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
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HISTORY: A GUIDE TO PEACE

HISTORY: A GUIDE TO PEACE

BY ERNO WITTMANN



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MERELY PERSONAL

EACH BOOK has its own story. Fate presides over its prenatal life; fate shapes its form and content. The story of this book was shaped by events in eastern Europe during the last decade of the preceding and the first third of the present century.

When my colleagues and I graduated from Budapest University early on a Saturday morning just as the new century began, the prospect was bright, the road before us looked as straight as one of New York's avenues—to be trod without hindrance. Citizens of a great empire, we felt secure. Its broad economy gave us opportunities. A good life seemed within our grasp. As the years passed, however, more and more obstacles appeared in our path. Wars in the Balkans, common occurrences in that part of the world, caused malaise in Austria-Hungary. Then came 1914, the breakup of the old monarchy, revolution, bolshevism, white terror. A few years of prosperity were followed again by malaise and finally by another world war.

During all these years my business was to argue cases before courts, national and international—cases in which human passions ran high and pecuniary interests clashed. Hard years they were, but years that lifted the roofs off the houses and let us, like the Limping Devil of Le Sage, see what was going on inside. States were created and broken up; individuals suffered abrupt changes of fortune. The unknowns of yesterday became the rulers of the morrow; distortion of values made the rich poor and paupers rich. The *bouleversement* and World War II landed me in New York, where I continued the quest for an explanation which I began in 1918 when I wrote: "Widespread discontent is a symptom of disease in a state's organism. Disease in an individual state endangers the health of all states. The odor of decay attracts those who are always looking for an opportunity to attack. To remove dead states and extinguish diseased states, the healthy state can employ the instrument of war and that alone. War, however, affects nonbelligerents as well as belligerents. Solidarity of nations must come to expression at the peace conference so that the boundaries assigned to states

shall be such as can be defended and must make possible their economic development. The peace treaty now in the making and the proposals of pamphleteers for eastern Europe are immature. New states are confined between impossible boundaries; the Czechoslovak frontiers contain the germs of future war; the Germans will press toward Hungary to the end of peacefully incorporating it as a whole."

Whether the observations and interpretations I am offering are right or wrong will be found out by those who may by chance some day read this book when its paper has yellowed with age. Although the historical process has gone forward during the production of this book, I have not altered the text to keep up with events.

For several years Martha Anderson has placed at my disposal her rich vocabulary and sound feeling for her native idiom, thereby making it possible for me to write in English. If you like this book, it is not only my thanks that are due her.

Among others who have aided me at various times, I wish to mention especially Mrs. Minette Kuhn and Miss Annabelle Learned. Dr. William Bridgwater and Miss Ida M. Lynn, of Columbia University Press, prepared the manuscript for the press. E. D. Weldon, draughtsman for the American Geographical Society, drew the maps. It was a great pleasure to work with all of them, and I am grateful for their help.

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ERNO WITTMANN

New York
January, 1948

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PART ONE: THE PREMISES

INTERCONNECTION AND ISOLATION

IN THE CASCADE of daily news in these times overcrowded with incidents large and small, memories of the past readily become submerged. Where are the headlines of yesteryear and the stories under them? Who can recall in detail today the history of the decade before 1937 and the troubles of early 1936? Who is now familiar with the speech of the President of Czechoslovakia:

According to universally recognized international law, nationality questions are an internal concern for all countries without exception. . . . No European state has therefore any right to intermeddle in these questions, and Czechoslovakia, as a sovereign state in complete consciousness of its dignity and its rights, will in no wise suffer such intervention.¹

President Benes was talking in terms of international law as it is taught in universities. Statesmen give it lip service, but nations do not observe it. Nazi emissaries penetrated into the Sudetenland, an area which severe economic depression had rendered receptive to the wiles of the propagandist. Spreading tales of maltreated and murdered Sudeten Germans, they laid the groundwork for a Sudeten German revolt. Then came the fateful train of events: Benes' agreement with the German activist party in the Prague parliament; German threats and the Munich pact; the revolt of the Slovaks against the Prague government—negotiations between Slovaks and Czechs—the German occupation of Prague.

Once again domestic disputes had led to foreign intervention. The little republic died of the mortal illness—ethnic group hate—it had inherited together with its land from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.² Twenty-one years earlier domestic discontent and foreign

¹ See speech by President Eduard Benes, August 19, 1936; *Sources et documents tchécoslovaques*, Prague, Orbis Publ. Corp., 1936, No. 32, p. 11. See also speech by Prime Minister Milan Hodza, March 4, 1938 (*ibid.*, No. 44, p. 29).

² Jászi, p. 379.

propaganda replete with promises of a better future, followed by a murder at Sarajevo and a world war, had led to the dismemberment of the parent state. In both cases the intrigues of a neighbor, exploiting domestic discontent, culminated in dismemberment. The sole difference was that in the first case the neighbor was Russia and the discontented were Slavs; in the second, the neighbor was Germany and the discontented were Germans. The symptoms were the same: domestic unrest, a socially and economically cramped population eager for change; peaceful infiltrations, spies, and *agents provocateurs*. Domestic affairs, which politicians and lawyers say a state may regulate according to its sovereign will, provided the kindling for an international conflagration and were settled internationally.³

When we look farther back in history we find many similar situations in which discontent has been exploited by a neighbor and intensified by bribes and propaganda with the aim of disrupting a state and annexing part of it, domestic affairs and revolutions being settled by agreement among other powers. One example at random is the kingdom of The Netherlands, created by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Ruled by a Dutch majority, the French minority became dissatisfied, and propaganda from France fanned the discontent already aggravated by economic depression following the Napoleonic wars. Within fifteen years the "union" was split. Only the intervention of other European states prevented the invasion and annexation of Belgium by the French.⁴ In the history of the United States the story of Texas shows the same pattern. It started with a penetration by Yankees and continued with oppression of the invaders by the Mexican authorities; this was followed by a revolution against Mexico semiofficially supported by the United States, and ended with the latter's annexation of the independent Texas Republic.⁵

Typical in all such case histories is the antithesis between the legal concept which separates state from state—the assertion that each has the unrestricted right to deal with its territory and people as it sees fit—and life, in which the unceasing movement of men, capital, goods,

³ Le Fur, p. 40. Cf. the "Atlantic Charter" (Aug. 14, 1941): "They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they want to live."—L. W. Holborn, *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations*, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1943, p. 2.

⁴ *Cambridge Modern History*, X, 480; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, 119 ff.

⁵ Morison and Commager, I, 581 ff.; *Cambridge Modern History*, VII, 392, 394.

and ideas binds all states together. This continuous interchange, subjecting a state to the influence of other states, limits its sovereignty.

Typical also are the ways in which a state initiates and exploits a movement from its own territory to disrupt or further the disintegration of another state. Bismarck, one of the great masters of what is now called "secret diplomacy," had as helper a man he dubbed "King of Sleuthhounds"—the privy councillor Stieber.⁶ Besides being the Fouché of the Bismarckian administration, he was the man whose labors and machinations during many years prepared the way for Prussia's war against Austria and later against France. Thousands of German farmers settled with his aid on enemy land, selected because it lay along the routes an invading army would traverse. Thousands of German waiters and waitresses serving politicians, military men, and peaceful citizens in the cafés and restaurants of Austria and France eavesdropped on their conversation, talked with the diners, and reported to Berlin. Thousands of retired Germans founded—with Prussian money—new businesses in the prospective enemy country and acted on instructions from the home government. There were said to be twenty or even forty-five thousand of this secret Prussian advance guard in France before the start of the war that was decided on the fateful day at Sedan. Much the same story can be told of the years preceding 1914 and those leading up to 1939, and not only of the German intelligence service in the Stieber tradition but also of analogous services in the pay of other powers.⁷

On the other hand, the general interchange and migration of men, goods, capital, and ideas benefits mankind, spurs progress, and initiates new states. Men oppressed in their native Britain sowed the seeds of freedom in the New World. American and European capital have opened trade channels and workshops in backward countries and raised their standard of living.

Men or goods, capital or ideas, whatever thus leaves one place for another proceeds if unresisted along a more or less straight line, impelled by the joint forces of centrifugal impulse at home and attraction abroad. Or it may move along some sort of diagonal, according to the balance of opposing forces. The channels of markets for goods are determined by need both at home and in foreign lands; by embargoes at home and customs barriers abroad. Ideas find welcome in one

⁶ Herzberg, "Memoirs of the Father of Prussian Spies," *The Bookman*, XLVIII (1918), 744-51; Mota, pp. 33, 51.

⁷ Berndorff, pp. 15, 77.

country, are spurned or only partially absorbed in another, and so forth.

Migrants affect a country either for good or for bad; they may remain, perhaps, or continue on their way. This infinite flux and reflux unites the world of nations in an interconnected whole, of which some parts continually resist union, and strive to retain their independence, each rejecting foreign influence and tending to separate itself and to surround its own body with protective crusts. In the whole and in every one of its parts two forces compete—one centripetal or integrating, the other centrifugal or disintegrating.

Is not this flux and reflux simply one variation on a far more general theme? Do not the celestial bodies exchange radiations? And is not an interconnected universe articulated by means of seemingly independent units? A star is defined as "an instrument for broadcasting energy into space." The energy it emits is "either entirely developed in it by contraction, or else is largely drawn from an unknown source."⁸ The sun warms our abode, ripens our crops. There are also rays from unknown cosmic quarters which may have less benign effects on earthly life, and Sir James Jeans tells us that even the sun's light and heat may some day increase to such an extent as to "shrivel up all terrestrial life."⁹

The interconnection between these isolated bodies influences the internal structure of the bodies themselves. This process, common to the entire universe as we know it, is set in motion by energy generated internally or falling upon a body from external sources; it continues with a reaction of the irradiated body—either absorption or rejection of the rays—and ends in changes caused by the rejection or the absorption, changes which may help to integrate or disintegrate the body itself.

Centripetal and centrifugal forces operate within an entity, whether celestial bodies or nations, and their strength is augmented or diminished by external influences. The joint operation of these forces maintains a body in equilibrium; the two must balance each other, for when the centripetal is stronger, concentration or density is increased in some way, and when the centrifugal is stronger, the entity as a whole tends to become more loosely knit, less dense or coherent.

It may sometimes be hard to determine what an entity is and what are only parts of an entity. In the case of a social body, for instance,

⁸ Dingle, p. 408.

⁹ Page 367; see also Eugster and Hess, p. 47.

the boundaries of a feudal realm, the independence of vassal states, may be matters for dispute. Examples, such as the relation of Egypt to England and of Outer Mongolia to the USSR, will be discussed later. States are formed out of states and broken up into states. Their integration and disintegration may be not unlike that of the stars.¹⁰

Between the more or less definitely separated parts of a whole there are also exchanges, radiations. In human affairs there are migrations—of goods, capital, ideas—between nations and also between groups within nations. Just as states and empires increase in coherence, merge with other states, or fall asunder, so also do groups within them.

All entities are shaped by the past. In human life our behavior is influenced by what our ancestors thought, felt, and did. Each of us is chained to our heritage like Prometheus to his rock, tightly held, though striving to be free. Traditions, customs, laws, precedents, wisdom, and prejudices all come down to us in an untidy bundle of contradictions. A generation or several generations so similar in their tastes and styles that they become known as a "period" will have each its own history,¹¹ its own way of seeing, hearing, and thinking, its specific manner of painting what has been seen, of putting into music what has been heard and felt, and telling what has been thought. Even in the few decades since the disappearance of the last children of the optimistic nineteenth century—the generation that proudly called itself *fin de siècle*—what changes have occurred! It used to be chic to have faith in the undeviating, relentless laws of Nature and the capacity of the human mind to unlock her every secret. In philosophy, the fashion was materialism; in physics, mechanism. Now knowledge has given way to doubt, and the glorification of reason to admiration for action guided by intuition. An age of rigid mechanism has been followed by one of rather flexible skepticism.

But even among changing views and ideas there are recurrences, connections. These are made visible on the Quay des Grands Augustins in Paris, familiar through paintings, drawings, and etchings of its elderly *bouquinistes* and the ever-wandering *grand philosophe* Gustave Colline as he sampled the books crammed into their lead-bound wooden boxes.¹² Here best sellers of bygone days—books that stirred the emotions, brought easy laughter or released tears, inspired discus-

¹⁰ Eddington, pp. 176, 230.

¹¹ Becker, p. 511.

¹² Henry Murger, *Scenes de la vie de Bohème*, Paris, Levy Frères, 1851, p. 346.

sion, and led to action—and barren writings by the unknown—unnoticed when they appeared, unmissed when they disappeared—lie sleeping. The box, their grave, equalizes them all: each sells for a sou. In the modern bookshops along the boulevards new books compete for attention. Browsing along the quays, hunting for old and forgotten volumes, or strolling along the boulevards in quest of new words and fresh thoughts, one is aware of the interchange between these two worlds, separated from each other as is the past from the present: the world of books just out and of those sleeping in their wooden graves. The boulevards send down to the quay books that no longer appeal to the public, or never did, while from the quays some are revived and reprinted and reappear on the boulevards.

On book counters the generations embrace, ancestors and descendants dwelling together. But not all; only ancestors chosen by their descendants are brought to life in any given era. Among periods, each with its own art, science, and music, certain ones attract, others repel each other. There are eras with similar trends of thought, ways of expression; others are very different; there are romantic and naturalistic periods, generations of doubters and of believers. From the huge store of past writings some books come back to life, while each age neglects writers—even contemporaries—holding conceptions alien to its own. Some time ago there was published a new edition of *Les Soirées de Saint Petersbourg*, the once famous book by Count Joseph de Maistre, who preached the supremacy of the spirit over force. Exiled to Russia after the armies of the French Revolution had invaded his native Savoy, he watched Napoleon rule a Europe torn asunder by violence. We, who give too little play and credit to the spirit, appear more foolish to this writer than the ancients we joke about for seeing spirits everywhere.¹³ Is it because of our parallelism to his time—violence once again riding roughshod over the world—that we have resurrected the wise Savoyard, a protagonist of the universal and uniting faith, of the power of brotherly love?

The catalyzing agent which recalls certain writers from the past, ignores others, and perhaps pushes some into the future is the present. The boulevard, with its revivals, holds as much hope for neglected authors of our time as the quay, the tomb of fame, was said by Anatole

¹³ Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, I, 232: "J'ai lu des millions de plaisanteries sur l'ignorance des anciens *qui voyaient des esprits partout*: il me semble que nous sommes beaucoup plus sots, nous qui n'en voyons nulle part."

France to hold of warning to best sellers in his day. It would do no good for one generation to will its ideas to its children or grandchildren; only those which find harmony in each generation will be accepted.

Thus, emissions of energy, exchanges of influence, go on between past and present ideas as between the earth and other planets, star and star, nation and nation, and individual and individual. The "rays" are hyphens connecting us all. "Any given event in any part of the universe has as its determining conditions all previous and contemporary events in all parts of the universe," Aldous Huxley has remarked.¹⁴ The astronomer who wrote "If a man on this earth raises his arm it will be felt in the moon" had the same thought in mind. The actors in this interdependent world—the man raising his hand and influencing the lunar orb; and stars, states, or groups—are alike segregated entities. Each is a mass of atoms or cells organized and closed, often between protective crusts, against outside influences. Their internal organization, their articulation, as well as their external effects, are determined by the past, by forces operating from within or from without. The division and the merging of bodies is the history of the universe, of the world, and of society.

¹⁴ Huxley, p. 16.

MICROCOSMIC AND MACROCOSMIC HISTORY

THIS EARTH, afloat in the universe, breeds the restless creature man, who, dissatisfied with his present and hounded by his past, forever seeks a better future. Integrated into nations, he wants to merge with other groups, occupy other territories, or perhaps separate himself and his group from the nation in which he finds himself and thus become more independent.

He tries to persuade himself that everything occurs according to a predetermined way of things—that all give and take is governed by laws, known to seers who sense the future and to scientists who have plumbed the secrets of Nature. The more the earth shakes under his feet, the more perplexing the difference between yesterday and today, the greater his craving for security. Some turn to astrologers, as did the ancient Romans. "Still more trusted are the Chaldeans . . . every word uttered by the astrologer they will believe . . . for now the Delphic oracles are dumb, man is condemned to darkness as to his future."¹ Others, though skeptical of astrologers, entertain the hope that the historians who trace the course of revolutionary upheavals in other war-torn periods and reduce them to cause-effect relationships may be able to reveal the destiny of their time. Is this hope warranted? Only if it is taken for granted that events faithfully repeat themselves—that what is happening today is a repetition of what has already happened—does the future become predictable. If historical events are merely tunes which have been recorded on a few disks, to be played over and over on the gramophone, then, if you are an historian and have made an inventory of all the records, you will inevitably recall the end of any tune when you hear its opening strains.

But we cannot assume a repetition of any one sequence of notes, for

¹ Juvenal *Satire*, VI, 129, tr. by G. G. Ramsay, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1940.

the number of disks is infinite. Historical events are variations, combinations, or permutations of human behavior, itself almost infinite in variety. If we count the units, the possible "sounds" or ways of behavior and calculate how many units make up the tune, we may glimpse the probability of repetition. Let us be modest and suppose that in all mankind's vast experience there are fifty-two possible ways of behaving, as many as the cards in a pack used for bridge. Suppose, moreover, that one historical event is made up of thirteen units in a definite sequence, as many as the cards each bridge player receives at a deal. How many hands must be dealt before one player gets the same thirteen cards as he held, let us say, at nine o'clock on a certain evening? The answer, as the reader doubtless knows, will run into billions. The law of probability permits an infinitesimally small likelihood of repetition.

Some historians—for example, Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee²—construct a kind of historical morphology. For these thinkers nations or civilizations are entities, each having its own structure and passing through a similar sequence of stages. They are born, come of age, expand, even overexpand, and then take a downward course to their final end, death. These cycles, too, admit a certain kind of historical repetition, not of events, but of stages; that is, not of detailed events, but of a condensed history, a synthesis of events. The stages in each nation's or civilization's history, it is said, have their own symptoms; one stage follows upon another in relentless sequence, and from a set of symptoms such as those that warn of the decay of Western civilization, its death may be predicted. From certain other symptoms Toynbee predicts that a universal empire will evolve.

Civilizations and nations are born and die. It may be argued that there has been only one western civilization since Ancient Greece. On the other hand, it may be argued that the Greek, or Greco-Roman, civilization ended when the Christian started, which again was followed by another when national states evolved. With the same justification we may speak of one or many French nations, as horizontal and vertical invasions changed Gaul successively to feudal, Roman Catholic, and nationalistic France. The time of their birth and death must be determined arbitrarily, as the successor civilization or nation is built up from the parts of its predecessors. In the eternal variations and permutations of group combinations there are no beginnings and no ends. The

² Toynbee, p. 51; Spengler, p. 3.

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trend from smaller to bigger units and vice versa is continuous and runs a zigzag course, not along a straight line. The microcosmic story of events may be told in more or less detail; the more detail given, the more obvious are its irregularities; in macrocosmic history the only observable unit is mass behavior. These various behavior patterns may be classified as integrating or disintegrating. But the classification is artificial, not historical. The destiny of nations is not, I believe, a mere playing over of familiar disks, nor is it divided into phases which necessarily follow each other; statesmen therefore, no matter how carefully they diagnose the present, cannot predict the future. The vision of the wisest of them is, as Charles and Mary Beard have observed, dim.³ A famous historian of Rome has remarked that the neighborless empire was "the result of pure chance, explicable by the mere interplay of circumstances; in a word, everything in the world conspired to further Roman greatness more than did the Romans themselves."⁴ It can no more be said of Rome that it was built by design than that it was built in a day. Indeed, speaking of the zero hour that launched a world empire, Ferrero concludes:

At this decisive moment Rome was almost afraid of becoming too rich, too great and too powerful. The future was frightening because it looked too beautiful. But fate does not adapt itself to the will of men; in spite of its misgivings Rome saw the day approaching when it would be forced to establish a great empire.⁵

The same thought is expressed in the oft-repeated statement that the British built their empire in a fit of absent-mindedness. Both Rome and Britain always applied themselves exclusively to the solution of each specific problem as it arose, their plans and measures designed simply to settle the immediate difficulty, and it was from a long series of such solutions of discrete problems that the empire of each evolved. Both strove hard against their destiny, refusing to participate fully in world policy and returning repeatedly to isolation. Both were forced by their own power and the waning power of others to police the world.

Thus, the road to isolation may lead nations into entanglement. Have not the great statesmen of the United States worked for its isola-

³ C. A. Beard and M. R. Beard, II, 8.

⁴ Frank, p. 55; *Homo, Primitive Italy and the Beginnings of Roman Imperialism*, p. 110; Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World*, II, 82.

⁵ Ferrero, *Nouvelle histoire romaine*, p. 69.

tion? Yet like the Romans, the British, and many others, despite a steadfast endeavor to keep their country out of embroilment, they have got mixed up in the affairs of the world. And the great dreams of the French kings and the Roman Empire of the Germans, hegemony over Europe and the world—indeed, all projects worked out in detail by jurists in the old era and geopoliticians in the new—have fallen flat. "The results of any plan of action are always unknown and unknowable; the plan must be pursued as an end in itself. This is the bald truth about politics."⁶

A former generation in Berlin used to sing:

Ach, Schaffner, lieber Schaffner,
Was hast Du getan?
Du has mich nach Berlin gebracht,
Und ich wollt' nach Amsterdam.⁷

There is something tragic in the successes and the failures of these larger endeavors. Are we fated to set our course in one direction, only to find ourselves by some perversity inherent in human events arriving at another destination? Science cannot help statesmen to foresee all the ultimate repercussions of their acts, but it can assist them in solving specific problems.

It is an irony of History [wrote *The Economist* editorially on August 11, 1945] that the terms for Germany decided at Potsdam should have been published within forty-eight hours of the dropping of the first atomic bomb. One may wonder what future historians will make—in such a context—of the victorious statesmen's conception of security. If one bomb can annihilate Koenigsberg, do the Russians gain much by annexing it? What possible defensive importance can be attached to a frontier on the Oder—or anywhere else? Can the ban on German production of aircraft and seagoing vessels have any bearing on war-making power in the Atomic Age? Once again we are reminded of the appalling gap between man's adult scientific mind and his political infantilism. It is as though the victors, in the age of the tank, were making a peace of bows and arrows.

Political infantilism is no doubt one of the reasons why the effect of policies is often just the opposite of what is expected. Discontent or danger calls for plans, but the diagnosis is made with an eye to party

⁶ Huxley, *Grey Eminence*, p. 204.

⁷ Conductor, conductor, What have you done? You've brought me to Berlin, instead of Amsterdam!

politics and the remedies do not go to the source of the trouble. In the mid summer of 1940 the campaign for the presidential election was just starting. The policy of both candidates was to keep the United States out of war. Yet future historians will agree that the participation of America in World War II, as in the first World War, was unavoidable.

Just before another presidential campaign, preceding another war, William Seward, then Senator and soon to be Secretary of State in Lincoln's Cabinet, avowed publicly: "This inevitable clash was not accidental, unnecessary, the work of interested or fanatical agitators, and, therefore, ephemeral. . . . It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces." Upon which Charles and Mary Beard have remarked: "In uttering this indictment, this prophecy soon to be fulfilled with such appalling accuracy, Seward stepped beyond the bounds of cautious politics and read himself out of the little group of men who were eligible for the Republican nominations in 1860."⁸ Commenting on Lincoln's famous speech at Springfield, in which he said, "A house divided against itself cannot stand," J. G. Randall writes: "Analyzing it, one finds in the first place that Lincoln had done the thing which fans a leader's fame, without clarifying his position—that is, he had coined a quotable but debatable phrase."⁹

By an honest diagnosis the one killed his chances for nomination; by a clever circumlocution the other assured his nomination. Had either candidate spoken in 1940 as Seward spoke, he would not have been nominated.

I do not protest that statesmen in their endeavor to obtain office speak as the public demands; I observe, rather, that they are occupied in directing the march of a humanity pushed by unknown forces toward unseen goals. Statesmen in some respects resemble medicine men and quacks; if their diagnosis is right and their prescription heals, it is good luck; events are playing into their hands. History, which we have said ought to help us diagnose the illnesses of the body social and find remedies for them, is a storehouse of unique events never repeated—many of them, quite impossible to foresee; the process, from birth till death, from death to the resurrection of nations or cultures, is not even divisible into parallel stages of a recurrent cycle or fixed sequence. We are reminded of Archy's statement:

⁸ C. A. Beard and M. R. Beard, I, 107.

⁹ Randall, I, 107.

I once heard the survivors
 of a colony of ants
 that had been partially
 obliterated by a cow's foot
 seriously debating
 the intention of the gods
 towards their civilization.¹⁰

From innumerable individual cases, on the other hand, each a never-returning event, medical science manages to distill rules of behavior for other unique cases. To our philosopher it may be answered simply that if a sufficient number of cow tracks are accurately mapped and a sufficient number of ant settlements, too, the ants' past misfortunes may be rightly diagnosed, and on the basis of statistics probabilities for the behavior trend of unborn cows may be worked out and ant colonies protected.

The divergence among medical case histories—their individual differences—does not hinder the reduction of similar cases to a single scheme: one statistical case, perhaps never actually occurring, but characterized by symptoms which recur generally in individual instances. Medical science has evolved in spite of the fact that no two individuals are identical. Meteorologists, too, predict weather with more or less accuracy, although no two days have exactly the same weather and the transitions from sunshine to rain or vice versa differ greatly. From many cases characterized by certain symptoms, physician and weatherman can determine, within certain alternatives, the outcome of present situations.

What the layman calls rain the meteorologist calls "precipitation," explaining the various stages, from the moment when dust particles draw water to themselves, forming minute drops, to that at which these drops join with other similar drops to form a cloud of fog, and then to the falling of the drops, now grown so large that they can no longer float. The integration of vapor into minute drops and these in turn into full-sized raindrops goes on continuously. But not every dust particle will form a droplet, not every droplet join another, not every cloud release rain.¹¹ Each stage is made up of innumerable individual causes and effects; only the mass phenomena can be averaged and reduced to a typical case characterized by certain symptoms. It will rain or not depending upon what actually ensues.

¹⁰ Marquis, p. 54.

¹¹ Byers, pp. 176 ff.

Similarly, although no two nations are identical, the case histories, as the physician would call them, of all nations since the beginning of human records constitute a store of cases from which schematic outlines may be made of typical condition—or behavior—patterns in the life of social bodies, and a knowledge of symptoms built up. From such a symptomatology we shall see, perhaps, that present situations can be diagnosed and the consequence of policies predicted on a basis quite different from narrow parallels to the sequence of past events.

Consider, for example, the question of a revolution. The symptoms of prewar and prerevolutionary periods are well established: malaise—an indefinable uneasiness—of the oppressed; a leader with an idea (which may be either right or wrong), who is believed by the people to be able to relieve their discontent; reluctance on the part of those in control to fight for the *status quo*. The list of symptoms has been determined by careful analysis of various prerevolutionary periods.¹² But a diagnosis that prerevolutionary symptoms are observable in, let us say, Spain, does not necessarily indicate that there will be a revolution in Spain; for revolution depends upon many factors and can be avoided if the ruling class shows a strong hand or makes concessions relieving the malaise or oppression.

Here is the fundamental difference between our method and the "cycle" view of history. Medical diagnosis states only that a set of conditions exists which is identical with one scheme defined by our knowledge of symptoms; the malady may take this or that direction, depending upon future events. The same may be said of the physical world; there, too, "cases" and events, statistics and actual history, differ widely. Yet our scientific knowledge of the human body—its anatomy, physiology, biology, and psychology—makes the physician's art of healing possible.

If we consider nations as organisms, each living in a certain environment, suffering at times from internal illnesses and always competing with other, similar organisms, we may realize that in dealing with nations also, if we wish to cause or to avoid events, certain policies must be followed, and that for a science of politics, history must be the basis.

Before the anatomy or psychology of groups can be satisfactorily studied, a certain gap must be bridged between the realms of science

¹² Brinton, pp. 79-80; Pettée, pp. 152 ff.

and of politics. If we compare the working of the scientific mind with that of the politician, we notice that the former presupposes a world governed by natural laws; the latter, one directed by human will and whim.

Physical science is based upon the premise that, given identical conditions, under the impact of identical causes identical events will occur. In the mechanical world there are no good or bad atoms. One may be stable, another unstable and radiating, one may emit alpha, another beta, and a third gamma rays, and these rays may split or may build up other atoms. The atom which emits the rays is not called bad or aggressive; it is not the enemy of atoms split by its emissions, nor is it said to be unduly interfering in the private affairs of a neighbor atom. This one world of the physicist and the chemist consists of atoms combining into bigger agglomerations, and all these separate entities influence each other by attraction or repulsion. The scientific mind observes and describes; it does not approve or disapprove.

In politics, on the other hand, decisions are based upon the assumption that in this phase of life at least, human beings do not act in obedience to natural law. The man in the street will tell us that the chemist's and physicist's world is mechanistic. An iron ingot has its own qualities, and if we want to make tools out of it we must do what those who have an understanding of its behavior tell us to do. No persuasion, no exhortation will induce the iron to change its form or character. But social beings make their own laws. It is entirely up to them whether they are peaceful or aggressive.

Jurists like to say that states, too, are sovereign; that whatever the legislators decree, the executive must and can carry out. They are likely to believe that this sovereignty can be transferred to an organization of states by endorsement, as a check is made negotiable, and that parliaments are pipers whom the public will follow as a matter of course, like well-trained human rats.

Nothing is further from the truth. Statutes are challenges intended to stimulate material having certain properties to certain reactions. If the properties are misjudged, the reactions may be surprising.

In revolutionary periods and in wartime, laws setting maximum prices or requisitioning certain types of goods are common. Ancient, mediæval, and modern societies alike have ordered sellers not to sell and buyers not to buy goods at prices above the "ceiling." All have obliged their citizens to hand over certain goods, such as metal needed for

munitions and gold or foreign exchange to pay for them. Punishment for hoarding or nondelivery has ranged from fines to hanging. Yet obedience is by no means uniform. There are always men prone to obey and men who are rebels; always black markets for people willing to pay the price. The relation between the legitimate and the black market, the laxity and the strictness of those whose duty it is to prevent bootlegging, reveals the ethics of the community. When duties were high in England. Trevelyan says, smuggling was "prodigious . . . Parson Woodforde, a truly good as well as 'respectable' man, wrote on March 29, 1777: Andrews the smuggler brought me this night about 11 o'clock a bagg of Hyson tea. . . . The inhabitants of this inland rectory thought and spoke of Andrews the smuggler just as one might speak today of 'Andrews the grocer'!"¹³

If you ask a lawyer in London, Paris, Budapest, or New York whether mutual consent is a legal ground for divorce, he will answer no. Nevertheless, you may get a divorce in London if your husband makes an excursion to Brighton with a blonde; in Paris if he boxes your ear in the presence of a witness; in Budapest if he faithlessly leaves you; in other parts of the world if he changes his religion or citizenship. Collusion, no doubt—but of the public, the lawyers, and the courts; collusion of all concerned.

In the larger realm, peace treaties are statutes, and not always followed. Time and again the reaction of the body social nullifies the legal solution of a war and the treaty of peace which concludes it. Of the American Reconstruction Period the historian Samuel Morison writes:

Thus James Russell Lowell, at the Harvard commemoration service of 1865, saluted, as he believed, a reunited nation purged by war of all the grossness that had accompanied its rise to power. *Dis aliter visum*. Only in the narrow sense of territorial integrity had even the Union been restored. Only in a legal sense was slavery dead. The civil war was over; a less bloody but not less cruel conflict began between victor and vanquished, a conflict with striking analogies to that which began in Europe with the armistice of 1918, and is not yet finished as I write.¹⁴ [1928].

Those who governed the United States after the victory had a definite problem on their hands: to incorporate the Negroes into the nation. It was not achieved by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Laws giving the slaves their freedom

¹³ Trevelyan, *English Social History*, p. 387.

¹⁴ Morison, II, 324.

did not inspire any general feeling of obligation among whites to consider Negroes their equals. In other words, the material itself had to be changed. Booker T. Washington advocated educating the Negroes, that is, changing their properties. Evidently he did not realize that the fusion of two elements depends upon the qualities of both.

Those who make the rules within a state, those who enforce them, and those to whom they apply are groups of men each of which has its own personality. Laws are challenges to groups, eliciting the desired response or not according to the properties of the group. Statesmen themselves are like the author in Pirandello's famous play, *Six Characters in Search of an Author*; their task is to provide a happy ending for a drama whose characters—states and empires and their relations, attractions, and repulsions—have already been shaped by the past and their environments. Pirandello's six characters complain, "We are alive; the drama is in us and we are the drama. We are impatient to play it. We want to live our drama";¹⁵ they say they can play it even if no author writes the lines for them. Several solutions of the conflicts among them seem reasonable. The author has only to choose—unless he decides to change the characters so as to give the play a happy ending.

Is the statesman able only to select, or can he, too, change the characters with which he is presented? The man who doubts his ability to change the characters is rare. Statesmen are prone to discuss plans for the future in terms of ideal rationality, when they ought to search for the realistically possible solutions of a situation. If none can be found that is satisfactory for the characters as they are, can the latter be changed to suit a solution more befitting the current needs of the world? In the war of 1914–1918 President Wilson said that the world must be made safe for democracy and organized into a league of nations. No one inquired what institutions render a country safe for democracy. No one tried to determine what institutional changes would have to be made in each country to render it safe for democracy or whether, in view of the character of the country's population, such changes were possible.

Yet the materials statesmen have to deal with—human groups and masses—have, like the iron ingot, their own properties.

The gap between science and politics can be bridged for our purpose, and the significant properties of groups more relevantly dis-

¹⁵ *Broom; an International Magazine of the Arts* (Rome, Italy), 1922, p. 191.

cerned, if we act on the thesis that society also is mechanistic; that it has definite characteristics at a deeper level than the local whims of individuals, and independent of them. There is no good and no bad nation; states are merely human agglomerations. Their components cannot be created or destroyed, but under the impact of forces or influences emanating from other similar agglomerations they may be split into smaller or united into larger groups just as mechanically as an atom is built up into a "bigger" atom or broken down into smaller parts by the impact of radiation.

It is interesting to note the contrasts observed by the physicist between the irregularity of individual (molecular) processes and the regularity of the mass (molar) movement:

In order to produce a physical process wherein we observe such conformity to Law, innumerable thousands, often billions, of single atoms or molecules must combine. . . . In a very large number of cases of totally different types, we have succeeded in explaining the observed regularity as completely due to the tremendously large number of molecular processes that are cooperating. The individual process may or may not have its own strict regularity. In the observed regularity, the mass phenomenon, the individual regularity (if any) need not be considered a factor. On the contrary, it is completely effaced by averaging millions of a single process, the average values being the only thing that are observable to us. The average values manifest their own purely *statistical regularity*, which they would also do if the outcome of each single molecular process were determined by the throwing of dice, the spinning of a roulette wheel or the drawing of sweepstake tickets from a drum.¹⁶

Perhaps behind this mechanistic world of the physicist is hidden one ruled by the individual will of atoms. For is it not also possible to condense the irregular events of molecular history into the statistical regularities of molar events?

The world of human atoms, too, is mechanistic when viewed *en masse*. A mechanistic view of events is possible only if we reduce the microcosmic happenings of every day—the story of individuals and their actions—by innumerable instances to macrocosmic events, such as mass migrations or invasions, much as economists trace business cycles and statisticians determine the divorce rate. John marries Jane; Patricia divorces Peter—behind these facts is a complicated story. Novels a thousand pages long have been written about an engagement,

¹⁶ Schroedinger, p. 109.

a marriage, and a divorce; statistics oversimplify these complications. The statistician counts the number of permits issued each year to authorize the marriage of a man and a woman, lists the attributes of the individuals concerned—age, religion, nationality, race, and economic situation—and from this statistical picture of human adventure makes generalizations: of a thousand men in age group X, a certain number marry each year, and a certain number out of each 1,000 marriages end in divorce. The statistician's averages show a trend, but all the trends give merely a hazy picture, a kind of indistinct X-ray of the body social and its dynamics.

When we look into the distant past, where even the names of most individuals have vanished and the picture is dim, out of the mist emerge only units whose movements seem directly related to the law of cause and effect. Is there any doubt that the farther back we look and the less detailed our knowledge, the more unified and regular the mass movements will appear? When decades shrink to millimeters and centuries to centimeters or thereabouts, when the strata unearthed by the archeologist's shovel are dated in the roundest numbers, we discern only tribes and empires, hazy masses in which individuals are lost. And if we synthesize the details of history into a compound which ignores individuals, their actions and their fates, describing merely the trend of the gross movements, will the latter not be subject to the statistical rules of mass phenomena? Is the appearance of regularity, perhaps, merely a matter of scale? A minimizing glass reducing a hundred thousand years to an inch would change our view of the universe as radically as did the magnifying glass.

Mass movements, under the impact of unforeseen conditions, continually evolve into other mass movements. Each movement, or typical "case" for our purposes, has its own symptoms and will be followed by another—unpredictably, since we cannot foresee all the conditions which will bring it about. So each stage of a historical process—mass behavior which ends in the integration or disintegration of states or in wars or revolutions—has its own symptoms, but this is not to say that each process has the same sequence or that certain phases will necessarily follow each other; rather, each diagnosed situation can lead only, as in illness, to certain alternative events, and the occurrence of a specific kind of event—A, B, or C—may be furthered or avoided by the application of certain methods.

We distinguish, therefore, between the history of individuals and

the history of masses. The stories are on different levels; one includes all the details of events as they have happened, together with the motives of the leaders and their followers; the other disregards both the peculiarities of each case and the motivations of the actors. For Mason, who wrote numerous books about Napoleon, and Carl Sandburg, author of a long biography of President Lincoln, the smallest events in the lives of their subjects are important. Each draws up an inventory of his hero's belongings and tries to give a complete history of his public and private life. Every act, whether in the council room, boudoir, or alcove, is recorded. For the history of masses only the ever-recurrent elements of the story—the facts condensed to symptoms—are important; the motivations of individuals are uninteresting. The leader and his followers are in one sense mere marionettes moved by forces behind the scenes. Each figure has its individual characteristics; one is Pierrot or Pierrette, another Harlequin or Columbine. When the time is ripe they appear and act according to character, whatever the script. But for historical statistics such individual decisions and motivations are insignificant.

In the history of the German Empire, Prussia's role and that of Bismarck in the history of Prussia may have been of decisive importance. It may be that the alteration Bismarck made in the original text of the Ems telegram rendered it more provocative to France and led to the French declaration of war on Prussia. But if we consider only the mass movement—Prussia's attempt to build a fortress for herself—all these details may be disregarded. The main factors are the acquisition of a seacoast (by the war of Schleswig-Holstein), the elimination of the chief competitor (by the war against Austria), the surrounding of vassals by cutting their connections with the other outstanding great power, France (by the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine). By what wars or in what years the pattern was fulfilled is immaterial; whether the leader, a Bismarck, changed the Ems telegram or employed *agents provocateurs* does not matter. The behavior patterns will be the same irrespective of whether the group engaged in integrating a nation or an empire is a religious, nationalistic, or class-organized group.

The same may be said of the United States during the struggle for the Union. In the progress of the country to its present form the Civil War is something which had to happen. Professor W. E. Ramsdell's comparison of Lincoln's activities in the Sumter affair with Bis-

marck's alteration of the Ems telegram may be valid or not;¹⁷ it may or may not be true that Lincoln induced the Southerners to put themselves in the wrong by attacking the fort. The prerevolutionary state of affairs would have led to war even if Lincoln had not been President—even had Fort Sumter not existed.

Such a mechanistic history of mass movements as we suggest has its own importance, especially in times like ours when over-rated differences between so-called irreconcilable beliefs heat emotions to a high pitch of intensity. By this method events are told, impartially and without attributions of righteousness or guilt. In order to work out the larger trends of the irresistible forces behind human action in history, ideologies, otherwise important factors, may for the moment be eliminated. By admitting that red or white, monarchists or republicans, have in certain basic respects the same group behavior, we agree that they are not automatically bad if they follow one ideology and good if they follow another, but just groups at certain stages of evolution—without ethics—just savages, so to say. This equalization may be of great importance for our understanding of history.

Moreover, the impartial relation of mass movements, may, to use Freud's language, "hit upon some unconscious experiences which withhold the meaning of symptoms"¹⁸—symptoms which disappear when the unconscious process becomes conscious; i.e., they may relieve the sharpness of, or even remove, compulsive attitudes which spring unrecognized from the unconscious pressures of mass events. The conviction that the Negro is another kind of man, and so forth, leads to race hatred—the truth that he is of the same kind may have a healing effect.

The patterns of action and reaction in mass movements as observed from outside are quite different from the individual comings and goings planned by the insiders concerned. Birds fly north each spring and return each autumn. Year after year they follow the same route, flying in a certain formation. The naturalist, an outsider, explains the migration as their reaction to climatic or other environmental factors.¹⁹ The birds themselves, however, doubtless have a totally different, a birdlike, notion of why they act as they do; for instance, they may be moved to follow a leader or to pursue some higher command.

To separate the factors involved and consider the effect of only one basic phase as determining the results is oversimplification. But over-

¹⁷ Quoted in Randall, I, 344.

¹⁸ Freud, p. 241.

¹⁹ Thomson, pp. 285, 287 ff.

simplification has its own importance. Astronomy was the earliest science to succeed in making statements about our universe, for the great distances oversimplified observations. In human affairs there may be a similar usefulness in the long view.

Isocrates, the famous orator, argued before a judge in ancient Athens the case of a young man whose father, governor of a large district of Pontus, had sent him to the capital as a precaution against the disfavor of the local tyrant. Provided with shiploads of wheat and with money for trading, the young man arrived and was introduced by a casual Phoenician acquaintance to the banker Phasion, of whose bank he became a client. Meanwhile, at home tyrant Satyros, being falsely informed that the father was conspiring against him and the son, in Athens, was associating with exiled persons, arrested the father and instructed the Pontians of Athens to seize the son's assets and send him home; if he refused to go, they were to ask for his extradition.

In such straits [said the lawyer, eloquently impersonating his client] I told all my troubles to Phasion, with whom I was on friendly terms, trusting him in many matters as well as with my money. I thought that if I gave up everything I had here I ran the risk, if misfortune befell my father, and he became needy, of not being able to help him. On the other hand, if I declared everything in full but refused to give up my prosperity as ordered by Satyros, I would lay myself and my father open to serious charges. After long discussion, the best course seemed to be that I should pretend to comply with Satyros' orders and hand over the visible funds. At the same time I would not only deny the existence of the money deposited with Phasion but even assert that I was in debt to him and others . . .²⁰

This he finally did. Later, when his father's affairs had straightened out and his sister was, in fact, married to a son of Satyros, the young provincial could safely return home with his money. "But Phasion," Isocrates concludes, "denies that he has any of the plaintiff's money on deposit."

Picture to yourself the rich old Sopaios coming home one night and hinting to his family that his relations with the tyrant are not all they might be, that he is rather afraid he will be obliged to join his friends living exiled in Greece; the family then taking the precautionary measure of sending the son and some of its wealth to Greece, and all the rest of the tale—here you have the match of ever so many stories that could be told of happenings in Central Europe in the 1930's. But you

²⁰ Mathieu and Brémont, "Trapezetique," p. 70.

will hardly contend that the story of Sopaios has ever exactly repeated itself? Surely not. The sequence is never quite the same, nor are the individuals, the motivation, and other factors. A *governor of a province* sending his *son* by *ship* with *goods and cash* to a *foreign land*; the son meeting a *Phoenician* and *depositing his money* with a *banker*; the *marriage* of the refugee's *sister*; the *banker's default*, and so forth; all these very natural elements make up a unique sequence—unique since the probability of precise repetition is exceedingly slight.

Thus individual motivation or detail is one thing; the mass movement as observed from outside is another. Both have their own importance and are factors at different levels in determining the end results. In the case of the Greek story and its endless variations in other countries and ages, if we ignore the particular and consider only generalizations we find that to persecution the response is emigration. The flight of capital from unsafe to safe countries in the years following the first World War (as from Germany and Austria to only generalizations we find that to persecution the response is emigration—Switzerland, Britain, and the United States) has also been a recurrent movement, analogous to emigration. Such regularities, however, do not appear until we generalize from the discrete items and then divide such generalizations into behavior patterns leading from a need to its satisfaction; until we consider individuals as very like automats, responding to human challenges in the same general way, whatever the myriad individual details of the response or the occasional exceptions.

THE ORGANISM

TAKING STOCK of my arguments, I repeat: The great systems of the universe—the world—nations—all in turn are interdependent entities, articulated into bodies and each tending toward independence. In the development of nations and empires history describes the integration and disintegration of such separate bodies. Unique single events (molecular irregularities) leading to integration or disintegration may be condensed into mass behavior patterns (molar probabilities). Individual activities, or ideologies motivating such activities, may all be momentarily disregarded, and the changes understood as a mechanistic process determined by centripetal and centrifugal forces within the body, fortified or lessened by the radiation of other separate bodies (neighbors). From the condensed story of separate bodies a symptomatology may be worked out—that is, symptoms characterizing each phase of integration or disintegration may be determined, and the work of statesmen in diagnosing the reasons for present malaises and devising possible remedies for them may thereby be given a scientific basis.

A symptomatology of the process which makes and destroys nations presupposes, as far as our nonobjective picture is concerned, that each nation, like an individual, is an organism. Each has its distinct life—begins, grows, changes, and ultimately decays as a unified entity.¹ Without such an assumption no behavior patterns are possible; without patterns no statistical body of knowledge can be built up of symptoms appearing at certain stages of evolution or regression and of the alternative consequences of situations diagnosed.

Meninius Agrippa, a Roman senator, in his speech to the plebeians who seceded to the sacred mountain, compared the Roman nation with a human body; both, he said, have members, and in order to live they must co-operate. If they don't, all perish. He told how the members of the human body went on strike against the belly—" . . . that the hands should carry no food to the mouth nor the mouth accept anything

¹ Kjellen, p. 53.

that was given it, to take it nor the teeth grind up what they received." These members protested that the belly, like aristocrats within the state, only enjoyed life, leaving the work to others. But in this they disregarded its important function, and since none could live independently, all starved.²

Paul, writing to the Corinthians, observed, "For the body is not one member. but many," and on the other hand, "God hath tempered the body together . . . and whether one member suffers, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honored, all the members rejoice with it. Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular."³

In these illustrations both the worldly state and the religious community are described as organisms. This resemblance between the social state and the human body was also apparent to the great modern German biologist R. V. Virchow, who, describing the millions of cells which make up the body, calls it a "state of cells." Nor are these the only thinkers to see in the structure and function of groups the elements of an interrelated organism, or vice versa. Entomologists—W. M. Wheeler,⁴ for instance—think of insect societies as organisms. In the plant world, according to F. E. Clements,⁵ the "climax" or highest stage in the evolution of the community of plants constitutes a complex organism. Some will remember Fechner's mystical philosophy and his idea that the universe is a single organism made up of sun, planets, and stars—each a member of the greater, but itself a smaller organism. The earth, one of the smaller organisms, is composed of men, animals, and plants—each a member of the organism "earth," but itself a smaller one, and so forth.⁶

What is the common denominator of all these various kinds of entity described by the one word "organism"? Whether we consider the human body or a community of plants, bees, or men, we notice elements—cells, atoms, particular members—combining into a whole that is something more than its elements; has other qualities and activities. The organism is built on co-operation among individuals; by co-operating they lose their individuality, but gain many-sidedness for the whole—abilities none of them had.

Thus, entities emerge from the organization of formerly independent elements. They are composed according to a pattern; they have the quality of replacing lost members; they take material from the

² Livy xxxii. 9 (The Loeb Classical Library).

⁴ Wheeler, p. 192.

⁵ Clements, p. 242.

³ I Corinthians 12:12.

⁶ Fechner, quoted in Wheeler, p. 130.

outside world and give material to it, and, they are related to other organisms and their environment.⁷ Defining an organism, the biologist says, "either as a single cell or as a group of cells, the individual organism behaves as a unit . . . the parts are subordinate to the whole."⁸ The behavior as a unit, the subordination of the cell or member to the whole, reaches various degrees in the various organisms; there are higher and lower organisms, entities coherent and consistent in greater or lesser degree, and more or less disciplined.

Certain sponges, for example, are not even well-separated from each other. "It is difficult to determine how much of the living tissue belongs to one individual and how much to the other," writes the biologist.⁹ Others, again, are clearly separated, each individual isolated from the next. The boundaries of such organisms, like pioneer communities or a feudal state in the Middle Ages, are not so well defined as those of the modern state, which protects itself by tariff and immigration laws.

Within the limits of the organism, floating or well-defined, its body may greatly vary with regard to degrees of concentration; the relation between the members is such that they may or may not survive separation. The parts of some organisms, when cut, continue life as separate entities.

When such an animal [a sea anemone] crawls over a glass plate or a smooth rock, parts of the foot may be torn off and left behind because they are unable to let go of the smooth surface soon enough to keep up with the rest of the animal. Such fragments round up and within a short time may grow into whole new small anemones.¹⁰

Organisms which are well separated from each other—coherent entities, consistent and indivisible—are dominated to a greater or less degree by a central authority; or, failing such a central authority, the action of the organism is decided by competition among its members.

Even in fairly well-organized animals such as starfishes, the different parts of the body may work in decided opposition to each other rather than in co-operation. When a starfish is placed on its back, three of the arms may

⁷ Haeckel, II, 295; W. M. Wheeler, "Emergent Evolution and the Social Revolution," *Psyche*, January, 1927, p. 29; Egler, "Vegetation as an Object of Study," *Philosophy of Science*, IX (July, 1942), 252; Wheeler, pp. 45 ff.; W. W. Alechin, "Ist die Pflanzen Association eine Abstraktion oder eine Realitaet," in *Engler, Botanische Jahrbuecher* (Berlin), Vol. LX, No. 135 (1925), 16.

⁸ Wheeler, pp. 29 ff.

⁹ Allee, p. 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

be working vigorously to turn in one direction and be actively opposed by the other two, or the arms may be attempting to right the animal by working in three or even five directions at the same time.¹¹

Other animals are better controlled; there is only co-operation and no competition between the members. As evolution takes a further step, the organism discovers the most economical way to act. Not only does competition among the parts cease, but in every activity only such parts participate as can perform most efficiently, with the least expenditure of energy. Higher organisms in general are illustrations of this economy; cells, parts of organs, and organs become specialized and have their own exclusive functions.

We have seen that communities of interdependent individuals are called organisms, and rightly—perhaps “superorganism” is the more correct term. Though the body of which they constitute the parts is not visible in concrete outline, like that of the starfish or the buffalo, it is nevertheless a living entity of interdependent members, and its development and articulation, as we shall see presently, follow what seem to be certain basic rules in the growth of organisms generally.

Here, too, there is great variety. Certain insect societies may be like a complex organism; each member has his own function—one a worker, another a soldier, still another a propagator of the race. The members are so closely united that unless they co-operate they cannot survive. On the other hand, herds of animals easily divide. Each member, even if it has a special function, can do another job; each is an understudy of the next.

In social organisms at the human level the parallel may again be seen to the specialization of members within single bodies. Compare—as Stuart Chase does—Tepoztlan, a Mexican village, with Robert and Helen Lynd’s Middletown, U.S.A., each a cell in an organism, the former purely Indian, the latter “is an omelette of English, French, Poles, Italians, Czechs, Russian, Negroes, Germans, Irish”; the former self-sustaining, the latter producing “only a lone fraction—perhaps one percent of what is locally consumed.”¹² The first is a member of a lower organism whose parts depend less on the whole than do those of the latter. Middletown, despite its “higher” civilization, is more dependent, because it is a cell of the United States, which is more nearly a unit—or at least behaves more like a unit—than Mexico.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Chase, pp. 15 ff.

The view taken of organisms does not compel us to consider Hobbes' Leviathan, the artificial man, "as a biological entity of a new order."¹³ It merely compels us to admit that wherever men form groups, groups merge with groups, symbiosis creates a more or less stable entity, having other characteristics and behaving differently from its members. On the other hand, we are precluded from considering "civilization" or "society" as defined by Toynbee as the subject of history.

One religion, the same civilization, may make for identical responses; but the entity created by symbionts is characterized by different and more abilities. The responses of the new organism differ from those of the individual.

The organism has its own more or less well defined borders; it is a body responding to challenges, in its own peculiar way. The Hellenistic society, the Hellenic city-states of ancient history, may have behaved as an organism when all city-states united to defeat Persia, but they were not the same organism as the state Athens or the state Sparta.

It may be said in general that organisms are not stable, but changing and dynamic, with a continuous evolution from the less to the more distinct, from the less united to the more united, from the less to the more centrally controlled, or vice versa.

One mode of creation of various types of new organism, as distinguished from mere reproduction, begins with symbiosis—"a mutually beneficial internal partnership between two organisms of different kind"¹⁴ and may advance through various stages to a complete fusion of cells or types of constituent unit. In the earlier forms the components are easily distinguished; in the higher forms the merging is complete, and a new individual is apparent, distinct from previous types.

To take an illustration from the plant world, the lichens are partnerships of an alga with a fungus. The relationship varies with the various species within the group of lichens, three stages or modes of combination being discernible. In the simplest forms the two partners reproduce independently, and it is necessary for their offspring—alga and fungus, respectively—to find each other and again join in the production of a lichen. In the next group, while reproduction may still be independent, an accessory method is represented by a process of budding; offspring by this method include both algae and fungi, both

¹³ Roberts, p. 1.

¹⁴ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, "Symbiosis."

still capable of independent reproduction and life. In the highest groups of lichens, however, a reproductive organ, the "soridium," appears. Here the symbiosis has become absolute, and reproduction can no longer be separately achieved. The offspring are lichens.

"The relationships in these three groups of lichens," says the scientist, "appear to indicate that there is a gradual development toward a complete interdependence of the two partners."¹⁵ In the more lowly lichens, in other words, there is possibility of separate existence of the partner types; in the higher forms they are incapable of independent life. And a still closer union may be possible, beyond the present highest stage of development of the lichens.

Meninius Agrippa, had he lived today, might have told his story in another way to suit the tenets of one school of modern biological theory: In ancient times, when the gods still lived on earth, there was a microbe which could see: that is, the special texture of its cell enabled it to react to light waves and reflect them. Another—maybe a plant—could hear; its body was like an ear in that it reacted when sound waves touched it. Besides the "eye" and the "ear" there were those that had a sense of smell or touch and numerous other specialists.

Now each microbe, plant, or other life form has its difficulties in maintaining itself in a world full of various kinds of signals—a world where by light, sound, smell, and in many other ways attention is called to danger or opportunity. The eye did not notice sound, the ear was impervious to light; both were consequently always in danger and could not enjoy themselves.

One day, in this world of specialized microbes someone (was it a scholar, or a politician, or maybe just a poet?) proposed a social contract: all should be parts of one organism. The microbe eye should be a sentinel for light, the microbe ear for sound; each was to do a special job, and the common organs were to provide each member with the fluids essential for existence. From this contract evolved man.

A narrator of more bellicose temper might tell the story with a post-Darwinian flavor, recounting how the microbe brain with its army forced the other specialists to unite and maintain common institutions. In the version of the eclectic philosopher believing in the *sententia media*, the golden rule, persuasion, and force would play roles. The more factors included, the better the description of the indescribable.

Whether the composing of man's social body at various times has

¹⁵ Wallin, pp. 98 ff.

taken place by agreement or force or both, or for reasons unknown, the merging (*synoecism*)¹⁶ of various towns, districts, and regions clearly occurs by stages. At first the alliance is for only a short time. From temporary alliances more intimate relations develop, and finally, in a given case, all members merge in a common social body dominated by a governing "brain," a domination ultimately stabilized by institutions—the nervous and circulatory systems of the new national anatomy.

In this process of symbiosis, initiated by the merging of two or more different kinds of functioning organisms and ending in a single new organism of more complex type, there is, no doubt, much resemblance to the process leading from the fertilized egg through various stages of embryonic existence to the living individual. Whether the formation of an individual (the ontogenesis) is a short replica of the total history of emergence of a species (phylogenesis) as Haeckel stated or not is of no interest for our researches. The thesis that social communities are organisms, emerging and advancing from mere partnerships to blended unity, that when partnership reaches a certain intimacy it will follow an expanding development not unlike that of the fertilized egg and an articulation into a coherent body, and finally, that there is a similarity in the formation of social communities of all life forms irrespective of whether they are plants, animals, insects, or human beings—these are working hypotheses which we accept for our investigation.

In all these processes the merging of types precedes growth, and growth will precede "cell movements which lead to the production of body form"; it will be followed by specialization and combination and end with "functional adaptation and correlation to produce a working organism." And in every one of these processes we shall see that *organizers*, "exerting definite, directing influence on neighboring parts" by imposing an order upon regions that come under their influence—have a major importance.¹⁷

There are as many differences between superorganisms or types of community as between the anatomy, physiology, or biology of various animals and men; nevertheless, a study of the more primitive systems will facilitate our understanding of the more complex.

¹⁶ Glotz and Cohen, I, 389; Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, I, 155; *Cambridge Ancient History*, III, 579; cf. "Isopolity, Sympolity," *ibid.*, VII, 8.

¹⁷ Arey, p. 6.

Clements' story of the building of a plant community to a climax starts with an empty territory created by the retiring of water or some other cause.¹⁸ The old statement that nature abhors a vacuum appears to be true, for wherever and whenever a biological niche is opened, plants and animals from the neighborhood move in. Life forms, whether plant, animal, or human, seem to be eternal migrants. The empty place, the shining adventure of the new, calls them.

Sooner or later, however, some barrier stops them, sets a more or less permanent limit to their settlement. The barrier may be an already existing community into which the few individuals that manage to enter will be assimilated; it may be soil on which they cannot thrive; too much or too little water and other impediments. It is not far-fetched to liken the process to the flow of liquid into an irregularly shaped container; the vessel will take no more when its crannies are filled; just so a habitat reaches, for reasons obvious or obscure, a saturation point and will take no more immigrants.

With migration begins the process called by ecologists, with their love of coining words, the "sere." The term designates "the series of communities that follow one another on any given area of the earth's surface"¹⁹ and takes into account the initial stages, transitional changes, and climax or final stage in which a community is at its peak. Another form of the sere, a regressive phase, takes the sequence in reverse through whatever ups and downs may occur, from the climax back to relative chaos, from which a new and different integration of life may spring.

The total process of invasion is a complex of which migration, settlement, and competition are the essential steps. A relation is formed between the pioneer community and its new habitat. The community "reacts" to the habitat; the habitat to the community. To describe it in another way, competition is in fact a mutual adaptation between soil and plants, and between plant and plant. Immigrants which cannot flourish under the climatic, soil, or light conditions die. The most aggressive of them succeeds, and in the role of organizer builds up its community.

"The aggressiveness of a species depends upon its fecundity, its capacity of reproduction and spread (formation of clumps or masses), and its power to occupy its place permanently."²⁰ The successful organizers—the dominant species of tree, or group of tree species—also

¹⁸ Clements, pp. 68 ff.

¹⁹ Carpenter, p. 242.

²⁰ Braun-Blanquet, p. 13.

have a decisive effect on the soil, determining to a large extent the character of the ground cover. The acid soil created by oaks and pines gives rise to blueberries, rhododendrons, and other sour-soil plants and shrubs; the hardwoods which make for neutral or alkaline soils have their characteristic following. Certain types of mushroom must be looked for under beech trees; arbutus associates with hemlock. Such interrelations combine to establish certain plants and literally choke off others.

Eliminated pioneers help to transform the soil to a point where it is suitable for the optimum stage of the community, its climax. This may be a prolonged stage, lasting indefinitely. In such a plant community various species exist. Shallow and deep-rooted plants, sun- and shade-loving plants, all grow and flourish together. Some species dominate others; relationships of dependency tend to become balanced and perpetuated. Though the various components of the group are well adapted to one another, competition continues between equal individuals—between tree and tree, plant and plant; the struggle of their roots for water and nourishment, of their branches and leaves for light and air, continues.

A well-established plant community is more or less isolated and distinct. When for any reason its adaptation to geological factors or other plants ceases (through inundation, change of climate, etc.), the dynamic equilibrium reached by adaptation and the dominant-subordinate relationship comes to an end; the advancing and aggressive community becomes retrogressive and "relict," the boundaries shrink, and geographic and climatic isolation become more important in preserving what was once a vigorous and self-perpetuating blend of types.²¹

Retrogressive succession, as the plant ecologist calls it, may be due to various causes: human, animal, climatic, or other changes. Equilibrium is disturbed if changes in the environment—such as inundation—kill the dominants or organizers; chaos may follow, which lasts until a new dominant, adapted to the newly combined environment, establishes a new equilibrium.

The stages noted in plant communities, such as migration, settlement in the new habitat, competition, equilibrium, and retrogression, are characteristic of all communities, of whatever life form. But "the principles of usefulness, of division of labor, of conscious support, of

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 325, 352 ff.

marshaling all resources for the accomplishment of a common purpose do not exist in the plant world.”²² There are, it is true, certain kinds of mutual aid in plant communities. Trees hold and protect each other against the whipping and shattering force of the winds; at the same time they shade the ground, thus preventing the growth of noxious weeds and protecting the young forest seedlings against night frosts. But, notwithstanding such general protections, the struggle for existence goes on undiminished between the atoms of the community—tree and tree, bush and bush, herb and herb. In this absence of mutual help, of individual co-operation, lies the deep and fundamental difference between the vital relations of plants and of animals.

Animal societies are arrangements for co-operation to more or less common ends. There are associations for special purposes, such as mating or protection; others are more general and embrace all individual activities, as in certain insect societies. Associations for special or general purposes are built upon a dominant-subordinate relation.²³

The learned psychologist, taking his illustration from the animal kingdom, informs us that among those living in a cage, kennel, or roost a hierarchy evolves. A “dominant” is one

whose behavior patterns (sexual, feeding, aggressive, and social) are carried on without deference to its associates. The subordinate animal is one whose behavior is suggested, modified, limited or inhibited by the behavior of its more dominant associates. There is a pecking order in a roost, there are well-settled orders of rank among apes and other less highly developed animals, and probably also among humans.²⁴

The dominant animal sometimes attains its position without a fight and retains it until a new arrival or revolt sets up a new order.

I mentioned that members (cells, organs) of organisms lose their independence and become parts, and as such specialized. Similarly, in superorganisms members may be transformed from Jacks of all trades into specialists. Time and motion studies show how individual effec-

²² *Ibid.*, p. 5; Dengler, p. 55.

²³ Alverdes, pp. 14 ff.; Espinas, pp. 206 ff.; Allee, pp. 1 ff.; Wheeler, p. 129.

²⁴ A. H. Maslow, “The Role of Dominance in the Social and Sexual Behavior of Infra-human Primates: I. Observations at Vilas Park Zoo,” *The Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology*, XLVIII, 261 ff.; A. H. Maslow, “The Role of Dominance in the Social and Sexual Behavior of Infra-human Primates: III. A Theory of Sexual Behavior of Infra-human Primates,” *ibid.*, pp. 310 ff.; A. H. Maslow and S. Flanzbaum, “The Role of Dominance in the Social and Sexual Behavior of Infra-human Primates: II. An Experimental Determination of the Behavior Syndrome of Dominance,” *ibid.*, pp. 278 ff.; Hooton, pp. 34 ff.; Yerkes, pp. 71 ff.; Britt, pp. 261 ff.

tiveness can be raised when factory workers are trained to perform only a single operation involving the least possible output of energy and muscular effort. In the course of generations men might conceivably lose their more general abilities and become specialized like insects. W. M. Wheeler, under the genial name Wee-Wee, 43d Neotenic King of the 1,429th Dynasty of the Bellicose Termites, writes whimsically how this very real insect society may have reached its present form.

Our ancient biological reformers started with the assumption that a termite society would not be a success unless it was constructed on the plan of a super-organism, and that such a super-organism must necessarily conform to the fundamental laws of the individual organism. As in the case of the individual, its success would have to depend on the adequate solution of the three basic problems of nutrition, reproduction, and protection. It was evident, moreover, that these problems could not be solved without a physiological division of labor among the individuals composing the society and this, of course, implied the development of classes or castes. Termite society was, therefore, divided into three distinct castes, according to these three fundamental needs and functions, the workers being primarily nutritive, the soldiers defensive, and the royal couple reproductive.²⁵

This insect society, with its specialized members, is more coordinated than that of the apes or other mammals. Specialization furthers isolation.

Limited range, especially for species and genera, is, on the whole, a much more general phenomenon than wide distribution. Specialization, i.e., the exact inherited adaptation to given habitat conditions, affords so many immediate advantages that specialized species usually win in the struggle for existence.²⁶

The area inhabited by a species is in general surrounded on all sides by barriers which prevent its further dispersal and the species is thus limited in its range.²⁷

The barrier may be a natural boundary; it may be climatic, i.e., conditions under which the species cannot live; it may be the frontier of a superior competitor. Within a given region, however, various species may live together, isolated from one another. Races may be separated by food preferences and breeding habits, inclinations for cross-breeding, hybrid sterility. In other words, isolation may be due to

²⁵ Wheeler, p. 211.

²⁶ Hesse, p. 124.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

factors that may be called ecological, geographical, sexual, or psychological.²⁸

Whether we consider societies of plants or of animals, we notice a progress from lower to higher organization, or a regression from higher to lower. Whichever the direction, the characteristics are similar:

a) If there is an uninhabited niche, or one inhabited by a community unable to defend itself or without friends ready to protect it against mass migration, it is invaded. Competition then begins among the various invaders and between the invaders and previously established inhabitants. This ends with the adjustment of the various life forms to each other and their habitat; a new organizer forms new associations, and a hierarchical order evolves.

b) While the characteristic types of the new community are forming and finding their mutual balance, the community expands toward its natural boundaries, such as mountains, sea, or different climate or food conditions. Psychological boundaries, or another strong community, may also set a limit to further expansion; over-expansion results in extermination.

c) The highest form of integration attainable by a community is called its "climax" and consists of a stabilized equilibrium between the dominant and the subordinate types involved. In plant communities the highest form of organization is a hierarchy, but we shall see that human social bodies achieve integrations beyond this stage.

d) Equilibrium persists until changes in the environment or the interrelations of the members alter the dynamic balance of forces or the hierarchical or institutionalized order, as the case may be. The change may occur through new invasion, climatic changes, or for many other reasons. The order relaxes, disintegrates, and the chaos of competition begins a retrogression.

e) Even during the period of equilibrium within the community, individuals compete, but only equals with each other. Among the rest there is a dominant-subordinate relation rather than competition.

f) The stricter the organization and the greater the isolation of a community, the more it tends to become self-sustaining and independent of its neighbors. There is, however, no absolute isolation, no 100 percent self-sufficiency. The "whole space occupied by living organisms, called the biosphere"—the total known space that contains

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 56 ff.

life in any form—is interdependent, each part conditioned by its habitat. Between the more or less isolated parts of the biosphere there are exchanges; plants and animals render services to each other, and all are in this sense symbiotic.

These generalizations, of course, oversimplify complex processes—yet is not a map an oversimplified picture of our country or the world? Even the first efforts of the map-makers, full of mistakes and with much *terra incognita*, were useful for orientation.

To sum up: there are organisms built of cells and superorganisms whose very cells are organisms, all at various stages of the process of integration or disintegration. This is not to say that the formation of a social body or community is a direct-line process, beginning at one point and ending inevitably at another. There are advances and retrogressions; the continuous zigzag does not always lead to the highest stage, nor, in regression, to complete chaos. Whether in the lichens or in man, we seldom see the actual changing—only the changes when they have been accomplished. We assume that the various stages we perceive are connected by a continuous process.

But the evolution of all life forms, the formative processes of all living communities, are symbioses—mutually co-operating combinations of life—and as such have recognizably similar stages. Some sort of contact or mingling begins them, followed by a merging and an increase in the mass, which fills out into an articulated body, more or less consistent, more or less isolated and self-sufficient. A body which reacts to impulses in its own peculiar way.

The society of men, we have said, like that of plants, is an organism. Its organization, too, is evolutionary and goes through similar stages with the same possibilities of sequence. Man is no more self-sufficient than any other life form. He needs partners for his existence: partners to protect him against various kinds of enemies; partners who will help him to obtain all the various kinds of materials he needs for sustenance; partners with whom to propagate his race. Thus, people unite into families, families into tribes, and tribes into nations, each family, tribe, or nation an integrated organism made up of various kinds of human beings—a symbiosis for mutual help. And each of these organisms is formed by a process which starts with the alliance of a few and ends in a more permanent, better-organized merging of many.

Whether we consider tribes or feudal domains, the city-state or the

nation, hierarchies of states or the community of all states, each has its own sere, its vital sequence; each has a body, and each body its peculiar kind of organization. Migration or invasion brings together different kinds of men in a habitat, and out of this mixture—as from Saxons, Normans, and others in early England—a new type, a compound, evolves. The compound, then, if it reaches a certain degree of coherence and is able to express itself in the actions of a unified army, takes possession of a certain more or less well-protected habitat. The social body within the habitat then begins to develop its organization. According to its consistency and mode of articulation it will be of a balanced, hierarchical, or institutional type, for there are communities consisting of groups which balance each other; others settle on a hierarchical order of rank; while still others finally work out a common institution. Internal restraints—in a balanced society the power of others with conflicting interests, in a hierarchical society the command of the leader or primus, and in an institutional society the authority of the law, courts, and sheriffs—bind the members of an organism to follow a diagonal of compromise between their own personal forces and those around them.

Not all communities necessarily proceed directly through the successive steps from chaos to climax or vice versa; some may revert from a more to a less advanced stage and then integrate anew. In any case, not all organisms begin with migration, nor do all reach their climax. Whether integrating or disintegrating, the organism finds its way after many trials and errors; many die on the road, remain chaotic, or never go beyond the pioneer stage. Nevertheless, when many individuals are integrating into a society, or many societies into a hierarchy of nations—or when, by reverse process, all these are falling back into their component parts—the process is characterized by certain clearly recognizable stages, and each stage by certain symptoms.

Now, if the symptoms reveal that a society is at a given stage, measures may perhaps be taken to further or to prevent integration or disintegration. That is, short cuts in the process may be possible, induced by human diagnosis and remedy.

If we want to ascertain the symptoms of each stage, we must consider separately the nation, or personal element, the habitat, or territorial element, and the government, or administrative element, corresponding to the nervous system of the higher organisms. I must emphasize here that the separation is artificial; the picture, even when

simplified and reduced by our minimizing glass to the scale of a map in a pocket atlas, remains a unit, and in speaking of nation, habitat, or government at certain phases of the process, we touch upon only single aspects of a total situation. What we shall gain is not the picture of a continuous process, but a table of statistics on the behavior of various elements engaged in integrating into an organic whole or disintegrating from it. The history of nations is a zigzag; our description will break it into parts only in order to make statistics possible. Each chapter of the process is a behavior pattern, a response of a more or less complete entity to a stimulus of some kind—a motion fulfilling a sense of need.

Before the various factors of the historical drama are analyzed, we shall consider its prelude: migration. In speaking of migration separation of personal, territorial, and administrative factors is superfluous, since migrating masses are in most instances well united under a leader and have no habitat.

PART TWO: THE THESIS

MIGRATION

IN *The Natural History of Our Conduct* William E. Ritter discusses the kinds of activities which lead to adaptation and those which do not. Among examples of the unsuccessful he cites the migration of the Scandinavian lemmings, small rodents of sub-Arctic regions. Following an enormous increase in numbers, which occurs every fifteen or twenty years, hordes of these little animals

steadily and slowly advance, always in the same direction and regardless of all obstacles . . . "they are pursued and harassed by crowds of beasts . . . and never spared by man . . . The onward march may continue two or three years, till those which survive the depredations of enemies reach the seacoast. But even this does not stop them, for into the water they plunge and swim straight off from shore as far as their strength will carry them.¹

It is said that none of the migrants ever returns home.

Ritter explains this remarkable performance by saying that the westward drive of the animals is inherited from ancestors who migrated in geological times when the European continent extended much farther west and north than it does today. He remarks:

If the creatures have been going through such self-destroying experiences as this every twenty years or oftener since the Pleistocene age and have learned nothing therefrom, the fact is certainly disparaging evidence as to their grade of mental development.²

But is Professor Ritter's reproach well founded? Consider the situation from a totalitarian point of view rather than from that of the individual. On a given territory there are too many lemmings and not enough food; as the lemmings cannot produce more, they compete for the existing supply. The strongest, most cunning, and ablest get all they can eat. A minority starves. An instinct—if we are to believe Professor Ritter—or perhaps the mirage of lands where there is plenty of food, stimulates migration. That it is suicidal does not give the

¹ Ritter, pp. 226-27.

² *Ibid.*, p. 227.

emigrants pause; in adverse circumstances hope is stronger than caution.

From a totalitarian point of view migration is a good solution. It relieves from pressure those who remain at home. And certainly some lemmings remained at home; otherwise their first migration would have exterminated them. The migration itself is evidence of discontent with their situation; expectation—it may even be said, the call of a better world—directs their steps.

Human migration, like that of animals, is directed by discontent and hope combined. Thucydides rightly analyzes the causes of movements of population in Greece in the centuries preceding his day.

The most powerful of those who were driven from the other parts of Greece by war or sedition betook themselves to the Athenians, and as they obtained the privileges of citizens, have constantly, from remotest time, continued to enlarge that city with a fresh accession of inhabitants, so much so that at last, Attica being insufficient to support their number, they then sent over colonies into Jonia.³

Freedom in Athens invited refugees; then overpopulation led to emigration. New colonies were founded. We do not know how many migrants died on the way or were killed by the natives or how many attempts at colonization failed.

After the departure of the Turks in 1680 Hungary, once populous, was empty. The niche attracted immigrants from Germany and from the Balkans, which were still dominated by the Turks. It may be, however, that this migration after the liberation of Hungary was not voluntary, but like that of Negroes to the western hemisphere, forced. Invited by the landowners and forced by the Hapsburgs, the immigrants were driven to Hungary like slaves.⁴

From England, in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, two waves of emigration set forth. The first was to the Americas and Ireland; the second to all the various colonies. One recent authority on seventeenth-century migration says that "the largest number of those who settled in North America, were influenced by the desire for land to make a home for wife and children."⁵ In the nineteenth century the industrial revolution drove away from England the old craftsmen, made superfluous by machines. Reports of the Americas and

³ Thucydides, pp. 388-90.

⁴ O. Zarek, *The History of Hungary*; by P. P. Wolkonsky, London, Selwyn and Blount, 1939, pp. 259 ff.

⁵ Davies, p. 317.

their "unlimited possibilities" exerted a suction force on overcrowded territories.

Nor is this movement of peoples a thing of the past, even aside from war. In modern times migration from China to Mongolia and Manchuria has revived. Peasants from overpopulated territories have streamed to the grasslands of Mongolia, the Mongolian nomads, a dwindling population, have given way to Chinese tillers of the land.⁶

Highly-cultured France has also been subject to an influx like that of the barbarians. For some time France has been threatened with underpopulation. The falling birth rate, the great losses suffered from wars, on the one hand, and overpopulation and misery in Italy and eastern Europe, on the other, caused a migration in the early 1920's to the wealthiest country in Europe. During the five years from 1921 to 1925 nearly a million persons entered France, of whom 30 percent were Italians, 17 percent Poles, and 15 percent Spaniards. In 1927 Italy, under Mussolini, restricted emigration. Manpower, he said, was an essential element in the political, economic, and moral power of a nation; Italy must bring her population up to sixty million during the second half of the century. He held that the way to achieve this objective was not only to raise the birth rate and reduce mortality but also to restrict emigration, which impoverishes nations both quantitatively and qualitatively. Thereafter Italians were not permitted to emigrate, and eastern Europeans entered France in their stead.⁷

The total number of foreigners in France increased from 2,409,000 in 1926 to 2,900,000 in 1931, that is, to about 7 percent of the population. The newspaper *France Libre* estimated the population of the country on September 15, 1935, as 35 million, of whom 6 million were old. The population pyramid, which should rest upon a broad base in the younger categories and taper toward the top, was thus top-heavy. If the native-born decline to 29 million, as predicted for 1980, foreigners will constitute about 30 percent of the population of France.⁸

In these various examples from random centuries it is clear that migration itself is simply the movement of masses in smaller or larger

⁶ Bowman, p. 266.

⁷ *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, p. 84; 1927, pp. 125 ff.

⁸ S. Wlocewski, "Y-a-t-il trop de travailleurs étrangers en France?" *Revue d'Economie Politique*, XLIX (1935), 324 ff.; "Redevenir une grande Puissance," *France Libre*, Sept. 15, 1944, p. 322; *ibid.*, February 15, 1945, p. 284; Alfred Sauvy, "Calculs démographiques sur la population française jusqu'en 1980," *Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris*, 1932, pp. 319 ff.

groups from territories with high to those with low pressure.⁹ The high pressure may reflect over-population, deficient technical knowledge, or a shortsighted policy. The barbarians on the borders of Rome had plenty of land; they had only to clear it and use methods of tillage, but they did not do so, preferring to migrate into Roman territory proper. The English also were land hungry in the seventeenth century, although England's population was one eighth as large as it is today, and there were relatively fewer farmers.

The low pressure may be real or imaginary; the remedy right or wrong. Stimuli are responded to by men or groups either consciously or instinctively, and not always with the right action. The imagined land may or may not be ready to accept immigrants; it may or may not have a climate in which they will find it possible to live; it may be already overpopulated or at its climax and refusing immigration altogether.

Somewhat similar to this voluntary migration and transfer of population are military invasions. Ellsworth Huntington writes of the Mohammedan invasion:

Mohamed made his appeal to the Arabs after the prolonged period of increasing aridity which culminated with a sudden access of dryness in the first half of the seventh century. Without the genius of Mohamed, that long period of adversity might have come to an end without any serious upsetting of the old conditions; without the discontent and unrest fostered by years of distress, Mohamed might have had to speak to men who did not desire change, instead of those who ardently longed for it.¹⁰

Whether the explanation advanced by Huntington is correct, we do not know. Contemporary Arabian authors told a romantic story, repeated by later historians, such as Dupin, who wrote his history of the revolution in Spain in 1724. Count Julian, he says, was governor of Ceuta in Africa, one of the advance positions of Visigothic Spain. According to the customs of the times, he sent his daughter "Cava" to the court of the last Visigothic king, Rodrigo, where she acted as lady in waiting to the queen. The description of the beautiful girl, of the King "possessed by so violent inclination to the female sex that his whole kingdom was too small for him" ¹¹ . . . the misfortune of the poor girl, who was by chance décolleté in the presence of the King, his admiration of her beauty, and her rape are described in great detail.

⁹ Petrie, p. 32.

¹⁰ *Civilization and Climate*, p. 390. Spanish Islam.

¹¹ Dupin, I (Part 1), 194; Dozy, p. 230.

Dupin even gives the text of the daughter's letter complaining of her shame to her father.

The Arabic invasion was, we learn, initiated by Count Julian who, in order to revenge his daughter, invited the Arabs into Spain. Other historians mention that Rodrigo was an usurper, as he eliminated the lawful heirs of his predecessor, King Wititza. The heirs, who lived in Africa, invited the Arabs to Spain. Later historians tell of the oppression of the Jewish population in Spain by the Visigoths and report that the Jews, through their coreligionists in Africa, invited the Arabs to Spain.

No doubt there were malcontents in Visigothic Spain; perhaps Count Julian, the heirs of Wititza, or all of them and many others who were ready to help the enemies of their rulers. There was a fifth column in Visigothic Spain too, but a fifth column alone will not explain the Mohammedan invasion or the fact that although Mohammedans had more land than they could populate and more food than they could consume they still advanced farther and farther. The lure of gains, the wealth of Spain, called them. Men are not only migratory but also predatory animals; Argonauts are always on the move; and the Golden Fleece lures them, even if they have more fleece than they can utilize. Men, as an old story tells, are like fish. Fish live in lakes or rivers, surrounded on all sides, in every direction, by water. They have plenty of water, but when it starts to rain they leave their liquid home to catch more drops of water.

Like the Turks and other invaders, the Mohammedans advanced till, when overtired, they were stopped by a growing resistance.

Voluntary migration, like slave driving, like military invasion, is a means by which the distribution of mankind and of wealth is rationally or irrationally changed, and connections between groups are increased.

The migration of masses or individuals is successful only if followed by settlement or when the settlement is absorbed by the environment. "The first step in the development of vegetation," writes a plant ecologist, "is migration. Next comes the establishment of the invading species . . . then arrangement in the new habitat and finally their competition. In the case of plants, migration takes place in the form of seeds. Their invasion is "marginal"; the seeds of surrounding vegetation fall on relatively empty land niches; or wind, water, or animals may bring seed from far-off lands. In both cases the seeds must

take root—climate and soil must favor their growth. Only then does competition between the natives and the various immigrants begin.

Human beings arrive already grown. Nevertheless, their invasion, too, many be repulsed, or they may succumb to the climate or other conditions of the new habitat. Only after they have gained a foothold can immigrants establish a pioneer community, whether by themselves, together with other invaders, or by mingling with the natives.

Immigrants may arrive in larger or smaller groups, connected by origin, religion, or creed; en masse or one by one. The Visigoths, as we shall see later, were admitted as a nation into the Roman Empire, where they remained as a separate group, an alien body in a homogeneous medium. Had they arrived one by one, they would have formed a group and caused the same trouble. Immigrants come to the United States or to France as individuals, yet form national groups. In communities in the south of France, Italians; near the Pyrenees, Spanish; and in the mining districts, Poles and other Slavs make up as much as 42 percent of the population. The ethnic, religious, or other link which bound them at home still binds them in their adopted country. They live in groups, more or less isolated from other groups, and continue their traditional occupations.

In the main, in our illustrations, migrants of a higher cultural level have moved into the territories of a lower—English farmers came to America and settled on land inhabited by hunters; Chinese farmers on territories of nomads. At other times, in Greece, Rome, and even modern France, barbarians or people of a lower culture have overflowed the lands of higher-cultured nations.

The success or failure of the settlement depends upon whether the invaded territory represents—or contains—a niche in need of additions to the population, or at least having space for them; it depends also upon whether the natives welcome newcomers or are able to keep them out. Relatively empty territories such as America, Mongolia, and Manchuria invite tillers; in Greece, Rome, India, and Ireland, where dominants had lost their power and revolutions, or wars between tribes and clans had undermined native resistance, settlement was also possible.¹²

In their early forms, settlements are mere bridgeheads which make further invasion possible. If we mark on a map the various spots where the first migrants settled in the United States or the French or Anglo-

¹² Dawson, p. 37.

Saxons in India, we see only a few small dots. A map of the initial colonies of Egypt and Greece in Asia Minor, Crete, and so forth, shows these settlements as isolated entities, separated from the settlements of the natives and of other migrants to the same territory. Their relations with each other and with the natives may be cordial or otherwise; in any case, relationships start between them—ideas, goods, and men are exchanged, and even deadly bacilli, for connections between isolated groups often begin with epidemics. Increased connection between the settlements may lead to fusion.

There are migrations which do not end in a permanent settlement, and these are not always recorded in history. How often were the Greeks repulsed when they began to colonize Asia Minor—the Spaniards in South America—other adventurers in North America? How many could not endure the hardships of migration?

An example of unsuccessful migration into a state at its climax may be illuminating. The settlement of Mohammedans on the Asiatic and the African coasts of the Mediterranean in the seventh century and their invasion of Spain in the eighth century divided the Roman world in two. Commerce ceased, and the interchanges between the cities of the Roman Empire ceased with it. There followed the breaking up of Gaul into domains loosely connected in little local states, or *pays*. As the families of lords, villeins, and serfs remained on the same domain generation after generation, the number of those dependent upon it for their living multiplied. Gaul had thus to find occupation for its younger sons (educated for white-collar jobs) and its workers. Overpopulation and unemployment together with fanaticism, fanned by preachers, and tales of the riches of the Orient, led to the crusades. Once again hunger and religious zeal caused mass migrations, this time from west to east—migrations of needy throngs headed by zealots eager to fight the unbeliever, and by younger sons thirsty for adventure. The latter founded domains in Asia Minor and its islands. Adventurous Norsemen settled in southern Italy, in the region once called Magna Graecia, and in Sicily. Merchants followed the flag, and the revival of commerce renewed the contact between the West and the East. The medieval French architecture in the Near East, the Rue des Chevaliers in Rhodes, the Gothic ruins of Famagusta on Cyprus are today reminders that the West and the East of their day did indeed meet.¹⁸

¹⁸ Funck-Brentano, pp. 102-3.

The settlements of crusaders in Asia were short-lived. Islamic society, still at its climax, repelled the invaders. The ecologist would say that migration into a territory where the dominant is still powerful may succeed for individuals—since immigrating individuals are more or less assimilated—but never for masses.

High pressure at home and expectation of low pressure abroad start a migration, which ends in settlement if the expectation is fulfilled and the new land genuinely needs or has room for new inhabitants. Meanwhile their departure from the country of origin may cause disintegration unless those who leave are superfluous. Nothing is more reasonable, therefore, than the demand that migration should be planned. And so it happens that migration, originally instinctive like other human activities, becomes rationalized—planned, however, not by all states in co-operation, but by each according to its own interest.

