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THERE ARE NO SOUTH AFRICANS

by
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I

THERE ARE NO SOUTH AFRICANS

CHAPTER I

I

THE worst of South Africa is that you never come across a South African. There is no surprise in the discovery that the United States produces Americans ; or Siam, Siamese ; or Lapland, Laplanders. The naturalness of so natural a condition does not strike one until its exception appears. The exception is South Africa.

You may travel the thousand miles of garden route from Cape Town to Durban, and thence along the white-lined road fringed with white-washed boulders to guide you through the night ; or you may leave the highways that radiate from the City of Gold ; and never, at petrol bowser, hospitable farm, the ubiquitous tea room, or gaunt hotel, meet a South African. Turn to any of the newspapers—from the conservative *Cape Times* of Cape Town to *Die Burger* of the same city, but not of the same conservatism ; from *Die Volksblad* of Bloemfontein to the East London *Daily Dispatch*—and you will soon be persuaded, by the number of editorial exhortations to their readers to think and act as South Africans, of abundant proof of the rarity. The term South African has no significance except outside South Africa, and only there because of a widespread ignorance—even among those in America and England who live on the dividends from the gold-mines of the Witwatersrand.

CHAPTER I

I

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This is true to-day, as it has been true since Commissioner General Hendrik Adriaan van Rhee de tot Drakenstein arrived at the Cape, as the representative of the Dutch East India Company, and left instructions that "the aim of the Company—the object of all its activities at the Cape is the assured possession and mastery of the same." "The Cape of Good Hope," he wrote, "must be considered a frontier and the Castle a place, which, being in daily danger of attack by an enemy, depends entirely on its own resources and strength. The greatest advantage the Company expects in this country," he continued, "consists in planting a good colony of our nation, that by the increase in their numbers they may become so powerful that they may keep out all enemies and assure its peaceful possession to the Company, and enable the Company as ruler, to draw from their prosperity enough in return to pay for her garrison."

Even the Dutch East India Company seems to have intended that there should be no South Africans !

But if there are no South Africans, pure and simple, there are many "qualified" South Africans. The after-dinner speaker, and he who is called upon to address some uplifting remarks to a mixed gathering, will talk about "good" South Africans, their duties, responsibilities, and to a less extent, their privileges. The qualifying adjective occurs in newspaper editorials when editors are looking ahead to the future or meandering about a racial Utopia. I have seen it most often in the bilingual *Forum*, a weekly journal established to forward the liberalism of Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr. In narrow political circles the "good" disappears, and is superseded by

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sharper distinctions. In political speeches no mention is made of South Africans, but more than enough of "British Jingo," the "loyal Dutch," the Afrikaners, our friends the English-speaking South Africans, or the other section of the community, the Afrikaans-speaking people. There are "extreme" Afrikaners, or "extreme" Britishers; moderates of both—Afrikaans sprekende medeburgers and Engels sprekende medeburgers, and a score of other variants.

II

Even these distinctions are but loose descriptions that frequently change their meaning on the lips of different people. There was a time, five years ago, when the opprobrious term "British Jingo" was confined to a few people in Durban and East London who made up the devolution movement of Natal, and who later found a doubtful political sanctuary under the wing of Colonel Stallard in the Dominion Party. Nowadays all those of British descent who support the war policy of Field-Marshal Smuts are "British Jingo." Field-Marshal Smuts is the "arch Jingo" of the lot—"C. J. Rhodes redivivus," according to Dr. Malan; while Dr. Malan and his party of Nationalists are "Malanaziz" in the eyes of the Jingo" and in the ink of the "Jingo" press.

In the more tolerant interludes, rare periods of quietude, the distinctions are confined to Afrikaans-speaking South Africans and English-speaking South Africans. An Afrikaans-speaking South African does not of course signify a citizen who can only

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speaking Afrikaans, it signifies one who is of Afrikaner descent. The English-speaking South African is one descended from British stock, and may be Scottish, Irish, Welsh, or English, or a product of all four. But English-speaking South Africans are themselves to be classified in terms of residence in the country. The third, fourth, and fifth generation of the early "English" settlers are politically more aware of the South African conflict than are recent arrivals. No additions in any number have been made to the Afrikaner stock. It has not drawn upon a mother country for almost two centuries, and has, in consequence, developed the characteristics of a separate people.

On the other hand the English-speaking peoples have enjoyed a replenishment which has kept alive a "feeling" for the Mother Country strongly affecting political attitudes. English-speaking South Africans, even of the fourth generation, still speak of going "home" when they plan a visit to a Britain they have never seen. When they have taken it, they "come back"; they do not come "home." It is an attitude which illustrates in a homely fashion the nature of their allegiances.

Another striking feature of the English section is the wide gulf that exists between recent arrivals and what might be called the colonial or dominion British. The loyalty of the latter to "home," to Britain, even in that class where loyalty is only strongly emphasized in time of war, is as intense as that of the recent arrival is vague. The dominion British are ignorant of the dynamic movement of English politics—almost as ignorant as the average Englishman in England is of South African affairs. They view Britain from the top of Buckingham

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Palace, and weave into it and about it a fabric of history and the past bereft of its social conflicts. They are, in fact, as the common gibe has it, "more English than the English." Partly because of this, and partly because of inherent fears of losing their identity, they are the more ardently disposed to an unreal conception of England, English life, and the English connection.

At the same time the recent settler is individually suspect. He is not slow to remind the dominion South African of a certain superiority, and makes free with knowledge that irritates his dominion fellow. South Africa is a first-class country for second-class brains. Anybody who comes here can make a living, and make not only a living: he can, and does, enjoy a social status which the possession of a native, coloured, or Indian servant or two bestows. The woman who would be doing her own washing-up in some suburban semi-detached house in England need not, and scarcely ever does, soil her fingers in South Africa. The new-comer to this sort of life, particularly from the middle classes in England, rapidly gives himself (and certainly herself) social airs, steps on the social ladder, and is generally frowned upon by the third and fourth generation. The latter do not like to be told how they do things in England. At the same time their eyes are turned politically to the England they don't want to know about save in war-time.

There is another type of Englishman who settles here. It is the retired civil servant or military officer from more distant parts of the British Empire. As a class they are so patriotic that they refuse to pay peace-time income tax in England, or

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to live under its rising Socialism and its glowering skies. They prefer the more colonial atmosphere supplied by the South African sun. Steeped in the conservatism of the services, they with others become part of the political machine, and use their franchise in increasing the disproportion of wealth and influence under which the Afrikaans-speaking section writhes.

It is a small matter, but of the most powerful consequence. It proceeds from year to year to force the Afrikaner into a social inferiority which inevitably irritates the suspicious vigilance of his national self-regard. He watches the movement with heightening suspicion, rising to hatred; for he is aware that the hope of complete independence declines with every addition to the English-speaking vote.

It is not to be supposed that all Afrikaners are conscious of this social and political influence. In the leadership of the universities and in the narrow circles of intellectual Afrikanerdom, however, there is a feeling of frustration in the presence of a dominant culture. More and more Britishers arrive who have no intention, and would find it difficult if they had, to make South Africa their home in the spiritual sense; to care for the things which form the life and culture of Afrikanerdom; to become, in fact, South Africans. It may not strike the imagination of the "Britisher," for instance, that his refusal to learn a language, Afrikaans, is a matter of any importance. To the Afrikaner it is, for only in it and through similar "sacrifices" can the Britisher prove his concern for South Africa. So long as he refuses to show active sympathy with the Afrikaner tradition he

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cannot complain that the Afrikaner suspects his motives and question his loyalties.

What then is the position? The Afrikaner sees the English-speaking South African using South Africa as an appendage to the homeland England. As a result he withdraws into his shell. He contracts his interests to include only those of his own race. He takes the models of English institutions and copies them for his own, and into his imitations he projects a vehement allegiance that is only to be seen in races of small numerical strength sensitively conscious of past defeats. A sentiment of inferiority, whether justified or not, leads rapidly to racial animosity. Among Afrikaners this sentiment takes the form of an extreme "touchiness," which during times of crisis makes co-operation extremely difficult. Among the British every attempt of the Afrikaner to remember, with Cicero, that nothing becomes a nation so much as that which is its very own, is received with suspicion.

III

Feelings are so tender on both sides of the racial fence that we find growing up in political and social life what might be called "the gesture attitude." It becomes a gesture, a good gesture, to consider the feelings of the Afrikaner. A year or two ago Afrikanerdom celebrated the centenary of the Great Trek by rejoicings throughout the country. It was a "gesture" for the English-speaking people to take part in them. English-speaking interest in this matter was largely confined to fears that the celebrations would encourage and

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accentuate the narrower nationalism of Afrikanerdom. The gesture principle gave the event a superficial national quality, though in stern reality the centenary of the Trek was an expression of racial urge as complete as the Trek itself. Obviously, if gestures of goodwill are necessary between two peoples the degree of mutual understanding is not very high. Even in social communications the gesture continues to hide fundamental and striking differences—of character, culture, and political outlook. On the bigger issues the divergences are there for all to see. The Afrikaner is by nature a negrophobe ; or, shall we say, that of the two the Afrikaner is the negrophobe and the Englishman the negrophil. He has a contemptuous disregard for “uplift,” and for any policy that smacks of social progress likely to give the Native hope of equality with the White man in industry or social life. The Englishman’s official attitude is a sympathetic concern for the welfare of natives, though he is by no means certain in what direction the Natives’ true interests lie. The difference between the two is less than is generally imagined. If the Englishman has a greater regard for the rights of the Native, both he and the Afrikaner have no compunction about treating the Native as an inferior being. These attitudes emerge whenever their own interests are at stake, and this, after all, is the test of their concern for others.

The Afrikaner is but now freeing himself from long attachment to the soil, the Cinderella of industries ; the Britisher dominates industry and commerce. The Afrikaner’s tradition leans on the principle of leadership, a natural tendency to be led within a military organization resulting from

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the tradition of the early Burgher Commando. The Britisher prefers the looser discipline of a democracy. The Afrikaner is striving towards a goal, the Britisher is resting on the laurels of a goal reached by his forbears. The one seeks to cast off his inferiority; the other assumes the superiority that his forbears won for him. The one has no sense of humour, or, if he has, it is the sense of humour born of bitterness; the other has all the sense of humour that long superiority has conferred. The one is a Conservative, a reactionary through and through; the other is a Liberal to all save to those who are in a position to challenge his economic interests, when, as in the case of Asiatic competition in commerce, he becomes intolerant and reactionary. The Old Testament stands Bible to the Afrikaner; his nation has been described as the modern counterpart of an Old Testament tribe. The New Testament would stand Bible to the Britisher were there no British constitution to stand in its stead.

The centre of all Afrikaner spiritual and social life is the Dutch Reformed Church. In this matter alone there are wide gulfs separating the two peoples. The degree and extent of its influence cannot be measured. Totally unlike the power of the English Church, it is more directly in touch with the masses of the people. It is the nursery of government; the predikant makes politics his religion and religion his politics, and each is a local Moses divining the will of God in the politics of his inclination. The prelates of the Church of England influence politics by diplomatic manoeuvre behind the scenes. The predikants of the Dutch Reformed Church are often the most violent ex-

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ponents of direct action. The pulpit becomes their political platform in the coincidence of politics and religion, the twin impulses of Afrikaner life. In so far as the Afrikaner has only recently emerged from the rural surroundings of the veld, the greater isolation has emphasized the power of the predikant. Thus the difference in attitude of the two peoples towards religion and politics can in part be traced to what some would regard as the tap root of the "Racial" problem in South Africa; the difference between town and country—differences primarily economic but carrying with them important social and psychological corollaries.

At the same time the broad coincidence has served to throw into sharp relief the essential wealth of the town and the comparative poverty of the country. Thus, the conflict between the town and the country, as a result of the economic tendencies in industry, is related once more to the conflict between Afrikaner and Britisher. When the Government takes steps to stem the flow of population from the country to the town, or subsidizes the farming industry by debt redemptions and control of prices, the protests of urban dwellers assume a racial tinge, adding to the accumulation of factors of a separatist nature.

IV

The Union population is two million, made up of 60 per cent. Afrikaans and 40 per cent. British, and is distributed in three areas. The coastal ports, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, and Durban, are growing centres of trade and

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industry. Each of them has its inland towns, engaged in a variety of agricultural pursuits and acting as secondary markets for these centres. Cape Town, as is to be expected of the mother city, has a vast network of such places. Port Elizabeth has its Uitenhage, East London its Kingwilliamstown, Durban its Pietermaritzburg. Along this inland fringe, which varies in depth and in the kind of production, has grown up a population relying for its economy upon the outlets of the ports, upon distributing activities, and upon Government largesse.

The body of the country beyond the fringe is distributed in veld and mountain, with a few inland towns distant apart, dependent for their existence upon administrative activities, agricultural products, or local industries. From the coast inland the population thins out over the veld and karroo, to become more dense as the great Witwatersrand is reached—with gold as wealth, its centre Johannesburg, and its thriving Rand towns along the reef. Even as the huge mountain ranges fringing the coast stood obstacle to communications in the past, and made for an isolation that determined the political character of the people, so the forces that drive the distribution of population have an essential significance in the political conflict. The country's settled life is scarcely a century old. Johannesburg is a mere youngster among cities, thriving though it is. Cape Town approaches middle-age after spending most of its youth as a refreshment station of the Dutch East India Company. For the rest, only a few towns deserve the name. Durban is so new that it complains of growing pains. Maritzburg held its centenary a year or two ago, and is

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busy fighting its reputation as Sleepy Hollow ; Bloemfontein's history is not much further away than the naughty 'nineties, save in its jealous regard for the proprieties ; Port Elizabeth is bursting its first pair of stays ; East London has just reached the age to need a pair ; while Pretoria, the old capital of the Transvaal, fans itself in the atmosphere of Government administration and jacaranda trees.

In the diversity of interests, resources, and wealth, the Afrikaners' attachment to the soil and the Britishers' aptitude and preference for commerce and industry emphasize a division of labour, which, unlike the economic principles of Adam Smith, is a serious obstacle to social contentment. When the Afrikaner of the veld steps off the stoep to seek his fortune in activities other than farming he turns to the Civil Service and politics, for both of which he has a natural ability. The Englishman on the other hand avoids or ignores politics almost altogether, prefers commerce and industry, and only enters the Civil Service if his economic background demands it.

Control of these respective orders which are so obvious a condition and so clear a result of the tradition of the two peoples and the history that has gone to their making is vital. Some of the political and economic consequences are visible in the presence of 400,000 Poor Whites, over 90 per cent. of which are of Afrikaner descent and who live permanently on a subsistence level. To this great problem—related as it is to the competition of a Black labour force of 8,000,000, a "Coloured" one of 7,500,000, and an Indian community of 250,000—the mind of the European turns when

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it can forget its greatest obsession, the conflict between Boer and Briton.

V

Politically its results may be seen in the difficulties of sound trades union organization. The Afrikaner and the British, already divided on racial lines, do not easily take to trades union co-operation. Each tends to develop his own associations within the same trade or occupation, though there are one or two notable exceptions full of hope for the future. Unlike his English-speaking fellow in this respect, the Afrikaner worker sees his salvation in membership of a political party, or in Afrikaner "Culture" movements, of which there are several. He is not a born trades unionist, and knows little or nothing of the meaning of Socialism. His English-speaking fellow is not much better placed. The close political connection between trades unions and the Labour Party, so marked a feature of English politics, is almost entirely absent in South Africa. Trades unionism is only now being resolved in terms of co-operation between the two races, and chiefly as a result of the growing fear that the Black man in his teeming thousands will press hardly upon the European standard of living. The most stringent regulations are therefore in force to retard the entry of non-Europeans into industry, save in employment in which the European considers himself too superior to engage. Labour, then, has two great problems—the European racial issue that tends to make the Afrikaner worker choose his political party interest in preference to

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the economic advantages accruing from co-operation with his English-speaking fellow in trades unions, and the competition of the non-European. The wages of the European, to be sure, have been high enough to militate against the need for trades unions, but, in high or low, the racial-political division is the determining factor.

If in South Africa racial difference has hindered the development of trades unionism, it has revealed its worst aspect in the sphere of education. There are two official languages. The child of the Afrikaner is educated in an Afrikaans-medium school, the child of the Englishman in an English-medium school. The former learns English too often from an Afrikaans-speaking teacher; the latter, Afrikaans too often from an English-speaking teacher. Both these teachers are supposed to be bilingual, proficient in the teaching of the second language. Both of them are, as a rule, proficient in the mechanics of a "foreign" language, but are almost totally unlearned in language as a cultural activity. The educational system merely accentuates the differences already too well established in the home. The consciousness of racial difference, even of the ends to be achieved, is thus settled in early youth and can seldom be erased from the mind. Private schools emphasize what the State schools establish. The public school system, though it has provided some fine institutions, recruits its teaching staff mainly from England, giving the South African public school an English bias rather than a South African character. To each section the other official language is taught as a "foreign" language, a language of political importance, and of economic necessity. Bilingualism is commoner

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among Afrikaners than among Britishers. English, after all, is a world language of commerce and culture. Afrikaans has no meaning in world affairs and is seldom heard beyond the confines of the country.

Youth movements take on the same separatist complexion. The Boy Scout movement is essentially English. Its Afrikaner counterpart is an organization called the Voortrekkers. Much of the inter-college activity of the Universities possesses features of superficial South Africanism. They will not bear strict examination. One example will suffice. At one congress of the National Union of South African Students, the debating competition was held to decide who should represent the Universities on a European tour. The first competitor, beginning her speech in her mother tongue, Afrikaans, was requested by one of the judges, himself a judge of the Supreme Court, to address the house in English. He could not speak Afrikaans, and, had he been able to do so, it is doubtful whether he could have assessed the finer points upon which the decision depended.

These things make for separateness. The English youth who fails to obtain an appointment before an Afrikaans official, or because of non-proficiency in the Afrikaans language, blames the fact that he is English. Even the Public Service Commission, instituted as an impartial authority, does not escape criticisms, many of them admittedly having little justification. These are not extreme examples of social and individual attitudes. Well disposed people on both sides are conscious of individual difficulties. To a letter in which I expressed regret that the 'conflict of September

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1939 might result in the severance of our former friendly relations, Mr. Pirow, ex-Minister of Defence, replied significantly, "During ten years of ministerial work there is not an Englishman who can accuse me of not giving him a fair deal." In a sentence Mr. Pirow expressed a peculiar dilemma of South Africans. It was expected that he would always give the Afrikaner a fair deal. He took credit that he had always given the Englishman the same !

What we have in politics and trades unionism and in education appears in social institutions. Attempts have been made to bring the separate elements together in a variety of ways. In those social communications—music, art, and literature—where, it would be imagined, some common platform might be discovered, only partial success has attended a sincere effort. The Sons of England, the Caledonian Society, have their fellows in the Afrikaner Klub. The New Guard, a secret society of virulent British complexion fashioned on the sentiments of the "Up Guards and at 'em," faces its opposite number, the Handhaversbond or the Ossewa Brandwag, in suspicious and secret preparation, each the avowed enemy of the other.

The struggle of the Afrikaner people is essentially one for recognition as a nation, separate and distinct from any other. A matter of no consequence to others is to them of vital significance. If, for example, there is to be one flag for the country, he protests that it shall not be the Union Jack ; and the Britisher, even the one who never had an interest in a flag before, says it shall not be the Vierkleur. So we have two flags, the Union Jack and the Union flag. Wherever the Union

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Jack flies, next to it flies the Union flag, in the centre of which is a miniature Union Jack superimposed, like, as someone said, "a scab that will soon fall off."

As with the flag, so with the national anthem. Wherever "God Save the King" is sung, "Die Stem van Suid Afrika" must also be sung, save in places of entertainment, where, with his finer sense of what a national anthem should be, the Afrikaner insists that "Die Stem van Suid Afrika" shall not be sung. He prefers that it shall not be despoiled by the atmosphere of Hollywood films, but preserved for occasions that lend its song some inspiration and merit.

VI

A two-stream policy, then, marks the actions of the whole country. The two streams seldom converge, and upon that of war they diverge to polar limits and embrace the thoughts and actions of every individual—man, woman, and child. The whole is full of incidents which have served but to aggravate a condition. Time may prove the great healer; so far it has not been allowed to. It will take more than a century for a country so divided in people, so strident in its allegiances, so vivid in its differences, to fuse into a nation. From year to year in periodic regularity something happens—it may be a great war; it may be a great drought; it may be flood, or an invasion of locusts, or pestilence; or it may be a foolish speech of some Britisher or of some Afrikaner; it may be nothing more than a parochial dispute—any or all of them

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are sufficient to precipitate a national crisis, exacerbate feelings, and send the country into a racial conflict. Each time this happens nationhood recedes further and further into the background.

The two-stream policy—the dual make-up of the population, the Boer and the British—was thrown up into sharp relief on the issue of war. When General Hertzog, Prime Minister of the Fusion Government, stood up in Parliament hastily assembled in September 1939 to deal ostensibly with the prolongation of the Senate, but actually to discuss the issue of peace and war, it was the culminating act of a long course of historical development.

General Hertzog was the head of a coalition government. Under the name of Fusion, it represented a political compromise cast up in 1933 by serious economic and social conditions in the country. Necessity did for the country what statesmanship had failed to do in the extremes of party strife. At the time there were two parties. The South African Party, led by General Smuts, controlled the English-speaking vote and some of the moderate Afrikaner thought. Opposite it and in power was the Nationalist Party, faced with a gold problem and economic collapse. The position called for desperate remedies, even to the coming together of two individual personal enemies, Hertzog and Smuts, who had dominated the South African political scene since the death of General Botha in 1919. For reasons already apparent the coalition threw off two extreme elements. On the British side a few die-hards—distrustful of Smuts and the new programme, which included the right to make propaganda for

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republicanism—came together under Colonel Stallard and formed the Dominion Party. Most of its support came from the coastal areas of Natal, particularly from Durban, where the *Natal Mercury* pressed their issues over a predominantly English-speaking territory. At the other extreme Dr. Malan was joined by a somewhat larger number of nationalists and became leader of the official Opposition. Aside from these opposition elements stood a small Labour Party, represented by a half-dozen or so seats in the new parliament.

It is important at this stage to note the constitution of the Cabinet. Hertzog and Smuts, personal and political enemies over a quarter of a century, were Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively. No two men so widely dissimilar have ever pulled together in the same harness. The crisis that brought them together was not the crisis of war. That was to set them apart once more, a much more natural condition. It was their co-operation at this time that was unnatural to their political outlook and personal interests. Smuts, someone has said, is not a great politician among politicians, nor a great statesman among statesmen, nor a great philosopher among philosophers. This negative appreciation of him is surely high compliment. In politics no greatness is ever attributed to a rival, and philosophers are also known to be human. His wide interests and diffused abilities have inclined saints into paths of internationalism, a broad humanism merging the interests of his race and his country in the interests of the world.

Hertzog, on the other hand, far from being anything of an internationalist, is pre-eminently a

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Nationalist, seeking and finding his spiritual anchorages among his own people. The world may mourn Smuts, it will certainly honour him. It will be the impersonal honour in which a great man is held, who from his shoulders upward was higher than any of his people. A handful of Afrikaners will mourn Hertzog and bury him as they would a Moses.

In forming his Cabinet, General Hertzog had several factors to consider. First and foremost was the wish of General Smuts. As far as possible the Cabinet was to be a fifty-fifty arrangement. On his side General Smuts introduced his first lieutenant, Jan Hofmeyr. The Premier chose Pirow, Kemp, Havenga. Of these two groups the leading members were Hofmeyr and Pirow, two men at as great a variance in political outlook as their leaders—the former, an idealist preaching unity through diversity; the latter, realist and revolutionary—yet each a good colleague in Cabinet committee work. Nearer his Prime Minister in views and friendship was Mr. Havenga, an able minister of finance, essentially moderate in speech.

A Prime Minister of South Africa must not only satisfy the demands of the party, he is anxiously aware of the demands of the four provinces for representation in the Cabinet. It is a matter of expedience that as far as possible they should be represented. The Cape Province, the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and Natal merged their several interests in the Union of South Africa in 1910, not without serious qualms. Each is the jealous guardian of provincial rights and privileges, and each defends them, sometimes to the detriment of the whole country. In order to

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meet the importunity of the Provinces, then, it sometimes happens that ability is passed over. The balance between Afrikaner and British, between party and party, works broadly to ensure satisfaction; at the same time, insistence on this balance demonstrates once more the separatism that is the chief feature of South African politics.

The Hertzog-Smuts Fusion Ministry expressed the political character of the country. In ordinary circumstances a country possessing an executive so accurately reflecting the nature of the electorate might be congratulated. But the circumstances never have been ordinary in South Africa, unless one accepts the truism "there are no South Africans" as an indication of ordinariness. The circumstances, however, are manifestly extraordinary, and in their extraordinariness what would be desirable in so "ideal" a personnel is full of the most serious dangers.

The Cabinet was never a political entity. Its two leaders led two groups. In the evidence of events it is probable that men like Hofmeyr looked to Smuts for leadership rather than to Hertzog. They had little in common with the Prime Minister, even as Pirow had nothing in common with Smuts. The significance of this matter surpasses anything to be expected in a coalition government elsewhere. Purposes for which it had come into existence had been largely fulfilled when war threatened. At any rate it had not been constituted for the purpose of meeting the exigency of war. In the test of the war crisis the fundamental weakness of the executive was laid bare.

In 1933 the two generals had set about their purposes in the advocacy of a fifty-fifty policy,

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equality for Britisher and Afrikaner, his interests in public service and commerce, in education and in social life. "Fifty-fifty" was the slogan of the day. On the face of it, nothing could be fairer. Yet, paradoxically, this policy succeeds in doing the very thing that it sets out not to do. The very stress that was laid on the conciliation of both sections emphasized that two sections did indeed exist. An emphasis was laid upon the separateness of Afrikaner and English. While they talked of oneness—of the need for a fusion of interests, or in Mr. Hofmeyr's words, urged to seek "Unity through Diversity"—they laboured, fifty-fifty, the rights of both sections. When action was to be taken, the question that arose was not whether it was an action essential to the right ordering of government, valuable in itself, good for South Africa. The first issue to decide was whether it would irritate the Afrikaner, or annoy the Britisher. If it did either, then no matter how good it might be for the country it had better be dropped.

It was seldom the duty of statesmen to examine realistically the political consequences of the dual policy. Indeed it is difficult to see how otherwise they could have acted, even when close study would have provided reasons for political failure in the rising crisis of war. Cabinet Ministers were, no doubt, aware of the two-stream policy in the Cabinet, but, that they preferred to forget it is scarcely to be denied as the events are surveyed at this distance. The issue of peace or war was too dangerous a subject for Cabinet thought. As the importunity of different sections rose with the reading of the day's news, Government spokesmen met it by shifting its challenge to Parliament.

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"Parliament will decide." How Parliament was to decide no-one knew, not even members of the Cabinet. Neither the followers of Smuts nor the followers of Hertzog in the Cabinet dared grasp the nettle, fearful of precipitating a crisis before its inevitability was certain. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet, both camps of it, held to the faint hope that war would be averted and themselves saved from a decision that, either way, would split the country. If Chamberlain could pacify Europe in 1938, why not again in 1939? It was time enough, when he failed, to raise an issue before which the country might crash into civil war. If the crisis passed once more, then all was gained by silence. In the meantime let the slogan "Parliament will decide" be the answer to any importunate questioners of the Government's policy. If, on the other hand, the faint hope of peace crashed, each group in the Cabinet believed that the Prime Minister would decide in favour of its own inclination. On this issue the Government had no policy. There was, in fact, no policy because there was no Government; and there was no Government because there were two leaders and two camps. What policy there was existed only in the mind of Hertzog, and it was reflected in the interpretation of that mind in two images, that of the followers of Smuts and that of the followers of the Prime Minister. Forty-eight hours before General Hertzog rose to startle the packed House of Assembly with a motion for neutrality, a Cabinet Minister, fighting a by-election, flatly denied such an idea. "It was a gross libel to say that the Prime Minister would be neutral." He has since been criticized for bad faith. Actually he was a victim of circum-

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stances. He believed he knew the mind of his Prime Minister. What he actually knew was the mind of his leader, General Smuts, the Deputy Prime Minister. His declaration was sincere enough. It failed in truth because he, with others, was completely ignorant of the facts, or knowing them too well, had throughout the years of Fusion succeeded in burying them, as too dangerous for the light of day, until they had slipped out of his political consciousness altogether. He, with others, had for so long been occupied in persuading the English-speaking doubters of the sincerity and of the loyalty of General Hertzog, that he had come to believe in it himself. Meanwhile General Hertzog's lieutenants, Havenga, Pirow, and Kemp, kept a discreet silence. They knew their leader, and were not entirely ignorant of the second leader, General Smuts.

It was a tragic business. Those very conditions that separated child from child in English- and Afrikaans-medium schools, divided their social life into youthful Voortrekkers and youthful Boy Scouts, repeated the division in the universities, and which are to be seen in two flags, two languages, two policies towards the Native, two ideas of economic advance, divided the executive of government. What the Dutch and British had failed to do in the early days of the Cape settlement—to find a common platform and a community of interests—the Hertzog-Smuts coalition attempted to achieve by projecting the very factors which made such impossible.

It was inevitable that it should be so. No blame attaches to either for the idea and ideal. The cause lies deeper than blame can reach. In

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the final and ultimate tests of life and living, the Afrikaner fell back upon his own, returned to the allegiances of his tribe and race. The Britisher did the same. In such a plight he who can remain South African is a precious spirit and rare indeed.

Though this is the way of it in South Africa, life can be, and for most Europeans is, very tolerable. The South African sun compensates for much. Even it, however, is not without its influence upon sectional politics. If it burns in some hatreds, it burns out the energies to pursue them !

II
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CHAPTER II

I

AS soon as we begin to inquire how and when these queer folk, the Afrikanders, whom we now call Afrikaners, appeared on the scene, and why they called themselves Afrikanders, we need the historian to guide us. But even he is a little confused about the origins of the name, and is still engaged on his research into a not very distant past. He suggests that the first Afrikander was no Dutchman. He will tell you that he was a Frenchman—a Huguenot, one Bibault, the accused person in a case of no consequence—who, with the same pride that impelled Saul of Tarsus, declared, “Ek is n’ Afrikander.” That was in 1705.

There is good reason to believe that it was the Huguenots rather than the Dutch settlers who first realized their isolation from their homeland. For two or three generations the Dutch, settled at the Cape by the Dutch East India Company, looked to Holland as the fatherland. Indeed a number of them returned there for their education. The Huguenots had no such good fortune. They were the fleeing victims of a European order as totalitarian as the Nazi régime. They could not return if they would. They were as homeless as are countless Jews to-day. Of the two, the Dutch were more numerous. There were others that made up the polyglot population of the Cape settlement.

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"The inhabitants of this country," writes one observer in 1670, "are either servants of the Hon. Company or Burgers, also called free men, and Hottentots ; but also there are to be found English, French, High Germans from various parts, Savoyards, Italians, Hungarians, Malays, men of Malabar, Cingalese, Javanese, men of Malassar, of Bengal, of Amboyna, of Bambana, of China, of Madagascar, of Angola, inhabitants of Guinea, and of the Salt Islands, among whom one can find one's way about by means of Dutch, Malay, or Portuguese languages."

There were not, surely, so very many places left in the world from which the Cape might draw.

Between the Dutch and the Huguenot there was one powerful bond. They were both Christian. They were both Calvinist. There were to be others just as powerful before the eighteenth century was out. At first, as was to be expected, the colonists from Holland and the refugees from the harrying oppressions of Louis XIV. kept themselves distinct, settling in different parts of the Cape. Common grievances rapidly drew them together. There was, in all conscience, good reason for grievance.

These were the days of high dividends. The Dutch East India Company looked upon the Cape merely as a refreshment station, a base in the line of communication between the resources of Batavia and the markets of the West. Neither Dutch, nor British, in their turn, proposed to make of the Cape what it finally became, the golden gate of a new nation. The Dutch settlers were the servants of the Company, made to abide by laws framed by the Company and to live under a monopoly that

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rapidly became unbearable. Not all the succeeding governors had the wisdom of Van Riebeeck or the elder Van der Stel, and not all the regulations they had to enforce appealed to their best judgment. In good times, which were reckoned on the number of ships plying that way, there was not much to complain about, for the ships needed requisitioning with vegetables and fruit to be grown in abundance. Bad times, however, had a habit of coinciding with bad governors, and bad government merely served to accelerate a movement outwards.

The Company, uncertainly disposed to the proposal, finally established a system of free burghers, granting release to some of their servants to join newly arrived emigrants, with permission to farm the land or to occupy themselves in other undertakings. Many of these farmers discovered a more pleasurable life and more remunerative business in cattle grazing. Trade with the Hottentots, a tribe that scrambled over the land with herds of cattle and sheep, was forbidden under strict penalty, but neither the watchfulness of the Hon. Company nor the hazards of the undertaking could restrain the practice. The wiser governor endeavoured to direct the impulses of his peoples by establishing inland stations and farms, by controlling the Hottentots, and by calling upon "the Seventeen" for military aid. The unwise governor merely intensified the conditions that drove men outwards by his own malpractices. By this time, the early years of the eighteenth century, there had emerged signs of two modern concepts. The French were not to be allowed to remain French, for that would be to acquiesce in the possibility of fifth column

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activities within the territorial domains of the Company; and a sort of Dutch *lebensraum* movement was at work. The farmer wanted elbow-room, and could not abide the sight of the smoke rising from his neighbour's chimney.

That was one thing. But there was another. The wisdom of the elder Van der Stel was not in the germplasm that went to the making of his son who succeeded him as governor. This young man, furnished with the monopoly power vested in him by the Company, snatched at the opportunity presented for creating a monopoly within a monopoly. The directors of the Company, the famous Seventeen, had laid it down that no official of their company could own land, do barter, or engage in trade. Six thousand miles from the House of the Seventeen in Holland, many weeks' journey, and conscious of the encouraging fact that he held the destiny of the colonists in his hands, young Van Stel set about buying land, growing wheat, planting wine, capturing the meat monopoly, and generally making himself rich on the proceeds. Nobody objected. At least nobody objected so long as they got rid of their produce and grew bountiful in flocks and herds. The idea of the younger Van der Stel seems to have been to control all the agricultural and pastoral undertakings, the only industry of the Cape, and sell the produce to himself as the representative of the directors. It served well until the year Bibault claimed that he was an Afrikander, a year of such surpluses that glutted the Colony and brought the farmers up against the monopoly within a monopoly and the person of the governor. Uproar ensued; the Seventeen were advised of it, examined its causes, moved

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diplomatically as ones not guiltless of the sins of Van der Stel, dismissed the governor, and issued over the ocean stern orders for the future.

Hollanders, Germans, French, faced with common ruin, drew together in common protest. "Fusion," indeed, that still awaits the hand of fortune between English and Afrikaner in 1941, was thrust upon the early colonists by sheer necessity of fighting a common foe. The farmers' party, de Boeren, German, Dutch, French, became the Boers; became the Afrikaners; left agriculture for the pastoral life, later to find themselves convinced that they were a new nation, the Afrikaner nation. The Seventeen decided to send no more colonists to add to the turbulence about them. They had always been reluctant to send any at all. It was a decision that again cut off the Cape from the motherland and intensified the isolation of the frontiersmen. They gradually shook off the trammels of home, of allegiance to a company or a country. Fending for themselves, undergoing the hardships of pioneer life, they slowly scattered into the interior, gravitated towards a new way of life, raised a strange tongue from the soil and veld of their adoption, and struck through the Calvinism of the Dutch Reformed Church to a new sense of Old Testament living, to give them a uniqueness that is only possessed by such parallel development as is seen in the flight of Brigham Young to Utah.

II

It is worth while looking at these early days a little more closely. The forces that struck deep

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into the character of the new community produced the Great Trek which "is the central theme of Afrikaner history." It contains the outstanding feature of the transition from the agricultural to the pastoral, the change from the settled farmer—conservative, slow moving—to the frontiersman and the Trek Boer. On the edge of barbarism and on the fringes of an eighteenth-century civilization, it would have been remarkable if the frontiersman had remained in the same state of life and culture that his immediate forbears had known in Holland. He suffered a change, deeper and more rapid but not unlike that which overtakes the majority of English people settling in the country.

No matter what level of culture or what standard of gentle living the new-comer has attained, without a keen sense of self-discipline the years show a marked decline. Many books have been written about the influence of the European upon the Bantu; few on the influence of the Bantu upon the European. The new settler passes through all the stages of the struggle with the Native, in domestic service, in commerce, industry, and in social life. The first is marked, particularly with those people who are unaccustomed to the possession of servants, by the novelty of being waited upon by a Black man, and by a regard for his welfare that leaves the kitchen "boy," the cook "boy," or the garden "boy" occasionally amused, never overcome with gratitude, and always importunate. A year or so of this—accompanied by a succession of irritating mishaps in the kitchen, abscondings, and domestic "indabas"—exasperates the new-comer, until he, and certainly she, from sheer inability to cope with domesticity, gives up

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the struggle, abandons housekeeping, and finds shelter in a hotel or boarding-house to avoid the violence she has more than once contemplated.

I am told it is the European's fault, and I can well believe it, though to know whose fault it is provides little consolation. The Dominion Britisher blames the new-comer for treating the Native too leniently; and the new-comer blames the Dominion Britisher for having such low standards; and they both blame the Afrikaner for a harshness towards the Natives that has produced the condition. Whoever is to blame, one thing is certain, European life in South Africa lies on the fringe of a Western civilization, and is no less influenced by it than was the stock frontiersman over a century ago.

Where the European depends upon the intelligence, efficiency, and speed of the Native, the Native always wins. Outside the disciplined organization of great industries, the pace of the small business and the cleanliness of the home are functions of the likes, dislikes, discipline, or indiscipline of the Native "boy." At every stage, in a subtle way covering all his activities, the new-comer relaxes his grip upon his standards, becomes less exacting in his demands, and accepts almost everywhere what in Europe he would refuse.

This gradual transformation appears in aspects of his life where the presence of the Native does not enter, and it helps to produce a society which, cut off from the higher cultural environment of an older civilization, takes much that is habitual and usually attributed to colonial life. It is a society less sensitive to social problems; less aware of its social responsibilities; essentially incapable of self

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criticism ; and resentful of the criticism of others. The psycho-social conditions are in their modern way no less formative than those which moulded the frontier society. And just as on the edge of what might be called the bourgeoisie of frontier society degrading conditions appeared, so to-day a step beyond the border line of respectability lands one in a layer of society where White, Coloured, Indian, and Native exist, with no regard for a colour bar which, in South Africa, is the buttress of middle-class morality.

III

The Dutch frontiersman of the eighteenth century was no doubt as unconscious of the changes he underwent as we are of the subtle influences upon ourselves. He scarcely recognized, for instance, that he was developing a new and strange language, a *patois*, if you like, that was finally to be taken up and nurtured into Afrikaans and be recognized by no less a university than that of Oxford. And here again the English-speaking South African, if he so wills, can understand his fellow Afrikaner the better if he reminds himself of his own experience. Every English housewife daily engages in a practice which obtained for generations between the Dutch and the French, the German, the Kaffir, and the rest of them that populated the Cape territory. Social communications required a simplification of the spoken language. The Natal housewife talks kitchen Kaffir, a mixture of English and Zulu. It is this simplification that went on in the early days that

has produced the foundation of what is now Afrikaans. Indeed the chief feature of Afrikaans is its simplification. Unaware of what he was doing, the Dutch frontiersman was, even in his language, cutting himself still further adrift from the land of origin of his forbears.

One thing, however, he retained—his religion. Through it he developed other striking features. Strange psychological disturbances shaped his fixed prejudices: towards God, towards Afrikaners, towards other White men, and towards that which was less than man—"the Black man." He was uncompromising in the conviction, though he could not put it in Calvin's words, that "God hath once and for all determined both whom he will admit to Salvation and whom he will condemn to destruction." The Divine Right of his religion developed into a Divine Right of White Skin. It was the non-Christian who was to be despised. But, because the heathen were Black men and Coloured men, colour itself became the mark of inferiority. So God has willed, and so the possession of a white skin, the belief in Christianity, membership of the Church became the triad of attributes that qualified a man to be a burgher, and set the group apart and above all others as the elect, the chosen people. It was not difficult for this group consciousness to be turned to extremes, and to result in the intense colour prejudice that lies at the root of all colour-bar legislation. A not inconsiderable coloured population grew up, segregated itself, to appear in modern times as a force three-quarters of a million strong, with a political and social consciousness all its own. The divine right of skin colour denied the right of

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the missionary to proselytize among the heathen, and looked upon the later liberal tendencies of the Cape Government as grievous heresy.

Without a fierce insistence upon these things, it is almost certain that the Trek Boers would never have survived the demoralizing factors playing upon them. Anything less than the unrelenting attitude they adopted would have failed to keep the frontier society distinct. Its masculine character, based upon strong family allegiance to the family head, the patriarch of the clan, was but another aspect of the need to meet peculiar conditions. Here again is to be noticed the ease with which so many people judge harshly a racial attitude by taking it from its context and applying to it standards of conduct and behaviour which have no meaning in the circumstances of the times. By the time the British occupation was permanent the frontier society was an established way of life. Turbulent though it was, no new order was likely to change it. The frontiersman was too set in his ways, his mode of thought, to accept a modification of them. What he heard of the French Revolution, and the advance of its principles, suited him well enough in the sense that they accorded with his attitude to the government at the Cape. They affected him not the slightest in his dealings with those outside his group. How could they, when it was his firm belief that God had made the Black man and the Coloured man in a different image from Himself! The Bible told him so!

His fellows who had chosen to remain nearer the fort were no less conscious of their superiority. Their more settled ways possessed a quiet serenity of prosperity, they were no less certain of the

biblical rightness of their order, despite the liberalism that was taking shape on a distant continent.

IV

The appearance of the British then, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, did no more than give direction to the territorial distribution of the Dutch frontiersman. His thinking processes were already fixed in a strait-jacket. The British, indeed, made the same mistakes as the Dutch East India Company. Policy was set against a seascape, not a landscape ; against the European commitments of war with Napoleon and not against the background of the frontier. English relations with the frontier, indeed, were coincident with those of the Dutch East India Company : " keep the peace, placate the Kaffir, the Xosas ; more than that costs money and soldiers, both much needed elsewhere." Besides, the Cape was only to be held because it was better to hold it than to let the French have it. It was for that reason and that reason only that an Imperial Government agreed to do again what had already been done before.

They were soon convinced that the sea importance of the Cape could only be assured by guaranteeing the land frontiers. The conciliatory attitude towards the Kaffirs and the Xosas was one more step towards arousing the ire of the Dutch frontiersmen, who, before the inroads of native marauders, had either to stand up and fight or leave their grazing lands. They usually stood up and fought ; riding in punitive commando over a wild no-man's-land against the Kaffirs, whose tribal custom gave

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the raiding of cattle the quality of the chase in more senses than one. More cattle meant more wives ; it was an incentive that provided cause for half a dozen fully staged Kaffir wars.

Persuaded by many things to the need for establishing the frontiers, the British Government sent out settlers, twenty-four shiploads of them. The Dutch looked upon them with mingled disdain and wonder—disdain for their somewhat unsuccessful attempts at farming and wonder at their rising rebellion against the authorities. An auctioneer of the time seems to have expressed a common opinion. In his introductory patter on the terms of sale, he made a habit of entertaining his patrons with the remark, many times repeated :

“ Three months credit for Christians ; no credit for settlers ! ”

But if the settlers might be ignored, the Government at the Cape could not. It insisted upon a rule of law, and the forces of the law penetrated into the no-man's-land of the frontiers, where, within a period less than is necessary to produce a new generation, Boer frontiersmen had established themselves the feudal overlords of little States, where law was not, save as it was made and administered by themselves. More than that, the Government brought with it the new freedom that had swept the West. Slavery had been abolished, and there was a feeling for justice for the oppressed that, even on the fringes of this African barbarism, meted out punishment to offenders. New contracts superseded old regulations regarding the employment of Hottentots. A social reaction was gradually taking shape that threatened the feudalism of the Boer and challenged his interpretation

of the Big Book, the Bible. For not only was he required to accept a land tenure not of his own creation, he discovered that the upholders of the law used Hottentot levies as police under European direction. To be tried by his peers—Ek is 'n Afrikander—and to be arrested by his equals—these things were in jeopardy.

The story is told of one, Frederick Cornelius Bezuidenhout, refusing summons to appear before the circuit court on a charge of cruelty to a Hottentot. A European officer, at the head of a dozen members of the Hottentot Corps, straddled in approach to the farm for the arrest of Bezuidenhout. Incensed at the idea of being arrested by Black men, even if they were under the command of a White equal, he opened fire and was himself killed. Over his grave his brother, Johannes, swore an oath of vengeance to rid the district of the Hottentot and the British, and to set up a republic. Attracting three score fellow malcontents to his side, he challenged the British and the Hottentot regiment at Slachter's Nek. Here, deserted by his fellows, Johannes Bezuidenhout stood his ground and continued fighting until he was mortally wounded.

In the words of Professor Harlow, "the importance of a historical event lies, not so much in the extent of its influence upon contemporary thought and action, as in its propaganda value for a later generation." Slachter's Nek is still quoted to-day, and Johannes Bezuidenhout is remembered as the first martyr to the cause of Afrikanerdom. It was a cause that converged upon the inability of the governor at the Cape and the Government in London to understand the Afrikaners' objections

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to the administration of laws by the aid of Hottentot regiments. Successive ordinances carried the British policy still further, and acted with the other factors to drive the Trek Boer to seek elsewhere in Africa the liberty denied him in the Colony, and, in his wake, the British to follow and finally establish a great possession.

By the early 'thirties a situation had developed that, combined with the strong wanderlust that was his, set in movement the ox wagons that formed the vanguard of the Great Trek. Where there were only frontiersmen, great names leapt into prominence to give the Afrikaner movement its first pageantry, and impel it with those characteristics which marked the trekking communities as a separate and isolated people. Men like Louis Trigardt, the first Trek Leader; the van Rensburgs, destroyed at the Limpopo by hostile tribes; Hendrik Potgieter, the founder of the Transvaal; Gerrit Maritz, Piet Retief, and a dozen others deserving of merit and great regard, fought, struggled, and quarrelled their way over precipitous range and flooding river, seeking a final outspan over half a continent full of human enemies in the Matabele and Zulus, or in physical barriers that deny words. Over against these names of the Trekkers were set the high kings, Moselikatse of the Matabele, Dingaan of the Zulus, the latter inveigling the gentle Retief and his followers to a ghastly slaughter in Natal, to be revenged by Pretorius at Blood River upon impis of savage warriors.

"We go to seek liberty," wrote Piet Retief in a manifesto that might well be looked upon as the declaration of all that was and became Afrikaner-

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dom. It was marked by an almost Quakerly regard for moderate speech.

The groups scattered as individual allegiances inclined, some travelling north over the high veld to the Vaal River, others driving towards Natal, where, in the deep bowl under the tremendous sweep of the Drakensberg, the first Boer republic was established.

V

The years of flight, of testing his strength upon the red earth and the yellow river, on upthrust of mountain and the depth of valley, hardened his muscle and shrivelled his soul. The ox wagon is slow but sure. It has an inevitability about it that turns time into eternity. Its exasperating inertia drives men to grind their teeth and chafe their shoulders. But these irritations were but the initial protests in a wearing down of the spirit, until men conformed to the ox as they conformed to the progression of sun and moon and stars. Acquiescence to the will of his God was deepened in an acquiescence to the will of his ox.

Thuswise the Voortrekker mind was shaped and moulded. Between him, his horse, his ox, and his rifle there was a co-ordination, an adjustment, out of which was created a way of life not easily to be drawn into a legal framework. He lived by his interpretation of the Big Book the while he was scattered over the veld. It was the march to the Promised Land, and dotted along its route were the outspans, named in the course of the struggle in acknowledgment of the God of the Old Testament, upon whom, from the Patriarch of the Clan,

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the Head of the Family, the family, his manservant and maid-servant, his ox, his cattle, and his horse relied. Thus there was Bethlehem and Bethesda and Elam.

When it came to putting his law into legal form, he fell back upon the customs that had grown up about his life during the transition from agricultural to pastoral activity. His individualism chafed at restriction, yet at the same time his family tradition had given him the necessary belief in patriarchal leadership to draw him towards ideas of beneficent dictatorship. At this time he is full of conflicting ideas. Just as he chose the leader of his commando and then obeyed him, so he was willing to elect a council, the Volksraad, and then leave it in authority to appoint officers ; and where he was not willing to accept authority he went off with half a dozen followers to establish a republic on his own. Under the peoples' council, the Volksraad, were landdrosts (magistracies) and heemraaden (home or local councils). A community on trek was a very different affair from a community in settled life. Habits had to be adjusted, money provided for the privilege of independent government. Law had to be enforced and commerce established on the basis that a man is not a law unto himself. It was a complicated business for the simple Boer. "Was not the Law of Moses sufficient?" It was not!

Over him and his the shadow of the British Government fell. Unable to rule their erring subjects, the British followed them, sometimes with sympathetic concern for their welfare, at others with a harsher attitude of self interest. The Transvaal and the Orange republics gradually took

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shape, however, and Britain, exercised for a time with increasing anxieties in the presence of a new Napoleon in France and a threatening Russia, refused to shoulder the extra burdens of African sovereignty. It was not the first time that Europe had determined the fate of South Africa. It was not to be the last.

The little States were cut off from the sea, and at the will of the Cape Colony or Natal, could be left high and dry on an economic beach. Efforts to cut corridors to the coast failed in the forestalling activities of successive governors of the Cape, and on more than one occasion annexation with the Cape province was requested by the Republicans themselves, and was only refused because the British Government was obsessed by the cares of Europe, the need for economy, the threatening situations in other parts of the Empire. The Cape authorities were imbued by a desire to keep the peace, to help the republics where they could, to hope for the best in Native relations, and to prepare for the worst. Responsible government brought immense difficulties, not to be solved without the intervention of the British Cabinet. The annexation of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, shouldered with some misgivings, increased expenditure and aggravated the position. On the one hand it called for a unified policy towards the Natives, and some adjustment of the previous attitude of acting as buffer between the Boer and the Bantu. The latter, who had looked upon the Boers as their natural enemies, turned their enmity upon the British, for it was the British who now pressed hard upon Native territories. There followed the Zulu War, its attending defeats and

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victories, splashed with the fine heroism of Rorkes Drift and the massacre of Isandlwana, and the final collapse of Cetewayo, the progress of whom constrained Disraeli to declare, of the Zulus, that they were "a remarkable people. They defeat our generals; they convert our bishops; they have settled the fate of a European dynasty." It was a triad of achievements; the first a reminder of Isandlwana, the second a reference to the way in which the Zulu Cetewayo persuaded a bishop of his sincere attachment to Christianity, and the third, to the unfortunate death of the Prince Imperial, Louis Napoleon, only son of Emperor Napoleon and Empress Eugenie.

VI

Paul Kruger appeared as the advocate to the British Government in London for independence for the Boers. He and they read, with avidity and hope, the Midlothian speeches of Gladstone, who, in the Methodism of his day, denounced both the annexation of the Transvaal and the conquest of the Zulus with a vehemence that stirred the hatred of the Boers, once their champion in England showed reluctance to carry out when in power what he called for when out of it. The chance had slipped by for Afrikanerdom to be absorbed into the British system. The Volksraad, the symbol of Boer independence, had disappeared with annexation; promise of its return went unfulfilled, and the Boers, never anxious to pay taxes at all, were forced to pay them to an alien Government.

The Boers took to the only way they knew, in

protest. Blessed by the predikants who called to the Lord God of Hosts, they rode out in commando. It was the first armed revolt of the Boer Trekker Republican against the British, and emphasized in its victory of Majuba the failure of the British cabinet to grasp opportunities of absorbing the emigrant Boers in a confederation.

The first phase of the emergence of Afrikanerdom was the Trek itself. The second, in the Trek that even in 1941 is still in uncertain progress, was the psychological change in the Cape Dutch, who, since their fellows had left farms and taken to the ox wagon, had accepted the British authority, scarcely conscious that they were governed by an alien Power. In every department of government English was the rule, in education and in the courts. The Cape Dutch were in danger of losing an identity by default, as certainly as their wayward brethren across the borders were successfully determining theirs. They had acquiesced in a régime without knowing it. That they became aware of it at all was due in large measure to Afrikaner journalism, which in the eighteen-seventies recalled them to their identity by speaking in their own language the message that had lain dormant for so long. *Die Patriot*, an Afrikaans journal, appeared at a time when economic conditions had forced the Dutch farmers of the Cape into a protest society under the strong leadership of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr. This son of a farmer, who was the editor of *Die Volkvriend*, an organ of Church orthodoxy, might be looked upon as the founder of what later was to be known as the Botha Policy. His views on South African unity were as large as those of Cecil Rhodes, with whom

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he was to form a political alliance, giving Rhodes a free hand on the Missionaries Road to the north in exchange for concessions to the Dutch language in the Cape Parliament. He directed the wilder elements stirred by the Reverend J. J. du Toit and established the Afrikaner Bond, which had as its political aim the unity of the two northern Republics with the Cape, the whole to be a united South Africa under its own flag.

The upsurge of Afrikaner racial temper in the Cape was noted in the smaller (and British) Natal with fearful anxiety. The Afrikaners of the Cape for the first time were acutely aware that over the border, in the Orange Free State and beyond that in the Transvaal, were people of their own kin, in grave danger of alienation from them. True, President Brand of the Orange was drawn to union with his southern neighbour, and saw in prospect a land that would include all Afrikaners. But Paul Kruger in the Transvaal remained the father of a die-hard conservatism that was the real Trek Boer. He gazed with hard suspicion upon the Hofmeyr policy in the Cape, distrusted the Natal British, and saw, in Brand's approaches, a threat to the set independence of his domain—a domain, by the way, where the exchequer rattled in its poverty. On two occasions he had been driven to approach the Cape for a customs union and was rebuffed.

VII

But another trek was on the move, this time the great commercial trek of the British, via the imperial importunities of Rhodes and the promise

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of wealth for lesser Rhòdes, from Europe and the coastal fringes. Gold, diamonds, the riches of the river, and the wealth of the land drew the quicker mind and the alien hand to the vast and flowering veld. To it, this new Eldorado, peopled by thick-set, loose-limbed, conservatively propelled, slow-moving and slow-thinking Boers, the eyes of Europe turned. Up from the sub-continent, and west and east from the sea fringes, came more demands for concessions, for a place in the African sun. The Wilhelmstrasse sent dispatches to Whitehall. Statesmen, who had never looked upon the mists covering a Table Mountain that hid the interior from sight and knowledge, thrust their agents into it. Kruger, striving for independence, nibbling here and there for an outlet to the sea, moving uneasily with his hand on the Big Book, impelled by a sort of religious cunning, guarded the entrance to his domain ; while his followers sought in grass, that great forbearance of nature, the life for which they had parted with the Cape. It was a strange and turbulent time, a panorama that moved too fast for the Trek Boer whose father had known only the pace of the ox wagon. To keep up with the times, he would need to cast aside all that had gone to his making. He clung on the tighter to all that he had.

Kruger sought the aid of Germany ; dreamed heavily of a wide belt from Atlantic to Indian oceans that would include an independent Transvaal in a Teutonic strip ; stretched himself into odd corners of native territory when the road elsewhere was barred, while the British, under the powerful influence of Cecil Rhodes, were striking through to the north and isolating the island of

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Boers within a Transvaal already overrun with money-seeking scallywags of all sorts. In the face of these powerful influences, the foreigners, the Uitlanders within, the Big Business of Rhodes without, cramped in on every side—Natal, the Cape, Rhodesia—this shrewd obstinate Boer played his cards on an open Bible, refusing the Uitlanders the franchise they sought or the reforms they demanded, in a grim struggle to defend the way of life of his fellow-Boers. His story has been told many times, lately through the medium of the cinema, which would have been as repulsive to him as the new world that pressed him and his, to use his own words, "into a cattle kraal."

And so it was that inside his domain a fifth column plotted their nefarious purposes with the enemy without, failing at the last moment to give the Jameson Raid the success that so often grants a disgraceful act an honourable mention. Kruger stirred the more uneasily. The Boer War shocked a Methodist England to its foundations.

The three men who were to dominate South African politics were a product of this age and temper. Botha, Smuts, Hertzog, each in his own way served the Republics, each rode at the head of a commando in the Boer War. Two of them, Smuts and Hertzog, were the Afrikaner lawyers who helped to draw up the Treaty of Peace at Vereeniging. The other was to become the first Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa under whom the two served ; later to divide, to come together, and then again divide, on issues as deep as those that ever separated men. Sixty years before other men had done the same. Retief, Maritz, Potgieter, Uys, Pretorius, the sojourners

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of the Wagon, had "united, separated, and lost themselves, to come together again, each with his small group of personal followers. No trek has ever been propelled in greater conviction of God's approval. No war had ever been a war of sterner religion. In the words of de Wet, "the God⁴ Himself was seeking to make a nation worthy of His Name."

