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RUSSIAN TRANSPORT TRAIN CROSSING THE PLAINS OF MANCHURIA.

CASSELL'S HISTORY

OF THE

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Illustrated

VOLUME I

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JAPANESE CLEARING TALIEN BAY OF RUSSIAN MINES.
The mines were exploded by rifle shots from the steam launch seen in the picture.

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

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

INTRODUCTION.

THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT AND THE DANGERS AHEAD.

BY ARTHUR DIÓSY, F.R.G.S.

"WHAT IS IT ALL ABOUT?" says many a puzzled inquirer, unable to see why Japan and Russia should not be able to live as good neighbours in Eastern Asia. The answer he generally receives is that the immediate cause of war is the struggle for preponderance in Korea, Japan requiring for her own safety and independence that no Power but herself shall exercise paramount influence in that distressful, ill-governed, but naturally rich country. A glance at the map will show how nearly Korea concerns Japan. A hostile Power established in that peninsula would be within a few hours' steaming of the Japanese coast. Moreover, Korea is, to a great extent, the granary of Japan; it is a natural receptacle for the overflow of her constantly-increasing population, and an excellent market for her wares. Owing to centuries of seclusion and of wretchedly corrupt, inept government, the natural wealth of Korea lies for the most part fallow. It is evidently Japan's mission to develop these neglected resources and she has already set about the task with her usual energy, devoting herself chiefly, so far, to railway construction, but also making her influence felt in every branch of trade, of industry, and of finance. Japan has thus created for herself in the Korean Empire interests so considerable that they would alone entitle her to a predominant position in that peninsula, even if its geographical situation did not make it so vitally important—as a Japanese statesman described it, "An arrow pointing at Japan's heart"

It is just this geographical fact that constitutes the great strategical importance of Korea for Russia also; for Japan, established in a fortified position on the southern coast, could close the narrow seas against the passage of ships proceeding between Russia's older possessions on the Pacific and her newly acquired territories—"leased," or merely "temporarily occupied," but still in her grip—

on the northern gulfs of the China Seas. This danger to her communications by sea appears intolerable to Russia, but Japan could afford to ignore her objections, meeting them with the obvious rejoinder that Russia's presence in Manchuria being, by her own showing, purely temporary, it cannot be of very serious importance to her that the sea-road between that region and her own legitimate possessions should, in the future, be dominated by Japan. Nevertheless, Japan was willing, as an evidence of her sincere desire for a peaceful understanding with Russia, to undertake not to erect any fortifications on the southern coast of Korea.

Korea is, however, not the only bone of contention. Were it so, some arrangement might have been made possible—something short of partition, at one time proposed by Russia, or of her other proposal that a broad strip of the northern part of the country should be "neutralised," of course with a right of way for Russia across it; for Japan could not admit either of these schemes: the first would have done away with that "independence and territorial integrity" (however nominal) of Korea to which Japan and Britain stand pledged by their alliance; the other appeared undesirable to a nation like the Japanese, who have carefully noted Russia's tendency to spread like a spot of oil from any place on the map where she has once obtained a footing.

If the Korean question might possibly have been laid at rest, at all events for some years to come, this was not the case with the position of Russia in Manchuria. The mere fact of her presence, in great force, in that nominally Chinese territory, bitterly galling to Japan at any time, had of late been rendered little short of scandalous by the cynical way in which the Tsar's representatives lightly treated the gross breach of faith they had caused their august Master to commit by not keeping the solemn promise to evacuate by a fixed date. This disregard of national pledges was, indeed, an affront to other Powers besides Japan; to America it was a direct and open snub, as the most positive assurances of evacuation had been given to her, and were claimed, too soon, as a triumph for her diplomacy!

America and Britain have repeatedly intimated that the policy of the Open Door—that is, of equal rights and advantages for all nations trading with the Chinese Empire—was their chief concern in the Far East, and so far Russia has not actually slammed the Door in their faces. Some shrewd observers maintain that the Door is really only ajar, and that they have noticed signs of its moving slowly and noiselessly, towards closing, but *officially the Door is still open* in Manchuria Japan, however, claimed from Russia a formal treaty engagement for the fulfilment of her oft-repeated pledges that she would loosen her iron grip on what is still, in the eye of the law of nations, Chinese territory. Japan was willing that Russia should continue to enjoy the advantages in Manchuria she had bullied or cajoled China into granting, but she insisted on the recognition, in treaty form, of China's sovereign rights over that territory. For Japan knows full well the real meaning of Russia's continued presence in that region. She knows what Russia wants. What is it?

Russia's object, steadfastly, unswervingly pursued, with marvellous patience and boldness and skill, is of such a

HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY
THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN.

stupendous magnitude that even her most determined opponents admit its grandeur, and must respect those who have, for generations, striven towards its fulfilment.

It is nothing less than supremacy in Asia, to be obtained by means of the establishment of such naval and military predominance, at first in the northern half of the continent, as would place the untold resources of the huge Chinese Empire, and its teeming population, at the disposal, in course of time, of the Northern Conqueror (already Lord of the enormous tracts of Siberia, some day to rival Canada in productiveness), and thus make him Arbiter of the destinies of the peoples of Asia, and Ruler of the Pacific. A vast conception, truly, but one that seems to the minds of millions of Russians, even after the heavy blow their naval prestige has just received, simply a forecast of what will surely happen, all in good time. Nor are all the subjects of the Tsar particularly elated at the prospect. Many of them appreciate the tremendous difficulties in the way of its accomplishment, and deplore the terrible expenditure of blood and treasure it has entailed and will continue to entail. But the Russian is, by nature, a fatalist, and he looks upon this unceasing onward march of his nation to the conquest of vast new dominions as inevitable. "It is the destiny of Holy Russia!" So think nine out of ten of those Russians who think at all. It is this fatalism that imbues the eastward march of the Russian millions with such grave importance for other nations. The Russians see in their "grand destiny" the manifest expression of God's will, for it is their firm conviction, as a nation, that the Almighty has singled them out from all the peoples to be the saviours of the world. They believe that, in the fulness of time, all the other nations—and especially those that now rejoice in the possession of what they term freedom—will turn to Russia in their extremity, and, worn out by anarchy, tired and weakened by what many Russians call "the debauch of liberty," will ask to be taken under the benign sway of the autocratic Tsar, "the Father of his People." and will seek rest and salvation in the bosom of the Russian Orthodox Church. And this is not the belief only of fanatical peasants, of mystic priests, or of dreamy professors; it is the faith, deeply-rooted and ever active, of the men who are now ruling the Russian Empire. It comes as a shock when such convictions are suddenly revealed by one of those bland, highly-polished, deeply-learned men, and the shock is intensified when one notes the inspired tones in which they are spoken, the fanatical flashing of the otherwise mild eyes, the whole transfiguration of the man. It was in moments of such exaltation that the Russians formed the plans that re-arranged the map of Asia; it is this spirit, this fervour, in which religious zeal and patriotism become one feeling, that make the soldiers of the Tsar dangerous opponents for the Japanese to meet.

Strong as this national and religious impulse is with the Russians, a spirit still stronger, because more actively enthusiastic, burns in Japanese hearts. It is as fine an emotion as any race has ever felt, a spirit that makes heroes of a whole nation when the need arises: *Yamato Damashi-i*, the Spirit of Old Japan.

The astonished world has just seen a clear manifestation of what that

HIS IMPERIAL
MAJESTY THE TSAR.

indomitable spirit can accomplish. The great drama on which the curtain has now risen will reveal many more instances of its operation.

The die is now cast, and the nations stand, with bated breath, in presence of the beginning of a gigantic conflict, the end of which no man can foresee.

It is, indeed, a moot point whether the struggle now commencing, however vast its proportions, may not ultimately prove to have been but the opening scene of the War of the Nations—merely, the preliminary skirmish of the Battle of Armageddon. Earnest efforts are, undoubtedly, being made by all the great civilised Powers, and especially by the United States, to restrict to the original opponents, Japan and Russia, the conflict the neutral nations have not been able to prevent; but there is no certainty that they will be successful. Rather is it to be feared that the conflagration now kindled in the Far East may spread like burning oil, and involve nation after nation in its devastating flames.

This terrible contingency may occur, whatever the immediate result of the hostilities between the forces of the two Empires who have just drawn swords. In the event of Russia's numbers bearing down, at the end of a protracted struggle, the resistance of Japan's gallant warriors, Britain could not allow Japan, her friend and ally, to be so crippled by the victor as to debar her, for many years to come, from her legitimate position as a Great Power in Eastern Asia and on the Northern Pacific Ocean. It is hardly to be expected that the Muscovite, flushed by ultimate victory, would restrain his hand in response to any representations, however weighty, from Britain. The serious threat of force could alone influence him, and that only were he to find himself, at the close of a long and exhausting war, isolated in presence of stern and resolute Britain. Such isolation might, indeed, be the case were it not for the strong probability that France would have to support Russia were she confronted by two opponents (in that case Japan and Britain), just as, by the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, we are bound to assist Japan by force of arms should she have to encounter more than one hostile Power at a time.

The danger of Britain's being drawn into the whirlpool is almost as great in the contrary event. France, in spite of her recent entrance into closer and more friendly relations with Britain, would hardly be likely to continue to stand idly by whilst the "friendly and allied nation," her much-petted comrade, Russia, was being humiliated by the victory of an adversary so very much smaller, and that foe an Asiatic nation. Russia's ultimate defeat by Japan would mean the crumbling into dust of her prestige, the total loss of her masterful grip on Manchuria, the vanishing into thin air of her intended predominance in China and Korea, the hopelessness of her dream of mastery on the Pacific, the shattering of her aspirations to the suzerainty of all Asia. The wreck of her Asiatic power would inevitably entail her deposition from her proud eminence in Europe, where the nations would no longer stand in awe of the colossus when the Japanese sword had completely shattered its feet of clay. The Government of the French Republic, as at present constituted, would be loth to plunge France into war, especially as it would entail a conflict with Britain, to save Russia from such downfall; but behind that Government stands the French people, still, to a

great extent, enamoured with Russia—the thrifty French people, who have, out of their hard-earned savings, financed their Muscovite ally, both his State Treasury and his industries and railways, to the enormous amount of *four hundred and forty million pounds sterling!* Out of this sum, advanced by their French friends, the Russians have defrayed the cost of their great railway across Asia and of its branch line to the shores

RUSSIA'S SOUTHERNMOST CAMP IN THE FAR EAST: ON THE TEITONG RIVER AND HALF-WAY BETWEEN THE FRONTIER AND SEOUL.

of the China Sea, and of that large fleet they have so rapidly built, "almost secretly" (as Captain Ottley, R.N., formerly British Naval Attaché at St. Petersburg, said in a recent speech). Well may the French people feel intensely concerned in the fortunes of their huge debtor!

There lies the awful danger lurking in the dim future of the Russo-Japanese conflict: the possibility of Britain and France being driven to abandon their original positions as passive seconds in the great duel, and to draw swords against each other on behalf, nominally, of the principals, but in reality in defence of their own interests. Such a prospect is, indeed, terrible to contemplate. It might be rendered more remote could either party hope for the accession to its side of a third partner so powerful as to weigh down the scale in its favour to an extent that would render a conflict almost too hazardous for the opponents to undertake. Such might be the case were the United States of America to declare themselves openly, by word *and deed*—for mere words have lost their efficacy in the world's affairs when the guns have once spoken—on the side towards which their sympathies undoubtedly incline and on which, did the majority of Americans but know it, their real interests lie. But the very fact that America refrained from the determined action that would, if taken in concert with Britain, have prevented this terrible war from

breaking out, inspires but faint hope of her realising, at the present juncture, her new responsibilities as a Great Power on the Pacific. She has, it is true, taken the lead in striving to obtain an international agreement for the preservation of the neutrality of China and the integrity of her territory, and such an effort is deserving of appreciation; but the experience of the notorious "Concert of the Powers" during the repression of the anti-foreign outbreak in China, in 1900, induces scepticism as to the value of international "agreements" relating to the Far East.

There is another great World-Power whose influence, thrown into either scale, might entirely change the issue of the conflict; but the repeated declarations of German policy with regard to the Far East have loudly emphasised the Kaiser's resolve not to be drawn into the quarrel. Germany is not sorry to see two Great Powers (especially since one of them is a powerful neighbour) exhausting their fighting strength against each other; the shrewd Teuton hopes to do a good deal of business with both belligerents, and —who knows?—some unconsidered but valuable trifle may, somehow, fall to his share in the end. Officially, Germany favours Russia, a good understanding with that Power having always been a cardinal point in German policy; but the majority of the German people sympathise in their hearts with Japan, only they dare not express their feeling openly for fear of giving pleasure to the British! Germany is, however, still a "dark horse" in Far Eastern politics, and with a ruler like the Kaiser it is not safe to forecast any line of conduct as likely to be pursued by her.

There is another "dark horse" in the Far East—China. What part China may ultimately take in the conflict remains an unknown quantity; but it seems likely that her present rulers will continue to "sit on the fence" until some decisive victory may indicate which way the tiger-cat of war is jumping. Should Japan appear to be victorious, on land as well as at sea, there is but little doubt that China would turn and rend the Russians, at whose hands she has suffered much that was particularly galling to her stiff-necked pride. Whether the Chinese Imperial Government—that is, the Empress-Dowager and her advisers—side openly with one or other of the belligerents, or whether China remain officially neutral, there is a strong probability that considerable numbers of Chinese—especially young men of the Reform Party, the only ones in whom anything akin to the patriotic spirit, as understood in other countries, can be said to exist—will join, or, at least, aid, the forces of their former enemies and just and lenient conquerors in their fight against Russia.

Besides these purely Chinese volunteers, the roving horsemen of Manchuria, arrant robbers many of them, plying their trade in well-armed bands, are sure to seize the welcome opportunity of harassing the Russians. These half-wild horsemen would, with a little training under Japanese officers, usefully supplement the Japanese cavalry, numerically far too weak in proportion to the other arms. Important as the assistance would be that these Manchurian bands, and the Irregular Horse that could easily be raised amongst the great hordes of Mongol Tartars, could bring to the side of Japan, there is one aspect of the matter that renders their employment undesirable

from the humanitarian point of view. It applies equally to participation in the conflict by Chinese. The fate of any Russians who might happen to fall, wounded or unwounded, into the hands of Chinese, Manchurians, or Mongols, is too terrible to contemplate. The long-pent-up revenge for the atrocities committed by the Tsar's troops in suppressing the so-called "Boxer" outbreak would be wreaked upon them with all the fiendish ingenuity of Chinese cruelty, and this in spite of the strenuous efforts of the Japanese officers who might be attached to these irregular troops, to make them conform to the usages of warfare between civilised nations. Such efforts would be looked upon by Chinese, Manchu, and Mongol as mere sentimental weakness; they would probably fail to check the barbaric ferocity of the Irregulars, and Russia and her friends would hasten to cast the opprobrium for their crimes on Japan. The Japanese Government are fully alive to this danger, and will certainly discourage the embarrassing offers of aid they may receive.



THE HIGHWAY TO THE FAR EAST: VIEW ON THE MANCHURIAN RAILWAY.

The whole question of the effect the Russo-Japanese conflict may produce on China is so vast, so fraught with tremendous possibilities affecting the whole world, that imagination boggles at it. One may best estimate its supreme importance when one considers that the ultimate triumph of Russia would leave China, with her teeming millions, at her mercy; whereas the victory of Japan would drive the Chinese into the arms of the conquerors. Signs are not wanting that China, and especially the best and most promising element in her vast population, is already turning for guidance to Japan. Well may we hold our breath when we think of what it would mean for the four hundred millions of Chinese to allow their extraordinary vitality, their undoubted intelligence, their unrivalled industry and thrift, to be guided by their Japanese cousins into new channels; their sterling qualities applied, under that enlightened tuition, to the development—under good, honest government and with the help of all the resources of Western science—of the wonderful natural resources of the Celestial Empire. Under



APPROXIMATE POSITION OF FORCES WHEN NEGOTIATIONS CEASED.



VULNERABLE POINTS OF ASIATIC RUSSIA, KOREA, AND JAPAN.

Japanese leadership and instruction, even the unmilitary Chinese race would probably be able to produce land and sea forces strong enough to make their country secure from foreign aggression and competent to hold her own in international matters. The fighting strength of China's millions, thus added to the naval and military power of victorious Japan, might well exercise a potent influence in Europe, in America, and even in Australia. That prospect, however, fades into insignificance before the certainty of the tremendous competition the rest of the world would have to face in industries, in commerce, and the carrying trade by sea, were China to throw in her lot with Japan and to take her as her "guide, philosopher, and friend." Four hundred millions of workers, toiling unremittingly for infinitesimal wages, would constitute an army of labour before which the other nations, ever striving for more leisure and higher pay, might well quail! Portentous as the results of Japan's triumph might thus be, they would, in all probability, be far less dangerous to the interests of the rest of the world than an ultimate Russian victory. That event would make Russia, at no distant date, the arbiter of the destinies of Asia, and give her a preponderance in Europe that would be a standing menace to all free nations.

EMPEROR AND CROWN PRINCE OF KOREA.

It may serve to give a good idea of the far-reaching possibilities of the Russo-Japanese conflict if attention be drawn to another quarter in which it may easily bring forth momentous results. Russia's naval force in the Pacific has already, in the first twenty-four hours of the war, practically succumbed to the onslaught of the Japanese warships, and the Tsar may be under the necessity of replacing his lost vessels by others taken from his fleet in the Black Sea. In order to reach the Far East these ships must pass through the Turkish waters of the Bosphorus, and through the narrow gateway of the Dardanelles. The Sultan has the right, confirmed by international treaties, to close that passage to all foreign ships of war. Should he, yielding to Russian threats or cajolery,

give free passage to the Tsar's ships, other Powers would not be slow to claim the same privilege, and Constantinople would lie at the mercy of any maritime nation cunning enough to lead up to its opportunity and bold enough to seize it at the right moment. Should the Sultan, as is more probable, take his firm stand on his treaty rights, Russia might attempt to force a passage for her ships. This would be an act of war against the Ottoman Empire that would rouse the Turks to fury. They have old scores to pay off against their hereditary foe, the Muscovite, and another Russo-Turkish war, with the attendant horrors sure to ensue from the Balkan States joining in the fray, would deluge South-Eastern Europe, and probably Asia Minor, with blood.

Enough has been said to prove the world-wide importance of the war now commencing. It stands to reason that it behoves every thinking man and woman, especially those of the English-speaking nations, to watch closely the progress of the conflict, as they will be able to do in the pages of this "History."

RUSSIAN SOLDIERS AT PORT ARTHUR.

Photo: Imperial Press Agency.

CHEMULPO, THE PORT OF SEOUL.

THE HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

PRELUDE.

THE FIRST SHOT.

ON February 8th, 1904, Chemulpo, the insignificant port of an insignificant capital, suddenly became, for a brief period, the most famous and interesting place in the whole world. For in its immediate vicinity was fired from a Russian gun-boat the first shot in the great conflict between the great Colossus of the North and the Island Nation of the Far East. Not till the following day did that shot have locally any serious sequel, and, in the meantime, another and much more lurid incident had emphasised the breaking-out of hostilities between the two Powers mentioned. But "first shots" in great international struggles have an interest all their own, and the day's doings at Chemulpo on that fateful Monday demand precedence on that account in any faithful narrative of the war.

In the afternoon several foreign warships were lying in the channel, some three miles from Chemulpo, which constitutes the anchorage of that minor port. The British Navy was represented by the fine cruiser *Talbot*, and at other moorings lay the American warship *Vicksburg*, the *Elba* and *Pascal* flying the Italian and French flags respectively, and the *Varyag*, one of the newest and best of Russia's protected cruisers. During the afternoon another Russian warship, the *Korietz*, had weighed anchor, and towards evening was to be seen leaving the harbour

The shadow of coming events lay heavily on port and shipping in this apparently sequestered corner of the busy world. For it was known that diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan had come to an abrupt close, and that, to all intents and purposes, the nations were in a state of war. It is not

proposed here to discuss in detail the negotiations which for nearly half a year had been proceeding with an almost exasperating tardiness, marked by half-calculated procrastination on the one side, on the other by elaborate patience. But

Photo: Abrahams & Sons.