Read chronologically the German, Italian, Hungarian, or other government publications and statutes dealing with emigration. Each state begins by setting up humanitarian institutions and giving its citizens advice—telling them where to go and how to travel and warning them against exploiters of immigrants. Then societies are formed to organize the emigrants politically, so that they shall remain loyal sons of the mother country and protect her interests *in partibus infidelium*, even after becoming citizens of the land of their adoption. The interests of the new country, which wants to assimilate the immigrant, run counter to those of the old, which wants to retain a hold over him. In this manner emigration becomes peaceful penetration and is responded to by a closing of the doors of open societies.¹⁴

Radiation from one country brings about legislation in another; immigration is prohibited or the civil rights of the newcomers are curtailed, and life in their new home is made difficult. For such a process there are several causes, each having its own effects and stimulating divers kinds of reaction. The restriction of migration by Germany in the 1890's and by Italy under Mussolini led to overcrowding in those countries. In Switzerland and lands where emigration was free, this was avoided. In still other countries, to protect wages or for other reasons, the doors have been closed to immigrants. Thus, planned

¹⁴ L. Korodi, "Der Rechtverstandene volksdeutsche Gedanke," in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, July, 1934, pp. 1 ff.

activities dictated by the demands (well or badly understood) of overcrowded or empty countries increase the general pressure.

As population pressure grows, the closing of a country to immigration or emigration may lead to war. The wars of the Greek city-states against Persia and the wars of Germany and of Japan are cases in point. At other times immigrants are welcomed and even kidnapped. The totalitarian states of Germany and Russia in recent years have needed workers. Foreigners were imported, and members of minority groups were forced into the worst-paid labor. The dominant natives in such cases of imported unskilled labor take the better-paid and less onerous jobs; in France, for instance, there are practically no French miners. Or badly paid native farm hands will go to the towns and factories, being replaced by foreigners. The USSR, which forbids emigration, goes to extremes in rationalizing internal migration: it selects those who are to move, the area to which they are to go, and their occupations.

All these population movements, created by the needs of the moment, have serious consequences and end in a cacophony of national groups which may or may not, as will be demonstrated, result in the harmony of a well-organized nation. If infiltrations are not absorbed, they create illnesses and may cause the body social to disintegrate. Thus, political problems often have biological significance. Yet the result of a false step becomes evident only after generations have passed, and politicians with an eye to re-election do not bother about the repercussions of their policies.

Migration is not the only remedy for certain illnesses of the body social. The importation of goods made possible by invasion of other territories or by piracy on sea and land or by commerce, presupposing industrialization, may make actual movement of populations superfluous. But whether the need is for goods or men or both is irrelevant; as the need of one group is solved, the lot of other groups is affected. If two parties disagree, the stronger may impose his own solution.

Whether we look back into prehistoric eras or down the vista of ancient, medieval, or modern history, we find two kinds of movement—invasion or migration and the exchange of goods, capital, and ideas—always going on. Armed invasion is merely the arranging by force of a radiation of some kind which has been prevented by another country.

It is an excursion into the other country and ends usually with the return of the invaders to their own habitat laden with booty and stories of the wealth they have seen. If there is discontent at home, it may be a prelude to migration and may end with settlement in a niche created by the invader.

Of old ruins, studied from the perspective of later ages, it is hard to say sometimes whether they have been caused by invasion or migration. Our far-distant posterity, living in another civilization and dating its history from the foundation of another Rome or the appearance of another man-God—surveying the excavated remains of our period and unable to read our writings—may have an impression similar to that which we have of our ancient predecessors.

From time to time invasions and migrations go through these nebulous human beings; but ruins are quickly repaired, and poor houses built on the ruins of those destroyed, near caves which are definitely abandoned. Life starts anew on these "sites" which the historian tries in vain to classify, even identify, and lasts until the next catastrophe.¹⁵

By archeologists of that remote future the great wars of today may be interpreted as invasions or migrations. It will be noted that buildings fell into ruins and that new ones, better or worse, were built; the conclusion will be drawn that one group triumphed over another. The reasons for a German invasion of other European countries, for its repulsion and the subsequent invasion of Germany, will be forgotten. The knowledge of future historians will be as poor in detail, perhaps, as ours of the invasions of Greece which began six thousand years ago and were repeated around the year 3000 B.C. and many times thereafter.

¹⁵ Cohen, p. 27.

THE BODY SOCIAL AND ITS INTEGRATION

PLATO, in his dialogues, discusses the prerequisites for a state in an eminently practical way: he charges Socrates and his friends with selecting a suitable habitat and population for a new colony. We may follow his example and ask whether time has modified the prerequisites.

Nations are built up from divergent groups by assimilation. The first step in the formation of the body social does not differ from the last—the process of assimilation never ceases. The problem in the United States has been the same since the first settlers landed. Some aspect of it is discussed daily in the newspapers and at meetings. How can the many groups, the various minorities—Negroes, Jews, Italians, and others—be Americanized, and how can the older inhabitants be brought to admit that they have been assimilated? Apparently diverse native groups have various abilities; one born in a certain environment becomes a nomad, others farmers, and still others seafarers or traders or warriors. The various characteristics of neighbors act as stimuli to struggle. The co-operation of all these born farmers, merchants, artisans, and others is needed to fulfill the requirements of a body social.

When a nation is formed, not only is the habitat enlarged and the authority divided among many governors and gradually taken over by one, but the traits of the governed themselves are modified. What has been a mixture of types becomes a compound, a national type; the different molecules of which the mixture is made up are changed by mutual adaptation into a consistent blend, a solution, so to speak—a compound having identical molecules. The various groups in the area transform themselves into the single complex group that constitutes a nation.

In order to make one group out of many groups, an organizer, a group more aggressive than the others, better adapted to the habitat, is needed. In the United States the older inhabitants are the organizers;

the newcomers must adjust themselves to their ways, yet in the process the former too are slightly modified and adopt some of the latter's ways. Not only do newcomers and natives adapt to one another, but the two main participants in the dramatic action—the habitat and the inhabitants—are also changed through mutual adjustments.

The plan for the discussion of the formation of the body social is given by the matter itself. First, they are independent groups; by migration, technological changes, or what not, they become neighbors; the organizer steps in and is modified in activating the process from which the nation and its type emerge. When the saturation point is reached, the type characteristic of the nation is stabilized; stabilization may be followed by disintegration.

The road from saturation to disintegration is via specialization. The ossified type had adapted itself to its specific environment and to its partners. If specialization—a kind of individualism—increases to the point of a high degree of egotism, it acts like dynamite on the group.

Common spirit, we may say collectivism, creates groups; extreme individualism disrupts them. Short are those happy periods in human history when the two balance each other. Adaptation, ossification, and disintegration are the three phases in the cycles of groups.

But not all groups are able to unite to form a nation, and not all groups living in the habitat where a nation is formed participate in its integration; some remain foreigners or may even be eliminated. From various examples we shall see what kinds of group seem to be able to combine and what happens when they do not, or when dormant characteristics of the superficially assimilated groups revive. The building of a nation starts if and when by chance the contacts among groups multiply and become so close that the groups cannot live without one another. Isolation may be diminished by environmental changes—swamps are drained, forests cut, or other barriers demolished;¹ or by migration, the infiltration of alien elements into a group. As they settle, new special formations are created within the integrating body, which either absorbs them or is split into parts. In other words, one group emits particles—soldiers, merchants, adventurers, missionaries, emigrants; another accepts them, willingly or unwillingly, and the process ends with the merger of the groups and building up of one nation, or the forming of several nations. We may illustrate the process by Rome's history.

¹ Dahn, I, 139 ff.

Pre-Roman Italy "was a kaleidoscope of races and a mosaic of languages, to which a parallel could be found today only in the Balkans or the Caucasus."² How long had these tribes lived in the neighborhood, trading with one another, but remaining distinct? Why did one tribe one day by force or by cunning begin to organize the others? We do not know. It may have been overpopulation in Rome's local area or deforestation, as was later the case for the German tribes; it may have been some other reason—at any rate, a stimulus acted upon the various bodies social or groups and was responded to by a merger.

Rome, a small city-state, succeeded in gathering the various Latin tribes into a league under her leadership; the highly cultured Etruscans, who after the degeneration of the Etrurian league dwelt in towns separated from and independent of one another and did not co-operate even in times of danger ("we must also suppose that there were political difficulties between the separate communities and social division in the heart of each of them");³ the Samnites; and finally the Greeks of Magna Graecia in the southern part of the peninsula. Rome solidified the union by letting them live as they were accustomed to live, by granting them the same rights as Roman citizens enjoyed, and by planting colonies around the newly dominated lands. If we were to plot all the settlements on a map of the Italian peninsula with dots of different colors—let us say, red for the Etruscans, green for the Latins, yellow for the Samnites, brown for the Greeks, and black for the Romans (Latins too)—we should see, starting from Rome's own territory, lines of black dots radiating in every direction and framing the others. Each ethnic group was encircled by Roman colonies.

The inhabitants of this federation were of diverse origin; they spoke six languages as well as innumerable dialects and still called themselves Latins, Etruscans, Samnites, Greeks, and so forth. Union was facilitated by their lack of coherence. Neither the Etruscans nor the Greeks had ever been a nation; the Latin and Samnite semi-civilized tribes had not yet even reached the state of effective group consciousness. Moreover, all had been accustomed for centuries to trade in Rome, and all lived in a region well separated from the rest of the European continent. The situation was, perhaps, somewhat similar to that which precedes hyphenization—that parlous state when a new arrival is still a German, an Italian, or a Pole and has yet to attain the precarious se-

² Homo, *Primitive Italy and the Beginnings of Roman Imperialism*, p. 131.

³ Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World*, II, 11.

curity of being called a "German-American," "Italian-American," or the like.

Aliens, hyphenates, and Americans—all are milestones in an evolution which begins with migration or invasion, is followed by settlement, and continues its unifying process—retarded or accelerated by environmental conditions, intermarriage, and a common lot—until a new type emerges, with new ways of life.

The wars fought after the Italian peninsula itself was in hand were for better frontiers, struggles to acquire a surrounding protective area—or *glacis*—and to dominate trade routes. Meanwhile, the process of molding the Roman citizen out of various raw materials was going on; it had even reached the point where common danger—an emotional peak—could make a nation of them. When Carthage seemed ready to interfere in the domestic affairs of Messina in Sicily, almost in a moment Rome became a nation in her determination to resist this encroaching menace.

Similar dangers have fired and fused other peoples in other times. Britain, as Trevelyan notes, was at this stage when the still dual monarchy, England and Scotland, entered into the Great Alliance against Louis XIV. It was an island which "with luck and good leading, might in wartime display enough unity, wealth and vigour, to bring to his knees the mighty Louis, the undisputed lord of nobles and poor peasants, who had got rid of his Nonconformists once for all by revoking the Edict of Nantes."⁴ Of a later period and another country a writer comments, "The United States was not then [1918-1919] and has never been anything like a unit except perhaps in certain emotional climaxes like that of April 1917."⁵

Extraordinary events, which give rise to the emotional peaks just mentioned, everyday life with its various exchanges and common institutions—schools, courts—create out of the mixture a compound, out of many nationalities, one. If the co-operation of the many is successful, as in Rome—if to be a member of the evolving state is synonymous with more glory and better standards of living—the development of a general type is more rapid than when conditions are adverse.

The process of assimilation shows the same symptoms whether the infiltrations come to a body social as an invasion or gradually. It may even be said that all nations in their period of formation and again

⁴ Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne*, I, 4.

⁵ Dodd, p. 281.

when declining have had to deal with wave-like penetrations. Those that survived absorbed them; others were absorbed.

The formation of the British Empire is in some ways the modern counterpart of that of Rome. Its nucleus has its own habitat, England. The island has been invaded many times; the *civis Britannicus* has several blood strains. When Caesar's troops settled in Gaul, they made a brief excursion to Britain and prepared for a peaceful penetration. Both Caesar's invasions and the peaceful penetration were preludes to the Claudian occupation.⁶ On the British island Rome had its own *limes*, or border—an ethnic one separated the Romanized natives from those who maintained their barbarian character—and farther north a strategic one, the northwest frontier, the Roman wall, separated the land ruled by Rome from that inhabited by independent tribes.

The Nordic invasion of Britain starts, as Trevelyan observes, with "plundering raids of the Saxon pirates on the coast of Roman Britain well before 300 A.D., and it ends about 1020 when Canute completed the Scandinavian conquest of England by reconciling on equal terms the kindred races of Saxon and Dane. Between these dates the racial character of the country was fundamentally altered."⁷ Rome, weakened, was forced to retire from the British islands; she lost first the non-Latinized and then the Latinized parts of her empire. When the legions departed, Britannia fell into chaos. Reconstruction under the Nordic ruler followed the Nordic invasion, and a new era was begun. Since Canute's days the ethnic character of Britons has undergone "slight continuous modifications by the arrival of Norman, Flemish, Huguenot, Hebrew, Irish and other immigrants."⁸ These successive invasions differ from those that populated the United States mainly in the length of the period during which they occurred. Immigrants have come to the United States in successive waves—Anglo-Saxons, French, Spanish, Germans, Italians, and eastern Europeans. Each contributed to the formation of a new type, the North American, with his new creed and new ways of life.

The length of the process makes little difference to the result—the fusion of ethnic groups. It begins with the mingling of various tribes, clans, and families (later even nationalities) that live near one another at some period following migration or invasion and continue until they become a compound, a nation.

⁶ Trevelyan, *History of England*, p. 16.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁸ *Ibid.*

When the process has reached a certain stage, an organizer (Rome), after accumulating a certain mass, puts out chains by which it binds colonies of aliens to it.⁹ The aliens are assimilated and come to resemble the organizer. There may be (and often is) a variation on this theme when chains are formed because merging groups have one ingredient in common; the common ingredient becomes a series of links joining the aliens to the organizer.

Thucydides' picture of Attica is illustrative.

For in the time of Cecrops and the earliest kings down to Theseus, Attica had been divided into separate towns, each with its town hall and magistrates, and so long as they had nothing to fear they did not come together to consult with the king, but separately administered their own affairs and took counsel for themselves. Sometimes they even made war upon the king, as, for example, the Eleusians with Eumolpus did upon Erechtheus. But when Theseus became king and proved himself a powerful as well as prudent ruler, he not only reorganized the country in other respects, but abolished the councils and magistracies of the minor towns and brought all their inhabitants into union with what is now the city, establishing a single council and town hall, and compelled them, while continuing to occupy each his own lands as before, to use Athens as the sole capital. This became a great city, since all were now paying their taxes to it, and was such when Theseus handed it down to his successors. And from his time even to this day the Athenians have celebrated at the public expense a festival called the Synoecia, in honour of the goddess.¹⁰

Thucydides' description starts when the descendants of various migrants were settled each in his own city. Each city was ruled by aristocrats, *eupatrides*, who, connected by a similar way of life, together made up an international aristocracy. The *eupatrides* of each city-state were links in the chain that kept the new nation together. Those inside the chain, the governed, were, it may be said, local variations of one species; they had their own mores, their own way of life.

Whether the organizer emits chains or the chain is formed by a spontaneous joining of links, the processes are similar. Penetration into a body social starts, as we noted, with a bridgehead; bridgeheads are enlarged not only by further incursions but also by traitors—in Spain, during the Mohammedan invasion, they were called Mozarabs (would-be Arabs); in Europe, in 1939, fifth columnists, fellow travelers; they are renegades whatever name you give them. When, by the

⁹ *Arey*, p. 10.

¹⁰ The Loeb Classical Library, II, 289.

multiplication and intensification of exchanges, various groups become more interconnected, one group is always more aggressive than the others, and the more help and sympathy it finds among its neighbors, the sooner a new type emerges.

The process is always the same. The organizer and the groups that form his chain attempt to assimilate those within the habitat. In the case of Athens, the various types adjusted themselves to one another, and the Athenian was born. In Gaul it was Rome and in Ireland, Britain that acted as Theseus, imposing peace upon the tribes; in feudal times it was the king, the mightiest lord who through his law, his judges, his sheriffs imposed peace on the other lords and their subjects. In the days of Augustus and the Roman colonization, Gaul was divided among sixty tribes. Similarly, when the Anglo-Saxons invaded Ireland it was inhabited by hostile tribes. Each had its own habitat, though raids for the looting and occupation of neighboring territory were daily occurrences.¹¹

Feudal society, especially in its early stages before a hierarchy became well established, was like the tribal. The feudal lord was the leader of a group; villeins and serfs working on his domain and merchants and artisans who put themselves under his protection were his subjects. All lived on the lord's domain, whose center was the castle, a stronghold fortified by nature and man. In his own realm, or *pays*, the lord was a real sovereign, exercising all the rights of one—holding court, summoning councils, administering justice. A veritable army followed his standard. He kept peace among his subjects, assured them employment and a living, and defended them from attack. Outside his own *pays* he was a *hobereau*—a bird of prey—who led his people to plunder his neighbors and itinerant merchants. Out of these various tribal or feudal groups nations were formed.¹²

Rome, with her policy of establishing military colonies in alien lands—Theseus by uniting the several cities into Athens—the organizer and his chain—these are just random examples to show how an organizer builds up an organism. Militarily dominated border areas beyond the boundaries of sovereign states in Europe and the expanding frontier in the development of the United States and Russia¹³ are other instances of the same phenomenon. If press reports are true, the

¹¹ Trevelyan, *History of England*, pp. 360 ff.; *Cambridge Ancient History*, IX, 54, 545.

¹² Funck-Brentano, pp. 4 ff.; Bainville, p. 28.

¹³ Turner, *The Frontier in American History*, pp. 1-39; Morison and Commager, I, 250 ff.; Vernadsky, *History of Russia*, pp. 60, 90, 106, 118.

USSR is taking over farm land in the trans-Danubian part of Hungary and colonizing it with Russian soldiers. The colonists on such border areas or marches are intended as links between the northern Slavs (Czechoslovakians) and the southern—links in a chain locking in the non-Slavic Hungarian and Rumanian populations. The Germans, when they were advancing against the Slavs, had similar marches, one of which was Prussia. The various marches of the Prussian chain were connected when in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries Poland was divided and colonized by Germans and Russians. The pioneer population in these militarized border areas, dominated by an expanding nation, is like a frontier; early Americans advancing westward and Prussians on the move toward the east were alike links in a chain reaching out to more or less empty regions and enclosing all the various groups behind them.

Pioneers attempting to proselytize, going forth with the organizer's creed, sometimes lose their faith and are themselves converted. To be able to emit chains, to assimilate alien groups, the organizer must have a certain mass.

The attempt of the Romans to Latinize the Celtic civilization in Britain broke down because there were too few Romans.¹⁴ And the attempt of the Norman-French aristocracy and clergy to Gallicize England, though it had great and permanent consequences, was gradually abandoned because of racial antipathies, just as the attempt to Anglicize Ireland has recently been abandoned for the same cause. The Nordic conquest of England had more permanent results than any of these conquests, and it was secured by the gradual displacement of Celts by Nordic peoples in the richest agricultural districts of the island. The distinctive character of the modern Englishman is Nordic tempered by Welsh, not Welsh tempered by Nordic. In Scotland the Celtic element is stronger, but in Scotland, also, the Nordic language and character have prevailed.¹⁵

The importance of numbers cannot be overrated. The organizing nucleus cannot put forth a chain until it has itself reached a certain mass. In the development of every kind of organism the cell movements that lead to the production of body form follow the growth of the initial organism.¹⁶ It may even be called one of the tragedies of human history—to which we shall refer later—that certain organizers, nations which in our own days feel impelled to carry the white man's

¹⁴ Trevelyan, *History of England*, p. 28.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁶ Arey, pp. 8 ff.

burden, are putting out too many chains. Some links in the chain do not assimilate the local inhabitants, but are assimilated by them. Such failures weaken the organizer, since the organizing element and its chain constitute the nucleus and the skeleton of nation and empire.

The failure to Latinize England may have been due to ecological conditions—that is, the northern land had its influence on the invaders and transformed them, counteracting the effects of Latinization. Moreover, when invaders are so numerous as to strain the tolerance of the natives, the latter's resistance toughens.

All invaders and invaded, territorially separated groups and merging groups, and their more or less final end-product, the nation, have a similar structure. They are like complexly organized atoms. Each consists of a dominating core—Rome or Britain, the organizers—held together by some tie, such as religion, language, common economic interests, a similar mode of life, or the belief that they are children of the same ancestors. They are surrounded by electrons or protons, elements partly homogeneous, partly heterogeneous. We call the tie that binds the homogeneous elements into a unit with common interests and acting more or less effectively as a spell on subordinate groups around them the *nexus socialis*, or binding force. The statement that groups have a *nexus socialis* does not imply that the link is merely psychological. The *nexus* is evidence that numerous individuals molded by biological, environmental, and historical factors are associated as a group. Why some can form a group, and others not, is an unsolved question. No doubt the *nexus*, like other man-created factors, has its own influence.

A Russian anthropologist, S. M. Shirokogoroff,¹⁷ defines "ethnos" (nation) as a unit of people speaking the same language, recognizing their common origin, possessing a complex of customs as traditions and differentiated from other groups. I feel that the definition may cover the nucleus of the nation when it has reached the peak of its evolution or even a nation after it has regressed. During integration and disintegration, during assimilation and differentiation, the symptoms mentioned gradually appear and disappear. The process of merging begins with a general belief, religion, or creed. As the groups become assimilated, they have more and more characteristics in common. The culmination is belief in common descent.

¹⁷ *Ethnical Unit and Milieu*, Shanghai, Evans, 1924, p. 27.

When, again, the belief in common ancestors makes groups rigid, new prophets of new religions appear and sometimes succeed in opening the road for expansion. Hellenes are no longer the descendants of the same ancestors, but those with the same culture, wrote Isocrates when Philip of Macedon tried to make one Greek nation.

The more unified the elements, the less the pressure needed to hold them together. In other words, the group tie operates as a restraint on the individual. Loyalty creates duties, and the deeper the loyalty, the more willingly the duties are performed. The weaker the tie—the less responsive members are to the call of leaders—the more pressure must be applied to hold the group together so that its members will answer challenges in a uniform way, that is, behave as a unit.

The consistency of this more or less dense and concentrated body varies with the number and power of its heterogeneous elements and their relation to the homogeneous mass in which they are imbedded. Each nation is fundamentally ethnocentric. Ethnocentrism is according to W. G. Sumner a view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are seated and rated with reference to it. . . . Members of other groups, who follow other codes, are looked upon as perverse, immoral, savage."¹⁸ The dominant group within a nation, the nucleus, so to speak, is the bearer of this ethnocentrism.

The more organized and fused the homogeneous and heterogeneous elements, the more the nation separates itself from other organisms, other nations.

The nucleus, or elite, is not static. It may be modified by newcomers, superimposed by peaceful migration or by armed invasion. One group may merge with another, or it may split into several groups; an internal revolution may radically alter the dominant and its nexus.

There is a special type of invasion within a society already formed: a subservient group rises to displace a dominant. I call this 'vertical' invasion. When the various regions of Gaul were united into one nation, France, the local lords with their local customs merged into a single French court aristocracy. Religion and the same way of life were the bonds holding its members. The French aristocracy under its great ruler Louis XIV was Roman Catholic; its aim was to Catholicize first France, then the world.¹⁹ As religion was replaced by nationality as a nexus, the dominant aristocracy was replaced by a new bourgeoisie,

¹⁸ Sumner, Keller, and Davie, I, 356.

¹⁹ Hazard, I, 108.

whose binding force under its great ruler Napoleon was ethnic; though it did not attract all Catholics, it did attract all Frenchmen. The modern struggle for power of a new class—the workers—is an attempt to make another change in the nucleus and its nexus. The tie of the proletarians is not nationality, but an economic creed appealing to all proletarians.

To illustrate this transformation from a religious community into a national community, then into an economic community, an example may be taken from contemporary history. One of the great Americanizing agencies is the trade union. By transforming national groups into interest groups the evolution of the new type was furthered. Addressing the American Academy of Political and Social Science in 1906, Grover G. Huebner said:

"The most pronounced instance of union Americanization is the activity of the United Mine Workers. There are twenty-six nationalities now working in the coal fields, with a growing difficulty in the form of a movement away from the mines by the Irish, Welsh, English, Germans, and Scotch, and the coming in of an increasing number of Poles, Ruthenians, Hungarians, Italians and Bohemians. Today the union members consist of over 60 percent of foreign birth, one half of whom cannot speak the English language. Before the union entered, these people were formed into hostile groups which made Americanization impossible. The Lithuanians, for example, were bitter enemies of the Poles; the Magyars were the enemies of the Slovaks. At first separate nationalities had separate unions, because they could not be induced to organize together. In this form they were first taught that they had common interests. Then it was that men of the common nationalities and districts were organized together. Now it is not so much a question as to whether a man is Polish or Italian, as to whether he is union or non-union."

The transition is not necessarily from one creed to another, it may also be the emergence of one or more national groups from a chaotic society. In the Balkans in the 1830's the Hellenes,²⁰ dominated by the Turks, split into Serbs, Bulgars, Rumanians—each group having its own creed. The changes in creed are consequences of changes in the nucleus of a nation. Horizontal or vertical invasion eliminates the old dominants, and the elimination is followed by a new adaptation, by the evolving of a new nation. Revolution, war or peaceful penetration in a body social which has lost its equilibrium through attack or for other reasons, is followed by a clash of races, cultures, and customs, by the breaking

²⁰ Schevill and Gewehr, p. 303.

down of internal order, and finally by chaos. Chaos, in turn, may be followed by the adaptation of the new dominants and their new followers.

After invasion, whether by barbarians, the more highly cultured, or subordinates in successful revolt, comes adaptation. The new slaves educate their new masters, or vice versa. The Greeks educated the Romans,²¹ the Gallo-Roman aristocrats civilized their invaders and, as their lawyers and advisers, helped them manage their estates.²² Moslems, Hebrews, and Spaniards made by their translations the science of the ancient world available to the Latin West,²³ and the French helped to civilize Britain. Britain and other countries, as new masters, have civilized the rest of the world. The educator never succeeds in making his pupil a replica of himself, yet his pupil inevitably takes on some of his characteristics. After a period of adaptation, vertical, like horizontal, invasion creates a new nation.

New dominant compounds differ from the old, and from a chaotic mixture, not only in their components but also in their structure when the process of adaptation is far advanced. In Rome, as in Britain, the time came when the natives revolted against anything foreign. To Swift the imitator of French customs was as despicable as the *Graeculus* was to Juvenal.²⁴ The specific national character is praised: the man who observes the mores of his grandfathers, the "simple life of by-gone days." Such reactions we call "Cationic," after Marcus Porcius Cato,²⁵ the Senator Borah of his time. The resistance of such natives to later invaders is evidence that when the various groups in a territory mix, something new is created by mutual adaptation, and that when the stage of saturation is reached, invasions are repulsed, though individual newcomers may remain if assimilated.

By educating provincials to be British and to live according to Britain's rule, Britons—the Romans of modern history—have built up their own cosmopolitan empire. Of the Roman Empire it is said, "it never was nor tried to be a world-wide state of national type—a state in which one nation subdues and forcibly assimilates other na-

²¹ Colin, p. 541.

²² Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, pp. 374 ff.; Dill, *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age*, p. 215.

²⁴ Juvenal, *Satires* III, The Loeb Classical Library, p. 37.

²³ Fisher, I, 369.

²⁵ Rostovtzeff (*A History of the Ancient World*, II, 78): Cato "openly preached the doctrine that Greek Civilization was ruinous to Roman Life."

tions to itself, it became by constitution more and more cosmopolitan." ²⁶ True, indeed, but the skeleton of this cosmopolitan state, to which all parts adhered and which decided its organization and functioning, consisted of the "Romans" as they emerged from the melting-pot, Italy.

This skeleton was characterized, in the provinces as in the Eternal City itself, by certain habits, a certain way of life. But there was a great difference between the Romans of Italy and the Gallo-Romans or Latinized barbarians. Though the barbarians were educated in Rome and according to Roman ways—as Indian princes are educated in Oxford or Cambridge—they retained their secondary ties at home, their local color. When the Empire was integrating, the local color faded, but a secondary nexus between the Latinized aristocrat and his parochial subordinates in the provinces was still effective.

Even an empire made up of many nations will have as skeleton a single "nation" or group bound together by some basic tie and attracting subordinates through such bonds as history, language, and religion. Such an organism never depends entirely upon the spell of the dominant. Centralized institutions, such as a national army, courts, and civil administration, help to keep the heterogeneous elements within the empire.

The empire of the Turks, for example, was in the latter half of the fifteenth century a continuation of the Byzantine Empire. Its territory was a somewhat enlarged Byzantium, its inhabitants were accustomed for centuries to live under the sway of Constantinople, and its social order was the feudalism of medieval days. The new managers, Mohammedan Turks, replaced the Byzantine aristocrats. They could not keep their subservients in order without a friendly local aristocracy and a small, select body of "watchdogs," the Janizaries.²⁷

The difference between the bonds linking the members of the skeleton itself and those binding other elements of the organism to it is demonstrated in a great empire now under construction, the USSR. Here the skeleton consists of bolshevists, who have a common creed and educate elites in each smaller national Soviet in the theory of bolshevism, letting them go their own way as far as national and religious ideologies and practice are concerned. These secondary bonds keep the local Soviets together within the USSR. Before a neighbor's habitat is annexed, the ground is prepared by setting up the frame-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 242-43.

²⁷ Toynbee and Kirkwood, p. 24.

work of the prospective victim's Soviet. For example, in 1924 the Moldavian Soviet Republic was set up within the Ukraine to serve as political magnet for the peoples of Bessarabia. When the USSR acquired Bukovina and Bessarabia, it added them to the Moldavian Republic—doubtless in the hope that it could eventually acquire the entire territory Moldavia had when at its height—an area including the Rumanian district known as Moldavia. If this hope is fulfilled, the USSR boundaries on its Carpathian frontiers will extend to a point west of the Danube delta in the Black Sea. A similar extension along the Caucasian border toward Turkey is being prepared by the formation of an Armenian Soviet which will act as a magnet for the Armenians in Turkey.

The Karelian Soviet on Finland's border and other similar Soviets in the Far East are such frames. Like Rome and Britain, Moscow has its own cosmopolitan aristocracy, made up of several leading groups, with a more or less common creed and culture, on the one hand, and more or less local color, on the other.

The watchdogs, however, guard only the primary nexus, bolshevism; as far as secondary ties are concerned—nationality and religion—tolerance is preached. Nationalistic states are tolerant in matters of religion; bolshevists, in matters of nationality. The core, the nucleus, therefore, consists of various elements loyal to the USSR, and each people in turn is loyal to its own Soviet.²⁸

The process of adaptation is gradual. First the nucleus, the dominant group, is formed out of several related groups; then by force or cunning it attracts to itself those elements which it eventually transforms or by which it is transformed.

The process—once started—may succeed or fail. Rome succeeded where Alexander the Great had failed. When he conquered Persia and broke the power of the rival state which had prevented free trade and the spread of Greek cities in Asia, he aspired to unite the Greeks and the Persians so that from their mixture a single stock should spring and from the peaceful common life of the people a unified civilization—happiness and prosperity. About the method he had long wavered. At first he had the idea of transporting Greeks to Asia and Asiatics to Greece, planting innumerable colonies to further

²⁸ R. Broda, "The Revival of Nationalities in the Soviet Union," *The American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1931, pp. 82 ff. D. S. Mirsky, "Russian Post-revolutionary Nationalism," *Contemporary Review*, Aug., 1923, pp. 191 ff.

his hopes. When the victorious army returning from India reached Susa, capital of Persia, in February, 324 B.C., there was "put into effect an act which demonstrated in the most emphatic fashion the royal wish to bring about the fusion of the Greek, Macedonian and Iranian peoples." This was the marriage *en masse* of Macedonian men with the daughters of the Orient. "This amazing and unique wedding celebration with its great tents and hundreds of couches . . . was intended to erase by the most sacred ceremony the distinction between the conquerors and the vanquished."²⁹ But one mass marriage could not accomplish as much as a long series of marriages during succeeding generations under happy circumstances. A time of peace and quiet is needed for the process of adaptation.

Neighbors may retard or prevent the building of nations that are potentially a menace, but not even freedom from outside influence and prolonged peace can fuse fundamentally different groups into one. An illustration of the fact that only certain elements can be united is the contrast between the union of England and Scotland and that of England and Ireland. Great Britain did not exist until 1705. At the end of the seventeenth century Scotland and England were two countries ruled by one monarch. The two nations, however, were antagonistic to each other. A Scottish economist (Fletcher), writing at the end of the seventeenth century, "portrays in contrast to the busy opulence of London the lugubrious vista of seaports, formerly the scenes of a thriving commerce, falling into ruin; of an ever decreasing mercantile navy, of a decaying agriculture and industry, languishing for want of capital."³⁰ Fletcher's contemporary, Seton, writes: "Ever since our King's accession to the crown of England, the English have always used Scots as the ape did the cat's clutch to pull the chestnut out of the fire."³¹ The unfortunate colonial enterprise (Darien) increased animosity between the neighbors. The head of the dual Monarchy, William, in his answer to the address of the Lords in February, 1700, said: "nothing would more contribute to security and happiness of both kingdoms . . . [than if] some happy expedient may be found for making them one people."³² Later in the year, a dying man, he repeated his exhortation in favor of union: "War with Scotland, he felt must otherwise, sooner or later, be the result of international friction."³³

²⁹ Radet, p. 343; Droysen, p. 507.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

³⁰ MacKinnon, p. 17.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

The wisdom of English and Scottish leaders and fear of the aggressive policy of Catholic France made them choose union. But as Dicey and Rait point out, the Act of Union came to be accepted only gradually as Great Britain became prosperous. Even after union, common opinion held that "the unity of a State and the concord of citizens could only be preserved by unity of religious or rather theological belief."

Whoever yet a union saw
Of Kingdoms without faith or law?
. . . best he could call our common weal
A vessel with a double keel.³⁴

So wrote Swift when by the Act of Union the Episcopal Church became the Church of England and the Presbyterian the Church of Scotland.

The adaptation between the English and the Scottish dominants ended in a common type. Religion as a nexus faded; nationality—to be British—gained in importance, and a merging of the elements in the nucleus became possible. In Ireland, on the other hand, there was a kind of adaptation, too, but in such a way that English inhabitants of southern Ireland became Irish, and the Irish in England, English. They did not evolve that special kind of dominant class which is half metropolitan, half parochial, able at the same time to understand imperial London and to express its thoughts in parochial Irish. The adaptation failed, and in the twentieth century England was obliged to agree to the independence of Ireland.³⁵ This is not to ignore Ireland's passionate and bloody history, Ireland having been under closer domination by far than was Scotland. But such a history is evidence of the inability of the two peoples to fuse; the reasons are irrelevant here.

The fact is evident that while certain ethnic groups adapt themselves to one another, and two or more are able to form a new type, other groups, even when living in the same habitat, are unable to do so. In the United States, Nordics are apparently more easily assimilated than the so-called Mediterraneans. Negroes are assimilated in South America, but not, or to a very slight extent, in North America.

The better-known history of the great melting pots in the Western

³⁴ Dicey and Rait, p. 259.

³⁵ Trevelyan, in *England under Queen Anne*, p. 171, writes that in the early days of the eighteenth century the Union of England and Ireland was possible: "But it was not to be. England let the golden moment slip." See also B. Williams, pp. 271 ff.

Hemisphere, the United States, Brazil, and other South American states, may give investigators clues to similar processes in the less-known history of old or medieval Europe.

Wherever groups are increasingly connected by exchanges, or radiations, the more aggressive among them, when it reaches a certain mass, will send out members in an attempt to invade niches, chain them to itself, assimilate them, or be assimilated by them; form with them a nation. The nation so formed out of various ingredients will have its own group articulation. The organizer as a nucleus dominates by persuasion the homogeneous elements—those who are, or are on the road to being, of the new type—and by compulsion a certain number of heterogeneous elements—those who cannot be assimilated. The nation has a *nexus socialis*, but each group within it has a secondary nexus.

If outside or inside influences dissolve the skeleton, change the nexus, the nation disintegrates. Defects within it, differences between groups and men that have been dormant may awaken and cause disintegration. There is, therefore, only a difference of *degree* between the resultant centrifugal and centripetal forces among groups which cannot form a nation and among the more or less well-adapted groups which have united in a national body. An increase in the centripetal forces may weld together for an unpredictable period groups that have resisted assimilation; an increase in centrifugal forces may arouse dormant differences, increase the power of heterogeneous elements, and disintegrate the nation.

THE BODY SOCIAL AND ITS DISINTEGRATION

IT WOULD BE an error to think that behind the easy, or difficult, or even unsuccessful process of adaptation there are only—or, even mainly—ethnological factors. It is my opinion that even men of the same race cannot adapt to each other if their ways of life, morals, or whatever one may call their characteristic behavior, are different. We have already seen in the case of Ireland an instance of inability to merge, despite its constant contact with a close neighbor that made strong efforts to assimilate it. A close-up of the long experience of the Greek city-states will further illustrate the point. Here the ethnic and religious factors were far more homogeneous than they are between England and Ireland.

Each state in Greece was the product of a unifying process such as we have seen in the case of Athens, but every such process has its limits, set by the character of the inhabitants themselves and the degree of their adaptability. Athens was the city of the Ionians; Sparta of the Dorians. Both absorbed numerous other city-states. In spite of blood and cultural ties, Athens and Sparta were ideological opposites—the one democratic, and the other totalitarian—and they could not form a common state until they found a common denominator in an international aristocracy. Corinth was another type of political nucleus, more purely commercial in its frame of reference.

Every competent historian of ancient Greece points out the connection between her geological formation and her political organizations. Glotz, for example, says:

When I look at the relief map of Greece I see that this country is partitioned into numerous little rectangular sections, dominated individually by a central hill and separated from one another by high mountains. Nowhere on this terrain do I find a trace of those wide basins which nature designs for the concentration of large populations. The result of this physical partitioning was political division, and all these small sections, scooped out of

the earth, were ready to receive small groups of people and to assure their independent existence. There were as many city states in this region as there were islands and closed valleys. It was in this world that the word "Polis" was born, and it was here that it received its full meaning.¹

In this scene set by nature the Greek city-states evolved, well-integrated units separated in every respect from their neighbors.

Take two neighbouring cities; everything divides them. The sacred bounds which mark the limits of their territory trace almost insurmountable barriers between religions and laws, calendars, money-systems, weights and measures, interests and affections.²

But the geographical formation of Greece alone cannot explain this spirit of particularism. Her colonies also were parochial, loving their freedom and fighting for it in a landscape quite suited to be the home of great states. The reason for their parochialism may be found in their differing individual characters—a result of their history.

In his *Politics* Aristotle says, "There are places where the law aims at one definite object. That object is in all such cases power, as in Sparta and Crete. Both the systems of education and the bulk of the laws are framed in the main with a view to war."³ Other states considered the welfare of the citizen their principal concern. Preparation for war was often neglected or accomplished in haste and too late when attack was imminent. The antithesis between these two types of state and two ways of life—ideological and economic differences—and the demand for freedom to govern their own subordinates in each city-state prevented a larger union.

Greece and the territory colonized by the Greek city-states remained divided among independent units. They were connected, it is true, by a continuous exchange of men, goods, and ideas; they competed for the control of trade routes, other states, and colonies. Local freedom, so often a slogan for wars, was not freedom of the individual, but of the dominants to govern as they pleased. Athens, because of her geographical position, history, wealth, and other factors, had a predominant position in the fifth century B.C.; other city-states, in other centuries, but the union advocated by orators and poets was never achieved.

Macedonia, after it had been admitted under Philip II to membership in the Delphic League, and its citizens to participation in the

¹ Glotz and Cohen, I, 8.

² Glotz, p. 34.

³ The Loeb Classical Library, p. 543.

Olympian Games, tried to unite all city-states in a federation; after the battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.), which sealed the doom of Athens, Philip essayed to do from without what Hellas had never been able to do from within to form a sort of national organization. The Corinthian Federation, organized in agreement with the Greek cities, guaranteed the freedom and independence of each member. It was the duty of the military forces at the disposal of the federation council to see to it that no state interfered with the freedom of another, its constitution, or the property of its citizens. The council had supreme executive power and was charged with the prevention of intrafederal clashes. Membership on it was proportional to the population of the constituent city-states. Yet at the very time of its inception "many Greeks refused to regard it as a unification of anything, but an instrument of foreign control; the delegates met under the shadow of the Macedonian garrison in Acrocorinthus."⁴

When Philip died, leaving his throne to an untried youth later to be known as Alexander the Great, several Greek cities, including Athens and Thebes, thought it an opportune moment to strike for real independence. The new young ruler of Macedonia quickly put down this revolt and re-established the Corinthian Federation under his tutelage—for a day, as it were, for presently all the "glory that was Greece" was simply a component of Alexander's new empire.

After his untimely death the empire won by his sword split into three parts—Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt—governed by three Diadochi—Alexander's generals turned governors, who soon took for themselves the title "king" in their respective areas. They promptly began to quarrel among themselves, and in the ensuing chaos the Greek city-states regained their independence. Independence again meant competition, better frontiers to dominate others, and better frontiers, in turn, meant war.

The attempt of Macedonia to unite the Greek city-states had failed. Except as they were held together by artificial force, each went its own way. The union split into its natural units: Athens, Sparta, Corinth, Thebes. Subsequently, they lived in inimical units, which underlines our point. After the Aegean world expanded, its parts became more interdependent; great powers such as Macedonia, Syria, Egypt, and finally Rome evolved, and the pivot of Mediterranean civilization shifted from the Greek peninsula to Rome.

⁴ Cohen, p. 283; Glotz and Cohen, III, 370 ff.

For many years Egypt held the balance of power. The city-states lost in importance, but maintained their autonomy as second-rate—or third-rate powers—independent when more than one of the stronger states wanted to occupy one of them and the potential victim was jealously protected; vassals when Macedonia, Egypt, or Syria divided them by agreement. The city-state, the small organism with a small army and navy, could not survive in a world of large states. To accommodate themselves to changed circumstances and become in some measure a match for the larger powers, some of them organized into leagues, of which the Achean and the Aetolian leagues are the best known. Formed primarily to wage war and negotiate peace, they adopted common currencies and commercial usages to good effect, in one case for nearly a century. The merger of the city-states into greater units was not invariably successful. Only where a community, “ethnos,” existed and made of the citizens of several city-states one nation could a federal state be organized. Parochial city-states, whose citizens were not connected by any kind of *nexus socialis*, resisted assimilation.⁵ Something more than ethnic relation is needed to adapt group to group and merge them in an ethnos. What is this something more? Is it common tradition, a common way of life, or many other common traits? It is impossible to say exactly. Outside pressure, the fear of neighbors, may further amalgamation. Secondary ties, the local color—religion in addition to race, or vice versa—may be helpful. In the world of the Greek city-states, however, “Ye, all of one blood, all brethren, sprinkling the selfsame altars, from the selfsame laver, that ye Hellenes, with barbarian foes armed looking on, fight and destroy Hellenes.”⁶ Here were men of not only the same origin but also the same culture, yet even this, used as an argument by great orators in the hour of danger, did not prevent Sparta from intriguing with the Persians against Athens.

It may be said that the more stabilized a type is—the more crystallized its character, ways of life, beliefs, and thoughts—the less its general mutability and the more difficult for it to adapt. It is not easy to form one nation out of several which pride themselves on their past. By the same token, wars or internal revolutions may eliminate the leading class in various areas of a potential nation, and when the bearers of ethnocentricism disappear and new dominants form new

⁵ *Cambridge Ancient History*, VII, 8.

⁶ Aristophanes *Lysistrata* (The Loeb Classical Library), tr. by B. R. Rogers, p. 109.

groups, the merger which was formerly impossible may become real.

Byzantium, the united Greek state—the Eastern Roman Empire—was formed when the purging of the parochial aristocracy by war and oppression made adaptation possible. The core was changed, and the Greco-Roman leading class replaced the Athenian, the Spartan, and other aristocracies.

Parochialism impeded the merging of Greek city-states into one Hellenic nation. Communalism, as this is called nowadays,⁷ may also render difficult or even impossible the integration of a coherent nation from various groups within a state. Centripetal and centrifugal forces, each represented by a group or combination of groups, operate to further or impede the integrating process. A view of this struggle at close range may help us to clarify our conception of the qualities which facilitate or hinder adaptation.

Our first example is taken from the history of Canada. In 1838 Lord Durham—popularly nicknamed “Radical Jack”⁸ and one of the campaigners for parliamentary reform in England whose persistence contributed to its being put through—was appointed Governor General of all British North America, including Newfoundland. His mandate, unprecedented in scope, carried instructions to report on ways and means of settling the problems of these colonies. The feud between Lower and Upper Canada had long troubled the Colonial Office, the Cabinet, Parliament, and the general public. His report makes interesting reading.

I expected to find a contest between a government and a people. I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state. I found a struggle not of principles but of races, and I perceived that it would be idle to attempt any amelioration of laws or institutions until we could first succeed in terminating the deadly animosity that now separates the inhabitants of Lower Canada into the hostile divisions of French and English.

The national feud forces itself on the very senses, irresistibly and palpably, as the origin or the essence of every dispute which divides the community; we discover that dissensions, which appear to have another origin, are but forms of this constant and all-pervading quarrel, and that every contest is one of French and English in the outset, or becomes so ere it has run its course.⁹

⁷ Hancock, I, 429 ff.

⁸ *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, II, 337.

⁹ Lucas, II, 16.

The insurrection of 1837 in Lower Canada had completed the division.

The conquering British armies had found on the banks of the St. Lawrence an agricultural population which from generation to generation lived its happy, contented, unchanging life isolated from the rest of the world. . . . The real menace came not from the new political power, but from the establishment in their midst of a different type of life. A group of bustling Anglo-Saxon merchants, heirs of generations of commercialism, worshippers of what commercialism considered progress, threatened the good old life. The old province must be reshaped to serve their ends, the old ways must be broken down in the interests of every improvement that would facilitate modern business. All the way through the history of the province, from 1763 to 1837, conflict between agriculturists of particularly conservative stamp and mercantilism of an aggressive type can be discerned.¹⁰

This economic clash was intensified by the fact that the agricultural interest was French and the more important mercantile interests were in the hands of English traders. In Canada race antagonism created political disturbances. The report notes, however, that in a parallel situation in Louisiana the same two races co-operated, under more favorable political conditions.

Every provision was made in Louisiana for securing to both races a perfectly equal participation in all the benefits of the Government. . . . In all cases in which convenience requires it, the different parties use their respective languages, in the courts of justice, and in both branches of the legislature. In every judicial proceeding, all documents which pass between the parties are required to be in both languages.¹¹

Here, as in Canada, Lord Durham found that differences between the French and the Anglo-Saxons caused great jealousy. Free competition, not interfered with by government, made them at first enemies, then rivals. Nevertheless, the outlook was hopeful; for this he cites concrete reasons:

The distinction still lasts, and still causes a good deal of division; the society of each race is said to be in some measure distinct, but not by any means hostile; and some accounts represent the social mixture to be very great. All accounts represent the division of the races as becoming gradually less and less marked; their newspapers are printed in the two languages on opposite pages; their local politics are entirely merged in those of the

¹⁰ New, p. 320.

¹¹ Lucas, II, 301.

Union; and instead of discovering in their papers any vestiges of a quarrel of races, they are found to contain a repetition of the same party recriminations and party arguments, which abound in all other parts of the federation.

The explanation of this amalgamation is obvious. The French of Louisiana, when they were formed into a state, in which they were a majority, were incorporated into a great nation, of which they constituted an extremely small part. The eye of every ambitious man turned naturally to the great centre of federal affairs, and the high prizes of federal ambition. The tone of politics was taken from those by whose hands its highest powers were wielded; the legislation and government of Louisiana were from the first insignificant, compared with the interests involved in the discussions at Washington. It became the object of every aspiring man to merge his French, and adopt completely an American nationality. What was the interest of individuals, was also the interest of the State. It was its policy to be represented by those who would acquire weight in the councils of the federation. To speak only a language foreign to that of the United States, was consequently a disqualification for a candidate for the posts of either senator or representative; the French qualified themselves by learning English, or submitted to the superior advantages of their English competitors. The representation of Louisiana in Congress is now entirely English, while each of the federal parties in the State conciliates the French feeling, by putting up a candidate of that race. But the result is, that the union is never disturbed by the quarrels of these races; and the French language and manners bid fair, in no long time, to follow their laws, and pass away like the Dutch peculiarities of New York.¹²

The formation of political parties along purely ethnic lines is a symptom of parochialism. Majority and minority cannot exchange places, and the minority is relegated to a position of permanent, bitter, and ineffective opposition. Such a rigid group formation was characteristic of Canada at the time in question; the body social was divided into sects which tended to become more and more independent. Members of such sects either have no loyalty to the common group or their loyalty is on the decline.

When, as in Louisiana, membership in political parties is independent of the ethnic division, then majority and minority can exchange places, the group formation is flexible, and the body social is healthy, being divided along party lines and imbued with the same national

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 302-3.

aims; each party may advocate a different method of achieving them, but all parties believe in the common creed.

Consider the political oppositions in any democratic state—as, Tories, Whigs, and Labour in England, Republicans and Democrats in the United States. Members of all parties have certain beliefs in common and the conviction that public affairs should be conducted according to their principles. Any individual who is in sympathy may join. Like the Vicar of Bray, each member may switch his allegiance when he thinks it opportune. A party either is a majority in the government or influences affairs by minority tactics. Changes in membership or principles from the majority to the minority position are usually carried out without violence; in short, everything vital to the life of the group is flexible. As Lord Durham observes:

A member of the opposition in this country [England] acts and speaks with the contingency of becoming minister constantly before his eyes, and he feels, therefore, the necessity of proposing no course, and of asserting no principles, on which he would not be prepared to conduct the government, if he were immediately offered it. But the colonial demagogue bids high for popularity without the fear of future exposure. Hopelessly excluded from power, he expresses the wildest opinions, and appeals to the most mischievous passions of the people, without any apprehension of having his sincerity or prudence hereafter tested by being placed in a position to carry his views into effect; and thus the prominent places in the ranks of opposition are occupied for the most part by men of strong passions, and merely declamatory powers, who think but little of reforming the abuses which serve them as topics for existing discontent.¹³

When the division is along sectarian lines, changes may be difficult or impossible; you may join a party, but you are born or brought up a member of a sect. Your party may be the minority today and the majority tomorrow; your sect, on the contrary, is either dominant or subordinate and can change its position only by revolution.

In Lord Durham's days the aim was to unite the two British colonies, Upper and Lower Canada, into one; in 1860 the merger was carried out, and the more independent Canada has become, the more Canadian its inhabitants.

The story of the Union of South Africa is similar. Ethnic antagonism

¹³ Quoted in *The Colonial Problem*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 234.

between the Boers and the British led to war; after the war four independent colonies had great difficulty in managing their common affairs.¹⁴ Finally a union was formed. Will the English- and the Dutch-speaking South Africans be able to overcome their traditional antipathy and unite in one nation? ¹⁵

A keen observer of conditions mentions

"the extreme sensitiveness of the social and spiritual texture which controversy can so easily tear." "The ground on which educational processes must work, the cultural material through which the educator operates, are all intensively alive and palpitating. They are penetrated through and through with historic memories, with growing passions, and with intimate personal and group loyalties. The most innocent and colorless may acquire a sudden significance under such conditions. All unwittingly and with the best intentions teacher and administrator may raise a storm and the lightnings begin to play. It is not perversity or mere quarrelsomeness of factious self-assertion which charges the electric atmosphere. It is just history." ¹⁶

I have emphasized the distinction between parties and sects as revealing the flexible or rigid articulation within a nation. Sectarian opposition is not necessarily ethnic; it may be religious or ideological. In Newfoundland in the early twentieth century, for example, under pressure of competition among the churches, politics underwent a process of "modernization." Methods foreign to the British tradition were introduced: the "spoils system" in public appointments, personal enrichment, corruption in granting contracts and wangling favors for political supporters and constituents. Of this situation the parliamentary (Amulree) Commission observes:

Things had reached such a pass . . . that the electors preferred to vote for candidates who openly pursued their own fortune at the public expense. The electors argued that, if a man proved himself capable of using his political opportunities for his personal advantage, he would be better equipped to promote the advantage of his constituents; an honest man would only preach to them.¹⁷

These political malpractices were caused by religious sectarianism. The parliamentary commission reported:

It may have been expected . . . that the influence of the churches, so strong in Newfoundland, would have acted as a check to political mal-

¹⁴ *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, VIII, 569 ff.

¹⁵ Smuts, quoted in Hancock, I, 278.

¹⁶ Clarke, pp. 9 ff.

¹⁷ Quoted in Hancock, I, 404.

practices. It is clear from our investigations that this has not been the case. . . . For members of successive administrations have been led, consciously or unconsciously, to place the interest of particular sections of the Church before the good of the Country as a whole.¹⁸

From our various examples we may without rashness conclude that if the inhabitants of a territory are articulated into sects, each loyal only to his own sect—or, more accurately, loyal to the sect when sectarian and national interests conflict—then within that area a situation will exist similar to that of the Greek world of city-states, and only a power from without—a Macedonia—can temporarily unite them. It is irrelevant whether the sects are religious, ethnic, or ideologically differing groups; when there is between them no link uniting them into a single group—as the French and the Anglo-Saxons in Louisiana were united by their relation to the United States—the tendency will be toward disintegration.

In these circumstances only a power from without can increase the centripetal force of nationally-minded groups within the state to the point where its effect is greater than that of the centrifugal tendencies created by the sects. The outsider, we must emphasize, can successfully employ its additional power for union only when there is at least a nationality-minded or empire-minded minority. Or it may by invasion and colonization create such a minority. The principle is the same, though seen from another angle: an organizer forms a nation by means of its chains, and organizers of other kinds may likewise divide it.

The two facts, (1) that the nucleus of a nation is always homogeneous and (2) that a nation can integrate only when it is articulated into parties, each having full opportunity to obtain a majority—that these are basic elements in the coherence of social and political bodies is evident from the examples given. It is more broadly and strikingly shown, however, and over a significantly longer span, in the contrasting histories of Austria-Hungary and Switzerland.

I well remember a conversation in Vienna before the first World War. Seated at dinner beside the well-known scholar Joseph Redlich, I found myself involved in a discussion of the controversy then going on between Vienna and Budapest over the clash of national and federal rights. Several other Austrians and Hungarians joined the argument,

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

and as it went on there seemed not the slightest hope that we could ever agree on any question. Finally Redlich said, "You Hungarians are very nice, but you will never learn what *Gesamt-Monarchie* [united monarchy] means."

He diagnosed correctly the fatal illness of Austria-Hungary. Germans, Austrians, Slavs of various shades and descriptions, Catholics and Protestants, Jews and Moslems—all were kept in the Monarchy by tradition; each group, however, was eager to get more and more parochial rights at the expense of the federal government. Hungary's demand for an army of her own, the right to fly her national flag and speak her own language, together with similar demands by Croatia and Bohemia, served to weaken the Monarchy. Where there were conflicts, state as against federal interests were favored. The waning competence of the federation spelled disintegration.

Among minority politicians the Monarchy was an idea directly associated with the rule of Germans. It was not regarded as an embracing, nonethnic state; unity connoted chiefly the loss of independence and rule by someone they hated. Signifying German tyranny, the *Gesamt-Monarchie* aroused their animosity and fostered their opposition. It seemed reasonable that the various ethnic groups in Austria and in Hungary, each separately too weak to protect itself against its mighty and aggressive neighbors—Russia, Germany, and other countries—should unite for a better life. But within the Monarchy the decisions of each constituent group were made, not by the proper mechanism, the brain, but by emotions, which were substituted for intelligence.

We may note that it is one of the great qualities of our physical mechanism that when certain parts are maimed or destroyed, others function for them; our muscles, nerves, and organs are closely connected, each seeming to be the understudy of some other. As Kurt Goldstein explains:

Persons whose right arm is paralyzed or amputated learn very quickly to write with the left. It is not really correct to say they learn; they do not need to learn because in principle they know it already. . . . The performance is based not on the activity of certain mechanisms, but on certain potentialities of the organism which realize themselves by utilization of all sorts of substitute means when the "normal" means are out of order.¹⁰

Similarly, our psychic mechanisms, ready to act when called upon, are easily interchanged, spell one another; but in consequence, when

emotion is uppermost it sometimes happens that the appropriate mechanism is paralyzed and its function assumed by another, which is likely to be inappropriate. We hit when we ought to caress and destroy instead of protecting ourselves and our neighbors.

In the Monarchy the federal state wanted an army, a sound currency, and unhampered commerce. One would think that in building up an army the chief aim would be to make it strong and its operation efficient; that currency, trade, and other questions would be decided on their merits. But they were not. In place of the solution best for the Monarchy as a whole, each ethnic group had its own national solution. Instead of one strong federal army, they wanted many national armies, which could not be other than weak; instead of one federal currency, many unsecured national currencies; instead of a single unified economy, many small national economies. All responses were in terms of nationalism. It was an organism in which emotions paralyzed the parts that might have given the right answers and substituted wrong ones. Austria-Hungary was not unlike the starfish on its back and trying to turn over in five directions at once.

Undermined as it was by the ethnic question, the society set up by the Hapsburgs could ultimately, with the help of the Allied powers, be divided by dynamic minorities when in 1918 the decisive moment came. In every section of the Monarchy there was a homogeneous group—Germans in Austria, Czechs in Bohemia, Hungarians in Hungary,—ready to form its own state. Each was capable of ruling a proportionate number of heterogeneous members. The Monarchy was thus divided because every non-German group preferred autonomy to German rule.

Even later, the history of Czechoslovakia after the Munich agreement, with the splitting off of the Slovak state under German influence, and the story of Yugoslavia and the splitting off of the Croat state—both the work of dynamic minorities assisted by foreign powers—these, too, are evidence.

Yet it had not always been so. These clearly divided groups evolved when the court aristocracy, the one type, skeleton of the Monarchy, lost its power to the middle classes who had more local color and fewer traits in common. The great aristocratic families, whether of the Austrian, the Hungarian, the Bohemian, or the Polish part of the Monarchy, had intermarried, and all lived in the same way. But the new middle class, the merchants and manufacturers and their intel-

lectual supporters in Vienna, Budapest, and Prague, were separated not only by economic interests but also by the difference in their ways of life and even by the contempt of the various groups for the beliefs and customs of the others.

Switzerland,²⁰ on the other hand, like former Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovakia, is surrounded by countries having as their majorities the respective ethnic groups of which she is composed. She is without an outlet to the sea; depends on imports for most of her food and raw materials and on exports and tourists for the wherewithal to pay for them. Yet she has kept her freedom and has a high standard of living and practically no poverty. A masterpiece of human evolution, unique, like all great works of art, her strength derives from the consistency of her population and a true spirit of democracy, manifest in the absence of ambition to dominate others and an iron will to maintain individual liberty and independence as a state. Without this democratic sentiment the federation could not endure. The German-speaking part does not try to manage the others; the French group does not demand *gloire* with every meal; the Italians are not envious. Each canton is ready to do its part for the entire state, willingly relinquishing any petty rights which would interfere with national integrity.

Whatever their extraction, the Swiss are not Germans, Frenchmen, or Italians; they are Swiss—that is, something else, something different from those in the neighbor lands. The federal political parties do not follow linguistic or ethnic lines, but rather ideological trends—they are conservative, liberal, socialist. The left of each of the several parties is very nearly continuous with the right of the next. The Swiss citizen, regardless of what language he speaks or what church he attends, is Swiss first, last, and always. He is bound to his fellow countrymen by a common history and way of life. Unlike Austria, therefore, Switzerland, a federation of states, reached a stage of true union because loyalty to union was stronger than loyalty to the cantons.

Man is a member of many groups and has many loyalties; he decides among conflicting duties on the basis of law or ethics. A decision that the interests of one's own narrow group (that is, sect) take precedence over those of the nation means that a stage of disintegration has been reached or that integration has not yet been attained. When loyalty to the nation takes precedence, the setting is ripe for integration. And

²⁰ Martin, pp. 200 ff.

the integrating and disintegrating processes—the conflict and the tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces, whatever their direction at the moment—are continuous.

Our examples seem to prove that parochial groups can merge if they can repress their own ethnocentrism and work out a common *nexus socialis*. The Anglo-Saxons were not able to Anglicize the French in Canada or the Dutch in South Africa, nor could the Boers make Dutchmen out of the Uitlanders; yet their merging into broader groups, becoming Canadians and South Africans with a broader creed as their bond, may be possible.

In Austria-Hungary neither the Germans nor the Magyars could assimilate the Slavs, and they failed to find a common tie. Switzerland and the United States, on the other hand, have succeeded in uniting several ethnic and religious groups, and the bolshevist creed may merge into one nation the great number of nationalities living in the territory of the Soviet Union.

It might seem that the relation between creeds determines whether or not their adherents can find a common denominator. Groups with diametrically opposed creeds—such as paganism versus a one-god religion or bolshevism versus capitalism, totalitarianism versus bi-party systems, and so forth—are intolerant of each other. On the other hand, gaps between groups representing shades of the same opinion can be bridged. However, history seems to show that groups, whether holding diametrically opposed or similar creeds, sometimes behave like sects and at other times more flexibly, like parties. Their behavior is determined more by the general atmosphere of the period than by the relation between the creeds.

When groups are on the road to integration and ruling power, they are intolerant; when well-seated in the chair of government, they are tolerant; in their old age, threatened by new creeds, they may again become intolerant. Athens, as Thucydides noted,²¹ was tolerant in her early days to those who as refugees settled in her territory; as she expanded she granted Athenian citizenship to inhabitants of the city-states which she annexed or which joined her league. But several other city-states were highly illiberal; Greeks and aliens had the same difficulties in obtaining civic rights in most cities of which they were not native-born citizens, and this was true also of Athens, as, after

²¹ Page 4.

Pericles' time, she became more exclusive.²² Homer likened those who did not have all rights pertaining to citizenship to "some alien settler without honor."²³

Rome at her height was liberal. She put the peoples of the provinces on an equal footing with her own citizens, whose bond was the unity of the human race. Fénelon expressed the same philosophy centuries later: "I love my family more than myself, my fatherland more than my family, and the universe more than my fatherland."²⁴ Rome was ready to erect a new temple whenever a new group came with a new god. Pagan Rome tolerated even the one God of Judaism, but became intolerant of Christianity in the days of Trajan, in the second century, when by refusing to worship the emperor its adherents appeared suddenly dangerous.²⁵

In the Byzantine Empire, from the old pagan and the new Christian ideas a new and no less splendid civilization evolved under oriental influence. But it may be said without too much exaggeration that this was concentrated in Constantinople—a Noah's Ark which kept afloat when the rest of the world was submerged by the deluge. The history of the Byzantine Empire consists of a thousand years of warfare against rising new powers in the disintegrating West and the integrating East, its hinterland in Europe and Asia constantly changing—a history of warriors living the dangerous life, fighting desperately both abroad and at home. Struggles within ecclesiastical and political groups, or even between the greens and the blues in the gladiatorial arena, become more and more bitter. Mere daily life in the imperial city, pressed from east and west, was subject to more emotional strain than it had been in harmonious Athens or the peaceful Rome of Augustus.²⁶

The early period of the Reformation and the counterreformation also had bloody days. Neophytes, like governors whose power is threatened, are notoriously intolerant. Is this merely the result of the greater egotism of children and the aged—or are there periods, actually, when struggles are more intense? As Thucydides noted:

When men are retaliating upon others, they are reckless of the future and do not hesitate to annul those common laws of humanity to which every individual trusts for his own hope of deliverance should he ever be over-

²² Jardé, p. 252.

²³ Aristotle (*The Loeb Classical Library*), p. 199.

²⁴ F. Fénelon, *Oeuvres*, Paris, Lebel, 1824, XII, 332.

²⁵ Harnack, I, 290; Homo, *Les Empereurs romains et le christianisme*, pp. 29, 36 ff.

²⁶ Diehl, pp. 138 ff.

taken by calamity; they forget that in their own hour of need they will look for them in vain.²⁷

But as new national ties evolved which cut across the lines of sects and groups, Roman Catholics and Protestants became tolerant of each other.

In other periods human passions as regards this or that issue are muted. At the present time, for example, the conflict between two factions, one promising communism or collectivism, the other struggling for individualism, has reached a stage, especially in Europe, where in every state each faction flirts with the enemy to gain power for its own party.

The initial connection between groups may be set up by war, peace being followed by a merger. This was the case in New Zealand in the nineteenth century. When settlers from Europe arrived, the country was inhabited by Maoris. Each tribe had its own habitat; among the tribes there were the usual feuds and wars. The picture we are able to reconstruct from contemporary reports does not differ much from that obtained by reading about the settlement of Ireland or North America in earlier centuries by the Anglo-Saxons and the Scots. The new way of life comes into conflict with the old; the newcomers' need for expansion and the natives' desire to retain their land and customs end in war. There were Maori wars in New Zealand, wars against Celtic tribes in Ireland, and Indian wars in America. There may be truces, and after the natives have been decimated and most of their land taken, a fusion of the groups. Such was the course of events in New Zealand. "Though there are two races in New Zealand," declared the Prime Minister in 1937, "we are but one people."

"Such endings," writes W. K. Hancock, "are exceptional."²⁸

If the American Civil War is looked upon as a conflict between mercantile and farming interests, it was successful; intermarriage and industrialization brought the two groups together and opened the eyes of the South to Northern viewpoints. But if it is looked upon as an attempt to liberate the slaves, it was only partly successful.

There are lesser wars. A local feud may even survive its causes, cropping up after the groups concerned have forgotten the incidents behind their animosity. H. H. Munro (Saki, *pseud.*) tells the story of the blood feud of Toad-Water, when two villagers came to hate

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, II, 70.

each other because a hen belonging to one had once invaded the other's garden and ruined his onions. Saki concludes his tale:

Years have rolled away and some of the actors in this wayside drama have passed into the Unknown; other onions have arisen, have flourished, have gone their way, and the offending hen has long since expiated her misdeeds and lain with trussed feet and look of ineffable peace under the arched roof of Barnstable Market. But the blood-feud of Toad-Water survives to this day.²⁹

The moral applies to fields much wider than the precincts of Toad-Water village. Buondelmonte, the Florentine who married the beautiful Beatrice instead of the plain Amadei girl, was killed by the latter's friends. This episode, it is said, split Florence into two factions, the Guelphs and the Ghibellines. The division later became one of opinion and finally of name. In the fourteenth century factions which hated by inheritance and vied for power were called Guelphs and Ghibellines.³⁰

My point is that group behavior is independent of the nature of the ties connecting its members; in times of peace and of war ethnic, religious, and economic groups all behave alike. Nomads or hunters on the one hand, farmers on the other; farmers on the one hand, merchants and manufacturers on the other; pagans as opposed to Christians; variously differentiated ethnic or other groups; all may or may not succeed in becoming a coherent nation. Economic, ecological, and—last, but not least—historical factors help or hinder the merging.

In Hans Andersen's famous fairy tale, ducks and chickens live together in a barnyard. One day a very large duckling was born; none of the others are at all like it.³¹ The poor duckling did not know where to go or what to do. It was unhappy because the whole yard thought it ugly. Day by day matters became worse. Everyone picked on it, and the girl who fed them kicked it. Finally in desperation it flew over the fence—"but it would be too melancholy if I were to tell you all the misery and trouble the duckling had to endure in the hard winter." At last it found its own kind and grew up to be a beautiful

²⁹ Short Stories, New York, Viking, 1930, p. 60.

³⁰ Dante, *Paradiso*, Canto xvi, lines 140-41: "O Buondelmonte, quanto mal fuggisti le nozze sue per li altrui conforti!"

³¹ H. C. Andersen, quoted in *Fairy Tales and Legends*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1936, pp. 108 ff.

swan. But, "it matters nothing if one born in a duck yard has lain in a swan's egg."³²

In discussing migrations we have noted that waves of emigration and immigration are often responded to by statutes prohibiting departure or entry. Or if no bars are put up, the instinctive movement in any case becomes more and more rationalized and planned. We have tried to demonstrate that in each society there is a process toward integration—toward making the nation coherent, consistent. Leaders try to educate their followers, to assimilate the heterogeneous. The sectarian minority is considered dangerous, a potentially subversive element, a tool the neighbor may utilize to disintegrate the state, and the fear of such disintegration is expressed in "homogenizing" statutes.

In the preceding section we saw that resistance to invasion sometimes decimates a native population to the point at which fusion is possible between invader and invaded; we shall examine now an instance of internal struggle to obliterate heterogeneous elements and thereby to focus homogeneous elements and solidify them into a dominant core. In large groups there is usually not only one ugly duckling; often they are numerous and multiply. Andersen's barnyard Cinderella solved its problem by leaving voluntarily; human groups often try to dispose of their unassimilated elements by expelling them. Spain is the classic illustration. Its population after the *Reconquista* consisted of Moors, Jews, and the various races—Celtiberians, Romans, Visigoths (all Christians)—that became Castilians and Aragonians, dominants of the two kingdoms united by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469. After the conquest of Granada—the last Moorish state in Spain—the Moors were expelled; the expulsion of the Jews began soon afterward.³³

The persecution of the Jews and the Moors cannot be considered as incited merely by religious feeling, by the ardent Catholicism of Isabella and her followers. No doubt Catholicism was the great sympathetic link, and the only very strong one, between the inhabitants of the various kingdoms under the Spanish crown. Jews and Moors were heretics. But aside from this there was something else: antipathy for the dark-skinned Moors and the Jews. Both Jews and Moors were allowed to remain if they professed Catholicism. Legal enactments, however, in the sixteenth century closed many occupations to those

³² *Ibid.*, p. 402.

³³ Altamira y Crevea, p. 111.

in whose veins pure Spanish blood (*limpiesa*) did not run, yet prohibited their emigration. But the Marranos and the Moriscos led hunted lives. It was often noted that no smoke rose from the chimneys of Marranos on Saturdays; though "converted," they continued to observe Jewish ritual. Similarly, Moriscos remained Mohammedans at heart. The reader may remember Abarbend in Burrow's *The Bible in Spain*, who asked the author in the early nineteenth century, "Are you one of us?" Abarbend had a wife and an *amiga*, or "I should rather say two wives, for I am wedded to both"; he adds that there are others of the same race and faith in Spain. The Inquisition, however, instituted to cleanse the Church of unbelievers and heretics, killed thousands. Secret proceedings daily threatened the lives of the newly-converted.⁸⁴

By expelling the Jews, Spain disorganized her economic organization without being aware that she was doing so. To carry on the functions Jews had formerly performed, foreigners were admitted to urban activities—"three hundred thousand adventurers." The complaints against them were loud. As the industrious Moors could not be replaced, the land was left untilled and yielded little income. When groups are expelled, certain activities of a nation die, for ethnic and religious groups have traditional occupations.⁸⁵

The expelled Moors and Jews appeared as refugees in many countries of Europe and Africa, and the Moorish corsairs on the African coast caused trouble to other seafaring nations as well as to Spain; it may be assumed that Jewish refugees also incited the people to revolt against Spain. Was this trouble caused by expelled Jews and Moors responsible for the fact that the Marranos and the Moriscos were later forbidden to emigrate, being exterminated instead, or was that change merely a by-product of the Inquisition, which insisted upon punishing heretics?

The two policies, expulsion and extermination, are alternative extreme ways of homogenizing nations. Germany was not the first to send away its Jews, then change its policy and put them into camps and exterminate them. Turkey similarly treated the Bulgars and the Armenians,⁸⁶ Iraq, the Assyrians. Shortly after World War I Turkey expelled the Greeks from Asia Minor.

⁸⁴ Lea, II, 1: "The heretic was a venomous reptile spreading contagion with his very breath, and the safety of the land required his extermination as a source of pestilence."

⁸⁵ Baumgarten, pp. 44-45.

⁸⁶ *Survey of International Affairs 1934*, pp. 115 ff.

In the early days France alternated tolerance with oppression or massacre. Religious intolerance induced Louis XIV to revoke the Edict of Nantes, which granted rights to Protestants. Emigration as a reaction to intolerance deprived the country of many of its most industrious citizens—from 150,000 to 400,000 are said to have emigrated. By a curious quirk of fortune these emigrants, welcomed in Protestant countries—especially in Prussia—helped to spread the French language and culture as well as a feeling of bitterness against their country. The Huguenots helped to build up nations which finally defeated Louis XIV.⁸⁷

It must be emphasized that the two methods, expulsion and extermination, are resorted to whether the majority's nexus is religious, ethnic, or economic. Moreover, it is not always possible to determine which it is. The modern USSR is, as we have noted, tolerant of ethnic minorities, but intolerant of noncommunists. It has not only an internal migration policy but also a policy of social engineering. Non-communists are indoctrinated, converts are closely followed by secret police, and heretics are punished.

The centripetal and centrifugal forces within a nation are reinforced by the radiations of its neighbors. Plato writes of the Greek city-states, "Not one of them is a state but many states; for any state, however small, is in fact divided in two—one the state of the poor, the other the state of the rich, and these are at war with one another."⁸⁸ As the political parties of the city-states joined hands across the frontiers, the communities of the rich and the poor made common cause with each other. The state within the state, the faction out of power, clamored to its sympathizers in power in some other state for intervention.

The friends of Athens in Sparta were those in democratic opposition to the oligarchy—the oppressed classes; the friends of Sparta in Athens were the slighted aristocrats. The situation was similar in every city-state. Virtually everyone was the potential enemy of every other, and each sought to weaken its enemies by supporting their opposition at home—the centrifugal forces—with money. In short, every state tried to sap the resistance of other states by fomenting sedition.

The serf class in Thessaly repeatedly rose against its masters and so did the helots of Sparta, where they were like an enemy constantly lying in wait for disaster to overwhelm the Spartiates. Nothing of the kind had hitherto occurred in Crete, the reason perhaps being that the neighboring cities,

⁸⁷ Bainville, pp. 185 ff.

⁸⁸ Plato, II, 246.

even when at war with one another, in no instance ally themselves with rebels, because as they themselves also possess a serf class this would not be for their interest.³⁹

The consequence of defeat in war was revolt in the defeated city. One set of rulers was exchanged for another—the poor for the rich, let us say, the poor confiscating and appropriating their wealth. Aristotle writes of the Peloponnesian war:

As long as the chances of war remain indecisive the Athenians conserved their democratic regime. But after the Sicilian disaster the Lacedaemonians brought it about by means of an alliance with the Persian King that the Athenians were forced to establish the system of the "four-hundred" [oligarchic rule]. . . . This used to happen in the days of the Athenians and the Spartans; the Athenians used to put down oligarchies everywhere and the Spartans democracies.⁴⁰

Intolerant seventeenth-century Europe was divided into religious factions. In England the Protestants, in France the Catholics were dominant, and the subordinates—Catholics in England, and Protestants in France—intrigued with the dominants in the other country.⁴¹ This pitting of faction against faction follows the pattern traced in ancient Greece by oligarchs and democrats.

Ancient history has its counterpart in the traditional Russian policy of protecting sectarian minorities in neighboring countries. Russia was the great protector of the Orthodox Church in Turkey and the northern and southern Slavs in Austria-Hungary, and she did her best to disrupt the Monarchy. That the reason for such a policy is realistic rather than ideological—that is, to harm the neighbor—is evident in her maneuvers after the Napoleonic wars, considered by many observers enigmatic. In 1819 Gordon wrote to Castlereagh:

The different language of the different Russian agents is the puzzle. In Germany, Kotzebue [a well-known dramatist who was in Russian pay] is murdered, and Stroudza nearly so, for espousing the cause of unrestrained monarchy and obscurantism; while in Italy M. De La Harpe [an intimate friend and agent of the Czar] travels up and down holding a language of purest democracy.⁴²

Russia's doings are not so mysterious when we consider that a weak and disunited Europe was to her interest. Her dominion over the east

³⁹ Aristotle, p. 133.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 419.

⁴¹ Fisher, II, 692 ff.

⁴² *Cambridge Modern History*, X, 21.

could be complete only if other states were rendered inactive by domestic disturbances. The Czar simply augmented the centrifugal forces in other countries.

It was Russian agents who organized the Greeks against the Ottoman Empire. It will pay us to study this development in some detail as a prolonged example of our point.

When the central power ebbs in an area, general discontent arises, and a malaise—an indefinite unease, such as we mentioned on page 16—seizes the population. Like hunger or fear, it brings the discontented together under the banner of the leader who promises a better life, a secure existence. Such a rift in the body social affords opportunity to the neighbor to foment revolution or secession. The process is the same as we noted in the splitting by parochialism of the Roman Empire, Austria-Hungary, or Czechoslovakia. A rising power, that of the barbarian princes in the case of Rome, Russia in the dual Monarchy, and Germany in Czechoslovakia, takes advantage of the discord of parochially-minded groups to disrupt the old state and form new ones. In short, the malaise of minorities is exploited to make majorities of them—ruling élites in new states, or, at the very least, participants in the government of the states they join and thus enlarge. The symptoms are the decline of the central power and the formation of parochial units—city-states, the *villa Romana*, feudal domains, *pays*, or tribes; then foreign intervention to help the parochial group to eliminate their rulers and liberate themselves.

Tradition is the presiding element in the formation of new states; it selects the groups to be fused into a nation in a given region and also the foreign "liberator" who will hasten the disintegration of the old and the integration of the new group. In the Balkan peninsula those who now became "Greeks" included Bulgars, Kutzo-Vlachs, and orthodox Albanians, who until then did not know "the virtue of racial as distinct from religious hate." Greek in faith, they felt themselves Greek in nationality. Toward the end of the eighteenth century a group of malcontents who had both the local dialect and the Greek Orthodox religion in common drew together. Their vernacular was fabricated into a literary language, which gave them a link with ancient Greece. A new unit, the Greek "nation," was born.

The same evolution went on in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. The history and the literary monuments of alleged ancestors were popularized; sooner or later Serbs, Bulgars, Rumanians, each found a

language and a past they could boast of: the great days of Czar Dushan, the early medieval Bulgarian empire, and the Roman province of Dacia. The rise of nationalism in the Balkans, starting with the decline of Moslem power and aided by Russia, with the fashioning of national languages and the weaving of an appropriate history led to the consolidation of groups ready to secede from the Empire and form independent states.

For these rising peoples history was the link between the group and its territory, since it decides the frontiers the parochial group in the process of evolving into a nation feels entitled to claim. Greeks are entitled to all lands once ruled by the Hellenes; Serbs, to those over which Dushan was Czar; Bulgarians and Rumanians made claims based on similar "historical" rights. That such claims overlap in a manner quite impossible to resolve to the satisfaction of all parties has no effect on their urgency. Each group means to assert its sovereignty in a manner befitting the real or imagined period when its "ancestors" reigned over the greatest number of foreign races; this—according to native historians—constitutes its most illustrious epoch. Thus, history is the source of the conflicting claims which give rise to the ever-recurring Balkan wars.

Russia was predestined to play the role of liberator for two reasons, first, the lack of natural boundaries between her and Turkey, and second, the bond of a common religion, strengthened by the sympathy and religious emotion of the disaffected groups living under Turkish rule. There was a saying among the peoples belonging to the Greek Church that the Turkish Empire would be destroyed by a fair-haired nation. Up in the north among the heirs of the Vikings and Tartars converted by Byzantine monks to the Orthodox faith the "new Czar Constantine in the new city of Moscow"—head of an independent Russian patriarchate (a separate unit in the Greek Church)—asserted that he was the head of that nation. Greek members of the Church, subject to infidels, saw in Russia the blonde liberator and believed that the Grand Dukes of Moscow and their successors, czars of Russia, had been chosen to bring under their rule all disciples of the faith, taking over from the infidel the inheritance of the East Roman, or Byzantine, Empire.⁴³

For her own part, from the time her central government in Moscow

⁴³ Toynbee and Kirkwood, p. 35.

had become strong, Russia, an expanding power, had looked covetously on misgoverned Turkey with her old longing for "windows to the sea"—that warm sea at the heart of civilized commerce to which she had no access. Now Turkey was crumbling, and Russia appropriated fragments of her empire.

The action was carried out principally by means of propaganda, first through priests and monks of the Church, who preached the gospel of the union in one state of all their faith, later by teachers and historians, who advocated the union of all Slavs in a single pan-Slav state, one which would revive the East Roman Empire. Propaganda was followed by an attack on Turkey with the help of England. Throughout most of the eighteenth century the "Eastern question" did not interest England; now, in 1770, she kept on good terms with Russia by helping the latter's men-of-war to enter the Mediterranean with the object of attacking Turkey. By the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, which in 1774 concluded the hostilities, Russia not only advanced her frontier toward the Dardanelles but also acquired the right to intervene between the Sultan and his Christian subjects, thus becoming the "protector" of Christians domiciled in Moslem territory.

To diplomats this meant that she could on any day she pleased start a row with the Turks and "liberate" for herself additional provinces. The Western Powers began to think about the Eastern Question: How far could they permit Russia to go, how far allow Muscovite power to increase?—a question all-important to Austria, with her vital valley of the Danube, which flows into the Black Sea through what was then Turkish territory, and to Britain, whose land routes to India crossed Turkish soil. Could Europe allow Russia, a strong and vigorously expanding state, to acquire the cornerstone between Europe and Asia, hence control of the eastern Mediterranean? By the treaty she had firmly planted herself on the Black Sea.

England still remained friendly. When Austria and Russia united in 1786 to partition and despoil Turkey, she looked on without protest. But after three years of war the younger Pitt suddenly took a stand, abruptly declaring that the Russian advance to the southern shores of the Black Sea was a menace and that she should not be allowed to retain the port of Ochakoff. Here for the first time the Eastern Question appears in its modern form. "In the aggrandizement of Russia and depression of Turkey," said Pitt on March 28, 1791, "our political in-

terests were both concerned." And in 1799 he concluded a treaty with Turkey guaranteeing her independence and territorial integrity for eight years.⁴⁴

Other European powers helped or opposed Russia as their interests fluctuated; it was a game lasting two centuries and more—indeed, it is, perhaps, not yet finished. The partners in the group which planned to partition Turkey and which wanted to preserve her intact were not always the same. During the eighteenth century and in the early nineteenth, Russia and Austria favored division, while England opposed it. By the middle of the nineteenth century France had joined England, and in the Crimean War both fought Russia on Turkey's behalf. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 all European powers were united against Russia and agreed to preserve Turkey in Europe. In the first World War Germany, having peacefully penetrated Turkey, fought, with Austria as an ally, to preserve that country against Russia, Great Britain, France, and Italy, who fought to dismember her.

Changes in partnership were determined by changes in the partners' rank in the balance of power. As long as Austria was independent and considered herself Russia's equal, she was prepared to partition any rival for a fair share. When she became a dependency of Germany and the latter fought for top rank, Austria tried to prevent Russia from gaining further power and from taking advantage of the war to make Turkey her vassal. As long as England was strong, she favored an independent Turkey; when she needed Russia's aid against Germany, she was ready to use Turkey as payment.

In 1830, when the Powers did not want any one of their number to increase its influence by annexing Belgium, they formed a new state out of it. Similarly, in the Balkans four "independent national states" were formed, and their liberty was guaranteed. Each considered it a duty to the past to rule all the others—as, according to tradition, they had been ruled by those long dead. Parochialism in the form of group hatred and historical memories blocked the unification of the Balkans from within; could four small and poor states be independent under the shadow of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia? Several such "independent" states meant the division of Balkan territory, not, to be sure, among the Great Powers themselves, but among their respective protégés, whose allegiance changed from time to time. Thus,

⁴⁴ J. H. Rose, *Life of William Pitt*, I, 610 ff.; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, I, 178, 204; Stanhope, II, 113.

Serbia was subject first to Austria, then to Russia; Rumania, first to Russia, then to Austria and Germany. With the disappearance of Austria-Hungary and the eclipse of Germany, it appears probable to-day that Russia will be the single dominant power in the Balkan area.

Thus, group struggles against group, state against state, to disorganize its opponents and to exploit and increase their national defects. The informal war, the diplomatic game preceding or following a war, is played with persuasion, threats, bribes, and spies. Charles Diehl's description of Byzantine diplomacy is applicable to any modern intelligence office.

Study of the barbarian world was one of the most steady preoccupations of the imperial court. Among the chancellory offices one was called the "office of the barbarians," and there as well as in the services of the *logothete du drome* [ministry of foreign affairs] information was carefully gathered and notes made about all foreign peoples. The strength and weakness of each was known, how they could be influenced, used or neutralized, which families were the most influential, what presents pleased them most, what opinions, what interests could most usefully be cultivated, what political and economic relations could be promoted with them.⁴⁵

An intelligence service was the handmaiden of diplomacy, put to work to persuade as well as to intimidate, to the end—again to quote Diehl—

of attaching them fast to the empire like the faithful slaves of his imperial majesty. By means of skillfully passing out money and favors to the right people, Byzantium sought also to divide her foes, neutralize them by playing one off against another, fostering jealousies, grudges, enmities.⁴⁶

The contest begins peacefully enough: mating songs are alluringly voiced to induce the heterogeneous elements in the opposing group to revolt against the dominant, the homogeneous. The appeal of Athens was to the democratic opposition in states ruled by oligarchies; of Sparta, to tyrants and other exiles from democracies, and their followers at home. Russian monks agitated among the Greek Orthodox in the Balkans, missionaries prepared the road for the *ecclesia militans*. Pan-Slav zealots worked among the ethnic minorities of Austria and Hungary. To the underprivileged everywhere bolshevist Russia's partisans have described the communist heaven.

