order that another Government might introduce a measure which the loss of the Clare election had convinced them to be inevitable, their behaviour would have seemed logical and decent, but the spectacle of their clinging to office in order to pass a measure which they had sworn on principle to oppose—coming so soon upon the spectacle of governmental ignominy in the Queen's trial—was just a little too much for the patience of the large number of ordinary men whom Cobbett and others had made politically conscious.

The blow to the aristocracy, which Greville had seen would be felt "some day or other", fell upon them immediately. We can understand now the reasons for that rapid acceleration in political and democratic psychology after 1829 which caused the violence and victory of the Reform agitation. Nothing could have been more fatal to a government and a class which refused all proposals for parliamentary reform than the ground on which, in the Clare election and the Catholic Relief Bill, they chose to display their incompetence and vacillation. To ordinary men Wellington's Government appeared to be afraid; they seemed to have been intimidated by the result of a single election, by the overwhelming vote of the Clare electors, into granting a demand—a demand in effect for parliamentary reform and political equality as well as for religious emancipation—which hitherto they had obstinately refused "on principle". The lesson was

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not lost on Reformers and Radicals. The Government which had just refused to give the town of Birmingham any representation in the House of Commons had been frightened by the votes of the Clare "serfs", by the "ultra-popular" franchise in Ireland, to yield to a far more "democratic" demand. The result was to encourage and incite all those who felt the impulse of the new economic and psychological forces to press for parliamentary reform.

Before I go on to examine the actual way in which the Reform agitation boiled up and boiled over during the twelve months which followed the passing of the Catholic Relief Act, it is necessary to stress once more one factor in the situation to which I have already referred. I am coming now in this book to the age in which attempts were made to translate the ideas of democracy into practice, in which Governments began themselves to be or to pretend to be democratic. I have referred already to the fact that it is customary to-day to assume, either with satisfaction or regret, that democracy has proved itself a failure. Its opponents deride it for its vacillations, weakness, and incompetence, and are accustomed to contrast the impotence of Governments based upon political equality, freedom, and a broad franchise with the efficiency of "strong Governments" of an oligarchical or dictatorial nature. I do not wish to prejudge the question which will have to be considered again and again in this volume as to the failure or success of "democratic" Governments, but this is the place to draw attention to a fact which the controversialists on both sides seem strangely to have overlooked. Surely it is extraordinarily relevant to the controversy to consider the record of those

“strong” autocratic and oligarchical Governments to which the semi-democratic Governments of the nineteenth century succeeded. If this be done, what a spectacle leaps to the historic eye! How strangely different from the rosy picture which is conjured up by the words “strong Government”! In the whole of English history it would be difficult to find a more inept and incompetent Government than that which governed Britain from 1815 to 1830; its record is one of ignominious failure. The chief characteristics of the aristocratic Governments of eighteenth-century England were corruption and inefficiency. The ineptitude of the autocratic Government of Louis XVI., which gave rise to the French Revolution, was so colossal that, as we saw in the last volume, it seems to the ordinary person simply incredible. The reign of Louis XVI. was preceded by that of Louis XV.; the stubborn stupidity and inefficiency of his Government almost equalled that of his successor and very nearly produced the same result. The reign of Louis XV. was preceded by the “glorious” reign of Louis XIV.; his Government is usually regarded as a typical example of the success of “strong”, heroic, autocratic rule; the result, according to the historians, was national disaster and bankruptcy, and the almost universal misery and penury of his subjects. The “strong” autocratic or oligarchic French Governments of the nineteenth century will have to be dealt with later on in this book, but in general outline their record stands out plainly from the past for all to read. The anti-democratic Government of Charles X., which brought down upon its head the Revolution of 1830, was almost incredibly weak and foolish—and not unnaturally, since its head, the

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Prince de Polignac, was admirably described as a man who "has made up his mind, but he does not know exactly to what". The Government of Louis-Philippe should perhaps be reckoned among "democratic" Governments, but that of Napoleon III. was unquestionably "strong" and autocratic; its ineptitude and corrupt incompetence ended in Sedan.

The records of these non-democratic "strong" Governments are not very encouraging; nor do those of still later despotisms speak very well for the efficiency of despots. The Governments of Wilhelm II. of Germany, of Franz Josef of Austria, and of Nicholas II. of Russia can hardly be said to have been conspicuously successful except in bringing the peoples and territories ruled by them to misery and ruin. It is, of course, arguable that all Governments have hitherto proved themselves to be failures, whether monarchic, dictatorial, aristocratic, democratic, or communist; certainly their record in history is an extraordinary succession of ruined empires, impoverished and misgoverned nations, unhappy and exasperated peoples. The greatest achievements of those rulers like Frederick the Great, Louis XIV., and Napoleon, who are most famous in history, consisted in national glory and national misery; obscurer or less famous Governments achieved the misery without the glory. Where economic prosperity among large numbers of ordinary people began to establish itself, it was rarely, if ever, due to the Government, and has frequently been resented by the governing classes; at any rate, hitherto Governments have always succeeded in preventing prosperity from becoming permanent or widespread by war, persecution, taxation, economic mismanagement, or

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simple misgovernment. There have been times and places in which, for a moment, it seemed that some permanent form of human civilization and culture might establish itself, that large numbers of human beings and considerable areas of the earth might become really civilized. But with very few exceptions and except for very brief intervals, Governments and governing classes have always been on the side of the ancient barbarisms and opposed to nascent civilization; it has proved to be impossible to civilize them, and by wars, persecutions, and ineptitude they have succeeded in making civilizations as impermanent and restricted as prosperity. After contemplating this record, it is not surprising that as kings, oligarchies, and democracies have followed one another, leaving behind them a trail of ruined States and oppressed peoples, each in turn, before its final disappearance or dissolution, has won the hatred and contempt of most ordinary men. It may be that man, who can harness the lightning and split the atom, is simply incapable of governing himself, that everything is possible to him except managing a parish council intelligently and becoming civilized. At any rate, when judging the failure of nineteenth-century democratic Governments, it is essential to have these facts in mind. Their achievements must be compared, not with those of some imaginary Solomon or some enlightened but non-existent aristocracy, but with those of the Governments of Louis XVI. and Lord North, of Lord Goderich, the Duke of Wellington, and the Prince de Polignac.

Let us now turn from these speculations to the Revolution of 1830 and the passing of the Reform Bill, from which historians date the beginnings of

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democratic government in Britain. In the middle of 1829, when Wellington and Peel passed the Bill for Catholic relief, the question of parliamentary reform seemed to be as quiescent as it had been during the whole of the preceding decade. George IV. died on June 26, 1830, and in July of that year a general election was held at which the burning question was parliamentary reform. The Tory Government lost and the Whig Opposition won practically every seat in which the existing system allowed public opinion to affect the result, and these seats were lost and won on the question of reform. The new Parliament met in November, and on November 2 the Duke made his famous speech in the House of Lords which roused the whole country (if by "the whole country" one means the "middle classes") against him and made reform or revolution inevitable:

The Legislature and the system of representation possess the full and entire confidence of the country. I will go still further and say that if at the present moment I had imposed upon me the duty of forming a legislature for a country like this in possession of great property of various descriptions, I do not mean to assert that I could form such a legislature as you possess now, for the nature of man is incapable of reaching such excellence at once; but my great endeavour would be to form some description of legislature which would produce the same results.

On November 15 the Government was defeated by 29 votes in the House of Commons; on November 16 the Duke resigned; by November 20 Grey had formed his Government; and on March 31, 1831, Lord John Russell rose in the House of Commons to introduce the Reform Bill. I propose first to

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attempt to disentangle the various causes which combined to produce this overwhelming impetus of public opinion towards parliamentary reform between August 1829 and March 1831, and then to examine the communal psychology of the revolution itself, the hopes and objects of those who supported and the fears and intentions of those who opposed reform.

The causes of the sudden explosion in public opinion were partly economic and partly political. History shows that the masses will endure with extraordinary patience a very large measure of either economic distress or political incompetence and injustice, but if the governing classes allow both to combine in sufficient quantities, the result is an explosive mixture which we call revolution. This perhaps only means that there is always a limit to the amount of misery which a Government can safely impose on ordinary men. In 1829 the economic condition of Britain reached a point at which large numbers of people no longer had enough to keep them alive; it was a period of what is euphemistically called economic depression and distress. When the country gentlemen began to arrive in town in January 1830, Greville records that "they all tell the same story as to the universally prevailing distress and the certainty of things becoming much worse; of the failure of rents all over England, and the necessity of some decisive measures or the prospect of general ruin".¹ This "depression" was, of course, temporary, one of those economic crisis which alternate with "booms" and which in the next hundred years came to be regarded as a periodic

¹ Greville, January 17, 1830.

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and inevitable feature of the "capitalist system". This particular crisis, which undoubtedly had so remarkable an influence upon the history of British democracy, may perhaps be said to have begun with the extraordinary financial panic of the first months of 1826. By the beginning of 1828 the position was so bad throughout the country that "County meetings"¹ were petitioning Parliament to relieve the distress. August 1829 was a month of grey skies and tremendous storms of wind and rain; the harvest was a complete failure and was immediately followed by agricultural riots, amounting almost to an agricultural rising, which began in Kent and spread through the southern counties. In the north, already industrialized, reduction of wages produced organized strikes in the cotton trade and the coal mines.

The economic crisis of 1829 and 1830 was, as I have said, temporary and abnormal in the sense that the misery and starvation became intolerable to large numbers of agricultural labourers and industrial workers. But the financial panic and bad harvests of those years were superimposed upon and exaggerated the effects of a permanent and normal economic system which was incompatible with humanity and civilization, and particularly with any civilized society based upon principles of liberty and equality. All through the nineteenth century we shall find the history of democracy and the communal psychology of democracy powerfully affected by the economic conditions and economic psychology² of landlordism and capitalism. It is important

¹ See the letter of Brougham to Creevey, January 1828, *The Creevey Papers*, p. 489.

² I mean by economic psychology the beliefs, desires, ideals,

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to notice that by 1820 all the main features and problems of an industrialized, capitalist society were already in existence in England, and intelligent observers were able to see how they must inevitably complicate the new political ideas and aspirations of democracy. The complication came from the economic structure of nineteenth-century society. It was based upon an enormous and growing inequality in the distribution of economic power and the products of industry and agriculture. At the one extreme in 1820 was a class of very rich people, living in many cases lives of ostentatious luxury; it included the old aristocracy and landowners, the new industrialists, merchants, and financiers. The whole of the political power was concentrated in the hands of this class. At the opposite extreme were large numbers of people living lives of intense labour and the most abject poverty. It included the industrial workers in such flourishing industries as cotton, wool, iron, and coal, "a large and miserable proletariat" living in "degradation and distress".¹ It included the agricultural labourers of Kent, Sussex, Hampshire, Berkshire, and Wiltshire starving on wages of 6s. to 10s. a week. Lastly, it included the dreadful population of slum dwellers in London and

customs, and morals which are partly the effect and partly the cause of the economic structure of society at any particular moment. In this sense there is an economic psychology both of the individual and of the community. The communal psychology of peasants differs from that of industrial workers partly because of economic differences; in most cases the beliefs and desires of any individual stockbroker will be found to differ from those of any individual Civil Servant in part because the economic structure of stockbroking differs from that of the Civil Service. These differences are differences in what I call economic psychology.

¹ J. L. and Barbara Hammond, *The Town Labourer, 1760-1832*, p. 96.

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the great industrial cities whom the new economic system and civilization had succeeded in completely dehumanizing.

I have said above that even in the early nineteenth century intelligent observers already recognized the danger to society and civilization from this immense disparity in the distribution of wealth. Greville was one of them, and he is a remarkable witness, because his birth, mode of life, and tastes, favourable though they might be to the development of political judgment and sensitiveness, were not of the kind to develop economic understanding or sympathy with ideas from which in the corners of great cities and wild men's minds the doctrines of revolutionary socialism were already just beginning to sprout. There is an interesting and prophetic entry in Greville's diary on April 13, 1829, the day the Catholic Bill was read a third time in the House of Lords and many months before the reform agitation had begun:

I went on Friday morning to the Old Bailey to hear the trials, particularly that of the women for the murder of the apprentices; the mother was found guilty, and will be hanged to-day—has been by this time. The case exhibited a shocking scene of wretchedness and poverty, such as ought not to exist in any community, especially in one which pretends to be flourishing and happy as this is. It is, I suppose, one case of many which may be found in this town, graduating through various stages of misery and vice. These wretched beings were described to be in the lowest state of moral and physical degradation, with scarcely rags to cover them, food barely sufficient to keep them alive, and working eighteen or nineteen hours a day, without being permitted any relaxation, or even the privilege of going to church on Sunday. I never heard

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more disgusting details than this trial elicited, or a case which calls more loudly for an investigation into the law and the system under which such proceedings are possible. Poverty, and vice, and misery must always be found in a community like ours, but such frightful contrasts between the excess of luxury and splendour and these scenes of starvation and brutality ought not to be possible; but I am afraid there is more vice, more misery and penury in this country than in any other, and at the same time greater wealth. The contrasts are too striking, and such an unnatural, artificial, and unjust state of things neither can nor ought to be permanent. I am convinced that before many years elapse these things will produce some great convulsion.

This view of the economic structure of the society in which he was living was not an isolated and fleeting impression of Greville's. When in 1831, in the middle of the reform crisis, cholera found its way to England from Russia and helped to reveal the appalling degradation and poverty in which the great mass of "the lower orders" were living, he frequently notes in his journal the details of dreadful economic conditions and repeats his reflections upon the instability of a social order which tolerated them. The point is of importance. Here was a Greville, a grandson of the Duke of Portland, the product of Eton and Christchurch, once a page to George III., now Clerk to the Privy Council, a great racehorse owner, and an intimate friend of the Duke of York. There was indeed a dangerous flaw in the social structure, a new and dangerous element in communal psychology, when a man of such traditions and position could write as he does in the following entries:

November 14th, 1831.—The reports from Sunderland

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exhibit a state of human misery, and necessarily of moral degradation, such as I hardly ever heard of, and it is no wonder, when a great part of the community is plunged into such a condition (and we may fairly suppose that there is a gradually mounting scale, with every degree of wretchedness up to the wealth and splendour which glitter on the surface of society), that there should be so many who are ripe for any desperate scheme of revolution. At Sunderland they say there are houses with 150 inmates, who are huddled five and six in a bed. They are in the lowest state of poverty. The sick in these receptacles are attended by an apothecary's boy, who brings them (or I suppose tosses them) medicines without distinction or enquiry.

I saw Lord Wharnccliffe last night, just returned from Yorkshire; he gives a bad account of the state of the public mind; he thinks that there is a strong revolutionary spirit abroad; told me that the Duke of Wellington had written to the King a memorial upon the danger of the associations that were on foot.

February 17th, 1832.—The cholera has produced more alertness than alarm here; in fact, at present it is a mere trifle—in three days twenty-eight persons. Nothing like the disorders which rage unheeded every year and every day among the lower orders. It is its name, its suddenness, and its frightful symptoms that terrify. The investigations, however, into the condition of the different parishes have brought to light dreadful cases of poverty and misery. A man came yesterday from Bethnal Green with an account of that district. They are all weavers, forming a sort of separate community; there they are born, there they live and labour, and there they die. They neither migrate nor change their occupation; they can do nothing else. They have increased at a rate at variance with any principles of population, having nearly tripled in twenty years, from 22,000 to 62,000. They are for the most part out of employment, and can get none; 1100 are crammed into the poor-house, five or six in a bed; 6000 receive parochial relief.

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The parish is in debt; every day adds to the number of paupers and diminishes that of ratepayers. These are principally small shopkeepers, who are beggared by the rates. The district is in a complete state of insolvency and hopeless poverty, yet they multiply, and while the people look squalid and dejected, as if borne down by their wretchedness and destitution, the children thrive and are healthy. Government is ready to interpose with assistance, but what can Government do? We asked the man that came what could be done for them. He said "employment", and employment is impossible.

The awful thing is the vast extent of misery and distress which prevails, and the evidence of the rotten foundation on which the fabric of this gorgeous society rests, for I call that rotten which exhibits thousands upon thousands of human beings reduced to the lowest stage of moral and physical degradation, with no more of the necessities of life than serve to keep body and soul together, whole classes of artisans without the means of subsistence. . . . Can such a state of things permanently go on? Can any reform ameliorate it? Is it possible for any country to be considered in a healthy condition when there is no such thing as a *general* diffusion of the comforts of life (varying of course with every variety of circumstances which can affect the prosperity of individuals or of classes), but when the extremes prevail of the most unbounded luxury and enjoyment and the most dreadful privation and suffering.¹

The philosophic observer of human society in Europe in 1933 will find much to interest him in these reflections of Greville. A century has passed, a century of unprecedented material progress. Like Greville, we are once more the survivors and victors

¹ The second paragraph of the entry of February 17, 1832, is not given in the three-volume edition of the journal, edited by Henry Reeve (second edition, 1874). It is given as an extract under that date in *The Greville Diary*, edited by Philip Whitwell Wilson, vol. i. p. 304 (1927).

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of another great war. In 1933, as in 1833, a man might come from Bethnal Green or Sunderland, or any parish of England, and tell us of poverty and unemployment, and if we asked him what could be done for the people, he would say "employment", and, like Greville, we should have to reply "employment is impossible". Even the slums are still there in Bethnal Green, and the Minister of Health of 1933 is still talking of "campaigns" for their removal. And everywhere to-day people may be heard saying what Greville was saying a hundred years ago, that there must be something rotten in a state of society in which wealth is so unequally distributed, in which wealth and splendour glitter upon the surface of society, while below thousands of human beings have no more of the necessities of life than serve to keep body and soul together and whole classes of artisans are without the means of subsistence. In the communal psychology of our day two different reactions may be observed among those who contemplate these facts. There are some who believe that these economic diseases of society can only be cured by altering the economic structure, by substituting socialism or communism for capitalism. There are others who seem to believe that economic and all other social diseases are due to political causes. The source of all our evils they find to be democracy; socialism and communism are only the final stages in the social dissolution produced by democracy. The remedy, they think, should therefore be political, to destroy the whole fabric of the democratic State and (strangely enough) to go back to a political organization much more nearly akin to that of the predemocratic era in which Greville

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was writing his journal. They prescribe a dictatorship, a privileged class of fascists or Nazis, the abolition of free speech and a free Press, the abolition of individual liberty, and they call it a corporative State.

In Greville's time, when people were enjoying and had enjoyed for many centuries a non-democratic political system, the reaction was diametrically the reverse of this. Many people thought that the economic evils deplored by Greville could be cured by political reorganization, and (strangely enough) they imagined that the remedy could be found in democracy. The ground had been well prepared by men like Cobbett, Place, Hunt, and others who had educated the masses and the middle class to think politically. The impotence of the Government, the universal distress, and the feeling in all classes (which one can see in the quotations given above from Greville) that "something ought to be done", suddenly created conditions in the last half of 1829 favourable to the rapid growth of an overwhelming demand for parliamentary reform. The first signs of this new movement appeared early in 1830. In January of that year Thomas Attwood, the banker, formed the Birmingham Political Union. It was an immediate success, and the example of Birmingham was rapidly followed by other towns which formed similar Political Unions. The objects of these associations were "to obtain by every just and legal means such a reform in the Commons' House of Parliament as may ensure a real and effectual representation of the lower and middle classes of the people in that House". At the same time Cobbett was riding round the country preaching to large audiences in town

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and country that the Government and governing classes were impotent and corrupt, and that parliamentary reform must be obtained as a preliminary to economic reform and recovery. And at the very beginning of 1830 Cobbett—an excellent judge in such matters—noticed a profound change in communal psychology. "It was impossible", he says on January 3, 1830, "for me to behold my audience at Liverpool without receiving a perfect conviction of the great change which has taken place in the public opinion." The change which Cobbett saw is characteristically described by him; the public had decided that Cobbett was right, and not only that Cobbett was right, but that Cobbett should triumph: "When I saw my audience at Liverpool, I saw that the public had decided the point: I saw that it had decided that I should not only triumph, but that the triumph should be so signal, as to leave no doubt in the mind of any man in the world".¹

By the middle of 1830, therefore, what we now call "the public mind" or public opinion was in a state which already threatened danger for the governing classes. The Government itself had reached that condition of obstinate and suicidal inaction, broken by short spasms of inept provocation, which so often attacks a privileged class in its last stage when it can no longer deal with the situation and refuses to reform itself.² Even its own

¹ *Rural Rides*, Northern Tour, January 3, 1830.

² The condition was exactly the same in the Government of Louis XVI. just before the outbreak of the French Revolution, and in the Government of the Tsar Nicholas II. just before the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. Wellington and Peel had no policy for trying to deal with the economic situation or to relieve the distress beyond spasmodic acts of provocative repression. There is an admirable instance of this in a letter from Peel in October 1830, when he received

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supporters, even the country gentlemen, were, however, convinced that "something ought to be done".

reports of industrial disputes and disorders: "Dear Sir, I am deeply impressed with the importance of your communication. . . . Under ordinary circumstances no doubt could be entertained that the best policy would be for the masters to resist the demands of their workmen, to close their collieries, to stop the cotton mills, and abide the consequences. It is clear that the wages received by the men are ample, that the men have no just cause for complaint. To whatever distress the workmen might be subject, they would only have themselves to blame. It is equally clear that nothing permanent will be gained by the concession to unjust demands, and that the time must come when there will be no alternative but the positive and decided refusal of the masters to advance the wages of their men. We must look forward, however, to all the consequences of this refusal, and we must take every possible precaution for the preservation of the Peace and the protection of Property. . . . If you . . . are of the opinion that the civil power, the military, and the aid that can be derived from the well-affected, would prevail practically over the combined efforts of the union, would either compel the men to submit for want of subsistence, or would suppress and effectually put down any attempt at violence, I think there can be little doubt that the true policy for the owners of collieries and the masters of mills to pursue is peremptorily and decidedly to refuse concessions which they feel to be unjustly demanded." This letter is quoted in *Sir Robert Peel*, by A. A. W. Ramsay (1928), p. 130. The miners whose wages the Home Secretary considered to be ample were on an average earning about 15s. a week, but in many cases wages were as low as 8s. or 10s. a week; the expenditure of a miner with a wife and three children, if the family was to have "reasonable comfort", was at this time estimated to be £1 : 6 : 3½ per week (see Hammond, *The Town Labourer*, p. 34). Miss Ramsay, a persevering and able defender of Sir Robert Peel, excuses him on the ground that he had been completely misinformed as to the rates of wages paid to the miners (and also the cotton workers). A curious defence, which itself is characteristic of middle-class communal psychology. The Home Secretary, in a time of acute economic distress, was inciting the employers to reduce wages and close the mines and factories, and was offering them the use of the civil and military power in order—to use his own words—"to compel the men to submit for want of means of subsistence". He had accepted the employers' untrue statements as to the wages that were being earned. "Peel", writes the middle-class historian in 1928, "cannot be blamed for accepting the statements as to wages, which apparently came from authentic sources" (Ramsay, p. 132). Whether a Government can or cannot be blamed for not taking the trouble to find out what the wages and economic conditions of the workers really are, before it

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Beyond the creation of a new police force, the suppression of strikes, and the reduction of wages, the Government had no ideas to offer to their supporters as to what should be done. On the side of the growing opposition there was no such barrenness of ideas; they had an economic policy in free trade and a reduction or abolition of the corn duty, a political policy in parliamentary reform. Two events occurred in 1830 which combined to bring communal psychology in England or opinion in the mass of the middle and lower classes from the first to the second stage of revolutionary development, as described by Lenin and Trotsky,¹ to concentrate the "revolutionary pressure of all the people" behind a demand for parliamentary reform. On June 26 the king, George IV., died and was succeeded by his brother William IV. This event had two important effects upon politics and communal psychology. It made an immediate general election inevitable and thus gave an opportunity for the mass of the people, wherever seats were not in the absolute power of the governing classes, to demonstrate effectively both their hostility to the Tory Government and their demand for parliamentary reform. It also acted, in a less obvious way, like the release of a spring in political psychology, particularly in that of the Whig constitutionalists. So long

interferes in an industrial dispute, must depend upon one's view of what should be the ultimate function of a Government. One must add that, although Miss Ramsay sees no reason for blaming the Home Secretary for not knowing what wages the employers were paying, she does think that "his warmest admirers will agree that the writer of this letter was using his influence as a Minister of the Crown to support one party to an industrial dispute in a very improper manner".

¹ See pp. 23 and 28 above.

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as George IV. sat upon the throne, the Crown remained an insuperable obstacle—at any rate in the minds of all active politicians—to a reform of Parliament by constitutional methods or even to a Whig Government. Professor Trevelyan says that George “would never have sent for Grey, or allowed the Reform Bill to be introduced as a Government measure”.¹ One may have one’s doubts with regard to such historical predictions about the past, when one remembers that, if George IV. had died in 1828 instead of in 1830, historians would certainly have said that he would never have allowed the Catholic Emancipation Bill to be introduced as a Government measure. But even if one hesitates to predict what George would have done in 1831, it is certainly true that most of his contemporaries believed what Professor Trevelyan believes—and that, after all, is the important thing. The politicians of 1830 felt that, with George IV. on the throne, no Reform Bill could be introduced as a Government measure; once death had removed him, an alternative to a Tory ministry and the introduction of a Reform Bill became possible.

The second event which had a great and permanent effect upon the political psychology of the English people in 1830 was the revolution in Paris, which broke out in July just at the moment when the constituencies were electing their members to the first Parliament of King William IV. The July revolution probably did not, to any material extent, affect the actual results of the elections, for already on July 31 Greville noted that “the elections here are going against the Government, and no candidate

¹ Trevelyan, *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill* (1929), p. 218.

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will avow that he stands on Government interest, or with the intention of supporting the Duke's Ministry, which looks as if it had lost all its popularity". But it had a profound influence upon the temper in which the middle classes and the "lower orders" faced the governing classes and the King in the coming struggle for reform. The three ordinances of July 25 were the final act of Charles X. and his minister, Polignac, in an attempt to abolish from the French Constitution the last vestiges of democracy and to re-establish the pre-revolutionary, eighteenth-century system of absolutism and privilege. If the ordinances had stood, they would have made the election of deputies or the expression of opinion hostile or unacceptable to the King and his minister impossible. The middle-class political leaders and even the journalists—it was in fact the journalists who "made" the revolution—did not want an armed rising or the King's abdication. But before the leaders knew what was happening, the bourgeoisie and the working classes had united in an armed rising against the Government and in defence of the constitution, democracy, and liberty. Within a few days the populace of Paris had driven the royal troops from the city and forced the abdication of Charles X.

The news that Charles X. had issued his famous and disastrous ordinances reached London on July 29. Greville notes that "nothing could surpass the universal astonishment and consternation", and he goes on to relate that the only Minister he could have a word with on the subject of Charles X.'s coup was the Tory Lord Bathurst, President of the Council. His "Tory blood", says Greville, "bubbled a little quicker at such a despotic act, and while owning the

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folly of the deed he could not help adding that 'he should have repressed the press when he dissolved the Chambers, then he might have done it'". The bubbling of Lord Bathurst's blood is not without historical significance. The sympathies of the governing classes, the Tories, and the Government were really with Charles X.; they recognized the folly of his act and deplored its failure, but they had the fellow-feeling which comes from pursuing and failing in a similar object. In the Six Acts Lord Bathurst and his colleagues had tried unsuccessfully to suppress opinion and in their resistance to the demand for reform they were unsuccessfully resisting the emergence of democracy. Naturally their blood bubbled a little quicker at the news of Charles X.'s despotic act.

But the bubbling of blood cannot be confined to aristocrats and Tories; the same phenomenon can be observed in the hearts of the middle classes and lower orders, Reformers and Radicals. The fact that Lord Bathurst and those of his class identified themselves with the Government of Charles X. had its political and psychological corollary; the opponents of the Tory Government who were demanding parliamentary reform identified themselves with the opponents of Charles X., the makers of the July revolution. Not only did their blood bubble a little quicker when they heard of the success of the revolution, but they learned two lessons from it which materially influenced their own political psychology and their tactics during the political struggle of 1831. The July revolution was accomplished by an alliance and close co-operation between the bourgeoisie and what is now called the proletariat. Tocqueville, who saw both the

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revolutions of 1848 and of 1830, noted the difference between the two. 1848 was a purely proletarian revolution, but "la révolution de Juillet avait été faite par le peuple, mais la classe moyenne l'avait suscitée et conduite".¹ And it was an armed rising; the despotism of the *ancien régime* had again been defeated and its troops driven from Paris by the bourgeoisie and the proletariat with arms in their hands. The result was the establishment in France of an eminently respectable bourgeois Government; on the barricades and by means of the muskets of the working men political power had passed from the French King and aristocrats to the French middle class.

The resemblance between the political situation and the alignment of classes in France and Britain was so close that the successful tactics of the Paris revolutionaries naturally served as an example to English reformers. The overwhelming demand for reform was deliberately organized into a movement in which the working classes co-operated with the middle classes. All the popular leaders, such different men as Place, Attwood, and Cobbett, worked for this co-operation, and the Political Unions, in which the spirit of the revolution was most effectively organized, reflected this plan, for they united the middle class and working class under middle-class leadership. This is a crucial point in the development of the psychology and machinery of nineteenth-century democracy and one to which we shall frequently have to return. The Reform Bill gave the franchise and political power to the middle classes, or rather to the upper half of the middle classes, for

¹ A. de Tocqueville, *Souvenirs*.

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the £10 franchise excluded the small shopkeeper and those who are now sometimes called significantly the black-coated proletariat. The proletariat itself was completely excluded. Why did the working classes give their enthusiastic support to a revolution, when it was clear that they were to have no share in the fruits of victory? On what terms were they induced to co-operate? Large numbers of the working classes were now "politically conscious" and politically articulate. They knew that the only means by which they could obtain their share in political power was through the ballot and universal suffrage. But the object of the Reform Bill, as Grey and the Whig politicians who promoted it proclaimed, was to hamstring the demand for these dangerous implements of advanced democracy. "The public", wrote Grey to Lord Wellesley, a day or two after the Bill had been introduced, "is now completely with us, and the first effect of what we have done has been to set aside at once, all the clamour for Universal Suffrage, annual Parliament and Ballot." It is not surprising that up to October 8, 1831, when the Lords threw out the Bill, large sections of the working class gave no support to what they correctly regarded as a middle-class Bill.¹ Two things changed their attitude to co-operation² with the middle classes. The first

¹ See G. M. Trevelyan, *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill* (1929), p. 285.

² The co-operation was never quite so complete nor so enthusiastic as one would imagine from the accounts of professional historians, who perhaps do not realize that they are looking at the facts of history through Whig or middle-class spectacles. For instance, one gets from Professor Trevelyan the impression that whereas "in the first half-year of the controversy, many working men stood apart, viewing the Bill as a middle-class affair", the working classes became solidly enthusiastic for the Bill after the Lords threw it out in October. This was not really the case. Place's papers show that even after October

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was instinctive and emotional, the wave of anger which swept over the "common people" when the Lords threw out the Bill and showed that they were determined to wreck any measure of reform which seemed to curtail the political privileges of their class. But many of the working class were also won over by the arguments of the middle-class radicals and some of their own leaders, who represented the Bill as the first "great inroad in the accursed system", and urged that it should be supported by the working class as a first instalment of democracy and a powerful weapon for improving the social conditions of their class. That those who used this argument were themselves conscious that it entailed something in the nature of a compact or covenant

he had great difficulty in maintaining the "united front" between the two classes. Many of the working men remained profoundly suspicious that they were being used by the middle classes and would be thrown over when their help was no longer wanted. Some of them always remained aloof or actually hostile, and Place was able to get the active support of the others by insisting that the Bill was only a "first instalment". "*The Reform Bills*", he wrote to the leader of the Huddersfield working men in July 1832, "*are in themselves of little value, but as a commencement of the breaking up of the old rotten system they are invaluable.*" When after the Lords had thrown out the Bill he thought that there was an inclination in the National Political Union to treat the Bill as if it was a final measure, he was furious, and wrote: "The working people would see in the proceeding the old desire to use them for a purpose and then abandon them. The gap between the working and middle classes would be widened, the rancour that exists would be increased, and all chance of conciliation put off for years." In March 1832 he noted that the danger that the working classes would break away from the Reform alliance had not grown less, and he makes this significant and ominous remark: "The great peculiarity causing a difference between the Political Unions" (which were middle class in outlook or leadership) "and the Unions of the working class was, that the first desired the Reform Bill to prevent a revolution, the last desired its destruction as the means of producing a revolution." See Wallas, *Francis Place*, pp. 226, 281, and 290.

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deliberately entered into between the two classes is shown by an important passage in Cobbett:

In the passing of the Reform Bill an effort has been made to save the country from revolution; but saved from revolution it cannot be, unless that Reform Bill produce such a change as shall restore to the labouring part of the community that share in the fruits of the earth which, according to all laws human and divine, is their unquestionable right.

For the Reform Bill to produce this change, however, those who are to have the power of voting must resolve to do their duty; must not forget that they are not merely voting for *themselves*, but that each is voting for a circle of his neighbours, from which the right of voting is yet withheld, and unjustly withheld too. Each elector should bear this in mind; *and if he do not bear it in mind, he ought to be reminded of it.* During the debates on the Reform Bill the advocates of the Bill contended, that the ten-pound voters would *be the representatives of the people who had no votes.* This ought to be constantly borne in mind by both parties.¹

The idea of this compact and co-operation was influenced and strengthened by the spectacle of the Paris workers co-operating with the bourgeoisie in a middle-class revolution. But that revolution had a further effect. When the Lords threw out the Bill, it became clear that, if the governing classes persisted in their refusal to agree to reform, the working classes would follow the French example of armed rising. The riots at Bristol and Nottingham, and still more the organized arming and drilling of the Political Unions, were signs of this revolutionary attitude, which in the end even Wellington and the Tories

¹ Address as prospective candidate to the people of Manchester, July 28, 1832, printed in *Rural Rides*.

had to acknowledge. That the Reform Act was not won by an armed rising was due solely to the fact that William IV., Wellington, and Peel, unlike Charles X. and Polignac, realized just in time that, if once the guns began to go off, they would be beaten.

The revolutionary nature of the situation, the certainty in men's minds that if the demand for reform were ultimately rejected, there would be an armed rising, is well shown in a letter written as early as November 1830, by Francis Place, a man who was admirably qualified to judge the temper of "the people" and who himself was, as Mr. Graham Wallas points out, opposed to the use of force and "pitched battle" tactics:¹

The Duke thinks this is not the time to meet the wishes of the people. He does not understand them, and has therefore resolved to make no concessions. I hope he will stick to his resolve. If I thought as the Duke thinks, and were in his place, I would permit no change to be made and would be obstinate to the death. It is a question of longer or shorter—change will come. It is a very simple question,—there must be a radical change, not a sham reform, but a radical change from the top to the bottom, and this you may if you please call a revolution.

The whole scheme of our Government is essentially corrupt, and no corrupt system ever yet reformed itself. Our system could not reform itself if it would. Take away the corruption and nothing remains. His Dukeship and his coadjutors know this as well as I do, but they think they can continue to cajole the people. Catholic emancipation was to appease them. Repeal of taxes on beer and on leather was to satisfy them. . . . He has seen that concession goes for nothing, while everything remains to be conceded,

¹ Letter to Hume, November 1, 1830, quoted by Wallas, *Francis Place*, p. 246.

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and he will concede no more. Well done, brave Duke! It is a happy circumstance that, when the people have obtained the thing they clamoured for, they set very little store by it. This is the security for good government in the end. . . .

But we are told, if all concession be refused the people will become outrageous, and no one can tell what may follow. Yes, I think anyone can tell. There will be much grumbling and growling, and meeting and petitioning will follow. They will become more and more dissatisfied; and in time they will use force, and after a while they will triumph. This is inevitable.

In the preceding pages I have tried to give a general picture of the political communal psychology connected with the demand for and refusal of parliamentary reform up to the moment at which in 1831 the parliamentary struggle became acute. I do not propose to deal with the details either of the Bill itself or of the complicated and exciting process by which the resistance of the aristocracy and King was broken and the Bill forced through the Lords; they can be studied in such standard historical works as those of Professor Trevelyan and Mr. J. R. M. Butler, and, though they illuminate many aspects of political psychology, an intensive examination would necessitate too many and too long digressions from my main object. I propose therefore now to pass to the psychological background or setting in which the Bill was actually passed, the beliefs and desires, the hopes, fears, and reasons, in the heads of those who fought for and against it in Parliament when, on June 4, 1832, the struggle ended with the Third Reading in the House of Lords by 106 votes to 22. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to remind the reader of one or two obvious facts regarding the

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provisions of the Bill and the battle over it between Lords and people.

There were two aspects of the Bill itself which even to-day are not always adequately distinguished by historians. The consternation among the Tory members in the House of Commons when Lord John Russell revealed its provisions on March 1, 1831, has more than once been picturesquely described. Both sides had expected a moderate measure of reform from the Whig Cabinet; they were presented, as it seemed to them, with a revolution. The revolutionary provisions of the Bill, which caused such consternation on the Tory benches, were, it is to be observed, those which dealt with the distribution of seats. By disfranchising boroughs with less than 2000 inhabitants and limiting those with less than 4000 inhabitants to a single member, and by redistributing over 100 of these seats among the counties and large towns, it swept away the pocket boroughs and with them the foundations of the ancient system of the aristocracy's political power and privilege. The governing classes, including even men like Peel,¹ regarded the boroughs as property, and it was through their ownership of this property, the pocket boroughs, that the aristocracy maintained its direct power over the House of Commons. The provisions with regard to disfranchisement and redistribution, noted above, introduced the principle of making representation depend upon population, and so at

¹ Peel "thought it highly unjust to disfranchise by Act of Parliament any borough, however small, that had not actually been convicted of corrupt practices" (Ramsay, *Sir Robert Peel*, p. 145), i.e. the borough was property, and the State would be "unjust" to interfere with the sacred rights of property unless it had been proved that those rights had been misused.