Whatever may be the Englishman's interpretation of those days, it was plain enough to the Afrikaner of that day as it is to this, that the second phase of his trek had become not an immigration but a crusade for the defence of his Christendom. The picturesque must not disturb or blur the main features of this progression of the Afrikaner. There is a great deal of romance in South Africa which diverts the mind from its real nature. The war of the Boers makes a great story, which becomes greater in the knowledge and experience of the wide sweep of veld and karroo, the blue of sky and the yellow of grass. The big map thinking is so big, and owners of fingers that are traced upon it so great in name, that by trick the mind escapes the deep significance of the Boers' struggle.

VIII

It would be churlish, indeed a grievous error, to ignore the sterling qualities of many English Governors and High Commissioners whose contributions to the life and living of South Africa were of the same order as those of the greater Boers to their own people. In some of them an unselfish devotion to duty, a quick and broad recognition of

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a South African nation in which Boer and Briton were one, shot through all their undertakings. To them it was never a question of Vierkleur (the Republican flag) or Union Jack. The earlier ones recruited from England, where distances shorten the vision or blur the need for continental sight, failed to clasp the two races in one united whole when they were in the process of being moulded. The later ones found a people already set, a society apart from the world, inexperienced in government, naïve in the ways of commerce, shrewd only in suspicious defence of their isolated independence, and sensitive to any attack upon it.

The Boer War cost Britain 22,000 men and £223,000,000, and Afrikanerdom somewhere about 6,000 men as well as the deaths in concentration camps. Numbers, however, give no idea of consequences. The British temper cools quickly after a war. Even with the Great War the tide of hate of the Germans receded rapidly. This is too easily accounted virtue. Another explanation of it is possible. In no modern war has Britain suffered defeat, and government is the prerogative of the victor. But not only do the British soon forget to hate former enemies, they soon forget the sacrifice of their own sons. At this distance the casualties of the Boer War seem insignificant to a nation that has since lost a million of its fair youth, and is even now, as I write, in the process of losing others. The history of Britain is too full of battles permanently to raise the loss of 22,000 men to the position the loss of 6,000 holds in the mind of Afrikanerdom.

Only the other day I was in conversation with a field cornet of the Ossewa Brandwag (Sentries of the Ox Wagon), an Afrikaner organization adver-

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tised as cultural, but essentially anti-British and Republican.' He is a farmer in the Orange Free State. His family tree is in the Big Book. He is one of several hundred bearded, dry-skinned men, who, a year or so ago, met at Majuba and wept with his women-folk for the fate of his nation. A conversation that turned on my refusing to publish a letter about the concentration camps of the Boer War drew from me a commonplace remark that the past should not determine the present. He looked at me and said simply enough, "There can be no forgiveness without confession." He is just a Boer, a backveld Boer, whose memory is long. Lord Salisbury might have been speaking of him when he said, before the Boer War, that if the Boers submitted without fighting they would hate the British for a generation, and if they fought and were beaten they would hate them still longer.

To the English mind the need for confession has no appeal ; compensation is a more substantial claim upon forgiveness, if, indeed, forgiveness is in debate. By the Treaty of Vereeniging—"one of the strangest documents of history," in the opinion of Lord Milner—the British Government provided as a gift £3,000,000, and spent considerably more on the re-establishment of the dispossessed burghers, while the burghers who yielded voluntarily before the end of the war, the handsappers, were treated to £2,000,000. All told, something like £14,000,000 was expended on the rehabilitation of individuals, and vastly more to reinstate industry and commercial life. On a matter of material relief, in the eyes of the commercially inclined Britisher, there was no

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apparent need for confession as preliminary to forgiveness.

The field cornet would have none of this as argument, and for the understanding of him and his a complete reversal of the English mind is necessary. The Boer trekker had no use for the industrial system of the nineteenth century. It was an unknown way of life to him, forced upon him by the scallywags of every nation under the sun. He looked on in growing and glowering anger at the usurpation of all that was him and his. How could he know—who had no experience of the Crimean War, of the German March on Paris, of the Indian Mutiny, and the Chinese conflict—the uncleanness of war upon men, women, and children? All but one of his wars had been fought facing the assegai of the Native, in the open in offence, in the laager that encircled his world in defence.

Industrialism and commerce, the struggle for gold and the sweating for diamonds, he could not fight. It tore his mind to shreds even as the totalitarian revolution devastates the soul of intellectual Jewry. The evolution of the Witwatersrand shattered him. For, consider this Boer. In 1710 he was a Dutchman. Queen Anne was on the throne of England and the South Sea Bubble had just been blown. He was off the map in a lone station of call, the servant of a powerful monopoly. For a hundred years he was as a lost man and heard of Europe almost by mere chance. He turned his back upon the sea, it no longer had meaning for him. A century of conquests left him wandering among Hottentots and Bushmen. In 1810 he was still there. There was no change in

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his life save the deeper conformity to the sun and earth and the Black man. In 1838 he escaped, only to find that the European shadows followed him and drove him, four years later, to leave behind the nucleus of his chosen capital and a name that was his leaders', Pietermaritzburg. Go where he would, the other White man was in his tracks ; go where he would, the other White man came to the side of the Native he ousted.

CHAPTER III

I

THE Boer War settled the matter of the second stage of the Boer trek. Those who had ridden at the head of the commando now were chosen to lead into newer paths the troubled mind of the Boer. He was given their advice "to acquiesce in the peace and to obey and to respect the new government." The Englishman who is to understand him is not the Englishman who has lived with him. The vast majority of English-speaking people do not know the Afrikaner at all, chiefly because whenever he needs understanding the other is in no mood for trifling with his own allegiances ; but partly, also, because they themselves have been beached on a political strand remote from greater historical pageants of the world. The vast panorama of South Africa has lain before them for four generations, and they have taken part in a few of the most vivid scenes in human history. But they have never been sensitively aware, as a group, of the magnitude of the revolution they caused the Boer Trekker to pass through, and because he did not emerge from it unscathed, they consider him an ungrateful being. In the phraseology of the vulgar, "We taught the Japies to use something better than a bucket, and now they want all we've got."

Yet, could the Englishman twist and turn his

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mind to become the Anglo-Saxon of nine centuries ago, he would be in a somewhat similar plight to that in which many of these simple men of the Afrikaner race found themselves after the Boer War. It is not to be supposed, for example, that when the Saxon Harold (the only king before the sixth George who had to fight a fifth column and an invader on the same day) was killed the ordinary Saxon welcomed the usurpation of his rights and lands ; or approved a land tenure system foreign to his mind ; or rejoiced at the introduction into his law courts of a language he could not understand. It was a new order that placed the Anglo-Saxon for a matter of centuries in the position of an oppressed people. What is more, it introduced him to a continental economy which, however inevitable and however ultimately beneficial to future generations, required an adjustment that was not easily made. The Anglo-Saxon way of life was not the fleeting thing that so many of us have been persuaded as the result of a desultory glance into school history books. It was a well-established state of mind, with forces of growth making themselves felt by the time the Norman-French conquest gave it a new acceleration, if not a completely new direction. The new order, that threatened and overcame Harold the Saxon, uprooted the English peasantry in a manner that no subsequent revolution in England succeeded in doing. Distant though it is, both in time and (to most of us) in knowledge of its daily life, it offers the only example of the Englishman in defeat with which can be compared the feelings of the Boer in his travail.

The newspapers of the Boer War period remark

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upon a new era in terms no less vigorous than those which form the propaganda of a newer order to-day. Paragraph after paragraph of South African newspapers from 1902 onwards is headed "The New Order." It was no less new to the Boer than the Norman-French conquest was to the Anglo-Saxon peasant. It fetched the Boer Trekker, whose tradition had never known a European system, right up against the immense and overmastering forces of an outer world. This, it will rightly be protested, would have been inevitable in any case. The inevitability of it, which is conceded, does not erase the consequences. The point is that the Boer farmer is not far removed from the Anglo-Saxon peasant in his reactions to an alien order, and only in so far as the Englishman of to-day can put himself in the position of defeat in Anglo-Saxon times can he appreciate the sense of frustration under which the Boer suffered.

The newspapers reflect the usual attitude even of defeated peoples after a war. There is no doubting the accounts of overjoyed Boer families when peace was signed. There comes a time, for a nation that is desolate, when peace at a high price is preferred to war. But underneath it was the sentiment expressed by a Dutch predikant at the time, who, in pouring forth the trials of his flock, ended with the plea, "Give us then a little time to weep." The rural Afrikaner, even in 1941, weeps easily. There is a deal of significance in such a frailty that is missed by the hard-boiled commercialism of the English-speaking section.

It is in the consequences of the Boer War, more than in the Afrikaner movement of the 'seventies, that the shape of things to come is to be discovered.

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To the English the Boers remained either Boers or Dutch ; it was a long time before " Dutch " was dropped and " Afrikaner " appeared to describe " the other section " of the South African people. But in the mind of that other section the term Afrikaner had gone a long way to supersede the term Dutch or Boer. The latter described him as a farmer, the former did not describe him at all. He was no longer a Dutchman.

It is in the first two and a half decades of the century that the Afrikaner rose to ascendancy and dominated the political scene. There are few of them that lived through the Boer War who will admit that Lord Milner's policy was designed for anything but the extermination of the Boer way of life, and the absorption of the Afrikaner world into the British system. It is a useless task to debate whether it was so or not, and less than useless to attempt to persuade the Boer that it was not. Reason and argument are no weapons against conviction, and it is with conviction religiously held, or with prejudices deeply entrenched, or with experience bitter and personal, that the observer of the South African political scene must be concerned.

The Afrikaner world was small enough in all conscience. Its forces were scattered in poverty and desolation which the compensation proposed by the British Government could not alleviate. On the English side there was a genuine desire that the war should be forgotten and co-operation take the place of conflict. Some care was taken to avoid friction and to respect the feelings of a defeated people. That it did not succeed in healing the wounds will be understood well enough by

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anyone who knows defeat in war. The Boer in his struggle for independence has often made use of the enemies of Britain. He had pinned his faith upon help from Germany which never came, and on aid from Holland that was withheld. He was the more convinced that he was alone in the world, and could only expect salvation in his own efforts.

His way of life was once more in jeopardy ; his language in danger of decline. He needed spiritual leadership more than anything ; something that would give him hope and encouragement, and he found it in a poem rather than in politics, in his language rather than in his land. It is sometimes described as the second Afrikaans movement that swept over his world between 1902 and 1908. No measure of the social and political value of a poem such as "Die Vlakte" can be made. Its title in English would be "The Plains." It was written by Jan Celliers, and was one of those pieces of literature which awaken a whole people to a new sense of their being. During this time small cultural societies, born of the instinct of self-preservation, were established. Because their aims were such, the line that separates culture from politics was thin indeed, even as it is to-day. Most of the verse, and most of the literature, and all their journalism was devoted to exhortation and appeal to remember their origin, to honour their past, and to guard their language.

II

Political factors aided this movement. Crown Colony Administration that followed the Boer War

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soon occasioned a demand for responsible government. The people who called in the Imperial forces to crush the Boers became the first critics of Whitehall. The centre of gravity of the country moved from Cape Town to Johannesburg, and it was in the Transvaal that industrial progress was accompanied by a political movement that sought to be free of the trammelling influences of a distant Cabinet. The Transvaal Responsible Government Association pressed its claims, while the Boers established themselves in a political party, the *Het Volk*—the people.

The *Het Volk* did not have to press long for responsible government. A Conservative Government was beaten at the polls to return Campbell Bannerman at the head of a Liberal administration in England, one of the first acts of which was that gesture of goodwill which is still referred to as a premature folly by some Britishers—the grant of responsible government to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. At the election that followed, the preponderant Boer vote placed General Botha, the leader of the *Het Volk*, in power opposite the Progressives representing big business and English opinion. In the Orange Republic, by an even greater majority, the southern counterpart of the *Het Volk*, called the *Orange Unie*, undertook the government, with a Mr. Fischer as Prime Minister. In the Transvaal J. C. Smuts became Minister of Justice, and in the Orange Republic J. M. B. Hertzog was Minister of Justice and Education. Instead of the British governing from Whitehall, through a High Commissioner and two Lieutenant Governors, the Boers were now in complete political control.

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In the other two colonies events played into the hands of the Afrikaner. In the Cape, the Afrikaner Bond, under the leadership of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, held a majority. In three colonies then, at this time, the Boers were politically predominant. In the fourth, the overwhelmingly British Natal, where it might have been thought that the Imperial Government's intervention would be welcome, a threatening situation had arisen. The Boer War threw a shadow over the Natives, darkening counsels and enraging leaders against the White man's rule. They rose in revolt. The ringleaders were arrested and sentenced to death. On receipt of the news Lord Elgin, the British Colonial Secretary, issued an order to stay execution. Such interference was met by the summary resignation of the Natal Cabinet, despite the fact that it was a British regiment that saved the day.

This matter flaming up in the fourth quadrant of South Africa emphasized the grave weakness of separation. Though it did not originate the proposals for some sort of Union, it had a marked effect on the general progression to that end. A closer Union Society, enlisting the support of Milner's young men, toured the country. The gist of the matter was plain enough. The interests of the four separate colonies converged upon a High Commissioner, who acted as a liaison officer between them and the British Government. Each had its own economy; its distinct judicial system; its separate police and defence organization; its departments of education, of agriculture, and of industry. These retarding factors to progress of the whole were accompanying the rise of Afrikaner unity at this time. Dominating two colonies and

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preponderant in a third, the Afrikaner looked upon closer association as a means of obtaining full political control of the country. A National Convention, representative of the four colonies, deliberated upon a scheme Smuts had prepared. The Act of Union, which was the outcome of these deliberations, completed a decade of rapid transformation. Its main features were the institution of a two-House legislature—the Senate and the House of Assembly (Volksraad)—and the institution of Provincial Councils. The provincial sentiment, strong then as it is to-day, was met by an equal representation of eight members in the Senate, elected by the new bodies. Eight additional members were to be nominated by the Governor-General, and four of these chosen for their knowledge and experience of Native affairs.

III

The Act of Union achieved one more thing which, from the point of view of future difficulties, was the most far-reaching of all its considerable achievements. For forty years the Afrikaner Bond in the Cape had struggled for the recognition of Afrikaans. In the Orange Republic bilingualism had already been enforced, and the Afrikaner national sentiment encouraged by the Volksraad by introduction of the two-language system in schools. The Act of Union laid down that "both the English and Dutch languages shall be official languages of the Union, and shall be treated on a footing of equality, and shall possess and enjoy freedom, rights, and privileges."

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But equal freedom, rights, and privileges have yet to be defined. Did they mean, for example, that a man could use the language he preferred, and that he could demand a position in the Government service on knowledge of one language—other things being equal? In a word, was the individual Englishman or the individual Afrikaner to approach the language problem in his own way?

The tremendous satisfaction which greeted the South Africa Act was short-lived. There were four Prime Ministers of the colonies. Who was to be the Premier of the Union? By common consent, save in the Cape where supporters urged the claims of Mr. Merriman, General Botha was chosen first Prime Minister of the Union. That the choice was a happy one none can doubt. Botha combined the qualities most likely to appeal to British and Boers alike. His reluctance to follow Kruger all the way, his large urbanity and generous thinking, these were at the service of the country at this time. The new order opened with the rejoicings that are usually attributed to the accession of a new and young monarch from whom much is expected.

High hopes were registered when Parliament was opened. The Ministry of the Union took over the ox wagon of government of a sub-continent, and charge of a Trek, in double harness, of British and Boers, and quadrupled reins of four provinces. The Trek recorded another inspan.

There were in it Louis Botha, Premier; J. C. Smuts, Defence; A. Fischer, Lands; and J. B. M. Hertzog, Justice. It was an experiment of great magnitude. The Afrikaners of the two northern colonies were inexperienced in the English Cabinet system. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State

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had been ordered on the system deriving from the tradition of the Trek Boers.

The first Cabinet then was in no way versed in collective responsibility and ministerial reserve. Had the Transvaal and Orange territory continued uninterruptedly as republics, all the forces were there to make them one-party governments, with a tendency towards a dictatorship, and these tendencies appeared to the great disadvantage of those in office in the first essays in Cabinet government. General Smuts would have preferred something in the nature of the Volksraad system in the separation of the legislature from the executive. Hertzog, on the other hand, was slow to learn that he could not, in the manner of republican days, preach policies contrary to those of his Prime Minister without reprimand or compunction. Added to this inexperience of the English system, the experimental nature of the Cabinet did not encourage confidence. There was no real opposition, for the Unionists, representing the English opinion, were only too anxious to aid Botha in his essays in government. There was much controversial and dangerous material. The country was in a state of transition. The rights of the four new Provinces, the jealous defence of Afrikaner and English aspiration, and the sectional prejudices on all things pertaining to Natives and non-Europeans, were subjects of robust debate.

Before Union, in his little State, Hertzog had insisted on the education in the mother tongue up to and including Standard IV., a decision which invited opposition in the establishment of unilingual schools. On the school language question Botha himself was defeated at Pretoria in 1910. When,

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therefore, it was raised in the Union Parliament the division of opinion was clean-cut and deep-set. To begin with, the Provinces had been given power to direct their own educational systems. The rights of the two languages had also been stressed. On this, the most important issue before the country, the Cabinet shifted responsibility to a select committee, itself as divided as the country. Union has more than once been threatened on this issue. Hertzog was rapidly rising to be the chosen of his people—its leader, counsellor, its Moses and Aaron. He watched the conciliation policy of Botha with growing alarm, daily convinced that all for which the Trekkers had striven and the Boers had fought since they were Boers was in danger of being submerged by things British—British commerce, language, culture. In December 1912 he made his famous De Wildt speech, famous because it crystallized in politics the spiritual movement began in the Boer War, and set the course of Afrikanerdom anew on a second great trek from which there was to be no return. He prevented the success of Botha's great experiment in the conciliation of English and Afrikaner peoples as certainly as Jameson had ruined the chances of better understanding twenty years before. At the same time he saved Afrikanerdom from complete absorption by the British.

Without Hertzog it is probable that the Afrikaner people and the Afrikaner tradition would have gone the way of the Welsh—of no more significance than a medium of communication in the valleys and the hills and on the veld, a language of song and verse, a romantic reminder that there did once exist a people called the Boers and an

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episode called the Trek. If Welsh had age, then Afrikaans had youth, to be nurtured and nourished lest it die out, and with it the race, lost in an alien soil.

IV

General Hertzog clung to Afrikanerdom to the exclusion of all else. "After the Boer War," he said, "there were only two ways open. Either the Afrikaner, his language, and self-respect must go under, or he must fight for his rights." General Hertzog and his people chose the latter alternative. "A little storm," he went on, had been caused by his assertion that the time would come for a true South African spirit to be at the helm of affairs. Sir Thomas Smartt, the leader of the Unionists, had said that he was an Imperialist first, a South African afterwards. This, in General Hertzog's opinion, proved that Sir Thomas was not yet a pure South African. "I believe in Imperialism," he said, "only in so far as it benefits South Africa. . . . Whenever it is at variance with the interests of South Africa, I am strongly opposed to it. When the time comes, South Africa will be ready to do its share for the protection of its own interests in the first place, and of the Empire's interests in the second. All this noise has been started by a few thousand interested people who shout 'Empire! Empire!' They try to raise this feeling with the object of keeping the Dutch and English-speaking Afrikaners apart."

There was more in the same vein, and while General Botha was insisting that "They should

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make it their motto that every man who comes here to make his home was as good a South African as the man born here," both sections were split irretrievably. The Natal Independents, fiercely British, suspected Botha of holding the same views as Hertzog, despite his protestations, and the Dutch were split as a result of Hertzog's language policy and his declarations on Imperialism.

Botha's Dutch supporters asked themselves to what purpose was the rebellious Hertzog labouring the two subjects. He had got what he wanted in bilingualism in the Orange Free State; in their opinion, much to the disadvantage of Afrikaner education. They quoted the report of Dr. Viljoen, Director of Education: "Hertzogism means a selection of teachers on racial principles, of which the result inevitably is to handicap the education of the children. The language compulsion policy of the Taal madman is ruining the education system of the Free State, and is keeping competent teachers out of the country and inflicting the gravest injury upon the Dutch section. There was the dismissal of three inspectors. There was the notorious case of the veto put up by an Afrikaner committee on an English lady's appointment. Ostracism of the British people in the Free State condemns the Afrikaner youth either to a superficial purposeless education or to positive illiteracy. It is poetic justice that the legislation which was framed in an anti-British spirit is working out mainly to the injury of the Afrikaner race. There are 13,000 white children not attending any school in the Free State because there are insufficient teachers. There are two hundred vacancies for teachers which the Dutch cannot fill."

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What then was the particular bee in General Hertzog's bonnet? And how long could the Prime Minister permit a responsible Minister to address himself in a manner so contradictory to the Cabinet's policy? General Hertzog's colleagues did what they could to allay the suspicions of English-speaking people. They explained that General Hertzog had been misinterpreted, that by translation into English his speeches had been distorted, that he did not mean to call Englishmen foreign adventurers but fortune-seekers, or alternatively, if he did mean foreign adventurers, it was not to be thought a slight of the English.

As the story unfolds, it reflects a confusion of truth from which only the consequences are clear. Predikants of the Church exhorted their congregations to seek "in prayer to the God of Kruger and Joubert guidance for their leaders." General Hertzog's account of the events, published subsequently in a Dutch journal, describes how, on his late arrival at a Cabinet meeting, Colonel Leuchars asked to see General Botha alone. The two left the room, and on his return the Prime Minister announced that Colonel Leuchars, who was representing the Province of Natal, had found it impossible to stay in the same Cabinet with General Hertzog. General Hertzog maintained his refusal to resign from the Cabinet unless the Prime Minister asked him to do so and the reasons were stated. As for recanting, this too he refused; for, he asked, was not the policy, of South Africa first and Empire second, that of General Botha himself and the Cabinet? According to General Hertzog, the Prime Minister agreed that it was, and to it he had addressed himself on more than one occasion. The

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reasons then for General Hertzog's resignation or recantation fell away.

In the midst of these recriminations and throughout a turmoil of racial feeling, as one newspaper significantly said, "Only Mr. Smuts remains silent." But if Mr. Smuts was silent in public, he was at work in private. The *Pretoria News* put it thus: "In the second act of this drama, the Grey Cardinal appears on the scene. He drafts a letter and selects as his emissary the venerable Father Abraham, the only Hertzogite in the Cabinet, dispatches him to the recalcitrant one with the suggestion that if a letter of that sort were sent to General Botha, Colonel Leuchars might yet be placated and a public quarrel avoided." The letter was to contain a promise that the writer, General Hertzog, would refrain from speaking on the subject of Imperialism. "But the Grey Cardinal had over-reached himself. He had misjudged his man. The Mullah of Stellenbosch rose in his wrath, startled the benign Mr. Fischer, laid his hand upon his heart, and saved the last vestige of his self-respect. Ajax defying the thunderbolts of Job was as nothing to Hertzog daring the Prime Minister to eject him from the Cabinet."

His *éminence grise*, however, was not to be refused so easily. He himself approached "the recalcitrant one" with proposals for a meeting with the Prime Minister, when he felt sure the whole affair could be put straight. General Hertzog explained hotly that this, after all, was what he had been asking for, and for weeks. The meeting did not take place. "Darker clouds covered the sky, the bolt fell, Botha resigned, and Ishmael Hertzog (the Mullah of Stellenbosch) went into the wilderness,

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where 'he will be a wild man, his hand will be against every man, and every man's hand will be against him' (Genesis xvi. 12)."

The "grave Cabinet crisis," as it was described in England, did not leave Botha unscathed. Violently opposed to Hertzog as every English newspaper was, one of them—and in the most Imperialist of centres, Natal—was constrained to remark :

"Everybody knows what we think of General Hertzog. . . . His nature is fiery, ill-balanced, and unrestrained. . . . But despite that, we believe he tells the truth, and now that he has left the Cabinet, we have no reason to change our opinion. He has declared what, by their own cognizances, the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues believe in private."

A by-election was in progress at Albany following the retirement of Sir Starr Jameson. Botha himself went down to the support of the Government's candidate. In ordinary circumstances it was a safe seat. The Government's candidate was opposed by a Unionist. The platform was Hertzogism, the result a crushing defeat for Botha. The parties were at last dividing as a reaction of the two-stream policy that was Hertzogism. It is probable that Botha—accused of being all things to all men, an almost necessary qualification for political success in South Africa, even more than elsewhere—never forgave Hertzog.

The Albany result, where "Keep out the Dutch" was made the slogan, was overwhelming proof of the rising tide against the Prime Minister. For several months the country debated this matter in Parliament, in the lobbies, and to the farthermost corners of that wilderness intended for

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Hertzog which proved populated by Boers ready to support him in the stand he had taken. In the Orange Free State Hertzog's followers gathered amid scenes of great enthusiasm for the "saviour" "leader and patriot" of the Afrikaner cause. "No Cabinet can exist a month without General Hertzog," declared a Dutch paper when the debate merged into discussion about the formation of a new Ministry.

The distribution of seats when General Botha assumed office in 1910 illustrated the strength of parties—

	<i>National Party.</i>	<i>Unionists.</i>	<i>Independents.</i>	<i>Labour.</i>
CAPE	29	21	1	—
TRANSVAAL	20	12	—	4
NATAL	1	4	12	—
ORANGE FREE STATE	16	1	—	—

As the head of the National Party, the popular name for which was now the South African National Party, General Botha not only enjoyed the support of the Unionists: seven of Natal's Independents turned National during these years. On the other hand, when he resigned, while there were seventy-three Nationals, thirty-seven Unionists, five Independents, and four Labour members, Hertzog could command at least twenty-five of the Nationalist members. With a split in the British ranks, anything might happen if the test ever went to the country; and the British were by no means united. While prominent supporters like Mr. de Wet were declaring in the Orange Free State that the "Language of the conqueror on the lips of the conquered is the language of slaves," leaders on the other side were passionately asserting the views of Sir Thomas Smartt, leader of the Unionists.

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General Hertzog had laid down the tests of any claim to being a good South African in a series of questions : Is his an undivided devotion and love for South Africa ? Is this country first and foremost for him ; and does it exclusively command his loyalty ?

" If that is the test of a good South African, then I am not one," declared Sir Thomas Smartt, and the leader writers of the day echoed it in two- or three-column leaders.

It would be a mistake to imagine that General Hertzog was universally accepted by the Afrikaner people. Where he was not, however, was due to a personal allegiance to General Botha, and in the case of a few Afrikaners, to a belief that he was, of all things, less zealous than he should be about the morals of his people. A certain Mr. A. C. Lyell asked the question of " Hertzog the Man " in a contemporary journal—and answered it thus :

" First, Afrikaner leaders must uphold the Dutch language." That, it was conceded, Mr. Hertzog did. But nationality, he went on, does not count in language only. There is something deeper. A leader should stand for the retention of the moral standards of the people. " On this, Mr. Hertzog is lax in his outlook, because he saw no harm in holding a dance at the Eunice School, Bloemfontein ! he looked upon dancing as noble art and saw no harm in the theatre. What," bemoaned Mr. Lyell, " would Sarah Cilliers or Paul Kruger have said ? They would have thrown him out of the synagogue. Therefore it is for the people's good that Mr. Hertzog is not in the Ministry."

The admonition reflects the conservatism of the

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Boers and their regard for attributes of leadership which scarcely appeared in English thought.

General Botha gathered a new Cabinet, dropping Mr. Hertzog and Colonel Leuchars. He invited Sir Thomas Watt, once a Natal Independent, to join, and it was not long before he, Imperialist in outlook as he was, was campaigning on a slogan adopted from General Hertzog's "South Africa first, Empire second." These were the days of European tension. The first world war was only a few months ahead. The bigger navy programme had been on the way for some time, and Natal was filling the local newspapers with lists of subscribers to the "Battleship for Britain" fund. Sir Thomas Watt, though supporting Botha, raised the cry of "Natal first, South Africa second." It was a projection of the fears that had caused Natal to doubt the wisdom of Union at all.

Here was a case the exact parallel of Hertzog's pronouncement. The Natal newspapers were not slow to point to its real meaning despite their own manifest doubts about Botha as Prime Minister. What is surprising is that General Hertzog, who was no fool as a politician, did not swiftly pounce upon it and sustain his own case by devastating reference to it. For, if words mean anything at all, the attitude taken up by Sir Thomas Watt was contrary to the policy of the Prime Minister vaguely defined in the term conciliation, and if people misinterpreted Sir Thomas Watt and his fellow true-blue Britishers, then the remarks Botha had made about Hertzog applied equally to him.

"A public man," the Prime Minister declared, "must be held responsible not only for what he himself intends to convey, but also and especially

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for the impressions that his words have left reasonably in the public mind."

It is a pretty stiff test, and one that not even General Botha could meet successfully. His own speeches, and even some of his published letters, are full of ambiguity. They leave the present day observer of South African affairs as doubtful of Botha's wisdom as they did the newspaper men at the time they were made and written.

Though Natal Independents loathed all that Hertzog advocated, bilingualism and South Africa first, they were at one with him in his quarrel with a Prime Minister, whose policy as he himself once described it was so slippery that no-one could catch hold of it. Hertzog's logic was devastating. Quite apart from the "hurt" he had caused in personal reference, some retraction for which he offered, his protests were scarcely debatable. He may have been fundamentally wrong in the Orange Free State regarding bilingualism. He was at fault in permitting the loss of excellent public servants. But, after Union, he was courageous enough to do what it is doubtful if Botha would have ever felt it necessary to do.

The life of the people of South Africa, he wrote in another letter, runs in two streams—the English-speaking stream, and the Dutch-speaking stream—each with its own language, its own manner of life, its own great men, its own heroic deeds and noble characters. That this is so is the result of history. No-one is to blame for it, and everyone has like right to think highly of his own, to protect and maintain it. But it is our duty to see that we develop a higher national life, a national life in which we altogether, while maintaining our

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language and so forth, will nevertheless enter as one people in spirit and feeling. Then when we have reached this point, and when we have developed such a national feeling, the man of Dutch speech and the man of English speech will say each to the other: "Your language is my language, your great men are my great men, your heroic deeds my heroic deeds, your history my history, because we are both South Africans."

"As a Minister, I am a Minister of South Africa, not of the Empire." He failed to see how even General Botha could take exception to so obvious a fact. In any case, General Botha had himself stated that he was not left out of the Cabinet because of this claim of South Africa first. Then why was he left out? Because, in General Hertzog's opinion, Botha never wanted him in it. He claimed that the Prime Minister refused to declare what he meant by conciliation. If it was the policy of the Government to see that the Afrikaners were well treated in language, and that South Africa was its chief concern, then there was no need for conciliation and nothing to conciliate. If by insistence on these two things the Prime Minister alienated the British section, then conciliation of that section could only be achieved by ignoring the Prime Minister's policy. For what was conciliation other than for that? To lean to the British side in demands to help the British Navy, in ignoring bilingualism in practice, in favouring the towns against the country, these were a negation of all principles.

"I also desire re-approachment—conciliation—call it what you may—but I do not desire it in words, least of all do I desire it in a spirit of one-sided sacrifice and surrender of the interests of

the people and natives of South Africa to an insatiable political gang of financiers."

The Prime Minister's replies were, in the view of one or two English newspapers, "unconvincing."

"He has gratuitously and unnecessarily put the question whether the interests of South Africa should take preference over those of the British Empire. The question should not have been put," said General Botha. "In the circumstances, it was unpardonable to suggest, as happened at De Wildt, that the Empire is only good so long as it is useful to South Africa. Moreover, the pointed condemnation by General Hertzog, in his speech at De Wildt, of the policy of racial conciliation . . . has been understood to mean that General Hertzog's policy was different from that of the Prime Minister, and that therefore the Government seemed to speak with two voices."

General Hertzog was adamant. He asserted and reiterated that he did not use the word Empire, but Imperialism, that nobody knew what conciliation meant. He was right. Nobody did. His presence in the Cabinet was a source of irritation to the Prime Minister, whose policy of "the slippery pebbles" offended the extreme Britishers as it did the extreme Afrikaners, serving no more than to vacillate between two sentiments.

But if the Prime Minister was failing to please the extremists in being all things to all men, Mr. Hertzog was not without difficulties. His colleague of the Free State, Mr. Abraham Fischer, after many attempts to bring about reconciliation, remained in the Cabinet, declaring that though there was not one principle in which he differed from General Hertzog, he declined to degrade principles

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by associating them with the names of individuals. General Hertzog, he maintained, was careless of his speech and was apt to create dissension, where need for it did not exist, by his insistence that the Hertzog principles were right.

Mr. Fischer sent the extreme English Press into hysterics, and Mr. Burton, Minister of Railways, did not help in spite of his anxiety to do so. On the same day that Mr. Fischer was declaring that Mr. Hertzog was sound in principle and unreasonable in tactics, Mr. Burton, two hundred miles away, was urging that the whole difference between the Prime Minister and the Mullah of Stellenbosch was very much a matter of principle. Critics of the Government were convinced that Botha must do something to prevent these conflicting individual declarations. "Unless he breaks with racialism and reaction, his reputation will assuredly go down into the grave that has swallowed so many good names in South Africa," wrote one newspaper; and another, "The truth is, Botha is not a statesman. He made his name and reputation in the field and, like many a soldier, he has proved that the qualities of the soldier and the statesman are not necessarily combined in the same man."

Newspaper opinion is not the best guide to the historian. There was another incident, small enough in itself, that enraged the extreme British section. St. George's Day was approaching. The regulations about flying the Union Jack were too strict to please a province as sensitive as Natal. There was an uproar when the Administration was refused a request to fly it on St. George's Day, and the whole population brought out its bunting, flew its flags from shops and residences as a protest.

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A poem was published, almost in the manner of a dirge. Here it is :

In winds of all the world to see thee blowing,
The love of Britons for their country showing,
Yet here the symbol of our Empire loyalty
Cannot be flown except to honour Royalty.
O Flag of England here alone
But twice a year canst thou be shown !

In other climes none know thee but to love thee,
Though murky fog or sunshine be above thee,
Yet here, ere long, our children will not know thee—
So seldom, say our rulers, may we show thee.
O Flag of England would that we,
Ere Union, had remembered thee !

It is not to be supposed that the editor published this for its merit as verse !

But about the sentiments it held and the two-stream policy of General Hertzog the political parties were grouped. The Afrikaners themselves were hopelessly divided, and it is difficult to decide how far the conflict was the old trouble of personal allegiances, so much a feature of the Boer Trek days and later in Paul Kruger's time, and how much it was a question of principle. Paul Kruger had more than one enemy among his own people anxious to supplant him—men who raised the standard in small towns of his little State and had to be burnt out or shot out by a commando often led by himself. Between Botha and Hertzog the Afrikaners were divided, while in the political sense Afrikanerdom ruled the country. As the London *Morning Post* protested at the time, "The Dutch have everything they desire. They rule South Africa. General Botha has been attacked because he admits a few British South Africans into his councils."

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Behind Botha was Smuts, "whose seals of office dangle round his neck like the charms of a medicine man," and behind them both was the dreaded economic power of the industrial interests.

Beside them was the Unionist Party, equally concerned with big business, with a more decided leaning to British Imperialism, while on its fringe were the reactionaries of the Labour Party and the true-blue Bull Dog Breed of Natal, who, fearful on the one hand of the rising tide of Labour and embracing the receding British connection, clung together in a Federal league, bent on decentralization. Faced with the threat of the Dutch to gain by diplomacy what they had lost by the sword, the Federalist Natalians held meetings and dreamed dreams of a South Africa in which a Pitt or a Disraeli ruled under the patronage of a Victoria. To them the English Unionists were deserters, renegades, and traitors, and the Dutch followers of Botha as cunning as a box of monkeys, against which honest South African John Bull was of no avail.

In addition to other groups, there was the Parliamentary Labour Party, the Trades Hall Labour Party, the Young Unionists, and there was talk of a Farmers' Party. But the triangle remained that was to be the political design of South Africa for the next decade. Its base was reconciliation; its one side, Hertzog, the Afrikaner Nationalist; its other, the Union Jack, the Royal Navy, the British connection, and the English language. It was in the fear, the very real fear, that the two sides opposite him were about to coalesce or would do so in time, that Hertzog insisted upon his Nationalism.

So far there had been little political grouping on the basis of economics. Labour was represented, but Labour politics had seldom come into conflict with Capital in the past. Under Kruger, the White labour aristocrats on the gold-mines were united with the owners. With responsible government and Union, the political demands of the White labourer were met. He could turn to other interests, this time in conflict with capital. Times were bad.

Perhaps it was inevitable that the revolt of labour all over the industrial world should blaze forth with particular violence in the deepest mines in the world and around what Paul Kruger had spat at as "the pestiferous city." A matter of fifty years had changed the vast and rolling veld from the forbearance of grass to the relentless machinery of gold-getting; beginning in a small way and growing into a vast ramified industry, using millions of money, demanding a quarter of a million Black labourers and an executive direction of huge proportions; big map thinking applied to some seventy miles of auriferous reef, in which the British coal-miner would exchange coal-dust that choked his pores for metallic particles that turned his lungs to stone.

The trouble began when a manager altered the shifts in such a way that the men had to work on Saturday afternoons. The miners struck; five of them were dismissed without notice and reinstated as soon as the Company realized the legal error. But the rising temper of the days did not allow the occasion to pass. The great struggle that started in the decades of the fourteen-hour day was still

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being fought in England. The cry of the eight-hour day was set up and in no time forgotten in the revolutionary confusion that followed. Where moderate men raised their voices, the fury of the extremist drowned them. Before a Government inexperienced in dealing with strikes could realize what had happened, the Rand was seething with unrest, violence was rampant, and battles between strikers and strike-breakers and between both and the small police force were in progress. Along the reef the frenzied cry of "Scab" was the signal for the infuriated miners to fall upon any who dared the vengeance of the strikers in going to work, to beat him down and beat him up with all the fury of the mob. This was a tyranny new to Johannesburg.

The Rand was a frontier of rage and anger in which human conduct touched the fringe of bestiality and wallowed in that brute force which lies just over the border line of respectable society. The main railway station was fired; the leading newspaper went up in smoke; a miserable Native was burned up alive; shops were looted; the military and police fought rearguard actions in the backways and alleys, and held themselves, in circumstances of intense provocation, with a restraint that was sometimes foolhardy and always meritorious.

The story has been told many times. Suffice it here to say that it was an exhibition of mob law that brought the eyes of the world upon it, and reduced a government (Generals Botha and Smuts) to negotiating with the miners' representatives on terms which, as they declared later, were humiliating.

It was not the end of the trouble. The effect

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of the miners' strike was to aggravate the depression that was a factor in precipitating it. There were rumours of a general strike ; this time the agitators were convinced that they could bring the whole country to heel. The Government was on its toes. In a swift application of martial law, the country woke up on the morning of the strike to find the strategic centres under armed guard with machine guns mounted and rifles levelled. "The Shadow of the Burgher Commando" was over Johannesburg, glowering and threatening. The officials of the strike committee fortified themselves in the Trades Hall, Johannesburg. A red flag flew at the mast. Stores of bread and fruit had been laid in, dynamite and cartridges stocked. The control officer besieged the hall. Water and light were cut off. A field gun was hurried into position. The besieged cried they would never yield. They did. A local censorship was applied. Nine of the leaders were hurried by train to the coast, put on board the only ship available at Durban. Mr. Creswell gathered a few sympathizers, including a supporter in the legal profession, to interrupt the boat outside the territorial waters as it passed Cape Agulhas. They were too late.

The Government had the whole matter in hand, acted first and explained afterwards. The deportation was a serious matter.

"The only crime which fits this state of affairs is high treason," said General Smuts when debating the Indemnity Bill, "but you attempt to indict these people for high treason and see what will be the result. Our law of high treason comes from the Middle Ages. Our treason law does not fit

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these new and extraordinary conditions which have arisen in the present case, and if you were to indict these people for a crime they have really committed, you would never obtain a conviction."

The British world looked on, not without anxiety. In England, while the Conservative Press applauded the way General Botha has broken the strike, it condemned the deportations. The *Morning Post* pressed for intervention on behalf of the rights of the subject. To do so would have imperilled the whole Commonwealth and shaken the foundations of the Empire.

What is relevant to our purpose is the effect of the revolutionary disturbance upon the political thought of the country. For four years the racial issue had dominated all others. It had retarded the legislative business of Parliament; the protagonists of Hertzog in the Botha-Hertzog controversy had succeeded in making South African politics unique in the Commonwealth. The two-stream policy defined by General Hertzog divided the British from the Afrikaner. They could only come together when, as Hertzog himself said, each recognized himself as a South African. In the meantime Botha's policy, in the eyes of General Hertzog, leant towards the British opinion. The truth is that a vast change had come over the country at short notice and in rapid time. The industrial and commercial progress relied upon attracting capital to it, and capital could only be attracted if Botha could imbue the financial world with confidence. His policy was therefore directed to doing nothing that would raise doubts in the investing world about the relations of South Africa with Britain. At the same time, he was genuinely

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moved to seek the welfare of South Africa by close co-operation with Britain.

There was an attempt to make political capital out of the way in which General Hertzog acted during the months of strike. He had declared himself as sympathetic to the cause of the working man. He inclined to their point of view. He did not offer himself as a special constable as—and this was a point made by General Smuts in his speech—Mr. Merriman and others had done, in order to defend society against a syndicalist conspiracy. It was generally insinuated, though it was never actually said, that Hertzog encouraged the strikers. He was guilty of unwise speech, but he was never guilty of encouraging mob violence. The strike was a partial eclipse of the racial quarrel. The eclipse was to pass. But, during it, another aspect of the many-sided South African conflict was raised. General Hertzog saw more clearly than ever the coincidence of the supremacy of British politics with economic power. He inclined to the strikers because he opposed the economic power of the gold-mines. While he supported their cause he, like Ramsay Macdonald in England, condemned the methods and repudiated their leaders. He had arrived at a conclusion grasped seven years before by General Smuts, and it is in the words of General Smuts then that Hertzog's attitude to the strike may be discovered.

"In South Africa," said General Smuts, "is the world's biggest trust, yet whereas in the United States there are 80,000,000 people to fight the combination, here there are no more than 300,000 to fight the greatest and strongest financial combination in the world."

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"There is only one great issue—will Parliament or the Transvaal Chamber of Mines rule this country?" was a newspaper comment upon the speech.

The economy of the Boer Trekker was a simple one. The ramifications of the Joint Stock Company was alien to his mind, even as the horizontal and vertical expansion of big business is still foreign to his thinking. Only very gradually is he coming to recognize that political power is an elusive thing; that though, the *Morning Post* averred, "the Dutch rule South Africa," the Dutch in power are ruled by other forces than are to be found in the franchise. There was something else to fight then, besides the alien Englishman, and something else to defend other than a language. Afrikaners who had moved in to work at the side of the English worker in the mines were better acquainted with this than those who still relied upon the forbearance of grass. They saw that the English were split into great camps: the many (the miners) as artisans; and this thing called the Chamber of Mines. Many of them joined this thing called Labour, often against the wish of their predikant. Whether they joined or not, it reached out to them from the great centres of the western world, and they began to hear of syndicalism and anarchy.

The Labour Party was on the move, being faded in as the racial issue faded out. They captured a majority in the Transvaal Provincial Council, could call upon many Dutch votes, and enjoyed some support from the middle classes who complained that the Unionists had no policy at all. As Labour united, the opponents of Labour did the same. "There will only be two great parties," said a

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Labour leader at this time, "Labour and the Nationalists." He was wrong, but he had marked the tendencies. The Unionists—an opposition that was no opposition at all, and had no stated policy—tended to join up with the Nationalists, who had now taken the name of South African Party under Botha.

The South African Party members who were supporters of General Hertzog tended to become Nationalists pure and simple. The political framework was beginning to take shape. And now, scarcely had the lull in the purely racial conflict been appreciated and the re-groupings of the political parties been recognized before the murder of an archduke sent a shaking continent tottering over, the reverberations of which thundered through a sub-continent six thousand miles away, itself but four years young as a nation, an infant in political experience.

CHAPTER IV

I

IN 1912 General Botha accused General Hertzog of raising an issue that should never have been raised—the relations of South Africa to Britain. There was no call for it ; sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof and the good. In 1914 it became a matter of urgent practical importance, a test of those fundamental principles upon which Afrikanerdom, in the sense that Hertzog had represented it, was based. For years he had remained a member of a party, pre-eminently Afrikaner in its leadership, with which he was at complete variance. He had acted even, as a Cabinet Minister, as if he were leading an opposition. The outbreak of war merely accentuated his position. He was now the leader of a struggling party in open and more direct opposition. In other words, instead of being a patriot, he became a politician, an exploiter of political occasions to serve his patriotism. He was not unique in this. General Smuts had beaten him to it by ten years. But because he was now a politician and on the wrong side of the fence his policy was denounced not only as unsound, but as unmoral and illegitimate. It is often thus with the challenger of an established order. Not only was General Hertzog a Republican, he was a sinner as well. It is remarkable how we adapt our ethics to our politics.

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There was the Opstand, the rebellion, the course of which has so often been described and which need not detain us. The causes and results are more relevant to our purpose. Generally it has been placed to four causes. There was German encouragement at the back of it ; it was an organized attempt to regain independence ; it was a mere acceptance of local leaders ; it was a rebellion against Botha and Smuts. All these four had something to do with it, and one or other of them will explain the attitude of individual Boers. It was clearly a response to a very special set of circumstances. A story is quoted in the *Round Table* for June 1916 that gives some estimate of this matter. It relates an incident that occurred during the early months of the Botha-Hertzog quarrel : " A party of half a dozen men were discussing the significance of the split when Delarey strolled up to the table and stood listening with a look of quiet amusement in his eyes. The prevailing opinion was that, as the Dutch were in power and could remain in power, and as they had all they wanted, there was nothing in the Botha-Hertzog quarrel. During a pause, the old Boer leader (Delarey) turned to his British friend and said, ' What do you think ? Why don't you say something, you were here among us.'

" The reply was, ' Yes, and I have learnt this at any rate—that I don't understand the Boer.'

" ' That's why you come so much nearer than these others. I'll tell you,' he went on, pointing to an earlier speaker, ' you talk about Union of all the States ; of one Government, one flag, one King ! What does that signify to the Boer ? Do you think it matters to him, that that is what he

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wants? Why, I can remember the time when we had five Governments in the up-country—all our own, too! and that was not enough. No sooner did we start a new Government than there would be two parties again and each would want its own Government and Parliament, and we would take up our rifles and break up again. It is the way of the Boer. Now that we no longer have any English or Kaffirs to fight, we shall quarrel among ourselves! It is the way of the Boer!’”

Delarey had, indeed, seen five little States; he had watched a score of aspiring presidents squabble for supremacy. He will be recalled as the hero of the rebellion—well beloved, a laughing cavalier of a Boer, amazingly frank, able as a soldier, who met his death in fantastic misadventure. He knew the Boer as he knew himself, and as no Englishman can know him; and the Opstand of 1914, in which he took part against the Government, he might well have described in some such terms he used three years before. For it becomes clearer that the rebellion was not only a revolt against the alien English, it was also a revolt against his own kind. It is impossible for the observer to escape this facet of Boer politics, and it leaves him wondering whether, after all, there is not something unique and strange about this community which is not to be explained only by reference to the reaction to defeat. It is where the Boer seems to triumph—not where he is defeated, when he has no enemy external to himself—that the instinct for battle urges him to rend his own and destroy the very triumph he has won.

It is the same to-day as it was then.

The government of the country was in Afrikaner

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hands, and the Englishman naturally asked if that was not enough. The rebels, it would seem, and Hertzog included among them, wanted the country governed as if there were no Englishmen domiciled in it. Many Englishmen, particularly in Natal, were persuaded that it was so governed, so suspect was Botha's policy until war broke out. When Hertzog insisted that it was not a rebellion but only an armed protest, his arguments were blatant casuistry to the majority of onlookers, and to the non-Boer a fantastic quibbling with words. To the Boer it was plain enough. He seldom registered his disapproval of anybody or anything in the constitutional manner of the English. His procedure was to talk it over with his own kind, saddle a horse, sling a rifle, clap on a wide-brimmed hat, and go out to protest his grievance. As Delarey said, "It is the way of the Boer." Very often he had no intention at all of using his rifle. He had become so used to the weight and feel of it that it was as necessary to speech as liquor is to the tongue-tied. He was at home in his saddle, more comfortable there than anywhere else, and even to-day he will ride out of his dorp to meet a prominent leader miles out of town, bring him in, and still in the saddle, listen to what he has to say. It reminds him of the old times when he or his kinsmen diddled the English over the veld and about the kopjes. It is one of the things that made him different from the Uitlander; he loves it the more. For a similar reason the young urban Afrikaner of 1941 grows a beard. Not to be bearded is not to be *'n ware Afrikaner*. A beard is the outward sign of difference, and the young Afrikaner Republican wears one, even as his "loyal"

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fellow wears "the orange flash" on his uniform as signature of his willingness to fight anywhere in Africa. This "Armed Protest" then was no rebellion at all, but merely an armed insistence upon rights he could not defend in any other way. It is commonly explained that Hertzog was anti-British and a rebel in 1914 when he rose in Parliament to propose an amendment to the Prime Minister's motion "for co-operation with His Majesty's Imperial Government to defend the security and integrity of the Empire." The terms of his amendment ran :

"This House, being fully prepared to support all measures of defence which may be necessary to resist any attack on Union territory, is of the opinion that any act in the nature of an attack or which may lead to an attack on German territory in South Africa, would be in conflict with the interests of the Union and of the Empire."

He was defeated by ninety-two votes to twelve, a defeat which represented him as not even the object of unanimous Free State support. But it is doubtful if these figures reflected the opinion of the country then ; they certainly did not six months afterwards. He continued to reiterate two facts : one, that in all things South Africa must come first and the Empire second ; two, that he was not anti-British but pro-Afrikaner. On the first he took the course that has been followed since in the economic policy of Great Britain herself—of home producer first, Dominions second, the foreigner third ; and though he could not point to a policy that had not yet been introduced by Britain, he could and did refer to the manner in which Britain had become strong by the development of her nationalism. One

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cannot but be struck by the strange shifts of the politician that caused him to refrain from an intervention which might have made an early end of the rebellion. He had an opportunity of using his great influence. A mutual friend sent a telegram to Botha and Hertzog pleading that the Government end the Opstand without further bloodshed. The Prime Minister refused negotiation with a rebel, while Hertzog chose to send a copy of the telegram to General Botha with an offer of his services in this direction. To this, the Prime Minister's answer was laconic. It contained a suggestion that good service would be performed if General Hertzog publicly repudiated the rebel Maritz. Neither General Hertzog nor the old ex-President of the Orange Free State, President Steyn, with whom he was in close association, saw the matter in terms of the Prime Minister's suggestion. General Hertzog's silence was interpreted as connivance—probably he was guilty of no more than political tactics—and his name was drawn through the leader columns of the English Press and later through the parliamentary debates on the Indemnity Bill, as "a renegade of the worst type," and "a man unfitted to be a member of a British Legislature."

II

The course of the rebellion—marked as it was by the belief of the Boers in one or two rebel leaders, the manifest reluctance of the Government forces to shed blood, and the quick intuition of General Smuts—has had its narrators. If, however, the war and the rebellion found the country disrupted, the state of disunity in the Boer world was compen-

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sated by a flow of strength to the Prime Minister as the victor in the South West African campaign. He in the field and General Smuts in Parliament, their complementary abilities projected into the British cause, were held in an esteem by the extreme British elements which is all the more striking by contrast with the suspicious anxiety of some newspapers previous to the declaration of war. If Botha's treatment of the rebels after the rebellion was not acceptable to them in its conciliation, his handling of the rebellion itself, and then of the campaign against the Germans, called leader writers to admiration. The Botha policy at this time set the course for Smuts who followed him. The speeches of the latter in the present conflict, faced as he has been with mounting anxieties about domestic peace, read identically in spirit with, and are not greatly different in phraseology, from those of Botha in 1915.

The South African Party could go to the country with solid assurance. It was one of four parties in the field. The war having cut party politics to pieces, the issue at the General Election of 1915 was pro-war and anti-war. Only the Labour Party had doubts about its position and hovered between its declarations of individual conscience and supporting the rigorous prosecution of the war. The election was the first test of Hertzogism. There were 122 contested seats and a voter's roll of some 350,000. Their distribution gives a picture of the result.

	<i>S.A.P.</i>	<i>Unionists.</i>	<i>Nationalist.</i>	<i>Labour.</i>	<i>Ind.</i>
CAPE	46,215	28,136	34,773	6,502	6,603
TRANSVAAL	30,159	17,815	25,049	14,683	2,424
ORANGE FREE STATE	9,530	—	16,597	—	—
NATAL	8,413	3,668	1,767	3,259	1,510

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The Nationalists polled over 30 per cent. of the votes, a remarkable proportion illustrating the anti-war Dutch feeling. Excluding Natal—where, except in the northern districts, the Dutch were an insignificant number—the Hertzog Party polled 43 per cent. of the total, while the South African Party took 49 per cent. Botha lost in his stronghold of 1910, the rural areas ; at the same time, in the stronghold of Nationalism and neutrality, he still held some power. Elsewhere the Unionists, in the absence of a candidate of their own, gave their support to the Prime Minister's Party. The new House of Assembly was ranged—South African Party, 54 ; Nationalists, 27 ; Unionists, 40 ; Labour, 5 ; Independents, 4.

It was clear that the war would be prosecuted by South Africa. How it went, the world and South Africa know. South Africa's part in it, against a perspective of so short and so conflicting a history, was a demonstration of allegiance and loyalty scarcely exemplified throughout the Empire. At Delville Wood the cross to its fallen marks the extent of its sacrifice.

Hertzog continued to oppose Botha in the intellectual circles of universities in protracted debate ; while Tielman Roos, " the Sinn Feiner of South Africa, the arch priest of racialism, the villain of the piece," preached the gospel in the dorps. Thus, General Hertzog, before the students of Stellenbosch :

" As far as the territory of the Union is concerned, we have been placed in possession of a perfect State organism of which the life power rests with us. In no single essential respect can any difference be observed between our State

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Constitution and that of Great Britain . . . in fact, no self-government in the true sense of the word can exist without such independence from all other Governments, as also that of Great Britain. We stand in no way under Great Britain or its Parliament or its Government. The only bond that binds us together is our common King, but under him we each stand separately and independently of each other. This being so, South Africa possesses the same independence in her relations with a foreign Power. South Africa can still be loyal to the King and at the same time claim neutrality in war in which the King is engaged as King of Great Britain. Neutrality," he maintained, "is the right to take no part in war. It is an unsailable right, and must necessarily be so, of any country which possesses the right of self-government."

The fact was, of course, and is—despite the Statute of Westminster that was to follow, and the constitutional legislation which created a storm over Africa—that General Hertzog's arguments were based upon an interpretation of self-government which did not then exist in legal terms and which does not now, save in Lord Balfour's ambiguity. Then the Crown was one and indivisible. The King of South Africa could not easily be at peace while the King of Great Britain and Ireland was at war. In the first place, if he could, then South Africa as a neutral would have certain obligations to all belligerents who were the enemies of the King of Great Britain and Ireland. It could not, for example, permit her territory to be used by British forces. In the second place, it is possible that South Africa might want to declare war against a neigh-

bouring State. Does that mean that the King of Great Britain and Ireland would be at peace in Kenya and at war in South Africa, even as General Hertzog would have him at war with the Kaiser in Europe and at peace with him in Africa? But the mind of the Boer lawyer, General Hertzog, refused to work on those lines. It was not that he refused to see the truth of the matter; he was persuaded that the truth of the matter was all on his side, and he debated in question and answer with "What is the use of self-government at all if it failed to grant the right of neutrality, the right of decision in the final test of self-government?"

The well-known aphorism that war is not a conflict between right and wrong but between right and right is strikingly portrayed in the dilemma of General Hertzog. For eventually—even with every legal right proved, and General Hertzog was far from achieving such conclusion—a people seldom bases policy on legalities and never in the crisis of war. General Hertzog might talk his head off. There were those who would listen, but they were the Boers. In the first weeks of his new Nationalist Party, he once said, "All English-speaking people could be good Nationalists." It was an optimism that took no heed of the days. The English people called him the German Advocate. Of his fellow Boer, Botha, they said, "There is not in all South Africa a more stalwart Britisher." Twelve months before they had referred to Botha as a vacillating Dutchman, a soldier rather than a statesman.