When heterogeneous elements begin to organize themselves in re-

⁴⁵ Diehl, p. 54.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

ligious, ethnic, or political groups, parochialism is already splitting the state. Assimilation, or the evolution to one type—to the *civis Romanus*, the Briton, the American without a hyphen—has ceased. The rulers of the state, the dominants in the group, are frightened, the writing on the walls spells disruption.

Incensed by Pan-Slav propaganda to divide Austria and Hungary in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Dual Monarchy began to oppress its Slav minority. The latter became more susceptible to foreign influence, and the consequence was a murder at Sarajevo. Germany's naval program and her peaceful penetration of Turkey were responded to by fear in England and British action against Germany; this frustration of her ambitions in turn transformed Germany's resentment into rage, culminating in the war slogan of 1914: "God punish England!" Fear and rage will silence reason and tolerance; civilized curbs are forgotten, and the barbarian reappears, accompanied by violence, revolution, and war.

Typical of nineteenth-century optimism is the speech made by the Marquis of Salisbury in Albert Hall, May 4, 1898, as Prime Minister.

You may roughly divide the nations of the world as the living and the dying . . . the weak States are becoming weaker and strong states are becoming stronger . . . the living nations will gradually encroach on the territory of the dying, and the seeds and causes of conflict amongst civilized nations will speedily appear.⁴⁷

The skeptical twentieth century would be inclined to say that when the dead are buried illnesses begin to appear among the living; other states arise and inflict mortal wounds upon the new candidates for death. There is no progress and no end—simply an eternal interchange. Groups organize, fall apart, reorganize, only to fall apart again.

To sum up briefly, in the struggle between centripetal and centrifugal forces, reinforced or impeded by the radiations of neighbors, the nation forms. Environment, ecological and economic factors, and the habitat influence the process. The expanding nation acquires additional territory and new inhabitants, which may or may not be assimilated. Each nucleus has its saturation point; when the new type is fixed, further adaptation within it becomes difficult, nay, impossible, though outside elements may adapt to it. But each nucleus can bind

⁴⁷ Garvin, III, 281.

only a certain number of heterogeneous elements. Ecological and other factors make specialization into regional types inevitable. The dominant group, the skeleton of the nation, has its metropolitan and parochial members, with more or less local color. Local secondary ties—ethnic, religious, or economic—are more or less dormant when the nation integrates and awaken when disintegration begins. The local color gains in importance, and the central bond fades as loyalty to the provincial region or group increases and that to the empire decreases—thus, the cosmopolitan state begins to disintegrate.

We have looked into various circumstances in the formation and re-formation of states; let us now examine some further instances of the disintegrating sequence, or *sere*.

The barbarian invasion of the Roman Empire, already weakened for many reasons, began a process of disintegration. Latinization paled and local traits emerged. By the end of the second century the Germans on the western border of Rome were settled and had taken to farming. Not so the east Germans, however, whose migrations began when the Goths—the first of them to move—started from their homelands beyond the Elbe for the upper valley of the Vistula and at length reached the Black Sea. They overran the Roman borders about A.D. 250, invaded Dacia and Transylvania, and settled down. Rome drew her frontier back to the line of the Danube. Because of continual raids by the Goths, Emperor Constantine strengthened this natural boundary with walls and fortified camps. Toward the end of his reign he concluded a pact of friendship with the Visigoths, who became federated with the Empire, obligating themselves to defend its borders and fight for it in case of war. In return, they received an annual subsidy from Rome.⁴⁸

Not long after this and similar agreements, however, a new enemy appeared in Europe, an enemy of both Goths and Romans, the Huns. They were apparently driven westward from their home around the Caspian Sea and Lake Aral by political events in northern and central Asia at the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth century.⁴⁹ Drawing upon Chinese sources, Bury thinks it possible that a large new empire extending from Korea to the borders of Europe was formed at this time and that its builders pushed the weaker Huns from their pastures.

⁴⁸ Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire*, pp. 96 ff., and *The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians*, p. 21. ⁴⁹ *The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians*, pp. 48-49.

When the Huns arrived in Europe,

the nation [of the Visigoths] as a whole were seized by panic and firmly believed that there was no safety for them north of the Danube. They determined to withdraw southward beyond that river and seek the shelter of the Roman Empire. . . . Accordingly they sent an ambassador to the Emperor Valens, who was then staying at Antioch, beseeching him to allow the nation to cross the river and grant them lands in the provinces of the Balkan peninsula. It was the year 376. . . . The situation was highly embarrassing for the Emperor and his government. It was unique: they had no experience to guide them in dealing with it. It was pressing; some decision must be come to immediately; there was no time for ripe deliberation. The opinion of the ministers and councillors was naturally divided, but it was finally decided to accede to the request of the Goths and to receive them as new subjects on Roman soil. . . . To settle peacefully within their borders a nation of perhaps 80,000 or more barbarians was a problem which could be solved only by most careful organisation requiring long preparation. . . . As might have been expected, when the barbarians crossed the river and encamped in Lower Moesia (Bulgaria) all kinds of difficulties and deplorable incidents occurred.⁵⁰

From the long and complicated story let us now sort out the high points. The Roman Empire had become a neighborless universal power. In the nearer reaches of Asia rose the Parthian kingdom—succeeding the Persian—which made sallies across the Roman borders. Farther away, in northern Asia, a great new power sprang up, setting in successive motion the Huns and Rome's "friends," the Goths. The latter and other Germanic tribes settled on Roman territory and brought unrest into the life of the Empire. In 410 the Visigoths sacked Rome.

From the time of Marius to the fifth century not a hundred years had passed without some violent invasion by German hosts.

In spite of all troubles on the frontiers, in spite of the alarms of the great invasions of the second, third, and fourth centuries, the sacred centre of government had never realized the possibility that her own stately security would ever be disturbed. Not only had all true sons of Rome a religious faith in her mission and destiny, but they had good reason to rely on the awe which she inspired in the barbarous races who ranged around her frontiers. There seemed an almost infinite distance between the plunder of provinces, which was so constantly and rapidly avenged, and the violation of the heart and seat of Roman power. But now the spell was

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

broken; the mystery and awe which surrounded the great city had been pierced and set at naught. The moral force, so much more important in government than the material, had been weakened and desecrated. The shock given by this great catastrophe to the old Roman confidence and pride must, for the time, have been overwhelming.⁵¹

The news was enough to make St. Jerome break off his work. Dill quotes him as writing to one of his friends before the sack of Rome, "The Roman world is sinking into ruin, and still we hold our heads erect. . . . Happy Nepotianus who does not see such things, who does not hear of them. Miserable are we who have to suffer them, or see our brethren suffering."⁵²

Yet, as Bury says:

If Alaric had been told that he was attacking the Empire and seeking to destroy it he would have repudiated the suggestion. The existence of the Roman Empire was almost a necessity of thought to Alaric and all his contemporaries. They might ravage the Roman world and try to force the government to do and give what they wanted; but all their ambitions were consistent with its continuance. The Goths aimed at gaining a satisfactory position within its borders; they did not feel like hostile outsiders. The attitude of the Goths and the Germans generally toward the Empire was the direct result of their gradual Germanisation. They did not regard it as a foe to be defeated, but as a great institution in which they had a natural right to have a place, seeing that men of their own race had already a large part in it. Their hostilities, they might have argued, were less like the hostilities of external enemies and rivals than of disfranchised classes struggling to wrest for themselves a place in a body politic.⁵³

One might almost say that Alaric sacked Rome because he was disappointed at not having been made prime minister.

• Later, when the Byzantine Empire, heir of Rome, faced a similar fate at the hands of Bulgarians, Serbs, and other subject peoples, the aim of the revolting barbarians, like that of Alaric, was not to destroy the Empire, but to maintain it as the universal Christian society with themselves in command. For the ancient Romans as for the Germans of the Roman-Germanic empire and the Greco-Romans of Byzantium, the unity of the world and the existence of one society ruled by one emperor was a matter of course. It was a question, not of replacing the

⁵¹ Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, pp. 305-6.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 306.

⁵³ Bury, *The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians*, pp. 65-66; *Cambridge Ancient History*, XII, 107.

satisfactory world order with a new one, but of replacing the unsatisfactory *primus*, or world emperor, with a more suitable one. In this eternal "*Ôte-toi de là, que je m'y mette*" the rebel destroyed the system, breaking up the authority-pattern of the existing regime, and so doomed the old order.

The history of Rome's fall demonstrates not only that when adaptation between differing elements became impossible the nation split into parts, but also that the new dominants, unable to form a nucleus, could not manage the old Empire. The change in the management meant a new structure, a new organization. These barbarian tribes, culturally inferior, wanted to join the Empire, to dwell in harmony with its ruling classes and so learn the ways of civilized life. But their geographical distribution was such that they were a disintegrating factor, for each was a separate body unconnected with other infiltrating tribes. The cosmopolitan aristocracy disappeared; the Roman or latinized population were city dwellers making a living from trade, and when in the seventh century the Moors split the Roman world in two, the old traffic ceased altogether.

The cause of the break with the tradition of antiquity was the rapid and unexpected advance of Islam. The result of this advance was the final separation of the East from the West and the end of the Mediterranean unity. The western Mediterranean, having become a Mussulman lake, was no longer the thoroughfare of commerce and of thought which it had always been.⁵⁴

Trade came to an end, the great commercial cities, with their several industries in Gaul and Iberia, gradually decayed; with the cities, their inhabitants—the "one type," the skeleton of the Empire—disappeared, and upon the heels of this general ruin came the Dark Ages. Economic "stimulus" split up the body social, already suffering under the infiltration of foreign elements.

This great split between the eastern and the western Mediterranean was followed by smaller fractures, which ultimately divided Europe into separate seignorial domains. Every estate became self-sustaining. The standard of living declined steadily. The straight roads, now overgrown, which in Roman times had bound city to city were abandoned, and deserted cities became wasteland. Only centuries later, after promotion through the Crusades, did commerce slowly revive and the

⁵⁴ Pirenne, pp. 143, 260.

standard of living rise again. With this revival began the unfolding of a new stage in civilization, and from the mixing of the *civis Romanus* with barbarians new nations evolved. The isolation caused by the breaking up of the old world led to specialization: the Gallo-Romans became French; others, Iberians or Germans.

As with the Roman Empire, contemporary history will, perhaps, afford us evidence of a similar disintegration and breaking down of an empire into more specialized units latent in the character of its widely separated component parts. Is not the British Empire beginning to disintegrate? Are we not on the eve of events which may parallel the history of Rome—her division into east and west and the splitting up of her various elements into self-sustaining domains? Are not Canadians, Australians, Indians invading British provinces vertically, taking the place of the dominant squires of England?

The constitutional history of England and her dependencies has been characterized by fluidity: a new practice starts, is followed for years, and eventually may be embodied in an agreement or codified in a statute. The colonies, which since 1907 have been called dominions, make their own laws, do what they please with their products, have their own immigration policies. The rights of the mother country over them have been successively relinquished, but what about her obligations? The last British soldier has left Canada and other dominions, but the British navy still protects them.

Naval protection has lost its importance in an air-minded world, and perhaps the atomic bomb will further reduce it. The British *Kriegsverein*, as Salisbury⁵⁵ called the Empire, with its sea lanes as life lines and the blockade of non-British territories as its main weapon, may be just a survival from another period.

Before 1914 Canada, always sure that no foreign danger could menace her from any quarter,⁵⁶ claimed her independence in foreign affairs. Australia and New Zealand, less sure that they did not need protection, merely suggested that they should be consulted on foreign policy. Britain's reply was that foreign policy cannot be separated from the responsibility of naval defense;⁵⁷ both must remain in her hands. She agreed, however, not to negotiate any treaty on matters primarily affecting the dominions until she had consulted the dominions con-

⁵⁵ Hancock, I, 36.

⁵⁶ *Round Table*, 1913, III, "Downing Street," pp. 601 ff.; *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, VI, 704 ff.; Dewey, I, 260 ff.

⁵⁷ *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, VI, 717 ff.

cerned. Constitutionally the relation between the mother country and the dominions was the same: the Empire's foreign policy and defense plans were determined in London. But dominion representatives had a say in the direction of World War I, and they sat at the peace table. The imperial war cabinet and the delegation to the Paris Conference indicated a tendency toward federal organization; it looked as though England might transfer to some new authority the power vested in her to conduct the affairs of the Empire—perhaps to a council made up of representatives of the Britannic nations.

In the years after World War I the British Dominions followed the policy of the United States of avoiding entanglement in European affairs, refusing to become a party to any agreement or protocol guaranteeing France or other continental countries against aggression. Their interest, like that of the United States, shifted from Europe to the Pacific. The Locarno Treaty made apparent this split in the unity of the Empire as a single corporate body in international life. Article IX reads: "The present Treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the British Dominions, or upon India, unless the Government of such Dominion, or of India, signifies the acceptance thereof."⁵⁸ The Dominions and India emerged as entities having their own rights and obligations. Dominion ambassadors and ministers of foreign affairs, as well as representatives of India, appear side by side with English representatives at international conferences. Britain, however, was not relieved of the burden of defense.

By 1930 the evolution from the British Empire to the British Commonwealth was well-advanced, and in December, 1931, the Statute of Westminster declared the Commonwealth a Union of Independent Nations. India's status was not clarified. She is not a dominion, but she cannot be described as a colony. Her government participates in imperial conferences, and her delegates in international negotiations. It is hard to see in a British dependency anything but a nation progressing toward independence, yet it is hard to say what stage any one has reached or how far the mother country will go against its wishes.

Is not this trend toward separate units still on the increase, owing to a failure to organize a federal authority empowered to deal with imperial affairs? In World War II all dominions, with the sole exception of Eire, fought for the common cause. But are Canada, South Africa, Australia, India, and others who voluntarily joined in the common ef-

⁵⁸ Dewey, II, 253 ff.; *Round Table*, 1927, XVI, 676, 684.

fort—are these members of the British Commonwealth ready, now that the danger has passed, to renounce one iota of their alleged unrestricted sovereignty? Will they accept the decisions of a board directing the affairs of the Commonwealth? Will Canada let it determine the size of her army and navy or her defense budget? Or will the South African Union, or even Kenya Colony, submit to it in such matters as the right of Indian subjects to immigrate and acquire real estate?

Before World War I statesmen in the dominions often remarked, . . . “This is the British Empire, and we are Britons whether we be born in the British Isles, or in Canada, or in Australia, or in New Zealand.”⁵⁹ But when Joseph Chamberlain and others tried to set up British authorities to deal with federal affairs, the dominions resisted in the name of parochial independence.

The illness observed by Lord Milner and his associates in South Africa, that common or federal affairs were handled by negotiation among independent units, each acting on behalf of its parochial interest rather than in the interest of all, is evident also in the Commonwealth. The imperial conferences are meetings of the delegates of sovereign states. In the Commonwealth there are imperialists and nationalists.

When an issue arises, the mental habits of the imperialist impel him to consider the imperial implication first. He cannot visualize the welfare of the several parts save in relation to the whole. The Nationalist, on the other hand, sees merely a group of separate nations, (one of which, England, insists on calling its interests “Imperial,”) and shrugs his shoulders when the concerns of others than his own are mentioned.⁶⁰

Minority groups, such as the French-Canadians and the Dutch in Africa, who are afraid of being submerged in the British Commonwealth, join the ranks of the nationalists.

It may be objected that while disintegrating politically, the British Commonwealth has been integrating economically; it may be argued that while each dominion is acquiring more and more independence of political action, such agreements as that made at Ottawa in 1932 further their action as an economic unit.

The Ottawa Conference did its best to transform the Empire into a trading union, but as W. K. Hancock observes:

. . . the results achieved were really incommensurate with the results prophesied. They learnt this in the years which followed Ottawa. Ex-

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 15, quoting R. B. Bennet.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 21.

perience has taught them that the Empire was insufficient for their trading needs, not because their productive energies were weak, but because they were strong.

The insufficiency of the Empire might signify in certain dominions a shortage of population; but in no dominion did it signify a shortage of commodities. It was the abundance of commodities and of the capacity to increase their production which convinced one dominion after the other that it was a folly to endanger the wider opportunities of world trade for the sake of smaller quasi-monopolistic advantages within their own narrow circle.⁶¹

The movement within the Empire to make the mother country supply the dominions with men, money, and markets failed. England could not send her dominions men or offer them a market big enough to absorb their surplus products. Economic factors thus furthered disintegration, while parochialism strangled the ties which common danger had created. Sir Robert Borden judged well the probable effects of the first World War on Canada.

I am not so sure (he said:) the result may not be exactly the opposite of what you are imagining. It may be that the spirit of national pride which the war is evolving will create psychological conditions unanticipated by you in Great Britain and favour processes of decentralization rather than of centralization.⁶²

It may be further objected that the dominions, with the one exception of the Irish Free State, by voting to become active belligerents proved their loyalty to England. Important as this demonstration of unity is, it cannot be counted on. In the informal war preceding World War II no British foreign secretary or minister had the right to promise or threaten third parties with the active belligerency of any dominion. Ramsay MacDonald said:

One of the most constant problems that we have to face now is how we are to make arrangements by which our moral authority in the councils of Europe will not be merely our own moral authority, but the moral authority which we have as representative, not of these islands, but of the whole British Commonwealth of Nations.⁶³

During the fateful years when Hitler was rearming Germany, occupying Austria, negotiating at Munich, and invading Czechoslovakia, the British prime minister spoke in the name of a country whose in-

⁶¹ Hancock, II, 266.

⁶² Zimmern, p. 12.

⁶³ Hancock, I, 278; Mr. Havenga, quoted in Dewey, II, 244.

habitants were outnumbered by those of either Russia or Germany.

In the process of integration the British Empire went through a period when it was united only in times of emotional peaks. Now on the way to disintegration, it may be passing through a stage when an emotional peak can still unite it. In the war against Louis XIV there was one British army made up of Englishmen, Welshmen, and Scots. They had common heroes and memories and developed a national saga. In World War II British, Australian, and Canadian armies fought together as allies; each has its separate heroes, memories, and national saga. Immigration from non-British countries, the intermarriage of natives and immigrants, and ecological factors are splitting the inhabitants of the disintegrating Empire into various types. The Anglo-Saxon has become an American, a Canadian, an Australian, or an Afrikaner.

It is overestimating human intelligence and knowledge to suppose that we can foresee all the implications of the clever plans and blueprints we may draw up. Two things, however, seem undeniable: life is rich in diversity, and interchanges among groups never cease. Cross-fertilization creates new forms, hybrids. Some are successes; others failures. New forms, new men with new ideas and loyalties, kindle new life in old groups—new dominants with new ties. A wasteful process, since not all novelties are good or survive, but a luxury inherent in creation. The alternative is the equalization of death, the uniformity of nonradiating lead. Nations formed out of numerous and diverse elements achieve greatness while the process of assimilation is going on. Only madmen who in their megalomania imagine they are God would think they could level the diversities while preserving the malleability of life. To try to deal out human beings like a pack of cards is futile. "Nichts ist dauernd als der Wechsel. Nichts beständig als der Tod!"⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Ludwig Boerne, *Gesammelte Schriften; Gedenkrede auf Jean Paul*, Munich, Luft, Blicher and Co., 1858, p. 1501.

HABITAT

EACH NATION consists of a species of the genus man. It does not matter whether the anthropologist is able or unable to measure the differences between them, or even whether there are differences; the important thing is the fact that men are convinced and feel that they are different from other men.

One ancient group called themselves Athenians and thought they differed from the Spartans, though at emotional peaks both called themselves "Hellenes." Wherever Roman Catholics have formed a state they have felt superior to the heretics it was their purpose to convert; their aim was to proselytize, and the convert remained suspect, to be watched and cared for. A Frenchman thinks himself different from the Briton, and both are convinced that the German, who claims membership in a "master race," is a barbarian. We call these various groups, whether the tie that binds them is a common ancestry, religion, or creed, *de facto* groups and have demonstrated that as their coherence and solidarity increases they integrate, whereas when it decreases they disintegrate.

The *de facto* group may have its own organization: rules are made for co-operation and to control competition; institutions presently standardize the type and assure the application of the rules. Such rules and institutions make out of the *de facto* group a *de jure* society. But even when organized, the *de facto* or actual society lives its own life, adapting itself only more or less to the legal corsets devised for it by judges, lawyers, and statesmen. The effect of stays on a figure is limited; they constrict rather than mold.

The physical scene of this eternal merging, splitting, and reorganizing of human groups is one world, one connected whole, like mankind itself, but divided into regions and their inhabitants, which we may call territorial groups. Each is separated from others by natural barriers, soil, or climatic differences, and the character of the region puts its stamp on all life forms—men, beasts, and plants—living in it. Its

group traits set it apart from other territories. Robert M. Yerkes even ventures to predict that it

will presently become clear that, like our human nationals, the different-appearing chimpanzee types are simply local varieties which, adaptively or otherwise, have acquired certain reasonably constant features of form, function, and custom. It may also be discovered that only those social groups which have been able to defend their boundaries against all comers have survived as types. It is indicated that natural barriers such as rivers, lakes, mountains, separate the types.¹

Natural boundaries further the isolation of various groups and their transformation from mixtures into compounds. The greater the isolation, the more consistent the group; thus the inhabitants of islands or of valleys surrounded by high mountains have their own peculiar character and are homogeneous. In order to exist the group needs goods of various kinds and in various amounts. The habitat is not only a cage separating outsiders from the insiders but also a kind of general store, producing as well as distributing goods for the needs of its inhabitants.

Such regions as Gaul, Italy, or the Iberian Peninsula, separated from the rest of Europe by sea and mountains and connected with it by smaller or larger gaps, have been the habitat of successive nations. For the Romans, as well as for the Franks and the French, the problem in Gaul or France was to close the gaps in the natural boundaries of the land, and all tried to solve it by including the Rhine. The Visigoths, the Arabs, and the Spanish inhabited a similarly shaped territory; they took the Pyrenees and the sea for their boundary and secured it by annexing land on the northern slopes of the mountains. For the great imperators of Rome, as for Mussolini, the problem of securing Italy was similar: to dominate the large islands next to it and the eastern shore of the Adriatic.

In time natural boundaries become not only historical but also ethnographical. The factors which co-operate in the building up of a nation and determining the boundaries of its habitat cannot, therefore, be separated. The Rhine is dear to Frenchmen not merely because it is a natural boundary, Alsace-Lorraine not merely because it presses Germany like a knee; both traditional and historical associations have grown up since they were willed to the French by great ancestors. To-day the natives of France are too few to cultivate and to consume her resources; year in and year out the country must add to her foreign

¹ Yerkes, p. 18.

population. Yet in her eagerness to annex land she is heedless of the domestic trouble which the acquired Germans will create for coming generations.

On the other side of the Rhine, the Germans² assert that the Rhine is not a boundary, but a link connecting German territories—that the natural boundary between France and Germany is farther west, beyond the gap that lays France open to invasion. The German claim is historical, too. After Waterloo, Prussia claimed Alsace—a German principality until occupied by Louis XIV; after the French defeat at Sedan she obtained it. She was obliged by the Versailles Treaty to give it back, regained it after a new Sedan, and has returned it after her own Leipzig.

England, the third power interested in the western frontiers of Germany, has her own traditions. The seacoast opposite her island must be divided among several states. She cannot tolerate a united European continent or that one power shall dominate the great mining and industrial region which extends from the Ruhr through the Rhine deep into France. Germany may have one part, France another, but the seacoast and its hinterland—the link connecting the valleys with the sea and France with Germany—must belong to Belgium. This English economic-strategic policy is backed by a tradition followed since the younger Pitt first devised it.

To take another example, the map on page 343 gives the boundaries of the Mediterranean empire of Rome, showing the line which divided the eastern and the western empires. The British Empire life line passes through the Mediterranean; to secure it England occupied Gibraltar and Suez and has maintained a traditional friendship with Austria, Greece, and Turkey. Her zone of influence has included the entire Roman Empire. Now that the USSR is advancing with great steps toward Europe, the old line dividing the eastern and the western empires may gain in importance. The division between eastern and western empires is not only geographical but also ethnographical—or, rather perhaps, religious, since it separates Rome from Byzantium and the Roman Catholic religion from the Orthodox. Centuries of war have divided east from west, uniting the belligerents on each side. Geography, therefore, includes history, and history, ethnography. The physical habitat of a nation, like the nation itself, is built up piecemeal. To illustrate our thesis we revert to the small city-state of Athens.

² E. M. Arndt, quoted in C. Andler, p. 89.

When its parts merged to form Attica, wars—the French call them “*guerre des limites*”³—were fought to round out the territory to its natural limits.

Attica was described by ancient writers as an *akte*, that is, a peninsula. . . . The land frontiers of Attica, though not impregnable to a military force, precluded close intercourse with the neighbouring countries. . . .

The interior of Attica is ribbed with a loosely-jointed system of mountains which break up the land into several distinct compartments, but do not completely sever intercourse between these. Attica does not form an obvious geographical unit, but its constituent portions can all be connected up through the Athenian corridor which provides a natural centre of communications for the whole country.⁴

Typical of the habitat-forming process are three elements: first, mountains and sea are utilized as frontiers; second, the merging of local interests and national character begins at Athens, which is so located as to be a meeting place of all roads; third, when mingling has advanced to the point where the various groups within the future nation become a compound under the stress of an emotional peak, wars for borders begin. The date of the *synoikismos*, or “merging,” is unknown; we are told that it was between the tenth and the eighth centuries B.C., and Eleusis was acquired in the seventh century. Bury writes:

Though Attica was a poor country, scantily watered and with light soil, her prosperity in the oil trade might encourage her to look forward to becoming rich. But, if she was ever to become a political power, there was one thing to be achieved at all hazards. Every Athenian who stood on his strong hill and looked south-westward, could see what this was. He descried, lying close to his own shore, an island which was not his own. And, if he walked across Mount Aegaleos, he saw how the foreign island [Salamis] blocked up the bay of what was now his own Elcusiis. Almost equally distant from Athens and Megara, parted by a narrow water from both, Salamis in the hands of either must be considered a menace to the other.⁵

It was, of course, finally absorbed.

When the fortress is ready, the need for further protection—for a glacis—is obvious, and we shall see that when the glacis is well established great interest and care is taken that the vassal neighbors constituting it shall remain in a habitat without natural boundaries, without

³ Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, I, 253 ff.

⁴ *Cambridge Ancient History*, III, 573 ff.

⁵ *History of Greece*, p. 190.

glacis, and separated into small groups. The natural tendency is sooner or later to absorb the glacis and annex the buffer states, which in turn begets a need for new buffer states and fresh wars of conquest. Starting with an original impulse of self-protection, the state is impelled to embark upon a course of armed aggression, the upshot of which is a struggle for hegemony.

Every Greek city-state which by virtue of its natural situation or the temper of its people had sufficient strength to enter upon an imperialistic career sought to enlarge its territory so as to have strategic frontiers adequate for defense and at the same time serviceable as springboards against its neighbors—frontiers which would command also its trade routes, thereby assuring economic independence.

The picture of the evolution of the European national states is similar. Each local governor situated at an interprovincial Times Square tries to increase his territory until it is well secured. If the *guerres de limite* are successful, the *guerre de magnificence*⁶—the war for glacis, for neighbors divided and dominated by friends—begins, and ultimately, through overexpansion, leads to the ruin of the empire builders.

To illustrate this sequence we may turn again to the history of Rome. The Roman Empire began as a federation of several smaller states. Its habitat was the Italian peninsula—an *akte*, as the Greek historians called it. By the time the last campaign against other inhabitants of the peninsula had ended in the defeat of Pyrrhus, in 274 B.C., all the states of Italy were members of the federation and the habitat extended from the Alps to the toe of the peninsula. But Italy was not a nation, nor did she rule a territory on which an empire could be established. For this she needed to control the large islands of the Mediterranean nearest to her and the east coast of the Adriatic.

The Mediterranean is divided in two by Italy, and by the time of the Pyrrhic wars there was little contact between the Balkan peninsula and the west which was dominated by Carthage. Like Rome, Carthage had grown from small beginnings; from a Phoenician trading post she had become the foremost maritime power of that time and region. She was sovereign over much territory on the European side of the Mediterranean, including stretches of Spain, all Sardinia and Corsica, and a large part of Sicily. Moreover, she had reliable subservient friends and

⁶ Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, I, 283 ff.

trade connections; for instance, Greek Massilia on the site of modern Marseilles.

Polybius, in his great history written in the second century B.C., says:

To prevent my narrative from being obscure to readers owing to their ignorance of the geography, I will try to convey briefly to them an idea of the natural advantages and exact position of the places referred to. 42. Sicily, then, as a whole occupies the same position with regard to Italy and its extremity that the Peloponnese occupies with regard to the rest of Greece and its extremity.⁷

If we draw a straight line from Tunis, near the site of Carthage, to Genoa, it will cross both Corsica and Sardinia, which constitute a wall facing Italy's west coast. If, similarly, we connect Tunis with Reggio in the toe of the peninsula, this second line will run across Sicily. If we then draw a third line between Reggio and Genoa we get a triangle, two sides of which, from Tunis to Genoa and from Tunis to Reggio, were under the control of Carthage, a sea power. The third side of the triangle, the seacoast from Reggio to Genoa, held by Rome, a land power, was thus gripped as in a pair of pincers by Carthage (see map on page 297). From Sardinia and Corsica on the west and from Sicily on the south she could close in upon Rome's westward sea lanes. Only the east coast of Sicily, controlled by two city-states of Greek origin, Messina and Syracuse, was free of Carthaginian overlordship.

In the third century B.C. disorders broke out in Messina, one faction asking help of Carthage, the other turning to Rome.

They [The Romans] were therefore in great apprehension lest, if they [the Carthaginians] also became masters of Sicily, they would be most troublesome and dangerous neighbors, hemming them in on all sides and threatening every part of Italy. That they would soon be supreme in Sicily if the Mamertines [sons of Mars, as the rulers of Messina called themselves] were not helped was evident; for once Messene had fallen into their hands, they would shortly subdue Syracuse also, as they were absolute lords of almost all the rest of Sicily. The Romans, foreseeing this and viewing it as a necessity for themselves not to abandon Messene and thus allow the Carthaginians as it were to build a bridge over to Italy, debated the matter for long.⁸

Thus Rome, compelled to aid the Messinians, became involved in war with Carthage. In the year 264 B.C. for the first time a Roman army

⁷ Polybius i. 117.

⁸ *Ibid.*, i. 25, 27.

left the soil of continental Italy, to disembark at Messina. It was a war for security—to procure bases needed for protection against a mighty neighbor and avenues for Rome's radiations, avenues controlled by her great rival. Of this venture Meyer writes:

It was a step that could never be retracted, a step whose consequences were as incalculable as was the occupation of Silesia by Prussia, or the war of the United States against Spain and the occupation of Cuba and the Philippines. The immediate result was the twenty-four years' warfare with Carthage for the possession of Sicily and the creation of a Roman sea power; the Carthaginians were no match [for Rome], and were wiped out by [the contest]. The final result was the acquisition of an overseas possession ruled by the Roman aristocracy and plundered by the Italian money interests.⁹

When Cato's *ceterum censeo* was carried out and Carthage destroyed, Rome had her western glacis—the islands in the western Mediterranean—and was on the eve of acquiring an eastern one—the Adriatic coast opposite the peninsula.

What was then (in the third century B.C.) called the world was an economic unit, all countries having an outlet to the Mediterranean. Goods, men, and ideas traveled from city to city; products manufactured in Greece were consumed far back in Arabia and even India; foodstuffs and other raw materials of these countries and Russia were consumed in the Greek city-states. Greek and hellenized merchants went from country to country founding other autonomous city-states. This trading empire was, however, politically divided. The three Diadochi who had succeeded Alexander—becoming kings of Egypt, Syria, and Macedonia, respectively—maintained for a time a balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean, watching the Greek city-states and preventing them from uniting. There had been competition in the Empire between individuals; now it was between states. In the last quarter of the century Egypt lost her paramount position, upsetting the balance of power, and probably about 203 or 202 B.C. (reviving the ancient coalition of Syria and Macedonia against Egypt) the two former powers concluded the disgraceful agreement of which Polybius writes.

It is very surprising that as long as Ptolemy in his lifetime could dispense with the help of Philip and Antiochus [kings of Macedonia and Syria], they were very ready to assist him, but when he died leaving an infant son whom it was their natural duty to maintain in possession of his realm,

⁹ Meyer, *Schriften*, pp. 247-48.

then encouraging each other they hastened to divide the child's kingdom between themselves and be the ruin of the unhappy orphan. Nor did they, as tyrants do, take the pains to provide themselves with some paltry pretext for the shameful deed, but at once acted in a fashion so unscrupulous and brutal that they well deserved to have applied to them the saying about the food of fishes, that though they are all of the same tribe the destruction of the smaller ones is food and life to the larger.¹⁰

When Philip V of Macedon attacked and occupied the Greek states which had been Egypt's vassals and protective glacis, the latter country was too weak to come to their aid. Bitter fighters as the Greeks were, they could not offer serious resistance. The one power with whose co-operation they could hope to vanquish Philip was Rome. But Philip was not afraid of Rome, for he felt certain that in no circumstances would she interfere in bickerings between the city-states and Macedonia. Rome desired above all to avoid involvement in Greek affairs, which she found confusing and did not understand and with which she felt no connection whatever. Philip's spies had informed him that, while the Roman Senate had received the delegates of the Aetolian Federation, it had refused aid on the ground that the latter had abandoned Rome during the second Punic War and the Aetolians had only themselves to blame, therefore, if Rome did not rush to their defense in the present trouble.

All this happened in the year 202 B.C. Barely two years later Rome declared war on Philip. What was the reason for this *volte face*? Why did Rome consider that in the year 200 the time had come to take up arms against Macedonia and render to the Greek cities the help refused two years earlier? Why did the Senate now decide to interfere in the affairs of Greece, whereas two years earlier it had opposed intervention? The Roman populace at large had not changed its opinion; it wanted as much as ever to keep clear of Greek affairs. The popular assembly, the *comitia*, refused to concur in the resolution of the Senate, and only after repeated efforts was its approval gained for the declaration of war.

Modern historians of Rome attempt in various ways to explain this sudden change of policy. Mommsen holds that one reason was the pro-Hellenic sympathy induced by the spread of Greek culture in Rome. Others argue that Rome, having become mistress of the western Mediterranean by the peace of Sama, now turned toward the east with the

¹⁰ iv. 20; v. 507-9.

intention of seizing the eastern shores of the Adriatic, whose mountains and protected harbors controlled the opposite flat littoral. Still others contend that Rome had to defend her peninsula and assure her own security; they seem to agree that the policy was imperialistic, aiming to consolidate or to extend Rome's glaxis. The change itself is graphically described by Holleaux.

Suddenly the rulers of the Romans emerged from the indifference in which they had gladly wrapped themselves whenever there was a question of overseas regions. Suddenly they renounced their habitual preference for inaction, which had simply been that indifference turned into a system; suddenly we see that these same men, whom we had so often seen uncertain, drifting, so slow to act when all they had to do was to dispatch a squadron eastward just across the strait, become resolute and determined, all decision, all *élan*; suddenly they take the ground that Rome has interests over there which are pressing, so pressing that they must be attended to at once, and that they are entirely convinced that the care of these interests demands the prompt and decisive defeat of Philip, the end of his power in Greece, and the restoration of Hellenic liberty.¹¹

The fact was that Philip, as we have noted, had made an agreement with the king of Syria for the division of peaceable Egypt and the enslavement of the Greek cities, likewise at peace and incapable of resistance. The Roman senators realized the danger implicit in an invasion of Greece and the threat of subsequent attack on the Italian peninsula. Rome already had principles for the guidance of her foreign relations: she would not wage war for any reason other than to redress a wrong committed against her or an ally. Philip had not as yet overtly harmed Rome or any of her allies. Yet the Senate invoked the *lex fetialis* on the ground that his course involved the contingency of overt wrongs. Under political pressure the term "allied powers" was interpreted to cover also "friendly powers"—the *amici* of Rome; accordingly, the Greek cities were said to be victimized by Philip. War was declared as a preventive measure to forestall invasion.

The long tale of what led to the war between growing Rome and the kingdom of Macedonia may be reduced to this single action on the part of Philip, which aroused the feeling of danger in Rome and Rome's reaction in going to war to meet it. Psychologists tell us that underlying the emotion of fear are the experiences of the individual

¹¹ Holleaux, pp. 192 ff.; *Cambridge Ancient History*, VIII, 138 ff.; Rostovtzeff, *Hellenistic World*, II, 603 ff.; Mommsen, II, 211.

and the deposits left in him by the experiences of his ancestors; that challenges awakening such memories arouse fears. Like all other elemental feelings, such as hunger and pain, fear has an energizing effect. "William James in one of his last essays suggested . . . that in every person there are 'reservoirs of power' which is not ordinarily called upon, but which is nevertheless ready to pour forth streams of energy if only occasion presents itself."¹²

It is as true of a nation as of an individual that when the generally accepted and accustomed order or way of life is disturbed, fear is aroused. The response of a healthy organism to fear is resistance. The latent energy thus set free goes into an attack on the cause of the fear.

The events in Macedonia and the Seleucid kingdom of Syria, which was extending its sway over Palestine, were antipathetic to Roman law and customs. But they excited fear only in the Roman Senate and in the upper layer of Roman society, which, concerned with foreign policy and familiar with past and current events, could weigh their effect. Remembering Alexander and Hannibal, the Roman senators recognized the danger of signs when they saw a new conqueror, allied with the Seleucids, on the move in the Mediterranean world.

The great majority of Romans, sensing no danger, were unmoved. The plebeian saw no connection between his own life and welfare and events in distant lands. It is a truism that people usually underestimate their interest in the maintenance of law and order at large; unless directly affected, they rarely even protest against wrongs committed abroad. Individual states likewise, it may be said, seldom realize that lawless acts anywhere, if unchecked, open the gates to widespread destruction of law and order and are the first steps toward general anarchy and chaos.

Shortly after Rome had defeated Philip she marched against Syria with equal success. The following centuries were disturbed by a series of wars and revolutions. The wars against Jugurtha the Numidian, Mithridates, king of Pontus, the Gauls, and other neighbors, as well as revolting vassals—all the conquests, since Rome was forced to annex the defeated states—led finally to an empire in the Mediterranean world. In seeking security the nation whose habitat was Italy expanded to the northeastern wall in Britain, to the Rhine-Danube line, to what are today Turkey and Asia Minor.

In the introduction to his great satire on human history, *Penguin*

¹² Cannon, p. 227.

Island, Anatole France relates how the wise Gratien traveled through the empire of the Penguins. One day he stopped under an oak tree near a house to enjoy the beauty of the idyllic scene.

The master of the house, a young and sturdy man, offered some bread and milk to Gratien. The Porpoise philosopher, having taken his rural repast said:

"Delightful inhabitants of a delightful country, I give you thanks," said he. "Everything here breathes forth joy, concord, and peace."

As he said this a shepherd passed by playing a march upon his pipe.

"What is that lively air?" asked Gratien.

"It is the war-hymn against the Porpoises," answered the peasant. "Everybody here sings it. Little children know it before they can speak. We are all good Penguins."

"You don't like the Porpoises then?"

"We hate them."

"For what reason do you hate them?"

"Need you ask? Are not the Porpoises neighbors of the Penguins?"

"Of course."

"Well, that is why the Penguins hate the Porpoises."

"Is that a reason?"

"Certainly. He who says neighbors, says enemies." ¹³

This is how Rome viewed the world: her neighbors were her enemies, and the normal relationship between enemies was war. Only a state that had no neighbors—the neighborless empire—was secure.

The enemy was to be conquered. It may even be said that perception of danger had made Rome oversensitive. In this respect also a nation is not unlike an individual. If fear becomes a habit, so to say, it may engender a state of anxiety, which must be differentiated from fear. Danger may be seen where no real danger exists, where no fear is justified. But the "sense of danger generated or magnified by intrapsychic factors" ¹⁴ is responded to in the same manner and by the same reactions as real danger. Danger, real or imagined, makes us more alive. We love the fear that gives us strength for conflict. Fear is something not only to escape from, but also to welcome as an answer to the need for anxiety.

Through anxiety and loving to fight—always on the alert, always ready for war—Rome fought one war of conquest after another, until she had vanquished all her neighbors (see map on page 343).

¹³ Anatole France, *Penguin Island*, tr. by Lafcadio Hearn, New York, Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, 1909, p. xi.

¹⁴ Horney, pp. 41 ff.; Goldstein, pp. 294 ff.

The wars to build up Rome's neighborless empire consumed the force of her elite and killed the best of her population. Depopulation began, barbarians were taken in, and the empire fell; when it fell, fear returned to the world, and with it the desire for the resurrection of the empire.

Rome disappeared, but Roman ideas—the idea of an empire secure against all its neighbors—remained. Popes, barbarian chiefs, kaisers, and emperors all tried to rebuild Rome and make its inhabitants feel safe.

That fear should create a desire for security is human; that security is to be achieved in the same way today, when war is three dimensional, mechanized, and the atom bomb its tool, as when there were no motors, no planes, and no explosives is an assumption that may remind us of the lemmings or the Bourbons, who neither forgot nor learned. Perhaps it is merely evidence that to divide the spoils and divert them from competitors, the daily business of politicians, is so absorbing a pursuit that there is no time to learn.

To match our illustration from ancient history, let us turn to that of France. A glance at the map shows that France is separated from Spain by the Pyrenees, from her neighbors in the east by the Alps, the Vosges, and the Ardennes, and from England and countries outside Europe by the Straits of Dover, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. Only in the northeast, from the valley of the Meuse to the Straits, does an open pass link the plains of France with those of the rest of Europe. Romans, barbarians, and French alike have looked upon the Rhine as the natural frontier which would close that gap. Early in French history the theory evolved that the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean, the Alps, the Rhine, the Channels, and the Atlantic constitute the natural frontiers of France. In this region, selected by nature as one nation's habitat, the Paris basin is so located as to play the same role as did Athens in Attica. Saucer shape, it has the best connection with all the great valleys of France.

In the tenth century, at the beginning of the reign of the Capet line, the territory within the "natural" boundaries of France was divided into numerous small units. We have mentioned how the *villa Romana* became enlarged into a domain, each one a little state. And states with precise limits try to expand at the expense of little neighboring states, whose inhabitants look upon the outsiders as strangers, even as enemies. In this world separated from the rest of Europe by natural barriers,

in this mosaic of states, the domains of the Capets were scattered throughout the Ile de France or Paris basin, easily connecting with all regions, particularly if their ruler could succeed in extending his sway over both Poitou, the door giving access to the valley of the Garonne, and Champagne, the door to the Rhône. Thus enlarged, the Ile de France, with open roads through the valleys to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, could control both the southern and the western boundaries of France.¹⁵

As several cities merged to form Athens, which, centrally located, served as the nucleus for Attica, in France on a somewhat enlarged scale the process had the same stages. First the Ile de France, then the rest of Gaul was brought under the sway of the king. Through marriage, inheritance, and private wars France was assembled piece by piece. Marriage brought to the crown its first seacoast, the Duchy of Flanders; private wars gave it the domains of the heretics in the south. The power of the greatest vassal, the Duke of Normandy (after the Conquest, king of England) was still unbroken in the middle of the twelfth century; with a seat in both Rouen and London he was more powerful than his overlord, the French king. France could not be united until he was eliminated.

Geography forced the kings of France to proceed against Normandy in order to acquire the mouth of the Seine. Their situation in the Seine and the Loire valleys was similar to that of the United States government before the Louisiana purchase; whoever was sovereign in the Ohio and Tennessee valleys had to acquire control over the Mississippi delta.

It is not our task to tell the story of all the wars waged by France against England or of the revolts and private campaigns which helped to secure other domains. Territories were gained, lost and regained. After the Philip Augustus wars of the thirteenth century and again early in the fifteenth century after the Hundred Years' War, France reached a high degree of unity under the king. Somewhat later the conflict of the Reformation once more turned the land into a battlefield as Catholic royal authority fought to maintain its centralized hold over rebelling Protestant princes, struggling for parochial freedom. Local independent governors again came into power, and a feudal aristocracy reappeared.

When England left the Continent and the French king fought his

¹⁵ Vidal de la Blache, in E. Lavisse, I, 124 ff.; Funck-Brentano, I, 295.

revolting vassals, each party in France tried to obtain foreign help, while foreign powers intrigued to take advantage of the domestic unrest, as is usual in civil wars. For the steady helper of discontented parochial princes within a kingdom or empire trying to consolidate its central authority over a segregated territory is always the outside prince, ambitious to be like a Roman emperor and dominate a neighborless realm. But as the last wars were fought for the consolidation of France, the days of Charles V were gone; there was no prince in Europe with the *élan vital* to try to dominate the Continent. Europe was divided. England and Spain were hostile, the Low Countries were struggling against their Spanish masters, and the Germanic empire was disintegrating. This situation saved France until Henry IV began to reconsolidate the royal authority. Louis XIII and his great minister Richelieu completed the work (see map on page 208).

It would seem that when a state reaches the frontiers best for its protection, expansion should stop, especially when the inhabitants of the whole territory within the boundaries designated by nature or the real or imaginary will of a great monarch are of one stock and can be merged into a nation. Regions whose inhabitants speak the same language, cherish the same traditions, and enjoy the same culture naturally unite more readily than those in which language, traditions, and culture differ.

Land with its inhabitants has been likened by Vidal de la Blache¹⁶ to a living cell which has its chemical affinities and repulsions. Sometimes these cells coalesce because of their geographic configuration, sometimes for historical reasons or because of the common origin of their inhabitants. From these living cells, like pieces of mosaic, the state is built. The closer the coherence and affinity between cell and cell, and the more completely they merge and lose their individuality, the stronger the state. The state is land and its inhabitants welded together. The better welded, the smaller the danger of splitting into several units.

Sorel calls frontiers the landmarks where national characteristics, that is to say, where analogous traditions, like aspirations, a common civilization, stop.¹⁷ Ideally, therefore, boundaries should separate cells with affinity to one state from cells gravitating toward other states. But

¹⁶ J. Ancel, "Die französische geographische Schule und die Geopolitik," tr. by L. Noser, *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 1939, pp. 640 ff.

¹⁷ Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, I, 245.

such boundaries determined by affinities seldom or never correspond with strategic-economic lines. States when they reach a certain degree of consistency—when they reach their natural frontiers—take “the step which can never be taken back”; they engage in external wars, *guerres de magnificence*—wars to enhance prestige.

No French conqueror had the self-restraint to stop at the natural boundaries. The two who fully reached them, Louis XIV and Napoleon, grasped beyond and tried to make France supreme in Europe. Given human nature, anxiety follows fear, and the *guerre de magnificence* is bound to follow the *guerre de limite*.

France first felt the urge toward wars “of magnificence” after the battle of Bouvines, when Philip Augustus looked for further territory to protect the country, but in the wrong direction. Of this time F. Funck-Brentano writes: “The enthusiasm with which the battle of Bouvines filled the whole of France was, perhaps, more remarkable than the victory itself. It is an explosion of joy in which vibrates, with a sublime emotion, the ideal of one’s country.”¹⁸ Possessing, as H. A. C. Fisher says, the rarest of all qualities in a medieval ruler, “concentration on the possible,”¹⁹ Philip attempted the impossible. While King John of England was engrossed in domestic disputes, Philip sent an expeditionary force across the Channel to win the English crown for his son Louis—an overexpansion bound to end in failure. The separation between England and France was social as well as physical. When Norman and Saxon intermarriage and the climate of England had done their work, the grandchildren of the invaders were quite different from those of their kinsmen who had remained in Normandy. They spoke another language and observed other customs. The villeins and serfs who settled in England with the Conqueror had become English squires, freemen, and town dwellers.

The French expedition did not succeed, and in the next century the Hundred Years’ War confirmed the verdict that England could no more obtain dominion in France than France could in England. After a short time France, somewhat restored, again reached the stage when a state looks out for better frontiers and begins wars against its neighbors. This time she tried her hand against Italy. But after an early triumph for France, the Franco-Spanish rivalry in Italy ended “like all subsequent French invasions of Italy . . . by a sudden and complete reverse.”²⁰

¹⁸ Page 282.

¹⁹ I, 220.

²⁰ Bainville, pp. 102 ff.

Sully under Henry IV settled French foreign policy for the coming centuries. Profiting by the experience of his sovereign's predecessors, he began by realizing that the golden mean is as becoming to a state as to a person; he held theoretically that only such territories should be acquired as could be retained. Conquest carried to extreme would exhaust the state and make enemies. Above all, would continued conquests not awaken in French rulers such desires for conquest and domination as would be more dangerous to her than the hatred of foreign powers?

Consider [Sully wrote his royal lord] what might be the thoughts of a prince less wise, less temperate and modest than yourself, such as might be one of your successors . . . and whether they know how to keep within such limits without such size giving birth to ambitious desires and insatiable greed to enlarge the domain to a point where it could bear the title of occidental monarchy.²¹

Thus did Sully warn his king against ambitious plans—against aligning all other powers on the other side. If France kept within her natural frontiers, she could regain her ancient glory and make herself supreme over the rest of Christendom. But she must persuade the neighboring countries and those she had already absorbed that those boundaries were fair.

To attack the house of Austria and reduce it to the peninsula of Spain, to divide Europe among rulerships that would check one another, to found among them a republic of Christian states of which the Pope would hold the presidency and France the government, to enfeeble rivals, strengthen friends, to encircle it with a belt of neutral states, in law its protégés, in fact its vassals, serving as a bulwark of its defense, and the advance guard of its influence, then—peace established among the Christians—to expel the Tartar and the Turk from Europe and restore the Empire of Constantinople, such was, in its chief items, the famous proposition of Sully.²²

To the golden mean Sully did lip service; stronger than himself was the tendency to acquire European hegemony for France. The plan of fortress France, the natural frontiers to be reached, had been predetermined by experience and tradition; Vauban, the great fortress builder of Louis XIV, later in the century merely filled in the details. If the Rhine were the frontier, Alsace, the knee of France, would press against Germany. To make the Rhine a boundary, seizing the domains

²¹ Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, I, 268.

²² *Ibid.*

of the German princes on the left bank, would mean overcoming Germany and keeping her subordinate as a territory for *grabuge*—a policy well described by Marillac, ambassador under Henry II, the self-styled “defender of German liberty,” when he advised, “By secret methods keep the affairs of Germany as much stirred up as possible.” Henry epitomized the policy in one word: *grabuge* (squabbling).²³

Germany [the historian tells us] was a mosaic of principalities, republics, and free towns. She was, therefore, weak and offered a free field for French diplomacy because her three hundred and forty-three independent states of all sizes and sorts were masters of their own movements and of their alliances. Their relations with the Empire were becoming extremely vague and were represented by a Diet, a veritable parliament, where, with a little skill, the French agents could intervene in such a way as to keep the “Germanic body” divided.²⁴

The aim of the French Monarchy was to support Teutonic *liberté*, the right of each prince to reign as he chose over his own domain. “The principle of European equilibrium founded by the Treaty of Westphalia,” concludes Jacques Bainville, “rested on the actual elimination of Germany and this remained the policy of France, a policy which naturally was to her greatest interest up to the end of the eighteenth century.”²⁵


In the history of the Greek city-states or of Rome or of France the sequence of events is the same: the fortified territory is reinforced by a glacis consisting of friendly neighbors, vassals. Fear of the neighbor leads the dominant group to overexpand, to seek hegemony. Today Germany—tomorrow the world. Plants and animals expanding into territories not suited to their existence are eliminated by others better adapted to local circumstances. Lack of suitable food, water, or what not, environment and strong natives—all tend to exterminate intruders. The overexpansion of a nation has the same consequences. However, in this case the exhausted dominants lose their power not only outside but also within the natural boundaries.

France’s overexpansion under Louis XIV and again under Napoleon are cases in point. Both succeeded in occupying land beyond their natural boundaries; both succeeded thereby in hammering the discontented into a resistant group. Against both all other European powers aligned themselves (see map page 123).

²³ Bainville, p. 119.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

²⁵ *Ibid.*



Expressed in Yerkes' language, the apparent morals of our stories would read

1. When human beings have acquired, or at least think they have acquired, group traits which distinguished them from other groups evolved as a local variety—when, more precisely, in a moment of emotional peak the nucleus of the new nation is aware of its unity—they launch wars to secure their existence by occupying the whole region separated by natural barriers from other regions. This is the stage at which Rome took the first step to make herself secure by occupying Sicily—when Romans realized that their manifest destiny was to build up their state on a territory segregated by nature from the rest of Europe, the stage when the French kings acquired leadership among the feudal lords and with their followers embarked on *guerres de limite*. When a nation—or better, perhaps, the nucleus of a nation—

emerges, it tries to attain security and self-sufficiency by expanding toward the boundaries of its region.

2. It is another moral of our illustrations that *experience transforms fear into anxiety*; that the dominant, better-consolidated nation becomes more and more aggressive, and *guerres de limite* are followed by *guerres de magnificence* until the world defeats the aggressor.

From Athens to Germany nation follows nation, each in turn becoming the strongest, the best organized in its own world; each expends its own force in building up a universal empire until all other "peace-loving" nations unite against it and each aggressor in turn is defeated. We may call as further witnesses for our statement early German emperors, Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns, the Little Corporal, and the Russians of the past—perhaps Russians of the future. A state selects its frontiers with an eye to its next plans; they are tools to realize a policy. Each state needs an Alsace, a knee with which to hold down its neighbor. Bases are good for protection when they are good for aggression.

To illustrate in further detail this process, which starts with acquiring a glacis and ends in overexpansion, we may consider the history of Prussia's war to unite Germany.

Heinrich Heine once remarked that the English rule the seas, the Russians and the French the flat land, and the Germans the "airy regions" of dreams.²⁶ As a matter of fact the great monarch-statesmen—whether Swabian, Saxon, or Austrian, whether Otto, Frederick Barbarossa, Frederick II, Maximilian I, or Charles V—did dream of re-establishing the universal empire of Rome.²⁷ To this end they fought in Italy, in France, and against invaders from the east. To procure men and money for such wars, each emperor had to grant local sovereignty to the various tribes or clans and their dukes; this policy eternally embarrassed the purpose in view, and regional dissolution became the equivocal condition of would-be universal empire.

All failed to unite Germany and Italy and thus construct a *Mittel-europa*. Voltaire's much-quoted remark that the Holy Roman Empire

²⁶ Heinrich Heine, *Deutschland; ein Wintermärchen*, Leipzig, Bibliografisches Institut, III, 126-27:

"Franzosen und Russen gehoert das Land.
Das Meer gehoert den Briten.
Wir aber besitzen im Luftreich Des Traums
Die Herrschaft unbestritten."

²⁷ Lamprecht, I, 4 ff.; Kantorowicz, p. 382; Brandi, p. 21; Friedjung, I, 66.

was neither holy nor Roman nor an empire epitomizes its defects: ²⁸ the inadequacy of one religion as a bond in an empire with many violently divergent sects, the incapacity of the "Romans" to dominate the Teutons, and the inability of parochially-minded tribes to develop a national spirit.

From the Treaty of Westphalia, which in 1648 ended the Thirty Years' War, to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 Germany was a league of several hundred principalities and cities, each eager to preserve its independence. The "Empire" was then a league of nations—rather, perhaps, a military organization, a *Kriegsverein* of independent states which sometimes fought each other, sometimes co-operated. The independence of which each state was proud, the *liberté Germanique*, was guaranteed by the Treaty of Westphalia. But this no more meant the freedom of the individual German citizen than it did in the period following the Vienna Congress, when our story begins. This was a freedom of the prince, who could exercise his sovereignty as he chose.²⁹ He had the right to determine the religion of his subjects, to raise troops and sell them to foreign states for cash, euphemistically called subsidies, to declare war, and to conclude alliances. These rights were not restricted by an imperial power. Based on a contract among the sovereign princes, the "Empire," however gloriously named, was without federal authority and could neither maintain an army nor direct a collective and consolidated foreign policy.

With army and bureaucrats, each ruler governed his own realm. Like the Greek city-states, these independent units were separated by customs barriers, and each used its own currency. Nevertheless, the new middle class, merchants and artisans as well as artists and scientists, flourished; cities such as Frankfurt-am-Main, Nuremberg, Augsburg, and those of the Hanseatic League thrived. Among their inhabitants the tradition of Rome's universal empire and of the great German emperors Charlemagne and Frederick Barbarossa—the *Kyffhäuser*—was still alive. Charlemagne, originally chieftain of the Franks, was, seen from Gaul, a French emperor, and seen from Germany, a Teuton, like the two-faced Roman god Janus. For centuries popular belief held that the *Kyffhäuser* was not dead, but lived in hiding and would return some day to lead his people to new glories. Where a messiah is longed for, pseudo-messiahs turn up. From generation to generation,

²⁸ Bryce, p. 216.

²⁹ Valentin, II, 565 ff.

now among the Saxons, now among the Swabians or Franks, and even as late as the eighteenth century, Frederick Barbarossa reappears,³⁰ commanding, like Hitler and the Captain of Köpenick, instant obedience.

When Napoleon's army fell back from Russia, nationalist feeling burst forth among the German peoples and won a decisive victory at Leipzig. The army of the peoples was not entirely spontaneous. Certain states gave military aid in return for promises of independence. Bavaria, Württemberg, even Saxony, secretly agreed with Austria to abandon Napoleon and join the Allies if their future independence were guaranteed. A united Germany—the goal of Stein, the German professors, and other intellectuals—was blocked by these secret agreements even before Napoleon abdicated and the Congress of Vienna assembled. At its sessions Talleyrand had merely to continue the policy of *grubage*, enlisting the support of Metternich and all German princes who were eager to perpetuate their own sovereignty. To maintain this division within Germany—to protect the *liberté* of the princes—was French policy.³¹

Somewhat opposed to this policy was the English. Dissatisfied with Austria's part in the wars against Louis XIV, as well as against Napoleon, Britain wanted a strong power in north Germany to check the French attempt at hegemony. It was Britain who helped Prussia to get the Rhineland. Her suggestion in 1805 that a barrier state be erected on the left bank of the Rhine as a *cordon sanitaire* against French aggression and liberal ideas reminds one of the phrases heard during the early years of the Hitler régime: Let Germany rearm—Let Germany gain power over her weaker neighbors—The West needs protection against Russia and its communist ideas. Castlereagh practically forced the Rhineland on Prussia, thus making her the protector of other German states and setting in motion the evolution which led in time to Prussia's Germany and the overexpansion attempted by William II and Hitler.

Nobody then foresaw the union of Germany under the Prussian crown or that change in the balance of European power which still makes Germany formidable to her neighbors. Far otherwise was the outlook in 1814. Then, France was regarded as the general enemy, and Prussia as the power best qualified to keep a watch upon the Rhine. The new map was

³⁰ Kantorowicz, pp. 687–88.

³¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, IX, 610 ff.

shaped by statesmen for whom revolution emanating from France was the greatest of all dangers to the well-being of mankind.³²

As a matter of fact, a plan for a united Prussian Germany was actually in existence in 1815. In a report to Hardenberg, Prussia's leading minister, his agent Gruner announced that he had sent two men into southern Germany,

to enlist new members for a secret organization aiming at the integration of all German states under Prussian leadership . . . The pressure on and the excitement among the subjects run high, and the ablest citizens of Baden, Bavaria, and Wuerttemberg are unanimous in declaring that a revolution cannot be avoided. . . . On the other hand, all agree that the secret organization's task is to prevent an explosion before things are ripe, and thus likely to be abortive, and to contrive that action be taken only when Prussia gives the word. The members of the organization scarcely know one another, but urge a convention. . . . With enough money and efficient work of organization, I am convinced that (1) the German nobility, the German scholars, the clergy, and the educated classes can be entirely won over, the soldiers and the peasants partly so . . . (2) that all risings can be staved off as long as it suits our interests.³³

Had England known the plan or interpreted the historical evidence, she could have foreseen that a united Germany would imitate French policy against her—that Germany, like France, would bid for Continental hegemony, striving to eliminate English influence from the Continent and claiming title to the colonies of other Continental states. Even had English statesmen seen at Vienna the danger that Prussia might unite the German states, with the result of a confederation revolt against the *Pax Britannica*, they would still have helped Prussia, for a strong Prussia was vital to England as a safeguard against Russia as well as against France. Since neighbors are usually enemies, a strong Prussia as neighbor of both France and Russia would be their enemy and a friend to England.

There was in 1815 a plan to unite Germany. But what is Germany? Spain, Italy, and even Gaul are regions separated from their neighbors by sea and mountains. There are gaps in their natural frontiers, there are nearby islands, such as Sicily, and there are places where the moun-

³² Fisher, III, 686.

³³ Meinecke, "Zur Geschichte des Gedankens der preussischen Hegemonie in Deutschland," *Historische Zeitschrift*, LXXXII (1899), 102 ff.

tains are flattened and the gates open for invasion. The rulers of naturally defined regions, however, can close the gates and annex the adjacent islands, thereby controlling the roads to and from their boundaries. But Germany—the Confederation at any rate—occupied one part only of a plain open both to the west and to the east.

The Confederation of German States, as the Holy Roman Empire was called after the Congress of Vienna (at the close of the Napoleonic wars), was a federation of states on the road to disintegration. Each member was independent, and in organizations of this degree, whether tribal, feudal, or a federal society, the mightiest tribe, lord, or state, as the case may be, controls the others by a balance of power.⁸⁴ In the German area the two powers struggling for hegemony were Prussia and Austria. Their neighbors to the east were Slavic groups—Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and Slovenes; to the south, Hungarians and Rumanic groups. No natural frontiers separated the Germans from the Slavs or from the Hungarians. On the eastern frontiers of France, Austria as the heir of Spanish aspirations had until now ruled the Austrian Netherlands and certain other territories on the Rhine and with the South German states stood watch against the dangerous French.

The Vienna Congress, under English influence, returned to Prussia the provinces Napoleon had taken from her and in addition gave her Westphalia and certain Rhine provinces. Relinquishing all her holdings in western Europe, including her share of the Low Countries, Austria retired to the Danube Basin and Italy, Prussia with her new territories succeeding her as the protector of Germany against France. It was up to her to bar any expansion toward the Rhine.

Thus, Austria and Prussia, the two states on the German borders, protected other Germanic cities and duchies from their non-German neighbors. Austria closed the gap in her frontiers by incorporating Bohemia and Hungary, thereby acquiring a buttress against invasion. Regressing organisms, we have said, tend to retire into better-defined habitats, and Austria was already on the decline when the nineteenth century opened. When the Hapsburgs, in 1815, after a victorious war, voluntarily left the Rhineland and opened the road to the Rhine for their rival, they cut themselves off from the west and initiated a policy bound to make of their domain a state dependent upon Prussia. Intrigues with Napoleon III before the Franco-Prussian War could no longer restore what was lost after Waterloo.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Friedjung, I, 57, 66.

⁸⁵ Lamprecht, X, 4.

Prussia after the Congress of Vienna consisted of scattered parts, separated by other, smaller principalities. When a state is not a territorial unit, it tries to acquire the land between its parts. Any state tends to take in territory that will make it a rounded, approximately circular whole, since a state without prominent extensions is easier to defend than an irregular one; though other circumstances, such as natural barriers, usually interfere with this tendency toward a perfect shape. Moreover, states are organisms, and each organism tries to achieve self-sufficiency, independence. As none has ever wholly succeeded—as every state in order to exist needs services and goods from other states—every national policy includes also the effort to obtain free avenues to the world market and to control them.

To unite their divided parts and secure their own free access to the world, states will try to encircle their neighbors and cut them off from the sea, the one road free to all. When the Teutonic Order of German Knights penetrated into Poland and settled on the shores of the Baltic, this group was simultaneously an obstacle between the Poles and their seacoast and a bridge connecting the divided parts of Prussia. After 1918 the Polish Corridor similarly separated the two parts of Germany and made a bridge for Poland to the sea. In both the eighteenth and the twentieth century the result was the same: the tendency of the separated parts to unite was fulfilled, twice by Prussia at the expense of Poland, and once in 1945 by the joining of Poland's separated habitats into their ancient unity.

Prussia divided after the Napoleonic wars into many separate parts, aimed at territorial unity by cutting off her neighbors from the high seas and thereby from free communication with other strong and independent neighbors. She developed an army and a philosophy that might is right, subject to no ethical code. From Arndt through Treitschke and Bernhardt to Hitler the thread runs: small states have no right to exist, since they cannot protect themselves; any attempt to restrain a great nation's power and wish to dominate is a sin against the Holy Ghost of politics.³⁶ No other powerful nation of the European world—not Rome or Britain or France—has ever gone so far. Was this due to the absence of natural boundaries and the expression of an inferiority complex toward those better protected?

Proponents of a Greater Germany from Arndt to Hitler had their own plans. For them Germany was the territory outlined by the Brit-

³⁶ Treitschke, I, 92, 138.

ish cartographer John Bartholomew.³⁷ This ethnographical Germany included parts of France, Belgium, Holland, Austria, and Switzerland. For Bismarck and those who stood for a smaller united Germany such a union seemed unobtainable; their plan included only the territory outlined on the map on page 131. Supporters of the smaller Germany were ready to admit the independence of those who had cast their lot outside and had acquired individuality as states—namely, Switzerland and Holland.


Prussia was well-situated to fuse the Germans domiciled on a territory not clearly segregated from other parts of Europe; she had the crossroads position necessary for unification. After the Treaty of Vienna she enveloped the German states as Austria had never done,³⁸ and the international situation in the second half of the nineteenth century gave her an opportunity to create a united German nation. Russia, then the paramount power in Europe, was defeated by the Franco-British coalition in the Crimean War; she was unable, therefore, to follow an aggressive policy. England, after one of her hard-won victories, isolated herself. France was under the inefficient leadership of Napoleon III. It was Bismarck's opportunity to unite Germany.

For the statesmen of Prussia who wanted to combine the smaller German units into a single state the problem was to cut off Austria and the other more or less powerful German states from the North Sea and western Europe and thus make it impossible for France to play her diplomatic game in Germany—that is, protecting the *liberté Germanique* by helping Protestants against Catholics or feudal lords against their king. Bismarck saw the road ahead quite clearly. The first step was to acquire Schleswig and Holstein; the second, to oust Austria from the German Federation; the third, to absorb Alsace and Lorraine and so push away the French knee pressing into Germany's flank. He used the effective technique of the bull ring, enraging his opponents one by one to the point of declaring war on Prussia while maneuvering the other European powers into benevolent neutrality. The three Bismarckian wars—for Schleswig, against Austria, and finally against France—accomplished the encirclements, and the way for an ultimate Greater Germany was opened (see map page 131).

The map tells the story, but Bismarck's manner of achieving it will

³⁷ *The Times Survey Atlas of the World*. . . prepared . . . under the direction of J. G. Bartholomew, London, *The Times*, 1922.

³⁸ Meinecke, *Historische Zeitschrift* (see note 33, above).



illustrate the gentle art of diplomacy. His first war, for Schleswig-Holstein,³⁹ was to secure the seacoast for Prussia and Austria. "Only three men," said Palmerston, "understood the overcomplicated question of Schleswig-Holstein. One was Prince Albert, but he is dead, the second, a Danish statesman, but he developed madness, and the third am I, but I have forgotten it."⁴⁰ If we look at a map of the German Empire founded in 1871, the question does not seem too complicated.

³⁹ A. O. Mayer, "Zielsetzung Bismarck's Schleswig Holsteinischen Politik," *Gesellschaft für Schleswig Holstein, Zeitschrift*, LIII (1923); 105; Lamprecht, XI, 460.

⁴⁰ Lacour-Gayet, p. 58.

Holstein, the land between the Baltic and the North Sea, was the keystone of Prussia's Germany. Both gates of the Kiel Canal, then projected, would be in Holstein. And Schleswig constituted the glacis of a German Holstein against the Danes—dangerous neighbors always, for when they were strong they tried to unite the Scandinavian countries, and when weak they were easily dominated by England or Russia.

The *casus belli*—the constitutional question whether the Danish king or an independent local German prince should rule in Schleswig—did not interest Bismarck. He saw in the duchies a missing link to round out Prussia's unconnected provinces. Prussian to the core, attached to his king "unto the Vendée,"⁴¹ as he phrased it, he did not want the Augustenburgs, next in the German line, as rulers of an independent state in the German Confederation, in a position to play ball, now with Prussia against Austria, now with Austria against Prussia. Nor did he want the Danes in these duchies, since a strong Denmark might block the road from the North Sea to the Baltic, while a weak Denmark might again fall under the thumb of England or of Russia. Accordingly he insisted upon annexation, although his king and colleagues were opposed. After retiring from office he used to boast that the acquisition of Schleswig and Holstein was his diplomatic master stroke. "A play of intrigues for the stage," he remarked to his intimate, Busch.⁴²

This annexation, his move against Austria, and the blow at France were the steps of a man bent on a definite goal, but he did not map out the whole road at once. His concern was always the immediate step; he could bide his time until the situation was ripe to take the next. "There are two ways to elevate yourself," says La Bruyère, "by your own industry and by the imbecility of others." No politician can know in advance which will determine his next move. Bismarck was guided by the conviction that in diplomacy as in war the primary aim of every move must be to get the best of your adversary; you can then force him to do your will. The terms of the peace may be little concerned with the *casus belli*. A war may be waged for any reason whatever—as Bismarck said, three months are plenty of time to set the stage. The object of the Bismarckian wars was not to restore a status quo or to repair injuries; for Bismarck, war was not the "just"

⁴¹ Friedjung, I, 53.

⁴² Mayer, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

war of the Romans, not an international procedure to vindicate one's rights, but a means of eliminating rivals.

In the hostilities against Denmark, Austria co-operated. The pretext for war was the fact that Frederick VII, "that honest and pure man but bad politician,"⁴³ had merged Schleswig and Holstein with the rest of Denmark, destroying their autonomy and thereby violating the London Protocol. The Danes had, in fact, revised their laws to permit a female in the direct line to inherit the duchies, contrary to German practice. Though Denmark was defeated, the peace agreement of 1852 did not restore the terms of the Protocol; instead it assigned the territory to Austria and Prussia.


Bismarck attempted in vain to acquire Austria's rights in them by negotiation.⁴⁴ The Gastein Agreement of 1865 gave Prussia the administration of Schleswig, leaving that of Holstein to Austria. Bismarck entered into it well knowing that Austria would not renounce her rights without war. The next year was spent in preparing the ground—striking up a friendship with Russia, courting Napoleon III with promises of "compensation," and making an alliance with Italy. A *casus belli* was found, and Austria and the German states siding with her were defeated at Königgrätz. By the peace treaty Prussia gained possession of Schleswig and Holstein, Hanover, the Hessian states, and other smaller units.

The map on page 134 clearly demonstrates the tragic situation into which the Hapsburg Empire fell after it overexpanded and failed to unite Europe. It still controlled Germany by its glacis on Germany's western, eastern, and southern borders. Then it lost, successively, the key position in west, south, and east. Its anti-Russian policy during the Crimean War turned its former friend into an enemy. Finally, Germany, its one remaining friend, dominated it.

The North German Confederation, a euphemism for an enlarged Prussia, now succeeded the Confederation of German states, thereby excluding Austria. At this point Germany consisted of two parts. Prussia controlled not only the entire Baltic and North Sea coasts but also the lower and middle sections of the principal German rivers: the Oder, the Elbe, the Weser, and an important stretch of the Rhine. In the south were the independent states of Bavaria, Württemberg,

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁴⁴ Lamprecht, XI, 420; *ibid.*, XI, 453 ff.; Friedjung, I, 123; Marcks, p. 85.



Baden, small states with only one outlet; toward the west and France, they formed a bridge between the latter and defeated Austria. But their economic dependence upon Prussia forced them into a tariff union with her.

The final step in rounding out Prussia's Germany was to bolt the outer door from South Germany. Acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine would barricade Austria's corridor to France.

Napoleon III had tolerated Prussia's attack on Denmark. He had

remained neutral and friendly during her war against Austria in the expectation of a slice of the Rhineland or at least the Duchy of Luxembourg, which he believed had been promised him. He got nothing, however; disappointed and chagrined, he was eager to score some offsetting success. While Napoleon was in this frame of mind, Bismarck struck, and he knew where and how to strike. Hoping to arouse fear in France and that the French reaction would be war, he persuaded Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, of the cadet line of the reigning house of Prussia, to accept the Spanish throne.

France's foreign policy was conditioned by the memory of Hapsburg rule and the fear of having all her land routes blocked by one and the same power. She was determined not to allow the same power or dynasty to rule in both Spain and the Low Countries or in one of these and that part of Germany which bordered her on the east. A Hohenzollern in Spain and a Hohenzollern in Germany reminded those who governed France of the situation which had prevailed when Richelieu first initiated his policy of freeing her from the "Hapsburg pincers."

Now, suddenly, a Hohenzollern prince accepted the Spanish crown. Not only the French emperor but also all of France saw red. Bismarck's skillful maneuver brought him what he wanted—war—and the odium of declaring war was thrown, at least so far as the German public was concerned, on France. The South German states were obliged by their agreements, as well as by public opinion—since they were led to believe that she was being attacked—to help Prussia with their armed forces.

The war against France, said Bismarck, was "inevitable"—that is, necessary in order to unify Germany.⁴⁵ Even as late as 1870, in the South German states—especially Württemberg and still more in Bavaria—while there was a strong party that wanted a united Germany, another wished to maintain the parochial independence of the local dynasties. The leaders of the latter, sovereigns and their cabinets, had until shortly before the war been negotiating with Austria and France with a view to forming a single allied block against Prussia.⁴⁶

The war and the general feeling in Germany, heightened by memories of Napoleonic France, accomplished Bismarck's aim. The parochialists lost their case, and the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine which followed the peace rendered similar cabals impossible in the future.

⁴⁵ *Bismarck*, II, 94 ff.

⁴⁶ Reinach, p. 203.

France, the potential ally of Germany, had been undermined, and the South German states joined the North German Confederation, or more truly, were annexed.

Let us say to Bismarck's credit that he understood as well as followed Machiavelli: he knew that dominion acquired by force and cunning cannot be held without the consent of the governed. He did not dictate conditions to the particularists, but tried to satisfy them, leaving it possible for them to remain leaders and ministers in their own states and postponing the hardening of federal and the reduction of state authority.

Similar considerations underlay his subsequent policy toward Austria. When North and South Germany were united, Austria-Hungary had as neighbors, aside from Germany, states which with increasing pressure from decade to decade claimed parts of her territory: Italy, the sections inhabited by Italians; Russia, Serbia, and Rumania, the areas inhabited by Slavs. By pursuing a policy of good will and helpfulness toward Austria-Hungary, which before 1870 had tried under Beust to free itself from Prussia, Bismarck prepared the day when the Hapsburg Monarchy would be subordinate to its powerful friend. Annexation would have made of Russia, the Balkans, and Italy his enemies. Thus Austria lost her power; she had only enemies as neighbors—Italy and Russia, who coveted parts of her lands. Obligated to request Prussia's protection, she became Germany's vassal state.

Bismarck had cemented "Little Germany"; the union of all Teutonic tribes in a "Greater Germany" remained a dream to be cherished by the "Herr Professor" and his young students, by army men and bureaucrats, although none of the Germanic states left out—Austria, the Netherlands, or Switzerland—had the least desire to surrender their independence and join Germany.

As long as Bismarck remained at the helm, overexpansion was precluded and the pan-German enthusiasts were curbed. Guided by experience, he knew that only his adroit handling of England, Russia, France, and Austria, each in her turn, had made possible Prussia's absorption of Germany. Further conquests might arouse the rest of Europe to line up against the new German Reich. Bismarck's nightmare was a France recuperated and associated with Russia; the cardinal points of his foreign policy were friendship with Austria and Italy (the Triple Alliance) and "reinsurance" by a secret understanding with Russia.

Could this policy last? Could the energies liberated through the union of the German states be cooped up inside the frontiers drawn by Bismarck? Was it not in the logic of European history that Bismarck, Germany's Sully, must be followed by a German edition of Louis XIV and Napoleon?

In his *Memoirs* he relates that the Marquis de Moustier, French Minister to Berlin during the reign of Napoleon III, said to him one day, "The line of policy you are on will take you to Jena."

"Why not to Leipzig or Rossbach?" parried the Chancellor, quite sure of French defeat.⁴⁷

After two wars it looks as if Moustier had been right in his prophecy that Bismarck's policy would bring Prussia low. Yet it was in a second people's battle, a second Leipzig, that German ambitions were crushed.

⁴⁷ *Bismarck*, I, 141.

NATION AND HABITAT

WE HAVE CONSIDERED two of the three major factors in a state: the personal and the territorial, the nation and its habitat—demonstrating that nations when integrating endeavor to occupy the entire area within their natural boundaries. Beyond the frontier they then see other groups suitable for incorporation, groups with affinities to them. They reach out once more, break into another region, only to come up against its boundaries in turn. As groups attract other groups and parts of regions other parts, the two tendencies in political evolution—"one nation, one state" and "one region, one state"—are not congruent, for men belonging to the same nation may live in different regions, while one region may be inhabited by men of different nations.

To build a house you need certain materials and a piece of land. If you find no empty place, you can demolish another house and create space for yourself. Empires are built of the debris of other empires, but group and habitat, the living cells out of which they are formed, are so united that we cannot separate them. We cannot empty habitats, we cannot transport the material for a nation to an empty spot. As we have already mentioned, nazis and communists and others before them have thought they could by geopolitical speculation determine the best territory for an empire, then, by social engineering, clear the existing population from it and transport to it new inhabitants who would have the qualities essential to form a nation: nazis or bolshevists as dominants, with subservient forced labor and whatever else might be needed to make them comfortable.

I do not believe that the best territory for a state can be selected or that a nation can be made to order. Great masters of art have speculated as to what constitutes the most beautiful human form and have tried to determine its measurements and proportions.¹ Had they succeeded, eugenics or even plastic surgery could not produce it. The world changes, ecological factors modify yesterday's type, and ideals change

¹ J. Giesen, *Dürers Proportionsstudien*, Bonn, Schroeder, 1930, p. 32.

also. Heterogeneous elements—both those taken in when a state is formed and those created by the processes of adaptation—change the group through vertical invasion. The chief actors in the historical drama, the “we” groups and the region, are not well defined or stable. If a shift in dominance occurs and the *nexus socialis* is altered, the group changes. We have seen that religion may lose its appeal as one of the cohesive forces and nationalism become predominant, or nationalism may recede and economic interests come to the fore. Regions, or rather men’s ideas about the region they need for self-sufficiency and a well-protected state, also change.

With each age, advances in technology—new weapons—render the former conception of natural boundaries obsolete. The divisions between the Greek city-states—the impassable mountains, unbridgeable rivers—are no obstacles to tanks and airplanes. Moreover, the nearly self-sufficient city-states of ancient times can hardly produce all the food and other materials we consider necessities today. The multiplication of “necessities” increases the number of regions required to make a territorial unit approximately self-sufficient.

Thus, the requirements of the strategic-economic factor—and this is one moral of our tale—are modified by advances in *technical knowledge*; those of the personal factor, by *evolution* or *revolution*, changes in the bond uniting the dominant group. There is more stability in the geographical or foreign political aims of a nation, however, than in its personal nexus. The goal of the new regime in France after the Revolution was the same as that of the old: to fill out her natural boundaries. Russia, under the bolshevists as in the old czarist regime, seeks warm seaports. Germany under the Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns, and nazis has pursued the same *Fata Morgana*. Successors to dying states inherit their geographical demands. When the Roman and the Turkish empires disintegrated, each part inherited the geographical demands of the whole: Rome’s numerous successors, the drive to reconstruct the Roman Empire and re-unite the Mediterranean world; Turkey’s legatees (every one of the Balkan States), the ambition to rule all the Balkans—*hereditas onerosa*, burdensome, since it has caused many wars.

The reason for the relative consistency of geographical demands may be that they have a tendency to become infinite, to increase until the neighborless empire, world dominion—or at least the fortress state making world dominion possible—becomes the national policy. On

the other hand, religious, ethnic, and economic demands have only a limited appeal to the discontented minorities in other countries. The French Revolution with its watchword of bourgeois domination appealed to the middle classes still subservient in other states, but had only a negligible effect in England, where the middle class already exercised political influence. The *Illuminati* in the German states prepared the way for the Napoleonic wars, but England's power to lead the war against France was not undermined by a similar fifth column. Nationalism and religion are strong pulls to kindred minorities; a socially reorganized state such as Soviet Russia, appeals to the underprivileged in other states. The new affinities between the dominant in one state and the subordinate in another create the demand for a merging of the two, and these pulls represent a constantly changing and shifting factor.

In short, each state tends to occupy one region, while each nation tries to unite all groups with affinity to it. Each of the two constituents of the state—land, the strategic-economic factor, and men of the same type, the personal factor—has its own tendency to expand or split up, and the two tendencies may well diverge.

This divergence between the elements, nation and habitat, is well illustrated by the negotiations at the Paris conferences after World War I. A homogeneous group, on well-segregated territory, with broad-minded governors, may in the course of generations form a state. Politicians and their legal, geographical, and historical advisers at Paris were convinced that, should they select the groups and give them land, states could be built.

The central European territory at their disposal is outlined on the map on page 134, together with its division into ethnic groups. Any one of the various groups domiciled on the territory could assert with more or less truth that it had once ruled the area—or at least a greater or lesser part of it—as its national state. Each had some historical right to the land, and all the historical rights conflicted. The conference had to divide it among the ethnic groups so that each should have its own healthy and—as they said in Paris—"viable" state.

How could this wonder be accomplished? President Wilson proposed

that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend

its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unlimited, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing government by consent of the governed.²

And somewhat later, in a communication to the Russian government on the war aims of the United States, he wrote:

No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty.³

Self-determination was one of the principles advocated by the leaders of the French Revolution. But even in that day Carnot inquired how a nation can be defined—where the line of demarcation can be drawn between “every village, every farmstead”—obviously incompetent to determine its allegiance—and a “nation,” a “people,” entitled to do so.⁴ Under the Wilsonian principle each ethnic group had the right to choose its allegiance, and each had its own governors ready to govern. But as the Paris Conference and its technical committees soon found out, a state must be “viable.” There is somewhere a limit, a minimum population, a minimum territory without which no state can live. As Harold Temperley wrote:

The guiding principle of the Czechoslovak Commission of experts to fix the boundaries obviously was expressed in the one word—viability. It was no use creating a new state at all unless it could live; and the new nation could not live on Czechs and Slovaks alone. Their racial distribution was so curious and intricate that many Germans and many Magyars would have to form part of their body politic if there was to be any body politic at all.⁵

The Conference therefore had to select from the many ethnic groups living within the territory those who deserved the right of self-determination—that is, would be permitted to cut out for themselves a “viable territory”—and then force a certain number of others to live with them as heterogeneous elements.

The Congress of Vienna had been crowded with emperors, kings, and greater and lesser princes, most of them hungry for more territory or to recover what they had lost during the wars. And the Congress

² W. Wilson, I, 335.

³ Robinson and West, p. 399.

⁴ Wittmann, p. 53.

⁵ Temperley, “How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn,” *Foreign Affairs*, VI (April, 1928), 437.

awarded them land or left them their titles, but deprived them of the right to rule. At Paris the hunger was the same: for land—only the crowd had changed. The seekers were now members of “national committees” who claimed the right to speak in the name of one homogeneous group, such as the Czechoslovaks or the Yugoslavs, the Poles, the Armenians, or the Arabs. Looking back we may say that in 1918 “Czechoslovak,” “Yugoslav,” were just names; behind them were groups which could eventually, if conditions were favorable, unite into a nation. Czechs and Slovaks were far from being one group in 1918, and 1938 proved that it was easy to separate them. In Yugoslavia, writes Louis Adamic,

There was a great body of humanity—Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Orthodox and Catholic, Moslem and Jewish—that was sound, tough-fibered, not yet functioning very much on any creative lead, but immensely eager for a new deal, for fundamental social, economic and political adjustments, and ready to work hard to achieve them.⁶

These divergent elements may be united into one nation, if some chemical action changes the properties of each group.

Czechs and Slovaks—Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs—each combination was taken as one group; the Arabs were divided into many groups, each having the right to form a state; the Armenians were not given the right to determine their own lot. Decisions were arbitrary, or, perhaps, rather based on political reasons unconnected with the merits of the case.

To get a closer insight into the workings of the Paris Conference, let us see how one of the new states was conceived and born. Paraphrasing the language of Genesis, we may say that in the beginning there were men who desired to govern (and I readily admit their competence); while far from Paris, in their native Bohemia or its environs, were their fellow countrymen, disgruntled with their lot under the Austro-Hungarian regime (and I admit also that their complaints were well founded). In the beginning, then, there were the venerable Thomas Masaryk, Eduard Benes, and their friends in the United States; some millions of discontented Czechs in Austria and more millions of Slovaks in Hungary. The “pretenders” argued that the Czechs and the Slovaks together constituted one nation, one ethnic group. As such they were a single unit entitled to determine their own fu-

⁶ Adamic, pp. 323-24.

ture; furthermore, they were set upon forming an independent state and for its territory they claimed, principally out of what had been the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, an area in which Czechs and Slovaks formed the majority of the population. This territory is "a peninsula of Slavs thrust westward into the heart of Europe, a long and very narrow strip impossible to defend in its entirety against powerful neighbors should they ever come to blows with it."⁷ To round out this strip and make it easier to protect, they meant to include in the new state regions where non-Slavs were in the majority. They also demanded a common frontier with Yugoslavia, admitting by implication that their state would be in the midst of a racially hostile—non-Slavic—environment and that for the sake of security they needed a friendly neighbor.