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least unlatched the door for democracy. It was this part of the Bill in its two aspects which was immediately and rightly felt to embody a revolution, by implicitly denying that political power could validly be the property of privileged classes and by implicitly affirming that population and not privilege should be the basis of representation. The rest of the Bill was far less revolutionary; indeed it was, and often still is, described by many people as reactionary. It would be more accurate to say that its omissions (*e.g.* of the Ballot) and its provisions with regard to the franchise tempered the wind of revolution to the Whigs and the middle class, and Whigs and the bourgeoisie, at all times and places in history, temperamentally get no pleasure from riding the whirlwind. This leads us to another important point with regard to the process by which the Bill was passed and the opposition of the Lords broken without resort to force. It is essential to understand the political psychology of the Whig politicians during the period of crisis in order to understand what the revolution meant in the minds of those who promoted and passed the Bill, and the course which events and ideas followed in the period after they had passed it. Let me begin by quoting one more passage from a letter of Francis Place's, because it gives a contemporary's view of the Whig attitude towards the Bill. It is true that the contemporary was somewhat bitter of tongue and hostile to the great Whig politicians, but he was a man of very clear vision who knew what was going on behind the scenes, and was a powerful influence, working below the surface of politics, upon the policy of Whig Ministers. At the end of 1831, when

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the Bill was introduced for the second time in the House of Commons and the country was threatened by an outbreak of cholera, Place wrote to Hume:¹

Ministers should look well to this [the cholera] without loss of time; but they are after all but a poor set of creatures, and will probably let the thing take its course. It is plain they have sadly embarrassed themselves by taking in hand a matter too large for them to manage; they hesitated and vacillated about reform like weak men as they are, and then plunged into it rashly. Hardly had they unfolded their scheme than they wished they had not done so, and would have withdrawn it if they could. Insufficient as it is (notwithstanding it is more than anyone expected them to propose), it is too much for them, and has made them imbecile for any other good purpose. The people have kept them to it, and they must continue to keep them to it. It seems to be the lot of almost every country that in eventful periods the men who govern shall be especially weak and absurd. Strong-minded, discreet, bold men would have carried the Bill before this time, have had the people with them, and fixed themselves so firmly in power for all good purposes, that Taxes on Knowledge, and Gagging Bills, and Printing Press Registering Bills would all be repealed, to the honour and glory and permanent advantage of the country.

Place's description of the attitude of the Whig Cabinet towards the Bill is essentially correct. The picture of Lord Grey as the head of a Government anxious to pass a great democratic measure of reform, and guiding the Bill with obstinate patience and statesmanlike sagacity through the storms and stresses of 1831, would be suitable only as an illustration to a historical fairy tale. In understanding of and sympathy with democracy, it is doubtful whether

¹ Wallas, *Francis Place*, p. 288.

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Grey or any of his colleagues (except perhaps Durham and Lord John Russell) differed greatly in their political psychology from Wellington and Peel. Four years before the reform crisis Grey, as was remarked in the first volume of this book, opposed Canning on the ground that "he regarded the son of an actress as being *de facto* incapacitated from being premier of England". After Canning's death many contemporaries thought that a coalition between Wellington and Grey was probable. When called upon to form a Government, the colleagues whom he chose were not men whose views indicated much sympathy with democracy or even parliamentary reform. His first intention was to retain as Chancellor the Tory Lord Lyndhurst, who was to be one of the bitterest opponents of his Bill. The Cabinet, which he did gather round him, "contained", as Lord John Russell noted, "very few members who had supported proposals for reform of Parliament".¹ Durham, Brougham, and Althorp had, it is true, given an academic support to the principle of reform, and Durham, a violent and erratic man, held such "advanced" opinions that he was known as "Radical Jack". Of the other Whig members of his Cabinet, the Marquis of Lansdowne, Lord President of the Council, was a very "moderate" Whig, and in the stormy days which followed, a supporter of "compromise". The Duke of Richmond had been a High Tory, proved himself an extremely lukewarm supporter of reform, and subsequently became a protectionist Conservative. Palmerston and Melbourne had both been Tories and remained spiritually Conservative all

¹ John, Earl Russell, *Recollections and Suggestions* (1875), p. 69.

their lives. Sir James Graham began his political career as a Whig and won the reputation of being an advanced reformer, but he had no sympathy with democracy and, after 1832, found the mild Liberalism of the Melbourne Government so distasteful to him that he crossed the floor of the House to become a Peelite Conservative. Stanley, who was Chief Secretary for Ireland and entered the Cabinet in 1831, had much the same political psychology and, as a result, the divagations of his political career were similar; he was by heredity a Whig, by temperament a Conservative; he became a Whig Canningite and then a member of the Cabinet which passed the Reform Bill. But he had no liking for reform as the first thin edge of democracy and was a leader of the "compromisers" in Grey's Cabinet. After 1832 he passed naturally from the nascent Liberal party to the Peelite Conservatives, became the creator of the modern Conservative party, and ended his career characteristically as the aristocratic Conservative Prime Minister who in 1867 passed the second Reform Bill.

These were the men who formed the Government which made the revolution and laid the foundations for English democracy. It is necessary to understand their political views and temperaments if one is really to understand the nature of those foundations and the subsequent history of nineteenth-century democracy. They were essentially Whigs, by position English aristocrats, temperamentally of the ruling classes. "A motley assembly", the democratic tailor, the real believer in reform, the man of the people called them, "Whigs, Whig reformers, half and half Tories and others who cared little about anything

beyond their emoluments, and knew little beyond what they learned in the drawing-rooms of their associates, the clubs to which they belonged, or the clique with which they congregated". Why, then, did these Whigs, these "miserable Whigs", these "worn-out, palsied Whigs", as they appeared to the eyes of Place, pass the Bill and make a revolution? Greville, who was mixed up in the negotiations for a compromise and knew as much as any man of the real views of ministers, remarked that more than half of them "abhorred the Bill".¹ Even if this be an

¹ On March 22, 1831, Greville records: "As for me, I see nothing but a choice of difficulties either way, and victory or defeat would be equally bad. It is odd enough, but I believe Lord Lansdowne thinks just the same, for he asked me yesterday what I expected would be the result, and I told him my opinion on the whole question, and he replied, 'I can add nothing to what you have said; that is exactly my own opinion', and I have very little doubt that more than half the Cabinet in their hearts abhor the measure." Later, when Greville was negotiating with the Tory "waverers", Lords Harrowby and Wharncliffe, on the one side, and the Whig compromisers, Melbourne, Palmerston, Stanley, and Richmond, on the other, for a watering-down of the Bill, Melbourne himself told him that every man in the Government, except Durham, "was aware of the desperate nature of the step they were about to take", and urged Greville to get his Tory friends to declare their willingness for a compromise. Greville goes on: "I was, however, extremely surprised to hear what he said about the Cabinet, and I asked him if it really was so, and that all the members of it were *bona fide* alarmed at, and averse to, the measure; that I had always believed that, with the exception of those who were intimate with him, they all wanted the pretext to establish their power. He said no, they really all were conscious of the violence of the measure, and desirous of avoiding it; that Lord Grey had been so from the beginning, but that Durham was always at him, and made him fall in with his violent designs; that it was 'a reign of terror', but that Durham could do with him what he pleased. What a picture of secret degradation and imbecility in the towering and apparently haughty Lord Grey!" This was on February 7, 1832. This description of the attitude of his colleagues by the Home Secretary shows that Place and the Radicals were essentially right in their conviction that the Cabinet were a Cabinet of "shufflers" who would only be induced to steer a straight and consistent course on the Bill by the assurance that only the Bill, the whole Bill, and nothing but the Bill stood

exaggeration, it is certainly true that by the beginning of 1832 most of the ministers disliked the Bill, feared it as dangerously democratic, and would have been only too glad to emasculate it by compromise. But by that time they had got themselves into a position where compromise was itself more dangerous than the "democracy" of the Bill. The Tories had been swept out and Lord Grey's Government swept in by a great popular movement against the incompetence of the Tory administration and in favour of reform. Grey and his colleagues belonged materially and spiritually to the aristocracy, the governing and propertied classes; by Whig tradition academically in favour of reform, they found themselves at the head of this new and dangerous popular movement, the first real stirrings of English democracy. Grey, in a long life of political inactivity, had become a statesman who instinctively adopted Fabian strategy. From the first his object was to

between the country and revolution. Professor Trevelyan, it is true, takes a different view, at least with regard to Grey, who, he says, never "meditated 'remodelling the Bill' in the sense of concession. . . . Though Grey was at first averse to peer-making, he was at no time in favour of weakening the Bill." The question is one of considerable historical importance and can only be settled by psychological inference. Does the history of the negotiations mean that Grey and his Cabinet never meditated remodelling the Bill in the sense of concession or that they were prevented from doing so in the end by fear of provoking a revolution? The facts seem to me to prove the second hypothesis. There was no sense in the negotiations (to which Grey himself was a party) unless both sides were prepared to compromise, and compromise entailed concession. That the negotiations broke down does not prove that the Cabinet were not prepared to make concessions, at any rate in the early days of the negotiations. The view that Grey and a majority of the Cabinet were ardent and resolute reformers, determined to obtain the Bill, the whole Bill, and nothing but the Bill, can, moreover, only be maintained on the assumption that either Greville, Melbourne, or both were, in the passage quoted above, deliberate liars.

give the minimum amount of reform that the popular demand would accept. As he himself said, in the passage quoted above, the effect of the introduction of the Bill was immediately to kill "all the clamour for Universal Suffrage, annual Parliament and Ballot", and that again, as Professor Trevelyan admits, was his intention and the intention of the majority of the Cabinet.

The Bill was therefore a curious mongrel of mixed political parentage; Whig aristocracy, the new industrialism, and the new bourgeoisie were its parents and godparents. But the most dominating influence in the accouchement was the almost universal demand for reform which swept through the middle and lower classes. The Cabinet put into the Bill just so much as, but no more than, they thought would satisfy the demand. The breakdown of the existing system was so great and the discontent so deep and wide that, in order to satisfy the demand, the Cabinet had to give far more than they liked or than any of the governing classes had expected. The Whig strategy was successful, at any rate in the early days of the Bill's history. They had given enough to satisfy the middle classes, the moderate reformers, the advanced reformers, the new industrialists, and the Radicals. The middle-class reformer obtained middle-class reform; the new industrialist obtained the enfranchisement of the new industrial towns; the Radical agreed to support the Bill because it gave more than he had expected from Earl Grey, Viscount Palmerston, Viscount Melbourne, and the Duke of Richmond, and because he thought that the Bill would serve as an instrument for further reform and a reformed Parliament would

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pass Radical measures. It was not strictly true that *all* the clamour for universal suffrage and the ballot had been silenced by the introduction of the Bill; it was still heard among the lower classes, excluded from the benefits of the Bill, but it was silenced in the middle classes and among a sufficient number of working men who were prepared to believe the Radicals and support the Bill as a first instalment of democracy.

These differences in political and social psychology among the promoters and supporters of the measure immediately began to have their effect when the governing classes showed that they were determined to use the political power which belonged to them under the Constitution to defeat the Bill. The crisis had arrived which was to determine whether in fact the real change in the political and social system of the country was or was not to take place, whether the aristocracy and landed gentry should be compelled to share their political powers and privileges with other classes. It was indeed a question of compelling the governing classes to yield, if the Lords decided to rely upon their constitutional powers to defeat the Bill. Ultimately nothing could compel them, except an armed rising or the threat of an armed rising.¹ After the rejection of the Bill by the

¹ To be strictly accurate, the governing classes could be compelled to give up their political powers and privileges either by the making of Peers or by violent revolution or by the threat of such a revolution. In fact, however, as it soon appeared, the King would not pledge himself to make Peers unless he was convinced that the only alternative was an armed rising. In the end the Tories were compelled to yield partly by their fear of revolution and partly by the King's assurance to Grey that he would create Peers, and the King was compelled to give that assurance by his fear of a revolution. Ultimately therefore it was an armed rising, or the threat of it, which compelled the House of Lords to pass the Bill.

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Lords, the only way in which the Government could have made certain of carrying reform was definitely to put itself at the head of the popular movement, and that would have implied identifying itself with revolution if the Lords again rejected the Bill and the King refused to create Peers. The negotiations between the Tory "waverers" in the Lords and the Whig "compromisers" in the Cabinet show that that was the very last thing that Lord Grey and his colleagues wanted to do. They disliked and feared their Bill and democracy no less than did Lord Harrowby and Lord Wharncliffe. The Tory waverers were quite ready to pass a sterilized and emasculated reform Bill, in which some rotten boroughs were abolished, some big towns enfranchised, and some of the middle classes received the vote, if thereby the popular demand could be "satisfied" without any real change in the social system and the balance of political power. The Whig compromisers were no less ready to accept such a Bill, in which some of the rotten boroughs would be retained, some of the little towns would still return a member, and the franchise would be conveniently manipulated, provided thereby the real struggle and change could be avoided. Unfortunately for this characteristically English scheme of political compromise there was another proviso to the possibility of Lord Grey's Cabinet agreeing to the Tory compromise. The black fear of revolution sat even more heavily upon the shoulders of the Cabinet than it did upon those of the King and the House of Lords. Ultimately it was the threat of an armed rising which prevented the Government from accepting the Tory compromise and emasculating the Bill, and which forced them, against

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their will, to insist upon an assurance from the King that he would create a sufficient number of Peers to carry the Bill in the Lords. The Radicals and the leaders of the reform movement in the country were fully aware of this situation and the precarious balance of political and psychological forces, and they based their whole strategy very skilfully upon it. They channelled the universal discontent of the middle and lower classes into an overwhelming demand for reform; they organized this popular movement so that it would be ready in the last resort for active revolution; they made the Government understand that their Bill was the minimum measure of reform which the people would accept; and whenever there were signs that the Cabinet might compromise and weaken the Bill, they whipped them back to firmness through fear, by convincing them that, if they yielded or compromised, they would inevitably bring revolution down upon their own heads as well as upon those of the King and the Tories.¹

¹ There is ample evidence in the Place papers for this view of the political psychology of the several classes and parties and of the successful strategy of the Radicals and leaders of the reform movement. A single instance may be quoted to show the way in which the intimidation of the Government was organized in order to keep them straight and "firm". On May 18, 1832, at 8.30 A.M., Hobhouse, Secretary of War, who would have been himself responsible for dealing with an armed rising, sent a message to Place that there was to be a meeting of the Cabinet at noon and asked Place to send him a letter "telling him" (in Place's words) "all the facts I could, and giving him my opinion of the state of feeling among the people, as far as I could, and my view of the prospective results". Place, who was himself the organizer of the revolutionary steps which had been decided upon, promptly gave to the War Minister an account of "the commotion in the nature of a civil war" which would break out, if the Bill were not passed. The letter was intended by Place to be laid before the Cabinet, to convince them that civil war was inevitable if the Bill were not passed. It had the desired effect, but, as Mr. Graham Wallas says, "It is safe to assert that no such letter was ever before written by the

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We have reached a point in our analysis of the political psychology of the reform movement at which it is necessary to take account of the economic background. I have had to observe more than once that one has only to scratch the surface of politics in the nineteenth century to find economics. In the previous pages we have been scratching the surface of the Whig mind, of their political attitude towards reform and the Bill. We shall find that economics played an important part in determining that attitude. There is a passage in Greville's diary which throws considerable light on the subject. On March 7, 1831, five days after the Bill had been introduced, Greville remarks that "nothing talked of, thought of, dreamt of, but Reform". He goes on to say that that day he met Hobhouse in the street and had a talk with him. Greville was the eighteenth century; he belonged to its aristocracy and governing class. Hobhouse was the nineteenth century; he belonged to what was to become its aristocracy and governing class. His grandfather was a Bristol merchant; his father a lawyer and successful politician who was rewarded with a baronetcy in 1812. John Cam Hobhouse himself, who was to die in Berkeley Square a Peer, a very conservative Whig, and the partner in a brewery, was, on the day when he discussed the Reform Bill with Greville, an advanced Radical, the disciple of Place, and M.P. for West-

organizer of a rising to a War Minister, for the purpose of its being laid before the Executive Government. But Place may have felt, with the instinct born of long experience in the management of men, that since everything now turned on the decision of Ministers, the greatest value of the plot was that it could be used to influence their minds, and may have calculated that, if Ministers did again resign on that day, it was not likely that their last act would be to order his arrest" (Wallas, *The Life of Francis Place*, pp. 315-316).

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minster. The following is the conversation which took place between the wealthy Radical M.P. and the wealthy aristocratic Clerk to the Privy Council, as they strolled along the London streets on that March morning one hundred years ago:

Hobhouse told me he had at first been afraid that his constituents would disapprove this measure, as so many of them would be disfranchised, but that they had behaved nobly and were quite content and ready to make sacrifices for such an object. I asked him if he thought it would be carried; he said he did not like to think it would not, for he was desirous of keeping what he had, and he was persuaded he should lose it if the Bill were rejected. I said it was an unlucky dilemma when one-half of the world thought like him and the other half were equally convinced that if it be carried they shall lose everything.

It is fascinating to feel how vividly the class psychology of a hundred years ago is resurrected in the few lines of this conversation. Observe, first, Greville's reflection that one half of the world thought like Hobhouse and the other half like Eldon. Two halves make a whole, and to Greville the whole world is the tiny world of his own class. When he speaks of "the world" to Hobhouse, he instinctively excludes anyone outside the small class of the well-born and the wealthy. In that world, as he sees, some were reformers, being Whig or Radical; others were anti-reform, being Tory: the Reformers, like the wealthy Radical, Hobhouse, were in favour of reform because they thought that it was only by granting some such measure of democracy to the people that they could prevent a violent social and economic revolution and so retain their wealth and property; the Tories were fighting against reform because they

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thought that, in resisting Lord Grey's measure, they were resisting the first step in that revolution which would deprive them of their wealth and their property.

"An unlucky dilemma" Greville calls it. He did not realize that he and Hobhouse, in discussing frankly what people were really thinking and feeling at the moment, had necessarily stumbled up against the great dilemma of the nineteenth century. It was the dilemma of reconciling the economic inequality of the world in which Greville and Hobhouse were living with the demand for political equality and happiness of nascent democracy. Many people have in their minds a historical picture of the last century in which the perspective is quite wrong. They see the first fifty or sixty or even seventy years dominated by political struggle, the struggle for political democracy, and only in the last thirty years or so emerges through socialism the spectre of the economic problem and class war. Such a view leads to a complete misunderstanding of the history of the last hundred years. As soon as democratic ideas and ideals began actually to affect and determine men's actions, the economic issues with which we are now so familiar—the catchwords are property, capitalism, class war, proletariat—sprang into life and began to have their effect upon ideas, policies, and events. It is important to understand from the start the nature and inevitability of this process. Democracy begins, as I have shown in the first volume, as an attitude of mind. It implied certain beliefs with regard to happiness, liberty, and equality, and their importance in human society. These beliefs in their turn implied a social ideal, a conviction as to the kind of human

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society that was desirable, and the ways in which political organization should be used to attain it. The conviction and ideal can be compressed into the statement: "Government should exist for the benefit of free and equal citizens, politically united in a common purpose—the happiness of each and all".

So long as democracy remained only a social theory or a social ideal, and no attempts were made to put its ideas into practice, the problem of reconciling political equality with economic inequality could be ignored, though even in those early days, as I pointed out,¹ there were men who foresaw that the democrat who tried to obtain an equal distribution of liberty and happiness in society by political changes would find himself entangled in economics. As soon as any attempt was made to democratize society by political measures, the nineteenth century was faced by the economic dilemma inherent in the class structure of society. The facts are really simple and obvious, but it is essential that we should get them firmly in our minds at this point in our investigation, for they have become obscured and distorted by violent controversies. Democracy is fundamentally a belief about the kind of society which is desirable. *A priori* there is absolutely no reason to believe that a society of human beings, as we know them to-day, organized as free and equal citizens, showing equally a high standard of material prosperity is impossible. The problem before those who desired such a form of society at the beginning of the nineteenth century was a problem of means: what changes would have to be made in the structure

¹ See Vol. I. pp. 206 and ff.

of existing society in order to transform it into one in which happiness was equally distributed among free and equal citizens? Existing society was based upon classes, and the class structure was partly social and political and partly economic. There were four distinct classes determined by economics: (1) The aristocracy, country gentlemen, wealthy industrialists, business men, lawyers, etc.—Greville's "whole world"; (2) the middle and lower middle class; (3) the industrial workers; (4) the agricultural workers. These classes not only existed, but they were clearly recognized to be the structure of society by contemporaries;¹ the position of a man in society was determined by the class to which he belonged, and he belonged to that class because of his place in the economic machine and the economic power which was assigned to that place.

The political class structure was quite different from the economic, and, owing to the changes in industry and agriculture, political and economic power was no longer in the hands of the same classes. Political power was mainly reserved as the privilege and property of a part of the first economic class, the aristocracy and country gentlemen; the other subdivisions of that economic class, the rich industrialists and business men, had been able to obtain only a negligible share of political power, though economic power was rapidly passing from the aristocracy

¹ A very important point, because of its effect upon both communal psychology and class psychology. Both Greville and Place, whom I have frequently referred to, provide good examples of men of widely different views and in different social strata who were fully conscious of this economic class structure and of many of its implications. Another example is Brougham, to whose views reference is made on p. 138.

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and landowners into their hands. None of the other three classes had any share in political power. In the case of industrial workers and agricultural labourers, this entailed no discrepancy between their political and economic position, for they were powerless both politically and economically. But the middle classes were already becoming, numerically and economically, important and powerful.

It was natural, perhaps inevitable, that democratic ideas should begin to operate upon political organization and institutions. The ideal of a society of free and equal citizens, with an equal right to happiness, was so obviously incompatible with the existing distribution of political power, its reservation as inherited property and privilege to individuals and small classes, selfish, self-interested, and often politically incompetent. The first task, therefore, for those who desired to translate the new ideas into practice appeared to be the reform of political institutions and the widening of the base of political power. The communal psychology of this first democratic phase can be observed not only in the French Revolution and the movements for freedom of the Press, the removal of political disabilities on religious sects, and parliamentary reform, but also in the thought of all those who had most influence upon the social history of the period, such different men as Paine, Godwin, Cobbett, Place, and Bentham.

The first effect, then, of the new ideas of democracy was this movement to widen the base of political power, of which the English reform movement was only a particular example. To widen the base of political power in the world of the early nineteenth century meant to extend the political privileges of

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the privileged to other classes, *i.e.* in Britain an extension of the franchise and a redistribution of seats, if not a curtailment of the powers of the Crown and the House of Lords. But as soon as the extension of the franchise and of political power became a practical question, the economic class structure of society introduced a terrible dilemma into the problem of democracy and the psychology of democrats. How could society be transformed into a community of politically free and equal citizens, with an equal right to happiness, unless all economic classes were admitted to an equal share of political power? But if all classes were given a share in political power, how could the existing economic structure of society possibly be maintained? If the hundreds of thousands of propertyless and landless lower orders, from the half-starved labourer and three-quarter-starved weaver down to the savage slum dweller, were given equal political power with the country gentleman, the rich capitalist, and the "respectable" bourgeois, would they not inevitably use that power to improve their own economic position at the cost of the property owners? In other words, would not universal suffrage prove incompatible with "the rights of property"? And finally—a last, tremendous interrogation which even in 1830 some people already saw looming over Europe—if a society of free and equal citizens was really desired, would it not in fact be necessary to redistribute economic as well as political power?

This is the great dilemma which dominated the political and economic history of the nineteenth century. It confronted Hobhouse and Greville as they discussed the Reform Bill; it confronted the

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Whig Cabinet and the Tory Opposition and the Radical skirmishers in the Left Wing. Let us see how the various persons, parties, and classes reacted to it in the early days of insurgent democracy. Greville himself, it will be observed, saw the dilemma as primarily involving the right of property. It was the natural and just instinct of the possessing classes to see immediately that a challenge to their monopoly of political power would ultimately involve a challenge to their monopoly of possession. The resistance of the aristocracy, Tories, and landowners to the demand for parliamentary reform was logical and consistent. They already regarded the Bill itself as an attack upon the right of property, because it deprived them of *their* property without compensation, the rotten boroughs and political power. But they also saw it as the first stage in a profounder revolution. In 1830 no member of the upper classes, no property owner had that sense of solid security which they have enjoyed at some other periods of history, *e.g.* round about 1880; their dreams were still troubled by the spectre of the French Revolution and the nightmare of the Terror. These were the menacing figures which the Duke of Wellington and Lord Eldon saw looming behind Lord Grey's Bill; they fought the Government and the Bill because they were convinced that, once their class should lose its monopoly of political power, universal suffrage must inevitably follow, and then the Crown, the House of Lords, and the sacred rights of property must disappear. This was the half of Greville's world which was convinced that, if the Bill were carried, they would lose everything.

The psychology of the Wellingtons and Eldons is

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simple and satisfactory, but before going on to investigate the other half of Greville's world, it is worth while examining the psychology of Greville himself. Greville was against the Bill, but his mind was too alert and sensitive to allow him to settle down to the simple, satisfactory opposition of Eldon and the Tories. He wobbled, and the psychology of political wobbling is usually more interesting and illuminating than that of political consistency. During the period between the end of the war and the introduction of the Reform Bill, Greville observed and understood the new ideas and forces which were to change the world in which he had been born into the world of nineteenth-century democracy. His attitude towards them was not wholly unsympathetic, and in any case he was politically intelligent enough to see that such profound changes were taking place in society and communal psychology that the stubborn and stupid conservatism of the ruling classes would certainly bring ruin upon themselves, and probably upon the whole country. He believed that Canning was the only statesman who combined strength and sagacity with understanding of the new forces and ideas, the only man who might make the necessary social changes without disaster. After Canning's death he was convinced that the sterile incompetence and resistance of the Government, alternating with such panicky surrender as they made over Catholic emancipation, must almost inevitably end in revolution. But Greville not only recognized the necessity for political changes, he had too at moments an unusually clear vision of economic complications. As we have seen above, up to a point he accepted

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—quite unconsciously, no doubt—the postulates of democracy with regard to equality and happiness. He saw that no society could claim to be civilized in which happiness and material wealth were distributed so unequally as they were in the England of 1830; he believed that the lower orders would not indefinitely tolerate such inequality and that, unless “something were done”, the end would be “social upheaval”.

It will be seen that, although Greville regarded with aversion radicalism and what in his days was called democracy, yet, as a humane and intelligent man, his general attitude towards social problems had been profoundly affected by the ideas out of which democracy issued. This general attitude and his reaction to the Reform Bill are characteristic of many people in the upper classes during all periods of transition. He recognized that some measure of parliamentary reform, some widening of the base of political power, was both desirable and inevitable, and that the negative policy of blind resistance adopted by the majority of his own class was, even in their own interests, suicidal. But when faced with the actual proposals of the Reform Bill, when he saw what “widening the base of political power” might mean translated into the terms of seats, franchise, legislation, and property, he was unable to reconcile the implications of his political beliefs with the almost instinctive feelings and ideas which had their roots in the traditions and economic interests of his class. He wobbled painfully. He was inclined to agree with that half of his world which believed that, if the Bill were passed in the form in which it was introduced, the upper classes would lose all they

had. His belief that the existing distribution of wealth was incompatible with a civilized society was not sufficiently strong to counteract the belief that for Greville himself and for his world to lose what they had would be an irremediable disaster. He hoped, therefore, that the Bill would not pass. On the other hand, he was inclined to agree with Hobhouse that, if the Bill did not pass, there would be a revolution; they would get a Bill still more drastic than Lord Grey's, and so even more certainly lose what they had. There were, therefore, moments when he hoped that the Bill would pass.

Greville's painful vacillations can be read in the pages of his diary. They ended, as such political mental conflicts so often do, in a desire for compromise. That was the meaning of his almost agonized concern with the negotiations of Lords Wharncliffe and Harrowby. The important point to notice in his attitude towards those negotiations is that his idea of a compromise was to concede the shadow and retain the substance. He and the Tory waverers were convinced that, if a Bill transferred political power from the possessing classes to "the people", the possessing classes would lose all they had. They wanted therefore to water down the Bill in such a way that, although seats were redistributed and the franchise widened, the balance of political power would not be seriously disturbed.

This political psychology of compromise, which can be observed so clearly in Greville, was common in 1831 and is common at all times, particularly among the upper and possessing classes. In all normal times it is probably an extremely useful and civilizing element in communal psychology. The

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process of ensuring that the more things change the more they remain the same makes for the maximum of social stability and the minimum of social disturbance. If that is the ideal to be aimed at in human society, it cannot be more effectively attained than by keeping everything fundamentally the same while allowing the change to take place upon the surface. The great majority of the men in Lord Grey's Cabinet, temperamentally and owing to the traditions and interests of their class, possessed this political psychology. Like Greville, their outlook had been unconsciously influenced by democratic ideas and by the revolution in the economic life of the country, but, like him and the Tories, they assumed that society would be destroyed if the propertyless lower orders were admitted to political power. When the impotence of the governing classes and the demand for reform swept them into power, they sought a solution in a compromise between the ancient system of privilege and the new system of democracy. Their Bill aimed at extending the privilege of political power from aristocrats and country gentlemen to capitalists, financiers, and those members of the middle class who, owing to their social and economic position, might be trusted to use their votes in order to keep the world safe for property. They thus won for their Bill and themselves the solid support of the business and financial interests, the professions, and the great middle class, all of whom had hitherto been excluded from political power. After the Bill had been introduced and it became clear that the governing classes and the House of Lords would prevent its passing, the majority of the Cabinet became more and more anxious to com-

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promise still further. Melbourne, Palmerston, and most of the other ministers felt that the Bill went much too far in the direction of democracy; they began to doubt whether, if it passed, everything would after all remain fundamentally the same. They tried, with Wharncliffe, Harrowby, and Greville, to make the further compromise, but, alas, it was too late; the alternative now was between the Bill and revolution; the Government, the King, and in the end the House of Lords decided that the Bill was the lesser of the two evils.

We have now analysed the attitude of both halves of Greville's world towards the Bill and the democratic revolution which it seemed to portend. Before leaving the subject, however, I propose to examine the famous speech of Brougham in the House of Lords in October 1831, just before the Bill was defeated, for nowhere else can one see more clearly the political psychology of that half of Greville's world which supported the Bill and desired a measure of reform. Brougham belongs to the nineteenth century. He came from a family of small country gentlemen, and to the Whig aristocrats he was a parvenu. He was of the type to which a large proportion of our most successful politicians have belonged during the last fifty or sixty years. A self-made man, he won his successes by great intellectual ability, an extraordinary variety of talents, and a superhuman exuberance of energy or vitality. What part political principles and beliefs play in determining the actions of men like Brougham, it is extremely difficult to say. To many contemporaries, especially in his own party, he seemed to have no real beliefs except in himself and his own opinions of the moment, and

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no principles other than those of power and success. The verdict of history, in so far as it has been given, seems to follow this view of his contemporaries, but it is not an adequate explanation of his personal and political psychology. He was one of the first of the many successful lawyers who during the nineteenth century made politics a profession and rose to the highest positions in it. No doubt his career and position, crude calculations of personal advantages and disadvantages, always played an important part in determining Brougham's actions. But he was not primarily a careerist; the primary motive with him was probably always simply love of power, a passion for dominating his human environment in the courts, in Parliament, even at the dinner-table and in conversation.

Men like Brougham are not idealists. Politics and the society in which they live exist for them as mediums for the acquisition of money, position, and power, and their attitude towards political and social problems can therefore never be objective. Men so different as Place, Bright, Bismarck, and Lenin were all politically idealists; they were able to apprehend a state of society as either objectively good or bad and to aim persistently at its attainment or destruction. Their beliefs might be determined by their interests; their actions enormously influenced by the love of power; but the preservation, creation, or destruction of something in the framework of human society always remained with them as the ultimate and determining object. That is why even their bitterest opponents usually admit regretfully that these men have political beliefs and principles. Brougham's actions were never deter-

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mined in this way by beliefs and principles, but a study of his career and character shows that he was not entirely uninfluenced by them. He was a boy of eleven when the French Revolution began; he was thirty before he made a reputation at the Bar, and thirty-two when he entered the House of Commons in 1810. The years in which his mind was formed and the foundations of his career were laid were, therefore, those in which the ideas of the Revolution appeared to be completely crushed and the Tory governing classes impregnable in Britain. Yet Brougham attached himself to the Whigs, and he was soon causing considerable uneasiness in that highly respectable party by the vigour and violence with which he championed such "revolutionary" measures as parliamentary reform, law reform, the removal of religious disabilities, and the prohibition of slavery. The explanation of Brougham's political psychology is to be found in the fact that his mind had accepted—almost unconsciously—the democratic idea of happiness, with liberty and equality, as the proper foundations of human society. Unlike Bismarck or Lenin, he was not consciously pursuing a political or social ideal; he had no clear vision of the kind of society which he wished to preserve or create; but if you had shaken out of his mind all personal desires and ambitions together with the beliefs, theories, principles secreted by them, and all the lumber of deceptions and self-deceptions which practical men have decided to be indispensable for success in the law and politics, you would have found at the bottom one little hard kernel of objective conviction or rather feeling—a feeling that the kind of society which Wellington and Eldon were deter-

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mined to preserve was already an anachronism, and that it ought to be transformed into a society in which the happiness of ordinary men, their liberty and equality, were determining factors in politics.

I have analysed the psychology of Brougham, because it is through the voice of a man like him that you can hear most clearly the voices of the ordinary men of his time. The Voltaires, Rousseaus, Benthams, Places, Brights, Bismarcks, and Lenins are bell-wethers who lead the flock of sheep; they produce thoughts to be thought or objects to be pursued by the contemporary flock or unborn generations of lambs. The Broughams produce nothing; they bleat a little louder and more eloquently than the ordinary sheep. That is why, if you want to understand the final stage in communal psychology in which political ideas are translated into political actions, you must examine the mind of men like Brougham. It is he who will tell you what were the political ideas and objects in the minds of ordinary middle-class men who demanded the Reform Bill.

Brougham's main argument is that Parliament should represent the people—"the question is", he says, "how we may best make the people's House of Parliament represent the people". And he is clear that the object of representation is that the will of the people, that public opinion should determine the course of political events. He argues, for instance, that if the House of Commons had consisted of members elected as delegates by "the people", the slave trade would have been abolished years before it actually was, that the American War could not have lasted beyond 1778, and that the "ruinous warfare" with France "never could have lasted a

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day beyond the arrival of Buonaparte's letter in 1800". There are three important implications in his argument: first, that public opinion is normally right; second, that the actions of Governments ought to be determined by public opinion; third, that the best method of ensuring that the action of the Government shall be determined by public opinion is to have a House of Commons consisting of representatives elected by "the people". Brougham would not have liked to admit it to the House of Lords, but he was in fact speaking the language of "democracy". He was discussing the best method of translating into action the democratic ideas with regard to happiness, liberty, and equality.

Like all Whigs, Brougham prefers to think of the liberty and happiness themes rather than that of equality, for it is a right to equality which raises the most awkward political and economic questions. On liberty and happiness Brougham is a sound democrat. He says that "the system of representation" is "the fundamental principle of our constitution", and that this system is "the great political discovery of modern times—that, indeed, which enables a State to combine extent with liberty". This system of representation "consists altogether in the perfect delegation by the people, of their rights and the care of their interests, to those who are to deliberate and act for them". The representative is not to be "a mere organ of the passing will, or momentary opinion, of his constituents", but "there ought to be a *general* coincidence between the conduct of the delegate and the sentiments of the electors".

Brougham thinks rhetorically rather than logically, but his attitude is clear. Political events and the

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actions and policy of the government should be determined by the will of the people, *i.e.* by the steady and persistent influence of public opinion upon the legislature and executive. The Reform Bill, by redistributing the seats and widening the franchise, was creating an effective system of representation, "a calm and deliberative, but a real organ of public opinion, by which its course may be known, and its influence exerted upon state affairs, regularly and temperately, instead of acting convulsively and as it were by starts and shocks". The objection to the existing system was that it attempted to maintain for nineteenth-century adults the patriarchal system of the eighteenth century, giving to a privileged oligarchy the monopoly of political power so that they treated the people like children or a subject race. The results of such a system were justice denied—rights withheld—wrongs perpetrated—the force which common injuries lends to millions—the wickedness of using the sacred trust of Government as a means of indulging private caprice—the idiocy of treating Englishmen like the children of the South Sea Islands—the phrensy of believing, or making believe, that the adults of the nineteenth century can be led like children, or driven like barbarians.

And since the people were given no power to influence the course of politics, the only way in which public opinion could effectually express itself against these injustices and stupidities was by the "starts and shocks" of revolution or revolutionary movements. By making the House of Commons the representative organ of the people, so that public opinion should regularly and temperately control the votes of members and the actions of Govern-

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ments, Brougham maintained that those injustices and stupidities would be removed and revolutionary reaction against them avoided.

There is another interesting point in Brougham's speech regarding the relation between people and Government. Freedom of the Press, involving the right of newspapers to criticize and attack the Government, is in practice compatible only with a democratic type of Government, in which the people and public opinion regularly and temperately influence the Government's policy and can in the last resort remove one government and put another in its place without revolution. Every oligarchy or, as we now say, dictatorship must prevent the expression of truths or opinions which it dislikes or considers to endanger its policy or existence. The ultimate principle of democracy may, perhaps, be that, though you can fool some of the people at one time and some at another, you cannot fool all the people all the time; the ultimate principle upon which the existence of oligarchies and dictatorships depends is that, though you may imprison or shoot some of the people at one time and some at another, you cannot possibly imprison or shoot all the people all the time. Moreover, the unfortunate dictator finds that not only the dictatorship principle about shooting, but the democratic principle about fooling also applies to him. Under a democracy, if the Government fails to fool enough people for long enough, public opinion expresses itself, the Government resigns, and another takes its place; but when a dictatorship reaches this stage, it has to start shooting or being shot. The dictatorship cannot afford, therefore, to have the whole or even a large

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part of public opinion against it, because such a state of affairs might easily lead to its having to shoot all the people all the time—and that, by historical experience, has been found to be an impossibility. It follows that all political thought or free expression of opinion is dangerous to oligarchies and dictators, because thought is so extraordinarily and rapidly contagious, and if any hostile criticism of the Government is allowed, no one can foresee what its effects may be upon public opinion, and so upon the fooling and the shooting. These kinds of Governments are, therefore, compelled for their own safety to keep the mass of the people politically in a state either of inert ignorance or passionate patriotism—and ignorance is probably the safer, because the more durable.

The years which followed the Napoleonic wars furnished, as we have already seen, an interesting example of these elementary principles regarding public opinion and the art of government. The dictatorship of the governing classes could not afford to allow the formation of any political public opinion, because such opinion would inevitably have been hostile to the foundations of their power. The Tory Government shot some of the people at Peterloo and imprisoned or transported a good many others. But that was not enough; it realized that if it could not prevent the free expression of political opinion, it would soon have to shoot or imprison or transport the majority of the population. It tried, incompetently and unsuccessfully, to save itself by the Six Acts, which made the expression of views hostile to the Government punishable as sedition. It failed because the Press beat the Government; the victory

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of the Press made the formation of public opinion possible and this in turn, during the Reform crisis, inevitably brought the governing classes to the dilemma of having either to shoot the majority of the people or yield.