Botha, by quick appreciation of the Boer mind, took command of the South African forces in South West Africa, captured the imagination of many of his countrymen, and at the same time served the

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purposes of those who now hailed him as a Britisher of Britishers. This mixture of statesmanship and political opportunism which Botha possessed in such high degree was something to which General Hertzog could not aspire. Over the English-speaking world, Botha first, and Smuts second, as he handed back the control of Parliament to the victorious Prime Minister—to repeat his chief's triumphant performance in East Africa—were swept into prominence by the fact that they were Boers, great Boers certainly, and serving a cause they had fought but a decade before. How much it was a triumph for the British system, and how much a triumph of the individual faith of each in the future of a sub-continent, no-one can tell. That it was both and other things, too, is certain. In like manner it is certain that to the academically inclined General Hertzog, who is suspicious of anything that is not stated in proper legal form, must go another kind of respect. The Mullah of Stellenbosch may have been out of step with the times and walking uncertainly through the days—he was in step with those for whom he worked.

III

As suddenly and swiftly as these younger sons of a divided people were mown down at Delville Wood, the declaration of Armistice came to a torn South Africa. In the joy of it there were many who felt that this, at any rate, would end for all time the problem of the sub-continent. But the Boer mind, backward as it may appear to the people of Britain and elsewhere, projected its purpose in

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an attempt to use the idealism of the war in order to reach out to independence and secession from the Commonwealth. President Wilson became General Hertzog's hope. The principle of self-determination, which had formed the hinge of all its proposals, was placed in the forefront of the national creed. If, as they stated, the Western Powers were fighting for the freedom of smaller nations and people, "selfbeskikking van klein nasies," then they could not entirely ignore this small people, the Boers, who for almost a century had been wandering through a wilderness of thorns seeking their habitation. Hertzog took his case to London.

Heading a deputation of fellow Boers he proceeded overseas to meet Mr. Lloyd George—the forger of victory, the Premier of England, the Wizard of Wales, the man who had been chased out of the back doors of public halls a few years before for his support of the cause of the Boers. Mr. Lloyd George received the deputation on the recommendation and approval of General Botha, who showed considerable diplomatic skill in urging the British Prime Minister to see the leader of the Nationalist Party.

"We went in the first place to Europe," said General Hertzog, "to obtain a restitution for the two ex-Republics. As an old Free Stater who took part in this campaign with earnestness, zeal, and feelings of affection, I never expected that we might succeed. We have received no assurance that restitution will be made to the old Orange Free State and Transvaal. But that is no reason for us to become shaky in our belief of the freedom of the people of South Africa. We must bow to

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it, but it does not say that we give up the right to redress the wrongs done in 1902. It is my duty not to do so."

The reply of Mr. Lloyd George to the deputation on June 5, 1919, emphasized the British Prime Minister's sympathetic consideration of what the Boer leader had to say. It was quite obvious that Mr. Lloyd George could have refused the interview on the formal ground that "as the important point you raised intimately concerns the Union of South Africa, a self-governing Dominion, the British Government could only listen to such representations if they come from the Government of the Union." Mr. Lloyd George noted that there was no complaint about any interference of the Imperial Government in South African affairs. "The case," he said, "is based purely on South African considerations. My own attitude towards the Boer War and the Boer people is well known to you. You say that some of the South African Ministers have been weak men and too subject to outside influence. I can only say that every soldier I have consulted has told me that General Botha was one of the most formidable opponents against whom he has ever fought. Lord French has publicly stated that he never had against him a more successful general than General Smuts. I can also confirm the power and influence exerted by these two Dutchmen in the Councils of the Empire and in the Peace Conference.

"The Boer people, loyally supported by the British people, have completely justified the confidence and trust so fully put in them by the British Government and people. The constitution of the new Union was the free act of the whole people

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representing both White races. Each made sacrifices, each incurred risks, each surrendered its local independence, and placed good faith and trust in the other. The view of the British Government is that South Africa rests on a grand pact, a fundamental understanding and agreement between the British and Dutch elements, not that it can be dissolved by the one-sided action of either element without the consent of the other. The proclaimed principle of self-determination to which you refer has been given effect to by the people of South Africa in the fullest, freest, most solemn and deliberate manner. We could not agree to any action which means the disruption of the Union. Everything points to the status which South Africa now occupies in the world. It is surely no mean one. Speaking to you not only as a British Prime Minister, but as a tried friend and well-wisher of the Dutch people, and as myself, a member of one of the smaller nations of the British Empire, I would advise your people with all the earnestness at my command not to endeavour to undo the past but to look forward confidently to the great future which lies before a united South Africa, and to persevere on that road which providence has marked out for our common line of progress."

Such was the tone, too, of great speeches by General Smuts in a Parliament assembled to consider the Peace Treaty. Such, without stressing his name beyond a casual reference, was the tribute paid by the Prime Minister of Britain to General Botha, the first Prime Minister of the Union. While yet alive, he saw the seal of Britain's approval upon his work. He died on the 28th August of the same year, leaving General Smuts—*son éminent*

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grise, the co-founder of the League of Nations, the victor of an African campaign, the man who went to Wales to hear the Welsh miners sing "Land of my Fathers" and saw them go to work next day, the man who had come to be known as "Slim Jannie" the Saul of the tribe—to carry on a work begun with a slogan of "conciliatae." Others called it *beroepspolitiek*. Against it Hertzog stood something in the same way as President Wilson shrunk before the *beroepspolitiek* of Lloyd George. 'Hy was 'n professor ! n' idealis !

IV

As the South African troops guided their steps back to their homeland, General Smuts was making a bid for a united South Africa. They found a country in debate ; Smuts on the one hand, cool, collected, tolerant of his political enemies ; Hertzog on the other, demanding "Yes" or "No" answers to questions that have no answer save in unpredictable conditions, and then only in sentiment.

General Hertzog : Has South Africa the right to secede from the Empire—Yes or No ?

General Smuts : I shall reply to that, I think it is my duty to reply to that, and my reply is, absolutely and decisively, *No*. Our constitution is laid down in writing and our constitution in Clause 19 says the legislative power of the Union consists of Parliament of the Union, composed of the King, the Assembly, and the Senate. It is impossible and unconstitutional for either of these parts to secede from the other.

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General Hertzog : Can it renounce the King ?

General Smuts : No. This is not a question of status ; it is a question of the constitution. In terms of the constitution the King cannot give up the Assembly.

General Hertzog : At the request of the people ?

General Smuts : No, he cannot. Of course, by means of a revolution you can do that sort of thing, but you cannot do so by constitutional means.

Coming to the second question, whether the right of veto still existed and whether the King could veto a law for the secession of the Union from the Empire, there was, he said, no doubt as to that question. On an ordinary law there was no such thing as veto, but on a question like that it was not only the King's right, but according to the constitution it was his duty to keep himself in force and connected with the Union.

But General Smuts had questions for General Hertzog.

Did General Hertzog confirm the statement made by one of his lieutenants that the Nationalist Party policy was to work for secession ?

His party was a democratic party, replied General Hertzog, which would be guided by what in conference was decided. But there was no doubt about it, "absolute freedom, and secession as a people, is an ideal to us, and shall remain our ideal."

Parliament was coming to an end. The Prime Minister appealed for three things : agreement to abide by the British connection ; the principle of frank, honest, and whole-hearted co-operation ; the recognition of our industrial potentials.

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While Sir Thomas Smartt the leader of the Unionists agreed to the principle, he was in no mind for absorption of his party with the South African Party. Colonel Creswell for the Labour Party said much the same thing. But General Hertzog, speaking for the Nationalist Party, decided otherwise. The Prime Minister had closed the door to the realization of a truly free South Africa. That was the price General Smuts proposed for the privilege of working with the Government. He was not discussing the desirability of severing the British connection. The only question was whether or not they possessed the right to secede.

So General Smuts faced the country in March 1920. The result was a telling victory for Hertzog's Nationalist Party. When the House met, there were 44 Nationalists and 44 South African Party members, 25 Unionists and 21 Labour, with 3 Independents upon whom Smuts could rely. It meant that 65 per cent. of the rural Dutch population were behind Hertzog ; that he had gained 17 seats ; that the South African Party had lost 12 and the Unionists 13. The rising cost of living had swept the Labour Party into a commanding position ; the racial issue of South Africa had given Hertzog a fighting force.

If the question of secession was still safe in the hands of the Prime Minister with the aid of the Unionists and Labour, the position of General Smuts depended upon the manner in which he placated Labour in the economic field. He designed a vast scheme of social legislation to meet the mounting depression that had already begun to sweep over the world. Not for long, however, can the political mind of South Africa be diverted

from its main obsession. For some time the feeling of dismay among the Dutch people at the persistence of the cleavage between the two sections had given rise to a deep sense of concern. A small community could not be so divided and expect to live. There was a movement towards reconciliation. Dutch members of the South African Party and Nationalists, which meant in many cases members of the same families, sought to come to an understanding. The aim was the unity of the Dutch people. But the obstacle remained—the right of secession.

Yet because in these early days of Union the course was being set for the present, it is worth while to note the two points upon which a National Congress, consisting of members of both parties, was agreed. Though it cannot be called a dilemma, there is no doubt that General Smuts, as leader of a minority government, was faced with alternatives not easy to decide. He had proved himself no less a "Britisher" than Botha; he was anxious for a union with his fellow Dutchmen.

One thing the Congress conceded, and it seemed to acknowledge for the first time the point Hertzog had made almost a decade before: "In order to attain the necessary and desired secession, a beginning should be made by co-operation under the motto 'South Africa First.'" Such an ideal had never been admitted so clearly before.

"The ideal of sovereign independence, which was, and is, well known with a section of the people, is admitted; but this ideal shall only be considered ripe for realization when this rests on the broad basis of the people's will.

"While the existing connection with the

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United Kingdom is one of equality in theory, it is necessary that such equality shall be applied practically."

These valuable proposals emerged as an expression of goodwill on all sides ; created a happier atmosphere in the House of Assembly. Here was something concrete on which to build. Then, with a few preliminary rumblings in the extremist skies, Doctor Malan, the Nationalist leader in the Cape, the first editor of the Nationalist newspaper *Die Burger*, delivered a speech at Worcester in which were dashed all hopes of hereinging (union) by insisting on the right to independence and the propaganda for it.

V

There was nothing for the Prime Minister to do but to turn with the same programme of principles from the Nationalist Party to the Unionists. He could not hope to carry on without them. Based upon his appeal for the allegiance of "all right-minded South Africans, irrespective of party or race," it found favour with the Unionists, who by this time were conscious of the increasing threat of Labour as a political force, but who were stirred to action and to unity against the far greater threat of the secessionists.

Seizing the opportunity with swift decision, General Smuts guided the Unionists' desire for a new party into what was no more than their absorption by the South African Party. Attempts by the Unionists to create an entirely new centre party with a new name (the United South African Party was suggested) were diplomatically redirected.

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The Prime Minister was aware that such a course would alienate many of his Dutch supporters in the rural districts, from which both he and Botha before him had gained most of their political support.

Mr. Patrick Duncan, a leading member of the Unionist Party, declared himself for the Prime Minister's proposal. What opposition there was came from the die-hards in Natal. Having made sure of Unionist support, General Smuts—with that unerring instinct possessed by General Botha, and almost completely lacking in his fellow Boer, General Hertzog—went to the country. He struck almost before General Hertzog was aware of it, and he struck with the sharp weapon of South Africa's relations to Britain rather than with the programme, already rusty, of economic advantages. South Africa a Republic or South Africa a Nation. That was the choice. Which was it to be? Secession, that not only meant secession from the British Commonwealth but also secession of province from province, Briton from Boer, and Bantu from both. "It means," he said, "that a civilized South Africa becomes a dream, and that the White people of this continent has decided to commit suicide."

The quicker mind of General Smuts left General Hertzog uncertain of the move he should make. All through this duel Smuts used a rapier, leaving the bludgeon for his adversary. The slower Boer has proved no fool in dealing with party squabbles. He has ever been quick at out-manceuvring *son éminence grise* in Slim Jannie. On this occasion he sidestepped the issue, or tried to. He issued a manifesto. The Afrikaner loves a manifesto. He attempted to shift the election

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issue from the question of secession to one of economics. He maintained that what this country was heading for was a return to the navigation laws of the past, subjecting the interests of the Colonies to Britain, which had as its most important result the breaking away of the American Colonies. He accused the Government of being linked with Britain ; that the commercial interests of South Africa were to be determined entirely by a banking trust of the whole Empire. In other words, he turned his attack against the financial control of the Chamber of Mines linked with the great commercial houses of London.

On the question of seceding from the Commonwealth, he declared that this was not to be the issue at this election as far as the Nationalist Party was concerned.

Such a declaration brought from General Smuts a triumphant answer that it was " the first instalment of victory." The Labour Party, under Colonel Creswell, turned upon General Smuts with the accusation that it was his intention to rid the country of the Labour Party altogether. " Let them define their policy," demanded Smuts. " They combined with the Nationalists in order to defeat the Government. They will try to do so again. If the result is the defeat of the Government, it will not be Colonel Creswell who will form a new Government. It will be General Hertzog, and with sections quite beyond the control of the Labour Party." While General Hertzog, then, was accusing General Smuts of playing into the hands of the Unionists, the British Imperialist section, the Labour Party maintained that the Unionists were throwing themselves at

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the mercy of the conservative South African Party in which land-owning interests were uppermost.

The elections settled the game thus : The South African Party won 78 seats ; the Nationalists, 44 ; Labour, 9 ; and Independent, 1.

The subject of secession, it was felt, was placed beyond doubt.

" If the foundation of the country's political fabric were continually to be dug up, stable conditions would become impossible ; and if the settlement embodying the Act of Union is to be fought over at every general election, South Africa would become hardly worth living in," wrote the *Round Table* in reviewing the results of the election.

General Smuts formed a Cabinet from the two component parties he had brought together, and expressed the hope that the English, as well as the Dutch, would prefer to be South Africans first and foremost and to live together as one people.

VI

It was an easy victory, won on the fears of " the sinister intentions " of General Hertzog. The Mullah of Stellenbosch was the bogey man who did service in overshadowing the critical economic position of the country. In his person, and that of his followers like Tielman Roos, the South African Party were supplied with half a dozen " Zinoviev letters " to confuse the real issues, and to make people who had never used their franchise before rush to the polls to save South Africa for the Empire.

A party, however, may go into power on one

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issue and discover that it does not exist, or that it is drowned in the thunder of other events. It was soon to be proved that it was not the Empire that was in danger but South Africa, and not from war but from war's reaction and consequence.

The price of gold fell from one hundred and ten shillings to ninety-eight shillings per ounce in 1920. Production costs had mounted during the war. Wages were high. Something had to be done, and it were well it were done quickly. But South Africa chose to act upon the assumption that there is always to-morrow. A Commission of Inquiry suggested that more Natives should be used on the mines, and that the colour bar should be removed from many classes of work. In 1915 it cost seventeen shillings and fivepence to work a ton of gold-bearing ore; in 1919, twenty-three shillings and ninepence; in 1921, twenty-five shillings. Wages of the White employee were the main change that could be adjusted, and it was proposed to adjust them by substituting Native labour in certain classes of work from which they had been excluded. There were other recommendations, each of them, though designed for the efficiency of the mines, tending towards the greater use of the Natives' potential for skilled work. It is difficult to persuade the distant observer of the significance of the proposals. It was tantamount to the suppression of a miners' lodge in the Durham coal-fields. Had Mr. Baldwin abolished Lord Londonderry's royalties and given the proceeds to the coal-miners it would have been less an attack upon vested interests than was the partial abolition of the colour bar in the gold-mines. Either the proposals must be accepted by the Mine Workers'

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Union or 10,000 White workers would be thrown out of employment. The men went into conference.

But troubles, which never come singly, were bubbling up and over elsewhere. The Transvaal coal-owners, pressing for a reduction of wages, refused the Government's offer of arbitration and issued notices of wage cuts within a week or so of the decision of the Chamber of Mines to alter the conditions of work on the gold-mines. Twenty thousand miners went on strike, and with them 200,000 Natives were thrown out of employment. A conference under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Curlewis broke down. The Prime Minister intervened. He found it more difficult to settle a strike on the gold-mines of the Rand than on the coal-mines of South Wales. The Rand miners did not sing "Land of my Fathers"—and the war was over. He argued on the lines adopted by Mr. Baldwin a year or two later, that unless work was resumed the miners would lose more than they could possibly hope to gain. He did not, as Mr. Baldwin did in 1926 in Britain, call to them, "You can trust me!" The mines were reopened. It was a signal for the strikers to patrol the streets to prevent "scab" labour from strike-breaking, and it persuaded the Workers' Industrial Federation to seek the aid of the political party in opposition to defeat the Government. The Nationalists, and particularly Mr. Tielman Roos, took a hand in turning what was fundamentally a trades union dispute into a political one. It need not be emphasized that all through these negotiations the rights and the common justice due to 200,000 Natives now out of work were completely ignored. The miners were typical democrats.

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They were not prepared to grant to others what they demanded for themselves.

Outreaching the whole cause for which they had called the strike, a mass meeting in Johannesburg City Hall called upon the Members of Parliament, who were about to meet in Pretoria, to proclaim a South African Republic and to form a Provisional Government. The Nationalists counselled constitutional methods. The Ballot is better than the Bullet was the theme of their advice, and though they were being accused of incitement to indiscipline by a public that was now thoroughly aroused, their influence was directed in the main to calming the situation.

Meanwhile, encouraged by the number of workers returning to their tasks, the Chamber of Mines refused the Federation's request for another conference in the words (described as deplorable by General Smuts) :

"The Chamber has made an attempt to start the mines on its own account. That attempt is succeeding to a very considerable and rapidly increasing extent. The Federation, in the obvious desire to obstruct that attempt, proposes to substitute for it an opportunity for their orators to expend a few more million words. The Chamber will be no party to such an absurd and obstructive proposal."

The Federation went to its union on a ballot, to work or to continue the strike. The ballot was never held, instead the extremists held up the delegates until they decided for a general strike. The Prime Minister waited for things to develop. He left Cape Town for Johannesburg, and was shot at. "I do not think," he said in Parliament

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afterwards, "that the gravity of the situation as it then was has been sufficiently appreciated. Johannesburg could not be entered at any point without having to run the gauntlet. Practically the whole of the Witwatersrand was in possession of the revolutionaries. There was very great danger that great bloodshed, slaughter, and murder might set in, such as might take one back to the French Revolution."

The Government forces engaged, once martial law was proclaimed, numbered nearly 20,000; 61 were killed and 199 wounded, while of the revolutionaries and peaceful citizens, 138 were killed, 287 wounded. Twenty-one non-Europeans met their death; rebel arms captured amounted to over 2,000 pieces and nearly 70,000 rounds of ammunition. The Government forces used an aeroplane to bomb the Trades Hall at Benoni; while the revolutionaries goaded Natives to violence.

These are the broad outlines of the "revolution" that was fought to prevent the substitution of Black labour for White. The only section that emerged from it with honour was the Native population. They conducted themselves with restraint and discipline in an episode for which they were the occasion, but in which, and out of which, their interests were forgotten.

The workers of the Rand have never forgiven General Smuts.

Hertzog, the leader of the Nationalist Party, made a pact with Colonel Creswell, the leader of the Labour Party. Their aim was to oust Smuts from office.

The Labour Party sacrificed its Socialism—it is doubtful whether Colonel Creswell had much to

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lose ; and the Nationalist Party sacrificed secession—for the present.

Within a few months a by-election occurred at Wakkerstroom. The South African Party played its ace in a candidate who was personally popular and held high office in the Province.

It was at Wakkerstroom that the Boers had refused Shepstone's terms of annexation.

It was at Wakkerstroom that Sir Garnet Wolseley had declared that it is as likely for the Vaal River to flow in the opposite direction as for the British to consider annexation.

It was at Wakkerstroom that a Boer concentration camp had been established.

And it was at Wakkerstroom that General Smuts suffered a crushing defeat.

Without consulting his caucus he resigned. He was personally defeated at the polls with three of his Ministers !

The Mullah of Stellenbosch was now Prime Minister, and in his Cabinet were Dr. D. F. Malan and Mr. Havenga.

On the Government side sat Mr. Oswald Pirow !

III

“ EK STEL VOOR ”

CHAPTER V

I

“**E**K stel voor”—thus Dr. D. F. Malan, predikant of the Dutch Reformed Church, first editor of the Nationalist newspaper *Die Burger*, leader of the Nationalist Party in the Cape, and at this moment of time in the rise of Afrikanerdom, Minister of the Interior. “Ek stel voor”—“I move.” The day was Black Monday in 1927; the occasion, the Flag Bill.

When General Hertzog, the third Boer to do so, received his seals of office as Prime Minister of the Union, the world's economic tide was on the turn. To his predecessor had fallen the grim tasks of the aftermath of war and the consequences of an economic blizzard. General Hertzog escaped the rocks and sailed on a comparatively pleasant course. The country entered a period of balanced budgets, making it and its Minister of Finance, Mr. Havenga, the envy of exchequers the world over.

Hertzog, the Afrikaner Patriot, who had perforce become the Afrikaner politician, was now called to Afrikaner statesmanship. He might have chosen a safe course and secured for himself the great esteem of the British. All he had to do was to abide by the pact with Labour, to drop the issue of secession, and govern with due attention to the two vested interests, first of industry, and second of

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sentiment. There was abundant encouragement for him. The *Rand Daily Mail* invited him to take this course, voicing its readiness to accept his sincerity at its face value and pledging him fair dealings and a chance to win through. The English Press treated his rise to power very much in the same way the London *Times* received the first Labour Government in England.

But Hertzog was no Macdonald. He chose to remember the land of his fathers, and to recall that his wife was once in a concentration camp and his young son separated from her. He prepared to reorientate the political mind of South Africa. It was now to be South African, with a bias, perhaps, to Afrikanerdom. Parliament was, and for the first time, divided on a racial basis; the English on one side under Smuts, the Afrikaners on the other, supported by the Labour members of the Pact.

With the stage set, the play was to be in three acts. Its title might well have been "South Africa First," with General Hertzog as producer-playwright. Dr. D. F. Malan was in the lead, though occasionally, in the phraseology of the cinema, the picture was stolen by Mr. Tielman Roos, playing the part of diplomat with disarming success on the central theme of "politics is the study of the possible."

"Ek stel voor" became the signal for Afrikaner advance and the trumpet-call to the defenders of the British trenches. The defenders massed in Natal looked on in panic. They saw the "King's Head" disappear from the postage stamp. A woman in Durban made a vow never to lick a stamp again! They witnessed the lowering of the

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Union Jack as the flag of South Africa. They saw the Empire trade preference policy emerge into a cold-blooded commercial policy that included advantages to Germany. They watched the South African moon recede from the British sun. And as they watched, their wrath rose and knew no bounds.

II

In the first session the "sinister" figure of Dr. Malan threw its shadow over the Ulster of South Africa. His formal introduction—"Ek stel voor"—came with a bill "to define South African Nationality and to provide a national flag for the Union," that it may, in the mover's words, "establish a physical symbol of independent nationhood." For two years the flag was South Africa's *cause célèbre* that threatened to wreck the constitution. A newspaper ran a design competition; a special committee was appointed to look into the whole subject of heraldry; a British Patriotic Society was formed to defend the honour of the Union Jack; an "Ons Eie Vlag" organization protested its opposite. Overflowing mass meetings thundered resolutions right and left. A petition to the King was drawn up "praying His Majesty" to do something about the threat to the flag of the Empire.

The Bill was withdrawn for a space, and Englishmen, not to mention Caledonians, reminded themselves of a recruiting song that began with "Boys in Khaki, Boys in Blue" and ended with "There's going to be dirty weather for anyone who tramples on the flag." There was!

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"Long before this Bill is passed," declared General Smuts, "the country will be in a state of turmoil such as we have not seen for many a day."

Officially, the parties were agreed on the principle of a South African flag. Officially, the conflict was over the design. The first committee set up to investigate the subject was as hopelessly divided as are all committees in South Africa when constituted for the examination of a matter pertaining to racial sentiments. Should the flag embody the Union Jack or the Vierkleur, the old republican flag of the Transvaal, or both; or should it be a new flag, "looking to the future instead of the past!" The Nationalists said a new flag; the South African Party said a flag to incorporate the Union Jack and the Vierkleur.

"The inclusion of the Union Jack and the Vierkleur in the South African flag would be like rattling the bones of the conquered dead in unison with the music of the conqueror."

Months passed. There was the Walker Flag, drawn by the eminent historian of that name, that was like the Vierkleur in form, with a red strip next to the flagstaff, red being the dominant colour of the Union Jack, and having horizontal labels of green, yellow, blue, to represent some feature of the old Republics and Natal. The uproar continued.

"What is all this," cried a prominent Natal M.P., "but a declaration to the whole world that we, as a nation, have ceased to be a part of the British Empire. Our national flag is to show only the Dutch domination of the Nationalists. This is a solemn renunciation of the Union Jack and all that it means. It is a denial of a British citizenship

before the whole world. That is the position which the Nationalists have worked for ever since General Hertzog left the Cabinet of General Botha. It is the first original step towards secession. With a tangible symbol of British citizenship once omitted from the flag, the rest is easy.”

A commission of citizens was appointed to seek a compromise. The English newspapers poured scorn upon it. The defence of the Union Jack was rapidly becoming a disgrace to it. “Never has there been such a roaring of lions,” declared Colonel Stallard—“the gallant colonel,” to the London *Times*, later to become the defender of the faith in Natal. The Caledonian Society and the Sons of England stood their ground. “Natal is entitled to a quarter of the flag, and to say how that quarter shall be designed,” cried one. “We have rights in this country, we are entitled to half of the new flag, and we Britishers want the top right-hand corner next to the flagstaff,” said another; while Mr. Madeley, the Labour Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, was heard to ask, “What is the good of our hold on the Union Jack if somebody else has a bond on the policy?” “The Union Jack must be rededicated in Natal as the flag of Natal for all time,” declared an enthusiastic parson. Dr. Malan was adamant. “The Union Jack shall never be included. The flag,” he said, “is not a mere cloth. It symbolizes national existence—it is a living thing. It is a repository of national sentiment. It is able to create the greatest enthusiasms. The flag is able to move to tears. The flag can stir the deepest springs of action, and inspire the worthiest efforts. For its flag a nation can live and fight and die.”

The ultra-British agreed with every word of

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this peroration. They were ready to fight, and if noise is a measure of their willingness, they were ready to die for the flag, but it must be the flag of the Empire.

In the middle of this exchange of temper the Prime Minister left for the Imperial Conference, but not before he had appealed for an amicable settlement and given promise of a referendum as an earnest of his intention to meet the real wishes of the country. Banner headlines in the English newspapers flung out their challenges—smashing the British connection—Join the Patriotic League. Mild and timid men surprised themselves in the boldness of their denunciations of the attempts to force an unwanted flag upon the British.

How much of the excitement was due to legitimate sentiments and how much was the product of political tactics it is impossible to say. There is no doubt that Dr. Malan would have been willing to take the issue to the country. "It will be a fight between the sons of South Africa and the sons of England." At one stage of the quarrel the Minister of Justice issued an order forbidding members of the police force from membership of the Sons of England, as it was, in his opinion, a political organization. It was a foretaste of the action of the present Government in forbidding the police membership of the Ossewa Brandwag, an anti-war organization. On the other hand, when General Smuts claimed that Dr. Malan was attempting to oust the Union Jack from the flag of the country—"Only a very great man can do that," he said—he was, perhaps, carried away by a desire to retrieve a position he had lost.

The Labour members of the Cabinet looked on,

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aware that without an agreed settlement they would have to face the martial music of their British constituents. Early in the debate they had suggested a compromise in which the Union Jack would be flown separately to denote the Union's relation with the Commonwealth of Nations. But nothing they could do placated their irate supporters in the constituencies, and more than one harmless Labour member paid, with the loss of his seat, for tampering with the allegiances of his electors, and one, at least, was reprimanded by his local branch of the Caledonian Society for “letting Scotland down.”

The Government stood pat on the principle ; though concessions were made about the design, which, after a score of people had engaged their wits upon it, now included the Union Jack and the two flags of the old Republics enclosed in a shield on the National Flag. The Bill passed through its stages in the Lower House but was thrown out by the Senate, where Smuts still had a majority. There followed the Senate Flag, which was an abomination.

Once again the flag was redrawn. But this time the desire for a settlement was everywhere evident. The quick mind of Mr. Tielman Roos saved the day, and as suddenly as it began the flag issue ended with not one flag but two, the Union Jack and the Union Flag. The arrangement permitted the Union Jackers of Natal to rejoice in the news that “Natal has won the Day,” while the Nationalists claimed that not a principle of theirs had been sacrificed. The contending parties gathered in joint session for a parliamentary “morning tea,” the most sociable occasion of a South African day,

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and agreed, for half an hour at any rate, that their opposite numbers were not such renegades as they had thought.

There was a moment when it appeared as though the joy of victory, assumed by both sides, would result in a better understanding between them. The flag issue, however, must be looked upon as a surface symptom of a deep-seated organic condition requiring more than the tannin therapy of a parliamentary tea party for its remedy. To change the metaphor, it was the lashings of a storm at sea which, though they may strike fear into the hearts of men, have no effect whatever upon the currents fathoms deep and beyond the sight. Far away, and uninfluenced by the fury of a Durban mass meeting or by the crude outpourings of the Press on both sides, imperial thought was proceeding to give shape and substance to this thing called the Commonwealth of Nations.

III

The wisdom of General Hertzog may, and legitimately, be doubted. What General Smuts called his unbending obstinacy may be a correct estimate of the Prime Minister. But General Hertzog's courage cannot be denied. War, domestic and foreign, added to the experimental nature of the first Parliaments of the young nation, had provided little opportunity for his predecessors to give protracted thought to the legislative design. It was General Hertzog who stamped South Africa's political direction with the seal of Afrikanerdom and gave the country its present political character

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in the threefold programme that covered independence, Afrikaner equality, and White supremacy. Nor did he discharge one subject before he introduced the next. One of the chief complaints of the Nationalists was that the British were ever ready to accept principles but never ready to carry them out. The purpose of the Nationalists was to do so. As far back as 1917 General Smuts had circularized public servants informing them that promotion in the service would largely depend upon language qualifications, in accordance with the spirit of the South Africa Act. Some insuperable difficulties prevented the application of the order, but none that approached the antagonistic attitude adopted by the British. The British, in fact, did not want to learn Afrikaans—and for reasons which have little to do with oft-repeated assertions that Afrikaans was no language at all, and much to do with the fear of Afrikaner advance. In consequence, wherever the principle was applied it acted to increase the number of Afrikaner Civil Servants. As the British witnessed this movement they did not, of course, seek in their own reluctance the explanation of the increase in Afrikaner membership of the public services, but accused the Government of direct favouritism of the Afrikaner.

There was adequate reason, however, other than affecting the principle of Afrikaner equality, to persuade the Nationalists to more official recognition of Afrikaans as the second language. Among Afrikaners themselves many adhered to the Dutch language. As Dr. Malan explained, "Our children are speaking Afrikaans at home and learning a little Dutch at school." The effects of this can be imagined. There were, however, a considerable

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number of Afrikaners of the old school who looked with some concern upon the use of the Taal, and many men now in adult life can recall the wrath of their grandparents when, as small boys, they fell from grace by passing into Afrikaans speech. It was, then, not only a political move to place Afrikaans on a sounder base than before, but an act necessary to uniformity.

The debate warmed up with the rising temperature occasioned by the Flag Bill, and the opposition, having accepted the principle of bilingualism, were forced back upon the interpretation of the clauses in the Act of Union relating to the subject. Afrikaans, it was maintained by the Government, though at the time *in statu nascendi*, was a form of Dutch which had it been spoken in a province of Holland would have been called a dialect. As a spoken language, they declared, it was somewhat in the same position as English was in Chaucer's time or Dutch in the age of the poet Katz. There are, of course, many differences, the chief of which, and one that is of powerful consequence to-day, is that even in Chaucer's time English had a tradition of literature, whereas Afrikaans has not yet produced a great literary figure who might be looked upon as a standard by which to measure either merit or correctness.

Concerned here as we are with the political and social results of the policy to eliminate Dutch entirely and to give recognition to Afrikaans, the main point to notice is that Afrikaans was to some extent forced upon a British community that did not want it for fear of Afrikaner domination, and also encouraged among an Afrikaner community in an artificial manner. It is a forced

growth, deliberately pursued with the intention of establishing in permanence a tradition which was in danger of being lost.

To the Britisher, Afrikaans was no language at all. Too many of them are of the same opinion to-day, though they may not declare it. There was, they said, a danger that public servants would not get a fair deal. They gave the impression that this was the only safeguard they desired. At the same time they whispered of secession on the east side of the Drakensberg, and reminded the Nationalists that in Natal, Zulu was more important than Dutch; to which the Nationalists reply was, "Why don't they learn it?" On the principle enunciated by Cicero and quoted by General Hertzog, that nothing becomes a nation more than that which is its very own, the Nationalists proceeded and succeeded in putting Afrikaans in the same position as English, so that to-day it costs the country twice as much as it would otherwise do—in paper, in paint, and in other materials—for the duplication of all official notices, publications, and street names.

It was no easy task to persuade the British objectors of the sincerity of the Government's attitude. To begin with, the geographical distribution of the two sections did not help to any exchange of ideas and the understanding of the other man's point of view. Natal was, and is, essentially British, and one might live in Durban for ten years and never hear Afrikaans spoken at all. The Orange Free State is a stronghold of Afrikanerdom, while in the Cape and in the Transvaal there is a zonalization which very broadly results in the social isolation of the two communities. The lack of opportunity

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was, and to a large extent still is, accompanied by an absence of will. There is an attitude of benevolent superiority, always a dangerous condition, about the British approval to the Afrikaner's insistence on his language.

Having achieved equality and official recognition which is essential to the cultural autonomy of the Afrikaner people, one or two of its consequences cannot be ignored. It was not about them that the Britisher was anxious, in his objection to General Hertzog's policy, when he protested about the harm it would do the country. They were chiefly and predominantly concerned with the threat to the British position. But to-day it is fact that bilingualism, as necessary and as desirable as it undoubtedly is, has had and is having a serious influence upon the general educational and cultural advance of the people. There is a distinct tendency in the schools and colleges to ignore the wealth of culture in foreign languages and in the Classics. Time does not permit these studies, and as a result there is, even among some Afrikaner intellectuals who should know better, a reluctance to encourage classical studies. They emphasize the "equality" of Afrikaans culture with that of the Classics. Let it be said at once that the commercial preoccupation of the English is an equally strong factor acting in the same direction. There is something certainly wrong with an attitude that allows the principal of a university college, for example, to remark on the non-necessity of French in an Arts course. Had the Britisher based his protest upon the bilingual qualification on this consideration instead of on the upholding of the British connection, he would have been on firmer ground.

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As it is he has no case at all against the legitimate claim of the Afrikaner to cultural autonomy, even though those claims are artificially stimulated against the certain fears of final disintegration of that culture if left to fend for itself.

IV

In these ways, in language and in domestic affairs, Dr. Malan's "Ek stel voor" was the continuous echo of General Hertzog's declaration on the independent status of his country. He returned from the Imperial Conference of 1926 convinced that the whole Empire had set its seal upon the doctrines he had preached since 1912. In that masterpiece of ambiguity Lord Balfour had penned "the feeling of the Empire in words which leave the foreigner guessing at the meaning of the Commonwealth of Nations and provide the rebel Dominion with subjects for interminable debate." "The Dominions," he wrote, "are autonomous communities within the Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any respect of domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations."

General Hertzog believed he had something in this statement of inter-Dominion relations that spoke to his condition and that reflected, in fact, the central theme of all his thinking.

Before the Imperial Conference, in adherence to his pact with Labour and mindful of the responsibility that high office demands, he was able to say,

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"I am in favour of the British connection being maintained. The Nationalists do not look upon secession as a matter of practical politics. A Government is in power which considers itself the trustees of the people and no longer the agent of any other country. Though I hold it in common with a great many of the most distinguished English statesmen, that any Dominion has the right to secede, such a decision, so far as the Union is concerned, would be a flagrant mistake and a national disaster. I hold further, that only in the very gravest national consideration could such a step be taken without the concurrence as a whole of the two great sections of the people."

The passage from Hertzog the patriot to Hertzog the politician and then to the statesman is seldom better demonstrated than in the gradual admission, which so many of his fellows would deny to-day, that the right to secession from the Empire did not endow the immediate application of it with wisdom. Though he "was firmly convinced that the Republican Government is the only one suitable to South Africa, he was equally convinced that it could not come in a day. . . . It would be nothing short of folly to claim a republic without due regard being had for all circumstances existing at the time."

Until the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, it was the general opinion in Government circles that the Dominions, notwithstanding the possession of self-government, were nevertheless subordinate to Great Britain and had no rights in matters of foreign policy. This, in General Hertzog's opinion, was becoming a matter for increasing dissatisfaction. He quoted a statement made by a

Portuguese Minister that South Africa was a colony with a large territory but dependent on British sovereignty; and another that the Union of South Africa could not be considered an independent country; and still another, by a prominent Canadian politician, who asked: "Is there a place in the Commonwealth of Nations for Canada if she becomes a Sovereign State precisely as Great Britain is a Sovereign State? Obviously, if there is room in the Commonwealth of Nations for Great Britain as an independent nation, but no room for any other independent nation, Canada and the other Dominions are not nations, but are in fact glorified colonies, pretending, in the face of the world, to be something which they are not."

Although these things were said before the Imperial Conference, and a policy laid down in domestic affairs and in foreign trade which was designed to impress upon the world at large, as well as upon the country itself, that South Africa was an independent nation, there was afterwards an almost embarrassing admission, by prominent Nationalists, of the British Government's magnanimity and the wisdom of Empire statesmen. "All feeling of subordination and inferiority has been removed; we possess all liberties and rights of sovereign independence." "If ever there was anything which could move us Dutch-speaking Afrikaners to identify ourselves heart and soul with the idea of remaining in the British Commonwealth of Nations, it is this declaration of the Imperial Conference." The effect of such declarations upon the mind of the Nationalists was to produce a conviction, since firmly held, that at last South Africa had reached national maturity,

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and that she was the master of her destiny in affairs foreign and domestic. If such be so, they had in fact a republic save in name, and henceforth they might go in peace. The fear of a federal empire, the group unity, which General Smuts had advocated, was no longer present. South Africa could do what she wished with her own—declare war or make peace, secede from the Commonwealth or stay where she was. Had not the Imperial Conference so declared? Had not the British Government in the Locarno Pact acted upon this very principle, that the Dominions were nations separate and distinct? Was South Africa a member of an Empire State or a State with sovereign independence? On this, General Hertzog maintained, the Imperial Conference gave a decisive and final answer. "If South Africa cannot find salvation within the British Empire, or if any of the Dominions do not find salvation within the Empire, then you will not keep them there."

"But what," General Smuts asked, "did the Prime Minister mean by independence, as in the report the word independence has been carefully avoided?"

"Does General Smuts believe that we are not independent?" parried the Prime Minister, almost with an anxiety to learn of the possibility of some flaw in his interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. The Balfour Declaration was no new principle; it was the statement of it which gave rise to such satisfaction in the Nationalist's mind. It was a mind nurtured in the Calvinist tradition and the letter of the law, and nourished in legal rather than in philosophic atmosphere. It sought to define abstract principles in hard concrete terms and to

put down in words the rights of a people to meet every conceivable eventuality, forgetful perhaps that very often, as General Smuts reiterated, "We are up against something new, something to which the categories of juridical science do not apply." "Do not let us differ too much," he warned his hearers.

The very approval with which the Balfour Declaration was received in Afrikaner circles subtracted from any joy the British section might have found in it. It was no easy thing for the British domiciled in South Africa to accept the idea that the Union was Britain's equal, with independent liberty. Such equality seems to bestow, and indeed did bestow, upon the Afrikaner Nationalists a new sense of power which might in the future jettison a connection upon which the Britishers, unable as it were to stand on their own feet, relied for that feeling of security so much a part of colonial and dominion society.

The Cabinet was Afrikaner. There were one or two Britishers in it, but they were Britishers who had Socialist leanings and could not, in the opinion of the Natal caste, be relied upon to defend an empire. There was a danger, therefore, that by neglect of their own politics and their preference for commerce, their economic power would fail to prevent the Afrikaner carrying out what he had threatened years before. Such default as was the Britishers' was not due to any lack of political consciousness. No-one, in fact, can long remain in proximity with the Afrikaner without becoming intensely aware of the part politics play in South African life. At the same time the observer is impressed by the absence of any outstanding

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Britisher representing the English-speaking section. In every instance where the British tradition has been seriously at stake it has been saved by Afrikaner leaders ; Botha and Smuts in particular, and more generally, that section of Afrikaner representation which, for one reason and another, prefers the Britisher's way of life. The numbers of this section have always been large enough in a crisis to weight the scales on the British side.

The British connection, on this reckoning, exists by grace of Afrikaner leadership and not by virtue of British statesmanship. During this period—in every sphere of domestic, imperial, foreign policy—the more or less permanent features of the independent nation were being drawn ; no man of the British side arose, big enough or able enough, to reflect the British case. Possibly as a result of this, the vehemence of the British protest was the louder ; certainly it was the more ineffectual. Few able Englishmen in South Africa enter the party struggle. Few able Englishmen outside commerce remain in South Africa, so that the English case and cause, at this time, and the English tradition suffered accordingly.

Where it was presented, as it was by General Smuts, it was advocated in its narrower or more national aspects, such as British protection and the British Navy as the great sheet-anchor of South Africa, and never in the wider sense, which may be described as a state or attitude of mind. Despite the fact, then, of the presence in South Africa of a wide political awareness by Afrikaner and British, the former is almost entirely unacquainted with the broader and the best of what is known as the English tradition and way of life, and what is best

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described as living by a motto rather than living within a fabric of legal pronouncements, so peculiarly appealing to the Afrikaner mind.

The Balfour Declaration had no meaning for General Hertzog save as giving definite and decisive confirmation of the fact of independence. To General Smuts it was otherwise. It was the expression of the tradition of the English way of life, which has no definition ; and General Smuts interpreted a South African British point of view which the South African British could not interpret for themselves or for anyone else. The limit of their contribution stopped at a patriotism vehemently and vociferously expressed, genuine enough, in all conscience, but devoid of those finer attributes which are regarded as the contribution of the British to the world.

As a result, the Afrikaners saw only the British Jingo—there was only the British Jingo to see—and acted accordingly. This absence of the voice of the English way of life and of the English approach to the ordering of a society had immeasurable consequence. It tended to magnify racial groupings, classification on the basis of race—a division which is quite foreign to the tradition which allows men of different races to think more of social attitudes than of the constitution of their blood.

It is a serious reflection on the South African British that they have preferred the means of life to the way of life, and its results are obvious in the ignorance of the Nationalist Afrikaner of what that way of life is. There was, during the rise of Afrikanerdom, a British tradition ; there was not an English tradition. The former found its ultimate expression in political revolt—in whisperings of

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secession in Natal, and in the Devolution movement in South Africa's Ulster—that might have precipitated civil war. The latter was not there to express.

The Nationalists were frankly amazed to discover that what an Empire Conference was prepared to concede South Africa, in company with the rest of the Dominions, was the cause of such disquiet among the Natalian British. "I leave," said General Hertzog before he left London, "fully satisfied that whatever I wanted to have and to attain has been attained . . . and what is more, it has been attained with the full co-operation and sympathy of all when we have met together."

V

Imperial thought was far in advance of the Dominion British opinion, which, distant from the centre of the Commonwealth and faced with the implications of Afrikaner domination, expressed its doubts of Imperial wisdom by an antagonism towards the Hertzog Ministry and all that was Dutch. The implications touched the British in their most sensitive parts. It was one thing to insist upon bilingual qualifications ; it was possible, by stretch of magnanimity, to overlook the secondary position to which the Union Jack had been brought ; it was understandable, though unfortunate, that the Afrikaner should want to park his car in areas demarcated in Afrikaans and English ; but, protested the British, when the Nationalist Government projects the spirit of independence to favour German manufacturers to the

disadvantage of trade with Britain, it was time for all men to man the trenches.

In the tally of legislative purposes, erected on the principle of “ South Africa first and ourselves alone,” trade agreements with Germany were not least in arousing the anger of the British. To hear these policies expounded and presented in a language he did not understand was enough to raise the ire of the British Member of the Union Parliament. For we must remember that during this time the English-speaking Member of Parliament made no effort to understand Afrikaans. It is not much better to-day. There are English-speaking Cabinet Ministers in the Union Government who cannot follow their opponents’ speeches from the floor of the House. Think of the confusion and irritation that would result in the House of Commons if Labour in Opposition talked Chinese and the Conservatives in Power talked Spanish. Even nonsense assumes importance when it is spoken in an unknown and alien tongue !

Whereas there was not an Afrikaner in the House that could not turn from Afrikaans to English with ease and facility, scarcely an Englishman could address the Assembly in a language that was fast mounting to dominate parliamentary debates. To-day three-quarters of the speeches delivered in Parliament are in Afrikaans. The unilingual British Member must wait for the translations before he knows what has been said, and by the time he has digested the written word it is too late to do anything about it.

The English tradition, then, is completely unknown to the Afrikaner, for the good reason that there was, and is, no-one to reflect anything of

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Britain save that which lies for the most part outside it—in the products of the Colonies and the Dominions, from Fascism that derives from “Poona-Poona” to the flat imperialism of British middle-class representation.

This province, wrote the *Natal Witness* in surveying the political scene late in the nineteen-twenties, is the last outpost of nineteenth-century England. When Dr. Malan declared, “Our highest principle is not to be found in republicanism but in fidelity to the interests of South Africa,” he was expressing the whole philosophy of General Hertzog, a philosophy that was diametrically opposed to the nineteenth-century tradition of Natal. The same Dr. Malan defined the four periods of South Africa’s political evolution and emancipation. “There was,” he said, “the Crown Colony period ; the Colonial period, when South Africa had no nationality but British nationality but when she had certain rights of self-government. Then came the period of old Dominion status, under which, too, there was no South African nationality. The fourth was that declared in the Balfour Declaration, called into being with the creation of South African nationality and the flag. It was a nationality that existed side by side with British nationality.” One step, he said, remained to be taken, to have only one nationality—our own nationality : South Africa for the South Africans—for all those, at any rate, who were willing to remain in the country and to accept the new orientation that the Nationalist Party gave the country.

There were many who refused to do so, and sought elsewhere an atmosphere more in accord

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with their traditions. At the same time there were many others, particularly in south and south-east Europe, that looked to South Africa as a refuge and as an opportunity. The “ Ek stel voor ” of Dr. Malan was once more to be heard, this time on the subject of immigration and with proposals based upon the Australian and the American quota systems, denying right of domicile to thousands from Europe who sought sanctuary. A new term appeared in the debates of Parliament—assimilability—an ever-ready escape for the little Afrikaners from the inevitability of their mediocrity.

“ I can see, looking in the dictionary of the future,” Mr. Madeley twitted, “ the student wanting to find the meaning of assimilability. They will find the word, and against it will be written, ‘see Malanism,’ and they will read, ‘capable of being swallowed, absorbed, digested, taken in by a political party; see also ‘Duncanism’ for construction; and for derivation and for balance, see Hofmeyrism.’ ”

It was in the course of the debate on immigration that J. H. Hofmeyr, present Minister of Finance, made his maiden speech in Parliament. Singularly enough, it was typical of the Botha-Smuts tradition which was so objectionable to the Nationalists. “ We accept the principle, but,” and in this case the “ but ” was that the Bill was directed against Jewish immigration and designed with that discriminatory bias. The measure, however, with some amendments, passed through the legislature with the rest that had marked Dr. Malan as the most consistent politician, and in some respects the ablest statesman in the Union of South Africa.

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In five years, acting on the inspiration of his Prime Minister, General Hertzog, Dr. Malan had materially influenced the perspective of political South Africa; occasionally running ahead of the Prime Minister, but always reflecting in his legislative proposals the idea and ideal of "ourselves alone." Not only the symbols but the substance of sovereign independence was his direct objective. In education, in the universities, in the schools, he determined to accord minority rights; whether they were English, as in the case of Pretoria University, or Afrikaner, as in the case of Cape Town, the principle of equality was followed in design and decision. That his policy was in conflict with neither section, but coincident with the broad interests of a new and young nation, is evident from the rebuffs and protests that came from both sides.

Five years of office, then, found General Hertzog's Ministry, if not as strong as at its advent, weakened only as a strong man is tired after years of work. The Prime Minister's pact with Labour had been well kept. It was the Labour Party and not the Nationalists that first showed signs of disintegration; with the Flag Bill, and later in domestic rift, it tore itself to pieces, giving the 1929 elections the character of a straight fight between Hertzogism and Smutsism; between the Afrikaner under the banner of the Mullah of Stellenbosch experienced in office and the British under the banner of an Afrikaner of world repute but of domestic doubt.

The five years of the Nationalist Government may be looked upon as the action and interaction of two forces, or they may be looked upon as a test of the degree to which the British in South Africa

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were willing to become members of a new South African nation. Packed into half a decade were challenges to the South Africanism of the English-speaking people—the flag, bilingualism, sovereign independence, and the political domination of the Afrikaner.

By all the tests, Hertzog should have been swept from office in 1929. Instead, he went back to power freed from Labour entanglements. That he did so was due to the use he made of the old battle-cry of White supremacy, a cry that drowns all others in a land that teems with the Black man, the Coloured man, and the Indian. A survey of the contribution of the Nationalist Party would be incomplete without reference to the manner in which the manifold problems raised by the presence of the non-European were ordered. They have the added significance of being the only platform on which Afrikaner and Britisher meet in some agreement, to demonstrate that on questions of White supremacy, the unofficial fascism of the South African British is not very far removed from the official fascism of the Afrikaner.

IV

THE DIVINE RIGHT OF WHITE SKIN

CHAPTER VI

I

ON the east side of the sub-continent that is South Africa the land flows in wide and therefore smoothly undulating waves, and is known as the High Veld. It gathers into immense folds and upthrusts as the coast is approached, almost as if it had decided to precipitate itself into the Indian Ocean. From the veld, that varies from 4,000 to 6,000 feet, the earth reaches up to a mass of berg, sweeping and cutting the landscape. Then, as if weary of its labour and unsuccessful in its design to splash into the ocean, it falls into the more gentle curves of Natal. In a bowl of its making stands the city of Pietermaritzburg, more English than any city of the land, but less British than the port of Natal, Durban, sixty miles away, which is the last ditch of British fascism.

Pietermaritzburg has one feature common to most South African towns. It is ringed about by a black belt of varying depth populated by Natives, Indians, Coloureds, and a sprinkling of Poor Whites, all of whom live in symbiotic relation with one another and with the disease threatening all. The European population of the centre, that is, of the city itself, is 22,000 ; the population of the black belt is somewhere about 17,000. The Umsindusi River flows through the black belt before it flows through the city. The Umsindusi is the

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scavenger of the black belt, receiving into its flow a stream of disease-laden filth. The black belt is a pestilence of a place. From it, and places like it that are cheek by jowl with other towns, the Europeans draw their labour, their domestic servants, their daily help, their industrial labour power. In order to defend themselves, the Europeans draw a *cordon sanitaire* about their towns. Every Native boy seeking work in the towns submits to a medical examination ; every native woman should undergo the same examination, but for some reason the regulations do not apply to Native women. The chances are that the Native boy, who of course may be old enough to be your grandfather, is riddled with syphilis or gonorrhea or tuberculosis or amœbic dysentery ; and syphilis and gonorrhea and tuberculosis and amœbic dysentery are not only social problems of great and growing magnitude, they can be weighty political and economic problems. They form at any rate part of the consequence of the presence of the White man in Africa, and are one aspect that opens up others which in the aggregate are called the Native Problem. Such is the way of the European, that he calls a problem, which is of his very own making, by a name that seems to suggest to the uninitiated a responsibility of another.

With the coming of the White man, the Natives of the Cape soon discovered an elementary maxim of European economy. First fetch wood, then eat bread. Even a dog can be taught it, and a Hottentot was a little, though not much, superior to a dog. The Native, of course, had already discovered, even in those days, what the Europeans have not learnt despite all their science. He knew how to

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live. Within the law of his tribe he had much leisure to devote to drinking his beer and consorting with his wives and basking in the sunlight. On the European plane, however, knowing how to live was not the way to salvation. That lies in knowing how to work and in working. So, in order to help the Native to salvation as well as, of course, to aid in his own enrichment, the European taught the Native to work. First fetch wood, then eat bread—a simple enough condition of life that served as a principle upon which to hack the rough path through a jungle, to make roads and build houses, to search for diamonds and to dig for gold. The Native proved a lazy fellow ; he had to be driven. His laziness was the White man's cross. He preferred to live instead of to work. By fits and starts he objected to this intrusion upon his right to live, until, by other fits and starts, he was gradually forced to accept work that he might exist, in place of adhering to the great truths of his forbears about life and living.

He was not without sense, and there came a time when he discovered that White men were fundamentally lazy, for all their hurry and bustle and their Divine Right of White Skin. There were two kinds of White people, but both had the same idea of getting as much work out of him as possible. For some strange reason, one section of the White men, who came under the Great White Queen, were concerned to give him rights he could scarcely understand, and to make him a Christian which he never wanted to be. The other kind were full of the belief that there was such a thing as the dignity of work and labour, but that the Good God, the great Creator, who was set above the Great White

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Queen, had made him different from the White man and set the White man over him. The glimmerings of these things did not come early, not did they affect, by one jot or tittle, the idea which seemed to stand not only above the Great White Queen but also above the Good God—first fetch wood, then eat bread.

II

This principle, and the use made of it, destroyed much of the Native's community life centred in the tribe. Eventually it detribalized him; but before it did, and before he accepted it, he put up a strong resistance in the hope of driving the White man out of his country. It was an unsuccessful series of wars he staged, and ultimately he came under two rulers and two ideas of government—one in the Cape, that was traditionally and broadly British and granted him some elementary political rights in his economic subjection; the other based upon the Calvinistic doctrine that God had already fixed who were the elect and had decided that he was not one of them. In the Cape Colony, then, the Native, as the servant, had the right to the franchise. In the Trekker Republics he had no rights at all. "The people shall not admit of equality between White and Black either in Church or State." This difference in the official attitudes between the South that was British and the North that was Boer did not define unofficial attitudes. In the developing Transvaal, the British themselves rapidly assumed the attitude that the Native must be kept in a state of subjection. So that when the four

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colonies came together, though the position of the Native was left as before, the North was in no conflict about his status. It was decided that the Cape Native franchise should remain, but that it could be abolished by a two-thirds majority of Parliament. The North believed it soon would be !

Years before this, and particularly after the Boer War, the detribalized Native was forced to find work. He did so by attaching himself to the bywoner, a White farmer who held land on lease on the feudal system, sharing the returns of his labour with the owner. The bywoner was often a Poor White, quite unable to farm the land, so that he in his turn leased patches of it to the Native on similar conditions of feudal service. Many of his fellow-Natives went to town, where they were called to make the necessary psychological adjustments to a new environment. The more enterprising of them recognized that the land, of which there was a surfeit before the appearance of the White man, had a special meaning all its own. They bought land, won a case before the courts on their right to do so, and proceeded to set up, through associations, small townships. The White man took fright. The Native, whose original and grievous sin was his laziness, was now beginning to appreciate the White man's game of land economy. As a lazy fellow he was a problem ; now that he was not lazy, he was an even greater problem. The threat of his refusal to work had, over a period of two or three decades, become a threat to the White worker. There was on all sides a demand that he should be kept at bay.

How to do this was the first part of the Native problem. General Hertzog set his mind to this

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case in the first Union Cabinet. His idea was to segregate the Natives from the Europeans in areas where they would eventually govern themselves and "develop along their own lines," whatever that may mean. The proposals were designed to forbid the Native the right to purchase land and to end the system in which he paid for his tenancy by a proportion of the produce. He was placed in the position of contracting his service to the farmer or quitting his home. Not a British vote could be found to support the Bill; not because the British did not believe in segregation, but because of the haste with which it was hurried on its way.

The Opposition brought about the appointment of the Beaumont Committee, which reported two or three years afterwards. There are few reports that make more discouraging reading. "The Commission," it reads, "would have liked to frame its recommendations on broad lines, recognizing the advantages of large compact areas for the Natives." That it could not was due to the refusal of the White farmers, who were already scattered in such a way that there were no large areas that did not include them. The Native was pushed out of his holdings, and now that he was detribalized, he had nowhere to go. Work he must, for the poll tax made him. But in human affairs, no less than in the physical realm, Newton's third law applies. "To every action there is an equal and opposite reaction." When the Native squatter left the White bywoner, the latter could not make his farm pay. He, too, left it—to the wind and the rain that play havoc with surface soil and destroy by erosion in a few months the fertility that a thousand years have produced. The eroding

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effect of the Native laws was one thing, but the quitting of the farms by the Natives drove not only the Natives into the towns, but also the bywoners—a section of the Poor Whites.