THE CREW OF THE *ASAMA*.

it may be very briefly stated that on August 12th, 1903, the Japanese Government had proposed to the Russian Government a basis of agreement with reference to the mutual recognition of the interests of the two countries in Manchuria and Korea. In spite of earnest representations on the part of the Japanese Foreign Office, the Russian reply was delayed until December 11th, and, when received at Tokio, was held to be unsatisfactory. The Russian Government was, accordingly, asked to reconsider it. On January 6th, 1904, a further reply was forthcoming, which, again, was regarded as falling far short of Japan s requirements. On January 13th a renewed request was made by Japan that the Russian Government would reconsider certain of the questions raised. To this Japanese note no reply had been received in Tokio on February 5th, although the Russian Government had been frequently urged to expedite the matter. On February 6th it was understood in Europe that the reply had been

forwarded on February 4th to the Russian Viceroy of the Far East for transmission to Baron von Rosen, the Russian Minister at Tokio. Presumably it would in the ordinary course have been delivered on the 6th, but on the 5th Japan had formally intimated to the Russian Government that she would wait no longer, and that she had decided to cease further negotiations, to recall her Ministers from St. Petersburg, and to take steps to protect her interests at stake. As a consequence of this intimation orders were issued to the Russian Minister at Tokio to leave Japan forthwith, and on Sunday, February 7th, it was known to the civilised world that war might break out at any moment.

Returning to Chemulpo, where we left the *Korietz* slowly steaming out to sea—an old 10-knot gun-boat, she was incapable of any very sprightly movement—it was about 5 o'clock in the afternoon when this luckless vessel took upon itself the responsibility of actually commencing the Russo-Japanese War. She was passing Round Island, which lies outside Chemulpho harbour, when a vision which, under other circumstances,



THE JAPANESE WARSHIP *ASAMA.*

would have been an inspiring one, was gradually revealed to the Russian commander, Captain Bielaev, and his crew. In rapid succession there came into view several transports, escorted by a cruiser division of the Japanese fleet, and some torpedo boats. Well might the Russians have felt misgivings as they "sized up" that workmanlike contingent. For, although of the six attendant cruisers five were vessels of about half the size of the *Korietz's* late consort in Chemulpo harbour, the sixth was the big armoured ship, *Asama*, which was half as large again as the *Varyag*, and with the appearance of which many Englishmen are familiar. Probably, too, Captain Bielaev was aware that the division was commanded by Rear-Admiral Uriu, an officer of very remarkable attainments. and one of the youngest of Japan's admirals. Now only forty-six years of age, Admiral Uriu received his early naval training in the United States; he was actively employed on the Staff during the Chino-Japanese War; and his name and reputation will, of course, have been familiar to the Russian Navy.

However, Captain Bielaev seems to have been in no way daunted by the imposing approach of the Japanese squadron, any one of the cruisers in which could have sunk him in a few minutes, and, as one of the Japanese torpedo-boats came within short range of him, one of his guns "spoke." Thus, in a moment of passionate foolhardiness, strangely typical of Russia's action in provoking the resentment of a Power temporarily and locally, at any rate, far stronger than herself, was fired the first shot of the war.

That shot, like so much of Russia's "bluff" against Japan, missed its mark. Nor was it immediately countered by effective Japanese reprisals. A couple of torpedoes were discharged at the *Korietz*, but did not hit her; and Captain Bielaev, finding discretion the better part of valour, ran back to rejoin the *Varyag* inside the harbour.

The Japanese ships continued their passage, and, in due course, four battalions of Japanese infantry, aggregating some three thousand men, were landed from the transports, an operation which would have been impossible in the eye of any but a very inferior enemy. Subsequently Chemulpo was occupied by a Japanese detachment, the remainder of the troops continuing the march to Seoul.



"THE SEARCHLIGHTS OF THE RUSSIAN WARSHIPS START INTO RADIANCE" (*p.* 18).

CHAPTER I.

FIRST BLOOD TO JAPAN!—THE ATTACKS AT PORT ARTHUR.

IT is nearing midnight. In the roadstead outside the strongly fortified harbour of Port Arthur the bulk of the Russian fleet in the Far East lies at anchor. Inside the land-locked bay which forms the harbour there is ice, and, partly because of this, the Russian warships are moored in the outer anchorage. They are also, perhaps, contemplating an early movement in view of the tidings that a diplomatic rupture with Japan has taken place. Sombre shapes of steel, bristling with great guns, they lie in seeming absolute security, under the advanced works of one of the strongest fortresses in the world. Seven huge battleships are here—the *Petropavlosk* (the flagship of Vice-Admiral Stark), the *Poltava, Sevastopol, Peresviet, Retvisan, Pobieda*, and *Tsarevitch*, with the cruisers *Novik, Bayan, Diana, Askold*, and *Boyarin*.

This powerful fleet has presumed heavily on its inert strength. No special precautions have been taken against surprise beyond the sending out of a patrol of three torpedo-boats. All the destroyers and other light craft which might well have secured the squadron from insidious attack have been withdrawn into the harbour. On shore the harbour lights and beacons are burning as usual, and it is said that a circus in the town has enticed many men away from the forts, and possibly some of the officers from the ships. The sea is calm, the air is clear, the moon is shining, and Russia and Japan are to all intents and purposes in a state of war. Heaven help the

British Navy if ever, in such circumstances as these, a squadron of it is so careless of the danger which may leap on a sudden from out the tingling stillness of the night!

It is nearing midnight, and the great fleet and the frowning batteries beyond are hushed in sleep. Surely, despite all negligence, the real risk is small. What, save a fleet of immensely superior weight and power, whose approach would have been manifest to the torpedo-boat patrol, would venture on such a night to attack battleships grouped in front of such a backing of fortress artillery? As giving some idea of the inherent strength of a naval force like this, even at rest, let us take a single ship and note its qualities, both of resistance and offence. What a capacity to repel, as well as to deliver attack, is indicated in a monster like the *Tsarevitch* with its displacement of over 13,000 tons its four 12-inch and twelve 6 inch turret guns and powerful lighter armament, its gun-protection of from seven to eleven inches of specially hardened armour. Even without its engines of over 16 000 horse-power, giving a speed of eighteen knots, such a vessel is in itself a powerful floating fortress, a single discharge from the broadside guns of which means a hurtling mass of nearly three tons of steel, and from the armoured sides of which the projectiles of Nelson's day would have rebounded like peas. Yet there are foes which can strike swift and sudden terror even in such a strong citadel as this. A modern poet has, in language aptly fitted to their dread purpose and swift, stealthy oncoming, described those foes under the title which Carlyle gave to the Valkyrs of Norse myth. When the shades of this momentous night closed in on the Russian fleet, the "Choosers of the Slain" were not far distant, and as the hours crept on, so they have crept on to their grim, appointed task.

In another quarter of an hour it will be midnight. Suddenly the air is rent with a dull explosion. The searchlights of the Russian warships start into radiance, and a rattle of machine guns and small arms follows. The Japanese are attacking with torpedo-boats, and have already succeeded in torpedoing one of Russia's finest battleships! Close to the stronghold, which, at Russia's instance was wrested from Japan in 1895, and which less than three years later was in the Bear's own grip, the Island Nation is dealing her enemy a blow, the tidings of which will to-morrow throw great continents into wonderment and solemn thought.

The scene is one of mingled confusion and deliberate devastation. Japanese torpedo-boats are rushing at full speed along the whole line of Russian ships, and in the distance are now dimly revealed the shapes of four Japanese cruisers, the vanguard of the main fleet under Admiral Togo's command. On these the Russian warships and the forts on shore open fire with their larger guns, while the lighter armaments continue to bark out a savage greeting to the flying torpedo-boats. But the "Choosers of the Slain" dash on, their throbbing engines shaking them from stem to stern, the sea parting in cleft billows from their bows: and two other torpedoes take effect on the great Russian hulls silhouetted against the beams of electric light. The Japanese cruisers open fire at long range, and bursting shells fall among the Russian fleet and the fortifications of the harbour. Their task magnificently accomplished, the torpedo-boats



THE ROADSTEAD OUTSIDE PORT ARTHUR: THE SCENE OF THE FIRST FIGHT.

Russian warships entering the harbour through the broken ice.



THE BATTLESHIP *RETVISAN*.

return to the attendant squadron, the latter suddenly withdraws, and the Russians are left with their former assumed superiority of naval strength irrevocably destroyed in half an hour. Thus ends the most daring, the most successful torpedo attack in history; ends with a loss to the attackers of but four men killed and fifty-four wounded, and without injury to their brilliantly handled ships.

Morning reveals two great Russian battleships—the *Tsarevitch* and *Retvisan*—and the cruiser *Pallada* lying to all appearances hopelessly disabled at the entrance to the harbour. Examination shows that all have received damage which has placed them at least temporarily *hors de combat;* and Admiral Alexeieff, the Tsar's Viceroy of the Far East, is constrained regretfully to telegraph to his Imperial Master the news of an initial and terrible reverse. Nor will it be many hours before the wires tremble with messages of fresh disaster to Holy Russia's arms.

Such an episode as the above has an individual interest of a sufficiently exciting sort. But modern warfare does not tend to the contemplation of isolated battle pictures, especially when the side that has dealt a heavy blow has dealt it on the offensive, and has not been crippled in dealing it. Before they felt the first torpedo shock that Monday night, the Russians had not, we are told, expected an attack for three or four days. Indeed, they may themselves have hoped to take the initiative. But we may be sure that, when that terrible half-hour was over, the first thought in the minds of two-thirds of the Russians in and around Port Arthur was when another onslaught might be made by foes which had already showed themselves so full of dash and daring. Nor had the fleet and forts to wait long before their doubts in this direction were vigorously solved.

The sun rose very red on the morning of the 9th, disclosing on the horizon three two-funnelled cruisers at a distance of several miles. These scouts, from whose masts another Rising Sun—that which is carried on the flag of Japan—fluttered

in the chill air, remained calmly taking note of the fleet among which their mosquito comrades had wrought such havoc. For two hours unmolested they remained within long distance range, while the Russians made shift to render aid to their disabled ships, and to prepare for further eventualities. There were, according to an eye-witness, now lying in the roadstead outside Port Arthur five effective battleships, five effective cruisers, one volunteer cruiser, one gun-vessel, one training-ship, and seventeen torpedo-boats and destroyers, the last-named being grouped near the harbour entrance.

About 11 a.m. the main Japanese fleet swept majestically into view on the horizon, and a glorious sight it must have been. Sixteen magnificent warships were to be descried in battle formation, including Japan's six battleships, *Mikasa*, *Hatsuse*, *Asahi*, *Shikishima*, *Yashima*, and *Fuji*, the first four fitted to meet any vessel afloat, and all of immense power and recent construction. Several of the cruisers also were of the first class, among them being the mighty *Idzumo*, which to all intents and purposes is a small battleship, and carried on this occasion the flag of Rear-Admiral Kamimura, commanding the Second Division. The whole of this splendid fleet was under the command of Vice-Admiral Togo, the "Nelson of Japan," and a very striking personality. It was he who struck the first blow in the Chino-Japanese War by sinking the transport *Kowshing* with a shot from the *Naniwa*, and at Port Arthur, flying his flag on the great battleship *Mikasa*, he enjoyed the complete confidence of all his countrymen. A short, stout man, silent and reserved in manner, and known to be possessed of splendid courage and resolution, he owes something to British education, for he "went to school" on the British training ship *Worcester*. His right-hand man, Admiral Kamimura, also knows England well, having come to this country when the battleship *Asahi* was building on the Clyde. He was to have taken command of that vessel, but was wanted in Japan, and was urgently recalled. He commanded the cruiser *Akitsushima* in the battle of the Yalu, and has long been looked upon as assured of a brilliant future.

But we must not linger too



THE CRUISER *PALLADA*.

long over these personal details. The Russians are waiting to see what the newcomers intend doing, and already their ships are in motion, not with a view of going out to meet the enemy, but in order not to present stationary targets. The gunners in the forts are at their posts, and all is ready either for a game of long bowls or a deadly contest at close quarters. The Japanese know their strength, and also that of the forts behind the Russian fleet. Their option is for a long-distance combat, in which their splendid shooting will give them the advantage.

Between eleven and half-past the game begins. A flash breaks out from one of



the Japanese vessels, and 850 lb. of steel drops near the entrance of the harbour where the torpedo-boats are lying. The Russians reply, their cruisers fighting as a first line, their battleships in constant motion in rear, never more than a mile and a half from the shore. The rate of fire on both sides is slow, and it is noticed



THE BATTLESHIP *TSAREVITCH*.

that many of the Russian shells fall short. But the Japanese aim is excellent, and one great Russian ship after another is struck by the terrible shells from the 12-in. guns of the attacking fleet. The forts take their share in this impressive combat. Armed with scores of modern and powerful guns, their batteries vomit discharge after discharge of huge projectiles specially shaped to pierce the armour plating of a warship, and certain of carrying death and destruction if correctly sped on their grim errands: for in them are charges of mélinite, that evil compound of picric acid which not only scatters broadcast the jagged fragments of its steel casing, and rends like paper any resisting substance which the shell has penetrated, but sheds noxious fumes which poison the air and kill men like flies.

In few equal areas are there to be found so many possibilities in the way of "vile guns and villainous saltpetre" as in the works at Port Arthur this Tuesday morning. The surrounding eminences literally bristle with batteries of long-range artillery, those at the harbour entrance being specially formidable. Here there are four monsters of sixty-three tons each, and several batteries of Canet quick-firers, while along the hills that overhang the sea there are simply miles of parapet from the embrasures of which guns are now roaring. But the range is a long one, and the attacking ships present no easy mark. From the forts as well as from the Russian fleet the shots fall ineffectively into the sea water, the shells bursting on impact with the surface but in futile fury.

The Japanese ships are beautifully handled, and their aim is sure. Officers and men, though full of ardour and warlike exultation, perform their tasks as steadily as if at manœuvres, and the captains derive from their two admirals a splendid example of forceful and resolute demeanour. There is no haste and confusion. Gun after gun speaks to good purpose, and levelled glasses show that forts as well as the hostile ships are feeling the effect of the bombardment. It is on the Russian cruisers and battleships that the fire is mainly directed, for it is far more important for Japan to cripple the Russian Navy than it is to inflict such trifling damage as can be inflicted from the sea on fortifications like those of Port Arthur. But, from time to time, a



GENERAL VIEW OF PORT ARTHUR.

heavy shell is hurled into the works overlooking the harbour, and on the summit of one fort two in succession burst with evident effect. Some thirty projectiles are said to have fallen beyond the harbour into the town, and throughout the forty minutes' duration of the bombardment there must be few mortals within the full range of the Japanese guns that do not feel some effect, if only of transient apprehension, from that deliberate, precise, and far-reaching fire.

An episode is furnished by the plucky but rash behaviour of the Russian cruiser, *Novik*, under command of Captain von Essen. Little more than a scout, with practically no protection in the shape of armour, she has the gift of speed, for her boilers are British-built by Thorneycroft, and she can make her twenty-five knots an hour, or could do before this fateful Tuesday. She is described as "rather a pet toy of the Russian Navy," and in her own department should have proved invaluable. But small cruisers are out of place in such actions as these—at any rate when the enemy is of the size and strength here indicated. The *Novik*, with admirable pluck, moves closer in than her comrades to the Japanese fleet, and spits out shell from her 6-in. quick-firers, regardless of the doom she is drawing on herself. Alas, poor *Novik!* The mighty *Mikasa* and *Akashi* open fire on her, and, like a wounded bird, she flutters back heavily to a less prominent position.

Other damage is done to the Russian fleet, from which it is not likely to recover speedily. The *Poltava* battleship is hit below the water-line, and the cruisers *Diana* and *Askold* have also been severely handled. The last-named has been pierced by a shell, and is filling with water. She will presently be pumped out and towed inside the harbour, but in the end will fill again and be of no further use, at any rate for immediate fighting purposes.

It is between noon and one o'clock when the bombardment begins to slacken. Noting the discomfiture of their enemies, the Japanese feel that their task is over for the present, and Admiral Togo gives the signal to retire. In superb formation the great fleet withdraws to the south-eastward, having since a little before midnight put three Russian battleships and four cruisers out of action. The Japanese vessels, as Admiral Togo

SHOWING THE HARBOUR AND NAVAL BASIN.

reports, have suffered very slight damage, and the fighting strength of Japan's Navy has not decreased.

As the conquering warships are steaming in the direction of Talien Bay they meet the steamer *Foochow*, in which the Japanese Consul and some refugees are returning to Chifu. The Consul is puzzled to know why his country's fleet is present in such strength in this quarter, but he presses to the side and leads a cheer for the Mikado as the fleet sweeps past. Pleased and proud must Admiral Togo's officers and men have been to receive this the earliest patriotic greeting that followed the achievement of their grand exploit, and doubly proud and pleased the happy Japanese on board the *Foochow* to learn afterwards that they had been the first to felicitate their countrymen on Japan's opening victory in the struggle with her gigantic foe.

A word must be given to the effect of the news of these two engagements upon the nations of Europe, more especially upon those allied with the two combatants. As a matter of history it may be recorded that the tidings of the torpedo attack was the first intimation received in the Western world that hostilities had actually commenced. It came in the form of a reproduction of Admiral Alexeieff's telegram briefly announcing to his Imperial Master the delivery of the attack and the damage sustained by the fleet. Needless to say, it created a very great impression, which has sensibly increased by the report of the subsequent bombardment. On all sides the striking demonstration given of the value of the torpedo was



Photo: The Topical Press Pl

TALIEN BAY.

eagerly discussed, and it was significantly recalled that the Russian Navy had always prided itself on its own potentialities in the way of torpedo warfare.

Throughout Great Britain the initial success of the gallant Japanese aroused a strong feeling of admiration, but there was not wanting a disposition to sympathise with Russia in her great calamity, and to admire the fortitude with which the first bad news was received in St. Petersburg.

From the expert standpoint there was little to discuss beyond the great central fact that Russia had lost, in all probability hopelessly, any chance of gaining and retaining the Command of the Sea in Far Eastern waters It was further recognised that a country which at the outset had used its naval strength with such brilliant effect as had Japan, was not likely to forego any advantage which naval superiority would give it.

Even France, with all her loyalty to her Russian ally, could not fail to be impressed with the splendid audacity of the first attack on Port Arthur. The admiration of a people so keenly appreciative of courage and *élan* could hardly be withheld from a deed so stimulating in its conception and execution alike.

And what of stricken Russia? Our own Press bears eloquent testimony to the self-restraint and control with which the Russian people bore the shock of the first grievous news. According to one correspondent, it was strangely like the aspect of the British public in the "dark days" of December, 1899. "There is," he writes, "the same silent, wondering look on the faces one passes in the streets, the same doubts both of the known and the unknown, but the same tightening of the lips in grim determination to 'see this thing through.' Moreover, there is the same quiet, resolute confidence that whatever is happening now, the ultimate result must and should be unaffected."

In the presence of such feelings thus expressed, harsh criticism may well be hushed. The respect for patriotic sorrow deepens as we read how, on the morrow of the first disaster, the Tsar and Tsarina proceeded sorrowfully to the church of the Winter Palace, and there, in a service of solemn intercession, knelt in supplication for Heaven's mercy on an enterprise already tinged with dark misfortune.



SEOUL, FROM THE SOUTH GATE.

CHAPTER II.

JAPANESE LANDING IN KOREA—DOOMED RUSSIAN WARSHIPS—ACTION OFF CHEMULPO.

THE landing of Japanese infantry at Chemulpo, to which brief allusion has been made in our Prelude, was a picturesquely significant operation. Significant, since it demonstrated in very striking fashion the excellent military organisation of Japan, the forethought of her departmental officials, and the wonderful precision and attention to detail to which she has attained even in the difficult art of carrying out combined naval and military processes. To land even a handful of troops at Chemulpo at the best of times would be no easy task, but to carry out such an important disembarkation as this without a hitch, and in six or seven hours, was a feat which cannot but have been noted with approval by the numerous foreign experts in such matters who witnessed it.