When, therefore, Brougham was defending the Reform Bill in the House of Lords in October 1831, the freedom or licentiousness, as the Tories called it, of the Press was a very controversial question. The Bill's opponents attacked it as the offspring of a scurrilous and seditious Press. Lord Winchilsea, who spoke before Brougham, had "inveighed strongly against the licentiousness of the Press; complained of its insolence; and asserted that there was no tyranny more intolerable than that which its conductors now exercised". Brougham's reply shows that he to some extent had perceived the relation between freedom of political opinion and democratic government, though he did not foresee the complicated interaction of semi-democratized Governments, great newspaper proprietors, and public opinion. He pointed out to the Earl of Winchilsea that "the overgrown power of the Press" was due to the fact that, under the existing system of government, "the Press is now the only organ of public opinion". He admitted that the Press had great influence, but it derived "this influence from expressing, more or less correctly, the opinion of the country". If it attempted to oppose that opinion, its power was instantly at an end. At the same time it was true that, "going in the same general direction with public opinion, the Press is oftentimes armed with too much power in particular instances; and such power is always liable to be abused". The right

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cure for such abuse is to make the House of Commons represent the people, to convert it into a real organ of public opinion:

The periodical Press is the rival of the House of Commons; and it is, and it will be, the successful rival, as long as the House does not represent the people—but not one day longer. . . . Let but the country have a full and free representation, and to that will men look for the expression of public opinion, and the Press will no more be able to dictate, as now, when none else can speak the sense of the people. Will its influence wholly cease? God forbid! Its just influence will continue, but confined within safe and proper bounds. It will continue, long may it continue, to watch the conduct of public men—to watch the proceedings even of a reformed legislature—to watch the people themselves—a safe, an innoxious, a useful instrument, to enlighten and improve mankind! But its overgrown power—its assumption to speak in the name of the nation—its pretension to dictate and command, will cease with the abuse upon which alone it is founded, and will be swept away, together with the other creatures of the same abuse, which now “fright our Isle from its propriety”.

It will be seen from these quotations that in the sentimental, rhetorical, and confused manner in which practical politicians and great lawyers are accustomed to consider and decide the most important political questions, Brougham was attempting to translate the principles of democracy into practice, to apply them to parliamentary reform. His argument is that the actions of Governments must be determined by the people and public opinion. But this leads us to another and the last point in Brougham’s speech and political philosophy which deserves attention.

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When the democrat says—and a man like Brougham says with him—that the actions of Governments should be determined by “the people”, he is raising implicitly the question of equality—primarily of political equality, but inevitably, in the end, no matter what he may do to avoid it, the question of economic equality. Examine the argument of Brougham himself in favour of the democratic control of Governments by “the people” or public opinion. What he really says is that the monopoly of political power in the hands of privileged classes leads to the abuse of that power and injustice, and that “the people” in the nineteenth century can no longer, at any rate in England, be treated by the governing classes as children or subject races. The reform that he therefore asks for is that the people and public opinion shall through the House of Commons determine the policy and acts of the Government. The machinery of the franchise and the redistribution of seats in the Bill which he was recommending to the House of Lords were merely the means by which he proposed to ensure that the House of Commons really “represented” the people. But the democratic belief in the efficacy of political equality is implicit in this argument. The House of Commons was to consist of members elected by “the people”, every unit in “the people” having an equal vote in the election of a member for a constituency determined, as far as possible, by common interests.¹

¹ The opponents of democracy will, of course, deny the assumptions underlying this statement. I am not here concerned with the truth or falsehood of these assumptions; I am merely trying to analyse the expressed and implied beliefs of democrats in the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century. For instance, the widespread belief that the people’s will in politics could be made effective by the people

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The representative would really represent the people, the public opinion, the common interests of that constituency, because each individual was treated politically as equal and had an equal share in the election of the representative. Observe that it is not true, as the original opponents of democracy maintained and as its enemies are again maintaining all over Europe, that the democrat, in arguing thus, is naïvely hoping to find salvation and utopia in numbers, majorities, and "the counting of heads". In every school of political thought it is possible to find naïve and silly people convinced that they possess the keys of heaven or of utopia, and it would be easy to find democrats in the early nineteenth century whose political delusions were no less extravagant than those of kings like the last German Emperor, of aristocrats like the Duke of Wellington, or of dictators like Herr Hitler. But the real foundation of the democratic attitude towards the franchise, representation, and political equality which I am now examining was simply the belief that (1) the common interests of ordinary men would necessarily be more consistently the concern of the Government if it were subjected to the control of representatives elected on a basis of political equality than if it were

voting for representatives in constituencies determined by geography implied, I think, the belief that geography created a natural community of interests. In fact, there is obviously a great deal of truth in this assumption. If I live and work in the town of Lewes, it is practically certain that I shall have more political interests in common with my neighbours than I shall have with the inhabitants of, say, York. This is true, even though it may be also true that the interests which, as a landowner in Lewes, I have in common with the landowners of York are more powerful in determining my political beliefs and actions than the other interests which I have in common with the non-landowning inhabitants of Lewes.

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in the hands of a single irresponsible individual or of a small privileged class, and (2) that such a political system implied the enfranchisement of the people, the election of representatives in constituencies by majority vote, and finally the control of the Government by a majority vote of the representatives. Whatever may be said of the failures and shortcomings of democracy in practice, history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has proved that these beliefs were largely justified. All through the nineteenth century in proportion as this kind of political democracy grew and established itself, Governments were compelled to concern themselves—or profess to concern themselves—more and more with the common interests of ordinary men. Indeed, the most virulent and outspoken of the critics of democracy, like Herr Spengler in Germany, make it one of the chief charges against democracy that democratic Governments were compelled to promote the material interests and happiness of “the masses”—*e.g.* by increasing the wages and reducing the hours of labour of the industrial workers and providing the social services for them—instead of pursuing those ends which monarchs, dictators, and aristocrats had rightly felt to be the true objects of human government, war and conquest, prestige, expansion, and glory for the State; power and wealth for the “ruling” classes; hard work, poverty, and a soldier’s death for the “ordinary man”.

We shall have, of course, in this book to study in greater detail the actual effects of the system of political equality which democrats attempted to establish in the last century, but looking round the world of 1939 and observing what men are saying

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about history and government, it has seemed to me necessary to enter this warning at once against accepting the vociferous assertions of those who hate democracy that democracy completely failed. Those in Germany and elsewhere who have attacked and destroyed democracy hate the kind of society, based upon individuality, happiness, and equality, which the democrat aimed at creating. The violence of the reaction against democracy and democrats which we are now witnessing is in part due to the fact that democracy had been too successful in creating an equalitarian society and promoting the interests of the masses, and threatened to establish still more widely and permanently the kind of society which Fascists, Nazis, Spenglers fear and hate.

But I must return to Brougham and his political psychology. As we have seen, he felt that ordinary men in nineteenth-century England could no longer be ruled paternally or autocratically, and that, if their common interests were to be served, the Government should be directly controlled by the people and public opinion; he believed that this could be best achieved by the enfranchisement of the people and the ultimate control of the Government by the representatives whom the people had elected to the House of Commons. I have said that this argument or—perhaps more accurately—psychological attitude of Brougham's raises implicitly the question of political equality and that part of his case rested on the argument that the Government should be controlled by members elected on a basis of political equality. The important thing to notice is that Brougham, like so many practical statesmen, was only half conscious of the nature of his own

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beliefs and half conscious of the fact that, if those beliefs were acted upon, the results might well be revolutionary and extremely distasteful to Brougham himself; and, again half consciously, he reacted against his own beliefs, instinctively erecting barriers and creating obstacles against their fulfilment. In other words, already on that October evening of 1831, when Brougham was defending the Reform Bill so eloquently, there had loomed up at the back of his mind—and many other people's minds—that crucial dilemma about equality which was to wreck so many democrats and democracies during the next hundred years. Let us examine how at this early stage Brougham and the middle-class reformers were instinctively attempting to evade it.

If you say, as Brougham did, that the people ought to control the Government and that the representatives who are the immediate controllers of the Government should be elected by the people, you have, of course, to answer the question, "Who are the people?" Why not the whole people? If the possession of political power as a privilege by a small aristocratic and landowning class had led to injustice and misgovernment, what reason was there for believing that its possession by a large class or classes would not produce the same results, so far as the unprivileged classes were concerned? It is, of course, by this path that political thought and psychology lead to the conception of complete political equality and its corollary universal suffrage. But in the centre of that path, for any of the upper and middle classes—the property owners—who may approach it, there stands the menacing spectre of economic equality. Already in 1831 Brougham had caught a glimpse of

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the spectre. He had heard the first faint future mutterings of the "class war". He felt the approach of something even more terrifying than democracy, something which in a few years' time the middle classes would learn to call socialism. He did not know that facts were forcing him to face the great dilemma of the nineteenth century, the question whether the kind of equalitarian society envisaged by democrats was compatible with the existing economic system of land tenure, private property, and capitalism, the question whether the establishment of political equality would not inevitably lead to a demand for economic equality.

Brougham, the Whig Cabinet, and their middle-class supporters compromised characteristically. They were not democrats; they abhorred democracy. Yet their political psychology had already embraced many of its postulates so that their feet were already on the path leading to political equality and the great dilemma. Instinctively they recoiled from the logic of their own beliefs, because, as they dimly perceived, it might well conflict with the material interests of their class. They attempted to evade the logic of their own beliefs and to keep out democracy by erecting a barrier, composed of myth, muddle, and compromise. Its curious composition can be studied in Brougham's speech. He begins by denying that the Bill makes population the basis of political power. In his view there is a sound objection "to taking mere population as a criterion in giving the elective franchise"; such a criterion "gives you electors without a qualification" and leads inevitably to universal franchise. The Whig in his Whig bones, even in 1831, felt the economic danger and the

threat to property in universal suffrage, and firmly laid the first brick of compromise in his barrier. The qualification for the elective franchise must be property, for thus property would be politically entrenched to defend itself against the economic dangers in political equality. Speaking of the Bill, Brougham says:

I utterly deny that population is the test, and property disregarded, in arranging the borough representation. The franchise is conferred upon householders only. Is not this a restriction? Even if the right of voting had been given to all householders, still the suffrage would not have been universal; it would have depended on property, not on numbers; and it would have been gross misrepresentation to call population the basis of the Bill. But its framers restricted that generality, and determined that property, to a considerable amount, should alone entitle to elect.

Standing on this ground, one might have thought that Brougham and the Whigs had nothing to divide them in principle from Wellington and his Tories. The only room for disagreement between them seemed to be as to the amount of property which should qualify a man to share in the privilege of political power, a question which had nothing to do with democratic ideas or the notion of political equality. But almost in the next sentence Brougham swings over to the other horn of the dilemma and begins to accept principles which must lead him into the camp of the radicals and democrats. Political power must no longer be the monopoly of the few, and the Bill is intended to expropriate those classes which at present have a constitutional claim to it as their property, for its object is to transfer power through the House of Commons to the people, to

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make the people's House of Parliament represent the people. The passage must be quoted in full:

But so perverted have men's minds become, by the gross abuse to which they have been long habituated, that the grand topic of the noble Earl [Lord Harrowby], and other debaters—the master-key which instantly unlocked all the sluices of indignation in this quarter of the House against the measure—which never failed, how often soever used, to let loose the wildest cheers, has been—that our reform will open the right of voting to vast numbers, and interfere with the monopoly of the few; while we invade, as it is pleasantly called, the property of the Peers and other borough holders. Why, say they, it absolutely amounts to representation! And wherefore should it not? I say. And what else ought it to be? Are we not upon the question of representation and none other? Are we not dealing with a representative body for the people? The question is, how we may best make the people's House of Parliament represent the people.

Having first laid it down that political power must be confined to property owners, and having then swung over to the democratic statement that political power must belong ultimately to the people, Brougham reconciles the two principles by a strange and illuminating identification. The people, he explains, are the middle class; they are distinguished from the mob or populace, the propertyless lower orders. These lower orders he obviously regards as half children, half savages, a menacing horde which must be kept politically in the background and subjection—"and may God in his infinite mercy avert any occasion for rousing the might which in peaceful times slumbers in their arms!" It is the people, the middle classes, who will keep these sub-human hordes in their place, for the middle classes are the

link which connects the upper and lower classes, and they are regarded by the lower classes as "their kind and natural protectors". But again it is necessary to quote this remarkable argument in full:

But I cannot so flatter those Noble persons, as to say that their support would have made the Government sufficiently strong in the last Parliament. Honest, and useful, and creditable as it would have been, it never would have enabled us to go on for a night without the support of the people. I do not mean the populace—the mob. I never have bowed to them, though I never have testified any unbecoming contempt for them. Where is the man who has yielded less to their demands than he who now addresses you? Have I not opposed their wishes again and again? Have I not disengaged myself from them on their most favourite subject, and pronounced a demonstration, as I deemed it, of the absurdity and delusion of the Ballot? Even in the most troublous times of party, who has gone less out of his course to pay them court, or less submitted his judgment to theirs? But if there is the mob, there is the people also. I speak now of the middle classes—the most numerous, and by far the most wealthy order in the community. . . . If they have a fault, it is that error on the right side, a suspicion of state quacks—a dogged love of existing institutions—a perfect contempt of all political nostrums. . . . Grave, intelligent, rational, fond of thinking for themselves—they consider a subject long before they make up their minds on it; and the opinions they are thus slow to form they are not swift to abandon. It is an egregious folly to fancy that the popular clamour for Reform, or whatever name you please to give it, could have been silenced by a mere change of Ministers. The body of the people, such as I have distinguished and described them, had weighed the matter well, and they looked to the Government and to Parliament for an effectual Reform. Doubtless they are not the only classes who so felt; at their backs are the humbler and numerous orders of the State; and may God in his infinite mercy

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avert any occasion for rousing the might which in peaceful times slumbers in their arms! . . . in my conscience, I do believe that no man out of the precincts of Bethlehem Hospital—nay, no thinking man, not certainly the noble Duke, a most sagacious and reflecting man,—can, in these times, dream of carrying on any Government in despite of those middle orders of the State. Their support must be sought, if the Government would endure—the support of the people, as distinguished from the populace, but connected with the populace, who look to them as their kind and natural protectors. The middle class, indeed, forms the link which connects the upper and lower orders, and binds even your Lordships with the populace, whom some of you are wont to despise. This necessary support of the country it was our duty to seek (and I trust we have not sought it in vain), by salutary reforms, not merely in the representation, but in all the branches of our financial, our commercial, and our legal polity.

And so the stage was set for the nineteenth century. In the naïve mind of Brougham we can still observe all the elements from which the logic of facts and the logic of men's beliefs were to create its grim political history. If we sum up what we have already observed, we shall at least conclude that the causes of the larger political events and movements are not nearly as simple or uniform as the philosophies of history allege. An attitude of mind, political beliefs and theories, illusions and delusions, desires and ideals, the compulsion of interests, the determinism of economic facts can all be seen mirrored in Brougham's mind making history. I will try to summarize what, as it seems to me, one can see mirrored.

First an attitude of mind born in the eighteenth century; a feeling that ordinary men and their happiness are important, that the politically privileged classes have abused and misused their power, that

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the ordinary man can no longer politically be treated as a child or savage. From this attitude of mind, as I have shown in the previous volume, comes the psychology and theory of democracy, a new conception or ideal of what human society might be. And from it has come too this demand for the Reform Bill, and that is why the struggle for the bill is a landmark in the history of democracy. The demand for reform was a demand that government should be rooted in freedom and equality; "the people", not the King and a handful of aristocrats, should make the laws for the people. The demand came from all classes which had not the privilege of political power. First the City of London and the manufacturers and business men of the new industries and new industrial towns. These were soon to be known as "the capitalists"; Brougham and his contemporaries knew them as, or included them in, the middle classes. Here economic facts can be observed at work and history, many have said and will say, was here materially determined before our eyes. The capitalist wanted the Reform Act because he wanted political power; he wanted to determine the destinies of Manchester and Birmingham himself instead of leaving them to be determined by the Duke of Wellington and a few hundred aristocrats and country squires who only understood fox-hunting and shooting. For the free development of his economic power he required political power; he took it, says the Marxist, by means of the Reform Act and imposed upon it the almost meaningless labels: freedom, equality, democracy.

The historical process was, however, much less simple and conscious than that, and the minds of

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most capitalists who supported the Reform Bill were certainly in the same state of muddled naïvety as Brougham's. In the first place the democratic psychology which we can observe in Brougham, though he himself was not in fact conscious of it, and which existed in the same form in the minds of so many of his contemporaries, including capitalists, came into existence before the economic facts which are said to be the only effective determinants of the Reform Act. It is therefore not true that democratic psychology was the result of economic facts which are roughly described as the capitalist system. The relation between human psychology and historical events is extremely complicated and cannot be described dogmatically. In this case, the psychological attitude towards happiness, freedom, and equality was very widespread; it had infected aristocrats like Lord John Russell, professional men like Brougham, capitalists like Owen, tailors like Place, poets like Shelley, as well as many forgotten men of "the lower orders". This attitude created a demand from all the unprivileged classes, not from the middle-class capitalists alone, for a share in political power. It was common to them all, to the new class of industrial workers, and even that most ancient class of Kent and Sussex agricultural labourers as well as to the capitalists, the lower middle class, and the "enlightened" aristocrat. That it was not a reasoned and conscious political and social philosophy, but often a vague and confused attitude towards life and society, did not make it any the less effective in determining men's political actions. For it is such vague and confused attitudes which in human psychology are precipitated as the objects and ideals

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for which men are prepared to struggle, suffer, and die. The ideal was in this case, like the attitude from which it sprang and like so many human ideals, often vague, but it can be accurately described as the ideal of a new kind of society, built not upon the privilege of classes, but upon the individuality of common men, their happiness, freedom, and equality.

All ideals have to accommodate themselves to existing facts or alter them. "To have" or "to aim at an ideal" is always a complex state of mind or mental attitude in which beliefs, desires, and imagination all play a part. As soon as the ideal begins to affect action or an attempt is made to "attain" it, its modification of or by facts begins, and when the ideal is modified by facts, the modification may take the form of an alteration of the beliefs, desires, or imagination which entered into the original ideal. Economic facts are only one among many species of facts to which beliefs, desires, and imaginations have to accommodate themselves. They are, no doubt, peculiarly stubborn, and have, therefore, immense power of resisting modification by non-economic "ideals" and of moulding or infecting the entire ideology, as it is now called, of individuals, classes, and communities. But that is a very different thing from the fantastic myth in which economic facts determine the whole psychology of communities, classes, and individuals—a myth which could only have been taken seriously in a society where economic barbarism had made men blind to truth and to all but economic values.

The communal psychology of democracy became what the Marxist calls a "bourgeois ideology", but it is not true that it was created by the economic

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facts, by the bourgeois capitalist system. It existed in its primal form, the form in which we studied it in the first volume, before the economic facts existed. That primal form was an attitude of mind which we have seen to crystallize later into various political and social beliefs and desires or ideals. It will be useful to tabulate the most important beliefs and ideals implicit in the earliest forms of democratic psychology:

- (1) Belief (social): Importance of individuality.
- (2) Belief (social): Importance of happiness of ordinary individuals.
- (3) Belief (political): All men should be politically free.
- (4) Belief (political): All men should be politically equal.
- (5) Ideal (political): Political power should not be the property or privilege of particular classes or individuals.
- (6) Ideal (social): A community of free and equal citizens, politically united in a common purpose—the happiness of each and all.

By the time that Brougham was making his speech in the House of Lords these beliefs and ideals were already part of the psychology of a considerable number of people in all classes; they were in process of becoming part of the communal psychology of the era. In the Reform Bill struggle we are watching the first attempt in Great Britain to translate them into political action. Such an attempt immediately brought the beliefs and ideals—often extremely vague and confused—up against economic and other facts inconsistent with the aims of reformers. The alternatives, then, were either to change the facts or to change the beliefs or ideals, and the important

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thing is to observe how the economic interests of different individuals and classes made them instinctively stress, modify, or even abandon some or other of the six beliefs and ideals implicit in democracy. Thus the new capitalist class found in the political belief regarding freedom (No. 3), the political belief regarding equality (No. 4), and in the political ideal regarding political power (No. 5) an argument for demanding reform of the parliamentary system. But so did the new proletariat. To say that the belief and ideal were created or determined by the economic system is therefore absurd, particularly for anyone who holds that within that system the economic interests of the two classes were diametrically opposed. The belief and ideal were, as we have seen, deep rooted in an attitude of mind, a broad communal psychology, which had gradually developed through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe. There is an attitude of mind or communal psychology peculiar to each moment or period of history and it is the ethos of civilization or barbarism in that moment or period of history; economic facts always have a share in determining its spirit and content, but only a share, for communal psychology as it appears in the individual, the class, or the nation is clearly also determined by the most primitive human instincts, by tradition, dead ideas, religion, scientific knowledge, dreams, delusions, philosophies, aspirations, and misery. The attitude towards equality and political power which we are examining in the minds of the capitalists and proletariat in 1830 was an important part of the new ethos of nineteenth-century civilization or barbarism. As soon as it became a question of trans-

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lating into action the desires and ideals which sprang from the general attitude of mind, economic facts and the divergent interests of the different classes caused a modification of each belief and ideal peculiar to each class. Thus the new capitalists used the beliefs that all men should be politically free and equal against the existing regime and the governing class of aristocrat and landed gentry, and demanded parliamentary reform in the name of the ideal that political power should not be the property or privilege of a particular class. The proletariat at the same time were doing the same thing, logically translating the beliefs and ideals into a demand for the ballot and universal suffrage.

As soon as this stage was reached, the divergent economic interests of two classes began to operate and produce the kind of modification in the beliefs and ideals which we have been studying in the mind of Brougham. The property owner who had unconsciously accepted the communal psychology which was producing democracy had to face the great dilemma. He probably believed with Macaulay that property was

that great institution for the sake of which chiefly all other institutions exist, that great institution to which we owe all knowledge, all commerce, all industry, all civilization, all that makes us to differ from the tattooed savages of the Pacific Ocean.

He probably believed, with Eldon and Grey, that the proletariat was a perpetual menace to property and order, and that if the working classes were admitted to political power through the ballot and universal suffrage, it would be the end of property as well as of the monarchy and aristocracy. If then

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he was to retain both the psychology of democracy and the psychology of his economic interests, he had somehow or other to reconcile two inconsistent and contradictory series of beliefs and ideals. He performed this feat, partly by the common human trick of keeping contradictory beliefs in separate watertight compartments in his mind, and partly by stressing some and forgetting others among the beliefs and ideals which were all integral parts of the psychology of democracy. Thus while the proletariat stressed the belief in equality (No. 4), the property owners and middle classes preferred to forget about it and stress the beliefs with regard to individuality, freedom, and privilege. In particular they applied the new feelings about individuality and the new beliefs about freedom with immense vigour and enthusiasm to the economic sphere and so developed the theory and practice of *laissez-faire* which seemed to accord with their own economic interests. Politically they applied the ideal that political power should not be the property or privilege of particular classes or individuals (No. 5) against the aristocracy and landed gentry, the monopolists of political power, using it as a weapon with which to force their own way into the seats of the mighty. They did not see that they were thereby merely stepping into the property and privilege of the old governing classes, and that the ideal of a society in which political power should be the property and privilege of no class could be applied by the proletariat against the middle class no less than by the middle class against the aristocracy.

But even this analysis suggests a too rigid and logical picture of the communal psychology of the

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property-owning classes in 1830. Let us return for a moment to Brougham's extraordinary dichotomy of the English population into "the people" and "the mob", and his identification of the people with the middle classes and of the mob with the proletariat. It is the queerest and most bizarre thoughts and actions which, rightly interpreted, reveal most clearly the real foundations of beliefs and motives of action in individuals and classes. It was not a natural mode of thought or expression, even in 1831, to identify the middle classes with the people, to refuse to reckon the working classes as part of the English people. What was working in Brougham's mind to induce him to adopt this curious terminology? One thinks immediately of that other dichotomy which a more cynical and clearer-sighted politician was to make and to make famous only fourteen years after Brougham addressed the Lords:¹

"Well, society may be in its infancy," said Egremont, slightly smiling; "but, say what you like, our Queen reigns over the greatest nation that ever existed."

"Which nation?" asked the younger stranger, "for she reigns over two."

The stranger paused; Egremont was silent, but looked enquiringly.

"Yes," resumed the younger stranger after a moment's interval. "Two nations; between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws."

¹ *Sybil, or the Two Nations*, by Benjamin Disraeli, published May Day, 1845.

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"You speak of——" said Egremont hesitatingly.

"THE RICH AND THE POOR."

Neither Brougham nor Disraeli would have admitted that they were democrats, but Brougham would not have divided the population into the people and the mob, nor Disraeli into two nations, unless unconsciously they had accepted the ideas implicit in democracy. It was the idea of freedom, the belief (No. 3) that all men should be politically free, which induced Brougham to identify the middle classes with the people. We have already noted his belief that the English people in the nineteenth century could no longer be treated politically like children or subject races, and his assertion that the problem to be solved was "how we may best make the people's House of Parliament represent the people". At the back of his mind, therefore, lay the vision of "the people" governing themselves, which is itself a very important part of the democratic ideal. And this is precisely the point at which the great dilemma breaks into the vision and confronts the democratic idealist. If society is to consist of a people governing itself and the unpropertied proletariat, the nation of the poor, are to be counted among the people, will property be safe? Brougham and the vast majority of the middle class were already clear in their own minds that, if the proletariat were numbered among the people which governed itself and sent its representatives to Parliament, the economic system as they knew it—or property, as they called it—would be destroyed. So Brougham solved the dilemma by a fraudulent fiction. The middle class were "the people", and so the ideal of the people governing itself could be attained

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by putting political power into the hands of the middle class. And any inconvenient doubts about freedom in the mind of nascent democracy can be soothed by the reflection that the lower orders, rechristened the populace, "look up to" the middle classes, rechristened the people, "as their kind and natural protectors".

I have devoted considerable space to the analysis of the communal psychology of the reform agitation, because it was a crucial moment in the history of political democracy, the economic system, and of Western civilization. There were three new factors or forces of immense potency acting or about to act upon the fabric of European society. The first was the new communal psychology which had given birth to democracy; the second was the industrial revolution and the communal psychology of capitalism; the third, which had only just begun to develop its tremendous powers, was the communal psychology of nationalism. The action of these three forces upon society could not be consistent or harmonious, for the form which one was imposing upon it was not the same as that which the others were imposing upon it. The future of European civilization depended therefore upon how these forces reacted upon and modified one another. In the reform agitation we have been studying the beginnings of this modification. The communal psychology of democracy was, as we have seen, from one point of view an attitude of mind, from another a social ideal, and from another the very ethos of nineteenth-century civilization. Its strongest motive power was human desires, the satisfaction of which required a society in which individuality had free play and a

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nation of free, equal, and educated citizens governed itself. The idea that human beings who had struggled out of the barbarism and squalor of apes and savages to create the civilizations of Sumer and Akkad, Athens and Rome, had reached the limits of development in the eighteenth century and were incapable of building a new civilization, a classless society of educated, intelligent, free, and equal citizens—the idea is absurd. The kind of human society which the communal psychology of democracy implied and aimed at was attainable, the kind of human being which was necessary if the society was to function might have been created—but only on condition that nineteenth-century man was not at the same time desiring and creating things incompatible with this classless society of free and equal citizens. The importance of the English reform agitation is that it showed so early in the century exactly where the choice would have to be made. Lord Grey, Eldon, Wellington, Greville, Hobhouse, Cobbett, Place—we have seen them all, one after another, instantly and instinctively feeling that, if they wanted to keep the existing economic system and the institution of property, it would not be possible to create a society of free and equal citizens governing themselves. They made their choice. The communal psychology of the industrial system was stronger than the communal psychology of democracy. The desire for property and profits was stronger than the desire for freedom and equality. The process of modifying the ideals and aspirations of democracy took various forms in the minds of different men, but the result was in every case the same. The English people for political purposes was

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identified with the middle or propertied classes; political power became their privilege, as in the eighteenth century it had been the privilege of aristocrats and landowners. The ideal of political equality was rejected in order to erect a bulwark against the ideal of economic equality. The rule of the bourgeoisie in Britain had begun.

CHAPTER V

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

IN the last chapter we have seen the first attempt in England to translate into political practice the ideas and ideals of democracy which had developed during the eighteenth century. The political crisis which ended with the Reform Act of 1832 was a revolution in which the guns were loaded, but did not go off. When the bloodless revolution was accomplished, the rule of the bourgeoisie in England had begun. Now we are going to examine a French revolution in which the guns went off. In the political communal psychology of France from 1815 to 1830 there are considerable differences from that of Great Britain during the same period, but the resemblance is even more remarkable. And perhaps the most remarkable resemblance in the history of the period is to be found in the fact that, when the revolution of 1830 had been accomplished, the rule of the bourgeoisie had begun in France.

In 1815 the position in France was very different from that in Britain. The political framework of society in which the ordinary Englishman lived, as we observed in the last chapter, had not changed since the middle of the eighteenth century. The King

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who sat on the throne at the beginning of 1820 had been sitting there since 1760, that is to say, he began to reign fourteen years before Louis XVI. succeeded to the throne of France and two years before Catherine the Great began to rule over Russia. At the beginning of his reign, as we have noted, he announced to his subjects: "I will have no innovations in my time"; and when, sixty years later, on January 29, 1820, his time was fulfilled, politically his prophecy or determination had been completely accomplished. For sixty years there had been no constitutional change, no political innovation in Britain. All that time the same King had reigned with the same powers. It was still the same House of Lords with the same powers, the same House of Commons with the same powers, the same franchise, the same parties, the same families of the same governing class. And as though to emphasize the changelessness of England and the political void in the heads of Englishmen, for the better part of two generations power had been in the hands of the same party, the party of conservatism and reaction.

The background to the political psychology of the Englishman of 1815 was stability and immutability. Very different was the background of memory against which a Frenchman watched the allied troops march into Paris after the battle of Waterloo. Even if he were under forty, he had seen the monarchy abolished and the King executed. He had seen all the powers and privileges of the aristocracy abolished and a republic set up in their place. He had lived through the Terror. He had probably fought in the republican army. He had seen the republic followed by the Consulate and the Con-

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sulate by the Empire. He had probably fought in Napoleon's armies in Italy, Flanders, Spain, or Leipzig. Perhaps he had seen Moscow burning. And now he watched Russian, Prussian, and English troops marching into Paris; the Emperor shipped off to St. Helena; the Empire abolished; a Bourbon King replaced upon the throne of France in the person of an old gentleman called Louis XVIII.; the disappearance of the tricolour; the appearance of *émigré* aristocrats with the white cockade cheering and embracing the foreign soldiers. Everything had changed and changed again in the political kaleidoscope, except two men who, by betraying every principle and every master, had contrived still to remain in power, Fouché the policeman and Talleyrand the diplomatist.

Both the framework of society and the political psychology were completely different in France and Britain at the beginning of the period 1815 to 1830, and it is extraordinarily interesting to see how, despite that fact, the same fundamental ideas and the same economic forces interacting produced the same results in both countries. We must begin by examining more closely the framework of French society and its relation to political psychology at the beginning of the period.

The whole period is known to history and historians as "The Restoration". Unlike many titles to historical chapters, the name exactly describes the event. The Frenchman who watched Louis XVIII. enter the Tuileries on July 8, 1815, was in fact the spectator of a restoration. M. de Chabrol, the Prefect of the Seine, who received the King at the entrance, had a few years previously been the gaoler who

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received the Pope Pius VII. into a French prison, and it was said of him that he had seen a succession of so many contradictory events that he had lost the faculty of astonishment. Many of the spectators who saw Louis XVIII. enter the Tuileries on July 8, 1815, may have seen Louis XVI. leave it on August 10, 1792; they had seen Mirabeau, Danton, Marat, Robespierre, Napoleon. Like the Pope's gaoler, they may have lost the faculty of astonishment; but they all knew that they were witnessing a restoration.

It was something much more than the restoration of a Bourbon to the throne of France; it was an attempt to recreate in France the whole framework of society which is known as the *ancien régime*. In England, as we have seen, the political and social framework had remained absolutely unaltered for a century, completely unmodified either by democratic ideas or economic forces; in the struggle which culminated in the Reform Act an *ancien régime*, in undisturbed possession, had to meet an attack upon its political powers and privileges from new ideas and new economic forces. In France the rôles were reversed; the Restoration was a counter-revolution in which a feudal aristocracy attempted to reconquer its lost powers and privileges in the teeth of new ideas and new economic forces. The situation in France during the period was, therefore, much more complicated than in England, and in order to understand its history it is essential to disentangle these complications, to estimate accurately the various psychological and economic strains and stresses to which society and its framework were subjected.

Between 1789 and 1795 France passed through and far beyond the English democratic revolution of

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1832. The powers and privileges of the Crown and the aristocracy were completely destroyed. An attempt was made to establish a republic on the democratic principles which we have examined in the first volume. In that attempt all the problems, ranging from liberty and equality to the franchise and property, which confront men and Governments as soon as they begin to translate democratic principles into democratic practice, were immediately revealed. The problems proved to be beyond the power of solution by men and Governments in 1789. The attempt failed and the reasons for its failure are broadly obvious. The revolutionary leaders were politically inexperienced; their economic ideas were crude and primitive. To pass straight from the feudal regime of the monarchy to complete political democracy was in itself a stupendous task. It was immediately complicated by the divergent interests of economic classes, though this complication was obscured to contemporaries and even to many historians by the fact that at the time hardly anyone realized the relation between political and economic equality. As though these difficulties were not enough, the revolutionary Government had to face an imminent threat to its own and the revolution's existence from war. This war was from the first a national and a class war rolled into one. By 1792 revolutionary France was at war with Austria and Prussia, but the coalition against which Dumouriez's armies fought was a coalition not merely of Austria and Prussia, but of Austria, Prussia, and the French aristocratic *émigrés*. On February 9, 1792, the property of the *émigrés* was confiscated; in July of the same year the Duke of Brunswick published his famous and fatal

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manifesto. The manifesto was fatal because it announced to the French people that the allied armies were fighting to re-establish the *ancien régime*, both politically and economically. If the Duke of Brunswick were victorious, the *émigrés* would be victorious, and there would be a "Restoration", a restoration not only of the King, but of the powers and privileges of the aristocracy. In its third year the Revolution had already passed from a political to an economic stage, in which the conflicting interests of the aristocrats and landowners on one side and of the bourgeoisie and peasants on the other were a determining factor. The confiscation of the property of the *émigrés* was a landmark in history; it marked the beginning of the expropriation of a class. It was a visible symbol that showed the revolution to be a victory of the middle and peasant classes. Hence, as we shall see, it became again of great economic and political significance in the years 1815 to 1830, for a restoration of the *ancien régime* could not be complete unless the confiscated property were restored or compensation paid to the landowners.

The Revolution was killed by misgovernment and war and was succeeded by the interlude known as Napoleon and the Empire. Napoleon was what we now call a dictator, but he was comparatively a civilized man and his regime a civilized dictatorship.¹ He put an end to the Revolution, to the ex-

¹ A curious and probably little known incident may illustrate the difference between a civilized and an uncivilized dictatorship. In 1806, after the battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon passed through Strasbourg. The Alsatian landowners and peasants were in an extremely bad economic condition and they were heavily in debt. Many of their creditors were Jews. The debtors complained to the Emperor, and their complaints were largely against the Jews. Napoleon promised that something should be done, and on his return to Paris remitted

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periment in political democracy. But there was no reaction, in the sense of a return to the *ancien régime*. Wherever it was a question between the Revolution and the privileged orders of the society which it destroyed, Napoleon remained to the end a revolutionary. Hence there was no restoration of the privileges, social or economic, of the aristocracy. It is true that he created a new aristocracy of the Empire out of his policemen and his field-m Marshals, but his Dukes of Otranto and Dukes of Dalmatia belonged not to reality, but to the imaginary, nascent world of the Romantic Movement; such power as they had came to them from their offices; as aristocrats, they had neither political nor economic power.

the question for examination and report to the Council of State. This was a signal for the outbreak of anti-semitism, and de Bonald wrote a violent article in the *Mercure* on the position of the Jews among Christian peoples. The Council of State instructed M. Molé, then a young man of twenty-five, to make a report. His report took the anti-semitic side and proposed that the Jews should be subjected to special laws. The rest of the Council took the opposite view, namely, that it was contrary to the principles of civilized law to "enquire into a creditor's religion in order to decide whether he had the right to be paid his debt". The final discussion was adjourned in order that it might take place in the presence of Napoleon. Napoleon was at that time in favour of taking some action against the Jews, and, when he attended the discussion, was annoyed by a rather foolish speech of the orator chosen to put forward the view of the Council. He became so angry that it looked at one moment as if he would adopt the proposals of Molé. However, in the end he relented and agreed to the appointment of a commission to enquire into the condition of the Jews in France and their methods of money-lending. An extremely instructive and impartial report by M. Pasquier convinced the Emperor, and the result was an imperial decree recognizing the Jewish religion and guaranteeing equality before the law. Baron de Barante, who was himself a member of the Council, ends his account of the incident as follows: "To sum up, the whole affair, which originated in a movement of irritation, hostility, and intolerance, ended with a solemn recognition of the rabbis and synagogues and a striking confirmation of civil equality for the Jews" (*Souvenirs du Baron de Barante*, vol. i. pp. 149-153).

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Thus Napoleon maintained the framework of society as it had been left by the Revolution, except in those parts operated upon by political power, which he concentrated in his own hands.

The Revolution had been a victory of the middle and peasant classes over a privileged aristocracy; upon the bourgeoisie and the peasants Napoleon simply superimposed an army and himself, and organized the society thus formed for military conquest. His empire fell to pieces when the middle class, the peasants, and the army in its higher ranks turned against him. His marshals deserted Napoleon when they had nothing more to gain in dukedoms, decorations, and wealth from winning further victories;¹ the bourgeois and the peasant, when they became tired of perpetual war which prevented the first from making and enjoying his profits and the second from cultivating his garden.

When, therefore, Louis XVIII. and his *émigré* nobles returned to Paris in 1815, they found the passive body of the French people, not as it had existed in 1789, but as it had been left by the revolution; in the path of restoration stood the bourgeois and the peasant. The object of the *émigrés*

¹ This attitude of his Generals had already manifested itself and was known to Napoleon as early as 1806. The Baron de Barante in his memoirs (vol. i. p. 184) relates that Napoleon after the battle of Jena said to the historian Müller in Berlin that his Generals "*déjà fatigués, n'avaient pas d'autre désir que d'aller jouir en repos de la position et des richesses acquises*". Barante adds that it was perfectly true and that most of them avowed it pretty frankly, "*tout en conservant une obéissance imperturbable*". When the Marshal Berthier said as much in Napoleon's presence, the Emperor replied to him: "*Vous seriez donc bien content d'aller pisser dans la Seine?*" Barante is a good witness, for throughout the campaigns of 1806 and 1807 he was with the Grand Army and in constant touch with the higher command.