III

The “ Poor White ” problem, though it did not originate with the panic of the European at the forward move of the Native, was intensified by it. It was there before, growing up in the same way as the Labour fund of any other older industrial country, as a maladjustment of industrial progress. The Poor Whites number somewhere about 300,000. The vast majority of them are Afrikaners. They do not all live in the towns, but when they do they exist on a bare subsistence, seeking a European standard with an economic status no higher than that of the Native.

The Native—deprived of his land, and now, out of reach of his tribe, detribalized—sought the work he wanted in competition with the lowest paid worker in the town. When he could not find it he lived on the outskirts of the town, and the outskirts rapidly became a black belt in its several senses. The towns, taking panic at this inflow, framed regulations to stem the tide and attempted to drive him back whence he came. And the White man, no matter what his work, saw his standard of living in jeopardy. The Colour Bar became an economic barrier in defence of European standards. The chief citizens raised their brows in horror at the approach of the Native worker, cried, “ What’s to become of our children ? ” and pro-

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ceeded to deny the Native, and any other non-European for that matter, any opportunity to rise beyond the status of hewer of wood and drawer of water. It was a hopeless task. Government legislation, trades union regulation, and that which is more repressive than both, an unenlightened public opinion, each and all failed to accomplish an impossibility—the distribution of Native labour and social forces in such a way that Newton's third law of motion, applied to human affairs, did not obtain. A sociological Newton would agree that it could not be so.

The Beaumont Commission set apart 87 per cent. of the country for Europeans and 13 per cent. for the Bantu. The numbers of the former were one and a quarter millions ; the numbers of the latter were nearly four times that. It is not necessary to add that the 13 per cent. was not the choicest of the land available. The results cannot be measured. Only a few of them strike the uninitiated, for the *cordon sanitaire* drawn round the towns becomes stronger every day, while the mind becomes blunted, less sensitive, and even callous to this disgrace to the White man's self-respect.

The health cordon cannot be quite so strong as the economic cordon, drawn round the White man's standard of living and known better as the Colour Bar—a group attitude of the Europeans as fixed as the stars. A list of occupations which the Native could not enter was drawn up long before any legislative enactment gave industry and commerce the legal right to do so ; and we have already seen, in the revolt of the White workers, how violently incensed the Europeans of the Transvaal were at the proposals to engage Natives in classes

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of work denied them by custom. The rising tide of Colour had somehow to be stemmed, and in 1925 General Hertzog introduced a one-clause Colour Bar Bill with the object of safeguarding the employment of the Europeans.

It was not only directed at the Natives but at all non-Europeans, and fell heavily upon Indians and Coloureds, lumping these widely divergent sections together and treating them without distinction of ability or potential. South Africa, then, has become a country with a large non-European proletariat, towards which Labour, in the political and trades union sense, presents an unrelenting exterior.

It is a common assumption in England and elsewhere that it is the Dutch, the Afrikaners, who prevent the progress and upliftment of the non-Europeans, and that were it not for them the British would return to the liberal policy of the Cape, and extend it. This is but half the truth. The Afrikaners' official attitude is well known: "We are not called upon to grant the Native anything which is not in accord with our own interests," expresses their position. But no less draconian is the attitude of the trades unions, official and unofficial. Many of their members might agree that the Native got a raw deal, but that, he would say, is just bad luck. Nothing can be done about it in a world ruled by the instinct for self-preservation.

Something, however, would have to be done about it if the towns were not to be inundated with Natives, if the Native unemployment problem was not to assume the gravest proportions, if the black belts were not to break down the *cordon sanitaire*. The Native Urban Arcas Act of 1923 served to

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emphasize the need for residential segregation in the towns, for the clearance of slum areas, and for the control of the inflow of Natives from the country. The Natives already expelled from the land, it was now proposed to drive them out of the towns. Unable to live in the kraal, essential to the industrial concerns of the country, and at the same time confined to the inferior tasks at low wages, "the plumber's mate," who was never to be allowed to become "a plumber," they were between the devil and the deep sea.

IV

The position, then, when General Hertzog came into power was such that the Natives were in three classes: the Native who lived in his kraal; the detribalized Native who had become "urbanized" in the towns; and the Native who was neither one nor the other. Of the three, the last was the most numerous.

In any estimate of General Hertzog's attitude to the Native problem it is important to retain the perspective of the days, and to keep in mind certain facts and certain comparisons. The average Native worker in industry is no more oppressed than the Durham coal-miner. Very often, standard for standard, he enjoys a fuller life. Certainly I have seen poverty in the coal-mines of Durham that is as distressing as anything I have witnessed in South Africa. The Native has a legitimate complaint that occupations for which he may be fitted are denied him, and that there are no training grounds whereby, by dint of industry, he might improve

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himself. The second point is that there is much truth in the arguments about the threat to European standards of living. It is a truth that has been demonstrated in the sphere of international trade in the competition of such countries as Japan. There are numbers of people who talk uplift for the Natives who are busy denying it to their fellow Europeans, and who condemn the traditional Boer attitude they long ago made their own in the treatment of the underprivileged. What is more pertinent to remember is that until General Hertzog's rise to power no approach had been made to the Native problem except in palliative measure designed to relieve what was thought to be a temporary condition that would remedy itself.

General Hertzog, then, reflected the bulk of the opinion in the Union, the opinion of British Natal and Afrikaner Transvaal, when he proposed a fourfold scheme for the remedy of the problem. This plan took many years to shape from these foundations of past neglect of Native administration. There was the Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill, designed to abolish the old Cape Franchise and grant, instead, European representation to the Natives with limited power of voting. Another Bill suggested a Native Council of thirty-five members, elected from the provinces and presided over by an officer of the Native Affairs Department. The powers of this Native legislative body were "to pass laws, to be called ordinances binding on Natives only, in respect of such matters affecting Natives in the Union, or any part thereof, as Parliament may, by law, specially authorize." The third Bill was the Natives Land Act, 1913 Amendment Bill, by which it was proposed to

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proclaim further areas for the Natives, to abolish the right of squatting, and to provide moneys for Native purchase of land in proclaimed areas.

It would be difficult to defend the whole of these proposals, and no-one pretends that they were formulated solely or even largely for the benefit of the Natives. What can be commended is the Prime Minister's courage in raising the Native question in its entirety and placing before the country suggestions for discussion and debate.

From the beginning it was the custom to look upon Native affairs as non-party issues, to be dealt with or ordered in a spirit of co-operation between the political groups. Unfortunately the political groups at this time were more firmly opposed to one another than is usually the case. The policy of General Hertzog and the "Ek stel voor" of Dr. Malan had angered the Opposition to a point at which they could not look at any political issue save in a party spirit. General Hertzog, quick to see the opportunity presented as the debate on the Native question lengthened into years, chose the subject on which to fight the election at the end of his five years' term of office. He was on safe ground. To his supporters in the Transvaal and the Free State, whose reluctance to grant the Native even indirect representation was resolute, he could plead that to silence the Native voice altogether would be to alienate a large number of Church congregations. To the Natives he could say, and did, that the proposals would allow them a measure of self-government to develop on their own lines. To the White workers on the Rand and elsewhere he could use the bogey of the rising tide of Colour. To those who were sincerely concerned for the

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disappearance of the Cape franchise, he could point to the need for greater representation throughout the country.

They were telling arguments. The most successful of them was that which touched the standards of living of the workers. "If I wanted to be Prime Minister," exclaimed General Smuts, "I would choose no better platform than the Prime Minister's Native Bills." It was the platform General Hertzog offered him, and on it won by a margin that gave General Hertzog freedom from his pact with a disrupted Labour Party. It was a platform on which the majority of South Africa agree, the platform of White supremacy and Black subjection, on which the Divine Right of White Skin was successfully defended.

The Native Bills became the subject of prolonged consideration in the new Parliament, and they were not passed in their final form until the coalition ministry of Hertzog-Smuts came to power. It was then that Mr. Hofmeyr, as a member of the Fusion Cabinet, was to make his protest against them. In their final form they appeared as a triad of enactments that govern the political status and representation of the Natives, abolishing the old Cape franchise and substituting for it a separate Native electoral roll responsible for the election of three members in the House of Assembly. Certain European senators are chosen to represent Native interests in the Senate. On the economic side Native reserves were increased and the prescribed work of Natives defined. In principle the proposals of General Hertzog were accepted and the general lines of political and economic evolution settled, apparently for all time.

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As a projection of the central theme of segregation it meets with the approval of Boer and Briton alike. White supremacy is preserved in its clauses, and it is doubtful if Liberalism will ever persuade the Europeans to accept the opinion that the population of South Africa is ten and not two millions.

The presence of Liberal elements, indeed, seems but to enhance the reaction of other sections. It is in the administration of parliamentary enactments rather than in the legislature itself where success or failure is to be found. There is in South Africa a reluctance to be guided by any experience that history offers. Both British and Afrikaners in the mass are not given to concede any value to past experience. A profound truth—such as that contained in the experience of other nations and expressed in the conclusion that, where a section of the people with economic power is denied political rights, unrest and discontent are the inevitable result—is lost upon South Africa. One of the unavoidable consequences of the refusal of citizenship to the educated Bantu is the movement towards industrial association. The Natives have watched the ways and the manners of the White men. If they have aped him in habits, they have also imitated him in workers' associations.

The example of the industrial Commercial Union, the first Native trades union organization, will suffice to illustrate several cognate aspects of South African politics. This union, wishing to place its complaints about the conditions of Native workers in the postal department, requested an interview with the Minister, Mr. Madeley, a Labour M.P. and known to be a Socialist. At the time a

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serious rift of a domestic nature had occurred in the Labour Party, so that there was other reason for the Prime Minister to question the stability of his Cabinet with those Labour members in it. The Government and employers of labour, particularly the farmers, looked with disfavour upon the Natives' trades union. It appeared on the edge of the middle 'twenties when the spread of Communism was disturbing the western world. The Prime Minister advised Mr. Madeley to refuse the interview, or, at any rate, postpone it until the matter had been discussed by the Cabinet. Mr. Madeley, possibly on some misunderstanding, considered it suitable to meet the delegates under the official introduction of the secretary of the Trades Union Congress, whereupon the Prime Minister wrote Mr. Madeley telling him that he had lost confidence in him. Mr. Madeley did not resign immediately, but asked for opportunity to advise and consult the National Council of the Labour Party. To this, General Hertzog's answer was to hand in his resignation to the Governor-General and, on the latter's request, form a new Cabinet and drop Mr. Madeley from his Ministry.

It is not to be supposed that this minor crisis was occasioned solely by the partial recognition by Mr. Madeley of the rising trades unionism of the Bantu worker. It is of value in illustrating some possible doubts in the minds of Labour leaders on Labour principles, as well as showing the extent to which the menace of Black labour was spreading. It would be difficult to decide which held first place in the South African British worker's mind—the Union Jack or the Colour Bar—but both, during those years, called from him all the allegiance he

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possessed. On the Union Jack he raised a storm of protest against the "Ek stel voor" of Dr. Malan. On the Colour Bar and White supremacy, he put the Mullah of Stellenbosch, once the avowed republican, back into power in preference to General Smuts, who had claimed that General Hertzog was trying to abolish the Union Jack.

V

Native policy, then, in this country is not so much the imprint of Calvinistic doctrine on the law of the land as it is the reflection of a majority opinion. Convention is stronger than democracy, and there was good reason for conventions. Not only have we two European races at grips in the political and constitutional arena, but we have two nations, white and black, at widely separated stages of development—the one moving upward at too rapid a rate to dissipate the fears of the other and having a profound effect upon the social and economic fabric.

Having ignored the Native as citizen so long, we continue to ignore him as a potential market. South Africa is a land of surpluses. It is not peculiar in this. What is peculiar is the way in which the economic direction of the country is made to serve the European's prejudice against the Blacks. Not only do Europeans refuse him direct political representation and deny him any advance as an industrial worker where his skill would soon be in evidence, but the European will keep the Black man in his place at the expense of his own economic welfare. South Africa possesses a large potential

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internal market. To develop it requires the raising of the purchasing power of the Native. He is a good spender. The rise in the demand, as a result of an increase in the purchasing power of the Native, would do much to relieve the country of marketing legislation and an export policy which permits South African foodstuffs to be sold 30 to 50 per cent. lower than they can be purchased here. But such a rise in the purchasing power would result in other demands of a political nature. It would do something to narrow the gap between White and Black and accentuate the process which is proceeding inevitably, despite all restrictive factors, to force upon the White man a recognition of the Black man's right to greater political recognition.

South Africa chooses, therefore, to retard the development of its internal market and to order its agricultural and marketing economy on the basis that the population is two millions instead of ten. In the social sense this means that the country is prepared to pay, and pay heavily, for the Divine Right of White Skin. "There is no obligation to give the Native anything which does not accord with our own interests." This is the crux of the matter. On the one hand, then, in order to save some vestige of self-respect and to safeguard public health, large sums are devoted to the general health control of the Natives, who suffer a degree of poverty and a state of malnutrition which is by no means unique but is nevertheless a disgrace to our national self-respect.

At the same time high tribute must be paid to the ability and the work of men in the Native Affairs Department. It is a mistake made by many people overseas to look upon the Bantu as an un-

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cared for, oppressed people living in poverty unknown to White communities. There is much advanced work proceeding at the side of deplorable conditions. Some municipalities can point with pride to model Native villages where a degree of self-government obtains. Hospital services, educational opportunities of all kinds, public health and hygiene enjoy the devoted service of many Europeans. One has only to point to the experiments in Bantu markets and Bantu associations—in towns as far apart as Pietermaritzburg and Port Elizabeth, where social projects of accumulating worth are in train—to compensate a superficial opinion.

In any judgment of South Africa's Native policy it is as well to remember these things—and one other. Just as all Indians are not Sastris, so Natives are not all Tshekedis.

CHAPTER VII

I

“ I CLAIM my right to take my seat as a member of King George’s household. I shall not be content with a place in his outer stables.” In such words Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru addressed the Imperial Conference in 1923.

It is remarkable that it was in the problems of the most despised section of the polyglot of South Africa’s population that Dr. Malan rose to the highest point he ever attained in South African statesmanship. He ventured far beyond British public opinion on the manner of treatment of Indians, and if he has since returned to the doctrines of a youthful political experience, it is the more to be remarked upon that for a moment of time he came very near to expressing the best British conception in dealing with subject communities. Indeed a few observers of South African politics believe that were Dr. Malan—now so heartily hated as a Nationalist Republican—Prime Minister of South Africa, and the ultra-British could resist the temptation to prejudice him, he would prove more genuinely liberal than either General Smuts or General Hertzog. At least it can be said that his ministerial attitude to Indians in the middle ’twenties gave promise of high statesmanship—more, of great benefit.

The Indian question, like the Native question,

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is, of course, a European charge. If it is a problem, it is essentially the British of South Africa, and especially of Natal, and not the Afrikaner, who are responsible for it. The sugar planters of the Natal coast, disgusted with the labour of the Zulus, or unable to procure it, persuaded the Natal Government to import Indian coolies. That was in 1860. A system of indentured labour was introduced. It was not Indians that the Natalians wanted but the Indian labour, in the hope that once their indentures had been served, the Indians would return to India. Instead they settled in Natal, where they became gardeners, worked on the Natal Railways, or took whatever came along in the domestic work of the Colony. Natal, in fact, soon discovered that it could not do without the Indians' labour, and any attempt to stop the indenture system met with loud protest from the sugar industry.

With the increase in the Indians' numbers, the British of Natal took fright—a similar fright that obsessed the mind of the Whiteman at the advance of the Native. The Indians were confined almost entirely to that province. The Orange Republic had banned them in the beginning; and the Transvaal, following the example after a few had rushed in, refused entry to Asiatics; while the Cape, though no strict policy had been introduced, was not, at the time of Union, burdened with any proportion of Indian population. The problem, then, was confined to the territory of Natal, where until recent years it was so novel an event to hear Dutch spoken that children playing in the streets turned to mark the wonder of it. It was a problem of the British reaction to the presence of the Asiatic.

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The deliberations that resulted in the Union of the four provinces in 1910 found it expedient to ignore the majority of questions arising out of the presence of the Natives and of non-Europeans in general. The separate enactments of the Colonies regarding the Indians, their comings and goings, remained to make Union no Union at all as far as they were concerned. They could not move, nor can they now, from one province to the other for work and domicile, and those who had trickled into the Transvaal in the old republican days were registered by finger-prints, in order to check immigration over the land frontier from Natal and forbidden trade in the gold areas. In Natal, one year before Union was celebrated, the Clayton Commission had presented its report on the advisability of discontinuing the importation of Indians. It could not, in the interests of the Colony, recommend such a step because, it said, a large number of Europeans with their families were dependent for their livelihood, directly or indirectly, on the employment of Indians, and were any action taken to interfere with this labour supply great hardships would be caused. The Europeans then were in a cleft stick. The richest sugar planters in Natal declared that the success of the industry rested entirely upon the labour of Indians, while the rest of the community were anxious to repatriate them.

For decades Indians had been arriving in some numbers, and after five years service at ten or twelve shillings a month they were entitled to a free passage home or to a grant of Crown land equal in value to the free passage. It was the cheapest labour, short of slavery, in the world; so cheap, indeed, that in 1864 a public loan of £100,000 was

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raised to encourage it. In 1876 the Indian population was about 6,700 ; in 1884 it had risen to 27,000 ; and in 1891 it amounted to over 35,000 beside a European population of 46,000. Whereas the Colony saw to it that the Natives, though outnumbering the Whites by a million, were kept politically impotent, the Coloureds, in which Indians were included, possessed municipal and parliamentary franchise. Free Indians occupied portions of Crown land, developing the marketing of fruit and vegetables, which is so marked a feature of Natal life to-day. Their votes were rapidly rising to overtake the European. Natal, therefore, abolished the offer of Crown lands, and when the Colony became self-governing in 1893, approached the Indian Government for the purpose of ridding herself of the Indian incubus. Unsuccessful in this, the province argued that as these Indians did not enjoy the franchise in the country of their origin they should not be given the privilege in Natal. So the franchise was abolished. About the same time more pressure was brought to bear on them. They were taxed if they did not re-engage themselves to the sugar industry or get out of the country. This, too, failed to drive out those who had pressed in, so the Natal Government extended the tax to the children of free Indians, placed restrictions on Indian licences to trade, and clamped a special education test upon further immigrants. Moved by the plight of his fellow countrymen, Gandhi wrote his famous green pamphlet describing the conditions in Natal. A Durban mob tried to hang him, in the words of the song, "to a sour apple tree."

By 1910 there were 7,000 Indians in the Cape,

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11,000 in the Transvaal, and 133,000 in Natal—outnumbering the British in Natal, unable to move beyond the provincial frontiers, chafing under a three-pound penalty for refusing to get out of the country, and irritated by a regulation that their marriage laws were not approved in South Africa and their wives refused admittance to the country.

With the instinct for political action that has since held up the greatest Empire in the world to ransom, Gandhi, then a practising lawyer, organized a demonstration and marched at the head of thousands of his fellow countrymen into the mountain passes to the Transvaal border, whereupon the prisons soon overflowed and South African Indians were driven into political unity. Against such a mass protest the Union Government retreated with a promise of a commission of inquiry. The three-pound tax was abolished, Indian marriages were recognized, and hope for better things born in the Smuts-Gandhi agreement.

II

There were others, however, interested in the lot of British subjects in South Africa. India had emerged from the war with a new status and a growing national consciousness. What happened to her offspring domiciled in South Africa affected her deeply, and not only her, for the British Government looked with no little concern to the plight of a community whose main fault had been to fall in with the wishes of the British of Natal, wishes that did not happen to coincide with those of the Dutch of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal.

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India agreed that the indenture system should cease, and had, indeed, determined on it in 1911. Her spokesmen, however, were not slow to press for a better treatment of those who remained. South African Indians were not all the despised coolies indentured to the sugar industry. Many hundreds were traders, the Madrassi, known in South Africa as Arabs; a few score were professional men; and traders and professional men, serving their own community in the first place, rapidly attracted European patronage. The Transvaal laws might deny the right of Asiatics to hold land and property in the gold-mining areas, they could not easily deny that right to a limited liability company in which Indian capital predominated. Nor could they easily put a finger on the European practice of holding Indian property in a European name. There were gaps in the law through which a motor lorry could pass. And the trading restrictions that kept the Asiatic trader out of European areas did not cover the fringes of the gold areas. Across the border of the townships he set up his store and attracted the custom of the poorer Europeans, so that now he does a good trade with these, and quite often a high-class trade with others.

There is another point. The Indian trader made, and makes, a special effort to encourage Native trade. While the European shopkeeper will keep the Native waiting at the counter and serve a procession of Europeans, the Indian pays the Native the compliment that his money is as good, though it may not be so clean, as that of the European. The Native, then, shops at the Indian store.

What is called the Indian menace, therefore,

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was different from the menace of the Native. The latter was making his bid in the labour market ; the Indian was competing in the sphere of commerce. The White protest shifted from the White worker, who often welcomes the Indian trader, to the European storekeeper. Being a commercial protest, it received the more immediate attention of the Government. In 1919 it was decided to issue no further trading licences in the gold areas, and the gaps existing in the regulations were stopped. A wave of anti-Indian feeling swept the Transvaal and Natal. Fearful of being submerged under it at the next election, the Government appointed a commission to inquire into the extent of Indian penetration. Its recommendations included a measure of trading segregation, the encouragement of voluntary residential segregation, the uniformity of licensing laws, the limitation of Indian farm ownership in Natal—where the cry had gone up that the Indians were scrambling over the whole province.

By the time General Smuts had refused the Imperial Conference a request for political rights for Indians, there were more Indians in Natal than there were Europeans. The Indian who had served and made the sugar industry became a pest, a constant irritant to the European, not only because of his commercial competition but also because, unlike the Natives who are conceded a right to the country, he was an alien, a coloured alien at that. Worse than being an irritant to the flesh, he was an aggravation to the mind. His presence, as the lowly representation of a civilization more ancient and no whit inferior to western civilization, denied the prerogative of the European—

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the Divine Right of White Skin — consciously approved by the Dutch, and long since assumed by the British. The Indian was a reminder of a subterfuge that made the White man's supremacy possible, and was fast proving in every sphere he was allowed to enter that he was the White man's equal. His presence disturbed a European complacency that might have continued for decades as far as any Native advance endangered it.

Behind the Indians, though in the distance, was the new India, advancing to a premier position in trade and in political responsibility. The South African Indian problem was rapidly affecting the whole Commonwealth, and India was taking a closer and closer interest in her overseas peoples. To her leaders, and to the South African Indian who had served in the Great War, the repressive attitude of government and provincial councils appeared in strange contrast with the welcome that had been accorded Indians on all the war fronts of the Empire. There might be some excuse for the extreme Afrikaner, there was none for the British of Natal, the Indians argued—and little, indeed, for a philosopher-statesman of the stature of General Smuts for introducing the Class Areas Bill of 1924 projecting a policy of segregation which, in the words of a young and able South African Indian, "sounded the death knell to Indian interests." Before the Bill could be passed, however, the Wakkerstroom by-election had sounded the knell of the Smuts Government.

It is seldom in history that such legislation as was the lot of the South African Indians passes without consequence. The South African Indian Congress, now five years young in experience,

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became a strong Indian front with the debating power that injustice usually earns. General Smuts as Prime Minister appealed to the British of Natal, called upon their patriotism to consider the Indian question in terms of Empire unity, and deplored their anti-Asiatic attitude.

"Let them consider the matter carefully," he pleaded, "not alone from their own point of view, but from that of all the other Dominions, and remember that any decision arrived at here would have repercussions far beyond Natal, far beyond the Empire. Let them avoid trying for a settlement which might do no good and which might do the Empire incalculable harm."

But the Natal British were in no mood to jeopardize their cause by reflecting on the influence it might have upon the Empire. Their attitude coincided with that of the Nationalist Party which, coming to power in 1924, pledged itself to introduce legislation to meet the rising public demand. Dr. Malan, as Minister of the Interior, was responsible once again, and his "Ek stel voor" was heard this time with the approval and acclamation of numbers of the opposition who hailed from the British province. The Natal Provincial Council presented an ordinance, three times refused by the Smuts Government, for the abolition of the Indian municipal franchise. One of the first duties of the Hertzog Government was to pass it. Natal, then, looked with hope and favour upon Dr. Malan's introductory speech on the Class Areas Bill.

"I must say," he said, "that the Bill frankly starts from the general supposition that the Indian, as a race in this country, is an alien element in the population, and that no solution of this question

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will be acceptable to the country unless it results in a very considerable reduction of the Indian population in South Africa. But, on the other hand, the method of dealing with this question will not be the employment of any forcible means. The method which the Bill will propose will be the application of pressure to supplement the inducement which is held out to Indians to leave the country."

The British, having brought them in and with their aid raised fortunes out of sugar, looked to Dr. Malan the Afrikaner to get them out. Dr. Malan did not hurry the passage of the Bill. Its purposes were threefold: one, to enable urban authorities to adopt and project trading and residential segregation; two, to forbid land ownership outside the coastal belt of Natal of thirty miles; three, to limit to five years the right of Indians to introduce wives from India. The Government of India showed immediate interest as a party to the introduction of Indians in the first place, and, more recently, to the proposals on repatriation. A Round Table conference was proposed, and on the refusal of qualifications demanded by the Union Government, was superseded by the idea of a delegation from India to inquire and report on the whole situation. It was led by Mr., afterwards Sir, G. F. Paddison, and included Sir Syed Raza Ali, later to serve as the Indian Agent-General in South Africa. While it toured the country and appeared before a select committee appointed by the Union Government, a South African Indian Congress delegation was touring India and arousing the Motherland to an awareness of the conditions in the Union. Eventually

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the Union Government was persuaded to accept a Round Table conference between representatives of the two nations, and for the first time a very different India from that known in South Africa introduced itself through distinguished "men of colour."

III

At the Round Table Conference of 1926, then, sat such men as the Rt. Hon. Srinivas Sastri, side by side with Union delegates, under the chairmanship of Dr. Malan. The prevailing opinion of Natal can best be reflected by the cheers that greeted a speech of welcome to the Indian delegates when they visited the province. After expressing hopes that the Conference deliberations would prove successful, the speaker could not resist the neat reminder that :

"The Empire of India is one of the brilliant stars in what some people call the Commonwealth of free Nations, but which I prefer to call the British Empire."

The Cape Town Agreement that was the outcome of the Conference became the high pinnacle of Indian hopes in South Africa and of Dr. Malan's statesmanship. It is a far cry from the statement that "Indians are an alien element in South Africa," on which basis the Class Areas Bill was based, to the admission that "The Union Government firmly believes in and adheres to the principle that it is the duty of every civilized government to derive ways and means and to take all possible steps for the uplifting of every section of their permanent population to the full extent of their

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capacity and opportunities. The Union Government accepts the view," the statement continued, "that, in the provision of education and other facilities, the considerable number of Indians who will remain part of the permanent population shall not be allowed to lag behind other sections of the people."

This declaration, known to Indians as "the uplift clause," set a new standard for the relations between European and Indian, and might, indeed, well be taken as the starting-point of all racial relations. The Class Areas Bill was now dead. Aided repatriation was to be encouraged, and an Agent-General for India was to be appointed to act as liaison officer between the two Governments, the education and health services in Natal were to be investigated, some relief from the Colour Bar was inherent in clauses dealing with employment, and new licensing rules were to be framed. The hope engendered by the recognition of the Indians was expressed in an increase in education opportunities and in a general social awareness among them. Under the inspired leadership of Sastri, the advance to Western standards proceeded over the whole gamut of Indian activities and without any great financial aid from the British province.

Promise and pledge are one thing ; performance another. While the Indians advanced, the Europeans stood on the defensive, suspiciously aware of a new menace. The Indians practised a voluntary segregation, but that did not prevent overlapping of residential areas. From the centre the industrial and economic progress in Natal radiated outwards and infringed upon the Indians in their areas. The slums of a South African town are almost invari-

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ably on its outskirts. It is on the outskirts that the Indians live. By inevitable movement the degree of overlapping increased with the years, until it sometimes happened that what was predominantly an Indian quarter became predominantly European.

On the other hand the trader and commercial Indian whose store is on the edge of the town often endeavours to move in towards the centre. This movement is looked upon with grave suspicion. A wave of anti-Indian feeling is worked up as a result. There are other aspects of this matter. While the Indian may not be entirely blameless, his code of conduct does not differ very much from that of his European fellow. On the outskirts of the towns the racketeers of European syndicates produce the condition of filth and poverty for which, officially, at any rate, the rest of the community blames the Indian. The syndicate buys up land, divides it into small parcels, lets it out or sells it to Indians, sometimes at a profit that would surprise a Wall Street broker, and Indians accumulate and accomodate themselves in shacks, tin shanties, and start a process that ends in a black belt.

The Indian quarters of all towns are filthy. Children abound and poverty with them, and the badly illuminated streets are never clean. It seldom strikes the authorities that such areas receive far less attention from the municipal street cleaners than do the areas of Europeans. The Indians are reminded in the speeches of mayors and public men that they must learn to help themselves, and I have heard more than one public man mention that God is a useful ally in this direction. It would

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seem that God alone is—as far as the poorer Indian is concerned. The trading Indian, enterprising and highly competitive, is able to take care of himself. He does not always see his responsibilities to his fellowmen.

IV

A year or two after the Cape Town Agreement, a new wave of anti-Indian prejudice passed over the Transvaal and occasioned the Transvaal Asiatic Land Tenure Bill to enforce the old laws of segregation. Once again the Indian Government intervened, this time through its established Agent-General. A second Round Table Conference was held to consider the possibility of extending emigration to such places as North Borneo, British Guinea, and New Guinea. The new attempt failed, and it is now clear that the Indians are here to stay. Eighty per cent. of them are South African born; they have their roots in South Africa, or, at any rate, in that part of it which is permitted to them. Moreover, they have become an integral part of Natal economy. They wash the clothes and wait at table; they cook the food and grow vegetables. Whenever their young people get an opportunity they pass examinations and teach in schools, and the European teacher will remark on their keenness. The Indian taxi-driver, a Jehu on the roads, can always be relied upon to help the European in a breakdown. The Indian is almost invariably docile, his wife entirely demure. The Indian woman runs to fat, the Indian man to lean.

It is only recently, and under the encourage-

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ment of successive Agent-Generals and sympathetic Europeans, that the Indian woman has begun to take her share in social work. There is much promise in this, and none can doubt that, given proper housing conditions and reasonable treatment, many more Indians would attain a standard deserving of reasonable political representation. As it is they have no means—save through the Indian Agent-General, whose status has now been raised to that of High Commissioner—to advance their interests.

This, perhaps, is their chief disability. With periodic regularity the fears of the European retail traders rise before the advance of the Indian, and with the same regularity a Commission is appointed to investigate and report. The process will continue as long as there are Indians and Europeans in Natal, and it is difficult to conceive of any solution that will deal justly by both sections while the Colour Bar is part of the Europeans' political and economic equipment. On this matter the Indian is extremely sensitive. Two or three years ago a distinguished Agent-General for India was refused the use of a lift in a business house because he was a non-European. The profuse apology that followed did not subtract from the indignity suffered. There are similar discriminating restrictions in post offices, and on the railways, where the Indians, however socially and intellectually superior, are provided for as non-Europeans with the lowliest of Natives.

The Indians' protest, then, against such legislation as proposed to make illegal mixed marriages, was an expression not against the principles of segregation or mixed marriages but against the

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affront such legislation was to his honour and pride. Indians, after all, segregate themselves broadly on a voluntary basis, and other than in Durban, where admittedly the position is complicated, residential and trading problems are capable of treatment.

As a first, and perhaps the only, qualification to a solution of all Indian problems in South Africa is the acceptance by a large number of Europeans of the clause of the Cape Town Agreement, which for a moment of time found favour even with Dr. Malan.

V

At a sitting of the Indian Penetration Commission appointed in 1940 to examine some of these social problems, the Mayor of a small city, addressing himself to the extent of Indian penetration into European areas, said, "In this city we look upon the Coloured people as part of the European population."

The non-European problems in South Africa are not dispatched merely by reference to the Bantu and the Indian. In addition to them we have three-quarters of a million mixed breeds to whom the term "Coloureds" is applied. As the Indians are congregated largely in Natal, so the Coloureds are to be found mostly in the Cape Province. They have their origin in the intermingling of slaves brought from East Africa and Madagascar in past centuries with Hottentots, followed later by an addition of European and Malay blood. To the three factors—Slave, Hottentot, and European—has since been added the Bantu; so that no flight of imagination can err in a picture of a human conglomerate

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passing—in physical features, hair texture, and skin colour—from near white, through many creams, to brown and near black. The term Coloured, then, has not been easy to define for political and legal purposes; but it was recently recommended by a Commission of Inquiry that the following might serve :

“The typical Cape Coloured may be defined as a person who does not belong to one of its aboriginal races, but in whom the presence of coloured blood (especially due to descent from non-Europeans brought to the Cape in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries or from aboriginal Hottentot stock, and with or without an admixture of White or Bantu blood) can be established with at least reasonable certainty, (a) from a knowledge of the genealogy of the person during the last three or four generations; or/and (b) by ordinary direct recognition of characteristic physical features (such as colour or skin) by an observer familiar with these characteristics.”

It is an interesting definition, for it permits a number who have “coloured” blood in their veins, in vulgar parlance “a touch of the tar brush,” but are near enough to “White,” to pass off as such, if, and by good fortune, they possess an economic competence. All they need fear is that their offspring may be a throw-back to their “coloured” ancestry.

Though Coloureds cannot claim social equality with the Whites, or even with those who have passed over the border line and call themselves white, they admit no inequality in ability or skill. Indeed a series of intelligence tests conducted upon Coloured and White children were not sufficiently

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conclusive to suggest inherent inferiority of the Coloureds. The life of these people is determined more by environmental than by inherent disabilities. They suffer from social inferiority, are disunited and split into more social groups than are the Europeans, and they are in danger of becoming the same social disaster as the Poor Whites among the Europeans.

Having endeavoured to define the Coloured person in terms of heredity, succeeding governments have determined the economic status he must hold. In 1924 the Government issued a circular on "civilized" labour in an attempt to give employment to more Europeans in government departments. The definition of civilized labour is devastating.

Civilized labour, it reads, is to be considered as the labour rendered by persons whose standard of living conforms to the standard generally recognized as tolerable from the usual European standpoint. Uncivilized labour is to be regarded as the labour rendered by persons whose aim is restricted to the bare requirements of the necessities of life as understood among barbarous and undeveloped peoples.

It requires little imagination to discover where the Coloured man stands in the life of South Africa. Civilized labour, by this definition, rapidly came to mean White labour. The definition decides whether or not a man is Coloured by the wages he earns; for if wage rates are to be based on existing standards of living, it is impossible for any Coloured man not yet on a civilized standard of living ever to attain a new level. The attitude of the Government is reflected in trades union

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organizations. Some trades unions have no Colour Bar in their constitutions, others have; but all in practice, and perhaps inevitably so, prevent the Coloured worker from taking his place on the basis of equal pay for equal work.

The Coloured man is in more than one cleft stick. He might be only too willing to sell his labour for less than the minimum wage laid down by the trades union. As the employer has no option but to pay the minimum rates laid down, he is more inclined to pay that wage to White workers. Again, political recognition of the Coloured man is less to-day than it was in 1850 in the Cape. Then he might call himself a citizen of Cape Town. He could offer himself as a municipal officer. A Coloured man was elected a ward master in 1840. It was only in the old republics that "no bastard may sit in our meetings as a member or judge up to the tenth generation." Since then, the position of the Coloured man has declined. The British tradition, indeed, has largely disappeared and it is the policy of the Boer republics that dominates. "We do not forget," said Mr. Asquith in 1910, "and we ought not to forget, that, besides Briton and Boer, South Africa contains a vast population of His Majesty's Coloured subjects, and we may feel the strongest confidence that the same wide liberality of treatment which has made Union possible will be as promptly shown to these Coloured races."

Mr. Asquith's generous hopes have yet to take practical shape. The Mayor who maintained that "we look upon the Coloured people as part of the European population" was engaged in a piece of special pleading. There is probably no reason why

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we should accord the Coloured the status of the European, but there is every reason that we should not assume a concern we do not feel and pursue. The observer of social progress would naturally turn to the trades unions to find some defence of the Coloured worker and his rights. He would search a long time in South Africa before he found any. The White workers join with the White employers and the White government—with, recently, a Labour Minister of Labour and Social Welfare—in urging industrial segregation, which condemns the non-European to a fixed level of inferiority as inevitable as a caste system and as permanent.

Gertrude Millin in her book, *The South Africans*, writes :

“ It has not yet happened in the history of South Africa that a really Coloured man, a man so dark that he could not, even by a general conspiracy of evasion, pass as White—it has not yet happened that such a one had distinguished himself in any branch of achievement whatsoever. No Cape Coloured man has risen to high rank in commerce, art, science, the professions, or politics. Hardly any Coloured man, indeed, has even gone so far as the son of some aboriginal chief, rich in land and cattle, who, now and then struggles through an English or Scottish university to a profession, and then comes back to South Africa to practice that profession. The young African, it is true, does not gloriously succeed either. His difficult circumstances apart, he has not the persistence, the temperament, the tradition, the mental equality, the general capacity, to compete against his White colleagues. But yet, in merely making the attempt, he does something which seems to be beyond, not

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only the ambition, but also the means of the young Coloured man."

How can it be otherwise in a system where every factor seeks to prevent the emergence of any ability or ambition the Coloured man may possess? Even when South Africa finds it necessary to use the loyalty of these people she contrives to place them in an inferior position. A Coloured Corps and an Indian Corps have been recruited for various transport duties. General Smuts paid them high tribute in the House of Assembly, attributing to the transport drivers much of the success of South African armies in Abyssinia. Yet we refuse these men arms to defend themselves in so perilous and essential a service. They carry neither rifle nor revolver. In other words, no non-European is allowed to fight for his country, which is another way of saying that South Africa is not his country. He merely lives in it, or exists in it, and he is exploited by party politicians, British and Afrikaner—from behind a façade of democracy in the case of the British and in front of the Divine Right of Skins by the Afrikaner.

The Afrikaner makes no bones about a matter that the British prefer to hide in a mass of liberal professions. It remains a fact that the relatively high standard of life is enjoyed by the White man at the expense of the low standard of life of the Coloured man. The Afrikaner Nationalist is determined that it shall be so. "It makes a world of difference," once said Dr. Malan, "whether a European has to compete with uneducated competition or whether he has to compete with those who are on a similar plane of education and who are as educated as himself." "Knowledge means

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power," he continued in the same speech, " and the power of the European decreases the more he is faced with educated opposition. Since Union to 1935 the number of Europeans in schools have increased from 163,000 to 371,000. Non-Europeans have increased from 136,000 to 482,000 over the same period. Thus the number of Europeans has increased by 127 per cent., and non-Europeans by 254 per cent. In the Cape Province European school children have increased from 1911 to 1935 from 81,000 to 154,000 and non-Europeans from 103,000 to 268,000. Some people said that the colour problem affected the Cape more than other provinces. Those who adopted this point of view divided the power of the people and robbed them of their strength. In the Transvaal, since 1911 to 1935, European school children have increased from 48,000 to 144,000—an increase of 200 per cent. Non-Europeans have increased from 14,000 to 100,000 an increase of 614 per cent. In the Transvaal the Asiatics problem is passing. Because of the Oriental's greater ability he is a more deadly menace than any other non-European."

VI

The presence of Liberal elements, indeed, seems but to enhance the reactionary sections. Liberalism in South Africa must not be mistaken for its European counterpart. The Afrikaner describes a Liberal as anyone who is anti-Nationalist ; who is a negrophil ; who would extend the franchise to the Indian ; who deplores Colour prejudice ; who, in fact, recognizes the God in every man as equal

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to the God in himself, and who subscribes to a policy based on the idea that the population of South Africa is ten millions instead of two. Because all these things lower the prestige and the position of the White man, or, at any rate, tend to raise the status of the non-Whites, they are anti-National. In the political conflict everyone who is not a member of the Nationalist Party is despised as a Liberal. A high Tory in England subscribing, if only in theory, to an enlightened policy towards non-European British subjects, would be labelled a Liberal in South Africa. South African Liberalism then has nothing to do with free trade, not much to do with *laissez-faire*, and only a little to do with individualism. Instead, Liberalism is looked upon as half way to Communism, which is the particular hell of every Afrikaner Nationalist to be avoided at all and every cost.

Actually there are very few Liberals in South Africa. The Afrikaner Nationalists, however, have persuaded themselves that every Britisher is a Liberal and therefore anti-Nationalist and anti-Afrikaner. The way they arrive at this conclusion is illuminating. The Union has never known a political division of parties based upon economic ideas and political theories other than those that derive from concepts of race and colour. One of the main items of Liberal thought in Europe during the nineteenth century was a belief in the freedom of nations. This should appeal to the Afrikaner Nationalists of to-day, more especially, perhaps, as the Liberals held—if somewhat vaguely—with the present Dutch Reformed Church, that a nation possesses a soul. Out of such beliefs emerged the principle of nationality, perhaps the dominant theme

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of nineteenth century Liberal thought, which led in direct consequence to the principle of self-determination, expressed in its final form in President Wilson's creation, the League of Nations. These things fall naturally into the policy of Afrikaner independence, actively pursued by Afrikaner Nationalists.

There is no doubt, for example, that Dr. Malan is the staunchest of Liberals in this sense. But, just as British Liberalism of the nineteenth century merged inevitably into Imperialism, so the Afrikaner Nationalists, who are nineteenth century Liberals living in the nineteen-forties, have developed an Afrikaner Imperialism in all matters non-European.

The Afrikaner, it must be conceded, would describe his attitude somewhat differently. He would first protest that he is no enemy of Native, Indian, or Coloured. He would defend his policy of political, social, and economic segregation for the non-European by insisting, in the words of Dr. Malan, that "God had an object in creating races and colours and nations, and that God does not want his creational work to be destroyed." This derives from Calvinistic dogma. The next step is like unto it: that, as already stated, the Black man and the Indian are made in a different image from the White man. The Coloured having some "white" blood may lay claim to a degree of likeness. All men are not born equal either in the knowledge of man or in the sight of God. But, while insisting on these differences, the Afrikaner Nationalist does not deny the Bantu, as a race and a community, the possession of a tradition, a way of life. In order that the way of life of the Bantu,

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the Indian, and the Coloured may be preserved, political, economic, and social segregation is imperative. Anything less than that will destroy, as it is destroying to-day, the Bantu nation and the Coloured community. So, argues the Afrikaner, the policy of segregation serves two purposes, the supremacy of the White man and the survival of the way of life of the Black and the Coloured man.

While the truth of this is not in doubt, how the degree of segregation is to be achieved to fulfil this policy in the present state of economy is yet to be discovered. Half the Bantu population is already detribalized and de-Bantu-ized, growing up with and into an industrial system, with devastating effects upon Native life. With the passage of time the White man's economy will require that still larger numbers of Natives be urbanized and the problem of segregation made more difficult. The Afrikaner looks upon the Native as a labour supply that makes no demands. The Native must work, and having finished work, must return to his own place, uninfluenced by his contact with the White man. Could these conditions be fulfilled all would be well. Unfortunately segregation can never be so complete that the Natives can escape European influence ; unless, of course, South Africa chooses to drive the Native off the land, out of the factories and kitchens altogether, and to make the country a White man's country in the only way possible, that is, by the White man and the White woman doing all the manual labour, which, were it possible, might be no bad thing for White and Black.

It can be accepted that the attitude of the vast majority of Britishers coincides with that of the

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Afrikaners on the question of White supremacy. Any difference that occurs is on a matter of emphasis. On the whole the British are concerned with industry and commerce, each of which depends upon an organized Native labour force. Industry tends to accept detribalization and disintegration of Bantu life, and in doing so, to acquiesce in a measure of political representation for the Native. Industry need not be called Liberal on that account. It is better to look upon it as a recognition of the traditional British policy of absorbing non-European communities into a political and economic system rather than to apply to it the language of a Liberalism that does not exist.

The Afrikaner Nationalists, unfortunately, will not let the Liberal myth die if they can possibly help it. It is an ever present help in time of trouble. They labour the point that this "Liberalism" accompanies Imperialism. It is a product of the capitalist system, another British importation that is unnational. Liberalism, then, tends to be associated with everything British in South Africa, so that hating Liberalism is another way of hating all things British. "The three points of friction between White and Black which have to be reviewed," declared Mr. A. F. Werth, a prominent Nationalist, "are non-European franchise, depression of European wages by the Native Labour standard, and the pigging together (saamhokking) of Europeans with Coloureds and Natives." "If only we can get rid of the Imperialists," he continued, "we shall win back the respect and esteem of the Kaffir and the Coloured person as in the past."

Addressing himself to the same topic, Dr. Malan

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is more explicit. "Behind all this (the limited measure of non-European political representation) is the Imperialist or Empire interest. How did the non-European come by his vote? There is only one answer. Oversea Imperialist authorities, when it came to granting self-government, were afraid because Afrikanerdom was in the majority and would strive for freedom. So non-Europeans were not only enfranchised, but were set against the Afrikaners. That Imperialistic interest still exists in South Africa and still employs Natives and Coloureds 'to beat down Nationalism.'"

The speech from which this is quoted may be pursued a little further to illustrate how the Afrikaner nationalizes his attitude towards the Natives in hatred for the Jews.

"Behind Communism and Liberalism there is a power which has grown tremendously of late—that power is Jewry. Jews are in the minority in all countries, but they understand the art of attracting to themselves a great deal more than is due to them in proportion to their numbers. The means they employ are not only their economic power, but directly and indirectly they always preach the doctrine of Liberalism, or, whichever it is suits their purposes better, the doctrine of Communism. They discriminate and propagate these doctrines of equality because they want no race or colour discriminations. Jews do not always support Communism or Liberalism in the political merits of these creeds, but because they are the means of protecting Jews. In all countries Jews are either Liberals or Communists."

The Jew, the Jingo, the Imperialist, the Liberal, and the Britisher are thus bunched together in a

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mass as unnational and anti-Afrikaner. The terms Jewry, Jingoism, Imperialism, Liberalism are synonymous in the language of the Afrikaner Nationalists. The very presence then of so-called Liberal elements intensifies the Afrikaner republican's hatred. It is, in fact, doubtful whether a complete solution of the Native problem, even on terms advocated by them, would be welcomed by the Afrikaner Nationalists, for it would deprive them of much material out of which they manufacture political capital.

At the meeting at which Dr. Malan made the remarks quoted in this chapter, someone offered a hundred pounds so that the whole of his speech might be printed and broadcast throughout the country. Mr. Pirow's sister was present. "I cannot help being Mr. Pirow's sister," she said. "I must end it at once. Anyhow you can see the difference. He has gone to London, I have come to Bloemfontein."

Mr. Pirow's going to London did not make him a Liberal. And there is not much hope for the Coloured man in Bloemfontein.

V
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CHAPTER VIII

I

AS the nineteen-twenties drew to a close the smouldering wrath of the British section found in that good friend of all parliamentary oppositions, an economic collapse, a weapon without which their anger would have been of no avail. While whisperings of Afrikaner unity had done duty as front-page news in the occasional lulls since General Hertzog came into power in 1924, leaders on both sides publicly repudiated any such move. "The South African Party is not for sale," said General Smuts. "General Hertzog and I are divided on big issues," he added as late as September 1932.

About the same time there was some talk of General Smuts' retiring from politics and being appointed Governor-General. The Prime Minister's comment upon this possibility did not encourage any hope either of Afrikaner unity or of the coalition that was to come. "Just imagine," he said, "what would happen if Smuts was Governor-General. He knows my policy and I know his, and in the circumstances we are not going to trust each other. . . . The destruction of a national freedom, the reintroduction of the Union Jack as our national flag, and the suppression of Afrikaans is Smuts' policy. He is preparing a big piece of treachery to hand over Afrikanerdom to the jingo racialists of South Africa." Among the extreme

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elements in Afrikanerdom the opinion of the day was expressed at the Nationalist Congress. "We Nationalists are not yet where we should like to be. We want absolute independence. There is still a chain binding us to the Empire, and I look forward to the time when that chain will be snapped and we are absolutely free from the British Empire."

In the political spectrum, if the Fraunhofer lines of Hertzogism and Smutsism were distinct and separate, the ultra violet of loyal Natal was still more distinct from the infra red of South African republicanism. If the ultra violet deepened into royal purple in Durban, the infra red was no bolshevism.

By 1931 all the fears of the old Natal Unionists of Botha's day had taken shape. Coastal Natal was thoroughly sick of Union and all that it meant in the new symbols of national maturity—in the flag, and in the more substantial independence of bilingualism, foreign trade, and sovereign status. Besides, Dr. Malan had "let the Natalians down" on the Indian question. The Indians were as numerous as ever.

There were other threats in the offing. A demand for a South African Governor-General came from the Orange Free State, and rumours of a South African National Anthem in the place of "God Save the King" were heard as a result of a competition sponsored by the Afrikaans Cultural Associations. The prize was £200, and it was common gossip that Dr. Malan provided £125 of the prize money.

It was time to man the barricades in Durban. A Home Rule Council was formed, and, with "Home Rule for Natal" and "Wake up, Natal"

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for slogans, was launched upon a Durban public ready to receive it. It was to be the peoples' movement, a non-party patriotic body, and according to its founders it was not intended to split the South African Party. Natal within a federation within the Empire was its programme. The revolt gathered force if not direction, and by the middle of 1932 it had assumed serious proportions. A Devolution League was formed. If it did not know what it wanted, it was sure of what it did not want: the domination of the country by Dutch Nationalists. Its leaders had no standing in politics. "I do not know the members of the Devolution League, but I would warn them that any disaster which now befalls Natal will lie at their door," General Smuts was to say at a congress of his party. But long before he said it a Devolution leader had cried, "To hell with General Smuts," to an audience that received the suggestion with acclamation.

It is doubtful whether, without the Durban newspaper, the *Natal Mercury*, the small men who sponsored the Devolution movement would have found much response, but with this support, it came dangerously near to wrecking the South African Party. Instead, it wrecked itself in a confusion of aims, personal ambitions, and petty-fogging squabbles. There were leaders who wanted to destroy the South African Party; others who wanted secession from the Union followed by federation; others, secession and complete independence. The people of Durban revelled in a patriotic revival which in hysterical fervour was not far removed from a religious orgy. They packed the City Hall from floor to ceiling, and sat

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around tableaux of Britannia besporting the Union Jack. The acoustic properties of the hall were stretched by the full-throated rendering of that mighty hymn, "O God our help in ages past," while, incanting their aims, the leaders invoked the aid of another, and called down upon their works the "help of Almighty God."

"In demanding federation for Natal," they insisted, "the province is not the slightest degree concerned with what happens in other parts of the Union." The Afrikaner Press replied that the sentiment accurately reflected the attitude of the rest of the Union towards "this wretched little group of jingoes." Nor did the English Press give any longer shrift to the revolt. They deplored it, ridiculed it, warned its leaders, and finally let it alone. For a time, however, it inveigled the Natal Members of Parliament into an anomalous position; momentarily it looked as if there would be a serious split in the South African Party ranks. With a zeal that deserved a better fate, the League appealed to Westminster, where sat Mr. J. H. Thomas as Secretary for the Dominions, who, carefully avoiding the need of an aspirate, replied, when he heard of the proposal, "I never interfere with other people's business."

Other than holding protest meetings and waving Union Jacks there was only one more course that offered. Having decided to separate from this "unholy alliance of the Union of South Africa," they requested the Prime Minister to give them a hearing, and reminded him of the occasion when he had appealed on similar grounds of self-determination to the Premier of England. But that course, too, was barred. "I am not prepared," said the

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Prime Minister, "to be a party to a discussion of a claim which, apart from its futility, nobody entrusted with the guardianship of the State can entertain without committing a betrayal of trust in him by the people of the Union."

According to General Smuts, the movement "was the result of being goaded to frenzy by the insensate policies of the present Government." Frenzy, indeed, it was, and in the froth of it General Smuts did not escape. While every English newspaper, save one, was condemning "the wild men of Natal," that one, in Durban, was helping to pack the City Hall with an hysterical population to applaud virulent attacks on him. General Smuts' actions, it was said, "coincided with orders he got from the *Rand Daily Mail*, which is owned by Sir Abe Bailey. . . . The policy of the South African Party is dictated by the *Rand Daily Mail*, and Smuts runs with the hare and hunts with the hounds. In view of General Smuts' record, are you prepared to trust the South African Party to save Natal?" The challenge was greeted with catcalls, and the Mayor, wearing a kilt, declared the resolutions carried, as indeed they were, with acclamation.

Following the retreat of the Natal Members of Parliament the movement rose to boiling-point and cooled down slowly as the dramatically reiterated denial of the impossibility of separation and secession from the Union gave place to a consideration of the consequences were the right conceded. An Ulster in South Africa by no means rich in natural resources, its population small and that concentrated in Durban, would be at the mercy of any customs barriers the remaining three partners in Union liked to set up against it. The Devolutionist

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leaders proclaimed that secession would mean prosperity. "When you hear of Home Rule," warned General Smuts, "it means more taxation." Political independence would have meant economic suicide, and Durban was never anxious to commit such folly as that even for the prospect of a coffin swathed in the Union Jack.

The League serves to illustrate the extent of the British revolt against the rise of Afrikanerdom. As a political move it was great folly, providing some useful ammunition at a by-election outside Natal, where the Nationalists, quick with political rifle as with a shot gun, made good use of it to retain a seat at a time when General Smuts was of the opinion that the Government was about to be defeated. What should have been a weapon to be directed to the sole purpose of ousting Hertzog from office was so clumsily wielded that it was invaluable aid to keeping him where he was.

The times were ripe for a Smuts victory. Britain was off the gold standard. The Government of South Africa intended to remain on it. All that the opposition had to do was to wait. There was no need to wait long; just long enough for the Afrikaner Nationalists to be persuaded once more that political power is a snare and a delusion. On subjects of flag, language, racial equality, Native affairs, Indian status, it confers the supreme decision. General Hertzog had directed them powerfully. He had placed a High Commissioner in London with extended powers, and in other chancelleries of the world; nations were beginning to realize that South Africa was a sovereign State, beholden to none and subject to none. On the economy of gold, however, his country was united

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irrevocably with a capitalist world. When Britain went off gold, he mistakenly thought he could stay on it. Neither Press nor politician might bring General Hertzog to defeat on any test of status or independence ; but neither he nor his Minister of Finance could, Canute-like, restrain the tide that was lapping his feet. Commerce has little regard for language, or flag, or anthem ; and money, though it has politics, has no conscience. It travelled overseas, was transferred in huge quantities to make more money, while exports fell prices rose, farmers failed. A million a day was going out of the country. It was all very proper for General Hertzog to say, "I look into my heart and I find there no trace of racial feeling against any English-speaking South African." He had once said, "Sentiment is good cement," but it required more than sentiment to stop an economic avalanche which threw racialism into lateral moraines of extremism and swept moderate men into united action.

II

Something had to be done. Tielman Roos, the lion of the north, after his retirement from the Cabinet in 1929 a judge of the Supreme Court, decided to enter the political arena once more. He came out and down with a roar, demanding the formation of a coalition government. In the Nationalist Party there were many who would follow him, and with the aid of General Smuts, he might form a ministry with a more elastic gold policy and no racialism. General Smuts was in no

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hurry. He believed he could beat the Prime Minister at an election without the aid of a pact. But the stirrings of new political dispositions were felt throughout the country, not only among Nationalists, but also among the South African Party. At a mass meeting Dr. Hjalman Reitz introduced Mr. Roos with the words, "I see the sign of prosperity peeping through the clouds with the colours of the South African Party and the Nationalists blended together as a promise for the future."

With the end of 1932 the economic collapse was calamitous. Waves of speculation, the hoarding of gold, the export of capital, reached such proportions that the Reserve Bank refused to quote exchange rates. External trade was brought to a standstill; nobody could buy or sell. "We became a Robinson Crusoe island." Those who sold goods could not receive moneys to which they were entitled; war pensioners were turned away from post offices.

At 4 p.m. on 29th December South Africa went off the gold, and the prospect of money flowing back to the country—millions of pounds accruing from the gold premium, extension of the low-grade mines—greeted the country as Mr. Tielman Roos, General Smuts, and a score of others canvassed the possibility of an end to the farce of racialism in a combination of parties. All parties moved warily for position. British Natal decided that Mr. Roos had a past. He was a Dutchman. He was out to pull the Nationalist chestnut out of the fire for General Smuts. The South African Party would win the election in any case, and an election had to come, and come soon. General Hertzog would

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never weather the storm. The *Cape Times* suggested that Mr. Roos should be saved from his friends. "He must surely yearn," it wrote, "for them to have the sense that something more is necessary for the hatching of a cabinet egg-clutch than for the prospective cock of the walk to descend from the eminence of his dunghill and crow his challenge to the morning."