The demand for the internationalization of certain rivers and railways shows their awareness that the new state would be an enclave not only racially but also economically. To insure free communication with the outside world, therefore, they demanded that routes actually controlled by unfriendly neighbors should be put under international control guaranteed by formal undertakings on the part of the Great Powers. In short, the "pretenders" realized that the new Czechoslovakia could get on only with foreign aid and crutches; this they might have known, at least, had they considered that this area had always been a part of a larger unit, the Roman Empire of German Nations and the Hapsburg Monarchy.

Not all the Czech demands were granted. Czechoslovakia did not get the common frontier with Yugoslavia she had claimed. In the end the Danube alone was internationalized. Czech leaders haggled with Allied and Associated Powers, who could not give all they asked, having to consider the viability of other states which would be formed out of the remainder of the monarchy—Austria and Hungary—they, too, must be viable. Their job was to divide the whole into viable parts; if one slice were too big, the others would be "sick men," and sick men create wars.

When the frontiers of Czechoslovakia were finally settled, she had the form of a long parallelogram rather than the chunky shape of an ideal state. The frontiers to be defended were long. The population, made up of Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Hungarians, and Ruthenians, lacked the personal unity by affinity essential to a healthy state.

⁷ Bowmann, *New World*, p. 329.

If I may quote my own words written in 1919, "the Czechoslovak frontiers contain the germs of a future war."⁸ Yet, had the Paris Conference, with the idea of making Czechoslovakia "viable," given her better frontiers, a chunky outline, and a corridor connecting her with Yugoslavia, the majority might easily have been German-Hungarian.

What makes a "nation"—which unit has the right of self-determination—what constitutes "one people," and what the proper boundaries of its territory? These questions can be decided only arbitrarily. The decision of Paris that Czechs and Slovaks are one ethnic group and that an ethnic group called Southern Slavs exists was arbitrary. There were Slovaks ready to co-operate with the Czechs; others wanted their own state. There were Croats, and Slovenes, and Serbs, but each was a separate group, each had its own idea: to form within an embracing Serbian state an autonomous and more or less independent nation. The history of each proves that what Paris called a group was an inharmonious combination of groups, needing wise governors with ample time to hammer them together, if a forging were indeed at all possible—that is, if the other strategic and economic conditions for a state's happy existence were granted. As many politicians familiar with electoral geometry know, by enlarging or reducing a constituency one can help or hinder a party's victory.

Czechoslovakia could be protected against German attack only if other Powers, great and small, supported her—the great by lending their armies, the small by letting the armies of Great Powers pass through to her. Actually, in the hour of need the Great Powers did not lend their armies, and the small would probably have refused the right of transit.

Since the Allies did not know whether the Soviet Union would prove to be pro- or anti-German, they forged a chain of states in eastern Europe and lulled themselves into the belief that this *Ersatz* Russian would check German expansion. But states acquire strength only when history grants them a quiet time to evolve, a time for their diverse elements to carbonize into a firm and solid texture. States whose neighbors have majorities which act as magnets to their own minorities are continuously disturbed by foreign interference. We may remember Plato's advice: "When you form a state, look well to its neighbors."

⁸ Wittmann, p. 176.

The Paris Conference tried to save the Wilsonian principle by defining a nation as a big enough population living on a territory large enough to give it "viability." I doubt whether "viability" can ever be forecast. Economically, even some small states are viable. Those carved from the Hapsburg Monarchy—Hungary, with its fertile soil, and Austria, with its scenery and diversified topography, to say nothing of Czechoslovakia, the most fortunate since it inherited the Monarchy's chief industrial districts—were able to live. They needed simply to lower the living standard of their workers, borrow money from the United States, repudiate their debts, depreciate the foreign exchange value of their currencies, and dump the products of their cheap labor abroad. By such tactics any state can make itself viable; it can always manage to live by hook or crook.

It is a melancholy satisfaction to me that my remarks about self-determination proved true, and that E. H. Carr, Alfred Coban, and Arnold Toynbee,⁹ writing some twenty years later, emphasize the impossibility of defining a nation and deplore the fact that the application of the rule of self-determination created numerous small states, dependent upon the good will of their neighbors.

Would the Paris Conference have done better to follow other principles than those advocated by President Wilson? Or could the conference have done a better job if it had had better experts to select the groups and determine the viability of the states they proposed to form? I doubt it—but let us consider the various criteria for viability. The question discussed in Paris under this head was discussed by the Greeks when they considered how much land and how many inhabitants a new colony should have. In his *Republic* Plato writes:

"The rulers are to determine the size of the state and the amount of territory which they are to include and beyond which they will not go."

Adeimantus inquires, "What would you propose?"

And Socrates answers, "I would allow the state to increase so far as is consistent with unity. That I think is the proper limit."

"Very good," he said.

"Here then," I said, "is another order which will have to be conveyed to our guardians, let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but one and self-sufficing."¹⁰

In the dialogue entitled *The Laws* Plato reverts to this question.

⁹ Carr, *The Future of Nations*, p. 58; Corban, p. 182; Toynbee, IV, 299, V, 640n.

¹⁰ Plato, *The Loeb Classical Library*, II, 247.

Of land we need as much as is capable of supporting so many inhabitants of temperate habits, and we need no more; as to the population, we need a number such that they will be able to defend themselves against injury from adjoining peoples and capable also of lending some aid to their neighbours when injured. These matters we shall determine, both verbally and actually, when we have inspected the territory and its neighbours.¹¹

In his *Politics* Aristotle deals more methodically with the structure of the ideal state:

Most people imagine that the prosperous state must be a great state; but granted the truth of this, they fail to realize in what quality the greatness or smallness of a state consists: they judge a great state by the numerical magnitude of the population, but really the more proper thing to look at is not numbers but efficiency. For a state like other things has a certain function to perform, so that it is the state most capable of performing this function that is to be deemed the greatest.

And further:

. . . there is a due measure of magnitude for a city-state as there also is for all other things—animals, plants, tools; each of those if too small or excessively large will not possess its own proper efficiency, but in some cases will have entirely lost its true nature and in others will be in a defective condition. . . .

. . . a state consisting of too few people will not be self-sufficing (which is an essential quality of a state) and one consisting of too many, though self-sufficing in the mere necessities, will be so in the way in which a nation is, and not as a state, since it will not be easy for it to possess constitutional government—for who will command its over-swollen multitude in war? or who will serve as its herald, unless he have the lungs of a Stentor? ¹²

Can Plato and Aristotle give any practical guidance to such experts as those entrusted by the Paris Conference with the responsibility of advising on the boundaries of new states? If their specifications are borne in mind, is it easier to determine a "viable" nation, or group entitled to decide its own lot? I fear not. Even were we to hold that the limits of a state must be set according to a developing rather than an existing unity—if we said to the experts: Include in your new state not only those who are already united but also those whom further evolution can unite—how could they decide whether Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, and Ruthenians could be welded into a single Czecho-

¹¹ Laws, The Loeb Classical Library, V, 357, tr. by R. G. Bury.

¹² Aristotle, pp. 553, 555, 557, 559.

slovak nation? The future of Czechoslovakia, the experts admitted, would rest with her citizens of foreign nationality and depend upon how successful the governors were in making them willing citizens. Mr. Benes assured the foreign nationalities that their future government would be "extremely liberal," that the regime would resemble Switzerland, with its federal decentralization. Yet marked out between a German and a Hungarian state, the chances for her survival were small, for willing ears were certain to be found for the complaints of minorities. "All the ambitious persons of their country," Machiavelli would have told them, "and all the ill-affected will have an 'otherwhere' to make their recourse."

Some economists will assure you that they can calculate the optimum population a given territory can support—that "there is a certain size of population which is best fitted to secure the maximum economic return per head from a given body of natural resources under a given system of production, or perhaps better, under a given type of social and economic organization."¹³ Though others deny that such a calculation can be made, let us assume that it can—that given, let us say, the area of Czechoslovakia, we can calculate how many people should live there. But if we find that actually more people live in Czechoslovakia, what then? More land can be had only by taking in surrounding country which already has its own inhabitants. The experts may advise them to leave their homes, as Hitler did the Jews, but only Nazi methods would induce them to move.

What is an optimum? If everyone were a farmer, it could be calculated. But in our society some live by manufacturing from native and imported raw materials goods to be consumed at home or exported; others render services to foreigners, insuring them against risks, or to tourists and visitors, giving them lodging and food, some of which may be imported. Many earn their living by work that is not a function of the fertility of the soil. How are we to calculate from the most accurate measurements of the areas of London, Paris, or New York—and even including their suburbs—the number of people they can support? For a large part of an urban population

¹³ Robbins, "The Optimum Theory of Population," in *London Essays in Economics in Honor of Edwin Cannan*, London, Rutledge, 1927, p. 108, Dalton, "The Theory of Population," *Economica*, VIII (March, 1928), 38 ff.; R. Mukerjee, "The Criterion of Optimum Population," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVIII (1933), 688-98; Sir W. Beveridge, "Population and Unemployment," *Economic Journal*, XXXIII (Dec., 1923), 447; J. M. Keynes, "A Reply to Sir William Beveridge," *ibid.*, p. 476. Penrose, pp. 58 ff.

makes its living merely by dictating, typewriting, and talking over the telephone.

Statistics covering the last twenty years or so may give certain data, but again, how can they be applied in constructing a new state? Of what good are statistics on the populations of Vienna, Budapest, and Prague, and averages during the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, when one is on the point of moving the boundaries, thereby reducing the area over which a given tariff system operates—thus destroying the business and livelihood of many city dwellers—and when at the same time one is creating new states and multiplying the number of state employees?

A state's viability depends partly on the fertility of its land, but equally on its geographical situation, political relations with other states, and many other factors. As we have shown, and will show again in other connections, states are interdependent; they do not live only from and on their own territory, but exercise influence on the internal life of other states—on their production, consumption, and politics; they have an orbit, or fall within the orbit of others. Viability depends upon power over, or domination by, other states, on the terms arranged for immigrants, exports, or imports, and many other factors.

One German geopolitician calculated that a certain area—say that of Germany or England—could support by its own production a certain number of people; that the population of Germany is 30 percent larger, that of England 70 percent larger, than those countries can support. That is, the life of 30 percent of Germany's population and 70 percent of England's, respectively, depends on such international relations as make it possible for them to import certain goods and pay for them with other goods or services.¹⁴ Again, the possibility of import and export at a rate of exchange favorable to England or to Germany depends on the amount of goods sold on the protected home market, control of access to the world, political power, and what not.

In conclusion it may be said that the physician may heal a malady, may advise a hygienic and healthy way of living, but can he determine in advance the constitution a baby ought to have in order to remain healthy in his unknown future environment? The Paris Conference may be criticized in that the states it formed were not healthy and had

¹⁴ Fischer, "Die Tragfähigkeit des Lebensraumes," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 1924, pp. 847 ff.

no power of resistance; yet one could hardly have done better, since it was impossible to divide the danger zone into economically sound and internally consistent states. The real question is: Was such a partition necessary?

England has had long experience in the difficult art of state building. For a century she has developed economically backward countries and as trustee has aided and directed new nations when they were growing up on virgin territories. She has re-educated nations broken into parts and warring against one another and has directed the re-education of old nations settled on territories haunted by conflicting historical memories. In her Augustan age great colonial statesmen such as Lord Durham and his collaborators, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, Charles Buller, and James Stephen, well-known permanent under-secretary of the Colonial Office during several governments, shaped her policy.¹⁵ The wealth of Britain's experience in colonial history was the one practical guide from which the Paris Conference might have profited.

In no document have the conflicting claims of the economic-strategic demand for "one region, one state" and the ethnic clamor for "one nation, one state" been discussed with more wisdom and ability than in Lord Durham's celebrated report—quoted on page 75—on the affairs of British North America. Unfortunately, this illuminating document was not represented in the many handbooks with which the circumspect Foreign Office weighted the luggage of the British delegates to the Paris Conference.

We discussed earlier the personal antithesis between the French and the Anglo-Saxons and their sectarian organization; it may help us here to view the geographical side of that problem along with other instances of the nation-habitat conflict.

The French predominated overwhelmingly in Lower Canada. That is, this province along the lower reaches of the St. Lawrence up to its mouth—a sort of northern counterpart of Louisiana—was inhabited and held by people differing from the inhabitants—mainly of British stock—of the upper reaches for which the river was the gateway to the outside world.¹⁶ By the St. Lawrence River nature had made Lower and Upper Canada one unit, hence the economic forces were

¹⁵ *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, II, 275 ff., 335 ff.

¹⁶ *New*, p. 499.

centripetal; but the personal factor, the two races with their different ways of life, was centrifugal.

We have mentioned that in South Africa regional unity was opposed by the two nations contending for domination. In both Canada and South Africa the paramount power from without succeeded in helping the two nations to unite. In India, England's effort failed, and Hindus now demand one state ruled by the majority of the inhabitants, Moslems, the division of India.¹⁷ In Palestine Britain has proposed a division between Arab and Jewish autonomy. In Ireland and in eastern Europe, the danger zone of the Continent, the territory was actually divided between the two conflicting groups. But division is not a real solution, as each sovereign part always thinks it ought to rule the other. War can be avoided only if a strong third power guarantees the independence of both and is ready to back its guarantee by force.

Does not the history of the Eastern Question corroborate this assertion? The statement of Sir Henry Layard, Britain's minister to Constantinople in 1877, that you cannot replace the Turkish Empire by a number of petty states jealous of each other, has been borne out by the many wars among the Balkan nations.¹⁸ Even when they united against Turkey, as once the Greek city-states against Persia, peace with the common enemy was only a starting-point for wars among the former allies. A solution which did not work in the Near East could hardly be expected to succeed in the Balkans, when, by dividing Austria-Hungary, the number of Balkan states was increased. States were made out of groups without unity—jealous states. The supposition in Paris that all these states would co-operate as a "little Entente" and act as one federation was one of those happy assumptions which only thinkers who disregard the evidence of history can cherish.¹⁹ The Paris Conference created niches around two great powers—Germany and Russia—temporarily weakened by revolution and war; later, restored internal pressure and the call of states unable to protect themselves led inevitably to World War II.

From our brief exploration of this subject we have come to certain conclusions.

- 1) States which have existed for centuries and are a geographical

¹⁷ Coupland, Part I, pp. 28 ff.; Part II, pp. 31 ff.

¹⁸ Seton-Watson, *Disraeli*, p. 363.

¹⁹ Monsignore Nosek, *The New Europe pour la victoire globale*, London, Constable, 1917, p. 416; Wittmann, p. 136.

unit should not be partitioned; to help in the healing of communalism or other personal defects of such nations should be the recognized duty of other states. The right of any group to self-determination is restricted by the rights of other groups; no one is entitled to exercise his rights in such a way as to jeopardize or ruin his neighbor's existence or freedom. Everyone must move on the diagonal. This was the principle acted upon, and in the end realized, by the American government in the conflict between the North and the South. "We cannot physically," said President Lincoln, "remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them."²⁰

The problem remains to remove the "impassable walls" between two or more groups contending for dominion in the same region. The internal articulation of the inhabitants of the region must be changed: rigid division into sects should be modified to foster a flexible division into parties. The traits of groups within the state, the belief in the antithesis between whites and Negroes, Christians and Jews, must be changed by education, in the broader sense of the word.

But has education a chance? In any case, as between the two conflicting factors and their demands, the nation seems to be more easily modified than the region.

²⁰ Inaugural address, March 4, 1861, quoted in Nicolay, p. 181; Adams, p. 109.

ORGANIZATION

MEN AND LAND, living cells, are the material out of which an organism forms itself; government, with all its ramifications, is the mind and its nervous system which direct and co-ordinate the functioning of the members.

A group with *élan vital* can, if it is lucky, make a compound out of a mixture—hammer several tribes or groups with different languages into one. When the nation is in the making and has reached the stage where at an emotional peak it acts as a consolidated group, it begins to use its power to secure its habitat. It will take the step that cannot be reversed. The fortress will be surrounded by a glacis, and the unity of the nation will be further established by great leaders and glorious wars until it is no longer only a special event under the emotional stress of danger, but an everyday matter, year in and year out. The nation which has become consistent, coherent within itself, will begin its imperialistic career.

In certain circumstances the consistency dwindles and regression sets in. Again the nation will be united only in times of emotional peaks. Groups will regain their own local color, forget their metropolitan habits, and separate.

Both series, the upward and the downward, usually begin when horizontal or vertical invasions alter the elements or the order of elements in a society. Integration—the dominants expanding their power over new territories and groups; disintegration—the dominants losing their power over territories and groups: the two processes are conditioned by the struggle of groups both within and without the state. Both are attempts at new group formations: the establishment of homogeneous groups in an economically self-sufficient, strategically well-protected region.

We have seen the process of consolidation of several states from the national and geographical points of view; let us consider now what happens to the organization or channels of articulation and control within groups during the various phases of the process.

Each tribe or ethnic group, each domain, has its own governors. The story of the expansion of groups and their habitats may also be told as a tale of the struggle among local governors for the supremacy of one, and in reverse, of the reappearance of local governors and their growing competition when the force of the national or imperial nexus wanes.

Thucydides, relating the great deeds of Theseus, says that before him the king of Athens was a *primus inter pares*. Theseus abolished the parochial governments and established a central one. Throughout Egypt's long history the stable periods when she was under one dynasty were interspersed with chaotic periods when rival claimants vied for power. There were periods when the local governors became more independent and called themselves great "chief" or great lord of this or that nome [district]; periods when the internal struggle between the independent local chieftains developed at last into a convulsion in which the destructive forces were for a time triumphant.¹ In Ireland in the dark days of tribal society the Great King in Tara was a *primus* whose advice was seldom sought in local feuds and seldom followed even when asked.²

It is the lot of many states to pass through periods when internal chaos or invasion destroys the central authority, when harmony between the ruler and his subjects is disrupted by a cacophony of rival kings. There have been times when each city, perhaps each block, had its own ruler, each street its own barricade and army, and each leader with his followers fought every other and his clients until one got the power and used it to the satisfaction of the dominant elements.

Competition between various natives and invaders, followed by mutual adaptation, ended the incursions of the barbarians in western Europe. We have seen that Gaul was divided during the Dark Ages into thousands of domains, each having its own governor. Beginning in the tenth century the Capets were, first by election, later by inheritance, kings of France. Claiming the right of succession to all kings and emperors who had ruled the country, they called themselves successors in their title and office and sovereigns apart and without peers.³ They outshone the other dukes in personal prestige. But in the eighth and ninth centuries, when barbarian incursions were rou-

¹ Breasted, *History of Egypt*, p. 131; Breasted, *The Conquest of Civilization*, pp. 5 ff., 88.

² Trevelyan, *History of England*, p. 201.

³ Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, I, 246.

tine affairs, the "king" ruled only his own domain. As protector of his own nation, of his own small realm, like any other local governor he had performed his duty when he thrust back a predatory band upon his neighbors' territory.

It happened that the local governor who had inherited the name "king" had the most prestige and the best geographical position to unite all domains into a state. Before the various states were forced into union, as had happened between the Greek city-states, an order of dominance evolved; the stronger tried to dictate to its weaker neighbors, the mightiest to all the others. Their relations depended upon relative force—perhaps, more accurately, upon the conception each had of its rivals' strength, as well as upon their respective interests, affinities. Rule was based upon private agreements reached after a war, or even without one, between the lords and their overlord. Their relation was a state-to-state relation characterized by a lack of common authority for legislation, administration, and the adjudication of disputes. If a baron was delinquent in the discharge of his obligations to his count, there was no court or sheriff to compel him to fulfill them; the count's one recourse was to occupy the domain of the recalcitrant baron.

The once united province of Gaul had split into domains because its body social was sick.⁴ Feudalism, tying the smaller landowners to the larger and the larger to the king and obliging the smaller to obey the bigger fellow's order to keep "the king's peace," was the first attempt to bring order into a society by an elaborate balance of power.⁵ But this order did not create the peaceful conditions needed by merchants and artisans, the rising middle class, to ply their trades. A central authority alone could do that. The transition from a period of many local governors to one central authority, as from several groups to one or from many domains to a single habitat, reaffirms the process leading from the pioneer society to the climax, the *Rechtsstaat*.

In a tribal or feudal society, as among the city-states of Greece or the society of national states in the nineteenth century, one or more rulers, with relatively greater prestige, exercise authority or suzerainty over others. The power of the king over tribes or the primus over his equals is not stabilized, nor is his rule institutionalized by a royal court, a treasury, or a standing army; he has no direct relation to

⁴ Pirenne, *Histoire de l'Europe des invasions aux XVI siècle*, p. 35.

⁵ Funck-Brentano, p. 161.

individual members of tribes or citizens of countries influenced. It is personal, and those subject to such power are the local governors—not the individual citizen. Some overlords and tribal kings had in fact real power, while the power of others was merely nominal, a survival from happier days; but none, strong or weak, could command the individual subjects of his local governors.

Nor, inversely, did the citizen have individual freedom or recourse to a common centralized law of the land. Under the Holy Roman Empire, as we have seen, each prince or duke clung to his sovereignty. He determined the religion of his subjects and could impress them into an army to be hired out to foreign countries for gold accruing to his treasury. No centralized law interposed its protection between the burgher and the will of his local prince.

In Ireland this tribal society was ended by English invaders, who in the name of their king asserted power not only over the tribal chiefs but also through their judges over every citizen, and thus built up a state with its common law. In France, too, the sundered land, people, and administration were ultimately again made whole, with a single government.

The climax of an integrating society is characterized, therefore, not only by the fusion of various tribes and races into a nation and the joining of the habitats of the tribal or feudal society but also by a union of all organizations into one—a central mind with its nerve system. Many local governors, their own judges and bureaucrats following parochial customs and laws, are replaced by one governor, his judges and bureaucrats enforcing the one law, the “common law” of all domains, all tribes or groups comprised within the nation. The development from many governors and several courts, bureaucracies, and laws to one, like the integration into a single nation and habitat, is often broken, or reverts from more to less advanced forms. Trial and error shape the zigzag of evolution.

In discussing the various kinds of lower and higher organisms I called attention to the fact that the members of a primitive organism compete, and that supremacy in the competition decides the action of the whole and its members; the organism is meanwhile more or less loosely united to, more or less detached from, other similar bodies. In higher organisms the activity of the members is co-ordinated, and a single central authority directs their co-operation. The evolution of one social organism from many is similar to that of a higher organism

from a lower; in the process the competitive order becomes a co-operative order. In the feudal or tribal society the domains, the tribes, are the members, and their competition leads to a dynamic balance of power—dynamic because the competition is ceaseless and tends to undermine the balance.

The mightiest local governor commands and co-ordinates the activities of all local governors. When he is able to secure his influence by customs and tradition, it becomes legally defined power, and the order becomes hierarchical. Hilaire Belloc writes of English society:

Everything in England is hierarchic; not only is society divided into strata—often most elaborately so divided . . . Most foreigners, whose observations on England are worth following, have noted the strength which this instinct for oligarchy gives to the English nation. It provides that nation with cadres: that is, it provides commanders in a fairly ordered sequence of superior and inferior, who shall conduct the commonwealth as an army is conducted by its commissioned officers and its non-commissioned officers.^a

The *primus inter pares* of a hierarchy may further secure his power by institutions and extend it to the smallest components, the individuals. Thus, out of the hierarchical order the *Rechtsstaat* evolves: the co-ordinator (king or outside interfering state), with his judges, sheriffs, and other bureaucrats, regulates the activities of the citizen.

It may be said that in primitive societies the order of rank as between the ruling chief and various members fluctuated. In less primitive ones, the co-ordinating figure at the top and the order of rank were stabilized. The nervous system in the hierarchical or feudal state connected the leaders or local "minds" of groups with the co-ordinating chief or king at the top; there was no connection, or only a mediate one, between the latter and the individuals who constituted the motor organs, so to speak, of the groups. The local governor might or might not instruct his officials to carry out his chief's order.

In a society at its climax, on the contrary, where headship and rank are finally institutionalized, the nervous system becomes one and extends from its center to all the executive organs of its members. There are intermediary centers, or ganglia; nevertheless, the connection remains direct. Just so, the nervous system of an organism, during the evolution from the primitive to the more complex state, expands from

^a Belloc, *Elisabeth, Creature of Circumstances*, pp. 73-74.

the brains of members to their executive organs; the local brains atrophy and become ganglia—an intermediary station may be a transforming station without a will of its own.

This expanding process, or the merger of many organizations into one, is carried out gradually in the case of nations by war or by agreement. The component parts, for example, first of Athens, then of Attica, agreed to merge; Sparta gradually extended its domain by force. In England there were at first communes, and each commune, shire, or hundred had its own courts with their own laws, "whether Dane, law or law of mercia or of Wessex, or some obscure provincial custom."⁷ Then England was feudalized, the shires and hundreds were united into feudal domains, and judicial control passed from local to more central organizations. Feudal justice encroached upon the local law, and in the hands of the feudal judges the many laws and customs were made consistent. When the king's authority began to grow, and the many nationalities in England, the many domains, were being hammered into one, the king's court encroached on the feudal courts, and common law—the law common to the entire country—was born.

It is not by force, or more correctly, not by force alone that the monarch or a power outside the state—a foreign state—takes over the rights of the local governors. In France the king and his allies, the newly-evolving middle class, and the Church pressed hard on the local sovereigns; in Ireland it was England, the king's army and its associates, and English colonists and adventurers. Peace came high to a small captain in a feudal or a tribal society; for protection he had to pay a fee to his overlord, make temporary local alliances, and carry on feuds.

Seán O'Faoláin, in his biography of the great O'Neill, gives a vivid description of how the Queen of England became sovereign over a petty captain in Ireland in the time of Elizabeth. The situation of Donal O'Connor Sligo was very similar to that of a small feudal lord in France. The English suggested that if he would surrender his entire estate to the crown, they would return it to him as a gift. In exchange for obeisance, that is, the English offered protection. He agreed.

There were many inducements. It all came down to what modern society calls "muscling in on the racket." The English adventurers had

⁷ Trevelyan, *History of England*, p. 92.

simply observed that Gaelic society was now broken up into many parts, that every man was out for himself, that the stronger commanded the weaker, and that there was nobody strong enough to be what the modern racketeers have called "the Big Shot." They said to whatever O'Connor Sligo they happened to be handling at the moment: "You are a small man. You are paying levies to your local dynast, O'Donnell, merely because you are not strong enough to make him pay levies to you. We are stronger than O'Donnell. We mean to take over all this countryside, and rule it. Sign on with us and we will give you protection. True, we want a levy too, but you will get a slice of the spoils, and be for ever safe, powerful, wealthy, and so, honored." (Henry VIII called this system "Surrender and Regrant"). . . . O'Connor Sligo, in agreeing, simply threw off O'Donnell and took on Queen Elizabeth . . . at best he might profit by the scheme, get lands and feudal tenure in which he had formerly had only an interest as chieftain; . . . at worst the scheme altered nothing.

But it did alter a great deal, as he and hundreds like him found to their cost. The chief who thus compromised weakened his local authority, since he weakened the traditional system of which he was a part. . . . He would, indeed, keep on saying that it all really meant nothing, and for the time being speak the truth; but, presently, the inch of his compromise would lengthen to its mile, and he would find himself being brought, bit by bit, within the ambit of English law. He would be asked to acknowledge the foreign legal system of possession, inheritance, landlordism, against all of which his followers would furiously protest. Officials would come to shire his land, and sheriffs would follow.^a

Thus a new order, introduced by the foreigner, but needed by many within the land, destroys the old one. The earl of Tyrone, pleading before the Privy Council after having "overshot himself in doing execution upon Hugh Gaveloch," is quoted as saying:

I acknowledge that by my education among the English I am not altogether ignorant, but that in the strict course of Her Majesty's laws I might be reprehensible for this execution. Nevertheless, I humbly desire that consideration may be had to the place where this fact was done and to the person, a notable murderer, and to the ancient form of government among us in Ulster, where there is neither magistrate, judge, sheriff, nor course of the law of this realm; but certain customs by which both O'Neill and I and others of our sort do govern our followers; neither have we been at any time restrained from execution of evildoers, nor of such as be invaders of our country, or professed enemies to the same.

. . . unless O'Neill and O'Donnell and others like himself were allowed

^a O'Faoláin, pp. 17-18.

to use their ancient customs they could never defend their country at all. Later, he agreed, when the whole province was governed by English law as in other reformed parts of the realm, the situation would be different.⁹

The intruding power has its associates in the old order—today we call them Quislings—and these have an organization behind them. The new sovereigns, judges, and sheriffs can usually find elements homogeneous to the new organism ready to obey their orders and willing and able to help them keep the heterogeneous in bounds. Whether a new group and new organization is born depends upon the strength of the support of the homogeneous, the soundness of the new order, and the results of adaptation between the intruders, their followers, and their opponents.

In Gaul, Germany, or any other European country, the evolution was the same. Medieval France and Germany had not only many languages but also many different laws and customs, and there was continual competition between feudal, ecclesiastical, and royal courts. The local governor forbade his retinue to apply to the court of church or king; the church, with its spiritual influence, and the king, with his sheriffs, tried to force their respective laws and courts upon the followers of the vassal. Parochial authority competed with two pretenders—the national king and the international church—for central power.

Coming down to the present day and the modern society of nations—is not the independence of our own national states characterized by their differing legal systems and law courts, all jealous of their jurisdiction? International law is the law between states, and international courts have jurisdiction among states only. A national of one state may not apply to the Hague Tribunal if he has been wronged by a foreign state. Modern international society, like the feudal or the tribal, is a community of groups, not of men.¹⁰

The difference, moreover, between the various kinds of pioneer societies and the same societies at their climax is qualitative as well as quantitative. Not only is Britain larger, with more inhabitants, than England alone, or Wales, or Scotland, not only is France bigger than Normandy, Brittany, Anjou, and other sections, taken separately, but also the new life of their citizens is less competitive and more co-operative—is, in fact, a different kind of life.

Before we call other evidence in support of these statements the

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

¹⁰ Hyde, II, 1619.

two modes of organization—the “competitive” and the “co-operative”—must be defined. Both are basic in the life of any social body, and the way in which they are combined largely determines its quality. Competition and co-operation are the two behavior patterns by which men strive for the prizes of human activity. They compete when no one compels them to co-operate or when they cannot come to agreement with their opponent about the coveted prize.

To illustrate the two patterns, we may imagine a man going down the stairs into a subway station and trying to take a train during the evening rush hour. His path is determined by a struggle: the competition of others who want to ride in the same car. He starts on the shortest route, but someone pushes him to the right, and someone else steps on his heels. After he has zigzagged on the various diagonals which express the combination of his own and his competitors’ forces, he finally gets into a car, and there he competes for a seat or standing room.

If people had to enter subway stations in line, as they do a theater, you would see co-operation. Before a moving picture box office the newcomer takes his place at the end of a line, moving up one place as each customer leaves the window—co-operation arranged by the parties themselves, individual action tempered by generally accepted method. Inside the theater you are roped off into groups if all seats are taken. As places are vacated, an usher—a Mr. Civil Servant—beckons to the right or to the left. You must take your turn; your movements are subject to the fellow superintending you, who makes you wait or lets you move according to orders issued by his superiors or his own whims. Certainly many in the line are impatient; the waiting is tedious, and they complain. Others, fighters by nature, are always ready to use their elbows to get what they want. But the complainers and the fighters are not permitted to take advantage of the better bred, those with more patience and better manners. All wait and advance one by one, some because they are habitually well disciplined, others because they know that anyone who presses forward out of turn will be forced back by a bigger power—by the usher or the group; still others, because they think order is the best guarantee that all seats will be fairly distributed.

In the case of competition the course actually taken is established by the relative force of rivals; there is no co-ordinator, and the members work out the diagonal. In co-operation the diagonal is established

by rules drawn up by some higher authority or by mutual agreement among those co-operating, or both. In both cases, curbs are put on individuals; they cannot follow their own wishes exclusively—all must make compromises.

The more stabilized the diagonal becomes, the more the co-ordinator (the brain and its nervous system) is separated from those co-operating.

But let us imagine that we are looking down at the competing or co-operating mass from a high tower far above the actors, all roofs and other obstacles removed. We see them as through the wrong end of a pair of field glasses; the distance between individuals disappears, and they look like one body, their movements like that of an organism. In the case of competition, the body moves in a random way; one subway car is crowded, another nearly empty; parts of the body are pushed away and remain outside; the movement starts in one direction, halts, wavers uncertainly, and follows another instead.

This resembles quite closely the first movements of a lower organism—movements carried out before a connection is established between the various central and motor neurones. The stimuli proceed simply along the line of least resistance, and the parts they happen to reach react.

The co-operative mass, the mass moving in line to the box office, is like a more complex organism in which sensory nerves are connected with a central organ, and the central organ with motor nerves. The action projected by the center, determined by rules written or unwritten, is carried out by each member automatically. The cells are organized, a nervous system responding to an unseen central command makes a unit of the organism; the behavior is recognizable as having an ordered purpose.

The activities of members within one organism are never exclusively competitive or co-operative; they are always intermingled. Even in the most chaotic stages of competition, certain members co-operate and one or another of them tries to co-ordinate the activities of others. Even among the crowd rushing down the steps to the subway train, force does not solely determine who gets into which car. Individuals are restrained by breeding, education, authority; their behavior is curbed in many ways—laws, customs, and etiquette determine how far and in what manner they pit their strength against that of others. There are also some *ad hoc* guardians to maintain order. The restraint in-

culcated in the competing individual by education changes from period to period and from one setting to another. In the early days of a pioneer society methods are used which would be considered shocking in its later days.

On the other hand, where restraints imposed from above by a co-ordinator determine individual activities, there still remain unrestrained, competitive activities, as we shall see later. At this point let it be emphasized that in the competitive and co-operative order restraints are placed on individual activities, and these restraints have their own guardians.

Now imagine that the group of co-operators or the mass of competitors become frightened, that someone screams "Fire!" The heat of fear dissolves restraints; the impulse to save one's skin, to reach safety, starts a wild scramble among people who, before fear changed them, behaved in a more or less orderly manner. The higher the melting point of restraints, the more intense the emotions must be to dissolve them. In a crowd the melting-point is particularly low. When a body is organized, on the other hand, great emotion may paralyze its nervous system, or anxiety may so terrorize the organism that it will remain stock-still or make random movements rather than reasonable ones.

Thus, extraordinary events may eliminate the co-ordinator's activities, and restraints may cease to operate. The more stabilized the co-ordinator, the better established the nervous system, the greater must be the shock to disorganize it.

This appears to suggest that the ultimate orderly development of a social body must involve a harmoniously centralized authority with a nervous system of enforcement. But are laws, courts, and sheriffs which insure the execution of the will of the control "brain"—are these really indispensable to the carrying out of orders? Or may an organism be conceived wherein each member is trained in such a way that even without compulsion he acts in the interest of all—where typical stimuli are not carried to a center, then responded to, and the response carried out by a motor organ, but where each individual organ responds to any stimulus as if directed by the whole?

Societies have been imagined whose members respond in the right way without legislators, judges, or sheriffs. In certain utopias there is no compulsion, no reward or punishment; each person instinctively does the right thing, each has within himself the curbs necessary for

co-operation. A utopia, no doubt, but utopias may conceivably become realities.

Every organism has something subtly in common with utopia. Competitors rushing to a subway car respect certain curbs; they are trained by mores, etiquette, and what not. Laws regulate only a few activities; the majority are left to the individual. Even in those regulated by law the actors seldom realize that they are following a law. Harmonious action, co-operation among members, is or becomes automatic.

Can every kind of right action become immediate, automatic? Can education and training eliminate law courts and sheriffs? These are questions for the future and cannot be decided on the basis of past experience. In discussing higher and lower organisms we called attention to the fact that in certain insect societies the individuals are biologically fitted for only one kind of social activity, that is, co-operation, and that co-ordination in insect societies is secured by a specialized constitution of the members. Anyway we can imagine that co-ordination and restraints become instinctive so that finally order is secured through a biological change, not by way of commands.

But even when we say that order, that is, co-operation, is maintained to some extent by the command of the co-ordinator, we do not want to imply that the co-ordinator is free to determine whatever order he chooses or that his subordinates will do whatever is his bidding.

I do not preach that might is right or mean to expand the doctrines of power politics. The statement that might is right—that the world is ruled only by power—disregards the individual, groups, and their will. Laws and statutes, commands and plans of administrative authorities, are often duds. Bound by the properties of the material we have to deal with and by our inheritance from those who have already organized the society we live in, our actions are only a few of the multiple factors determining the diagonal which will be the path of actual events. The march of time is a centipede to which politicians try to affix an extra pair of legs; unfortunately they don't always attach them in the right spot or face them in the right direction. Not only minorities, with their more or less passive resistance, but also the intrinsic properties of men, environment, and tradition curb the power of any dominant.

Some nations and their leaders when dominant become drunk with power and go farther and farther along the road of senseless conquests, exercising their might to oppress those dominated; others,

through failure, develop an inferiority complex and compensate for it by aggressiveness. Dominant apes sometimes prevent their subservients from eating even when there is plenty of food and they themselves are not hungry. In certain periods and places employers use their power to make their employees work twelve or more hours a day under dangerous conditions and for a grossly insufficient remuneration. Such shortsightedness finally ends in erosion, as does that of farmers who exhaust their land. Better-advised employers understand that it is in their interest to preserve the capacity of their employees by giving them decent working hours and wages.

Some mother countries exact slave labor from their colonies, compelling them to sell their products cheaply and buy dearly the goods they need from her and setting ruinous tariffs and rates of exchange. Others consider their mission a trust to be administered in the interest of their wards. The dominant-subordinate relation may range from coercive forces to education and fostering. One may admit that there is some tendency in men to overdo things; Don Juan, Harpagon, and the insatiable conqueror or dictator belong in the same class. But such excesses create their own remedy—passive resistance, revolt, or war—and order is eventually re-established.

Constructed as it is, the world cannot operate without some kind of order, which necessitates a certain amount of authority. And this authority—command and co-operation with it—is secured among animals, individual human beings, and groups either by balance (the result of formal or informal wars) or by a dominant-subordinate relationship which makes possible the automatic operation of commanding and obeying. It is not necessary to believe, however, that balance, or the dominant-subordinate relationship, need be equivalent to tyranny. I have said that a homogeneous group can dominate a heterogeneous group of a certain size, but we have seen also that domination is tempered by the resistance of the subordinate, and if the dominant does not accept a diagonal, a modification of his own force in the interests of others, he will disrupt states and groups.

Neither co-operation nor competition alone, we have noted, ever determines all conflicts between men in a group, groups with a state, or states in a system, but in every period in various degrees both patterns are employed.

In your morning paper you may find numerous advertisements,

one offering the best shaving cream, another a still better. Behind each of them are interests striving to secure and to increase their profits by inducing you to buy their product rather than that of somebody else. On another page you read of a strike or a shut-down—here another type of interest is trying to get a larger share of the total profits. On still another page you read pledges by political party leaders, supported by editorials and columnists, intended to make sure of votes and members and to bring about defection from the ranks of the opposition. Again competition: the competition of parties and politicians for power and office—municipal, state, and federal.

All this competition among producers for consumers, between employer and employee for profits, or between political parties for power, ends in a division of the customers, profits, or power. Each advertiser will sell certain amounts of goods; no one of them will supply the entire market. Profits will be divided between employer and employees, and the party out of power will limit the power of the majority.

A similar division may be brought about without a struggle, by command or agreement. Until the United States entered World War II gasoline production and sale were free of government restriction; that is, the competition of producers and consumers fixed the price and the distribution. But when a gasoline shortage developed on the eastern seaboard, the Federal Government changed from a mere policeman into a manager. Competition was replaced by a statutory price, ration cards, and the compulsory regulation of distribution.

The Roman law and its various offshoots—the common law of the Anglo-Saxon world, the Code Napoleon, the *Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*, and many other codes—enforce the co-operation of individuals or groups, but they do not cover all areas of conflict or dispute. Suppose I rent an apartment from you; we agree to co-operate, you by giving me the use of the rooms, and I by using them as agreed and paying you the stipulated rent. If a dispute arises between us regarding the lease, it can be taken to court. Applying the pertinent rules of law governing our behavior, the court will decide the case. If, on the other hand, you refuse to rent your apartment to me because my religion or color does not please you, and if I then appeal to the court to compel you to rent it, I will be told that it has no jurisdiction, inasmuch as the matter is not subject to legal rules.

In the "heroic" period of capitalism a sharp line was held to divide disputes that can be adjusted from those which must be fought out.

In the former, co-operation is obligatory; in the latter competition decides. The state, according to this theory, should leave the settlement of economic conflicts to free competition and must even forbid attempts to hinder it. This attitude was a reaction to the restraints put upon social and economic life in the late Middle Ages, when the Church regulated every phase of individual life and action, and canon lawyers took upon themselves the task of settling economic disputes. They assumed the existence of a "just price," "just wages," a standard quality for goods, and no legal right to charge interest.¹¹ The difference between the attitude, "What do I care about law? Hain't I got the power?"¹² and that prevalent under the New Deal indicates another reversal of the pendulum's swing. The bureaucrat of the modern state steps into the shoes of the cleric.

Those who contend that the economic life of the state should be planned want to put co-operation in the place of competition. Planning is the executive rule of one or a very few with dictatorial powers, authorized to regulate by law the co-operation between those who have labor or goods to sell and those who wish to buy. In time of peace, production, distribution, and the employment of manpower are regulated by free competition; in wartime, by planning. For the distribution of manpower, material, and money during a war must be decided from day to day by a manager, who gives detailed instructions; it cannot be determined by general laws concerned with standard cases which turn up over and over again, but in order to meet rapidly changing situations it must be allocated by *ad hoc* orders. These orders are effective only if the homogeneous elements in a society consent and are willing and able to compel others to obey.

The line between conflicts settled by co-operation and those fought out by competition is not constant. The more organized a society, the less competition and the more co-operation prevails in its activities. Better organization means more specialized members and indicates adaptation of the individual. In an insect society there is no competition between the queen bee and the workers; in well-trained individuals there is no competition between the various muscles.

More thorough organization along co-operative lines leads to greater specialization, which has its own dangers. By specialization, individuals and societies lose their flexibility, become rigid; the individuals are

¹¹ Coulton, pp. 331 ff.

¹² "Commodore" Vanderbilt, quoted in Lingley and Foley, p. 201.

more limited and therefore more dependent upon an unchanging environment. But even where competition exists, the state tries increasingly to moderate it by rules. Competition must be fair; physical compulsion and means considered too crude are forbidden. You may kill your opponent by starvation, but the "brave man with a sword" ¹³ is outlawed. Statements concerning the merits of a product must keep within certain limits of truth. Other products may not be disparaged. The employees of competitors may not be bribed.

If the competition is political rather than economic, the rules are less strict. Campaign oratory includes promises which will never be fulfilled and statements which can never be proved. Competition which would be "unfair" between manufacturers and merchants is permissible between political parties. This fact is partly included in the statement made above that even when the activities of an organism are co-ordinated there always remains scope for competitive activity. Better co-ordination merely means more co-operative and fewer competitive activities, and with progress the co-operative tend not only to restrain but also to control competition.

The danger in competition lies in the fact that when there is conviction (or hope) of greater strength on either or both sides, the balance is lost, and force is used. The balance—largely a private agreement between equals (i.e., those operating at the same level of activity)—is maintained through the institutions controlling competition. The stronger the equals, whether balanced or unbalanced, the less valid the institutions of control; sects, political parties, and trade unions are in some states almost sovereign. Of this latent factor of disturbance V. O. Key, Jr., writes: "In almost all political disputes there is an underlying possibility that one or the other factions seeking ascendancy may resort to the use of violence, and this threat of disruption of the peace conditions the operation of representative and deliberative procedures." ¹⁴

Not only in intra-state political struggles for power but also in the economic war of class against class, or between employer and employees, violence waits just offstage for its cue the moment persuasion fails.

Thus, on the one hand no one is bound in all his plans and actions by institutionalized co-operation; on the other, no one is ever entirely

¹³ Wilde, *The Ballad of Reading Gaol*, New York, Brentano's, 1907, p. 3.

¹⁴ Key, p. 705.

free to pursue his own interests or to do exactly as he pleases. The mightier a group discontented with the order and the less powerful its competitors or the central authority, the more imminent the fight for a new balance or order.

The difference, therefore, between the pioneer community, kept together by a balance of power, and a community stabilized by common law and common courts is merely one of degree. Pioneers fight more, are more ruthless, have fewer institutions and laws; in a balanced society and at the climax (crystallized balance) of any society, planned activities, rules, and institutions prevail.

Competition is a struggle ending in dynamic balance—the diagonal perforce accepted by competitors until it is upset. Centripetal forces, represented by the contented faction within states and their friends outside, strive to maintain it; centrifugal forces, represented by the discontented within and by enemies of the state who support them, try to disrupt it.

During the balanced stage the competitors co-operate. If the dominant succeeds in making the diagonal secure by laws and institutions, the pattern is fixed and the balanced behavior of an organism, which at the outset was capable only of erratic movements, is learned. The organism which has emerged from the synthesis of various formerly independent units builds up institutions—a nervous system we have called it—serving as the conductor between the central authority and the motors executing orders.

State institutions are established only after the nation has been formed out of tribes or domains. The tribal or feudal society is transformed into a federation of states, which may be followed by a federal state, which in turn may finally be transformed into a united state. The federation of states is kept together by a balance of power; the federal state has both federal and state constitutions. In a united state all activities tend to become federal and the control of federal authorities over the competitive activities of the states is institutionalized.

Following the evolution of the nation the order of the organism emerges, the association of tribes or of groups is followed by their federation, the federation by their union. The stage of evolution of the body social determines the form of the social order, its constitution. A constitution aiming at union will not operate when the body is articulated into sects. On the other hand, the constitution of a federal

state will not operate if the body social is articulated into flexible parties.

To sum up: History shows us that more or less isolated groups, each having its own will and policy, are connected by radiations. Increasing co-operation and exchange necessitate a common organization. The organization is at first loose—a federation of tribes or states as the case may be—then may evolve to a federal state and finally become one united state. This is the process we have followed in various individual instances, starting with several local governments, such as the *pays* in Gaul, and ending in one government, such as that of centralized France. The story of the British Empire begins with settlers turning British trading posts into colonies in various parts of the globe. Missionaries educated the natives. Traders, settlers, and missionaries, preceded or followed by soldiers, as W. K. Hancock demonstrates in his *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, laid the foundation for an empire.¹⁵ From a loose federation, it became more and more united, then was transformed into a federation of states, and may eventually dissolve again into several states.

The various forms of organization, therefore, are merely stages in the integration of a system of groups into a single group, or inversely, in the disintegration of a single group into a system. Each stage is distinguished by the loyalty of the individuals to a different group.

Opposed to our statements are the general legal and political theories concerning federal government and a federation of states. Jurists will tell you that

federal government necessarily involves (I) some surrender of sovereignty; (II) a precise allocation of powers between federation and the component state; (III) a complete reduplication of the organs of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—and a precise definition of their respective functions; (IV) an instrument or written constitution in which these arrangements are embodied; (V) special machinery for the revision of the terms of the instrument, which being in the nature of an international treaty, can be revised only with the assent of all or at least a great majority of the states concerned; (VI) a body, presumably judicial in character, entrusted with authority to safeguard the constitution and competent to interpret its terms.¹⁶

¹⁵ Hancock, II, 53 ff.

¹⁶ Marrioth, "Whither," *Quarterly Review*, CCLXXIX (October, 1942), 147.

The definition covers a united state and both kinds of federations. If to change the constitution or to decide about federal affairs the special machinery requires (V), the consent of all member states, we have a federation of states. If for such decisions a majority of the delegates representing a majority of citizens in each state is required, we have a federal state. If, finally, there is no special machinery, but all internal and external affairs are dealt with in one and the same way, we have a united nonfederated state. The legislative body has simply to select—the jurists tell you—what kind of constitution it prefers, and the social body will organize itself accordingly.

But I repeat, not the words of a constitution, but the direction of the historical process determines whether the members or the entity are gaining or losing rights. It is the tendency of the *de facto* community that counts. Contrast the case of the United States with that of Austria-Hungary. The constitutions of both limited the powers of the federal authorities and left with the states all powers not specifically delegated. As far as the printed word was concerned, the conditions were similar. But in the interpretation of the text the evolution of the United States toward integration increased the power of the federal government and restrained that of the states, whereas in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the trend toward disintegration led to a diametrically opposite interpretation.¹⁷

Even better evidence for our statement is to be found in Canadian history. The framer of the British North America Act, MacDonald, thought that he wisely utilized the experience of the United States.¹⁸ To avoid particularism, conflicts between the members of the federation and the federal authorities, he enumerated the rights of the states and made the federation bearer of all other rights, exemplifying merely the competency of the latter.

In the United States the residuary power to legislate was lodged with the states; in Canada, with the federation. We have noted that in the United States the federal powers are increasing, while in Canada it is the state powers that are augmenting. D. G. Creighton writes:

The residuary power of the Dominion has been almost completely divorced from the enumerated powers and Lord Watson actually went so far as to declare that it was supplementary to them. The enumerated powers have in effect, become the normal legislative powers of the Dominion, the general residuary authority has become an ambiguous power which has

¹⁷ Munro, p. 508, Hungarian Statute XII from 1867.

¹⁸ MacCormac, p. 182.

validity almost solely in time of crises, and thus the examples have virtually swallowed up the principle which they were intended to illustrate but not to restrict. The legislative competition between the Dominion and the provinces has thus been brought down to a conflict between the enumerated powers of each. While certain of the Dominion's enumerated powers had been divested of any real authority, the provincial power to legislate in relation to property and civil rights in the provinces has been given an extended scope; and there is some truth in the charge that it has become the real residuary clause of the Canadian constitution.¹⁹

John MacCormac writes:

Seldom has the fallibility of human hopes been better demonstrated. Like many another will, this bequest of all political wisdom has been successfully attacked in the courts. The powers of the central government have been whittled down until not it, but the provinces, have become residuary legatees. Whereas the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the American constitution to widen the powers of the central government, the British Privy Council, by a series of remarkable decisions, has clipped the wings of the Canadian Federal Government.²⁰

The different language of the two constitutions was determined by legislators, the different interpretations by the courts. The acceptance of each interpretation without urgent request for further legislation by public opinion indicates that forces behind the scene, namely, the stage of articulation of the body social, determined the court decisions. The United States is integrating; Canada is divided by provincialism and sectarianism.

The same story may be told of the Holy Roman Empire and the German Federation before 1870. Subjects placed loyalty to member states above loyalty to the Federation. After 1870, however, when German affairs were managed by an elected parliament whose members belonged to national parties such as the Centrum and the Social Democratic party, Germany became strong, evolving toward union.

The United States and Switzerland are federal states as consistent and coherent as national states, since their citizens are united by loyalty to the union; the Holy Roman Empire and Austria-Hungary were loose federations because the allegiance of their citizens was to the members of the federation, not to the federation itself.

Democracy and dictatorship both presuppose a certain type of body

¹⁹ Creighton, "Federal Relations in Canada since 1914," in *Canada in Peace and War*, ed. by Chester Martin, Oxford University Press, 1941.

²⁰ MacCormac, p. 182.

social. Without articulation into parties, without a balance between the groups within the state, no democratic constitution can operate. When the body social is articulated into rigid sects, when the group calling itself "majority" does not tolerate opposition, etc., a democratic constitution will degenerate into dictatorship. The *de facto* community can have only a *de jure* organization which corresponds to its properties, an organization which it is ready to accept.

The rule that *pacta sunt servanda*, that one ought not to steal or murder, operates if most members of a community are obedient and the few potential lawbreakers are forced to behave or are punished if they do not. In a community of men convinced that theft, murder, or the breaking of agreements is justified when their private interests are involved, such brakes do not function. Even today, when war and the trend of the times have extended their scope, governmental agencies regulate only a few of the citizen's activities; most of these are arranged automatically without interference by government, and such interference functions only when a *de facto* community exists—when the group is bound by a *nexus socialis*—and has a *de jure* organization suitable to it.

The following is presented by way of illustrating the discrepancy between *de jure* and *de facto* communities. In 1923 France, dissatisfied with the Versailles Treaty and discontented because England and the United States would not give her the security she wanted, occupied the Ruhr. Since parts of the Rhineland were already occupied by France and Belgium under the treaty, together they held practically the entire territory which under Napoleon had been an autonomous state called the Rhinebund. They tried to separate this territory from Germany and make it an autonomous state, something in the nature of a French vassal. In Germany, internal troubles had followed the collapse of the army; now a well-organized foreign power occupied its richest and best industrial part and proposed with the help of a German group, the so-called "Separatists," to found a new state. The intention was to transplant a French *de jure* organization—governors, military power, police, and courts—to a piece separated from the German *de facto* society. As will be shown, it failed.²¹

²¹ 1924, pp. 268 ff.; W. D'Ormesson, "L'Epilogue de la Ruhr," *La Revue Hebdomadaire* (Année 33), IX (1924), 259 ff.; G. de Traversay, "L'Échec du séparatisme Rhénan," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 9th ser., XXV (1925), 304 ff., 631 ff.; D. C. Boulger, "The 'Barrier State' in History," *English Review*, XXXVIII (1924), 681 ff.; J. Levainville, "The Economic Function of the Rhine," *Geographical Review*, XIV (1924), 242 ff.

The territory involved was mainly land regained or newly acquired by Prussia after the Vienna Congress. Its population, as the German historian Karl Lamprecht has recounted, was German, but it had strong French leanings; the lower strata "promoted . . . the formation of the myths attached to the person of Napoleon"; the business men, even after 1870, "counted in French."²² Between 1919 and 1923 a number of independent republics were set up in this area. On November 13, 1922, the German ambassador in Paris wrote to the French government:

Owing to the mass expulsion of officials, especially the leading officials without exception, the administrative machine is already completely shattered. Moreover, in almost all territories the population has been deprived of its leaders, since the policy of expulsion has not spared the heads of the political parties and trade unions. Any enlightenment of the population has been impossible for months owing to the crippling of the entire non-Separatist press by the most severe censorship, the suppression of many newspapers, and the banning of all meetings not convened by the Separatists. Finally, any liaison between political, economic, and trade union organizations of the Rhineland and the corresponding associations in the rest of Germany has long been made difficult, or rather absolutely impossible by the drawing of a strict cordon of isolation round the entire Occupied Territory.²³

The British consul in Munich reported to his government:

Having spent five days hearing views of people of every class and from every part of the Palatinate I have come to general conclusions:

1. Overwhelming mass of population are opposed to Autonomous Government.
2. This Government could never have come into existence without French support. . . .
5. A considerable element, while indifferent to question of separation from Bavaria, are opposed to separation from the *Reich*.
6. There is also a feeling amongst certain classes, especially peasants and Socialist workmen, in favour of Rhineland State including Palatinate, politically independent but economically bound to the *Reich*. These people fear militarist policy of Berlin and Munich.²⁴

Because the *de facto* community insisted on remaining part of the Reich the French were unable to force a *de jure* organization on it.

²² Lamprecht, IX, 453.

²³ *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, pp. 84 ff.; *Survey of International Affairs*, 1927, pp. 125 ff.

²⁴ *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, p. 313.

No able Germans with a following were ready to act as Quislings.

It may reasonably be objected that the separation might have been effected had England not been opposed. The passive resistance of the Germans to the occupation of the Ruhr was broken after a few months, and their resistance to separation might also have been broken had the French found an abler crowd to govern the new state and had English protest not forced France to yield and conclude the London agreements of 1924.

Actually, a truly vital nucleus for the proposed new states was not to be found within them, and outer pressure was not strong or prolonged enough to foster its creation. Guns and bayonets can destroy a state, and in sufficient number can keep a nation down; however, as the French say, bayonets are useful tools, but you cannot sit on them. Only well-seated governments can create new states by partitioning the old. The situation in the autonomous states became more and more chaotic—evidence that sheer force cannot create a viable organization—until the territory was returned to Germany.

Another illustration may be found in a report by Helferich, a German Minister during the first World War, to a committee of the Reichstag. After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Germany created a Ukrainian state and installed a puppet government.

Our armies of nearly half a million men have not liquidated the war on the Eastern front as was hoped, and indeed announced, and the actual situation gives no promise of liquidating it in the months to come. We meet, it is true, with no important mass resistance either from the peasants or from the Bolsheviks, but our losses in the Klein Krieg [guerrilla warfare] are very heavy and the audacity of these peasant marauders and other irregulars increases every day. The Skoropadski Government which we sustain with our bayonets would collapse immediately if we withdrew.²⁵

The vertical or horizontal invasion may, if it succeeds in forming a strong elite and is backed by a homogeneous group responding to its commands, form a nation and secure the co-operation by institutions. But—and this is our point—something more than a plan, something other than force is needed: the governed must be content with their governors, and the group's co-operative reaction must become largely instinctive.

In Napoleon's days the French army proceeded from conquest to conquest. In dealing with the conqueror Europe was maladroit; every

²⁵ *Sueddeutsche Monatshefte* (Muenchin), Feb., 1924, p. 176.

state acted and made peace separately. The downtrodden throughout the Continent at first hailed the revolutionary armies as liberators; clubs were formed by the intellectuals, the so-called "Illuminati." But, the historian tells us,

Impoverished armies had need of money and the impoverished people refused to give it to them: it was necessary to raise the level of contributions, to requisition material and services of prime necessity.

Sorel continues in the same vein:

Above all he [Danton] was intent upon nourishing the war, and nourishing it at the expense of foreigners: governments, kings, nobles, priests, and the privileged classes if possible; or, in default of these tyrants, all those individuals who were able to pay in cash or in kind. Moreover he liked to believe he would succeed in reconciling these two aims: revolution and requisitioning; the doctrine of the conqueror forced upon a conquered people, and the acceptance by the conquered country of the paper money of the conquering state at a specific rate of exchange.²⁶

The leader of the coalition, England, on the other hand, paid cash. The result was the rising of the peoples—Leipzig and Waterloo.

I have sketched the road of integration; that of disintegration leads in the opposite direction. The empire of Alexander the Great broke into parts, and the Diadochi, independent rulers after his death, were kept in balance by a primus. Revolting against this balance on the part of ambitious subordinates among the three caused a number of wars.

After the single organism had split into parts, the laws and institutions of the once universal empire were gradually transformed into the separate laws and institutions of new organisms. Thus the united state becomes federal, and the federal state in turn loses, and local autonomies acquire, essential rights. The federal state further disintegrates into a federation of states.

It is therefore irrelevant whether one organism evolves from many or many from one; when the body of the new organism is ready, or nearly ready, it creates and begins to use its own mind, its own nervous system.²⁷ The process of integration or disintegration being gradual, there are many intermediary stages. At one stage the will of members in a new organism just coming into being, or an old one from which they are becoming independent, balances in effectiveness the central

²⁶ Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, III, 206.

²⁷ Holt, pp. 166 ff.

authority. The balance is maintained by virtue of orders passing from the central authority to local authorities, from the king to the local governors. When a merger is completed, centralized laws and commands are directed to the subjects; by the end of the splitting up process the king no longer has any power.

Even when integration or disintegration is complete, neither the independence nor the dependence of the former members is ever absolute. Under a balance of power independent, so-called sovereign states are not free in every respect, but are subject to their mightier neighbors and a *primus*. Conversely, in a universal monarchy the parts are not subject in every respect to one central authority, since provincial authorities have their own local autonomy.

From this brief investigation of the growth of a nervous system in nations we may come to certain conclusions. The organizing of a body has its own rules. One is that *a community must exist before it can be organized*. We shall see the importance of this point when we come to consider the possibilities of world organization. Another, that the organism gradually acquires or loses its nervous system. While integrating, each member's separate institutions are in the process of disappearing—during disintegration those of the members reappear, and the central system disappears. When members are on the road to individual integration, the larger entity is disintegrating, and vice versa. The balanced state, the federation, the federal, and the united state are separate stages of the process, whichever its direction.

HIERARCHY OF STATES

IN AN IMPREGNABLE SOCIETY no fear is known; if its inhabitants can produce on their own territory all they need and can consume what they produce, it can do without both foreign commodities and foreign consumers. If its inhabitants are all of the same type, and all men of that type live within it—none being scattered beyond its borders—if, furthermore, all its inhabitants are fully employed, it will encourage neither immigration nor emigration.

The inhabitants of such a society would be organized, one supposes, along the lines of certain insect societies which practice the most perfect communism. Its members would have no free life of their own; each individual, like a bee in the hive, would depend on others. Collectivism would be substituted for individualism, for complete separation from neighbors would preclude the radiations of exchange. Such a society would be a perfect organism. Each member could do only his own job, and the whole would not be capable of entering into any kind of combination with another organism as complete and distinct as itself.¹

I should not choose to live in such a society, though it may have been Taylor's or Bedaux's idea of heaven. I even hope with Nicolas Berdiaeff that "a new century will dawn when the intellectuals and cultured classes will dream of means of avoiding utopias and returning to a society less perfect but with more freedom."² The wholly self-sufficient and isolated state is useful only as a standard to which existing societies may be compared. Actually, some states have territorial defects—may not be comfortably segregated, may be too far from self-sufficiency to be independent. Others have personal defects—their inhabitants are of many types, hard to assimilate, or the various groups are ill-adjusted and/or badly organized, and the duties and rights of groups and individuals not well defined. One does more work; another less. The compensation of one may be extravagant; of

¹ Bouvier, p. 312; Emery, "Les Insectes sociaux et la société humaine," *Revue d'Economie Politique*, XV (1901), 26.

² Huxley, *Brave New World*, quoted on page 1.

another, insufficient. Such defects create discontent; hunger and insecurity breed resentment, fear, and other unpleasant emotions.

Under the strain of malaise, states, groups, and individuals develop ideas as to what would remedy their situation. It is human to blame defects on others. No dominant class will admit failure in duty—that the population suffers because of a misuse of power, that too large a portion has been taken from the common pot, and that it has neglected to educate subordinates within the society and to remedy its own faults. Personal defects due to failure in adaptation are blamed on the minority, the ugly ducklings, said to be unassimilable. Territorial and organizational defects are blamed on the neighbor who obstructs traffic or has too large a slice of the globe. As “Archy” says of man:

he is the great alibi ike of
the cosmos when he raises hell
just because he feels like
raising hell he wants somebody to blame it on.³

Improvement begins with acknowledgment of error. But politicians are never plagued by a sense of guilt; they woo voters. The priest consoles with the doctrine that to err is human, and the politician keeps himself in office by doing whatever his constituents advocate.

The defects of states could often be healed from within, but our well-known clemency to ourselves and strictness with others lead us to blame the illness of the body social on those around us; the remedy, therefore, is to re-educate or to eliminate others or to take away their territory. If the dominants in a state would rightly diagnose their malaise, see their own failures, and understand the needs of other nations, policies for peace might be worked out. In the present stage of group morale, however, there is only one solution for all discontents: reform your neighbors, eliminate the ugly duckling.

For defects of the state, whether rightly or wrongly diagnosed, the remedy is national policy. Since Sedan, France has never felt secure in her habitat. Her demand for Alsace and her request that Germany be divided into small competing states are the traditional responses to her fear. Germany, on the other hand, has been dependent upon imports and exports. An organism far from self-sufficient, she devised a policy which would make her an empire like the English: a superorganism in which the needs of the motherland are supplemented by exchanges on terms arbitrarily fixed upon her colonies. The devices of

³ Marquis, p. 123.

other states are similar; they, too, try to solve their problems and bolster their weaknesses by educating or annexing other nations. Each state has its own national policy and tries by hook or crook to acquire more power over its neighbors, or, at the very least, to maintain its own independence.

No organism can be wholly self-sufficient; none can surround itself by walls and cease to emit or to receive exchanges with the outside world. A state needs partners. It may be said that states with defects will seek an ally who can compensate for them.

The need for partners is a constant stimulus to symbiosis, the building up of organisms. Each state has its own ideas, condensed from experience, tradition, and imagination, and concerning not only its own body social—that is, not only the groups which must be its members and the land which must form its habitat—but also what partners it must have and the influence it must exercise on other states. Such a national policy is often held together by the myth of having been determined by one of the country's great statesmen or by Providence itself. France looked to Henry IV's great design; Russia, to the fraudulent testament of Peter the Great; modern Japan, to the Tanaka Memorial.⁴ The United States has its "manifest destiny."

The national policy of a state determines its extraterritorial activities. Such activities are not only acquisitive; states not only seek to increase their own power, but also to restrain within certain limits those of their competitors. The national policy of France includes not only a demand for her natural boundaries, but also a divided Germany; a territory of grabuge. Russian national policy includes not only a demand for warm sea ports but also, as we shall see presently, a divided western Europe.

Powers both large and small restrict the acquisitive tendencies of their neighbors. Polybius stated the thesis thus: "No principality should tolerate an expansion of its neighbor through oppressing its enemies to such an extent that it is later able to exercise its will freely in all things."⁵ And in an interdependent world each state is every one's neighbor.

If we call the progress of each state on the road to achieving a

⁴ G. Tanaka, *Japanese Imperialism Exposed; the secret Tanaka document*, New York, International Publishers, 1942.

⁵ Quoted in Garden, I, vi: "Ne cuiusquam principatus a vicinis sinatur in tantum crescere, hostibus illius oppressis, ut, pro libitu, postea dominari in omnes possit." Compare also: Machiavelli, *The Prince*, tr. by W. Baynes, London, Moring, 1929, p. 15. "That he that gives the means to another to become powerful ruins himself."

national policy of its own motion, we must observe that the attraction or repulsion of others diverts it from its path and compels it to move along some diagonal.

In this eternal strife for vassals and colonies, for rights over the territory of other nations, and for the restraint of the expansion of other nations, not all states have the same strength. One has a large population, another is thinly populated. One lives on a well-segregated territory; another is unprotected by sea, mountains, or desert. One is nearly self-sufficient; another is far from it. One produces goods needed by many other states—oil or certain metals; another those which are too plentiful to be used (formerly, wheat and other agricultural products). The present generation in one state may have inherited from its ancestors many claims against other states; that of another may be burdened by debts, and these may influence the state's position in the hierarchy of states. The consistency and coherence of the nation and its prestige in the eyes of other nations will also influence its success and failure in peaceful competition and in war.

War, like revolution, is a test of a state's *auctoritas*, or practical power, as distinguished from mere formalistic legal rights. A state's *auctoritas* is based on its co-ordination, its industrial capacity and moral forces, and its power to resist greedy barbarians, to protect its own way of life, and to maintain its own standards. War may reveal serious defects in the belligerents. The relative strength and consistency of each victor and vanquished will be apparent by the time hostilities end. Throughout the centuries wars proved that Spain, Turkey, and Austria were sick and could maintain their power only if supported; also, that Rome and Britain were strong. Powers, with various potentialities, influence one another's acquisitive and restrictive activities.

Let me repeat that a power's own motion and the attraction and repulsion of others determine the diagonal. The greater the difference in power between two states with opposite national policies, the more closely will the diagonal of the weaker follow the road of the stronger. A vassal state is compelled by its overlord to move within the latter's orbit and may eventually be swallowed. If, however, on the other flank of the small state there is a Great Power with a national policy antagonistic to that of its overlord, this may supply the additional force necessary to modify the diagonal the other two Powers will follow and thus enable the smaller to remain more independent.

In the days when in accordance with Roman custom the paramount

Power made gifts of royal crowns to its friends and vassals, Pope Sylvester II, head of the western hierarchy, conferred one on St. Stephen, king of Hungary, which was inherited by his successors, A.D. 1000; the Byzantine emperor, Michael VII Dukas, one on his successor and nephew, Geza, A.D. 1074.⁶ The great medieval kingdom of Hungary, between large eastern and western hierarchies of states and dependent upon both, was able to maintain its independence. In the thirteenth century the two crowns, symbols of dependence, were united in the Holy Crown of Hungary, a symbol of independence. The danger for the small state remained that its neighbors might agree to partition it, as happened in the case of Poland.

The greater a state's power, the more it can realize its national policy; the weaker a state, the more its national policy becomes a cherished dream. The accord and discord of the Great Powers determine the world's history, which consists of the continual integration of states from the disintegrating bodies of others. The processes of integration and of disintegration show the same characteristics, whether it is a question of city-states merging into larger city-states, tribes uniting into national states, or national states being absorbed into more or less neighborless empires.

The dimensions of the components and the size of the new entity influence the process in certain ways. The smaller the components, the less developed their individual characters and the more flexible their organization, the more intimate their union may become; the larger the components, the better defined their individual characters, and the more petrified their organization the less intimate their union and the more difficult their assimilation.

The formation of hierarchies of states is the same process as that of the integration of states, but it has its own peculiarities, determined by the characteristics of its components.

Animals form temporary alliances to provide for certain aims which cannot be achieved alone. Danger, attack, or aggression, may make necessary an alliance, a pooling of the resources of the partners and their co-operation toward a common aim. In an emotional peak, states forget their divergent interests and unite. Sparta, fighting Athens, turned for aid to Persia, the great enemy of all Greek city-states. In the wars against the Hapsburgs, Roman Catholic France, led by a

⁶ Marczali, p. 105.

cardinal and a devout monk, Richelieu and his Père Joseph, invoked the help of the Protestant princes of Germany who opposed the Hapsburg overlordship. In World War II Germany was allied with Japan—to the former kaiser, the “Yellow Peril.” They were partners because both were against Britain.

One of the traits of competitive policies is that in solving the problems of today, tomorrow is forgotten. Once the common enemy is defeated, the partners in a war (or alliance, or entente) fall out; already at the peace conference each intrigues against the others. This was the story of the Greek city-states, brought together first by a common danger—Persia—but squabbling once more after her defeat. It was the same with the alliance against Louis XIV. After the defeat of France, England quarreled with the United Provinces.⁷ A century later, during the Vienna Congress, Austria and Britain made an agreement with France against their former allies, Russia and Prussia. Even when Napoleon's return reunited the allies, the Quadruple Alliance was short-lived; Metternich's policy, to freeze the *status quo*, did not appeal to England. The allies split on the question of the Spanish colonies and on the right of intervention. Paris, in 1918, again resounded with rows among the Powers over how the spoils should be divided. Of each period may be said what Hamilton said of his own time:

In the early part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiations were exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion.⁸

Hamilton, like Mably⁹ before him and Castlereagh and Canning after him, rightly concluded from the history of alliances that their objectives must be well defined and limited.

We shall presently consider arguments in support of the thesis that the larger community of independent states cannot be stabilized and

⁷ Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne*, III, 188 ff.

⁸ *The Federalist* (Modern Library), No. XV, p. 90.

⁹ Mably, pp. v-vi.

is bound to remain merely balanced or unbalanced. For the moment let us note that when one member of an alliance becomes more powerful than the others—when a dominant-subordinate relationship begins to make itself felt—the temporary alliance is transformed into a hierarchy of states or a federation, which may end in a united state.

I have mentioned elsewhere that Rome in her early years felt the need of free sea lanes and the eastern shores of the Adriatic for her protection. She annexed only Sicily, however, and refrained from annexing Greece and Macedonia.

All in Rome agreed on the main ideas of the new policy; wars, but no conquests. After having fought down in a short period Carthage, Macedonia, and Syria, the three greatest powers of that age, and having forced them to pay considerable indemnities, Rome was queen of the Mediterranean. This hegemony, maintained with the money of the vanquished, was of more value in the eyes of the Romans than any increase in territory.¹⁰

Nevertheless, while preserving the territorial integrity and autonomy of the defeated states, she buttressed her hegemony by bringing about changes in their domestic politics. Her friends were put into the government, their foreign policy was placed under her tutelage, and their land and naval forces were reduced. Thus the vanquished became in effect her vassals, permitted to maintain their individual existence in her service. A bulwark for the Italian peninsula, they were expected to use their reduced armed forces to fend off roving tribes.

Before Rome annexed the territories of her defeated enemies and made them provinces of her neighborless empire, she had brought into being a hierarchy of states. When the process started, each state was still independent, each having the same sovereignty, but Rome, with her increasing authority, influenced—nay, directed—the foreign policy of her defeated enemies, to whom she restored their parochial liberties. "As the disturbance of the balance between the Roman power and the rest of the world became accentuated," writes Homo, "these treaties of equal alliance degenerated into contracts of clientship and even narrower protectorates."¹¹

As the Roman power increased, the "part of the Senate prevailed in whom self-interest predominated over fairness and justice."¹² Rome's sovereignty became more absolute, and she disregarded her inter-

¹⁰ Ferrero, *Nouvelle histoire romaine*, p. 65.

¹¹ Homo, *Primitive Italy and the Beginnings of Roman Imperialism*, p. 340; Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, pp. 163 ff., 190.

¹² Livy quoted in Phillipson, I, 104.

national obligations. As long as the intermediary stage, a hierarchy of states headed by Rome as *primus*, existed, the other members of the hierarchy were dominated by Rome. She issued orders to the sovereigns, not to the citizens, since the latter were subject to their own local rulers, and her commands bound them only when endorsed by their own princes. Roman policy later changed, and the territories of the vassal states were annexed and made part of the Empire. The need arose for new vassals and new protectorates.

However, not every vassal state was annexed, and not every neighbor could be made subservient. Rome had barbarian neighbors, many of which remained more or less independent to the end—"neighborless empire" is a relative term. Annexation was possible only if the elite could be Latinized, the habitat extended to well-protected frontiers, and Rome's competitors were ready to tolerate her expansion. Rome had no interest in taking in barbarians who would cause trouble in her body social or in going beyond her natural frontiers—the Danube-Rhine line, for instance a good boundary—and expanding into the unlimited steppes, thereby opening a road to her core. Nor could she annex states coveted, and therefore protected, by as mighty a state as Persia. Rome limited her liabilities, and where annexation was inadvisable she tried to make arrangements that would give her rights over her neighbors. Friends and vassals complemented her strategically and economically. She claimed the right to direct the policy of states independent of her. "Rome has spoken, the case is concluded" meant that a decision had been reached and must be followed.¹³

Inherent in the Roman idea of a "neighborless empire" was the Roman emperor's prerogative to be the head, the chief, of all rulers. In a later age, Byzantium, combining the Roman idea with the universality of the new Catholicism, decreed that there should be only one empire in this world, as there is in that beyond, and that it should be headed by a trinity of Byzantine emperors, as Heaven is ruled by the Holy Trinity.

Alliances—this was our thesis—have a tendency to transform themselves into a hierarchy if one of the partners becomes dominant. After the Treaty of Utrecht, Britain's position toward the United Provinces, later called the Netherlands, changed; she became the protector, and the provinces retired under her wings. The defeat of the Austro-

¹³ St. Augustine (Sermons, 113.10); see *Roma locuta*, *The International Encyclopedia*, new ed., Philadelphia, Winston.

Hungarian Monarchy at Königgrätz, the defeat of France in 1870 and its consequence, and Prussia's German empire changed the situation between the two equals competing for hegemony in Germany. Austria was not only excluded from the German federation of states, but became more and more subservient to the new Germany. It may be said that when the link between the states changed, competition developed into a dominant-subservient relationship.

This relationship has, again, many shades. In his memoirs Emperor Augustus wrote of a critical moment in his rise to power, "After that day my authority [*auctoritas*] was greater than that of any one of my colleagues, notwithstanding that my power [*potestas*] was no wider than theirs."¹⁴ Augustus thus distinguished between *auctoritas* and *potestas*. The former is an individual's intrinsic power, derived from his capacity for leadership; the latter, his legal power derived by constitution or law. "That day" was in the 27th year B.C., the end of Octavian's six terms as consul. When this clever politician informed the Senate that, the civil war being ended, it was time for him to relinquish his extraordinary powers, they conferred on him the name "Augustus" and honored him in other ways that enhanced his *auctoritas*, also conferring upon him a *potestas* somewhat greater than that of former Roman consuls.¹⁵

Thus the danger that the Roman Republic would split into parts, each governed by a local governor, was averted by granting to one governor (in accordance with Cicero's advice in his *De republica*) dictatorial powers within the law of the republic. Augustus, whom nineteenth-century historians call the first Roman emperor, was, as twentieth-century research has demonstrated, merely a consul of the Roman Republic. It was his enormous *auctoritas* that made him a quasi-emperor.

Rome was on the eve of disintegration. One of her governors, by attaining greater *auctoritas* than the others, succeeded in saving the unity. Augustus was *primus inter pares*; his successors became sovereigns.¹⁶

A similar process operates among states. The Roman emperor of

¹⁴ Harrer, *Res gestae divi Augusti*, North Carolina University Studies in Philology, XXIII (1926), 402 ff.

¹⁵ Curtis, I, 242; Barker, pp. 55 ff.; Barraclough, p. 211; Ostrogorsky, pp. 44-45; Schramm, p. 12; Schraeder, p. 3; W. Sickel, "Das byzantinische Krönungsrecht bis zum 10. Jahrhundert," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, VII (1898), 511, 516; *Bulletin de l'Institut Archéologique Bulgare*, IX (1935), 57-68.

¹⁶ Buchan, p. 14.

the West or of the East had no legal rights over neighboring rulers and states equally sovereign; he had merely an acknowledged influence or authority. Of this Holtzmann remarks, "Today we cannot really understand a sovereign state that is subject to the spiritual *auctoritas* of another."¹⁷ Perhaps it would be truer to say that historians have taken note of facts of the past which contemporary jurists have overlooked. *Auctoritas*, the invisible "authority," may represent a beginning or an end of *potestas*. When the evolution is toward integration, a single governor's *auctoritas* is transformed into paramountcy, suzerainty, and finally the sovereignty of the *primus inter pares*; when it is toward disintegration, the *auctoritas* is the last vestige of a former sovereignty. It may also be a solution where *potestas* is not possible—a *faute de mieux* where integration cannot be reached and disintegration would be fatal.

Great Britain has friends, such as Portugal and Norway, which are independent sovereign states. But as her *auctoritas* is the greater, she influences them. Other states, such as the Boer Republics before the South African War and certain native states in India, are also her equals, but are, or were, subject to her influence; still others, such as the feudal princes in India, are not her equals, but are subject to her as a sovereign to his suzerain.¹⁸ Friends and vassals, in the wake of a legal *potestas* tending to become an intangible *auctoritas*, or vice versa, are as common now as they were in Roman days. When the tendency is toward integration, vassals become more numerous; when it is toward disintegration, "friends" are the rule.

And Britain is not the only power to influence her friends. Russia's traditional policy, like that of other continental states since the early days of China, is to protect herself by a glacis, or surrounding territory of small independent states, enemies among themselves, but friendly to her. Under the Monroe Doctrine the United States claims, as big brother, good neighbor, or perhaps as wielder of a big stick, an *auctoritas* in Latin America or even the paramount right of influence in the Caribbean.

From a world viewpoint governors of independent equal states are local governors. Nothing is more natural than that a hierarchy should emerge, since the states and their governors, through having the same

¹⁷ R. Holtzmann, "Der Weltherrschaftsgedanke des Mittelalterlichen Kaisertums," *Historische Zeitschrift*, CLIX (1939), 251 ff.; F. Dölger, "Die Kaiserurkunde der Byzantiner als Ausdruck ihrer Politischen Anschauungen," *ibid.*, pp. 229 ff.

¹⁸ Coupland, Part II, pp. 2 ff.

theoretical rights in the international community, wield varying degrees of influence or authority.

We have already seen that in a feudal society the king, as overlord, tries to encroach on the power of his vassals. His court, sheriffs, and army compete with those of his subordinates for domination of individuals. The more successful the king in dominating his vassals' subservients, the more his *auctoritas* is transformed into the legal *potestas*. If, on the other hand, the parochial governors succeed in preserving—or liberating—their retainers from the direct influence of central authority, the king's *potestas* becomes a fainter *auctoritas* merely, or remains an empty term.

The hierarchy of states is like a feudal society, loosely organized. In the hierarchy, as in the feudal pattern, the degree of dependency of one state upon another is not well defined. If we translate the macrocosmic picture of dependency into the microcosm of day-by-day events, the dominant-subservient relation is a steady competition and also co-operation between the ruling powers concerned; a mixture, so to speak, constantly changing in proportions. The personality of the ruler or government—a strong emperor and a weak king or vice versa, a trend towards integration in the one and towards disintegration in the other—together with innumerable other events of the day, shapes the relationship. Historians with retrospective insight still discuss whether Hungary and Russia in the twelfth, the thirteenth, or some other century were vassals or *amici* of Byzantium; they are as uncertain now as citizens of that period were blind. Likewise, Britain's relation to Egypt may give some future historians cause for arguments.

To sum up—leading to the hierarchy there is an evolutionary process from a federation of states to the federal state, from the federal to the united state. The same process, seen from another angle, is a progressive transition from *auctoritas* to suzerainty. In time the order of the transition is reversed. When Rome was a league, her word was heeded; when her Senate ruled a federation, she demanded obedience from her friends; when she had united the greater part of her dependencies into an empire, the Senate ruled all Roman citizens. During the course of her existence Rome was, like Britain, simultaneously head (in the sense of political head) of a federation of states, a federated state, and a united state. She had partners who accepted her authority, others who were vassals, and finally, former partners who had lost their identity by becoming parts of her body social.

There is thus a difference to be observed in the relationship of interdependent "equal" sovereigns. There are states influenced by the *auctoritas* of one among them—they are members of a loosely organized hierarchy: others have greater independence—have their own hierarchy or are placed between two hierarchies, thereby securing greater freedom for themselves. All states form a system, which is either balanced, each power accepting its limits as the best it can attain under the circumstances, or unbalanced; in the latter case the powers fight to work out a balance. In the total system of states, even in periods which have a balancer, a *primus*, his rights are not admitted by his "equals"; he may exercise a *de facto auctoritas*, but this has never been a *de jure potestas*.

And always there is competition and co-operation between these more or less consistent entities within the system, with all their varying degrees of organization. Hierarchies of states, in their interrelated elements of power constituting single low-grade organisms, compete with each other. The competition of missionaries, merchants, statesmen, and soldiers—the diplomatic game—degenerates into wars; wars end in further peaceful competition.

The world is one, but articulated into parts more or less well defined. The state, which is in itself a high-grade organism, forms with its satellites a less well-organized feudal state. All feudal states, plus a number of smaller independent states, form our one world with its dynamic balance, unable to stabilize a mere hierarchy. For in order even to approach the highest state of organization, groups—whether tribes, feudal domains, or entire states—must begin to lose their identity as groups, and the atoms organized must be men. An organism made up of states of whatever size, so long as they remain highly crystallized and integrated within themselves, can never attain the highest stage of integration; it always remains in the stage of the pioneer community, where common affairs are arranged by competition. It may be balanced, it may be a hierarchy (made up of hierarchies); but it cannot stabilize or institutionalize the order.

Even though a hierarchy of states is nearer self-sufficiency than a state, it needs for its security—or at least thinks it needs—the assurance that other hierarchies will co-operate with it and be prevented from growing stronger and becoming better protected. There is thus sustained opposition of interests and intent that forms a barrier to processes conducive to merging.

The conflicting principles "one nation, one state" and "one region, one state" hinder the division of the earth into equal, well-protected, and self-sufficient parts, but if division into isolated units were possible, it would not last. The Dark Ages of medieval history began, as we have noted, when the Mediterranean became a Mussulman lake and its world was split—first in two, a Christian part and a Mohammedan part, and then Europe into many parts. Even in those days of isolated states Syrians and Jews carried on a black market in the Mediterranean; wars and invasions began again and furthered international exchanges.¹⁹

China was unable to isolate herself behind her walls; even Japan could not remain aloof. Unifying forces—whether crusaders or missionaries or Commodore Perrys—in some form or other invariably reappear to demolish walls and re-establish one market in which everybody competes. Though we may not need anything from our neighbors, are not afraid of their growing power, are isolationist in every respect, we still demand that others believe what we believe, shall have the same creed that we have. *Pro maiore gloria Dei* the world must be Roman Catholic; for the glory of Marx, bolshevist.

This picture of the world is somewhat like that of our universe: within it there are sun systems, stellar hierarchies articulated into planets and their satellites and dominated by their sun; integrating and disintegrating stars and independent stars which may be attracted by more than one system. Each hierarchy and star has its own path determined by the diagonal of all forces, and the whole seems to us well-balanced, perhaps because we live in a period of interstellar peace.

In each member of the one world, centrifugal as well as centripetal forces operate. The neighbor, by definition a potential enemy, interested in the disruption of a state except when it needs help against a third power, supports the centrifugal forces within it. When the centrifugal forces within are stronger than those making for coherence in the existing order, the territory is on the way to becoming a niche. Horizontal invasions (migrations) or vertical invasions—(the revolution of the subordinates within)—transform the niches into new states, or make out of them parts of bodies on the way to integration. The expansion is stopped when forces from within paired with forces from without prevent invasion, when the centripetal forces within a state,

¹⁹ Pirenne, *Mahommed and Charlemagne*, p. 174.

reinforced by its friend, are stronger or are thought to be stronger than the centrifugal forces within a state with their helpers.