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was to return to 1789, to re-establish the political and economic dominance of the monarch and a feudal aristocracy. The success or failure in this enterprise depended to a considerable extent, as the history of the next fifteen years showed, upon the terms and circumstances of the original monarchical restoration. Even to-day it is difficult to say whether the apotheosis of the principle of Legitimacy and the return of a Bourbon to the throne of France in 1814 were inevitable or accidental. At the time itself it certainly did not always seem inevitable to many of those who in the end were responsible for bringing it about. Guizot,¹ looking back from the revolution of 1848 to his own political debut in the Hundred Days, protested against the view that the Bourbon restoration was imposed upon France by foreign bayonets or that it was an accident or afterthought of history. It was, he said, the only "natural and serious" solution, the only solution imposed by "principles which were independent both of the chances of war and the caprices of the human will"; and the reason was that it gave to France the promise of two blessings of which she was in desperate need and of which she had been deprived for twenty-five years—liberty and peace.

Guizot was always too much inclined to see history and politics in terms of "natural principles", and the truth probably lies somewhere in between his own view and the views rejected by him. Foreign bayonets, accident, caprices of the human will, intrigues, all these conspired with the eternal principles of human action and the desire for peace

¹ *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 29.

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and liberty to put Louis XVIII. on the throne of France. Ultimately, however, the decision rested with the foreign bayonets, and what the foreign bayonets wanted was insurance against war and revolution. The obvious path to these, the line of least resistance, was Louis XVIII., and after long wars and violent revolutions history and statesmen are accustomed to choose—more often than not disastrously—the paths which are obvious and easy. The declaration of Alexander on March 31, 1814, to the French people in the name of the occupying armies and the victorious monarchs was a clever and persuasive document, for it had been composed by Talleyrand. Alexander was not going to repeat the mistake of the Duke of Brunswick by imposing a king or a constitution on France. The Senate was invited to set up a provisional Government and determine a constitution which the Allies would recognize and guarantee. But a delicate indication of the line of least resistance was offered: the monarchs would not treat with Napoleon Bonaparte or with any member of his family, but they would “respect the integrity of ancient France as it had existed under her legitimate kings”. The hint covered a policy, the result of many conversations and intrigues behind the scene in which Alexander, Talleyrand, Metternich, Dalberg, M. de Vitrolles, and many obscurer men played their part. The Senate took the hint and on April 9 the French people learned, by a public Declaration, that it had “freely summoned to the throne of France Louis-Stanislas-Xavier of France, brother of the last king, and, after him, the other members of the House of Bourbon, in their ancient order”.

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The foreign bayonets—Alexander, Wellington, Blücher, Metternich—had now got a Government with whom they could treat. What they wanted was peace and an insurance against revolution, and they thought that they had obtained both when the French people freely summoned to the throne their “legitimate” king, Louis-Stanislas-Xavier, and the other members of the House of Bourbon in their ancient order. Peace too was one of the things which, as Guizot said and we know, the French people wanted. But there was another thing which, according to Guizot, the French people wanted, something which Alexander, Wellington, Blücher, and Metternich were not much concerned with—liberty. Liberty in 1814 was still something inside men’s heads, a political idea. It could not be dissociated from the Revolution which had killed a legitimate king and fought its battles in the name of liberty and equality. It lay behind the restoration of a Bourbon, a question-mark in the mind of every thinking man. Its antithesis was the *ancien régime*, the principle of the Bourbon monarchy. There were many men, watching and waiting in 1814, who were fully aware of that antithesis, though the shades of their political thought might vary: Benjamin Constant, Royer-Collard and his young Doctrinaires, Carnot, and Lafayette. They had had enough of revolution, war, and imperial glory, but the question-mark in their minds was whether these things could be avoided without paying their price in liberty. They, like hundreds of other Frenchmen, felt in their political bones that the revolution had gone too far, had marked too deeply the surface of men’s minds and the social and economic fabric of society,

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to make a simple return to the ancient order safe or indeed possible.

The easy and obvious way of dealing with an anti-thesis is to reconcile it by taking a bit of both, by challenging logic and standing firmly on both horns of your dilemma. Once more statesmen and history took the easy and obvious path. The ancient order and the legitimate monarchy were to be restored, but with them the liberty of the French people which they had won by abolishing the ancient order and abolishing the legitimate monarchy. The idea, the very words themselves are explicit even in the Declaration of April 8: it ended with those words which must have had a sinister and ominous sound in the ears of many Frenchmen, "l'ordre ancien", but the omen was balanced or cancelled by the use of the word "librement"—equally sinister and ominous to other Frenchmen—in the opening words: "Le peuple français appelle *librement* au trône de France . . ."

This reconciliation or compromise was embodied in the Charter, a constitutional instrument which dominated French politics for thirty-three years. It intended or pretended to be the charter of French liberty, a guarantee that the restoration of a Bourbon was not to be a restoration of the *ancien régime*. And since it was given by and not imposed upon the monarch it was the charter, too, of legitimacy and monarchical stability.¹ It was, therefore, an agree-

¹ The contemporary view of it as such a compromise or reciprocal guarantee is shown by the following remarks, made in August 1816, by the Secretary of the French Academy, in a speech to that body: "Un prince éclairé par les lumières de son siècle, par celles de l'expérience et par celles d'un esprit supérieur, vient de donner à l'autorité royale un appui qu'aucun autre ne peut remplacer, dans cette Charte qui consacre tous les droits du monarque en même temps qu'elle garantit à la nation tous ceux qui constituent la vraie et légitime

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ment between the king and the people, the primary effect of which was to substitute for the Empire a constitutional monarchy which, however, took over from the Empire its highly centralized administration. The guarantee of liberty and the insurance against revolution were in the last resort a parliament of two Chambers with legislative powers. It was the legislature which differentiated the monarchy of Louis XVIII. from the monarchy of Louis XVI. and which reconciled those who wanted *la vraie et légitime liberté* to the restoration, not of the *ancien régime*, but of a constitutional king.

The Hundred Days was an episode of no permanent importance; when it was over, it left the political and economic situation precisely as it had been before Napoleon escaped from Elba. This, I am well aware, was not the opinion of many contemporaries who played prominent parts in the events themselves. Guizot, for example, held the view that the Hundred Days did irreparable harm to France, not so much by the bloodshed and treasure wasted, but because "they rekindled that old quarrel which the Empire had suppressed and the Charter was meant to extinguish, the quarrel between ancient France and the new France, between the emigration and the revolution". But Guizot was misled by a curious theory with regard to politics and society which was held by many of his contemporaries besides himself and is the key to much of the communal psychology of the nineteenth and even of the twentieth centuries.

liberté. Rallions-nous à ce signe d'alliance entre le peuple et son Roi, leur union est le seul garant assuré du bonheur de l'un et de l'autre." See Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 143. Note the qualification in the adjectives attached to liberty; we shall hear them again and again in the mouths of the middle class during the nineteenth century.

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The "quarrel" between the emigration and the revolution was, as Guizot sees, something more than a political struggle for power; it was a class struggle. Now a class struggle is concerned not with political or social ideas, but with interests; it has to be fought in the foundations, not upon the surface, of society. In Guizot's view this is unnecessary, unnatural, and disastrous. "A certain amount of fermentation and emulation" is good for a State, but it must be confined to political parties and to "questions of government and public affairs"; if instead of the rivalry between political parties you get hostility between classes, and instead of differences about "questions of government" attacks upon the very foundations of society, that effervescence or movement which is a sign of health in the body politic gives place to "a destructive evil which brings in its train the most lamentable disorders and may encompass the dissolution of the State".¹

Count Molé differed completely from Guizot in origin, career, temperament, and doctrine, but he expresses exactly the same view in slightly different terms. In opposing the proposed law with regard to the press in 1822, he explained that representative government entailed a struggle between two rival opinions. This was a desirable state of affairs, since the object of the struggle was "de remettre le pouvoir aux mains des plus habiles"; but if the struggle increased from one between opinions to one between interests, it soon changed its nature and became a formidable war.² This, it will be seen, is only another

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 109.

² *Le Comte Molé, 1781-1855; sa vie—ses mémoires*, by Marquis de Noailles, vol. v. p. 18.

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way of putting Guizot's view. These two statesmen, one a liberal conservative and the other a conservative liberal, believed that the best form of society and constitution was one in which there was more or less free play for the conflict or competition between political parties through parliamentary institutions. They thought that these conflicts were and would be about questions of government or administration, that they were therefore necessarily "political" questions, and that the differences between parties would be determined, not by conflict of interests, but by conflict of political opinion or political principles. What they feared and abhorred was the intrusion of class and class interests into politics. A conflict between political parties or political principles was safe; a conflict between classes or class interests was dangerous, if indeed it were not wicked.

This extraordinary view of government and society was almost universally held by the bourgeoisie throughout the nineteenth century. Its effect upon the history of that century has been profound. It persists even to-day in the attitude of many liberals and conservatives to what is known as the class war. Marx and most socialists mean by the class war the divergence or conflict of interests between the capitalist or employing class and the employed or wage-earning class. In their view the existence of the two classes and of the conflict between them is an objective fact of immense social importance, and as such is and must be one of the determining factors (to put it at the lowest) in the State, in government, and in politics. Many liberals and conservatives do not really deny the existence of this conflict of

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interests as an objective fact; indeed their political opinions and actions often prove that they accept it in the full Marxian sense. But like Guizot and Molé, they resent its intrusion into "politics". They speak as if Marx and the socialist movement, by recognizing its existence, have themselves thereby created it. This, no doubt, is an example of the natural instinct of human beings in politics to imitate the ostrich, for whose attitude to what is unpleasant or dangerous there is a good deal to be said. But there is something more in it than that. All these politicians believe that, in a society in which people are "respectable", politics should be determined by opinions, beliefs, and principles, that competition for power should be between political parties which differ from one another only in opinion and on principles of government, and that to recognize classes or class interests politically or to allow them to determine the structure of political parties and of the State is disreputable, wicked, and revolutionary.

We have here a phenomenon which goes deep down into political psychology, for it crops out in the third decade of the nineteenth century in the *Doctrinaires* of France and in a man like Molé, in the Whig reformists in England, and again to-day in the liberals and conservatives faced with socialism. Even at first sight the doctrine is a curious one, but below the surface a still stranger thing will be discovered than the doctrine itself. It will be remembered that Brougham, faced with the problem of "how we may best make the People's House of Parliament represent the people" and at the same time how to prevent political power falling into the

hands of "the lower orders", solved it by the fraudulent fiction that the middle class was "the people".¹ Now Brougham agreed with Guizot that politics should be concerned with parties, opinions, and principles and not with classes and class interests. And Guizot, as we shall see later, independently of Brougham, had arrived at precisely the same opinion in France as Brougham had arrived at in England, namely, that political power should be confined to the middle classes or, in other words, that for political purposes the middle class was the people. So that the very persons who were maintaining that it was fatal to allow classes or class interests to affect politics were themselves building class into the very structure of politics.

We are unearthing in this inconsistency one of the most important principles of individual and communal psychology which determine political actions. There may arise at any moment in anyone a conflict between his beliefs and his interests. The interests may be personal or class interests. For instance, Brougham and some other members of the Grey Cabinet were, as we have seen, moved to action with regard to the Reform Bill partly by political or social beliefs, the "democratic" beliefs concerning liberty and equality derived from the revolt against aristocracy and privilege in the eighteenth century. Everyone recognizes that such beliefs may conflict with the personal interests of the individual. Those members of the Grey Cabinet who, more than once, had to decide whether they would resign office rather than allow the Bill to be emasculated were partly influenced in making a decision by this con-

¹ See above, p. 149.

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flict between their belief with regard to liberty and equality and their private interests in remaining in the Cabinet. A man must be an unusually determined believer in economic determinism if he maintains that no one in such cases ever allows his beliefs, and not his individual interests, to determine his political action.

But the interests which Guizot and Molé were thinking of were class interests. Since their day an immense amount has been written about them and the part that they play in politics and in society, but little has been done to study their actual effect upon the political psychology and actions of individuals, and so upon communal psychology. The fact that class interests are usually much more complicated and elusive than an individual interest makes generalization about their political or economic significance easy and attractive; at the same time it makes their effect upon the individual more subtle and less easily discoverable. A class interest is in its nature often very much the same as a personal interest, but a personal interest once removed. This has important effects upon the part which they play in political psychology and in the conflicts between beliefs or "principles" and interests. The enfranchisement of the middle class and the disfranchisement of the lower orders are, or may appear to be, a class interest, *i.e.* they protect the economic position of the middle class against any encroachment upon it by the lower orders through political action. When, in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century, many middle-class people supported a political system based upon this form of franchise, they did so because their political psychology and

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action were mainly determined by this class interest. That means that they consciously or unconsciously identified their interests with those of their class; they were aware or felt instinctively that the enfranchisement of the lower orders might undermine the economic position of the middle class, and that their own individual interests might therefore suffer with those of their own class. In the conversation between Greville and Hobhouse, quoted on page 110, one can observe a class interest operating upon political psychology in this way. One half of the possessing classes thought that the Bill, if passed, would dispossess them, and each individual thought that he personally would be dispossessed with his class; but Hobhouse, a member of the possessing classes, and the other half thought that the Bill would be a bulwark against encroachment by the lower orders upon the economic interests of the upper and middle classes, and each thought that he personally would be protected; Hobhouse, as he said, did not like to think that the Bill would not be carried, for he was desirous of keeping what he had, and he was persuaded that he would lose it if the Bill were rejected.

A class interest of this kind may conflict with a political belief or principle just as a personal or individual interest does. A middle-class person may hold that liberty and equality are desirable and therefore that an extension of the franchise is desirable, while knowing that such an extension will probably threaten the economic position of his class and therefore of himself. He is then faced with the alternative of subordinating his beliefs to his interests or his interests to his beliefs. But the conflict here is essentially indistinguishable from the conflict of the

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Cabinet Minister who is faced with the alternative of subordinating his beliefs to his interests by accepting an emasculated Reform Act or his interests to his beliefs by resigning from the Cabinet. That people's class interests determine their political psychology and actions is obvious and notorious, but the idea that they never sacrifice their class interest in order to stand by their beliefs, just as sometimes they sacrifice their private interests for their beliefs, is much too crude to be true. There are two important truths with regard to this matter, the evidence for which may be found in a study of history and the experience of one's own mind and of everyday life. The fact that a class interest, as compared with a personal interest, is not immediate, but is once removed, often obscures for the individual the fact that he is holding some political or social belief which does or may conflict with the interests of his own class. A middle-class man, for instance, may hold the democratic beliefs with regard to equality and liberty for a long time without perceiving that, if they were completely put into practice, they would adversely affect the economic interests of his own class. Large numbers of people in such a situation, when at last they become aware of the conflict, stand by their beliefs, as is shown by the fact that, in the first part of the nineteenth century, there were hundreds of middle-class men who supported manhood suffrage, and in later years there were thousands in the bourgeoisie who followed the four great bourgeois leaders, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky, in their attempts to translate socialist beliefs into a socialist revolution. This explains why in fact it is probable that many more people sacrifice their

class interests than their personal interests to their principles.

But this brings us to the second of the important truths. The fact that the class interest is not immediate also makes it easy for the individual to evade, elude, or obscure the conflict when it arises between his class interests and his belief. This can be accomplished in various ways. So long as the belief or principle remains in the abstract and unrelated to political action, it can be kept in a separate compartment of the mind comfortably insulated from all considerations connected with the class interest. Those Ministers in the Grey Cabinet who had been reformers until they saw with horror what Lord John Russell's Reform Bill really meant, and who then tried to emasculate it, took this course. This process of psychological insulation probably also accounts for many cases in which the most sincere and humane radicals, like Bright, have opposed, with what appears to be the most repulsive hypocrisy, economic and industrial reforms which their radical beliefs and humanitarian principles demanded, but which were contrary to the interests of their class. But there is another process of evasion or self-delusion almost always operative in these cases. A class interest is not, like a personal private interest, immediate and simple; it affects an immense number of people other than oneself, usually in a very intricate manner. There are therefore always many arguments for protecting the important interests of any large class in the community which yet do not appear on the surface to be related to the immediate interests of a particular individual of that class. This enables the member of such a class, when

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his political belief conflicts with his class interests, unconsciously to discover or select arguments which justify the protection of the class interest and the subordination or curtailment of the political principle. It is this process which explains Brougham's selection of arguments to prove that the middle class were the people and Guizot's selection of arguments to prove that in the new society of the Restoration the middle classes must be the "fundamental element" politically in the State.¹

It is essential to keep these facts of social and individual psychology in mind when one studies the position in France at the restoration of Louis XVIII. and the events which produced the revolution of 1830. The instability of that position was mainly due to an extraordinarily complicated conflict between political or social ideas and class interests. The complication was due to the fact that there was no simple conflict between either the ideas or the interests, and the ideas cannot therefore be explained or displayed as determined by particular class interests. There was, no doubt, as there always is, a broad connection between certain interests and certain social ideas, a continual influence of interests upon ideas, but neither the connection nor influence was simple and regular, so that as soon as one begins to examine the individual stitches out of which the fabric of history is woven one is confronted by a bewildering criss-cross of interests and beliefs. It is

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 296, explains that in his *Du gouvernement de la France depuis la restauration et du ministère actuel*, published after he went into opposition to the Government in 1820, "Je soutins avec ardeur la cause de la société nouvelle telle que la Révolution l'a faite, ayant l'égalité devant la loi pour premier principe, et les classes moyennes pour élément fondamental".

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necessary to unpick some of the stitches in order to see how the web has been woven. In other words, we must begin by analysing some of these interests and beliefs.

Let us start with some beliefs, the democratic beliefs, which were ineradicably connected with the revolution, with regard to liberty and equality as the right basis for society. It is of course true that different classes and different individuals interpreted these democratic ideas and principles differently and that the dictatorship of Napoleon had suspended their application over large areas of political life. But it is also true that when Napoleon fell, the influence which they had had upon the attitude of all classes towards political and social questions and many of the profound modifications which they had actually imposed during the revolution upon French society still existed. It is important to distinguish the different forms which this revolutionary ideology (to use a favourite modern word) had taken in the heads of different people in 1815. There were some who still, despite the vicissitudes of the revolution and the Empire, held it consciously in its pure and extreme form, which was analysed on page 144. They believed that the principle of all political action should be the supreme importance of the happiness of ordinary individuals, that political institutions and laws should be such as to ensure the political freedom and equality of all men, that political power should not be the property or privilege of particular classes or individuals, and that the immediate aim in politics should be to transform France into a community of free and equal citizens, politically united in a common purpose—the happiness of each and all.

The number of these convinced and conscious democrats was small. They were almost entirely intellectuals and bourgeois. The little band of republicans which had survived the Empire and the Restoration was numbered among them. They were the nucleus of another little band, the extreme Left in the Chamber of Deputies after 1818.

To the right of these democrats and republicans was a much larger and heterogeneous body of opinion whose memory was still haunted by terror or even hatred of the revolution, but which yet accepted many of its principles as right and many of its effects as irrevocable. Their attitude is clearly expressed in a letter which M. Molé wrote to Baron de Barante on July 29, 1816:¹

Je n'ai cessé et je ne cesserai point de détester les principes et les résultats de cette révolution qu'on [the ultra-royalists] veut défaire. Mais je ne laisserai pas plus que Cassandre de dire la chute de quiconque osera attaquer ou même menacer ces résultats. Ils sont devenus l'arche sainte: celui que y touchera, périra. Opinions et intérêts, il faut tout en respecter également et marcher appuyé sur eux.

These people were not democrats, but democracy had deeply tinged the whole of their political thought

¹ *Souvenirs du Baron de Barante*, vol. ii, p. 251. I think that there can be no doubt that Molé is referring in the phrase about "l'arche sainte" to the famous proclamation of Louis XVIII. in 1795 when the Dauphin died. At that moment, in the middle of the revolution and the revolutionary wars, the new claimant of the French throne declared his intention to re-establish the ancient French constitution and to restore to that constitution all its purity which time had corrupted and all its vigour which time had weakened, and he added these ominous words: "Mais elle nous a mis elle-même dans l'heureuse impuissance de la changer; elle est pour nous l'arche sainte; il nous est défendu de lui porter une main téméraire". See *Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire*, by M. Duvergier de Hauranne, vol. ii, p. 124.

and feeling, as it had done in the case of Brougham. They rejected any idea of complete political equality and they had already invented the convenient distinction between liberty and licence which smoothed the path of governments and eased the conscience of liberals throughout the nineteenth century. But they thought that in a civilized modern State a considerable amount of freedom and a considerable amount of equality were essential. They objected to the arbitrary or irresponsible government of individuals or small classes; they objected to political privileges when they attached to small classes, though not necessarily when they attached to large classes in the community. This mild and parti-coloured democracy was the Ark of the Covenant which, in the sphere of "opinion", Molé and his like saw that it was dangerous to touch. The revolution had drawn a line of equality and freedom, a vague and often fluctuating line, across which there could be no permanent return.¹

There could be no permanent return, because the revolution had taught the vast mass of the French people to think politically in this way. The psycho-

¹ The Duc de Broglie, a member of the ancient aristocracy, but not an *émigré*, is another eminent example of this political psychology. His attitude was that of Molé, but more "liberal". In his *Souvenirs* (vol. i. p. 262) he gives the following analysis of what that attitude was in 1815: "I did not despise or depreciate the *ancien régime*, but I considered that any attempt to re-establish it was puerile. I belonged in heart and in head to the new society; I believed very sincerely in its unlimited progress; while I detested the conditions of a revolution, the disorders which it leads to and the crimes which defile it, I considered the French Revolution, taken as a whole, to be an inevitable and salutary event. Politically I looked to the United States as the future of civilized nations, and to the English monarchy as the government of the present day; I hated despotism and regarded administrative monarchy only as a stage of transition."

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logy of incipient democracy—for that is what it was—was not confined to one class or to one political party. It was, of course, extremely strong in the middle and professional classes, but, as events were to prove, it was almost equally strong among the financial and business classes. It had a strong hold in the army and among the Generals, a class by itself which had great importance politically during the early days of the Restoration. It had penetrated to the shopkeeping and to the working classes, and had become the colour of their political thought, in so far as they were at all politically minded. The same was also true of the peasants, except in those districts of France in which royalist traditions and the royalist cause had always been all-powerful. What is even more significant is that this political psychology had been accepted by a considerable majority of the old aristocracy and landed gentry, and that the Ultra-Royalists formed a small minority, not only in the nation, but in their own class. The Duc de Richelieu, who in the early days of the Restoration was at the head of what contemporaries called “a moderate Liberal Government” and who opposed the reaction in its worst and most dangerous period, was an *émigré*, and yet he might have used exactly the same words as Molé, which are quoted above, to describe his attitude to the revolution and its psychology. His supporters and the supporters of the “Liberal” Government of Decazes, which followed his, were very largely drawn from the aristocracy and the landowning classes, men, like Barante, whose families had suffered during the revolution, who had had no enthusiasm for the adventures and absolutism of Napoleon, and who had emerged from

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the shadow of the Terror and the glories of the Empire convinced believers in the necessity of a form of government which would combine stability and peace with liberty and equality.¹

The history of the nineteenth century was, for the

¹ The evidence for these statements regarding the social psychology of the different classes in the France of 1815 is to be found in contemporary memoirs, autobiographies, and letters. In these kinds of cases, expression of opinion by persons at the time itself is far better evidence than statements about what people thought made long afterwards in reminiscences and memoirs; for instance, Molé's letter to Barante, quoted above, is far more conclusive as to his state of mind and that of many others of his class in 1816, than if, say in 1830, he had given this account of the state of the country and his own mind as his reasons for having supported the Richelieu Government. Barante's *Souvenirs* are very useful from this point of view. They are full of contemporary letters and documents and he himself is an admirable witness. He had little real sympathy either for the revolution or for the Empire, but he emerged from them a liberal conservative. From 1807 to 1813 he was Prefect of Bressuire in la Vendée, and from 1813 to the Restoration, Prefect of la Loire-Inférieure at Nantes. In these posts he was in close touch with and able to understand the views of every class of the population. He was intimate with M. and Madame de La Rochejaquelein, who lived in the château de Clisson, near Bressuire, and stood aloof from the imperial regime. He mixed with the landed gentry who had fought in the war of La Vendée, with the judges, the lawyers, and the notaries. He was continually in touch with the workers and peasants. And he was interested in observing the manners and in learning the views of these different classes. Of the lawyers and notaries, for instance, he says: "I did not seek or avoid their company; I showed myself, without any affectation and quite naturally, hail-fellow-well-met with them, taking an interest in what interested them, so that they became quite at their ease and I could form my opinion of them as they really were. In fact, their conversation fascinated me much more than that of others who formally are much less vulgar. I was able to observe the movement of mind and opinion in a class which plays a large part in France. I saw how ideas were spreading which up to that time had penetrated but little into this isolated region. I noticed the difference of manners in the different provinces." And again, in a letter written to his wife in 1813, when he was ordered to leave Bressuire for Nantes, he says that he rather regrets having to leave the rural district of La Vendée for a large town: "In La Vendée I was daily in touch with every kind of person. A workman, a peasant always found my door open. I had time to talk with him and to deal with his affairs."

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most part, written by liberals and democrats and it usually escaped their notice that there were political ideas as well as interests behind the opposition to liberalism and democracy. The Royalists and Ultra-Royalists of the Restoration and reaction had an authoritarian political philosophy to set against the ideas of revolutionaries, republicans, and constitutional monarchists. The intellectual basis of the reaction found its most famous and persuasive interpreters in Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald. De Maistre's politics are founded upon a denial of the efficiency or desirability of reason, justice, or change in human affairs. Government is authority and authority comes from God. The organs of divine authority are two, closely connected: the Church of Rome and the absolute national monarch. Liberty and equality, democracy and revolution are social diseases, and the executioner, therefore, provided that he is on the side of the king and aristocracy, is "the corner-stone of society". It must always be the privilege of the few to command, the duty of the many to obey.

Bonald, as a recent writer has said,¹ reached the same conclusions as de Maistre, but by a different road. The conclusion is the intimate connection between religion and politics, the divine right of kings and upper classes to absolute authority, and the folly and wickedness of all attempts to change the basis of power or of human society. These views are, no doubt, the rationalization of desires in those whose interests lay in a return to the *ancien régime*, but they were something more than this. The political ideas

¹ Roger Soltau, *French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 16.

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identified with the revolution involved a social ideal based upon ethical judgments as to social values. The democrat held that a society of free and equal persons would be a better society than one in which the few were privileged to command and the many compelled to obey. The authoritarian of every age and every generation denies the political and the ethical premisses of this democratic belief. Authority upon the one hand, and obedience and discipline on the other, have for him a high ethical value. The majesty of kingship, the pride of aristocracy, the authority of strong government, the command of a ruling class, the loyalty of the masses, the deference of common people, the obedience of subjects, and the discipline of the ruled constitute for the authoritarian a better and nobler spectacle than a society of free men and equals.¹ These are the authoritarian's ethical beliefs, and there is no reason to hold that they, any more than the ethical judgments of the democrat, are always the rationalization of class interests.

But there is also a political basis for authoritarianism which played a particularly important part in the Restoration and the reaction, in Maistre and Bonald. The authoritarian denies not only the ethical beauty, but also the political practicability of freedom and equality. He denies the possibility of a society of free and equal citizens. He maintains, as Maistre did, that without an absolute monarch, supported by an aristocratic ruling class and an all-powerful Church, society becomes chaos. From this

¹ These ethical judgments are of course no less explicit in the speeches of Hitler and Mussolini than in the books of Maistre and Bonald.

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belief come the condemnation of all political change and the exaltation of tradition which are so notable in Maistre and Bonald. In 1815 there was much in the experience and memory of every man over the age of forty which might easily seem to confirm the belief that democracy was another name for chaos. These men had actually seen the attempt to establish liberty and equality end in the Terror, and the Terror had meant to many besides the aristocrats of France political chaos. Fear is a dominant emotion, never far below the surface of their consciousness, in all animals, including the human animal; it is one of the most powerful of all the social and political emotions, and politicians, historians, and sociologists habitually underestimate its importance. If you observe the wild animal in the jungle, the cow chewing the cud in the field, or the dog lying on the hearth-rug, you will see that each of them requires for its equanimity a certain stability and routine in the universe of which it is aware. The crackle of a dry leaf or the snapping of a twig, a white piece of paper fluttering across a field, a car back-firing in the street outside are sufficient to make the universe of the leopard, the cow, or the snoring spaniel collapse into chaos. A revolution will do much the same for human beings. The French aristocracy and bourgeoisie which had lived through the years 1789-1795 knew what it meant to be confronted by a universe from which all stability and routine had vanished. Their political memories were haunted by the fear of what to them was chaos, and the fear that that social chaos would return dominated the politics of the Restoration. The liberal looked to constitutional monarchy and "la vraie et légitime liberté"

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as the bulwark against its return, the Ultra-Royalists, following Maistre and Bonald, to absolute authoritarianism and the resurrection of the *ancien régime*.

Such were the ideas and beliefs operative in the minds of his subjects when Louis XVIII. became king. We must now turn for a moment to the class structure of French society at the time and examine how these ideas were correlated with the various classes. At the end of the Napoleonic era France was economically still mainly an agricultural country; its economic structure rested upon two classes, the aristocracy and landed gentry at the top and the peasantry at the bottom. The upper class, though its economic interests were naturally or superficially homogeneous, was in political ideas deeply divided. On the Right were the *émigrés*, who soon came to be known as the Ultra-Royalists, or merely Ultras. They returned to France determined to reinstate the *ancien régime* both in politics and economics. Most of them had been out of the country for twenty years; they were strangers, physically and psychologically, in their own country. This fact is of primary importance for an understanding of their political tactics and strategy and, indeed, of the whole history of the Restoration. The revolution had been not only a political and economic, but also a psychological revolution. The communal psychology of the mass of the French people was completely different in 1815 from what it had been in 1789. It already had a definite attitude towards questions involving political privilege, liberty, and equality. It was aware—though in many places dimly—of the implications of democracy. It was already politically conscious to a degree not reached in Britain until

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after 1830. That is what Molé meant when he said in 1816 that there were opinions as well as interests which had resulted from the revolution and that the man who attacked them would perish. And Molé's opinion is confirmed by a large number of other witnesses. Contemporary diaries and letters are full of statements by men who hated and feared the revolution as much as Molé, but were keenly aware, having lived through the revolutionary era and the Empire, that it had left in the people of France a sediment of democratic beliefs which it would be perilous to attack. What horrified and terrified them from the first days of the Restoration was the fact that the *émigrés* were blind and deaf to this peril. Again and again these men, who were aristocrats, bourgeois, conservative, whose attitude to democracy was that of the Duke of Wellington or Queen Victoria, lament that these *émigrés* "do not understand France" and that their misunderstanding of it must be fatal to themselves and ruinous to the country.

The *émigrés* and Ultras formed a very small minority of the nation and even of their own class, but their influence upon the politics of the period was immense. Their policy was suicidal, as hundreds of observers of every kind of political and social colour saw from the very first days of the Restoration. There is, indeed, no more amazing example of a class deliberately committing political and economic suicide than this blind descent to destruction by the Ultra-Royalists and the Bourbons between 1815 and 1830. The class psychology of these suicidal maniacs is easy to analyse; it was determined by ignorance, social beliefs, desire for revenge, fear,

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and economic interests. I have already dealt with their ignorance of the new psychology and new social conditions in France and with their social philosophy.¹ Their economic interests drove them along the path which led to an integral restoration of the *ancien régime*. The most dangerous question was raised by their determination to reverse the act of the Legislative Assembly in 1792 which confiscated without indemnity the property of the *émigrés*. The political results of their efforts to restore the *ancien régime* in this particular will have to be considered later. There was, however, another and more general side to their economic interests, as a class, which brought them into hostility with the majority of the nation. They looked upon the return of the *émigré* king as having as its primary object the advancement of the interests of every individual *émigré*. This royalist "profiteering" started at once, and its disastrous effects upon public opinion were at once evident. As early as April 1814, Barante at Nantes wrote a letter to his friend, M. de Montlosier, in which he said that in his opinion the vast majority of the people, if it were not for pure weariness, would begin the revolution over again to-morrow, not against the king, but against the nobility. There

¹ There is an interesting passage in Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 107, in which he analyses the motives which determined the action and policy of the Ultra-Royalist party in the Chamber of 1815. First passions, good and bad: love of order and thirst for vengeance, pride in the past and fear of the future, religious emotions, and the pleasure of persecuting their previous conquerors. Second, material interests. Third, the empire of ideas. Guizot points out that the party had for each class of motive a leader or representative who stood out from the rank and file. "M. de la Bourdonnaye marchait à la tête de ses passions, M. de Villèle de ses intérêts, M. de Bonald de ses idées." It will be observed that Guizot's analysis agrees roughly with my analysis on page 179 and in the paragraphs which follow.

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had been hostility to the Bourbons, but it had evaporated. But there had been no diminution in the people's jealousy of the upper class; twenty-five years of equality had only increased it, "and that upper class is generally so vain that it irritates with pin-pricks even the most level-headed people. There is no one with any pretension to be a 'gentleman' who does not believe that the king of France had returned to France for his private benefit. They must all have their jobs, their pensions, and their honours. It must all be for them alone; their time has come, etc. etc."

Their time had come to "cash in" not only on the economic interests, but also emotionally. There was first the need for revenge, and the emotion of fear is always inextricably associated with desire for revenge. The White Terror of 1815 was, no doubt, numerically not comparable to the Red Terror of 1793, but it was bad enough. The savagery of the human race was once more satisfied by the Royalists killing in cold blood a few hundred unfortunate people to offset the few thousands who had been guillotined over twenty years before. The motives were revenge and fear. Barante tells us that at the time he protested to certain Royalists and said to them: "You are just as guilty in the sight of God as Marat and Robespierre". They did not trouble very much to defend themselves. "Apart from these, who were intoxicated by their own passions," he says, "they had their theorists who considered an extensive regime of reprisals and executions to be necessary. 'It is not merely a question', they insisted, 'of a political revolution; we have got to make a social revolution. We have to change the form which

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the imperial regime gave to society. The ancient society has been destroyed by violence, the executions, and the confiscations. We have got to use the same instruments; otherwise we shall not succeed at all; our success will not last. The France of the Revolution will get the upper hand if we allow it to continue to exist.'"¹ These shootings and executions of the early days of the Restoration did not last long; they gave way to a "legal" Terror which continued spasmodically and inefficiently all through the reigns of Louis XVIII. and Charles X. It consisted in legal prosecutions and executions of those whom the Royalists hated. Here again there is contemporary evidence that the motives were consciously fear and revenge. In 1822 Guizot wrote a letter to Barante in which he said that the trials and executions, the prosecution of Benjamin Constant, and the attempts of the Royalists to interfere with the freedom of the press were giving to public affairs a remarkably gloomy aspect. Subordinate agents of the royalist party were openly saying that "one of the two parties must succumb and succumb completely, that they cannot live together. . . . It is clear", he continues, "that they would like to make certain persons sufficiently afraid to determine them to leave France; they say quite openly: 'They forced us to emigrate; let them clear out in their turn; we will not confiscate their possessions; that is better than they treated us.'"²

The *émigré* or ultra-royalist section formed, as I have said, a small minority of the aristocratic and

¹ *Souvenirs du Baron de Barante*, vol. ii. p. 212.

² Letter from Guizot to Barante from Paris, September 22, 1822, in *Souvenirs du Baron de Barante*, vol. iii. p. 42.

landowning class in 1814. The composition and economic interests of the majority deserve some attention. The whole class had been profoundly affected by events in the interval between 1789 and 1814. Those aristocrats and country gentlemen who had not emigrated accepted the Empire, but rarely with enthusiasm. They entered Napoleon's civil service or his army, and they served him for the most part loyally, but as one year of interminable war succeeded another, they grew more and more restive. In the last years of the Empire the Prefects found it impossible to apply the conscription laws in the provinces either to the upper or the lower classes, and the attempt to raise a kind of compulsory volunteer cavalry force from the country gentlemen was a failure. They therefore welcomed the fall of Napoleon and were prepared to welcome the Restoration and the Bourbons. They ought to have been the staunchest supporters of the Government in the next fifteen years, and the fact that most of them, even the "provincial aristocracy", were driven into opposition explains the complete collapse of 1830.¹ Except in the

¹ The opposition of the provincial aristocracy to the reactionary government in the years preceding the revolution of 1830 was very remarkable. In 1827 the Villèle Government was so unpopular generally that already the only alternatives were a royalist *coup d'état* or an election. But an election, even with an electoral law designed to keep the Left out, was almost certain to result in a liberal majority in the Chamber. (This in fact took place in January 1828, and resulted in the fall of Villèle and the formation of the Martignac Government, which was "too liberal for the Royalists and too reactionary for the liberals".) In a letter to Barante, dated July 25, 1827, the Comte de Sainte-Aulaire, after describing the difficulties and hesitations of the Government, writes: "Ce qui déconcerte le plus nos habiles, c'est la défection de la noblesse de province. Après s'être donné tant de soins depuis sept ans pour la reconstituer et lui rendre un rang, un esprit de corps, une influence dans l'État, ils s'aperçoivent que nulle part ils ne pourraient trouver une opposition plus hargneuse et moins

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matter of the confiscations and indemnity, their class interests were the same as those of the *émigrés*. Like them they feared the revolution, but, unlike them, they were not influenced politically by any desire for revenge. Their class interests demanded a stable government at home and peace abroad. But they understood the France of the nineteenth century, and felt in their bones that it could not be forced back into the political and economic garments of the eighteenth. In other words, they accepted, even if unaware of the fact, the social structure which the revolution and the Empire had imposed upon France. That meant that in practice they were in favour of a constitutional monarchy, a government which should have all the virtues which we now know to be characteristic of the middle class; a government which should give the maximum amount of liberty to all respectable people and the minimum amount of liberty to revolutionaries; a government, in fact, which should guarantee all those rights which make up "true and legitimate" liberty.

But the class which we are now considering, the "upper class" whose interests were connected with the land, had itself been profoundly affected in its very composition by the revolution and the Empire. It is roughly accurate to regard it as composed under the *ancien régime* of aristocrats and country gentlemen, but by 1814 this was no longer true. The aristocracy, "l'aristocratie du nom" as nineteenth-century writers called it,¹ was itself divided into two

maniable: cela m'amuse, je l'avoue, parfaitement" (*Souvenirs du Baron de Barante*, vol. iii. p. 396).