General Smuts held his hand, recognizing the need for a change in government, willing to negotiate, but doubting the wisdom of a coalition with Mr. Roos. Conversations proceeded on the constitution of a cabinet, and every conceivable permutation and combination was discussed. The supporters of Mr. Roos were willing to limit their representation in the cabinet to three members, provided that Mr. Roos was Prime Minister. The South African Party would allow the Roosites five members, with the qualification that General Smuts was Prime Minister. Mr. Roos stumped the country appealing for a coalition government to save the nation from economic and racial disaster. Shouted down in the Orange Free State, he was applauded in the Cape Province, and was the hope of the Transvaal. Colonel Creswell, the leader of the Labour Party, looked with some concern at the proposals for a Smuts-Roos combination. "There is only room for one Napoleon at a time," he said; while in Natal, the remnants of the Devolution League, as well as members of the South African Party, were warning audiences of the new treachery—the one distrusting Smuts, the other Roos. An odd major or two were ready to form a South African Federal League to supersede the Devolution League, the leaders of which had

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found their way into court to settle some of their differences. Durban, chameleon-like, received Mr. Tielman Roos with "He's a jolly good fellow." Devolution was giving way to coalition, and when the House met in January, 1933, the country stopped work in expectant anticipation of the result of rapid exchange of negotiations.

Meanwhile General Hertzog stood fast. A deputation of maize farmers of a small town had waited upon him and upon General Smuts, begging each to end the conflict and form a coalition government. General Hertzog refused to consider it. At the Nationalist caucus meeting before the opening of Parliament, a Mr. Steytler dared to emphasize the wisdom of a coalition, whereupon the Prime Minister requested him to quit the caucus and never return. To certain sections of the Nationalists the coalition movement was "Boere Verneukkery," designed by Smuts to break the Nationalist Party. They could not believe that General Hertzog would accept such a proposal. When the House assembled to hear General Smuts read, at a faster pace than was his wont, a motion requesting the Prime Minister to resign and form a National Government, as one newspaper put it, "the balloon was rising." A ten-day debate inside the House, and the last-moment negotiations between the lieutenants of General Smuts and of Mr. Roos, who had returned to Parliament, kept the country at fever pitch. Farmers had one consolation—wool prices went up by 40 per cent., and those who could afford it got in on the share market and rejoiced in soaring prices.

The debate swung from side to side of a packed House, descending to the bitterness of a personal

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feud that was the Hertzog-Smuts quarrel, and rising to the heights of impassioned appeals to save the country. The most sensational speech of all came from the Independent member for Namaqualand, one Dr. Steenkamp, who refused to vote for the motion unless General Smuts was prepared to ally himself with "the strongest man in Africa," Mr. Roos. "Hertzog should come over and say to General Smuts, 'Jannie, for the country's sake let bygones be bygones,' " he pleaded. But General Hertzog, instead, called for a vote of confidence, complaining that a National Coalition "would drag our people further in the way of dissension and bitterness." The Prime Minister won the day by eighty votes to sixty-six. Mr. Roos and his supporters, independents and two Labour members, voted for the Government. The balloon, it seemed, was descending. Before the session was out, however, the threats of the Natal Devolutionists increased; a Coalition Union Party was promised by Mr. Roos, and more serious still, commercial men began to organize the Chambers of Commerce into a political force. Confusion was now confounded in the local factions of Natal and the rising discontent throughout the country.

The tide of coalition could not be resisted, and General Hertzog, a few days after he had refused the offer of General Smuts, issued a statement welcoming co-operation of the parties. After that events moved quickly. Negotiations between the lieutenants of both sides arrived at an agreement that was, for the most part, the basis of the Nationalist policy. Dr. Malan described it as an amazing step, taken without reference to the caucus; but in every province save the Cape, where Dr. Malan

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was leader of the Nationalist Party, General Hertzog's action was approved and applauded.

On the British side Natal was assured that General Smuts would never let Natal down; whereupon, suspicious to the last, the Devolution die-hards decided to quit their domestic wrangling and put up Devolution candidates at the general election on an old slogan, remodelled, of "Natal before Nation." The Durban newspaper performed a long radius curvature in editorial policy, and now acclaimed as a statesman of great merit the Smuts it had lately denounced.

General Smuts paid General Hertzog high compliment. General Hertzog reciprocated, and the two, who a month previously "were separated on big issues" and "could not trust each other," got down to the big business of cabinet-making to deal with the biggest issue of all, that of governing the country. The Cabinet contained, among others, Mr. Patrick Duncan and Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr as Smuts' men, Mr. Havanga and Mr. Pirow as Hertzog's lieutenants, and left out men who believed they should have been included and who, once anxious to put party before nation, were now willing to put themselves before either. Some of them preferred to stand aside from the coalition and to wait and see.

Personal ambitions cannot be excluded from politics. Nor need they be. But how far Natal had been the victim of the carpet-baggers and self-seekers is evident from the number of parties and factions that sprang up in the early months of 1933—the Democrats, Unionists, the Devolution League, the Provincial Home Rulers, the one-man Independents. Among them, it is true, were one

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or two men genuinely concerned for the fate of the British tradition—who erred only in not being South Africans, and who were willing to make some sacrifice, as one at least did, for their political beliefs. These feuds in Natal split families and bred local animosities; and while it lasted the Devolution League used every device of sentiment, prejudice, and suspicion to condemn the coalition, even as they had condemned General Smuts “as a snake who could go through a mealie patch without touching a stalk.”

He had pleaded with them, cajoled them, and, without condoning their follies, had sympathized with their difficulties. Despite his assurances of wider powers for the provinces, the extreme section of Natal distrusted him. He lacks the demagogic gifts which appeal so powerfully to a middle-class British audience. His speech is rapid, repetitive, jerky, and harsh upon the ear; his speeches are seldom well prepared. He has none of the polished phraseology of the orator, while the combination of mastery of language and emotion, so much the feature of Mr. Churchill's orations, is entirely foreign to him. His appeal is to the intellect, and intellect was sadly lacking in a Natal, “the mental horizon of which,” as one leader writer put it, “was bounded by Elgar and Rudyard Kipling.” In consequence, the presence of General Smuts in Durban was not welcomed with the acclamation accorded his arrival in London.

As the Devolution League disintegrated and left a typewriter as its sole asset, there were other parties to join which embraced similar causes. Home Rule for Natal remained as much a Scottish “wha hae”

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as Home Rule for Ireland was the Irishman's war whoop a decade before.

III

The general election was a twice-foregone conclusion. General Smuts went down to help Dr. Malan, whose seat was in some jeopardy as a result of the reluctance of South African Party members to vote for so doubtful a coalitionist.

Of the one hundred and fifty seats, the Hertzog-Smuts coalition won a hundred and thirty-nine. It could scarcely be more unanimous. Labour returned four representatives. It has had little more success since. Another new era dawned. "There is to be no secession, no racialism; that is all dead." The country echoed the words of General Smuts in hope rather than in conviction.

Before the year was out the two leaders, somewhat prematurely, declared that the coalition should be projected into a fusion of the parties under a new name, the South African National United Party. Revolt had already broken out among the Nationalists. The Cape members and Dr. Malan, suspicious of coalition, could only welcome fusion if it were called hereniging, and signified the adoption by the new party of those convictions of Nationalist policy which, from the very beginning, had distinguished it from the Botha-Smuts conciliation government.

They went further, and demanded the abolition of dual nationality, the entrenchment of language rights, and the right to republican propaganda. It was, in Dr. Malan's view, impossible for two such incompatible elements of Hertzog racialism and

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Smuts Holism to come together as one party. The Nationalists feared that such a combination would be dominated by the jingoes and the commercial interests. "Nationalism," said Dr. Malan, "is not a programme, it is the spirit of a people. . . . In the first place," he went on, "the Nationalist Party had originally intended coalition as a tactical move to prevent the South African Party from capturing the reins of government." He therefore would have nothing to do with the fusion of the parties, and carried the Cape Nationalist Congress with him.

General Hertzog, angry at this defection, accelerated his plans to form the new party, with Mr. Pirow and Mr. Havenga supporting him. "I happen to be a Republican," said Mr. Pirow in November 1932, "but having said that, let me also add that nobody in his senses will imagine that it is going to be a practical issue in our generation, or, as far as I know, at all."

At the other pole, unlike in sign and repellent in action, the extreme British section concentrated at the Natal coast argued from Dr. Malan's speeches that the Fusion Party was a trap for the South African Party, and that the intention was to perpetuate a Nationalist policy under the guise of a national one. The discontent that had simmered so long boiled over once more, with the result that the Dominion Party emerged under the leadership of a Transvaal lawyer, Colonel Stallard, a man of some parts, not least of which was, and is, an appearance of a Victorian statesman. He spoke like one, dressed like one, and, more pertinent still, thought in terms of that century whenever the British connection was subject for thought. He had

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as his first lieutenant a Mr. Coulter, of polished speech and the "advocate's" attitude to politics, and a Mr. J. S. Marwick, the hardest working British M.P. in the House—a very ferret for getting information he was not supposed to have.

But so great is the distance in thought and in space between the Natal coast and the Western Province of the Cape, so hopelessly unilingual were members of the Dominion Party, and so ponderously heavy were the Nationalists, that neither party could come to grips with the problems of the other.

General Hertzog had explained his position. The Nationalist Party could not possibly have won an election at the time of the gold crisis. He never had any intention of going off gold. He would have to be driven off. He was. In order to save what had already been gained by the Nationalist Government, and conscious of public feeling, he entered the coalition. So promising a start had been made that he was willing to go further and to incorporate the sovereign independence and domestic progress of the nation in a new party.

Proof of his adherence to his pledges was rapidly at hand. It was a matter of form to establish in legislation the new status achieved by the Statute of Westminster. That this had not been done in Australia or in Canada did not prevent South Africa from doing it. In 1934 General Hertzog introduced the Status Bills. Other than declaring a republic, he could have done nothing more certain to arouse the wrath of British die-hards. They now condemned the Statute of Westminster root and branch. Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr described

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the Bills, "as emphasizing in the clearest possible manner the continuance of our present constitutional position as a part of the British Commonwealth." That did not suffice to pacify Natal, where sentiment outweighed statute and smothered history in such declarations as "the King is going to be a rubber stamp, and after the passage of the Bills no South African will owe any allegiance to any country but South Africa"; "the Executive Government of the Union should be administered by the King. The Bills usurp the executive authority of the Crown. We consent only to be governed by the King, and if Parliament places this tyranny upon us, we shall have every right to complain."

They maintained that the Status Bills accepted an important change in Imperial relations and virtually cut every link that bound South Africa to the homeland. Nothing that General Smuts or anyone else could say could allay their fears. "Whether it is neutrality or secession or any of the things the opponents complain about," said General Smuts, "they will be decided not by legal documents or the phraseology of a Bill like this, but by the ordeal of facts and of great events." How true these words were is obvious to-day, but at the time the British extremists maintained their antagonism to the Bills and the men who sponsored them. They saw in it the disappearance of the British connection, the possible abolition of the provincial system, the loss of British citizenship, and the severance of those links, visible and invisible, of substance and sentiment, which made them British before they were South Africans.

In their genuine anxiety they were often at sea

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in their constitutional history and in their interpretations of the functions of King and Crown. Their revolt was an expression of the fear that one day the final test, "the great events" of which General Smuts had spoken, would find South Africa standing aside and watching from afar an Empire at war. It was probably this temper which brought out the New Guard, advertising itself as non-political, but keeping no-one ignorant that it was British in sentiment—one Empire, one flag, one King—and it is with this section, remnants of the dozen abortive parties of the past, that General Smuts had to deal.

Once the Status Bills were on the Statute Book, there were smaller matters to irritate the Dominion Party. "God Save the King" had never appeared as a national anthem. Why should it? It was untranslatable in Afrikaans; its sentiment was not South African; and it was scarcely to be expected of any people, no matter how grateful to Britain, to sing somebody else's national anthem in another's language. But this, they argued, like the flag issue before it, was but one more step on the road to secession. Long before the anthem claimed their attention, a couple of Britishers had torn the Union flag from the top of the Durban City Hall; and on this new attempt to raid British sentiment there were those, even in the new Fusion Party, who were not a little disturbed—either genuinely or for the inconvenience many of them might experience at the hands of their constituents.

While, therefore, the revolt continued in spasmodic fashion, the representatives of that revolt persisted in Parliament to harass the Government. The prospect of the Prime Minister's departure for

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London was taken as an occasion by Colonel Stallard to press him for a statement on the Government's policy regarding defence and neutrality. Impelling Colonel Stallard was Mr. Pirow's speech to the Imperial Conference of Journalists, in which he had surveyed with remarkable frankness every aspect of South Africa's frontier position and reviewed the factors governing defence policy. He explained the reasons why South Africa was not prepared to participate in a general scheme of Empire defence. "While a direct secession from the British Empire would meet with negative response in this country," Mr. Pirow continued, "to-day, when we are in the fullest sense masters of our own destiny, I can say without fear that there is no anti-British feeling in this country. All the same, with that expression of the past and against the historic background, if a war broke out and a Government were to attempt to commit us rashly to war, there would be large-scale disturbances, possibly even civil war; and that is the reason why, although we are living in the greatest harmony and almost every South African of Afrikaner descent accepts the constitution, the Government would not participate in any general scheme of imperial defence."

Intensely suspicious of such statements and jealously guarding the trenches of the British connection, the leaders of the Dominion Party made almost daily assaults on the Government. One of them occasioned the following exchanges in the House. Colonel Stallard moved :

"That having regard to the forthcoming meeting of the Dominion Premiers in London, this House is of the opinion that it is essential to repudi-

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ate the doctrine recently enunciated by the Prime Minister that the Union of South Africa may lawfully trade with the enemy of Great Britain in time of war and that the naval base of Simonstown is during any such war severed from the Union in the same way as Gibraltar now is from Spain, and this House on the contrary affirms that the Union of South Africa is in peace and war an integral and indivisible part of the British Empire, and bound by the obligations created by that status."

General Hertzog : I state emphatically that my view as to the legal consequences flowing from our sovereign independent status is, they include the right and the fullest right of neutrality . . . and . . . I would like to know whether there is any country in the world which has any other policy which demands beforehand that if war breaks out between two parties, it is going to take part.

Mr. Coulter (Dominionite) : We are part of the Empire.

General Hertzog : That interruption only shows the amount of prejudice which lies at the bottom of the whole thing—"We are part of the Empire." I thought that would convey to a legal mind the question, "What authority is there? Where is that Empire authority?" Is there an Empire State anywhere? And if there is no Empire State and if there is no Empire with authority, then please tell me how we can deal with it?

Mr. Coulter : There is a British Empire left.

General Hertzog : Do not let us play with words. I am speaking now about an Empire which is a State authority, or entity. Where is that entity? Where is that authority? By the mouth of whom or through whom will it declare its desires?

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Mr. Coulter : We are represented by one King.

General Hertzog : It is no use arguing with my hon. friends. Prejudice is so strongly in them that they cannot get out of it.

“Really,” said General Hertzog, “my hon. friend—who was one of those who in 1926 helped to confirm the declaration of the Imperial Conference—has gone very wrong. In 1930 he again, if I am not mistaken, supported and voted for the Statute of Westminster.”

Colonel Stallard : The Statute of Westminster, not sovereign independence.

General Hertzog : That does not matter. Since 1926, and especially since 1930, not one of the Dominions has thought of consulting other Dominions as to what they may or may not do. Since the declaration of 1926 no self-respecting Dominion Prime Minister—assuming or taking for granted that the declaration meant what it gave expression to—seeing that he was the representative of a sovereign free State of absolute equal standing with any other State in the British Empire, thought of consulting or of asking the sanction of any other body for the action that he was taking.

Colonel Stallard : Would you not consult each other over war or peace?

General Hertzog : We are not going to have war, are we?

Colonel Stallard : The Minister of Defence says there is a risk of it.

General Hertzog : My hon. friend forgets that we are a sovereign independent people who need not go anywhere for any constitutional rights any longer. The Statute of Westminster clearly contemplated nothing else but a renunciation of all the

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rights and powers that the British Government and the British Parliament had with regard to us.

Colonel Stallard (continued the Prime Minister) had tried to twit the Minister of Defence with regard to the non-acceptance by the Government of a policy embracing a general scheme of military defence.

"How baseless are these fears. I may say," he went on, "that it just so happened that the meeting in 1926 of the Dominion Prime Ministers coincided with the signing of the Locarno Agreement, and the question arose as to what part the Dominions were going to take in it. Would it be the concern of Great Britain alone, or would it be the concern of all the Dominions? All and everyone agreed that it was a matter for England alone."

Colonel Stallard: They were not going to contribute their forces?

General Hertzog: It was not a matter of forces; it was a question of whether we were going to sign it or not. We were going to adopt a policy of co-operation and not to take part in a general defence scheme. We were going to adopt a policy of co-operation, but it was laid down in the report of 1926 that "Every Dominion is now and must always remain the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation in war or not." My hon. friend does not seem to be able to disassociate our rights as a sovereign State from the question of how we shall use those rights. I have simply insisted what our rights are. How far they may be carried out in the one way or the other is a matter to be decided by the people of this country according to the circumstances.

Mr. Coulter: You say we have no obligations.

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General Hertzog : We are, so the hon. member says, an integral and indivisible part of the British Empire.

Mr. Coulter : So the Act of Union says.

General Hertzog : Let us see what happened in 1926. Let us see what was said in reply to the question put by me, "Are we a free people or are we not?" To that question the following was the reply of the Imperial Conference : "To the group of self-governing communities composed of Great Britain and the Dominions." I wish particularly to draw attention to this—that in the group of self-governing communities, Great Britain is included. In the reply it is set out that the Dominions may be better looked upon as autonomous units within the British Empire.

Mr. Coulter : You say there is no British Empire.

General Hertzog : No, sir. What I did say was this. There is no State unity British Empire. The British Empire is a mere term—a term to cover certain States. That is all.

What is there in the declaration of the 1926 Conference that gives Colonel Stallard the right to say in his motion that South Africa is nothing else but an indivisible part of the British Empire? Where is that Empire of which South Africa must be part and parcel? It is a mere name and nothing else.

Mr. Coulter : I do not agree.

General Hertzog : Then the hon. member must inform us where the British Empire authority results.

Mr. Coulter : It is the King.

General Hertzog : Since when has the King taken back the sovereignty which belongs to Parliament?

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Mr. Coulter : The sovereignty does not belong to Parliament.

General Hertzog : My hon. friend says the sovereignty does not belong to Parliament. Even my hon. friend is getting more and more obscure. He is living in a period of no less than eighty years—no, one hundred and eighty years ago. I know that there are people who want to think of restoring that sovereign power again to the King, but just fancy the British Parliament and the British people ever again restoring it—of taking it away from the British Parliament and restoring it to the King.

Mr. Coulter : The Prime Minister does not understand the wording of the constitution if he says that.

General Hertzog : No, no. You must not make an excuse like that. Generalizations like that will not do. I ask the hon. member where is that authority. He says it rests with the King. He knows as well as I do that it is not so.

The third side of this debate—that of the Nationalists, the purified Nationalists as they were called, now that they were without General Hertzog and his followers—was expressed by Dr. Malan during the same and other debates, demanding that in accordance with the Status Act of 1934 the right of neutrality should be translated into a declared policy.

IV

There were good reasons for the anxiety of all parties, and particularly, perhaps, for the British section, on the issues of peace or war. Herr Hitler,

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risen to power, was practising the use of it, and at least one able writer, Mr. Sydney Barnett Potter, then editor of the *Natal Witness*, in a series of articles which to-day read as prophetic, was calling his readers' attention to the dangers of the German revolution. Published on the fringe of the Commonwealth, distant from the chancelleries where policies are formulated and destinies decided, they denied, in knowledge, foresight, and comprehension the facile optimism of statesmen here and elsewhere. At the end of 1934 General Smuts, speaking in London, denounced the talk of war and described the expectation of war to-morrow or in the near future as sheer nonsense. Before the Institute of International Affairs he made an eloquent appeal for the recognition of German equality. "There is no place," he said, "in international law for second-rate nations, and least of all should Germany be left in that position half a generation after the Great War. Let us break the bonds," he pleaded, "and set captive and harassed souls free in a decent human way," and proceeded to illustrate, by reference to his own country, the great benefits flowing from international generosity.

The news of the day was ominous enough. In March of the same year Germany introduced conscription. A British note was dispatched to Berlin and a British statesman followed it post-haste.

It was in those days of 1934 to 1938 that the challenge of Germany, first to the Treaty of Versailles and then to Europe, that the fog of suspicion hung over British South Africa as the Government set its face against the demands of the Opposition for a statement of policy in a grim set of circum-

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stances. In February 1935 Mr. Hofmeyr declared, "The Cabinet agreed that in the event of war it is for the people of South Africa to decide upon the nature and extent of their participation." This was the first intimation, perhaps, of the cry that was taken up by every prominent spokesman.

At the Imperial Conference His Majesty the King, in greeting Dominion delegates, seemed to have had much of the South African conflict in mind when he said, "The unity of the British Empire is no longer expressed by the supremacy of this time-honoured Parliament of Westminster." As someone wrote, the Dominionites preferred to be *plus royale que le roi!* One of the coastal newspapers denounced Mr. Hofmeyr's declaration as "a very foolish statement."

It would be a great error to assume that the Dominion Party represented the bulk of British opinion. Their supporters were confined for the most part to Durban and East London. Their representation in the House of Assembly numbered no more than two at one time, and less than a dozen at another. They made no headway in the Cape; very little in the Transvaal; and it is doubtful if they had a supporter in the Orange Free State. At the same time it is in the study of the extreme that the policies of a nation are occasionally to be discovered; and in the flat refusal of the Dominion Party to accept the King's word on the freedom of the Dominions is reflected that tendency of the bulk of English-speaking citizens to revolt against the separatist instincts of the Afrikaner. For, let it be understood that at least four members of the Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, had at one time or another declared themselves as Repub-

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licans, one political observer going as far as to say "All Dutchmen are Republicans, even General Smuts."

If, of the Dominion Party, it may be implied: what do they know of South Africa who only England know? the Dominionite might answer, and what do they know of England who only South Africa know? It was true that they knew nothing in England of the rebel Dominion. It was true also that the Dominionites, had they been in England during the decade 1924 to 1934, might not have been so anxious to look upon Westminster as an infallible guide to a nation's destiny.

Being in South Africa, the "whittling away" of the British connection was their chief concern. No sooner had the Status Bills been placed on the Statute Book than the question of the national anthem aroused Britishers to renewed and vigorous protest, and set up the opposition on the other side to equal clamour about the rights of the Afrikaners. If "God Save the King" was not to be South Africa's anthem, all, the Britishers felt, was lost. By a genius for duality which is the mainstay of South African politics, it was accorded equal rights with "Die Stem van Suid Africa"; so, having two flags, two anthems followed, each rejoicing in the close attention of the respective parties to see to it that when one was played the other should be. But with the best will in the world rules and regulations go awry, and there came a time when, at a Union Day function, "God Save the King" was omitted, whether by design or mischance was left for the individual allegiance to decide. Then came the changing of the name of the Defence Headquarters from Roberts Heights, a name intended

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to perpetuate the memory of Lord Roberts, to Voortrekker Hoogte.

v

In May 1938 the Government, having run its course, went to the country on its record of something attempted, something done, and was returned with a majority of over eighty in an Assembly of one hundred and fifty. The Nationalists carried twenty-six seats and the Dominionites eight. Not one of the seven constituencies of Durban returned a Government candidate. Five of them fell to the Dominion Party as a result of an attack upon General Smuts, the like of which had never been seen in South African journalism. It became so despicable that it drove one editor to protest and subsequently to resign. It was a triumph for that particular type of journalism that sends circulation sky high and is as devoid of political worth as an American pulp. And it put into Parliament half a dozen men who, sincere enough as they may have been, made no contribution to the English political tradition and moved one observer to remark, "Some of us wonder whether the English genius for public leadership and statecraft is dead in South Africa."

Except on the coastal belt the Dominion Party made no headway. Its leader, Colonel Stallard, was defeated at the polls ; Mr. Coulter, his lieutenant in the Cape, followed him, while Mr. Marwick, the Athos of "the three musketeers," held his constituency on the earnestness of his concern for his constituents, and remains, to-day, as the only

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Britisher courageous enough to project his opposition to Afrikaner domination to the point of opposing a pension for General Hertzog.

European affairs and South Africa's attitude towards them occupied the minds of the public and the business of Parliament. General Hertzog was a supporter of the League of Nations and ranged his Government on the side of those Powers ready to apply sanctions to Italy. It was an attitude that did not appeal to the Nationalist, and Dr. Malan took every available opportunity to call for a definite statement of foreign policy, advancing, at the same time, the view that South Africa's safety lay in refraining from any pledge or promise in external affairs. The defection of the League as a whole and the vacillating diplomacy of Sir Samuel Hoare and Monsieur Laval saved South Africa from a course to which she was pledged, though it did not save the Government from considerable criticism. During the period of partial sanctions the Government continued to pay a subsidy to Italian shipping.

The period was marked by these several doubts—on the British side, that a policy based upon sovereign independence would be followed by a declaration of neutrality in war, and on the purified Nationalist side, that it would fall short of doing so. Neither the Prime Minister nor the deputy Prime Minister was prepared to give any assurance. General Smuts kept his own counsel, except when it was necessary to calm rising temper or dispel anxiety.

It is never easy in the study of politics, and particularly South African politics, to decide when a Prime Minister or party leader is speaking in

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terms of politics or of statesmanship. Perhaps it was inevitable that General Hertzog and General Smuts had separate functions to perform. The former seldom ventured to British Natal. He left his colleague to hold the British province while he was at home in the back veld. What is said in the back veld is usually unpalatable in the towns, and certainly in ultra-British circles. The same themes treated by the two leaders in different languages often appeared as mutually contradictory, so that it seemed once more as if the Government spoke with two voices. The defenders of the faith in Natal pointed to the speeches of General Hertzog to the rural Afrikaner as evidence of the Government's insincerity, and the Nationalists searched the declarations of General Smuts for suitable ammunition. They both found what they were looking for, and played squash rackets with the Government as the wall.

By the time Mr. Chamberlain was hastening to Munich, South Africa was a disturbed nation. The great body of political opinion was solidly behind the Fusion Government. There was no economic question which threatened it. It had the support of the Chamber of Mines, and through it, the encouragement of the Argus group of newspapers. The Chamber of Mines will support any government that lets it get on with the job of gold-mining. Agriculture, too, had been carefully nursed. For five or six years the country rode a mounting wave of prosperity. Year after year Mr. Havenga, Minister of Finance, received the congratulations of the Press for a condition he did not bring about. In congratulating him the public congratulated itself, and bought itself a new motor car in an

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exuberance of self-esteem. There is nothing like prosperity for smoothing out political differences and racial animosities. The year 1938 was a veritable *annus mirabilis*. Great flying ships plied between Durban harbour and England. Seventy-mile-an-hour roads were crawling up from the coast and down from the Rand ; luxury liners sailed the coast of Africa. Prosperity sat upon the Berg ; but Herr Hitler sat at Berchtesgarden.

CHAPTER IX

I

WHEN the two generals shook hands in 1933 there was at least one thing upon which they agreed and another upon which they agreed to differ. They agreed that each of them might advance a personal opinion upon national issues without endangering the other's right to do so or pledging the Government to that opinion. There was complete unanimity also about the right of the young sovereign State to be neutral in war. There was a subtle difference of opinion about what would happen if Britain were attacked. For the better part of a year General Smuts had devoted study and speech to the European situation, and as late as August 26, 1938, stated the position of South Africa in the following reply to Dr. Malan:

The policy of the Government was that South Africa would not automatically or in any way be involved in war, but that South Africa would only take part in a war if Parliament should so decide in the interests of South Africa. In view of this policy, there was no reason to believe that the Union was bound to participate in a war.

There were two circumstances which could involve Great Britain in war. These had been set out by Mr. Chamberlain in a recent speech in the British House of Commons. Great Britain's

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Locarno obligations compelled her to protect the boundary between France, Holland, Belgium, and Germany. The British Government, however, had had a clause inserted in the Treaty exempting the Dominions from any obligation in this matter. The other circumstance in which Britain could be involved in war was in defence of the Dominions. The position in Central Europe had been mentioned. Great Britain had no obligations in Central Europe or in any other part of the world. Great Britain might be interested in the situation, but was not bound in any way to take part in a Central European war. There was no question of automatic participation in any war by the Union. It was for her Parliament to decide in the interests of the country what she was prepared to do.

The Union's status was such that there could be no question of South Africa going to war automatically. If Great Britain declared war, "it will be for this country to decide in the light of circumstances what her policy will be.

"My personal opinion is that if Great Britain is involved in a war there can be no doubt—I cannot imagine that South Africa would fail to go to her assistance. I think it is quite clear that if Great Britain is in danger, or is attacked, South Africa will assist her."

Mr. Strydom : Yes, but what is the Government's policy?

General Smuts : I have told you what the Government's policy is—that it is for Parliament to decide. I cannot imagine, however, that if Britain, which is the custodian of our independence, was in danger South Africa would not go to her assistance.

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In conclusion, General Smuts remarked that he hoped he would be in the Government which might have to decide South Africa's attitude should war break out, and he would give Parliament the same advice as he had expressed that day.

On this statement the leader of the Nationalists, Dr. Malan, suggested that the question now arose, if this were General Smuts' personal opinion, what would the Cabinet do. General Smuts had seven followers in the Cabinet who would agitate for participation in England's war. It was now only necessary to know what General Hertzog's followers would advise.

What would happen, Dr. Malan asked, if the ultimate decision rested with the people of the country? There would be complete chaos. General Hertzog, however, maintained complete silence in what he personally would do. General Smuts, he said, had a right to his opinion and the right to express it, but when the time came the people would decide.

The pressure from the side of the Dominion Party can be expressed in one amendment which was proposed during the Status Bills. It was that "Nothing shall give the Union the right to remain neutral in the event of the British Empire being engaged in war." As this amendment was tabled four years previous to the above debate, at a time when Herr Hitler had not become a serious menace, it can be imagined that in August 1938 it stood more fixedly than ever as the opinion of the extreme section on the English-speaking side.

Individual opinions of political leaders were in greater evidence than a declaration of Cabinet

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policy, and this, more than anything else, was the reason for the disturbed state of the country. Separate as they were, the two opposition parties, the Purified Nationalists on the one side and the Dominionites on the other, converged in their opinion that the Fusion Government was merely a return to the Botha Cabinet, which, it will be recalled, was accused of being too Dutch by the one and too British Imperialist by the other. The only difference, if this view is correct, would be that in the Fusion Cabinet ministers enjoyed the freedom of speech and individual policy not permitted by General Botha. General Hertzog, however, was willing to concede to his colleagues in 1938 what he had demanded, and been refused to point of expulsion, from the Cabinet in 1912.

This freedom had some powerful consequences. Mr. Pirow, for example, had declared that South Africa would not participate in any war "except where the true interests of South Africa made participation inevitable." But what were the true interests of South Africa? On that aspect of the matter Mr. Pirow was silent. But what he did indicate was that if a chain of circumstances arose again, such as forced South Africa into the last war, he would be the first to protest. In the atmosphere of a political meeting in the rural Free State he had even declared that he would rebel.

II

He would be an insensitive Britisher who remained completely unmoved by statements so divergent as these, and coming from Cabinet

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Ministers at a moment so fraught with danger as the northern autumn of 1938. Leader writers had a difficult time explaining away the two voices of the Government. They took the only course possible and emphasized that "Parliament would decide." The Opposition Press on the Nationalist side warned its readers of the coming treachery, while a couple of newspapers on the English side did the same, but differed merely in the direction of the treachery. It was not as if the issues of peace and war were the only subjects that gave cause for dissatisfaction. The debate on the national anthem has already been mentioned, and one or two of the speeches are worth quoting as illustrating less the temper of the days than the genuine attitudes of party leaders. They will serve to illustrate the nature of allegiances and approach to what we have called South Africanism. Here is the argument of Dr. Malan :

"To have two national anthems is an acknowledgment that as a nation we do not yet stand on our feet, but are still merely an appendage of another nation, and thereby give others the right to regard us as the boot-black of another country. There are those in South Africa who claim that they love South Africa, and that they are good South Africans, and yet they desire for their country and nation the national anthem of another country. Surely this is in direct contradiction to the genuine feeling and spirit of nationalism ?

"We have not to do here with race but with the principle underlying nationhood. I think that if there is one country in the world which requires symbols to represent its nationhood, it is South Africa. South Africa has two races and two

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languages. That I do not regard as a catastrophe. On the contrary, I think that this duality may in many cases be an advantage, and can add to the wealth and richness of our national life. What is a calamity, however, is that while one section of the nation has planted its roots firmly in the country and feels and acts as a South African should, another section has not yet taken root here, and is still in spirit and sentiment attached to the home country. The tragedy is that these people, while calling themselves South Africans, are merely strings to the bow of another country. That is a South African tragedy."

For the English opinion, I choose a speech by Mr. Leslie Blackwell, at that time a Fusionist :

"What," he asked, "is the character and status of 'God Save the King'? I affirm that it is the national anthem of South Africa. Its use in South Africa is as old as the English language itself. The Prime Minister seems to think that to make a national anthem official an express statutory enactment is necessary. I differ from him. I know of no country in the world which, by express statutory enactment, has enacted or adopted a national anthem. Does anyone doubt that 'La Marseillaise' is the national anthem of France? yet it is not enshrined by statutory enactment.

"I believe that 'God Save the King' is built into the fabric of this country and that as long as the English language is spoken . . . so long will 'God Save the King' be the national anthem in South Africa. We English-speaking people in the Union are South Africans. We love every inch of South African soil. In no other country would I live. In no other country will I die. To me it is

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my home. Yet there is nothing incompatible with my loyalty to that great Empire, which, with all its faults and imperfections, is the world's chief bulwark of democracy and the greatest civilized force this planet has ever known. The real tragedy of South Africa is that politics are still dominated by race, that His Majesty's Opposition is a unilingual, uniracial, intolerant minority."

The circumstances in which these two speeches were made are sufficiently defined by the date, the end of July 1938; but if the atmosphere of the days was charged with peril, the declarations were not the products of fears or emotions. These may have accounted for the choice in peroration, they did not account for the views themselves, which, touching the very fundamentals of our dual society, were more permanent than impending war could make them. It can be assumed that Dr. Malan's opinion represented the views of a far greater number of people than the representation of the Nationalists in the House would suggest. It was no negligible minority that held the same opinion as Dr. Malan, it was a dangerously powerful political force which required the most delicate treatment. Anything, in fact, might upset the balance of political forces, so delicately poised was the Fusion Ministry on the knife-edge of a fifty-fifty policy. There is no shadow of doubt, for example, that thousands of English-speaking people had been confirmed in their desire to vote for the Fusion Party in May 1938, on the assurances of General Smuts that there would be no tampering with the British national anthem. In fact, only the delicacy of South Africa's political structure at this time could excuse the subtle changes in the inter-

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pretation of pledges given. There was great consternation among English-speaking people at the possibility that they had been deceived; and in Natal, at any rate, there were many who remembered the words of General Smuts at a Party Congress, when he appealed to them to look at the big things, and admitted that he had swallowed a lot for racial co-operation.

The *via media* of a fifty-fifty policy bristled with difficulties, but fifty-fifty it must be, as far as human ingenuity could make it, if the nation was not to descend into a permanent state of racial conflict. When, therefore, a mass petition of some 9,000 signatures was presented to the Prime Minister, praying that a national anthem might be chosen to sing with "God Save the King" it was refused as condemning the government to a particular policy. South Africa, to-day, has no official national anthem, enshrined by statute, but both "God Save the King" and "Die Stem van Suid Africa" are played on State occasions and on other occasions when gestures are the order of the day.

To-day, in some theatres, particularly in Pretoria, numbers of Afrikaners walk out during the playing of "God Save the King," an action that provokes the anger of others and has resulted in more than one free fight and a few broken heads.

Despite these things, a solid centre of the people supported the Fusion Government in principle, and were not unmindful of the great benefits accruing from its economic policies. The majority remarked upon the fact that there was no alternative government save that of Dr. Malan, which was, in their belief, viciously racial. As far as governing the nation was concerned, the Dominion Party was

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too weak in numbers and in ability. The majority preferred, then, the see-saw of a Fusion Ministry, weighted occasionally on General Hertzog's side towards a Nationalist policy, but with a counter-balancing weight of the Smuts group.

The Prime Minister continued in generous praise of his English-speaking followers. Wherever he went, he emphasized the way in which they were anxious to put racialism aside; and though this was a matter of some political expedience, it may be accepted as a genuine anxiety on the part of General Hertzog to rid the country of its worst features. Indeed, it is more than possible that the Prime Minister was so persuaded of the change of heart of his English followers and an acceptance by them of true South Africanism, that he believed they would approve of steps such as we have recorded in the introduction of a South African national anthem. The progress of national unity instead of sectional interests was probably forced at too rapid a pace for the English-speaking people to adjust their minds to it. Only in this way can the zeal of the Prime Minister to forward the "South Africa First" policy be explained, and only in this way can his sincerity be accommodated to the facts. It was a long time before he appreciated in full the fact that nation-building does not proceed from a series of legislative proposals, but that the latter are the expression of social and political advance.

III

The Prime Minister's intellectual make-up did not confer infallible wisdom. The obstinacy to

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which General Smuts had referred was a product of his political experiences and an inherent trait of his legal mind. He was impatient of criticism and short-suffering of opponents, and more than once he allowed his better judgment to be warped by an inability to concede error. His loyalty to friends had no limits. It was taken to such lengths that its virtue was wrung out of it, and it became a factor in arousing the suspicions of many members of the public and the doubts of at least one member of the Cabinet.

For a member of the Cabinet of the proved administrative ability and culture of the young Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr to resign was felt to be a blow to the English-speaking cause. General Hertzog had decided that a Mr. Fourie, defeated at the general election, should return to the Cabinet. No constituency could be found for him, and few had a good word to say of his ability. Unable to secure his return, even to the Senate, the Prime Minister decided to include him in the four members of the Senate, in terms of the constitution, for the representation of the interests of the Natives. The constitution lays down, as Mr. Hofmeyr reminded the House at the time, that the Senators nominated by the Government shall be selected for their knowledge and experience of the reasonable wants and wishes of the native people.

"I," said Mr. Hofmeyr, "cannot lay my hand on my heart and say Mr. Fourie is being nominated because of his knowledge of Native affairs."

This action, Mr. Hofmeyr maintained, was an attack upon the constitution which could not go unchallenged, and rather than be a party to it he

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preferred to resign. A second Cabinet Minister followed him.

Throughout the country it was generally felt that the Prime Minister was creating a twelfth portfolio for his friend Mr. Fourie, and over a period of weeks, when it was suggested that Mr. Fourie was likely to stand at a by-election, some malicious attacks were made upon him and upon the Prime Minister. The Press, in fact, put the Prime Minister in a dilemma. He has never been one to rejoice with other people when they have gained a point at his expense. He will not be dictated to, or even appear to be dictated to, by the newspapers. In fact, he does not like the newspapers. He has good reason for his dislike. During the Fourie episode General Hertzog arched his back and determined that his friend would re-enter the Cabinet by hook or crook. The Press put Mr. Fourie back in the Cabinet, and the public, reflecting that attitude, went on its way more disturbed than ever. One whom they looked upon as a future Prime Minister was now out of the Cabinet, another had followed him, the rumours that were disseminated on strong winds accused Mr. Pirow of being behind General Hertzog, and whenever Mr. Pirow was mentioned in Natal people thought of Hitler.

The year 1938, that recorded so many anxieties for Europe, was the Centenary of the Great Trek. Afrikaner history is a short story rather than a long novel. Its characters are sharply cut ; its theme is single. There are no excursions into pleasant by-ways in search of the riches of the hedgerows, and no diversions such as give wealth and broad beauty to the novel. Instead, it rises sharply, as the land

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itself, to the dramatic conflict. A few well-turned sentences that give it atmosphere need scarcely be read. They reach up to the central peak that tears the skies and marks the beginning, continuing to stand out in repetitive harshness to the end. Its very ruggedness surfeits the mind, and its finest qualities become its worst features. No-one is left in doubt of the characters. They are few in number, not one unnecessary to the plot, and all to be counted on the fingers of two hands. No Afrikaner looks beyond the Great Trek, it is for him the starting-point of all that he hopes to be, and it is only a hundred years distant. From then to now his mind has not ventured far from the straight path. If he has looked at the fringe, the sight of it has more than persuaded him to shun its temptations. The centenary year, then, was celebrated by him in a rededication to his interpretation of that Trek. On the surface it had national significance, but below the surface it surged with racial meaning. From the moment a party of Afrikaners inspanned their oxen to retrace the footsteps of the past until the moment it dispersed, the whole Afrikaner community returned to the places and the thoughts that it knew and vowed once more the old vows.

The Centenary, then, was more than opportunity for Afrikaner rejoicings, it was more than a religious revival that has emotion and no intellect—froth and no substance. It was a rededication to the racial and, therefore, to a political faith; and because its central conflict was related to the British, it was inevitable that the Centenary had an alienating effect upon them. On the surface there was no lack of the most friendly gestures. Afrikaner leaders themselves, including the Prime Minister,

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were anxious that the Centenary should be a nationwide rejoicing. In many places English-speaking people took part in plays and pageants, and the English Press surpassed itself in giving the celebrations a tremendous reception. Despite every inducement, however, there was awkwardness in the Britisher's response. He felt like a ghost at the feast. He was. He looked on, played a part in it, but he was not of it. It was an Afrikaner occasion that lasted for months ; it recalled every success of the Boer and his every defeat ; and the Britisher felt that even now he was being held responsible for it, and that the Afrikaners were " chalking it up " against him ! How could it be otherwise ? The ox-wagons lumbered through the country north and east. The young Afrikaner grew a beard, and his sister wore the Voortreker costume. There were braavleis, where they sat round the open fire on the veld and grilled fresh meat. There were balls and dances in the towns and solemn vows in the country. The ouma wept and the oupa shed a tear.

Such an occasion could not be free from politics, for religion, language, custom, race, tradition, the whole of Afrikanerdom, revolved about politics ; and there was not an Afrikaner that was young, or Boer that was old, who had not himself, or his father before him, fought the British. The British were the only White people they had fought, and every incident of the fight was indelibly recorded on a mind that was moulded like the veld.

What the Centenary did was to bring to the surface urges which were never far below it. It deepened the gulf between Afrikaner and Briton ; it emphasized the Afrikaner tradition, itself so much

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at variance with the British tradition ; it did for the mind what Piet Retief had done for the body. He placed, or tried to, geographical miles between him and those who, in his belief, oppressed him. The Centenary put psychological distance between them.

It was inevitable that it should be so. The Afrikaner who had neglected his Church went once more to hear the predikant. He who had strayed returned to the fold, and the stranger, the Britisher, sat without the gates. Dr. Malan was right. Two such conflicting elements could never come together. The conflict was too vivid for the author to accommodate it in a short story that has a happy ending. He would be accused of mere manipulation did he end it on a satisfactory note ; and yet a short story of a hundred years it had to be, for a hundred years, and the perspective it permits a mind to which perspective is foreign, has not the ideal novel's length. Courageous and valiant attempts were made, by Press, Pulpit, and public themselves, to forget what could not be forgotten, to erase the indelible, and to cover the facts of separatism in the hope that they would disappear.

If to the outside world South Africa appeared in 1938 and 1939 as a happy prosperous nation, rejoicing in a recent national celebration, it was as false a picture as could be painted of two peoples who were not prepared to own to the world what they were not anxious to own to themselves : that each was the side of a triangle, almost an isosceles triangle, the base South Africa, upon the extremities of which they did no more than rest, as Afrikaner and British. If that base represented the

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real South Africa, then their interpretations of it were as divergent as the length. They met at the apex, a point having position and no magnitude.

But to acknowledge that was to be dubbed a racist. To state the truth of the matter was like talking sex in a nineteenth-century drawing-room or heresy to a fifteenth-century cardinal. All through 1938 and 1939 people deceived themselves, and around them politicians and the Press wove a defensive web of wish-thinking, hoping for the best, hoping, in fact, that the great tests of unity would never present themselves.

This attitude of mind accounted for the fifty-fifty policy, for the scrupulous care to avoid giving offence to either section ; and more particularly, for the refusal of the Prime Minister to declare the policy of the Government in a hypothetical set of circumstances. It was clear, then, that as the European situation deteriorated the position in South Africa became more artificial, the more difficult it was for General Hertzog and General Smuts to keep their respective groups calm and unruffled, and the easier it was for Dr. Malan on the one side and Colonel Stallard on the other to arouse the suspicions of the country. The foreign policy of General Hertzog being based upon the hopes of Munich, Mr. Chamberlain gave South Africa a short reprieve. The Press and the country breathed freely for a space. General Hertzog prophesied fifty years of peace ; but General Smuts, with keener mind for unseen forces, confessed that, while statesmen nearer the main theatre of affairs assured him that there would be no war, he did not share their optimism. "It is a dangerous and cruel world," he said. "Back to a reformed League must

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be our policy . . . but for peace I would arm to the limit."

IV

So South Africa approached the fateful days of September 1939 ; a divided Cabinet, a divided country, awaiting the moment when the fundamental challenge to sovereign maturity should come.

" We are living in times of far-reaching change, the outcome and the end of which no man can foresee. Science has become the dominating force in reshaping human outlook and human society in every department of life. Vast ideological forces are on the move. The needs of human organization in society, in State, and among the States generally, for an international system have been immensely intensified. Mankind is truly on the march, and there is nothing to stop it. We are moving rapidly to a new and unknown order of things."

Such was the warning of General Smuts.

How the young South African nation would march with the rest of mankind weighed heavily upon the mind of many who listened to the grave words of Mr. Chamberlain at eleven of the clock on Sunday, September 3, 1939.

On the fringe of the English-speaking world, in the old Voortrekker city of Pietermaritzburg, where the sky is seldom clouded, there was only one question asked that could not be answered with confidence, " What would South Africa do ? " A few months before, Mr. Mackenzie King, the Premier of Canada, had declared, " I cannot accept the view that regardless of circumstance this country

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must say, here and now, Canada is prepared to support any action which may be decided upon by the Government at Westminster."

It was what General Hertzog had been saying for twelve months ; more, he had been saying it for twice twelve, and not in months, but in years. Stealing upon South Africa, by a process of self-deception, was the belief that South Africa was a nation in fact as well as letter, and that its people were South Africans in spirit as well as nationality. The crucial test, which Britisher and Afrikaner hoped would never come, was now upon them. It was the more perilous because we had convinced ourselves against all the facts that we were a homogeneous community. Brought swiftly and suddenly to the issue of war, the deceptions and the assumptions fell from us. Then it was that not even a Cabinet Minister could say what South Africa would do. Of one thing only we were persuaded—that Parliament would decide. Parliament had decided so many things : that South Africa should have two official languages ; that it should have two anthems, two flags, and two capitals ; and that, in essentials, as in non-essentials, there should be equality of status and opportunity, a fifty-fifty ratio, and a sort of national charity in all things. But there was now a case which could not be divided into equal parts or settled by the South African genius for duality. You might have two flags, two songs, two languages, but you could not have two conditions of war and peace. The decision about war must be an outright decision. There was no escape from it, no alternative.

For seven years political leaders all over the

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country had become expert in explaining things away. Whenever General Hertzog said anything that could be interpreted as meaning that South Africa would remain neutral, it became the duty of others to show that he did not mean what people said he meant. Many a hard-pressed politician in Natal was compelled to the habits of the pulpit, where the texts of the New Testament are torn to pieces in order that the congregation might discover that Jesus did not mean what He said. Like the congregation, the public was half convinced, and the more they appreciated the ordeal, the less they liked it.

The day that members of the Cabinet were called to Pretoria, I had occasion to meet United Party leaders in Natal, gathered together to consider prospects in a by-election where a Cabinet Minister was being challenged by Colonel Stallard. Had they spoken in Afrikaans they would have said "Alles sal reg kom," which is the sort of phrase used by all and sundry to express hope, where no conviction exists, that all will be well. Instead, speaking in English and in low tones, they discussed the possibilities. I was assured that men like General Kemp, a rebel in 1914 and now a Cabinet Minister, had but recently exploded at some of the actions of Herr Hitler and was only waiting the chance of getting into uniform and leading a commando into Germany; and I recalled, though I did not relate, a story of the rebellion during the last war, of a burgher commandant ordered to prepare his company for action. The preliminaries completed, he is said to have telegraphed his superior officer, "All ready, who do we fight, English or Germans?"

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In the first week of September 1939, while one Cabinet Minister said, "Hertzog will fight," another on the other side of the Drakensberg was saying the opposite. Yet in this little sunlit town a group of leaders of the party were thanking God for Smuts in case it proved that they could not thank God for Hertzog.

On Saturday, 2nd September, the Cabinet met for three hours at Groote Schuur. What General Hertzog said then was the first indication or intimation, to more than one Cabinet Minister, of his intentions.

"These were the most historic hours I have ever passed through," said Colonel Denys Reitz, son of an ex-president, one-time rebel, one-time exile, the author of *Commando*. "I remember General Smuts saying, 'This is the most vital decision I have had to make in my life.' You could have heard a pin drop. All of us could sense, and sense deeply, the historic importance of the occasion. For three or four hours we tried to dissuade General Hertzog from making his fateful decision, but he was inflexible in his determination."

Weary of argument, the meeting was adjourned until Sunday. "I am going to remain neutral," declared General Hertzog, "and under no conditions allow South Africa to enter this war." Renewed pleadings were of no avail. "Gentlemen, I am the Prime Minister of this country," he finally reminded them, "and this is what I have decided upon."

In the words of Colonel Reitz, "the tragedy had occurred." For six years, he reminds us, we used to feel that the system of rule by the Cabinet had almost fallen into disuse, so autocratic and

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dogmatic had the Prime Minister become, so inelastic and so untractable his mind.

It was a Cabinet of thirteen members, one without portfolio. It was the one without portfolio that made all the difference. For General Hertzog there were five followers; for General Smuts, six.

On the following Monday the Prime Minister addressed a crowded and expectant Assembly. The author of South Africa's two-stream policy in 1912, the Mullah of Stellenbosch, the father of Afrikanerdom, the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, who had travelled far along the road to meet the British, faced with the greatest decision of his remarkable career, turned about—and went home. Sitting a yard or so away was *son éminence grise*, older now than when he had sat near General Botha and conjured how he might placate the Mullah of Stellenbosch by the help of Father Abraham, Mr. Fischer. If *son éminence grise* had become the philosopher-statesman, the exponent of Holism and the co-architect of the League of Nations, he still retained the figure and the faculty of the Grey Cardinal. The Grey Cardinal had travelled too far to retrace the steps his mind had taken.

Near them on the ministerial benches sat "lucky Klassie Havenga," totalitarian-minded Mr. Pirow; and in front of them on the Government benches sat the Liberal ex-minister, Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr; and not far away Dr. Malan, like an owl, and Mr. Marwick, his hand ready to draw a sword.

In the first sentence of his address the Prime Minister described the condition of all South Africa.

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"I feel myself obliged," he said, "to inform the House that since Friday last there has been a very deep flowing difference of opinion in the ranks of the Cabinet."

With that his following address may be divided into three parts. There was the statement on the question before the Government, whether the Union should take part in the war or whether it would keep out of war and still maintain the most cordial relations with Great Britain. On this issue the attitude to be adopted as far as he was concerned was that :

"The existing relations between the Union of South Africa and the various belligerent countries will, in so far as the Union is concerned, persist unchanged, and continue as if no war is being waged."

The obligations between the Union and Great Britain as a member of the Commonwealth, its commitments with the League of Nations, were to be faithfully fulfilled, and no-one "shall be permitted to use the territory of the Union for any purpose which may in any way impair these relations and obligations.

"Is it not a fact," he went on, "that during all this time I myself, General Smuts, and other ministers of the party have repeatedly insisted on our promise to the nation that we would not take part in any war unless it was in our direct interest to do so? Was it not the duty of those who are now taking the other view to have explained their attitude at that time? I have not deserved to be left in the lurch by my colleagues in a time such as this. I have said over and over again that South Africa would not be plunged into a war except

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when the interests of the country itself demanded such action. There I will take my stand."

General Hertzog proceeded to insist upon South Africa's freedom of action, her goodwill towards Britain, and the absence of any attack upon the interests of the Union.

Then by way of introduction to the third part of his speech the Prime Minister discoursed upon his warnings to succeeding Imperial Conferences that unless "that monster, the Treaty of Versailles, were not altered" a war was inevitable. There followed what was unique in Dominion Parliaments, a survey of Hitler's rise to power and an interpretation of his policy totally at variance with current Commonwealth opinion. General Hertzog referred to the various acts done by Germany during the past few years, and said there was no iota of proof that Herr Hitler desired world domination. It was said, he continued, that the Union must enter this war because Germany had shown that she was out for world domination. He had, however, followed carefully every step taken by Germany, and had asked himself whether the interpretation that Hitler was out for world domination was correct. If that had been the case, no-one would have opposed Germany more fervently than he. There was, however, no proof that this was Herr Hitler's object.

"I have always said that, unless the injustice of Versailles were removed, the soul of Hitler and the German nation would be so embittered that Germany would do anything to put an end to her humiliation."

Then, as if deep from the wells of memory, General Hertzog recalled :

"I have gone through this struggle myself, and

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I know what it is to be trampled underfoot so long that eventually one prefers destruction to further humiliation," he said. "We are now being asked to go to war. We have not the least right to do that, and if we do enter the war the Afrikaner nation will suffer such a shock that it will take years before we recover."

Rising to the dying cheers of the Nationalists, and amid the growing ones of the Government Party, General Smuts, the Deputy Prime Minister, addressed himself to the subject. With a few preliminary remarks on the gravity of the occasion, he proceeded to answer the question, "What was the point at issue?"

General Hertzog had said the point on which General Smuts and his colleagues had broken with the Prime Minister was that he (General Smuts) supported a policy of active participation in the war.

"The position we take up is this," said General Smuts, "that it would be wrong and it would be fatal for this country not to sever relations with Germany at this stage. We think it would be wrong and it would be fatal for this country to continue to consider Germany as a friend and to continue as if nothing has happened in the world. Is Germany, under the circumstances of to-day, going to be considered as a friendly Power, or are we going to take what I consider the proper course and sever relations with her? That is the point on which we have broken. The question of our active participation is not at issue. To my mind, if we were to take up the middle course the Prime Minister proposes, we would be adopting an attitude unknown to international law. In war you

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are either a friend or an enemy. The Prime Minister wants to be a friend, but he wants to temper his friendship with acts and behaviour which no hostile Power will ever recognize as legal or proper. If we are prepared to adopt this course of modified neutrality, we shall be up against the gravest difficulties possible. No nation in the world—certainly not Germany—would be under any obligation to recognize that behaviour.”

In the end South Africa would probably be forced to take sides one way or the other, General Smuts declared.

“Is it not wiser and better to adopt a clear-cut line recognized by international law, recognized by the usages of nations, and sever relations with Germany and look upon her as an enemy?”

General Smuts cast his mind and those of his hearers over the events of the past two years and returned to General Hertzog’s advice to the country in the words :

“To my mind, however we phrase it and attempt to disguise it and wrap it up in all sorts of subterfuge, such an action would practically dissociate us from our friends in the Commonwealth. Nothing would be more fatal for this country, poor as it is in defence and rich as it is in resources, than to dissociate itself directly or indirectly from its friends in the Commonwealth. It is not only a question of loyalty and self-respect, which I assume we all feel deeply. It is question of the gravest importance and deepest interest for the future of South Africa.”

With these two speeches the test of sovereign status, of national maturity, of homogeneity, and of deep and rich sentiments lay before the House

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and the country. How deeply it struck sincere men on all sides of the House can best be reflected by quotations from their speeches.

Mr. Heaton Nicholls, the ablest of Natal members, who, perhaps owing to his support of Devolution in the past, had not been invited to take over the portfolio of Native Affairs for which he was so admirably fitted, was moved to declare that :

“In the eyes of every English-speaking man, in this country and elsewhere, South Africa is at war, and it does not require any vote of this House to determine whether we are at war or not. What the Prime Minister is actually proposing is secession from the Commonwealth—that, and nothing more. Such secession will be fought in every possible manner by every British subject in South Africa, who considers that the constitution is a sacred thing which maintains the liberty and freedom of the people of this country, and which has come down to us through the ages and been fought for in many battles, and is, after all, the finest instrument of human government yet devised. It is this that the Prime Minister would idly cast aside.”

Dr. Malan preferred to engage General Smuts in arguments about the Treaty of Versailles, reminding the Deputy Prime Minister of his own denunciation of it. General Smuts had disposed very lightly of the cause of the present war—Danzig and the Corridor. From his own point of view General Smuts had been wise to get away from this point as soon as possible.