Sir Halford MacKinder considered that the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa are one connected land group, which he called the "world island."²⁰ East and west of this island are smaller islands, England and Japan, and farther away are continents, such as the Americas and the islands in the Pacific. At the center of the world island is the "heartland"; the power dominating the heartland dominates the world island, and the world island, in turn, the world. Whether this aphorism is wholly true I shall not attempt to discuss; many conquerors in the past have believed it, and however worded, it may be adopted by others. A united world island, a single, self-sufficient Power including all or most of this territory and undefeatable is the nightmare of the states outside it, since no one of them could defeat it.

More than fourteen-sixteenths of all humanity live on the Great Continent, and nearly one-sixteenth more on the closely offset islands of Britain and Japan. Even to-day, after four centuries of emigration, only about one-sixteenth live in the lesser continents. Nor is time likely to change these proportions materially. If the middle west of North America comes presently to support, let us say, another hundred million people, it is probable that the interior of Asia will at the same time carry two hundred millions more than now, and if the tropical part of South America should feed a hundred million more, then the tropical parts of Africa and the Indies may not improbably support two hundred millions more.²¹ [See Map on page 343.]

The world island as one state, therefore, would be self-sufficient and could not be defeated by any power outside it; the states within this area would be exceedingly interested in preventing anyone from dominating the heartland. The powers outside the world island would be interested in dividing it.

The history of the world island shows a series of states tending to dominate the whole region; powers from outside, with the help of some insiders, try to stop expansion and to divide the world island. The aggressors have always failed; the protectors have always succeeded. The reasons for the failure of Spain, France, Germany, and Prussia to unite the world island into one body will be discussed later, now we merely note their failures, and turn to the history of England as an illustration of the struggle of the universal monarchies against

²⁰ Page 62.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

parochial liberty. In 1701 Charles Davenant wrote an essay entitled *Universal Monarchy*, attacking the theories of Pedro Mexia, historiographer of Charles V. Mexia argued in favor of the Roman emperors,

That in their times the whole Earth enjoy'd Peace and Rest; that, notwithstanding their infinite power and numerous forces, Justice prevailed every where, and their subjects were in full possession of Liberty, Security, and Property; that to their courts resorted all the Noble, Valiant, and Learned Men in the Universe; that it was matter of great Wonder to see what Union and Friendship there was between different nations, insomuch that a man might have travell'd through the World, or the best parts of it safely, and without any Fear, all Nations looking upon themselves as Neighbours, and as it were Fellow Citizens; There was then no occasion of Passports and Letters of Safe Conduct, nor to procure another sort of Coin for every region to which your Business led you; That then every Country had not different Laws, Travellers were not apprehensive of falling into the hands of Enemies, or to be made Captives; Nor could a Malefactor commit a Crime in one place, in confidence of finding Refuge and Protection in another.²²

But universal monarchy, said Davenant, means the dominion of one power over the rest. A conqueror must first subdue all other nations, then force them to remain subservient. He thus concluded his argument against Mexia.

With as much Brevity as so copious a Subject was capable of, I have here described some of the great Empires that have been hitherto created; I have shown what Calamities the unbounded Ambition of desiring to engross the whole, has brought upon Human kind; and I have done it with this Intention that the Young Nobility and Gentry of *England*, to whom these Papers are directed, by having a short view before 'em of past times, may be the better able to form a Judgment of the Future.²³

To hinder the formation of such a universal monarchy, England became the protector of the independence of European states. Her wars for the freedom of others are one of the constant refrains of history. England, Spain, and Austria at Bouvines and later, to prevent the formation of a strong and mighty France, fought for the *liberté* of the vassals of France. To prevent the United States of Europe, England, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, fought for the liberty of the states on the Continent, small and large. Independence and

²² Davenant, III, 288.

²³ Page 300.

liberty, of course, meant freedom of the governors to govern as they pleased, not the freedom of the governed.

To protect the freedom of European countries, England habitually protected the strongest rival of any power striving to obtain hegemony over the Continent. Seldom did she deviate from this policy. Allying herself in turn with France against Spain, with the German princes against France, with France against Russia, with France against Prussia, she destroyed whatever was the paramount Continental power and helped to build up the second until it became the first; then, with a new second, she fought it. Since Napoleon the charge against her has been the same: she prevents the union of the Continent and thereby perpetuates warfare. Geopoliticians today use the same arguments as Treitschke or Bernhardt in the Wilhelminian period, or *Citoyen* Hauterive (the *çi-devant* Count Joseph Marie d'Hauterive) ²⁴ in the second year of the French Republic, at the end of the eighteenth century.

Before England's policy was shaped, the Continent consisted of hostile camps, states separated by languages, customs, races, ideas, ideals, and religions, and at the same time united in almost equally balanced alliances ready to fight for their freedom and oppose unification. Like ancient Greece, Europe was divided, but when a new Macedonia or a new Rome tried to unite it, and one or more European states opposed the unification, England was always ready to help the opposition. Against any power which proposed to transform Europe and the rest of the world, still in the eighteenth century Europe's dependency, into a single federal state, England, with the help of states which loved their freedom, continued to fight.

The various Continental powers in turn fought for a united state on the Continent; the maritime power, England, for a feudal society in which she must be the balancer. The fight was for hegemony, for the rank of *primus inter pares*. England, more realistic than the Continentals, was ready to secure to the other states more freedom, more autonomy.

The prologue to the historical drama of England begins with the great change that happened when men realized that the earth is round and so thought that the shortest route to India would lie westward. Their misconception led to the discovery of the New World and a change in England's relative geographical position. In the Mediterranean world she was "cramped onto the edge of the *mappe mundi*,"

²⁴ Pages 21 ff.

her only space for expansion the European continent. Of the world as enlarged by the discovery of America, she was at the center, with enormous opportunities.²⁵

While the world of Rome was fashioned like a city ²⁶ its parts connected by roads, the greater world opened up in 1492 was maritime, its highways the oceans. To police such a world a navy was needed. Spain or France might just as well have been the power to police the world as England, but the role fell to England because her navy not only was larger than Spain's but also had adopted a new method of warfare, and she could keep aloof from Continental affairs as France could not.

Spain was the last ruler of the Continental world before the development of great maritime power. She was, moreover, with Portugal, owner of the recently discovered New World. England had the advantage of what may be called a new weapon. Her ships and men had always plied the ocean and the treacherous northern seas opening out of it. The Spaniards, accustomed to sail the Mediterranean, were badly handicapped on the ocean. The great Armada was their first fleet on the Atlantic. Like the Greeks, Romans, and Venetians before them, they "wanted to make sea warfare as much like land warfare as the elements would permit"; their ships were primarily a means of transporting their army. The sailors sailed the ships, the soldiers fired the guns. Unity of spirit, the prerequisite to strength in action, was lacking.

It was the English who led the world in the evolution of a new kind of warfare at sea, decided by cannon fired through the portholes in the side of the ship. Drake's guns were not much smaller, though they were less numerous, than those on board Nelson's three-deckers. To serve them the seaman was more important than the soldier, because the success of the cannon-fire depended on manoeuvring the ship into favourable positions to rake the enemy, and on aiming the guns with a sailor's instinct for calculating the roll of the two vessels. To Sir Francis Drake the warship was a mobile battery; to the Duke of Medina Sidonia it was a platform to carry the swordsmen and musketeers into action. English naval history tells indeed of many a gallant boarding episode, from those of Drake and Hawkins themselves to Nelson at St. Vincent and "brave Broke who waved his

²⁵ Trevelyan, *History of England*, p. 338.

²⁶ "Feciste patriam diversis gentibus unam: profuit iniustis, te dominate capi. dumque offers victis proprii consortia iuris urbem fecisti quod prius orbis erat." Rutilius-Numatianus (c. A.D. 417), quoted in Hancock, I, 176n; Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, p. 310.

sword"; yet it was not the boarder but the broadside that made England mistress at sea.²⁷

Just as centuries earlier the Assyrians had domesticated the wild horse and with their swift cavalry conquered peoples who still rode donkeys, so the English by a new instrument in war became supreme on the seas. Under the Stuarts the English navy was allowed to decline. However, "in time of public peace merchants carried on their private wars and developed naval power and knowledge of navigation." Later generations put this knowledge to good use; they built a navy bigger than that of any other single power, or of any combination of powers which might line up against England. The navy became her frontier.

As a Roman province, England was part of the political and economic organization which spread over the Continent. When the popes organized their world, she became part of the *Monarchia Christiana*, and when the economic unity of Europe was restored, she participated in its life. Her peculiar situation—a political independence from the Continent and a spiritual and commercial interdependence with it—determined her policy. From the wars against France which ended when she lost Calais, England learned that to have a dependency on the Continent was unwise. The advisers of Henry VIII exhorted him:

Let us in God's name, leave off our attempts against the *terra ferma*, as the natural situation of these islands seems not to suit with conquest of that kind. . . . The Indias are discovered, and vast treasure wrought thence every day. Let us, therefore, bend our endeavors thitherwards; and if the Spaniards and Portuguese suffer us not to join with them, there will yet be region enough for all to enjoy.²⁸

The advice was followed.

Nevertheless, she could not divorce herself from Continental politics. Her commercial dependence upon the Continent made her interfere whenever any Continental power made a move prejudicial to her. Even so, she had an advantage over France, who could not help acting in every scene of the Continental drama. Moreover, the intervals between her appearances on the Continental stage were well spent in consolidating her kingdom. A liberal domestic policy made possible the assimilation of Wales and Scotland and the establishment of parliamentary government and common law. The "revolutionary settle-

²⁷ Trevelyan, *History of England*, p. 343.

²⁸ Quoted in "The Balance of Power in Europe," *XIX Century and After*, Jan.-June, 1905, p. 788.

ment" reached upon William's ascent to the throne threw the balance of power between Parliament and the Crown in favor of Parliament; no king thereafter ever attempted to reign without Parliament.

The Cavalier Parliament, reflecting the passionate feeling of the English country gentlemen, hated and feared the very name of "standing army." They were well aware that lawful Kings could play them tricks with such a force, as easily as usurping Protectors. The King alone, as all good Cavaliers believed, had the right to nominate to military commands and give orders to the armed forces. To claim any such power for Parliament was to be a rebel and a Roundhead, for the Great Civil War had broken out on that issue. But it followed from these loyal premises that the army must be kept very small, lest His Gracious Majesty should be tempted to arbitrary rule.²⁹

Happy the island that could gain and hold world-wide prestige with only a militia in addition to its navy and keep order at home by a parliament and judge-made laws! The strength derived from the consolidation, the stabilization of the currency and budget by the founding of the Bank of England and the funding of the state's debts, made Britain the best-consolidated state in Europe. On the Continent in the same period French kings fought their Protestant vassals.³⁰

It would not add to our evidence if we gave a detailed history of England's fight against Spain, France, and Germany, each of whom in turn tried to build up a universal monarchy. Important for our conclusion is only the fact that England achieved her victories by her navy. "All the grand schemes of war and diplomacy," Trevelyan comments, "depended on the battleships of England, tossing far out at sea; Louis of France, like Philip of Spain before him, and Napoleon and Kaiser Wilhelm since, was hunted down by the pack he never saw."³¹

The Commonwealth of British Nations and the British Empire are territorially scattered, as Prussia was after 1815. Hypothetically, Britain might have secured her possessions as Prussia did, by acquiring the territory separating the scattered parts—this would have meant occupying the whole Eurasian continent, an impossible task. The only alternative was a floating defensive border, her navy. By her navy Britain unified the Empire; her security depended upon the naval ring surrounding the Eurasian continent and at the same time connecting the detached parts of the one organism. Such a ring needed coaling sta-

²⁹ Trevelyan, *History of England*, p. 454.

³¹ Trevelyan, *History of England*, p. 487.

³⁰ Bainville, p. 124.

tions, continental bases, which in turn needed states friendly to England for the sake of their security—states which, like the *amici* of Rome, without foreign policy of their own would follow Britain's lead. Portugal, Greece, and Egypt, on the lifeline of Britain, and many other countries, came more or less under her control; they were not annexed or taken over as colonies, but a certain kind of influence was exercised over them.

This British Empire was the political and economic arbiter for the world. Politically, because it, the great divider of the world island, was the *primus inter pares* among the various hierarchies of states and the independents. Economically, because men, goods, and capital could be distributed with the help of the Empire to powers that needed them.

Returning to Sir Halford MacKinder's statement, we notice that Britain's lifeline divided the world island into parts which may be blockaded, separated from the other parts. The Mediterranean, the Middle East, India, and Malay States are all bridgeheads from which barriers may be thrown up to divide the world island into parts which cannot unite without Britain's permission.

Denmark, Belgium, Portugal, and Greece have been stanch friends of Britain, their geographical situation is such that they always serve as end stations for barriers dividing Continental states, making possible blockade of such powers as Russia, Germany, or France.

The states forming part of the lifeline, as well as the barrier states against the expansion of a Great Power, must be Britain's friends. Britain intervenes in their domestic policy when by vertical invasion her friends are losing power and her enemies gaining it. Britain has intervened whenever an aggressor tried by horizontal invasion to unseat her friends.

When the wars against Napoleon ended, Czar Alexander of Russia proposed that the Quadruple Alliance be preserved in order to control France and that the general (Holy) Alliance should guarantee the territorial *status quo* of legitimate sovereigns. Relieved from the fear of revolution, these governments could offer equitable constitutions and prudently regulate the liberties of their peoples. In essence the Russian proposal was merely a new formula for the old idea that princes own their states; their "trade union" was for mutual protection when revolt threatened. Insurance against change was called "legitimacy."

Having settled all territorial questions left open by the Vienna Congress, the members of the German Confederation met at Carlsbad. Even the liberal princes of Baden and Bavaria agreed to the proposed reactionary measures against liberal professors, the restriction of academic freedom and the freedom of the press, and the organization of police forces to quell popular movements. The Carlsbad Decrees, as one historian has said, "constituted an attempt to apply within the group of sovereign States forming the German Confederation the principles of mutual guarantee and supervision."³² "Guarantee" meant the support of existing rulers; "supervision," to keep an eye on revolutionary elements at work in one state which were potentially dangerous to the sovereigns of all member states. At conferences in Troppau, Laibach, and Verona, the governments of Russia, Prussia, and Austria endeavored to extend these principles throughout Europe and its colonies. Numerous revolutions in Italy, Piedmont, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey, and the revolt of the Spanish colonies in America made intervention imperative in the minds of the Holy Alliance and the adoption of these principles urgent. Forty years earlier France had offered aid to all peoples revolting against their tyrants; now tyrants offered aid to their fellow tyrants against revolts.

For the Alliance to be effective the powers had to be in a position to do whatever might be required to prevent or quell revolutions against internal or international order. It had to have the right of armed intervention to safeguard any ruler whose throne or power was threatened.

Britain, as the protector of small states, opposed intervention in the affairs of other states. Under Castlereagh as Secretary of Foreign Affairs and even more so under the "radical" George Canning, she objected to intervention and insisted, in opposition to the "new holies," that each nation had the right to live under a government of its own choice and in accordance with its own laws and that no power should intervene in the affairs of another state. Realistic critics of Britain's foreign policy—witness an editorial in *The Spectator* in 1847, reprinted in *The Living Age*³³—dubbed this "nonintervention" a humbug; in 1860 August Grenville Stapleton in analyzing English history came to a similar conclusion.³⁴ "There is no Power, indeed," said Disraeli, addressing his constituents in 1866, "that interferes more than

³² *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, 32.

³³ *The Spectator*, July, 1847, reprinted in *Littell's Living Age* (Boston), XIV (Sept., 1847), 284.

³⁴ Pages 87 ff.; Phillimore, I, 553.

England.”³⁵ A question mark seems justified after the frequent statement that the fight over intervention, a theoretical question pure and simple, split the European concert—the league of nations following the defeat of Napoleon.

After the Spanish colonies in America had freed themselves, an army revolt in Spain forced her king to grant a constitution. On the ground that to grant a constitution is solely a king’s prerogative and cannot be forced, the Allies debated whether they should not intervene. Indeed, they proposed further to restore to Spain her overseas dominions. Russia was ready to act; France, too, though she did not like the prospect of having a Russian army pass through her territory to Spanish soil. Prussia and Austria were in favor of intervention—Great Britain was opposed. The decision was left, first to the Congress of Laibach, subsequently to that of Verona, where Britain withdrew from the Quadruple Alliance.

In 1818 Castlereagh had said:

It could not for a moment be admitted that states have a right to intervene in the internal affairs of other states in order to prevent change, whether legal or illegal; for how could foreign states be safely left to judge what was “legal” in another state. The only safe principle was that of the law of nations: namely, that no State has the right to endanger its neighbors by its proceedings, and that if it does so, provided they use sound discretion, their right to interference is clear.³⁶

This was very different from the idea of “an alliance solidaire, by which each state shall be bound to support the state of succession, government, and possession within all other states from violence or attack, upon condition of receiving for itself a similar guarantee.” Said a British confidential paper dated May 5, 1820:

Fearful as is the example which is furnished by Spain, of an Army in revolt, and a Monarch swearing to a Constitution which contains in its frame hardly the semblance of a Monarchy, there is no ground for apprehension that Europe is likely to be speedily endangered by Spanish Arms.³⁷

The right to interfere in the domestic affairs of a state if it endangers its neighbors is thus upheld as a general principle. Intervention in the affairs of revolutionary or Napoleonic France was therefore justified. Britain was for intervention also when the balance of power

³⁵ Monypenny and Buckle, II, 201.

³⁶ *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, 29.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 626.

in Europe or some other vital interest, such as the independence of Portugal, was menaced.

This was the policy pursued by Sir George Canning, who after the death of Castlereagh, in 1822, once again became Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Congress of Verona, concluded during his term of office, had ended in a break between the Allied Powers and Great Britain. After the coalition had threatened to intervene in Spain, France did so alone. Relations between France and Great Britain became strained in consequence, and the tension was only lessened when Polignac, the French Minister, gave way. To Canning's statement that any French attempt to restore the Spanish dominions or, as an alternative, to set up French authority in them would lead to war, Polignac's surrender was complete: "She [France] abjured, in any case, any design of acting against the [Spanish] colonies by force of arms."³⁸

Britain's policy was clear. Now that the trade between her and the former Spanish colonies for which she had so often fought both publicly and privately, was in her hands, she was determined not to lose it. She sought no treaty monopoly, for her superior industrial progress and equipment had already given her a *de facto* monopoly. She could even afford to be generous and declare that trade with the new states should remain free. The door was open to everybody. Britain would not object if Spain, harassed by revolution, endeavored to recover her former possessions; but she would strongly object if France or anybody else helped her in her struggle with the independent colonies. In line with Castlereagh's state paper, Canning insisted that England would not tolerate it if Spain, reinforced by France, should invade Portugal or threaten her independence. In other words, Britain was not intolerant of intervention as such; it simply must not take place unless her own interests were at stake.

But even a century and a half before Waterloo, when England was still a secondary power, she intervened when disposition of the land was concerned which is today divided between Belgium and The Netherlands. In 1667 a French political agent wrote from London: "With one voice the lower chamber has decided that the English should sell everything down to their shirts (these are the terms in which they express themselves) to make war on France for the protection of the Low Countries."³⁹ England would not permit a French fleet in Antwerp or Amsterdam, a principle voiced in the seventeenth

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

³⁹ Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning*, p. 114.

century and later reiterated. In 1789 Pitt declared that the absorption of the Low Countries by France would be considered a *casus belli*. Britain's policy did not subsequently budge, except for one instance; the sole change was in the name of the aggressor, Germany later giving the *casus belli*. However, when France broke into Belgium, in her war against Austria and Prussia during the Revolution, England accepted the French government's explanation that "Belgium was a (temporary) military necessity, not a prelude to annexation." She assumed, in fact, that France would be defeated, but events in the late autumn of 1792 demonstrated her error. Contrary to these expectations, France won the battle of Valmy, and the British government became convinced that without England's help Belgium would not be freed. War broke out, unavoidably.

In 1823 England intervened in the affairs of Portugal during the contest between Donna Maria da Gloria, leader of a faction desiring a constitutional regime, and her uncle Don Miguel, who headed a faction which wished to preserve the absolute monarchy. England favored Donna Maria. Said George Canning:

Let us fly to aid Portugal by whomever attacked, because it is our duty to do so, and let us cease our interference where that duty ends. We go to Portugal not to rule, not to dictate, not to prescribe constitutions, but to defend and preserve the independence of an ally.⁴⁰

In the early nineteenth century, when Queen Isabella and Don Carlos were struggling for the throne of Spain, four powers, including Britain, intervened, Britain throwing her weight in this case on the side of the Queen.⁴¹ But when Poland was partitioned and when Austria, with Russian help, put down the Hungarian revolt in 1848, England did not move. Nor did she aid Denmark, Austria, or France when Prussia attacked them, for Belgium and the French coast were not involved, and Schleswig-Holstein, the one seacoast affected, was well controlled by the then British Heligoland.

Thus, in one case Britain intervened for the independence of a state; in another to support a liberal government; in still another for the establishment of an autocracy; yet in a fourth, where factions were at war, she abstained.

It must be clearly understood that intervention is interference in the affairs of others—individuals, groups, or states—for the purpose

⁴⁰ *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, 79-80; Stapleton, pp. 51-52.

⁴¹ *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, 191 ff.; Stapleton, pp. 53 ff.

of compelling them to act, or abstain from acting, as the interfering power desires. The difference between England and the "Holies" was not that one was for, the other against intervention; both were for intervention whenever their interests demanded it, but their interests diverged. Russia intervened to build up an eastern empire; the "Holies" together to maintain ruling princes; Britain to secure her island and a balance of power on the Continent. However, it must be admitted that by standing against the legalization of intervention Britain protected the small powers from domination by any one paramount power which might aim at subjecting all Europe to its own religion, race, or economic system.

I have suggested that the unification of Europe in one superstate has been and will be impossible until some deluge or prolonged dark age washes away national obsessions of glory, conflicting religious and racial hatreds, and the divergent interests of each nation's ruling class. Even then, it might be that other ecological factors would revive current differences.

In the absence of any early possibility of a united world, the greatness of the British Commonwealth, the outstanding services England has rendered and is rendering to humanity by instituting the rule of law and public morality among those living under the Union Jack cannot be overestimated. It is in the highest interest of mankind that her power be not only preserved but also strengthened. After many trials and failures barbarism may destroy the civilized world. The new leaders of the new barbarians cannot understand what Attaulfus, a German chieftain, meant by his remark, ". . . that he had once in his youth dreamed of overthrowing the power of Rome; but experience had taught him that the Roman rule was the rule of law and order and peace."⁴² If it should come to pass that England ceases to have a voice in world affairs, her spirit will undoubtedly still make itself felt. Or if through human limitations retrogression overtakes us—if productive years must be followed by fallow—English common law and equity and the guiding principles of her colonial policy will be the Roman law received again at the beginning of another renaissance.

British policy resembles that of the ancient Romans: confine yourself to safeguarding your own interests; limit your interests so as to economize your forces. The story usually told of the fateful years

⁴² Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, p. 351; Bury, *Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians*, I, 197.

1815-22 is not true, or at least it is not the whole truth. The wars that wrecked Europe during the eighteenth century gave England the opportunity to assemble her huge colonial empire. Her policy was shaped to her ends: to enjoy within her Empire the ease and peaceful life self-government and equitable laws secure. This second "Roman Empire" recognizes its own proper limits: the shores immediately opposite the homeland, and its dependencies. Anything that happens here concerns it; anything beyond them is of no interest except as indicating the tendencies of other Great Powers.

Even after wars against a country inside the *limes*, Britain's concern was that the ensuing peace treaty be fair and just. For example, the Dutch were allowed to retain their rich colonies. After the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, Castlereagh in Commons and Lord Liverpool in the House of Lords explained that Britain wanted France to be contented; consequently, she should keep her pre-Revolutionary frontiers.

By protecting the states on her borders politically and economically, Britain keeps them friendly. British policy is determined by the repercussions she thinks a state's actions may have on her interests. If a state alters its frontiers, it increases or decreases its power. If a state exchanges one government for another, its foreign policy, alliances, and friendships may be modified. If the state is on her borders or within her sphere of vital interest, such domestic decisions affect Britain in any case; if it is outside the *limes*, she will be affected only if the change means that one state acquires hegemony on the Continent. Within the *limes* England has been the *primus* who, with friendly advice and military intervention, controlled the foreign policy of subject states and protected governments friendly to her. Outside the *limes* she has been a balancer whenever her interests were affected.

During the nineteenth century British policy assured the world relative peace. Under the balance of power, neighbors checked one another. If they went to war, the outcome depended on whether Britain left them alone to fight it out or threw her weight in favor of one side or the other. Her policy of splendid isolation, her reluctance to contract alliances and liabilities, was corollary to her position as leader. Her policy was to await events and then decide. As Albert Sorel says, they [the English] make up their minds to fight only when their interests seem absolutely threatened. But when they throw themselves into the struggle because they feel bound to do so, they bring to it a serious and con-

centrated passion, an animosity that is the more tenacious the more egotistic is the motive. Their history is full of alternations between an indifference that makes people think them decadent and a zeal that baffles their foes. They are seen in turn abandoning and dominating Europe, neglecting the greatest continental matters and claiming to direct them down to the minutest detail, turning from peace at any price to war to the end.⁴³

The explanation of this contradiction in Britain's policy is that she was the regulator which prevented the growth of any one state within the world island to a point dangerous to outsiders. When overexpansion began, she acted; when neighbors were in balance, she retired. She was the balancer among equals. She and her dependencies operated as an *Ersatz* mind and nervous system for the primitive organism. The prerequisite to Britain's order was the division of the world island among independent, more or less equal Great Powers, and her own Empire, outside it, holding in check with its bridgeheads and barrier states all other states.

⁴³ Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, I, 340.

WAR

MEN, groups, states, hierarchies of states, and the community of all states are all organisms; some more nearly united, better isolated, and more strictly organized than others. There are high- and low-grade organisms, and the higher the integration of member organisms, the lower the grade of the superorganism of which they are parts. Between the insect state and the community of all human states the scale of organisms is continuous.

The state, hierarchy of states, and community of all states are three different classes of organism, each with its own gradations. There are states with planned economies and complete control over their citizens, as well organized as an army or a production line, each member being assigned his place and his job. In other states the individual atoms or members are more independent; competition directs the economy, and each has whatever place it can gain for itself by skill, cunning, force, or good luck. The former are closed societies; the latter, open societies.

A hierarchy of states also has many gradations, but its order always remains a dynamic balance stabilized by tradition and mores, a loose organism of highly-organized members without common institutions. The total community of states, on the other hand, is a very loose association of competitors, seldom balanced, always struggling, its hierarchical order changing and complex.

The common denominator of all these organisms is order of some kind, a diagonal established by authority for common social functioning, or sometimes by agreement following or heralding struggle, or perhaps by the biological structure of the members.

The order, whatever it is, functions to the satisfaction of some and the dissatisfaction of others. There are members of whom we may say what Samuel Butler writes of Christine in *The Way of All Flesh*. She "hated changes of all sorts no less cordially than her husband. She and Theobald had nearly everything in this world they could wish for; why, then, should people desire to introduce all sorts of changes

of which no one could foresee the end?" Those who are discontented for one reason or another, or for no reason, desire a change in the order. They may desire a more tightly knit or a looser organization than the existing one; more imperialism or more parochial freedom. When the centripetal forces are not strong enough to outweigh the centrifugal, the society disintegrates; in the reverse situation, it integrates.

The transition from one stage to another may take place by agreement or violence. When the contented are convinced that the would-be reformers will gain their ends and the reformers have some doubts as to their victory, they are likely to come to some agreement; when each party is convinced that it is the stronger, they come to blows.

The order at any moment is a compromise between those desiring greater and better—that is, more complete—organization and the proponents of less organization and more freedom for the members. War is the revolt of the discontented against an order they consider unsatisfactory; it can always be avoided by reform. A constitution or a treaty is an attempt to establish an order satisfactory for both parties or an order which the stronger can maintain by its power.

Within a state, groups compete for power—for economic, ideological, even spiritual ends. There are dominant and subordinate groups. One may have dominance in the political sphere, another in the economic, and a third in the religious. The competition between each set of dominants and its subordinates and among the several dominants in various realms goes on without pause: political leaders striving to extend their power into economic life; economic leaders, to invade the sphere of politics; religious leaders pressing upon or even controlling matters of politics and economics; and so forth.

Each group uses similar weapons to further its ends: persuasion, intimidation and bribery. One fine day naked force gets its cue, and there is civil war. As I have remarked, the resort to violence cannot be explained merely by saying that the rebels are bad boys.¹ There may be uprisings of subordinate groups prompted by economic distress, as of serfs against landlords or workers against employers; even in such cases the economic issues only make the subordinates more receptive to some leader who promises a better existence through change. Grievances against social institutions (such as the exclusive domination of a privileged class) may make subordinate minorities receptive to a call

¹ Beard, *The Devil Theory of War*, pp. 18 ff.

to arms. In the great revolutions all the discontented, whether economically, socially, or politically cramped, band together under the leadership of one group against the common oppressor.

And even this is not the complete explanation. It took hunger *and* Mohammed together to launch the Arabs on their conquests, and the conquests succeeded because the invaded countries had for one reason or another lost their group coherence. The same is true of vertical invasions. The unrest, the leader, and conditions ripe for overturning the existing order—all three are necessary.

One symptom of the prerevolutionary stage is a malaise in one or more groups within a state, attributed, whether justifiably or not, to the behavior of the dominant group. Other symptoms are the appearance of a leader offering an idea for the relief of the malaise, once the oppressors are ousted, the hypnotic effect of the idea upon the disturbed groups, and, finally, the reluctance or incapacity of the oppressors adequately to relieve a serious malaise, and so preserve their order.²

Many who join the revolutionaries of a given period or country are men who because of personal characteristics have been failures under the established regime. During the bolshevist revolution in Hungary, we were struck by the astonishing number of leading bolshevists with physical defects. The discontented, whatever their grievance, join those who revolt against the established order. Even discontent cannot always be traced to well-defined causes. Hate often survives its source.

Revolutions within states may have a specific object—such as a change of leadership. Dominants may revolt against their primus, as in France when the Bourbons were deposed and the Orleans put in their place, and in Serbia when Obrenović was murdered and Kara-georgevič became king. In other revolutions a subordinate class revolts against the dominant class; the aim is then to change the structure of the society. The first kind of revolution is the less bloody, but there are many gradations between the two. There is no doubt that every revolution could be avoided, in the literal sense, by relieving the malaise of the discontented or handling the situation so as to make an adequate compromise; in one instance slow changes may effect a shift for which agony and blood is required in another. Thus, a landed aristocracy originally ruled both England and France. In both countries, successively, it was exchanged for the middle class; we ourselves are


² Pettee, pp. 30 ff.; Brinton, p. 38.

likewise, perhaps, on the verge of a change from bourgeois rule to proletarian. The nuclear change which caused a revolution in France was in England the end-product of evolution.

Hierarchies of states, like states themselves, are organized according to dominant-subordinate relations within them, and war is the rebellion of a subordinate state. Like revolution within a state, it occurs when a marked malaise exists and a leader promises to relieve it. Also, like revolution, war is undertaken only when the dominants are thought to be weak and unable or unwilling to protect the order, in other words, when the chances of success seem good. For example, discontent in the Balkan peninsula, together with the conviction that Turkey was tottering, caused the Balkan wars of the early twentieth century. Discontent with the world order created after Bosnia and Herzegovina had been annexed to Austria-Hungary, coupled with the conviction that the Monarchy was about to fall, set off the first World War.

Wars are not simply the creations of evil personalities, of anti-social minorities. War, like revolution, is a tool in the hands of the discontented to change the order or the body social in which they live. It may be a vertical invasion aiming at nuclear changes—a way to unite several bodies into one or one into several. The Kellogg-Briand Pact forbidding war was futile; it reminds one of Seranissimus, the local lord of a small German state, who boasted in 1848 that he would disaccustom his subjects to making revolutions. Fear of punishment does not deter the discontented from revolting if they are convinced that the dominants cannot or will not fight. Nor can it be said that all these various kinds of revolt and aggression are unjust. Decades (sometimes centuries) will make a glorious revolution out of a nefarious conspiracy—the daring deed of human genius, out of aggression. England in Elizabethan days was oppressed by Spain. Full of energy, she revolted against Spanish domination. Trevelyan writes:

In one sense England was the aggressor. But if England had not taken the aggressive she would have been forced to accept exclusion from the trade of every continent save Europe, to abandon her maritime and colonial ambitions, and to bow her neck to reconquest by Spain and Rome as soon as the resistance of Holland collapsed. A world of sheer violence, in which peaceful Englishmen were liable to be imprisoned or put to death in any Spanish possession, the world of the Inquisition and the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, of Alva's appalling devilries in the Netherlands, and the



Pope's deposition of Elizabeth which Catholic Europe was preparing to enforce, left no place for twentieth-century standards of international conduct.³

A comment similar to that of Trevelyan could be made about the wars of France against the Hapsburgs. The map on this page shows divided France enclosed by the Hapsburg empire on land and in the Mediterranean. The better integrated France was the better she could unite with internal and external enemies of the Hapsburgs and break up their empire. Protestants and peasants from within, France, England, Sweden from without, after several wars, changed the old order. United France overexpanded, and Napoleon's Empire (see the map on page 123) shows the French order and its enemies. In final analysis

³ Trevelyan, *History of England*, pp. 350-51.

organisms fight to liberate themselves from another's pincers as Rome fought Carthage (see map facing page 296).

Is it certain, however, that when the history of the twentieth century is written by another Trevelyan he will agree that all the wars this century has suffered so far and will, perhaps, suffer, were caused by unjustified aggression, not justifiable revolts against an unjust order?

When, by the co-operation of heterogeneous elements at home and neighbors without, a dominant state is weakened, the time is ripe for aggression. But sick men have friends who are more or less interested in keeping them alive, or at least in preventing their land and inhabitants from being used to the advantage of their competitors.

Similar motives may be discovered among the revolts called war: the desire of a state to shift leaders or to become a leader in an existing hierarchy or balance of power. Serbians went to war to free themselves from Austria, and they might have become subjects of Russia had the bolshevist revolution not intervened. As the Karageorgević were too weak to try to rule Austria-Hungary, they attempted to put Moscow in the place of Vienna. There are also wars to change the order of rank among states, to make subordinates into dominants, and revolts of a single growing subordinate against a weakening primus in the hope of replacing it and organizing a new order. Revolution—civil or external wars—cannot be explained merely as wicked individual conspiracies (draped in dark and esoteric mystery) to seize office and power.

There is little doubt that theoretically every revolution or war can be avoided. Spain could have made concessions to Elizabethan England; she could have tolerated another creed; she could have granted free trade and part of the New World to England. England might have agreed to accept less than she actually obtained by centuries of warfare. Reforms could satisfy the discontented, thus averting armed conflict.

As organisms and orders differ in structure, the specific character of an order determines whether revolt against it will be a daily or an exceptional event, involving few or all members of the organism. The less institutionalized and the more dependent on the person of the ruler an order is—the more its activities are directed by competition rather than co-operation—the more often revolt will occur. The order of tribal or feudal states depends on the person of the overlord,

and wars among feudal lords, as among national states, are, speaking relatively, of daily occurrence. Even the decaying authority of a well-institutionalized Rechtsstaat has more prestige than a strong overlord. Again, the more coherent the body of an organism is, the more seldom revolts will occur, all its members being equally involved and bound to be affected by the revolt of any one party. There are no neutrals in revolutions within a complex state.

When the goal of war is well defined (as in the wars of Bismarck against Schleswig-Holstein), or when war is brought on by minor powers, the conflict may be localized. But wars against the balance within a hierarchy, or even among hierarchies, are more general revolutions. To illustrate my point I shall discuss the events leading to World War I, which began with the revolt of Serbia, a small power, against its dominant neighbor Austria-Hungary, but developed into a general conflagration when Germany revolted against Britain.

During the forty years of peace following the Vienna Congress, in 1815, Britain was paramount, and Russia was her rival. When they agreed on a policy, as Czar Nicholas I said, no power could frustrate it. Often they disagreed. The British diplomat Sidney Herbert wrote of this period:

"Her [Russia] relations with Circassia, Georgia, Persia are the same as ours with Rangoon, Scinde, the Sikhs and Oudh. . . . The public here are right in thinking of Russian aggression, but wrong in attributing it to a wonderful foresight, skill and design. The Russians are just as great fools as other people; but they encroach as we encroach, in India, Africa, and everywhere—because we can't help it."⁴

Between these two encroaching powers war was always possible.

The Crimean war, fought in 1854–56 on behalf of Turkey against Russia, was the first alliance of the paramount power, Britain, with the second power on the Continent, France, against her rival, Russia. The war, and later the forced revision of the St. Stefano Treaty between Turkey and Russia at Berlin, proved that Britain, with the help of the smaller states of Europe, could keep Russia's ambitions within bounds. The end of the Crimean War marked the exit of Russia for a prolonged period as ruler of the Continent. During the years after the Treaty of Paris, which closed the conflict, Prussia's Germany and the Italy of Savoy were built up with Britain's permission, and her old

⁴ Sidney Herbert, quoted in *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, 359.

ally, Austria, and her new one, France, lost much of their night. A new power situation was evolving in Europe, which ten or fifteen years later Britain could balance by allying herself with Russia and France against the first Continental power, Germany.

Germany was tolerated with the understanding that she would not threaten British security and would continue to accept the protection of the British navy and not build one of her own. Germany's war against England, as we shall see, was a revolution against the *Pax Britannica*, an attempt to eliminate British dominion and establish a German one.

The prelude to this revolution was another revolt, that of Serbia against Austria-Hungary. The famous "pig war" is the story of this rebellion, again of one state against another which dominated it economically. The two revolts brought on the first World War, which was, in turn, again a major fight for a new order of rank among the powers, ending in a peace powerless either to re-establish the old or to build up a new order.

To gain a preliminary insight into the manner in which the broader type of conflict is precipitated, a study of this incident will repay us. In 1877 Turkey had once more been operated upon by Russia. After a protracted war the peace terms were settled at St. Stefano. But the "sick man" had been carved into too many pieces; most of his European empire had been converted into new states, protégés of Russia. The latter had not claimed the Straits or Constantinople, and the treaty left them with Turkey. But since Russia would be in control of the "Greater Bulgaria" created by the settlement and would consequently have the Straits within her grasp, it seemed to the British that she had virtually reached the Aegean Sea and thus the Mediterranean. To placate Austria, Russia had not insisted on giving more territory to Serbia and Montenegro, not even on the union of the two southern Slav states, and she left Bosnia and Herzegovina with Turkey. The treaty also provided that local autonomy was to be granted, but details were to be worked out jointly with Austria.⁵

The Vienna Foreign Office, however, considered the wedge held by Turkey between the two southern Slav states too narrow. It feared that Austria's interests would be jeopardized by proximity to self-governing Slavs whose mating songs might even attract her own Slavs. Britain under Disraeli and Austria under Andrassy were in accord;

⁵ Medlicott, pp. 10 ff.; Monypenny and Buckle, II, 873 ff., 1182 ff.; Lewin, pp. 56 ff.

Bismarck joined them for Germany, and at the Berlin Congress, in 1878, they forced Russia to modify the St. Stefano Treaty to her disadvantage. The spoils of the Russian victory were equitably divided among the Great Powers.

"Greater Bulgaria," the realm of Boris in the ninth century, was not restored, and Russia did not reach the Aegean Sea by means of her straw man. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sandjak of Novi Bazar (the wedge between Serbia and Montenegro—between Serbia and the Austrian Adriatic coast of Dalmatia) were to be occupied and administered by Austria. Montenegro received notable additions to her territory, though considerably less than she would have gained had the treaty stood. She got a few miles of coast line on the Adriatic, but could use it only under Austrian supervision.⁶ Serbia was somewhat larger, but was encircled by Austria; not with scientific German thoroughness, but with easygoing *Schlamperei*, for though the roads to the Adriatic through Dalmatia and Montenegro were blocked, the way to Bulgaria and the Vardar valley remained open.

By controlling the main outlets from Serbia, Austria-Hungary dominated the economic life of that country: she bought 70, perhaps even 80, percent of all Serbian exports and sold to Serbia more than 90 percent of the latter's imports. Serbia's chief exports were cattle and pigs. She thus competed with Hungary, Austria's partner in the Monarchy, reducing the price of meat in the markets of industrial Austria. Hungary, of course, did her utmost to induce Austria to cut down her imports of Serbian cattle and pigs.

In 1903 the conservative pro-Austrian Alexander, the Obrenović king (the Serbian Orleans) and his queen were assassinated by the terroristic Black Hand, one of Serbia's basic institutions. The new king, Peter, of the Karageorgević line⁷—the Bourbon family, as it were—promptly instituted an anti-Austrian policy. Two years later, while an agreement was under negotiation with Austria, newspapers announced that Bulgaria and Serbia had concluded a customs union, already sanctioned by the Sobranje, Bulgaria's legislature, and only awaiting the vote of the Skuptchina in Belgrade.

A customs union between the two agricultural countries producing and exporting the same kind of goods smelled of a political move against Austria; it was certainly not an economic solution of the ex-

⁶ Seton-Watson, *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans*, pp. 56, 95-234.

⁷ Hayes, *A Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe*, II, 498.

port problem. The London *Economist*, in an article from Vienna dated January 23, 1906, reported "consternation" on all sides that these Balkan countries had surreptitiously agreed to what could only be regarded as a violation of the Treaty of Berlin, which stipulated identical duties for all countries. A somewhat similar situation will be remembered, when, in 1931, Austria and Germany announced that a tentative agreement for a customs union had been reached. The Allied and Associated Powers protested, realizing that an economic union, a new Prussian *Zollverein*, was designed to prepare the way for political union, the feared and opposed *Anschluss*. They declared that such an agreement was in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of St. Germain, and the Geneva Protocol of 1922. The World Court at the Hague held the treaty to be a violation of the Geneva Protocol I of 1922, and the customs union was prohibited.⁸

Such quasi-legal proceedings were not needed in 1906 to scotch the Bulgar-Serbian customs union. On January 27 the London *Economist* wrote: "Yesterday the Hungarian frontier was, by consent of the Austrian and Hungarian Governments, closed against Servian livestock. Not only cattle and pigs are excluded from import to Austria-Hungary, but also Servian meat of all kinds." In Serbia "20,000 pigs are kept in readiness for export." The road through the Vardar valley, over which Serbian meat was later exported to more distant countries, could not then be used, since no facilities were available for slaughtering and preserving.

A malaise was thus created in Serbia which could be blamed on Austria and Hungary. The only consolation the Belgrade government could give its citizens was that the "pig war" could not last long, that famine would break out in Vienna, and that Viennese workmen would riot as meat prices rose.⁹

But the so-called "cattle convention" of 1894 between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, by which Serbian cattle were admitted if Serbian veterinarians vouched for their health, was annulled. Thereafter Serbian cattle or pigs could be admitted to Austria or Hungary only if examined and certified by Austrian or Hungarian veterinarians, a stipulation which rendered the trade difficult and finally stopped it. Serbia ultimately obtained loans in France and in England, built slaughter houses, and exported meat by way of the Vardar valley. But the

⁸ Permanent Court of International Justice, The Hague, *Arrêts, ordonnances et avis consultatifs* No. 41, Opinion, Sept. 5, 1931 (A. W. Sischoff, Lyde, 1931).

⁹ *Economist*, Jan. 27, March 10, 1906.

"pig war" had been a great object lesson, emphasizing the old experience that an open road to the Adriatic was vital for Serbia's future progress and prosperity.¹⁰

In 1908, when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and refused to grant Serbia free access to the Adriatic, Milanović, a Serbian minister then on a propaganda tour in England, had a long conversation with Sir Edward Grey and Sir Charles Harding. He threatened that if Austria refused compensation, especially free access to the sea, Serbia would devote her energies to starting a war at a favorable moment, since she was sure she could not gain her ends by peaceful means.¹¹ In 1914 the favorable moment arrived.

It is interesting to note the sequel. The Paris treaties of 1918 re-established Czar Dushan's "empire," opening a way for Serbian cattle and pigs. Serbia's need had been filled. But Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Austria were cut off from the sea. The export and import routes of the northern Slavs and the Magyars were now controlled by the Germans. One is reminded of the Roman festival of the Saturnalia, at which master and servant exchanged places, the masters waiting on their servants, and the latter ordering their masters about.

To Americans the moral must be obvious. Cutting the webs which connect and interconnect states, stopping the flow of energy and exchange, causes superfluity in some places and want in others. The need for an open road, therefore, is the need for free circulation, which, according to the evidence of the centuries, is best secured when a state is master of its trade routes. Every state is fearful that its neighbor may gain control over such avenues; that it may close them or permit their use only under conditions advantageous to itself. The response to the malaise created by British discriminatory regulations against early American commerce was embodied in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States: "Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." It was a weapon in America's struggle for commercial independence. And was not the War of 1812 fought to clear the routes to and from the United States which had been choked off by British orders in Council? ¹²

¹⁰ Austro-Servian Dispute, *Round Table*, IV, 659 ff.

¹¹ Lee, II, 643.

¹² C. A. Beard and M. R. Beard, I, 393: "If in form the war on England was declared for commercial motives, it was in reality conceived primarily in the interest of agriculture. . . . Agriculture just as shipping suffered from British depredations . . ."

After the Franco-Prussian War the Treaty of Frankfurt, intended to keep France down for a long time, proved too lenient. She recovered more quickly from the disaster of 1870-71 than had been expected, and Bismarck looked for an opportunity to weaken her. His attitude was rather like that of Cato when he held up before the Roman Senate a bunch of grapes from Carthage as evidence of her recovery and, with the directness of a less hypocritical man, declared that a country able to grow such fruit so soon after a disastrous defeat ought to be destroyed.

But when, in 1875, Bismarck spoke his *ceterum censeo* against France, the other great European powers prevented an attack on her. Bismarck then modified his policy, stimulating the French to enlarge their possessions on the other side of the Mediterranean, in North Africa. Let France establish an empire in Africa which would compensate her for her losses in Europe, and let this empire be extended to the borders of the British colonies; if England and France had common frontiers in Africa, an enmity might develop between them which would relieve Germany of French pressure.¹³

In British foreign policy Egypt has an importance on the Mediterranean similar to that of Belgium on the North Sea. Belgium is on the road from London to the Continent; Egypt, on the road to India. Egypt might be independent, she might be neutral, but she must always be Britain's friend—must never be ruled or dominated by another great power or any power having interests divergent from Britain's. Because of her geographical situation, Egypt is strategically dependent on several glacis; whoever rules Palestine and the Sudan, for instance, can influence Egyptian policy. The independence of Egypt also means the independence of the glacis. France, on any one of the glacis influencing Egypt, was a potential enemy of Britain and thus a help to Germany, and to clear the way for French adventures, afford an outlet for her excess energy, and awaken latent Anglophobia in that country was now the best protection for Germany. Bismarck's foreign policy during these years was based on making Britain amenable to an understanding with Germany—indeed, on insuring her silent partnership in the Triple Alliance. In addition, it was designed to force Britain's hand in aid of his own colonial policy.¹⁴

¹³ Mitchell, p. 50; *ibid.*, p. 114; also to separate Italy from France, *Cambridge Modern History*, XII, 239.

¹⁴ Valentin, "Y-a-t-il des lois dans la politique extérieure de Bismarck," *Revue Historique*, CLXXVIII (July-Dec., 1936), 1 ff.; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, III, 257.

The economic situation—nay, I may say the economic character—of Germany changed utterly between 1870 and 1895. During this quarter century two and one half million Germans emigrated. At the peak, between 1881 and 1885, about one million left the country in four years. From 1895 to 1914 the figure dropped to practically zero, immigrants about equaling emigrants.¹⁵ The earlier wholesale emigration had been evidence of a disparity between land and population; evidence that the "Athenian problem" of the days of Pericles had descended upon German statesmen.

The historian Bury enumerates three ways in which the problems of overpopulation among the barbarians of ancient times might have been solved: (a) clearing land for agriculture, (b) better methods of farming, and (c) war—that is, appropriation of land farmed by others. The barbarians' own solution was war; that actually adopted by Pericles was the more rational course of better farming methods, colonization, and industrialization.¹⁶

The new German Empire followed the example of Pericles and Athens. Germany's population increased 50 percent from 1878 to 1912, to the enormous figure of sixty-five million, yet did not suffer from unemployment or lack of nourishment. The explanation was an increase in crops from 1878 to World War I so enormous that it not only provided the rapidly growing population with the same per capita quota as the former population had, but even raised the average per capita by one sixth.¹⁷

Concurrently Germany was industrialized. In 1879 high protective duties were imposed to foster and shelter new industries. The usual symptoms of industrialization appeared. A strong drift set in from rural to urban areas. Imports, as well as exports, increased. With the object of gaining new markets, both to procure raw materials and to sell finished goods, Germany began to acquire overseas possessions and "spheres of influence."

The more Germany . . . was obliged to depend on exporting her industrial products, the more zealously she had to strive either to maintain the open door in as many countries as possible beyond the seas, or else, by securing colonies, leases, spheres of influence, or coaling stations, to augment her share in the economic advantages to result from opening up re-

¹⁵ Burgdörfer, p. 88; *Round Table*, III (1913), 395.

¹⁶ Bury, *The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians*, p. 7.

¹⁷ D. Gunther, *Die Übervölkerungs und Wohlfandtheorie im Spiegel der deutschen Bevölkerungsbewegung 1840-1933*, Berlin, 1936.

moter regions, if she was to hold her own among the other far more powerful countries of the world.¹⁸

In 1895, the year in which emigration practically stopped, Germany's foreign trade, exports and imports combined, had risen to 7.5 billion mark from about 3.5 billion in 1880, in 1913 it reached a peak of 21 billion mark.

Germany's response to the pressure of overpopulation, the tilling of more land and the application of more scientific methods, solved her problem for the time being, emigration ceased, and there was no unemployment. But as the population kept on increasing, though after 1910 at a somewhat lower rate, the pressure for more production, new markets, and new industries actively continued and created fear for the future, a certain malaise.

In 1914 the financial position of Germany was not as favorable as was her trading. She was a debtor state, and by that time she had exhausted her credits in foreign countries. Even then German banks used foreign short-term loans for long-term investments; by their investments they immobilized the cash they owed to others. At the time of the diplomatic tension over Morocco, culminating in the Algeciras Conference, it was rumored that Germany's fighting spirit had been cooled by the threat of the big Paris and London banks to call their short-term loans; since the money for payment was not available, the Berlin banks were faced with bankruptcy—for these and other reasons the Morocco affair was settled peacefully. The truth of this story I cannot vouch for; at any rate, in the years immediately preceding 1914 Germany's balance of payments showed a considerable surplus in her favor; the payments received for goods exported, for services rendered foreigners, and for interest, exceeded the sums she paid for imports, services received, and interest on money lent her. The annual surplus was available in gold, which she could import and use to pay off foreign loans or for investments in foreign countries. In 1913 Germany had ample reserves of gold and several billions invested abroad.

What was England's economic situation during the same period? A huge workshop and office, she exported goods throughout the world and rendered services to every country; she insured foreign merchandise against all risks, forwarded goods of whatever origin in her merchantmen sailing the seven seas, put the idle money of other coun-

¹⁸ *Cambridge Modern History*, XII, 170; Fuller, pp. 303 ff.

tries to work at home or lent it to still others. But her own agriculture could supply only one tenth of her needs; half the iron ore she used, all other ores, and all the raw materials consumed by her textile industries had to be brought in ships from more or less distant lands.¹⁹

England's economic situation is revealed in her balance of payments. Between 1900 and 1913 the annual surplus doubled. The full implication of these 200 million pounds sterling, which she could either import in gold or convert into foreign investments, becomes clear when we realize that this credit remained after she had paid for all her needed imports of foodstuffs and raw materials and had paid for all services rendered her by foreigners.²⁰

England always invested her credit balances abroad. The balance of payments clearly demonstrates that in the period which saw a continuous increase in English exports, the services England rendered as banker, underwriter, and forwarding agent to the world were also steadily mounting. In *The British Common People, 1784-1939*, G. D. H. Cole states that between 1870 and 1900, while money wages rose 5 percent, real wages rose from 35 to 40 percent as commodity prices declined. In the decade 1900-10 real wages declined 4 percent. "In one sense, the years of the twentieth century which preceded the outbreak of the Great War were for Great Britain a period of remarkable progress and prosperity. Despite the rapid growth of industrial production in other countries, British exports were increasing at a tremendous pace."²¹

Employment followed the trend of business cycles: unemployment prevailed during depressions, and rising employment during upswings. Thus, in the crisis years of 1879 and 1886, 12 percent of all registered workers were unemployed, but in 1893 only 8 percent, and in the most prosperous years, 1882, 1889, 1890, and 1913, less than 2 percent. Before World War I chronic unemployment was unknown in England. Everybody—not only the worker but also the professional man and the capitalist—all enjoyed increasing incomes, with a single exception. The exception was the English farmer, who passed through a period of steady decline. However, after 1900 his situation also improved.

No doubt, if you compared the figures of English economy with those of Germany and the United States, you would find that the in-

¹⁹ A. E. Kahn, *Great Britain in the World Economy*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1946, pp. 84 ff.; Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century and After*, p. 434.

²⁰ Kahn, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

²¹ Page 443.

crease and improvement in Germany and in the United States was considerably greater than in England.

In many ways British industry was far more solidly based than German. It owed nothing to tariffs or government subsidies; the firms engaged in it stood on their own feet. The German economic structure included not a few imposing features, which existed for military or political reasons, and could not be justified on economic grounds. But in Britain, enterprises had to pass the test of paying. The national standpoints were different, and the British one, being purely economic, gave on that side better results.²²

R. C. K. Ensor cites the case of steel as an example. German steel production expanded enormously; in 1900 it was double that of the British.

But what did the Germans do with their steel? They sold vast quantities to Great Britain at lower prices than they charged at home. Using it to build ships and construct machinery, the British could therefore easily compete with Germany in the world market.

It is more remunerative to build the world's ships than to smelt the steel for them, especially if you are to sell the steel below cost price. On the economic side Britain had the best of the bargain. The compensation to Germany was on the military side. The gigantic steel industry, which she thus uneconomically built up, proved during 1914-1918 a preponderant factor in her war-strength. On the other hand, years of war passed before England could develop a steel output adequate to her fighting needs.²³

One can hardly help recalling the various arrangements concluded before the war between German and American industrialists for regulating the production and distribution of certain commodities, such as light metals and chemicals, on a world basis. The device was used by Germany to develop her own mass production and, by delivering the products cheaply to other countries, to discourage them from developing adequate facilities of their own. Here again Germany sought to influence the outcome of a war. By her managed economy she hindered the process leading to self-sufficiency in other countries.

Here we see the great ideological difference between the two countries: England, the democratic free trader, basing her economy on economic considerations alone, producing the goods she could make more cheaply and better than others; Germany, ruled by an oligarchy and surrounded by a tariff wall, her economic policy requiring the

²² Ensor, p. 504.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 504-5.

co-operation of banking and industry in following the lead and instructions of the government.

One of the great economic remedies against unemployment after the first World War was, as is well known, public works. The industrialization of Germany, too, was intended in part to give employment. When she became overpopulated, her first response was emigration; her next, improved farming methods, increase in her arable land, and industrialization. Was there not an interrelation between this artificial industrialization—the deliberate production of goods which can be bought more cheaply from other countries—and the desire to keep her people at home, to stop emigration? It was argued that emigration was a social evil to be combated. Look into the writings of German economists in the years when the German emigration reached its peak; consider the propaganda against it at that time, and the numerous measures taken in that country (and in other countries in similar situations) to impede it, and you will understand more clearly the artificial industrialization of Germany, the huge “army investment” program. Germany put a stop to emigration in order to maintain a big army and to get cheap labor for her industries.

When efforts to raise the birth rate as well as to stop emigration are accompanied by complaints of overpopulation, we know perforce that the motive is a desire for power and a greater army. This contradiction was already evident in Wilhelmian Germany. A solution was sought in the acquisition of colonies—lands where the immigrants remained subject to German military service. In short, before the first World War Germany’s reaction to overpopulation, further swollen by her emigration policy, was to feed her industry on armament production and demand colonies.

This digression from the history of the Anglo-German struggle has been made in order to stress the following point. Pressure, whether from overpopulation, maldistribution of wealth, lack of opportunities for better earnings, or political oppression, causes a tendency to emigration. This may be obstructed or promoted by the home government. Other countries, underpopulated, may facilitate, or in order to protect their own labor market or for other reasons, may restrict or bar immigration. Domestic factors in the country of the emigrant and in the country of the prospective immigrant alike regulate migration.

Notwithstanding economic progress and the rise in the standards of living, malaise was growing in England and in Germany. In Eng-

land strikes, the struggle for and against Irish Home Rule, the suffragette movement; in Germany financial crises, the advance of the Socialist party, and the growing power of the military over the civilian politicians; in the Balkans the war of those countries against Turkey and then of Serbia against Bulgaria—all these things created uncertainty and unrest throughout Europe.

Both Germany and England needed foreign trade and income from services rendered to foreigners. As early as the Bismarck regime, when the first German colonies were acquired, disputes had arisen between the two countries: there was friction over Jamaica and Zanzibar. But in 1890, soon after Bismarck left the Chancellery, the conflicts were settled by an agreement which turned Heligoland, the small island at Germany's doorstep owned by England, over to Germany.

The splendid isolation championed by Gladstone was still the policy of England at the end of the nineteenth century. But events in China and on the borders of Egypt and more trouble and finally war in South Africa impressed on her statesmen the fact that she needed an ally. At the same time, the Russian occupation of Port Arthur and trouble in the Egyptian Sudan, when Captain Marchand hoisted the tricolor at Fashoda, strained her relations with both Russia and France. The one practicable alliance was therefore with Germany.

Two years after the Kruger cable, Joseph Chamberlain, the radical who had campaigned in favor of an imperial customs union, proposed a deal with Germany and was ready to pay for an alliance. Even before negotiations were really opened England made an advance agreement concerning Samoa—a new colonial concession. In a speech at Leicester in 1898 Chamberlain spoke eloquently of the qualities of the German people, coming as they did from the same stock as the English, and in warm terms of America, expressing the hope that a new Triple Alliance between the United States,²⁴ Great Britain, and Germany would secure the peace of the world.

Salisbury, then prime minister, replied to Chamberlain's report on his negotiations, "I quite agree with you that under the present situation a closer relation with Germany would be very desirable; but can we get it?"²⁵ Germany negotiated, but without any real desire to conclude an alliance. Her primary object was to obtain during the negotiations something on account—more colonial concessions—and to soothe England into the illusion that she intended her no harm.

²⁴ Seymour, p. 138; Meinecke, p. 63.

²⁵ Garvin, III, 279.

The tone of Chancellor von Bulow's reply to Chamberlain in the German parliament was unfriendly:

We are entirely prepared to live in peace with that power [England] on the basis of complete reciprocity and mutual consideration, but it is exactly because our international situation is now favorable that we must make use of it to make ourselves secure for the future; for without might, without a strong army, without a strong navy, we cannot become a world power. In the coming century the German nation will be either hammer or anvil.²⁶

At the same time, Kaiser Wilhelm thought it important to keep official sentiment in England favorable to Germany, "since a hopeful and friendly mind in England puts a new card in our hands." Count Hatzfeld, German ambassador to Great Britain, had the difficult task of stalling off a formal alliance, yet keeping up the appearance of a cordial desire for it on the part of his home government.²⁷

There is no more stringent indictment of Germany's policy, no stronger evidence that she did not at that time want an alliance with England, than the famous Willy-Nicky letters in which the German Emperor wrote to the Czar of all the Russians in strict confidence that England had proposed an alliance, offering especially good terms, but that he did not wish to make such an agreement without giving his friend an opportunity to offer better terms. Plainly the idea was to heighten the tension between England and Russia, thus putting neutral Germany in a still firmer position, with greater power. This maneuver did not entice the Czar into raising the ante, however.²⁸ Negotiations with England were continued, but finally fell through, and German policy took a tack which aimed to bring England to terms by diplomatic strategy. All preparations for an assault on England were to be carried out on the lines already devised by Napoleon. Germany wanted a fleet strong enough to convert the sea war as quickly as possible into a land war and to seek a decision where all the nerves of the world empire meet, in London.

As early as 1797, when a French invasion of England was out of the question, Napoleon had proposed to the Directory that the way to oust the English from India was to launch an attack from Egypt;

²⁶ *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, III, 278.

²⁷ Garvin, III, 270.

²⁸ *Letters from the Kaiser to the Czar; copied and brought from Russia by J. Don Levine*, New York, Stokes, 1920, pp. 47-50.

to gain India, Egypt must be occupied. This was actually attempted. But Nelson's victory in the Bay of Aboukir—"that miserable hole which lay between me and my destiny," as Napoleon called it—ruined the project.²⁹ Later, without an adequate navy, first in accord with Russia and then in opposition to her, Napoleon tried to open a road to India via the Continent. His goal in the war against Russia in 1812 was to gain possession of that road. Again he was thwarted. The plan bogged down in Russia's resistance and the growing spirit of revolt on the Continent. To build and control a railway line from Berlin to Bagdad, thereby threatening England's communication with India, was the German version of Napoleon's plans.

I have noted how memories of Alexander's mastery over the Mediterranean through Greece and the Greek Islands and of Hannibal's invasion of the Italian peninsula always remained alive in Rome, and that they gave rise to new fear when Philip of Macedon and the Seleucids of Syria tried to imitate Alexander. Along similar lines the memory of Napoleon, the Alexander of modern times, created fear in England that any power ambitious to rule Europe would try first to gain a hold on Turkey. In robust England this fear aroused strong reactions.

Before we look into these threats and the reactions to them in somewhat more detail we must get a proper perspective for the situation of the moment. The failure to come to an agreement with Germany forced England's hand. Germany held stubbornly to the belief that Britain would never pay the price demanded for any arrangement with France and Russia, and she herself could accordingly force Britain to accept any conditions she laid down. When France became more receptive to a pro-English policy, after the defeat of her Russian ally in the Far East, Britain came to an Entente Cordiale with that country in 1904, and with Russia in 1907.³⁰

In 1898 Germany had begun to build a strong navy. A statute of 1900 doubling the naval program was followed by supplementary appropriations. The fleet was built to the tune of the German jingoists, led by the Kaiser. The refrain was the need for a fleet so great that any power challenging it would risk its proud claim to supremacy. "We must take into our hands the trident. I am the admiral of the Atlantic Ocean; you the admiral of the Pacific," said Willy to Nicky.³¹

²⁹ Bonaparte's Report of Feb. 23, 1798, referred to in *Cambridge Modern History*, VIII, 596; *ibid.*, p. 604; Rose, p. 110. ³⁰ Fay, I, 152 ff., 214 ff. ³¹ Hamman, 124 ff.

England felt that her naval supremacy was endangered and that her fleet must be increased; that for each keel laid in Germany she must lay two. This policy ran squarely up against the new social program initiated by Lloyd George, whose party demanded money for social reforms, such as old-age insurance, and resented any expenditure on nonsocial services. But the opposition to the big navy faction was broken.

In a budget debate in the House of Commons in 1908 Mr. Balfour asserted not only that Germany's ship-building capacity was equal to England's but also that the Krupp works were equipped, partly through machinery supplied by Great Britain, to construct guns as well as their mounting equipment for the German navy. In short, the argument ran, Germany was building men-of-war even faster than scheduled. Prime Minister Asquith concurred with Balfour's statement that Germany was building ships faster than England and as well, if not better, though the two speakers differed somewhat in their estimates of her rate of building. This was a minor detail in the sensation created. Said the *Saturday Review*, reporting the speeches:

When Mr. Asquith's speech was delivered, said Mr. Dillon, the House was crowded. When the Prime Minister sat down the Speaker looked at the House and the House looked at the Speaker, and for three or four minutes no one rose. That means that the speech of the Prime Minister created a panic in this House as it has created a panic in the country.

Germany's answer to the "naval scare" as this panic was dubbed in England was to make it known through Admiral Tirpitz that by 1912 Germany would have only thirteen dreadnaughts, not Asquith's count of seventeen, let alone Balfour's twenty. Nevertheless, the scare had its effect: it convinced public opinion in England that her naval supremacy was in jeopardy and that German industry was the culprit—that Germany had the capacity to build a great fleet and was building it in a shorter time than stipulated in her statutory program.⁸²

Added to this competition in shipbuilding was Germany's colonial policy. She tried to acquire from Portugal the colony at Delagoa Bay off southeast Africa, also a Chinese port and a naval base on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. Casting about for bases for the navy she was constructing, she selected them with an eye to threatening England.

Let us turn for the moment to Turkey, potential steppingstone for

⁸² *Saturday Review*, March 20, 1909, p. 356; *Quarterly Review*, 1909, pp. 550 ff.

Germany toward India. Even before Germany embarked on her large-navy program her policy concerning Turkey had changed. European statesmen kept trying to reform Turkey by long diplomatic notes. But from time to time the "sick man" of Europe rallied sufficiently to ward off reforms and used his waning powers to kill Christians in Macedonia and Armenia. After one of the Armenian massacres the powers agreed to insist that Turkey institute reforms and stop the periodic harrying of her Christian subjects. Germany refused to participate in this diplomatic action. She wooed Turkey during the Turkish-Greek war of 1897, and in 1898 the Emperor made a journey to Constantinople, Damascus and Jerusalem, delivering pro-Turk and pro-Moslem speeches.³³ This friendship was aimed at England, as was evident in the railroad projects that went by the name "Berlin-Bagdad." The line, so far as it traversed Europe, could be controlled by Germany only if she dominated Austria-Hungary and the Balkans; friendship with Turkey was useful only if backed by German overlordship up to the Turkish frontier.

England could stop the project by keeping her from a controlling influence over Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. The first step was to settle her differences with Russia, among which was the trouble over Persia. An agreement signed in 1907 divided that country into two spheres of influence, of which Russia got the northern or inland part. Her maneuvers for an outlet to the warm sea in the Far East had been thwarted by Japan and the new agreement now barred her from an alternative outlet in the Gulf of Persia; the one opening still left to her was in the Near East, in the Balkans. Constantinople and the Dardanelles were the sole remaining possibilities—the old dream, inherited from the Byzantine Empire, of raising the cross on the Hagia Sophia.³⁴

England's political moves thus forced Russia to oppose Germany's progress to the east. In 1908, when King Edward on his annual visit to Marienbad stopped at Ischl to call on Emperor Franz Joseph, there was a general impression that this was more than a friendly visit to an aged monarch on the eve of his diamond jubilee. The motive was thought to be the detachment of Austria-Hungary from Germany and solidification of the ring around the latter. English official and semi-official circles denied it, professing that the sole political reason for

³³ Laloy, p. 34; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, III, 271; Lewin, pp. 53 ff.

³⁴ Lee, II, 564; Trevelyan, *Grey of Fallodon*, p. 267.

the visit was to make the old emperor see that Germany must be reasonable and cut down her naval building program. But the "first gentleman of Europe" declined to intervene in the domestic affairs of Germany. From what he learned at Ischl, Edward gathered the impression that the independence of the Monarchy was already hardly more than nominal.³⁵

In the *Quarterly Review* André Chéradame wrote of the situation in Central Europe:

From the map entitled 'Slavs, Germans and Magyars in Austria-Hungary and the Balkan States,' we may observe that in Austria-Hungary the Germans number 11,740,000, the Magyars, 8,640,000; the Slavs 23,140,000. Now, even admitting, what is daily becoming less probable, that the Magyars make common cause with the Germans, still Germans and Magyars together amount to only 20,380,000, as against 23,140,000 Slavs. The Slav populations are increasing more rapidly than the Germans and the Magyars, and are, therefore, sure to outnumber the Germans and the Magyars to an ever-increasing extent.

Now, though some Austro-Hungarian Slavs are less advanced than the Germans in culture, and do not yet enjoy equal political rights with them, they have nevertheless entered upon their own evolution, which is distinctly marked.³⁶

In Austria-Hungary, therefore, against the dominant ethnic groups, Austrians and Hungarians, there are the great dominated populations originating from the Slavs, and the consciousness of their race and the desire of these nationalities to have the governing power, or at least a part of it within the monarchy, is increasing.

Thus England, in her endeavor to bar Germany's way toward the east, helped the Slav groups in the Hapsburg Monarchy to transform it from an Austro-Hungarian duo into a trio. "Give the Austrians, Hungarians and Slavs belief in France and England, get them to see the future importance of their political development, and that they may count upon Anglo-French sympathy equally with Russia's," and Germany's path would be closed.³⁷

Many other writers expressed the same idea. R. W. Seton-Watson, Henry Wickham Steed,³⁸ and others urged a policy whose essence

³⁵ Lee, II, 550, 649; Farrer, p. 119; Steed, p. 241.

³⁶ Oct., 1909, pp. 613-15.

³⁷ Chéradame, "The Strength and Weakness of the Triple Entente," *Quarterly Review*, CII (July, 1911), 262; *ibid.*, p. 615.

³⁸ Steed, p. 65.

was that the Monarchy must be preserved, but must be transformed from a state dominated by Germans into one dominated by Slavs. As late as 1907 Seton-Watson³⁹ contended that the Monarchy was an absolute necessity and that no Austro-Hungarian "problem" existed, but after the Ischl meeting he changed his mind, admitting that a unified south-Slav state might be the solution.⁴⁰

From Italy similar voices had been heard for years. "Geographical, ethnographical, historical and military reasons compel us," said Pellegrini, in *Verso la guerra*, "to be masters of the Trentino, Trieste and Istria, and also to enforce a renunciation by Austria of her aspirations in the Balkans."⁴¹ That and nothing else, he held, was the indispensable condition for an understanding with Austria. Albert Sorel had correctly judged the situation as early as 1902: "For a hundred years attempts have been made to solve the Eastern problem. On the day it is solved, Europe will realize that it must take up the problem of Austria next."⁴²

At the end of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth Germany was supreme on the Continent. Her power had evolved during the fifty years in which England lived in splendid isolation. The fruits of this evolution were only then ripening. Germany's standard of living, her income, and her wealth were rising, and her colonial empire was expanding. But she was dependent on foreign markets, access to which was controlled by her neighbors. Though open in time of peace, it might at any time be cut off by England.

Drowsing happily in the conviction that her navy had secured to her the sea lanes to world markets, England was rudely awakened by the German preparations.

In 1897 Canada granted a preferential rate of 33⅓ percent on all merchandise bought from England. Germany protested on the ground that this concession infringed the most-favored-nation clause of international trade treaties. She was clearly frightened, suddenly realizing that England might cease to be a free trade country and shut herself and her dominions and colonies behind trade barriers. The fear was intensified by the campaign led by Joseph Chamberlain at the turn

³⁹ Seton-Watson, *The Future of Austria-Hungary and the Attitude of the Great Powers*, p. 59.

⁴⁰ Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question*, p. 343: "Croato-Serb unity must and will come."

⁴¹ B. Pellegrini, *Verso la Guerra*, Rome, Voghera, 1906, quoted in *Quarterly Review*, CCXIV (1911), 156.

⁴² Quoted in Chéradame, p. 170.

of the century for an imperial customs union and colonial preferences. What would happen when German goods ran up against imperial customs barriers? Furthermore, did not an imperial customs union mean the consolidation of the Empire's armed forces? ⁴³

With the formation of England's Entente Cordiale, first with France and then with her ally, Russia, Germany felt imprisoned on the Continent. For a moment it looked—writes Oncken—as if Germany were to be exposed to the danger of isolation and to a policy of hemming in (“Einkreisungspolitik”) on the part of her enemies, led, as was thought, by King Edward VII.⁴⁴

Negotiations were begun with Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm's intention was to revive an important element of Bismarck's policy, “re-insurance with Russia,” and he persuaded the Czar at a meeting in Bjorko to make an agreement. But it was never ratified. Once back in St. Petersburg, the Czar informed the Kaiser that he could carry out the agreement only if France would join as a partner. An exchange of letters—sharp retorts:

You have agreed; the alliance is made, wrote Willy.

I am sorry I cannot agree, my previous arrangements with France prevent me, replied Nicky.⁴⁵

The web remained. Even when England and Russia composed their differences, in 1907, agreeing that any conflicts of interest arising in the future should be settled by friendly negotiation and that neither country should attack the other or participate in an attack by other powers—even then Germany could not quite realize that with this agreement the Entente Cordiale had been transformed into a triple alliance. Not until 1909 did German politicians realize that the real Triple Alliance had become France, England, and Russia and that the former Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) had shrunk to a dual alliance, since in view of the Irredentist movement to recover Italian territory from Austria there was no chance whatever that Italy would join her former partners in any war against England.

In 1906, before the Anglo-Russia agreement, the French ambassador to England had informed Sir Edward Grey, head of the British Foreign Office, that his government feared an unprovoked attack by Germany and inquired whether France might count on military help from

⁴³ *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, VI, 714.

⁴⁴ *Cambridge Modern History*, XII, 172.

⁴⁵ Lee, II, 354 ff.

England. Sir Edward's first response was that he was not in a position to make any declaration binding his government. After consulting some of his colleagues in the Cabinet, however, he authorized a conference on military matters, with the proviso that it should not commit Great Britain. From then until the eve of the first World War conferences were held each year. Similar discussions had already been started between the British military attaché at Brussels and the Belgian staff.⁴⁶

From documents published after the war we know that the French had good reason for apprehension, since the chief of the German general staff had already, in 1905, urged a fundamental clarification of relations with France by an immediate war. We know further that the plan of the general staff actually put into execution during World War I—the so-called von Schlieffen Plan—had been drawn up and accepted in 1905 and that Belgium was to be the avenue of attack.⁴⁷

The diplomatic battle was lost by Germany. England responded to her threats by preparing for war. In the island kingdom the "little navy" men were overridden. More ships were the answer to the German fleet, the move against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the Berlin-Bagdad railway. At the same time, Italy was completely estranged from her former allies.

The Wilhelmstrasse had been outwitted. The sum total of its diplomatic defeats, however—in South Africa, in the contest with France for Morocco, in attempting to win the friendship of Russia—seems only to have convinced the military leaders of Germany that they must break the bars of her Continental prison by war. Frustration increased German aggressiveness. The army was enlarged, and the revenue from a special tax of one thousand million marks was spent on armaments.

France responded by extending her military service from two to three years. Agitation for conscription sprang up in England. As early as 1908 Clemenceau tried to convince King Edward that war with Germany was unavoidable and that England would need conscription and a large army as well as a navy if France were to be saved. The glorious British navy, Clemenceau argued, would sink the German fleet, but wonderful holes in the water would not save Paris

⁴⁶ Trevelyan, *Grey of Fallodon*, p. 154.

⁴⁷ Buchfink, "Moltke und Schlieffen," *Historische Zeitschrift*, CLVIII (1938), 313; E. Bricker and W. Bode, *Schlieffen*, Nauck, Zurich, 1937, pp. 137 ff.

from German occupation; it might well be that the real answer to the German fleet would have to be a big British army.⁴⁸ That formidable animal Germany, so well fitted for land battle, had striven to become amphibious; was there any course for the ruler of the waves other than to adapt herself to land warfare and become also amphibious?

Once more Great Britain offered conciliation. In 1912 negotiations were opened with Germany. Sir Ernest Cassel, an English banker of German origin, and Albert Ballin, a friend of the Kaiser, prepared the way. Haldane, the British Secretary of War, went to Berlin to ascertain what the chances were. But Germany was not willing to accept the British condition: that her colonial empire, to be built up with Britain's help, should be protected by the British navy, as were those of other Continental states, such as the Netherlands East Indies, and others.⁴⁹

The offer might have created a situation similar to that which existed between Britain and the United States after the 1820's. By proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine, the United States confined its interests to the American Continents. England, who was agreeable to the idea, tacitly placed her navy at the disposal of this country to prevent infringements. Not until 1917 did the United States ever propose the building of a navy stronger than that of the British, and in 1921 the Washington naval agreement cut the American building program to establish parity between the two countries.

Under the unwritten agreement on the Monroe Doctrine the United States had been assured of help in case of attack by any combination of powers. But Germany was unwilling to accept England's protection. It is ironic to reflect in this connection upon what two world wars have shown: the United States outgrew England and got, against its will, the position of international prominence which Germany coveted and which no blueprint or force could give her. Germany revolted: she and her satellites wanted another order of rank, a community of states dominated by herself. The revolt failed, but it was a prelude to a nuclear change in the community of states which is still unfinished and will, perhaps, still be unfinished when the present generation disappears.

The goals of wars are sometimes well-defined, at other times vague.

⁴⁸ Lee, II, 629.

⁴⁹ Bickford and Johnson, "The Contemplated Anglo-German Agreement," *Political Science Quarterly*, 1927 (XLII), 29.

Historians often say that from the death of Louis XIV until the French Revolution, war was the game of sovereigns, played with small armies for small stakes and according to rules.

The epoch of these "wars subject to . . . minutely codified restrictions," ended when in a new kind of war the

French Revolution had thrown the whole weight of that people and all its forces into the scale which had hitherto nothing but the weight of limited armies and the limited revenues of the state. It was the war of the natural forces of a state and a great and simple motive to the artificial diplomatic assemblage in which those states stood mutually involved.⁵⁰

The new French weapon of the Napoleonic era, the *levée en masse*, or rising of a whole people, defeated Europe. Not until Europe adopted the same measure and mobilized its entire population in the *Voelkerschlacht* at Leipzig did it defeat Napoleon.

A new era had begun, the era of national wars, of wars which were to assume a maddening pace, for those wars were destined to throw into the fight all resources of the nation, they were to get themselves not the goal of a dynastic interest, not of the conquest or possession of a province, but the defence or the propagation of philosophical ideas in the first place, next of principles of independence, of unity, of non-material advantages of various kinds. Lastly they staked upon the issue the interests and fortune of every private individual. Hence the rising of passions, that is, the elements of force hitherto in the main unused.⁵¹

Through new weapons man changes his method of warfare. But it is not the method that is responsible, or primarily responsible, for the difference between the two kinds of war. The essential difference is that the war for a limited object, a change of leader or rectification of frontiers or one or two additional provinces, is kept under control by the nonparticipating members of the community of states. The belligerents must not offend other powers by their methods or by their peace terms. If they do, a conference or diplomatic pressure will compel them to revise their contracts. The Congress of Berlin, in 1878, is a case in point.

The bloodier wars are those with a more general objective: to change the order of rank among the nations. Such have been the revolts of subordinate nations against Spain, France, or the *Pax Britannica*. What Ferrero, Toynbee, and others call "eighteenth-century

⁵⁰ Ferrero, *Peace and War*, p. 5.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10; Toynbee, IV, 144 ff.

warfare" was also waged in the nineteenth century for minor adjustments in the society of states—violence applied with the permission of the primus, so to speak. The great conflagrations, whether of the seventeenth, eighteenth, or nineteenth centuries, were general revolutions for a new balance of power because the old was functioning badly. They did not lead to a universal state, but either restored the former pecking order or changed it.

PEACE AGREEMENTS

WAR, we have seen, is sometimes a revolt of the discontented against an order they consider unjust and not so strongly protected but that it can be upset. Malaise and expectation of success are the two chief incentives for revolt. If the aggressor has won, it seems reasonable to expect that the peace treaty will establish a new order; if not, that it will restore the old order and provide for guarantees to maintain it, bulwarks against new aggression. When a war ends, the peace treaty codifies provisions to realize the victor's aims, whether offensive or defensive.

In what Ferrero and Toynbee called eighteenth-century wars—what I have called violence applied with the consent of the community—this goal is relatively easy to achieve, since the peace treaty has only to effect the transfer of the disputed object from the vanquished to the victor or to arrange those changes or maintain the *status quo* for which the successful parties have fought. The Bismarckian wars, for example, had their well-defined objectives: Schleswig-Holstein, the elimination of Austria from the German Bund, the separation of France from the German states by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine—objectives realized when Prussia won.

In what our historians call nineteenth-century warfare, which I have defined as a general revolution of powers against the balancer and minor local dominants, the treaty of peace ought in principle to realize the new order or to re-establish the old. It is, however, a characteristic of the organism of which our one world consists that it has never crystallized an order of rank, that is to say, an order among its many states as a whole. The order remains nebulous. The various hierarchies and independent states tolerate the domination of some one Great Power by co-operating in its policies, but never admit that they have a boss or are bound to follow its commands. When peace is concluded, when a new order of rank is established or the old restored, this object is not attained by any clear-cut written dispositions. In 1714, when the war against Louis XIV ended in the Treaty of

Utrecht, France was defeated and her expectations of uniting Europe in a single Roman Catholic monarchy were checked. A new order, with England as balancer, began to emerge. The United Provinces abdicated from their rule as maritime overlords, and England took command, but it was a *de facto* change; no well-drafted articles in the treaty expressed it.¹

Nor will one find any order of rank created among states by the Congress of Vienna or the Paris conferences of 1918. The new order of all states, or the re-established old one, is a *de facto* product of the dynamic balance worked out after a general revolution as the aftermath of the war. The peace treaty contains at most terms establishing a provisional domination of the defeated, or general rules providing a method by which agreement is to be reached in the case of other conflicts of interest. Napoleon's defeat was followed by a temporary occupation of France and an agreement that future conflicts would be settled by conferences between the Great Powers, to be convened from time to time. The defeat of Wilhelm II was followed by a temporary occupation of Germany and the creation of a League of Nations.

The line between the two kinds of wars—those for minor, well-defined adjustments and those for an order of rank—cannot be sharply defined. Even wars for limited objectives demonstrate clearly which belligerent is the stronger and thus enhance or diminish the prestige of both parties. Prussia's rank among the great powers was advanced by her victory, Austria's reduced by her defeat. General revolutions of power, on the other hand, may also partake of the nature of minor wars, having certain specific and well-defined aims as to transfer of territories, "open doors." The peace treaties of Paris in 1918 redrafted the boundaries of European states, also taking away colonies from one and adjudicating them to another. Each peace treaty is therefore both parochial—carrying out specific territorial changes or reorganizing one or another of the community of states—and general, through its effects organizing the order of rank among nations in the following years. Both parochial and general terms of a treaty are declarations of policy agreed upon. Such declarations are proposals for action, blueprints for the future.

But the aftermath of the peace, the actual events, are likely to be quite different. Though Alsace-Lorraine was given to Germany in 1871 by the Frankfort Treaty, it did not become a part of Germany;

¹ Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne*, III, 209 ff.; Lipson, II, 211; III, 234 ff.

for this more than an agreement was needed. The treaty granted to those who wanted to remain French the right to maintain their allegiance by emigrating to France; it tried to help assimilation by eliminating the recalcitrant. But did it succeed in making of the province a homogeneous part of the German body?

In wars of all against all, in general revolutions when everyone's rank is challenged and a new balance is at stake, the disparity between the written word of the agreement and the general situation shaped by the aftermath of the peace is likely to be even greater. Today, after Germany's defeat, discussion is loud as to the terms of the peace to be granted to the defeated. One party says Germany must be divided into parts, its western area detached, the states on the territory of Napoleon's *Rheinbund* dominated by France, an eastern section occupied by Poland, as one of Russia's vassals, and the central region formed into a small independent Germany. Another party insists that the country be converted from a single Reich dominated by Prussia into a federation of independent states; the new Germany must be as impotent as the old Federation before 1870.

Imagine to yourself that at a new conference, the big fellows, after hearing the advice of the small, are confronted with the task of selecting the order to be imposed on Germany. The various salesmen, called politicians, put before you their various new garments, one black, another red, the third polka-dotted red on black or black on red ground, each telling you that this or that one is best suited to Germany and will secure the peace. I say again: no matter how clever its design, the dress they select is for an indeterminable figure, since they do not—cannot by any possible knowledge or effort of will—foresee it. The future will decide whether the garment will fit or not. If historians and political scientists could describe from past experience a collection of possible patterns, they might at least form for themselves an opinion of what would happen to Germany and its neighbors if the dress offered by the French were selected, or that proposed by the Russian Minister, or the one designed by Mr. Morgenthau. But we have no such collection. Speaking more generally and looking over the historical experience selected at random in this book to show the possibility of discerning a symptomatology of nations, we may say with reasonable certainty that the future of a federation—whether it will integrate into one state or disintegrate into many—is not determined by the constitution selected by any legislative or deliberative body,

but by the properties of the *de facto* community involved. Germany is a nation, and any federation of German states will be better united, whatever its constitution, than, let us say, Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia before 1939. I can remember that as children we often played with little figures which had round weighted bases; they never stood quite straight or still, but no matter how hard you pushed them over they bobbed up again, irrepressible. The war's aftermath will show, as others have shown, groups and nations are such figures, often vacillating, but with a tendency to stand up again when thrown down.

As Trotsky and others have pointed out, after the revolution of 1906 had been put down by the czarist regime, the following oppression succeeded in splitting up and reducing to insignificance the socialist parties within the country.² Repression was followed by terroristic acts on the part of individuals, a kind of guerrilla warfare carried on, not by groups, but by single members of former groups. Then, when certain changes in the general situation—one might say in the Russian atmosphere—occurred, the old group reunited. The atoms attracted each other, and agglomeration readily took place.