¹ E.g. Viviani, who says of the political situation after 1815: "Deux aristocraties vont s'emparer du pouvoir: à la Chambre des représentants, l'aristocratie de l'argent; à la Chambre des Pairs, par la

different sections. The provincial aristocracy remained in many parts of France much as it had been before the revolution, living a country life upon its estates and with little or no connection with the life of Paris. The interests of this section were pre-eminently land and landed interests. But there was another section whose life centred, not in the country and their estates, but in Paris. It contained some of the greatest of the aristocratic names and politically it had very great influence, for the focus of its activities was government, power, and office. But its interests were no longer primarily those of a landed aristocracy. Many of its most influential members were now closely connected, in business or even by marriage, with what Viviani calls "l'aristocratie de l'argent", the new class of very wealthy bankers, financiers, and industrialists. Talleyrand's career in this respect differs from that of many of his class only in the scale of his operations and of his success. He belonged to the highest ranks of the old aristocratie du nom; he never abandoned the habits and manners of the great landed eighteenth-century aristocrat; in his immense house at Valençay he still in 1830 kept the state and lived the life of a Talleyrand-Périgord of 1730. But the grand seigneur of Valençay, who had blossomed into the Napoleonic Prince of Benevento, had also developed another side. He was intimately associated with "l'aristocratie de l'argent" and even with the underworld of finance. The connection had begun years ago during the early days of the revolution. It had continued during the exile in England and again in the United States, where the

désignation du roi, l'aristocratie du nom". See René Viviani, *La Restauration*, p. 90, in *Histoire socialiste*, vol. vii.

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grand seigneur had acted as commission agent for English firms. Under the Empire his financial operations developed on a great scale. The foundation of Prince Talleyrand's vast fortune was, no doubt, laid in the bribes which he received as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under the Directory, the Consulate, and the Empire. But the large sums which came to him in the form of bribes or presents from foreign Governments were used by him for financial speculation in the grand manner which has become a marked characteristic of nineteenth-century capitalism. And they were used with great success. His inside knowledge of what was happening in the world of governments and high policy was worth a great deal in the world of speculators, currency manipulators, share-pushers, and the cornerers of commodities. It was this financial class with which Prince Talleyrand was closely connected, and his class interests were no longer in the land, but in the money market and the stock exchange.

We are here once more discovering that the idea of class interests as a determinant of political or social action is not as simple or effective a key to history as many people to-day assume. Talleyrand's class was that of the landed aristocracy, and in 1815 he was a royalist; his economic interests were those not of the landed aristocrats, but of financiers and stock-jobbers. And a considerable and very influential section of the landed aristocracy, whose lives centred in Paris, were in the same position as Talleyrand, though their royalism was probably more sincere and their financial transactions less successful than his. The important point is that, though their class

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was the same as that of the provincial aristocracy, their economic interests were entirely different.

The "upper class", connected with the land, had thus lost its aristocratic homogeneity and purity at the top; it may be said to have been narrowed and thinned by the fact that finance and business had introduced divided economic interests and divided class loyalties. At the other end this class had been modified by a process of expansion. Contemporaries and historians are agreed in regarding it as still composed in 1815 of aristocrats, lineally descended from the aristocracy of the *ancien régime*. But this was not in fact the case. It is true that during the Directory and the Empire a good deal of the landed property returned to its original owners, the aristocracy and country gentlemen,¹ so that by 1815 a substantial proportion of the landed property in France still belonged to the aristocratie du nom or to the "gentlemen", as Barante called them. But the class of gentlemen and country gentlemen had been enormously extended since 1789. The *ancien régime* had made a real distinction between the aristocracy of

¹ For instance, the Duc de Broglie, who played a considerable part in the political history of France both under the Restoration and Louis-Philippe, was in possession of his ancestral estates in 1815 and had been ever since the Directory. His grandfather, Maréchal de France and Governor of Metz at the time of the revolution, took command of the royal army at Versailles and after July 14 became an *émigré*. His father joined the army of the revolutionary government in 1792, but was executed during the Terror, and the family estates at Broglie were confiscated. But they were restored to the son under the Directory. See *Souvenirs du feu Duc de Broglie*, vol. i. p. 26. Neither de Broglie himself nor his father had been an *émigré*. The *émigrés* proper began to filter back into France very soon after the execution of Robespierre, and the restitution of their property to them, in cases where it had not been sold, began even under the Directory (see *Mémoires du Chancelier Pasquier*, vol. i. p. 126). The process of return and restitution increased considerably under the Empire.

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the landed proprietors and all other classes, but the shocks which the revolution gave to the social and economic structure of France destroyed the distinctions and began that amalgamation of the upper bourgeoisie with the aristocracy and gentry which is a notable feature of the nineteenth century.

An actual instance of the infiltration of the middle class into the "upper class" which was connected with the land will best explain the change. The Chancellor Pasquier, a notable figure and an important politician of the Restoration, came from a family of distinguished lawyers and magistrates. In the last years of the monarchy the Pasquiers were already on the road to becoming country gentlemen. Their work was in the Parlement, but during the vacations they lived on an estate which had been in the possession of their family a long time, the château de Coulans, near Le Mans. But they were not aristocrats nor country gentlemen; they were typical representatives of the privileged class of the higher magistrates, the noblesse de robe. The future Chancellor Pasquier was born in 1767 and he followed in the footsteps of his ancestors, entering the Parlement de Paris as Counsellor in 1787. At that time he was, as his memoirs show, an ordinary representative of his class, sharing their political and social psychology. The psychology and interests were not those of a feudal aristocracy or a landed gentry, but of a privileged class of lawyers, administrators, and civil servants.¹ And at the moment at

¹ The difficulty and superficiality of cut-and-dried generalizations about classes and class interests are shown as soon as one considers the class psychology of Pasquier and men like him, and its relevance to historical events. Pasquier's class was extremely important under the *ancien régime*, but it is by no means easy to say exactly what it was or

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which Pasquier entered the profession, this privileged class was engaged in a struggle with the king's

what its interests and psychology were. From one point of view it was essentially an upper middle class, just as judges, wealthy barristers, and the higher civil servants to-day in England are upper middle class. Historians frequently include it in the "aristocracy", partly, no doubt, because the upper magistrates were often called the noblesse de robe. But it was a privileged class rather than an aristocracy, its privileges being those of power and economics. The French aristocracy was a feudal aristocracy and its roots and lower ranks descended as far as the country and landed gentry, large numbers of whom were terribly impoverished. Pasquier's class was closely bound to this feudal aristocracy in the complexion of its social psychology and by many of its economic interests, just as in England for at least a hundred years the upper middle class of professional men have stood nearer to the aristocracy in psychology and economic interests than to the lower middle class or the working class. But the essential class psychology and economic interests of the French magistracy, even in its upper ranks, were quite different from those of the feudal aristocracy and landed gentry, and in the lower ranks definitely opposed to them. They were those of an upper middle class and were centred not in land and feudal rights, but in power, place, and social security. That is why in the early days of the revolution, which began as a revolution against feudalism, the privileges of the feudal aristocracy, and the autocratic power of the king, the magistracy, and the wealthier members of the middle class, despite the fact that they owned a considerable part of the estates of the aristocracy (see Mathiez, *The French Revolution*, English translation, p. 51), were the protagonists in the struggle against king and aristocracy. In those early days, that is to say before 1789, it was ideas and ideals rather than class interests which were determining the political action of the upper magistracy, the middle classes, and even a good many aristocrats, and the ideas were those of nascent democracy. For instance, the party known as the Americans, Anglomaniacs, or Patriots, to which the aristocrats Mirabeau and Lafayette belonged, was of great importance at that time and was powerfully influenced by American revolutionary ideas regarding liberty and government. Its members came from the upper middle class, the Parlement, and "enlightened" aristocrats, e.g. bankers, like Clavière and Panchaud; members of the Parlement, like Duport, Fréteau, and Sémonville; aristocrats, like Condorcet and the Duc d'Aiguillon.

These facts show how doubtful any dogmatic generalizations must be with regard to the psychology and interests of Pasquier's class in 1789. One other small but not unamusing fact may be added to point the moral. I have said that Pasquier's class was psychologically and economically distinct from the feudal aristocracy. It was fully

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government which was the prelude to the revolution. The Parlement was championing liberalism and nascent democracy against arbitrary government and arbitrary taxation. It was natural that Pasquier should at first have been carried away by the enthusiasm of the Parlementarians, particularly the younger members, for the new ideas of liberty and equality, for which the magistrates seemed to be standing in their conflicts with the king.

Pasquier was present at the taking of the Bastille; in October he stumbled over the corpse of M. Foulon which lay in the gutter of the rue de Richelieu; he saw Berthier being taken in a cab through the place de Grève to his death; he watched the king enter the Hôtel-de-Ville under a dome of bayonets and drawn swords; as Counsellor of the Parlement de Paris, in accordance with ancient custom, he went to the Tuileries to pay his respects to the king on the day after he had been brought captive to Paris. These spectacles, and particularly that of the unfortunate and terrified king and queen receiving the felicitations of the magistrates on their unwilling return to the capital, made a profound impression upon him. "All the attraction", he says, "which a wise liberty, regulated by law, had for my mind

aware of this and was notoriously class-conscious, both towards those above and those below it in the social hierarchy. As a matter of fact, however, the family of Pasquier was entitled to an aristocratic title, which attached to the estate of Coulans, and he was obviously proud of the fact, for under the Empire he was a little hurt that it had been forgotten. He tells us that, at the time when Napoleon was trying to create a new Napoleonic aristocracy, he himself was given the title of Baron, and he adds rather tartly: "Je ne fus nullement tenté de m'en plaindre. On ne s'était pas souvenu que ce titre appartenait à ma famille avant la Révolution." See *Mémoires du Chancelier Pasquier*, vol. i. pp. 7 and 349.

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and heart vanished in presence of that lamentable spectacle which roused my indignation." From that moment Pasquier became a Royalist and an "aristocrat".¹ His father and many of his friends and relations went to the guillotine. He himself had the narrowest of escapes, for he was in prison waiting his turn when Robespierre fell. When his prison doors opened and the Revolution came to an end, and Napoleon appeared as champion of law and order and the saviour of the middle class, Pasquier was still a royalist and an "aristocrat", and so intransigent was he in his political allegiance that it was many years before he could bring himself to come out of his retirement and take service under the Imperial Government. And when Napoleon fell and Louis XVIII. returned to France, the king had no subject more royalist and more "aristocrat" than Pasquier.

The political evolution of this rather dreary, but very clever, politician is characteristic of the period. The Pasquier of 1789, Counsellor of the Parlement de Paris, was not an aristocrat, but of the upper middle class; the Pasquier of the Restoration was an aristocrat. His interests were still those of the ruling, upper middle class, not of the landed aristocracy and gentry; but there is little or nothing in his political psychology to distinguish him from the class of royalist aristocrats and landowners. And what had happened to him had also happened to a large number of less distinguished people in many different sections of the middle class. Pasquier himself, in telling the story of his own conversion to

¹ "Ils (les événements) achèveront de me rendre ce qu'on appelait aristocrate" (*Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 35).

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royalism and aristocracy, admits that in 1789, 1790, and 1791 the great majority of the French people supported the revolution with enthusiasm,¹ and this certainly applied to the upper middle class. But in the latter part of 1791 a marked change appeared in the attitude of the wealthier bourgeoisie and the property owners. Already in the peasant risings of 1789, which began in the Île-de-France, the property-owning bourgeoisie had seen that it was not only the estates of the nobles, but their own property, which was threatened, and it was the Committees and National Guards of the middle class which restored order. Even in those early days in many districts peasants and workers fought small pitched battles against the combined forces of the nobles and the bourgeoisie. And as the revolutionary forces gained impetus and began to threaten the rights of property in all classes, the economic interests of the upper middle class began increasingly to affect its political psychology and to cool its revolutionary enthusiasm. The process was encouraged by the fact that during this period a considerable number of the bourgeoisie became owners of landed property, for when the national property was sold most of it was bought by the middle class.² Whereas in 1789 political ideas played a far more important part in determining men's political actions and historical events than class interests, by 1792 class interests were becoming dominant. That was why by 1792 the division into political parties began to coincide with the division into economic classes. The crisis in the Jacobin Club in the middle of 1791, which

¹ *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 57.

² See Mathiez, *The French Revolution*, p. 107.

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produced the splitting off of the Feuillants and Robespierre's "purge" of the Jacobins in the winter of the same year were parts of this process. The bulk of the Jacobins originally came from the middle class and included well-to-do people, those who owned some property, and those who paid taxes.¹ The wealthier people and the landowners split off from the rest and formed the Feuillants, a party which by 1792, as Mathiez says, "was becoming more and more fused with the old monarchist and aristocratic party".

This fusion of the upper middle class with the royalists and aristocrats was completed during the last years of the revolution and the Terror. It was stabilized and to some extent still further developed by the deliberate creation of a parvenu nobility and the acquisition of wealth and landed property by the middle class under the Empire. The result was that, in 1815, although France was still economically an agricultural country, the upper class, connected with the land, had been profoundly modified. As a class it had lost its homogeneity; it was no longer a feudal aristocracy, but was composed of a fusion of the old aristocracy, country gentlemen, the new nobility, professional men, and the rich bourgeoisie. And its psychology and interests, like its composition, were no longer homogeneous. The younger generation in families of aristocrats and country gentlemen which had not emigrated had often lost the psychology of a feudal aristocracy in the twenty-seven years which separated 1815 from 1789; the new nobility and the bourgeoisie had never had it. These people

¹ See J. M. Thompson, *Robespierre*, vol. i. pp. 164 and 197, and Mathiez, *The French Revolution*, p. 136.

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were royalist and "aristocrate", in Pasquier's sense; they hated and feared the revolution; but they had no intention of returning to the feudal system of the eighteenth century. The reason was partly psychological: their political psychology had been permanently affected by the ideas and ideals of a revolution which they now feared and hated. But it was also partly economic. Many of these men, though they now belonged to the landed upper class, were not primarily interested in the land. Their interests, their chief occupations, and their social ties were elsewhere, in Paris, in the government and administration, the professions, finance, industry, and trade. This reorientation of the upper classes was one of the many things in France which the *émigrés* did not understand and never learned to understand. It accounts for the fact, referred to above, that the Ultras always formed a small minority not only of the nation, but of their own class.

The France of 1789 and of 1815 included, as have all agricultural countries before the twentieth century, two classes connected with the land, an upper or aristocratic class of landowners and a lower class of peasants and agricultural workers. We must now turn to this lower class. The political and social psychology of the peasant is a mystery which historians ignore as far as possible and which political theorists and propagandists invent or romanticize. I have lived for many years at pretty close quarters with those who plough the earth with a mammoty in Ceylon and with a tractor in Sussex, and I know the mind of the Tamil and Sinhalese cultivator or the Sussex agricultural worker as

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intimately as I know that of any people outside my own immediate class; I have seen something of the peasant's life in France, Italy, and Spain. As a class, all these men and women whose work is on the land, in so many and such different countries, seem to me to have certain characteristics which are the same everywhere and extraordinarily evident. In some respects, particularly when compared with urban workers in the same country, their minds are narrow and their ignorance enormous. The universal habit of human beings to deny what is true, but new, and to resist the impact of any new idea is exaggerated in them to the point at which it sometimes seems to be superhuman. The townsman or stranger is inclined, therefore, at first contact with them, to think that they are superhumanly stupid. But they are not; they are no more and no less stupid than the rest of us. And in certain respects they are very remarkably shrewd. The peasants as a class, in every country where I have known them, have an extremely clear understanding of everything connected with their own interests or with what they consider to be their own interests, and in this field they display intelligence, shrewdness, subtlety, and tenacity of a very high order.

The political psychology of the peasants at the time of the Restoration cannot be understood without reference to their position in the economy of the *ancien régime* and their history during the revolution. There is a wide difference among historians in their accounts of the life of the French peasants during the reign of Louis XVI. Those who love liberty, equality, and the revolution, or who accept the Marxian interpretation of history, represent them as still

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little better than serfs, La Bruyère's "animaux farouches",¹ the economic victims of the feudal system, the aristocracy, and the landowners; the authoritarians who see salvation in the authority of kings and capitalists draw a very different picture, in which the peasant appears more often than not as himself a landowner, comfortably off, and with few real grievances against feudalism and aristocracy. By selecting particular instances it is possible to produce good evidence in support of either of these extreme views. The truth, if it is to take the form of a generalization as to the economic condition of the French peasantry under the *ancien régime* and immediately before its collapse, lies somewhere between the two. It is true that during the years preceding the revolution a considerable extent of land passed into the ownership of peasants, and that the process was in itself a slow economic agricultural revolution. It is true that this land which the peasants gained, and the very large extent which at the same time became the property of the middle classes generally, passed into their hands out of the hands of aristocrats. There were hundreds of aristocrats, particularly in the "noblesse de province," who owned nothing but a dilapidated house, an acre or two, a ruined dovecot, a genealogical tree, an old hound, and a rusty sword which might distinguish them economically and in their mode of life from the peasant owners of what had once been their fields.²

But it is also true that if some peasants were prosperous landowners, a vast number were landless or poverty-stricken or both. The feudal system was in

¹ See *After the Deluge*, vol. i. p. 269.

² See P. Gaxotte, *La Révolution française*, p. 40.

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decay, but to all who cultivated the earth with their own hands it was still a reality to them, and the reality, when not a positive burden, was at the best unjust, erratic, and irritating. And the aristocracy was rightly identified by the peasant with the feudal system. The economic interests of the aristocrat, even if the feudal system had left him nothing but a genealogical tree and a dovecot, were always fundamentally opposed to those of the cultivator of the land. Authoritarian historians who represent the revolution as the work of utopian idealists, homicidal maniacs, and mobs, naturally overlook this fact. The French feudal system and the French feudal aristocracy, they say, were already in decay before 1789; only the shell of the social and economic system for which they stood remained; and if it had not been for the idealists, the homicidal maniacs, and the mobs, the decay or "progress" would have continued and the transition would have been made peacefully from the agricultural economy of the *ancien régime* to that of the nineteenth century. This view is a misreading of history and a misinterpretation of communal psychology. The feudal system has been an unconscionable time dying in Europe, and it is a significant fact that about 130 years after the French Revolution, at the end of a great war, in eastern and central Europe, it was still dying, not of peaceful decay, but in class struggles which were precisely the same as those of 1789. The decay of the feudal system in the years before the revolution was itself only a symptom of the decay of the *ancien régime*; the two were bound up together. The *ancien régime* was decaying because the social system, the economic organization, and the communal psycho-

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logy which it embodied—a system and psychology rooted in authority and privilege—were yielding to the onset of another system and psychology, those of liberty and equality. These were not mere words, the dreams of philosophers, the ravings of homicidal lunatics, or the wind which blows up the fires of popular passions; they were hard and dangerous facts, for the social system and the communal psychology at every point touched the springs of power, property, and profits.

Now it is a curious fact in human history that more often than not men wait until systems or institutions have decayed and have been reduced to nothing but an empty shell before they fight to the death for them. The longest and most bitter religious wars were fought when religion had decayed to the empty shell of dogmas and churches. To-day, when only the shell of a ruined capitalist system exists anywhere in Europe, we are watching capitalists desperately fighting against socialists to protect it, prepared even to change the empty shell of capitalism into state socialism or fascism, if that be the only method left to them of prolonging the struggle. It was the same with the *ancien régime* and the feudal system. Those who fought to maintain them in 1789 and to restore them in 1815 were fighting for institutions out of which most of the substance and reality had decayed. There were, no doubt, at the centre of things, as there always are, men who knew that their hold upon power, property, or profits depended upon the existence or resurrection of this dry corpse of a social and economic system. But that was not the case with the vast majority of aristocrats and Ultra-Royalists who were determined in 1815 at all costs to resurrect the

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France of Louis XVI. Power, property, and profits had long ago passed out of the hands of the provincial aristocrat decaying in his dilapidated château, and if anything was certain it was that they would never return to him. He had in fact nothing to gain from a struggle to restore the *ancien régime* and he stood to lose by it even his dilapidated château, his rusty sword, and his genealogical tree. He was fighting for an empty shell, like the Roman Catholics and Protestants in the seventeenth century and the fascists and communists in the twentieth. And he fought, like them, all the more desperately. The explanation of this strange trait in political psychology is probably twofold. In the earlier and even middle stages of a social revolution large numbers of people who may in fact be intimately affected by it remain unaware that it is taking place. The changes which take place in the structure and fabric of society, owing to economic forces or to political and social ideas, are at this stage often slow and erratic. They may have profound effects upon society itself, but by the individual they pass unnoticed. The individual, whether he be a French aristocrat in the middle of the eighteenth century or an English capitalist at the end of the nineteenth, is normally not a social philosopher nor an observer of the great tides in the affairs of men; his vision is limited to what to him is the centre of the universe, namely himself and his own personal affairs. He may lose some of his property or power, and this may be due to a profound change in the fabric of society or in men's ideas and ideals, but he cannot himself see this; he sees it as a personal and isolated misfortune and injustice. Hence at this stage the substance of political and economic power

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may pass from one class in the community to another without a struggle, and without the losers and winners being really aware of what has taken place. The French aristocrat has been peacefully anaesthetized in his château; he has lost his power, his privileges, and his property; he has been so much concerned with himself, the centre of this strange and difficult universe, that he has allowed the *ancien régime* and the feudal system to be destroyed without a struggle. He wakes up one morning in 1789 to find that nothing is left of *his* society, *his* world, *his* universe but an empty shell. Then at last he begins to fight for it to the last drop of his and everyone else's blood.

At this point a second element in human psychology asserts itself. In ordinary life we all recognize that the actions of individuals are largely determined by irrationality. We know that there are no limits to the violence and obstinacy with which a man will pursue some object when every person except himself agrees that the object is stupid and wrong and the pursuit hopeless. And the more hopeless and irrational his action is, the greater is his obstinacy and the more violent his anger against any resistance. Historians sometimes forget that what is for them a "historical event" was, when it happened, a welter of individual actions and passions in which this obstinate irrationality of the human mind played a dominating part. The word "die-hard" is a recent addition to the English language, but it exactly expresses this communal psychology of those who will violently, irrationally, and uselessly resist a change which has already and irrevocably taken place. Their politics are those of the blind Samson in the temple of Dagon at Gaza; they have lost power or property,

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as he had lost his eyes, and they say with him, "O Lord God, remember me, I pray thee, and strengthen me, I pray thee, only this once, O God, that I may be at once avenged of the Philistines for my two eyes." They are even prepared, like him, to take hold of the pillars upon which their country, the State, society stands and on which they are borne up, and to say, "Let me die with the Philistines". And their epitaph is the epitaph of Samson, namely that the dead that they slay at their death is more than they which they slay in their life. That, indeed, is why they are rightly called die-hards.

Die-hards have existed ever since the time of Samson, and even before it; they have played a large part in determining the course of history. The aristocrats, particularly the provincial aristocrats and returned *émigrés*, who tried to restore feudalism and the *ancien régime* in France between 1815 and 1829, had the psychology and methods of the die-hard in their most characteristic forms. Such a restoration was socially, politically, and economically impossible. The revolution, the Empire, the Napoleonic wars, and the industrial revolution had produced in France a new social system, a new economic system, a new class structure, new ideas in the heads of ordinary men and women and new demands upon society and governments from them. The absolutism of a Bourbon king and a national economy based upon the privileges of a feudal aristocracy were compatible with none of these things. The attempt to restore them was a hopeless and impossible task, for it was bound to break itself against economic and social facts and the resistance of those who felt immediately and instinctively that the *ancien régime*

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was incompatible with the society, the economics, and the political beliefs of the nineteenth century. I said on page 12 that in many different places we should see the same attempt to restore the eighteenth century in the nineteenth century meet with the same political reactions, the same attempt to translate democratic ideas into democratic institutions complicated by the same social and psychological problems. The Ultra-Royalists who tried to reimpose upon France a Bourbon absolutism and aristocratic feudalism after 1815 were attempting the same Sisyphean task as the statesmen of the Holy Alliance attempted in international affairs, and as Wellington and the Tories in electoral affairs, when they maintained that the political machinery of the early eighteenth century, in the hands of aristocrat landowners and country gentlemen, was the best possible for the industrialized England of 1830.¹ They were beaten and broken by the same economic facts and the same political ideas.

Let us return now to the peasant and the agricultural worker. I was led into this analysis of the feudal reaction because it was necessary, in order to understand the position of the peasants, to establish their relation to the *ancien régime*. This analysis shows that the situation was much less simple than appears in the ordinary accounts of historians. In 1789 the *ancien régime* and feudalism were in decay; by 1815 they were dead, and resurrection was impossible. The whole policy of ultra-royalism centred in their resurrection, and it was doomed inevitably to failure. The peasants had everything to gain from its failure, for their interests were everywhere opposed to those

¹ See p. 19.

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of a feudal aristocracy. It might, therefore, reasonably be expected that they would have been everywhere among the stoutest opponents of the ultra-royalist reaction. That this was not the case is one more example of the fact that the political action of classes is determined by other things besides class interests. The French peasantry at the time of the Restoration were divided in political allegiance. There were districts of France where loyalty to the throne was deeply rooted in every class of the agricultural community. In the west of France it had produced the terrible civil war in which the peasantry, under aristocratic leaders like Rochejaquelin, fought against the revolution for the Bourbons, the *ancien régime*, and feudalism. The memory of that war in the Vendée and of the Chouans persisted for two generations, so that in 1832, when the Duchesse de Berri landed in France to raise for the last time the standard of the elder branch of the Bourbons—this time against the younger branch—she went to the west, and the tragi-comedy which ended so ignominiously with medical reports and the scandal of an accouchement, was played in the ancient scenery and melodrama of La Vendée and its Chouans. By 1832 the loyalty and traditions had worn thin, but in 1815 they were still a reality. There is ample evidence to prove that the Ultra-Royalists had behind them the support of the peasantry in the west, and to a certain extent in the north and the Midi. The political psychology of the lower agricultural classes, against their own interest supporting the hopeless adventure of an upper class, was probably determined by several different causes.

Contemporaries who lived in the districts maintained that religion played a considerable part. In the royalist districts the Church had always retained a tight hold upon the peasantry. The revolution had been anti-religious, and the wars against it had been as much for the Church as for the king. Napoleon, who began with a Concordat, ended by imprisoning the Pope and embroiling himself interminably with bishops. The cause of the Bourbons was the cause of the Church and religion, and the religious peasant felt it deeply. Instructed by his priest, he knew far more about salvation, eternal truth, and cosmogony than about economics, and the saving of his soul was politically more real to him than class interests. And, in this respect, the Ultra-Royalists did indeed promise him exactly what he wanted, for to them the Restoration meant even more the restoration of the ancient power of the Church than of the king. The appeal of the king, the Church, and the priest to the peasants of these royalist districts was reinforced by certain more material factors. They were, in the first place, precisely those districts in which the evils of a decaying feudalism, and particularly absentee landlordism, had been, under the *ancien régime*, less common and less onerous than in the rest of France. The soil had not been fertilized for revolution as it had been elsewhere by long bitterness against the aristocrat and the landlord, and two factors, almost universal in France, favourable to the Restoration and unfavourable to the revolution and the Empire, had their full effect. The cause of the revolution and the Republic had been compromised in the eyes of the agricultural population by the disorders in

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Paris and the economic and financial disorganization in the years following 1789. The Empire, which at first had been welcomed for restoring governmental and economic stability, eventually became identified with the miseries of conscription and of unending war. The peasant of the Vendée and Midi could therefore find more material reasons to fortify his royalism and religion when they urged him to support the Bourbons and the *ancien régime*.

The political psychology of the Vendéan peasantry and of other traditionally royalist localities was peculiar; it was fundamentally different from that of the agricultural population in the majority of the French provinces. Barante, in one of his letters, remarks that the Ultra-Royalists were making a great mistake in reckoning upon the support of the peasantry for their policy of reaction in the rest of France as well as in the west. Events proved him to be correct. The peasants may have known little and have cared even less about democracy, though Barante himself remarked how the new ideas had penetrated into the most unlikely places and heads in rural districts.¹ They had the dislike of new ideas, new things, and change which is common among those who plough and sow and reap (and among a good many other people). The relation of their souls to the curé, and secondarily to the Church and the Almighty, was a matter of as intense and real importance to them as it was to men who ploughed the fields of Vendée. But the experience of their fathers and fathers' fathers had made the revolution and even perhaps the economic determination of history equally a reality to them. They had got

¹ See p. 179 above.

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something out of the revolution, something tangible out of "liberty and equality", which they could understand and to which they would cling with the grim tenacity characteristic of their kind. Undisturbed possession of the land was now theirs or might become theirs, and the privileges and powers of the aristocrats had disappeared with the *ancien régime*. Knowing all this, these peasants belonged to the nineteenth century; they belonged to the future and nothing could have induced them to join the Ultra-Royalists in their attempt to make history go backwards. They were, in fact, another section of that new France which the Ultra-Royalists could not and would not understand. That they were against the reaction, and therefore unwittingly upon the side of democracy, was an important factor in the situation which led to the failure of the Ultra-Royalists and the collapse of the Bourbon monarchy.

There remains one other class to consider, the urban working class which we now know as the proletariat. The communal psychology and the political importance of this class will have to be fully discussed when we come to the period between 1830 and 1848 and examine the difference between the revolutions of those two years. During the years of the Restoration the industrial workers can hardly be said to have had, as a class, any communal psychology or political importance. The industrial revolution had begun in France, but it had not yet attained anything like the proportions which it had reached in Britain. Its real effects upon society and politics only began to be felt after 1830. In 1815 France was still predominantly an agricultural country. There had been for long a considerable

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working-class population in Paris, and its political importance, particularly from the revolutionary point of view, had been demonstrated between 1789 and 1794. It is significant that Pasquier, who was responsible for law and order in Paris as head of the police in Napoleon's Government, was mainly concerned about possible trouble from the Parisian workers during the interregnum and the occupation of the city by the allies. Those who might welcome the restoration of a Bourbon king were confined to the upper classes of society, and the proletariat's sympathies were suspected to be still with the Empire, or even the Republic. The first result of Napoleon's defeat and the closing in upon Paris of foreign armies was unemployment and shortage of food supplies. The unemployment continued for months and the distress among the working classes caused the head of the police great anxiety. He successfully avoided trouble by distribution of relief in the form of money or food, and by taking steps to increase employment.

Outside Paris the industrialization of France had begun only in a few of the larger towns. In Lyons the silk trade employed a large working-class population which was soon, under Louis-Philippe, to cause a great deal of trouble to bourgeois governments. Behind the protection of the continental blockade flourishing industries had grown up in several moderate-sized towns, like Amiens and Saint-Quentin, and there was a considerable working-class population in such ports as Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Havre. But it was not yet class-conscious, or even politically conscious, in the modern sense. Moreover it must be remembered that the economic

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interests of the industrial classes, as factors in the political situation, were divided by the events of 1814 and 1815. The defeat of Napoleon, the victory of the allies, and the restoration of Louis XVIII. struck what seemed to the interested parties a fatal blow to those trades and manufactures which had grown up behind the blockade, but on the contrary they meant a sudden return of prosperity to the great ports whose commerce had been ruined by the war with Britain. This explains why the industrialists of Amiens and Saint-Quentin were hostile to the new regime, while Bordeaux in the last days rose against Napoleon and welcomed the Duc d'Angoulême and the trading and maritime classes in Havre were open and fervent supporters of the Restoration.¹ Taking a short view, the economic interests of the employed in these several places were divided just as were those of the employers, *i.e.* the worker of Amiens stood to lose and the worker of Bordeaux to gain from the Restoration. In 1815 the French workers, not yet being class-conscious, were unaware of and uninfluenced by the broader, long-term interests which a generation or two later were widely recognized and became of great importance in making for the solidarity of the proletariat and setting it in conscious opposition to the capitalist class. They were not, therefore, as a class, a serious factor in the political situation, for it was sectional or local interests to which they reacted. On the other hand they were ripe, as events proved, for political education, and were potentially a very dangerous and effective political instrument. And there was little doubt on which side their beliefs and interests

¹ See *Mémoires du Chancelier Pasquier*, vol. iii. pp. 47-49.

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would range them in any struggle between reaction and democracy. Just as in England during the Reform crisis, the spectre of the working classes, the ominous question of their relation to liberty and equality, in the background dominated the struggle, so even more insistently in France the shadow of a nascent working class loomed over the political future in the minds of the most "liberal" statesmen. For the proletariat was inseparably connected in their minds with the revolution and the Terror, and they felt instinctively that the bond must still exist. The revolutions of 1830 and 1848 showed that they were correct.

This completes our brief and preliminary analysis of the main political beliefs and economic interests of the various classes in France at the time of the fall of Napoleon. We are now in a position to examine more closely how they combined and interacted to produce the events leading to the revolution of 1830. That revolution was on the face of it constitutional; it was concerned with liberty, equality, democracy, the question whether representative government should be abolished in France and give way to the arbitrary power of the king, Charles X. During the eight years prior to 1830 the Ultra-Royalist Party had grown more and more triumphant. Charles X. was on their side. When Polignac, after the short interlude of the Martignac Government, succeeded Villèle, they had the Minister of their choice. The electoral law had been altered for their benefit. All the leading politicians who had opposed the reaction, from Decazes to Guizot, Royer-Collard, Molé, Broglie, and Barante, had been driven out into a rural retirement. Yet the country was so solidly

opposed to the policy of ultra-royalism and feudalism that the Ultra-Royalists in fact no longer existed as a party at all. The reactionary policy of the Ministry was supported only by the Ministry itself and a handful of fanatics and office-holders and courtiers, almost exclusively confined to Paris.¹ This is the explanation of the fact that, although the franchise was intended to produce and ought to have produced a solidly reactionary Chamber, the election during the last years of Charles's reign returned more and more liberals and the Government was faced with a hostile majority in the lower House. The dissolution of May 1830 and the election which followed was a final attempt of the king and the Ultras to obtain a Chamber which would endorse their policy. The attempt failed, for the elections were a triumph for the liberals. The King and his Ministers now knew that it would be impossible for them to carry their measures through parliament. The reply of the king and his Ministers was the Ordinances of July, an attempted royalist and authoritarian *coup d'état*. They were in direct contravention to the Charter, which it had been the object of the Ultra-Royalists from the first to abolish and which Charles X. had never honestly accepted.² If acquiesced in, they

¹ This strange marasmus of the supporters of the *ancien régime* was noted by Barante. Just six months before the revolution broke out, he wrote from his country retreat to Molé: "La seule chose que je vois très clairement dans mon coin de province, c'est la disparition presque complète du parti ultra; ceux mêmes qui auraient sympathie avec le ministère n'ont pas confiance et désavouent les témérités qu'il pourrait tenter" (letter of January 1, 1830, in *Souvenirs*, vol. iii. p. 535).

² The attitude of the king towards the Charter and constitutional government is admirably described by Barante, *Souvenirs*, vol. iii. p. 487: "C'était lui qui portait sa propre condamnation. Il avait pris son parti sur la forme de la charte. Il n'en acceptait pas le véritable sens. Permettre aux Chambres de parler quand elles ne disaient rien

would have superseded the constitution established in 1815, substituting for parliamentary and responsible government the personal and autocratic rule of the king, while at the same time abolishing the system of civil liberties by striking a deadly blow at freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

Thus the Ordinances were a final and fatal attempt to return by a *coup d'état* to the authoritarianism of the *ancien régime*, to abolish parliamentary government and reinstate a feudal aristocracy. The attempt was defeated by an armed rising of the people of Paris, and Charles X. and the elder branch of the Bourbon family lost the throne of France. The nature of the armed rising and the parts played by the different classes and political parties in the revolution will have to be considered later. Here I am concerned with the ideas in the heads of those who made the revolution, the reasons why they resisted the king and the king's government and the political objects which they sought to attain. There is no doubt what those ideas and reasons were; they were precisely the same as those which we have already found in the heads of Englishmen and producing the Reform crisis of 1832. Guizot relates how, immediately after the July revolution, from August 5 to August 7, while the Chamber was discussing the revision of the Charter, groups of people assembled in the vicinity, in the garden or the courtyard, and

qui lui déplût; agréer leurs conseils sur ce qui lui était indifférent; à cela se réduisait sa vocation constitutionnelle. En 1828, j'eus occasion d'avoir deux audiences de lui et il y eut entre nous quelque conversation. La responsabilité ministérielle vint sur le tapis. 'Ce serait une absurdité et une injustice en France', me dit-il. 'En Angleterre, à la bonne heure: les ministres gouvernent et doivent être responsables. En France, le roi gouverne et les ministres ne peuvent être punis de lui obéir. C'est leur devoir!'"

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discussed with passionate earnestness the questions of the moment, many of which were also at the same moment being debated in the House itself. The arguers were nearly all young men, lawyers, students, and journalists. In entering or leaving the Chamber, Guizot frequently joined one of these groups and took part in the discussions. "The subjects which we discussed", he says, "were the monarchy, the two-Chamber system, the electoral system, a hereditary peerage. And it was there", he adds, "that I saw the extent to which the axioms and projects of republicanism had their roots in this generation, bred in the bosom of secret societies and conspiracies. The monarchy was for them only a concession unwillingly granted, nominal and temporary, which they looked to sell at a high price. At no price would they accept a hereditary peerage or any element inconsistent with pure democracy."¹

It is clear that what these enthusiastic groups of casual spectators were discussing on August 5, 6, and 7, 1830, in the garden of the Chamber of Deputies was the French version of that question which, a few years later, Brougham maintained in the House of Lords was the crux of the Reform crisis—"the question how we may best make the people's House of Parliament represent the people". They were discussing how the ideas and principles of democracy might be translated into political practice, what machinery of government was necessary to safeguard liberty and equality from political privilege or the arbitrary use of political power. Guizot, who already saw "liberty" as desirable only in the form of "sage liberté", a highly specialized and restricted species

¹ Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. ii. p. 31.

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of liberty, was obviously perturbed by the more vigorous and catholic ideas of "pure democracy". And if we turn from the professional politician and the young lawyers and journalists to two very different men and look at the inside of their heads in the year 1830, we shall find the same ideas with regard to liberty and equality agitating their minds and forcing them to travel along strange political paths.

The Abbé de Lamennais is one of the most curious and pathetic figures in the history of that age. He enters the historical scene as a man of intense and passionate religious conviction, a firm defender of the most extreme forms of absolutism in Church and State. His most intimate friend was de Vitrolles, who played a prominent part in the restoration of the Bourbons. He was one of those men whose purity of motive and sincerity of belief are peculiarly dangerous, particularly to themselves, and that was why all politicians, from the Pope and Cardinals in the Church to Guizot in the State, regarded him with a mixture of dislike, fear, and contempt.¹ Facts and clear thinking forced Lamennais into "liberalism" in religious matters first. His experience, when he went to Rome to urge his views, opened his eyes to the true nature of "authority" and the wheels which work authoritarian governments.² He dis-

¹ There is an amusing account of Guizot's relations with the abbé in the third volume of the memoirs. Lamennais affected Guizot much in the same way as Rousseau affected Voltaire. The politician could see in the priest only "esprit faux et fougueux orgueil" and "those dreams and anti-social passions which have always brought and always will bring, wherever they penetrate, anarchy instead of liberty and chaos instead of progress" (vol. iii. p. 96).