To ask South Africa to shed a drop of blood for the Treaty of Versailles was demanding too much. Dr. Malan declared that if South Africa was to go into war simply because Britain was involved, it

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would mean that we were a country of slaves whose destiny was decided by a nation overseas. If that was the position, we had no freedom in practice. He wished to emphasize that this was a matter of principle and had nothing to do with racialism. Proof of this was the fact that there were Afrikaners on both sides in the Cabinet dispute.

He wished to ask General Smuts whether, had the British connection not existed, there would have been any question that South Africa would not have entered the present war.

Even General Smuts would admit that there would never have been the least question of South Africa's being involved.

In 1914 General Smuts, as one of the country's leaders, had succeeded in getting the Union to throw in its lot with Great Britain. But the constitutional position was now very different. After the Imperial Conference of 1926 the adoption of the Statute of Westminster and the passing of the Status Acts, General Hertzog had taken the view that South Africa had the right to decide its neutrality.

Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr followed. He had always held that, constitutionally, when one part of the Commonwealth was at war the rest was also at war. "South Africa needs friends and where shall it get better friends than in the British Commonwealth of Nations? South Africa's interests can not be detached from those of the world at large. There is to-day a conflict between two sets of principles. There is an indisputable danger of the ideas for which Hitler stands coming to dominate the world. We must take our stand now for the principle of respect for human personality, freedom,

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and the ultimate human brotherhood requiring us to approach international situations, not in a spirit of the ethics of the jungle, but of the family.”

The House rose at 9.10 p.m. By eighty votes to sixty-seven the Prime Minister was defeated. By eighty votes to sixty-seven, the Deputy Prime Minister's amendment was carried.

South Africa was at war !

CHAPTER X

I

THE effect of General Hertzog's neutrality speech upon the English-speaking public was devastating. It was one of the worst speeches he had ever made. It failed to state the Afrikaners' case in any of its finer aspects. It seemed, instead, and as General Smuts described it, a justification of Herr Hitler. Moreover, in no particular did it analyse what might be called the Prime Minister's foreign policy as opposed to that of General Smuts. Admittedly no Dominion possessed a foreign policy consonant with the liberty of action enjoyed by a Sovereign State outside the Commonwealth of Nations. At the same time, the attitude of General Hertzog towards the revolution of Europe explains to some extent the apparent defections of which he was accused. More than one of his critics recalled how in the years 1933 to 1939 he had drawn nearer to the idea of Commonwealth co-operation. There were several occasions on which he emphasized mutual interests and the need for friendship. All these seemed vain outpourings before the speech on the issue of war.

There is, unfortunately, no recorded speech that gives a clue to General Hertzog's attitude towards the European revolution. For that we must turn to those near him, and to one man in particular, who, in my opinion, states the policy

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adopted by his Prime Minister as clearly as anyone. South Africa depends upon personalities. More than in any other country in the world South African affairs can be approached through the study of the principals. General Smuts is the pendant from whom hangs the whole British cause. General Hertzog offers the student the study of the two-stream policy; Dr. Malan for a type of Nationalism that is uncompromising; Mr. Pirow for a reaction to the whole conception of British democracy as applied to South Africa.

II

No estimate of the politics of South Africa can be adequate without some special mention of one who was, three weeks before the outbreak of war (as he himself reminded them recently), "the blue-eyed boy of the English newspapers." It is not necessary to say that he is so no longer. But it is necessary to say, in the interests of truth, that there was a time when his ability was recognized and that the fact that it possessed an element of German thoroughness did not prevent the English Press from appreciation of it. "Pirow is a remarkable man . . . as an administrator, he probably has no superior in the British Empire," wrote the London *Sunday Times* in October 1938. Those who in days of peace opposed him were probably at one with the editor of a newspaper who began a leading article: "We do not like Mr. Pirow—we respect him!"

That was five years ago. To-day they do not even respect him. He has fallen from grace, the

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disgrace being an inability to accomodate himself to the cause of the Britisher. His fall from grace differs fundamentally from that of any other Afrikaner public man. In their better moments, thousands of English-speaking people in South Africa think of General Hertzog with sympathy tinged with regret. They feel sorry for him, and are tempted to explain away his rebellion against the war policy of General Smuts by reference to his age. There is always sympathy for age in defeat, and there is a rush of it when an old leader is repudiated by his own people. It is a sympathy for General Hertzog which *Die Burger* dismisses as "crocodile."

For Dr. Malan, too, there is a certain sneaking regard. Britishers do not like him, for what Britisher can love the thing that seeks to destroy the British connection; but they will admit that he, at any rate, has been consistent since the moment General Botha tried to patch up Afrikaner differences. They give him credit for a measure of political integrity, though it speaks a policy they hate, despise, and fear. They know where he stands, and "better the devil they know than the devil they don't know."

Mr. Pirow, they felt, they did not know. He is a man of many parts, speaks four languages, won a swimming championship in London once, is something of a big game hunter, and can use his fists in the boxing ring. He is, however, of German descent—suspect from the start. Once in an election he challenged General Smuts in the latter's own constituency. He was Minister of Justice in the Hertzog ministry of 1929, and has since been detailed to Railways, Defence, Industry, and Com-

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merce as occasion demanded. As one of the younger ministers in the inner Cabinet, to whom General Smuts made reference as the coming leaders of the country, he was essentially different from his colleagues.

Mr. Havenga seldom sought publicity. He allowed his budget surpluses to speak for him in the country, and his unfailing courtesy to bear his witness in the House of Assembly. In close friendship with his chief, General Hertzog, and enjoying the confidence of all sections and interests in the country, he was in the fairway for the premiership. He may still be, despite the fact that, at the moment, he has resigned his seat.

The other member of the inner Cabinet, before his resignation, was Mr. Hofmeyr—Hoffie: "too clever by half"; possessed of an administrative ability for carrying a whole row of portfolios without appearance of strain, a follower in the direct line of Generals Botha and Smuts.

Apart from the two streams stood Mr. Pirow, leaning towards a newer concept of society, yet, in the words of Mr. Hofmeyr, "a good colleague in the Cabinet." His political outlook is perhaps best described by reference to the Press conference he called soon after his return from his visit to Europe towards the end of 1938. If Cabinet Ministers can seldom resist the blandishments of newspaper editors, it is no less true that few journalists refuse the attentions of Cabinet Ministers in the running for the premiership. Mr. Pirow, aware of the value of a good Press, followed President Roosevelt in imitation of his "off the ice" talks.

He took himself to Europe for two reasons: first, to discuss defence and to arrange for the de-

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livery of defence materials with British factories ; and the second, to talk trade relations with the Government of Portugal. But Mr. Pirow is nothing if he is not an opportunist. He travelled by air via the east coast and called upon the authorities of Kenya and Tanganyika to learn something of difficulties which converged upon two subjects—defence, and the increasing penetration of Asiatics into European preserves of commerce and industry. He was able to satisfy them on the first as far as South Africa's guardianship of the continent was concerned. It is no secret that South Africa, being the only Sovereign State in Africa save one, felt herself responsible for the ordered plan of the whole ; and Mr. Pirow had on more than one occasion let it be known that our defence should be designed for the purpose of meeting attack distant from the frontiers. He had, in fact, invited the northern territories to look upon South Africa as a big brother.

From Africa he proceeded—with one slight breakdown, in recalling which he paid high tribute to the Imperial Air Services—to Lisbon, where he hoped to gain some information from the British representatives on the nature of the Spanish Civil War, and to learn about the conduct of military operations over a country not dissimilar in topography from the veld and bushveld. Unable to obtain the information, and probably intrigued by the prospect of seeing a modern war in progress, he accepted an invitation from the Spanish Nationalist Command to visit the front. A few were struck by the fact that he chose to visit the "Fascist" headquarters at a time when, as a minister of a neutral State, diplomatic pro-

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cedure would surely have suggested paying respects to the Republican Government. Strict attention to procedure, however, went out of fashion when the *London Times* refused to call a rebel by his proper name !

What Mr. Pirow learned of military tactics he did not vouchsafe. His respect for the Republicans as fighters, however, was not in doubt. He thought more of their courage than of their cause. For the new economy of Portugal he had high praise. "Doctor Salazar," he said, "is probably the greatest statesman in Europe. He has done more for Portugal than Hitler has done for Germany or Mussolini for Italy." From conversations I have had with him since, I have gained the impression that the Portuguese conception of government, lying midway between the rigid uniformity of Nazism and the undisciplined licence of Democracy, attracted him as an ideal to be pursued by South Africa.

He was received in England, as *The Times* put it, "as a sort of mystery man, from whom great things are expected," unknown to the vast majority and something of a novelty to the Press, though, perhaps, not such a great one as Paul Kruger had been in what now seems to be, in looking back, a world of fantasy. Both in England and, more particularly, in South Africa the newspapers were demanding to know the real purposes of his visit. Perhaps they of South Africa had more reason to question his activities. As far as Mr. Pirow was concerned, however, they could "writhe like a toad under a harrow." He refused speech, and, save at occasional banquets, denied the sensational Press of London its importunity. Mr. Pirow's

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silence became "news." He was the acme of correctness and made but one *faux pas*—when he arrived at a gathering without a silk hat and hastily dispatched his secretary for it. There is a photograph of the occasion somewhere in Mr. Pirow's dockets !

Speaking of his conversations with Mr. Neville Chamberlain, he was in haste to assure us that the Prime Minister's word-pictures of the men of Europe, whom he was yet to see, "possessed the accuracy of photographic prints." At the same time, these must not be forgotten, as indeed he did not allow us to forget, the coincidence of views he shared with Mr. Chamberlain.

The Prime Minister of Great Britain based his policy on the dissociation of ideology from territorial adjustment. It was an attitude consonant with that of Mr. Pirow. For Mr. Pirow the differences between the democratic and the totalitarian orders are less than they seem. To exchange one for the other is to exchange a domination by big business for control by political directors. However that may be, there is no question that the views of Mr. Pirow, both as an individual and as a minister of the Hertzog Cabinet, coincided with those of the British appeasers. Probably, as a result of this, Mr. Chamberlain either suggested or acquiesced in the suggestion that Mr. Pirow should extend his tour to include Berlin and possibly Rome. As Mr. Pirow explained it, the statesmen of Europe had listened to one another so long, without success, that it was felt by some that the efforts of a "backvelder" could do no harm even if they did no good. One or two newspapers accused Mr. Pirow of going to Germany for ulterior motives, including

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the handing over of South West Africa to Germany. Even the newspapers of the Argus group expressed some suspicion of his roving commission. Questions were asked and left unanswered. Asked by Reuter's correspondent on his return to London, "Can you say something about your colonial mission?" Mr. Pirow replied, "That is rather difficult, because, you see, I never had any colonial mission, either officially or privately. I can, however, say this: That nowhere did I discover any desire to regard this matter as urgent."

This information he confirmed on his arrival in South Africa.

Neither he nor King Carol of Rumania, competing for audience with Reich Chancellor Hitler, was accorded an interview of any length. Talk of colonies lasted three minutes out of an audience of thirty-five. South Africa was not mentioned, and Herr Hitler referred to the whole colonial problem as an issue that could wait "for five or six years."

What Mr. Pirow did vouchsafe was that "Hitler's health was likely to prove one of the greatest factors in European politics." The refugee problem was at that time of greater moment than colonial restoration. Mr. Pirow looked upon it as the major complexity of the European situation. If it can be solved, he maintained, peace might be saved. In the meantime the conflict of Europe was essentially a psychological conflict. What we have to recognize, he explained, is that two new Empires and Imperialist Powers have arisen in Europe, Germany and Italy, and Europe must be adjusted or adjust itself to rapidly changing conditions. Something of the same outlook had already been the tenor of Mr. Chamberlain's speeches. But

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similarity of policy is not always an expression of similarity of approach. Mr. Chamberlain was an exponent of the idea that the Nazi revolution could be absorbed by the existing régime ; that, in fact, its economy could coexist with that of the capitalist democratic orders. Mr. Pirow had no such views. His is the totalitarian mind. He is anti-capitalist though not pro-socialist, save in the sense of being a national socialist. The Chamberlain conservative represents the *ancien régime* with which Mr. Pirow is at revolutionary variance. The one sought to preserve a political, social, and economic order by a placatory adjustment of the threat to it. The other accepted the elements of the challenge and believed the old order to be in a state of collapse. The two approaches to the European situation, then, were entirely different, though the end was the same : the recognition of the place Germany must take on the Continent of Europe. Munich was but a month old, yet the plaudits of the German and Italian Press had already died down, partly as a result of Mr. Chamberlain's eleventh-hour decision to sustain Munich in rapid rearmament of Britain, but mostly, as is well known, as a projection of the set policy of Herr Hitler.

On the refugee problem no more need be said, since it has been silenced by the thunder of war. On the colonial question all parties of South Africa, save one, were of one mind. Dr. Malan, conscious of the danger to peace in the colonial settlement at Versailles, has at all times advanced the justice of negotiating with Germany over South West Africa. By letter and by speech he has risked the confidence of many Afrikaners in his advocacy of the German

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claims. Neither General Hertzog nor Mr. Pirow was willing to consider its return. Indeed the Hertzog ministry was bent upon relieving the League of Nations of mandatory discretion, and upon making South West Africa the fifth province of the Union.

Mr. Pirow, while recognizing the special relation of South West Africa within the economic unity that is South Africa, saw the approach to appeasement in Africa as a reflection of Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement in Europe. It is the more remarkable that in each case the territory to be ceded to Germany—the Sudeten strip of Czechoslovakia in the one case, and territory unstated in the second—was distant and extraneous to the immediate concerns of the appeasing Power. It is inconceivable that the British Prime Minister would have yielded Czechoslovakia had that territory been a British possession ; and, in like manner, there is nothing particularly discreditable in the refusal of Mr. Pirow to agree to the transfer of South West Africa. In every instance the general pacification policy of his attitude is the same as that of Mr. Chamberlain ; yet, while the latter was applauded for Munich, Mr. Pirow is thoroughly trounced for daring to be a Chamberlain in Africa. Mr. Chamberlain agreed to German expansion in Europe ; Mr. Pirow was convinced that Germany should be a colonial Power in Africa. Mr. Chamberlain was willing to hand over something that did not belong to Britain ; Mr. Pirow something that did not belong to South Africa. The London newspapers splashed a speech by General Smuts with the headline, "South Africa will fight for German South West Africa," the very day the

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German newspapers were welcoming Mr. Pirow with demands for the return of colonies regardless of exchange.

On his return to London Mr. Pirow issued the following statement :

" Europe is drifting into war—war which no nation wants, but against which every nation is preparing. Unless there is a complete change of outlook within the next month or two, international tension will reach breaking-point during the spring of next year [1940].

" The tragedy of the situation is that since the settlement of the Czechoslovakian issue there is no principle at stake which would excuse war, let alone make it inevitable.

" The drift to war is caused purely by psychological factors. Even the refugees' question—I call it that because it is more than a Jewish problem—is capable of comparatively easy settlement. Two things are necessary for such a solution. Firstly, the money to replace assets which the refugees are not allowed to take with them ; secondly, land to settle those who have no money or who, despite their money, are debarred by immigration laws.

" An international loan, for which countries who wish to get rid of their refugees will be responsible but which would be guaranteed by other great Powers, would solve the first question. As regards land, there is more than enough unoccupied land which could form an entity either as a State or as a mandate to settle twice the numbers of refugees likely to be available.

" What is absent, however, is willingness—both on the part of the countries who wish to shed their refugees, and of those who profess to feel sympathy

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—to make real sacrifice. The former are merely prepared to give them one-way passports, the latter to accord them sympathy.

"The international attitude on the refugee question is not by itself a reason for war, but it is symptomatic of that state of mind which is not prepared to make a substantial sacrifice for peace. As long as that state of mind exists the drift to war—a drift with increasing momentum—will continue."

The *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* described Mr. Pirow as the prophet of disaster, and its London correspondent wrote that Mr. Pirow wishes to vanish from Europe as much veiled by a cloud of smoke as when he started on his trip. The London *Daily Telegraph's* comment expressed a similar disappointment. "Mr. Pirow," it wrote, "has been credited with evolving a plan, it would be interesting to learn in which direction Mr. Pirow turned for the complete change of outlook he mentioned. It must be admitted that his statement is better calculated to produce alarm than relief."

"Mr. Pirow has thrown a dash of cold water on the 'post Munich' optimism," said the *News Chronicle*; while the *Daily Mail* described Mr. Pirow's statement about the arrival of the breaking-point in the spring of 1940 as "hopeless . . . which will receive no support in European chancelleries," ending with, "He would do well to consult the constructive statements made this year by his wise and experienced fellow-countryman, General Smuts."

"I am leaving Europe," persisted Mr. Pirow, "with a feeling of almost unqualified anxiety."

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He had no illusions about the shaking continent. Britain, he knew, was not ready for war. If she could stave off the conflict for eighteen months, he told us, "she would be more or less ready."

III

When we begin to inquire into the reference to the psychological condition of Europe and the need for a complete change of outlook, it is possible to discover the image of General Hertzog's mind reflected in that of Mr. Pirow. If General Hertzog is a rationalized Paul Kruger, Mr. Pirow, over twenty-five years General Hertzog's junior, is his senior projected into the new world. In the old world General Hertzog pleads for the destruction of "that monster" the Treaty of Versailles as the condition of European settlement. In the new, Mr. Pirow, disowning the promises upon which the Treaty of Versailles was erected, maintains that we live in transition greater than that which produced the Liberal-Capitalist democratic order, and that there is no way of escape save in the new direction indicated by the Nazi-Fascist experiment. It is not merely a question of appeasing Germany, for that is like appeasing for a space a hunger that will return. It is a question of ourselves accepting the inevitable. Mr. Pirow would argue, with Mr. Drucker in his book, *The Fall of Economic Man*, that the old ideas and the old practices are outmoded and outworn and no longer satisfy society.

It was in the hope that Mr. Chamberlain would succeed in appeasing Germany and Italy that General Hertzog found himself at one with British

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foreign policy. Both he and Mr. Pirow broke with British foreign policy when Britain gave her pledge to Poland. Until that moment General Hertzog's references to Britain and the Commonwealth were often encouraging and always cordial. Until that time Mr. Pirow was surprisingly appreciative of British efforts. After it, there was a tendency, if not to retract previous declarations, at any rate to be more reluctant in pursuing them. And here it is worthy of record that in no single instance after the war decision was made did Mr. Pirow waver in his opinion of Mr. Chamberlain. Questioned at public meetings by Republican audiences which might have preferred to hear a different answer, he invariably acknowledged that the British Government had at all times treated South Africa as a free member of the society of nations and master of her own destiny.

The conflict to-day is not a conflict between Britain and South Africa. It is a domestic conflict, and, so far as General Hertzog is concerned, revolves about the question: "Are South Africa's interests affected to the point of war?" It is the only question that General Hertzog has ever put to himself since he first propounded his thesis of South Africa first. It lies at the very roots of Hertzogism and is the test applied to every domestic and external proposal placed before him.

By South Africa he did not mean, as is commonly supposed, his own section of the people. Hertzogism, indeed, is the very antithesis of sectionalism though it is pure nationalism. It is a nationalism, indeed, that antedated Herr Hitler's policy by many years, and to which it is related at some points. The idea of cultural

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autonomy which imbued him in the Orange Free State and constrained him to emphasize language equality is but one feature. There is also the insistence upon political rights, and the struggle on behalf of his Boer fellows who had become an alien, a foreign, element in the land of their birth under the commercial and industrial pressure of the Uitlander. He broke with General Botha on these things, and his two-stream policy, which has generally been misinterpreted as a policy of division, was in actual fact conceived and pursued as the only possible way in which he could achieve the cultural autonomy of his own people and at the same time hope to unite in a broad South Africanism the English-speaking people.

When, therefore, General Hertzog seems to be vindicating Herr Hitler in his neutrality speech he is doing no more than project his own personal and national struggle into the conflict of Europe. It appears as anti-British, and is so interpreted by the English Press and the English-speaking people, who, caught up in the greatest challenge to every allegiance they own, are in a somewhat similar dilemma to that of General Hertzog himself.

General Hertzog's foreign policy, then, was an extension of his domestic policy. He was a firm supporter of the League of Nations, but only in so far as the League was the apex at which the interests of its members converged. He recognized the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles, pleaded for their removal, sympathized with a Germany living under it, and excused her revolt against it. With the French system of alliances erected athwart the League, he had no sympathy or interest except to recognize them as pointing all the guns of

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Europe towards Germany. Out of this system would come war ; of that he was certain, and it was within that system of pacts that he placed the British guarantee to Poland.

Some support is lent this estimate of General Hertzog's attitude by the policy he adopted towards the Czechoslovak dispute. When it appeared possible that France would go to the aid of the Czechs and precipitate war in 1938, it was agreed by the Union Cabinet of the Union Government that if war broke out as a result of the German claims, South Africa would not participate. This information was not made public for over a year, not until we were at war. At that time General Hertzog and General Smuts agreed that South African interests were not at stake. It is pointless exercise to inquire what would have happened had Mr. Chamberlain failed to save the peace. What can be noted is that General Hertzog looked upon this agreement as a general one to cover the circumstances of war between Germany and any of her continental neighbours, including Poland. General Smuts, however, maintained that the Czechoslovak dispute was a special case, and many things had happened between September 1938 and September 1939. In the opinion of General Smuts it was twelve months of proof that Hitler intended more than revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Always sensible to the territorial injustices of the peace, General Smuts, like Mr. Chamberlain, was sympathetic to the German claims in the Sudeten dispute. From Munich onwards, however, he became convinced, with the rest of the world, of Herr Hitler's bid for European and world domination. General Hertzog, on the other hand, re-

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mained unconvinced. For a year, therefore, it would seem that General Hertzog relied upon the understanding over the Czech dispute to guide him. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that during the year there was a lack of frankness between the two generals, and that each of them approached the challenge in the hope that it would disappear before they had to meet it.

When they did meet it, one of them, General Hertzog, used the Czech dispute as parallel case to argue that Poland was no concern of South Africa. Mr. Pirow had given some similar opinion months previously, broadly in public speech and more precisely in private. Much confusion surrounds Cabinet deliberations during the crisis of 1938. General Hertzog's Cabinet memorandum was claimed by some members to lay down a general policy, by others, to meet a particular case. The deeper mystery that followed for twelve months can only be explained by the hopes and the fears of the two divergent opinions from which escape was to be found in the mechanical reiteration of "Parliament will decide."

IV

The position of General Smuts is clearer than that of General Hertzog. The Deputy Prime Minister had stated in public, and categorically, that if Britain found herself at war he would advise participation. It was not a question of the right to neutrality at all. All South Africa's interests were bound up with the survival of the Commonwealth way of life. General Hertzog had a

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narrower view of what was good for his country. South Africa first was his creed and faith. It always had been. In international affairs he was differing with General Smuts on the same platform as he differed with him in the Botha cabinet. It was the same issue on a vaster plane. In 1913, as Professor Cilliers reminds us in an interesting pamphlet on Hertzogism, "Hertzog het sy hoed gevat en uitgestap, gevolg deur al sy ondersteuners." Faced with the test of South Africa first, Hertzog "has always picked up his hat and walked out, followed by a handful of his supporters." On this test he has staked the whole of his career, leaving it at the outset to the Boers to decide who was right. Those who watched him go, leaving the Botha Party and policy at the congress in 1913, will recall how he was followed by De Wet, and how De Wet waved his *au revoir* to those who remained and whom he was to meet in the mortal combat of rebellion a few months later.

On the occasion of September 1939, he had equally faithful followers to go with him. None more loyal than Mr. Havenga. There were, indeed, nearly forty of them who, forsaking the Government benches, walked—behind their leader, and with Dr. Malan and the "purified" Nationalists—into opposition. Mr. Pirow was among them, a Mr. Pirow who, but a year before, had looked at Europe with the eye of the realist, and, much to the concern of all Englishmen in South Africa, knew much that was confidential and secret about Britain's defence and all that was to be known of South-Africa's lack of it.

General Hertzog placed his resignation in the hands of a Governor-General, Sir Patrick Duncan,

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who but a few years before had said in Parliament that South Africa was not an independent nation. The Governor-General refused General Hertzog's request that a general election should be held, and called General Smuts to form a Government. The debate passed from the House of Assembly to the city and the veld. The parliamentary division represents broadly the division in the country. A majority of thirteen, small as it may seem elsewhere, is a workable one in South Africa, though no-one would claim, on so vast and perilous an issue as war, that it represents the broadly based will of the people.

What is to be reiterated is that the English-speaking cause, the allegiance to Britain, could only be saved by the Afrikaners in Parliament who voted with General Smuts. An Afrikaner himself, Smuts is prepared to risk the consequences within his country, and to stand out for the society of nations on which his hopes for an ordered world are founded.

Whatever the decision, the internal condition of the country would have been the same. Early in 1940 the Dominionite, Mr. Marwick, declared that had South Africa decided for neutrality there would have been civil war; and we can recall Mr. Pirow's warning of disturbances were South Africa "dragged into war." Neither of their opinions^{*} appealed to General Hertzog. In his defeat he voiced the hope that English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans might one day come together again. Such a hope, and such an intimation, coming from him at the bitterest moment of his career, are, by contrast with apparent anti-British declarations in Parliament, more in accord

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with his political worth. He might have made the Afrikaner case on a higher plane. That case deserves study. First of all, he might have said: the population of this country, the history of one section of it, and the nearness of that history, are such that no cause that does not appeal to 60 per cent. of the people not of British descent can be permitted to precipitate South Africa into war. He might have reminded the Assembly and the world in general, as Mr. Pirow did when writhing under suspicion in London, that the fact that South Africa was Britain's best customer was a better yardstick to measure her goodwill than the doubts of the newspapers. He might have said that the whole point of sovereign independence was intended for just such an occasion as war. For what else does sovereign independence stand except for the untrammelled decision of a nation faced with choice of peace or war? He might have said, instead of leaving it to be said later, that the Britisher in South Africa must search his heart and soul and ask himself this question: Do I go to war because I am British or because I am South African? The English-speaking South African having two allegiances, one to his homeland, another to South Africa, is he impelled by the first or the second? If the second, then I honour him though I disagree with his decision. If the first, he is no true South African. This is the test and the only test of South Africans, in General Hertzog's opinion. "A man," he said, 'way back in 1917,' "may be one day in South Africa and yet be a good South African, but some people would never become South Africans, if they lived here for a hundred years."

There is no tie of sentiment, bond of family, or

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of language between the Afrikaner and Britain. Instead, there is a widespread feeling of inferiority among Afrikaners as a conquered nation. Everywhere the cultural advance of the Afrikaner has been opposed by the British. The British failed in their endeavours, so successful elsewhere, to absorb their defeated subjects within the British way of life and dissipate the challenge. How, then, can the Afrikaner be expected to enthuse over a war which, in his opinion, is still a war for oil, for territory, for metal and material resources, for, in fact, imperial interests.

This is the way the Afrikaner argues. There is another point. The Afrikaner turns to declarations made by public men in other dominions who, like the Prime Minister of Canada, have questioned the infallibility of the British Government on more than one occasion. The Afrikaner protests that South Africa cannot be expected to hand over her fate to the British Foreign Office and to any British Foreign Secretary who for the time being might represent a policy at variance with the best interests of South Africa. It is no use to point out to the Republican-Nationalist that South Africa exists by grace of the British Navy. He only answers that the British Navy is there to defend British imperial interests, the Cape route and the British capital in gold. Nor is it any use to suggest the merit of democracy and that to-day it is being challenged. He will parry with a quick move to the United States, and show that for the first twelve months of war America was isolated and neutral, despite all protestations that the United States is the greatest democracy in the world. And why, if Britain is fighting for democracy, does she

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allow herself to be allied with Greece which is not a democracy, and seek the aid of Turkey which has never been one.

Thus and thus, the Afrikaner argues, with a degree of realism and political audacity that is not easily to be dispatched or demolished.

And suppose, now that South Africa is committed, that Germany wins the war?

"It is," said an Afrikaans announcer before the Commission of Inquiry on Broadcasting Affairs in 1941, "a matter of complete indifference to me whether Germany or Britain wins the war." Such a statement is but one of many that send a profound shock through the English-speaking section, and shatter their ability and their inclination to look at South Africa in calm perspective.

The Afrikaner has a case, but so, too, has the Britisher. That case, if it finds its strength in the deep wells of history and tradition and lure for the homeland, is no less powerful for that. Most honest English-speaking people would readily admit that on the challenge to Britain, and all that it stands for in their way of life, they automatically respond as Britishers first and South Africans second. Who shall say that there is disgrace in this? There may be some debate about the right to neutrality. It was conceded by some English-speaking members of Parliament—including Mr. B. K. Long, one-time editor of the *Cape Times*—and denied by many others. But such debate is academic to the Britisher. When the world is falling about Britain every statute and every right is swept aside. Paper does not turn the edge of sentiment, nor legal quibble divorce man from his origins. From the Britisher's point of view the whole thing

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is contained in the sentence of Mr. Heaton Nicholls: "In the eyes of every English-speaking man in this country, and elsewhere, South Africa is at war, and it does not require any vote of this House to determine whether we are at war or not."

Whether Poland or Czechoslovakia, Danzig or Austria be the immediate cause the response would be the same. Watching the decline of Europe, marking the calendar of Hitler's advance, English-speaking men and women returned, like General Hertzog, to the places they knew and the loves and the allegiances that go to make England home. In the ultimate analysis sentiment is more powerful than statute. It proved so in South Africa in 1939; it will do so again when the challenge arises. The rest are mere side issues that engage men in debate and permit them to discover, in things seen, support for actions impelled by things unseen. English-speaking South Africans can say, and with justification, that General Hertzog, having said "Parliament will decide," must accept what Parliament, the final arbiter of the democratic States, did decide. It would be his argument had the decision gone the other way.

And what of those Afrikaners who, pulled by racial origin to one side, voted on the other; by virtue of whom the cause of the British was saved? Neither the arguments of the opponents of General Smuts nor the full sentiments of the British can explain their position. These Afrikaners, it is argued by the Republicans, are "anglicized" Afrikaners who have forgotten the allegiances of their youth; they are traitors to their own cause, place-seekers, and hangers-on. More accurately their numbers measure the extent to which the

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Afrikaners have accepted the British outlook, and they include, from Colonel Deneys Reitz, men of calibre and of great physical courage who, in the past, fought against Great Britain. More than one of them have paid high tribute to the attitude of Britain in the last four decades. It is doubtful whether the English-speaking section have recognized their debt to these Afrikaners or given measurable expression to it. It has not been easy for many of them to suffer the ostracisms of their late colleagues.

Their presence on the side of General Smuts denies much of the racial nature of the political divisions. It is no longer true that the conflict is confined to British and Afrikaner, though it is determined by the former's presence. There is a struggle between Britisher and Afrikaner. There is another struggle between Afrikaner and Afrikaner, between the one despised as "loyal Dutch" and the one of his own race who thus despises him.

VI
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CHAPTER XI

I

A YEAR or so before the war, as an outcome of the racial urge of the Voortrekker centenary, a certain Colonel of the Defence Force raised the Banner of the Ossewa Brandwag, a literal translation of which might be Sentinels of the Ox Wagon.

The great problem before all Afrikaner leaders is the unity of Afrikanerdom. The psychological heritage of the modern Afrikaner determines the design of Afrikaner politics. As frontiersman and Trek Boer the Dutchman was a Calvinist in an environment that made him more a Calvinist than ever. He was scattered over a wild land, roaming in rough places, and among inferior peoples. What he brought with him was a belief that his was the chosen people. The longer he lived in the wild country the more he was certain of it. He became permanently possessed of a one-track mind. His is the only race on earth where the new environment has completely coincided with the attitude of mind brought to it. He did not, for example, have to adjust his religious beliefs to meet the conditions of a land full of black men. Propinquity with the Black man merely intensified his traditional religious attitude. His was an Old Testament tribe; he sojourned in an Old Testament land, where physical forces magnified the merit of his religious canons.

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So long as there was sufficient land he could move off towards another piece at the first sign of unrest or oppression. He has, therefore, never developed any strong sense of commercial living. The more organized his own society was, the more he chafed under it. When that society is shared by a people alien to him, the greater is his reluctance to adapt himself to its order and discipline. Social discipline was a late-comer to his philosophy. In consequence there are two powerful factors in Afrikaner politics which explain much that is happening in South Africa to-day. First there are its fissiparous tendencies. Afrikaner politicians often explain the political disunity and divisions among their people as the work of Imperialists seeking to divide and rule. It is a very inadequate explanation that takes no thought of history or the psychological heritage to which the Afrikaner is heir. The explanation is to be found in himself, in what Professor Bews would have called the factors of human ecology.

The Afrikaners have always followed men rather than principles. Their independence has retarded social unity and cultural autonomy. At one time in 1941 there were as many as five separate political groups bidding for Afrikaner unity. It is the cry that is repeated throughout all their history, how to get unity among themselves. Steyn, Botha, Smuts, Hertzog, Malan have each in their turn tried and failed. The centenary celebrations of the Trek was one more opportunity.

It is probable that the Ossewa Brandwag would have remained a social rather than a political force had it not been for the war. As it is, it describes the revolt of the Afrikaner people: first

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against their own fissiparous tendencies, and second against the alien order of the British. To the first aspect some attention must be paid. The reaction to a century of racial division, when it does come, almost invariably contains an element of force. Split by internal dissensions, no small community can command power. The Ossewa Brandwag was formed to gather all Afrikaners, through the inspiration of the Centenary of the Trek, into one fold that returned to the ideals of the Voortrekkers. It took as its badge the wheel of an ox wagon surmounted by a miniature of the great Voortrekker Memorial erected near Pretoria, which is now the Mecca of Afrikanerdom. In order to achieve the unity so much pursued, but unsuccessfully, by political leaders, it made use of the traditional though somewhat paradoxical preference for a military system. It is one of the more intriguing aspects of the Boer mind that he submitted to the discipline of the Commando system yet retained independence that sometimes proved disconcerting to his generals.

The Ossewa Brandwag, then, is based upon the idea that if the Afrikaners cannot achieve unity in the ordinary way of democratic procedure, they must be made to fall in with the "people's will," that is, in this case, the Ossewa Brandwag. To the student of Afrikaner history and psychology this is not particularly remarkable. At its head is the Commandant-General as the president, as it were, of the Groote Raad, the great council, members of which are drawn from the provincial councils of the organization. Then there are generals, commandants, field cornets, somewhat on the same basis as the Boer Commando system, all elected "by the people."

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Colonel Laas, its first leader, resigned probably at the request of the Groote Raad, not because he was a Freemason, as some have alleged, but because his policy was not approved. Its present Commandant-General is Dr. J. F. J. van Rensburg, who resigned his position as Administrator of the Free State in order to devote himself to his own people. Dr. van Rensburg has considerable administrative abilities, and was looked upon as a likely successor to Mr. Pirow as Minister of Defence. He has devoted some years to the study of military science and systems, and his resignation and subsequent alliance with the active interests of the Ossewa Brandwag is explained by the English newspapers as due to the fact that he is a Nazi. If he is, then he is at the head of a widespread organization with a membership reputed to be 100,000. Not all the members are active, but all of them are Republicans, Nationalists, opponents of South Africa's participation in the war, intensely pro-Afrikaner; some of them are anti-Semitic, and anti-British; some are pro-Nazi, and some are pure Nazi.

The difficulty of the serious student of Afrikaner affairs is to decide how many fall into each of the classes mentioned. A high official among them, a man of economic competence though of no great scholarship, tells me that the Ossewa Brandwag is the Afrikaner counterpart of the Sons of England. It is, he says, a cultural organization seeking to keep alive the Voortrekker way of life. There is, he admits, but a thin line between politics and culture among the Afrikaners, and would probably agree that the culture merges into Kultur. Here again the average observer abroad is in a quandary. For the most part he does not

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recognize, because he himself has not experienced it, the close alliance between the Afrikaner's struggle in language and his political advance. Language was General Hertzog's first political weapon ; his first platform, Nationalism, came second ; sovereign independence third ; and all of them over a period of thirty years. The progress of Afrikaans culture is linked, then, with the unity of the Afrikaner people and, therefore, with their political advance. How far that culture has progressed into a broad and rich field of inspiration is a matter of some debate. Recently I was surprised to hear that one of the few Afrikaner actors refused to consider Afrikaans plays because of their dramatic poverty. I was even more surprised that a group of Afrikaner players were touring with "Koöp my blomme," "Buy my flowers," the Afrikaans version of "Pygmalion." This, surely, is deserving of one of Mr. Shaw's inimitable post cards !

It can be broadly accepted that, related to the political conflict of to-day, the Ossewa Brandwag appears in its political dress more often than in its cultural garb. Some of its leaders talk in the Nazi idiom. One of them suggested the way to unity was via the sjambok, and others have uttered speeches which are not far removed from the threats the Nazis used during their rise to power. Suspect by the English-speaking section from the first, the Ossewa Brandwag is now looked upon as subversive and a danger to the State, opposed violently to the war, and prepared to overthrow the Government by fair means or foul. Its political philosophy has never been clearly propounded, perhaps because it continues to insist that it is not a political organization. The broad outlines, however, are

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fairly clear. The Liberal-Capitalist-Democratic order, its leaders argue, is a British-Jew creation foreign to the Afrikaner way of life. In this the Afrikaner antedated Hitler by over half a century. A one party system was a feature of the old Boer republics. To that he wants to return, to rid the State of what he calls alien and un-national elements—the Liberal Press, the control of big business, organized Jewry. Such aims are the elements of Nazism, though at the same time they are essentially Afrikaner and were present before Nazism was ever heard of.

II

There is another unconscious fear that occasionally rises to the surface. The Afrikaners are in mortal fear of becoming a proletariat. It is an intangible fear, but then every feature of Afrikaner thought and politics is intangible and the product of a unique mental heritage. Revolt, again, takes many forms. The Ossewa Brandwag is one. The Trek Boer had to compensate for his economic poverty. He ruled the Native like a feudal lord. To-day, despite the fact that Afrikaners are highly placed in the Civil Service, that in the government of the country Afrikaners dominate the whole field, they suffer from an intense inferiority complex. They feel it so deeply that it emerges in daily social communications and in unexpected quarters. In the mass they are economically subservient to the British. Thousands of them feel it as a physical fact that they are foreigners in their own land.

Such mental attitudes are not to be disposed

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of by a shrug of the shoulders or even by the evidence that hundreds of Afrikaners hold superior positions in the public services. They are there ; and while they may be explained, they cannot be explained away. Without a struggle the Afrikaner would be completely "anglicized" in half a century, and without a cultural-political-racial emphasis in all his undertakings he would not have survived the last fifty years as a racial entity. In all probability he would have become South Africa's White proletariat—such is the power, the influence, and the distribution of economic factors.

According to one high-placed official in the movement, the Ossewa Brandwag adopts the following policy :

1. All Afrikaners have one ideal, namely freedom.
2. The Ossewa Brandwag will support that political party which strives for that ideal.
3. The Ossewa Brandwag will not tolerate any party or personal divisions at a stage when the Afrikaner nation is in danger, and if a man will not do his duty and co-operate, then he must be forced to do so for the sake of the salvation of the Afrikaner nation.

In a statement of the Natal branch the organization denies that it is subversive or Nazi. It has as its policy and only object the advancement and consolidation of Afrikaner interests. It repudiates the accusation that it is planning a *coup d'état* and is a secret society with sinister objects. It would welcome a judicial inquiry, provided that a similar investigation was made into the activities of the New Guard and the Sons of England. The Ossewa Brandwag, it explains, "is forced to keep

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the names of its members secret because it is a well-known fact that State officials and others who are members would be victimized and their positions jeopardized were membership made public."

Related, then, to the political situation, the Ossewa Brandwag forms an Afrikaner peoples' front, and as such it has been welcomed by Dr. Malan, the leader of the Nationalist Party. Over the actions of that party it claims a sort of dictatorial oversight, ready to mark derelictions of duty or side-tracking of purpose. In this way it is a reaction to the fissiparous tendencies already recorded. If it is non-political, its political influence is very great.

Much of the difficulty in understanding its aims is to be found in the interpretation of terms used. When the Ossewa Brandwag claims that it is non-political, it probably means that it has no intention of forming a political party. When it claims it is not subversive, it means that it is pro-Afrikaans, anti-war, republican, not anti-British or rebellious. The Government, however, looks upon it with great suspicion, while the English Press denounces it as a serious threat to the Government's main task of prosecuting the war. All manner of stories are told of its activities ; that its members are trained in the use of arms, that somewhere in the bush there is a cache of machine guns, and that it is in league with the Germans. In the temper of the days, street clashes have occurred between pro-war elements and anti-war groups. Civilians are accused of spitting at soldiers, waylaying them and beating them up. At Potchefstroom, where a military camp is situated, there was an attack by soldiers upon a university college hostel. Some

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damage and some broken heads resulted. These disturbances culminated early in 1941 with the Johannesburg riots, in which police clashed with soldiers and civilians in what proved to be a serious civil commotion. Violence was beginning to raise its head. The Minister for the Interior, Mr. H. G. Lawrence, who had not always been wise in speech about subversive activities, was badly beaten when addressing a meeting.

Some of these things were attributed to the set policy of the Ossewa Brandwag, and all were examples of a temper and a violence which are the prelude to a dangerous situation. There were demands for the introduction of martial law and an exchange of vituperation by the two sections of the Press. To the English side, the Ossewa Brandwag had become what Mr. Pirow hoped they would become, "the Storm Troops of Afrikanerdom." For a time dispassionate and calm judgment disappeared from the platform and the Press. The Ossewa Brandwag issued warnings to its members against committing unconstitutional acts, while publicly dissociating itself from such activities. The extent of the disturbances gives some idea of the size of the anti-war movement. Dr. van Rensburg, in defending the Ossewa Brandwag against the accusations of the English Press, said that the movement obtained its strongest support from the railways, where sabotage was unknown. The police and the public services, however, are riddled with members of the organization, and I have heard it claimed by one member that there are members in the South African forces. Opposition to the Government, however, is not confined to the Ossewa Brandwag. Sixty per cent. of the popula-

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tion is Afrikaner. An approximation to the strength of the anti-war Republican parties is probably two-thirds of the Afrikaner population. They are not all active. Membership of the Ossewa Brandwag is forbidden the police, and it is a matter of economic expedience that keeps hundreds of teachers and professional men and women inactive.

III

Apart from the anti-war, anti-Jew, Republican policy, pursued with such vigour that it occasions the deep concern of the Government, the Ossewa Brandwag has had its influence upon the direction of official Afrikaner politics. General Hertzog's first act after his resignation was to unite the anti-war groups by co-operation with Dr. Malan. The negotiations were not easy. In the first place there has always been a competition, if not an element of jealousy, between the provincial branches of the Nationalist Party. Dr. Malan held the Cape, General Hertzog thought he held the Orange Free State, the Transvaal leadership was shared by several, and Natal was provided for by the leadership of Mr. Jansen, the Speaker. Between the Cape and the Orange Free State, as represented in its leadership at any rate, there is more than petty jealousy obtaining between organizations. Dr. Malan refused the invitations of General Hertzog in the Fusion Party in 1933 because he was committed to republicanism. So, for that matter, was General Hertzog.

The difference between them was the difference that once found expression in the Labour Party in

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England, the difference between "Socialism in our time" and "Socialism some time." Dr. Malan was all for "a republic in our time." General Hertzog, while convinced that a republic is the ideal government for South Africa, maintained that it could only be brought about by the broad will of the two sections of the country. Dr. Malan takes the view that, were the Nationalists in power, the way to a republic need not depend on any larger parliamentary division than that by which the war decision was carried. This difference of opinion could not be adjusted, and over a period of weeks the minds of Nationalist leaders, and of not a few Afrikaner intellectuals, were exercised upon the discovery of a formula which would accommodate both attitudes. By the end of January 1940 they arrived at a compromise. While convinced that a republic, separate from the British Crown, "is best suited to the traditions and aspirations of the South African people, and is the only effective guarantee that South Africa will not again be drawn into the wars of Great Britain," membership will not be denied any "national-minded Afrikaner who is prepared to adhere to the party obligations but is not convinced of the desirability of establishing a republic under the present circumstances."

With this as its chief clause the Herenigde Nasionale or Volks Party, the Re-united National or People's Party, was launched. The clause satisfied General Hertzog's first condition that the party shall not decline into a racial bloc, and his second, that hangs on the first, that it shall not exclude English-speaking people who cannot be expected to subscribe to secession from the Commonwealth of Nations.

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The compromise was not unlike that of the Fusion Party, which permitted Republican propaganda to any of its members. For the reason that there was this loophole in it, the new party has been given the name "the and/or Party." It acknowledged General Hertzog's conviction that a republic can only be achieved on the broad basis of the nation's will, and with full regard to the equal language and cultural rights of the two European races. To this extent it was sanely founded on the general lines of "Hertzogism."

That it did not survive indicates the increasing intensity of Afrikaner racial emphasis. Younger members of the Malanite section, some of them led by Mr. Pirow, others following a Mr. Swart, an early protégé of, and private secretary to, General Hertzog, and under the inspiration of extreme opinions, revolted against the policy of gradualism. General Hertzog found himself a leader without an active following. The impatience of youth against the conservatism of age was everywhere present. Many of these young men were already members of the Ossewa Brandwag ; some of them had seen diplomatic service abroad, like Mr. Eric Louw, who was minister plenipotentiary to Paris ; and others had had parliamentary experience. The revolt of youth against age took the form of throwing aside political restraints. The compromise clause of the Herenigde Party was one more obstacle to a straight issue. For how long was Afrikanerdom to depend for secession upon such vague promises ? Had not the warmongers decided, by a small majority in the House of Assembly, to drag the country into war ; and if that could be done, then the Nationalists, by any sort of majority,

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should declare for a revolutionary change in the constitution. There was a reaction to General Hertzog not dissimilar from that of the pro-war Cabinet Ministers. They had found him obstinate, dictatorial, intractable. Now it was the young Afrikaner extremists who were to find him unbending, slow moving, inconsiderate of opinions that did not coincide with his own, overweening in his leadership. They began to take upon themselves decisions without reference to him. They held meetings, and staged one in the capital of his own territory, the Orange Free State, to inaugurate a movement to strike for a republic by every constitutional means.

General Hertzog, unable to prevent it, repudiated it and its activities. "Deep flowing differences," his own phrase, could now be applied to his own ranks. Nor did Dr. Malan do much to discipline the erring followers, save for an expression of regret that a mass meeting was held without the leader's knowledge or permission. It seemed that Dr. Malan was aware of the nature of the movement.

The part played by the Ossewa Brandwag in it may not have been official. Many of these young politicians were members of that organization as well as being members of the party. It is reasonable to assume that they expressed a widespread opinion in opposing General Hertzog; and without accusing the Ossewa Brandwag of official action, the assumption is supported by its decisions to rid Afrikanerdom of leaders or members who stood in the way of their aims. General Hertzog, therefore, was rapidly becoming a discredited leader among his own people. Whether a deliber-

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ate whispering campaign against him was started is not for me to assert. Nor does it affect the issue before us. But stories went the usual round that General Hertzog had made some bargain with Smuts about a republic if the war was lost. There was another that was connected with the Freemasons. What truth would deny, rumour asserted; and these were the days of rumours the like of which I have never met among men who claim the possession of intelligence.

There were many attempts to bridge the widening gulf before the provincial branches of the party group considered the programme for the Herenigde Party. Mr. Pirow busied himself in the work of conciliation. By this time, the middle of 1940, he was more hated than ever by the English section; scorned as treacherously inclined, and dubbed by the *Rand Daily Mail* as the "Get nothing done" ex-Minister of Defence, and by parliamentarians as South Africa's pocket führer. He was a Hertzogite, but saw the revolt of youth against age as an opportunity to capture the imagination with declarations on "a new order" for South Africa. While protesting his loyalty to General Hertzog he was making a bid for the leadership of the young people, and probably was partly responsible for the resignation of Dr. van Rensburg as Administrator of the Free State and his subsequent acceptance of the leadership of the Ossewa Brandwag. The reins of leadership of Afrikanerdom were passing swiftly out of the hands of the old general and being fought for by a number of young men. Violent speech against the "warmongers" accompanied the movement to oust General Hertzog from his position.

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The climax came at the Bloemfontein Conference, and as is so often the case, a minor storm provided the occasion for the deeper forces to emerge. It is the custom at conferences and political meetings for the delegates and audience to elect a chairman. With the consideration usually accorded long service, age, and experience, a most suitable chairman would have been Senator Brebner, an English-speaking member of the old Nationalist Party and a very old and trusted friend of General Hertzog. He was passed over. During the course of the deliberations, General Hertzog placed before the congress the draft programme for the party which he, in conjunction with Dr. Malan, had framed. He was defeated on a counter motion of Mr. Swart, the young leader of the Orange Free State Nationalist Party, which omitted the provision for equal rights for English- and Afrikaans-speaking people.

The counter-motion provided only for equal language and cultural rights, which, in practice, meant, as General Hertzog said, that no English-speaking person could ever become a leader of the party.

"It is abundantly clear to me that we are here faced with a lack of that trust which is so necessary to make a party a success," spoke General Hertzog. "I warn you that such a party will ban itself to the desert, and for not less than twenty-five years. For forty years I have fought for the Afrikaner, but most certainly I am not going to associate myself with men who have adopted such a course. I trust that this course will not lead us to our own doom, but it will certainly lead you into the desert.

"I am, therefore, leaving, so that you cannot

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accuse me of failure. In doing so, I am resigning my leadership of the Free State. During the past year I have been subjected to every possible humiliation and insult. I can bear it no longer."

And with that, General Hertzog once more picked up his hat and walked out.

The chairman asked those who remained to stand and sing "Komt Treen wy dan Gemoedigd Voort."

Those who were not weeping did so.

In the place of De Wet, Mr. Havenga walked out with his leader. It was a strange and fantastic curtain, if indeed it is a curtain, upon a strange and fantastic career.

But a day or two before, General Hertzog accompanied by Mr. Havenga, and Dr. Malan accompanied by Mr. Swart, had addressed a large Nationalist gathering in the City Hall, Bloemfontein, where, a few weeks before, the rebellious spirits had declared for republicanism. At that meeting he delivered an onslaught upon the democratic order as virulent as anything to be found in Mr. Pirow or Mr. Swart. It was at that meeting, too, that the remarkable admission was made by a certain Mr. Schoeman, M.P., leader of the Here-nigde Party on the Rand. "The whole future of Afrikanerdom is dependent on German victory." We might as well say this openly, he declared, because it is a fact. "If Germany wins the war we will be able to negotiate with her, and in this way ensure the establishment of an independent republic in South Africa."

Within forty-eight hours General Hertzog was received at his constituency of Smithfield in traditional manner. "I am in the evening of my life.

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Give me a hundred Afrikaners and the right man able to give them guidance and I am convinced that Afrikanerdom can still be saved."

Before the meeting ended Mr. Havenga, in a rare moment of emotion, exclaimed, "Let me tell them that they cannot push General Hertzog out of Afrikanerdom. He is Afrikanerdom."

The revolt had succeeded. It is a matter of some interest and consequence, as Professor A. C. Cilliers has pointed out, to discover whether General Hertzog left the extremists or they left Hertzogism. When Mr. Havenga declared, "General Hertzog is Afrikanerdom," what did he mean by Afrikanerdom? Now that General Hertzog has resigned, not only from the leadership of the Herenigde Party, but also from Parliament, does Hertzogism still remain? Is it to be found in the newer elements represented by members of the Ossewa Brandwag?

IV

The surface storms give no indication and provide no clue to the racial revolutions of South Africa. The Afrikaner who supported Fusion between 1930 and 1939 did so because he believed that it was prepared to act upon the sovereignty achieved. Many of them, Members of Parliament, have said they believe they have been bluffed, and because of the failure of previous attempts at racial concord, the failure of this last one has left in them a permanent hatred and a fixed determination not to be bluffed again. Any element of compromise, then, is rapidly repudiated. This is the reason for

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so many of General Hertzog's personal followers remaining behind after he left the Congress.

For those in South Africa who are concerned for anything but the superficial, one more tendency deserves notice. For a century persons were more important than principles. Men followed men, not ideas. That is why there is such dearth of ideas in Afrikaner politics. You were Kruger man or Joubert man, a Botha man, a Smuts man, a Hertzog man, a Malanite ; seldom were you a Liberal or Conservative or Socialist. Even to-day it is more common to hear an old politician say, "I am a Smuts man" than "I am a Liberal." Probably quite unconscious of the minor revolution in which they are engaged, the Ossewa Brandwag is overthrowing a reliance upon persons. We are not here concerned with the nature of the ideas but the emergence of them. During the conflict that ended with the overthrow of General Hertzog, he was not the only one so threatened. Dr. Malan and even Mr. Pirow did not escape criticism, and at one time, indeed, General Hertzog himself predicted that these two men would eventually find themselves without supporters. The shock of General Hertzog's enforced resignation was the more profound for this very reason : that personal leadership has counted for so much in Afrikaner politics. It is probable that General Hertzog himself relied upon his personal position to carry through his proposals. His failure to do so is not to be explained merely by the challenge of lesser men for leadership, but by the upsurge of a new interpretation of Hertzogism—in an idea, however crudely expressed in the Ossewa Brandwag movement. The majority of its members are, of course,

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quite ignorant of these forces, even as the majority of the supporters of General Smuts are ignorant of the underlying challenge of the European conflict to democratic thinking.

The Ossewa Brandwag will support any party and any leader that abides by its aims, which, if Mr. Swart reflects them correctly, converge upon "the new republic with only one people, one language, one national anthem, one undivided loyalty."

It is these ideals that are now widely accepted among Republicans. General Smuts was not far from the truth when, at the end of 1940, he said, "If the Opposition is not very careful this body (the Ossewa Brandwag) is going to take control of it. I am not at all sure that it is not the Ossewa Brandwag that has booted General Hertzog out."

What General Smuts thinks of the Ossewa Brandwag is contained in a speech delivered in November 1940 :

"Though it insists that it is nothing but a cultural organization, it is clear that it is an organization of precisely the same character as the organization which brought Hitler into power in Germany. Its methods come straight from Germany and its purpose is nothing less than to introduce into this country the system that has flourished in Germany.

"Its organizers keep telling us that the Ossewa Brandwag is not a secret organization, but if it is not a secret organization, why is there so much talk about singling out traitors.

"Just the other day Mr. Swart, one of the leaders, said that the traitors must be branded and

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treated as such, but if the movement has no secret how can it be betrayed?

"We have seen, too, how the movement devotes its time to such things as drilling—if it is a cultural movement, why should it worry about drilling? And why, if it drills, should it drill at night? This is no seeking after culture, this is what Hitler's people did. This is how the storm-troopers and similar bodies started in Germany.

"And if it is only culture that is involved, why all this espionage and attempts at espionage? Why are details being gathered about the numbers of men in the army and about the size of guns and quantities of ammunition?

"I say that all this is being done to prepare the way for a new order—a Nazi order—in South Africa.

"It is quite clear to me, as it must now be to everyone else, that at the heart of this movement is a sinister coterie which is trying to introduce a new Nazi order into South Africa. The Government is keeping a careful watch on its activities and it is collecting all the necessary facts, and if it deems it fit will not hesitate to act."

There is no doubt, for it has been admitted on several occasions, the Ossewa Brandwag and the leaders of the Herenigde Party were convinced, in 1940, that Germany was going to win the war. General Hertzog was so convinced, and made it the chief topic of a long speech in Parliament during the Afrikaner peace offensive. As Mr. Schoeman had said, the success of the Republican cause depended upon a German victory. It was in preparation of that victory that the Herenigde Party leaned towards a new order that would abolish

the democracy of the Jingo-Imperialist-Jew creation, Hitler, it would seem, would have to be persuaded of South Africa's good faith. Thus we listen to Dr. Malan repeating such views as the following, given in Parliament in November 1940:

"If it was made clear to Germany that the people of South Africa repudiated General Smuts' declaration of war, Germany might consider that the establishment of a republic in South Africa—which would mean the separation of a Dominion from the Empire—would be a blow at the Empire, which, after all, is her enemy." The view of the eventual defeat of Britain was held by Mr. Pirow no less than by others who had less knowledge. The inevitability of Britain's defeat seems to have accelerated the desire to put South Africa in a favourable position *vis-à-vis* Germany, in the hope that Germany would accede to South Africa's Republican freedom.

It is very difficult, indeed, to find a way through the maze of contradictions at the end of 1940 and the beginning of 1941. Mr. Pirow, still a Hertzogite in the sense that he owed some personal allegiance to his old leader, had one foot in the Herenigde Party. Dr. Malan, welcoming "the people's front," the Ossewa Brandwag, now led the party and to some extent accepted the extreme claims of the younger members like Mr. Swart; Mr. Pirow having lost, or careless of, the political leadership of the Transvaal, threw a wider net in his New Order, and toured the country west of the Drakensberg (British Natal is on the east) with a formula and a philosophy designed to overthrow the Liberal-Capitalist-Democratic order and put, in its stead, the disciplined economy of Christian

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National Socialism, or one that can only be described as such.