Furthermore, during the period when force has dissolved the group, and its members retain under repression their properties and their tendency to reunite, these members will have some influence on the body within which they exist. Imagine a France as early as 1939 split up by many sectional interests, differing ideologies, and an increasing number of foreigners, taking in, as did declining Rome, such a nation as the Visigoths. Will it help France to rule millions of Germans? Imagine, on the other hand, Russia taking in German technicians, scientists, and organizers *en masse*. No doubt they will be slaves, but was not the culture of Rome made over by Greek slaves?

These are consequences, perhaps, only for a far distant future and do not interest politicians now working for the next election. Yet the march of time is increasing its speed. It was a proverb in Denmark not long ago that the sweets eaten by the fathers spoil the children's teeth; ³ it may well be said today that our own indulgence is likely to produce a decay we ourselves shall feel.

Again, the general importance of terms of parochial peace may easily be demonstrated in considering the question of Trieste. The statement often made nowadays by columnists and commentators that

² Trotsky, pp. 88 f., 127 ff.

³ "Die Väter haben Herrlinge gegessen."

Trieste is the natural harbor for the Danube Basin is not exact. Danubia has its own waterway, the Danube, which by canals now partly built will connect with the Elbe and the Rhine, and its own broad path to the Black Sea. The German ports of Hamburg and Bremen and the Rumanian ports can offer cheaper rates to Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary than can Trieste. This port was important for these countries when all formed part of one state, which was able to offer cheap rates through Trieste because for military reasons it had to keep a railway line and a good mercantile port in operation in this area. After the partitioning of Austria-Hungary the importance of Trieste declined and traffic flowed from the independent former parts of the monarchy toward Hamburg and Bremen.⁴ Thus, the importance of harbors is greatly influenced by the integration and disintegration of states; the formation of the Union of South Africa, to take an example, unified the railway rate policies of the five states involved, and certain harbors gained, while others lost, in importance.

Trieste and Istria are important, however, in strategic geography. Trieste is on Italy's great plain, which is dominated by the mountains of the Venezia Giulia and the Carsto, its hinterland. It is the only great port on the western side of the Adriatic, for the Italian rivers which stream into that sea, being muddy, have no large harbors; the east coast of the Adriatic, on the other hand, is rich in natural ports.⁵ The power controlling Trieste and the mountain range around it has a great influence on Italy. A glance at the various historical maps of the Mediterranean area is sufficient to show that central Europe has controlled Italy whenever it has held Istria and Trieste. Full Italian independence from Austria-Hungary, including Trieste and the mountain range, was possible only with the advent of the twentieth century, when the monarchy was weakening and Italy was protected by Great Britain, overlord of the Mediterranean. A decision on Trieste and Istria, therefore, a term of the parochial peace, like other strategic elements is bound to influence the order of rank of national powers.

The function of a treaty of peace is to establish an order for the community of states. The order of such a community is secured when it corresponds to the inner power relation of the states, which, however, is itself determined by the aftermath of the war. When the new

⁴ "Trieste et Fiume, ports de transit de l'Europe Centrale," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, CXVII (Oct., Dec., 1923), 401 ff.; Jangakis, p. 81.

⁵ Whittlesey, p. 243.

order perpetuates malaise in states potentially mightier than the victors, when it also creates niches nobody is ready to defend against attack, then, obviously, it is just a truce, the prelude to a new war.

In discussing this situation I shall begin by illustrating my contention that the hidden order of rank is established by the aftermath of war and that the effects of peace treaties are not always those imagined by those who draft them; we shall come later to the question of whether it is possible to draw up general treaties which will secure a peace more lasting than the dynamic balance with its more or less hidden order of rank.

It may not be inappropriate to remark parenthetically that politicians centuries ago were less sophisticated and more frank than they are today. There was a period when in literature, as in conversation, anything could be mentioned: the words "sex" or "venereal disease" were not taboo. An era of polite silence followed, to give place in our day to the neo-Rabelaisians and their clinical observations and language. Perhaps in politics a similar return of frankness will soon be evident; perhaps we shall revert to the days of the Westphalia Treaty, when statesmen not only thought but also spoke of balance of power and discussed how equilibrium could best be established.

In 1640 Europe was faced with conditions similar, on a smaller scale, to ours today. Called to Münster and Osnabrück for the year 1643, the negotiators of the treaty began to arrive in 1644, to negotiate in 1645, and to come to some agreement in 1648.⁶ Means of transportation and communication were slow, distances great, and men lived at a leisurely tempo. Space had not yet been eliminated by engines, and time was not as yet merely a fourth dimension. After the all-important questions of precedence and etiquette had been settled, the negotiators began to discuss the real problems they had been convened to solve.

The Thirty Years' War had been a revolution against the order maintained by the then-paramount powers, Hapsburg Spain and Austria, who aimed to unite Europe in a *monarchia universalis* and convert the feudal German states into a neighborless empire, of which the German princes would be citizens, members of a federation without the right to formulate their own foreign policy or keep their own armies. France and Sweden, the two rebels against that order,

⁶ Garden, VI, 15; Pütter, p. 110; Koch, I, 121 ff.; Bolingbroke, Letter No. VII.

had supported the Protestant princes, the heterogeneous element in the empire, and the war had ended with the defeat of Austria and the exhaustion of all parties involved.

The first question before the negotiators was to decide who were the *subjecta belligerantia*,⁷ or who had participated in the war. This was not as simple as it may sound. On one side there were the imperialists—the Hapsburgs—and on the other “les Couronnes”—France and Sweden. But each side had its large following of princes and other “estates” of the realm, “immediate and mediate,” and their citizens. The question was how far these parties, in whose interest the war had been waged, had a right to take part in the negotiations. The French king, who called himself the protector of German *liberté* “and of captive princes,” proposed that all should be admitted to the congress; naturally enough, since France was for a Germany governed by many independent governors, a Germany in chaos, Austria was opposed.

After the list of participants had finally been compromised upon, the reasons for the war were discussed. At that time war was not considered merely an aggression by bad boys against good ones. It was the war of the Roman law, of the canon lawyers, a procedure to compensate a wrong or vindicate a right.⁸ Like private combat, war was violence applied to decide a conflict, and the decision was God’s; the peace treaty was a judgment drafted in the name of the Holy Trinity. The negotiators had therefore to decide what grievances had caused the war, to remedy them, and finally to grant to the Couronnes *des satisfactions* for the trouble they had been put to in fighting for the rights of the aggrieved.

By the treaty Austria was forever stopped from realizing her dream: the universal monarchy of the Roman Catholic church. She could not incorporate Germany; she was obliged to tolerate Protestantism and Protestant princes among her local governors. By keeping Germany divided, France secured an element of protection. For a divided Ger-

⁷ Wedgwood, p. 479, writes: “The congress had been sitting for nearly a year when the delegates found that they were still in doubt as to the *subjecta belligerantia*. A debate was therefore held with the purpose of formulating a clear idea of what had been fought for, and what *subjects* [sic, italics mine] the peace treaty shall handle.” “Subjecta” are persons subjected to war, taking part in war, not the objects of war. It is not used in the sense as the French would say “sujet de roman.” See also Meiern, *Acta pacis*, “Actum iustitiae facit,” II, 204-5; Vanderpol, pp. 17 ff.; Batiffol, p. 661; Phillipson, *op. cit.*, II, 166 ff.

⁸ Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne*, III, 209 ff.

many meant security for France and even for Austria, while a united Germany equivalent to Prussia would have been a danger to both her neighbors.

After Westphalia there was no *primus inter pares* in Europe. The Hapsburgs were defeated; France was a rising power, but still not admitted to be the mightiest. Peace could not last long, for a feudal society needs an overlord.

By keeping the German Empire divided, the great seventeenth-century French masters of diplomacy Richelieu and Mazarin, who consistently opposed Spanish and Austrian policy, opened the way for conquerors such as Louis XIV and, later, Napoleon. The small states of Europe were an invitation to France to annex them. And during the eighteenth century, when a new paramount power (England) was emerging, and the nineteenth century, when it was at its peak, the division of Europe was corrected. As we have already seen, in order to balance a dangerous France and an ambitious Russia, England made Prussia strong.

Louis XIV tried to convince Europe not only that the Hapsburgs were no longer the leading power, but that France was their successor and the king of France the legitimate head of the *Monarchia Christiana*. When France was defeated, the Treaty of Utrecht was concluded, of which Lord Bolingbroke wrote in his *Defence of Utrecht*:

The precise point at which the scales of power turn like that of the solstice on either tropic, is imperceptible to common observation, and in the one case as in the other, some progress must be made in the new direction before the change is perceived. They who are in the sinking scale, for in the political balance of power, unlike to all others, the scale that is empty sinks, and that which is full rises, they who are in the sinking scale do not easily come off from the habitual prejudices of superior wealth, or power, or skill, or courage, nor from the confidence that their prejudices inspire. They who are in the rising scale do not immediately feel their strength, nor assume that confidence in it which successful experience gives them afterward. They who are the most concerned to watch the variations of this balance, misjudge often in the same manner, and from the same prejudice.⁹

When Bolingbroke made these observations, the balance of power in Europe had just shifted. Spain's domination had ceased, France had been halted in her push for hegemony, The Netherlands had lost their

⁹ Letter VII, p. 33; Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne*, III, 188 ff.

financial and maritime supremacy, and Britain had laid the foundation for her dominance. By the peace treaty she had, if possible, to make her naval domination secure, the strength on which her paramount position rested. From her well-protected harbors her fleet must be able to reach all her scattered dependencies. She must acquire the bases necessary to secure routes to every part of the globe, she must keep France from dominating The Netherlands and make sure that they should come into the hands of an independent neutral, but small, power with slight naval strength.¹⁰

The Treaty of Utrecht accomplished all these ends. "By the transference of the Netherlands [the 'Spanish Netherlands,' now Belgium, to Austria] an inland power of central Europe from whom we had nothing to fear," writes Trevelyan, the French threat to the Rhine delta was parried. From the Treaty of Utrecht until 1793 Europe was untroubled by danger from the preponderance of France, until the French Revolution gave that country a new vital impulse.¹¹

In 1714, at the time of the treaty, Britain needed to acquire the colonies which were a necessary corollary to her naval ring. To achieve this she had not only to deal with her enemy, France, but also to dispose of her ally, Holland. The story of the Anglo-Dutch diplomatic war during the negotiations preceding the treaty and the defeat of the Dutch and their retirement from world power, as told by that great master of history Trevelyan, are evidence that wars settle not only the order of rank between the victors and the vanquished but also among the victors themselves. At Utrecht the Dutch lost their position as first maritime power to the English, who dictated the peace.¹²

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the European states headed by Britain controlled a large part of the world, that country acted as balancer. Her geographical position and navy made her impregnable; her economic position made her financing, services, and trade indispensable for all countries, whether in peace or in war.

The Napoleonic wars ended in another French defeat. The treaty of peace dealt with territorial questions at stake between the victors of the Quadruple Alliance and vanquished France. The latter was made to return Napoleon's conquests to the Alliance, which in turn

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, III, 211.

¹¹ Trevelyan, *History of England*, p. 499.

¹² Trevelyan, *English Social History*, p. 393.

returned them to their rightful owners; one of the owners, the German Bund, arranged the retailing privately. The war and the peace, Napoleon, his conquests, his failure, and the redistribution of European land were hard facts which altered the order of rank in the world. For the second time France had failed to organize Europe.¹³ She was defeated, but it had taken all Europe to do it, and the defeat was offset in some degree by the memory of her "glorious conquests" and the rising myths of the great French Revolution and of Napoleon. Notwithstanding her failure, her position as a power was secure.

In the struggle against Napoleon, as more recently, it was Russia who, by her army and her endurance, proved her overwhelming power. She showed herself unbeatable and inexhaustible and demonstrated that her army was always prepared and able to dominate Europe. The newly born Prussia and the aged Austria were under her wing. Britain prepared to retire to her vantage point of domination from offstage. It took time for the true picture to be seen: Britain as the world's balancer, Russia as second, Prussia as pretender for the rank of first-rate power. During the decades following the Congress of Vienna Russia appeared to dominate. To preserve Europe from more revolutions and also according to the principle that might is right, she proposed that the Quadruple Alliance should rule Europe. The Russian diplomat Pozzo di Borgo argued that the Alliance was "but the center of the 'universal union'"; though "unalterable in principle" it would, he thought, "by extending its sphere according to circumstances" become "the alliance of all the states."¹⁴

Here, strangely enough, as in the Russian memorandum of 1804 and in the celebrated manifesto of the Holy Alliance, we have again the idea of a central alliance ruling the world, to be transformed ultimately into a world ruling itself. But analysis of the situation after the Napoleonic wars shows that the so-called "concert of powers" was an illusion. Great Britain, then *primus* in the larger world, never joined the Holy Alliance; she was a partner in the Quadruple Alliance only, formed for a defined and limited purpose: to prevent French aggression. She would not join, as one of her diplomatic notes expressed it, any "universal union committed to common action under circumstances that could not be foreseen."¹⁵ Her co-operation with the Con-

¹³ Talleyrand (II, 99): "With a real equilibrium, Napoleon would have been able to give to the peoples of Europe an organization consonant with true moral law."

¹⁴ *Cambridge Modern History*, X, 15; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, I, 421; Fisher, III, 861.

¹⁵ Fisher, III, 873 ff.

tinental powers even in the Quadruple Alliance and its conference diplomacy was short-lived, lasting only till 1822.

The aftermath of the Napoleonic wars worked out a diagonal between national policies. The Czar proposed the Holy Alliance as a disguise for Russia's real ambitions: to be the fourth Rome, the great Eastern Empire. Europe was afraid of Russia, and when Alexander himself grew apprehensive because of revolutions and murders, Metternich succeeded in transforming the Alliance into an instrument to bar Russian expansion and freeze the European *status quo* by guaranteeing the permanence of ruling houses and their territories. Europe was petrified: no change in rulers or possessions would be tolerated.¹⁶ A period of wars was thus followed by a generation of rigid order; the rigid order by revolutions in 1848.

Russia dominated the Continent, but France, Prussia, and Austria often joined forces to restrain her desire for intervention. Outside Europe, Britain was dominant, but checked by the evolving United States. A world organization or a "Holy Alliance" ruling that organization, did not exist; a provisional balance of power kept the world at peace. I say provisional, because the relative strength of England and Russia was not decided until shown up by the Crimean War, in 1854-56. After that war Europe had no war unless the *primus*, Britain, permitted or at least tolerated it. Britain specified through diplomatic channels the conditions under which she would countenance Germany's war against France. Putting pressure on Russia in 1878, she forced her to divide with Austria the spoils gained by the Treaty of San Stefano and even to return parts to Turkey.¹⁷

About a century after Waterloo a new revolt against a *primus* ended in the defeat of the revolting power, Germany, and the nations met at Paris to determine the new order for a new world. The picture of the world was now greatly changed. Germany, the greatest power in Europe, was defeated, Russia knocked out by her own revolution, and a newcomer, the United States, dominated the scene. The problem was the same as at Vienna: to divide territories detached from Germany and Russia and to organize the world, after the "war to end wars," to make it safe for democracy.

¹⁶ Srbik, I, 573 ff.

¹⁷ For Disraeli's threatened departure see Ensor, p. 5; *Cambridge Modern History*, XII, 395; Monypenny and Buckle, VI, 310 ff.

Paris still spoke the old language of diplomats. Clemenceau said to Lloyd George and Wilson:

You Anglo-Saxons believe in allowing Germany to recover. You believe in this new-fangled institution the League of Nations which we Frenchmen have not much confidence in as security. We believe that the Germans are much safer people dead than alive, and that the best way of securing the peace of the world against a renewal of war by Prussia is to divide it up, at any rate to separate the Rhineland from the rest of Prussia.¹⁸

French public opinion, well expressed by Jacques Bainville, was convinced that the politicians, by not heeding their military advisers, by not invading Germany and acquiring the Rhine frontier for France, and especially by their failure to divide Germany into several states, re-establishing the early federation, not only failed to destroy Prussia and its military spirit but also paved the way for its resurrection.¹⁹

Opposed to this policy were those who agreed with Professor Keynes' well-known contention: "France and Italy abusing their momentary victorious power to destroy Germany and Austria-Hungary now prostrate . . . invite their own destruction." For Keynes the treaties were "Carthaginian" ²⁰ and not Wilsonian agreements; they do not terminate but perpetuate hatred and war.

From the conflict between the two opposing factions were born the compromises of Versailles, Trianon, and St. Germain. The Turks alone, by revolting against the Treaty of Sèvres, succeeded in obtaining its revision in their favor at Lausanne. Considering the joint picture of all the individual peace treaties after World War I, it may be said that Germany revolted with the help of the other central powers against the *Pax Britannica*; she failed; the treaties were, therefore, to restore the *Pax Britannica*. That was Britain's wish, and the Allied and Associated Powers agreed. And it was a part of the British plan for world order that the European Continent should remain divided between great equal powers balancing one another. France and the newly created or enlarged states, partners in an alliance—the Little Entente as an *Ersatz* Russia—were to balance the weakened Germany and Russia.

But the aftermath of World War I proved that the prewar order of rank could not be restored. The war itself had shown that Britain alone

¹⁸ A. J. Toynbee, "The Issues in British Foreign Policy," *International Affairs*, May-June, 1938, p. 363.

²⁰ Keynes, pp. 5, 36.

¹⁹ Bainville, pp. 465 ff.

could not decide conflicts among the Continental powers. As E. H. Carr observed in his *Conditions of Peace*, the balance of power in Europe had "hopelessly broken down":

The condition expressed in the old Latin motto of the balance, *qui adhaerere praeest*, was no longer fulfilled. Germany, well-organised, highly industrialised and with Austria-Hungary as a pliable tool, had become more than a match for the rival group consisting of France and Russia.²¹

But he mentions only half the reasons. This new relation alone would not have amounted to a breakdown of the European balance. There had always been a difference in strength between the first and the second powers on the Continent, a difference not only made good but sometimes even reversed in favor of the weaker group by the support of the balancer. The European balance of power broke down because the Russian-French group, even with British help, could not defeat Germany and her allies. The Allies won World War I because the United States became their associate. It took American financing, American industries, and American manpower to make the British-French-Russian alliance stronger than the Axis. The United States, not Britain, was the balancer who decided the outcome of that war.

At the time of the Moroccan crisis keen observers might already have noticed the change. During the Russo-Japanese War Germany thought the moment had come for her to take a step toward realizing her national policy. She thereby came into conflict with France. It was the United States who decided that the conflict should be settled at an international conference. This country's support of the Anglo-French position frustrated Germany's plans at Algeiras.²²

But the change was not only a change in the balancer; there were now also more states to be balanced. New animals had entered the cage—the United States, Japan, and other states in the Western Hemisphere. The change was similar to that which occurred when Macedonia, Syria, and Rome extended the boundaries of what was then their world, and the Greek peninsula with its many city-states and leagues lost its preponderant importance.²³ After World War I Europe was no longer what it had been, and domination of Europe did not mean leadership of the world.

After acting as balancer in the wars against Louis XIV and Napoleon, Britain had retired to her happy isle, her "precious stone set

²¹ Carr, *Conditions of Peace*, pp. 194–95.

²² Bishop, I, 467 ff.

²³ Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, II, 1119.

in the silver sea,"²⁴ as soon as a decision was reached, or very nearly. But she always returned if changes threatened the balance of power among the world rulers on the Continent or her own position as balancer was endangered.²⁵ When the United States retired, however, it made no promise to come again to the rescue of the weaker states of Europe.

The first World War proved that Germany with her followers could lord it over Europe and that Britain could no longer prevent her. The years following the war seemed to show that the new arbiter, the United States, was uninterested in European affairs. The Republicans kept the country from joining the League of Nations; the Democrats framed the neutrality resolution, finally turned into the Neutrality Act of 1937, reinforcing America's isolation. Lord Lothian quotes an unnamed American publicist as saying that in the United States

. . . there was a subconscious feeling of this kind: we have lived in peace and security behind the British fleet for a hundred and twenty years. The British fleet is once more supreme in the world. Why should we not go back to our old security and leave Great Britain to run the show as she has done for a hundred and twenty years, provided we keep a strong enough fleet also to prevent her from abusing her power?²⁶

By a well-deserved vote of confidence in Britain and her navy, American policy disregarded the change in that country's cohesion as an empire, and the loss, through the technological revolution, of her position as an impregnable and inexhaustible power.

In a series of discussions at Chatham House in 1937 the speakers, with few exceptions, agreed that Britain was no longer able to manage the *Pax Britannica* and thereby to keep the world relatively peaceful as she had done in the nineteenth century. Arnold Toynbee said:

I think there will probably be general agreement that this is impossible for several reasons: first, because two great Powers, the United States and Japan, are now outside our British naval ring round Europe; secondly, because the narrow seas round Europe—the Mediterranean, the Channel, the North Sea, and the Baltic—can now no longer be controlled by sea-power, or anyway not exclusively. They have passed, at least in part, under the control of the land-power using air-arm.²⁷

²⁴ Shakespeare, *Richard II*, Act II.

²⁵ *British History in the Nineteenth Century and After*, p. 141.

²⁶ Lord Lothian, "The United States and Europe," *International Affairs*, May-June, 1939, p. 323.

²⁷ A. J. Toynbee, "The Issues in British Foreign Policy," *International Affairs*, May-June, 1938, p. 312.

It sounded rather sad when the Marquis of Lothian told his audience at Chatham House:

The *Pax Britannica* was, I will not say abandoned, but replaced by another system in 1920. . . . It was based first of all on the universal self-determination of all nations. . . . I think we are beginning now to realize how dangerous a principle that was. The number of Europe's sovereignties was increased from seventeen to twenty-six, and we light heartedly agreed that the ideal future for the British Empire was that it should develop into twenty or thirty Dominions, each of them with its own foreign policy, its own army, its own tariffs, and with no other unity but allegiance to a common crown.

The *Pax Britannica* depended on three things: it depended on an invulnerable Britain, an invincible British navy with naval bases everywhere, and a Britain which was Liberal, and therefore used its power in such a way that it did not challenge the vital interests of other Powers, because it practised free trade and protected individual freedom, and because on the whole throughout the world there was freedom of migration.²⁸

The reasons mentioned by Mr. Toynbee—that new powers had entered the cage and a new weapon changed the nature of warfare—are important, but is not the present situation due primarily to the disintegration of the British Empire mentioned by Lord Lothian? Not only had the position of Britain as the balancer of the world changed, but changes had likewise occurred in power relations in Europe. On the Continent the position of France, England's Continental partner, was not what it had been. For centuries her foreign policy had rested on three pillars: the "*grand dessein*"—her natural frontiers; a weak neighbor, a divided Germany, as a territory for *grabuge*; and alliance with powers flanking Germany on the east—first Poland, Sweden, and Turkey, then, when these lost their strength, their successor, Russia.

The Paris treaties did not restore France's natural frontiers, and she could not divide Germany as she had in former days. She failed in 1923-24 in her efforts to support the German separatists and build up autonomous states in the Rhineland, the Ruhr, and the Bavarian Palatinate; German resistance and English policy secured the unity of the Reich. The London Agreements bridged the differences between England and France for a time, but the Ruhr occupation without

²⁸ Lord Lothian, "The United States and Europe," *International Affairs*, May-June, 1939, p. 332.

English participation, the reports presented to the House of Commons concerning French help to desperadoes and ex-criminals who were agitating in favor of an independent Rhineland, and the outspoken pronouncements of English statesmen on French policy evidenced a difference of interest and of views between the former allies.

The lack of vitality in the western European democracies and the demand for bread in Germany and the splitting up of her eastern neighbors paved the way for the adventurer. The world needed a vigorous rule, stability, and security, but it was a world uncertain, disillusioned, and heedless of its peril.

The Locarno Agreement in 1925 aroused hope that the former balance of power in Europe was, or shortly would be, re-established. The old diplomatic device of a congress seemed for a time justified: the frontiers of France were guaranteed, Germany was invited to join the League of Nations and to be a permanent member of its Council. The Locarno Treaty, however, did not establish an order satisfactory to all parties, one which the signatory powers were ready to accept without seeking further changes. Locarno settled the frontiers in the west, but not in the east.²⁹

Reading the Agreement today with insight gained since 1923, we see that Germany then disclosed her real policy. She was ready to respect the western frontiers drawn by the Versailles Treaty if given a free hand for changes in the east by peaceful means. She wanted to annex Austria, thereby threatening Czechoslovakia, hemming in Hungary, and reaching the Yugoslav border. East Prussia must be territorially reunited with the Reich; Poland must be cut off from the sea and kept ready for seizure when the opportune moment came. By penetrating the territories made weak by the peace treaties—"Balkanized" if you prefer—Germany could retrieve her position as a Great Power. For this policy she might get the help even of Russia, with whom she had concluded a treaty as early as 1922 at Rapallo.

The treaties liquidating World War I failed, being based on the assumption that Germany and Russia would remain weak and that an alliance of the newly created or enlarged states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania could balance them. In 1918 I hazarded the judgment, "We strongly doubt that the new block will remain at peace and will pursue a united policy."³⁰ Indeed, the decades

²⁹ *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, Vol. I, Part II, Sec. iii.

³⁰ Wittmann, p. 136.

following the signing of the peace treaties proved that the partition of Austria-Hungary and the slicing off of parts of Germany and Russia had merely opened the road to new conquerors.

The sequence of mass behaviors, may it be remarked parenthetically, tends to be a vicious circle. Overspending during war years impairs the monetary system and leads to bankruptcy. Administration by a curator with dictatorial powers leads in turn to a better organization of the state's economy and isolation from its neighbors. Isolation, stopping the radiations between states, hinders the curing of defects through international trade and commerce. Each state becomes conscious of its own defects. The increasing malaise, paired with the conviction that the neighbor is responsible, may lead to a new war.

The great disadvantage of all such peace arrangements, whether within a state or between states, is that they are drawn up at a time when the coherence and consistency of the victorious groups is high owing to the elation which comes with victory, and that of the vanquished is low owing to the depression which follows defeat. These extremes, however, do not last long. The elation of victory and the depression of defeat evaporate, and everyday life re-establishes the real power relation. The victor's wounds and the recuperative power of the vanquished begin to be felt. The defeated groups survive, and though their bond may be weaker for a time, it still functions subconsciously.

A further danger of such arrangements is that they are made at a time when on each side there is a system of groups bound together by an alliance whose object is to defeat the foe. The victory of one alliance means defeat of the other; in both cases the common interest of the allies wanes, and their individual, perhaps divergent, aims increase in force after the close of hostilities. An informal war may begin among the former allies.

The treaty assigns to each, victor and vanquished, his place in the new order. If the peace conference has been wrong in its judgment of the relative power of the various belligerents, or if events following the conference change their relationship, the treaty will be modified by agreement or by violence. Perhaps if the chief defeated power recuperates it will turn out to be mightier than any one of its victors. If the interests of the former allies diverge, intrigues soon start between the defeated and the discontented within the body social of

the victors. In the victorious state (or states) the defects created or increased by the treaty will begin to be felt. The propaganda of the vanquished reaches their kin or former fellow citizens living discontented in victor states, and the new informal war tends to lead to new wars.

The parochial peace determines the boundaries of new or altered states and therewith of their population and territories, their strength and defects. The suggestion has arisen from time to time that a state created by the treaty, whose personal or territorial defects make it subordinate to a mighty neighbor, be protected by another Great Power whose support will in effect heal these weaknesses and guarantee its independence. A suggestion hard to realize unless the smaller power lies between two Great Powers and each has an interest in keeping it alive and not letting it be exclusively dependent upon the other. When in 1939 England and France were negotiating with Russia a pact for mutual protection, the latter requested that they guarantee to defend her small neighbors against direct or indirect aggression. In other words, the English and French were to spring to the aid of the Baltic States in case of peaceful penetration or military attack by Germany. Russia rightly considered a simple promise of assistance given by one country to a country not connected with it by land routes—such as the promise given to Poland—ineffective.³¹ She wanted an arrangement similar to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement. Egypt, an independent state, has accepted British protection and permitted Britain to keep garrisons and take such military measures on her soil as would protect the Suez Canal by forces to be maintained ready on the spot or sufficiently near to reach it.³² But in the case of the Russian request the arrangement did not seem feasible to the other negotiating parties.

To a prospective "protected" state, the protection is a matter of considerable doubt and ambiguity. It means the relinquishing of sovereign rights to an uncertain point—a point difficult to define, since there is no hard and fast division between military and nonmilitary affairs. First of all, the attitude of the public at large is determined by what it has been taught in school. Second, some disloyal groups may flirt with the protector's enemies—in Egypt, for instance, with the

³¹ Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942*, p. 40.

³² Lloyd of Dolobran, II, 238 ff., 395-96.

Italians. The protector then requests a voice in the measures taken against subversive groups or fifth columnists. It tends to control the police and to influence the educational curriculum. It endeavors to stop propaganda against itself. It influences the economy to produce what its soldiers need. Eventually, the military governors may come to have a hand in all activities, without intending to use their military power to dominate the state.

States are therefore very reluctant to accept protection. Poland accepted that of England and of France at a distance, but refused Russia's. The Baltic States and Rumania refused all protection; they were afraid to have Russian troops on their territory, a situation which might lead to vassalage, or of doing anything which Germany might construe as a breach of neutrality.

"President Smetona of Lithuania told the new British envoy, Preston, on June 12, that Lithuania would prefer German to Russian occupation." The president of the Kaunas court put the matter quite bluntly. "If the Germans should come, they will destroy the Lithuanian nation, but will leave us our homes and property. . . . The Soviets will leave the Lithuanian nation intact, but will confiscate our homes and property. I prefer the former."³³ This distrust was justified, for in 1940, when under pressure from Germany and Russia the Baltic States gave army bases to the Russians, they soon became Soviets (see page 318).

Let us stop and ponder this. The Russo-German agreement, the prelude to war, was possible because the Baltic countries and Poland were unwilling to pay the price Russia asked for protection. With German help Russia got what she wanted, but she had to give it up when Germany attacked her. Ultimately, now that Russia's side has won, the Baltic countries and Poland will probably have to accept the solution which might have prevented this war had they accepted it in 1939. Certain paragraphs of history seem to be written by some Mephisto with a delicate sense of irony.

This is one way of analyzing the problem, but it would likewise be true to say that the aversion of the dominant classes in those states to Russian rule—to making their independent country a member of the Russian hierarchy—made the use of force necessary to realize Russia's aim. Where pressure could not secure co-operation, violence

³³ Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942*, p. 242.

stepped in. Will the Russian invasion succeed in eliminating the parochial-minded aristocracy? Will it be able, with a new aristocracy of cosmopolitans, to assimilate a population both of former homogeneous and of mixed elements within these states? This is another question.

The terms of a treaty as shaped by the informal wars fought at the peace conference are intended not only, in effect, to fix a general order of rank but also, as we have seen, to strengthen some states and to weaken others. One state is given additional land; another is split up; one government is changed; another is crippled by controls or agreements. But such reconstruction after war is like building in a country subject to earthquakes. War transforms the economic life of countries.

Conversion to peacetime conditions also brings into play unpredictable factors of economic upheaval within altered states. Production is concentrated on war materials; wages and profits are high during the hostilities, and unemployment ceases. After the armistice industry must be changed back to the production of peacetime goods, and it is faced by a new competition: new industries built up in the neutral countries. The economic pictures after the ancient Peloponnesian War and World War I are similar. The propaganda of revolutionists and that of enemies find soil in which they can grow.

Democracy has entered Germany three times before the present day: with Napoleon in 1800 and 1848 and with the Allies in 1918. Each time its associates were misery, disorder, devaluation of the currency and oppression. They bred discontent, they evoked the desire for the old happy days of the glorious past, and the old order reappeared.

This may explain the fact, often noted, that revolution follows revolution: moderates are succeeded by extremists; extremists by reactionaries. The government of the revolutionary parties in France and that of Kerensky in Russia were succeeded by other regimes. In my native land the moderate Mihaly Karolyi was succeeded in 1919 by the Bolshevist Bela Kun, and Kun, in turn, by the reactionary rule of the "awakening Magyars." War follows war as long as the balance of power agreed upon in writing and commitments does not correspond to that which actually prevails as long as there is no arbiter ready and able to do justice.

It is my contention that wars are caused by malaise paired with an idea for remedying it on the one hand and lack of resistance on the other. Violence is not resorted to unless it seems the sole means of satisfying real or imagined needs, and the aggressor considers a state refusing to make concessions its inferior in strength. The corollary is that peace can be restored only if discontent is alleviated, its real causes diagnosed and remedied, and if, furthermore, the community is sufficiently well balanced to hold out no exciting opportunities to ambitious rebels.

A further hindrance to stable and equitable settlements is the atmosphere itself in which treaties are usually drafted. Peace negotiations call for helpfulness and mutual aid, for the healing of wounds and the building up of a better world, but they are carried on in an air still charged with triumph, despair, and hate. The easy promises of war propaganda are soon forgotten. The Congress of Vienna was not unique in having disappointment as its aftermath. Reorganization implies co-operation; co-operation, understanding; and understanding is possible only among men who essentially respond to challenges, ideas, and situations in not-too-divergent ways. Without some such co-operative factor the intense competition of the peace table is dangerous, tending to dissolve under the heat of emotion the restraints which law, ethics, and reason put on human egotism.

Yet competition is a creative and stimulating process. It involves undertaking to prove that the struggle of the discontented against the order established by their past and present rulers can and will be resolved. Discontent is for action what doubt is for thought.

Can man reach a stage in which the two great driving forces doubt and discontent shall be met with understanding and mutual aid? To make Athenians out of Spartans took education. Such education is a tough job, which can be done only by those who understand their pupils and are familiar with their reaction to punishment and reward. It cannot be done overnight. Yet war-weary generations demand immediate peace, immediate changes, convinced that, having been united in war, they will remain united in peace and that because of the passion and efforts that went into the aims for which they assume they have fought, they contain somehow within themselves a momentum that will carry them on to realization.

Here we sit in a branchy row,
Thinking of beautiful things we know;
Dreaming of deeds that we mean to do,
All complete, in a minute or two—
Something noble and grand and good,
Won by merely wishing we could.
Now we're going to—never mind,
*Brother, thy tail hangs down behind!*³⁴

³⁴ "The Song of the Bandarlog," *The Jungle Book*, Scribner, 1898, p. 73.

LASTING PEACE

PEACE TREATIES are not only agreements to build up a new or to re-establish an old order in the community of states; they aim also to make the chosen order permanent. War efforts within and without the walls of states are increased by the promise that the last war is being fought, that the peace treaty will establish an order for a new millennium. Various plans for such an order have been devised.

In the atmosphere of disillusion following the Vienna Congress of 1815 the Count de Garden published his exhaustive study on peace treaties. Reviewing the plans for lasting peace proposed during the Napoleonic wars, he wrote:

It was proposed: (1) to establish a universal monarchy in Europe; (2) to create a general association of all powers, whose representatives would form a sovereign court; (3) each government was to be organized on principles of representation; (4) finally it was hoped that the progress of reason and ethics will assure the reign of justice. However seductive these ideas, . . . they are merely nicely colored hot air, and there is only one secret to guide the world; to be strong, as in force there is no error, no deception; that is the naked truth.¹

Now, more than a hundred years later, many books are being published on lasting peace, reviving ideas inherited from other war-weary periods. It may be instructive to examine the nature of some of these ideas, the source or turn of mind from which they derive.

The idealists wish to build a universal state in which all children of God will be citizens, a world community including all peoples under a world government, federal in structure. That state will not have a national policy any more than individuals have, but will enjoy instead leadership.

Government is the thing. Law is the thing. Not brotherhood, not international co-operation, not security councils that can stop war only by waging

¹ Garden, I, iv.

it. . . . Where does security lie, anyway—security against the thief, the murderer, the footpad? In brotherly love? Not at all. It lies in government.²

Others, mainly jurists, say that nations cannot be persuaded to yield to one government, but that a new league, of which all states would be members, could establish a court for settling conflicts among sovereign states. This is the lawyer's heaven, a world in which international law regulates the intercourse of states. The judges, after hearing both parties, will decide, and sheriffs will execute the judgments.

Still others, mainly politicians, who do not believe in universal monarchy or that independent states will bow to the decisions of judges where their honor or vital interests are concerned, propose that all states be ruled by the party they themselves belong to, since only if that party is universally in power will there be a guarantee that other governments will not go to war to achieve their national policy. Make the world safe for democracy—establish a socialist or a communist government—and all will be well!

The fourth group admits that a world government, a world court, or democracy, socialism, or communism everywhere could ensure world peace if people were sufficiently mature, but believes that no world institution can be set up until people are educated to higher ethical standards.

The rest, like their predecessors a century ago, have faith in power politics.

The case against these various ways of attaining eternal peace has been argued; for the sake of clarity I shall recapitulate them at some length.

The idealist's means of assuring peace is a federation of states: the united state of all nations. War between city-states, between tribes and feudal domains, ceased when the city-states, tribes, and domains united into a single state. It is therefore reasonable to assume that when all states are united, war among the national states will also cease. Unfortunately, as the reader understands by now, the evidence showing how union takes place in any body social, of whatever size, is overwhelmingly against the likelihood of a strong coherent world union at this moment. A symbiosis of various life forms is possible only between forms which are mutually attractive, and only when a

² E. B. White, *The Wild Flag*, Cambridge, Mass., Houghton, 1946, pp. 186-87.

more stable union grows from their temporary alliance. A body must exist before it can have a nervous system; a body can grow, but cannot be created out of hand. A hierarchy of states can be transformed into a federation of states, a federation into a federal state, a federal into united states if some form of invasion and blending of essential characteristics succeed in creating a nuclear type able to hold it together. For the federation of all united states into a world state the same conditions are prerequisite as for the merging of groups into a nation or the federation of a hierarchy of states into united states. A chain, each link of which is a cosmopolitan elite of some kind, must exist to keep the homogeneous elements bound by its spell and the heterogeneous elements by its force. Such a world elite can evolve only when the divergent types are assimilated into one type; and this cannot happen unless the historical, biological, and ecological factors that created the divergent types cease to operate.

Arnold Toynbee has predicted that the period of national wars will end with the decisive victory of a single power through the annihilation of all the rest. Others, more idealistic, say that the universal state will be made by agreement. Thus, apparently the world is to be federated by conquest, as Sparta was, or by agreement, as was Athens. But history indicates that whether federation comes through agreement or by conquest, the hierarchy of states cannot be transformed into a federal state until it has a single body social. The nervous system which connects a central authority with all its members in a society at climax cannot develop, or even begin to develop, until such a body comes into being.

In the year of Our Lord 1948 we are farther from a cosmopolitan body than earlier generations have been. There is no elite loyal to a cosmopolitan creed above and beyond its national one; there is, therefore, no nucleus which by its spell and force can attract and keep within a cosmopolitan state both homogeneous and heterogeneous elements.

A change in the *nexus socialis*, the replacement of the parochial nexus by a cosmopolitan nexus, must precede the formation of such a nucleus. This might conceivably come about by conversion on a scale large enough to affect the international life of mankind, like that of Constantine to the Roman Catholic Church, which created a new and larger bond between men. Such a conversion might be the consequence of a successful revolt of subordinates against their own elite. The Bolsheviks claim to be such a cosmopolitan group, since in the

communist's loyalties his creed is supposed to take precedence over family, group, or nation.

Are they such a group? Will the invading Bolsheviks, with their communist minorities in all countries, be able by social engineering to transform nations into bolshevist communities? In any case, the process is possible only in a certain measure. Rome could not export enough citizens to Latinize Britain. Those who emigrated had to maintain their own metropolitan mind and resist the seduction of parochial Circes who wished to rule themselves. Moreover, such an empire as Rome, or another country, by exporting too many human beings may easily ruin its own dominant class.

The future will tell how strong the bolshevist nucleus is, how capable of extending itself; and to what degree, on the other hand, the other crusading political faith, democracy, has vitality among nations by comparison. In any case, before a world state with an order stabilized by institutions can be formed, there must be a group bound by a cosmopolitan nexus settled as dominant in each state and able to form a nation.

In our present world all these prerequisites are missing. Separate states, organisms to a greater or lesser degree isolated from their neighbors; hierarchies in the process of integrating into a state or disintegrating into many states; these are realities, not the creation of scholarly essays. The sovereignty of these organisms, their system of arranging their own affairs as they please, is a natural attribute of their existence, not the figment of any statute. To restrain or reform it, something more is needed than words and agreements. This something may be an ethical restraint operating from within or force operating from without. But if we examine the present trend of societies, it is evident that it is *toward a better organization of separate members*, toward a higher and more definite integration of individual states, and thereby necessarily toward a disintegration of the community of all states. The trend is toward increasing sovereignty and decreasing restraints on the nationalistic demands of individual states, whether from within or without.

This is visible even in the world of man's physical activities, in the tightening of official red tape. That the airplane has conquered distance during recent years is a truism. Paris, thirty hours from Budapest forty years ago, was only six hours away in the 1930's. This is technically an accurate statement, but politically the picture is quite

the reverse. In 1900 one could decide at a gay dinner party in Budapest to visit the World Exposition in Paris and go on to London or even New York, and start the next day. All one needed was cash for the journey. In 1931 one needed a permit from the home office, visas from the countries one wanted to pass through or visit, a license to sell the currency of one's own country, and possibly that of other sovereigns to buy or import their banknotes. The triumphal progress of the combustion engine was escorted by the passport visa, permit to enter, permit to stay, permit to exit, and many other stamps and seals slowing down actual movement.

The first World War was partially responsible for hastening this trend toward the closed state, which is by no means a tendency confined to Russia. We are evolving, one might say, toward the insect society, a society where each member is a specialist, his rights and duties determined, or at least very much limited, by a central authority.

When the seventeenth century, *le grand siècle*, ended, French society was totalitarian. Its ideal, at any rate, was a hierarchy. Men were to obey the will of God, and God's will was transmitted through a hierarchically organized clergy as intermediaries. The parochial priest made the "narrow and imperious rules" which regulated the lives of true believers. For the priest in turn the rules were made by higher priests.

The political chiefs are the Kings, "God's anointed," who received from God absolute power and must account to God alone. They are the masters of their subjects' bodies and goods. They can strip them of their property, imprison them, put them to death and their subjects have no more right to resist and accuse them than they have to accuse God, who sends them pestilence, earthquake, drought and famine. "Oh Kings," exclaims Bossuet, "you are Gods."³

During the eighteenth century new ideas successively undermined the totalitarian state of the Roman Catholic Church in France and on the European continent. Guarantees were demanded for individual rights, and tolerance was preached as a basis for co-operation between groups. The reform of criminal law, the abolition of the *lettre de cachet*, the transformation of the absolute monarchy into a constitutional one, these were planks in the platform. In 1770 Monsieur L'Abbé de Very wrote:

³ Mornet, p. 9.

Today almost no one would dare to say in Parisian circles "I am serving the King." "I am serving the State," "I have served the State" are the expressions generally used. The critical spirit has permeated all classes of the nation; the soldier who reasons does not obey like a machine . . . the Maréchal de Richelieu could say of the reigns of Louis XIV, Louis XV and Louis XVI: "Under the first no one dared speak; under the second one spoke softly; and now one speaks loudly."⁴

The great French Revolution, started by the bourgeoisie to gain control over a rigidly defined class society, culminated in a victory of the proletariat and the classless society of a united nation. The first constitution distinguished between civic, or passive, and political, or active, rights. Only those who owned a certain amount of property had the right to participate in the political life of the community; civic rights, on the other hand, belonged to everyone. Only if the individual committed an act defined by statute as a crime, and only after due process of law, could he be deprived of those rights. The later constitutions abolished the "marc of silver," or property as a prerequisite for active citizenship, and everyone enjoyed both types of rights.

In other periods evolution was in the opposite direction, for instance, from a relatively free society, such as Gaul under Rome's domination, to a feudal society with a well-established hierarchy and self-sufficient domains, where lord and overlord dominated vassals and serfs.

In every period in which the parochial society tightens, the coherence of the larger metropolitan life wanes. Roman Catholic feudal society was closed; each domain, *pays*, or whatever name its smallest unit came to be known by, was strictly organized, and the activities of community and individual were alike planned. Life in the medieval city was split up into guilds, and within the guilds into a strict order of rank (a tendency strikingly evident, incidentally, in the mode of growing organization and restrictive effects on community activities of modern labor). Life on the domain was as highly organized as in a soviet or among insects. The higher we go from this society of men toward its community of states, the looser and less organized the organism. Feudal society, the society of all Christian countries in that period, was chaotic, organized only during the short intervals when the members balanced each other, interrupting longer stretches of competition.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

When the state plans the economy, when all free enterprises are state ventures, when all international activities—migration and the exchange of goods, capital, and ideas—are controlled for the benefit of the state, then international life, the order of the community of all states, becomes chaotic.

Shortly after World War I internationalism tried to make a comeback. Sheer competition proving too expensive a means of carrying on trade for a Europe which was losing its grip on overseas countries and foreign assets, it was supplanted by a receiver who managed currency, banking, and foreign trade. The flexible interests of individuals were displaced by the rigid ones of communities. Whether a proposed deal—export or import—would be profitable to the individual merchants concerned no longer mattered; the question was whether it was useful to the state. Wheat was grown on the rocky mountains of Austria; Mussolini's boisterous appeals whipped the Italians into the battle for grain. Like the physiocrats of old, the advocates of self-sufficiency sought to export more, import less, and create gold balances. Their formula was: produce at home; use *Ersatz* goods; do not buy cheap foreign products, for foreign exchange is needed to buy raw material for munition factories; do not pay your debts to foreigners, for your individual credit as a merchant does not interest the state, which is interested only in saving foreign exchange for its own strategic and political aims. This was not conducive to internationalism.

After World War II the same trend toward isolation and self-sufficiency, a lessening demand for imports and an increase of uneconomic home production, has set in. Read your daily paper carefully; England is lauded for raising more agricultural products than ever before in her history. Everyone is gardening for victory, foregoing luxuries, and lowering his standard of living. But remember that England during the years of war was obliged to finance her purchases by selling and mortgaging the assets she and her citizens had in the United States, perhaps also in other countries. Obviously, the exigencies of war pave the road for the postwar economy. England will continue to grow all she can as long as she lacks the income from foreign assets sold during the war, and will continue to manufacture exports to pay something on her debts.

The peace treaty will be applied to a world in which each country is planning its own economy without regard for the needs and wishes of others. Each will endeavor to be as self-sufficient as possible, con-

trolling not only production but also consumption. It is not for this book, already overstuffed with facts and arguments, to discuss the great question of free versus planned economy. However, we must realize that the more planned an economy, the more segregated it is. That this is so is demonstrated by the fact that the state today farthest advanced along the road of planning is the one most segregated. The USSR not only controls all her own "radiations," but even in her vassal states is in command of such crucial matters as exports and imports, migration, and diplomatic representation abroad.

In a world where each state was moving in the direction of a nationalist economy enclosed by tariff walls and separated from the others by its currency, England was the free-trading center, seeing to it that the rules of the game under which the gold standard would work with beneficial consequence⁵ were observed; London was the financial market that provided subordinates with the credit they needed to buy goods to build up their own economies. England, with her free commodity markets, arranged adjustments between closed economies. The English ruling class taught other nations the gentle art of living well: to spend and to take advantage of everything any country produces.

At the same time, the United States with its open doors was ready to accept the hundreds of thousands of immigrants transported to its shores by the British merchant marine. But that world, with spots still open for superfluous men and goods—with one center managing the exchange between national economies—is a thing of the past, and the picture of it, like every picture of the past, is simplified and idealized.

When self-sufficiency is growing and most states plan their economy so as to buy as little as possible from others, no state can follow a *laissez-faire* policy which invites other economies to enter, bring in, and take out whatever they like and merely pay the brokerage, all else being left to the free play of forces. All will be compelled to plan, and plans will collide. The danger is great that violence will be used to open markets for goods and men against the obstinacy of those who refuse to buy in order to sustain production at home or refuse to accept immigrants in order to keep their land in order that future generations may make a living there. When individualism flourishes, when leaders and thinkers call themselves cosmopolitans, the free movement

⁵ McMillan Committee, *Report*, Great Britain, Cmd. 3897, 1931, p. 23.

of men, ideas, goods, and capital helps to rid states of their defects. When clericals and their heirs the bureaucrats reign, when the citizen, whatever his trade, craft, or profession, tends to become a state employee, autarchy is in the making.

In this world, where national egotism is being heightened by replacing individual interests by state interests and closed states, each conscious only of its own narrow aims, pursue them wantonly, a small group, mainly remnants of a buried generation, stands trying to stem the current, preaching the necessity of union and the advantage of subordinating national interests to the superior interest of the world as a whole. Is it doomed to fail? Hungary's great statesman, Ferencz Deák, is said to have remarked that if a waistcoat is wrongly buttoned up you have to unbutton it in order to button it again properly. It seems somehow as if we were preaching rebuttoning when the unbuttoning has just started. We are on the road to Byzantium, and we dream of Rome.

The world is disintegrating, states are multiplying, and each by planned economy and careful control of its emigration and immigration tries to separate itself from its neighbors. This is a world advancing toward many *de facto* societies, not one. It is like the old Austria-Hungary or the British Commonwealth, full of groups wanting a separate, independent existence in order to realize their national policy. In such a world the tendency is to increase the number and power of local governors and the various types of citizens and close their territories to aliens and their goods. This is not an integrating world where units are fusing—one type emerging from the fusion of several—where local governors are losing their power and central authorities gaining; it is not the integrating world of Augustan Rome and Elizabethan England. The world we are heading toward may live in peace only if each of its many independent states lives as Japan lived before Perry and his backers forced her to trade. Such a world is not on the road toward world government.

There is no unified world society; there are no citizens of the world, or very few, more loyal to universal society than to their own nation. The world is not "groupified"; it is tending toward further division, which from the point of view of our one world means simply disintegration. Hence the body social which our idealist proposes to furnish with organs does not exist.

Could the same goal, a world state, be achieved if one Great Power hammered all the others into a single society? Arnold Toynbee says this would be possible, but he is one who believes in historical morphology: that in this world every integration follows the same blueprint. If you have a different faith, you may agree with me that any would-be world conqueror will be stopped, as all others have been, and will fail to organize a world government by any method or for any form of government; in other words, I protest that there is no international community of men. No *de facto* community exists which can vitalize any *de jure* system we may artificially construct; there is no skeleton for a community. Whether ecological or other reasons prevent the growth of such a community is a question I shall not even attempt to discuss here. At present there is no federation of states, not even the simplest type of balanced order; therefore there is no foundation for further building.

We live in a world where states are being organized, where competitive economies are being transformed into planned ones, and directed and controlled radiations are being substituted for the free migration and trading of individuals. How can one imagine that strongly organized members and an equally strictly organized world society can exist at the same time?

To clarify this conclusion, imagine yourself as majority leader of the Senate. A draft of a constitution for an international organization is up for ratification. You have read Denna Frank Fleming's *The United States and the League of Nations* and are pondering over the list of "untouchable domestic questions."⁶ You ask yourself if there is more chance now than there was in 1920 that the Senate will agree that foreign governments shall have a hand in deciding questions relating wholly or in part to our domestic affairs, "including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children and in opium and other dangerous drugs"—[the wording is from a Senate discussion in 1920.]

As Professor Fleming remarked, five years after the Senate's reservation concerning domestic questions, "we had not only abandoned our sacred right to regulate the traffic in opium and other drugs, but we were insisting that the production of these drugs be subject to international regulation."⁷ With regard to the opium question the Senate, you may conclude, did not abandon its untouchable right; it merely

⁶ Fleming, pp. 422-24.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

said it was ready to accept an international regulation which was agreeable to it. In other words, it was ready to co-operate with foreigners on its own terms. An international agreement on migration, tariffs, and other domestic questions is, one may conclude, possible; but not a waiving of the right to make such agreements. Without an international government, without power to decide and to regulate those domestic affairs of nations which influence their foreign policy, no super-state could function.

The wars Bismarck fought against Denmark, Austria, and France were preceded by a period in which other nations were lulled into the belief that they could remain neutral, since the change projected by Germany was not against their interest and might even be said to favor it. War, violence applied to achieve the aims of a nation, is not resented by other nations unless it hurts them. After the Franco-Prussian war Britain agreed that Alsace-Lorraine should go to the victor; she had remained neutral, since both belligerents respected her interest in Belgium. Napoleon III remained neutral in the war of Prussia and Italy against Austria, since he had got a tip from Italy and hoped for one from Prussia. For the neutral state and its citizens another state's wars, as Goethe said, are just agreeable topics for a Sunday afternoon conversation.⁸

In the second World War, Britain and France fought Germany to protect the established order and to punish aggression; no other country participated until it was attacked. Norway, Holland, Belgium, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the United States joined the belligerents after, not before, they were attacked. Aggression made them belligerents. Switzerland and Sweden, which would have lost their freedom if Hitler's Germany had won the war, protected their neutrality by shoot-

⁸ "Another Citizen:

I know naught better on a Sunday or a holiday
Than chat of wars and warlike pother
When off in Turkey, far away,
The People clash and fight with one another,
We stand beside the window, drain our glasses,
And see how each gay vessel down the river passes,
Then in the evening homeward wend our ways,
Blessing with joy sweet peace and peaceful days,

Third Citizen:

Yes, neighbor! I would leave things so;
Each other's skulls they well may crack,
And everything may topsyturvy go,
If only things at home stay in the old, old track."

Goethe, *Faust*, tr. by G. M. Priest, New York, Knopf, 1941.

ing down planes of the Allied Nations, killing young soldiers who battled for their independence.

This is not a criticism of Swiss or Swedish policy; it is merely a statement of fact. When members of a society which suffers from a mortal illness do not help to cure it because the remedy would hurt their private interests, the society is already disintegrating. Corruption, oppression, and other illnesses of human society are cured, if at all, by the action of those who are not hurt personally as well as of those who are. We are invited to believe nowadays that when the next aggression starts—when another Italy, Japan, or Germany attacks another Ethiopia, Manchuria, or Austria—every country will participate in the war; none will remain neutral. I doubt it, for in thought and deed international life still rests upon group interests, not upon world interests.

To avoid wars and secure lasting peace, jurists have envisioned a world in which the intercourse of states is regulated by international law, conflicts among them being decided by arbitrators and the judgments executed, if necessary, by sheriffs duly created for the purpose. These thinkers even say that independent states will voluntarily transfer to a single organization (whether a league of nations or a "United Nation" or whatever) part of their sovereignty and that the central authority will then be able to decide all international disputes which may lead to war. International law, with a legislative body, courts, and executive officers, is to secure the peace.

There have been efforts to create such a joint central authority from early times in man's political history. After unsuccessful attempts to unite Greece, the Greek city-states tried to agree upon an international order for the regulating of warfare and the peaceful settlement of interstate conflicts. They failed, however. Plato, in his *Republic*, has Socrates and Glaukon say:

And any difference that arises among Hellenes will be regarded by them as discord only—a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called war? Certainly.

They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?

Just so.

And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor will they burn houses, not even suppose that the whole population of a city

—men, women, and children—are equally their enemies, for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to lay waste their lands and raze their houses; their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction?

I agree that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.⁹

To settle international disputes peacefully a league of nations, complemented by obligatory arbitration, was suggested. The amphictyonic leagues of neighboring city-states had been organized for religious worship in common and for cultural co-operation. However, joint ventures in this field stimulated collaboration in other respects. The most famous of the leagues had its seat at Delphi, the chief holy place of Greece and long the most influential. Uniting the worshipers of Apollo, the Delphic Amphictyony especially acquired a political as well as a religious significance. In the legal principles laid down by these associations we find the rudiments of international law. Members bound themselves not to destroy cities belonging to their league even in war, or to cut off their water supply. We find traces of collective procedure against a city which broke or did not live up to its obligations to the league.

The Amphictyonic League of Delphi, like that of the Peloponnesus, endeavored—sometimes successfully—to settle conflicts among its members. In the sixth century B.C. arbitration came into more general use. The Treaty of Niceas, in 418 B.C., providing for a thirty-year peace between Sparta and Argos, imposed upon the signatories the obligation to submit all differences to arbitration. But it was no more successful than other treaties designed to keep the peace, whether for five years or fifty. Minor questions were settled peacefully by the parties themselves, by the league, or by arbitrators; major ones never. As long as the city-states competed for dominance over seas, trade routes, and colonies, none was ready to submit such questions to a third party which had no actual power to give them what they wanted and felt that they could obtain by force. None was much stronger than the others, more independent, or more invincible; without foreign help none could maintain a paramount position among well-balanced independent units. War therefore followed war.¹⁰

⁹ Pages 298, 471.

¹⁰ Phillipson, I, 29 ff.

Before the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the powers allied against France concluded an agreement at Chaumont which provided for measures to be taken after the cessation of hostilities for the repose and prosperity of nations and the maintenance of peace in Europe. The alliance was, of course, a coalition against France. It was to function through congresses to be held from time to time to discuss European affairs.

But this was all the Chaumont Treaty ever accomplished toward strengthening international law, organizing Europe, and guaranteeing peace. The dreams of 1805, it is true, were still dreams in 1815. After Napoleon's defeat the Congress of Vienna met to elaborate the terms of the peace settlement. But the hope that it would organize Europe was quickly dashed; its protocols and the Paris Treaty settled territorial questions, but left the Continent disorganized. Frederick von Gentz, Metternich's right-hand man, wrote after he had witnessed the signing of the final Act of Vienna:

Men had promised themselves an all-embracing reform of the political system of Europe, guarantees for peace; in one word, the return of the Golden Age. The Congress has resulted in nothing but restorations, which had already been effected by arms; agreements between the Great Powers, of little value for the future balance and preservation of the peace of Europe; quite arbitrary alternations in the possessions of the less important States; but in no act of a higher nature, no great measure for public order or for the universal good, which might compensate humanity for its long sufferings, or reassure it as to the future. . . . The Protocol of the Congress bears the stamp rather of a temporary agreement than of a work destined to last for centuries. But, to be just. The Treaty, such as it is, has the undeniable merit of having prepared the world for a more complete political structure. If ever the Powers should meet again to establish a political system by which wars of conquest would be rendered impossible and the rights of all guaranteed, the Congress of Vienna, as a preparatory assembly, will not have been without use.¹¹

The "more complete political structure," of which Gentz spoke when the hope for a better order was frustrated, was not built. Diplomacy by conference functioned for a few years, but ceased to function when Britain separated herself from the continental powers after the conference at Verona.

The Holy Alliance, the trade union of the princes, was another attempt to organize the community of states. Proposed by the Russian

¹¹ Quoted in *Cambridge Modern History*, X, 2; Mann, pp. 280 ff.

czar, as I have mentioned, it was able to maintain peace for the short period during which Russia did not try to expand. The articulation of the Continent remained frozen until revolution changed the European nations and Russia began a new attack on Turkey.

After the first World War there was a further attempt to organize the international community, which we must examine in some detail. The war began, as we have seen, with Serbia's revolt against the paramount influence of Austria-Hungary in her sphere and with Germany's revolt against the *Pax Britannica*. The European powers participating—and Japan, too—each had territorial demands. Secret treaties concluded before the war, and the peace treaties after it, clearly demonstrate the Allied war aims; the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, those of Germany and her satellites. When the United States joined the hostilities, that country's interests were fundamentally different from those of the Allies except for wanting the *Pax Britannica* to continue. It had no need for more land, its vast area and immense natural resources being more than ample to support even a much larger population. It had no frontiers to rectify, since the two oceans gave all the protection it was supposed to need. The United States entered the war mainly to support a world order in harmony with its interests: an order resting on good faith and equity.

Woodrow Wilson's policy was neither the ideology "of a professor" nor that of a "methodist preacher." It was as realistic, or, if you prefer, as egotistically American, as those of England and France were single-mindedly English and French. President Wilson was of the line of American statesmen who had struggled for a more just law of nations and for the extension of arbitration as a substitute for war in international law.¹² Despite the differences between such seer-statesmen, who dreamed of and planned for a better world order, and the irreconcilables, the isolationists, with their rigid logic and narrow vision, both agreed that the United States required peace and detachment in order to make the most of its natural resources and to provide fuller opportunities for all. Wilson realized that the world is a unit, all its many parts interlocked and interdependent. Better international law, he felt—a more equitable arrangement for international traffic and commerce—were the securities for the peaceful development of the Americas.¹³ But the law was to provide that each country should manage its own affairs without interference; each would live in isolation.

¹² Notter, pp. 110-11.

¹³ Wilson (Part 2), II, 195.

In his note to the belligerents preceding America's declaration of war he affirmed: "It is necessary first to settle the issue of the present war upon terms which will certainly safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity and the political and economic freedom of the nations involved." Thus he admitted the necessity of the parochial peace of Europe. But he saw a further need "to secure the better order of the world, to consider the formation of the League of Nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world." In settling the international order "neutral nations as well as those at war are ready to play their full responsible part."¹⁴

There is a link, however, between the parochial peace and international order; peace can prevail only among states whose citizens are contented and free to choose their own system of government. The terms, the President said, must be such as will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. The peace must be just and secure, and not only the establishment of a new balance of power.¹⁵ It must not carry conditions, he declared, "to crush the antagonists." Just peace, creating healthy and distinct national states, state-to-state relations ruled by a league and its court—that was the Wilsonian idea.

What was the real conception behind the League? Was it the medieval notion of a Roman Empire in a new dress? Did its founders aim to establish an overlordship similar to that which popes and medieval emperors demanded for themselves? Or did they, rather, hope to revive Castlereagh's diplomacy by conference and a coalition against Germany, to keep her and her friend Hungary within the bounds laid down for them in the treaties of Versailles and Trianon and guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of France?

When the fight over the League began in the United States Senate, Henry Cabot Lodge, leader of the Republican opposition, declared that President Wilson had undertaken to continue the work of Alexander I of Russia and that his League of Nations was merely a new version of the Holy Alliance.¹⁶

The British committee on the proposed Covenant stated:

The earlier projects which aimed at setting up a ring of European confederations with a supernational authority we have after consideration re-

¹⁴ Robinson and West, pp. 359-70.

¹⁵ Robinson and West, p. 365.

¹⁶ Lodge, p. 386.

jected, feeling that international opinion is not yet ripe for so drastic a pooling and that the only feasible method of securing the object is by way of cooperation or possibly a treaty of alliance on the lines of the more recent treaties.¹⁷

The Covenant did not put a central authority over the society of states. The League Council had no right to govern, or intervene in the domestic affairs of member states. It merely provided for the decision of adjudicable disputes by a judicial power and for a process of mediation to solve disputes arising from competition not covered by law.

The League was stillborn. Member states did not submit their disputes to the Council and began hostilities without even informing it. That princely trade union, the Holy Alliance, had been held together by the common interests of its members, with support from the feudal nobility, the bureaucrats, the army, and the police. The League of Nations was supported only as long as fear and hate of Germany served as a bond for the Allies. As fear evaporated, the bond dissolved, and the ordinary course of economic and diplomatic competition was resumed. The United States began the process of dissolution by refusing to join, and soon after the war ended this country fell into the "Catonic reaction." The out-and-out isolationists, led by the Republican party, which in the 1918 elections had won a majority in the Senate, took the position that the United States had done its full duty by Europe, that American troops must be brought home promptly, that Europe must be left to stew in its own juice. It was ancient Rome all over again, restoring the liberty of the Greek city-states and leaving them to their own devices, or England after the overthrow of Napoleon, withdrawing from Continental affairs.

It has been contended that party spirit alone killed the League in the United States Senate. But as R. S. Baker wisely remarks, "political opposition, however factitious, must have some solid basis in public opinion or emotion. . . . We benevolently wanted the League—but we didn't expect to have to pay anything for it!"¹⁸

The Senate refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty because it did not understand that America could not live apart from the rest of the world. Of the states that joined the League, some at the opportune moment disregarded the obligations they had accepted. Japan and Italy, and Germany as well, finally withdrew from membership. The

¹⁷ Temperley, *History of the Peace Treaties of Paris*, VI, 427.

¹⁸ Baker, I, 314-15.

remaining member states ostensibly continued to support the League, each for its own reasons; they never really tried to curb violations of the Covenant and never applied the economic sanctions the Covenant stipulated for such contingencies. Even had there been a collective spirit willing and strong enough to discharge the obligations assumed by the League and to enforce their fulfillment, one may reasonably question whether the recent war could have been avoided. It seems doubtful that a superpoliceman, even backed by a group, can keep the peace unless clothed in managerial powers.

Underlying the League was the concept of a world made up of independent nations; its essence was an international order that respected the "personality, sovereignty and independence of each state." Domestic affairs were considered a state's private business and as such of no concern to its neighbors; to touch them was taboo. Only conflicts arising from nondomestic affairs were matters for international regulation.

Yet is this sharp demarcation between domestic and international affairs valid? Taxation and appropriations of money are indisputably domestic affairs. But when, as we noted, Britain doubled in her own shipyards the number of keels being laid in Germany, was it not really Germany who determined how many British men-of-war were built? Germany thus influenced the amount of taxes to be levied on British subjects, as well as how they were spent. And can we deny that the high taxation in the United States at present is really due to Germany and her policy? The very first commandment of competition is to be cognizant of what your rival is doing and revise your policy so that you will be able to parry his next blow. Secret diplomacy and its spying is clear evidence of the interconnection between international and national life. The domestic doings of other states affect our daily life, and ours theirs—in working hours, wages, and standard of living.

When the ratification of the Versailles Treaty was under discussion in the United States Senate, Senator France said that the League of Nations and obligatory arbitration could not operate until all nations had agreed on co-operation to promote justice, progress, and friendship, as well as on a general principle of how to rule their own subjects. Furthermore, they should consider and agree on plans "for the removal of the economic and social causes of war," such as over- and underpopulation and exploitation of workers.¹⁹

¹⁹ Fleming, pp. 93-94.

Senator France overworked his thesis. He claimed that a *de facto* society of states can have a *de jure* organization only if all activities of its members are regulated by law—if all co-operate and none compete. Let me be more modest and affirm that a *de jure* organization is possible *when the citizens of the member states are also members of a larger de facto organization, and their first loyalty is to the federal community*. A sense of community must exist before a society can be organized. Jurists admit that no such community exists among states—that no supergovernment is possible—yet they think that instruments of *de jure* organization (laws and courts, sheriffs and police) can regulate relations among states. My answer is that public opinion, law, and ethics are tribal; their operation must be an automatic reflex of the *nexus socialis*. When there is no nexus, when states are bound only by agreements, the response is conscious and deliberate, reflecting no deep-rooted mores or general acceptances. Agreements will be kept only as long as it is convenient, or as long as those to whom it is convenient are the stronger.

In fact, there are always areas of conflict among states, as among individuals or groups within the state, which cannot be dealt with by judges and the application of legal rules. Some matters are always decided competitively. To keep competition among individuals from degenerating into fisticuffs, the state regulates it. Competition in politics may excite popular emotion, yet decisions are made, not by physical combat, but by majority vote; competition in economics may involve persuasion, threats, coercion, but rarely resorts to brute force.

These limits are put on the tools employed in competition because there is a body social which has its own conscious and unconscious behavior patterns, and the actions of individuals always to some extent comply with these mores. In a society at its climax a central authority, with its rules and nervous system, is the agency for controlling competition among both individuals and groups. In a pioneer society the control, albeit less effective, is exercised largely through public opinion. In the present community of states there are no mores and there is no public opinion; indeed, as we have already seen, no body, and therefore no nervous system. Conscious behavior—laws and courts without subconsciously ordered behavior patterns—cannot secure peace, especially if international law is confined to what is termed “international life.”

There is a similarity in some sense between legal systems and mathe-

matics or geometry. All these systems are based on axioms; each rule is a deduction from the axioms and all the rules are logically consistent. On Euclidean or non-Euclidean axioms you may build up various geometries, each logical, each having its own rules.²⁰ Starting from different axioms, one may also arrive at different legal systems. You may build a system of international law by asserting that each state is independent and has the right to manage its internal affairs as it pleases, and that international affairs are only those which aim at "the protection and advancement of the common interest of all peoples," or by asserting the opposite. Both systems will be logical. The application of the first system will be helpful in a community of isolated states where international life does not greatly influence the national; application of the opposite system in a community where even internal affairs are international.

In the present community of states, with its intermingled internal and international affairs—its states having various interests in the internal affairs of other states—the application of neither system could secure peace. The helpless stuttering of international jurists about intervention which is forbidden and necessary at the same time is evidence for the statement that international affairs are merely internal affairs seen from another angle. The existence of autonomies, on the other hand, spheres of action reserved to individuals, groups, districts, or nations, shows that there are internal affairs whose arrangement does not affect the community of all nations. The sphere of application of the two is like that of sunshine and shade, day and night—continually shifting.

The lawyer's paradise, one is led to suspect, will not be peaceful, since laws and remedies are inevitably restricted to certain types of international conflict and disregard others. The charter of the United Nations Organization has the same defects as the Covenant of the League of Nations: it excludes domestic affairs from the competency of its courts and mediating boards—in other words, it does not provide for the peaceful settlement of great international conflicts.

To demonstrate the validity of this statement, imagine for a moment that after the Vienna Congress, in 1815, the European powers had formed, instead of the Quadruple, or "Holy," Alliance, a league similar to that of 1918. Had such a league existed between 1815 and 1870, would Europe have been spared all the wars that served to

²⁰ Poincaré, *La Science et l'hypothèse*, pp. 51 ff.

round out Germany, Italy, and Russia, and divide parts of Turkey and the Austrian Empire? The answer, I fear, is negative. The problems of nineteenth-century Europe—call them nationalism or the need for bigger trading empires—could not have been solved by mediation, arbitration, or a league of nations, had all the dead masters of diplomacy from Metternich to Bismarck and Cavour had these tools at their disposal. Put yourself in Bismarck's or Cavour's place. You feel the pressure of the masses who want to merge into one nation, of the farmers and industrialists who demand one big protected market. You know that Austria with her obsolete institutions, her decaying ruling class, stands in the way of uniting the Germans under Prussia, the Italians under Savoy. Of all the tools the learned masters of international law have put in your hands, which will you select in order peacefully to achieve these national aims? There is arbitration. Will you be inclined to submit to a court the case of Prussia *vs.* Austria or Savoy *vs.* Austria? There is no doubt that the court would decide both cases in favor of Austria. Or the case of Greece, Serbia, and Rumania *vs.* Turkey? Even were the court to have it proved to its satisfaction that the Turks had misgoverned their Greek citizens and refused them autonomy, could it, by the application of international law, decide that a new state called Greece should be set up and that Turkey must assign to it all her rights in that area? Is it unreasonable to suppose that Turkey would object that the judges or mediators were trying to interfere in her domestic affairs in a matter which, according to international law, is "solely within the domestic jurisdiction" of Turkey?

No territorial change can be effected on legal grounds, for what the international lawyer regards as legal is the *status quo ante*, the *uti possidetis*. Arbitrators would have been obliged to decide against the union of Germans in one Germany, of Italians in one Italy; if violence had ensued, all the other powers would have had to assist Austria when she was attacked by Prussia and Savoy. Laws and courts solve conflicts of a world satisfied to live under the old order, which must be restored when it is disturbed. If with Metternich you think that the world order can be frozen, then, and then only, will simple arbitration help to maintain it.

If, however, you believe that changes are necessary and that states will integrate or disintegrate as the merging or splitting up of communities demands, you need some procedure other than arbitration to carry out such transformations.

Lawyers have written many tracts on the need for methods to bring about peaceful changes in international life; they have tried to devise ways and means to carry out the alterations needed in the old order and to satisfy the would-be aggressor, pushed on by malaise, before he draws his sword.²¹ It seems fairly clear that the nation with a malaise and a strong army and new weapons, convinced that it can defeat its opponent and change the order, will resort to violence whenever it is aware that it cannot otherwise get what it wants.

In general, groups of citizens do not revolt against a law when they believe that at the next election they may possibly win a majority and change it. They have confidence in the state's organization: they know that if they win, they can carry out their cherished desires, since others will obey—will not frustrate their electoral victory by violence. In interstate life this faith in the more or less smooth operation of institutions is lacking. The parties do not obey unless forced to and convinced that other states will follow suit.

The eagerness of an aggressor to carry out changes by force is increased by technological advances. These, and the belief that there is no limit to them, have created a feeling of insecurity in the world; the nation technically furthest advanced has no time to lose, since by working a miracle its opponent may overtake it. After Munich, Hitler said that the English had talked him out of the victory he already had in the bag; ²² his successors will attribute his defeat to the fact that he struck too late.

Conference, mediation, and arbitration are very useful methods of solving minor conflicts among states. They may even be applied to forestall major conflicts if, as at the Berlin or Algeciras Conference, there is a primus with its followers able to propose a diagonal and to force both parties to yield. Moreover, power joined with equity is a safeguard of peace. It is useless, however, to imagine that one can transplant organs of the state, which function only when body and soul are healthy, to an international society, which has no body, no soul, and consists of isolated entities connected by interchanges initiated by the egotism of each.

In order to prevent war, the World Charter, its drafters believed, must prevent aggression. Was war envisaged as an act of bad boys? To forestall another case of it the good boys, leaders of the United

²¹ Cruttwell, pp. 90 ff.

²² François-Poncet, p. 336.

Nations, must be prevented from becoming bad or aggressive enough to kill their neighbors.

Does the World Charter implement its Security Council to do whatever is required to attain these ends? The Security Council cannot control the domestic behavior of states. If tomorrow, let us say, an internal revolution replaces Stalin by a Russian Hitler—if the Bolsheviks are converted to nazism—the hands of the Security Council are tied. It cannot intervene in the domestic affairs of any state, especially not the states that are permanent members of the Security Council, which have the right to veto decisions.

Changes in the character of the participants, deterioration in their ethics, cannot be prevented. What about aggression? Aggression begins with peaceful penetration, with intervention in the affairs of other states. Could the Spanish-American and Boer wars or the First World War have been prevented had our present World Charter been in force?

For the first, let us assume that the Act of Chapultepec had been ratified when McKinley was President. This is to suppose that on the day when the U.S.S. "Maine" was blown up in Havana harbor there was a regional agreement between the United States and the Latin-American republics and that a regional agency had the power to apply the procedures and measures recommended in Part II of the Act. The regional agency decides to take enforcement action against Spain, but first it requests, as stipulated in Article 56, Clause 1, of the World Charter, the authorization of the Security Council.²³

Spain, still a Great Power, is a permanent member of the Council. She will surely oppose the granting of power to enforce the decision of the regional agency, and war will indeed be prevented if the regional agency respects the Council's refusal. Would this be a satisfactory solution?

Now let us consider the events leading to the Boer War. South Africa consisted of two British colonies, the Cape Colony and Natal, and two states, the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State—independent in their own opinion, subject to Britain, according to the British. The antagonism between colonies and republics was that of a progressive society of merchants toward a backward society of farmers. The merchants, called Uitlanders, invaded the farm communities,

²³ *New York Times*, June 27, 1945.

where they were oppressed. The Uitlanders revolted. England supported them, for she was bent on building up one state in one region.²⁴ Let us suppose that before the war started the Security Council had requested England and the Boer states to settle their differences peacefully. England might have objected that "nothing contained in the . . . Charter" authorized the United Nations "to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" (Article 2, Clause 7). The right of suzerainty is domestic, and no foreign power has a right to interfere in its exercise.

Britain would probably say the same thing now, should one of her dependencies revolt; she would not consider submitting to mediation any question in which her overlordship is involved; would not, for instance, permit any state to mediate between her and Kenya.

Finally, what would the Security Council, consisting of representatives of Austria-Hungary, England, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and perhaps the United States and Japan, too, have done in July, 1914, when Austria sent her ultimatum to Serbia?

During the Crimean War, Russia and Austria ceased to see eye to eye with respect to the Balkans. Though the czar had saved the Hapsburg throne in 1848, Austria joined England in opposing the partition of Turkey, and in 1878, at the Berlin Congress, again supported by England, she stopped the Russian advance. Under the Berlin arrangement Serbia came into Austria's sphere of interest, and remained there as long as her kings were from the pro-Austrian Obrenović family. In 1903 King Alexander and his wife were murdered; with the help of Russia, France, and England, Serbia revolted against Austria. What would have been the course of history had some member of the United Nations brought to the attention of the Security Council the fact that the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia "might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute" endangering "the maintenance of international peace and security" (Articles 32 and 34)? The Council could have taken effective action only if it had decided by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members, that peace was threatened, had been breached, or an act of aggression committed. In July, 1914, therefore the Security Council, could have acted only if Austria-Hungary and Germany (as members) had agreed with five other members to the necessity for intervention. We have no reason to suppose they would

²⁴ *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, VIII, 613.

have done so, since they opposed the international conference suggested by Sir Edward Grey in 1914 to deal with the Serbian question.

Situations differ, depending upon whether or not a regional agency exists. If a dispute between Russia and Yugoslavia or between England and a state under her overlordship were submitted to the Security Council, England or Russia could stop further proceedings by vetoing the decision that the peace was threatened; or, even if willing to submit the dispute to mediation, they could prevent a decision to take or to recommend a certain line of action against themselves if mediation failed. In short, Russia and England remain free to act against the members of their hierarchy.

Not so the United States, if its hierarchy should become organized. As leader it cannot proceed against a European aggressor or a member of its own hierarchy without the decision of a regional Security Council and the authorization of the World Security Council. The latter can be vetoed by any permanent member, and under Article 25 the United States is bound "to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council."

Our three cases have two common denominators: they deal with countries revolting against their overlord and with revolutionaries helped by a foreign power. Serbia was supported by Russia in her revolt against the Hapsburgs; the Uitlanders in Transvaal and Orange by Britain against the Dutch; American and Cuban advocates of Cuban independence by the United States.

The conclusion must be that if a region is organized and has its own agency to protect its members against aggression, it cannot defend itself if the aggressor is a permanent member, or a protégé of a member, of the Security Council. If the region is not organized and the dominant power has separate agreements with each state recognizing its right to interfere in the latter's internal affairs, and a permanent member or its protégé is the aggressor, the latter cannot be stopped. So long, therefore, as Russia does not organize her sphere of interest regionally, the World Charter and Security Council cannot prevent her from pursuing her national policy. And from her attitude in San Francisco it seems probable that she has no intention of organizing regionally.

One may even say that such regional organization of the world is impossible. When Tories, Whigs, and Labour first came to power in Britain they continued the policy of their predecessors. The division

of the world into regions each dominated by one Great Power is one of the blueprints of the defeated totalitarians. It is a neat project—lovely, but unrealizable. There are hierarchies of states, but none can be organized on a strictly geographical basis, for history, strategy, the holdings of competitors, personal factors, all have their influence on boundaries.

Let us suppose that the hierarchy of the United States included all states in the Americas. It would then need bases in the Pacific and bases in the north, as protection against an eastern empire. Furthermore, hierarchies are organisms of a low level, without sharply-defined limits. Like feudal societies, they are never a community of men, but always loose associations of closed groups. In feudal times the king of France and the emperor of Germany had vassals who accepted the overlordship of one and at the same time the *auctoritas* of the other. Many vassals frequently changed their allegiance in accordance with the requirements of the day. Geography selected Belgium, Portugal, and Greece as Britain's friends; when France revolted against the *Pax Britannica*, Germany was added to the list; when Germany revolted, France became Britain's friend.

The hands of the great builders of state hierarchies are guided by daily requirements. They choose their partners among those they need, whether for reasons of security (when they usually choose a neighbor) or for economic reasons (a colony or another continent) or merely to enhance their prestige among those, whether neighbors or not, who may be amenable, since they, too, may need a partner to help them out of domestic or other troubles. The statesman directing the foreign policy of his nation is like a chess player, whose moves are determined by those of his opponent. The USSR's foreign policy will influence that of both Great Britain and the United States; that of Great Britain and that of the United States will in turn influence that of Russia.

The negotiators of the treaties to end the second World War will do their best to ruin the defeated countries and to cripple those whom a long, sustained effort to maintain the old order has weakened. As at Utrecht, the treaty following the second World War will be detrimental to powers that won the war but have proven insufficiently strong to maintain their leadership, and nothing will be done to divide the world into healthy states or to establish a balance among states. The failure is hidden behind the "United Nations" screen—nations

united as long as they have common enemies, willing to make arrangements with each other as long as they are too tired to start a new war or their internal affairs do not force them to it.

Though the game is only just finished, we already hear the voice of the croupiers crying, "Messieurs, faites vos jeux."

Without a consistent body no general nervous system or government can exist; without a central authority to dominate, or at least to limit and control, all competitive activities of the state, violence as one method of competition cannot be eliminated. Says the politician, if every state would only accept my system of government—if the internal affairs of each state could be managed by the kind of group to which I myself belong—peace would be assured to the world.

The *New York Times*, for example, reports on December 4, 1945, that Professor Harold Laski said to a New York audience:

We have come to the boundaries of the final dividing line between liberalism and socialism. There is no middle way. Free enterprise and market economy mean war: socialism and planned economy mean peace. All attempts to find a compromise are satanic illusion. We must plan our civilization.

This statement, disregarding all teaching of history and science, was not made by a soap-box orator, but by a university professor, trained in what is called "political science," to an audience of intellectuals. The statement itself is quite similar to those made by one of the figures who played upon the emotions of their audience during the French Revolution. There is just one small difference: then, war was said to be the consequence of the planned economy of the tyrant and his bureaucrats, and peace the inevitable result of the liberalism of free enterprise. I am convinced that if we had access to documents on Chinese or Egyptian revolutions of times much more remote than the era of *Le Moniteur* of French Revolutionary days, we could produce quite a respectable collection of statements to match that of Laski. Lacking acquaintance with such writings, I can only say that the monarchical system seemed to Metternich as strong security for peace as democracy did for French revolutionists and Wilson, and socialism or communism for Laski and Stalin.

Historical evidence shows that while a nuclear change, a change in the elite, alters the homogeneous element in a state, increasing or decreasing the power of the dominant and thereby influencing the num-

ber of heterogeneous elements which can be held together, it does not appear to change the basic foreign policy of nations or their geographical demands. Even if this or that system of government were proven universally applicable and were so accepted, states would still have their individual defects and would tend to remedy them by acquiring a neighbor's lands and goods—a remedy which entails violence.

Other politicians, the great believers in instinct, nature, and pre-established harmony, preach that the panacea for all maladies is freedom. Free migration, free trade, and freedom in every other respect for all nations is the best security for peace. In a letter to a friend the Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt wrote on July 2, 1871:

Great mischief was perpetrated in the last century, chiefly by Rousseau with his theory of the goodness of human nature. From it the man in the street and the college graduate distilled the doctrine of the golden age which was bound to come if noble mankind was only left alone. The consequence was, as every child knows, the complete eradication of the concept of authority from the heads of mortal men; of course they periodically fall under the rule of sheer force.²⁵

Complete freedom—every man's right to act as he pleases—is good only when we are capable of restraining ourselves, when our ethical standards are high enough so that we can live without guardians, procurators, and policemen. Freedom re-establishes nature's order, which, though rumored to be the order of Paradise, when practiced looks more like that of the jungle, where dominant apes have all the rights, and the subservient none. Among the apes, says Professor Hooton, "an equilibrium is established by the recognition of the scale of dominance. When this is upset, an entire readjustment of group-life follows."²⁶

British experience with the principle of *laissez faire* proves my contention. During the industrial revolution, when the handicraft system with its special provisions for the co-operation of capital and labor dissolved, competition between the two classes began. Each tried to organize, and the state intervened to regulate conflicts. By the eighteenth century trade unions were already active and wages were regulated by public authority. But in 1799 Pitt's Combination Act prohibited workers from organizing: "*laissez-faire* or the objection to interference by government became a theory, but first it was a fact."

²⁵ Burckhardt, p. 132.

²⁶ Hooton, pp. 36, 324 ff.

Thus, organization was replaced by "freedom"—an order under which the stronger kept the weaker from organizing and the state from interfering on the latter's behalf. The dominant party (capital) like the dominant ape, misused its power, and the subordinate (labor) starved.²⁷

Eventually the workers' reaction to oppression, culminating in the Luddist revolts in the early nineteenth century, made government interference imperative, and trade unions were legalized once more. Revolts had changed the balance. And labor, having attained its objective, was no less inclined than capital to keep others from organizing and the state from interfering.

Thus, the freedom advocated by some politicians and statesmen, *laissez faire* in foreign affairs, means the countenancing of only such competition among groups as will serve the interests of the stronger. The weaker may not combine with other states to become strong, interference by the society of states for the protection of the oppressed is not permissible, and revolution remains the sole recourse of the weak.

Alexander's successors, the Hellenistic kings, defended the right of Greek city-states to manage their own affairs; France fought for the *liberté teutonique*, the right of each German prince to rule his subjects as he pleased, and so prevented one German ruler from uniting the German states into an empire; England supported the freedom of Continental states, liberating Europe when Louis XIV, Napoleon, and Wilhelm II wanted to make an empire of it. All in the name of freedom, the Greek city-states, the German principalities, and the states of Continental Europe were prevented—like the workers—from organizing. Their lack of organization made it possible for the Diadochi to rule the Greek peninsula, for the French kings to use Germany as a territory for grabuge, for England to pursue her own policy. And time and again there was revolt among the discontented in the effort to replace the many local governors—an unorganized freedom—by one central government.

On the other hand, it was Britain who set the stage for Bismarck's fight for Prussian hegemony. When after 1815 England needed a strong ally against France, she enlarged Prussia by allowing her to take over the Rhine provinces. When it turned against her interest to preserve the freedom of a hundred or more local governors, she fostered Prussia's dominion.