² He describes his experience in a letter of November 1, 1832 (*Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 252): "Restait Rome: j'y suis allé, et j'ai vu

covered there "the foulest cesspool which has ever offended human eyes"; he discovered that the authorities of the Roman Church would sell anything, "including the three Persons of the Holy Trinity—one after the other or all together—for a plot of land or a few coins". Like many other men who have been among the most devout Christians of their age, he discovered that his Church regarded his attempt to put his Christianity into practice as a crime. The hand of authority descended heavily upon the abbé, and, though he humbled himself and obeyed, his humiliation was considered inadequate and he was excommunicated. Long before that happened, however, his experience with authoritarianism in Rome and religion had opened his eyes to its true nature in Paris and politics. Though he had not yet lost—and perhaps never did lose—his faith in the direct connection between God and the Pope, he no longer believed in the divine right of Louis XVIII. and Charles X. to absolute and arbitrary temporal power over the lives of Frenchmen. In other words, the abbé, who was to be the founder of liberal Catholicism, had become a liberal in politics. In

là le plus infame cloaque qui ait jamais souillé des regards humains. L'égout gigantesque des Tarquins serait trop étroit pour donner passage à tant d'immondices. Là, nul autre Dieu que l'intérêt; on y vendrait les peuples, on y vendrait le genre humain, on y vendrait les trois Personnes de la sainte Trinité—l'une après l'autre, ou toutes ensemble—pour un coin de terre, ou pour quelques piastres." In a letter of February 5, 1833, to a Polish correspondent regarding the insurrection in Poland, he writes of the Pope: "... le Pape n'est pas neutre, comme vous paraissez le dire; il a pris hautement et activement parti en faveur du despotisme antichrétien, contre les droits de l'humanité réclamés par les nations, au nom de la justice éternelle; et telle est la chaleur avec laquelle il a embrassé la cause de toutes les tyrannies, qu'il n'hésite point à sacrifier la Religion dont il est le chef..." (*Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 270).

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1828, sitting writing his letters far from the world of politics in Brittany, he was saying very much what two years later the young men were saying in the garden of the Chamber of Deputies. In 1829 he writes in one of his letters: ¹

When a certain number of men, boldly seizing upon certain truths which are the foundations of order, shall become united, then there will exist the germ of a new society, and the force which will necessarily develop within it will prevail—and very quickly—over all the anti-social forces of disorder. To attain that two things are required: to enlighten people's minds by discussion and strengthen their souls by struggle; and it follows from that that liberty—the possession of liberty or the seeking after liberty—is to-day the principal need of the peoples and the indispensable condition of safety. If those in power placed themselves at the head of such a movement, they would save us and save themselves. But can they? I do not know. What I do know well is that they do not want to.

In the same year he noted the wave of liberalism sweeping over provincial France and that “de toutes les conséquences de ce qu'on a fait, la plus claire est que, désormais, il y a guerre à mort entre le libéralisme et les Bourbons”.² There was no doubt upon which side the abbé would now stand in that war. Two months before the July Ordinances were issued he writes:

In fact and in law, the question is whether, under forms admitted to be empty of all reality, France will accept pure arbitrary government, a regime of absolutism and whims, such as Ferdinand and his valet have conceived; or whether, risking the consequences which a struggle may

¹ *Correspondance de Lamennais* (publiée par E. D. Forgues, 1865), vol. ii. p. 5.

² *Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 71.

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bring in its train, she will secure those liberties which have become the principal political necessity of the peoples. The monarchs seem determined to make us realize that those liberties are indispensably necessary for the safety of all. For myself, as a Catholic, I declare that there is nothing in the world that I fear more than despotism, which, in the period in which we live and with the ideas now current, would be the death of religion. The Church suffocates under the weight of fetters imposed upon it by the temporal powers, and it is necessary now to claim in the name of God that liberty which was demanded in the name of atheism; only then will there really be authority and obedience, for Society, guaranteed against all arbitrary forces, will have passed under the rule of law.

The extent to which the events of 1820 to 1830 had influenced the political views of Lamennais are shown in these quotations. In ten years he had changed from an Ultra-Royalist priest into a liberal or even radical. The change was profound, as can be seen from his subsequent history. Most of the middle-class men who led or supported the revolution were, as is so often the case, terrified of it as soon as they saw that it was successful. Their object was to reduce the extent of equality and the dimensions of liberty issuing from the revolution to the smallest proportions compatible with its success and the temper of their followers. The "liberté" was to be in fact the "vraie", "légitime", or "sage liberté" of Guizot and other bourgeois politicians, *i.e.* it was to be a bourgeois liberty, founded upon a monopoly of political power for the bourgeoisie and a bourgeois king, Louis-Philippe, to rubber-stamp the monopoly. Lamennais was not one of those who were terrified by the revolution into looking and moving backwards. His attitude immediately after it is shown by the following extract

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from his correspondence. On August 6, 1830, he wrote:

Charles X. and his followers were determined to destroy themselves and they have destroyed themselves. The question has now been decided once for all. . . . If one is wise, one must now begin again, for the past is irrevocable. The Duke of Orleans is to have the crown; it will weigh heavily on his head. The majority would prefer a Republic openly proclaimed, and *I am one of them*; but I hope the monarchy will be purely nominal. . . .¹

Three weeks later he reflects:

The revolution, in so far as it is political, is a universal reaction of the people against arbitrary power, or power which in this sense it is customary to call absolute; its ultimate result will be to overthrow it everywhere, and to put in its place, under some form or other, what is still called free institutions, and that result will be good in itself.²

I am not here concerned with the spiritual and political development of Lamennais after the year 1830,³ and must turn from him to an even more eminent man of a very different type and calibre. Victor Hugo belonged to the same generation as Lamennais, and, like him, he began his career on the extreme Right. In 1820 he was a royalist and a Catholic, not quite so intransigent an upholder of the

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 161.

² *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 165.

³ The development was, however, very remarkable. He continued to move to the Left until the end. He became more and more interested in what in those days were called social questions, but which we recognize as the problem of the economic organization of society. In 1833 the editor of the *National* asked him to give his views on socialism, and he wrote an interesting letter explaining why he was against socialism. But he was on the side of the Lyons workers in the great strike of 1831. At this time he believed in the necessity for "economic justice" and in the possibility of attaining it through republicanism.

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divine right of kings and of ultramontaniam as was the abbé in those days, but still, for a layman, a writer, and an intellectual, a devout believer in the duty of absolute obedience to the Pope and the king. Ten years later Hugo wrote his *Journal des idées et des opinions d'un révolutionnaire de 1830*, and there one can read how and, to some extent, why his political ideas had suffered exactly the same change in those ten years as had Lamennais's. "My old royalist-Catholic beliefs of 1820", he says, "crumbled away piece by piece during ten years under the influence of age and experience. There still remains in my mind some relic of them, but it is only a religious and poetic ruin. . . . I sometimes turn aside to look at it with respect, but I no longer go there to pray." By September 1830 the old Catholic royalist in Victor Hugo had changed into a republican; in that month he writes: "The republic, as certain people understand it, is war between those without a sou, without an idea, and without a virtue against any one who has one of these three things. The republic in my view, that republic which is not yet ripe, but which Europe will have in a century, is society sovereign over society, protecting itself through the *garde nationale*, judging itself through the jury, administering itself through the *commune*, governing itself through the franchise. For this republic the four members of monarchy, the army, the judges, the administration, and the peerage are nothing but four excrescences which soon atrophy and die."

Victor Hugo had become a republican because he had become convinced that the society of the nineteenth century should be "sovereign over itself" and that it should therefore be deep rooted politically

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in liberty and equality; such a society was incompatible with the rule of a king or with the monopoly of political power in the hands of a privileged aristocracy. The struggle between Charles X. and the Ultra-Royalists on one side and the Chamber, the electorate and the people on the other, which ended in the *coup d'état* and the revolution of 1830, was a struggle for and against the political rights and obligations embodied in the Charter. "There are always two things in a Charter," says Hugo; "the solution of a people and an age, and a piece of paper. The whole secret of rightly directing the political progress of a nation consists in knowing how to distinguish the social solution from the piece of paper. All the principles which have emerged from previous revolutions form the foundation, the very essence of the Charter; they must be respected. Thus, liberty of worship, liberty of thought, liberty of the press, liberty of association, liberty of commerce, liberty of industry, academic liberty, liberty of speech and of the theatre, equality before the law, equality of opportunity in employment—these are sacred things which, like the sting-ray, make kings who touch them fall."

Hugo's list of sacred things is worth studying. It is a description or definition of what in the communal psychology of 1830 were regarded by Frenchmen as the indispensable foundations of democracy. They were incompatible with the *ancien régime* and therefore with the Government of Charles X. which had attempted to reimpose the *ancien régime* on France. The fact that Victor Hugo includes in these democratic fundamentals "liberty of the theatre" (in the French it is "liberté de théâtre, de tréteau") is

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significant. He had learnt as a writer and dramatist the lessons of democracy which Lamennais had learnt as a priest. Lamennais had discovered that despotism and religion were incompatible in the world of the nineteenth century, Hugo had discovered that the despotism of the eighteenth century was incompatible with the new modes of thought and expression in poetry and upon the stage inevitably demanded by the evolution of a new generation. That precisely the same process should have taken place in these two men of such different temperament, interests, and occupation—the same mental, political, and social development—points to the fact that both were being acted upon by the same deep-rooted causes in the society of their age. Those causes were the clash between two mutually incompatible civilizations or social systems. Hugo's attitude towards society, the complicated network of his ideas and ideals relating to government and happiness, was fundamentally the same as Lamennais's. They accepted democracy in its original form, namely an ideal, a series of beliefs with regard to what the end and object of social and political organization should be.¹ Even when they were Ultra-Royalist and Ultra-Catholic in 1820, they held these beliefs, for beneath the surface of their minds they had accepted the belief that the community should be socially united in a common purpose, namely the happiness of each and all. They had also beneath the surface of their minds accepted the view with regard to the individual and the value of individuality which we examined in the first volume of this book and found to be the foundation of

¹ See Vol. I. p. 335.

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democracy. These beliefs were imposed upon them partly because they had accepted the communal psychology which developed in the eighteenth century and produced the French Revolution, and partly because they were themselves part of a new social system which was being created by new economic forces. What determined their political development after 1820 was this social ideal, this view of what society and civilization ought to be.

A civilization founded upon the value of the individual and individuality, embodied in a society of individuals (not classes) united in the common purpose of seeking the happiness of each and of all, could only be a civilization embodied in a society of free and equal citizens. That was the political truth which the royalist priest soon discovered at his altar and the royalist dramatist soon discovered on the stage. But the Ultra-Royalists, Polignac and Charles X., also had a communal psychology, a political ideal, a series of beliefs with regard to what the end and object of social and political organization should be. Their communal psychology was that of 1700, their political ideal was the *ancien régime*, and they believed the end and object of social and political organization to be a static hierarchy of inferior and superior classes united not in the pursuit of happiness and the protection and development of individuality, but in the pursuit of national glory and the preservation of religion, loyalty, privileges, and duties. Their ideal was thus a civilization which could only be embodied in a society of classes (not individuals) held together by privileges, rights, and obligations, by absolute authority and absolute obedience.

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The clash between these two opposite ideals and conflicting civilizations was immediate, and both the priest and the writer, like everyone else in France, felt it in their occupations and their daily life. They were forced to take sides in the struggle, and as soon as the struggle was really joined, the old clothes of royalism and Catholicism in which they had covered themselves fell away from them under the impact of realities and they knew that they stood for liberty and equality. They found that they were on the same side as the vast majority of the French people. There is an illuminating passage in Victor Hugo's *Journal* which shows how universal was the opposition to the king's government and how, in the last years of Charles X.'s reign, the only method of governing left to that government was to treat the whole nation as if they were criminals. After the July revolution, Polignac and some of the other ministers were arrested and put on their trial, and Victor Hugo went to one sitting of the Court. He tells us that as he sat there looking at the accused ministers, it suddenly struck him that in the end the government of Charles X. had become in fact a Cabinet of Public Prosecutors.

A thought [he says] occurred to me during the sitting; it was that the hidden power which impelled Charles X. to his ruin, the evil genius of the Restoration, this government which treated France as an accused, as a criminal, and was incessantly prosecuting her, ended—so strong is the logic of events—by being unable to find any men to fill the posts of Cabinet Ministers except Public Prosecutors. For, in fact, who were the three men sitting there next to M. de Polignac as his most immediate agents? M. de Peyronnet, Public Prosecutor; M. de Chantelauze, Public Prosecutor; M. de Guernon-Renville, Public Pro-

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secutor. What was M. Mangin, who would probably have been standing beside them, if the July revolution had been able to lay hands on him? A Public Prosecutor. There were no longer a Minister for the Interior, a Minister of Education, a Prefect of Police, but everywhere Public Prosecutors. France was no longer administered or governed by the King in Council; she was accused, judged, condemned.

It will be seen from this examination of the minds of Lamennais and Victor Hugo how widespread was the conviction among contemporaries that the revolution of 1830 was fundamentally concerned with constitutional and political questions. Like the Reform crisis of 1832 in Britain, the question was one of political power, and behind that was the question of liberty and equality. In Britain the king and the House of Lords were *beati possidentes*; they were in possession of a monopoly of political power and were resisting a demand for a step forward, a broadening of the basis of political power, the admission of the middle classes into the political preserves of the governing classes. When the demand was resisted, the king and the House of Lords were forced to yield, for united against them was nearly the whole country, not only the middle classes, but the lower orders and a good many aristocrats. In France the situation was more complicated and more difficult. Neither side started with the advantage of being in possession of political power, for the fall of Napoleon and the return to France of Louis XVIII. were constitutionally the turning of a new page and it was extremely doubtful what exactly was written upon it. It was, however, certain that the constitution of 1788, absolutism and aristocratic feudalism, were

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not written on it, so that the Ultra-Royalists and those who wished to establish a royal absolutism were not resisting a demand for innovation, but were making a demand for moving backwards. How the demand was made and how it united against the king and his Ministers practically the whole of France, from bankers like Casimir-Périer to politicians like Guizot, from politicians like Guizot to priests like Lamennais and writers like Victor Hugo, from aristocrats to the great middle class and from the middle class to the workers of Paris and Lyons and the peasants reaping in the great plains of France—that is the curious story of French political and social history from 1815 to 1830 which we must now briefly examine.

In 1815, when Louis XVIII. returned to Paris after Waterloo, there were no political parties in France, for political parties are both the result and the instruments of political liberty and are, therefore, incompatible with dictatorships. The Napoleonic dictatorship had lasted long enough to destroy all political parties and almost the memory of them. There were, however, certain political traditions which determined the attitude of those persons and classes which were "politically conscious" and which would inevitably form the basis of political parties if in the future liberty should assure their creation and development. These traditions, moving from Right to Left, were feudal and absolutist; constitutional monarchist; imperial; democratic; republican and revolutionary.

History cannot be understood unless one continually remembers that contemporaries, unlike historians, were unaware of what to them was the

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future, but to historians is the past. This is peculiarly true of people who were alive in 1815; they were still unfortunately ignorant of what was to happen in the years 1815 to 1830. The dominating factors in the psychology of those responsible for the government of France or concerned in politics in 1815 were doubt and a feeling of complete ignorance and insecurity. In 1814 the restoration of the Bourbons had been a leap in the dark. The dark was changed into chaos by the return of Napoleon and the Hundred Days. It is bad enough to have to leap out of the light into darkness, but to find the darkness turn into chaos and then to be forced to take a second leap out of chaos into darkness again is nerve-racking. That is what Louis XVIII. and his advisers had to do after the battle of Waterloo. Their doubts and sense of insecurity can be measured in the fact that the king entrusted the government to Talleyrand and that in Talleyrand's Cabinet the most important minister was the universally distrusted regicide, Fouché. No one of intelligence and with any sense of political realities and responsibilities ignored the difficulties of re-establishing the Bourbon dynasty. The great majority of the people, particularly the bourgeoisie and the agricultural population, had much to fear and much to lose by a re-establishment of the *ancien régime* as well as the Bourbons. How deep the roots of attachment in the army were to Napoleon had been shown only too clearly in the Hundred Days. In the government which had temporarily controlled Paris and which had been largely dominated by Fouché in the interval between Waterloo and the return of Louis XVIII., Fouché himself had found it extremely difficult to obtain acceptance of the

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Bourbons. There was a strong party in favour of Napoleon's son rather than Louis XVIII., and the last act of the *Chambre des Représentants* in passing the "Déclaration des droits des Français et des principes fondamentaux de leur Constitution",¹ ineffective and slightly ridiculous as it was, was an ominous reminder that the revolutionary spirit was not very far below the surface of French political psychology. Contemporaries in the last months of 1815, peering nervously into the future, were completely in the dark as to how wide and deep were the forces of Bonapartism and of the revolution. There were no political parties, but the first necessity for Louis XVIII. seemed to be to conciliate and reassure those who might form the parties of the Left, the potential Bonapartists, liberals, and revolutionaries. Fouché, the policeman, was the sop which Louis XVIII. threw to this three-headed Cerberus; he was universally regarded in royalist circles and by the allied statesmen as the indispensable guarantee of liberalism, or at least constitutionalism, in the restored regime.

The first act, then, of the twice-restored monarchy in order to convince the country of its *bona fides* and moderation was to entrust the government to two men whom no one, least of all the monarch and the royalists, trusted, one a regicide, both of them distinguished revolutionaries and the holders of high office under the Empire. The other hostage which Louis XVIII. had given to constitutionalism, if not

¹ This Declaration demanded: (1) the principle of the sovereignty of the people; (2) a guarantee of equality of civil and political rights; (3) "Abolition des confiscations"; (4) an oath from the king before ascending the throne that he would observe the principles of the declaration. See Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. iii. p. 313.

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to democracy, remained, of course, from the first restoration, the Charter. About this, and the nature of the obligations imposed by it upon the king and the guarantees of political liberty given by it to his subjects, a good deal will have to be said later. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to draw attention to two facts which had considerable influence upon political psychology and political events in the early days of the Restoration, and therefore did much to determine its subsequent history.

When Louis XVIII. entered Paris for the second time and was faced with the problem of re-establishing his government, Paris and France were in the occupation of four foreign armies, Russian, British, Prussian, and Austrian. Not only the armies of the Allied Powers, but their statesmen and even their Emperors were quartered upon Paris. It was true that Louis XVIII. was in theory the ally of the Allied Powers, but his country was "the enemy" and had been beaten and was now occupied by their armies. He had to make peace with them, and even to pay them an indemnity; indeed, his most urgent problem was to make peace with them and get them out of his country. His domestic internal problem and policy were overshadowed by their presence, for, although officially they declared that they would not interfere in the internal affairs of France, they were in fact continually doing so.¹ The relations of the French government to the allies had been greatly complicated by Talleyrand's policy at Vienna. Like everything which Talleyrand did, his peace negotiations were masterpieces in diplomacy or double-

¹ *E.g.* the appointment of Fouché was to some extent due to the influence of Wellington.

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dealing, but they left the victims of his cleverness and duplicity sore and suspicious. The most important among them was the Emperor Alexander, whose support France now lost owing to his hostility to the statesman who had double-crossed him. The instability of this position, the doubts and darkness in which the future of France was enveloped, the necessity of subordinating all internal questions to the problem of making peace and of getting the foreigners out of France, enormously increased the vacillations and hesitations of Louis XVIII. and the royalist government in domestic politics. In such circumstances they naturally began by being purely opportunist and by taking the line of least resistance upon every possible occasion.

But this state of mind was not confined to the king and his advisers and Ministers; it infected practically every one except the Ultra-Royalists. Bonapartists, liberals, and revolutionaries were all inhibited politically by their doubts of the future and a sense of complete insecurity, and, as patriotic Frenchmen, they felt, like the government, that everything else must be immediately subordinated to the problem of making peace and of freeing France from foreign armies. This explains why the parties of the Centre and Left were so slow to organize themselves in the first years of the Restoration, why their policy was so hesitating, and why they allowed a tiny minority of extreme royalists to obtain an almost impregnable political position. The Ultra-Royalists were, in fact, the only people in France who had no doubts and no hesitations. Their ignorance of France was in this respect an advantage to them. They entered the country with the Allies as foreigners and conquerors,

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and they had the psychology of the conqueror. They knew exactly what they wanted, the restoration of the king, the restoration of the Church, and the restoration of their own property and privileges, and with their desire for restoration went the eternal craving of that savage political animal, man, for punishment and revenge. Thus in 1815 the Ultra-Royalists were the only real political party in France, with a perfectly definite policy, and with no scruples or hesitations about the methods of attaining their ends. At times of political insecurity power always falls into the hands of those who know exactly what they want and are not squeamish about means. Such moments provide the happy hunting grounds of the political gangster and fanatic. 1815 was just such a moment, and there is nothing surprising in the fact that a mere handful of Ultra-Royalists were able to establish themselves in control of the parliamentary machine.

The way in which they were able to get control of that machine, or rather of one-half of it, and the use to which they were able to put it immediately set the stage for the struggle which lasted from 1815 to 1830. The first act of the drama began with the king's return in July 1815 and the election of the Chamber, and ended with the king's ordinance of September 5, 1816, dissolving the Chamber and ordering new elections. In this first act, as with all good plays, the characters of the *dramatis personae* were made clear to the audience (and in this case for the first time to many of the actors themselves), and a situation created leading inevitably and inexorably to the catastrophe. The crucial position of the Charter at once became apparent. Its very name,

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La Charte Constitutionnelle, indicated that it was, together with Fouché, a hostage given by the restored Bourbons to constitutionalism. It bound the monarchy to parliamentary government and the establishment of civil liberty, but it left three important loopholes: the method of electing the elected Chamber, the exact relation of the Crown to the Ministers and even to the Chamber,¹ and the powers of the king to control liberty of speech, particularly in the press. The political history of the Restoration is largely a struggle between those who wished to use or abuse and those who wished to close these loopholes for the re-entry of the *ancien régime*. The question of the franchise and the electoral system became urgent in the first week of Louis XVIII.'s return to Paris. He and his government had to provide for the immediate election of a Chamber. They decided that the elections should take place under the Napoleonic electoral system. The result was remarkable: the king and his government found themselves face to face, when the new Chamber met in October, with a large majority of extreme ultra-royalist reactionaries. The explanation of this overwhelming electoral success by a small minority is simple: the Ultra-Royalists were, as I said, the only organized political party in existence, the only body of men with a political programme and a clear knowledge of what they wanted. They were on the crest of the wave and conducting, apart from the elections, a fairly widespread campaign of Terror against those whom they disliked.

¹ *E.g.* the conditions under which the king could dissolve the Chamber and order new elections, a most important question, as was shown in 1816 and again in the events leading up to the July revolution.

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The position was impossible for the government even before the Chamber met. A government with Talleyrand at its head was incapable of making peace with Alexander, and a government containing both Talleyrand and Fouché was incapable of dealing with a parliament dominated by the Ultra-Royalists. It was, however, the problem of making peace which finally determined the change of government. Talleyrand resigned and made way for the Duc de Richelieu, and it was really Alexander who chose Richelieu to form a Cabinet and conduct the peace negotiations. The Richelieu government lasted for three years, and its strange adventures are well worth study for the light which they throw upon political communal psychology. Richelieu himself was an *émigré*; he returned to France with the Bourbons after nearly twenty-five years' absence. He did not understand the new France, far less the new Europe of the nineteenth century; he could neither understand nor sympathize with the political psychology of nascent democracy. His birth, instincts, and experience ensured that all his sympathies were on the Right. Temperamentally, however, he had that intellectual and emotional colourlessness which makes a man habitually slide or slip into the exact middle of the political see-saw and therefore gives him the reputation—perhaps deservedly—for “moderation”. He was a “gentleman”, in the old-fashioned use of the word, and considered that even in politics the standards of gentlemanly behaviour should be complied with. Those standards counsel moderation, even in the pursuit of one's own interests or in the persecution of one's enemies, and they were the psychological basis of Richelieu's dis-

like of the Ultra-Royalists. Finally, he was one of those statesmen who allowed their policy, both in strategy and tactics, to be influenced, if not directed, by some particular colleague; Molé, Lainé, and for a time Pasquier had this kind of influence over him, and the first and last were men who had held office under Napoleon, knew France, and understood the dangers in excessive reaction. These were the causes or factors which combined to force Richelieu to make his government a bulwark against the Ultra-Royalists and soon to rely for its support upon men and classes, both in his Ministry and in the Chamber, with whom he had no political or social sympathies.¹

The men whom Richelieu chose to be his colleagues in his original Cabinet were a strange collection. At least three of them were Ultra-Royalists or very near it. The only one of the six who was a man of real ability and energy was Decazes, the Minister of Police, and it was he who, in a short time, became the real director of the government's internal policy. He attained this position partly because he was the king's favourite and partly by his extraordinary energy and considerable political abilities. In history books the label "liberal" is commonly attached to Decazes. Decazes was

¹ Pasquier, who was Minister of Justice from January 1817 until the break-up of the Cabinet, speaking of the deep differences of opinion among the members of the Cabinet, says: "MM. de Richelieu and Lainé continued to distrust the men who had been in the public service before the Restoration. If they opposed the imprudences and excesses of the extreme royalists, they had nevertheless an irresistible inclination towards the Right in the Chamber, and to separate themselves from men whom they knew to be devoted to the throne was a painful effort. The five other ministers desired definitely to separate themselves from men whose indiscreet enthusiasm compromised the king in public opinion . . ." (*Mémoires*, vol. iv. p. 270).

certainly not a liberal; it is doubtful whether he was anything politically, whether he understood the meaning of political principles or beliefs. At one moment it seemed doubtful whether he was going to move to the Right or to the Left in the first year of the Restoration. He was really a professional politician of the type which became common in the second half of the nineteenth century, a man who found in politics a convenient field for immense ambition and for working off some of his excessive energy. That is not to say that he was not, according to political standards, an honest man.

It was mainly due to Decazes that the Richelieu government stood firm against the reactionary majority in the Chamber and organized successfully a parliamentary opposition to them. When the first session of the new Chamber opened, he appeared to be definitely in the camp of the Ultras. He owed his extraordinarily rapid advancement, not only to the king's attachment to him, but also to the favour shown to him by the leaders of the extreme royalists, and it seemed at that time to those of moderate or liberal outlook that he was in the pocket as well as in the camp of the reactionaries. By the beginning of 1816 a change had already begun which was to convert Decazes to "liberalism" and to earn him the implacable hatred of his former friends. This process, like all events which have important effects upon the course of history, was due partly to purely personal complications and partly to facts and movements in communal psychology of which the existence and significance were probably completely hidden from Decazes himself.

The personal causes are interesting and were not

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without historical importance. Decazes very early in his career as minister became "King's Favourite" in the full sense of the word. One of the most persistent personal factors operating behind the scenes during the reign of Louis XVIII. was the hostility between the king and Monsieur, his brother, who succeeded him as Charles X. Barante says that "the secret and cowardly hatred which he nourished against his brother was often one of the best means of influencing Louis XVIII. Such liberal opinions or even clever manœuvres as he was able to display almost always originated in this emotion which he scarcely dared acknowledge even to himself."¹ His brother, who reciprocated the emotion, was leader of the Ultra party; the whole campaign of terror and reaction was so highly organized from his headquarters in le pavillon de Marsan that at one time he was able, as head of the garde nationale, to establish all over France a government independent and answerable only to himself.²

With such personal relations existing between the king and his brother, it was inevitable that, sooner or later, a minister who was the king's favourite would embroil himself with the brother. It was also inevitable that the king should always have a bias, often perhaps unconscious, towards a policy which would thwart or oppose his brother and that the Minister-favourite should rapidly find himself in opposition to Monsieur and the Ultras. These personal motives making for conflict between Decazes and the extreme royalist party were

¹ Barante, *Souvenirs*, vol. ii. p. 249.

² This state of things was only brought to an end by an Ordinance in the middle of 1816. See Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. iv. pp. 117 and 118.

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reinforced by certain considerations of foreign policy, to which I have already referred. All through the reign of Louis XVIII. a two-edged sword seemed to hang over the heads of his Ministers, and the two edges were Revolution and Reaction. They had to satisfy the Allied Powers that France, after the revolution and Napoleon, had returned to the paths of virtue, and by virtue in a nation European statesmen round about 1820 meant a "stable government". Stability for a French statesman meant steering a middle course between revolution and reaction, for everyone, except the extreme royalists, recognized that the two extremes were complementary. In the first year of the Restoration allied statesmen seemed to be more nervous of French reaction than of revolution, the danger in their eyes being that the first would provoke the second.¹ Hence it was essential, in order to get the allied armies out of France, to make peace, and withdraw France from the tutelage of Europe, that the king's government should convince at least Alexander and Wellington that it was "moderate", constitutional, and stable. To do this it must pursue a policy which must thwart and antagonize Monsieur and the Ultras.

The hostility broke out in the very first session of the new Chamber. It developed into a struggle in which the principles of constitutional government and the whole communal psychology of democracy were involved and in which the conflicting interests of various classes gradually emerged to become a dominating force in politics. It will be necessary to

¹ Another important reason was that the Tsar was still at that time flirting with liberalism.

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examine the story of these complicated and sometimes confused events in some detail.

There were three questions of importance of which in 1815 the government and the Chamber had to seek an immediate solution, and on all three the government was compelled to oppose the Ultras and the parliamentary majority. The first was the problem of satisfying the *émigrés*' desire for blood and revenge without provoking resistance from their victims and frightening the foreigners. This involved a nice calculation for the government. They had to weigh the minimum amount of blood of revolutionaries and Bonapartists which would satisfy the *émigrés* against the maximum which would not unsettle the country and upset the allied statesmen. There was also involved a question of royal good faith. The king had by the Charter bound himself to grant an amnesty to all persons other than those primarily responsible for the return of Napoleon from Elba and for the Hundred Days. If the terms of this amnesty were strictly complied with, it was realized that the amount of blood which could be given to the royalists would be, though distinguished, extremely small, and the policy of the Ultra-Royalist majority in the Chamber was from the first both directly and indirectly to get behind the pledge in the Charter. But if their thirst for vengeance were to be satisfied, an extremely dangerous situation would be created. For it would have meant the persecution, prosecution, and often the execution of the majority of those persons who had held the highest civil and military posts in France during the preceding twenty-five years. This would hardly have made for internal peace, but the

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worst feature in the Ultra-Royalists' demands was the fact that they were really asking for *carte blanche* to be given them for vengeance. Instead of limiting, as the Charter did, the number of persons who could be tried and killed or banished, they proposed that special courts should be created and an indefinite number of persons should be tried before them for undefined crimes. Such a system and procedure would have left an immense number of people all over France in peril and at the mercy of a revengeful minority.

All these dangerous questions were raised in the new Chamber as soon as it met, when a law to establish special courts and an Amnesty Law were introduced, and the fanaticism of the Ultras compelled the government to oppose the majority in the Chamber. But even before that a curious incident in the royalists' hunting down of their victims caused the first serious rift between them and Decazes and was the first step, therefore, in the process which led to an open breach between the parliamentary majority and the government. Among those whose blood the royalists thirsted for was M. de la Valette, who had been Postmaster-General in Paris under the Empire. He was a moderate man, greatly respected, and widely popular. That did not save him from a criminal prosecution; he was accused of having entered into the conspiracy which led to Napoleon's return from Elba. There was a technical case against him for certain acts which he had authorized as Postmaster-General after the flight of the king in March, but his guilt, even on the worst construction, was far less than thousands of persons during the Hundred Days. He was found guilty and condemned to death. All persons of

decent feeling and moderate opinion were shocked at the sentence, and attempts were made unsuccessfully to induce Louis to exercise his prerogative of pardon.¹ When they failed, M. de la Valette escaped from prison disguised in his wife's clothes and was smuggled out of France in an English uniform by General Wilson and two other Englishmen. The royalists were exasperated at being balked of their prey at the last moment and a great deal of their anger was directed against Decazes as Minister of Police. This was the beginning of the breach between the king's favourite and Monsieur's extremists.

The breach widened as soon as the two laws which were to regulate the question of vengeance upon Bonapartists and revolutionaries came before the Chamber. The object of the Ultras was to extend the list of persons who were excepted from the amnesty and to increase the penalties to which they might be subjected. The king flatly refused to consider any tampering either with the letter or the spirit of the promise of amnesty contained in the Charter. The government was therefore forced to oppose the majority in the Chamber. It did so by working closely with a moderate group of Deputies. This group was, of course, a minority, but it contained some extremely clever politicians and it was of great

¹ Pasquier (*Mémoires*, vol. iv. p. 43) gives some facts regarding this which, as he says, shows the extraordinary violence of passion on the side of the Ultras at this time. The king was prepared to exercise his prerogative if the Duchesse d'Angoulême asked him to do so; the Duchess was prepared to do so, but was induced not to do so by her ladies in waiting. Again, he asserts that there was a general outcry against Marshal Marmont in the court and high society because he obtained permission for Madame de la Valette to see the king and plead for mercy. Monsieur de la Valette was one of the Marshal's oldest friends.

importance because it enabled the government to withstand the forces of violent reaction in the early days of the restoration and because out of it developed the political parties, of various shades of liberalism, which opposed the Ultras throughout the reigns of Louis XVIII. and Charles X.

The two other important problems which the government and Chamber had to face were the franchise and the press laws. They raised the fundamental constitutional questions of democratic or despotic and aristocratic government. Their discussion and the attempt to translate ideas into practice and principles into the detailed sections and clauses of an act of parliament immediately began to etch still more deeply the lines which were to divide the future political parties. Here it is possible to see very clearly the cross-hatching of political ideas and economic interests which produce the simplified picture of history in the pages of historians. For the alignment of the political parties which were formed in France between 1815 and 1820 was determined gradually by a series of strokes or impulses of political ideas and economic interests.

The question of amnesty or vengeance had left the Richelieu government opposed to the Ultra-Royalist majority in the Chamber and looking for support to the Centre. What we have to examine now is the evolution of that Centre into a political party, or rather into a number of political parties. The franchise question immediately brought economics and class interests into politics, just as the Reform Bill had done in Britain. The Ultra-Royalists, whose object it was to return politically and economically to a feudal aristocratic regime, were

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a party of large landowners. They formed a majority in the Chamber and they naturally expected that this would enable them to consolidate their power both in the provinces and in the central government, and that this in turn would re-establish the economic interests of "la grande propriété".¹ Such an intention, openly expressed with the arrogance peculiar to the French *émigrés*, spread alarm and indignation through every corner of the middle-class camp. It instantly consolidated the Centre of the Chamber into a middle-class political party, "le toryisme bourgeois", as Guizot called it. In 1815 "le toryisme bourgeois" consisted of many heterogeneous elements; it had few political ideas and no political programme. In sentiment it was overwhelmingly royalist; but, in so far as it was politically conscious, royalism meant to it a constitutional monarchy which would ensure for the bourgeoisie, from big business to the small shopkeeper, that peace and orderly government which is essential for the establishment of middle-class society and the pursuit of middle-class interests.²

¹ See Guizot, *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 167: "Pendant la Chambre de 1815, l'ancien parti royaliste . . . s'était promis que du moins la faveur de la royauté et l'influence de la majorité lui donneraient le pouvoir, aussi bien dans les localités qu'au centre de l'État". Guizot adds that this party attacked the franchise law of 1817, "l'accusant de livrer à la classe moyenne tout le pouvoir électoral, par conséquent tout le pouvoir politique, aux dépens de la grande propriété et du peuple".

² According to Guizot the fundamental political idea of the French middle classes in his time and throughout the course of three revolutions had been that "it is government which is essential to society and it is to the government that the good citizen must give his support", and he adds: "Beaucoup d'excellents et honnêtes sentiments, l'esprit de famille, le goût du travail régulier, le respect des supériorités, des lois et des traditions, les sollicitudes prévoyantes, les habitudes religieuses, se sont groupés autour de cette idée et ont souvent inspiré à ses croyants un ferme et rare courage" (*Mémoires*,

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The nineteenth-century political education of the French bourgeoisie began in the parliamentary debates on the franchise during 1815 and 1816. It is important to remember that it was completely uneducated politically when the first parliament of Louis XVIII. met. The military despotism of Napoleon, the concentration of power in his hands, his close supervision of the work of his Ministers and Prefects, and the abject servility which he demanded even from the highest organ of government, the Council of State, had withdrawn from his subjects for nearly a generation all political functions except judicial and administrative. In 1815 there were plenty of able administrators, and many of those who in the next few years became the parliamentary leaders of the Centre belonged to this class, but they had no experience of politics in the widest sense, of legislation, debate, party government, or executive initiative. The question of the franchise educated the Centre of the Chamber and the bourgeoisie with great rapidity. What these people wanted from society may be defined as follows: (1) peace; (2) orderly government; (3) that amount of liberty and equality which would enable them to live as they wanted to live, say what they wanted to say, and get on with their business. A very few months had shown them that these things which they wanted were incompatible with what the Ultras wanted. The Ultras wanted the political and economic domination of the feudal aristocracy and the Church. This was incompatible with peace or orderly government, because vol. i. p. 156). No one had better opportunity to understand the political psychology of the French bourgeoisie between 1815 and 1848 than Guizot, and it would be difficult to find a better analysis of it than the above.

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every intelligent man who knew French society in 1815 was convinced that the inevitable reaction to it would be resurgence of the revolution; it was, too, incompatible with liberty and equality and the development of middle-class society.

The first few months of the second Restoration had not only shown the middle class what the Ultras wanted; they also revealed to them the vital importance for the future of political power. It was clearly the intention of the Ultras to use their majority in the Chamber for getting what they wanted both politically and economically. The franchise law would determine whether that majority and their hold on political power should be temporary or permanent. Its terms became of crucial importance and their discussion at once led to an alliance between the king, the government, the Centre, and the bourgeoisie. The motives and objects of the four, or rather three parties to the alliance (for the bourgeoisie were in fact a section of the Centre) were not in all respects the same. The reason why the king and the Richelieu government were opposed to the permanent establishment of the *émigrés* and large landowners in political power was that they feared that it would provoke a revolution. The more "aristocratic" royalists of the Centre were primarily influenced by the same fear of revolution, though some of them, as we have seen, were also profoundly, if unconsciously, influenced by democratic ideas and ideals. The bourgeoisie and its representatives in the Chamber were influenced not only by fear of revolution and the psychology of primitive democracy, but also by an immediate realization that their economic interests would be

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threatened by the political dominance of a feudal aristocracy. Here can be observed the same political psychology and economic causes producing similar results in a completely different historical setting as we watched operating in a street off Piccadilly on March 7, 1831.¹ The Ultras were in the same position as that half of Greville's world who thought that they would lose what they had if the Reform Bill were passed, except that the *émigrés* were necessarily the attacking party; they had to re-establish the aristocratic monopoly of political power in order to regain what they had had, whereas Wellington and his English die-hards had merely to defend that monopoly in order to retain what they already had. Both sets of die-hards, however, were prepared to resist the onset of political democracy and risk a revolution for economic motives. The king, the Richelieu government, and the aristocratic constitutional royalists of the Centre had precisely the same political psychology as Hobhouse, Grey, and Melbourne at the beginning of the Reform crisis. Some of them were no doubt infected with primitive democratic ideas, but all were dominated by the conviction that, if they wished to keep what they had, they must give some hostages to democracy. They felt that an attempt to re-establish a monopoly of political power in the hands of king, Church, and aristocracy would unite the bourgeoisie and the lower classes in opposition to the government. Such an opposition implied universal suffrage, republicanism, the Terror, and the revolution. The alternative, therefore, to reaction and revolution was government based on the bourgeoisie.