As for picturesqueness, the surroundings were of themselves impressive. Yonder in the channel anchorage were the foreign warships watching with mixed feelings a proceeding with which two of them, at least, would willingly have interfered. Nearer inshore were the transports, screened from possible interruption by Japanese cruisers and torpedo-boats, while at the mouth of the harbour lay three of Admiral Uriu's ships anchored a mile apart. With marvellous swiftness the transports discharge their freight of sturdy Jap soldiers in new grey uniforms, with dark yellow-braided, star-pointed caps,

white putties, and sheepskin neck mufflers. Silence is observed, and the disembarkation generally is the perfection of orderliness. A bright effect is produced by the lighting of paper lanterns on the wharf, with numbers showing the different mooring places for the barges carrying the troops ashore. As the troops land they are marched quickly off to their billets, arrangements for which have already been made by the Japanese houses at Chemulpo. To quote another detail from the vigorous description given by Mr. M'Kenzie, the War Correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, log fires are kindled at short intervals along the water front, paraffin continually thrown on the coal fires burning in iron cradles on the wharf sends up great tongues of flame, while the scheme of illumination is quaintly diversified by the intensely white "flashlight" exposures of an American photographer correspondent!

Soon after midnight the landing is completed, and General Yasutsuma Kigoshi, commanding the troops, retires to rest in his temporary headquarters from which in a few hours he will emerge to lead his fine fellows to Seoul.

Before the troops are astir Rear-Admiral Uriu has taken serious action with regard to the Russian ships in the harbour. At 4 a.m. he sends a message to Captain Roudneff, commanding the *Varyag*, to say that if the latter ship and the *Korietz* remain in the harbour after twelve o'clock he will attack them.

It is, indeed, a melancholy position in which the representatives of proud Russia's Navy are now placed. Succour is out of the question, except by a miracle, and Captain Roudneff probably realises that Japan would never have attempted such a landing as she has just carried out unless she had taken care that the main body of Russia's fleet were occupied elsewhere. This Captain Roudneff is a fine fellow, an old shipmate of Admiral Alexeieff, who has only recently been given the command of the *Varyag*. A man of great force of character and firmness of disposition, he takes no long time making up his mind in these difficult circumstances. He knows well that both



THE *VARYAG*.

his ship and the *Korietz* are doomed, but he resolves that their end shall be worthy of the Russian flag. To lose the *Korietz* is no great matter. After seventeen years of service that insignificant gunboat is not worth much to Russia, even in the Far East, but it must be with a real pang that the gallant sailor thinks of the fate which is awaiting his own fine ship, which was only laid down at Cramp's famous yard at Philadelphia four or five years ago, and is one of the fastest vessels in the Russian Navy. With something of a heavy heart, we may be sure, the necessary orders are given, and half an hour before noon the two vessels are steaming out through the narrow and difficult entrance to the port.

But before the *Varyag* and *Korcitz* leave the company of the foreign warships, an episode occurs which marks the coming conflict with a distinctive touch of mingled pathos and sublimity. They are going to almost certain death, the brave fellows on these doomed ships; the ships themselves will soon, well-nigh inevitably, be frightfully mauled by their powerful antagonists—but the band on the *Varyag* strikes up the Russian National Anthem as she steams out majestically to meet her fate, and the strains of "God Save the Emperor!" are the stirring overture to a stirring, if one-sided, fight.

There is not much need to prolong the tale of what follows. Close to noon comes the first shot in the running battle which ensues between the Russian ships and Admiral Uriu's squadron which is pressing on their heels. From twelve to half-past the firing is fast and furious, the *Korietz*, as well as the *Varyag*, making a most plucky fight, and apparently escaping with much less damage than her big consort. But here again, as at Port Arthur, Russian gunnery proves deficient. With her turn of speed the *Varyag* might conceivably have succeeded in disabling one or more of her antagonists, while the *Korietz* has at least two quick-firing guns of considerable calibre. No serious damage, however, appears to be inflicted by either ship, while the Japanese deal some cruel blows, especially on the *Varyag*.

At 12.30 the firing becomes more desultory, and by this time the Russian ships, which have sought the shelter of the neighbouring Polynesian Islands, are showing signs of distress. Shortly afterwards the guns on both sides are silent, and the *Varyag* and *Korietz* are seen returning to the harbour. The Japanese squadron remains outside.

Listing heavily to port the *Varyag* struggles into the channel where the neutral warships are lying, and anchors. The *Korietz* does the same a few furlongs off, and to the experienced eyes of the observers on the *Talbot*, *Vicksburg*, *Pascal*, and *Elba*, the end is not far off. The *Varyag* has been punished frightfully, shells having struck her in the bows and low down in the stern, while the *debris* on deck, caused by the bursting of another shell on the bridge, is said to resemble that of a machine shop.

As the *Varyag* afterwards is found to be sinking, and the *Korietz* is on fire, the crews are taken off and received on board the neutral cruisers. The casualties are very numerous, brave Captain Roudneff being among the wounded. The *Sungari*, a Russian transport lying in the harbour, is set on fire and abandoned.

At 4 o'clock the *Korietz*, the fire having spread to her magazine, blows up. The Russian crew from the decks of the *Pascal* sing the National Anthem as the frag-



Photo: The Imperial News Agency.

CHEMULPO.

ments of their gallant little ship strew the waters of the harbour.

At 6.30 the *Varyag*, said to have been set on fire, sinks. The *Sungari* follows.

So ends the eventful evening of February 9th, a day which has seen two naval battles fought, and nine Russian warships put out of action. A terrible lesson in naval warfare this, and one which will linger long in the memories even of those not privileged to witness these tremendous sights, as so many spectators both at Port Arthur and Chemulpo were. But, perhaps, the memory which will survive the longest is that of the Russian sailors who went out to fight their last fight, went out to death, perhaps to agony—for torturing agony is what death on board a stricken warship sometimes means—singing "God Save the Emperor!"

ADMIRAL ALEXEIEFF, THE TSAR'S VICEROY IN THE FAR EAST.

CHAPTER III.

ANOTHER LOSS TO RUSSIA—MORE NAVAL MOVEMENTS—A DOUBTFUL EXPLOIT.

ON February 11th Admiral Alexeieff at Port Arthur is beginning to feel severely the pinch of adverse fortune. Three times already he has been compelled "devotedly to inform" his Imperial Master of heavy casualties to Russia's Navy. He has succeeded in bringing the ships injured in the attacks of the 8th and 9th into the inner harbour, and he has telegraphed to the Tsar optimistic messages as to the speed and completeness with which the necessary repairs can be effected. But he knows, of course, that, even supposing the legs and wings of his crippled ducks can be healed sufficiently to enable them to waddle or paddle out of harbour, most of them will never again be the strong waterfowl they were. He realises all too well that such naval supremacy as Russia possessed has passed like a dream, never to return except, possibly, as a dream. A magnificently successful Russian official, he is fully aware that at home he has many enemies who will not scruple to make the most of the Port Arthur and Chemulpo losses, and seek to belittle him in the eyes of the nervous and vacillating Tsar. How different his position to-day from what it was but a few months back, when, as newly appointed Viceroy, he reviewed the most powerful fleet ever assembled by Russia in those waters, and an army not far short of a hundred thousand strong! Well may the Admiral begin to show signs of breaking down under a strain which even in peace-time is one calculated to keep the strongest mind in a constant state of tension.

And now, with war begun, the Command of the Sea irrevocably lost, the mobilisation even of the Siberian Army Corps barely commenced, the Japanese triumphantly ranging the waters of the Far East with their victorious and unscathed ships, and landing troops by thousands almost at any point they choose, with reports arriving daily of the "kinking" of the "gossamer thread" of railway on which the present life and future reinforcement of the Russian Army east of Lake Baikal depends—with all these ghastly anxieties, the great Admiral-Administrator, who a few weeks back stood so near to the Tsar himself in power, and towered a head and shoulders above most of Russia's greatest bureaucrats, feels terribly the weight of the galling crisis, in the creation of which he himself played such a vigorously domineering part.

Fortune lays about her sometimes with a flail, and another stroke comes upon Alexeieff this morning. One clear day has passed since the bombardment of Port Arthur, and a reconnaissance has revealed no further traces of the Japanese fleet. It has probably dawned upon the Viceroy that, in the battered condition of his ships, every effort should be made to block entrances which might be forced with serious results by the Japanese

TYPES OF
RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.

TYPES OF
JAPANESE SOLDIERS.

torpedo-boats if not by heavier craft. Accordingly, renewed activity is being displayed in the matter of submarine mining, and special care is being taken to close floats at some distance from the surface of the water, and it goes without saying that the invisibility thus secured is apt at times to prove a double-edged tool.



Photo: The Imperial News Agency.

STREET VIEW IN VLADIVOSTOK.

the entrance of Talien Bay in order to hinder an attack on Dalny.

Submarine mines are of various kinds. but clearly those that are being laid in Talien Bay are of the "contact" variety. These mines are constructed to explode directly any vessel comes into contact with them, very considerable ingenuity being generally expended in their arrangement to this dramatic end. Sometimes they are so laid that they rise and fall with the tide, and, of course, the greatest care must be exercised to prevent their fouling one another when swayed by various currents. To be efficacious a mine should be submerged so that it

The vessel engaged in mine-laying in Talien Bay is of novel and special construction. She is called the *Yenisei*, and is a two-funnelled steamer of 2,500 tons, with a crew of over a hundred men. She is only lightly armed with 12-pounders and smaller guns, but she is a new and valuable ship, and has on board a quantity of costly stores. Her appearance is rather singular, for she has a long over-hanging counter, through which the mines are lowered.

Captain Stepanoff, who is in command of the *Yenisei*, is engaged in his difficult and delicate work when he perceives that one of the mines in the "field" in which

he is working has risen to the surface, and thus become a pointer to a hostile ship. The only course to be taken is to blow up this faulty mine, and Captain Stepanoff moves his ship nearer for that purpose.

Before, however, he can effect his object, an earlier and unpremeditated explosion takes place! The *Yenisei* has run heedlessly on a mine well and truly laid, which fulfils its deadly mission with tragic thoroughness. The bows of the devoted ship have caused the ignition of, perhaps, a hundred pounds of gun-cotton, part of the vessel is blown into the air, and list of those thus hurled into eternity includes the commander, Captain Stepanoff, the chief engineer, two midshipmen, and ninety-two of the crew.

Well may Alexeieff stagger under this fresh blow, one of peculiar significance in view of the criticisms which he knows will be launched against him for not having already used mines to greater effect in the defence of Port Arthur, and so, perhaps, have checked, at any rate, the midnight attack on the 8th.

The Viceroy's hope of being able to make good use of the fleet at Port Arthur is rapidly diminishing, but there is yet



Photo: The Topical Press Photo Agency.

TALIENWAN AND THE RUSSIAN FORTIFICATIONS.

what is left of her sinks rapidly. There is no time to take measures for saving life, and only a few survivors of this ghastly calamity are afterwards picked up. The a chance that Russia may score, even by sea, against her alert adversary. At Vladivostok there are four considerable ships, two of which, the *Gromoboi* and

the *Rossia*, are of over 12,000 tons displacement. Both these are armoured cruisers, and the former is of modern type. The *Rossia* flies the flag of Rear-Admiral Baron Shtakelberg, the commander of the squadron, and, like the *Gromoboi*, carries enough coal to take her at least 4,000 miles. The other two ships are the armoured cruiser, *Rurik*, of about 11,000 tons, and the protected cruiser, *Bogatyr*, of rather under 7,000 tons, but with a sea speed of 20 knots. Altogether a formidable squadron, provided it can keep out of the way of the main Japanese fleet.

Admiral Alexeieff knows that, contrary rumours notwithstanding, this squadron has left the ice-bound harbour of Vladivostok, and he is doubtless hoping eagerly to hear of its accomplishment of some brilliant exploit, or at any rate of some vigorously-dealt blow at Japan's naval strength.

The first reported act of Baron Shtakelberg's command does not very fully bear out this sanguine anticipation. On this same February 11th two small Japanese steamers, an old 1,000 ton ship, the *Nakanoura Maru*, built in 1865, and a poor little 300 ton boat, called the *Zensho Maru*, are sailing from Sakata in the province of Uzen to Otaru in Yezo, on apparently purely mercantile business. They should be secure if only by reason of Japan's chivalrous action in giving Russian merchantmen the freedom of the seas until the 16th of the month. The conduct of Russia in this incident presents a painful contrast to that of Japan.

As they creep along the coast in company, these harmless merchantmen come in sight of the Vladivostok squadron.



Photo: Mr. J. Foster Fraser.

VLADIVOSTOK.



A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE THEATRE OF WAR.

The four big men-of-war surround the hapless little steamers, and deliberately shell them. The *Nakanoura Maru* is sunk, but the *Zensho Maru* contrives to get away from the great bullies which have destroyed her comrade, and tells at Fuku-yama the sad and shameful story of the attack.

It need hardly be said that this performance on the part of the Vladivostok squadron was not only viewed with considerable contempt in Europe, but excited the warmest indignation in Tokio. The Japanese Legations abroad were promptly informed of the occurrence, and the Government of the Mikado made no secret of its intention to take the severest measures of reprisal for what may well be regarded in the circumstances as an act of absolute piracy. That in any case the two unarmed merchantmen should have been attacked, and that one of them—which, it is expressly stated, had hauled down its flag—should have been deliberately sent to the bottom with her passengers and crew, is an ineffaceable blot upon the history of the Russian Navy. But that such an act should have been perpetrated in the face of Japan's fine exhibition of international comity, makes it simply amazing that an opportunity was not immediately sought by the Government of the Tsar to repudiate the offence.

GENERAL KUROPATKIN.

It may be recorded in passing that the exploit of these four cruisers cost Russia a heavy price. Japan had captured five Russian merchantmen and had taken them to Sasebo, with the intention of releasing them in a few days' time, when the danger of their carrying away war news was over. On receipt of the news of the sinking of the *Nakanoura Maru* these five vessels were simply handed over to the appointed Prize Court, and, while public outbursts of indignation were officially deprecated, it was clear that a stiff rate of interest would be charged in settling Japan's account with the Vladivostok squadron.

As for the valiant squadron itself, after lingering for a short time in the Tsugaru Straits, it retired, its departure doubtless being accelerated by the arrival of a portion of the Japanese fleet off Hakodate, which it was feared was in danger of bombardment.

Let us now return to Port Arthur, where things are going from bad to worse, and where complications innumerable are arising. Strange tales are told of the state of the town in the days that followed the attacks of the 8th and 9th —tales illustrative of the excitement and nervousness prevalent in the highest circles of authority. Certain it is that agitation prevailed elsewhere. In the dockyard, of course, some semblance of busy orderliness prevailed; but even here the frantic efforts made to hasten the repairs to the damaged ships generated confusion and disturbance, height-

ened by the growing reluctance of the Chinese to work for Russian masters, or to sell provisions and cattle. The railway was still open, but overcrowded with fugitives. There was talk of a scarcity of forage, and doubts were being expressed as to the endurance of the water supply.

and every effort was made to represent the situation as one which, in spite of temporary reverses, was full of bright hopes of victory for Russia.

But as the first week of war draws to its close, the Viceroy finds it more and more difficult to preserve the semblance of a calm demeanour. He has severely



THE DOCK, PORT ARTHUR, FROM THE PUBLIC GARDENS.

Admiral Alexeieff appears to have done all that could be done by an overworked and harassed man to stem the growing feeling of apprehension, and to cope with the constant complications arising from Russian unpreparedness Cheering, if imaginative, reports were circulated among the soldiery, and a stirring appeal made to their patriotism and strong religious convictions. Captain von Essen, the commander of the *Novik*, was publicly commended for his gallantry in the action of the morning of the 9th, censured Admiral Stark, who is still in command of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, and who, it is whispered, will soon be superseded. But such a relief to his feelings can only remind him rather painfully of the responsibilities attached to his own proud position. He knows that at St. Petersburg there is a popular hero—General Kuropatkin, now Minister of War—who would have been appointed to the military command in the Far East had it not been inconvenient to subordinate him to the sailor Viceroy. It is a

bitter reflection that the events of a few short days may have undermined a position which seemed stronger than that of many a monarch, and may have brought Skobeleff's former brilliant lieutenant into such overwhelming favour at home that supersession of Alexeieff himself may soon be freely discussed.

Something of added bitterness lies in the memory of the *status quo ante bellum* as far as not only Japan but China is concerned. Will not he, Alexeieff, be blamed not only for Russia's humiliation at the hands of the Japanese Navy, but also for the loss of influence at Peking, which one Russian Minister after another has been industriously trying to conserve?

To the company of such sombre thoughts we leave the Russian Viceroy on the evening of Saturday, February 13th. A snowstorm is raging, and Port Arthur shivering in its white mantle must be, temporarily at least, secure from all but internal disturbances.



ADMIRAL ALEXEIEFF TALKING WITH CHINESE OFFICIALS.



Photo: The Imperial News Agency.

JAPANESE SOLDIERS ON THE MARCH.

CHAPTER IV.

A WEEK OF WAR—A BRIEF RETROSPECT—HOW AN ISLAND NATION MADE READY—A LESSON WRIT LARGE.

ALTHOUGH the first shot was not fired till the afternoon of February 8th, and the first real collision did not take place until some seven hours later, it is sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes to say, as we have done in our last chapter, that the first week of the war ended on the evening of the 13th. For it subsequently transpired from one of Admiral Togo's despatches that the Japanese fleet, which did such execution at Port Arthur on the Monday, had left Sasebo on the previous Saturday, February 6th. Practically speaking, then, by the evening of the 13th the Japanese, at any rate, had been at war for just a week, and this chronological statement seems one which may be usefully emphasised here. In the first place, it will enable us to resume our narrative in a succeeding chapter with an account of an exploit hardly less stirring than the first torpedo-boat attack described in Chapter I. Secondly, it seems clearly to justify a very brief retrospect by way of indicating certain pregnant lessons more sharply than is possible in a pure and simple narrative.

It does not seem necessary to recapitulate the broad facts of the foregoing pages. There is nothing more wearying than the bald iteration of war calamities and casualties, and, when we say that in this week the Japanese gained the command of the sea, we have said nearly all that is to be said, even from the lofty standpoint of the expert, as to the fighting history of these seven days. But

OLD JAPAN AND NEW JAPAN:

Warrior of the Period Ka-yei, 1848-1854, with lowered helmet-mask; and a Sergeant of the Infantry of the Line, in field service order, as in the early part of the War with China, 1894. (From drawings executed by Kubota Beisen, for use in "The New Far East," by Arthur Diósy.)

there is much in the situation created by the smashing onslaught of Japan upon her great, aggressive enemy which has a singular piquancy, more especially for the allied Island Nation of the West.

We Britons have been fighting on land and sea for a good many centuries. We need go back no further than the Norman



Photo: The Imperial News Agency.

WAR-SHIP IN DOCK AT NAGASAKI.

Invasion, when both the land-fyrd—the militia of the shires—and the ship-fyrd were called out, and the one guarded the coasts while the other cruised in the Channel, very much as might have happened in the case of Japan under slightly altered circumstances. We, of all nations, then, ought not to be content with merely looking at the Russo-Japanese War as a gladiatorial combat. At every point of that tremendous contest there is something of real instructiveness to the fighting nations of the world, and particularly to ourselves. No pretence will be made of dealing at all thoroughly with such lessons here. But at convenient junctures it may serve a useful purpose if we endeavour briefly and brightly to show how and why such and such things occurred, and what influence was exercised upon their occurrence by national character and national effort.

Mr. Diósy, in his Introduction, has given us a striking picture of the circumstances in which Japan was drawn into this epoch-making war, and he has indicated with sufficient clearness that in meeting the manifold, the almost overwhelming responsibility she has now incurred, the "spirit of old Japan" will be finely

demonstrated. But when we come to examine the stern realities of a week like that we are now reviewing, it is transparently clear that we have other forces to take into account, besides Japan's conviction that the present is for her a struggle of life and death, besides her patriotism, her warlike ardour, and the dash and daring of her sons.