²⁷ Trevelyan, *English Social History*, p. 483.

Similarly, over a period of decades Britain upheld Turkey's rule in the Balkans, a rule repressive of Balkan liberty. And Germany, needing a united state on her road to Bagdad and a strong ally against Russia, fought to maintain Austrian and Hungarian supremacy over the Slavs.

Thus, a neighbor wanting to divide the nations on its borders or to keep them divided, fights for the freedom of the local governors; while one who needs a strong ally fights for a central authority, for organization. Each Great Power, in pursuit of its own national policy, disregards the interest of other nations and that of an emerging community of nations. When in consequence the oppressed revolt, their revolt is supported by other nations with other policies. The freedom of every nation to manage its affairs as it pleases does not always lead to peace, either internal or external.

One could multiply the instances almost at random. Iraq, a mandated territory, was liberated on England's advice; she was now considered able to govern herself. The League of Nations reluctantly agreed. Liberation was followed by a massacre of the Assyrians, showing that Iraq was unable to govern other ethnic groups living on her territory.²⁸ Of the Assyrian debacle Saroyan writes:

Badal said, "I cannot read Assyrian. I was born in the old country, but I want to get over it."

He sounded tired, not physically but spiritually.

"Why?" I said. "Why do you want to get over it?"

"Well," he laughed, "simply because everything is washed up over there." I am repeating his words precisely, putting in nothing of my own. "We were a great people once," he went on. "But that was yesterday, the day before yesterday. Now we are a topic in ancient history. We had a great civilization. They're still admiring it. Now I am in America learning how to cut hair. We're washed up as a race, we're through, it's all over, why should I learn to read the language? We have no writers, we have no news—well, there is a little news: once in a while the English encourage the Arabs to massacre us, that is all. It's an old story, we know all about it. The news comes over to us through the Associated Press, anyway."²⁹

Let us assume that some magician could transform the parochial groups in a free India into co-operating parties. Would an independent, self-governing India necessarily have peaceful relations with other

²⁸ *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, p. 130; *Bulletin of International News*, Vol. IV, No. 8, pp. 171 ff., Oct. 15, 1927, Vol. VI, No. 11, pp. 251 ff., Dec. 5, 1927.

²⁹ *The Daring Young Man on the Flying Trapeze*, Random House, 1934, pp. 37-38.

countries? Overpopulated India needs room. If her emigrants go to other independent countries rather than to British colonies and are treated as they were in Africa, conflicts will arise. So long as the conflicts were between parts of the British Commonwealth, under one crown, imperial conferences could settle, then smooth over difficulties. Without pressure from a mother country, is not violence likely?

Suppose Britain acceded to the demand for the independence of all those "thirteen countries" Mr. Willkie "saw."³⁰ The Arab world would then be split into various states; the Moslem likewise. The situation would be similar to that of Gaul, divided among its feudal domains; and lead naturally to pan-Moslem and pan-Arab movements, to wars of unification.

Or consider Palestine, a Jewish state on the edge of an Arab world, in a territory always coveted by those who have ruled Mesopotamia or Egypt. Can human optimism reach such a peak as to hope that the homeland of the Jews—the Mediterranean seaboard of the land of the Arabs—will not be the scene of war?

Suppose that independent Persia, repeating history, should become part of a Moslem pan-state or the leader of a pan-Arab world, and thereby part of a strong state bordering India. Assume that independent India is in a situation somewhat similar to that of Ceylon, Malta, or Newfoundland, split by parochial groups. The pan-Arab neighbor would then protect the Indian Moslem minority, working to split up India. Russia's interests, too, her desire for ports in a warm sea, might contribute toward keeping parochialism alive in India as a place for grabuge.

As long as these dominions are parts of the British Empire, as long as there are vassal states on England's borders and they occupy territories which "happen to be strategic points on the military roads and trade routes of the world," and one paramount power controls their policy, their relations will be peaceful. Hope may exist that prosperity, education, and the welding effect of new ideas will unify these peoples, however slowly. Domination may become superfluous if self-restraint reaches a point at which independent men, free masses, behave like those governed by an imperial authority stronger and wiser than they.

President Wilson, by saying that the world is "one vicinage," and Mr. Willkie, by calling his book *One World*, expressed the idea that

³⁰ Willkie, pp. 15 ff., 82 ff.

the world is a system of interdependent parts in which no fraction can live "in liberty and independence."

"There is," argued Burke, "*a law of neighborhood* which does not leave a man perfect master on his ground. . . . This principle is also bestowed on the grand vicinage of Europe."³¹ It must accept the restraints put upon it in the interests of the whole. Suez and the road through Asia Minor to the East are just such spots as are New Orleans and Lower Canada; those in the Western Hemisphere were rightly prevented from seceding, and those in the Eastern should be made to stay within the British Commonwealth. The *Pax Britannica* meant order. It gave the nineteenth century the possibility of changing the *status quo*, sometimes by negotiation, sometimes by threat, even by violence; but everybody did not have to fight everybody else for every change. Revolution will follow revolution until a similar order is established.

It is a truism that as the character of individuals is modified with the passage of time, their reactions change. But it does not follow that the character of the masses also changes. The relation of the individual to the mass is similar to that of atom to compound. The properties of compounds or groups are not the sum of the qualities of the atoms composing them; some qualities may be neutralized by others, some may be increased or modified, and new ones may be created. A change in an atom will not necessarily cause a change—let alone the same change—in the compound.

To secure peace, therefore, it is not enough to convince individuals that it is more reasonable to agree with their competitors and follow the diagonal which gives maximum play to the desires and interests of both than to fight, kill, and appropriate the spoils. Men must be educated to the point where, as *groups* they will act with the reason, ethics, and restraints they show as individuals.

There has certainly been a great change in the ethics of statesmen since Elizabethan England. The world was then ruled by a corrupt oligarchy; sovereigns and their ministers considered public office a means of acquiring power and thereby wealth. Judges accepted bribes as a matter of course, and only the wealthy and mighty could be sure

³¹ "Two Letters Addressed to a Member of the Present Parliament on the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France," Burke, *Select Works*, ed. by E. J. Payne, 3 vols., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888-1892, III, 82; Phillimore, I, 553; *Corpus juris*, XLVI, 643, "Nuisance."

of getting "justice."³² Heavy drinkers and keen fighters, men without the inhibitions which education imposes, ruled the world.³³ Obviously, modern politicians and statesmen exercise greater self-restraint and have better ethics. However, acting as a group they behave not unlike their less ethical ancestors. In her policy toward competitors Elizabethan England was no more ruthless than Victorian or post-Victorian England. President Wilson proposed that states should follow in their dealings with each other the rules of conduct accepted by men as individuals. But when the Versailles Treaty was drafted, his proposals were almost forgotten.³⁴

Almost a century before, Canning had remarked to a member of Parliament: "It is difficult to apply to politics those pure abstract principles, which are indispensable to the excellence of private ethics."³⁵ Gustave le Bon sought to explain the phenomenon by saying that men in crowds lose their inhibitions and become irresponsible; that men engaged in transacting their group's business behave as if they were in a crowd. Le Bon, however, only diagnoses; he does not explain.³⁶ The antithesis between individual and group behavior can be explained by the presence or absence of a "link." Individuals act in accordance with rules imposed upon them by common opinion. We are bound to those who belong to our group, who are like us, and separated from those who are unlike us, who have skin of another color or different mores. The stronger the link, the greater the sense of community among members of the group. Individuals of a group bound by the same origin, religion, and customs, under the pressure of common opinion will protect one another. The greater the gap between the "we's" and the "they's," the less the group on the inside will be influenced by inhibitions, ethics, or laws in its behavior toward outsiders.

The behavior of white men in a position to rule men of another race, who all look alike to them, is sharp evidence for our statement. Whites and Negroes are, as W. E. B. Dubois has written, separated by a "thick sheet of invisible but horribly tangible plate glass."³⁷ Those who are free to do as they please and those who are imprisoned behind that stiff transparency find difficulty in understanding each other. To say that separate groups are less considerate in dealing with

³² Huxley, *Elizabeth, Creature of Circumstances*, Harper, 1942, p. 114.

³³ Trevelyan, *English Social History*, pp. 314, 570.

³⁵ Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning*, p. 447.

³⁴ Notter, p. 73.

³⁶ Le Bon, pp. 39 ff.

³⁷ Quoted in Myrdal and others, I, 680.

each other than average civilized human beings is just another way of saying that public opinion, law, and ethics are tribal. Hence a prerequisite for the improvement of international ethics is a "group" humanity.

I have tried to show that the idealists' superstate, the lawyers' attempt to transplant group institutions to international life, the politicians' machinations to impose their political creed everywhere, and the statesmen's endeavor to make all nations free, as well as the philosophers' theory that an improvement in the ethics of individuals will make international life more honest are all bound to come to naught if relied upon to establish world order. I have tried to prove that none of the proposed methods can be applied now and that none can secure lasting peace. Is the capstone of the argument, then, the advice of Iago to Roderigo, "Put money in thy purse. . . . Make all the money thou canst,"³⁸ or the admonition of Count Garden, "Be strong, as there is no illusion, no error in force—"? Such is not my conclusion, for the simple reason that history shows us that might can destroy, but cannot create. "Power politics," as we always dub our enemies' policies, if successful are more than brute force.

Professor Spykman introduces his *America's Strategy in World Politics* with an expression of faith in power: "Without mechanical power—the ability to move mass—there can be no technology. Without political power—the ability to move men—technology cannot serve a social purpose."³⁹ The objection to such statements is not only that they are so vague as to be almost devoid of meaning but also that they are motivated by the belief that power pressure—violence—is in the last analysis creative and that with the requisite force any plan can be realized.

If you analyze one of the great wonders of medieval architecture, such as the cathedral at Chartres or Nôtre Dame in Paris, you will notice that various periods have built it and others remodeled it, each leaving its own imprint. Time, by giving all parts the same patina, by corroding all parts indiscriminately, has made of it a harmonious entity. We are told that the Gothic cathedral is the result of man's ability to move material, since power is needed to put one block on another, to shape fine gargoyles and delicate rose windows out of

³⁸ Iago, in Shakespeare's *Othello*, Act I, scene 3; Count de Garden, I, iv.

³⁹ Page 11.

stone. I object; in order to create these or other wonders, be they of stone, words, or deeds, more than power is required. Fantasy, ability to dream, knowledge of materials, their properties and laws and also the art of transforming them and a will to create are essential. Power is only one of many instruments in the hands of a master, who must be endowed with imagination and vision to make his dreams real.

The national policy of a country, its manifest destiny, is likewise composed of the dreams of successive generations and shaped by tradition and events. To realize it, or parts of it, a strong nation is needed—a consistent, well-articulated, and organized mass. But aside from power, the artist is needed, the man who can take advantage of the historic moment to weaken or destroy his country's enemies and strengthen its friends. And the man who knows his material uses wisely all the tools at his disposal.

Bismarck and Cavour, great empire builders of the nineteenth century, employed not only force against their enemies but also persuasion upon others, and before starting on the traditional road of their country's development they diagnosed its situation correctly and devised a good plan.

But does not the admission that politics is an art and the great statesman an artist, realizing in the *moment historique* the dreams of those who have died, carry the implication that lasting peace among nations is impossible?

Each great body social, it is true, produces at some stage of its evolution a genius who is able to consolidate it, strengthen its friends and weaken its enemies. The consolidation is followed by expansion, then overexpansion, which in turn is succeeded by exhaustion and regression. Each of these periods is full of wars. This is the experience of the past. Yet human behavior has before it the possibility of becoming more rational; truth has a healing effect, and intelligence can devise other methods than warfare for the integration and disintegration of states. Reasonable employers nowadays are interested in the welfare of their workers; long working hours and living in slums ruin the employer, just as irrational farming and deforestation despoil the land. Statesmen must also come to recognize that by oppressing minorities, whether within the state or organized as independent states, they create malaise. Malaise leads to wars, and these finally ruin the victors, too.

Two possibilities are open for lasting peace. One is to "groupify"

mankind—create a cosmopolitan elite and a large group of homogeneous elements ready to follow its lead without compulsion and strong enough to rule the heterogeneous groups—that is, set up all the conditions which according to historical experience are essential for the formation of a body social and its co-ordination by a single mind and government. The other is to admit that the community of states is an organism at a low level of integration, at peace when balanced, at war when unbalanced. By this admission, to secure peace the prerequisites for a balance must be established.

It is futile even to speculate whether mankind can be liberated from the effects of its past and of its environment, whether there can be developed one type of man in the north and the south, the east and the west, all children of the same modern age. It is futile simply because at present man is divided. Ethical and highly cultured men have more primitive men as their contemporaries.

As long as man is bound to the earth and influenced by environment, the community of states will consist of egocentric members—at peace when their competition is along a diagonal. It stands to reason that the greater the number of really independent states in a given period and the more nearly equal they are, the more easily a balance is worked out among them. Balance is an order which imposes restraints on nations, groups within nations, and individuals within groups. It is a diagonal of forces, though less stable than that imposed by a primus or a central authority. Necessarily, therefore, the less any minority is oppressed and the better its chance of becoming a majority, the less danger is there of revolt. A flexible articulation within states and among states is a guarantee of peace.

The great danger for the future is that only two great powers will exist and the world will be split between them. Each will have its own followers, and their conflict will end, not in a *monarchia universalis*, but in a chaos like that of the Dark Ages. The enemy of any order is discontent. The fight for a new order is always a struggle to alleviate such discontent. In the United States attempts are being made to remedy defects. Methods are being worked out to bring about more tolerance between Negroes and whites, Christians and Jews—to make of all citizens equal Americans. Other defects, such as the economic ills of the southwest, are being seriously studied, and attempt follows attempt to correct them.

There is no general remedy for the maladies of a state; one is applica-

ble to personal defects, another to overpopulation, still others to bad organization. The real cause of discontent must be found in each case before a remedy can be prescribed. There is no general solution, no universal cure for all maladies; only impartial research can ferret out the root of a discontent, and only a thorough examination of political and economic life by unbiased inquirers can sift truth from propaganda.

President Wilson clearly visualized the problem facing the Paris Conference after World War I. He often returned to the statement that only a just parochial peace can be internationally guaranteed or is worth guaranteeing. One may disagree on the ground that self-determination is not the right principle by which to create healthy states. One may argue, supported by historical evidence, that nations must have a secure habitat which will make them viable, a flexible articulation which renders democracy possible, and an organization which reduces discontent sufficiently so that heterogeneous elements can reasonably hope for a better future. But one must admit that among healthy states a good parochial peace is the chief pillar for lasting world peace.

One may disagree with Wilson's opposition to the balance of power as a pillar of peace and not share his faith in a league of nations as an ideal organization of states. But I must admit that his draft for the Covenant of the League was a good tool for diplomacy by conference and useful when states are balanced. The great failure of the Paris Conference was that it tried to re-establish a balance which functioned well in the nineteenth century, but for which the elements no longer existed, and thus there were created niches for conquerors who were sure to come.

Today, as in 1918, it should be realized that there are prerequisites for a balanced state of society and that it is the statesman's job to try to institute conditions in which such a balance can be achieved and maintained with the help of diplomacy by conference. We should not pretend that our goal is a federal world state, when a right of veto shows the isolated nature of states. But we must realize that peace—balance—depends upon both internal and external policies. The more thoroughly we organize our own state, the more planned its activities, and the higher its stage of self-sufficiency and co-ordination, the less restrained will be its activities in deference to the interest of other states. The greater the power of a state, the more ruthless it becomes,

I have expressed the same thought in saying the better-organized its members, the less organizable the superorganism. This objection to perfect self-containment and the apparent advocacy of wasteful competition may seem irrational; but the former is rigid, the latter flexible. It is in the interest of every Great Power to realize that peace can last only in a world where more than two Great Powers are equal, being separated from each other by smaller states dependent upon more than one.

Alexander the Great's empire was followed by a balance of power between the Diadochi. When one of the three lost his power, wars followed. When the Eastern Empire was overrun by Islam, two powers—one in the West, the other in the East—isolated themselves, and wars followed.

Wars in the West against the invaders, wars in the East for liberation from the Eastern Roman Empire, helped to unite under Charlemagne the different groups living on territories later called France, Italy, and Germany. This central Empire disappeared and reappeared under various leaders: Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon, William II, and Hitler. Each tried to build a universal Empire to dominate the world of his day. Each state overexpanded and was reduced to its natural boundaries or less. During the long history of European domination of the world, the periods when the majority of nations lived in healthy states and could remedy their defects by exchanges with other states on reasonable terms were few. The period of Britain's predominance, that of the *pax Britannica*, was such an intermission. One power fights for predominance, for the *Monarchia universalis*; others oppose unity and protect each nation's right to its own state. (See maps on page 195, on page 208, and on page 297. In other words, periods of war are more common than periods of peace.

PART THREE: APPLICATION

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

THE FIRST WORLD WAR was a revolt against the *Pax Britannica*. The treaties were attempts to restore Britain's rule and to secure the balance on the European continent by supplementing Russia, considered nonexistent, by a league of secondary powers. The aftermath of the war proved that the Commonwealth of British Nations was on the road to further disintegration. At Locarno the Dominions separated themselves from the mother country and followed the isolationist policy of the United States. Britain was no longer a power that could be neither defeated nor exhausted. Economically weakened, and frightened by the new weapon of air warfare, she was unable to restore her prestige and world position.

The Old World lost its economic order with the political. The free-trading center, England, became an economic entity: the British Commonwealth of Nations. Meanwhile, the other center, the one hitherto ready to accept all migrants, the United States, also closed its doors; quota laws shut the gates of Eldorado to the hungry masses of Europe. There was a short-lived economic revival after World War I, but the devastating crash of 1929 showed the real situation: Europe's diminished purchasing power; America's increased productive power. Between 1929 and the third quarter of 1932 the value of international trade shrank more than 65 percent, average prices fell about 50 percent, and the volume of goods exchanged about 25 percent.

The division of Austria-Hungary after the first World War and the forming of new states out of parts of Germany and Russia cut prosperous countries into pieces. Capitals lost their hinterlands and had to adjust themselves to provincial life; the former ruling class became *nouveaux pauvres*, and the reduction in their purchasing power reacted on their banker, shipper, and insurance agent, London.

Economically Austria-Hungary had been well balanced. The various economic sections—the industrial provinces of Austria and Bohemia, the agricultural provinces of Hungary—were adjusted before the first World War to supply without tariff barriers the sixty million

inhabitants of the Monarchy. But its population was heterogeneous. In trying to make states with homogeneous populations, the treaties of St. Germain and Trianon ruptured the economic unity of the area. At the end of the period for which free trade had been stipulated, tariff walls were erected, and the small states suffered from their narrow markets. In Hungary farmers and flour mills went on the rocks, while new industries flourished under protection. In Austria and Czechoslovakia manufacturers failed, while farmers and millers prospered. Soldiers, civil servants, and railway men, dismissed when parts of Hungary were incorporated into Czech, Yugoslav, and Rumanian states, joined the already teeming intellectual proletariat of Budapest. In Austria and in Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland the crisis wiped out the purchasing power of once flourishing communities.

In Germany the situation was as bad as in the former Austria-Hungary, perhaps worse. On December 3, 1930, Hjalmar Schacht said, "The middle class has lost all its prosperity and consists of have-nots." And an Englishman traveling through Continental Europe wrote, "Of all European nations it is Germany upon which have fallen the worst effects of the international crisis."¹

Germany had 6,000,000 unemployed, including 45,000 university graduates, and it was calculated that by 1935 the latter would number 105,000. Conrad Heiden writes of Nazi Germany:

The intellectual proletariat awoke from its hopelessness. Here was a class which could give impetus to a revolution. They streamed out of the overcrowded universities, took the jobs or created new ones for themselves. For years Germany had been suffering from a surplus of men with academic training.²


Heiden estimated that before Hitler Germany had 10,000 positions open every year for academically trained men and 28,000 graduates looking for employment.

All university graduates considered it beneath them to do work for which a degree was not a prerequisite; in this respect there is a marked difference between the United States and Europe. Instigators of revolutionary movements are usually dissatisfied members of the once ruling class who have become leaders of subordinate groups. University graduates who cannot make a living in their profession and the bourgeois who have lost their fortunes are the most dangerous

¹ Schacht, in *American Chamber of Commerce, Bulletin*, Berlin, March 16, 1934; Heiden, p. 332.

² Heiden, p. 580.

THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD ISLAND



elements in any society. Discontent imbues them with ideas of reshaping the world, demands for what they consider to be absolute necessities, and a firm resolution to achieve their ends. They lack the patience of those brought up in toil and scarcity.

The host of malcontents in Germany were again awaiting some messiah, some miracle, and the pseudo-Kyffhäuser appeared, choosing Berchtesgaden—near the cave associated in memory with the sleeping emperor—for his residence. Hitler convinced them that their troubles were due to lack of land, to their Continental jail, and that a big self-sufficient state alone could make them prosperous. He promised to divide the land of the “haves” among the “have-nots.” Gustav Stolper³ has called the idea of the division of the world into haves and have-nots a fable; others have called the belief that Germany lacked raw materials and land a myth. But it does not greatly matter whether scholars find a political idea true or false; its emotional value is what counts. Discontented people are not logical, and the Germans believed in Hitler’s promises. The hungry crowd was ready to lay its misfortunes at the door of anyone except itself, and the Allied victors of the war, plus those in Germany who had come to the fore under the republican regime, were the logical candidates for blame.

Hitler tried to induce England to join Germany in dividing Russia. England, his geopoliticians said, ought to realize that the United States was her one enemy, that it wished to take over her power, which she could retain by associating herself with Germany. When England refused and continued to sponsor the small nations, Germany turned to Russia. Russia was to remain intact, but the British Dominions and parts of South America were to be acquired and divided between Russia and Germany.⁴

The two plans—division of Russia with British help and division of the British dependencies—were alternative only in the sense that Hitler intended first to strengthen Germany by surrounding her with vassal states, then to acquire land in order to be self-sufficient.

Banse, referring to the situation before the first World War, argues:

The German Empire in particular was badly over-populated. . . . Every year hundreds of thousands of her best man-power scattered itself all over the world in foreign service. It is not surprising that in such circumstances the internal pressure became higher and higher, so that the

³ *This Age of Fable*, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1942, pp. 181 ff.

⁴ Rauschnig, p. 109; Heiden, p. 321.

pent-up forces sought any kind of outlet and were ready to burst forth at any moment.

The Allies (England, Russia and France), on the other hand, had too much room. They had spread over the greater part of the globe, possessed every raw material that the stomach and machines of Man could require, and were unable to produce enough white people of their own to develop their vast territories economically, or even to keep military or civil control of them. But they had not sufficient generosity to pass some of it on to the Central Powers (by sale, for instance); no, they kept a jealous watch over every acre of land, even when it was nothing but a dreary desert.⁵

Malaise in Germany and the lure of foreign countries with empty land, which they were unable or unwilling to protect, led to World War II. Since Britain had not built two planes to Germany's one, in imitation of her shipbuilding program before 1914, Germany became convinced that she was a match for the island empire, especially since Britain had no support on the Continent. France was considered decadent, lulled into false security behind a wall that could easily be battered down by a mechanized army and air fleet. The other states constructed by the Paris treaties to balance Germany on the east—Poland and members of the Little Entente—were not united, nor were they all reliable allies of France. Poland, offended by the Locarno agreement, which did not guarantee her frontiers with Germany, tried in 1932 to make herself secure through an understanding with Germany and Russia. Rumania and Yugoslavia needed Germany as a customer and were greatly impressed by the growing might of the Third Reich. Czechoslovakia, France's sole reliable ally, was undermined by her internal defects and heterogeneous elements. The Versailles Treaty proved ineffective, since it did not keep Germany weak or provide for any strong power or powers to balance her.

The 1930's were very important in determining possible tactics. A League of Nations Commission reported that the Japanese attack on China was a case of pure aggression and that the Japanese alibi to the effect that Japan had been wronged and was seeking reparation did not tally with the facts. But Britain and the League were helpless. The old order was not defended against Japan, Italy, and Germany; or at least the measures of defense were lukewarm. Until 1939 the acquisitions of enterprising belligerents were honored, or at any rate tolerated. Hitler, noting that the invasion of Manchukuo and Ethiopia, as well as

⁵ Pages 79-80.

Japan's subsequent aggression against China, went unpunished—that no one policed the world—risked armed intervention in Spain. An apt pupil, he made it a dress rehearsal for the second World War, demonstrating at the same time that there was no such thing as a concert of Great Powers and that the League of Nations was hollow.

It has often been argued, and lately by Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson, that "It is not clear at what point in matter of time the face of the world began to turn from peace toward war" and that "the political turning point was probably the refusal of France in 1932 to co-operate in the support of representative government in Germany, with the consequent overthrow of the Republic by Hitler."⁶ To write a history of yesterday while its shadows still darken our thoughts is impossible, but I will venture to say, with much support from history, that the foreign policy of a country is not modified by the coming to power of a new ruling class—especially so far as geographical demands are concerned.

Comparisons such as those between France and Germany, Napoleon and Hitler, may be useful propaganda, but they are not sound history. Even if Herr Hitler had not overthrown the Republic, Field Marshal von Hindenburg and his associates the German nationalists would, perhaps more politely and subtly, have prepared for the new war and launched it as soon as they judged the situation ripe. Hitler was able to become the Fuehrer because in him the military, the bureaucrats, and the conservatives thought they had found the right man to further their policy—the policy of Bismarck and of William II—by dominating Austria, the Balkans, and Turkey to control the road to the East.

The Italian case is similar. For decades thousands of Italians had emigrated every year. Before the first World War ten million Italians lived in the Western Hemisphere. By sending their savings to their families, by investing money in Italy and finally retiring as small capitalists to their native villages they (together with the tourists) gave Italy what little prosperity she enjoyed. But in the twenties emigration to the Western Hemisphere dropped from about 200,000 annually to 59,000 in 1930. Propaganda and state aid increased the number of births to 426,000 in 1934.

Mussolini not only knew, when he assumed power, that Italy was behind the times and that Italians emigrated rather than struggle against conditions

⁶ Page 191.

at home, but he had seen enough diverse environments to appreciate that Italian resources were not being fully or most economically utilized, and that the Italians were largely ignorant of advances made elsewhere.⁷

Mussolini recalled Italians from other countries and tried to organize those who remained outside Italy. Though he reclaimed swamps for farmland and increased agricultural and industrial output by adopting progressive methods, the day was bound to come when the people could not make even the poor living to which they were accustomed—when there were no farms and no work to be had, in a land without coal, iron, or other ores.

Mussolini's efforts to build up a strong nation of warriors for a Mediterranean empire and to acquire by conquest sparsely inhabited lands in Africa brought Italy into the second World War when France collapsed and England's fall seemed imminent. Germany's story all over again, except that Germany's pretensions to being a self-sufficient empire were based on her alleged racial superiority, while Italy's were based on history.

"Co-prosperity in Asia" is the Japanese version. Attributing Japan's malaise to her overcrowded islands, the military caste was out for land. And as in Germany, the spirit of aggression fed upon the weakness of other states. China's internal difficulties, the fighting between various warlords, growing anarchy—these were the counterparts of the troubles of Balkanized central Europe. In Europe one integrating state is flanked by the small successors to disintegrated states—successors with dynamic minorities. In Asia the integrating state's opponent was a single state seemingly on the road to disintegration.⁸

In all three countries the rulers convinced their followers that their malaise was due to the meanness of foreigners who withheld from them the empty lands of the world, though they were in no position to prevent this territory from being seized. And, as is usual when the weakening of a paramount power is noticed, some dependents revolted. Large and small states in Europe disregarded Britain's wishes; diplomatic defeat followed diplomatic defeat. Russia, the Balkan States, and Turkey refused more or less decisively to follow Britain's lead; some joined the Axis; others tried to navigate under the flag of neutrality. All forgot that they owed their existence to Britain; none

⁷ H. Kemp, "Italy's Geographer-in-Chief, Mussolini," *The Journal of Geography*, April, 1940, p. 134.

⁸ Lederer, p. 224; Schumpeter, p. 45; Penrose, in Schumpeter, pp. 80 ff.

bethought themselves of Ataluf's comment on the essentialness of Rome to the world. To avoid eternal warfare, someone must be supreme or a balance must exist—order must reign. A fair ruler, one animated by the high principles of justice and law, is rare. It was to the world's interest that Rome and later Britain should remain paramount, but the barbarians were short-sighted and revolted.

We have seen that war is a revolt against the old order when it is commonly believed that it will not be adequately defended. The reluctance of the ruling class to fight for its rights and privileges, thus giving to rebelling elements the impression that it has lost control over the army, is one symptom of the prerevolutionary state in any society; others, as I have noted, are malaise, a cramped situation, a leader with a new idea mesmerizing the discontented into hopes of a paradise of comforts, obstinacy in both camps, and faith in the success of a new weapon. In the 1930's all these symptoms were present. The war was started by countries which, rightly or wrongly, thought they could solve their problems by acquiring land—underpopulated land, or land which if controlled would deliver raw materials more cheaply than they could be obtained under the existing order. England herself neither owned nor controlled this land. The one imperial remnant was her obligation to protect the members of the Commonwealth; like St. Peter she held the key to heaven. If the key fell into the hands of any state beyond the *limes*, her partners could not defend their heaven. The revolt occurred because the rebels believed she could no longer protect her empire or operate the *Pax Britannica*.

Germany's war against Russia is a different case. In 1914 Serbia revolted against Austria-Hungary, who dominated her economically. To secure for herself the road to Bagdad, Germany protected her subservient friend, the Dual Monarchy; Russia, in turn, seeking a road to the Mediterranean, objected to German-Austrian domination of the Balkans.

One of Russia's defects is a lack of outlets. So long as she does not control routes to the outside world, she can easily be cut off, especially in time of war; even in the days of the czars she was handicapped by not having a military port. The Baltic could always be made an inland sea if a strong power got hold of Denmark or Norway. During World War II, when Germany occupied those countries, goods could not be shipped to Russia via the Baltic. The outlet from the Black Sea, in

Turkish hands, leads to the eastern Mediterranean—a segregated part of it dominated by Greece and the islands between Greece and Asia Minor; consequently, this outlet also was of no use to Russia when this area was dominated by another power. Murmansk, her only ocean port, has serious drawbacks. The czar's policy was, therefore, to put it simply, to acquire one or more "Louisianas"—routes that would be safe in peace and war.

Soviet Russia inherited this policy. The peace treaties of 1918, by reducing Russia's seacoast, strengthened her demand for open ports. The Baltic coast was held by the independent states of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Kronstadt and Leningrad, Russia's ports on the Baltic, lie deep in the Gulf of Finland, controlled by Finland and Estonia.

When Bessarabia was given to Rumania, Russia lost an important coast on the Black Sea and command of the Danube estuary.

The czar's policy could be followed only if Russia first regained the territory lost after World War I. She made a pact with Germany in 1939 because the German bid for Russia's neutrality exceeded the price the Allies were ready to pay for her assistance. Admitting that the Baltic countries belonged to Russia's sphere of interest, Germany set them free to shift for themselves. Their plight is a situation worth noting, since it is a situation often repeated; we saw a classic example of it earlier in the position of Greek city-states when the Diadochi succeeded to Alexander's empire. A small state remains independent as long as it has competing neighbors, and independence ceases when the neighbors agree to divide it or when one of them uses it to pay another for services rendered. The small power with only one neighbor can be suffocated.

When Russia had acquired the right to garrison the Baltic seaports, she promptly annexed Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. Her participation in the war against Poland, her war against Finland, and her agreement with Rumania restored to her roughly what she had lost after World War I. Having reached her former boundaries, she continued to follow the czarist policy, and this inevitably brought her into conflict with Germany, heir of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy (dominion over the Balkans). Italy's decision to attack Greece and Germany's advance in the Balkans were bound to revive Russian attempts to dominate in the latter area. A German-Russian struggle was inevitable.

Russia, a country with sufficient land—even underpopulated—does not care whether certain colonies belong to Britain or to Germany; whether Italians or Germans swamp South America. But when Hitler made domination of the Balkans an issue of the war, Russia joined the United Nations.

World War II ended—we are informed by the newspapers—with five Great Powers in existence: the United States, the USSR, the Commonwealth of British Nations and British Empire, China, and France. The last three are on the road to what we call disintegration. China is in the hands of local governors who are fighting one another; France, with a dwindling population, is divided between sects which hate each other, while an influx of new barbarians threatens her beautiful body. Britain, as I have argued repeatedly, is in the same situation as her great maritime predecessor, The Netherlands, when she abdicated leadership after Utrecht. Two powers, the United States and the USSR, alone seem to be on the road to integration.

I do not say that it is necessary for these so-called Great Powers to disintegrate or for those now integrating to continue along the road to integration. Such roads are always zigzag, and the long history of Egypt and China proves that the trend often changes. The local governors of China may be defeated by one, the many sects in France may unite into a single glorious *ecclesia militans*, and the Dominions within the Commonwealth, the colonies in the Empire may understand the force of the words *viribus unitis* and revert to the consolidation of imperial against state rights.

On the other hand, unforeseen events in the USSR or the United States may obstruct the road to their further integration. I do not predict that this or that event will happen; I merely say that the trend is toward disintegration within three Powers and toward integration in two, and that the trend toward disintegration is strengthened by the integrating of a state's neighbors.

I shall argue further that the world needs a strong England, a strong France, a strong China, and an order in which all those great nations, as well as Germany, Japan, and other secondary powers, may exist and prosper. Also that their further disintegration and the further integration of the two Great Powers holds the danger that the world may be divided first into two parts and then into many. *Jam proximus ardet Ucalegon*; Ucalegon is now a chaos, the full stop history puts after its eras.⁹

⁹ Virgil *Aeneid*.

MONARCHIA UNIVERSALIS

WHEN the Duke of Brunswick's Prussian army, reputedly the best in Europe, was defeated at Valmy, in 1792, by French Revolutionary forces in which very few had faith, Goethe remarked that a new era had begun.¹ A century later Albert Sorel concludes that neither Valmy nor the Revolution changed the foreign policy or the military strategy of the old regime.

Supported by classical studies revived by historians, propagated by literary men, taught in the war colleges, conserved in the parliamentary archives, the tradition was transmitted to two classes of men, who exercised a dominant influence on the foreign policy of the French Revolution: the lawyers and the military men.

And the two classes did what their ancestors told them to do.

History and tradition are to nations what the monstrous beast of Baudelaire's *poème en prose* was to men "urged by unconquerable desire to walk." Their burden envelops and oppresses nations, forcing them to follow the difficult road of their destiny. Yet none seems to be irritated "by the ferocious beast hanging at his neck and cleaving to his back; one said he considered it as a part of himself . . . they journeyed onwards with the resigned faces of men condemned to hope forever."²

Once Henry IV decided that France must live within the boundaries nature had given her, generation after generation fought for the Rhine. A medieval German prince once determined that Germany must resurrect the Roman Empire, the neighborless empire encompassing the world; Charles V and his successors down to the present day have started one war after another in pursuit of the same *Fata Morgana*.

¹ *Kampagne in Frankreich* (XXVIII, 546), Jubiläumsausgabe, Berlin, Cotta, 1902-7, "Von hier und heute geht eine neue Epoche der Weltgeschichte an, und ihr koennt sagen, ihr seid dabei gewesen." Dr. Julius Zeitler, *Goethe Handbuch*, Stuttgart, Metzler, 1918, III, 465.

² Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, I, 321.

³ "Chacun sa Chimère," in *Petits poèmes en prose*, Paris, Société des Belles Lettres, 1934, p. 17.

The recurrent wars of Europe to realize some dead emperor's dream show how yesterday's history determines today's policies.

Is this true of the USSR? In trying to answer the question now on the tip of everyone's tongue—namely, What direction will bolshevist foreign policy take?—let us look back into Russia's history and see what her aspirations have been.

The best statement of Russian policy is probably that of Prince Adam Czartoryski, Minister of Foreign Affairs under Alexander II and "one of the most remarkable men."⁴ It was written at the time another conqueror was trying to force his new order on Europe. It showed

THE RUSSIAN PLAN FOR THE RE-ARRANGEMENT OF EUROPE IN THE EVENT OF THE COMBINATION WHICH WAS THEN (1804) BEING PROJECTED AGAINST NAPOLEON PROVING SUCCESSFUL. . . . The Emperor of Russia, taking the title of King of Poland, will have all the territories that belonged to Poland before the first partition, together with the country called the Kingdom of Prussia, so that his new frontier would extend from Danzig to the sources of the Vistula, and thence along the Carpathians as far as the source of the Dniester. . . . [Of the five great Powers in Europe], Russia and England, having the same interests and views, would probably remain united; the three others [Prussia, Austria and France] could hardly make any alliance to disturb the equilibrium that would thus be established, but their policy would have to be watched and controlled. . . .

If the question should ever arise of definitely settling the fate of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, the Powers which it would be necessary to satisfy should only obtain stations and rectifications of territory that might be suitable to them, but the mass of the Turkish territories in Europe should be divided into separate states, governed locally, and bound to each other by a federation, upon which Russia would be able to secure to herself a decisive and lawful influence by means of the title of Emperor or Protector of the Slavs of the East which would be accorded to his Imperial Majesty. In any case this influence would be established by the part the Russians will have taken in the liberation of these territories, by identity of religion and origin, and by a wise policy and a skillful selection of posts to be occupied by our troops.

If the consent of Austria should be necessary, she might be given Croatia, part of Bosnia and Wallachia, Belgrade, Ragusa, etc. Russia would have Moldavia, Cattaro, Corfu, and above all Constantinople and the Dardanelles, together with the neighboring ports which would make us master of the Straits.⁵

⁴ Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, Modern Library edition.

⁵ Gielgud, II, 53.

If we look at a map showing Europe's political division before the second World War and the various claims made by Czartoryski for Russia, we see that his aim was to:

a) Make Russia's own territory into a fortress, taking advantage of natural barriers—rivers, mountains, and sea—as boundaries. In the plain between the Baltic and the Carpathians, where no barrier existed, he selected the shortest line.

b) Rim Russia round with a glacis in which only states that need her for their protection or economic existence would be tolerated. Such states (now called states with a "friendly government") would pledge homage to the czar as their monarch. Like a crust they would protect Russia from inimical infiltration or aggression. Occupation of the Danube delta would cut off the Danubian countries from direct communication with the sea, and acquisition of Cattaro and Corfu would block the southern end of the Adriatic. Czartorysky, a Pole by birth, did not similarly protect Russia on the Baltic against Poland.

c) Divide the rest of the European continent into secondary states. Besides Austria and Prussia, there would be a German Empire between them and France, formed out of German states not absorbed by Austria and Prussia, and federated with Switzerland and Holland. The policy of these secondary powers should be watched and controlled by Russia and England. At the same time Russia could secretly incite one against the other, carrying on the old policy of grabuge.

d) Make an ally of the power outside the Continent on the other side of this territory of grabuge—England.

The Baltic Sea and the Carpathian Mountains are as perfectly typical of the age-old frontiers instinctively sought by a self-fortifying nation as Poland and the Balkans are typical of vassal states, and the division of the rest of the Continent among secondary powers of a territory of grabuge.

When the third coalition against Napoleon was defeated, he and the Czar Alexander I met at Tilsit to discuss the division of Europe between them and the exclusion of England from Continental affairs. Whether aligned with England against Napoleon or with Napoleon against England, Russia insisted upon two hierarchies.⁶ Was this policy merely an intermediary step toward her own domination of the world? Was she destined to play Rome's history backward, starting from Constantine, who divided the world into two empires, and continuing on

⁶ Driault, p. 171; Vandal, I, 74, 87 ff.

to his predecessors, who succeeded in establishing a universal monarchy? Was Russia's ultimate goal a neighborless empire, an autarchy? This was apparently Czartoryski's idea.

The Czars of Moscow had had the instinct of conquest since the reign of Ivan the Cruel; they employed artifice and violence by turns, and succeeded with rare ability in augmenting their territories at the expense of their neighbours. It was under Peter the Great, however, that the Russian policy first assumed that decided and stable character which it has maintained to this day. All the objects which Russia unceasingly pursues with indefatigable perseverance—amounting to nothing less than the subjugation of the greater part of Europe and Asia—were clearly conceived and designated to his successors by Peter the Great. He gave the first fatal blows to Sweden and Poland; he began the struggle with Persia and Turkey; he placed himself at the head of Greeks and Slavs, and created a European army and navy. The impulse which his iron will gave to the nation still continues, and by an extraordinary concourse of circumstances, Russia has come alarmingly near to the attainment of his objects without Europe having succeeded in stopping her. Internal difficulties may from time to time have retarded her advance, but the spirit of Peter still hovers over his empire, and his pitiless ambition lies at the bottom of every Russian heart.⁷

England was not too enthusiastic about Russia's plan to divide Europe. In a long note dated January 19, 1805, the British government declared its "fundamental agreement with the generous designs of the Czars for the deliverance of Europe and its future tranquility." However, before interstate relations could again be restored to normal and come under international law, France must be confined within her ancient boundaries and Sardinia, Prussia, and Austria strengthened to constitute a buttress against France.⁸ In other words, the realistic British Foreign Office objected to a Russian protective crust—to the division of non-Russian Europe into small states—insisting that on the Continent there must be two strong states, Russia and France, and that the weaker states, such as Prussia and Austria, must be strengthened so that by combining they could protect themselves against France or Russia if either attempted universal monarchy. To a Continent organized as a hierarchy under the sway of a conqueror England preferred the competition of independent states, with herself as um-

⁷ II, 7-8.

⁸ *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, I, 336; Stanhope, III, 269.

pire. Her idea was a world like the feudal system she had imported from Normandy, where the members of the order were equals and their relations with their overlords were direct. As overlord she would decide disputes, but respect the independence of small states.

At the Congress of Vienna and by the Paris Treaty, England put over her ideas. Russia was strongest on the Continent, but she was checked by France, Prussia, and Austria.

The "Eastern Papers" presented to the British Parliament in 1854 contain several reports of conversations between Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Minister at St. Petersburg, and the Czar. Sir Hamilton notes that the Czar said:

stay; we have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man: it will be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune if, one of these days, he should slip away from us, especially before all necessary arrangements were made.⁹

The British navy and the Russian army together could no doubt take care of Europe. But British statesmen were even harder of hearing than Metternich. They did not want to understand; even less did they wish to undertake responsibility for what they called "eventualities." They did not even care to discuss the inheritance of the Grand Turk. Twice in earlier centuries—in the preliminaries to the War of the Spanish Succession and in the discussion of Tuscany's fate prior to the death of the last Medici—they had participated in probate proceedings before the actual demise. But in these cases death was sure, the date alone uncertain; whereas Turkey, a state, might live forever. The British were not even willing to discuss what the Czar called a "negative policy." They would not say what changes they would not tolerate, but urged the Czar to explain his own ideas upon the subject.

Sir Hamilton reports further conversation as follows:

Your Majesty would be good enough to explain your own ideas upon this negative policy. This His Majesty for some time declined doing; he ended, however, by saying: Well, there are several things which I never will tolerate: I will begin by ourselves. I will not tolerate the permanent occupation of Constantinople by the Russians; having said this, I will say it never shall be held by the English, or French, or any other great nation. Again, I never will permit an attempt at the reconstruction of a Byzan-

⁹ Communications respecting Turkey made to Her Majesty's Government by the Emperor of Russia, with the answers returned to them. January–April 1853. Great Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1854, Vol. LXXI, Part V, Eastern Papers. Cmd. 1736, p. 2.

tine Empire, or such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful State; still less will I permit the breaking up of Turkey into little republics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis, and other revolutionists of Europe; rather than to submit to any of these arrangements I would go to war, and as long as I have a man and a musket left would carry it on. . . .

I wish to support his (*the Turk's*) authority, but if he loses it, it is gone for ever. The Turkish Empire is a thing to be tolerated, not to be reconstructed; in such a cause I protest to you I will not allow a pistol to be fired. . . .

The Principalities [Moldavia, Wallachia, the present Rumania] are, he said, in fact an independent State under my protection: this might so continue. Servia might receive the same form of Government. So again with Bulgaria: there seems to be no reason why this province should not form an independent State. . . .

As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can then only say, that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia [Crete]; that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession.¹⁰

The British Minister comments, "Whilst willing to undertake not to make himself the permanent master of Constantinople, His Majesty is intentionally inexplicit as to its temporary occupation."¹¹

Czartorysky's Balkan federation was no longer a plank in the Russian program. The plan now was to cut the Balkan states up into small national entities. Thus a hope dear to many Englishmen, especially the Prince Consort—to rebuild the Byzantine Empire—was dashed. The Czar's reason for refusing to permit the division of Turkey into small republics was his objection to independent states in the Balkans. The only partition of Turkey he would tolerate was its division into vassal states, monarchies controlled by Russia or her friend Austria. When I say Russia, the Czar told Sir Hamilton, I mean Austria too, for they are one as far as the Eastern question is concerned. To attain her ends Russia was ready to bribe England with Egypt and some islands in the Ionian Sea and perhaps give Austria the little *pourboire* of Bosnia, Herzegovina, or even Serbia.

England and her new ally France opposed the Russian policy; the Crimean War followed. During the hostilities the man who has had

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 10–13: Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell, Feb. 22, 1853.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord Clarendon, March 9, 1853.

such influence on Russia's fate in recent years, Karl Marx, wrote in the *Neue Oder Zeitung* (April 21, 1855):

We are assured by well-informed quarters, that the present Emperor of Russia sent to various courts a note stating, among other things, that if Austria should join irrevocably the alliance of Western Powers, or should be party to any inimical act against Russia, Alexander II—the heir of Nicholas I—would place himself at the head of the Panslav movement and change his title from that of Czar of All the Russians to that of Czar of All the Slavs. This declaration of Alexander, if authentic, is the first honest word spoken since the outbreak of this war. It is the first move to show the real European character of the war which has been hidden behind all kinds of pettifoggery, protocols, conventions, paragraphs from Vattel and quotations from Puffendorff. The independence of Turkey is now relegated backstage. The question is no longer who will reign in Constantinople but who will dominate Europe?¹²

England fought Russia for the same reason that she had previously fought France. As the balancer of the world she was obliged to keep Russia from attaining hegemony over Europe.

After Russia's defeat there was a vacuum on the Continent; there was no power or concert of powers to decide questions that did not interest England. Bismarck and Cavour took advantage of the situation to build up their own empires. In this new world of the 1870's, where alliances and the order of rank were to be rearranged, Russia made another stab at the Balkans.

When she began her war against Turkey, in 1877, the Balkans were a tower of Babel. Gone were the days when all Christians in that area were simply "Greeks"; whatever the Hellenes wanted, the Bulgarians opposed. The Bulgarians were at odds with the Serbs; the Rumanians with both; the Albans had their own wishes, too; and each group had its own protector. The ethnic division into Slavs—Serbs and Bulgars—and non-Slavs—Hellenes and Rumanians—was crossed by a religious division into Roman Catholics, Orthodox Greeks, and Moslems. Even the Greek Orthodox Church began to split up. Russia helped Bulgaria to establish her own church, which the Greek Church considered heretical.¹³ The church in Syria and Palestine was also in revolt, and the Greek monasteries on Mount Athos fought the Slav.

¹² K. Marx, *Œuvres politiques*, tr. by Molitor, Paris, Costes, 1930, VI, 195.

¹³ *Cambridge Modern History*, XI, 638-39; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, III, 115.

When the Turks were defeated, Russia had to divide the Balkans so as to benefit not only all groups but their protectors too. To avoid offending England, she was obliged to leave Constantinople in the hands of Turkey; to avoid offending Austria, she must keep apart the two southern Slav states, Serbia and Montenegro, magnets for southern Slavs in the Dual Monarchy, so that they would not become too strong. Her solution was to annex Bessarabia, which brought her to the Danube. In compensation for Bessarabia, Rumania, her ally in the war, got the barren Dobruja. To link Russia and her little brother, Bulgaria, which now extended as far as the Aegean, Rumania had to guarantee Russia military passage.

The Treaty of San Stefano was "a wholly Slavonic settlement of a question which concerned other races too."¹⁴ It was part of Russia's plan to gain control over the Straits and the Dardanelles without occupying Constantinople, and over the Danube valley and the Adriatic without making Serbia and Montenegro one state. Rumania, Greece, and Albania were reduced, Turkey, in fact, liquidated in Europe, and a Great Bulgaria, a Great Serbia, and a Great Montenegro established. Salisbury's circular note of April 1, 1878 reads:

By the Articles erecting the New Bulgaria, a strong Slav State will be created under the auspices and control of Russia, possessing important harbours upon the shores of the Black Sea and the Archipelago, and conferring upon that Power a preponderating influence over both political and commercial relations in those seas. . . . The provisions by which this new State is to be subjected to a ruler whom Russia will practically choose, its Administration framed by a Russian Commissary, and the first working of its institutions commenced under the control of a Russian army, sufficiently indicate the political system of which in future it is to form a part.¹⁵

England objected, because Russia, through her satellites, would have ports on the Mediterranean. Austria objected that the two southern Slav states would be practically joined and an all-Serbian railway would connect Belgrade with the Adriatic. At the Berlin Congress, in 1878, the treaty was revised, and Russia's domination of the Balkans was frustrated.¹⁶

Somewhat more than a century after Czartorysky's memorandum, on a gloomy November day in 1914 at Tsarskoie-Selo, Nicholas II and Maurice Paléologue, the last French ambassador to the Russian court,

¹⁴ *Cambridge Modern History*, XII, 393.

¹⁵ Temperley and Penson, p. 377.

¹⁶ Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe*, pp. 537 ff.

sat discussing the Allies' war aims. They agreed that the peace treaty must be dictated; it could not be negotiated. The Czar was

determined to continue the war until the Central Powers are destroyed. But I regard it as essential that the terms of the peace should be discussed by us three, France, England and Russia—and by us three alone. . . .

What we must keep before us as our first object is the destruction of German militarism, the end of the nightmare from which Germany has made us suffer for more than forty years. We must make it impossible for the German people even to think of revenge. . . . I accept here and now any conditions France and England think it their duty to put forward in their own interest.

"The Government of the Republic," answers the ambassador, "in turn will meet the wishes of the imperial Government in the most sympathetic spirit."¹⁷

And what were these wishes? Again the line projected by those long dead—Peter the Great, Alexander I, and Czartoryski:

In East Prussia Germany must accept a rectification of the frontier. My General Staff would like this rectification to be extended to the mouths of the Vistula. That seems to me excessive; I'll look into the question. Posen and possibly a portion of Silesia will be indispensable to the reconstruction of Poland. Galicia and the western half of the Bukovina will enable Russia to obtain her natural frontier, the Carpathians. . . .

Western Thrace to the Enos-Media line should be given to Bulgaria. The rest, from that line to the shores of the Straits but excluding the environs of Constantinople, would be assigned to Russia.¹⁸

Later discussion cleared the question. Paléologue writes on January 30, 1915:

In a heart-to-heart talk with Sazonov I have returned to the Polish question.

"I've no hesitation in mentioning it," I said, "as I know you're as anxious as I to see the kingdom of Poland restored—"

"Under the sceptre of the Romanovs?" he broke in abruptly.

"That's what I mean! You know my point of view. To me Poland, re-constituted in its national integrity and restored as an autonomous kingdom, is the necessary advance guard of Slavism against Teutonism, whereas if all political ties between Poland and Russia were severed she would inevitably fall into the orbit of Germany."¹⁹

¹⁷ *I*, 191 f.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 192 f.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

Russia's official demand for the Straits and Constantinople was conceded in March, 1915. As she still had the Baltic provinces and Bessarabia, all she needed to reach Czartorysky's line were the German and Austrian sections of Poland, East Prussia, and large sections of European Turkey. These had been promised her.

She did not neglect another phase of her traditional policy: to divide central Europe into strategically and economically weak states. By secret agreements she sought to reduce the German Empire. The German-French frontier was to be the Rhine; France was to get all Lorraine, with its iron ore, and the Saar, with its coal; German domains on the left bank were to become autonomous states. According to Paléologue, the partition of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was suggested in 1915, but France did not agree until later. The third requirement for Continental hegemony, alliance with Britain, was also in the bag, as England in her extremity was compelled to second Russia.²⁰

Under these agreements made during World War I, Russia was near her goal, domination of the Continent. But the Revolution laid her low and released England and France from their obligations. They further weakened her by forming new states and enlarging old ones out of territory detached from her.

In the first part of the nineteenth century, world policy was European policy. The rank of a state in the European order determined its share in the world, which was dominated by Europe. The influence of the United States on world policy began with Monroe, but for many years this country remained a silent partner of Britain. Outside Europe, in the Middle and Far East, Russia and England were the two great competitors. Baron Staal, Russian ambassador in London, wrote on June 8, 1884: "England could strike us everywhere with the aid of continental alliances, whereas we cannot reach her anywhere. A great nation cannot accept such a position."²¹ Russian policy outside the European continent was dominated by the desire to get a base from which she could attack England's lifeline, the road to India. Her endeavor to reach the Mediterranean, like her policy in Persia and the Far East, were largely motivated by this desire. Fear of France in the nineteenth century and fear of Germany in the twentieth

²⁰ Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, I, 170; VI, 5; Buchanan, I, 225.

²¹ Quoted in Lobanov-Rostovski, p. 177.

made Britain and Russia allies, but did not restrain the latter from trying to better her strategic position.

The Anglo-Russian convention of August 31, 1907, to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, defined the British and the Russian spheres of interest, separating them by a neutral zone. In the second half of 1911 the czarist government took advantage of Britain's preoccupation with the intrigues instigated by Germany in preparation for her 1914 rebellion to secure Russia's frontiers in the Middle East by extending her power in Persia. Disregarding the convention, she herself launched an intrigue with a view to annexing parts of Persia. The dramatic story of this intervention is well told by W. Morgan Shuster, then treasurer general of Persia, in *The Strangling of Persia*. As a result, the Russians acquired various rights and concessions in that country.²²

The aim of czarist policy in the Far East was to incorporate Korea, the territory known as Manchukuo, Inner and Outer Mongolia, and eastern Turkestan. Defeat in the war with Japan woke Russia abruptly from these dreams. Japan not only stopped her advance but also acquired parts of her territory on the Pacific. Since the most effective barrier, the sea, could not be reached, inland vassal states had to serve; among them was Mongolia.

Czarist Russia took the course all imperialistic governments follow in such circumstances: she fanned Mongol and Chinese antagonism until the Mongols were ready to revolt, then helped them to secede from China. But the new state was, of course, too weak to live without Russian support—a normal picture.²³

The names of the revolutionary leaders to whom Russia gave refuge, their propaganda in China, the Mongols' revolt, and the separation of Mongolia from China are details which need not distract us at the moment. Important is the fact that wherever a small power was Russia's neighbor, she tried to dominate it; and wherever a great power, such as Austria-Hungary, Turkey, India, or China, was her neighbor, she tried to reduce it—as she had Sweden and was on the way to doing with Turkey—to the level of a small state which she could dominate.

Thus, we see that, as an over-all policy, during the Napoleonic wars, before the Crimean War, and during World War I, Russia sought to protect her own territory by a glacis consisting of the Balkan States

²² New York, Century, 1920.

²³ Yakhontoff, p. 76.

in Europe and Turkey and other associates in the Middle and Far East, by a divided continental Europe, and by an alliance with England, the other great power. England's co-operation was to be assured by Russian acquisition of land bases threatening her lifeline.

The revolution of the Bolsheviks in Russia was what I have called a "vertical invasion." Led by a group consisting partly of bourgeois intellectuals, the workmen, peasants, and soldiers revolted against their former leaders. A new class of rulers replaced the old czarist aristocracy and the bourgeoisie supporting it. The new elite, by its spell, attracted new homogeneous elements and kept within the nation by force the elements now become the new heterogeneous. The *ci-devants*, the former bourgeoisie and the "kulaks," were replaced by a Soviet bureaucracy; the new Siberia and concentration camps came to have different inmates. But the new nation, striving hard to consolidate itself, claimed for itself the same habitat as that of old Russia.

The usual offer of revolutionary parties is a peace program. The Bolsheviks were no exception. Communism was to be the bond for all ethnic groups not only in the USSR but also in the world. Like the leaders of the French Revolution, they proposed to put fellow travelers in power everywhere. The "ambitious tyrants" of the eighteenth century were in 1917 the "bourgeois, capitalists, and imperialists"; the "citoyens" were "workers, peasants, and soldiers." French revolutionaries set out to reform Europe, the world of their time, but as Sorel has observed, ended by continuing the policy of French kings. The Bolsheviks likewise set out to revolutionize the world, now a bigger world. Are they, too, running true to form and merely following in the czars' footsteps?

The jurist has always been the associate of statesmen working to expand their states; it is his duty to prove that nature has decreed that the territory his sovereign wants to acquire belongs naturally to that state and that the sovereign's right has a good historical basis. In *Gargantua and Pantagruel* Rabelais gives an amusing picture of this kind of legal argument. In our scientific age, however, the scholar is taking the place of the lawyer. Hitler had his General Haushofer and other geopoliticians, and the Bolsheviks have their geographers and historians, too. The names of associates change, but not their argument; nature and history are still the dividers of the world. The former Byzantine Empire, somewhat enlarged, is renamed "Eurasia" and claimed as the bolshevist nation's birthright. From George Vernadsky's

summary of the arguments of Russian geographers and historians we paraphrase one pertinent passage: It is wrong to state, as the German and Russian geographers stated in the 18th and 19th centuries, that Russia is divided in an European and a Russian part separated by the Ural.

Far from separating the country, the Ural Range by its topographical and geological peculiarities has actually bound the eastern and western parts of Russia together into the only real unity possible, "Eurasian Russia."

The Russia that we are to consider is a single geographical unit, Eurasia . . . a specific geographical area of the great central continental land mass. It is made up of a series of large, interlocking plains. . . . This great area is in turn divided into several long latitudinal strips which are distinguished one from the other largely by variations in vegetation and soil. . . .

The fundamental urge which directed the Russian people eastward lies deep in history and is not easily summarized in a paragraph. It was not "imperialism," nor was it the consequence of the petty political ambitions of Russian statesmen. It was in the last analysis, perhaps, simply the inevitable logic of geography which lies at the basis of all history.²⁴

The many ethnic groups in this territory are bound, as S. H. Mirsky says,

by Eurasism, a kind of Russian Ghandism. You will find in it the same hatred for foreign capitalism, the same refusal to tolerate the struggle among classes at home, the same critique of western mentality, its rationalism and individualism, the same idealization of the Russian religion.²⁵

Curiously enough, the territory defined by nature is exactly the territory traditionally claimed, and the idea of Eurasia as the birthright of Russia was worked out by emigrés—several of whom, like Mirsky, later joined the Bolsheviks—whose historical role seems to be to transmit the thoughts of the dead to the living. On Vernadsky's map Finland is included in Eurasia, and on the natural history grounds he gives, Sweden and Norway might just as well be included. The argument that North America's "manifest destiny" is to be one state is just as valid.

Though smaller, Eurasia coincides with what Sir Halford Mackinder calls the "Heartland"; see map on page 343.²⁶

²⁴ Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, pp. 4-5; Vernadsky, "Expansion of Russia," in *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Art and Science*, V (July 31, 1933), 391; Lubenskij, "L'Eurasisme," *Le Monde Slave*, January, 1931, pp. 69 ff.

²⁵ Mirsky, "Histoire d'une émancipation," *Nouvelle Revue Française*, XXXVII (1931), 386.

²⁶ Page 74.

The consolidation of Russia, the great step backward to the old order that is inevitable after a step toward a new one, was taken about 1936, the year when the right of each man to his own earnings, to a reward commensurate with the quality and amount of his work, and to possess and inherit certain personal belongings, was acknowledged.²⁷ The bombastic foreign policy of the world revolutionary period was dropped, together with the attempt to set up a soviet in every country. The Bolsheviks reverted to the traditional policy of security.

In 1938, perhaps earlier, negotiations began to revive the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia. As *Ersatz* for what the USSR had lost after World War I, it demanded bases and other rights in the Baltic States and Poland. Since the latter refused, and Britain and France, their protectors, would not force them, the negotiations came to naught. The USSR then made a pact with Germany, because the German bid for its neutrality exceeded what the Allies had been ready to pay for its assistance. Admitting that the Baltic countries belonged to the Russian sphere of interest, Germany set them free to shift for themselves. Weak as they were, they could not avoid letting the Soviet Union garrison their seaports, and soon afterward they were annexed.²⁸

Again not a new policy, but that of the czars, who built up their empire from the debris of other empires, first separating parts from Turkey, Sweden, and Poland, protecting them, and then annexing these little bits of kingdoms—usurpation once again of territory where the dominants had lost their hold.

The overrunning of Poland and the war against Finland restored to the USSR roughly what it had lost on the Baltic after World War I. Its frontiers were moving in the direction Czartoryski had proposed, though his line had not been reached when Russia divided Poland with Germany in 1939. Then, as at the Vienna Congress in 1815, a compromise was made.

The Bolsheviks turned next toward the south, to the Black Sea and the Danube valley. When Bismarck devised his policy of a German-Russian alliance, the so-called "reinsurance" contract, Austria still existed and Germany had no interest in the Balkans, no Balkan policy of her own. In his *Memoirs* Bismarck describes what he would do about the Balkan question if he were Minister of Austria.²⁹ He advises the

²⁷ N. Harper, *The Government of the Soviet Union*, New York, Van Nostrand, 1938, pp. 163-67.

²⁸ Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942*, p. 29. ²⁹ II, 288.

Austrians to help Russia get Constantinople and the Straits. For such aid Austria would be richly compensated by Russia, and Constantinople would be the source of many troubles for Russia, tying up her forces for a long time.

Germany's industrial progress, the crippling of Austria and her vassalage to Germany swept away the possibility of any such independent policy for Austria. To carry out the Berlin-Bagdad project and gain a trade route to the Orient, Germany had to have a Balkan policy of her own; she had to dominate the countries along the route: Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and Turkey. Germany's *Drang nach dem Osten* was bound to conflict with Russia's *Drang nach dem Westen*, since both wanted an exclusive road through Constantinople.

At first the bolsheviks were modest in their demands. After the Paris Conference, traffic on the Danube thoroughfare was regulated by an international committee on which the Bolshevists were not represented, since they had no frontier on the Danube when it was constituted. They now demanded a seat on the committee; also that Rumania should hand over Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, which that country had acquired without her consent. With the cession of Bessarabia, which brought the Bolshevists near the mouth of the Danube, they became bolder, suggesting that with Rumania they should control navigation on the lower Danube.³⁰ Moscow broadcast a warning to Rome to keep its hands off the Balkans. Negotiations were begun with Yugoslavia, but Hitler's occupation of Rumania put a stop to further Russian advance in this direction.

Does this mean that in 1940 the USSR returned to the plan incorporated in the Treaty of San Stefano? If so, she may have claimed Dobruja, the link connecting newly acquired Bessarabia with Bulgaria, for herself and the outlet to the Aegean for her old friend Bulgaria. Her claims in 1878 led to the revision of the Treaty of St. Stefano at the Berlin Congress; those in 1940 to war. Germany occupied Rumania, Germany and Italy occupied Yugoslavia and Greece; thus German rule was established over former Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and the Berlin-Constantinople route. Russia in her march to Constantinople was stopped at the Danube.

The conflicting Balkan policies were not the only reason for the German attack on Russia. After Germany lost the battle for England itself, the same two roads were open to her as to Napoleon: through

³⁰ Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942*, p. 269.

Egypt or through Russia. Both led to India. And like Napoleon, Hitler was defeated on the plains of Russia and in Egypt too.

The territorial demands of the USSR, now a member of the United Nations, are shown on the map on page 297. The territory it claims for its fortress, Russia proper, "extends from the Carpathians to the Mongolian border."

If you compare the boundaries of Soviet Russia with those of Russia before 1914, you will notice an advance toward the west; first along the Baltic, by incorporating part of East Prussia; second, toward Hungary, by incorporating Galicia, Bukovina, and Russo-Carpathia. Both advances are motivated by strategic reasons. The incorporated part of East Prussia, Königsberg and its environs, by their location, dominate the short seacoast of Poland, especially Danzig. With Galicia and Bukovina the USSR reaches the Carpathians. Carpatho-Russia is a bridgehead on the western side of the Carpathians separating Czechoslovakia from Rumania and constituting a direct boundary between Russia and Hungary. The bridgehead and its garrison, on the border of the great Hungarian plain, controls three neighbors: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania.

Although the USSR proper does not now include Finland, as it did in 1914, or certain parts of Poland (Warsaw), its position on the Baltic and on the European Continent is better secured. Russia's territorial demands in the Caucasus have not been announced.

The Soviet press emphatically denies that the USSR seeks a security zone. It stresses the independence of all nations on its borders, but insists that they must be governed by friends.

Has any imperialistic power ever claimed anything else? As Aristotle said, after victory it was the custom of Athens to replace oligarchic governments by democratic; of Sparta, to replace the democratic by oligarchic ones. Did not the great French conqueror Louis XIV fight for a Catholic government in England? Did not Napoleon create states and name their governors? Was it not England's policy to maintain in small states—such as Belgium and Portugal, vital for her defense—governors friendly to herself? Are not all these friends bound to follow the policy of their protectors, and are they not left independent only as long as they behave?

Early in the game the bolshevist idealists renounced czarist policy in Persia and the Far East, professing to believe that the brotherhood

binding all Russians with other under-privileged groups was a better protection than vassal states. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is based on the volition of each—none can be compelled to enter or to remain in it; colonial and semi-colonial peoples must be given their freedom, since no nation has a right to dominate another. That is the theory.

Writing of the Bolshevik General Staff college, Alexander Barmine recalls that the head of the college, a former czarist officer, said:

In the nineteenth century the road to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, those outlets on the warm waters which are indispensable to us, were blocked again and continually by the British. We waged several wars in Persia and Central Asia in the effort to open it, but the British Empire stood always behind our adversaries. The victories of the Russian armies in the Balkans were also always frustrated by British intrigue.

You will ask me why I am telling you all this when the Soviet Revolution has cast out imperialism. It is true that the Soviet Republic has no imperialistic aims. The purpose of the Soviet Revolution on a world scale is to liberate oppressed peoples everywhere from imperialistic exploitation, and especially to bring freedom to the peoples of the Orient. But the most serious obstacle in the way of this liberation is still British imperialism. If we want to give the peoples of Asia their freedom, we have to break the power of British imperialism. It is still our deadliest enemy and theirs. Here is your task, and you will need to learn from us and our experiences how to deal with it.³¹

Persia, therefore, must be liberated. Czarist Russia, as we noted, had acquired a sphere of interest in Persia and various concessions or economic prerogatives. In 1918 the Bolshevik government renounced all these, canceled its arrangements with Britain, and transferred its assets—some of which, for instance, the Russian Bank in Persia, may be of dubious value—to the people of Persia. Sir Arnold Wilson writes: The insistence of the Soviet government on an admittedly unfair and grossly preferential treaty effectively neutralized in the eyes of the Persian government the dramatic cancellation in 1919 of all concessions and former treaties, and gave just cause of complaint to foreign and Persian merchants who were in practice unable to trade.³²

This statement is confirmed by Barmine, who was USSR Consul General in Ghilan in 1923.

³¹ Barmine, *One Who Survived*, p. 86, courtesy of G. P. Putnam's sons, copyright 1945 by Alexander Barmine.

³² A. Wilson, p. 85; Millspaugh, pp. 171, 229.

Although proclaiming a new policy of fraternal equality toward Persia, and an end of extraterritorial concessions, the Soviet Government, when brought face to face with realities, adopted a course little different from that pursued by the old Czarist Empire. The diplomats of the former regime had systematically prepared, chiefly by economic penetration, for the ultimate conquest of Persia. The Persians were forbidden by treaty to maintain armed ships on the Caspian. Russia, on the other hand, kept two gunboats anchored at Enzeli. The difference now was that the gunboats belonged to the Soviets. Russia was in control of the fishing grounds of Ghilan and Mazanderan, and a Russian company held a concession which included the only road linking the north coast to Teheran, the capital.

To be sure, by a treaty signed in 1921, the Soviets had agreed to abolish the system of concessions and had surrendered most of the advantages enjoyed by the former Imperial Government. But the clauses of this treaty were far from faithfully observed.³³

Outer Mongolia, one of the USSR's neighbors, calls itself a "Peoples' Republic." The USSR agreed with China that Mongolia is a part of China, but it made various agreements with Mongolia as a separate state.

What is the relation between the two countries today? According to Count Carlo Sforza and many others writing even before the Alliance of 1936 was signed, Chicherin, the bolshevist foreign minister, followed precisely the policy of his czarist predecessor, Sassanov: "He created a dummy 'Independent Mongolian Government,' whose head was simply a certain Bodo, formerly clerk in the Imperial Consulate General in Urga." ³⁴ To others, such as G. D. R. Phillips, the fact

that a small country is friendly to a big one, as Mongolia is friendly to Soviet Russia, does not, of course, make it the colony of the big one. A colony is a country which is governed, more or less directly, by a more powerful country, and which is simply used as a possession and exploited for the benefit of the power which owns it. Manchuria, Korea, and Formosa are colonies of Japan. . . .³⁵

Our love or hatred for the Bolshevist or the Jap should not prejudice us when studying their policy. The more different they are from us, the more interesting their behavior. A colony is not necessarily an exploited territory. On the contrary, it may itself, in effect, exploit the mother country, draining away her blood, men, capital, and goods, and building itself up at her expense. A colony as distinguished from

³³ Barmine, p. 141.

³⁴ *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1927, p. 70.

³⁵ Phillips, p. 98.

a dominion or an independent country is a land governed by foreigners, not by its own representatives, one in which, when colonial and imperial interests collide, the latter are favored.

If, therefore, we want to find out whether a country is independent, we must inquire who has the final say, its own representatives or foreigners. And the last word in a state's affairs is spoken by the makers of its foreign policy—those who decide what kind of immigrants, commodities, or ideas shall be admitted or rejected; those who decide on war or peace. The problem in this case, therefore, boils down to the simple question: has Outer Mongolia the right to conduct her foreign affairs independently, sending her own representatives abroad, or are all such rights vested in Russia?

Mongolia has no ministers or consuls in other countries, and no ministers or consuls of other countries are accredited to Mongolia except those representing Russia. For a short time in the 1920's the Mongolian People's Republic had a trade delegation in Germany.

But it can be said that the too great activity of this trade delegation was never viewed without suspicion by the Moscow authorities and when the Mongols tried in 1927 to establish a consulate in Berlin, the life of the trade delegation came suddenly to an end; it seems not far fetched to attribute its recall to the direct intervention of the Soviet Government.³⁶

In addition, Article 19 of her consular regulations provides "that a Soviet Consul may represent another state as well as the Soviet Union." "The commentary on the regulations interprets this to mean that such cases should not be considered absolutely impossible with regard to the Mongol People's Republic."³⁷

In the 1930's frontier incidents, especially that known as *Bon Noir*, necessitated the negotiation of an understanding between the Mongols, the Manchurians, and the Japanese. The Royal Institute of International Affairs reports:

The Mongols wished to restrict the discussion to the *Bon Noir* incident and similar frontier disputes. The Japanese, on the other hand, seized the occasion for forcing a far more important issue, nothing less than that of Mongolia's abandonment of her policy of isolation. The Japanese spokesmen demanded that the question of opening Outer Mongolia to travel, residence, and business for Japanese and Manchurian citizens should be placed on agenda. This was an open challenge to Russia's monopoly of

³⁶ Friters, p. 131.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

intercourse, political and economic, with Outer Mongolia, and her use of its territory as a glacis to protect her Siberian frontier.³⁸

Russia refused to negotiate the broader questions. It is reported that the trade between Outer Mongolia and the USSR constituted 100 percent of the total foreign trade of the former and 10 percent (compared with 1.4 percent in 1929) of the latter. Finally, Ambassador Grew quotes a Japanese foreign minister's statement that in 1941 Russian soldiers were stationed in Mongolia.³⁹

Another nearby people's republic, Tannu Tuwa, was once one of Mongolia's domains. When in 1921 the Chinese were driven out of Uringhai, as it was then called, the Mongols desired to incorporate it.

In 1924 the inhabitants of Uringhai declared their affiliation to Outer Mongolia. Soviet Russia was as intolerant of such a move as Czarist Russia would have been. "Troops were sent . . ." writes Professor Durdenevsky. "Mongolia and Tannu Tuwa cannot join. The idea is clearly absolutely impossible."

He instances the different language (allied to Turkish) and the fact that Tuwa's economic development demands conditions for farming similar to those in the neighboring parts of Siberia. Moreover, the inhabitants "do not consider themselves at all as Mongols . . . the misuse of the power of feudatories who had all come from Mongolia made them not very friendly toward Mongols."⁴⁰ The Tuwas and the Mongols, he concludes, will not become a nation.

In fact, by keeping the natives on farms, thereby weaning them from the nomadic life of the Mongols, Soviet Russia's policy in Tuwa has since been directed toward fostering a national feeling. Intensive colonization by Russians and the introduction of a national Tuwanic written language (until 1931 their written and official language was Mongolian) have been other important means of separating Tuwa from Outer Mongolia and at the same time increasing Soviet Russia's hold on the country.⁴¹

Similar statements about Britain would lead to charges of "*divide et impera*"—imperialism! In Flers and Caillavet's comedy *Le Roi*, a

³⁸ *Survey of International Affairs*, 1934, p. 332.

³⁹ Page 466.

⁴⁰ Friters, p. 97; Männen-Helfen, p. 99.

⁴¹ Yasuo Misshuma and Tomio Goto, *A Japanese View of Outer Mongolia*; tr. and condensed by Andrew J. Grajdanzev, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942; Conolly, *Soviet Economic Policy in the East*, p. 21; Conolly, *Soviet Asia*, p. 29; Cleinow, p. 10.

marquis says to a newcomer, a rich industrialist and socialist member of parliament,

"You are just as odious a capitalist as I." "Not at all," replies the deputy, "you consider yourself the owner of your assets; I, however, consider myself and my descendants merely the safekeepers of mine. That is why your assets are a capitalist's fortune, while mine are a socialist's fortune."⁴²

Of a third Far Eastern state, Sinkiang, also part of China, Alexander Barmine reports:

According to Stalin's plan, Sinkiang was to become a sphere of exclusive Russian influence and to serve as a bulwark of our power in the East. We had to equip 10,000 Sinkiang troops completely, from boots to Kuomintang insignia. Soviet advisers, who actually exercised the authority of ministers, were placed at the governor's elbow. A commission headed by Stalin's brother-in-law, Svanidze, was sent to Sinkiang to draw up a plan of reconstruction for the province. My trust was instructed to send engineers to build roads, airdromes, and hangars all over Sinkiang.

Sinkiang was soon a Soviet colony in all but name. The Soviet Government had guaranteed her currency with a huge loan of silver, dominated her trade, and was directing her politics. Although nominally a part of China, Sinkiang sent her own consuls to Russia, and the Chinese ambassador, understanding the situation, raised no questions.⁴³

In the Far East, we may conclude, a state governed by friends is a vassal state, a member of the Russian *Krieg-und Zollverein*.

Now that the USSR has a glacis in the Far East, will it try to form one in Europe, too? If so, what degree of overlordship will it try to exercise? Let us consider first the zone agreed upon at Moscow and Yalta; then the zone it is apparently trying for.

Under the Yalta agreement Poland remains, like Czechoslovakia, independent. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria were occupied by the Russian army alone; Britain and the United States have only military missions there, more or less to protect the interests of their own citizens. Russia's interest in the three states is admitted. Austria, like Ger-

⁴² Scene XI, Paris, Boyer et Bert, 1908, p. 10.

⁴³ Barmine, pp. 231-32. See also: Owen Lattimore, "Chinese Turkestan," *The Open Court*, XLVII (1933), 97 ff.; Hedin, p. 298; M. F. Taillardat, "La Rivalité anglo-russe en Asie centrale: Le Turkestan chinois," *L'Asie française*, XXXVII (1937), 6 ff.; M. R. Norins, "The new Sinkiang—China's link with the Middle East," *Pacific Affairs*, XV (1942), 457 ff.; C. Y. W. Meng, "Sinkiang—China's Northern 'Back-Door,'" *Amerasia*, V (1941), 394 ff.; *Pacific Affairs*, Dec., 1942.

many, is divided and occupied by four armies, but is to be governed by a triumvirate sitting in Berlin and Vienna. Austria therefore does not belong to the Russian protective sphere, but is dependent upon two or more antagonistic powers. Her geographic situation is like that of a large city square controlling several avenues. One avenue is through Hungary to Rumania and the Black Sea, admittedly a Russian zone. The second leads to Trieste on the Adriatic. It may be assumed that Austria was excluded from the Russian zone so that the second avenue might remain free; that is, in the joint Anglo-Russian sphere of interest.

The freedom of these countries, however, will be somewhat restricted in Russia's interest. The Moscow declaration reads:

The Governments of the United Kingdoms, the Soviet Union and the United States are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination. They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.⁴⁴

Thus, neighbors with problems similar to Austria's are distinguished from those with different problems. On the one hand is Germany, a state with different problems; on the other hand are Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania—all small states with problems similar to those of Austria. Though sovereign and independent, Austria will be forbidden to co-operate politically or economically with Germany. Her right to form a *Zollverein* or federation with other small states is theoretical, not practical.

Old World history affords no examples of small states federating unless external pressure is brought to bear. For example, in South Africa parochialism, nationalism, and local economic interests for many years kept Boers and British colonists divided into four states. After the Boer War, under British pressure, the Union of South Africa was founded.

In the Balkans and central Europe, the danger zone of Europe, the situation is somewhat similar. Left to its own devices each ethnic group

⁴⁴ *Voices of History, 1943-44*, New York, Gramercy Publishing Co., 1944, p. 504.

tries to form its own state, to be the majority in a territory as large as can be staked out. First the European part of Turkey, then Austria-Hungary, later Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, split into their constituent parts. Not only Czechs, Hungarians, Serbs, and Rumanians, but now also Slovaks, Slovenes, and Croats seek to dominate their neighbors; each wants to resurrect the glorious days when it ruled the others. Only an outside power can convince them that their strength lies in a nonnational state united by the feeling of being "east Europeans" or whatever they might be called, just as all ethnic groups in Switzerland are proud of being Swiss. The compromise of Moscow seems on the surface to signify that no outside pressure shall be brought to bear on the small states of central and eastern Europe to form a federation or refrain from forming one. They will be left free to form a southeast European Union if they can.

But one of them is Czechoslovakia. By her agreement with the Soviets she can join no combination directed against the latter.⁴⁵ It will be up to Russia to decide whether a federation among the Austro-Hungarian successor states is or is not directed against her. Thus, at the Moscow Conference Russian policy prevailed: the permission graciously granted to the small states was just a face-saver for British statesmen who had endorsed the Czechoslovak-Polish and the Greek-Yugoslav confederations, and for Mr. Benes, who wrote in *Foreign Affairs* on January, 1942: "The creation of this new political unit (the Czechoslovak-Polish confederation) can already be considered an accomplished fact." The USSR can prevent the federation of any states on its western borders just as it prevented the union of Tanna Tuwa and Outer Mongolia. It may even be assumed that the other independent states along its borders—Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia—will enter into arrangements with it similar to that already concluded with Czechoslovakia. And the Czechoslovakian agreement, according to Mr. Benes, provides that the Czechoslovakian foreign policy shall be one with Russia's. The so-called allies of Moscow can no more make alliances, declare war, or conclude peace, on their own initiative than could those of ancient Rome in the second century B.C.

The bolshevist Far Eastern policy is evidence, I repeat, that these states are not to lose their identity—will not be compelled to live as the Russians do, speak the same language, eat the same dishes, or pray

⁴⁵ Russo-Czech Agreement, 1943. See Benes, "Postwar Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1946, p. 399.

to the same god; nor need they have in every respect the same laws as Russia. But they are essential for Russia's defense and are to complement her economically. Only within the limits of the Russian *Kriegsverein* and economic autarchy are they free republics.

The three Far Eastern republics are not even communist. When communism showed itself impracticable, they returned to the pre-communistic stage, in which the means of production, land and factories, are state owned, production being carried on by licensed entrepreneurs for their own profit, and foreign trade a state monopoly.

Both the USSR–Outer Mongolia and the USSR–Czechoslovakia alliances provide for reciprocal use of territory and military forces, together with economic co-operation on a broad scale. The Czechoslovak People's Republic, like the other border states, will nationalize its means of production; foreign trade will be a state monopoly and the army will be trained by Russians. Within these limitations its inhabitants can enjoy their own culture. Some critics may point out that the agreements are reciprocal, that the Mongol and Czechoslovak People's Republic have the same rights as the USSR; that they emphasize respect for the mutual independence and sovereignty of other states as well as noninterference in domestic affairs. But "reciprocity" and "equal rights" do not mean much when one party to an agreement is as large as Russia and the other as small as Czechoslovakia. The bigger power will see to it that the smaller does not join with its friends to become a menace. No vassal state will have what in the days of the Westphalia Treaty was called the "right of arms and peace"—a foreign policy or an army of its own. They will have the rights small subject states have had in all empires from the Roman to the British—no more.

The czarist policy, as I have shown, was opposed both to the annexation of the Balkan States and to the formation of a Byzantine state in the Balkans. It wanted each ethnic group to have its own state protected by Russia. The St. Germain and Trianon treaties created three small states—Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary—out of Austria-Hungary. The Balkans, a dangerous vacuum, were thereby extended to the boundaries of Germany.⁴⁶

Evidently the Big Three have agreed that Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria are like Finland, definitely within Russia's sphere of interest,

⁴⁶ J. F. Unstead, "The Belt of Political Change in Europe," *The Scottish Geographical Magazine*, XXXIX (1923), 183 ff.

at least until they become "democratic" and "peace-loving." Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia remain independent, but Russia's predominant interest in their future is admitted. The USSR can prevent their federation, influence or direct their foreign policy.

Before trying to sum up a final tentative answer to the question of Soviet policy in Europe, a preliminary remark is necessary. The Soviets call their country a democracy; others say it is a totalitarian state governed by a dictator.

Expressions such as "democracy," which defy definition, are always misleading. If the criterion is equal opportunity, Soviet Russia seems as democratic as some western powers, perhaps more so. Every citizen seems to have an equal chance at education, employment, and advancement. If the method of choosing rulers is the criterion, Russia is not a democracy. It has only one political party and only the nominee of that party can be elected to office. Like the Roman Catholic church, the USSR is an organization with co-operating, not competing, members. The Catholic church considers itself the intermediary between its members and God; its clergy are delegated to care for the souls of its members. Since each priest has equal opportunity to attain the highest position, the church is a democratic organization. Yet since the members must do as the priest with his orders from above says, it is a hierarchy. The Bolsheviks are priests directing the activities of their hierarchy.

Mr. Molotov begins his report on the decentralization of Soviet foreign affairs⁴⁷ by saying that according to the Soviet Constitution each Republic has the right to secede from the Union. Now, self-determination is a democratic idea deriving its meaning from a system which gives citizens the right to form political parties and reach decisions by majority vote. What does this right mean in a one-party system whose members must obey their leaders? What does the right to secede mean in a federation of states where only one party is permitted? In Lenin's day Finland's secession was accepted, the independence of the Ukraine agreed to, and the principle of self-determination genuinely applied.⁴⁸ The Ukraine, however, soon lost its right to pursue its own foreign policy, and about two decades later war forced Finland to grant to Russia rights which curtailed her independence.

⁴⁷ *New York Times*, February 2, 1944; A. O'H. McCormick, *ibid.*, February 5, 1944.

⁴⁸ In his *History of Russia*, p. 372, Vernadsky writes: "Each of the Union Republics retained, theoretically, its right to secede from the Union."

Yet even in Lenin's time Joseph Stalin, Party secretary, argued like a Yankee when he wrote:

In the face of the life and death struggle between proletarian Russia and the imperialistic Entente the border states must choose one of the two courses: Either on Russia's side—liberating the masses from the imperialistic yoke—or on the side of the Entente, under the yoke. There is no third way. Naturally Russia's borderlands and the nations and peoples inhabiting them have the inalienable right of separation from Russia and if any one of these nations decides by majority vote to separate from Russia, as Finland did in 1917, Russia would probably acknowledge and sanction the separation. But here not the undoubted rights of nations but the interests of masses are at stake, those in the center as well as those in the border countries. Here we are discussing the kind of agitation our Party must carry on in the interests of the masses, if the Party is not to ruin itself, if it wants to influence the will of the working masses in a certain direction. The interests of the masses indicate that the separation of the border states at the present stage of the revolution would be profoundly counter-revolutionary.⁴⁹

Similarly it is hard to understand the significance of the division of power between Union and Republic when both are ruled by one and the same party and the leaders of both must be Party members, trained to obey and liquidated if they refuse. In the British Commonwealth the right of Canada to have her own army, minister of foreign affairs, and foreign policy is easy to comprehend, since Canada has her own economy and is governed by her own political parties. But what would such rights mean if Canada were *obliged* to elect representatives *bound* to follow the decision of the majority leader in the British Parliament? "Self-determination" like "friendly" has a different meaning in the USSR and in Western Europe. Britain would consider a government in her sphere of interest friendly even if the minority represented in its parliament were anti-British; if the majority in the government is friendly, so is the state. To the Russians, on the contrary, an anti-Russian minority makes a state unfriendly. The governing pro-Russian party or a coalition of the pro-Russian parties tolerates no opposition. All who oppose pro-Russian policies are enemies, criminals, and must be eliminated.