¹ See p. 110 above.

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I said above that in 1815 the only political party which knew what it wanted and had a programme was the party of the *émigrés* and Ultras. This was shown to be the case by the attitude of the government and the Centre to the franchise question in the first session of the Chamber. The government produced a timid and muddled Bill. The reactionary majority, in control of the Commission to which the Bill was referred, proposed amendments which turned the Bill upside-down and would in fact have consolidated them in power for three or four years. In order to attain their immediate objects, the two rival parties were forced to turn themselves upside-down, to adopt each of them exactly the opposite position from what was consonant with their political ideas and ultimate aims. The reactionary royalists, whose ultimate aim was the re-establishment of an absolute monarchy and the destruction of the embryonic parliamentary democracy guaranteed by the Charter, owed their momentary power to the possession of a parliamentary majority; their immediate object was, therefore, to consolidate and prolong their parliamentary majority and to protect its rights and powers, even against the king, in order ultimately to be able to destroy parliamentary government and parliamentary democracy. Their opponents, whose ultimate object was to defend the Charter, constitutional monarchy, and parliamentary democracy against the attempt to re-establish the *ancien régime*, found themselves defending principles and practices which, superficially at any rate, were undemocratic.¹

¹ The details of this first struggle between the two sides are of no historical interest, but it is important to note that contemporaries

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The attitude of the extreme royalists on the Franchise Bill, the amnesty, the budget, and other questions convinced the government that the parliamentary position was an impossible one. Decazes had now set his sails full for "liberalism"; he dominated the king by his charm and the Cabinet by his energy. A year's experience of *émigrés* in control of the Chamber had enormously increased their unpopularity throughout the country. The obvious way out of the government's difficulty was to try by new elections to get a majority of moderates in the Chamber. Decazes obtained the king's consent to this course, and on September 5, 1816, to the fury and astonishment of the Ultras, was published the

were conscious that each side was proposing measures which were in conflict with their own political principles, and were well aware of the causes of this inconsistency. Guizot and Pasquier may be quoted as examples. Pasquier is particularly interesting. On February 29, 1816, M. de Villèle, as spokesman of the Ultras, explained to the Chamber their proposals for electoral reform and their reasons for opposing the government. Pasquier writes (*Mémoires*, vol. iv. p. 80): "Our situation was so bizarre and so false, on both sides, that M. de Villèle, who certainly was not concerned to consolidate constitutional government, in the discussion used arguments and defended principles most likely to establish it. He knew well that, if once he succeeded in getting power into the hands of his friends, it would not be difficult later to ensure that the ideas which were dear to them should triumph. We on our side were compelled to concentrate our efforts on repudiating ideas which at other times would have easily accorded with our principles, but which, if accepted under present circumstances, might, in our view, entail the most disastrous consequences. A strange freak of fate for us that, in avoiding in 1816 the reefs which we feared the most, the result was that our opponents were the first before us to defend those principles which it would have been much more logical to leave to our defence. It was thanks to them that we had the most effective barriers against their most dangerous demands. Thus involuntarily they opened a path for representative government which they never thought of, and in almost every sphere of government they raised defences against the power of the Crown which probably for a long time no one would have thought of demanding."

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famous Ordinance dissolving the Chamber and fixing new elections.

The elections were held in October 1816. Like all elections in France during this period, they were "worked" by the government. The government "worked" them in close co-operation with the leaders of the Centre and the Doctrinaires. It was a pitched battle, open warfare, with the king's brother and the *émigrés*. The Ultras were inevitably defeated; they returned a parliamentary minority, but a strong minority. In the new Chamber, consisting of 258 deputies, the government could now count on a majority of 30 to 50.

As soon as the Chamber met and the new Franchise Bill was introduced, the future alignment of persons, parties, and classes became much clearer. The Bill as drafted and passed was the work of the Doctrinaires. It is important to understand the composition and the political psychology of this curious and powerful political party. In the ordinary sense of the word it was never a political party at all, for it consisted of a half-dozen "leaders" and no followers. In practice, its followers were the government itself and the party or parties of the Centre, the "toryisme bourgeois". Its important members were Royer-Collard, de Serre, Guizot, Barante, and later de Broglie. Outside the party, but working in close co-operation with it at this period, were Pasquier and Molé. In 1816 none of the Doctrinaires were in the government, and Guizot, who played a major part in drafting the Bill, was not even a member of either Chamber.

The Doctrinaires were royalists. Royer-Collard, their leader, had been a faithful royalist all through

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the Napoleonic era and had performed the highest services to Louis XVIII. before the Restoration. They hated and feared the revolution in one of its aspects—and they were aware that it was only one of its aspects—the Terror, anarchy, dictatorship of the proletariat, and the confiscation of property. But they were intellectuals—professors, philosophers, historians. The history of France was in their heads and in their bones, and they understood the living France in which they themselves lived. They knew that the France of Louis XVI. and feudalism, the France which Monsieur and the *émigrés* thought to resuscitate, was dead and buried, that any attempt to resuscitate it would lead to the resuscitation of Marat and Robespierre. They accepted the revolution as having left behind it in psychology and economics something hard, real, indestructible which it was convenient to call liberty and equality and which the statesman, if he wished to avoid social disaster, must translate into the terms of politics.

The Doctrinaires were men of the nineteenth century; they were sensitive to those currents of thought and economics which were bringing a new form of society into existence. Faced with the necessity of steering a course midway between reaction and revolution, between a feudal aristocracy and a proletariat, and of translating democracy and economics into terms of politics, they inevitably developed in themselves the political psychology of the Whigs. Their Whiggery was of course a French variety. Political liberty, interpreted as the negation of a system which preserved political power as the monopoly or privilege of the king or aristocracy, was to be ensured by a constitutional monarchy,

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representative and responsible government. The Charter, subscribed to by the king, was the written, constitutional guarantee of this political liberty. The Charter was also to guarantee that other strand of democracy, civil liberties,¹ which had assumed so much importance in the *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*, trial by jury, independence of judges, religious freedom, freedom of opinion, and freedom of the press.

Such was the political psychology and political programme of Royer-Collard, Guizot, and de Serre; they were the same, *mutatis mutandis*, as those of Lord John Russell, Brougham, and Hobhouse. For the French Doctrinaires, as for the English Whigs, the crux came over the franchise. If political power was to be neither a monopoly of the king nor a privilege of the aristocracy, in whose hands was it to be? It would be in the hands of those who controlled the legislature, for the despotic power of king and nobility was to be made impossible by constitutional monarchy with representative and responsible government, and this again meant that the last word politically would be with the majority in the two Chambers. Everything turned, therefore, upon the nature of the franchise, for in a class society political power would belong to that class which was able to elect a majority to parliament.

The Doctrinaires in 1817, like the Whigs in 1830, turned inevitably to the middle class. It was to the bourgeoisie that they gave the vote and political power. By the law of February 5, 1817, the franchise was given to persons paying 300 francs in taxes. About 100,000 persons out of a population of about

¹ See Vol. I. pp. 276-281.

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3,000,000 were thus enfranchised. Deputies had to be forty years old and to pay 1000 francs in taxes. In each Department the suffrage was direct by "scrutin de liste". One-fifth of the Chamber of Deputies was to be re-elected annually. That it was understood at the time and deliberately intended to place political power in the hands of the middle class is shown by the contemporary debates and in the defence of the measure by those who were primarily responsible for it. Its defence outside parliament was left by the government to Guizot and a short analysis of his apologia is desirable, for later he became the statesman who led bourgeois democracy to its *débâcle* in 1848.

Guizot maintained that if you want government based upon liberty, you must choose between two principles. Your choice is between universal suffrage, *i.e.* the right to vote "extended to the mass of the people", and a restricted suffrage, *i.e.* the right to vote "concentrated in the upper regions of society". In either case it is only if the suffrage is direct that it can "effectively ensure the influence of the country upon the government". Either of these systems can provide "real control of power and guarantees of liberty". The question which is desirable or feasible depends upon time, circumstances, the stage of civilization, and the form of government. Guizot admitted that universal suffrage might be suitable for small, federal republics; he maintained that the restricted suffrage was necessary in large, unitary monarchies.¹

It will be seen that Guizot, by a different path, in a different country, with a different political

¹ *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 215.

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background, is arriving at precisely the same intellectual and political terminus as Brougham. It is interesting to linger for a moment over the last stages in this journey. Already in 1816 the difficulties of this intelligent Frenchman's political journey are due to the fact of his being brought face to face with the eternal dilemma of bourgeois democracy. "Quand on veut sérieusement un gouvernement libre", says Guizot, you must choose between the principles of universal or restricted suffrage. In those first seven words he accepts the postulates of democracy. The communal psychology, the matrix in which his mind had been moulded, was that of the revolution, not of the *ancien régime*. Thus he instinctively rejected the idea of society and government based upon the hierarchy of privileges and classes. The "good society" is a society of free and (if possible) equal individuals. Government must therefore be "free" or based upon liberty, and that can be attained only if "the government" is influenced and controlled by the free individual citizens. "The real control of power and guarantees of liberty" which such a system provides are necessary because of that other postulate of democracy which Guizot in fact continually assumes, namely that the primary object of government should be the happiness of individuals free to live their own lives according to the dictates of their personalities.

But at this point in the journey two roads diverge. The logical one is universal suffrage. If direct suffrage is the only political means which can "effectively ensure the influence of the country upon the government", it would be natural to assume that freedom would be most effectively ensured by the right to

vote being "extended to the mass of the people". But at the end of that path lies not only liberty but equality, and with equality the shadow of revolution and storms which shake the sacred rights of property. Guizot, being unlike Brougham a Frenchman, looked down the path with open eyes. But he found good reasons for turning away from it and for taking the other turning. Universal suffrage might be admirable in some other countries which were small or republics or were very young or very old in political experience. But it was unsuitable for France, in which it had always been a cause of anarchy and revolution or the fraudulent credentials of despotism.¹

So Guizot took the other turning. It led him to a restricted suffrage, which gave the right to vote to 100,000 out of a population of 30,000,000. The influence of $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent of the population upon the Government was ensured and that $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent of the population was identified with "the country". It was also clearly and frankly identified by Guizot with the bourgeoisie. What Guizot wanted was a combination of liberty and stability.² His object was to obtain the maximum amount of liberty without endangering what seemed to him the bases of stable society—and among the most important of those

¹ See *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 166: "At that time (1817), universal suffrage in France had always been an instrument either of destruction or of deception: of destruction when it had really placed political power in the hands of the masses; of deception when it was used to abolish political rights in the interest of absolute power, maintaining the fiction of an electoral system through the meaningless intervention of the masses".

² *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 166: "Une idée dominante inspira-le loi du 5 février 1817: mettre un terme au régime révolutionnaire, mettre en vigueur le régime constitutionnel".

bases was property. He proposed therefore to give political power to an upper stratum of society, for there was a strong presumption that in that stratum would be discovered "an instinct for law and order, independence, and enlightenment". He puts the same thing even more clearly in another passage in which he says that the authors of the electoral system of 1817 had only one idea, namely "to place political power in that part of society where those whose interest it is to preserve social order (*les intérêts conservateurs de l'ordre social*) and who possess independence and enlightenment naturally predominate and to ensure for them, by direct election of the country's representatives, open and powerful influence upon its government".

The Doctrinaires had not to look long or far in 1817 to find the object of their search. They naturally and rightly identified those who combined a love of liberty and a love of order with the bourgeoisie. It was the middle class which, as Guizot remarked, was the most suitable instrument, owing to its character and its interests, to oppose both revolution and reaction. It was opposed to the *ancien régime* and had "acquired under the Empire the ideas and habits of a governing class; though it had accepted the Restoration with suspicion, it was not hostile to it; under the Charter it had nothing to gain from further revolution; the Charter was for it both the Capitol and a safe harbour; it found there protection for its conquests and the triumph of its hopes".

So the Doctrinaires, Guizot, and the Richelieu government gave the vote to $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent of the population of France and political power to the bourgeoisie with their eyes open. To what extent

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their eyes were also open at the time to the political and economic implications of their action, which was in fact a revolution, remains doubtful. Guizot, looking back to 1817 after his shipwreck in 1848, remarked that the opposition to the electoral law of 1817 came, not from the Left, but from the Right. It was only later, he maintains, that the democratic or popular party attacked the law of 1817 and the whole system of government based upon it, on the ground that they established "a political monopoly for the profit of the middle classes". His statement is probably correct, for in 1817 the forces of the Left were still in complete disorder and were scarcely vocal either in the Chamber or the country. The effect of control of political power by the middle classes upon the economic structure of society and upon economic classes was therefore imperfectly considered and understood at the time by the Doctrinaires, by the middle classes themselves, or by those who were to be their opponents on the Left. But imperfectly and subconsciously the economic dilemma of democracy was present already in their minds. It is therefore worth while to examine shortly Guizot's apology, explanation, and solution, even though he wrote them when the experience of 1848 had made clear and conscious many things which were obscure and subconscious in 1817.

Guizot admits that both the Charter and the electoral law of 1817 deliberately put the franchise out of the reach of the masses and placed it in the hands of the upper classes ("dans les régions élevées de la société"). In effect it handed over, and was intended to hand over, political power to the middle class. The middle classes were a middle term between re-

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actionary and revolutionary, and a constitutional regime, based upon an alliance between the throne and the bourgeoisie and upon a middle-class franchise, would be a mean between reaction and revolution. The revolution in this connection means for Guizot simply the Terror—anarchy, violence, mob rule, and expropriation—and he assumes that if the franchise is genuinely given to classes below the middle class, so that political power is really in the hands of “the lower orders”, the result must inevitably be this kind of anarchy. Guizot’s whole position and argument are here founded upon political expediency, and no one who remembers that the experience of men in 1817 was confined to their own past, not our past, will say that they were entirely unreasonable. He was also not a democrat. And yet, because his own political psychology was already permeated by democratic ideas and because the fundamental dilemma of nineteenth-century democracy, though unacknowledged, already stared him in the face, he was compelled to ask himself and to answer a further question. Was not this solution placing the middle classes in relation to the classes below them precisely in that position which under the *ancien régime* the aristocracy had held in relation to the bourgeoisie? Would not “les classes moyennes”, if political power was placed in their hands through the franchise, become immediately “des classes privilégiées”? Here, staring him in the face, though Guizot never acknowledges it, is the fatal dilemma. He cannot answer the question with a “yes” and leave it at that, because, as between the *ancien régime* and the society of 1817, between a privileged aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, Guizot accepted the

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postulates of democracy. The evils of the *ancien régime* had resulted precisely from the fact that the aristocracy was "une classe privilégiée" over-against the rest of the population. Guizot and the middle-class France of 1817 demanded that those privileges should be abolished, or rather that they should not be restored. The demand had originally been made by the revolution, and was still made in the name of liberty and equality, liberty for the bourgeoisie to do and say what it liked, political, social, and economic equality between aristocracy and bourgeoisie. But why should the liberty and equality and franchise stop at the bourgeoisie? Why should not their benefits and protection be extended downwards to "the lower orders"? And if they were not, would not the system of class privilege, with all its evils and injustices, be maintained in the domination of a privileged bourgeoisie over the "masses" excluded from political power?

Guizot, in the fifth chapter of the first volume of his *Mémoires de mon temps*, himself categorically asks these questions. His answer is curious and, in some respects, not easy to follow. He denies that anyone ever had the intention of substituting the bourgeoisie for the aristocracy as a privileged class, and he seems to argue that the domination of society by the middle classes is inherently impossible. His argument shows the political psychology of a man who was the French counterpart to Brougham in England at the moment when, in the opinion of most people to-day, the domination of society by the middle classes was actually being established. Guizot maintains that the domination of the State by one class cannot be established by laws or political theories, but only by

force or faith; that is why the whole of history proves that privileged classes have never been the bourgeoisie, but military or theocratic aristocracies. History, after 1817, proved this argument to be absurd, and it would be easy for us to dismiss it as disingenuous. Even if it were true that before 1817 there was no example in history of a society dominated by a bourgeoisie—a very doubtful proposition—that was no proof that there was anything inherent in a middle class which made it impossible for it to become a privileged class. The fact that it had not become a dominating class, say in France, was simply due to the fact that it had never dominated, *i.e.* it had never had control of the organs and machinery of government. Again, what he says about force and law is a curious argument in the mouth of a Doctrinaire. The whole policy of Guizot and his party in 1817 was to prevent the re-establishment of the dominating position of a privileged aristocracy; they proposed to do this by a process of law, by giving political power, through the Constitution and the franchise, to the bourgeoisie. But obviously if such political power could be used to abolish or prevent the re-establishment of the domination and privileges of the aristocracy, it might also be used for establishing a dominant and privileged bourgeoisie.

It would be easy, as I have said, to dismiss this ridiculous argument as disingenuous, but disingenuity is not really the explanation of Guizot's political and social psychology. I think that, like Brougham, he did believe that in some way or other the middle class, because of its middle position, was "the people" and could therefore never become a

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dominating or privileged class. Identifying the aristocracy with privileged despotism and the masses with political anarchy and social chaos, he looked to the bourgeoisie to hold the balance between the two extremes. It is this view of the bourgeoisie as holding the balance between two socially destructive extremes which enabled Brougham honestly to identify the middle classes with the people and Guizot to believe that they could never become dominant and privileged.

Guizot has another argument which deserves notice, because it is a very early and confused example of what later became the characteristic social psychology of liberalism. He maintains that good government and civilized society depend principally on two things: first, the law must ensure certain rights to every man, irrespective of birth, fortune, or rank, and in virtue of his individuality; secondly, it must for every man open every door to individual merit ("ouvrir aux supériorités individuelles toutes les portes"). These two principles were, he maintains, inherent in French society in 1817 and they made exclusive domination by the middle class impossible. Guizot's argument in this passage is confused and his words often obscure, but his meaning is obvious. In Volume I. of this work ¹ I drew attention to the intimate connection between the consciousness of individuality and those beliefs with regard to political or social equality and liberty from which spring the modern doctrine and practice of democracy. It will be observed that Guizot, who, like most of his respectable contemporaries, regarded democracy with the same kind of fear and disgust

¹ See in particular pp. 242-252 and 278-281.

as Queen Victoria felt for socialism and the Guizots and Queen Victorias of our day feel for communism, had unconsciously assimilated the fundamental psychology of nineteenth-century democracy. He accepted that view of the individual which is incompatible with the *ancien régime* and with all authoritarian governments or the governments of privileged classes. "In virtue of a man's individuality", he says, the law must ensure him certain rights and also equality of opportunity to exploit his own individual abilities. His first "principle" is simply the libertarian revolutionary principle which gave rise to the whole system of "civil liberties"; the individual is ensured legal right to equality before the law, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and freedom of speech, etc. Here there is a real and vital element both of liberty and equality, that element which distinguished the society and psychology of the France born of the revolution from those of the *ancien régime*, which divides the authoritarian from the democrat, and which underlay the struggle between the Ultra-Royalists and the rest of France.

But Guizot's second "principle" is also important and should not be dismissed, as it easily might be, as an example of bourgeois disingenuity. Combined with the principle and system of civil liberties, it produced what Guizot and the early liberals called the "*vraie et sage liberté*" as opposed to the liberty of the red cap, the sansculotte, and the revolution. It was a *legal* and constitutional equality of opportunity. It meant that the constitution and law should not create any class privilege or any legal obstacle which might prevent a man exploiting to the utmost his individual abilities. This principle,

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when translated into practice, constituted an essential difference between the society of the *ancien régime* and the democracies of the nineteenth century. It was the psychological pollen which fertilized the seed of capitalist liberalism and produced eventually the full bloom of *laissez-faire*. That flower, once so carefully tended and so highly prized, is now almost universally regarded as a poisonous weed. But our knowledge and prejudices, which time and history made it impossible for Guizot and his contemporaries to share, are not an adequate excuse for misunderstanding their psychology and misinterpreting their aims and achievements. Guizot regarded his system of legal equality of opportunity, not as the framework of a society in which a dominant bourgeoisie might pursue untrammelled its business of making profits, but as the foundation of a society of free and equal citizens. The citizens were free and equal because the State allowed no legal obstacle to be placed in the way of any man, no matter what his birth or class, from making the fullest use of his abilities and enjoying the profits or fruit of his activity. There is nothing, he would have said, either in the Charter or in the laws which can prevent a worker or a peasant from becoming by his abilities a millionaire, a landowner, a duke, or a Secretary of State, just as there is nothing to prevent the bourgeois Protestant M. Guizot from becoming Prime Minister—and that is the “*vraie et sage*” liberty and equality. That, too, is the real difference between the privileged society of the ancient and the free and equal society of the new France.

This position in 1817 was not mere hypocrisy; in fact there was a considerable element of truth in it.

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There was a real advance towards freedom and equality in the society which Guizot wished to stabilize in 1817, when it is compared with the society of 1789, and it was an advance which was not confined to the middle classes, but extended downwards to the workers and peasants. That was why all classes in France resisted the attempt of the reactionaries and Charles X. to destroy the Charter, just as Francis Place and the workers supported a man like Brougham in the Reform crisis. What people in 1817, and people far to the Left of Guizot, did not see was the fundamental inconsistency in the bourgeois position and the relation between liberty, political equality, and economic equality. The restriction of the franchise, and therefore of political power, to the possessing class was due ultimately to the fear of the upper and middle classes that, if political power were in the hands of the "lower orders", they would use it to dispossess the wealthy. The rights of property were so sacred that expropriation of any kind, and therefore economic equality, were identified by them with "anarchy and chaos". This enabled them to conceal from themselves the fact that the restricted class franchise made both political and economic power a privilege of the bourgeoisie, and that under such circumstances the formal legal "equality of opportunity" was for anyone born in the propertyless classes a farce. The full dilemma of democracy—the necessity of proceeding from political to economic equality if society should really consist of free and equal citizens—was not clearly presented to the men of 1817, for they were not yet consciously democrats; it only became clear and insistent after 1830, when

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democracy and liberalism became respectable, and the "lower orders" gradually realized that, if there was to be real freedom and equality for them, democracy must end in socialism.

The future was, however, as I have before remarked, hidden from the eyes of Guizot and his contemporaries. The years between 1817 and 1830 were occupied by a struggle. On the one side was a heterogeneous collection of men and parties, ranging from enlightened aristocrats to the solid ranks of the bourgeoisie and lower middle class attempting to stabilize a quasi-democracy, based upon the Charter, semi-responsible parliamentary government, civil liberty, and the restricted franchise of 1817. On the other side was a small, compact body of fanatically class-conscious men who feared and hated the Charter, parliamentary government, civil liberties, and democracy, and who were determined to reinstate an absolute monarchy and an aristocratic, feudal, authoritarian government. I do not propose to give a detailed chronological account of the struggle, but to examine only those phases and features of it which throw light upon the development of political ideas and economic forces and the part which they played in shaping the historical event.

The struggle ended in 1830 with a revolution, the fall of a king and dynasty, and the complete defeat of the Ultra-Royalist party. It was divided into two clearly marked periods, the dividing line being the murder of the Duc de Berri, the king's nephew, on February 13, 1820. In the first period, 1815-1830, the first attack of the reactionaries was beaten back. This was achieved by the establishment of parlia-

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mentary government and the use of political power by those in control of the two Chambers. The struggle concentrated upon such subjects as the franchise, the freedom of the press, and finance. At first, as we have seen, the reactionaries through their majority in parliament seemed to hold the keys of political power. Decazes, owing to his influence with Louis XVIII., was able by two successive coups to reverse the position. In September 1816 he persuaded the king to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, and the new elections provided him with a majority in that body opposed to the Ultra-Royalists. That majority upon which the government relied was the Centre, and the Centre was predominantly bourgeois; it represented, as Guizot said, "le toryisme bourgeois". Thus from the start the real lines of the struggle were marked out, a contest between an aristocratic minority and the bourgeoisie for political power. Decazes's second coup came early in 1819 and was a further lesson to the nascent democracy of France in the use and abuse of political power. Those who were enraged to see their control over the lower house pass into the hands of Decazes and his bourgeois supporters began to use the majority which they still retained in the upper house, the Chamber of Peers, to thwart him. He countered immediately by getting the king to swamp the hostile majority by the creation of sixty new peers. Thus the first attempt of the reactionaries to destroy parliamentary government through their hold on parliament was defeated, and the control over both Chambers had passed from them to Decazes and "le toryisme bourgeois".

The transfer of the control of the machinery of

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government from the Ultra-Royalists to the bourgeois parties had been rendered comparatively easy mainly because the former suffered from three decisive weaknesses. Public opinion was overwhelmingly against them. That in itself might not have been sufficient to prevent them from making themselves masters of political power. But at the same time outside their reach lay two key positions which it is essential for a minority making a counter-revolution to hold. The reactionaries had the king against them, because he hated his brother, who led the reaction, and because he was under the personal domination of Decazes, who led the opposition to the reaction. The subsequent history of the nineteenth century has shown how vital for democracy under parliamentary government is the control of the Crown and its prerogatives. Almost always and everywhere, during the last hundred years, the monarchy has been the willing ally or tool of reaction and conservatism; indeed, the main function of the Crown gradually became, under monarchs like Victoria, to serve as a last ditch, hedged by divinity, in the struggle to defeat or outwit the "forces of democracy". Chance and circumstances put this ditch in the hands of Decazes so that he was able to use constitutionally the ultimate powers of the constitution against the reactionaries. That put the reactionaries into a weak position, for they were left powerless if they acted within the orbit of the constitution,¹ and so they were faced by the

¹ It is significant that, as soon as Decazes felt himself secure in both Houses, he proceeded to suppress the curious extra-constitutional government which Monsieur had created and controlled in the "grand état-major de la garde nationale". See Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. iv. p. 253.

unpleasant fact that they could now only gain their ends by violent action.

The Terror which followed the Restoration showed that the Ultra-Royalists, if they had had the power, would not have been averse from attaining their ends by violence. But here, too, in a second key position they suffered from a fatal weakness. The armed forces, in which must be included the garde nationale and the police, were against them. The importance of this fact was very great. The State is ultimately, though not exclusively, an instrument of power and the government is a group of individuals who, provided that they can rely upon the armed forces, control that instrument of power. Social history is therefore determined, not only by political ideas and economic forces, but by the group of individuals in the State which controls the police and army, and by the objects and aims for which they use the power ensured to them by that control. It is an extraordinary fact that, although the political history of the nineteenth century throughout Europe was mainly a struggle to establish a system of democratic government, first by the bourgeoisie, and later by the bourgeoisie and workers, democratic leaders and democratic parties, and finally even democratic governments, have never realized the vital significance of what may be called the political loyalty of the armed forces; and the blindness of the politicians on this subject is shared by historians and even democratic and socialist theorists. By the end of the nineteenth century not one country in Europe, with the exception perhaps of Switzerland, had really democratized its army. In France and Britain, the leading democratic Great Powers, the

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command of army, navy, and police was in the hands of men who by birth, class, or tradition were overwhelmingly anti-democratic.¹ In Russia and Germany the military caste was still a bulwark of the aristocracy and despotic monarchy. This fact that the armed forces, the ultimate instrument or lever of political power, have normally been in the hands of reactionaries, has had a threefold effect upon the social history of Europe. When the group controlling the machinery of the State was reactionary, it always knew that, however arbitrary its rule and however discontented were the common people, it could always rely upon the "higher command" to endorse and obey its policy of reaction and repression. Whenever the group controlling the machinery of government was democratic or pursuing a policy of constitutional reform, it knew that the "higher command" would be opposed to it and that its "loyalty" or neutrality to the government could not be counted upon in an acute crisis. Lastly, whenever affairs reached a stage when revolution was imminent, all parties knew that, no matter what were the circumstances, the officer class in the army, the navy, and the police force would be on the side of the government and against the revolutionaries.

The importance of these facts cannot be exaggerated. We have seen reason to believe that historical events are largely determined by the interaction of ideas in the heads of individual men with economic

¹ The Dreyfus case in France and the promptitude with which the army leaders in Britain ranged themselves on the side of the Conservative Party and House of Lords in the Irish crisis against the electorate and House of Commons show this.

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forces. But as soon as one really analyses the events of any period and tries to trace what causes determined what effects, one finds almost always a third element complicating the interaction of economics and ideas. A group which, under the impulse of political ideas or economic forces, attempts to translate its policy into practice must control, and may have to use, power in order to do so. Thus power is a third element, with ideas and economics, of primary importance for the determination of historical events. In some ways it is the most important element, for however widely held may be the ideas, or however powerful may be the economic forces, a handful of men controlling overwhelming armed force within the State may render them impotent. In order to understand the history of a period, therefore, it is necessary to know the incidence of power in it, *i.e.* the capacity of groups or parties effectively to use the State's power, and in this connection the relation between the several groups or parties and those in immediate control of the armed forces is always an important, and may be at moments a determining, factor.

Between 1815 and 1829 it was a very important factor in the French situation and in 1830 it became a determining factor. During the whole period the position of the higher command and officers in the armed forces was politically very peculiar and abnormal owing to the events of the previous twenty-six years. The officer class, as I have said, is almost always reactionary and anti-democratic, and they might have been expected normally to have been on the side of the Ultra-Royalists. But this was not the case; the army was, owing to

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historical circumstances, throughout the Restoration on the opposite side; indeed, its tendencies in the higher ranks were to some extent democratic or even republican and revolutionary. The Napoleonic army was the heir of the revolutionary armies, and its generals began their military careers not at the court of Louis XVI., but in the ranks which fought under Dumouriez at Valmy or under Bonaparte in Italy. The imperialist regime and its military successes never completely obliterated these early traditions, but it superimposed on them something which was new in the early days of the century and which was to have a dominating influence on the psychology and history of Europeans. The loyalty of his marshals and lower ranks to Napoleon was astonishing, when one considers how ruthlessly he abused it, and it is remarkable, not that they eventually deserted him in his final defeat, but that they followed him so long. But their loyalty was not merely personal; they were devoted to him because he represented to them something more than the great and victorious Emperor; he represented *la gloire*, the glory of France. In this devotion to national glory in the Napoleonic armies one can see the first development of the new type of patriotism and nationalism which later in the century was to play so dominating a part in European history. It was a new type of patriotism, because it was intimately connected with the psychology of democracy. The officers and men who fought at Valmy felt that they were fighting, not for a king or dynasty, but for a nation and a country, *their* nation and *their* country, and just as the Napoleonic regime by its civil administration never destroyed the fundamental libertarian

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and egalitarian psychology of the revolution, so too it never eradicated from its armies this new popular or democratic patriotism or nationalism.

Their complete failure to understand these facts led the *émigrés* and the Court of the Restoration to make some of their most fatal mistakes. The victory of the Allies had been the victory of the Bourbons, but it had been the defeat of France and of her army. For years the army and Napoleon's marshals had seen the Ultra-Royalist *émigrés* supporting or even fighting for the enemies of France, and the triumph of the Restoration had only been accomplished by the humiliation of France. That was the explanation of the most amazing of all the feats of Napoleon's career, his march to Paris on his return from Elba, when all along his route the peasants and soldiers welcomed him, and his old army, from Ney, who had promised Louis to bring the Emperor back to Paris in an iron cage, down to the privates in the ranks, joined the Emperor against the Restoration. After the Hundred Days and Waterloo the relations between the restored monarchy and the army were even more delicate, and only the greatest restraint and understanding on the part of the *émigrés* could have effected a reconciliation. The Ultra-Royalists, by their vindictiveness, did everything in their power to increase the hostility of the Imperial army and its leaders, not only to themselves but to the monarchy. The disbandment of that army caused widespread hardship and discontent. The trial and execution of Ney contained a threat to all the marshals and generals who had "deserted" to

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Napoleon.¹ But it was in 1818 that the reactionaries finally destroyed all possibility of their reconciliation with the army. In that year the army was reorganized according to the scheme of Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr. The scheme provided for promotion from the ranks and enabled the government to re-enlist a considerable proportion of officers and men of Napoleon's army. As a corollary, it destroyed any possibility of creating an army officered by *émigrés*. For these reasons Saint-Cyr's reorganization was bitterly opposed by the Ultra-Royalists. The government and the king supported the marshal; the scheme was put through and a new army was created as hostile to the reactionaries as had been the old.

The attitude of the armed forces and their officers to the various groups aiming at or in control of political power during the period of the Restoration was determined by these historical circumstances. The result was not merely that the ultimate instrument for establishing themselves in power by a *coup d'état* was out of the hands of the Ultra-Royalists, but that no government which was based upon the

¹ The vindictiveness of the *émigrés* towards the officers of Napoleon's forces was, of course, not confined to Ney. After Waterloo, the following, among others, were arrested and brought to trial: General Debelle, General Drouot, General Cambronne, Admiral Linois, and Colonel Boyer. General Debelle and Colonel Boyer were condemned to death, but pardoned; the others were acquitted. The vengeance of the Ultra-Royalists was thwarted in these cases, because it outraged public opinion. The cases of General Drouot and General Cambronne enlisted the sympathy of everyone against the reaction. After the second abdication of Napoleon, Drouot made an immediate submission to the king, and it was mainly through his influence with Napoleon's soldiers, and particularly with the regiments of the Guards, which prevented further fighting. General Cambronne had distinguished himself and had been severely wounded at Waterloo; he was known as a brave and loyal soldier who took no part in politics. See Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. iv. pp. 106 and 107.

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Right or even the Centre could ever be quite certain of the loyalty of the armed forces. Various facts showed this. After 1818 one of the chief leaders of the Left in the Chamber was a general, General Foy, and his death in 1825 proved his immense popularity and was used as an opportunity for people and army to demonstrate against a reactionary government. Moreover throughout the period there was a series of secret conspiracies and sporadic risings, often ludicrously inept and hopelessly mismanaged. But it is significant that in almost every case the army was involved, the conspirators being regimental officers or in close touch with officers or units of the regular army. This was the case with the organization of the *Charbonnerie française* and the conspiracies in 1821 and 1822 at Belfort, Saumur, and La Rochelle.

In 1819, just before the catastrophe which brought the first period of the Restoration to an end, it looked as if the reaction had little chance of success in France, and it seemed probable that a system of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary government would establish itself peacefully. The Ultra-Royalists had lost control of the legislature, the army, and the *garde nationale*; the king, the government, and the people were all against them. There were, however, already symptoms of disorganization and weakness in the Centre and among the Constitutional Royalists which explain the complete reversal in the political situation which followed the murder of the Duc de Berri. The majority upon which Decazes relied was not homogeneous; it was politically immature and the *Doctrinaires* were the only section of it which provided the rudiments of a political programme and party. The

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Doctrinaires, partly on questions of principle and partly owing to the personal pique of M. Royer-Collard, had already begun to separate themselves from the government. But there was another and more serious cause of disintegration. 1819 was one of those years in which a wave of revolutionary or "democratic" feeling swept over Europe producing outbreaks against reactionary government in Italy, Spain, and Germany. It was felt very noticeably in France. There is no doubt that all through the period of the Restoration the undercurrent of political public opinion was on the side of the Left; it was not revolutionary or republican, but it was vaguely on the side of democracy or liberty and equality. Its movement to the Left had been accelerated by the excesses and stupidities of the Ultra-Royalists. The effect of this current in the political psychology of the time was felt in the elections of 1819. Despite the restricted franchise, the bourgeois electors began to move to the Left. Of the 54 new deputies elected, 35 belonged to the Left, 15 to the Centre, and only 4 to the Right.

This election threw the government and the bourgeois Centre, upon which it rested, into confusion. Even the mild liberalism of the majority of the new deputies who belonged to "the Left" sent them scurrying to the Right from the spectre of the revolution. And there was one result of the election which terrified and outraged all "respectable" people. The tactics of the Ultra-Royalists had been to vote for any one in order to unseat a government candidate, and, largely owing to this policy, the ex-bishop Grégoire, who had been a member of the Convention and had voted for the death sentence

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on Louis XVI., was returned for the Isère. The House, led by the government, refused Grégoire admission by a large majority, although the king himself after Waterloo had appointed another regicide, Fouché, to be his Minister. The flight from "liberalism" increased. Unsuccessful attempts were made to change the electoral law in order to make the electorate still more "reliable", to bring Richelieu back into the government, to induce Royer-Collard to form a government. All that happened was that three Ministers withdrew from the Cabinet, including the nominal Premier Dessoles, and Decazes became titular as well as actual head of the government. His two most influential colleagues were de Serre and Pasquier.

Into this unstable situation dropped the bomb-shell of the murder of an heir to the throne early in 1820. The murder was proved to be without political significance; there was no conspiracy behind it; it was the senseless act of an isolated criminal. But it was the last straw which broke the back of the bourgeois Centre and was sufficient to reinstate the Ultra-Royalists in control of the machinery of government and therefore to begin the second period of the Restoration.

The events of the next ten years are of great interest to anyone who wishes to understand the power and limitations of the various psychological, economic, and other factors which determine history. The births, marriages, and deaths—particularly the violent deaths—of princes always have an extraordinary power of stimulating popular emotion. Even before the murder, as we have seen, the political situation in France was panicky and un-

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stable. Under the impulse of natural horror at the crime and crowd emotion there was a political stampede from Left to Right. Taking advantage of this, the king's brother and the Ultra-Royalists launched a violent attack upon Decazes and brought him down. But they had at first to walk warily, for in the Chamber the constitutional royalists of the Centre and the liberals still formed a solid bourgeois majority fundamentally opposed to the aims of the reactionaries. The problem before the Ultra-Royalists was how to obtain permanent control of the legislature by means of a temporary panic before the bourgeois parties realized their danger and again closed their ranks.

The problem was solved with considerable political astuteness. Richelieu was induced to return as a god out of the political machine, as the saviour of his country, to form a government. He was just the man for the job, a political grand seigneur of the best type, whose character was above suspicion and who therefore would save the country and do the dirty work of party from the highest motives. He did both by forming a government composed mainly of the Ministers in the previous Cabinet which relied for support on the Right, and proceeded to pass a series of measures which were calculated to make parliamentary resistance to the Ultra-Royalists impossible. These measures consisted of three laws: one to restrict individual liberty, one to impose restrictions on the freedom of the press, and a new Franchise Act. The last was, of course, infinitely the most important, for upon it depended the future control of the machinery of parliamentary government.