It is easy to say that the matter is a simple one of preparedness, and that Japan offered no more striking spectacle in this respect than did Prussia in 1870. But, in the first place, Prussia was only ready on land, and, secondly, Japan had not the basis of tradition and experience to work upon, as the sealed pattern of European military efficiency had. If we wish to find the secret of Japan's success, we must reckon her national character and other racial advantages in the same column with a variety of other attributes, such as her insular position and her possession of fine harbours, and then *multiply the total by her splendid assimilation* of large ideas, her perfect grasp of the true principles of fighting preparedness.

When Japan, on the evening of February 6th, sent out a big fleet to Port Arthur, which marked the despatch of troops, duly escorted by warships, to Chemulpo, she gave even Great Britain a lesson, which the latter cannot afford to neglect. Negotiations had only just been broken off, and yet Japan struck right and left with perfect confidence and perfect success. Why? Because she was ready, of course; but that is not all the answer. It was because she was completely ready as regards both her fighting services, and not only that, but had first-rate home bases to work from, and every sort of convenience in the way of transport and supply that forethought of the most penetrating kind could suggest.

It is not so very long ago that the Japanese bought their first steamship from us. It was taken out by a British crew, and, when it arrived, the Japanese made haste to learn how the engines worked, and then urgently demanded that the British officers and men who had been "coaching" them should go ashore. Forthwith, the new crew set the engines in motion, and, having but imperfectly grasped the method of stopping them, were in some danger of coming to grief. But the helmsman was equal to the occasion. Instead of running the ship on shore, he merely took her round and round in great circles until her fires went out! When from this picture we turn to the magnificent apparition of the Japanese fleet in line of battle off Port Arthur on the morning of February 9th, 1904, we not only perceive the difference between a childish effort and a masterpiece, but *begin to have an inkling of some of the* "reason why" of the latter's evolution.

Another strange and instructive contrast is afforded by a glance first at the conditions of soldier service under "old Japan," and then at the perfection of military organisation to which Japan has shown herself for at least ten years past to have attained. There is an interesting passage in Lord Wolseley's Autobiography in which he relates his impressions of a visit to Japan in 1860-1, at the close of our war with China. He speaks as so many other travellers and historians have done, of the great Daimios, or Princes, with their crowds of Yaconins or retainers who wore their Daimio's crest, and "as a rule got drunk about sundown," after which it was dangerous for a foreigner to walk abroad lest one of

these fine fellows "might take it in his head to cut you down." There is as much difference between the Yaconin of forty years ago and the Jap soldier of to-day as between a British "gentleman in khaki" and the retainers of a feudal baron. But it has taken us a good deal longer than the Japanese to span that difference.

National character goes for a great deal, but it may be said that, in some directions, it was by the stern repression of her national character that Japan succeeded in preparing herself so thoroughly for this conflict with one of the greatest Powers of the world.

ADMIRAL TERAUCHI, JAPANESE MINISTER OF WAR.

Here is a picture drawn in the *Daily Telegraph* by Rear-Admiral Ingles, formerly Naval Adviser to the Japanese Government. A battalion is leaving the principal railway station at Tokio for service at the front :—

"Suddenly the ordinary travelling public are instructed to wait a little, and the turnstiles are locked. The public turn back and chat, not in the least disconcerted. At last the great iron gates at the end of the platform are opened, and at the same time the head of the battalion appears. It marches straight on till the leading company arrives at the front carriage. The battalion is halted, turns towards the train; in a moment the train is packed as full as it can hold. The guard whistles, the train moves off. There are no friends on the platform—no women—no band playing 'The girl I left behind me.' 'All is quiet, all is great.' Everything betokens order and quiet determination. Now the train has gone, the great gates are shut, the turnstiles are opened, the next ordinary passengers' train is ready to depart 'on time.'"

Surely there is repression of the bright Japanese character in all this, the sort of repression which betokens terrible earnestness, and makes for strong achievement.

How Japan sprang to war is lightly sketched in the foregoing three chapters. How she prepared for that spring, how she trained her every muscle, how she dieted herself, how she kept close reckoning of her weight and measurements—some "sporting" metaphors which seem appropriate—would take much space, and might, perhaps, prove wearisome. It is sufficient for the purposes of this running record to say that while, as a rule, the first week of any great war shows clearly where the main deficiencies in the way of preparation are, there is as yet no sign of weakness in Japanese methods. Warships have proved all that warships should be, and torpedo-boats, built by Japan herself, have splendidly stood the strain of service under the worst conditions. Such repairs as have been necessary to war-

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JAPANESE MARCHING THROUGH TOKIO.

ON THE MANCHURIAN RAILWAY: A NIGHT PATROL

ships injured in action have been promptly taken in hand and speedily effected, a fact which in itself indicates the most elaborate and skilful prevision. Armament and equipment have evidently been the subject of the closest attention and the most liberal expenditure on the part of a nation possessing by no means exceptional wealth. It is an interesting circumstance in this last connection that, when the tension between Russia and Japan was beginning to become severe, and war was not only growing possible but probable, an English firm, which had for some years been supplying Japan with shells, regarded it as certain that it would now receive an increased order. The contrary happened. Not even the usual supply was requisitioned. Japan had all she wanted. She had been for ten years or so making ready. She *was* ready, and the first week of war demonstrated her readiness in a fashion from which we may, nay must, take a lesson.

There is another direction in which Japan has worked hard and long, one in which every nation has its own peculiar methods, but in which the Japanese have attained perfection. "Why should we land troops near Port Arthur for the purposes of reconnaissance?" asked a Japanese officer, in reply to an inquiry from a newspaper representative. "We know all there is to be known about Port Arthur already." The spy, or, as he is sometimes called, the collector of "intelligence," does not get, as a rule, all the credit he deserves. But it may be that future recognition will not be wanting to the numerous Jap officers, and countless agents of lower degree, who, disguised as Chinamen, and by other devices, have penetrated the most secret details of the Russian occupation of Manchuria, and have supplied their Government with a service of information, political, naval, military, and topographical, probably unrivalled in the annals of international espionage.



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ON GUARD.

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JAPANESE TORPEDO DESTROYER.

CHAPTER V.

AN ERRAND OF DESTRUCTION—A DASH INTO THE NIGHT—RACING THROUGH THE SNOW—TORPEDO ATTACKS AT DAWN—ATTEMPT TO "SEAL" PORT ARTHUR —MORE BOMBARDMENTS.

AT the Japanese naval base there is an atmosphere of suppressed excitement as the night of February 13th closes in. Getting up steam in readiness for an immediate start is a small flotilla of those wicked-looking craft known as torpedo-boat destroyers, of which one or more fine specimens may be seen pretty constantly in the neighbourhood of Portsmouth and other of our own great harbours. Long, low vessels, specially engined and armed so that they can overtake and destroy the smaller torpedo-boats, they are themselves fitted with torpedo tubes, and are thus enabled to perform the same functions as the "mosquitoes," with the added advantage of being able to stand a heavier sea.

The midnight attack at Port Arthur on the 8th was carried out by torpedo-boats. The Japanese battleships and cruisers have also been in action, and have grandly distinguished themselves. The "destroyers" have been eagerly awaiting their chance, and now it seems to be drawing very near. For Admiral Togo has issued orders that a flotilla under the command of Rear-Admiral Nagai shall dash into Port Arthur, and wreak what destruction it can among the remnants of the damaged Russian Fleet in the harbour. It is easy to imagine the glorious thrill of exultation and warlike hope which runs through the little flotilla as the order is made known. The commission is one of serious danger, for it goes without saying that the Russians will now be far more alertly on their guard than they were five short nights ago, when the little torpedo-boats darted in

among them. A destroyer, too, presents a much better mark than a torpedo-boat. But the Japanese sailor, like our own Jack Tar, is sublimely forgetful of risk in such an enterprise. For him the whole prospect is one of tingling anticipation, of foreshadowed joy in rushing through the silent night and falling on the enemy at dawn; of dealing, perhaps, a crushing blow; of escaping, possibly, unscathed; but, anyhow, of doing the very best that can be done, and, if need be, dying a splendidly honourable death for king and country.

Such an attack as this is always a dare-devil exploit. With only a fraction of an inch of steel between them and the water, those who work on board destroyers know that but a slight rent in the wall of their frail tenement may mean destruction and sudden death. But they go forth joyfully, and in this instance not to harry and cut down lesser craft, not under the escort of battleships and cruisers, but in a flotilla acting by itself, and acting against warships grouped under the guns of a formidable fortress. The British soldiers who flung themselves against the *chevaux de frise* of swords at Badajoz were faced by obstacles and risks not more terrible than those which these Japanese destroyers are fretting to encounter.

It is a dirty night. The air is bitterly cold, dark clouds are massing, and the snow is beginning to fall as these hounds of the ocean are slipped from their leashes, and race out into the darkness. The heartfelt good wishes of the Fleet go with them; and Admiral Togo, resolute strong man as he is, must feel a spasm of anxiety as he learns that the flotilla has quickly vanished from view.

The snow thickens, and is driven by rising wind, which rapidly gathers strength and becomes a storm. The flotilla speeds on, at first in company, but cohesion soon becomes impossible. Gradually the destroyers separate, but there is no thought of slackening speed, much less of turning back. Full steam ahead! On through the blinding snow, dark walls of water rising through which the sharp stems cleave their way, to the accompaniment of great heart-beats from the throbbing masses of machinery packed in the long, lean hulls. As if running into a friendly harbour to avoid a storm the gallant little ships race on, and the snow gathers in drifts on the narrow decks, and plays in frolic sport round the commanders conning with keen eyes the dreary waste of waters ahead, and wondering whether by mingled luck and judgment they will hit the mark in spite of this trying drawback.

On, through the cold night and the small hours of morning, the flotilla presses, but in sadly scattered formation, till finally all touch is completely lost, and all chance of united action gone. What more natural in such circumstances than that each destroyer should independently return to the base, having striven manfully to carry out a hopeless task, and surely not to be blamed for not proceeding further and alone on an apparently impossible quest?

But the "Spirit of Old Japan" is aglow this early morning of February 14th, and its blaze and warmth, in two stout hearts at least, is more than sufficient to shrivel the falling snow, to lighten the gloom of that darkest hour which precedes the dawn, and to invigorate limbs chilled into torpor by the rigours of a bitter night.

At three o'clock in the morning the


12 PDR QF
TORPEDO TUBE
COMPASS
FORE BRIDGE
TURTLE BACK
WARRANT OFFICERS MESS PROBABLY USED FOR WOUNDED
WARD ROOM USED FOR WOUNDED
STORES
AUX
MAIN ENGINES
BOILER
STOKEHOLD
CREWS QUARTERS
CHAIN LOCKER
WATER LINE
SECTION OF A JAPANESE DESTROYER
DURING A MIDNIGHT ATTACK

destroyer *Asagiri*, commanded by Captain Isakawa, appears at the entrance of Port Arthur, a puny visitor, indeed, to knock at the gate of that giant fortress, from the works of which three hundred guns point their grim muzzles at the sea, and in the waters lapping the feet of which there are still some of Russia's best and biggest ships lying.

The *Asagiri* may well be proud of the sensation created by her early morning call. As she stands in boldly, the beam of a searchlight falls upon her, for the Russians are this time vigilantly on the watch, mindful of the scathing abuse with which Admiral Alexeieff rewarded them for their negligence on the ever-to-be-remembered 8th. There are scouts patrolling the entrance to the harbour, and in the crossed beams which light up the approach it is impossible even for the low-lying *Asagiri* to shoot in unnoticed.

Discovery of the intruder is followed by a roar which is quite as complimentary, though hardly as pleasant, to the *Asagiri* as would be a royal salute. The forts open fire at once on the destroyer, and it seems that nothing but a miracle can save her. It may be the speed at which she is travelling, the inferior skill of the Russian gunners, the fear of hitting a Russian ship in the uncertain light—each or all of these reasons may help to preserve the splendid little vessel which now essays a feat that will live long in the naval annals not only of Japan, but of the world.

Like a pike the *Asagiri* at full steam darts past the scouts, past the batteries, into the narrow entrance of the harbour itself! She sees before her the huge hull



PLAN OF PORT ARTHUR AND HARBOUR.

of a warship from whose funnel the smoke is ascending. She discharges a torpedo at this monster, and then swiftly turning, emerges, exchanging shots with the enemy's torpedo-boats, and, it is said, sending one of them to the bottom. Despite the rain of shot and shell she is still unharmed, and runs out to sea, proudly conscious of a brilliant deed, superbly done. Gallant little *Asagiri!* Wherever brave acts are honoured, wherever reckless heroism has its due, there shall be graven on the tablets of memory, in letters of gold, the glorious tale of your single-handed dash, after a night of storm and stress, into the very heart of a position deemed impregnable to the most furious attack.



By permission of Messrs. Yarrow & Co., Ltd.

THE DISCHARGING OF A TORPEDO.

Two hours after the *Asagiri's* arrival comes another visitor to pay respects to the Russian Viceroy of the Far East. Shrouded in snow, the *Hayatori*, commanded by Captain Takanouchi, speeds swiftly out of the dim light of breaking day—it is now five o'clock—and is seen approaching the roadstead outside the harbour of Port Arthur. One can fancy the *Hayatori* having, perhaps, been driven a little out of her course, and straining every steel nerve to make up for the lost time, and so be enabled to do a little mischief before full daybreak renders her enterprise insanely foolish. She has "cut things fine," and very little time now remains before all her chances will be merged in the certainty of destruction to herself and crew. Even as it is, such a raid as that carried out by the *Asagiri* is out of the question. Port Arthur is alive with lights, and sentinels and gunners at their posts. There is movement of shipping plainly discernible, and



a rush at the harbour entrance would mean the concentration on the raider of enough shot to sink Admiral Togo's flagship, let alone a poor destroyer with a shell of paper-like thickness.

But the *Hayatori* is in greater luck than would seem to be her lot in these rather depressing circumstances. As she hurries along, seeking for some worthy object for her one serious means of doing damage, her commander espies two unmistakable Russian warships lying well in front of the harbour entrance. In an instant his resolution is taken. His blue-jackets stand by the tube, and, as his craft darts past the huge shapes that loom in the near distance, the torpedo leaps from its receptacle and speeds on its deadly errand, that astonishing invention, the gyroscope, keeping it truly to its course. A moment of suspense follows, for, unless it has been correctly aimed, the torpedo will merely spend its energy in futile flight and be recovered later by the enemy. The *Hayatori* is at full steam, and cannot approach closer without the certainty of being crushed. But she hears the explosion, which can only have been caused by the torpedo coming into contact with the hull of the warship aimed at. Accordingly, she runs, well satisfied, out to sea, and later it is reported that the Russian cruiser *Boyarin* is the vessel which the *Hayatori* attacked in a fashion only surpassed in audacity by the earlier exploit of her pushing sister.

Trying times, these, for Port Arthur's garrison, and still more for the civilian inhabitants, who can hardly be expected to take a calm, professional view of such exciting episodes. But soon there are few civilian inhabitants left, for, with excellent forethought and considerable energy, Admiral Alexeieff proceeds to

get rid of all "useless mouths" in anticipation of the siege which now seems inevitable. The station is crowded with refugees, many of them Chinamen, who have left behind them large stores of foodstuffs. The latter are promptly annexed by the authorities, wheat and milling marines, accordingly, are drafted into the forts, and Port Arthur speedily begins to assume a very business-like air of readiness for further excursions and alarms, whether by sea or land.

The Viceroy himself retires to Harbin, the great junction where the Manchurian



Photo: The Topical Press Photo Agency.
A RUSSIAN MILITARY FUNERAL.

machinery are brought into the town from outside, and the authorities begin to talk proudly of being able to "hold out." if necessary, for two years. It is said that about this time another exodus besides that of civilians takes place. Nearly every soldier that can be spared from garrison duty is wanted for the field army, and a good many naval gunners are at "a loose end" by reason of the disablement of their ships. Sailors and Railway bifurcates to Vladivostok and Port Arthur; and while, morally, some disadvantage seems to attend this move, there is much to be said for it from the strategical standpoint. For Alexeieff will be far better able to do his Viceregal duty at Harbin or Mukden than at a place where he may find himself at short notice inconveniently isolated. At Port Arthur, too, there is little to be done of an active nature. The Russian fleet can hardly be

said to be "in being," and, if the Japanese attempt a landing on the Liaou-tung Peninsula, it will not be by a handful of troops from Port Arthur that they will be successfully hindered. What looks, then, rather like a retreat on the Viceroy's part is really a very sensible measure that it has established what is at any rate an efficient temporary blockade. It is essential to understand that, while all this time Port Arthur has been kept under the closest surveillance by quite enough ships for the purpose, a squadron has been detached to attend to the

THE JAPANESE ARMOURED CRUISER *NISSHIN*.

promptly taken at what may prove a critical juncture.

For about ten days following the visit of the *Asagiri* and *Hayatori* Port Arthur is watched by the Japanese fleet much as a mouse-hole is watched by a cat, but with a difference. For now and then the watchers in this case indicate their presence somewhat vigorously, although no actual attacks appear to have been delivered between February 14th and 24th. From Huang-Chin (Golden Hill), Port Arthur, the Japanese fleet can be descried at intervals, and the absence of arrivals by sea indicates pretty clearly Russian squadron which has its base at Vladivostok, and other warships have doubtless been employed in connection with the transport of troops destined to take part in land operations to be described hereafter.

These facts, if not very thrilling, are exceedingly instructive as showing the readiness and skill with which Japan at once began to take advantage of the command of the sea secured by her at the outset, although the actual number of vessels at her disposal was not large, considering the area of sea in question. Nor could she hope for some weeks to stiffen

AN INSPECTION ON BOARD A RUSSIAN CRUISER IN CHINESE WATERS.

her resources in this respect by the employment of the two powerful cruisers, the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*, which she had bought at the end of 1903 from the Argentine Government, and which had recently made a rather sensational voyage from Europe, shadowed for several days by Russian warships. These vessels had arrived safely on February 15th, but some time would necessarily elapse before they could be sent to join one of the squadrons at sea.

Let us now revert to the state of affairs at Port Arthur, where for ten days the garrison has been, perhaps, rather impatiently awaiting some fresh development. It is dreary work this watching and being watched, more especially as a strict order has been issued that no lights are to be used, and evening consequently brings no sort of relief to the monotony of the day. On the early morning of February 24th, however, a sensation comes at last. Once more the guns are roaring, pulses are quickened at the thought of a stirring fight, and soon the rumour gains strength that a determined attack has been delivered, and that the Japanese have not only been repulsed, but have suffered serious loss!

There can be no mistake. There are sunken vessels to be seen with funnels clearly showing them to be Japanese warships, and it is known that after the "battle" Japanese torpedo-boats were seen flying out to sea. Great and glorious news! The Tsar is promptly informed of the "victory," and Europe is thrilled with the intelligence that four of Japan's "battleships" have been sunk in the Port Arthur roadstead, and that special praise in connection with the notable achievement is due to the *Retvisan*, one of the ships torpedoed on the 8th, and supposed to have been permanently disabled.

War has its cruel ironies, and this proves to have been one of them. Gradually the true story comes piecemeal over the wires, and Russia's almost furious joy at such an unexpected piece of good fortune is slowly merged into sickening disappointment, sharply accentuated by a growing consciousness



THE JAPANESE ARMOURED CRUISER *KASUGA*.

that a crafty enemy has again scored a point, although his object may not have been attained with complete success.