It will not escape notice that the revolt of the Afrikaner against the war policy of General Smuts was almost entirely political and constitutional. The aim was a republic and secession from the Commonwealth. The next purpose was to overthrow democracy. There was no attempt to define the economy or the way of life that was to take its place. Mr. Pirow attempted to supply that, and at the same time to fix the attention of the Afrikaners upon those forces which were held responsible for South Africa's position in the war. Far more young Afrikaners support Mr. Pirow than is believed by the English-speaking section. He has personality, and despite every appearance of failure in administration, he has a driving force which denies the gibes of English newspapers. He too, however, relies upon a German victory for the success of his plans.

What we have to recognize in South Africa is that all its "subversive" elements are not "intolerances imported from abroad." There is such a thing as South African Nazism and South African Fascism, which, while finding inspiration in the European revolution, is nevertheless a South African product: the revolt against the apparent mal-distribution of power and wealth. The terms Nazism and Fascism were not to be found in the language of the Trek Boer and the frontiersman, but that early society possessed elements of both, and are still part of the Afrikaner's heritage.

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V

In political life, democracy is seldom apparent as a state of mind. The average English-speaking South African, say, in Natal, would emphasize the functions of the democratic order—the procedure of government known to democratic nations: the franchise, freedom of speech, and the like—as the features of democracy. It is unfortunate that “democracy” is a loose term in which is now included the triad of nineteenth-century concepts Liberal, Capitalist, Democracy. The Liberal-Capitalist part of the triad is anathema to the Afrikaner. Liberal means negrophil; Capitalist means the Jews—both un-national importations.

The revolt of the Afrikaner, then, rises first from the fear of absorption as a race, second from the fear of being a proletariat, and third as a protest against the whole idea of political subservience to an outside Power.

The first fear produced the Hertzog of 1906, the second produced the Hertzog of 1912, and all three contrived to get rid of Hertzog in 1940. This minor revolution, for such it is, has not yet crystallized out of its solution. What shape it will take is not yet to be known. When the political temper was at its height, the appointment of Dr. van Rensburg as leader of the Ossewa Brandwag suggested a moderating influence. But the calmer speech and greater prestige of a leader does not necessarily mean a lack of determination or the return of more orthodox methods. He may, and there is reason to believe he will, give his approval to Mr. Pirow's New Order, and both of them link up more closely

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still with the Herenigde Party. Mr. Pirow has the party's permission to push the New Order, and, for half a crown, anyone can receive pamphlets on its ends and aims. The general trend at the time of writing (February 1941) is towards the acceptance of some modification of Mr. Pirow's plans.

One or two factors may interrupt the movement. The first is the reluctance of many predikants of the Dutch Reformed Church to give it their blessing. The second is the refusal of *Die Burger*, the Nationalist newspaper, to accept its implications, either from fear that Mr. Pirow's plan means Mr. Pirow as its director and führer, or, what is more likely, the recognition by the editor that Afrikaners will not permanently accept a one-man dictatorship. Of the Dutch Reformed Church it can be said that it will not yield an inch of its Christian principles for any order which threatens it. At the same time there are no fiercer upholders of the Afrikaner traditions than the vast majority of predikants. The Church of South Africa is a unique trinity—the English Church, the Roman Church, the Dutch Reformed Church. The competition between the first two is an undercurrent. In the bid for the soul of the Native the Roman Church is winning. The Roman Church is international, the English is individual, the Dutch Reformed Church is national. "The Dutch Reformed Church," writes one of its ministers, "believes that God has not only endowed individual men and women with souls, but also individual nations." The Afrikaner nation, it believes, possesses an individual soul which is more than a composite of the souls of individuals. The Dutch Reformed Church is concerned with this soul. It cherishes it in isolation lest, being

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defiled itself by alien influences, the soul of the nation shall perish. As those influences are manifold in politics and in other Churches, the Dutch predikant must stand apart from his English brethren; stand, indeed, between it and its modifying influences and the soul of his nation. The predikant feels this deeply and religiously and sincerely. The greater the threat to the soul of the nation the more isolated he becomes. He acts, indeed, in the same way as his more direct political fellow. He withdraws, separates himself, and reminds himself that "in our isolation lies our strength," and places a barrier between his Church and his people and the "alien" influences of the Jews and the Roman Catholics. The Dutch Reformed Church, as a whole, follows, or perhaps is responsible for, the trend of isolation, and the soul of the nation is shrivelled in consequence.

The predikant is often accused of a refusal to co-operate with his English Church fellow priests. He answers that the fault lies not in him but in his accusers. He will point to the fact that not two out of ten of the English clergy endeavour to learn Afrikaans or sympathize with a point of view that cannot accommodate itself with the war policy. They do not appreciate the beliefs held by the Dutch Reformed Church that anything pertaining to politics, language, and culture must be the concern of those who care for the soul of the nation. The English clergy are, like all Englishmen, fortunate. South Africa is but one place to which they can go. There are others. "There'll always be an England," one predikant quotes, "and if there is not an England there is a Canada, an Australia, a New Zealand. As for the Afrikaner, he has no

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place other than Suid Afrika. When war came, then, the English Church saw one duty, the duty to England. It is all very well talking about serving South Africa and living together, but let the English Church inquire into the meaning of this matter and ask which they serve, the Kingdom of God or the Kingdom of England."

What did the Cape Town Church do only recently? In the peril of the days, it introduced a two-minutes' noon pause in the city. Afrikaner citizens were expected to join in something in which they had no belief. And when they objected disturbances occurred, a few free fights ensued. The noon pause in Cape Town became a political exercise, not a devotional one. It was a foolish display against which many British people protested, and it continues to widen the gulf between the communities in the city.

"Wherefore, come out from among them and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch not the unclean thing; and I will receive you." Thus the precept of St. Paul is the precept of the Afrikaner predikant, who, writing in answer to an open letter of an English cleric in a weekly journal, *Common Sense*, says, "Unlike the Anglicans, the Dutch Reformed Church cannot make common cause with the Roman Catholics in this country without betraying its Protestant heritage as a Church of the Reformation. Nor can it join Jewish societies without denying Christ the Crucified. . . . It is because our British brethren, aided by Jews and renegades, are actively fanning the spirit of war and Afrikaner persecution that isolation is the only Christian attitude left."

The fundamental dogma of the Dutch Re-

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formed Church, therefore, is in tune with every political and economic protest of Afrikanerdom. The triad—My God, My Country, My Nation—embraces the creed of the Church even as it is the creed of the Ossewa Brandwag. This explains why the predikant is so often to be found in politics, and even in Parliament. Time after time there is an outcry against the politics of the pulpit. On rare occasions the more liberal predikants have raised their voice against it. To no avail ; the care of the national soul requires the zealous watch over political interests. If the Church is thus persuaded to withdraw and to retreat on behalf of the soul of the nation, it is no less vigilant about the direction in which the soul is moving, and it is watching political plans and new orders very closely.

VI

The war has accelerated one other isolationist movement which is now part of South Africa's minor revolution. Fear of becoming a proletariat has given rise to an economic movement called the Reddingsdaadbond. As another outcome of the Centenary celebrations of the Great Trek the Reddingsdaadbond is less spectacular than its Ossewa Brandwag fellow. It is possible, however, that it may have a more far-reaching effect than the cultural-political movement led by Dr. van Rensburg. An Afrikaner patriarch, who has recently died, was the Reverend J. D. Kestell. For many years he addressed his wide sympathies to the plight of the Poor White, the greatest single problem before this country. There are 300,000

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Poor Whites. They are the cast-up of peculiar conditions, some of which have already been mentioned. They are the people, mostly Afrikaners, who have been left behind in the race, washed up on the economic beach. The patriarchal system was partly responsible. The swift transition to an industrial system, however, was the chief factor. Within a few decades the country passed from a system of subsistence economy to one of money economy. The laws of family inheritance, by which on the death of the head of the family the farm was divided up between the sons, was a determining factor in the process. The several factors have produced "a submerged fifth" of White people in South Africa, which, without incentive to work, have gradually fallen into a psychological and economic decline below that of the highest levels the Native has attained. Some of these people are beyond the fringe of society altogether, and could not be rehabilitated in self-respect or citizenship. Others are not beyond redemption.

How to remedy the condition is the first social problem of South Africa. Its political corollaries are vast. The presence of the Poor White offers the politician material for his exploitation, and to-day, from Dr. Malan downwards, the Afrikaner politicians point to the plight of these people and blame the Jews, the British, Capitalism, and Democracy. The Poor Whites are the "Stemvee," the cattle vote of the country. They can be moved hither and thither as labourers at six shillings a day to alter the strength of any particular constituency. A well-placed Afrikaner recently told me that no political party wants to solve the Poor White problem for this very reason. Whether that be

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so or not, they have certainly failed to discover a remedy.

It was to tackle this problem that the Reverend J. D. Kestell called his more fortunate countrymen. Out of that call emerged the Reddingsdaadbond, its chief aim "to prevent an extension of the process of impoverishment to which hundreds and thousands of Afrikaners are subject." It proposes to do this in two ways. First, there is the collection of funds by local committees, which are used for rehabilitating likely cases and for cultivating thrift and training Afrikaners in industry and commerce. Then there is an investment company called the Federale Volkesbellegging Beperk, the share capital of which is £300,000. Among its aims is the establishment of a wholesale distributing house not unlike the Co-operative Wholesale Society. There is also a cinema project. The whole concern has passed beyond the limits of Mr. Kestell's ideas, as, indeed, it would have to do to meet the purposes he intended. It proposes to launch suitable applicants in small businesses and industries. These applicants are not necessarily Poor Whites, for there are few adult Poor Whites who could, without years of training, enter upon any business with hope of success. It is hoped, however, that by extending the economic interests of Afrikaners as a whole that the Poor White will be absorbed in some measure within an Afrikaner economic system.

For the purposes of this review two facts are to be noted. The first that the Reddingsdaad movement is almost purely sectional and devoted to the Afrikaners. When a trader, for example, is a "protégé" of the movement, members will be advised to trade with him. The second point is

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that through the Reddingsdaad it is hoped to build up an Afrikaner "capitalist" front, which is, in practice if not in purpose, a challenge to the un-national, un-Afrikaner, British-Jewish capitalist hold on the country. Something of this sort was intended by Colonel Laas, the founder of the Ossewa Brandwag. It was his intention to issue traders' badges or signs to members and urge upon his fellows to deal exclusively with them.

If the Ossewa Brandwag is the political revolt of the Afrikaner against the war situation, the Reddingsdaad movement is an economic revolt against those elements which are held responsible for the war situation arising. In each case the founders and leaders emphasize that their aims are solely pro-Afrikaner and anti-British, a formula which is nicely balanced on the agate edge of political inclinations to disarm discipline altogether or to make it swing into violent extremes.

There is nothing illegitimate or immoral in either a political or an economic challenge. There is nothing illegitimate in a sectional project.

It only remains that we shall see these things for what they are: "the closing of the doors," as Dr. van Rensburg once said to me; a defensive reaction that is not due to conscious racialism—although it is certainly on the way towards a conscious realization. In a word, in business relations, in social, political, cultural, and every other sphere, there is a direct movement towards Afrikaner "autarchy."

VII
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CHAPTER XII

I

THE main feature of the South African Press is the flatness of its excellence. The reason for this is the absence of any newspaper magnate who makes newspapers his business. Newspapers are not sold in South Africa ; people buy them. There is a subtle difference. There are no national newspapers. How, indeed, can there be, with distances that are continental ! There are, instead, zones which by usage, and in some cases understandings, are covered by one newspaper or another. The newspapers are divided first by language—English and Afrikaans.

In the tradition of the times South African newspapers as a whole are ably conducted, responsible, and sensitive. On questions of domestic policy, particularly in matters concerned with the welfare of Natives and other non-Europeans, they are far ahead of public opinion. In format and in appreciation of their responsibility for public morals they are probably unexcelled in the world. The absence of intense competition, that is so much a feature of the popular dailies in England, probably accounts for their studied moderation. Save for an occasional beauty contest to encourage advertising during temporary lulls, nothing approaching journalistic stunts ever appears. There are no

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free insurances, no money prizes, no circulation drives that send crowds to the beaches "to find Mr. X." or to compete in sand castles or to watch an aerial display. Circulation is too inelastic a variable to make "net sales" propaganda a serious matter. If there is a daily with a circulation of 75,000 it is an exception. Perhaps in Johannesburg one or two may reach that figure. The majority fall far below 40,000, and there are some with considerable political reputations that manage to keep going comfortably on a circulation of fifteen to twenty thousand.

All the English newspapers support the Government's war policy; one or two Afrikaans newspapers also do so. It is not a case, therefore, of English versus Afrikaans in the for and against battle on the Government's war policy. The biggest, indeed the only, group on the English-speaking side is the Argus group. The organ of the Chamber of Mines, it owns *The Star* in Johannesburg, the *Cape Argus* in Cape Town, the *Daily News* in Durban, is part-owner of *The Friend* in Bloemfontein. It owns the *Diamond Fields Advertiser* in Kimberley, and extends its projects outside the Union in the *Bulawayo Chronicle* and the *Rhodesian Herald*.

The Argus Press is always good tempered, well informed, well endowed. In speaking the mind of the mining interests, it comes as near to dictating the policy of the Government as any group can that represents the biggest industrial organization of a country. Throughout the crisis years it followed Mr. Chamberlain and appeasement, took its beat from the London *Times*, the sounding board of the Chamberlain ministry, and sacked an editor who, somewhat like Mr. Mann of the *Yorkshire Post*, was

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not the intellectual acrobat he should have been when *The Times* made its famous somersault over the Sudetan fence. On all things, then, newspapers of the Argus group support General Smuts. When it criticizes the Government it does so with its left hand. It is, I repeat, just flatly excellent. Its readers will never cause a revolution.

The same can be said of the *Cape Times*. Quoted by the English Press it gives the same impression of South Africa as *The Times* does of England in South Africa. It is *Die Burger's* most constant reader. *Die Burger* is the Nationalist newspaper of the Cape, and all its republican opinions can be found, suitably criticized, in the *Cape Times*. A sort of private fight goes on between them, which is highly amusing to those who look on, and probably quite useful to *Die Burger* in disseminating its republican ideas. The *Cape Times* is always on the side of the angels. There is the *Rand Daily Mail*, the Johannesburg morning paper, which was owned by Sir Abe Bailey. It stands for a more popular expression of the sentiments that imbue the Argus group. Associated with it is the *Sunday Times*, the nearest approach to the *News of the World* in South Africa. There are no "star" reporters in South Africa save one, and he is in this combination. He is Mr. George Heard. His is the only name in South African journalism that is bandied about in the House of Assembly. The Nationalists hate him like poison. He gets inside stories. Once he got the Budget figures and published them before the Minister of Finance revealed them in Parliament. He was gaoled for a few days, refusing to incriminate his informant. There was a rumour that it was a Cabinet Minister.

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It might have been. South African Cabinet Ministers are more accessible than any in the world. Not all of them can keep their counsel.

Mr. Heard's faults in the eyes of the Nationalists, however, are more vicious than the revealing of Budget secrets. His attacks on the Ossewa Brandwag and on Nationalist leaders take a personal flavour that irritates them to anger. The *Rand Daily Mail* and the *Sunday Times* personify the Jingo-Jew influence and are hated beyond description. If ever Mr. Pirow gets into power they will be the first to be "controlled." The reaction of Nationalist leaders to the "revelations" of these newspapers is vividly personal. Mr. Pirow suffers from once being "the blue-eyed boy," to being "the pocket führer," the "get nothing done ex-Minister of Defence," the "little Hitler of South Africa." Mr. Pirow does not like ridicule; accusations of incompetence he likes less. The editors of the *Sunday Times* and the *Rand Daily Mail* see to it that he, republicanism, and the Ossewa Brandwag receive both.

In the same class of newspapers, with varying importance, come the *Natal Mercury* of Durban, until 1938 the supporter, if not the creator, of the Dominion Party, and the East London *Daily Dispatch*. The *Natal Mercury* used to hold General Smuts in grave suspicion, and earned for itself an unworthy reputation which it is now living down.

The East London *Daily Dispatch*, like the *Natal Mercury*, is a "family" paper. Neither has any use for the Statute of Westminster, and, reflecting the predominant opinion of the areas it serves, pursues a vigorous anti-republican policy. If Mr. Heard of the *Rand Daily Mail* is the most talked

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of journalist in Parliament, the East London *Daily Dispatch* enjoys that honour as a newspaper.

Two or three years ago, Mr. Isidore Schlesinger conceived the idea of adding to his enterprises, which are legion in South Africa, a chain of newspapers throughout the country. The Schlesinger financial projects have come in for criticism in the pages of the English journal *Truth*, and for more on the lips of hundreds of South Africans. Mr. Schlesinger is one of those men most men would like to imitate, who arrive in the country with five pounds and leave it with five million. He is the financial wizard of insurance companies ; he controls the African Consolidated Theatres, the biggest chain of cinemas ; he did control the O.K. Bazaar chain ; he started a chain of chemist shops on the Rand and turned them into grocers' shops. He started the citrus estates. He is reputed once to have said. " When I want to go bankrupt, I shall start newspapers." He is also reputed of having said " The Nationalists are right, we have too many little Jews in this country." Mr. Schlesinger is a Jew. He is the South African Jews' worst enemy.

He started his newspapers. The daily and Sunday *Express* in Johannesburg, the daily and Sunday *Tribune* in Durban. " Africopa," the news agency in competition with Reuters, was his. For a time it looked as if a refreshing breeze was on the way to enliven South African journalism. But for the first time, perhaps, Mr. Schlesinger came up against forces stronger than his own. He lost a powerful lot of money in printers' ink and did the cause of Jewry no great service. It was at a time when anti-Semitism was spreading—from the Nationalists, from the Afrikaners—to the British,

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and when "the intolerances of Europe" overshadowed South Africa.

Mr. Schlesinger's was the only challenge, and not a strong one, the Argus Group has had to meet. It, after all, has the first and last say in S.A.P.A., the South African Press Association controlling all Reuter news. "SAPA" is Reuter in South Africa. It is not altogether a good thing that the Argus Group has no real competition. It sets the pace of economic policy, and it would be useless for any individual newspaper outside the group to challenge it. In point of fact, as far as the economy of the country is concerned, the English Press is almost unanimous. It is a policy that revolves about the gold-mines. Any editor who sets himself to debunk the whole established order would get the sack. Worse, he might be burned at the stake—such heresy it is, not to worship at the mine dumps of the Rand.

The worst subject a leader writer is called to write about is gold-mining taxation. The language of gold taxation is enough to strike reverence into any journalist. When the subject crops up almost every leader writer in the country slides over it in the hope that he will make no impression upon the ice. Actually, he is as ignorant of the business as the reader who reads it, though from it "hang all the law and the prophets" and his own and everybody else's bread and butter. It is not far from the truth, then—gold being the hinge, axle, and wheel of South African economy, and the Argus Group reflecting the opinion of the Chamber of Mines—that every newspaper in the country is Conservative.

The English Press is usually described as

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"Liberal," a term not used in quite the same sense as when applied, say, to the *Manchester Guardian*. There is no Socialist Press in South Africa. There is no Socialist Party. A Member of Parliament, who left the Labour Party because it would not do what he wanted, calls himself a Socialist. He is, of course, no such thing ; and anyhow, "one swallow does not make a summer."

II

The Afrikaans Press bears no resemblance to the English Press except in paper and ink. The chief Afrikaans newspapers have the character of peoples' newspapers with a political purpose. *Die Burger* of Cape Town is the organ of the Cape Nationalists.

In December of 1914, in very difficult war conditions, a small group of General Hertzog's supporters met under the chairmanship of Mr. W. A. Hofmeyr. Shares in the new venture did not attract the monied man. No-one had any faith in it as a business project. One man was persuaded to risk £5,000, another £1,000. In this very fact lay its strength. *Die Burger* has more shareholders than all the English newspapers put together. Over three thousand people subscribed small amounts. Into a commercial community bitterly hostile to its policy *Die Burger* launched its first issue in July 1915, after having produced one specimen copy.

Dr. Malan, who was then minister of the Dutch Reformed Church at Graaff Reinet, was persuaded to become its editor. His editorial staff knew but

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little more than he did, while the technical staff was largely English. *Die Burger*, then, is the organ of Dr. Malan's type of Nationalism. It has its Nationalist fellows in the Transvaal, where *Die Transvaaler* represents the extreme; and in the Orange Free State, where *Die Volksblad* has a comfortable following. The chief feature of them all is that they are not the product of "business" enterprise so much as the outcome of a political faith which they pursue with remarkable vigour. All of them take the same attitude towards the resignation of General Hertzog from the leadership of the Herenigde Party. *Die Transvaaler*, which is violently opposed to any compromise with the British on the question of war and republicanism, believed that "General Hertzog performed a great service to Afrikanerdom by resigning from active political life." It viewed the split as a conflict between age and youth. "The struggle of the Afrikaner people was started by General Hertzog himself," wrote *Die Burger*. "The reunited Afrikanerdom will continue that struggle."

Towards General Smuts and the Government the Nationalist Press is shameless in bitter denunciation. Commenting on the "crocodile tears" of General Smuts' sympathy with General Hertzog in his defeat, *Die Burger* wrote of the "chameleon-like qualities of the greatest imperialist of our age," and quoted Dr. Malan's remark, "We are old enough, and we have had experience enough, to know a jackal when we see one."

A more moderate course is adopted by *Die Vaderland*, owned by General Hertzog and Mr. Havenga. On the Republican issue it reflects General Hertzog's views and deplors the manner

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in which younger men have ousted him from his leadership. On war issues it is no less insistent in its revolt than the others.

Some hard logic finds its way into the editorial columns of the Afrikaans Press as well as some strange arguments. As a whole, the Malanite newspapers claim as the basis of their policy co-operation between the two European races. In that they do not differ from the English newspapers. It is a matter of interpretation, whether we shall co-operate on the thesis that South Africa's part is in the war. The Nationalist Press brings its heavy guns to this issue, and repeats the attack made by General Hertzog and Dr. Malan on every conceivable question.

Whether one agrees with it or not, it has to be admitted that the case is argued with ability and competence. Indeed, in the presence of the editors of these newspapers, one is struck by their conviction. They can talk as well as write. They can pass from Afrikaans to English with a facility that leaves English editors standing. There are, no doubt, one or two English editors who can get along in Afrikaans. There is not one who can put the Englishman's case to the Afrikaner in the Afrikaner's own language. In conference, then, the Englishman's case suffers from lack of presentation. The case is there all right, but the bottom is knocked out of it once the Englishman admits in speech that he, a leader of the public opinion, knows so little Afrikaans that he can neither read editorial comments of the Afrikaans Press nor answer the Afrikaner challenge in editorial conference.

So on those occasions, when editors are called to a conference, say, with members of the Govern-

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ment, the English editors, for the most part, sit in ignorance while Afrikaans is exchanged between the minister and Afrikaner editors. Fortunately, Afrikaner editors are long suffering in this matter, and change into English when the discussion in Afrikaans would make the English deaf and dumb.

There is no excuse to be found in the fact that newspapermen write and do not talk. The point is that in the spoken or the written word the English case and cause, as far as South Africa is concerned, is lost before it is opened. For the man who wants to argue that South Africa's first cause as a nation lies with British policy and tradition, bilingualism is the first qualification. How can any Englishman expect any Afrikaner to believe in the protestations about "South Africa first" when the Englishman can only offer these protestations in the English language? And when it happens that these Englishmen are editors of powerful newspapers the unilingual excuse must strike the Afrikaner editor as a piece of effrontery.

In practice it means this. The English editor, when approaching the issue of neutrality and war, too frequently emphasizes the rightness of Britain's case in the hope that others will see that case as South Africa's case. The two are not coincident; no amount of argument will make them so; and to relate the case of Britain, mighty as it is, to the case of South Africa is fatal in the persuasion of Afrikaners to the view that this is South Africa's war. The Afrikaner is always asking whether this war is South Africa's war because it is Britain's war. The English newspapers have failed to prove to the satisfaction of the Afrikaner that, quite apart from Britain, this war is an Afrikaner's war. He will

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never be persuaded of it by English editors who know no Afrikaans.

So the battle between the English Press and the Afrikaans Press proceeds as an exercise that does not alter by one jot or tittle the strength of the respective opinions in the country. No anti-war Republican has been persuaded, by what the English newspapers say, to change his opinion ; and no Britisher has been convinced by what any Afrikaans newspaper says, because he never reads it. They are separated by astronomical distances. The *Cape Times* and *Die Burger* may go on for ever with their editorial exchanges without altering the position one iota.

III

In the belief that it takes an Irishman to put an Irishman in his place, the Government or its supporters own the Afrikaans newspapers *Die Suidersstem*, *Die Volkstem*, *Ons Land*. They serve as useful reminders that the conflict is an Afrikaner conflict, a clash between the old and the new in the interpretation of the place the Afrikaner should take in the world.

Where all of them meet is in the defence of the freedom of the Press, a freedom that has had to be watched with vigilance. On two or three occasions General Hertzog, when Prime Minister, threatened to introduce legislation to control in some measure editorial comment upon European affairs. There was the case of the publication in one newspaper of articles that were anything but complimentary to the heads of certain foreign States, at a time when

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South Africa was at peace with those nations. Through the Department of External Affairs the newspaper was called upon to apologize or to retract. The newspaper refused to do so, whereupon the Prime Minister, through the Department of External Affairs, did so on behalf of the Government. As a result of this and one or two other instances of like nature, General Hertzog called a few editors together and told them to order their own professional conduct or to accept some alternative of control. A code of conduct was, therefore, agreed upon by editors, but it is doubtful whether that would have satisfied a Prime Minister rapidly becoming aware of the influence of the Press in a country so divided on main issues.

At the outbreak of the war General Smuts was deeply concerned about the anti-Government propaganda in the Afrikaans Press. This concern has had a reaction in the English Press. There is a marked tendency to refrain from criticizing the Government on legitimate subjects lest, in doing so, the Government is embarrassed and the Republican opposition strengthened as a result.

Afrikaner editors do not agree that they obstruct the Government in the prosecution of the war, but, on the belief that "he who is not for us is against us," the Government may well question these protestations. At every turn in the critical study of South African politics we come upon these nice distinctions in motive and interpretation. The Republican newspaper will continue to argue that it is merely putting its own point of view, and not deliberately setting out to obstruct the Government's military progress or threaten the safety of the State. The test lies in the difference there would

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be if the Republican Press were not Republican, or if, having protested that the decision of Parliament in September 1939 was a grave blunder, it accepted the decision as the will of the people and accorded the Government its support.

General Smuts has enjoyed no such good fortune, and both sections of the Press have been guilty of adding to, rather than placating, the hatreds that now prevail. In a matter of life and death it is fatal to see the other fellow's point of view. Each is inclined, in seeing only his own, to exacerbate the feelings of the other until a condition has arisen in which the Press has been a serious factor in racial strife. At the same time, each is so obviously preaching to its own converted that no purpose is served by either. In contrast with the attitude during the years of Fusion Government the condition is serious.

There is not an English newspaper, save, perhaps, the independent journal, the *Natal Witness*, which will admit any element of legitimacy to the claims of the Afrikaner Republican Press. There is not an Afrikaans newspaper, save, perhaps, *Die Vaderland*, which could hope to join the *Natal Witness* in forming a bridge between the two sides. The rest see to it, and rightly from their point of view, that nothing appears in their columns that is favourable to, or is even informative of, the Opposition argument. It is a very noticeable aspect of the South African Press that if you wish to know what Mr. Strydom has said, or what Mr. Pirow proposes, you must read the Afrikaans Press to find out. The reports in the English Press are too condensed to give anything but a distorted account. This is not to question the integrity of

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"Sapa," the Reuter of South Africa. It is merely to state a fact. What a newspaper receives from "Sapa" is an abridged report, just as "Sapa" receives résumés of Hitler's speeches. In both cases, what is good as "news," successful in journalism, is by no means necessarily good in politics. It is not to be expected that newspaper reporters are close students of the best British diplomacy. They get news, and good news is news that sells a paper and heightens a reputation. Such "good" news is often damaging to a good political cause.

From time immemorial, and from the General Hertzog of 1912 to the General Hertzog of 1940, the tendency of newspapers has been to present the Opposition in the worst possible light. South Africa is not peculiar in this, but it is unique in having a racial constitution which reacts to "successful" journalism in a way detrimental to good racial relations. What in England would merely produce "political" animosities succeeds in South Africa in producing racial hatreds.

This may be unavoidable and inevitable, but inevitability does not make it good politics, and there is no doubt that in South Africa permanent hatreds, more vicious than political estrangements, are the result of newspaper attacks. Worse than that, large sections of the community remain not only in ignorance of the Opposition "case," they are encouraged to look upon the Opposition case as immoral as well as illegitimate. The English-speaking section become Britishers—and in the worst sense—to the Afrikaners; and the Afrikaners become Nazis to the Britishers.

Over the daily Press the weekly journal, *The Forum*, has adopted a paternal oversight. It was

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launched two or three years ago. Every week it offers its editorial "laurels" to what it considers the best editorial in the South African Press. A study of these shows its policy as one of conciliation, co-operation, and liberalism. Laurels are invariably given for expressions of racial concord that slide over fundamentals. The honour has no meaning. All that is required to engage its attention is to look to the future, pour oil on the present, avoid the facts, and spread an atmosphere of unrealism over the South African scene.

IV

The best thing *The Forum* has ever done is to introduce some honest film criticism into South Africa. The daily newspapers dare not do it lest they upset the box-office returns of the theatres. One or two editors have tried to do so, but they have lost the battle against the African Consolidated Theatres, who are good advertisers. Few intellectual film-goers take any notice of the film notices of the daily Press, and the theatres suffer as a result. The real sufferers, however, are all forms of art. For what happens in the cinema happens also outside it. The absence of sound and honest criticism in music and dramatic work is appalling. The musicians and the dramatists say they like criticism. They deceive themselves, they do not deceive newspapers. Most of the musicians in South Africa love music only in so far as they see themselves in it. Time and time again appeals are made to editors to describe the frocks worn at a concert because "that is what makes concerts

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popular." As if anybody wanted concerts to be popular !

It does not stop there. Because sound and stimulating critics are few, the art of criticism is neglected. No-one wants to be a cinema critic or a literary critic ; there is no demand for them.

Broadcasting is in a similar plight. Isidore Schlesinger gave South Africa its first network. We now have a corporation on the British model. But anybody can earn a guinea or two before the microphone. No standard is required. If you happen to be reasonably well connected, all you have to do is to send in your name. There are women singing on the air who would get the bird in any Yorkshire village—and they are singing repeatedly. The broadcasting authorities say they scour the country for talent and cannot find it. That is just the point, they do. There is no talent because there is no criticism, and there is no criticism because South African singers, artists, dramatists, writers, musicians, do not want criticism, and that is why there are no singers, musicians, or artists in South Africa. That is why, when a poet arises in South Africa, like Roy Campbell, he takes wing to another clime to save his soul. And that is why, if truth be told, the English tradition, in all its fine beauty, is never made known to the Afrikaner. It is swamped by the English "colonial" tradition. The Britishers have killed it, and, in doing so, have wounded their own cause. The African Broadcasting Corporation has followed in the wake of the newspapers, allowed itself to be dominated by the cultural standards of the market-place.

At the outbreak of the war the Broadcasting

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Corporation found itself in serious difficulties. Some of its employees were Republican. One or two of them were anti-British. There were domestic rifts between the loyal employees. The public was by no means certain whether the Broadcasting Corporation was out to support the Government's war policy. There were revelations in the Press, and it was not impossible for any impartial observer to discover where the major faults lay. Things happened that in any private enterprise would have been stamped out at once. Eventually a Commission of Inquiry was appointed to investigate the extent of the Corporation's failure. The political results followed the course characteristic of the internal conflict. Where domestic difficulties occurred within the broadcasting organization, attempts were made to remedy those that seriously affected healthy broadcasting features. Two examples will suffice. Owing to some inability to conduct the young peoples' programmes in the Afrikaans section, they were closed down. To give an appearance of equality the feature in English was also closed down. In the adult features, war commentaries, always censored of course, were censored so much that no commentator felt free to discuss enemy mendacity. The Broadcasting Corporation became, for a time, the plaything of internal politics. Even in 1940 it was not the instrument of a Government at war.

This aspect of propaganda is in the hands of the Bureau of Information. Starting as a liaison office between the Government and the public, it extended its functions to include daily broadcasts, acts as news collector and purveyor, and generally conducts propaganda on behalf of the nation at

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war. After some months of experimental work, during which its daily denials of Zeesen were the troughs of listening periods, it gradually settled down to more direct and useful work. It has ceased replying to Zeesen, and in consequence many people have ceased listening to Zeesen.

This is all to the good. Indced, the handling of the nation's propaganda, admittedly a super-human task in a country where internal war is as intense as the external war, was a disheartening business. In the first place the Bureau had two functions to perform which are by no means so similar that they can be put under the control of one director. As a liaison office between the Government and the public the Bureau acted as a sort of buffer taking the shocks of various departments and transmitting to the newspapers and to the public over the air such statements as the department wished to convey. Its second function, and by far the more important, was one (national propaganda) for which its officers, whatever their other considerable merits, were totally unfitted. To begin with, there is no relation between propaganda and news collection. Though journalists could manage the collection and dissemination of news, they are not, because of their ability as journalists, expert propagandists. No man trained as a journalist in South Africa can direct propaganda on a national scale. He certainly cannot hope to stand up against the slick, suave competence of Zeesen.

South Africa made a bad start in this direction, though the zeal of the Bureau deserved better results. The fault lay in the sheer inability of the Government to recognize that propaganda was the

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central problem of the country. Instead, it was treated in amateur fashion by men whose patriotism could not be questioned and whose loyalty almost disarms criticism. It was a problem requiring the finest brains at the Government's command, and even now it awaits the touch of a master-hand to give it dynamic purpose. After a year of experiment its use of the microphone took on more definite and encouraging character, and its discovery of cinema has done something to give life to its busyness.

V

We are slow to learn the value of these instruments of social worth, and it may be that the cinema project of the Reddingsdaadbond will have something to teach us of the crying need for a permanent film bureau for national purposes. As part of the plan to advance Afrikaner culture the Reddingsdaad cinema project has something of the vitality and aims of the Russian cinema. It treats Voortrekker subjects with a natural instinct for dramatic values, and promises to be the first successful endeavour to get below the surface and touch the virgin soil which is South Africa. If it has much to learn, it possesses the learner's avidity for knowledge. Whether it be a revolt against the established order of the cinema in South Africa or a dedication to the social purposes of the State, it may stimulate other enterprises to emulation. At present, perhaps, its tendency is towards an emphasis of Afrikaner culture in the manner of the autarchy, already a feature of Afrikaner society.

The late arrival of the Bureau of Information

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in its cinema experiments, against the background of its over-zealous use of the microphone, demonstrated the enormous advantage the cinema possesses over the microphone. The Bureau in co-operation with African Films produced one or two shorts which in photography and commentary were of special merit. The war may bring the nation to a recognition of this instrument of public good. It is a fact, and a regrettable one, that we in South Africa know more about the problems of the Middle West than we do of our own. The clash of colour, the poverty of Dixie, the economy of great wheatlands, the diplomatic service of the United States, all these things we know better than the cognate subjects of our own land. From soil erosion to the mining of gold, from the social problems of the Poor White to the wealth of our scenery, there is a vast fund of cinema material awaiting exploitation. The townsman in Natal is almost completely ignorant of the countryman in the Orange Free State. Their economies are widely divergent, and because they are also distinct in race, the clash of urban and rural has political significance. Yet, were the cinema to engage upon the highly dramatic material latent in this clash, it could bring to the townsman, who is so often English-speaking, an entirely new interpretation of the struggle of the rural dweller, who is so often Afrikaans-speaking. The cinema, in fact, under inspired direction even of private enterprise, provides a medium through which the best of politics may be projected. The material cries out for dramatic and documentary treatment capable of filling theatres with a public hungry for information and interest.

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It must not be forgotten that in the absence of the theatre, the cinema has a more permanent influence in South Africa than elsewhere. It is forgotten that, as Dr. E. G. Malherbe recently stated, "The people who make the films of a nation have a greater influence than those who make the laws of the country." As a result of the almost complete control of the cinema by one or two groups linked with the great Hollywood studios South Africa is rapidly being "Americanized," from love-making to language. Recently the Government set up a huge industrial development corporation with a capital of five millions for the purpose of encouraging secondary industries in preparation for post-war economy. No better way of spending part of that money can be conceived than in the establishment of a cinema industry designed to tap the resources of the country, to encourage art and drama, and to use the whole for the advancement of national ideals. The psycho-social condition of South Africa is field largely unexplored by the scientist. We have no yardstick by which may be measured the full influence upon social behaviour of the instruments of propaganda at our hands. Until the advent of war we had no propaganda at all, no national broadcasting aims that aspired to the ideals laid down in the constitution of the Broadcast Corporation. We were in fact at the mercy of an undeveloped broadcasting policy on the one hand and a cinema ordered by the African Consolidated Theatres on the other. We owed a debt to both ; it is a debt that has already been paid.

The time has arrived for a constructive plan within the nation's own reach to translate the social

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and economic problems into terms of cinema, to reflect the merit of our nation on the screen, and give life to the poetry that is within us. The cinema has one advantage not possessed by the Press or the radio. It is an untouched medium. No political suspicion attaches to it as political suspicion attaches to the radio. It is awaiting proper use, and it can be made to do more for the political maturity of South Africa than any other known instrument of government.

The alternative to its development is a condition of steady decline in cultural standards, the discouragement of scores of writers and artists, and the loss of youthful intelligence that somehow or other disappears in the quagmire of race politics. Perhaps this is the most serious feature of our times. We have in our universities and senior schools deep and rich wells of potential ability. Young South Africans there are in plenty, sensible of and alert to social problems, sensitively aware of a young nation, intelligent and critical. They pass through the schools into a society where social worth is assessed by the purse ; where social purpose lives in the atmosphere of teacup-reading and the bridge table, if they are English ; and if they are Afrikaans, in a society where the dead are considered more important than the living.

VI

For purpose of war propaganda a semi-official organization, called Unity Truth, is run by public subscription. It is known in some parts as the Knights of Truth. The Nationalists have other

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names for it. It serves to disseminate counter propaganda to that of the Republicans. It is generally agreed that the political situation is largely untouched by its efforts, which is another way of admitting either that its propaganda is all wrong or that the cleavage is such that no amount of propaganda, however skilfully projected, can affect it. In this matter I have had it explained to me that Afrikaner psychology needs a very different approach from that successful with the English-speaking section. Unfortunately, however, the propagandists have so far failed to discover what that difference is and how to supply what is needed. It has been explained, for example, that the Afrikaner of the backveld does not respond to reason and logic so much as he does to sarcasm and irony. If that be so, he is remarkably unlike his educated urban fellow whose logic is of that simple, aggravating kind that concedes every argument and proceeds to demolish the lot in a declaration of conviction which embraces all logic, encompasses all reason, and upon which sarcasm is merely impertinence.

If, in the case of the European population, war propaganda has been created on false premises, and therefore has failed lamentably, the Government has had more success with the non-European mind. It marks the difference between the expert and the amateur. Propaganda for the Natives is under the direction of the Native Affairs Department, many of the officers of which know the Native better than he knows himself. Every day the English newspapers publish war news supplied by the department in three languages, and every day groups of Natives gather round the newspaper

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offices to listen to one of their number reading the news and to interpolate with suitable remarks. "That's because Baldwin sent the navy to the bottom," was the remark of one on hearing of the submarine menace. The same news is broadcast by a Native at intervals. Here is an example of the colourful news summary translated for the Zulu :

"Behold knowledge !

"It is made known that recently a sea alligator of our side espied two vessels at sea and then approached to find out what vessels they were. It saw that they were enemy vessels, heavy laden. Therefore our sea alligator sank one, but the other left that place too quickly."

And this is how the Zulus heard of the Greeks :

"Nay, there are those in this war who cause astonishment, who bring rejoicing to our side. Who are they ? They are the Greeks."

"In June of the past year there came Benito Mussolini of the Italians. Without provocation he thrust strong armed hosts of his into the small peaceable country of Greece, like a bully without cause setting upon an unoffending child."

"The nations of the earth were grieved, for Benito Mussolini had then said that he would break the loins of Greece, and in time past he had proclaimed that he had eight million bayonets to do his bidding."

"The nations thought Woe to the Greeks, for assuredly Greece will now perish."

"But days went by and that did not happen. Then nations began to ask : Ah, what is this that we hear ?

"For they were hearing that the Greeks, led

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by their Prime Minister, General Metaxas, had turned upon the Italian hosts and that the Italians were being pushed back.

"The Greeks are without fault in this war.

"It was in their own country of Greece that they turned upon the Italian hosts.

"No land is like homeland. When a person goes home in his homeland he rejoices to see wisps of smoke rise from fire cooking food there. And all else that gladdens at home brings him thankfulness.

"Then there in their homeland, where the Greeks know even the smallest donga, there in their mountain country they turned upon the Italian armed hosts. And they pushed the Italians back."

The Zulu responsible for declaiming this material is a fine example of a born propagandist. There are no muscles left unused as Xhembu gesticulates before an unseen audience. The audience takes up the rhythm ; it is the rhythm of a strange and moving loyalty to the big Baas.

By contrast the European propaganda is poor stuff which cannot be excused entirely by reference to the greater complexity of the European scene in South Africa. Only from the simple do we arrive at the complex, and what is charged with simplicity in the approach to the Native contains the single truth upon which the creation of a public opinion rests, and therefore by which a propaganda machine must be propelled. In the case of the Afrikaner anti-war opinion, propaganda has been devised which refuses to admit a case for anti-war opinion. It refuses to concede the legitimacy of the Republican challenge, and by innuendo, implication, and direct statement demonstrates an ignorance of the inner nature of this minor revolu-

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tion: Even a disease is not cured by ignoring its existence, and a challenge of the human spirit is never met by assuming that it is a thing of evil.

It was Mr. Wickham Steed who said that the Press is the central problem of democracy. Certainly the Press, with the rest of the instruments by which public opinion is shaped, is the central problem of South Africa. Neither the Bureau of Information as the official propagandist of the Government, the Press, nor the Unity Truth organization has accepted the first fact of South African politics. It is an elementary fact. It is this. The political conflict of South Africa is not a conflict between right and wrong, but between right and right; between the rightness of the Afrikaner's case and the rightness of the Britisher's case.

There is no novelty about this conclusion. There never is about any simple truth. But the implications of it have escaped understanding in the tradition of the times. It is in those traditions that the Press can be described as flatly and uniformly excellent. It is on the traditions of the times that the Bureau of Information, which should be the greatest political force in the country, has ordered its purposes. This tradition of the times is to approach the South African political and social scene with the mind of the European, and to apply what is axiomatic in Europe to a problem to which such axioms have no relevance. European solutions cannot be applied to South African problems.

VIII

“SON ÉMINENCE GRISE”

CHAPTER XIII

I

AT a moment when, as he himself said, he might have looked forward to a release from the burden of the Government and office, General Smuts was called once again to direct South Africa's destiny. It is given to few men to spread their lives over parliament and cabinets and fields of war, the chancelleries of diplomacy, and the study of philosophers. In a universe of political comets General Smuts has the permanency of a planet. Without him South Africa would be, and for that matter will be when he passes from it, a strange and empty land. Then, as if in strange metamorphosis of the Boer of old, he will return to the great forgiveness of nature in the philosophy of grass and grasses. The political curtain will be rent in twain.

In the meantime, in 1939, and at over three score and ten years young, there was work to be done. Swiftly he put his hand and brain to it. First there was a Cabinet to be formed from the remnants of the United Party and its natural allies in war, the Labour and Dominion Parties. He had one first-class lieutenant in Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr ; another in Colonel Deney's Reitz, who once said : " I rode behind General Smuts as a boy with a rifle on my shoulder and I have followed since for forty years." There were men of lesser distinction

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in statecraft, from Mr. Stuttaford to Mr. H. G. Lawrence. He invited Colonel Stallard the leader of the Dominion Party to join him. Of the Labour Party Mr. Madelcy was the obvious choice, and he was given the post of Minister of Labour and Social Services.

The Cabinet was not a strong one. It lacked the ability of the Fusion Cabinet, and gave the impression that the burden was too heavily placed on the shoulders of the Prime Minister. General Smuts added Defence and External Affairs to the heavy responsibilities of the premiership. His next task was to look to the nation's defences. He took a fast 'plane to Defence Headquarters at Pretoria to convince himself of the loyalty of officers. But a few months before, in an address to officers, Mr. Pirow, as Minister of Defence, had informed any who felt their loyalties divided in the imminence of war, that their duty "as men of honour" was clear. The Prime Minister, if he did not repeat the advice, at least convinced himself that his immediate staff were with him in his two-fold task of meeting any internal difficulties and in preparing for the external conflict.

The defence situation was bad. South Africa had for many years given little heed to her military needs. Mr. Pirow as Minister of Defence had evolved a five-year defence plan as early as 1934. Mr. Pirow has always been obsessed by the threat of a war between White and Black or White and Yellow. He used to dwell on threats which could only mean that he visualized a war between South Africa and Japan, and I remember him talking of the possibility of an alliance between France and Japan, and looking upon France, with its colonial

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Black armies, as a serious menace. South Africa has always viewed with anxiety the establishment of large Black forces to the north, and it would seem that when he was assuring the Kenya authorities of South Africa's aid in the case of war, Mr. Pirow was visualizing something quite different from the fears taking shape in the mind of the British authorities. While they were thinking of Germany as the potential aggressor he was thinking of a Japanese threat, or a Black rebellion, or at most an Italian challenge, which he would probably have taken up with relish.

To dispel the mystery surrounding Mr. Pirow and defence, much more information is required. What can be said is that in 1938 when South Africa needed thousands of rifles she had scores ; where she needed hundreds of machine guns she had a few dozen ; where she needed scores of big guns she had a few. What also can be said with certainty is that the Defence authorities, under Mr. Pirow as minister, worked out a plan based upon certain premises which were not the premises of a war such as that which broke out in 1939 ; and also that he laid before a Parliament that was satisfied with it a long statement of the Government's defence policy in 1938 when asking for a vote of £5,000,000 for arms and equipment and £1,000,000 for the fortification of harbours.

The premises upon which the Fusion Government set about its intention is stated thus :

"Any approach to our problem of national defence must be from a purely South African angle and must take into consideration factors which are not found in any other portion of the Commonwealth."

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The first of these factors is the composition of our European population. "With 60 per cent. of the population Afrikaans-speaking," Mr. Pirow stated, "no defence policy will command the support of the bulk of the people of the Union unless its scope be explicitly confined to the protection of South Africa and her vital interests." Clearly this—though accepted by Parliament without discussion in 1938, when everybody hoped, but no-one believed, that peace would prevail—was a powerful limiting factor in preparation for a war that was to send men to the coasts of the Red Sea. But that it was legitimate basis is to be found in the statement of the Government's attitude given by Mr. Pirow during the debate on the defence vote in 1936, which read:

"We shall not take part in a war except when the interests of South Africa make such participation inevitable. We as a Government will not even take part in an apparently inevitable war except after the people of this country, through their representatives in Parliament, have, with the greatest possible measure of unanimity, given us an unambiguous mandate to that effect."

Whatever may be thought of this as a basis of defence policy, it was the one adopted by the Fusion Government and approved by Parliament in September 1938, and there is reason to believe that the premise laid down by Mr. Pirow was a direct outcome of the Cabinet's understanding about the Czechoslovakian dispute. However that may be, it accounts for the design of the defence policy.

By way of explanation of the Government's position, Mr. Pirow examined the state of the

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public opinion and the Government's reaction towards that opinion in these words :

" Much labour and ingenuity has been expended in trying to ascertain in anticipation under what circumstances South Africa's vital interests might be said to be affected. There are two extreme schools of thought. The one is convinced that South Africa can never, under any circumstances, fight side by side with Great Britain. The other is equally firm in its belief that when Britain is at war we are automatically compelled to participate.

" Both views are equally fallacious.

" It is not difficult to conceive the circumstances where it would be suicidal not to side with Great Britain. It is equally easy to imagine Great Britain in a quarrel in which nine-tenths of our people will refuse to participate. One can go further and imagine trouble in which Britain is not interested but which is a matter of paramount importance to us, *e.g.* where the integrity of Portuguese East Africa is threatened. In other words, the test as to whether Great Britain is involved in a war is not by itself of value in connection with South Africa's participation or non-participation in such war.

" Equally inconclusive is the test as to whether a war in which we are asked to participate is fought on behalf of some democracy against Fascist forces.

" As a country proud of its democratic institutions, we may have little time for any other forms of government ; but that by itself would not be a sufficient reason to take up the cudgels, for example, on behalf of democratic Spain.

" These few examples show, I think, how futile

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On the question of coastal defence the fortification of South Africa's harbours was based on the report of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1928. Mr. Pirow proposed to increase the defence beyond the proposals laid down by that Committee and to make Cape Town battleship proof instead of cruiser proof, by adopting a new scheme based on Robben Island and the replacement of the battery of 9.2-inch guns by 15-inch ones.

In addition to these proposals the Defence Department was engaged on a large air pilot training scheme. For 'planes and armament, however, we should have to go overseas. Mr. Pirow, as we know, did so, to find that the factories were engaged upon British armament needs. Every responsible person in political and Press circles knew, as Mr. Pirow said in Parliament in September 1938, that "the difference between what we have got and what we should have is very considerable."

South Africa found herself, in fact, very much in the same position, relative to potential enemies, as Britain did at the same time. If Munich was a function of Britain's weakness in armament, the temper of the House of Assembly in 1940 was a function of the lack of armaments. In the one Mr. Chamberlain was reduced to impotence, in the other Mr. Pirow was subject to the withering scorn of angry members. In the words of one member, "South Africa could not fight a tom cat"; and that South Africa "could not fight a tom cat" was due, in the opinion of the majority, to a Mr. Pirow who had deliberately allowed defence expenditure to be based on a policy of neutrality.

On assuming office, General Smuts appointed a small committee to investigate defence needs.

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One of its members was a Mr. Pocock, an M.P. During the course of the debates in 1940 Mr. Pocock turned upon Mr. Pirow in scornful reference to the latter's stewardship as Minister of Defence. Mr. Pirow had spent none of the money allotted for defence. South Africa had guns without ammunition, airmen without planes, men without equipment. In September 1938 the stock of ammunition for battle conditions was estimated to last for one day, and bombs for one air squadron for two days. In these attacks there was one disquieting feature absent, though Mr. Pirow's repeated interjections, "Why don't you ask the Prime Minister?" was drawing attention to the fact that the Cabinet usually handles progress reports of the Defence Department.

"My objection," said General Smuts, when finally acceding to the repeated demands of Mr. Pirow for an accusation, "is not against the plan of Mr. Pirow. My difficulty is that it has never got further than a plan . . . his grand ideals have remained a plan in the air, and that, after all those years when he was Minister of Defence, we still have a plan and only a plan."

There were other things, however, which, now that war was upon us, rose quickly to the public mind to question Mr. Pirow's integrity and to encourage that whispering campaign which spread, almost as fast as the Ossewa Brandwag, "like a veld fire." "Three months before the war," an English-speaking member reminded the House, "Mr. Pirow sent off a member of his family (his daughter) to a Nazi labour camp and thereby proclaimed to the man in the street that his sympathies were with Germany."

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During the same debate the same member referred to Mr. Pirow's promises to the northern British territories that "if there was any trouble South Africa would send three hundred aeroplanes." Then, to add to Mr. Pirow's discomfiture, it was recalled that he was responsible for buying Junker 'planes from Germany for the commercial air routes, and for the importation of German workers for the steel works. Perhaps on no occasion has a South African minister had to undergo such a scathing indictment. On more than one occasion he did not reply; on more than one he left the House while his opponents whipped him; and on all he glowered in fury and blanched with anger.

"I ask Mr. Pirow," one tormentor said, "is it true or not that secretly when he was Minister of Defence he sabotaged our defences by pressing a policy of neutrality? If that is so, it is not a case for a select committee, but we should ask the House to impeach him for his neglect of duty."

Nothing that Mr. Pirow could say, or General Hertzog protest, could divert the scorn of the House. This was no time for any niceties of Cabinet responsibility, or even for notice of the assurances of Mr. Havenga, who is not given to irresponsible language, that, after all, there was little in Mr. Pirow's plans that was not approved or not known to the members of the Fusion Cabinet. It was, instead, an opportunity for old colleagues, now separated, to rend one another, which they did; and for those outside the Fusion Party, the Dominionites, to remind the House and the country that they were right after all. And, of course—on the point that General Hertzog would be for neutrality in war—they were right; but, even now,

members of the Fusion Party do not like to admit it. The attack upon Mr. Pirow included everything he had done or had been, and constrained a woman member to remark that, though not condoning Mr. Pirow's deficiencies, she did not find it reassuring that his accusers were Cabinet Ministers who should have known all about them.

The attack on Mr. Pirow served the political purpose of the hour. At the same time the absence of an appreciation of the principle of Cabinet responsibility was disquieting. It illustrated two features of South African politics—a tendency to neglect those finer points of democratic procedure, and the inherent two-stream character of the Fusion Cabinet. Clearly some observance of the principle is to be desired, though the extreme difficulty of a literal interpretation of it in the Hertzog ministry is admitted. The Cabinet divided into two groups, and lacked that singleness of mind on subjects of great gravity which is essential to common purpose. It may be that the reluctance of General Smuts, now that he was Prime Minister, to accuse Mr. Pirow of past insufficiency was due to his recognition of the principle, and to his anxiety to avoid too open an exposure of the difficulties under which the previous Government had worked. In the Hertzog ministry he was second in command, taking part in a great experiment, where he was called upon to exercise tact and often to compromise with his better judgment. He was in somewhat the same position as Mr. Churchill in the Chamberlain ministry, conscious of the need of his presence in it, yet doubtful of the wisdom of Cabinet policy. In assessing the degree of the Cabinet's responsibility for what in the popular mind

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was laid at Mr. Pirow's door, the composition of the Government must have its place, and it is sufficient to persuade the observer to refrain from harsh judgment. While it may be said that the Fusion Cabinet must be held partially responsible for the deficiencies, it must also be conceded that the predicament was an inevitable consequence of the deep cleavage that existed. Amid the clamour of Parliament, then, we find General Smuts refraining from joining in the attack on Mr. Pirow until the taunts of Mr. Pirow stung him to a merciless rejoinder.

General Smuts is a man of long sight. If he sometimes fails to see the administrative chaos at his feet, his is the eye of an eagle for distance. When crisis was upon us the meaning of many of his utterances was made plain. It was recalled how he endeavoured to placate the extremist Natalians, how he overlooked unimportant matters such as the change of the name of Roberts Heights and the playing of anthems. Half his greatness seems to have depended upon the faculty for being on the spot when he is most needed. He was within a few hours of Cardiff when he was most needed in Wales, in Paris when his presence in Paris was imperative, and he was in the Fusion Cabinet when any other man would have been out of it and his cause lost in consequence. But he was only in it because he saw more clearly than his detractors on the British side, and was willing to be a lonely man over many years and permit smaller men to wrangle over small matters. Whether he knew the exact condition of our defences is of little consequence before the more powerful choices he had to make. We may well believe that he saw

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what was coming and acted accordingly, overlooking much with which he was not in agreement, and fully aware of even greater obligations than Cabinet responsibility. If the historian does not support his actions neither will Mr. Pirow's find complete acceptance.

The same difficulty of making the Cabinet system workable on the basis of collective responsibility is illustrated further by the tendency of General Hertzog to isolate himself from his colleagues and to allow ministers to be left in ignorance of their leader's intentions. It became natural then for the followers of General Smuts to rely upon him for guidance and information; it was natural for General Hertzog to turn to Mr. Havenga and Mr. Pirow; and it was inevitable that Cabinet supervision of departmental policies was not as strict as it should have been.

III

The fact remains that wherever the responsibility lay, the defence policy was based upon eventualities which did not include a campaign such as South Africa was called to engage upon in 1939. Mr. Pirow's scheme would have served to meet an attack of "the black hordes of the North," or an attack of the Japanese through Lourenço Marques, the Achilles heel of the Union. It was clearly based upon limited war objectives and not upon the immediate European situation.