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The leaders of the Ultra-Royalists in the Chamber were two men, MM. de Villèle and de Corbière. Behind the scenes the government acted in close collaboration with them and with Monsieur, the king's brother. They were consulted on all important questions by the Ministers, who in fact determined policy, Richelieu, de Serre, Pasquier, and Portal, and it was agreed that, as soon as it was safe to do so, places should be found in the Cabinet for Villèle and Corbière.¹ Thus the Richelieu government was in fact a façade behind which the reactionaries already controlled policy and were preparing the ground for their own accession to power. The electoral law, now introduced by the government, was dictated by them. Its crucial provision was in the first article, which provided for two electoral colleges, one for the department and one for the arrondissement, for the intention of this manipulation of the franchise was to transfer political power from the bourgeoisie to the landed interests. The liberals, who had begun to recover from the shock of the murder, fought the Bill desperately in the Chamber, for both sides realized that what was really involved was a kind of constitutional *coup d'état*. For the hope of a seizure of political power by Monsieur and his Ultra-Royalists depended upon the government's being able to force through the Chamber before the next elections a Bill which would manipulate the franchise against the bourgeoisie. There were signs in both Paris and the country that the unpopularity of the Ultra-Royalists and hostility to the restrictions upon liberty and the press, already introduced by the government, had

¹ See Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. iv. p. 431.

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counteracted any effect produced by the murder, and the government itself was convinced that, unless they could alter the electoral law before the next elections, those elections would prove a triumph for the Left. That was why everyone at the time called the parliamentary struggle over the government's Bill "la bataille des élections".

This is a very interesting example of the way in which various factors may influence the transfer of political power from one group to another. The bourgeoisie were actually in control of the machinery of political power. Public opinion was definitely on the side and hostile to the Ultra-Royalists and landed interests. The government had a bourgeois majority in the Chamber and was convinced that an election would reduce the power of the Ultra-Royalist Right and increase that of the bourgeois Left in the Chamber. Thus economic forces, the influence of political ideas, and the actual control of political power all combined to consolidate the position of the bourgeoisie against the Ultra-Royalists. Yet a small group of moderate royalists and conservative bourgeois, in control of the government, were able in collusion with the Ultra-Royalists and by manipulating parliamentary machinery, not only to prevent a further movement to the bourgeois Left, but to transfer control of parliament from the bourgeoisie to the Ultra-Royalists and landed interests. The small group, whose political psychology resembles that of the moderate Tories and frightened Reformers whom Wharncliffe¹ tried to bring together, in order to emasculate the Reform Bill, acted partly under

¹ See p. 119.

the influence of popular emotion and partly from fear of liberalism. It is worth while quoting the account of the government's action which Pasquier, one of the "Inner Cabinet", gives, for it shows how deliberately they manœuvred to transfer power from the Left to the Right: "Les jours s'écoulaient rapidement, la session durait depuis cinq mois. Allions-nous pouvoir faire venir avant la clôture la discussion sur la loi d'élection? Le sort du ministère en dépendait. Si le rapport sur le budget avait la majorité, rien ne pouvait empêcher l'opposition de la faire durer pendant deux mois. Ce temps employé par l'opposition à accroître par tous les moyens possibles l'irritation des esprits, après une session de sept mois, le budget voté, il n'y aurait aucun moyen de retenir les députés plus longtemps. Si la modification de la loi d'élection devenait impossible, quel triomphe pour l'opposition! Le cinquième qu'amènerait la loi du 5 février donnerait incontestablement la majorité au part libéral."¹

It was only by a small majority and with great difficulty that the government succeeded in forcing their electoral law through the Chamber of Deputies. Outside parliament popular opposition to the reactionary policy and to the alliance between the government and the Ultra-Royalists manifested itself in disorder. In Paris during the debates large crowds demonstrated against the Bill; provocative action by Ultra-Royalist officers of the Royal Guards against deputies of the Left led to fighting and bloodshed. The situation in the provinces was even more significant, for it revealed the implacable hostility of the armed forces to the reactionaries which

¹ Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. iv. p. 400.

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was so important throughout the period. The government, by means of a spy, learnt of a widespread revolutionary conspiracy in the Eastern Departments. It included Dijon, Lyon, and Grenoble, all centres of "liberalism". Plans were made for a revolutionary insurrection on the model of the successful revolution which had just taken place against Ferdinand in Spain. A large number of officers and non-commissioned officers and leading industrialists and financiers in the big towns were involved. The plot itself was actually directed from Paris, according to the government, by La Fayette, d'Argenson, and Laffitte. The government, in consultation with Monsieur, Villèle, and Corbière, took steps to meet the danger and nothing could be more illuminating than Pasquier's account of the forces upon which they found that they could and could not reply.

In Paris, Pasquier says, the government had at its disposal the garde nationale, the gendarmerie, the Royal Guards, and some regiments of the regular army. It decided that it must rely upon the Guards, which were officered by Ultra-Royalist aristocrats, and the gendarmerie. It was thought to be inadvisable to put the regular troops in the first line against the people, and no reliance at all could be placed on the garde nationale. Pasquier naively remarks that the garde nationale, which was essentially a bourgeois force, was an admirable force for dealing with popular movements and putting down disorders threatening middle-class interests. In the present case it could not be used, for the garde nationale would be composed of fathers and friends of the insurrectionists. In other words, it was too much to expect that, in a struggle between the

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aristocracy and the middle class, a bourgeois armed force would shoot down the bourgeoisie in order to establish the aristocracy in power.

In the provinces the position of the government was still weaker. There its ultimate instrument for "maintaining order" was the regular army. But no government in alliance with the Ultra-Royalists could rely upon the loyalty of the army, particularly the eastern garrisons and the infantry, which were Bonapartist or liberal. The Richelieu Cabinet decided that the only remedy was a complete, secret reorganization of the army, the main object of course being a gradual replacement of liberal by reactionary officers. The first step was to send "loyal" generals to take command in the eastern districts, where the danger was greatest, and quietly to exchange the more reliable western regiments with the disaffected eastern regiments. They also adopted a well-known method of rousing popular enthusiasm for the throne, and therefore obliquely for the king's government; they got the popular Duc d'Angoulême to make a military tour of the disaffected districts. In view of the recent murder, the plan was not without its dangers, but on the whole it was successful and the sight of a shy but affable prince riding or driving in procession through the streets of their towns roused such pleasurable emotions in the bourgeoisie and soldiers that, for the moment at any rate, they forgot politics.

The electoral law was finally passed in the Chamber on July 12, 1820, and, after voting the budget, parliament was adjourned at the end of July. The situation for the government and the reactionaries was, however, still by no means easy. The press law

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gave them complete control of the press and practically all the papers of the Left were suppressed. The administrative weapon was used freely against individuals, and Villèle insisted that the government should dismiss from the posts held by them, not only liberals or radicals like Laffitte and General Foy, but the Doctrinaires, Royer-Collard, Guizot, and Camille Jordan. But their hold over the existing Chamber was by no means secure, and the crucial question was how to make use of the new electoral law in order to obtain a reactionary majority in parliament and so a firm hold upon the machinery of government. Some of the more extreme Ultra-Royalists wanted an immediate dissolution, but the government realized that the hostility of the public and army was such that a general election might be the road both to an Ultra-Royalist majority and to a revolution. The precariousness of the government was shown by the discovery of a widespread revolutionary conspiracy. The plot envisaged an insurrection fixed for August 19, and not only were many officers involved, but all the well-known Left leaders, La Fayette, d'Argenson, Foy, etc. The plan was betrayed to the government and the outbreak forestalled by the arrest of officers, but the feeling in the country and army was so bitter that the government did not dare proceed against the more important conspirators, either military or political.

In the autumn of 1820 partial elections were held and the effect of the new electoral law began to be felt immediately. In the Departments the candidates of the large landowners were returned almost everywhere. Out of the 220 deputies elected, 44 were Presidents or Vice-Presidents of the electoral colleges

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and 65 had been members of the "Chambre introuvable" of 1815. The Ultra-Royalists now felt themselves to be sufficiently strong in Parliament to consolidate themselves in power. In order to do this, it was necessary to get rid of the "moderate" men, like Richelieu, de Serre, and Pasquier, whose fear of the Left had made them the servants of the reaction. The well-known political process of the extremists kicking away the timid and moderate ladder which they had used to climb into power now began. The first kick came immediately after the election of 1820, when Villèle and Corbière entered the Cabinet as Ministers without portfolio. They entered it in fact as Ministers of Monsieur and the Ultra-Royalists and their loyalty was given to them, not to the king or to their colleagues. The disruption of the Cabinet was, therefore, only a question of time; it took about twelve months. The partial elections in the autumn of 1821 again increased the majority of the Right in the Chamber. Monsieur decided that the moment had come; he broke his word to Richelieu, supported the intransigence of the Ultra-Royalists, and thus forced Richelieu to resign. On December 12, 1821, Villèle formed a government and the Ultra-Royalists were now in power.

During the next eight and a half years the *émigré* Ultra-Royalists attempted to use their control of the machinery of government in order to destroy the framework of primitive middle-class democracy which came into existence in 1815, and to establish in its place an authoritarian type of government and society in which political and economic power was shared between the Crown, a landed aristocracy,

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and the Church. The attempt was a failure; it ended in a revolution which drove the king from his throne and from France, destroyed the aristocracy and the Church as political forces, and established a triumphant bourgeoisie in a regime of civil liberties and parliamentary democracy, ornamented at top with the figure of the "bourgeois king", Louis-Philippe. The reasons why the reactionaries, once they had obtained full control of the instruments and machinery of political power, were unable to use them in order to stabilize a reactionary régime are worth a short consideration.

During the first six years of this period, and particularly after the death of Louis XVIII. and the accession of Charles X. in 1824, to contemporaries it seemed by no means impossible that the *ancien régime* would be successfully and permanently re-established. The power of the Church and Jesuits had certainly been re-established, not only over the king and Court, but over society, particularly education. Liberty of the press had been almost completely abolished. No one was secure in any post under or dependent upon the government unless he professed loyalty to the regime, and practically everyone who did not belong to the Right had been driven out of public life, unless he happened to be a member of the Chamber of Peers. Finally in the electoral law the government and reactionaries appeared to have an instrument which must ensure for them a permanent majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and therefore control of legislation and administration.

The strength of this position, built up by Charles X. and his Ultra-Royalist government, was neither

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illusory nor negligible. But it contained certain weaknesses which would probably have proved fatal to the regime sooner or later and which certainly could only be counteracted by a government of ruthless efficiency. The sequel showed that neither Charles nor his Ministers and advisers had the elementary competence and courage necessary for making efficient despots. The problem which faced them in 1822 was obvious. They were attempting to establish a counter-revolutionary regime, political, economic, religious, and social, which was distasteful to the vast majority of the inhabitants of France. To do this successfully three things were absolutely essential: (1) to complete and consolidate their control of the political and administrative machinery of government; (2) to build up an army and police force, large enough and loyal enough to make armed resistance to the authoritarian regime hopeless or appear hopeless; (3) to conciliate some classes or sections of the population in order to acquire some support in the country and divide their opponents. To do the first two of these elementary things required nerve, courage, efficiency, ruthlessness; to do the third required common sense and a little political intelligence. The history of Charles X.'s short reign shows that he and his Ministers had none of these qualities.

Let us examine first the way in which they dealt with the first condition precedent to successful despotism, the control of the machinery of government. The constitutional *coup d'état* of Richelieu and Villèle had put them in control of the Chamber of Deputies. But as soon as Villèle was in power and tried to carry out the social and economic programme

of the reactionaries, it became clear that they were not in control of the Chamber of Peers. The complexion of that body was bourgeois, for it was still determined by Decazes's creation of peers; the government did something to alter it by a further creation of peers favourable to the reaction, but they did not do enough to safeguard their position and they were never able to rely absolutely upon this half of the legislature. The result was disastrous to them, for they were unable to consolidate their position either politically or economically and the peers remained a focus of bourgeois and liberal resistance. The nature and importance of this resistance were shown in 1824. The *émigrés* had from the first regarded as a test case their demand for restitution of or compensation for the property which they had lost during the revolution; and it was in a sense a test case of what the class structure of France should be. At the end of the Napoleonic wars the economic structure of France was in the final stage of transition from feudal agriculture to middle-class capitalism superimposed upon peasant agriculture. Restitution would have meant a reversal of the wheels of this transition, an attempt to force the economy of France back into its feudal eighteenth-century shape. Compensation meant the same, in a modified form, for if the *émigrés* really were to be compensated substantially, it must be at the expense of some other class. The measures which Villèle proposed to parliament in 1824 were complicated; their object was to hand over to the *émigrés* a sum of 1,000,000,000 francs. This compensation was to be made at the expense of the holders of government securities, *i.e.* of the middle-class capitalists

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and rentiers. The Chamber of Deputies passed the measures, but it is significant that in the Chamber of Peers the Opposition, led by bourgeois bankers like Casimir Périer, who was to become the Prime Minister of bourgeois democracy under Louis-Philippe, was successful and the government were defeated.

It is true that a year later the Chamber of Peers gave way over the question of compensation, but it still remained a focus of successful opposition to the reactionary policy of the government in religious questions, to the unpopular law of succession introduced in 1826, and to the stringent law against the press introduced in the same year. The fact was that Charles X. and the Ultra-Royalists were attempting a political impossibility, namely to establish through a parliamentary system a political and social regime in conflict with the political and social ideas of the majority of the population, and an economic regime in conflict with the economic forces of the time and with the economic interests of the vast majority of the population. In the purely political sphere there were only two alternative methods by which they could possibly attain their object. They could have abandoned the Charter and abolished parliamentary government altogether, and thus at least have had effective control of the machinery of government. The extreme Ultra-Royalists always advocated this policy and they were probably right, because the opposition to the Ultra-Royalist programme was so widespread that the best chance of withstanding it was probably in a completely authoritarian regime. Eventually Charles X. was forced to choose between attempting

to establish such an authoritarian regime and capitulation to the bourgeoisie. He made the attempt in the July Ordinances of 1830 and lost his throne; that he did not make it before was due to his knowledge that it would provoke a revolution and that he could not rely upon the armed forces in a struggle between the *émigrés* and the bourgeoisie.

The second method by which it might have been possible to stabilize a reactionary semi-feudal regime in the France of 1824 was to keep the façade of the Charter and parliamentary system, but to manipulate it in such a way that the government would have in each Chamber a permanent majority of Ultra-Royalist yes-men. This was in fact Villèle's policy, in so far as he had a consistent policy, but he never pursued it with the ruthlessness and efficiency which alone could have given it any chance of success. He was attempting in the interests of a small minority to impose upon France a regime opposed to the interests, ideas, and ideals of all the other classes; so long as he left any reality in the parliamentary system he ran the risk of finding himself faced with a hostile Opposition in the Chambers. This is what happened to him between 1824 and 1828. His policy was suicidal. He never purged the Chamber of Peers effectively, so that even if the Chamber of Deputies were complaisant, he was never certain that the opposition in the country to one of his measures would not voice itself in the upper house and thwart him. At the same time he allowed the control even of the Chamber of Deputies to slip out of his hands. He did not, as he should have done, turn it into a mere parliamentary façade to an Ultra-Royalist despotism. He

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did not even, as he might have done, take the elementary precaution to divide the Opposition by conciliating or bribing some sections or classes of it; on the contrary, he allowed his extremists to exasperate those who might at least have been won to benevolent neutrality. The result was that, despite the restricted and manipulated franchise, the opposition in the country gradually began to influence and ultimately to control the electoral colleges, the elections, and so the Chamber of Deputies. As we have seen,¹ by the middle of 1827 the "noblesse de province" had deserted the government, and three years later Barante remarked that in his part of the country the Ultra-Royalists as a party had practically ceased to exist. By 1827 the government could no longer rely on a docile majority in the Chamber, and this led to the fall of Villèle in the following year.

Charles X. and his Ultra-Royalist supporters were now forced to face the problem which, if they had been efficient despots, they would have faced four years before. So long as any reality remained in the parliamentary system, stability could not be ensured to any government carrying out the Ultra-Royalist policy. Even now the king did not accept the obvious corollary—the abolition of the parliamentary system. He tried a compromise, or perhaps his intention was to take a temporary step backwards into liberalism in order the better to make his final leap into despotism. But the situation was not one in which compromise was possible, for the Ultra-Royalist regime which he was trying to impose upon France was diametrically opposed to the political

¹ See notes on pp. 188 and 215.

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ideas and economic interests of the great majority of Frenchmen. Unless, therefore, he abandoned his policy and the Ultra-Royalists, he could not possibly conciliate the bourgeoisie. The Martignac government failed inevitably, for it was a contradiction in political terms. Though Martignac himself was probably a statesman of considerable ability and integrity, his government was too liberal to retain the support of the reactionaries and too reactionary to win the support of the liberals. By the end of 1829 it had become clear to every intelligent person in France that events were forcing Charles to choose between a semi-democratic parliamentary system and a purely authoritarian government. Charles made his choice. The fall of Martignac, the summoning of the reactionary Polignac to form a government, the election of a liberal Chamber of Deputies, the abandonment of the Charter and parliamentary government in the July Ordinances formed the sequence of events in which his choice was declared and his final challenge made to the opposition. The answer of the bourgeoisie was the July Revolution.

Very few revolutions have been made so easily as that of 1830. When the middle class and working-class population of Paris came out into the streets and built their barricades, Charles X. and his Ultra-Royalist regime collapsed almost without a struggle. Contemporaries and historians have blamed Polignac and his colleagues for criminal negligence in embarking upon an obviously unpopular *coup d'état* without taking the elementary precaution of seeing that there were troops in and around Paris capable of dealing with resistance. No one who studies in detail the course of events in Paris during July and the

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evidence given at the subsequent trial of Charles X.'s ministers will deny that the suicidal incompetence of the Court and Cabinet was an important factor in destruction of the regime. But the creeping paralysis from which Charles X.'s government suffered was the symptom, not the cause, of its disease. The cause of their paralysis was that they had the whole of Paris, the whole of France, solidly opposed to them, and that they could not in fact rely upon the armed forces. This brings me back to the two other elementary things which, as I said above, were essential for stabilizing the counter-revolution in 1824.

These two conditions precedent for successful despotism were the conciliation of some classes or sections of the population and the creation of armed forces upon which the government could depend for intimidating the unconciliated. The previous pages have shown that all the three conditions mentioned by me—*i.e.* abolition of parliamentary government, conciliation, and adequate and reliable force—could not really be considered in isolation, for they were closely interconnected. The reason why in 1824 and again in 1828 Charles and his advisers did not dare to take the final step and abolish parliamentary government was that they knew that they had no one on their side, not even the army, and that it was almost certain that a *coup d'état* would end in a successful revolution. The political incompetence of the regime was shown in the way in which they dealt with this situation rather than in the final fiasco. They appeared blind to the obvious fact that, if they were not strong enough to do away with all the organs of government in which public opinion

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could express itself politically, it was the more necessary to conciliate some sections of public opinion. On the contrary, the government's policy seemed to be influenced continually by the ignorance and arrogance of *émigré* aristocrats and the secret intrigues of religious fanatics, so that, instead of conciliating opponents, it was perpetually alienating a new section of its own and the monarchy's supporters. Chateaubriand, himself an Ultra-Royalist, was treated with the greatest indignity; Royer-Collard, to whose loyalty and devotion the Bourbons had owed a great deal during the Napoleonic period, received the treatment which a haughty duke might feel appropriate for a drunken stable-boy. With tact and management, moderate aristocrats and landowners might easily have been turned into strong supporters of the regime; a little political common sense and restraint in gathering in the spoils of power would have prevented the upper ranks of the bourgeoisie going into opposition; even a moderately decent government might have conciliated large sections of the lower bourgeoisie, the peasants, and the working classes. None of these things were done; between 1824 and 1830 the government was weak where it ought to have been strong—in dealing with its own extremists, while it was violent where it should have been conciliatory—in dealing with its moderate supporters, moderate opponents, and that vast mass of ordinary persons who at the beginning of the nineteenth century were not politically conscious. In consequence, when it finally took the plunge and challenged the bourgeoisie, it had no one on its side but a handful of ignorant and incompetent reactionaries.

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There remained the problem of force. A government which is without supporters in the country and is tied to a legislature upon which it cannot rely has only one resource if it is to continue to govern: it must possess an army and police force strong enough and loyal enough to make resistance improbable or impossible. When Charles and Polignac finally challenged the constitutionalists and liberals by the Ordinances of 1830, they revealed the complete nakedness and weakness of the government. The ultimate instrument of power—force—was not in their hands: they had no army and no police force. A handful of unfortunate Swiss, trapped and massacred, and a few regiments of royal guards officered by aristocrats, proved to be the entire force which the would-be authoritarian government had built up in six years and which it could rely upon to repress 90 per cent of the population. This ludicrous position may at first sight appear to be the supreme example of Ultra-Royalist incompetence. As a matter of fact, the one sphere in which they did show some appreciation of their position was that of the army. Before the accession of Charles X., Villèle took a step which from the point of view of the regime was in the right direction. The sending of an expedition to Spain was a good strategical move. It might well have conciliated the army and turned it into a loyal instrument of the Crown, and a military success might well have given the Restoration that tinge of glory which was so essential if it was ever to become popular. The expedition was stage-managed with some skill. The most popular of the Bourbons, the Duc d'Angoulême, was put at its head, but the generals who served under him were the generals

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of the old army. The victories were not very glorious or very bloody, but they were victories; the French army defeated the liberals and liberalism, captured Madrid, and reinstated as an absolute despot Ferdinand VII., one of the worst kings and most despicable men who have ever sat on or lost a throne.

When the victorious duke and his army returned to Paris at the end of 1823, the fêtes, processions, banquets, and illuminations seemed to rouse such real popular enthusiasm that it looked as though the move might be successful as a first step to winning for the regime both force and popularity. But somehow or other the popularity fizzled out and the force was never consolidated. There were various reasons for this. The political stupidity of the human race is enormous, but there are limits to it, even in their stupidity about kings and princes. Ferdinand VII. of Spain was just about the limit. His behaviour ensured that no enthusiasm for the glory of having put him back on his throne could last very long, and when a French army had to be left in Spain in order to ensure that he remained on it, the glory and enthusiasm rapidly faded except among the few Ultra-Royalists who appreciated Ferdinand. At the same time the regime failed to follow up its success and effect a permanent conciliation of the army. There was a financial scandal connected with the provisioning of the army which caused endless recriminations in which even the Duc d'Angoulême was involved. There was invincible hostility between *émigré* officers and the officers of the old army. In consequence, the army was in 1829 a no more reliable instrument of internal power for the government and the king than it had been in 1824.

Polignac, as soon as he came to power, decided to try the classical expedient of rulers who are faced with the probability of having to suppress discontented and rebellious subjects with troops whose loyalty is doubtful—a foreign adventure. But it was too late, as the wily Talleyrand remarked as soon as he heard of the Algerian expedition. The glory of defeating the Bey of Algiers was insufficient to distract the attention of the Paris populace from its grievances or to induce the army to support an Ultra-Royalist king and Cabinet against the people of France.

The government failed even more disastrously with the garde nationale than with the army. It was, as was noticed above, a thoroughly bourgeois force, and it might, if properly handled, have been converted into a useful instrument of authoritarian government, particularly in Paris. During the Restoration the industrial and capitalist system in France was in a far more primitive stage than it was in England and there was nothing in the economic structure which would have made it impossible, or even difficult, to attach the lower and middle ranks of the bourgeoisie to a semi-feudal, monarchical, authoritarian government, provided that the reaction went about its work with a little astuteness and moderation. The *émigré* Ultra-Royalists, however, did not know the meaning of these two qualities; they were extremists *par excellence*, and by their social, political economic, and religious behaviour they succeeded in exasperating every class, including even their own. The exasperation of the lower and middle bourgeoisie had become by 1827 pretty violent and was therefore naturally reflected in the ranks of the garde nationale. The folly of the

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government allowed it open expression. They had introduced a drastic new press law and had been compelled to withdraw it by a revolt against them in the Chamber of Peers. The Paris bourgeoisie flocked out into the streets to celebrate the defeat of the government with bonfires and fireworks. When a few days later Charles chose this unfortunate moment to review his garde nationale, that force showed its feelings by greeting him with cries of "À bas les ministres! à bas Villèle!" The answer of the regime was the disbandment of the garde, and the government's forces "for maintaining order" were thus reduced to the gendarmerie and a doubtful army.

When the trial of strength between the government and people came in 1830, the inadequacy and disloyalty of these forces led to the immediate collapse of the throne, the government, and the regime. Charles X. abdicated and embarked with the Bourbon princes and princesses on an American boat, escorted by two English men-of-war, from Cherbourg to Portsmouth; the ministers fled or were arrested; *émigrés* re-emigrated; the *ancien régime* finally departed while the people of Paris, singing the "Marseillaise" in front of the open windows of the Palais-Royal, made such a noise that it was almost impossible for Louis-Philippe, Duc d'Orléans, to hear the deputation from the Chamber of Deputies offering him the throne of France.¹ For if the *ancien régime* had finally departed by way of Cherbourg to

¹ Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vol. vi. p. 339: "Les clameurs, le chant de la *Marseillaise* surtout, retentissaient jusque dans les salons et rendaient fort difficile de s'entendre. On n'osait fermer les fenêtres, de peur de mécontenter le peuple."

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Portsmouth, a new regime had at the same moment entered through the open windows of the Palais-Royal, which the new king and his supporters were afraid to close for fear of annoying "the people". It was a bourgeois regime, and at the moment, with crowds singing the "Marseillaise" in the streets of Paris, the bourgeoisie were anxious not to annoy "the people". It was the people of Paris, often led by officers of the old army, who had made the revolution, had shed their blood on the barricades, and had driven back the royalist troops sent to quell the insurrection. Many of their leaders were, like the everlasting La Fayette, republicans. But the bourgeoisie and its leaders had no taste for either revolution or republicanism. As soon as it was seen that the insurrection was serious, behind the scenes middle-class politicians and journalists began working for the restoration of "law and order".

The best way to put out a fire is to stifle it, to suffocate it, to deprive it of air; even cotton-wool is effective provided you have enough of it. It is the same with revolutions. The July Revolution was skillfully extinguished by suffocation; it was stifled by talk, Louis-Philippe, and constitutional monarchy. The process is worth a brief examination. The insurrection broke out on July 27. On July 28 there was heavy fighting between royalist troops and the insurgents. On July 29 the insurgents captured the Louvre and the Tuileries and the troops evacuated Paris. La Fayette and the leaders of the insurrection established themselves as a kind of provisional government at the Hôtel-de-Ville. The Hôtel-de-Ville threatened republicanism, or at any rate democracy. Meanwhile the bourgeois deputies and

leaders, according to their sects and pacts, were meeting, some in the house of the banker Casimir-Périer, others in the house of the banker Laffitte. They were not all of the same mind, but none of them liked the revolution or democracy or republicanism. Up to July 29 events were continually getting ahead of them, for they were still negotiating with Charles X. On July 30, however, the bourgeoisie began to catch up with events. The danger, they saw, lay in the Hôtel-de-Ville; somehow or other the control of affairs must be taken out of the hands of La Fayette and his republicans and democrats.

It was Lafitte and his group who found the solution in the bourgeois monarchy and Louis-Philippe. It was a brilliant and lightning coup, for on July 29 republicanism was spreading throughout Paris, by the evening of August 1 Louis-Philippe was Lieutenant-General and had been embraced in public by General La Fayette on the balcony of the Hôtel-de-Ville, and within a week the Lieutenant-General had become king of France. In the record of this middle-class victory a name, new to the history of France, emerges with considerable *éclat*, that of the bourgeois lawyer from Aix-en-Provence, now editor of the *National*, which Lafitte financed—Adolphe Thiers. It is a name which will be heard again twenty years later when the working classes of Paris made the revolution of 1848, and again twenty years later when the bourgeoisie, with M. Thiers still at their head, took their terrible vengeance upon the workers and their Commune and founded at last the bourgeois republic, the “*République conservatrice*”.

In 1830 Lafitte, Thiers, and the *National* were responsible for bringing Louis-Philippe into the

dangerous limelight of mid-revolution. Lafitte began it on July 30; the more "liberal" bourgeois deputies were now meeting informally at his house. It was clear that events had already outstripped their original idea of keeping a repentant Charles upon the throne, firmly attached by the revolution to a constitution, the Charter, and a Casimir-Périer ministry. The revolution had gone so far, the temper of the streets and the Hôtel-de-Ville was such that there could be no place in the future for a Bourbon. The deputies were dismayed by the news of the rapid spread of republican feeling throughout Paris. Lafitte and Thiers made the most of the news and the dismay. They put forward the Duc d'Orléans as the alternative to republicanism, which to the bourgeoisie meant mob rule and anarchy. And since the frightened deputies had themselves no other or better alternative to propose, there was a rapid conversion among them from Bourbonism to Orleanism. The conversion was indeed so rapid and the danger from the Hôtel-de-Ville so great that within about twenty-four hours Lafitte considered that the moment had come to call a regular meeting of the deputies. They met in the Salle des Séances with Lafitte himself in the chair, and after a short debate decided to offer the post of Lieutenant-General of France to the Duc d'Orléans.

The terms of the offer and of its acceptance were contained in the proclamation¹ made to the citizens

¹ It was drafted by Guizot, Villemain, Bérard, and Benjamin Constant. It was clear from the terms of this proclamation, as Pasquier remarks, that the deputies were in fact asking the Duc d'Orléans to become, not a lieutenant-general, but a king, for the constitutional reforms which he was required to guarantee could be effected only by a king.

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of Paris by the deputies explaining why they had offered the post of Lieutenant-General to Louis-Philippe, and in the declaration of the two Chambers, made on August 7, when they offered him the Crown, and accepted by him, when he took the oath as king. The terms, a compromise between the bourgeoisie's opposition to absolutism and fear of republicanism and democracy, reveal the social psychology of those middle-class politicians of the Centre and "liberal" Left who had been driven out of public life by the Ultra-Royalists; they formed the basis of the new political regime. In the first place, the abdication of Charles X. and of his house was not accepted, it was imposed; "considering", said the declaration, "that, as a result of this violation and of the heroic resistance of the citizens of Paris, the king Charles X., His Royal Highness Louis-Antoine, Dauphin, and all members of the elder branch of the Royal House, at this moment are leaving French territory, the throne is declared vacant, in fact and in law. . . ." And the inevitable corollary was that the throne was not Louis-Philippe's of right, but was offered to him subject to conditions. This was clearly stated in the declaration which announced that "he [Louis-Philippe] will respect our rights, for he will hold his rights of us". This question, fundamental in the history of democracy, had been raised at the beginning of the Restoration: did Louis XVIII. return to the throne of France as of right or did he receive it at the hands of his subjects? And was the Charter an act of grace on the part of the monarch or the conditions on which his subjects offered him the throne? This question had not been clearly answered in 1815, though it

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had been in many men's minds. The senate, it will be remembered,¹ took its stand firmly on both horns of the dilemma by proclaiming that the French people had *freely* summoned to the throne of France their legitimate king and the other members of the House of Bourbon, *in their ancient order*, and the wording of Louis's acceptance of the Charter, over which there was considerable controversy, left loopholes for absolutism or democracy. The Ultra-Royalists always maintained that Louis and Charles were kings solely by the grace of God, and that the Charter was simply an act of grace from one who was king by grace of God. In 1830 the question was answered explicitly in favour of democracy; Louis-Philippe was king by grace of M. Lafitte, M. Thiers, and the two Chambers; he held his throne and exercised his powers conditionally because they had been conferred upon him conditionally by the people, the people being identified in the Paris of 1830, as in the London of 1832, with the bourgeoisie.

The other guarantees which in his oath Louis-Philippe swore to observe were intended to steer the constitution towards a constitutional monarchy, responsible government, and civil liberties, while avoiding the dangers of full democracy. Louis-Philippe swore to observe "*la Charte modifié*", while the Hôtel-de-Ville, the democrats, and the people in the streets were assured by the proclamation that "*la Charte sera désormais une vérité*". The chief revision of the Charter was the suppression of Article XIV., which gave the king emergency powers of making ordinances and the use of which

¹ See p. 163.

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by Charles X. had led to the revolution. This gave to the Chambers a dominant position with regard to legislation, and their powers were still further widened by grant of the right to initiate legislation which they had not possessed under the Restoration. The censorship was abolished and the Church "disestablished". The upper house became an elected instead of an hereditary Chamber, a "reform"¹ which went much too far for the liking of many constitutionalists, *e.g.* Pasquier. Promises, tinged with democracy, were made regarding trial by jury, the franchise, and education. Finally, the garde nationale, that curious *garde du corps* of the bourgeoisie, which Charles had disbanded and which had fought and beaten his troops in the streets of Paris, was reconstituted under the leadership of their leader in the revolution, La Fayette.

On page 217 I quoted a passage from Guizot in which he describes how during the three days August 5, 6, and 7, when these conditions and guarantees were being discussed by the Chambers, he often joined the groups of middle-class young men who were themselves having violent discussions in the garden and courtyard of the Chamber. "The subjects which we discussed," he says,

were the monarchy, the two Chamber system, the electoral system, a hereditary peerage. And it was there that I saw the extent to which the axioms and projects of republicanism had their roots in this generation, bred in the secret

¹ The reform was not actually made until later, but the question of an elected or hereditary Upper Chamber had been fought out in the Commission which drew up the guarantees, and though no definite decision was taken, it was felt that in fact the hereditary principle would have to be abandoned.

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societies and conspiracies. The monarchy was for them only a concession unwillingly granted, nominal and temporary, which they looked to sell at a high price. At no price would they accept a hereditary peerage or any element inconsistent with pure democracy.

Guizot's idea of "pure" democracy was somewhat curious; the democracy of the young lawyers, students, and journalists who argued so passionately in the August garden a hundred years ago was probably not quite so pure as he imagined or represented it. Yet fundamentally he was right; they were discussing what they thought they were discussing, just as they had fought for what they thought they were fighting for—the place of democracy—liberty and equality in human society—and the methods of safeguarding it. The social struggle which persisted throughout the Restoration and flared up into the fighting of the July Revolution was a political struggle; on the one side was a small class demanding privilege and the arbitrary use of political power, on the other those who demanded government through public discussion, popular control of political power, and constitutional safeguards of liberty and equality. It was the same struggle which we have seen taking place in Britain in the Reform crisis, and in both places, once the struggle was joined, it was complicated and confused by the same division of forces, interests, and classes. In Britain, where the capitalist economic system was much further developed than in France, that force which I have called the communal psychology of capitalism immediately rose to the surface and began to work openly and powerfully. The Duke of Wellington and Peel, Lord Wharncliffe and Lord

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Melbourne, Hobhouse and Greville, Cobbett, Hunt, and the mole-like tailor, Place—all saw at once the economic dilemma of political democracy when it was proposed that universal suffrage should solve the problem: "How we may best make the people's House of Parliament represent the people". The House of Commons and the reformers, being middle class, solved the problem by the fraudulent fiction that the middle class were the people; they passed the Reform Act and the rule of the bourgeoisie in Britain had begun.

Things were a little different in France; but beneath the surface were working the same psychology and the same economic forces, and they produced the same results. Economically France was in a primitive stage of industrialization, and the economic dilemma of democracy did not immediately rise to the surface as it did in Britain. But it was really the same dilemma, though they saw it in a different form and gave it a different name, which confronted the middle-class deputies who made Louis-Philippe king. Their communal and class psychology had been moulded in the matrix of the revolution of 1789, and when, in the last days of July 1830, they looked out of their windows into the streets of Paris, what they saw happening there was illuminated for them not by the magic light of class interests or the economic determination of history, but by the fires of the First Republic and the flames of their own fears. They saw that the king and the Ultra-Royalists, absolutism and feudalism, against which they themselves had fought for fifteen years, had been beaten. And they saw Paris in the hands of republicanism, of the common people led by La

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Fayette, the old republican of the old revolution. Republicanism meant for them the Terror, but it also meant, as Guizot shows, universal suffrage, and universal suffrage presented the bourgeoisie, on the road to democracy, with the same dilemma in Paris in 1830 as in London in 1832.

The bourgeois deputies, sitting in the Salle des Séances, were on the road to democracy; they wanted liberty, equality, and kings and governments subject to constitutional laws and governing in accordance with the will of the "people". But the "people" was, in their view, not the mob, not the common people, into whose hands republicanism with universal suffrage would give political power. That way lay anarchy, the destruction of property, and the Terror. In their view the "people" was—well, it was simply the bourgeoisie themselves. Thus as soon as the Bourbons fell and the spectre of a republic and universal suffrage raised its head, instantly and instinctively there arose among the bourgeoisie the "policy of resistance", as Guizot called it, which dominated French politics from 1830 to 1848. The policy of resistance implied the semi-democratic, parliamentary rule of the bourgeoisie, strong enough to resist reaction on the Right and republicanism and universal suffrage on the Left. Lafitte won over the bourgeois leaders, Guizot, Pasquier, Molé, Casimir-Périer, Broglie, and the rest of them, so rapidly to Orleanism, because in the menacing situation he persuaded them that Louis-Philippe, the "liberal" prince who had fought in the revolutionary army at Jemappes and had learnt in exile all the virtues of a good bourgeois, was the only available instrument for

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getting power out of the hands of the revolutionaries of the Hôtel-de-Ville into their own.

Lafitte was right; the plan worked. The revolutionaries of the Hôtel-de-Ville fell into the trap and the danger of a republic faded out of the streets of Paris. The ease with which Louis-Philippe and the bourgeois deputies won their victory was due to the character of the republican leaders, particularly La Fayette, and the lack of political and economic understanding in the French masses. La Fayette was a romantic who lived on the memories of 1789; his mind was theatrical and a revolution was for him a stage revolution in which he could play the leading part. He was the more dangerous to his own side and the more easily duped by the other, because, unlike most revolutionaries of this kind, he was not a charlatan or a crook, but a singularly honest and simple man. La Fayette was duped himself and duped his followers with the happy idea that, if they had Louis-Philippe on the throne, they would get the best of both worlds, the blessings of a monarchy united to the advantages of a republic — “un throne populaire”, as he put it, “entouré d’institutions républicaines”. His followers followed him because their republicanism was really only skin-deep. It was emotional, not intellectual, and they had accepted it from the past; it was not connected with their sense of present political desires or economic needs. It was a slogan which meant something, but something which was not very much or very clear. On July 31, when the Duc d’Orléans courageously took his political life in his hands and went to the Hôtel-de-Ville, it was noticed that the nearer he got to his destination the more coldly he

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was received by the crowd, and that the cry of "Vive le Duc d'Orléans!" gave place to cries of "Vive la république!" and "Vive La Fayette!" But when the people saw La Fayette embrace the duke, the cry of "Vive la république!" was stilled. The rule of the bourgeoisie in France had begun.

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