To form a new nation a new elite is needed. When Russia attempts

⁴⁹ Quoted in G. Cleinow, "Die Nationalitätenpolitik in der Soviet Union," *Zeitschrift für die gesamten Fragen des europäischen Ostens*, 1925/26, p. 129.

to make a neighbor friendly, she starts by building up a Bolshevik elite and attempts to secure for it the position of a single dominating party. First the Jesuits and the Dominicans of a new *ecclesia militans* overrun the neighbor state; they are the organizers who will form a nation friendly to the USSR. The parochial elite will be dependent upon the hierarchically organized Communist Party. Finland, Yugoslavia, and all other countries in the glacis must be governed by one party or coalition of parties, taking its orders from the Bolsheviks.

The dominants in the friendly states are like a Metropolitan of the church, subject to the highest authority in Rome, but independent in many local affairs. The USSR is like the Roman Catholic church also in that it believes it has found the formula for a perfect state and that no sacrifice is too great to attain its ideal. Its methods are those of the medieval church: inquisition, the elimination of heretics, confiscation of their assets. The demand today is, not for an international revolution in the sense of the Trotskyites, but for the education of the world to Soviet ideals. Under the somewhat misleading title "Berlin Reds Bar a Soviet Regime; Party Approves Private Property," the *New York Times*, on June 26, 1945, published an Associated Press dispatch stating: "We consider it incorrect for Germany to open the path for implanting the Soviet system because such path does not correspond with the conditions of development of Germany at this *given moment*." [italics my own] In other words, the Soviet regime is barred for the time being.

Germany, like Mongolia, is in a pre-Soviet stage of economy. To transform a society bound by one nexus, such as nationality or religion, into a body social bound by a different tie takes time. The Bolsheviks call such re-education "social engineering."

The USSR hopes eventually to organize all states in its security zone into a *Zoll-* or *Kriegsverein*. Under the Soviet regime a *Zollverein* means a territory not only under one tariff but also subject to a central planning authority and a board exercising monopoly over exports and imports.

The USSR, I repeat, cannot tolerate on its borders an unfriendly state. To be considered "friendly," a neighbor must be a democracy governed by a coalition of parties including the Communists, the latter controlling the key positions in the administration of both domestic and foreign affairs. The job of the Communist minister of the interior is to socially engineer the population of the friendly state into

a pre-soviet stage of evolution. The job of the Communist minister of foreign affairs is to support the foreign policy of the USSR. A Communist, note well, is a man whose first loyalty is to the Party and who does whatever the head of the hierarchy orders. The friendly state must tolerate Russian economic penetration, nay, domination; must allow its products to be distributed as the Communist Party directs. Its trade with non-Russian countries is controlled by the Communists. Russia will, however, tolerate some degree of political independence in these countries, as in the case of the Far Eastern Republics.

It may be remarked parenthetically that there is a distinct difference between what may be called organization by the domination of individuals (one state) and organization by the domination of the leaders of groups (feudalism, friendly neighbors). The great difficulty in both kinds of organization remains the division between the spheres of free activities and those of legally regulated (individual or group autonomy, "laissez faire" versus "common law," federal affairs).

The more totalitarian the state, the more closed the groups, the less the individual and group autonomy. Totalitarian Russia grants less autonomy to the soviets or to friendly states than laissez faire Britain did to dominions or her supporters. The line of demarcation between the two spheres is continually shifting, and legal regulations cannot hinder changes.

International intercourse would be eased if it were admitted that there are Romes today as there were formerly; that they have *amici*, and that it is the duty of a friend to follow the command of its Rome. The admission ought to be supplemented by a clear definition of the duties of Rome and of the *amicus*.

Closing this long digression, we conclude by saying that international lawyers would do a great service to mankind by accepting the basic truth that the equality of states, like that of men, is a fiction which has its own importance. The inequalities among states are no less than those among men; the former should be recognized and provided for in international law just as the latter are in civil law. International regulation of the feudal relation, international protection of vassal states would help to secure peace. Let us admit that the USSR needs a port on a warm sea, and such a port can be granted to her by vassalizing an independent power, Turkey or Iran or some other

country. Could not the state granting the right of way to it be protected against complete domination by Russia?

I doubt it; for whenever sovereignty over one territory is divided between two or more powers, the dominion of the better consolidated power expands; international protection cannot stay it. Everybody's business is nobody's business; international protection of the weaker power worked in the past only when it was accorded to one great power having the requisite geographic situation and specific interest.

The state as we know it has several goals; it can reach many, but not all, for it is too small for some, too big for others. If it were split up or combined with other states to form larger groups, each adapted to a particular goal, it might achieve all. Each military state, *Kriegverein*, economic state, *Zollverein*, ethnic state, the nation, has its own ideal boundaries, determined by the techniques of war and industry and the assimilation of the inhabitants. At the same time the territory of a well-constituted *Kriegverein*, of a well-knit *Zollverein*, and of the ideal nation will partly coincide, and the organizer of each will try to dominate the entire body. Every state has various problems; each problem is distinct and must be solved in its own way. Science has answers only to specific, well-stated questions. There is no one remedy for all illnesses, only help for specific well-defined maladies. Historical analysis tries to elucidate the questions; to answer them is a different job, requiring creative thinking.

For years to come diplomacy will remain the game it always has been. If unchecked, the USSR will extend her policy to the Middle and Far East—to the three Moslem countries (Turkey, Iraq, and Iran) and to the countries liberated from Japan (Korea and Manchukuo). The physical shape of Russia in the Far East makes it desirable for her to incorporate—not in the Union as a soviet but as a member of her hierarchy—all territory up to the fortieth degree north latitude and also Korea. She will undoubtedly continue to consider it her manifest destiny to make all these countries her economic and strategic associates.

USSR policy is the traditional policy of an expanding power. She endeavors to make herself a fortress, surround herself with a protective crust, divide and keep the neighboring regions as a territory for grabage, and make the great power on the other side of her territory an ally. I have proved, I hope to the satisfaction of my readers,

that Russia has selected the best boundaries she could lay claim to and is engaged in building up a protective crust. It remains to be shown that she intends to divide the adjacent region beyond into secondary powers, pursuing a policy of disturbance among them, and to make the power beyond that territory her ally.

The evidence seems clear. Much as the bolshevists may flout tradition, they have followed czarist Russia in trying to protect their habitat by acquiring more and more land. The answer to the question "Quo vadis Domine Stalin?" would be: to a warm seaport, and this aim can be reached only by domination of the World Island. I do not mean to suggest that the present rulers of the USSR necessarily envisage world domination as their aim. But we have seen what Sully, in advising Henry IV to fill out the natural frontiers of France, wrote to him of the future; I will venture to quote again: "Consider what may be the ideas of a prince less wise than you, less tempered and modest, as your successors may be . . . whether they will be content within such [natural] frontiers, and not be filled with ambitious desires, insatiable greed for French domination."⁵⁰ In writing these lines, comments Albert Sorel, it looks as if Sully had a presentiment of Louis XIV and Napoleon.

If we consider the diplomatic game which is the prelude and aftermath of wars, we see that fanatics are aggressive and attempt by peaceful coercion not only to vassalize their neighbors but also to divide states which they cannot vassalize into hostile parties, supporting the party which represents the centrifugal forces within them. It is one of the aims of the traditional diplomatic game of Russia to make the states outside her glacis weak and to tolerate only one Great Power beside herself, which must be her ally. The community of all states must be divided into an eastern and a western empire. Whoever controls the western empire, whether France, England, or the United States, must be Russia's ally; the two Great Powers must rule all other states and see to it that the smaller states do not join in a federation as strong as the eastern or the western empire.

A Roman legal maxim runs: "What is right in my case is equitable in yours." If Russia's eastern empire in the World Island must be flanked by friendly states, co-operating economically with Russia, then England, too, has the right to head a hierarchy of states surrounded by friends, and England's right to economic prerogatives on its friends'

⁵⁰ Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, I, 268.

territories must be tolerated. But the Roman maxim is not observed in the "Fourth Rome." The western block, England's glacis, is taboo, and within the English empire the parochial minorities are the friends of the bolshevists. The USSR admits, as I have mentioned, the right of each member Soviet to secede, but in practice its one party system prevents secession. In all Soviets the officials must be communists. A nationalist—a man whose first loyalty is to the local Soviet, who is above all a *Ukrainian* and secondarily a communist—is an enemy of the state and must be liquidated.⁵¹ In the British Empire, on the other hand, the nationalists, those whose loyalty is first to their parochial groups, are supported by Russia. At home the communist is for one nation; outside his own borders, for many nations. At home he defends his nexus against any that might tend to disrupt it.

Russia's fight against imperialism and the domination of colonial and semi-colonial peoples is well known. An attempt was made at San Francisco to include in the United Nations Charter a declaration that colonies shall be permitted to become dominions. England's opposition was strong enough to prevent the adoption of such a weapon against her. The result (Chapter XI, *Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories*) is "a loud sounding nothing." The "members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government . . . accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost . . . the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories," but no power has the right to supervise the trustee or interfere in its domestic affairs. Even "statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions" in such territories are to be transmitted to the Secretary-General, "subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require." In short, one state undertakes to act as a trustee; it agrees to exercise its power fairly, but remains the sole judge of its actions, and no state is entitled to check up on it.⁵²

It seems superfluous to add that in Greece, Spain, and Iran (and perhaps tomorrow in other countries on the British Empire's lifeline) the USSR, through the Communist party, is actively opposing a friendly policy toward Britain, that is to say, a policy assuring a friendly attitude toward Britain if war occurs, whoever her adversary is.

⁵¹ Dallin, *The Real Soviet Russia*, p. 201.

⁵² S. Arne, *United Nations Primer*, New York, Rinehart, 1945, p. 142.

The objection may be raised that it is a little too much to expect that the USSR will help Britain to maintain a hierarchy of states strong enough to fight her; it is, on the contrary, only human that it should try to weaken, by the diplomatic game, a country that may be its adversary tomorrow.

Yes, it is human—but is it rational? If one admits that there is no possibility at present of organizing the world as one state or yet of the USSR dominating all states as the primus of a single hierarchy, chaos can be avoided only by a balance of power. Peace can be secured if there are more than two Great Powers, separated from each other by smaller healthy and independent states. If one admits these premises, the interest of the USSR is that Britain shall remain independent and strong, not become merely an exarchate of Ravenna, a *pied à terre* for the great Western Power, the United States of America.

Tradition, working behind the scenes, gives shape to policies. New circumstances render them unsuitable for later generations. Yet states follow tradition as unquestioningly as the sentry followed his orders in Bismarck's story.

During the first spring days it was then the custom for everyone connected with the court to promenade in the Summer Garden between Paul's Palace and the Nova. There the Emperor had noticed a sentry standing in the middle of a grass plot; in reply to the question why he was standing there, the soldier could only answer "those are my orders." The Emperor therefore sent one of his adjutants to the guard room to make inquiries; but no explanation was forthcoming except that sentry had to stand there winter and summer. The source of the original order could no longer be discovered. The matter was talked of at court, and reached the ears of the servants. One of these, an old pensioner, came forward and stated that his father had once said to him as they passed the sentry in the Summer Garden: "There he is, still standing to guard the flower; on that spot the Empress Catherine once noticed a snowdrop in bloom unusually early, and gave orders that it was not to be plucked."⁵³

The Viennese version of this anecdote is the tale of a sentry who paced up and down in front of an old house where Maria Theresa had spent a night. The Empress died, her heirs succeeded her, both the Hapsburgs and their empire disappeared, but the sentry returned to his post every day until someone inquired why.

Is it not time for statesmen to rid themselves of tradition, to question

⁵³ *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman*, I, 250.

the reasons for their actions, compare their plans with today's requirements? Why should the USSR follow Russia's traditional policy now that the reason for it no longer exists? That policy was determined by her geographical position, which was in striking contrast to that of the United States, whose open eastern and western coasts offer both a defensive and an offensive advantage. Only advanced bases were needed to control these seacoasts and the routes to the Panama Canal connecting them. Bases are the glacis of the United States. The British Empire kept its control by means of a chain of bases and friendly barrier states. Russia, meanwhile, was enclosed, her western outlets subject to the whims of the Germans and the Scandinavians while those to the east could be blocked by Japan, and that from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, by Turkey. The one year-round outlet in war and peace might have been through Iran had British interests not opposed giving Russia a right of way.

Land routes, unlike sea routes, can be controlled by territorial acquisitions. Continental glacis must be connected with the territory they protect. France and Germany, each in its century, failed in the struggle for dominion because the glacis it was obliged to annex had heterogeneous populations. Sea-power England and sea-protected United States have had other means of controlling such dependencies.

Since Arctic ports are frozen during the long northern winters, the Russian demand for a warm port seemed justified in former years and with it Russian expansion to the sea. But technical progress has given the USSR access to every port of the world, in winter and summer. In the new flying world of tomorrow, the USSR will have a unique position. In his *Air Future, a Primer of Aeropolitics*, Burnet Hershey writes, "Russia by all odds and from every point of view, has the strongest aviation position in the world."⁵⁴ From her Arctic coast cargo and troop-carrying planes have access to every part of the globe without flying over foreign territory. Bruce Hopper quotes a celebrated Russian scientist, D. Mendeleef, as predicting that the center of gravity of the Russian population will eventually be in the neighborhood of Omsk, near rivers flowing into the Arctic.⁵⁵ Professor Huntington says that "at Sverdlovsk, which represents the great Ural region, the temperature has risen almost steadily for a century." Further,

⁵⁴ Page 96.

⁵⁵ *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1943, p. 600.

The general increase in warmth helps to explain the success of the Russians in opening ocean transportation to the mouths of the Siberian rivers. The main reason for such success is doubtless the improvement in icebreakers, meteorological observations, and other aids to navigation, but the reduced thickness of the ice must not be overlooked.⁵⁶

Technology has brought Russia her long-coveted security, though her statesmen may not yet admit that ports and outlets are no longer vital to her or that the traditional policy has become obsolete. A united central and eastern Europe would not endanger Russia, and as an economic ally would be more important than a divided. England's position was similarly modified when the discovery of America brought her from the edge of the Continental world to the middle of a new maritime world. She then wisely changed her policy. Instead of continuing the barren effort to expand on the European continent, she began to colonize a new continent.

The traditional policy of Russia, to obtain access to the open sea and annex all territory between her homeland and a warm port, is now as barren as Continental expansion was for England in the sixteenth century. The ports she covets, Danzig and Constantinople, are on the Baltic and the Mediterranean, both inland seas whose domination lies with the powers that guard their doors—with the narrow Kattegat and Skagerrak, and Suez and Gibraltar—in the case of the Mediterranean, also the pillars dividing its eastern and western parts—Rhodes, Malta, Cyprus, and Crete.

The bolshevist aim in 1946, therefore, when to control an inland sea entails control of its coasts, can only be to make each of these waters a *mare nostrum* and to occupy, or directly or indirectly to dominate, all Europe.

It is, of course, possible to argue that the millions of Soviet citizens have a right to the same kind of security as the millions of American citizens. The USSR needs just as good frontiers as the United States has—which to her mean open seacoasts with free roads in war and peace. The USSR therefore will not relinquish her demand even if we are convinced that a warm seaport is like the forgotten sentinel. It is hard to persuade the USSR that behind the fight to separate her from the sea is not her competitors' desire to keep her down. The Bolsheviks may point out that Britain and the United States act as

⁵⁶ *Mainsprings of Civilization*, p. 415.

protectors of Turkey because they want to prevent the building up of a strong empire.

On the other hand, it must be recognized that the United States is afraid that by expanding the USSR is trying to acquire world dominion. Fear of the Carthaginian pincers on the one side and fear of world dominion on the other create one of those vicious circles that lead to wars and revolutions.

Behind these fears is the old inherited idea that the neighbor is the enemy, that man is man's wolf. Civilization may have tamed mankind, we may co-operate in many ways and behave fairly with friends and foes, but the fear remains and subconsciously presses the leaders of masses into false moves. Psychoanalysis might release mankind from its suppressed fears and reveal the folly of its ways. The greatest problems of mankind are ethical.

If the Bolsheviks take the road many before them have chosen—if they follow Spain, France, and Germany in the endeavor to build up a European universal monarchy, they will fail.

Medieval and modern history in Europe are alike in this matter. In the world of national states, first Spain, then France, and then Germany has tried to unite Europe into one empire dominated by itself. Again and again oppression or the threat of oppression has united all against the one who sought hegemony; with the help of an outsider, first England, then the United States, they have defeated the aggressor and ruined their own world.

Is not the historical evidence clear? Read the careers of Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon I, William II, and Hitler. Europe cannot be united until some deluge washes away the memories of each nation's glorious past, its national traditions and customs, its several forms of God, languages, political creeds, and the divergent interests of its numerous ruling classes.

Even if such a unification should for a time succeed, would not the resulting type of man, the Eurasian, be modified again by the different environments of each region into various types? Will not the past history of each country be resurrected and new antagonisms, splitting the united Europe, be born?

Every aggressor, though aware of the past, has thought he could reach the goal nobody had reached before him. But building an empire is a process, as Kipling says, of "hammering, hammering, hammering

little bits of Kingdoms" ⁵⁷ into line. The results of the hammering depend upon the resistance of the matter hammered as well as upon the strength of the arm that wields the tool. And as more and more states are hammered at the same time, the power of the hammerer decreases, and the resistance of the hammered gains.

Today the USSR is hammering into line the countries on its glacis. The bourgeoisie, the group formerly dominant in each, is being eliminated, and a minority, with another creed, put in its place. Will this process build up an east European nation? We doubt it, as the USSR is opposed to a confederation; it wants several states, not one, on its glacis. Nationalism and religion, the *nexus socialis* of the former groups, must be replaced by an economic creed, but retained as a secondary tie. The new *nexus* must bind the new masters to the USSR, the old one separate them from their neighbors. Hammering on the one hand and feeding the fires of resistance on the other is not a method conducive to harmony.

In her fight against Germany Britain granted concessions to the USSR. The secret agreements of the first World War and the open agreements of the second admitted the predominant interest of the USSR in the Balkans, but encircled its sphere of interest with the British. As Britain lost power and prestige, the USSR was free to expand. Is the United States stepping into the place of Britain, and can a balance be maintained in a world with only two great powers? These are the questions considered in our last chapter.

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"Never was a blacksmith like our Norman King
England's being hammered—hammered, hammered into line!"
R. Kipling, *Verse*; New York, Doubleday, 1942, p. 717.

THE DIVIDED WORLD ISLAND

TO MAKE a fortress of her own habitat, surround it by a glacis divided among vassal states, and keep the states beyond them weak, furthering the centripetal forces within them—this is Russia's policy today. To assimilate the vassal states, absorb them, make them a part of her body social, and acquire new ones by which gradually to convert the one world into one state united by the bolshevist creed—this, one may reasonably assume, is Russia's policy for tomorrow. In order to realize that policy, the new nation is strictly organized, directed by one mind, its plans and orders carried out by the Dominicans and Jesuits of the new *ecclesia militans*. It is my contention that the other Great Power, the United States, less consciously perhaps, follows a very similar policy, progressing by little-recognized steps to a similar organization. She, too, is in the process of building up a hierarchy of states and securing it by a glacis divided among vassal states; she, too, tries to undermine the power of other states by supporting the centrifugal forces within them; she is organizing herself by more planning and more bureaucracy; she, too, is trying to convert the one world into one state, united by the American creed, which she assumes must be equitable for all: a great federal democracy with an American way of life.

The expansionist policy of the United States is better concealed than is that of the USSR. The latter is a newly reorganized and radical nation, created by the vertical invasion of a new elite. As a newcomer in the old society of nations she overcompensates her fear by undiplomatic language and overt radicalism. The United States, the protector of the old order, on the other hand—the conservative power—opposes change and is obliged to cloak her expansion in "nonintervention." Both policies follow the trend determined by past generations. The history of the USSR is long, that of the United States short, and the longer the history, the clearer the trend.

History has dug out the river bed in which the everlasting present flows. A river channel shifts in its early days, generally becoming

more stable as it grows older; finally, wearing down the bedrock or spreading its course along the alluvial plain, it becomes a stable trough for flowing water. The later you find it, the clearer its trend. But even when the continuous activities of soil and flow, the pressure and counter-pressure of air, water, reaction, and whatnot, have determined a definite bed, fortuitous events of the moment, shaping the flow and overflow of water, influence the picture. The history of Russia, from the day when the principality of Moscow first began to expand in every direction toward the sea, seems to have had a single trend in which day-to-day events appear as steps, sometimes forward, sometimes backward, sometimes off the road, but in general toward one goal—in spite of trifling digressions, their direction is apparent.

The history of the United States, on the other hand, is so short that it is harder to distinguish between its deviations and the true direction of the steps. At school it would begin with a bird's-eye view of the Americas before the period of discoveries. A few sparse empires could be seen, each dominated by an elite less aggressive than those ruling in Europe and big tracts of land inhabited by nomadic tribes: a territory which, in the eyes of a European of that time, could be invaded and converted into a niche by eliminating the rulers.


Another view of the same territory after the age of the great explorations—in the year 1713, let us say, when the Treaty of Utrecht was concluded—would show in the northern half the result of migrations started earlier from all great European countries. Spain, ruler of most of the world, invaded the territory from the south and secured her empire by a large glacis reaching far north on the Pacific coast, and on the eastern seaboard to the northern boundary of Florida. The French migration opened a road for itself into Canada, and in the South near New Orleans; the two thinly settled areas came together in the Mississippi valley. Norsemen, Anglo-Saxons, Swedes, and Dutch settled on the eastern seaboard.¹

The niche was invaded by three chief kinds of migrant; each had its own line of attack and competed for dominion over the entire North American region. The Anglo-Saxons advanced in every direction; their settlements expanded. The French line from Canada through the Mississippi valley to New Orleans is one front; the Spanish Empire's glacis another. Natives partly assimilated by the Spanish and in lesser degree by the French were scattered throughout the

¹ Priestley, pp. 1, 210, 280, 291; Hansen, pp. 58-60.

region. The Anglo-Saxon groups, with their Dutch associates, were the most aggressive and best organized.

During the half century between the Treaty of Utrecht and that of Paris (1713-63) they increased from about 360,000 to 1,600,000. The increase came "in part from the large families, for whom there was always plenty of employment. in part from immigration. The



outstanding feature of this immigration was its non-English character. The two most important contributions were German and Scots-Irish."²

For these thirteen colonies the merging into one nation was inevitable, and the separation from the mother country was also as inevitable as cleavage for cells multiplying by division.

Morison and Commager write:

"All the different members of the British Empire are distinct States," said Wilson, "independent of each other, but connected together under the

² Morison and Commager, I, 92; *ibid.*, pp. 17-24, 199-200, 296; Priestley, pp. 345-46.

same sovereign in right of the same Crown." Wilson's *Considerations on the Authority of Parliament*, Jefferson's *Summary View*, and Adam's *Novanglus* papers published this startling theory between August 1774 and February 1775. Historically they found no ground for Parliament's authority, although they admitted that the colonies had weakly accepted it; logically there was no need for it, since the colonial legislatures were competent. The colonists should love and honor the king, follow his lead in war, observe the treaties he concluded with other princes; but otherwise govern themselves. So these three Americans in 1774-75 demanded for their colonies the exact dominion status which Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and the Irish Free State now enjoy in the British Empire, and which is now the official basis of the British Commonwealth of Nations.³

The federal state, however, represents a transitional stage between union and alliance; had England granted the United States dominion status in 1775, hostilities might have been avoided, but not separation. In due course the United States as a dominion would have claimed its sovereign right to declare war and conclude peace. The old *potestas* of the king would have been transformed into the more elusive *auctoritas*, which in turn would have dwindled away. Nothing could stop the evolution of the new organism; nothing prevent the formation of a new type—the American—or its strong tendency to make itself self-sufficient and secure in a suitable habitat.

The concessions granted by England in the twentieth century, after she began to decline, she was unwilling to grant a few years after the Paris Treaty, when she acquired India and Canada. Not only separation but also separation by force was unavoidable. The American colonies, with France's help, revolted against Britain and her loyalists. And when the revolution succeeded and the Treaty of Paris was signed, the thirteen colonies united in a federal state, the local governors agreeing that each state should be sovereign except in affairs common to all.

The thirteen states were subject to a federal constitution, but their inhabitants were not yet a nation. Virginia planters, New York merchants, and the political leaders of the other states were the beginnings of a national nucleus. In each state the homogeneous and heterogeneous elements were bound together by fear of their neighbors—English, Spanish, French, and Indians—and separated by sectionalism. This is not the place to tell the story of the birth and the growth of the American nation. Through common danger, by education in new ways of

³ I, 187.

life, a new creed binding them, the various groups were gradually assimilated. It was a long time before even the stage of nationhood was reached when an emotional peak could unite the diverse elements. For our purposes it is sufficient to say that the process resembled all processes of integration. Pioneering did not cease with the consolidation of the federal state; the organism sent out its chains in every direction. Large tracts of land were enclosed, the natives eliminated, and place was made for the masses which immigrated in increasing numbers in the following decades.

Like the territory of Gaul or Germany, that of the United States was assembled bit by bit, by peaceful means or by war. The peaceful means were not, as in the European monarchies, marriage or inheritance, but diplomacy and purchase (their democratic version). Louisiana, Florida, and Alaska were bought; Oregon was acquired by a diplomatic war, and Texas by infiltration followed by revolution; New Mexico and California, by war. As early as the Revolutionary War, statesmen like Jefferson had seen the bright future of the nation in territorial expansion; others, like Hamilton, insisted upon the need for self-sufficiency and independence from European workshops. The importance of open sea lanes was understood, and a war was fought with Britain to secure them.

The general tendency we have noted—that each nation tries to acquire as its habitat the entire region outlined for it by nature—is very evident in the history of this country. The manifest destiny of the United States was to have the North American Continent for a habitat, but the entire continent was not occupied; Canada in the north and Mexico to the south limited the expansion. Are these barriers permanent, as certain writers assert, or is it possible, as others suggest, that the annexation of both Canada and Mexico is just a question of time? The truth is, I think that an increasing trend toward expansion is clearly shown by the domination of neighbors; whether they will in fact at some time be annexed depends upon unforeseeable events of the future.

Writing of the relationship—he calls it “interplay”—between Canada, the United States, and Great Britain, John Bartlett Brebner calls his book *North Atlantic Triangle*. In the nineteenth century Great Britain was the paramount Power in the triangle; London, its economic center. English bankers and investors financed Canada and the United

States by buying American securities, English merchants bought the North American surplus or at least financed the purchases of other countries in America, insured the ships carrying the goods. England's navy protected both the Atlantic and the Pacific shores. I have noted the fact that an American statesman after World War I asserted that it would be desirable to leave the policing of the world to Britain and retire, keeping free from international entanglements.

But the world has changed. In 1910 British investments in Canada amounted to nearly two billion dollars, those of the United States to less than a quarter of that sum—five hundred million. In 1920, just after the first World War, British investments in Canada were two and a half billion, those of the United States over two billion. Between 1926 and 1939 England's investments remained stable, while those of the United States doubled. The situation today shows that during the recent war England's investments were liquidated; Canada, the former debtor, has become England's creditor.

The total trade of Canada with the United States in the same period became more important than her trade with England. In 1929 it amounted to \$1,372 million; the figure for Britain in the same year was \$624 million. In 1934, after the Ottawa Conference, trade with the United States came to \$430 million, with Britain, \$271 million.

The exchange of population between the United States and Canada during the same period is summed up by Brebner thus:

Up to 1930 an observer of North American population movements might fairly have described the Canadian-American relationship since 1918 as having been merely an odd variation of the characteristic pattern. Ever since the founding of Halifax in 1749 the peoples of North America had been going to whatever part of the continent attracted them most on any number of grounds—economic, political, cultural, or climatic. This habit was so deeply ingrained that it had produced a disregard for political allegiance which was probably at least as remarkable as the uprootings from Europe which were involved in the long-drawn-out Atlantic Migration itself. . . .⁴

In 1930 the number of Canadian-born in the United States was about one-sixth as great as the native population in Canada. Three and a third million persons of Canadian birth or Canadian parentage, living in the United States, represented a quarter of the total Canadian stock (by birth and parentage) in North America. About one-third of them were French. Over seven-eighths of the Canadian-born emigrants lived in the states along

⁴ Brebner, p. 298.

the border, with southward projections down the Atlantic Coast to New York, and down the Pacific Coast to California. Detroit, with 95,000 Canadian-born residents, was closely followed by Boston and New York. On the opposite side of the ledger, 345,000 American-born constituted in 1931 the largest single non-British immigrant group in Canada and about 30 per cent of all foreign-born residents. They were widely and evenly distributed over Canada and they were both more rural and became naturalized much more readily than Canadians in the United States. American stock in Canada (about 820,000 by birth and parentage) represented less than one-fourth of one per cent of the total on the continent. Interestingly enough, both the Americans in Canada and the Canadians in the United States stood appreciably above the general population in material, educational, and professional ways.⁵

A spiritual bond is forming between the two countries. Other observers note an increasing adaptation in Canada to the customs of the United States.⁶ Are not these symptoms evidence of increasing penetration, the prologue to merger, however little public opinion may at present support any such formal act?

Considering the political situation, we may say that when Canada became independent, after the first World War, its position in the triangle was not only *de jure* but also *de facto* similar to that of medieval Hungary. Dominated by Rome and Byzantium, Hungary kept herself independent by playing one against the other. Canada won her independence from Britain with American help and maintained her commercial freedom from the United States with British support. Can she keep her independence if Britain becomes more or less an American bridgehead in Europe? Surely not. Canada's defects, her small sectarian population and her sectionalism,⁷ make it impossible for her to be independent in a world where there are only two Great Powers, the USSR and the United States, who are also her nearest neighbors. Her habitat will necessarily become a battlefield in the event of a Russo-American war.

I compared earlier the boundaries of the United States with those of the USSR, noting as the latter's defect its lack of two seacoasts. A further comparison would demonstrate that the USSR has complete control over her coast on the Arctic Sea facing the North Pole, whereas the United States has only a relatively small coast on that sea and no land route to its Alaskan territory, connection with which is

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 301-2.

⁶ MacCormac, p. 149.

⁷ *Ibid.*

broken by Canada. If, as is at present assumed by certain strategists, the Arctic seacoast proves important for the protection of the hinterland,⁸ the Canadian-owned connecting link and short Arctic coastline are defects in the United States boundaries, and great nations, we have seen, try to remedy their defects.

The United States will need Canada as a friendly state, an *amicus*, as the Romans called it; a state having the same foreign policy and adhering to the ideologies that rule United States public opinion. The more the Commonwealth of British Nations is disrupted by centrifugal forces, the more Canada will become a vassal of the United States. By vassal I do not mean, as I have tried to explain, a slave to tyrannical control or that the United States will misuse its power to force Canada to do what she does not want to do or to exploit her economy. Just the contrary: as long as Canada's public opinion is—as at present—in agreement with that of the United States in ideology and follows the United States in matters of foreign policy, the relation will be one of co-operation, probably leading to the raising of the standard of living in Canada. But should the junior partner disagree—for any reason whatsoever—then since disagreement is the test of interrelations among states, it will become evident who is dominant. The hands of statesmen who plead against expansion may be forced.

In 1846-47 the United States fought a brief war with Mexico. Before the war even started there was, as the *Democratic Review* affirmed in 1845, "a pretty general conviction" that Mexico was destined to become "an integral portion of these United States at some future period."⁹ When the peace negotiations began, in 1848, the United States negotiator, Trist, was instructed to obtain the Rio Grande boundary, with New Mexico, Upper California, and a right of transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, one of the proposed interoceanic canal routes. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (February 2, 1848) was concluded according to these instructions. Public opinion, Morrison and Commager affirm,¹⁰ still demanded annexation of Mexico, but the Senate, "after the usual bitter fight," ratified the treaty as it stood. Half of Mexico was annexed; the other half was left as the Mexican Republic.

⁸ Seversky, pp. 121 ff.

⁹ *The Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico*, J. D. P. Fuller, Baltimore, 1936, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science LIV; Rippey, *The Caribbean Danger Zone*, pp. 359 ff.

¹⁰ I, 596-97.

Part of the land annexed (the present Texas) had been penetrated by Anglo-Saxons; part (California and New Mexico) was sparsely inhabited by Mexicans; the entire territory was a Mexican glacis. The nation's real home, the habitat of the various groups and tribes out of which a coherent Mexican nation may eventually be formed, was left with the Republic. In short, though opinion in the United States widely urged that a further step be taken southward to realize this country's "manifest destiny," underlying reluctance prevented the complete taking over of this habitat of tribes alien—it may even be said uncongenial—to those living north of the Rio Grande.

The policy of Rome after her victories over Carthage, Macedonia, and Syria was, not to increase her territory, but to gain hegemony in the Mediterranean world. England likewise refrained from expansion on the continent of Europe, but built up a strong leadership there.

For these refusals to increase the body of the organism by taking in living cells indistinctly felt to be unassimilable were substituted rights of paramountcy, or *auctoritas*, whenever the territory was needed for the security of the victor. The United States, as the story of the years following the Civil War shows, has claimed the right to intervene in the affairs of Mexico or any other part of the territory between the Rio Grande and the Canal Zone, whenever revolution in these states has threatened United States interests and when intervention has seemed necessary to further a revolution favorable to them.

The Republic of Panama was founded, and subsequent control over the Canal Zone obtained, partly through the interference of the United States warship "Nashville" in preventing Colombian troops from putting down rebellion in the then Colombian province of Panama—an action by enlightened international standards quite illegal.¹¹

Ernest Gruening writes,¹²

Already in the first quarter century of neighborly relations, diplomatic pressure in behalf of private claims, even before their consideration by the appropriate tribunals, was sufficiently common. . . . Repeated penetrations of American forces in pursuit of marauders . . . between 1874 and 1882.

Economic invasion during the same period rounds out the picture.

In 1912 . . . American investors apparently owned half of Mexican wealth. . . . The United States' share of Mexican foreign trade in 1930 was more than 60 per cent.

¹¹ Bunau-Varilla, pp. 347 ff.

¹² Pages 553 ff.

Henry Banford Parkes, writing on Diaz' revolt against Lerdo in 1876, notes that

Diaz himself gathered money and recruits in the United States without being molested by the American government. . . . The attitude of the United States was henceforth to be a decisive factor in every Mexican revolution. Since the Plan of Tuxtepec no Mexican revolutionary movement has failed if it has been allowed to use United States territory as its base of operations; none has succeeded if the United States' Government has been unsympathetic.¹³

The diversity of the inhabitants of Mexico and the varied conflicts between "those who wear spurs" (*gachupines*) native-born whites (creoles), mestizos, and Indians have given that country's mighty neighbor ample opportunity for the game of intervention. Mexico, like the other states between the Rio Grande and the Canal Zone, has been dominated by the United States; all are members of the hierarchy of states presided over by the great republic to the north. As early as 1858 Senator Houston of Texas suggested that a Senate committee be appointed to investigate the advisability of establishing a protectorate over Mexico and Central America. There was therefore a tendency to change the already permeating *auctoritas* into a more tangible right such as paramountcy or suzerainty, a transformation later carried out for certain parts of the area (as in the annexation of Puerto Rico, etc.). But in 1858, as often since, "important groups of its [the United States'] citizens always have opposed the use of force, menace, and drastic pressure as instruments of national policy unless they could be convinced that the vital interest of national security was involved."¹⁴ The objection to what used to be called "dollar diplomacy" mounted.

Throughout the decade of 1930's this new understanding, so auspiciously inaugurated by Dwight Morrow, has been undisturbed while a widespread interest in Mexican culture and an awakened appreciation of the great ideals of the Mexican revolution create a climate of opinion that augured well for the future.

Elsewhere in the Caribbean the United States found it expedient to shelve the big stick which Theodore Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson had successively brandished. The new policy was inspired not only by the rising impatience of public opinion with the grosser manifestations of dollar diplomacy, but also by the growth of political maturity and orderliness in the Caribbean

¹³ Parkes, p. 283.

¹⁴ Rippy, *The Caribbean Danger Zone*, p. 243.

nations, and by increase in American investments so large as to substitute direct economic control for political intervention.¹⁵

If we carefully consider this statement, we find that in the opinion of these historians the policy of the United States did not change, since control, by whatever means, was retained. The Caribbean Sea and the territory between the Rio Grande and the Canal remained within the hierarchy of the United States. Another keen observer, J. F. Rippy, writes that abandonment of the proposed protectorates does not mean the abandonment "of the maxim of dominating the Caribbean."¹⁶ Nor does the good neighbor policy mean that the United States does not interest itself intimately in Mexican affairs. In his well-known pledge of nonintervention President Franklin Delano Roosevelt stated:

The maintenance of constitutional government in other nations is not a sacred obligation devolving upon the United States alone. The maintenance of law and orderly processes of government in this hemisphere is the concern of each individual nation within its own borders first of all. It is only if and when the failure of orderly processes affects the other nations of the continent that it becomes their concern; and the point to stress is that in such an event it becomes the joint concern of a whole continent in which we are all neighbors.¹⁷

The statement is nearly the same as that made by Castlereagh and Canning in the days when the intervention of the Holy Alliance threatened the newly acquired independence of Central and South America, an independence dear to England. Revolutions, they said, must be tolerated if they do not threaten the neighbor. England considered revolution as a threat if a friendly government was exchanged for an unfriendly one within her sphere of interest, but refused to intervene and even prevented intervention otherwise. The United States will act in her larger realm of interest in a similar way. Roosevelt's statement has not changed the general policy, which remains the same as it was before the declaration.

There is, however, a distinct change in the American policy toward neighbors. The sacred right of property has lost its halo during the last decades, killing dollar diplomacy. The bourgeois society was a society of owners; a certain amount of property, the "marc of sil-

¹⁵ Morison and Commager, II, 512.

¹⁶ Rippy, *The Caribbean Danger Zone*, p. 252.

¹⁷ Quoted in Morison and Commager, II, 513.

ver," qualified the individual to membership in the ruling elite and its homogeneous retinue. Successive changes from a simple bourgeois rule to a bourgeois rule restrained by labor have abolished the token of silver as a qualification for civil rights, and the time may come when labor becomes the only qualification for them. Diplomacy protecting the owner—dollar diplomacy—will in this case be exchanged for one protecting the worker and the workman's income. *Plus ça change plus c'est la même chose*. Central and South America remain within the sphere of interest of the United States, even though the provocation likely to lead to intervention is no longer expropriation of capital or nonpayment of dividends, but trade agreements with other countries, curtailing of imports, and the closing of open doors. The two kinds of threat—confiscation (basic for dollar diplomacy) and resistance to economic penetration (basic for the new diplomacy)—are closely connected.

Mexico expropriated the American and the British oil interests so that she might sell oil to Germany and Japan. The United States felt its interests challenged both by the expropriation and by the fact that Mexico would have to buy Japanese and German goods in exchange. Though Mexico held stanchly to her expropriation right, her agreement to follow foreign policy and her declaration of war on Germany and Japan ended the oil dispute. Another Mexican policy had received another answer from the United States.

Simply put, the moral is: A mighty Power's small next-door neighbor must behave. If it does not, its independence is a threat to a peace-loving nation. What is good or bad behavior is determined by the big fellow.

To determine the outline or limits of the hierarchy presided over by the United States will be hard even for future historians. For the present argument the only important fact is that when the natural boundaries were reached, when the manifest destiny of continental unity was nearly complete, an expansion over these boundaries began. To quote Morison and Commager again,

After the Civil War the two traditional policies in American foreign relations—the Monroe Doctrine and expansion in the Pacific area—persisted. American interest in the Pacific and the Far East dated back to the old China trade and became vital with the acquisition of Oregon and California.¹⁸

¹⁸ Morison and Commager, II, 315.

The one, the Monroe Doctrine, was the foundation of security, the basis for "manifest destiny," and the motivation for the *guerre de limite*; the other, the Pacific policy, was expansion, and its consequence was the *guerre de magnificence*. Both were inevitable. The China trade, the Perry expedition, the penetration of Hawaii and its subsequent revolution and annexation, the Samoa policy, all prepared the way for expansion in the Pacific.¹⁹

The United States fought Spain in order to convert the Caribbean into an inland sea to protect its own shores. At the same time, its budding commercial and financial interests forced it to adopt the Philippines. It has been argued that

actually, the United States had already taken its proper place in the world before 1898. That was in North America. In 1898 it moved into the non-American world, at precisely the improper place, where it was most likely to become entangled in international rivalries alien to its interests—the Philippine Islands on the littoral of Asia, unwittingly athwart the path of the rising Empire of Japan. That was the first grave mistake in the history of American diplomacy.²⁰

But one might as well say it is a mistake for a tree to shoot out branches, since they may collide with its neighbors in the forest, as deplore the course of a state living in continuous competition with others. By wishful thinking one may be able to believe it possible to confine the activities of industrialists seeking new markets, merchants eager to sell more and more, financiers burdened with idle capital, and thinkers and proselytizing high priests of national creeds, all within national frontiers—especially when these enclose an ample area in which more is commonly produced than can be consumed. If you are isolated and surrounded by stronger walls than was China, you may even convince yourself that your rivals will, without further ado, respect the flag unfurled over your missionaries, merchants, and sailors on other seas and in other lands. In 1936 S. F. Bemis wrote, "The American people would never fight to maintain the Open Door, or to protect the administrative and territorial integrity of China; then why try to maintain it by words?"²¹ Five years later Japan forced the United States to fight for China's integrity and the Open Door. She fought to keep the door open for her own economic expansion, and her victory now gives her the opportunity of selecting bases to secure her *auctoritas* in the Pacific.

¹⁹ Dulles, pp. 66, 134, 158 ff.

²⁰ Bemis, p. 803.

²¹ *Ibid.*

Expansion toward the Pacific; this is what we may call the proper (in the sense of inherent or inevitable) movement of the United States. Her national policy is furthered by the attraction of China; hindered by the repulsion of other Powers. The weaker the resistance, the easier will be its realization. The weakening of resisting Powers, therefore, is likely to be one of the great objects of United States diplomacy.

"You yourself have said," my American readers may object, "that even Wilson aimed at isolation; even for him the ideal was a United States living within its own boundaries, left alone by others and leaving others alone. Now you appear to claim that the nation whose ambitions are centered at home, the nation full of good will toward everybody, follows the Machiavellian policy of Europe."

The contradiction between intentions and actions has its source in life itself. Each successful imperialistic state is, like Molière's physician, "in spite of himself." Rome, Britain, and a number of others have wanted to be left alone and have gone to war only when their security was threatened; fear and anxiety made them world conquerors. Conquest is prepared by the diplomatic game, taking advantage of every opportunity and even improving on its fate by creating opportunities.

The United States policy is to secure its *auctoritas* in South America and in the Pacific. Its competitors in South America were Britain and Germany; in the Pacific, Britain and Japan. Its diplomacy, therefore, took the inevitable direction of weakening all these countries and in the future will undoubtedly endeavor to weaken the remaining competitor, the USSR.

As Bemis has remarked of the history of this country in relation to other nations, Europe's distresses were America's advantage.²² Anglo-French rivalry gave the country its great opportunity to achieve independence. The Napoleonic wars made it possible for her to buy Louisiana; Spain's decline, to acquire Florida. The chaos following Spain's withdrawal from South America plus additional confusion in Mexico gave her Texas, New Mexico, and California.

The distresses of Europe during the last century have been caused by a competition among the Powers, in which the United States was also involved. We read every day in the newspapers and hear from platforms and the radio that in the recent conflict the culprit, Ger-

²² *Ibid.*, p. 215.

many, waged an aggressive war and that new aggression must be rendered impossible. The rest of the world consists of peace-loving nations; if the culprit and its satellites are in jail, peace is assured. For a nation, jail is occupation. To ensure that Germany shall have no war industry, no army, etc., occupation and continuous control over her activities are necessary.

After World War I the Versailles Treaty provided for a demilitarized Germany. German rearmament was possible because the victors of 1918 did not care to use the rights granted them by the peace treaty. Everybody in Europe knew that Germany was rearming; nobody was ready to stop it. Right, as the Roman lawyers said, is in the hands of those who are vigilant. After World War II another method is being used. Germany, says the United States, in order to be prevented from waging an aggressive war, must be deprived of her industry; she must become an agricultural country. German penetration into Central and South America must be liquidated, and all those "Nazis" who propagated the German faith in the Western Hemisphere must be shipped back to Germany.²³

But the new method is no better than the old. Demilitarized territory, as the 1930's proved, can be remilitarized; demolished barracks rebuilt. The same applies to industry and penetration. Plants can be rebuilt; emigration may once more be launched.

Germany was the great competitor of the United States in Central and South America. Her export capacity was built up not only on industry at home but also on the activity of Germans who *in partibus infidelium* sold German goods and propagated the German faith. By liquidating both, the intention of the United States is to obtain for itself the Central and South American trade, which it considers its birthright.

Morgenthauism, as the London *Economist* calls it, takes care of the liquidation of German industry; the Conference of Chapultepec made arrangements for the transfer of Nazis, which is to say, the liquidation of German economic penetration in Central and South America. How far this policy will succeed is another question; my contention is merely that the United States, like any other country, is out to damage its competitors.

The opposition to England is part of the life story of the United States from its embryonic beginnings to this day. I do not mean to

²³ Wittmann, *Inalienable Rights of Aliens*, Washington, D.C., Hobart, 1945.

imply that responsible statesmen of the United States with their entourage, the leaders of public opinion, are anti-British and by conscious action aim to disintegrate the British Empire or the British Commonwealth of Nations. No such statement can be made; I do contend that the policy followed by the United States—motivated by the American creed—is in effect anti-British.

The United States forced Britain to relinquish her naval supremacy and accept this country as an equal partner. Before the naval pact Britain was the strongest naval power in the world; the fact enhanced her prestige. In many other ways (financial situation, population, industrial capacity, etc.) she was less powerful than her American partner. With naval equality she lost her last advantage. Germany, a Continental nation, in order to become equal or even superior to England, tried to become amphibian: stronger on land and on the sea. She failed, but the United States succeeded.

This country endeavors to break up the economic unit created by the Ottawa Conference; it supports the unrestricted right of nations to determine their own future, the right of the colonies, etc., to liberate themselves from Britain. The life line of the British Empire, writes Wendell Willkie in his *One World*, cannot be justified, for no state should have rights over another state's domains.²⁴ Public opinion in the United States backed him, and the State Department supported the proposal at San Francisco for the liberation of colonies. Admitting the humanitarian considerations, one should take into account that individual rights must in a great many realms be restrained in favor of the general good. If this sounds shocking in relation to, let us say, India, it must be remembered that chaos in India is the most likely possible ground for Russian intervention there. A change in the foreign dominant would not be liberation.

The United States has its own life line and protects it with vassal states. To it a similar protection of the British Empire does not seem justified; on the contrary, it is supporting and fostering centrifugal forces within the vassals of its great competitor in the Far East and South America.

But, you may say, there is a great difference between the final aims of the USSR and those of the United States. Even admitting that the latter country, too, wants to be an impregnable fortress surrounded by vassals and the Great Power in a world where others are weak, you

²⁴ Willkie, *One World*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1943, p. 204.

cannot pretend that the United States, like the USSR, aims to dominate the world. In American policy there is no counterpart to the bolshevist aims of a world revolution.

I do not believe that the objection is valid. "The American creed," Gunnar Myrdal writes, "is identified with America's peculiar brand of nationalism, and it gives the common American his feeling of the historical mission of America in the world—a fact which just now becomes of global importance." It is global in the sense that American policy aims to arrange a world where everybody accepts the self-evident truths that "all men are created equal, *and from that equal creation* they derive rights inherent and inalienable, among which are the preservation of life and liberty and the pursuit of happiness."²⁵ The first World War was fought to make the world safe for democracy—for the American way, to realize the American creed. The second was fought for the Four Freedoms—again, to secure world peace by giving to the inhabitants of every country in the world the privileges Americans enjoy.

All states must unite into a federation of nations: American ideals, American ways of life must become universal in a world ruled as is the United States. In such a world, said Wilson, addressing Congress:

There can be no question of our ceasing to be a world power. The only question is whether we can refuse the moral leadership that is offered us, whether we shall accept or reject the confidence of the world. . . .

The stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us into this way. We cannot turn back. We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the vision. It was of this that we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else.²⁶

The Bolshevik agitates for a world divided into autonomous Soviets federalized into one world state, where everything is planned and everyone has his own place and does the job allocated to him. The center of this world, the Rome from which the eternal light will radiate, is Moscow. For the American the world must be divided into democracies, each independent, each granting its citizens equal opportunities, equal liberties. In this world of equality and freedom the pre-established harmony and the good will of men will come about automatically. The world state or federal state will come into being

²⁵ Myrdal, I, 5.

²⁶ Quoted in Weinberg, p. 470.

by natural momentum, as it were, and its center will be Washington.

Here are two opposed religions, the one repulsive to us, the other dear to our hearts—both designed to be imposed on a world often disinclined to them. The Bolshevik wants to reach his aim through social engineering, the American through education—and both roads to salvation mean the occupation of the territories of other nations and legislating for them. Heaven can be reached only if the monsters of inadequacy who stand in the way are dragged through a kind of purgatory under the tutelage of one or the other crusading party. But to realize this promise one of the two must dominate the world, just for an intermediary period.

The American creed, with its belief in free competition and the individual's inalienable rights, and the bolshevist belief in a co-operation imposed by a totalitarian state are diametrically opposed. But the members within all organisms, as I have noted elsewhere, both compete and co-operate: there is no social order without some degree of both individual liberty and imposed co-operation. The various orders differ from each other in the amount and kind of liberty they grant and the co-operation they impose on their members. When free societies are closing, the degree of imposed order increases; when closed societies are in the process of opening, individual liberty gains. For our purposes the direction or trend of change is more significant than the existing proportion of the two elements.

In the closed society of the Soviets, as we have noted, changes are appearing which may lead to more and more concessions to individualism. In the society of the United States, on the other hand, the trend of change indicates movement toward a less individualistic and more collectivist society. At present the United States appears to be evolving toward better organization, more restraint, and less liberty.

Throughout the past decades the American creed has been gradually modified by integration. The inhabitants of the original thirteen colonies lived off the land; each colony and its people were more or less self-supporting. There was some kind of trade in the earliest days between the colonies and the mother country; furs, tobacco, and other raw materials were exported, and manufactured goods imported. But the trade was something of a luxury; each colony, perhaps even each larger farm within it, could provide its own necessities without imports.

Specialization in farming and industrialization changed this situation. When mixed farming became an exception and various regions

concentrated on producing tobacco, cotton, wheat, or cattle, when industry and mass production created towns, and towns sucked up the farming population, then the living cells—the atoms of the organism—lost their independence and became more and more members of one body, separated from each other by their various functions—one farming, another manufacturing, another trading—each having different interests, but all connected as members of a loose organization. The policy of the organization—free trade or tariff, for example, and the decision of many other questions—was helpful to some and harmful to other members.

The diagonal to be followed in the common affairs of all members was decided at first by interregional competition; after the victory of the industrialist North in the Civil War, the equilibrium was stabilized under the domination of the North and finally transformed, or rather is still being transformed, into the legal order of the climax stage. Bryce has written that each state was at first a self-sufficing commonwealth, but with time became merely a part of a far greater whole—the Union—which seems to be slowly absorbing the functions of the single state. Edward Freeman, historian and writer on federal governments, remarked in 1882 that while “federal” had been used up to the time of the Civil War, later “national” was almost invariably employed. What used to be the federal capital, army, revenue, etc., is now certainly “national.”²⁷

The pioneer society, with its uncouthness and rough-and-tumble competition, gave way to a more urbane and better regulated one. The days disappeared when the ruling attitude was, as mentioned, “What do I care for law—hain’t I got the power?”²⁸ The domination of the manufacturing North, the stabilized equilibrium, was replaced by the bureaucrat and his legal order.

In the United States the Executive has, according to the Constitution, more dictatorial power than in England. The President is elected for four years and chooses his Cabinet; neither is responsible to Congress. They remain in office though the Congressional majority may pass to the other party. Within the sphere of their competence, they may go their own way, even when an opposition Congress enacts laws over their heads. The Presidential power—this was the aim of those who framed the Constitution—was intended to be confined to ad-

²⁷ Freeman, *An Introduction to American Institutional History*, p. 22.

²⁸ “Commodore” Vanderbilt, quoted in Lingley and Foley, p. 201.

ministration: to applying laws made by Congress. The President's actions are limited by laws already in force. However, in practice the administration makes its own policy, and in many affairs the President now takes the initiative and is the real legislator, not merely an executive. The most striking example is in the realm of foreign affairs. Those who argue that President Lincoln induced the South to attack the North say that the war was declared by the President, although declaration of war is a Congressional prerogative.

A declaration of war in itself can be avoided by the trick of the toreador—by baiting the aggressor and calling war a "police action." Apparently police action can be taken against another state without Congressional authorization. At least Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson had no authorization from Congress to act as they did in the case of certain South American states. As to this Charles and Mary Beard have written:

If . . . local leaders [in South America] refused to listen to the voice of warning and forced the landing of American marines, a limited warfare sometimes had to be waged on the basis of presidential orders to the Navy Department. And yet in no case did the parties of interest feel constrained to invoke the constitutional provision vesting the power to declare war in the Congress of the United States.²⁰

The end of wars, like their beginning, was conceived by the makers of the Constitution as a legislative act. Congress declares war and ends it with a peace treaty. When the first World War ended, peace treaties settled the fate of the defeated enemy, its land, its citizens, and their private assets. After World War II similar questions are being settled by the administration.

The demonstration could be continued by referring to the modern legislative technique, especially where economic planning is concerned. It could be shown that Congress, by granting wide power to the administration, transfers its right to legislate. In other words, planning has become a day-to-day process, though the goal may be determined by general rules.

Are all states moving toward a new form of society? The unit of society we inherited from the eighteenth century was the individual, who was protected against criminals, the influential, and the state by statutes. In the new society it seems probable that the unit will be the

²⁰ Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization*, II, 502.

group; the individual will be merely a cog in the machine. Group interests will determine the individual's fate; his duty will be to obey. From this world of groups with conflicting interests the self-denial and the self-restraint characteristic of individuals will be absent. Groups acknowledge only the restraints they are compelled to observe. Within states, therefore, the majority dominates; among states, the greater power. No constitution, no bill of rights, no religion, and no ethics will protect the weaker against the strong. Political motives will, perhaps, influence activities formerly settled by competition among individuals, and conflicts, decided by judges, will be removed from the jurisdiction of one state to that of several states—into the arena where force is the supreme court. States with armies will compete as individuals, as corporations without armies used to do. Inventions and information, formerly open to the public, will be guarded in the interest of groups, and every policy will tend to become dictatorially managed.

To conclude that such a new order as this is on the way may be bold. That the United States is today more organized than it used to be, however, is simple fact. Arthur M. Schlesinger writes, "The New Deal involved not only the greatest peacetime centralization of federal authority yet known in the United States, but also a vast extension of the power of the executive at the expense of the legislative."³⁰

In Russia, differences in income and private ownership of home, furniture, and cash were the first concessions made to individualism. In the United States, subsidies granted to farmers was the first step toward the redistribution of personal incomes, leveling differences. The increase in administrative power indicates a trend toward more dictation and less competition in Federal affairs. And this change was carried out by the New Deal, which was not "new" in the sense of being designed to meet the necessities of a postwar period; it was something long prepared for by evolution. As Schlesinger says, ". . . the New Deal may properly be regarded as a reassertion and extension of the ideals of the earlier progressive movement."³¹

Out of many living cells the United States became an organism. By specialization these cells lost their independence. One mind, with its expanding nervous system, is the means of co-ordinating them. The United States, for the sake of its own security, behaves just as imperialistically as the USSR. Its citizens are as convinced as are the Bolsheviks that for justifiable reasons of safety they must acquire bases

³⁰ *Political and Social Growth of the American People, 1865-1940*, p. 522.

³¹ A. M. Schlesinger, *Political and Social Growth of the American People*, p. 520.

on land belonging to other nations; the United States must have *authoritas* over the nations who are the owners or the neighbors of this land. In order to secure the subservience of other states, like every other power it will support the centrifugal forces within the states allied with it and will increase its own consistency, better its organization.

The two integrating Powers of the world, the United States and the USSR, are expanding in order to protect their own security; both are progressing toward a better organized, more planned, and less competitive society. Each proposes to save the world by its own creed. They are the two foci of crystallization in a world of developing niches.

The increasing area of niches, or "soft spots," of weakened confusion in the world is only too evident. The Commonwealth of British Nations and the British Empire show a tendency toward disintegration. England, the power which balanced the sects within several dominions, colonies, and protectorates, is retiring; the danger of internal dissension in the states separating themselves from the Empire is increasing. China, meanwhile, is going through one of those periods of her national existence when the local governors are mightier than the central authority. The United States tries to strengthen the latter; the USSR, the former. In the Far East the situation is evolving toward a chronic illness similar to that of the Near East in the nineteenth century.

In Germany, Japan, Italy, and several smaller so-called "satellite" states the victorious Powers, or rather the USSR and Britain, the latter with American help, are trying to arrange a vertical invasion to replace the elite they consider responsible for the war. Again this is a situation in which dominance is lost and chaos precedes the emergence of a new order, maintained by one Great Power and intrigued against by the others. Except for a few well-balanced states, such as Sweden, Norway and Switzerland, the world outside the two Great Powers seems to be disintegrating and throwing wide spaces open to the conquerors; and the interests of the conquerors are likely to clash.

There are no conflicts of interest between the United States and the USSR, we are told; their future relations will be as friendly as their past. But do not those who make this statement disregard the fact that there is a distinct change in the constellation of Powers?

The United States is in a situation which bears a significant parallel, devoid of any imperialistic intention, to the expansion problems of certain other states in history. The long struggle between Austria and Prussia for hegemony in Germany, for example, ended with Prussia's victory. We have seen that Bismarck brought into being the Germany planned by the "smaller Germany" party and that after Königrätz his policy was still to maintain Austria's independence. Austria, however, too weak to survive independently among inimical neighbors, became Germany's friend, and as time went on was more and more feudalized.

After the first World War, Austria was partitioned. "Niches" surrounded Germany; when she came to life after her defeat, she started to conquer them. She swallowed the territory of the former Austrian Monarchy, and with it the Monarchy's burden, an anti-Russian policy. Bismarck, as I have remarked, had no Balkan policy. But the more Germany merged with Austria, the more necessary it was for her to make a Balkan policy, and her conflict with Russia followed.

The same holds true in the North Atlantic triangle. The more the United States becomes dominant, the more her policy will become "British." Theodore Roosevelt in his day expressed the same opinion, according to Freiherr von Eckardstein:

Roosevelt in giving his private opinion on American foreign policy stated that if England failed to keep the scales level the United States would be obliged to step in at least temporarily in order to reestablish the balance of power in Europe, never mind against which country or group of countries our efforts may have to be directed. In fact we ourselves [said Roosevelt] are becoming, owing to our strength and geographical situation, more and more the balance of power of the whole globe.³²

And is not the history of two world wars bearing out his prediction? The stalemate between the Central Powers and the Entente in the first World War, about 1917, and a similar situation in 1941 proved that England could not keep the scales level, and in stepped the United States.

United States policy is in fact bound more and more to follow the same line as that followed by the previous balancer, Britain. We shall see in a number of connections why this is so. Britain's nightmare, as expressed by MacKinder, has been the possibility that the "World

³² Eckardstein, III, 175.

Island" (Europe, Asia, and Africa) will become one united state. To prevent the emergence of such a self-sufficient, inexhaustible, and undefeatable unit has always been an instinctive British aim. For a long time Britain was able to defeat any Power striving for hegemony over this wide area, or the key parts of it, by dominating the Mediterranean, the Suez, and the Red Sea and supporting Japan, the Power which flanks this vast territorial aggregation. By her life line she split the World Island into parts which are not self-sufficient and can be put under blockade. The British Empire life line is not only a connection between the separated parts of the Empire, but a potential trench to keep the World Island divided. Mediterranean domination, friends in the Middle East, and last, but not least, India are the requirements for such a policy. To it Russia is deadly opposed. She opposes British domination in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, and in India.

It seems self-evident that the weaker the British Empire becomes and the more the United States is forced to help her to maintain a secure channel through the Mediterranean—a life line in Europe—the stronger will become this republic's opposition to the USSR, quite apart from doctrinal differences. An anti-Russian policy will be just as cumbersome an inheritance for the United States as the Balkan problem was for Germany. The World Island as a single empire will be a nightmare for every statesman in the United States as it was for the British. The mere configuration of the continents makes this inevitable.

The main avenues of access from the European continent to the Asiatic and African parts of the World Island when the road through Russia—the only land route—is closed are as follows: (*a*) via the Balkans through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to Asia Minor; (*b*) via Greece and the Greek islands to Asia Minor; (*c*) via Italy and Sicily to Africa; (*d*) via Spain through the Straits to Africa.

Byzantium and Turkey each in its heyday included all states controlling access to *a* and *b*. The western Roman Empire and its German imitators tried to control *c*; the Arabian Empire, *d*. A maritime power, the British Empire, made sure of the sea route involved in each case by acquiring naval bases and friends along this Mediterranean life line. It did not control the land avenues to these various crossings, but by means of Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus, it controlled the water routes. Friendship with Turkey kept the Dardanelles closed. Her

navy and sea lanes, I have emphasized, are parts of Britain's frontier. Whether Britain will be able to maintain her frontiers is questionable. It seems evident, however, that technological changes will make it necessary for her in the future not only to secure her maritime frontiers by land bases but also to control the states governing the land approaches to the various bases and crossings. A consolidation of her hierarchy may be necessary for strategic reasons now that her empire is disintegrating.

When in ancient times the barbarian pressure on Rome increased, her rulers consolidated the frontiers, even drew back, giving up far-distant provinces. Stephen Vincent Benét's "The Last of the Legions" is a story of the Valeria Victrix, a Roman legion known as the "bulwark of the Northwest." After three hundred and fifty years in the Roman province of Britannica, it was recalled when Alaric the Goth marched against Rome. Fearful of being left unprotected, wealthy men sought to join the legion in order to go with it to Gaul or Rome, which were safer from the barbarians. "When the eagles go, Britain falls." But, writes the story-teller,

it takes time for the night to fall—that is what people forget. Yes, even the master of your villa may die in peace. But there are still the two spirits in man—the spirit of building and the spirit of destruction. And when the second drives the faster horse, then the night comes on.³³

Will the British Empire follow the road of Rome? Will it be forced to relinquish its *auctoritas* over Turkey and let the Dardanelles go to the Russian sphere of interest? Will the conflict between the friends of Britain and those of the USSR in Greece then turn in favor of the Bolsheviks? If so, route *b* likewise will vanish. Will Britain's frontiers be drawn back, then, to protect only routes *c* and *d*?

The Italian frontier of the new Russian hierarchy of states is similar to the Austro-Italian frontier before 1914. Austria, with Dalmatia, controlled the Adriatic; the Isonzo line and her South Tyrolian lands were within the great Italian plain. Strategically the frontiers favored Austria. Italy could never prevent an invasion of her territory or invade Austria. Britain's naval power made it possible for Italy to liberate herself from German-Austrian domination. If Britain is forced to retire, if she is not able to protect Italy, the latter's independence, too, will be gone, and route *d* will remain for England.

³³ S. V. Benét, *Selected Works*, II, 437, 442.

The life line of the British Empire would then depend upon her domination of the African coast, on the Arabian states, in fact, on the road by which in World War II the Anglo-Saxon armies advanced. By the end of 1942 Germany controlled routes *b* and *c*, for Italy and Greece were within her empire; *a* was in the hands of neutral Turkey, hard pressed by both sides; *d* was held by England. The Anglo-American invasion in 1943 was possible only because Germany was not a naval power and was exhausted by her overexpansion. The Mediterranean life line, with its many alternative connections, is an entity, and all its parts are essential for any Power which would restrain the USSR.

India is not the terminal of the life line. Eastward from India, Burma, French Indo-China, the Dutch colonies, the British dominions, and the Philippines once secured its extension as far as Japan, Great Britain's friend. When, at the request of the United States, the Anglo-Japanese agreement was not renewed, protection against the USSR was not needed, since Russia was weak, and Japan was occupied in trying to acquire parts of the niche open to her in China. Now that the USSR is the strong Power and China remains a niche, the eastern extension of the life line must again be in the hands of the Power that restrains Russian expansion.

The more Britain retires, the more the United States will be forced to advance, or she must allow the night to fall. In the northern triangle, therefore, when Britain's role is transformed into one similar to that of Austria or an exarchate of Ravenna, the burdens of the United States will increase. The world of the Commonwealth of British Nations is an evolving niche—a dominant losing its power, and subordinates trying to organize themselves into independent units. As usually happens, all who have been subordinate, all who have lived and flourished under British protection, are working to weaken and to destroy Britain. Britain's friends, as well as all her vassals, are supporting the anti-British policy of the USSR in helping to create more niches near Russia.

The USSR will occupy any country it can; it will vassalize others and separate them by an iron curtain from the rest of the world. This Russian policy influences that of other nations. There was another "iron curtain," separating the Islamic from the Christian world; both the old and the new one, which now divides bolshevism from capitalism, acted and will act on each. The heirarchy of the states of Islam

or bolshevism, on the one hand, is separated from several Powers on the other. The latter are at first astonished by the actions of the former; they try to live as they did before the separation; later a leading state unites all into a block.

Against its will the United States will be forced by events to unite the states in the anti-USSR world and to protect itself against the USSR by widely scattered bases. It will be forced to divide the Eurasian continent and keep it divided; it will be obliged, in other words, to act as Britain has acted. Generally speaking, the overexpanding aggressor is always in a state of readiness; the others, led by the mightiest among them, are always late in uniting.

Britain kept the world island—divided among various states—in balance not only by her navy, but also by her services as trader, banker, and insurer. Her passive balance of trade, her active balance of payments were as essential as her navy. States, as we have said, have defects, which bring malaises to their inhabitants. By accepting surplus goods from other countries, delivering necessities to others, giving credit and investing capital where it was needed, Britain helped to alleviate the malaises. Transporting excess populations to empty lands, Britain reduced pressure in Europe and developed lands overseas. By permitting other countries to unload their surpluses, Britain acted as a safety valve, making possible the prosperity of peoples obliged to exist under strictly managed economies.

Today it is up to the United States to continue Britain's policy, but she has neither Britain's geographic position nor can she play her economic role. She can deliver goods needed by others, grant credit to others, but she cannot buy all the goods produced by other countries, nor is she ready to admit the excess populations of others. She can advance one or two credits to Greece or Turkey, but not indefinitely. The United States cannot remedy Greece's defect, as she is unwilling to open her doors to the surplus population of Greece. Industrialization would not help Greece, a small country in a world of closed economies.

As balancer of the world, the United States cannot pursue Britain's policy. To heal the defects of states she will be compelled to help them merge and form big, practically autarchic units. She will be obliged to create other states as God created man, or man God—in his own image. The Leviathan, as Hobbes called his state, may be a monster, but monsters are organisms, and organisms are born; they cannot be made to

order. Once born, they increase by assimilation, an art at which some people are virtuosi, though its technique is unknown.

The United States and the USSR have at least one interest in common: to have a third power as strong and independent as they themselves. The policy of both states—to weaken Britain by ruthless competition—is wrong. A strong Britain is as much a necessity now for Russia and the United States as she was during the fighting. Great Powers must understand that illness in other countries reacts on themselves and the malaise of populations is the ultimate source of revolutions and wars. Social orders are ruined by the unrestrained egotism of rulers, whether within a state, a hierarchy of states or a society of nations. States must be convinced that their neighbors' plight is not their benefit, and cease to use another power's sphere of interest as their sphere of intrigues.

It was said that war is merely a continuation of diplomacy by other means. The converse is just as true: diplomacy is war carried on by other means. In peace and war states try to force their competitors to act as they wish. In peacetime they build up a fifth column in other lands in order to disrupt their neighbor's policy and further their own; in wartime they do it with bombs.

It follows from these premises that the aims of peacetime diplomacy should be confined to goals that can be achieved by fighting; military plans should be drawn up with due regard to postwar diplomacy.

Britain's policy in the Baltic and in Poland failed, since she had made the mistake of guaranteeing the independence of countries she could not physically protect and whose neighbors agreed on another policy. As Disraeli said, "Britain could not guarantee unconditionally the independence of Belgium, since she would be helpless if France and Prussia agreed on another policy while Russia and Austria [were] standing aloof."⁸⁴ Strategic plans must be drawn up by soldiers keeping in mind that their wartime allies will be their competitors at the peace conference.

Peace treaties, as we emphasized, are not only treaties between victors and vanquished; they determine, or at least try to determine, the order of rank among the victors. At the peace conference, the allies intrigue and haggle for better terms, for a higher, more dominant position. Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna and Paris—the last-mentioned how often—were the scenes for the same drama with different actors. Even

⁸⁴ *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, III, 13.

during a war preparations are made by one or another of the Allies to obtain for itself, by occupying such enemy territories as it covets, a better bargaining position at the conference table. It is said that during the second World War "the conflict between British and American objectives was seen to be primarily a conflict over whether the principal road into Europe should be via the Mediterranean or across the English Channel." Britain, mixing "political with military motives," argued for the Balkan route; American statesmen, thinking in purely military terms, for the shortest and most direct route to Berlin—via the English Channel. The history of 1946 and the following years may prove that the British knew already during the war that their aims—the freedom of small nations—would be just as obnoxious to the USSR after the war as they had been to Germany before the war. If the statements quoted above from Ralph Ingersoll's *Top Secret*³⁵ are true, American statesmen did not understand that they could achieve their war aims—a divided World Island and the independence of small nations—only if they were able to stop Russia's advance, in other words, that they had to occupy eastern Europe. Had they invaded Europe via the Balkans, they could have halted the USSR's expansion and secured the independence of several small nations.

Again, if invasion through the Balkans was an unrealizable military plan, the Anglo-Saxon powers were not and are not in a position to guarantee the independence of the Balkan countries, and the part of the world for which they can assume responsibility is their own sphere of interest.

"Let us not, in the foolish spirit of romance," said Canning, addressing the House of Commons on March 20, 1821,

suppose that we alone could regenerate Europe. . . . Here the spirit of monarchy was at war to crush every principle of freedom, said the one party; and there, said the other, the spirit of democracy was labouring to destroy all monarchies. We ourselves had in our constitution enough of democracy to temper monarchy, and enough of monarchy to restrict the caprices of democracy. Where then was the necessity for our incurring these risks, which other countries, not possessed of a tempered constitution, like our own, might laudably encounter?

Such a risk, he concluded, Britain has to take under certain circumstances.

³⁵ R. Ingersoll, *Top Secret*, New York, Harcourt, 1946, pp. 56, 217 ff.

Our duty, however, and our interests equally prescribed to us to persevere in an undeviating path, to preserve our resources entire until the period should arrive, if ever, when we might exercise our only legitimate right to interfere, from being called upon to quell the raging floods that threatened to distract the balance of Europe.³⁶

The lines have finally been drawn between individualism and collectivism. The United States' position is somewhat similar to that of Britain after the Napoleonic wars. Would it not be wise to realize that a new Crimean War, which would be more devastating than any preceding war, can be avoided by dividing the spheres of interest? Such a policy may be unpopular, since it is not good form to talk about spheres of interest or balance of power. But we should be realistic even at the cost of unpopularity.

Our world is one, temporally as well as territorially. Each generation inherits the achievements and failures of its forefathers and bequeathes them with alterations of its own to its children. Not until it is understood that all states are symbionts and have similar interests will states learn the great lesson of history and help one another to pull themselves out of the morass in which all are struggling. History is witness to the fact that the morality, or better amorality, of nations has never changed. However, customs, after remaining the same for centuries, were transformed by technology in a generation. In my young days, horses carried men and messengers carried urgent communications. Science, better understanding of the material world, changed locomotion; couriers were replaced by the wireless, the telephone, and radio. Why should I not believe or hope, after having lived through wars and revolutions, seen the ruin by the state of individual achievements, that a better understanding of the oneness of the world will allow political science to devise a solid foundation for international life? To achieve such a radical change, our statesmen must first learn to diagnose the present situation, then to report it faithfully.

To the breakfast tables in the United States come cereal and cream and toast and coffee and the morning paper. The cream is guaranteed for butterfat, the milk pasteurized, the coffee unadulterated, and the bread and cereal are enriched with vitamins. A dietician may have advised you to eat foods that agree with you and your special predilections and to avoid those which are bad for your streamlined figure or to which you are allergic. So much for your physical food.

³⁶ Quoted in *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, 53.

But the mental food, the newspaper, is not guaranteed, processed, enriched, or safe from adulteration. Let us forget the other counts; we do not ask to have it guaranteed, still less enriched. We fear censorship, which is worse than no guarantee. But is it too much to ask that the free press be free also from adulteration? That it harbor no poisonous germs? That it survey our mental food without adding deleterious substances? Suggestion of the false is as poisonous as suppression of the true. At least some respect should be paid to history.

Perhaps I should not blame the press for everything; the causes of the inconsistencies may lie in events themselves. After all, newspapers merely report. They may be the fault of the reported, not of the reporter. Judge for yourselves! I merely call your attention to the inconsistencies in a leading New York daily (the *New York Times*,) June 25 and 26, 1945: On page 1 Lord Halifax is reported as delineating what the headline writers call a world charter for "a new international organization designed to maintain peace and security and encourage respect for fundamental freedoms for all peoples"—the work of a "band of brothers laboring in a common cause."

What are the "brothers" doing at home? Under the caption "Zhu-koff, Urging Building for Peace, Warns of Smugness and Asks Greater Army" we are informed that, though the Red Army is "the most modern and powerful in the world," the USSR must in the future strengthen its "economic might" and "unceasingly perfect . . . [its] military skill, study the abundant experience of the fatherland war and develop . . . military science."

Meanwhile here and in England compulsory military training were being discussed. On May 19, 1945, the *London Economist* wrote:

Production and imports are more important chapters of a defense policy than even manpower . . . what is necessary is that there should be some systematic thought about the requirements of defense policy instead of the flight from thought on the subject that took place after the last war, and that the thinking should be begun while the public mind is still comparatively clear on the subject.

It is the old idea of the Hapsburg Empire: *si vis pacem para bellum*—if you want peace, prepare for war. When the Russians proposed to enlarge their navy, many here were indignant, saying that a Russian navy was not needed, since the United Nations could call upon Britain's and America's naval forces.

President Wilson's League of Nations looked forward to world disarmament. Because of today's disillusionment the drafters of the World Charter ask for power to enforce its decisions. Against whom? According to "12 Generals here by Air, Germany is through for Century." If Turkey, Yugoslavia, or Spain should rise against Russia, England, or the United States, and the Security Council should take effective action, a large force would not be needed. Rearmament, or rather the continuation of preparedness, can be explained only by the insecurity felt everywhere—by the experience that brothers sometimes quarrel and the fear that the United Nations will be no exception.

Do not these contradictions between the words of the charter and the arming of members of the United Nations demonstrate the universal realization that the charter affords no security and that the day may be near when diplomacy by conference will not avail to hold former allies together?

Nearly two years have passed since the pages analyzing the policies of the USSR and the United States were written. Shortly before the final revision of this text the newspapers were full of President Truman's Doctrine. That the United States would protect the Mediterranean life line and that England's retirement would force it to take her place seemed clear years ago. But one would scarcely have thought that a proposal designed to prevent further expansion of the communist state would be accompanied by a proposal that it join an alliance to keep Germany weak and disarmed. Again, what a contradiction in policy! On the one hand, the United States is acquiring bases in the Mediterranean to protect her against the USSR. On the other hand, she wants the USSR to help keep Germany neutral, nonexistent, in the showdown we fear may follow.

The words of the Truman Doctrine sound familiar. They are a variation on the theme composed by the French Republicans and repeated successively by Napoleon I, Lamartine's government, and Napoleon III. President Truman said: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by one-sided pressure." Revolutionary France's statement was: "The nations must be liberated; the free nations must dispose independently over their own destinies and the French Republic must be prepared to hasten to the aid of nations that are struggling to regain their freedom."⁸⁷ The policies are identical,

⁸⁷ Wittmann, p. 72.

but one is expressed in the sober business-like manner of the Anglo-Saxon, the other in the more vivid manner of the Latin. Both disregard the wise warning of Canning, both express an unrealizable policy, since no state is strong enough to intervene in the affairs of all other nations, wherever their habitat. To put the same idea positively: each state intervenes only in its sphere of interest; outside this sphere it may threaten intervention in order to harass its competitors. After wars, as Aristotle said, Athens replaced oligarchies by democracies; Sparta, democracies by oligarchies. In peace they helped their friends to rule or to revolt. Democracy and oligarchy meant for each rule by friends.

Today freedom means domination by the friends of the Great Powers. We are, therefore, still in a warlike competition, not with Germany, ruined by her own and all other states' common effort, not with Britain, weakened by her exertion in two wars, but with a new state, with the USSR. Both we and Russia ought to realize that neither will be able to dominate the entire world; that the prerequisites for a world state are missing.

One of the great tragedies of mankind is that contemporaries are at different evolutionary stages. Children of the highest culture live on the same planet at the same time with barbarians, even decadents. A trip around the world, even a short excursion, is a journey through centuries too. Each nation is characterized by its own political and social institutions; some countries need dictators, others can afford democracies. Some economies can be planned; to others, free competition is essential. This and other divergences are the bases for the articulation of the world into states. Peace reigns when there are no niches or when existing niches are protected by well-balanced states.

War between the United States and the USSR would be followed by the partition of the defeated power and an increase in the number of territories in which chaos would be both external and internal. Russian domination of eastern and parts of central Europe, wherever weakened or ended, would be followed by revolutions and wars. Communist and anti-communist parties would clash; dictators would replace dictators and would continue the war of all against all. The defeat of the United States—hardly imaginable—would be almost certain to release regional and racial conflicts. War would follow war until the prerequisites for a dynamic balance were achieved.

For a world dominated by two great states there is little prospect for lasting peace. To balance them there must be a third power, equal in

might and demonstrating by its mere existence that any state's power is limited. The third need not be an entity in the same sense as the two; it may be a league in which the leader retains rank by the consent of its followers and associates because of fair dealing and justice. The prime requisites are a foothold in the Western Hemisphere and a key position in the Far East: to balance Russia, it must include vital parts of the former Mediterranean empire, the great divider of the World Island; to balance the United States, it must include Canada or some territory in the Pacific. The third power is the *salon des refuses* of an ideologically divided world. In it live the various sympathizers with the heterogeneous elements in each of the others.

Britain obviously answers the description. For the peace of the world she is as essential as Austria-Hungary was for peace in central and eastern Europe. She was, as the Czech historian Palacky wrote, a necessity.³⁸ She was later partitioned, shattered; today the demand is for a federation in the Danube Valley—an Austria-Hungary with a better constitution.

The British Commonwealth, we tried to prove, is on the road to disintegration. Her potestas over her dominions is gone; her auctoritas over them is on the wane. Does this suggest that the British Commonwealth of Nations should consolidate itself into a federal state, with a single army, navy, and foreign policy? If this is to be achieved, the centripetal forces within the Commonwealth and the aid given these forces by neighbors must attain and maintain a strength sufficient to counter the forces of disintegration.

To believe in such a change of trend may sound utopian, but the histories of China and Egypt, even the Roman Empire, furnish analogies. China started to disintegrate several times, then was saved by nuclear changes, vertical or horizontal invasion. She came out of the chaos stronger than before. In Manetho's (an historian of the third or second century B.C.) chronology for Egypt, the orderly dynasties were interrupted by periods of chaos.³⁹ Rome, after a period of unrest, was controlled by colonial statesmen. Is a somewhat similar period for a federated Britain inconceivable?

There is doubtless another possibility. After the thirteen colonies in North America revolted, Britain built up her second empire. Perhaps now that her third empire faces a crisis she will be able to consolidate

³⁸ Quoted in R. Schlesinger, p. 186.

³⁹ Breasted, *History of Egypt*, pp. 13 ff.

a fourth. Less isolated from the European Continent today than she was yesterday, she is likewise less close to her overseas possessions. As the great European power, is her destiny not to consolidate the Continent, invite France to join the British Commonwealth, and at the same time act as the geographical and spiritual link between Europe and other parts of the world?

Union with France would give the British Commonwealth a broader basis and bring the African dependencies of the two countries under one flag. For France it would mean the realization of her lifelong ambition—annexation of the Ruhr and the Rhine. Since early in the nineteenth century Germany and France, successively, has each tried to bring all the great mining fields of western Europe under its flag. From Arndt through Naumann to Hitler, Germans have claimed the part of France that would supplement their own territory. From Napoleon through Clemenceau to De Gaulle, the French have claimed (and they will continue to claim) a strip of Germany for the same reason.

England opposed French and German ambitions alike. It was she who stopped Bismarck's army on the Belgian frontier; it was she, supported by the United States, who saved the Rhine and the Ruhr at Versailles and again in 1924 for Germany. England, for her own strategic and economic reasons, wanted a divided western Europe.

The economic aspect of the conflicting claims is that France has sufficient iron ore, but needs coal; and Germany has sufficient coal, but needs iron ore. If either possessed the entire western mining field, it would not only be self-sufficient but also would control the other's machine tool and armament production and also Europe. England delivered coal to France. If the western industrial area were under one flag, France would be her greatest competitor. Afraid that France, augmented by the Rhine and the Ruhr, or Germany, with Belgium and Lorraine, would dominate Europe politically and economically, she sided with the party whose land was sought.

Several statesmen, among them Field Marshal Smuts, proposed a similar union, an expansion of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Centuries earlier Shakespeare wrote of King Henry V,

Small time, but in that small most greatly lived,
This star of England. Fortune made his sword,

By which the world's best garden he achieved,
 And of it left his son imperial lord . . .
 Of France and England. . . .⁴⁰

But the Queen's wish:

That English may as French, French Englishmen,
 Receive each other! God speak this Amen! ⁴¹

was realized for a short period, as Henry VI "lost France and made his England bleed."

We fear that the spirit of Jeanne d'Arc in France, other memories in England will render such a union impossible. The missing nexus, the strong and different individualities will hinder the realization of that blueprint. The third great power may have to be created from chaos by war.

After the Roman Empire ceased to exist in the West, the world was divided between the eastern Roman and the Mohammedan empires. Between them were the various tribes living on the habitat of the former western Roman Empire. Pressure from the east and the west merged these tribes into a third state—the empire of the Franks—which reached its peak under Charlemagne. The Carolingians succeeded in utilizing the one nexus connecting the various tribes, Catholicism, to organize their empire. Should the Commonwealth of British nations disintegrate, the world situation would be somewhat similar to that of the Mediterranean world in Carolingian days. Are we facing a split into two parts, separated from each other by a galaxy of smaller states; each separately too weak to defend itself, too divergent to merge into one entity? Under pressure from the east and the west, somewhere in western Europe a Charlemagne is bound to appear and rebuild a middle empire. Geographically such an empire must include England, France, western Germany, and Italy. Historically, the catalytic agent must be a political or a religious creed. This third power, a necessity for equilibrium, is bound to assert itself, but apparently first a deluge must wash away narrow nationalism; see map on page 297.

The decline of an empire is a thought-provoking sight for contemporaries. The Old Kingdom State, the Second Union in Egypt, collapsed not very long after 2500 B.C. James H. Breasted writes in *The Dawn of Conscience*:

⁴⁰ Henry V, epilogue.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Act V, Scene 2.

The tremendous impression produced by this final break-up of the Second Union, after it had endured for a thousand years, did not yet find full expression but like the fall of Rome, it wrought powerfully upon the minds of the men who saw it. Thinking men were thrown back from the consideration of outward splendours to the contemplation of inner values.⁴²

The rulers of the Second Union held their position by force and the consent of the governed, the "Maat," which signifies "not only 'justice,' 'truth,' 'righteousness' which the men of the Pyramid Age discerned as something practiced by the individual, but also an existent social and governmental reality, a moral order of the world, identified with the rule of Pharaoh."

When the Second Union broke up and the central authority lost its power, righteousness, justice, and truth disappeared, and chaos followed. A new religion had to evolve before a new central authority could consolidate what had once been the Egyptian world.

When Rome was declining, one of the great emperors, Constantine, divided the Roman world in two, but at the same time tried to keep it together by propagating one creed, the new religion of the East. Before his conversion—before he saw by daylight the victorious cross in the sky—the eastern religion of the Jews and that of Christ had gone through many changes. As so often happens, the unrealizable part of a policy became a religion. Eternal happiness, the Messiah's world, was postponed from this world to the next, but the Jewish ethics, modernized and improved by the genius of Christ, were retained for this one. By saturating itself with the individualistic principles of Greco-Roman philosophy, the religion lost the narrow nationalism of the Jewish community. Throughout the centuries chaos was reduced by the new religion, and when new states began to integrate, canon law as a new international law was the bond of national states, lessening in some degree the barbarism of their conflicts.

Must mankind go through another period of suffering and disaster before it can see the eternal sign in the sky by daylight? Must Calvary be traversed to reach salvation? Or can we understand the healing truth that, inspired by brotherly love, we must be content with fewer luxuries in order that others may live a bit better?

⁴² *Dawn of Conscience*, Scribner, 1935, p. 153.

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