As a result General Smuts had to revolutionize the accepted thesis of the Fusion Government and

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order a defence scheme consonant with his belief that the North African fringes would be the site of important battles. This envisaged a new set of principles and a conception of war in Africa as one of mechanized movement, that might take South African armies into the northern territories far beyond the frontier and the bushveld, rather than the "walking pace" of bush warfare. He very wisely authorized the establishment of a directorate of War Supplies, under the competent chairmanship of Dr. van der Byl, to survey the nation's factories, to accelerate the production of small arms, and to consider the manufacture of other essentials. Within a year a country that lacked great industrial plants had grappled with the production of armoured cars, armament of all kinds, and an amount of equipment that was truly astonishing and a tribute to those responsible. As for men, there was too rapid a recruitment for training or equipment. The armies grew, and they were assured that they would get all the fighting they wished for without going overseas. Where they might go was a political question as well as a military one, and it serves to illustrate the magnitude of the task General Smuts had undertaken.

The Opposition, bent on obstructing the Government in Parliament, challenged every measure the Prime Minister introduced. There was a very present danger that, despite Dr. Malan's advice that Afrikaner Nationalists should act constitutionally, domestic upheaval would occur. In the terms of the Defence Act men could only be commandeered to fight "anywhere in South Africa, within or outside the Union." Mr. Pirow had declared in public that if the Government sent men

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out of the country "he would give the country a lead," a statement that was interpreted in the only way it could be interpreted. The Opposition in Parliament reiterated its question. What were the boundaries of South Africa? Briefly, General Smuts' answer to this was that the term South Africa used in the Defence Act was purposely allowed to remain vague. There were some who maintained that Union troops should not go beyond the Limpopo, others that they should stand at the Zambesi, but General Smuts continued: "Our enemy and the circumstances will dictate the scope of a military activity, not our Statute Book." There were, he said, limits beyond which the interpretation "South Africa" could not be stretched. It did not permit of men being commandeered for service overseas. One assurance, however, he gave the Opposition was that South Africans serving north of the Equator would be those who volunteered.

During the debates on the War Measures legislation tempers rose and reason vanished, and there were many occasions in which the Speaker was on his feet. From those occasions the Prime Minister, who is never more "Grey Steel" than when he faces an angry Opposition, emerged as coldly analytic as ever. The interpretation of the Defence Act on the matter of boundaries, and the violent opposition accorded the whole war policy, probably accounted for what proved doubtful wisdom in the attestation of volunteers. For a time we had the nuclei of two armies, one composed of men who had attested to fight anywhere in Africa, and the other composed of men who had not so attested. The former were issued with an orange flash, to be worn on the shoulder to distinguish their

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willingness ; the latter had no such distinction. It happened that the Police Forces of the Union were part of the Defence Forces, and that they too were invited to attest in like manner. While the distinction soon fell away in the new armies, it remained in the police force. In effect, the distinction was a political one ; the "tabbed" policeman being looked upon by the public as loyal, and the "untabbed" policeman disloyal—in the sense that he sided with those opposed to the war decision.

There was in this an official distinction made, not unlike the unofficial distinction the young Afrikaner Republicans adopted of growing beards ; the "bokbaard" (goat beard) became the insignia of opposition to the Government, while the absence of the orange flash on a policeman's uniform was interpreted as meaning the same thing, each of them a provocation to those sections of the public who were loyal to the Government.

Suspicion bred suspicion. General Smuts moved warily through the maze, refusing to concede to the demands of some for martial law, of others to intern every man of German extraction, or for clamping down the opposition Press. He permitted, in fact, a freedom of expression that, with a change of circumstances, would never have been allowed by those now lashing him with insults. All through these early months of the war the Opposition vented their rage upon the Prime Minister rather than upon the British section ; Dr. Malan, Mr. Pirow, General Kemp, and the young Turks of Nationalism breathed fire and brimstone against the Jew and the Jingo, the Imperialist, the Capitalist—all, it would seem, personified in the Prime Minister. What

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venom they had left to them, after expending it upon General Smuts, was directed upon those Afrikaners who had followed him, branding them as renegades, loyal Dutch, Hanskhakies, Jingo serfs, and British postillions. The position of the Afrikaner "loyalist," in fact, was an unenviable one.

In the midst of this mounting disaffection, with the fear of fifth columnists lurking in every block of flats, the cry of "Sa, sa" ("Catch him, catch him") was heard. Despite the appeal of the Bureau of Information to informers to be certain of their facts and to report only subversive acts within their entire knowledge, not a few innocent persons found themselves receiving visits from the police on information provided by some interfering woman or other—that they spoke German, or read German, or taught German.

Much of the Government's difficulty was to distinguish between the Nazi—of which we had, and have, many—the traitorously inclined, and the genuine Republican. Its internment policy was too oppressive for the Opposition and too lenient for the supporters of the war. When Norway collapsed there was outcry against fifth columnists, in which educated people joined with the rabble for a smelling out of the public services, the police, and society in general. Refugees fleeing from the Nazi régime found themselves interned in the company of those who were Nazis. People of no consequence were apprehended, while "the big shots" went on their way talking of storm troops without let or hindrance. The Ossewa Brandwag continued in its drill, and continued to cry "hulde" (homage) in full-throated answer to the "Ons bring" (We bring) of the leader. They continued to wear their badges, plan

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a new South Africa, and swear allegiance to their cause.

Before it all and through it all, "only General Smuts remained silent." He moved with a sure touch, which even the over-zealous Britishers could not embarrass, to disarm the Opposition of criticism and power. Even the weak state of our defences he used to serve his purpose. He called in all privately-owned rifles. In the wider field he met the criticism that democratic procedure was being usurped by taking that procedure to its full limits in Parliament and out, turning the words and actions of his opponents to strengthen his own case. At one moment he became the master craftsman—a master scene-shifter on the political stage, arranging the furniture so that his opponents fell over it. At another he seemed to look from a state box upon a petty world of Britishers and Afrikaners wrangling beneath him. A time came, however, on a state occasion, for him to take the stage, order it and its actors either to confound his enemies or discipline his friends. When he did so, he moved unerringly. A moment arrived when emergency regulations had to be introduced. Through the debate he sat as *son éminence grise*, waiting his turn, allowing Opposition leaders to go on talking and opposing. Then, choosing a suitable opportunity when Mr. Pirow was present, he reflected upon the preparations Mr. Pirow had made for just such an emergency. He reminded the House that Mr. Pirow's regulations were, in reality, martial law regulations—a vigorous control of the Press, the usurpation of power, the taking over of broadcasting, the banning of listening to foreign broadcasts and of foreign news—regulations that looked perilously like the

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methods of the Gestapo. Yet the man who proposed them, Mr. Pirow, was still allowed by the present Government a freedom of speech unknown to any order of government save a democracy.

One debate, alone, will illustrate the manner of treatment of the Opposition. When the closure was applied to the debate on the second reading of the War Measures Bill, eighty-six speeches had been made—sixty-three averaging twenty-seven minutes. It was the great Marathon debate of the House of Assembly, beating the previous record of twenty-eight hours twenty minutes of 1915 by half an hour. It is worth recording that the central figure then, as now, was General Smuts. On the last day of the debate the Parliamentary kitchen staff was the subject of appeals for adjournment; but, as General Smuts pointed out, the way for the Opposition to stop the debate was to stop talking, and that was the only weapon remaining which the Nationalists were not likely to discard.

There was indeed no stop to the peace offensive, led by General Hertzog, which left the thousands of English-speaking people bewildered. In August 1940 he addressed the House on a motion that every effort be made forthwith and immediate steps be taken to make peace with Germany and Italy. Surveying the war situation, he said :

" Deprived of her great ally, France, with whom she began the war against Germany, Britain stands to-day behind her own boundaries, an exile from the European continent, defeated and threatened. All her original war materials are in the hands of the enemy and, judging by the statements made by her Prime Minister, she is continuing the war in a spirit permeated with despair. Against Britain with

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her fifty million people stands Germany with her eighty or hundred million. Germany has virtually the whole of Western and Central Europe. Then there is Italy, who is well established on sea as well as on land and in the air. Her five to seven million well-trained soldiers have a fighting reputation not yet surpassed by British deeds or heroism in the war as far as is known. This review is sufficient to make anyone appreciate the stupidity of further participation by South Africa. South Africa now stands doomed as a second Sancho Panza, to do service as imperial postillion of Europe and her warmongers."

Proper consideration of the developments, explained General Hertzog, showed how hopelessly the war had already been lost. France, that Lucifer among civilized nations, was lying humiliated in the dust of war. The vituperation of her by her partners was undeserved and unpardonable. Britain was reduced to isolation. South Africans might admire the daring which inspired Great Britain, but this senseless motive must not serve as an example for South Africa. If South Africa was to play this rôle for from seven to ten years, not only would millions of pounds be wasted but there would also be moral, spiritual, and social deterioration. He would warn the Government that if the rights and liberties of the Afrikaner nation continued to be abused, no power would be able to prevent the people in South Africa from setting their maladministrators an example that would echo for all time in the history of Afrikanerdom. Notwithstanding the complete defeat of the Allies on the Continent they had witnessed the astonishing spectacle of General Smuts rejecting the German

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leader's offer without prior consultation with the people and Parliament.

To this, and for the third time, General Smuts made answer. "A year before," he said, "General Hertzog had treated the country to a glorification of Hitler. To-day, it was a glorification of Germany and her victories. But an argument of that sort would have just the opposite effect to that hoped for by General Hertzog. We do not run away, and we are not hands-uppers. I ask my honourable old friend to think back forty years, when the same arguments were used as he uses now. They did not move him or me then. Although we were defeated in the end, we reaped the fruits of our perseverance."

After surveying the war situation, General Smuts went on :

"For twelve months General Hertzog has been saying that the war was lost, but is that a fact? I can only think that there is much wishful thinking on the other side of the House. With the exception of France, Hitler's tactics have secured him victories only over small nations not strong enough to defend themselves. But that is not defeat. A country is not defeated by losing some of its patrols. Germany is now coming to the end of her tether. We have seen what has happened to her blitzkriegs and her great efforts in the Channel and over Britain itself. I say that this is going to be nothing more than a repetition of what happened in the time of Napoleon. Then, Britain, standing alone, defeated France who had the whole of Europe in her power. Hitler has those countries in his power, but their people hate him, and the day will come when what happened to Napoleon

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will happen to Hitler. In the last war, Germany was winning for four years, and then lost it in the last few months. That Colossus had feet of clay and suddenly it collapsed."

IV

If General Hertzog is quoted at greater length than General Smuts it is to illustrate a state of mind prevalent in the country that is generally unknown to the English reader outside it. A more deliberate opinion is to be found in Mr. Havenga, the ex-Minister of Finance, who stands in relation to General Hertzog as Mr. Hofmeyr does to General Smuts, and has been called "the truest of true friends" of the ex-Prime Minister. More resilient and realistic than his chief and unhindered by the trammels of aged bitterness, while he urged that no government had the right to involve a people in an offensive war unless the greatest unanimity prevailed, he recognized in the prevailing conditions that the Government could not make a separate peace. On the other side, Mr. Hofmeyr gave good reasons, in the magnitude and power of the British Navy, the strength of the island fortress, the assistance of the Americans, and the gallantry of the R.A.F.—"those were grounds of our faith in the winning of the war." "General Hertzog likes talking," he said, "as though he were speaking for the whole of South Africa, or at least for the whole of Afrikaans-speaking South Africa."

It would be churlish, indeed, if Englishmen anywhere in the world, and particularly Englishmen in South Africa, were ever forgetful of the tremendous response of Afrikaner youth to the

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appeal for men. During a lull in the domestic conflict General Smuts paid a visit to the South African forces in the north. He returned to refer to a description of them by a British officer as "tanks among men," an apt enough description, for in physique and in intelligence it is doubtful if there is a voluntary army of a higher standard anywhere in the world. Over 70 per cent. of them are Afrikaners, many of them the sons of men who fought with General Smuts in the last war. His own son is with them. It has been said of these men that they were forced into the war either by economic circumstance, by personal abuse, or by the several factors of public opinion impinging upon them. There is no need to accord South Africa's youth virtues which others do not possess ; but, within the knowledge of many who saw the last war and who were disillusioned in its consequences, there are young men of ability and promise who, despite all that might be said of them by some of their detractors, are concerned only for the best things that freedom can bestow. There are hundreds in the non-commissioned ranks who would be commissioned in any other army in the world. We have an abundance of the officer class in ability and competence. It is a poor recompense for their devotion that the conflict within the country should make it necessary to defend them. If some have failed at times to turn the other cheek in street clashes, and others have been guilty of provocation, it is not without point to remark that many public men, who should know better, have been guilty of provocative and sometimes of violent speech, while some of their followers have been by no means guiltless of violence.

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A more encouraging note can be struck by reference to the good fellowship that existed and exists between the two sections of the army itself. For the first time the unilingual English Natalian, urban born and bred, came into close contact with his unilingual Afrikaner fellow, possibly of the Orange Free State and the veld, and, to everyone's knowledge, developed friendships that may well be to the powerful and lasting good of the South African whole, even as it is fruitful in the success of South African armies in the field of battle. The growth of a nation, though recorded in legal enactments and social statutes, is a slow process of the intangibles turning into the tangibles. Among those intangibles in South Africa are the goodly fellowships between men of different races and of widely different social status.

They are proof that General Hertzog was not speaking either for South Africa or even for all men of his own race. There were times, indeed, when he spoke only for himself, pouring the bitterness of his soul upon those who, in times past, he had come to look upon as his friends. For no man in South African politics, perhaps, had more genuine sympathisers among English-speaking people of well disposed mind and outside the political arena. The reaction to his "stop the war" speeches, which so seldom argued the Afrikaner's case legitimately, was the more intense for this previous esteem in which he was held. It was not possible for English-speaking people to listen to the anti-British speeches and remain calm. They had more than a principle at stake. They had their sons or their husbands in the army in the north ; and overseas they had their kinsfolk meeting the shock of

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air attacks. People might go on arguing for ever about trade and commerce and the vital interests of South Africa, the follies of British statesmanship and the direction of British foreign policy—the British of South Africa cared nought for these things. They knew one thing, or were conscious of one thing, that Britain was in danger.

Others might wish to prove that South African prosperity and trade, freedom and independence were bound up with Britain's fate. The Government, indeed, had to demonstrate these facts for the benefit of those who could not otherwise be moved. Cabinet Ministers were called upon to show how, without the wool agreement with Britain, neutrality would have ruined wool farmers; how, in neutrality, trade and commerce would decline; how South Africa would be left economically destitute; how the honour of South Africa would be besmirched. All these things, save the last, were of secondary importance to the British. Britain at war was the touchstone of British action in South Africa, even as it was in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. No questions were asked how Britain had come into that war or by what processes she was left, in 1938, without the power to reinforce her diplomacy. The fact alone moved men and women of British descent to her side. The Britishers' case was the stronger for an opposition to it which argued by statute and sovereignty and accused by labouring the imperialistic motive of Britain and the sufferings of "poor Germany"—two things that formed the stock-in-trade of every Nationalist speaker.

And here we have a paradox. It is normally the British element in South Africa that has stressed

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the importance of economic factors as guides to conduct. The Afrikaners, on the other hand, have over a period of a quarter of a century tended to ignore the determining effect of economic forces on policy. They have, in short, too readily assumed that a policy that is desired emotionally, and seen intellectually to be good, can be put into operation once its exponents achieve political power. As a consequence of this frame of mind they have tended to ignore altogether the importance of economic forces. Most Afrikaner Nationalists have usually given the impression that they would consider the appeal to economic interest as something too base and unworthy to be considered by those who are conscious of the sacred claims of national integrity. But on the war issue it is the British who have given no weight to economic self-interest compared with their instinctive and profoundly emotional desire to rally to Britain's cause ; whereas it is the Nationalist opposition which has asked, again and again : Are South Africa's economic interests served by participation in war ? It must be confessed that their searching inquiries have not always been easy to answer on grounds of immediate economic interest. It is possible that this comparatively new Afrikaner concern for economic issues may hold a faint promise that, in the years to come, Afrikaner Nationalists will have a juster appreciation of the vague but vast imponderable influences of economic forces upon political policy. Are they, in fact, coming to realize that even the sincerest concessions of political independence, such as those embodied in the Statute of Westminster, cannot conjure away economic interdependence ?

Be that as it may be, in emphasizing this paradox

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I do not imply that economic consideration played no part in impelling South Africa into the war. No doubt the Government was largely influenced by such considerations, but the ordinary South African of British descent gave little or no heed to them, and they have hardly been mentioned in the official war propaganda, except, indeed, in so far as it has been necessary to reply to the economic criticisms of the Nationalists.

About many of these economic controversies there is an air of unreality. Never before, for example, has the plight of the Poor White received such attention. For almost two decades men who are now vociferous in the cause of the Poor White were Cabinet Ministers in a government that either neglected this section of the community altogether or treated it as of secondary importance. Their present protestations sound a little hollow in consequence, and even now the Afrikaners' real concern for their unfortunate fellows is due not to politicians but to a few sincere teachers like the Rev. J. D. Kestell. It is difficult to persuade Nationalist politicians that they have no monopoly of righteousness or to suggest, with any hope of its being accepted, that Afrikaner capitalism, where it does exist, possesses no higher sense of social values than does British, Jewish, or American capital. In time of war the Afrikaner is as gullible on these things as the Britisher is on others, and provides a rich soil for the type of propaganda that is so successful elsewhere.

Fortunately the economic situation as a whole is not one to encourage serious disaffection or to drive the conservative rural section into active revolt. Where safeguards were necessary to pro-

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tect the rural Afrikaner against the loss of overseas markets for primary products the Government was able to provide them. Broadly, it can be said that the rural Afrikaner is in no worse plight than he would have been had South Africa remained neutral and at the mercy of the blockade, while urban South Africa enjoys a quickening pace in industry and commerce. Indeed, when they read of the blitzkrieg over Britain the British in South Africa are almost ashamed of their good fortune. With income-tax a mere fraction of what it is in Britain, and enjoying immunity from the vaster perils of war, they suffer from a sense of frustrated loyalty to their own cause which can find no obvious outlet save in opposition to the Nationalist Republicans, and even then has to be of a restrained order if it is not to embarrass the Government. If the British feel this sense of frustration the Nationalist Republican Afrikaners are in no better case. In Parliament they are impotent; and out of it, while strong in numbers and not lacking in the possession of leaders, the more bellicose of them are without arms, while the less bellicose are uncertain of the wisdom of extreme policies. While there do exist large numbers who would favour a *coup d'état*, and even armed revolt, there is a strong restraining influence. At the same time the conditions in which violence flourishes are ever present, and it is perhaps the greatest contribution General Smuts has made to his country that he has been able to ensure a measure of domestic peace in the midst of so much explosive material.

IX
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CHAPTER XIV

I

THERE was a momentary flash of the old warrior when General Hertzog exclaimed to his followers, "Given a hundred men, and an able man to lead them, and Afrikanerdom can be saved." Within a few weeks of his resignation as leader of the Herenigde Party two hundred of his followers gathered in the same city hall of Bloemfontein that had been the scene of his resignation and which remains the nerve-centre of South African politics. The principal speaker at this meeting was Professor A. C. Cilliers, who was largely instrumental in bringing together the Hertzog and Malan groups after the war decision had been made. He is looked upon as "the father of Hereniging" or Union. "The child died after sickly start," he said, and proceeded to explain that Afrikaner unity was impossible without Hertzogism.

Dr. Malan had once insisted that it was impossible without Hertzog. Obviously, however, Hertzogism was more important than Hertzog. It was on Hertzogism that General Hertzog had withdrawn from the Herenigde Party. Hertzogism had for its end and purpose the converging of two streams, the English and the Afrikaans. Hertzog had formulated the policy in terms of parallel streams at a time when only in separateness could Afrikaans establish itself. Once established,

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he was prepared to believe with the philosopher that parallel lines meet at the distant limit. They would meet and fuse into one nation with "one broad national will." This was the first question that divided the Hertzogites from the Malanites. If this could be bridged the way was open to national unity. The other issue of difference concerned the rights of the English-speaking section. It flows directly from the first. It is the principle of equality. On that basis General Hertzog had erected the cultural and constitutional freedom of the country.

"If Boer and Briton," said Professor Cilliers, "want to share the same country, they must also share each other's language and culture. Only in this way will we become a nation—not by fighting each other at a distance, from hermetically sealed and separate national groups, as the present tendency is. We cannot, at one point in a programme, say that we recognize the principle of equality of language and cultural rights, and in another that we reject the principle of the broad national will. If we do that, we talk with two mouths, because the second postulate boils down to a denial of the equal political rights of the English section as a group, and such a denial, in its turn, will lead to undervaluation of their equality in language and cultural rights in an independent republic."

This is the first prop of Hertzogism in its third stage. Having achieved first language, then nationality rights for his section under a broad policy of "South Africa first," General Hertzog insisted with no less conviction upon the equality of rights for both sections. "On the other hand," Professor Cilliers continued, "the Afrikaans-speaking

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section demand the same rights as those which are to be given to the English section—namely, that the democratic right of the bare majority vote should be departed from where great questions such as language and the future are at stake.” It is here, Professor Cilliers maintains, where General Smuts departed from the Hertzog principles of the equal rights of the two White sections when he declared war as a result of a majority vote against the will of the Afrikaans-speaking section as a group. “The broad national will” had meant for General Smuts a bar to its logical conclusion.

Out of this meeting emerged the Afrikaner Party. There are now three parties in the country; for the Labour and Dominion parties, though enjoying separate existence in the exigencies of the political situation, are mere extensions of the United Party under General Smuts. There is the Here-nigde Party on the basis of the unity of Afrikaans-speaking people. There is the United Party on the basis of Holism. There is the Afrikaner Party on the basis of Hertzogism, which, paradoxical as it may seem, is an attempt at the application of the Holistic theory of General Smuts.

“Holism” writes General Smuts, “is an attempt at synthesis, an attempt at bringing together many currents of thought and development.” If democratic union, such as the European Utopians propose, is a problem of Holism, so is the South African situation. General Smuts recognized it as such as a very young man. After the Boer War, “We were left the fragments out of which we were to make a whole, and it is a problem of South African statesmen to follow up the ideal in the solution of our political problems. We did so,

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and I think not without some success. Gradually we have seen emerging out of these discordant elements the lineaments of a new South Africa. We have not yet the whole, we have not yet a really unified South Africa, we have not yet attained the unity which is our ideal. There is still too much of the old division and separation in our national elements, but still the effort had been made, and you see to-day in South Africa the biggest problem facing us being solved along Holistic lines."

This quotation is from a speech made in 1927. General Smuts proceeded in it to speak of a "society of nations" rather than of a League of Nations; to grant to "wholes" qualities not possessed by an aggregate of the qualities of their parts; and to emphasise that "wholes," in persons, societies, and nations were interrelated and interdependent. It is this philosophy, brought down to the platform of politics, that becomes "Smutsism" in South Africa and the League of Nations in international affairs. The world consists of a series of "wholes," each, as it were, a part of another whole. "Nature," says Smuts, "may be a 'whole' in the making." South Africa, he would seem to say, is rising to a "whole."

II

If the abstract speculation of Holism be applied to the Smutsism of South African politics it may not be impossible to relate it to Hertzogism. General Hertzog has never allowed his mind to wander in the exploration of the nature of the physical universe. He is no Eddington. He has not searched the dim reaches of the heavens for the under-

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standing of his own soul and his own place in the universe. Yet, as someone has said, if his vision is limited, he sees his own case clearly. He, too, was on South African soil after the Boer War. He, too—"from no abstract speculation, but by experience of life," which was the claim of General Smuts as the basis of his philosophy—had arrived at "a point of view" and a state of mind. It was a different state of mind, but not a dissimilar point of view from that of Smuts. All through the speeches of General Smuts, from 1906 onwards, there is the Holistic idea for South Africa, the idea of wholeness and oneness. But it was an idea that was brought down to South Africa from the heights of philosophical speculation, not an idea that grew up from the soil and into the minds of men living by the soil; and because not only foreign to their way of thought but antagonistic to their elementary philosophy, though in itself it was simple enough, there is, perhaps, a tendency to exaggerate the novelty and newness of the contribution of General Smuts to scientific thought. What he has said has been said before. What he did, and this is not to disparage but rather to increase the merit of General Smuts, was to give a new emphasis to the idea of "wholeness" in scientific circles, and to project that philosophy into a great human experiment of the League of Nations. As statesman-philosopher-soldier his contribution alone, of carrying the findings as a philosopher into the practice of statecraft, stamps him at once as unique. Uniqueness, however, does not make him infallible. As one of the greatest living personalities he would hasten to admit the possibility of error; and he might agree that the projection of a theory, which cannot

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in the nature of things be proved correct, into the practice of world or national government has even greater possibilities of error. A man stumbling upon "the concept of the whole" has no more than his knowledge and experience to guide him. He wanders beyond the realms of measurement and classification and facts. All these have brought him to the realm of speculative thought. He no longer uses the instruments by which his store of facts was obtained or the formulæ which express physical relationships with mathematical certainty. All these may be the beacons that light him in his intellectual wanderings, but they give no certainty to the products of his mature speculation. Indeed, he is not concerned with certainties but with approaches to the meaning of life; seeking in the unknown some special attitude of mind, something that will "speak to his condition" and relate and place him in the greater universe. His answers to the manifold questions that exercise his mind will often be tentative things, and sometimes it is possible, if these tentative answers or approaches are applied to some other cognate problem, that the solution to the cognate problem may be equally uncertain and tentative.' In the case of General Smuts, his findings on Holism were applied, as far as certain factors would allow, to the European problem in Holism at the end of the first world war—in other words, to the League of Nations. It is generally accepted by politicians, professional and amateur, and by the Utopians in South Africa and out, that the League of Nations failed because of some special lack of virtue on the part of governments and rulers in general. It has seldom been suggested that it is remotely possible that the theory

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of Holism and the concepts of a society of free nations which gave rise to the experiment are themselves almost as false as anything can be ; or, which is more likely, that there is something lacking in the Holistic attempt at synthesis. I am not suggesting that the theory is false or invalid. Far from it. What I do suggest is that, by the very nature of the speculation, it may be incomplete.

There are times when whole nations and other whole societies may go wrong. The League of Nations was one of those times. The League was created, as Professor E. H. Carr shows so ably in *Studies of Europe*, on the assumption that there existed a harmony of interests between its several members ; that they stood, as it were, on the same platform of equality, having the same interests and, particularly, the same interest in the establishment of peace. It was a false, though natural enough, assumption. There were certain ideas which made the assumption a facile one for the British peoples. The first was that the *Pax Britannica* was a condition acceptable to the rest of the world as it was to them. The second was that an interest in peace was the highest interest of every nation in Europe merely because it happened to be Britain's highest interest. There were other ideas peculiar to the "satisfied" nations all mixed up with the notion that what was good for them was both good for others and good in ethics.

Between the great experiment of the League of Nations and the great experiment of Fusion in 1933 made by the two contending parties in South Africa there are some interesting and instructive analogies. The one was an attempted solution, on Holistic lines, of an international problem ; the other

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of an inter-racial national problem. General Smuts was the co-originator of the one, and, taken by and large, the sole founder of the other. Each of them crashed after a few years of hopeful work. Each of them crashed when fundamentals had to be faced. The men in South Africa—statesmen like General Smuts, General Hertzog; younger and rising men like Mr. Havenga and Mr. Pirow—are not wicked men. It is usual to blame them for the crash. Before the crash, each was held in some esteem. After it, only one of them was. They were the same men at the time as they were previously. The public, too, was the same public that had unanimously subscribed to Fusion in 1933, and had, indeed, demanded it. The reason for the crash, however, does not lie in men. It is more probably to be found in some weakness of the Holistic approach. In other words, like the League of Nations, the Fusion experiment had some flaw other than the flaws to be found in the integrity of men.

III

We may assume that the end to which Holism approaches is the ideal one for all mankind, and yet still question the manner in which it is applied in any special case. There is much that this does not explain, but it has always seemed to me that General Smuts, and before him General Botha, rather tended towards thinking and acting as if the two parts that go to make up the South African "whole" were each "wholes" in themselves at a time when they were not. The British section was a "whole" in itself. It had a past tradition,

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a long history, an established order, a wide and rich culture. It was, indeed, the greatest "whole" of all the "wholes." But the Afrikaner section was never a whole, and had not the beginnings of being a "whole," in the Holistic sense, until General Hertzog left the Cabinet of General Botha. Even then, however, General Botha and General Smuts—possibly as a result of their wider urbanity, and certainly because the latter was already Holistically minded—seemed to act on the assumption that Afrikanerdom was one, when, in point of fact, it was only in the process, to quote General Smuts in another connection, "of rising to a whole." This vast assumption, had it remained to take its course under the direction of General Botha and General Smuts, would in every probability have caused the disintegration of what Afrikanerdom then was. There was, indeed, little of Afrikanerdom in 1910. There was no language to measure by languages of established groups, no literature of great consequence, no historical sequence of centuries. Before "the whole" that was British, "the whole" that was Afrikaans was in certain peril of dissolution.

It was Hertzog who saved it, who gave it life, and made it a whole. He gave it the opportunity of possessing the qualification of "wholeness" for a society. He gave it language. He gave it political stature. He gave it nationality. In other words, he gave it character and personality—everything which had constrained General Smuts to say, "I am a whole—you are a whole." That is the first part of General Hertzog's contribution to South Africa.

It was surely "an attempt at synthesis"—the very basis of the Holism of Smuts. But it did not stop there. Just as General Smuts proceeds to

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think in terms of the interdependence and inter-relation of "wholes," so, from an entirely different starting-point, General Hertzog advances to the same thing. The separate and distinct "wholes" that go to form the South African "whole" are not isolated one from the other. They are clearly related; they are interdependent. They could not approach one another to make the South African whole until the one in danger of disintegration was on a level in the equality of "wholeness" with the other.

Hence we have another problem in Holism. Hertzogism does not assume, as Smutsism seemed to do, an Afrikaner "whole" in the first and original condition. Hertzogism assumed two separate and distinct "wholes," Afrikaans and English, moving to a stage where the "wholes" are more or less equal in status and stature. Hertzogism does not now demand the disintegration of the British whole. It does not seek the dissolution of that whole. It seeks, instead, the creation of the greater whole—the South African whole; in a word, South Africanism—in another word, South Africans. It differs from the approach of General Smuts. Though, as he says, his philosophy is not the fruit of abstract speculation but the product of experience, General Smuts has worked from the general, and often from the abstract, to the particular and the concrete. General Hertzog started with the particular and the concrete, the certain depressed condition of his people in relation to their political and cultural environment. In no other way could Afrikanerdom be saved and made a "whole."

It will help, perhaps, if this Hertzogism is taken a little further in its relation to Holism, or, if you

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like, Smutsism. These two men, Hertzog and Smuts, have dominated the South African political scene. One of them also almost dominated the European scene in the creation of the League of Nations. The neutrality speeches of General Hertzog were a final plea for a readjustment of the ideas that made the Treaty of Versailles what it was. He pleaded for Germany ; but so, a short time before, as we have seen, General Smuts did the same. They both saw the danger signals ; they both realized that something was radically wrong with the state of Europe. At the time, and since, they uttered their warnings ; General Smuts, working, as it were, on the problem of European Holism and wholeness, the status of each part. It is as if General Hertzog said, " I am all for Holism ; indeed I am an adherent of Holism ; in this matter I am a follower of Smuts ; but you cannot have European ' Holism ' until the separate units, now in conflict, are themselves ' wholes,' relative to the other ' wholes.' " What is the matter with Germany, with Italy ? he might ask. The matter is, he might answer, exactly the same as what was the matter, and what is the matter, with Afrikanerdom. Afrikanerdom was not a whole relative to the British whole in South Africa. Germany after the war was not a whole relative to the other wholes, Britain and France. She did not meet them on terms of equality, but in terms of defeat and despair. That, once, was the condition of Afrikanerdom.

If, in the above, the term " whole " is stretched somewhat beyond the limits given to it in Smuts Holism, it yet embraces those limits. At any rate, it helps us to understand what Hertzog has been driving at all his life, and, for that matter, what

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Smuts has arrived at in another way. The two philosophers, if they can be so called, are complementary ; even as the two peoples. Afrikaners and British, in South Africa, are complementary. General Hertzog has had no opportunity, and has no mind, for taking the immediate interest in the affairs of Europe such as has been the privilege and concern of General Smuts. Yet, had Hertzogism been present in the concept of the League of Nations or this experiment in Holism of a European order, there might have been a very different tale to tell. There would have been, in fact, some attempt to recognize the qualification, inherent in Hertzogism, of the measurable equality of the "wholes" of Europe—that is, the nations of Europe—for an approach to permanent peace. Upon what, after all, does the broad success of the Commonwealth of Nations depend, if it is not that they, in the greatest Holistic experiment of all time, are "autonomous communities . . . equal in status . . . in no way subordinate one to another . . . freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations?" If they are not equal in stature they are equal in status, possessing equality one with another and enjoying satisfying economics not possessed by the States of Europe.

It may be protested that a very wide gulf lies between the humanity, the internationalism, of General Smuts and the narrow nationalism of General Hertzog. The one is looked upon as desirable, good for South Africa, good for the world ; the other is viewed as undesirable and bad. It is a legitimate protest only if it is accompanied by two assumptions : the first, that nationalism is in itself a dangerous doctrine and contrary to the best

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interests of the nation ; and the second, that Hertzog nationalism has no contributions to make to the international order. Many economic conferences have decided that the first assumption is true. We find, for example, a League Economic Conference in 1927 saying that "Any strictly nationalistic policy is harmful not only to the nation which practices it, but also to others, and therefore defeats its own ends." The same theme runs through a score of other conferences. Yet only in pursuing economic nationalism did America build up a huge economic prosperity, and only in returning to a large measure of economic nationalism did Britain weather the economic depressions of the post-war years. And, if present tendencies are any measure of future good, by economic nationalism South Africa intends after this war to add to her material prosperity. It is by economic nationalism that secondary industries have been raised to a position of importance, and it will be by economic nationalism that they will continue to expand after the war. To those who will now advance that there is a difference between economic nationalism and the political nationalism represented by General Hertzog it can be answered : it is too small a difference to matter. When the interests of any country are served by a policy of economic nationalism the political and foreign policy reflects that interest. The point that has yet to be proved, despite all the new order Utopians, is that nationalism is contrary to the interests of a nation ; and that its opposition is good for a nation.

On the second assumption, and it is one that is widespread in South Africa, it can be claimed that no society "rising to become a whole" can hope

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to make a contribution to the great whole until the process is complete. One of the most distressing things about South Africa is an apparent callous disregard shown by so many Afrikaners for the world conflict. Their detachment is disconcerting. It demonstrates how little they are moved by world affairs and emphasizes that as a community they are scarcely conscious that their own kith and kin are fighting in South Africa's armies. At the same time, the lack of concern for the well-being of the world in general is due to the absence of what they call active national sovereignty. Some of their leaders, and General Hertzog and Dr. Malan among them, were convinced that the Statute of Westminster conferred it. It was the advanced stage of Hertzogism as far as his South Africanism was concerned. By different routes the two generals had arrived at the same place, or believed they had, where Hertzogism and Smutsism met. But a few years later their meeting was more personal in the coalition of government called Fusion. Fusion was the point at which, for Hertzog, the parallel lines of Afrikaans and English met. It was the distant limit he had reached. For General Smuts it was the culmination of his life's philosophy, the bringing down to the earth that was South Africa the speculation that was Holism. Hertzogism and Smutsism had been achieved. The process of synthesis was complete; the South African "whole" was made—or so it seemed.

IV

The war proved that things are not what they seem. The coincidence of interests assumed for

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the two sections of the South African peoples was non-existent, even as it was non-existent between the European "wholes" that went to make the great Holistic experiment of the League of Nations. The war was a bad business for South Africa in another way, for it seemed to deny the foundations both of Hertzogism and Smutsism, and then to challenge the state of our democratic society. The Statute of Westminster had conferred high freedom upon South Africa, but because that freedom was expressed in a war decision contrary to their hopes the extreme Afrikaner Nationalists under Malan denounced both freedom and statute that embodied it. The Afrikaner revolt became a vigorous protest not only against the un-national and anti-national external forces of Europe, which, at regular intervals, had seemed to place South Africa at the mercy of Europe; it became a revolt against the forces within that could be interpreted as anti-national—the Jingo, capitalism, democracy. This revolt is the revolt of the Herenigde Party, and has been described as Hertzogism "run amok," disillusionment producing forms of extremism. They joined the wide revolution against the established order as a projection of their revolt against the "freedom" that failed to keep them out of the war. They decided that South Africa's freedom from European entanglements must be sought through the domination by the Afrikaners—the "established" section of the nation. Were there complete unanimity among all Afrikaners on this question political power could be achieved through the ballot-box in the numerical advantages Afrikaners possess.

But not only does the Herenigde Party believe

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that a republic and secession from the Empire are essential to the welfare of South Africa. It also leans towards a republic with a modified democratic practice. It might not go so far as Mr. Pirow's new order. But we must not forget that Herenigde leaders were firmly convinced that Britain would lose the war. This is how they talked in 1940. This, indeed, was the first qualification of their success. Some of them believed that on a German victory Herr Hitler would recall General Hertzog to power, and General Hertzog would form a government with Dr. J. F. J. van Rensburg as President of the new republic. The republic would then adopt a totalitarian order to suit South African conditions.

We in South Africa have never been unaware of Germany's interest in the Union. We have a large number of naturalized Germans. We have a significant number of Germans who have retained their German nationality, we have had Nazi agents and Nazi cells, and we have Afrikaner elements strongly disposed to South African Nazism. It is a matter of little consequence whether the extreme opinion of the Herenigde Party gets its inspiration from Germany or not. It is more important to recognize that the Herenigde Party as a whole will choose a totalitarian programme if by doing so it can achieve its aim, which is to be rid of the British connection altogether. The Herenigde Afrikaner has made up his mind not to concern himself with anybody else's freedom until he gets his own. That freedom is defined for him as complete separation, the neutralization of what he calls the Jew-Jingo control in economic affairs, and the liquidation of all unnational groups or influences. In a

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word, the new Herenigde policy—led by Dr. Malan, served by Mr. Pirow, and supported by the Ossewa Brandwag—embraces the Herrenvolk doctrine.

They look upon the Afrikaner Party, the Hertzogites, as “errant Afrikaners who must first acknowledge their guilt and do penance before they can be restored to a place of honour and trust.” It has been so since General Hertzog declared for neutrality.

The Afrikaner Party, if it does not believe that Britain will lose the war, does believe that she will not win it. The split in 1939, in their opinion, was a clash between two fundamental conceptions, whether South Africa was a separate entity or still remained a part of Europe. Its aim is to provide a home for all Afrikaners, Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking, who seek a party to give expression to Afrikaner ideals—using Afrikaner here in its wide sense of South African nationality. It is represented in Parliament by a handful of members, and lacks that political driving force which makes the Herenigde Party attractive to the younger people. It has, however, one unanswerable argument against the Herenigde Party. The latter talks of wanting freedom, but it is quite clear to anyone that South Africa possessed the greatest political freedom of any country in the world. There were no greater upholders of democracy than those very leaders who now decry it. It is true that most statesmen can be damned from their own lips, but it is worth recalling that Mr. Pirow, as late as June 6, 1937, was able to say “emphatically, that South Africa will never depart from its democratic system, and it will be deplorable, therefore, if that system is undermined or rendered impotent.” There is a

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whole calendar of such sayings to be culled from the newspapers, and in the contradictions of them to-day the extent of the minor revolution is to be measured.

On the subject of ability to declare war or make peace, however, every leader who was in the Hertzog Government and who is now in the Herenigde Party agreed that South Africa was as free as the United States. Her sovereignty laid the obligation upon a free Parliament. Parliament decided. That it decided against them is not sufficient to excuse a condemnation of the freedom by which it did so.

Moreover, in a republic, other than a dictator republic, it is legitimate to suppose that Parliament, faced by an issue of the same magnitude, would be similarly divided. Would that give the defeated party the right to denounce the freedom of Parliament? There are more Afrikaners than Englishmen in the South African Assembly. Are those Afrikaners renegades and traitors? Obviously the Herenigde Party must not claim a monopoly of patriotism. If it does, how do men like Mr. Pirow explain their past declarations of faith in the democratic ideal?

No, the Hertzogites say, though we believe in republicanism we insist that it must be achieved through the broad will of the people, something more than a mere catch vote of Parliament. Indeed this is the issue upon which they differ from General Smuts, who relied upon a small majority to express the broad will of the nation on a matter that decided a nation's destiny. A question of this magnitude, the Hertzogites believe, is not one to be decided by a vote, any more than can the language

question in the constitution. Had the language question been so decided it is probable that the vote would have gone against its official status. It was the broad will of the people that made the language clause possible in the constitution; the broad will, the "general will" of Rousseau, which acts in accord with the best interests of the country, in preference to the majority vote, which very often does not. A simple analogy for the understanding of the Hertzogite position can be taken from the procedure of the Society of Friends, the Quakers. At their business meetings, and they have many and upon all manner of subjects from relief projects to religious matters, there is no show of hands, no vote, to discover the majority opinion. There is, instead, a clerk of the meeting who, from long experience and great wisdom, frames a statement after the discussion and presents it as "the feeling of the meeting." The feeling of the meeting may not be, and in many cases is not, the will of all, and not even the will of the majority. It is the broad general will, General Smuts might call it "the Holistic will," expressing, as it were, something more than the mere majority will, and something finer than the sum of all the wills in the meeting. This procedure is not a formality. It has served, indeed, over many centuries to give additional weight to very weighty issues coming before a very weighty, if small, community.

The broad national will, which, the Hertzogites say, was not expressed by General Smuts or by Parliament on the war issue, would be, in Quaker language, "the feeling of the nation"; a most difficult thing to touch in a national assembly, but one which had been touched when

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bilingualism was accorded a place in South Africa's constitution. Quite clearly, in the present issue, there did not exist those conditions in which the broad general will, "the feeling of the meeting," could be expressed. There was, in fact, no harmony of interests essential to nationhood, wholeness, or oneness; and, just in the same way that the League collapsed because of its absence, so South African "wholeness" collapsed in the political sense. It is this harmony of interests, as Professor E. H. Carr calls it, upon which the Commonwealth relies for its strength. Out of such harmony of interests springs such group understandings as the Act of Havana between the American States. In South Africa the harmony of interests existed only so long as the paramount interests of each were not challenged; that is, as long as the world allowed South Africa to devote its time to trade and commerce and agriculture, where there was a common interest. Only in the final and ultimate tests is nationhood challenged. The greatest of them is war. On that test South Africa was not a "whole," but two "wholes."

Hertzogism stood, like Hertzog, bereft of all but a few followers. On the one side it faced the British and Afrikaner followers of General Smuts; on the other it faced the Malanites, the Pirowites, the Ossewa Brandwag—united, if uncertainly, under the banner of the Herenigde Party—seeking the re-establishment of Afrikanerdom, but this time on the basis of equality for the Britisher, which was to be denied if ever Dr. Malan rose to power. In other words, Hertzogism insisted, what we demand for ourselves we are prepared to grant to others.

Perhaps nowhere in the world has the British

way of life failed so completely to attract and absorb men of another race. It is a remarkable fact, mounting in its significance, that in the southern hemisphere the greatest Englishman is an Afrikaner—General Smuts. It was Mr. Bernard Shaw who once said that all great Englishmen are Irishmen. He was talking in northern latitudes, else he might have added, in the case of South Africa, that he noticed a surprising dearth of Irishmen !

“ There is no prospect,” wrote General Smuts in his message to the nation at the beginning of the war, “ that the present breach will be healed while the present crisis is on, and perhaps not thereafter.” However we may explain the breach in terms of Afrikaner isolation, we shall not have to ignore the fact that the new imperium, the expanding Commonwealth, the English way of life, has been but badly represented in South Africa. The Afrikaner has not seen the best of English culture in the political “ Britisher,” and it is by the political Britisher, and particularly those in Natal, that the Afrikaner judges Britain. The political “ Britisher ” lives with the old “ imperium ” not with the new. Had we produced, during the last two decades, Englishmen in South Africa of statesmanlike calibre, men who stood high in the esteem of Afrikaners, we might have attracted a whole people to the way of life that is the best of Britain. As it is, the political party system, with its narrow, meaningless purposes, has saddled the greatest cause in the world not only with mediocrity, which actually may be a virtue, but with small-mindedness, which is dangerous. Now that war is upon us the patriotism of these men is not to be denied. It is their saving quality.

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In times of peace, however, the party system threw up in striking relief the general lack of conviction and absence of political ability on the English side in contrast with the possession of both on the other side.

V

We may well face the fact. The historian marked the legacy of racial hatred of the war that ended with Versailles. He is likely to repeat the same at the end of this war. Whatever the advantages accruing from the war in industrial progress, it will leave South Africa sharply divided. Nor is there a ready solution of the racial problem in a world settlement based upon an international order such as is proposed in Streits' *Union Now*. The Afrikaner does not think "internationally." Nor does the Britisher, for that matter. Economic advantage is secondary to political and cultural autarchy. The Afrikaner has no faith in Leagues of Nations or in democratic unions, so long as he feels himself the victim of international diplomacy. He has no faith in British protestations about freedom and Christianity. The Nationalist Republicans will go on fighting their cause. It was General Hertzog himself who said, "It might take a hundred years, it might take a thousand, but one day South Africa will be an independent nation." It would seem that a two-fold re-education is essential: first, through a new appreciation of the great contribution of General Smuts, of Holism, to South Africa; and second, by a vigorous interpretation of Hertzogism as propounded by such Afrikaner thinkers as Professor A. C. Cilliers. Every

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discussion on the contributions of General Hertzog and General Smuts emphasizes a fundamental difference that does not exist. It is in their approaches to the same end that divergence can be recorded, not in the end itself, which was to achieve South African wholeness, oneness, and "a broad national will." Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr moves in the same direction, seeking unity through diversity, recognizing the differences but emphasizing common human needs and spiritual values. In them all, however, there still remains to be defined such concepts as wholeness, oneness, and "a broad national will." The six years' experiment of Fusion has much to teach us on this matter. We discovered, for example, that an end to racialism was a desirable thing in itself so long as it did not challenge a stronger interest.

When we had to meet the challenge of war the British section showed plainly that intense racial bitterness was infinitely preferable to racial peace with neutrality. The Afrikaners, on their side, would have preferred neutrality, even though it meant civil war. Clearly, South Africa did not possess the characteristics of nationhood, wholeness, or oneness. It did not possess the features or the personality that, according to the theory of Holism, "wholes" possess.

The experiment of Fusion also taught many people that a nation cannot be created by an insistence upon "rights" between two equal sections. The extreme Britisher section spent much time, legitimately it would seem, demanding its "rights"—the rights of its flag, its language, its anthem. But no-one would assert that, in doing so, those "rights" gained thereby; or that the

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"English" cause in its wide sense was enriched thereby ; or that, through the emphasis on rights, the English way of life attracted a single Afrikaner to it. In the same way, once General Hertzog had achieved the relative equality of Afrikaner status, the persistent demand for this "right" and that did grievous injury to the cause of "a broad national will." The mathematics of a fifty-fifty division of rights and privileges was fatal in its achievement.

An end to racialism, if that is the ideal of the broad national will, can only be attained in a realistic approach to national maturity. Dual citizenship, British and South African, is a cause of friction. To get rid of the friction one of two things must be done. Either dual citizenship must be abolished, and the British accept the abolition with a good will ; or the extremist Afrikaners must be persuaded that dual citizenship is the right thing for South Africa and an element in its wholeness. South African foreign policy is a function of British foreign policy. This, too, is cause of friction. If the friction is to disappear, then either the influence of the British foreign policy must go or the Afrikaner must be persuaded that it, too, is a desirable constituent of South African "wholeness."

These are grim choices. For the Afrikaner they strike at the roots of his tradition. None the less he must face them if he is seriously concerned for the future of Afrikanerdom. His re-education starts with them. The great weakness of Hertzogism, as a dynamic principle, is the reluctance to acknowledge the presence of determining factors in the sovereignty of a nation over which the nation itself has no control. Throughout the years General Hertzog was directing the twin streams of South

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Africa, the world's commercial, industrial, and political interests were impinging upon the nation. The British section and the Afrikaner section were, and are, at the mercy of a thousand external forces, most of them economic, but all of them continuous in action and potent in effect. As an example of the way in which these forces influence the broad national will, we may follow the changes overtaking the United States and examine the several phases, from complete isolation from the European conflict, to active industrial participation in it. Events and forces external to America were responsible for these revolutions in American opinion. South Africa is the object of similar influences, and to deny their presence, or to act as if they are non-existent, is to deny facts and our own experience. A nation does not decide its own destiny or completely order its own course untrammelled by influences outside it. The Nationalist Government of 1932, over which General Hertzog presided, believed it could remain on the gold standard in the face of world adjustment. The attempt to insist upon economic sovereignty failed, and it was protested at the time that South Africa was pushed off the gold standard by vested interests. The point whether those external forces are good or bad is not at issue. Their active presence is all that concerns us. Very often, then, sacrifices in fundamental principles and deep-set convictions are required for the preservation of sovereignty. The broad will of a people, which is the expression of sovereignty, is an ever-changing condition, adjusting itself not only to its own "isolated" needs, but also to the external forces impinging upon it. It cannot control those forces,

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but it must admit them. Afrikanerdom, after all, is only a child. The parents might wish to keep it safe from doubtful influences, but they can no more keep out of the nursery pestiferous aunts and grandmothers than they can stop it from growing. There is a present tendency, now that it has grown a little, to do all that is possible to keep it where it is, lest it forget its parents, its language, and the atmosphere the parents have created.

Does anyone imagine, had the nation decided upon neutrality in 1939, that the world would have allowed that decision to stand? If there be such a one, let him look at Greece, where the broad national will was for neutrality; or Turkey; or Jugoslavia; or, more pertinent still, at Belgium, Holland, or Finland. And if, in preference, he turns to Ireland he will find no comfort there. Ireland's neutrality at this date exists, not in her sovereignty, or in her status, or in her "wholeness," but only by grace of Great Britain, and by virtue of complex diplomatic factors and balancing interests. I am not advancing an argument to deny the value of the broad national will or pleading the case for the war decision. None is required. What I suggest is that the Afrikaner is in great danger of narrowing his sovereignty to a pin-point, and of the sovereignty remaining static; of "standing upon his constitutional rights," as the Americans put it, at the cost, and it is a high cost, of ignoring external factors. If he remains in this static condition he will be the victim of his own sovereignty. If he wishes to save Afrikanerdom he must relate his statutory sovereignty to growth and to a world environment. Every factor of human ecology insists that he shall do that, or be submerged in the

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overgrowth of others. It is no longer a question whether he wants to express the broad national will in this or that direction. The very direction of the broad national will is influenced by something outside it. This is where Hertzogism failed. It failed to recognize that the Statute of Sovereignty which was the Statute of Westminster conferred a sovereignty only in so far as the world at large permitted it. To save its skin a nation often has to compromise with its own soul.

VI

The Afrikaner's salvation, then, no longer lies in legislative enactment. It is a considerable presumption, for example, to imagine that the vast tracts of unused and unexploited veld have been God-created for the pleasure of a million Afrikaners. Possession is not nine-tenths of the law in this matter. Where a country can carry a larger population, that country eventually will be faced with the demand that it shall. Biology will see to it that it does, and no amount of cultural autonomy will prevail against it. The German challenge in Europe, Italian expansion in Africa, and Japanese incursions on the Asiatic mainland, yield proof enough of the worthlessness of paper agreements before the broad sweeps of biological forces.

The conditions for South African "wholeness" are no less challenging to the British mind. The Afrikaner is conscious of a fact the Britisher will not admit, that English culture is permanent in South Africa because it is dominant over three-quarters of the world. In the machinery of administration

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there is official equality, but the intelligent Afrikaner knows that, even if he denied the English-speaking people political rights, English language and culture would survive better than Afrikaans would in similar circumstances. This is merely an acknowledgment of the relative age, tradition, and extent of English. The same can be said of the sphere of economics.

It depends largely what the English-speaking people of South Africa want, whether there will be a homogeneous nation. A government could set out to settle sufficient Anglo-Saxons to ensure a "British" dominance by a policy of immigration. It could, and it has already been suggested that it should, proceed to a pan-Africanism through closer co-operation with the Rhodesias and Kenya. This, too, would tend to destroy the autonomy of the Afrikaner. A British "bloc" is visualized on this continent as a result of the war. It is a projection of the Rhodes dream, and it may come, but it will not succeed in bringing about racial peace. No Nationalist will welcome it. No Nationalist will support an immigration policy, and, for the same reason, that is proposed by some sections of the English Press.

If these policies are pursued after the war, in any readjustment required by a peace based on British victory, they will find the Nationalists in greater hostility; their ranks increased by Afrikaners who now fear Hitler and Hitlerism and have thrown in their lot with General Smuts. The Nationalists may never succeed in holding South Africa for the Afrikaners; they will protest with all their being against making it part of a British African mosaic. Their hostility is already active.

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The British section of South Africa will have to decide which they prefer : South Africa, or a British Africa. They will have to decide whether racial contentment in South Africa is their first aim, or their second, or their third. In several ways they can swamp the Nationalist republicans. Even to-day the Nationalist Press could almost be put out of business. It only requires a boycott by the big advertisers. It would be an unwise thing to do. In the same way racial enmity will grow if the present visions of a British bloc materialize in the post-war years. Whatever the motive, then, any post-war plan for the African continent such as this will find no favour in Afrikaner minds.

The way to nationhood, racial peace, and racial progress lies in concrete sacrifice by the dominant world group of their external bonds, and by the dominant national group of their racial ties. This is South Africa's dilemma. It is easy enough to propound these things in time of peace in the atmosphere of the study. In time of war it is positively dangerous. I have heard English people express the wish that Afrikaners would not be so narrow. Why are they not internationally inclined ? I have heard Afrikaners emphasize with cynicism that if the Britishers were "internationally" minded they would find plenty of international questions in South Africa without looking for them in Europe. The nearer "internationalism" receives little attention. It is a feature of the times that so many people in South Africa are searching for a solution to European problems, and that so few are prepared to face the similar problems near at hand. In the Press and in the speeches of public men the new world is receiving plenty of

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attention. It is agreed that world peace is a matter demanding some sacrifice of sovereignty or power. The people who are all for federal union and a limitation of national sovereignty in Europe would protest against any sacrifice, say, of British citizenship, as an approach to the problem of South Africa. They will advance a score of reasons to show that there is no similarity between the distant scene and the near one, when they should admit unashamedly, for there is no shame in it even if it be grievous error, that they are more British than South African, and that they assess South Africa's adolescent nationhood in terms of British supervision. If no blame attaches to them for this allegiance, none can be placed to the account of the republican Afrikaner for his isolationist demands. Absence of blame, however, does not mean absence of consequent racial enmities. South Africa cannot be divided thus and rise to any eminence among nations.

The plight of South Africa recalls some remarks made by Mr. J. L. Garvin in a letter written in 1913 to Mr. C. P. Scott, the editor of the *Manchester Guardian*, in a not dissimilar problem, the Irish question. "I do not feel gay, though all party men seem cheerful," he wrote. Writing "as a man of lonely mind," he describes his personal attitude to Ireland in words that apply to the condition of South Africa to-day. "The very colour of men's natures is still determined by feelings deriving from the real antagonisms of thoughts and swords in the seventeenth century." This is the gist of it; though the antagonisms in South Africa do not reach back to the seventeenth century. "Ireland is not yet made," Mr. Garvin wrote. South Africa is not yet

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made. The tragedy of two rights is the more tragic for the absence of minds that accept it as such, and in the presence of minds obsessed in peace, as in war, by their own rightness.

There are but few "lonely minds" in South Africa who see the sharpness of its tragedy; and, indeed, it may be that they are profoundly in error in the face of overwhelming majority opinions. It may be to the greater good that South Africa shall extend her territory or sphere of influence to the shores of the Red Sea. It may be to the greater good, and it is clearly inevitable, that she shall hurry forward to mechanize her society in the shadows of great industries. Again, it may be to the greater good that the Afrikaner shall sink himself, like the Welsh and the Scottish, in the composite that is British. There may be great profit in these things. Who can tell? The man of lonely mind may suggest, and he would only do so somewhat haltingly, that none of these things is certain to bring social contentment or spiritual satisfaction. And, as if to exercise his doubting mind, he would point to the failure of great wealth and great industrial progress to offer to millions of people in older countries a life consonant with the dignity of man. He would point, were he an Englishman of lonely mind, to the absence of a dynamic purpose to fulfil what so obviously was intended to be fulfilled in the promise of earlier English statesmanship in South Africa. And if he were an Afrikaner of lonely mind, he would recall an occasion on which General Smuts said:

"We stood alone in the world, almost friendless among the peoples, the smallest nation ranged against the mightiest Empire on earth. And then

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one small hand, the hand of a woman, was stretched out to us. Strangest of all, she was an English woman."

And the Englishman of lonely mind and the Afrikaner man of lonely mind would go out to meet one another, forgetting that the other was Afrikanerman or Englishman, remembering only that they are both South Africans.

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