The story is a simple one, but at the back of it lies a solid mass of that same quality of daring courage which has already characterised the action of the Japanese torpedo-boats at midnight on the 8th, and that of the destroyers on the morning of the 14th. It is the story of the sinking of the *Merrimac* in the Spanish-American War told a little differently, and not a jot or tittle of the lavish praise showered upon Lieutenant Hobson and his comrades for their splendidly courageous exploit can be rightfully withheld from the plucky Japs who took part in this brilliant endeavour to "bottle up" the Russian ships lying in the harbour of Port Arthur. In passing, it may be urged that the latter attempt was in its conception far the more elaborate and scientific, and, if it had succeeded, would have given the Russians a great deal more trouble than they actually experienced.

The war correspondent suffers, as a rule, under the disadvantage of having to regard the episodes of a campaign from a continuously one-sided standpoint. The war historian is happily not so hampered, and the present writer makes no excuse for perpetually flitting from Russia to Japan and *vice versâ*, in order to attempt the most vivid presentment possible of any particular happening. In this instance he was but a moment ago in Port Arthur, but now, Ariel-like, he spans a good



A GROUP OF SUBMARINE MINES GUARDING ENTRANCE TO A HARBOUR.

many leagues of sea and calls his readers with him to witness the inception of a very interesting and curious enterprise on the part of the wide-awake Navy that flies the flag of the Rising Sun.

In the very early morning of February 24th Admiral Togo's torpedo flotilla—both destroyers and torpedo-boats this time—is heading with rather singular slowness for Port Arthur. Evidently the pace is being set by five accompanying vessels of some size, which at first sight resemble Japanese warships, but whose appearance, on closer inspection, proves altogether fraudulent. Something a little queer, too, about the very leisurely, not to say torpid, manner of their going, very different from the brisk, forceful progress of an up-to-date cruiser, with engines running sweetly, and hull slipping easily through the water at a comfortable eighteen knots, or a good deal more. There is a wheeziness and clangour about the machinery of these queer craft which alone betokens some strange departure from the ordinary run of things.

Examination shows that the five vessels which are thus waddling along in company with Japan's fastest destroyers are simply so many old merchantmen: the *Hokoku Maru*, *Bushu Maru*, *Tenshin Maru*, *Buyo Maru*, and *Jinsen Maru*; all of them little more than shells fitted with engines rapidly nearing the scrap-iron stage. Each has on board the merest outline of a crew, just enough to keep the cranky machinery going and the ship's head in the right direction. These officers and men, it is said, have been most carefully selected from a host of eager volunteers for a task in which the chances of escaping a more or less dreadful death are quite ethereal.

The cargoes carried by these five new additions to the navy of Japan are very suggestive. Chiefly stones, it would seem; but with this unprofitable freight is combined a quantity of kerosene and of explosives linked up by connecting wires to an electric battery. It is easy now to see what is the object which these devoted old tramps are designed to fulfil. They are intended to be sunk, if possible, at the entrance of Port Arthur harbour so as to block the narrow fairway, and it is expected, doubtless, that they will further serve the purpose of the "fire-ships," the daring use of which has led to many a stirring episode in our own naval annals. If, in the excitement consequent upon the arrival of this "squadron" in Russian waters, the destroyers and torpedo-boats get a chance of running in and leaving their mark upon one or another of the enemy's ships, so much the better. But the main business lies with the masquerading merchantmen, and the gallant fellows aboard them are the heroes of this early morning adventure.

To the left of the navigable channel which leads into the inner harbour of Port Arthur is a narrow spit of land, known as the Tiger's Tail, which is lined with forts, and has at its southern end a lighthouse, marking the opening of the navigable channel. Close to this light-house the Russian battleship *Retvisan* ran aground on the morning of February 9th, after having been torpedoed a few hours before. She appears to have been still in this undignified position on the morning of the 24th, unable to move, but performing, and with vigilance and efficiency, the duties of a guardship.

The pseudo-warships, with their attendant destroyers and torpedo-boats, have come fairly close to the light-house before they are discovered, and no time

THE JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO SEAL UP PORT ARTHUR: A DIAGRAM IN EXPLANATION.

is wasted over their reception. The *Retvisan* in particular is soon awakened to the fact that two of the ships are bearing down upon her, and her big guns bellow out an immediate welcome. The powerful fort on Golden Hill, on the opposite side of the channel, joins in with the other advanced works, and for half an hour or so the fun must have been fast and furious indeed, although so curiously one-sided. One can imagine the joy with which the gunners on the *Retvisan*, in particular, saw ship after ship of the attacking "fleet" staggering under their heavy fire, then running aimlessly towards the shore, and finally blowing up and sinking helplessly. But there must have been many who, even in the excitement of the moment, must have regarded the silence of the attackers as rather remarkable, and have realised that here were no genuine representatives of Japan's heavier fighting ships. Still, in such an uncertain light, with guns roaring on all sides and unmistakable destroyers and torpedo-boats in hostile evidence, it may well be imagined that a general impression of a great victory now prevailed, and that for some hours Port Arthur laboured under the glittering delusion that a terrible and crushing blow had been dealt against a too audacious enemy.



OPERATING THE SEARCHLIGHT.

Whilst these hopes and fears and disappointments are being engendered in the heart of the defence, the Japanese destroyers and torpedo-boats are speeding out to sea, having, it is said, picked up all, or nearly all, the officers and men who so gallantly stoked and steered the merchantmen into the roadstead.

Morning shows that the object of this brisk attempt has not been successfully accomplished. All the five ships have blown up and sunk, but not in such a manner as to close the harbour entrance, even to the cruisers lying inside. But there can be little question as to the moral effect of an experiment so full of craft and daring.

At one o'clock in the morning of the 25th the Japanese destroyer flotilla makes a scouting attack on Port Arthur, Dalny, and Pigeon Bay, the ships having set sails to disguise their true character. That trusty watch-dog, the *Retvisan*, is again on the alert, and with the shore batteries opens such a fire that the destroyers perforce retire. Later in the morning the Japanese fleet appears in force, and subjects Port Arthur to two separate bombardments, eventually causing a violent outbreak of fire in the inner harbour.



ON THE *QUI VIVE*. GUARDING THE RAILWAY NEAR MUKDEN.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY—CHAOS AT LAKE BAIKAL—THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER—RED-BEARDED BRIGANDS—THE BRIDGE WRECKERS.

IT is intensely cold, and the bleak dreariness of the surrounding landscape brings into stronger relief the sense of hardship and desolation. To our rear runs a single track of rail forty miles to Irkutsk, the capital of East Siberia; in front lies Lake Baikal, the sixth largest lake in the world, now a great crescent of ice nearly four hundred miles from horn to horn, and at this point about thirty miles broad. Here, after a journey of four thousand miles from Moscow, the ordinary peace-time traveller by the Great Siberian Railway finds his journey checked, pending the completion of the circuitous line round the southern side of the lake, upon which the engineers were busily engaged when war broke out with Japan. In summer the journey is continued across the lake by steamer; in winter either a channel is forced by an ice-breaker or the voyager can hurry across in a sledge.

It may be imagined that the breaking of a railway route in this fashion by a great intervening sheet of water about as broad as the narrower parts of the English Channel is rendered twentyfold more harassing and complicated by the existence of a state of war. A glance at the scene before us shows us what a frightful problem has here to be encountered even by able, cool-headed, masterly men,

accustomed to evolving order out of chaos, and backed up by willing subordinates of conspicuous zeal and integrity—conditions which, alas! are hardly present here. In a word, the confusion and congestion are frightful, and the wonder is that the work of hurrying reinforcements to the front does not stop dead by reason of this appalling block, which Nature is doing her wintry best to render absolutely hopeless.

Lake Baikal is covered with three or four feet of ice, and raging snowstorms have produced great drifts of snow. There are three tracks now running across the lake—one, the sledge route marked by poles; another, a foot-track, over which we see a battalion of infantry disappearing into the hazy white distance; and, lastly, a temporary railway line which runs over sleepers laid more or less carefully on the ice. This last track has been rushed forward with all speed, and already at least one ghastly accident has taken place. As a locomotive was running a few days ago at a short distance from the shore, the ice suddenly cracked, an awful fissure was disclosed, and the heavy engine utterly disappeared. Small wonder, then, that the authorities are for the present using this ice railway solely for the conveyance of stores, the troops having to make the crossing either in sledges or on foot.

The surface of the ice on Lake Baikal is very irregular and uneven, with crevasses and fissures, several feet wide in places, and hummocks which nearly jar even the solitary traveller out of his sledge. The effect of these last obstructions upon sledges built for carrying three, into which five or six unfortunate soldiers

OFFICERS CROSSING LAKE BAIKAL.

have been packed, cannot but render the latter thankful at times to leave their precarious seats and tramp along by the side of their vehicles. Half-way across the frozen lake a great rest-house of wood and felt and brick is built every winter for the accommodation of travellers, and here hot soup and coffee can be obtained by those of sufficient means and leisure. But the great bulk of those who are now hurrying " to the front " have no chance of availing themselves of this comparatively luxurious opportunity. For the soldiers rough shelters have been constructed, under which they can partake of a hurried meal, and, if frostbitten, obtain attention from the military doctors.

THE " HALF-WAY " HOUSE ON LAKE BAIKAL.

Even the existence of a line across the lake for transporting supplies does not seem to lessen the terrible accumulation at Baikal station. The new ice railway cannot carry forward more than a fraction of the great piles of stores, ammunition and other war material which the freight trains bring in daily from Irkutsk; and on the shores of the lake there are mountains of cases, pyramids of bales, containing articles and provisions of which the troops already in Manchuria are in sore need. Russian officialism is not seen at its best in such circumstances as these, and the absence of all grip of the situation becomes daily more deplorable.

A pathetic feature of the situation on

the shores of Lake Baikal is the arrival of refugees, mainly women and children, from the Far East, more especially from the terminal fortresses of Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Some very striking accounts have been given of the sights and scenes occasioned by the hurried flight of these fragile creatures from their homes—a flight accelerated by the stern demands of the authorities, who knew well that the commissariat problem before them would not admit of any consideration for weaklings unable to render any sort of useful service. The families of naval and military men were packed literally by hundreds into the trains running westward, the poor soldiers' wives with their infants and children being crowded into the common carriages used for transporting troops. It is said that the first two trains which were hurried out of Port Arthur on February 9th, after the Japanese torpedo attack, carried two thousand souls, whose sufferings on the terrible journey are better imagined than described. "No lavatories, no food to be got along the line," writes the special correspondent of the *Standard*, "hardly any water, no milk, and six hundred children of all ages huddling together for warmth, and crying with misery and hunger. It is one of the pitiful sights of warfare, and a mere forerunner to the woes behind." The story of the crossing of Lake Baikal by this pitiful freight of weak and almost helpless humanity is too harrowing to be reproduced in detail. It is sadly sufficient to say that several infants, overwrapped through fear of the terrible cold of the sledge journey, were found dead at the end of the five hours' gallop across the ice. Influenza broke out on the train, and it must have been with a strange mixture of relief and dull despair that the unfortunate mothers, sick, nerve-shattered, and spiritless, arrived at Moscow to tell the tale of the sudden awakening of the Far East to the horrors of actual war, and of their own forced flight across thousands upon thousands of miles of dreary, snow-swept plain and ice-bound steppe.

And what of the troops? Here the picture seems a rather brighter one, although painful tales are told of sickness, cold, and privation. There is danger, too, in the long weary journey, liable to sudden and, indeed, tragic interruption by deep snowdrifts through which not even the specially constructed locomotives can force their way. A short time back a troop-train nearing Baikal station was thrown from the rails, one soldier was killed, and about a score variously injured.

The four thousand miles from Moscow to Lake Baikal have been traversed by the troops in special trains carrying about 500 officers and men with their baggage, in the case of infantry; a smaller number, of course, in that of cavalry and artillery. Only the officers are accommodated in passenger cars. The men are packed by thirties into covered freight-vans, the sides of which are overlaid with felt, each van being further provided with a small stove. The atmosphere in such conditions should be densely warm enough, but, with the thermometer registering 50 degrees of frost, many cases of frost-bite occur, and, if all tales are to be believed, not a few grim fatalities. The clothing served out at Moscow has been hardly adequate to withstand such Arctic severity of cold as this, through a journey to be measured by weeks, not days. For it is computed that no soldier is now reaching Irkutsk in less than a fortnight after leaving Moscow. Arrived at Lake Baikal, he

DEPARTURE OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FOR THE FAR EAST.



Photo: Mr. J. Foster Fraser.

THE GREAT ENGLISH-BUILT ICE-BREAKER *BAIKAL* IN SUMMER.

may have to cross that cheerless expanse of ice on foot, and there is still fourteen hundred miles—or, as the traffic now is, some six days to Harbin—the junction where the railway branches off southwards to Port Arthur and continues nearly due east to Vladivostok.

Yet, with all these cruel drawbacks to comfort, the Russian soldier, even on the shores of Lake Baikal, presents a cheery spectacle. He left Moscow in a glow of patriotism which has not left him yet; he is still the Tsar's "brother," and his own officer's "little pigeon"; and he is still, with all his ignorance, his rude ideas of civilisation, and his Tartar proclivities, one of the brightest, most docile, and most enduring fighting-men in the world. He suffers—who but a Polar bear would not suffer?—from the bitter rigours to which he is being exposed, but he is grateful for the permission, or rather orders, given him to disembark at intervals from the weary train, and shovel snow by way of restoring life to his numbed limbs. He is being miserably fed, but there is nothing remarkable in that, and a hunk of black bread and occasional portions of a thick mess of meat soup "keep him going," where many more refined soldier-men would break down. With all his troubles, too, the hardy Russ soldier is no morose grumbler, but a lively fellow, full of rough jests, and fond of anything in the way of a song or dance. Many a lively caper he cuts in the snow, and, later, when he trudges across the frozen lake, we shall hear him either singing himself, or tramping lustily in time with the vigorous chanting of some recognised regimental songster.

Apart from this racial light-heartedness,

the strong strain of religious feeling, in the Russian soldiery imparts a special significance to such a scene as the one which an attempt is being made to realise here. The Russian regiment ordered to the front attends a service, at which every effort is made by the priests to inspire both officers and men with the belief that their cause is a just, and therefore Divinely favoured one. Frequently the men are sprinkled with holy water, which many of them believe will afford them special protection from the bullets of the enemy. Thus warmly clothed with comforting beliefs, and supported by a bright and patient temperament, the Russian soldier draws round him his military greatcoat—a really excellent and serviceable garment—and makes light of early experiences in a campaign which, in any case, is not likely to bring him personally much additional comfort or advancement.

A distinction, however, must be drawn between the three classes of Russian fighting-man who are being carried to the front by the Siberian Railway. First, there are the average serving soldiers of the Regular Army, duly uniformed and accoutred, knowing their business and minding it in a spirit of mingled seriousness and indifference; secondly, the new levies, "happy, eager, careless boys, reckless and merry," laughing at the pretty faces to be seen at the windows of the trains carrying refugees, "passing compliments and blowing kisses, without a thought of the morrow." Another class is made up of reservists, men of forty, "strong-bearded fathers of families, masters of small holdings, responsible citizens, torn from counter and counting-



RUSSIAN ENGINEERS LAYING THE LINE ACROSS LAKE BAIKAL.

ATTACK ON THE RAILWAY BY CHUNCHUSES.

house, from field and byre, their wives and families left to starve, and their business, built up with care and caution, left to ruin —terrible fighters these, and most miserable of men." The net which Holy Russia casts when she calls her legions to war is a vast one, and its meshes are small. Although but a portion of her immense military forces have been mobilised to reinforce the Army in the Far East, the process has searched the remotest corners of the Empire, and well-nigh every shade of character and calling is represented in the moving mass of soldierdom which is restlessly passing eastward to fight the battles of the Great White Tsar.

Hitherto we have been, since the commencement of this chapter, sojourning in Siberia. Let us now step forward some hundreds of miles, and touch the "gossamer thread" of railway at a point somewhere in the great eastern province of Manchuria. Here we come into contact with another feature of Russian military organisation in the Far East—namely, the Manchurian Railway Guards. These have a trying and dangerous duty to perform, for here the Russians have other difficulties to contend with besides the frank hostility of Japan and the covert unfriendliness of China.

In immemorial times, when the Chinese first settled in Manchuria, many of them were not peaceful immigrants, but nomad desperadoes of the worst description, outlaws and criminals whose one hope of life consisted in desultory brigandage. Combining with the more evil elements of the Manchu population, these wastrels gradually grew in strength and influence, swelling at last into a great league which called itself the "Hunhuze," or Redbeards, a name afterwards corrupted by the Russians into Chunchuses. The audacity and power of these brigands increased apace, and their red flag, with its motto, "Vengeance," became a terror to the whole countryside. Even in a busy coast-town they set up a sort of "office" for the purpose of extorting blackmail from merchants desiring to carry their wares into the interior. Woe betide the wretched trader in Manchuria whose cart did not fly the flag which he had bought at this "insurance office" as a symbol of payment of the Redbeards' dues.

When the Russians commenced to build the Manchurian portion of the great railway to the Far East, they found the Chunchuses "kittle cattle" to deal with. By dint of constant vigilance and their almost illimitable resources, they were enabled in ordinary times to reduce the plague of brigandage to moderate proportions, as far as the traffic by railway was concerned. But in the early days of construction many a station was pillaged, many a Russian soldier killed, by raiding Chunchuses mounted on horses famed for fleetness and endurance. It was not to be expected that the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan would result in any inaction on the part of these turbulent spirits. Whether, as is suggested, at the instigation of Japanese officers who were able to impart organisation and cohesion to the wandering bands, or whether through sheer eagerness to profit by the pre-occupation of Russia, and by the passage of constant trains laden with valuable stores, the Chunchuses, since the war broke out, have become far bolder and more troublesome, and several sharp encounters have taken place between them and the "details guarding the line."

It is a grave reflection for the Russian authorities that at any moment not only may the work of reinforcement be seriously



Photo: Topical Press Photo Agency.

CHINESE COOLIES AT WORK ON THE SUNGARI BRIDGE.

impeded, but the actual military operations hampered, by the presence of these formidable brigands, who, by some means, have become possessed of modern rifles, and are especially active in the region lying between Mukden and Niuchwang. In one instance a band of Chunchuses 500 strong is said to have attacked a Russian post to the west of Haicheng, and, although eventually repulsed with severe loss, is reported to have killed or wounded a score of Russians. But the main danger is, of course, to the line of railway, and there are hints that the Russians are beginning to hold out the olive-branch to these tormentors, instead of treating them, as hitherto, with relentless severity.

Yet another illustration may be given of the variegated yet constant risk to which Russia's line of communication with the Far East is being subjected, even at this early period of the war.

In its setting the scene is not very different from that in which we have just parted with the red-bearded brigands at their work of raiding the stations and the freight-trains on the line. But at this point the railway crosses the big Sungari River, close to Harbin, by an imposing bridge, the safety of which is of far more importance to Russia than that of scores of versts of the ordinary plain-running track. For the destruction of a few miles of rail out of several thousands is, comparatively speaking, a mere inconvenience, from a military standpoint, provided no natural obstacle, such as a river or lake, is concerned. But the wrecking of a bridge, even where there are British Royal

Engineers to repair it, is a bad business, and especially so when there is only one route available and time presses. The Sungari bridge is therefore watched night and day, and well it may be, for there are crafty foes at work who, on the chance of damaging the enemy's communications, will gladly face the inevitable doom of those caught playing this deadly game.

The Cossacks who are acting as sentinels over this threatened link of the chain are typical of a class of soldier which has no counterpart in any other European Army. They are not, perhaps, all they were, these far-ranging, free-foraging dare-devils, whose reputation for courage, horsemanship, and endurance is such a singularly live tradition of the Russian Army. In some western districts they are beating their swords into ploughshares, and as soldiers, generally speaking, they are under stricter rules of training and discipline than in the old days, when the Cossack of the Don, with a costume which was more picturesque than uniform, with a scraggy but businesslike mount, and a stolen goose dangling from his saddle-bow, constituted a sort of sealed pattern of irregular cavalry. But change and progress notwithstanding, the Cossacks still constitute one of Russia's chief sources of military strength, especially in a country where present supplies are scarce and future supplies problematical. Inured to every sort of hardship, accustomed to fend for themselves not over-scrupulously when the commissariat is at fault, keen-eyed and mounted on animals almost part of themselves, these Cossack watchers over the safety of the Sungari bridge could hardly be surpassed in their performance of an exhausting and anxious task.



Photo: Topical Press Photo Agency.

THE BRIDGE ACROSS THE SUNGARI RIVER.

The driving snow renders the work of a guard at this point doubly difficult; but Russia has no lack of men, and the sentries are thickly posted, the patrols numerous. As one of the latter scours the neighbourhood of the bridge it comes upon a little group, apparently of Chinese coolies employed on the line, or in connection with the great workshops and wharves which line the Sungari River in the neighbourhood of Harbin, that great junction which in six years has become one of the most important centres in the Far East. A few weeks ago little notice beyond a rough, good-natured jest would have been given to the three undersized and, perhaps, not over-clean specimens of cold humanity upon whom the patrol suddenly descends. But the times have changed, and ordinary alertness has developed into very suspicious vigilance. The "coolies" are stopped and searched, and, either on them or in damning proximity, are found explosives evidently intended for the wrecking of the bridge!

In such cases military law, or rather that martial law which, as the Duke of Wellington said, is "no law at all," moves with terrifying rapidity. The would-be bridge-wreckers are hurried back to the nearest post and examined by an officer, the inquiry revealing, to the latter's satisfaction at any rate, the fact that here are no Chinese coolies, but holders of commissions in the Mikado's service. The names as subsequently published are not recognised by the Japanese authorities, but it is quite conceivable that, assuming they were really officers, the captives, though they may have admitted their rank and station, were careful to conceal their names.

The Russian account is that the three officers were immediately brought before a court-martial, condemned to death, and hanged, within twenty-four hours of their arrest, on the culverts of the bridge which they had intended to destroy. Native reports add that a further terrible vengeance was taken by the troops on a village near the Sungari River supposed to have harboured or encouraged the bridge-wreckers. The troops are said to have burned the village to the ground and to have massacred the inhabitants, including even the women—but statements of this kind are not to be accepted without substantial proof of their truth.

In the matter of the fate of the bridge-wreckers themselves sympathy is superfluous. Although in every case the detected spy in modern war is not necessarily put to death, there is practically no hope—nor, in the opinion of most, should there be—for the man caught red-handed in the act of wrecking or trying to wreck a railway bridge. For the damage done in nine cases out of ten means not only the interruption of an enemy's communications, but an almost certain sequel in the shape of an accident involving frightful loss of lives, very often of non-combatants. The deed itself may savour of heroism, it unquestionably is the mark of fanatical courage, but it is a murderous business, and it is not surprising if the punishment meted out to murder follows even a foiled attempt in a direction in which humanity of purpose counts so little.

This note of the difficulties and dangers besetting the line upon which Russia has to depend for the maintenance and reinforcement of her Army in the Far East would be incomplete without some allusion to a sensational incident much "nearer home" than is the Sungari River. The story, as telegraphed by Reuter, goes



MUSCOVITE MERRYMAKING. RUSSIAN SOLDIERS TAKING PART IN A NATIONAL DANCE IN THE STREETS OF A MANCHURIAN TOWN.

that near Syzran station on the Siberian Railway three Japanese, disguised as nuns, were arrested by the gensdarmes and railway guards for an attempt to blow up the great railway bridge over the Volga by means of mines placed underneath the bridge. The attempt failed, since the mines were carried away by the current, and exploded harmlessly at some distance down stream. It is easy to understand that such a daring endeavour as this, even if unsuccessful, would have the serious moral effect of producing considerable nervousness among the public, and possibly to some extent among the soldiery also. Prompt and vigorous measures followed this later discovery, the whole Siberian Railway was placed by an Imperial Ukase under martial law, and the guards along the line were considerably strengthened. Henceforth a sentry was posted at every third telegraph pole for many hundreds of miles of the journey. Here is a precaution probably unexampled in the annals of war, and one which only a military power with extraordinary resources could afford to take, even where such vital interests are involved as in the case of the wonderful railway which links Europe with the Far East, and, with all its weaknesses, is perhaps the most impressive example in existence of combined commercial and strategical design.



OFF TO THE FRONT! A COMMON SIGHT IN ST. PETERSBURG.



Photo: Mr. J. Foster Fraser.

THE CITY OF TOMSK.

CHAPTER VII.

SUPERSTITIOUS RUSSIA—AN ALTERED SITUATION—MEASURES AND MEN TO MEET IT—KUROPATKIN—RUSSIA REINFORCING.

LET us try for a moment to picture ourselves in some remote Russian village, where the peasants are discussing, with a queer mixture of indefinable alarm, boastful confidence, and superstitious piety, such garbled news as has reached them concerning the progress of affairs in the Far East. Their talk may seem childish in comparison with the generally shrewd, if often strongly prejudiced, observations of the British village politician upon any matter of current national interest. But it is impossible not to be impressed with the simple fervour which animates these rude scratchers of the soil in giving expression to the hopes and fears that surround the present doings more especially of the Russian Army in its operations against the hated "yellowskins." Military service in Russia penetrates every section of social life to an extent, perhaps, even more marked in some respects than is the case in Germany and France. Many and various are its traditions and ideals. Of the Russian Army the living head and front is, of course, to noble and villager alike, the Tsar. But the military ideal of the people is enshrined in a dead man, a leader who, after a career of extraordinary brilliance, met his end suddenly

—mysteriously as some think—in ignoble circumstances which it is needless to recall. It will be many a long year before another soldier comes to storm the hearts of the Russian peasantry with such thoroughness as did the "White General." Skobeleff, the hero of Plevna, and of a score of thrilling battle incidents.

In the Russian village where we are temporarily and imaginatively sojourning, there is a quaint belief concerning Skobeleff, which has a special reference to the war with Japan. The legend is that Skobeleff is not dead, but has been for years detained in prison, because he angered the Tsar by repeated requests to be allowed to make war, first against Germany, then against England, and finally against Turkey. "You shall remain in prison," said the Tsar, "until you can speak Japanese, and you shall not speak Japanese until the time comes when I shall make war with Japan." From this childlike story to the conviction that now, in due course, the "White General" has been released, and will shortly take his place at the head of a conquering Russian Army, is an easy step, and those make a great mistake who underrate the significance of such beliefs among a populace by nature prone to superstition, but also possessing qualities of courage and endurance with which superstition is not always allied.

From our Russian village let us now take a great leap eastward to Tomsk, the semi-civilised, semi-primitive capital of Western Siberia. Here we find streets thronged with villagers who—to quote the words of the *Daily Chronicle*, which specially reported the circumstance—are in an intense state of religious excitement. Many of them are actually begging to be helped on their way to Moscow, where they propose to offer up special prayers for the success of the Russian troops. For they declare that they have seen in the heavens a blood-red hand, gripping the cross-shaped hilt of a sword. This they believe to be the hand of the Bringer of Victory, St. George, and their enthusiasm has been further stirred by the priest, Athanasius, who has predicted that, in three months' time, St. George himself will appear on a flaming horse and gallop across Siberia to the sea. The affrighted soldiers of Japan, adds the priestly prophet, will thereupon fall an easy prey to the Russian troops, the Sea of Japan will dry up as did the Red Sea for the passage of the Israelites, and the Army of the Tsar will walk dry-foot and victorious to Tokio!

It is easy to say that the record of such amazing superstitions has a purely trivial interest. But those who read history by the light of national character will be inclined to attach considerable importance to such manifestations of popular thought and feeling at a time of national trial—manifestations which come somewhere between the sturdy Englishman's exhibition of personal doggedness in defeat, and the former tendency of another brave nation to cry "*Nous sommes trahis!*" when unexpected disaster fell upon its arms.

But whatever significance we choose to apply to these and other indications—some of them, it is true, very different in character—of the manner in which the actualities of the war with Japan were construed by the Russian lower classes, we should do wrong not to make some effort to understand the new position in Russia created by the early Japanese successes, and the means which were adopted to cope with the altered condition of affairs.

CZAR BIDDING FAREWELL TO OFFICERS OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD.

In a previous chapter (Chapter III.) an attempt has been made to illustrate very briefly the extraordinary preparedness of Japan both by land and sea for this great conflict. We have seen the Japanese fleet striking blow after blow upon an enemy apparently incapable of effective retaliation; we have noted the commencement of Japanese land operations, and have recorded a disembarkation of troops on a system which worked with clocklike precision; while on the Russian military side we have heard little beyond the news of Admiral Alexeieff's withdrawal from Port Arthur to Harbin, the preparations for standing a siege of the former, and the difficulties of reinforcement by means of the Siberian Railway. Here, it may have seemed to some, was a nearly complete contrast between absolute readiness and smoothness of action on the one hand, and, on the other, unfitness, immobility, and utter failure to grasp the realities of a serious situation.

But we must not be over-hasty in generalising from such comparisons. Russia has been taken by surprise, it is true; she has suffered well-nigh irreparable loss, and she has much to do before she can again claim local equality with a foe whom the Tsar has publicly proclaimed to be "brave, crafty, and confident." But Russia, temporarily startled and confused by the vigour of the first blows dealt by Japan, is not necessarily a Russia which cannot recover herself, at any rate on land. From the villagers fondly hoping that she will be enabled to do so by the intervention of St. George or Skobeleff, we must now, in common fairness, turn to those higher official quarters in which responsibility for retrieving Russia's losses rests. It may be that the result will be both interesting and inspiring. For while the spectacle of a great nation taking the field in perfect condition for a "fight to a finish" may be of surpassing attractiveness, there is something fas ating, too, in the efforts of a world-Power, which for the moment has suffered a tremendous shock to its prestige, to right itself and regain its former ascendency.

Just as in the "dark days" of December, 1899, when the heart of the British Nation was sore stricken by the news of reverse after reverse in South Africa, the eyes of the country turned to Lord Roberts, so the close of the dark second week of February, 1904. found the Russians eagerly demanding the immediate employment at the front of General Kuropatkin, formerly Skobeleff's Chief of the Staff, and for some years past the Russian Minister of War.

Alexei Nicolaievitch Kuropatkin, now just fifty-six years of age, has had a wonderful career, more especially as, even in Russia, there is, among those who are qualified to speak with authority, a sharp divergence of opinion as to his real military qualifications. Indeed, there are those who hold that he was by no means the most gifted of even Skobeleff's not very well-chosen lieutenants, and who point to his six years' administration at the Russian War Office as productive of nothing in the shape of useful progress. But there has never been any question as to his dashing leadership, and many stories are told of his exploits in Central Asia, where he helped to storm Khojend, was present at the triumphant entry of the Russians into Samarkand, and, in a later campaign, set out with a wounded arm for a two-thousand mile ride among

the Tartar tribes of Kashgaria. At Plevna Kuropatkin added fresh lustre to his reputation by emulating the reckless bravery of Skobeleff himself in the attempt—at last successful—to force an entry into the fortress which Osman Pasha defended with such glorious stubbornness and skill. Later, as Governor of Transcaspia, Kuropatkin seems to have lost something of his old dash and vigour, but, even at the outbreak of war with Japan, he is more than ten years younger than was Lord Roberts when he accepted the command in South Africa. "A big, bearded man, who quite fills his uniform, with a very pleasant voice and very charming manners," he is described; one who, though as a nation he may not particularly love us, has often shown himself disposed to be very friendly with the individual Englishman.

One faculty possessed by General Kuropatkin, to which reference may be made in passing, is his capacity for gathering good men round him. Among those who have worked at headquarters with him is Lieutenant-General Gilinski, one of the most able and scientific officers in the Russian Army, and, when General Kuropatkin was in due course appointed to the chief command of the Russian land forces in the Far East, it was the most natural thing in the world that the Quartermaster-General should accompany him as Chief of the Staff. There was an additional good reason for the appointment



READING THE WAR NEWS: ST. PETERSBURG.

in that General Gilinski is regarded as an officer of great tact, whose services might prove useful in any complication which might arise between his chief and

ADMIRAL MAKAROFF,
NEW NAVAL COMMANDER AT PORT ARTHUR.

Admiral Alexeieff. For it was understood that the latter would for the present retain the Vice-royalty of the Far East.

Almost simultaneously with the appointment of Kuropatkin to the command of the land forces in the Far East came the news of the selection of Vice-Admiral Makaroff. the Commandant-General of Kronstadt, to take command of the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is. strangely enough, this naval officer whom the Russian populace, and, what is more extraordinary still. the rank and file of the Russian Army, believe to be the living personification of the dead Skobeleff!

The appointments of Kuropatkin and Makaroff are, of themselves, indicative of Russia's intention to act with energy in the crisis which has arisen since Japan took such a forceful initiative in regard to the naval attacks on Port Arthur and the landing of troops in Korea. Alexeieff may still be Viceroy of the Far East, and in that capacity have nominal control of the ships and troops. But it is clearly understood that Kuropatkin and Makaroff are going out "to save the situation," and that they will be given a free hand and, at any rate as regards the former, the privilege of direct communication with the Tsar. It will thus be seen that little time has been lost in putting things on an altogether new footing as regards naval and military leadership, and while Admiral Makaroff is hardly to be congratulated on the crippled condition of the fleet of which he is about to assume control, General Kuropatkin may well feel confidence in his capacity to win back Russia's lost credit by judicious handling of the large

ADMIRAL STARK,
RECALLED NAVAL COMMANDER AT PORT ARTHUR.

and daily increasing force of seasoned soldiers of whose enthusiastic devotion to himself he is well assured.

Apart from her despatch of two of her

best leaders to the Far East, Russia tackled the questions of naval and military reinforcements with considerable vigour, but hardly with equal effectiveness in both cases. Some warships had been on their way to join the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur when the war broke out, but these, of course, were recalled, and for a time created a certain amount of innocent diversion by lurking in the Red Sea and stopping vessels which they thought might possibly be Japanese. Several British steamers were thus "brought to," and a little pleasant excitement afforded to those on board. In one instance an expert observer on the British ship was enabled to note that the Russian destroyer which came up to inspect the suspected liner was in anything but a ship-shape condition, while the utmost speed of which the vessel was capable appeared to be 16 knots. Clearly such craft would be of little use in the Sea of Japan, and it is not impossible that Admiral Makaroff had already asked that no reinforcements of this description should in future be sent to add to his already serious responsibilities in the way of slow and crippled ships.

TAKING FLAGS TO CHURCH TO BE BLESSED.

The revised Russian scheme for readjusting the balance of naval power in what may now be termed with complete accuracy Japanese waters was a simple one. It consisted in the despatch of the Baltic squadron of some fifteen battleships and cruisers, accompanied by a fleet of colliers, and some thirty torpedo boats. There was talk of sending these by the north-east passage; but the whole scheme was somewhat nebulous, and did not serve to blind any competent observer to the fact that Japan, having already made a successful bid for the command of the sea, was not likely to let the advantage she has secured slip easily out of her hands. Moreover, in any case the Baltic squadron—or, rather, what was left of it, for, as a matter of fact, the Baltic fleet had already made a handsome contribution to Admiral Alexeieff's naval necessities—could not hope to reach either Port Arthur or Vladivostok for some months, since several vessels supposed to belong to it had yet to be completed, and the coaling arrangements

undoubtedly presented some difficulty. For the present, then, these proposed naval reinforcements must be regarded rather in the light of a concession to Russian *amour propre* than as a practical contribution to the maintenance of the war.

With the military reinforcements the case was altogether different. When the war broke out—and, indeed, for a long time before hostilities became imminent—the prevailing belief was that the Siberian Railway would almost immediately either break down of its own accord, or be so tampered with by the Japanese or their agents that it would become useless as a means of transporting either men or stores. Yet a month after war broke out the line was still working, notwithstanding several reported interruptions, and a certain amount of undoubted congestion and confusion to the existence of which allusion has been made in the preceding chapter. Now, even a single line of rail over which trains are proceeding at a very moderate speed can be made in a month to carry a very great number of men, and there is little doubt that in the four weeks succeeding the torpedo attack on Port Arthur a good many thousands of troops found their way to the Russian front. How many it is impossible to say, but it is probably not an exaggeration to estimate the total Russian land forces in the Far East in the second week of March at considerably over 200,000. At that period such a number would be the maximum that Russia could conveniently feed in a country like Manchuria. But, with practically unlimited resources to draw upon, and a railway which, at its worst, conveys from seven to nine hundred men daily, reinforcement becomes a cumulative process which cannot but eventually have distinctly impressive results.

In Russian military circles, the favourite scheme of land operations amounted, at the outset, to little more than an attempt to overrun Korea. The composition of the force designed to achieve this, in the circumstances, rather ambitious result was assumed to be constituted as follows: The advanced guard was to consist of eighteen regiments (to be reckoned at about 3,500 men each) of infantry, with a corresponding force of cavalry, ninety-six quick-firing guns, and three batteries of mountain artillery. The main body was to be composed of forty regiments, including a force of Cossack cavalry and 300 guns. Reserves were to be held in readiness to the north of Mukden, and telegraphic and telephonic communication was to be carefully maintained.

We shall see in due course how far it became possible to carry out this grandiose programme. But, incidentally, it may be remarked that an unquestioned moral advantage belongs to the nation which, at the outset of a great land campaign, is enabled to make its schemes on a quarter of a million basis without having to trouble itself as to the source from which such numbers will be available. We ourselves maintained more than a quarter of a million men in South Africa, but, in order to do so, we found it necessary to pay many individuals a sum per day which would secure the willing and excellent service of about a dozen Cossacks.

If, then, Russia was surprised, as one clever critic put it, *en flagrant délit de concentration* at the commencement of the war, she justified to some extent her claim to be considered a very great military power by the prompt and extensive

measures she subsequently took to repair her deficiencies in the way both of troops and leaders. In a variety of other directions, too, she busied herself at home in letting the world see that she was fully awakened to the presence of war and to a sense of her new responsibilities.

In some instances these efforts were not particularly happy. One or two early manifestoes were issued by the Government of the Tsar in the hope, partly of alienating sympathy from Japan by describing her attack upon Port Arthur and her other early action as "treacherous," partly with a view to obscuring the utter unpreparedness of Russia by making it appear as if this were simply a natural outcome of the circumstances. Such rather transparent performances proved futile. Japan countered the accusation of treachery very effectively by pointing out that hostilities before a formal declaration of war were sanctioned by international usage, and that Russia herself had not in times past scrupled to attack Turkey before formally declaring war upon her. As for Russian unpreparedness, the nations of the civilised world were not prepared to join with Russia in ascribing this to her previously pacific intentions. They did not fail to recall, in some instances with caustic humour, the fact that for months before the torpedo attack on Port Arthur Russia had been strengthening both her sea and land forces in the Far East, and had at times displayed considerable arrogance in the process.

BRITISH STEAMER "BROUGHT TO" IN THE RED SEA BY A RUSSIAN TORPEDO DESTROYER.

In other directions the people of Russia rose more worthily to the occasion. Some may be inclined to smile at the pious enter-

prise displayed by the Grand Duchess Elizabeth Feodorovna in undertaking to despatch to the seat of war a series of churches on wheels, but it will be readily understood that, in a nation like Russia, this anxiety on the part of the Imperial

A CHURCH CAR ON THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY.

Family for the spiritual welfare of the soldiers in the field was warmly appreciated. Equally grateful was the sentiment inspired by the energy with which the ladies of the Russian aristocracy threw themselves into the task of providing warm clothing and other comforts for the troops. Yet another instance of the fine enthusiasm of feminine Russia for the troops at the front was afforded by the eager zeal of thousands of educated young women of the better classes, who volunteered for employment as army nurses. All these girls were carefully informed of the privations and discomforts to be undergone in Manchuria, but not one in ten is said to have been daunted by the prospect, and thousands were rejected by the representatives of the Red Cross Society simply through the superabundance of applications.

The question of strengthening the Russian Fleet was taken up in several non-official quarters with marked enthusiasm, although the attempt of a St. Petersburg newspaper to open a subscription for replacing the sunk Russian ironclads with wooden ships does not appear to have been very warmly supported. A single nobleman sent in a contribution of £20,000 towards the cost of new warships, and offered to repeat the gift if the Government desired it. Finally, the Tsar himself intimated his intention to rebuild the *Varyag* and the *Koriets*, which were lost to Russia at Chemulpo on February 9th, at his own expense.

Such was the endeavour of the great Colossus of the North to recover the footing he had lost in his first sharp encounter with the Island Power of the East.

Japanese Fleet.

THE SINKING OF THE *VARYAG*.

Boats of the French Cruiser *Pascal* going to the rescue.

CHAPTER VIII.

AT VLADIVOSTOK—EXCURSIONS AND ALARMS—THE VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON—THE GOLDEN HORN—VLADIVOSTOK BOMBARDED—BACK TO PORT ARTHUR—A TORPEDO-BOAT BATTLE.

"WAR, the Red Angel, the Awakener," has produced a sudden and extraordinary change in Vladivostok, the terminus of the Siberian Railway and a strong competitor for the honour of being considered the true "Sovereign City of the East." For, although its population and commerce are still in process of development, its natural advantages are such that in time it can hardly fail to attract to itself a body of trade, and a mass of residents, which will render it a serious rival even to such old and, in their way, favoured ports as Hong-Kong, Calcutta, and Bombay. Lying on the slopes of a curving peninsula which overlooks a magnificent land-locked harbour, four miles long and half a mile wide, which is known as the Golden Horn, Vladivostok affords unsurpassed shelter to ships; it has many fine buildings, and in peace time is the centre of a good deal of gaiety, as well as of brisk and variegated commerce. But on February 9th, 1904, the progress of this important terminus was suddenly arrested, its natural attractions obscured, and its social brightness dimmed. For it was known that war had broken out with Japan, and, after such an attack as that delivered the previous day on Port Arthur, who could tell how long Vladivostok would remain untroubled by similar surprises?

The first indication of the altered state of affairs appears to have been the boom of three guns from one of the forts which line the eminences overhanging the Golden Horn. This is the signal for the mobilisation of the Siberian Army Corps in the Amur district, of which Vladivostok is one of the chief centres. Soon afterwards a proclamation of a state of siege, signed by the Commandant, General Vorognetz, is posted up, which conveys the further intimation that all inhabitants who wish to leave with their goods and chattels must apply for permission to the military authorities. Hundreds immediately take time by the forelock and crowd the outgoing trains, although, as a correspondent writes, the prospect of the journey does not seem a pleasant one. For there have been ugly rumours of late of obstructions on the line, and on February 8th three Japanese would-be bridge-wreckers are said to have been arrested near a little station in Eastern Manchuria. Indeed, for the last two or three days, the Manchurian trains have been accompanied by armed military escorts for fear of attempted outrage.

Those who take part in this early exodus are perhaps lucky, for such civilians as remain have trying times before them. Some have thoughtfully accumulated large stores of provisions in anticipation of the siege which it is felt will follow, but this precaution proves quite futile, for the

military authorities swoop down and commandeer the little hoards without any scruple. Later in the month the Commandant issues a formal declaration to all civilians to leave the town, and even the local bank transfers itself, bag and baggage, to Khabarovsk, on the Amur River, whither runs a northern branch line known as the Ussuri Railway.

Something of a sensation is caused by the departure *en masse* of the Japanese residents. These are said to have been fully aware for some time past that an outbreak of hostilities was imminent, but when it comes they are none the less panic-stricken, and they altogether decline to remain a moment longer than is necessary, although they are promised the protection of the authorities. They sell their property at any price they can get, and seventeen hundred of them, accompanied by the Japanese Consul, leave Vladivostok for Japan in a mail steamer, the remainder following in a few days.

Photos: Imperial News Agency.
VIEWS OF VLADIVOSTOK HARBOUR IN WINTER.

Perhaps those who remain in Vladivostok are not sorry to see the backs of the Japanese, for there have been strange tales lately concerning them and their

audacious experiments in the way of explosives and espionage. A short time back it is said that a Russian officer, who happened to be in a barber's shop at Vladivostok, hurled some abuse at the barber, who, in a passion exclaimed, "I am a captain in the Army, and will not be insulted," drew a revolver, and shot the Russian officer dead. There is talk, too, of an infernal machine which has recently been found placed in position with a view to blowing up a portion of the vitally important dock. The design is traced to two labourers who have disappeared, but who are understood to have been Japanese officers in disguise. Such reports may be largely exaggerated, but where is so much smoke there is sure to be some fire, and one can well understand that even the Russian military authorities of this strong fortress are somewhat relieved when the Japanese quarter of the town has been finally cleared.

Meanwhile mobilisation proceeds apace. The reserves are duly called up, and either brought into Vladivostok or despatched to other military centres by rail, the military authorities taking care to prohibit the sale of alcoholic liquors during the process. Horses for military purposes are freely requisitioned, and among the inhabitants of Vladivostok who are not actually engaged in military work volunteer cavalry and infantry corps are rapidly formed. A final touch of warlike realism is added by the attendance of over a hundred ladies of high social standing at medical classes with a view to acquiring knowledge fitting them to act as nurses.

Almost immediately after the outbreak of war the Vladivostok squadron proceeds to sea. It consists, as has been already recorded in Chapter III., of four armoured cruisers—the *Rossia, Gromoboi, Rurik,* and *Bogatyr,* under the command of Rear-Admiral Baron Shtakelberg. It puts to sea with Captain Reitzenstein as Commodore, and intends to bombard the Japanese coast-town, Hakodate, but is prevented by a heavy snowstorm. To its doubtful exploit, the sinking of the *Nakanoura Maru,* one of two unarmed Japanese merchantmen which it encountered, allusion has been previously made. Some alleviation of this outrage, as described in Chapter III., is provided on the return of the squadron to Vladivostok, by the landing of the bulk of the *Nakanoura Maru's* crew. It appears that only two of the latter were drowned, the remainder, some two score in number, being transferred to one of the Russian cruisers, and subsequently sent back to Japan at the cost of the Russian Government by a German steamer.

The later movements of the Vladivostok squadron are for a time very obscure, and for weeks the whereabouts of these four vessels remained not only a mystery to British students of the operations, but also, it would seem, a matter of some concern to the Japanese fleet, which presently detached a squadron to search the northern waters and to make an incidental call at Vladivostok itself.

A note has already been made of the singularly enclosed nature of Vladivostok harbour. The opening to the Golden Horn is fronted to the south by a number of islands, of which the largest is Kazakavitch Island, separated from Vladivostok harbour by the Eastern Bosphorus strait. The peninsula on which Vladivostok lies separates the Amur and Ussuri bays, from each of which there is a practicable entrance by the Eastern Bosphorus



RUSSIAN SHIP *BOGATYR.*



Photos: A. Renard, Kiel.

RUSSIAN SHIP *GROMOBOI.*

into the Golden Horn. It has long been a rule that not more than two foreign warships at one time should lie in the harbour of Vladivostok, and there is an interesting story told of the incident which led to this restriction. One evening a good many years ago the British China Squadron, under command of Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton, was cruising in the neighbourhood of Vladivostok, when a dense fog came on which altogether obscured the opening to the harbour. Notwithstanding this drawback, the Admiral took his ships in, a magnificent feat of seamanship which few but British naval commanders would care to attempt in similar circumstances. The next morning the Russian Commandant looked forth over the harbour, and beheld the British fleet lying quietly at anchor, as if it were the most natural thing in the world for a massive squadron to be "discovered" in this dramatic fashion. It is hardly to be wondered at that the Russians should come to the conclusion that such surprises were hardly to be encouraged, and that, accordingly, good care should have been taken to impress upon foreign navies that similar feats of seamanship would be regarded with an unfriendly eye.

If the harbour of Vladivostok were clear from ice all the year round, it would be quite one of the finest in the world, and very possibly the Russians would have been well content with it, instead of seeking another warm-water port further south. As things are, they have at Vladivostok to endure the inconvenience of being ice-bound from the middle of December to the end of March. It is true that an ice-breaker keeps open a narrow channel, but this is a makeshift, and one which entails considerable trouble when, as in 1903–4, the winter is particularly severe, and the ice has a thickness of three or four feet.

It is about ten o'clock on the morning of March 8th when the inhabitants of Vladivostok receive an official notification to the effect that a Japanese squadron has been sighted, and that a bombardment may be looked for. One can imagine the excitement created by this startling intelligence in a community which began anticipating an attack from the sea a month ago, but which latterly has been so greatly troubled by the question of its daily food supply that the risks of shot and shell have probably been well-nigh forgotten. For during the past fortnight there has been a sudden and ominous scarcity of provisions observable, and fresh meat is no longer to be had at any price. According to a *Daily Express* correspondent, a number of soldiers were sent on March 2nd to the islands fronting the harbour to shoot deer for food. On their return the game they had secured was literally torn to pieces by the waiting crowd on the beach, and such fragments as could be secured by civilians willing to pay for the luxury changed hands at over a sovereign a pound.

To return from this commissariat detail to the Japanese squadron, which is now plainly seen on the horizon making its way towards the eastern or Ussuri Bay entrance to the Golden Horn. By the Russians the squadron is thought to consist of five battleships and two cruisers, but a likelier estimate says that the ships were the armoured cruisers *Nisshin*, *Kasuga*, *Yacumo*, and *Idzumo*, the protected cruisers *Matsushima* and *Hashidate*, and the old battleship *Chin Yen*.

Examination with powerful glasses shows that the ships are covered with ice, having already passed through some

miles of frozen sea. Doubtless the thicker ice inshore delays their progress, and it is not until past one o'clock that the squadron comes within about five miles of the harbour and opens fire. little over three miles of the shore of the peninsula which locks the harbour, doubtless in the favourite Japanese formation known as "line ahead," or, as lay spectators might term it, in single

VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON (THE *ROSSIA* LEADING) FORCING ITSELF THROUGH THE ICE OUT OF VLADIVOSTOK HARBOUR.

Only five of the vessels take part in the bombardment, two of the cruisers having been left further out at sea, presumably for fear lest a shot from the forts may penetrate their light armour.

The spectacle is a fine one. The five ships approach to within a distance of a file. As they come on, each ship fires both port and starboard broadsides, evidently with blank cartridges, in order to warm the guns. Then the forward guns of the leading ship speak in earnest, and two great shells go hurtling towards the harbour. Suddenly the squadron

alters its direction and steams along the shore, each ship firing its port guns as it follows the lead of the flagship, possibly one of the two new cruisers which Japan bought so fortunately from the Argentine Government.

The squadron turns thrice and fires continually, except while turning. The bombardment lasts forty minutes, during which period it is estimated that nearly two hundred shells must have been fired, mostly from 12-in. and 6-in. guns. After the third turn the ships cease firing and steam off to the south, finally disappearing about half-past five in the evening.

From the official Japanese report of this attack it is evident that the principal object in view was to search the Golden Horn for the four Russian cruisers composing the Vladivostok squadron. Nothing was seen of these vessels, and with this negative result the Japanese had to be satisfied For, apart from "moral and intellectual damages," it is pretty clear that the bombardment did not have much effect. It did not even draw the fire of the forts, which remained silent, awaiting, as the Russian account says, the closer approach of the enemy. It has been unkindly suggested that this is another way of saying that the guns of the fortress were outranged or lacked ammunition—and, indeed, this is possible, in view of the extent to which the fortification of Vladivostok is believed to have been neglected in order to provide for the needs of Port Arthur.

In Vladivostok town the only damage admitted is of a very trifling character. One poor woman is said to have been killed, and in the courtyard of the Siberian Naval Barracks a shell exploded and slightly wounded five sailors. Another shell produced a noteworthy incident by dropping into the house of a Colonel Shukoff. The projectile passed through a bedroom without exploding, then buried itself in a wall, and burst. Near the wall was a safe, over which a sentry was posted, and when the shell burst, the soldier



"LINE AHEAD" FORMATION OF ATTACK.

ADMIRAL TOGO, IN THE CONNING-TOWER OF HIS FLAGSHIP, DIRECTING A NAVAL ACTION

was covered with *débris*. The gallant fellow took the visitation very calmly, and merely shouted for someone to carry the regimental colours out of the house. This duty was promptly performed by the colonel's wife and a soldier.

It may be that some damage was caused to the forts, but of this, of course, no details were forthcoming. Altogether, the bombardment, even if it did not cost, as the Russians imagined, £20,000 in powder and shell, seems to have been a curiously futile performance. For, while a steady rain of bursting projectiles may have in some instances an important moral effect, apart from the material damage done, a forty minutes' bombardment which is, practically speaking, ineffective is apt rather to raise the spirits of a garrison than to depress them.

That the Japanese were not fully satisfied with the information they had acquired on the 6th is shown by their reappearance on the following day. After reconnoitring some of the bays in the vicinity of Vladivostok, the warships again approached the eastern entrance to the Golden Horn, and, seeing no trace of the Vladivostok squadron, again retired.

Let us now hie back to Port Arthur, which we left (at the close of Chapter V.) undergoing, on February 25th, a gentle reminder of the continued presence of the main Japanese Fleet in the neighbourhood. A few days later these attentions were fitfully renewed, and in the very early morning of March 2nd the gunners in the Port Arthur forts were galvanised into sudden and tremendous activity by the sight of numerous lights approaching the harbours, lights which could hardly be other than those of attacking torpedo-craft. This notion was favoured by the sound of firing out at sea, evidently from the guns of battleships or cruisers which were backing up the "mosquito" flotilla. In a few moments the Russian artillerymen were at their posts, guns were trained on the moving lights, and a hot fire was kept up for an hour. Alas! not even the previous experience of the mock battleships had taught the Russians to beware of Japanese craftiness, more especially in all that relates to sailoring. After all this furious cannonade it was discovered that the lights were merely those of lamps fixed to the masts of lumber-rafts which had been quietly towed towards the harbour entrance by a couple of torpedo-boats. The latter had then given the rafts a shove and retired, subsequently firing a shot or two to draw the attention of the Port Arthur sentries to the simple little scheme of illumination provided. Of course, the idea was merely to make the Russians waste ammunition which could no longer be replaced; and it succeeded admirably, as General Stoessel, the Commandant at Port Arthur, must have ruefully admitted when he glanced at the return of rounds thus hastily expended.

For a few days after this Port Arthur was left alone, and Russian reconnaissance failed to discover any trace of the Japanese ships. On March 5th Admiral Makaroff, the new commander of the Russian Fleet in the Far East, had arrived at Harbin, and early in the following week he came on to Port Arthur, where he cannot have found things greatly to his liking. For it is becoming evident by this time not only that the ships in harbour have suffered more than Admiral Alexeieff's optimism has led the world to believe, but also that a not altogether satisfactory spirit prevails among the officers of the garrison. Only a day or

two back General Stoessel has had occasion to issue an order severely reprimanding officers for indulging in useless criticisms of their superiors, instead of devoting themselves to their duties in connection with the defence of the fortress. Admiral Makaroff probably knows that this objectionable frame of mind is the result of being "bottled up" by a strong and energetic enemy, and he takes early and drastic steps to bring about a better state of affairs. He has not to wait long for an opportunity of putting his new policy into practice.



GENERAL STOESSEL

At midnight on March 9th two flotillas of Japanese torpedo-boat destroyers appear before Port Arthur and proceed cautiously to reconnoitre. No enemy is seen, and at dawn the second flotilla commences to lay a number of specially contrived mechanical mines. The forts discover the intruders, and keep up an intermittent fire on them, which does not, however, hinder them in their tricky and rather dangerous work.

Meanwhile Admiral Makaroff has been informed of the approach of the enemy, and he promptly orders six of his own torpedo craft to leave the harbour and give battle. A different attitude, this, from that of the unfortunate Admiral Stark, who seemed so absolutely stunned by the previous Japanese attacks that even prompt retaliation—much less vigorous anticipation—was apparently the last course that occurred to him.

At 4.30 a.m. the Russian destroyer flotilla, under command of Captain Matoussevitch, arrives off the lighthouse on the Liau-ti-shan Peninsula, on the western side of the entrance channel to Port Arthur. Here they come in sight of three Japanese destroyers, the *Asashio*, *Kasumi*, and *Akatsuki*, under command of Captain Shojiro Asai. According to all ordinary conceptions of the "game" of naval warfare, the smaller flotilla should in such a case, more especially if it has the requisite "heels," beat a speedy retreat. But Captain Asai does not trouble himself to consider the prudential side of the question. Evidently he is cast in the same mould as the commanders of the *Asagiri* and *Hayatori*, to whose individual exploits testimony was

borne in Chapter V. Although the odds are one to two, he does not hesitate, but orders his craft to close with the enemy, and an action ensues the like of which has never hitherto been recorded in naval history.

It is only fair to preface any account of this hot little engagement by a qualification of the statement of the chances in favour of the Russians. There is no question that the Japanese destroyers are much finer craft than those opposed to them. The *Asashio* is a 30-knot ship built by Thorneycroft some five years ago, and the *Kasumi* and *Akatsuki* are 31-knot vessels built by Yarrow in 1901. But the superiority possessed by the Japanese is not only in speed. Russian destroyers are armed mostly with one 12-pounder and several 3-pounders; while the Japanese ships carry, in addition to the heavier guns, 6-pounders, the heavier bursting charge of which causes far more damage to a vessel and its crew than is the case with the lighter projectile. The Japanese destroyers are particularly "well found" and well manned, the crew numbering about fifty-five. Each destroyer is of about 300 tons burden.

The manner in which the three Japanese destroyers come into action cannot but be a little disconcerting at the outset to the Russian flotilla. With an impetuous rush they bear down on their opponents, and in a few minutes the ships engaged are so close that they almost touch each other. It is a battle of wasps and hornets, and many a fierce sting is suffered and inflicted. The firing is fast and furious, but from the first the Japanese have the advantage in this respect. Evidently they have foreseen this kind of conflict, and their first thought is to concentrate their fire so as to put the 12-pounders of the enemy out of action, leaving each hostile destroyer with only 3-pounders against 12- and 6-pounders—a very serious disadvantage when shells of cardboard thickness, crowded with machinery, are in question. In all probability the details of this engagement will never be known with anything like accuracy, so tremendous must have been the excitement, so absorbing and many-sided the interest, of the struggle. Picture nine little ships, armed with thirty or forty quick-firing guns and manned by seamen of two nations renowned through ages for courage and endurance—picture, if you can, these vessels almost bow to bow, the guns roaring, the shells perforating the frail hulls and bursting, the agony of poor wretches torn to pieces by flying fragments of metal, or scalded to death by escaping steam, the decks swept by a storm of lead, and over all the smoke of battle drifting lightly in the frosty air.

Both sides suffer a good deal of damage during the action, principally to their machinery, and on the Japanese side the *Akatsuki's* auxiliary steam pipe is destroyed. Fire breaks out on one of the Russian vessels, and her engines are seen to have been badly knocked about. Early in the fight two of the Russian destroyers have sustained such severe injuries that they prudently draw off and make for the harbour. After about half an hour from the start the other four destroyers retire, still fighting, until they reach the protection of the forts.

One of the heroes of this brisk combat is Engineer Minamisawa, of the Japanese ship *Kasumi*, who has displayed extraordinary gallantry in circumstances in which courage needs to be remarkable indeed if it is to receive special mention.



THE JAPANESE RUSE (*p.* 98.)

(i.) *Preparing the dummy lights.* (ii.) *The forts open fire on the dummy lights.*



TORPEDO DESTROYER *SAZANAMI*.
(Built for the Japanese Government by Yarrow & Co., Ltd.)

This fine young officer has already come to the front twice, having been commended for his courageous conduct both in the first torpedo attack on Port Arthur and in the attempt to sink the old merchant ships in the harbour entrance. In the present action he receives a dangerous wound from which, it is feared. he can hardly recover ; but the Mikado promptly honours his splendid exhibition of fighting spirit by promoting him to Chief Engineer, and awarding him an order equivalent to our Victoria Cross.

About two hours after the close of this action—that is, about 7 a.m.—the second Japanese flotilla, having laid its mines, is leaving the roadstead outside Port Arthur, when it sights two Russian destroyers, which have evidently been sent out for reconnoitring purposes and are now returning to the harbour. Even the numerical odds of the previous combat are reversed here, for there are four destroyers in the Japanese flotilla. Of these, again, one at least, the *Sazanami*, is a 31-knot boat, and sister to the *Kasumi* and *Akatsuki ;* while one of the Russians is a distinctly inferior vessel, the *Steregutchy*, a small destroyer of no particular speed. The Russians are certainly not to be blamed for attempting to make the harbour, but the endeavour proves futile. The swift Japanese destroyers give chase and intercept the *Steregutchy* and her consort, and an engagement ensues, in some respects even hotter than that just fought between Captain Asai's and Captain Matoussevitch's flotillas.

Again the struggle becomes, so to speak, hand to hand. The Russians fight with desperation, and their enemies subsequently bear generous testimony to their devoted gallantry. On board the *Steregutchy* a lurid incident takes place which recalls the old days when " boarding " was the constant accompaniment of naval warfare. So close has the *Sazanami* approached that a Japanese blue-jacket is enabled to leap aboard the Russian ship, the commander of which is just emerging from his cabin. The Russian officer draws his cutlass to protect himself from this unwelcome visitor, but the agile Jap deals him a terrible blow on the head, and then literally, so the story runs, kicks his prostrate body over-

board and he is drowned. The Russian lieutenant now takes command, but falls shot in both legs. The sub-lieutenant is also killed, and, when ultimately the Japanese take temporary possession of the battered craft, thirty dead and horribly mutilated bodies are counted on the deck, the remainder of the crew having mostly jumped overboard to avoid being taken prisoners. A gallant effort is made by the Japanese to save them, but is frustrated by the firing from the forts. The *Steregutchy* herself is taken in tow by the *Sazanami;* but she is leaking badly, the sea is rough, and finally the tow-rope parts. Eventually the ship sinks, taking down with it two Russian sailors who have locked themselves in a cabin aft and have steadily resisted all persuasion to come on deck. Out of a complement of over fifty only two stokers and two wounded are saved.

On the Japanese side considerable damage is recorded by the Special Naval Correspondent of the *Times*, who mentions that one destroyer was hit on the water-line and two compartments flooded: "As the quick-firing ammunition was wet, the vessel was unable to participate further in the action. Her officers escaped narrowly. The lieutenant, sub-lieutenant, and a signalman were on the bridge when a shot from a 12-pounder struck her 12-pounder platform just in front. One man was killed. The shell exploded, and the bridge was swept with splinters. The



Photo: S. Cribb, Southsea.

12-POUNDER GUN ON A JAPANESE WARSHIP.

binnacle and the engine-room telegraphs were injured. The same vessel received a 3-pounder projectile through her hull. No material damage, however, was done. The davits were shot away, and other marks of shot and splinter damage could be seen on the funnels and deck fittings." Four days later, adds the correspondent, all the damage had been repaired.

The second Russian destroyer made good its escape, largely owing, it is said, to the reckless daring of a young midshipman named Palovsky. The mechanical steering gear of the vessel had been disabled, the man at the wheel had been shot, and the vessel was drifting rapidly towards the four Japanese destroyers. Palovsky, at the risk of his life, sprang to the wheel, and with shot falling fast around him skilfully steered the vessel out of danger.

It is noteworthy that when the plight of the *Steregutchy* became evident to the Russians at Port Arthur Admiral Makaroff made a personal effort to save her. Hoisting his flag on the fast cruiser *Novik*, whose injuries received in the first bombardment of Port Arthur had been repaired, he steamed hurriedly out of the harbour, accompanied by the *Bayan*. But by this time the Japanese cruiser squadron had come up, and the Russian Admiral was forced by common prudence to withdraw and leave the doomed destroyer to its fate.



Photo: S. Cribb, Southsea.

RUSSIAN ARMOURED CRUISER *BAYAN.*

CHAPTER IX.

PORT ARTHUR AGAIN BOMBARDED—A STORM OF SHELLS—SOME PAINFUL INCIDENTS —A GLOOMY OUTLOOK.

THE two engagements between destroyers described in the last chapter proved to be the prelude to an operation which, if less brisk and full of vigorous incident, was vastly more impressive, and perhaps more far-reaching in its ultimate results. We have seen how Admiral Makaroff. emerging from Port Arthur harbour with the *Novik* and *Bayan*, was compelled to retire in view of the support rendered to the enemy's destroyers by the Japanese cruiser squadron. But beyond the latter there was a greater danger looming in the shape of the main squadron of the Japanese Navy, commanded by Admiral Togo himself, and consisting of six battleships. At 8 a.m. on March 10th, while the cruiser squadron was backing up the second destroyer flotilla, the main squadron also moved majestically towards the head of the Liau-ti-shan Peninsula, and, taking up a position unassailable by the Russian fortress artillery, commenced at 10 a.m. a much heavier bombardment than any to which Port Arthur had yet been subjected. This bombardment lasted three hours, and, although, like most bombardments, it produced little immediate perceptible result, and strenuous efforts were made by Russia to minimise the reported damage, it is possible that, when the war comes to be viewed as a whole, this nerve-shattering episode may be found to have been a real turning-point in the history of the operations. In any case, the bare record of it affords a striking picture of the possibilities of modern war conducted on strictly scientific principles.

It is importantly instructive, as well as deeply interesting, to note the admirable skill displayed by the Japanese in all their preparations for this particular bombardment. It has been mentioned above that Admiral Togo's battleships opened fire from a position in which they could not be reached by the Russian guns, although, as will be seen later, they themselves were excellently placed for dropping shells from their 12-in. guns into both the harbour and the forts. This was simply but effectively accomplished by firing from behind the Liau-ti-shan Peninsula and relying on an absolutely accurate knowledge of the topography of Port Arthur, and of the range, for the general conduct of the bombardment. But another and significant precaution was taken. After the sinking of the *Steregutchy*, the Japanese cruiser squadron drew up in line with the town of Port Arthur, due east of the harbour entrance, and at right angles to the line of fire. In this position they were enabled to watch the effects of each shot, and to signal it by wireless telegraphy to Admiral Togo's flagship. Any more complete, more shrewdly practical, exhibition of up-to-date methods of

bombardment it would, indeed, be difficult to suggest; and the exhibition in this case is the more effective since it is the result of Japanese study and forethought alone. Let us now, with the help of such details as are available, endeavour to gain some clear idea of this dramatic scene. On the Japanese side only the battleships are firing, and on the Russian side only the forts and the *Novik* and *Bayan* reply. Why, it may be asked, do not the larger warships still lying in the harbour move out and make some sort of demonstration with their guns, a fair proportion of which are as powerful as those of the Japanese battleships? The answer is a sadly simple one. They may have been repaired sufficiently to enable them to get to sea—and, thanks to a Scotch engineer, some remarkable work has been done in this direction—but to get in sight of the bombarding squadron they must leave the shelter of the forts and expose themselves to the direct fire of the enemy's guns. Moreover, there are the mines which the Japanese have been laying to be considered, and such a cautious exit as would have to be made in the circumstances might of itself prove disastrous by inviting a torpedo attack. Accordingly, the Russian warships lie supine in the inner harbour, and presently suffer, according to several credible accounts, no inconsiderable damage from the enemy's "high-angle" fire.

To the lay reader a word of explanation as to the meaning of this term "high-angle fire" may be necessary. In simple language, it is the result of pointing the muzzle of a gun into the air so that a shot fired from it reaches a considerable height, and then drops in a bold curve upon whatever it strikes. To take a common example, the effect of high-angle fire upon a ship would be to pierce the deck instead of the sides, and this, of course, is a very desirable result, but only to be attained when the range is hit off to a nicety. High-angle fire is a necessity when intervening hills screen the objects it is sought to hit, and is then mere guess-work, unless supported by observation such as in this case was carried out by the Japanese cruiser squadron.

Although the Russian warships are mostly silent, and the fort guns cannot reach the Japanese battleships, there is no lack of firing on the side of the defenders at one time or another of the bombardment. Captain Troubridge, the British Naval Attaché at Tokio, who witnessed the bombardment, says that the Russian shells which fell around his vessel during the action literally churned up the sea, although it would seem that the damage actually done by them was insignificant.

The Japanese battleships fire from their 12-inch guns only, and the firing is at the rate of about one shot a minute, since in the three hours 150 shells are hurled into the town and harbour, and among the forts. Of these, over 110 are said to have fallen in the town.

The effect of a single shell from a 12-inch gun may be sufficiently appalling. Eight hundred and fifty pounds of metal with a bursting charge capable of rending it into countless fragments, the smallest of which may cause frightful mutilation if not sudden death—such a dread visitor a hundred times repeated in the course of one short morning cannot but create something if not of panic fear, at least of nervous apprehension. That great painter of battle word-pictures, Archibald Forbes, tells us that in the days of the Commune the women of Paris grew so accustomed to the noise of the whistling bullets on



BIRD'S EYE VIEW SHOWING HOW THE JAPANESE BATTLESHIPS FIRED OVER THE HILLS INTO PORT ARTHUR.

The approximate position of the earlier engagements is shown by crossed swords.

their roofs that in their crazy courage they called them "sparrows." In many other bombardments familiarity with danger has bred contempt; while in others, such as the leaden storm which raged round Paardeberg in the Boer War, security from immediate personal injury may have given temporary confidence. But these are not in the same plane with a three hours' bombardment, at the rate of one 850-pounder shell per minute. Even where there is no risk to self or valued belonging, even where there is no painful sight in view of men or women hurled suddenly into eternity, or of human flesh shockingly mangled as the result of some near explosion, the steady, continuous advent of these huge deadly messengers from an unseen enemy—for the bombarding battleships must have been invisible from the town—cannot but have effect even upon those stout hearts in the Port Arthur garrison to whom the inspiring watchword "Mighty Russia and the Tsar!" is a constant impulse in conditions of less passive sufferance.

The full tale of the scenes witnessed in Port Arthur during those terrific three hours is not likely ever to be told. But some idea of the awful severity of the bombardment may be gathered from details collected by responsible correspondents, notably by Mr. Percival Phillips, the representative of the *Daily Express*, who carefully cross-examined at Shanghai the crews of three Norwegian vessels which left Port Arthur on March 13th, and obtained from these eye-witnesses some deeply interesting and significant particulars as to the damage done in the inner harbour. One of the Norwegian vessels was lying alongside the Russian battleship *Retvisan*, and on the latter's deck a shell was seen to fall, which, exploding, killed nineteen officers and men. A cable's length off, a Russian cruiser was hit on the water-line and set on fire, eighty casualties resulting. The Russian hospital ship *Mongolia* was struck, and half a dozen men killed, the *Sevastopol* damaged by two shells, and the docks, it is believed, badly injured.

Many non-combatants are said to have lost their lives during this bombardment. From the deck of one of the Norwegian steamers a shell was seen to fall among a group of spectators who had gathered on rising ground in order to watch the fire from the attacking fleet. Twenty-five of these hapless mortals are said to have been killed. The same fate overtook three Government clerks who were hurrying from the Port Admiral's office. A very tragic incident was the death of the wife of Colonel Baron Frank, who was struck by the fragments of a bursting shell and killed instantly. A lawyer, M. Sidorski, and several other civilians, lost their lives, and numerous wounds and other injuries were sustained. General Stoessel, the Commandant, and his staff were sprinkled with splinters of a shell, but were not hurt.

It must be recorded that, although placed at a disadvantage by the skill of the Japanese in choosing their positions, Admiral Makaroff displayed great energy in doing all that could be done in the way of taking precautions and effecting repairs, even while the bombardment was proceeding. Not content with personally attempting to rescue the *Stereguitchy*, he ordered steamers to be sunk in the channel entrance, so as to reduce the fairway to less than 300 feet, and the desperate operation of marking out the narrowed channel with buoys was carried out under

fire. During the bombardment, too, he despatched the destroyer flotilla under Captain Prince Lieven to reconnoitre. Later, by encouraging proclamations and increasing activity, he showed himself to be not only worthy of his high scientific reputation, but one of those rare spirits the change produced by his vigorous presence.

The bombardment continued, as has been mentioned, until past 1 p.m. In the meantime a detached squadron of cruisers steamed round to Talien-wan and destroyed the buildings on the

RUSSIAN SAILORS EMBARKING TORPEDOES ON THE *TSAREVITCH* AT PORT ARTHUR.

who rise to great emergencies, and play a losing game with as much confidence and tenacity as a winning one. Comparisons in such cases are seldom happy, but we may surely pay the gallant Russian Admiral the compliment of saying that he was the Sir George White of bombarded Port Arthur, and even the Japanese may well have felt

Sanshan island in the entrance to the bay. Two cruisers also scouted the western coast of the entrance to Port Arthur, but did not see the enemy. The action was finally discontinued at 2 p.m., and the entire Japanese fleet then withdrew.

The state of Port Arthur after this fearful experience cannot but be one of

mingled relief and stupefaction. Among the civilians the prevailing note is evidently one of profound depression; while, in spite of Admiral Makaroff's fine example, it can hardly be supposed that among the naval and military defenders the situation has produced any marked enthusiasm. Indeed, it is said that the soldiers are still accusing the sailors of incompetence and cowardice, notwithstanding the efforts which the latter have just been making to compensate the inglorious inactivity of their larger ships. For the authorities themselves the bombardment has brought fresh perplexities. There is no question that the damage done inside the harbour has been serious, some of the forts have suffered severely, while there is a naturally increasing shortage of ammunition which Admiral Makaroff duly represents with some urgency to Admiral Alexeieff, now at Mukden.

MR. J. A. R. GILCHRIST.

Luckily, there is now no imminent fear of starvation, for supplies are fairly plentiful, one or two steamers having succeeded in running the blockade, which the Japanese have been strictly maintaining, with cargoes of cattle. But the authorities have laid an embargo on all stores, and the daily rations which they issue are of such homœopathic proportions that considerable discontent on this score prevails.

One of the chief anxieties is in respect to espionage. Port Arthur is still evidently honeycombed with spies, and even during the bombardment four Chinese and two Japanese in disguise were caught in the act of signalling to the attacking fleet. These were promptly hanged, but the leakage of information is found to continue, and the Russian police are constantly pulling the pigtails of Chinese coolies on the chance that a Japanese spy may be thus discovered.

Many of the Chinese artificers have been so terrified by the late bombardment that they have made strenuous efforts to desert, but have been brought back, lashed together in gangs, and forced to work at the point of the bayonet. The task of repairing the *Retvisan* proves especially heavy, and is not lightened by the recent departure of the Scotch engineer, Mr. Gilchrist, who until lately has worked manfully for his Russian employers. He has, however, been so pestered by their constant surveillance that he has given up the work in disgust, and gone off to Niu-chwang, leaving only a solitary Englishman, a mining engineer named Simpson, to share the troubles and anxieties of the Port Arthur garrison.

FATHER JOHN OF CRONSTADT BLESSING ADMIRAL MAKAROFF ON HIS DEPARTURE TO SUCCEED ADMIRAL STARK AT PORT ARTHUR.

An important step taken by Admiral Makaroff, with an eye to future bombardments, is the mounting of three siege-guns on Golden Hill, at the lower extremity of the eastern entrance to Port Arthur. These will command that part of the sea from which the Japanese have in this last bombardment been firing with deadly effect.

But it is not only by sea that fresh attacks are apprehended, and some of the preparations now taken indicate the conviction that the Japanese will not delay much longer a land movement on a large scale against the fortress. Fresh earthworks have been thrown up, dynamite mines have been laid, and an elaborate system of barbed wire entanglements, similar to those so skilfully used against us by the Boers, has been constructed as a further aid to the land defences.

There is no doubt that Port Arthur is still a hard nut to crack, and the fresh heart which Admiral Makaroff has infused into the garrison, coupled with the arrival of fresh troops by the railway which is still running to Mukden, and thence to Harbin, and thence—a reflection in itself encouraging—to "Mighty Russia"—all this is a fine corrective to anything like despair. But the other side of the picture is a dreary one. Three heavy bombardments on the top of repeated torpedo attacks, each of which had left its mark on ships that might have rendered bombardment impossible; no sign of slackened vigilance on the part of the enemy; and no confident feeling of having caused that enemy any considerable loss. All these are grave reflections which this last manifestation of Japan's naval superiority cannot but intensify and tinge with something of gloomy presentiment.



RUSSIAN AMBULANCE WAGGON
(Showing method of carriage on a sledge during winter).



Photo: The Topical Press Photo Agency.

JAPANESE OFFICER RECONNOITRING.

CHAPTER X.

THE FOG OF WAR—PREPARATIONS FOR A LAND CAMPAIGN—STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS—HARBIN AND LIAO-YANG—A COMPLEX SITUATION—SOME MILITARY PERSONALITIES.

IT is now the third week in March, and the curtain is about to rise on a new act in the great war drama of the Far East. Seldom, if ever before has such complete mystery enshrouded the imminent possibilities of an important campaign; seldom have expert students of military history been more at a loss to discover indications calculated seriously to confirm or refute this or that ingenious theory as to the next move in the game. Japan is known to be on the point of commencing operations by land which can hardly be less impressive than those which she has already carried out by sea. But, up to this point, the "fog of war" is over those operations, a fog which even the most enterprising and painstaking of "war specials" has no chance of dissipating. Presently the fog will lift, and all will be clear as on a summer noon. But no history will ever faithfully reproduce the earlier phases of the Russo-Japanese War if it does not take note of the obscurity in which the opening of the land campaign was for weeks successfully enveloped.

That obscurity was the more astonishing by reason of the intense keenness that existed in non-combatant Europe to dispel it. Never had the Press of the West made more strenuous en-

deavours, or displayed greater enterprise, with a view to the speedy and continuous record of every movement, more particularly of the opposing forces by land. Despatch-boats, and even wireless telegraphy, had been pressed into the service of special correspondents, and nothing that forethought could suggest or money procure was wanting to provide the reader of, at any rate, the English newspapers with as early and accurate tidings of the war as he has of a railway accident in Scotland or a meeting of the London County Council. Yet, for a time sufficient to produce in Europe a lively feeling of impatience, Japan completely muzzled the "war specials" by the institution of a censorship of unexampled severity, and quietly left the remainder of the civilised world to indulge in vague fancies and baffling speculations. In few respects may the Japanese be said to have profited more conspicuously by the lessons of latter-day war than in the amazingly successful secrecy with which they surrounded their plan of campaign by land during the first six weeks after the outbreak of hostilities.

Japan had, of course, everything in its favour to this end. In the first place, an island nation has an obvious advantage in this respect over a continental country in which details of mobilisation and many other instructive hints can be carried over land frontiers by more or less casual observers. In Japan, as soon as war was declared, it was not difficult to render leakage well-nigh impossible, except through black treachery, and we may be sure that, where ordinary restrictions failed, surveillance of the most skilful sort stopped all but the minutest gaps. The possession of the Command of the Sea enabled Japan to move freely in her own waters without fear of being watched to an embarrassing extent, while the natural reserve of the Japanese character, coupled with an unquestioned tendency to craftiness, contributed at times to the production of views and forecasts utterly bewildering in their apparent air of authority and actual baselessness.

It is necessary here to find room for a few words of retrospect. For, although in some respects no serious change seems to be perceptible since we "took stock" at the end of the first week of war, the actualities are altogether different. Japan has not been idle. She has added two powerful cruisers—battleships one may almost call them—to her Fleet; she has maintained a strict blockade of Port Arthur, has caused further damage to the Russian ships there by torpedo attacks, has severely bombarded the place, and also bombarded Vladivostok; and, as we shall see presently, she has, to the knowledge even of Europe, acquired a masterly grip of Korea. Russia, on the other hand, has kept the Siberian Railway open, and has sent out to the Far East a steady stream of reinforcements. The Vladivostok squadron has apparently eluded the observation of the Japanese cruisers, and its whereabouts are to the outside world altogether uncertain. Port Arthur has been galvanised into fresh activity by the substitution of Admiral Makaroff for Admiral Stark; several of the damaged Russian warships have been repaired, and the Russian torpedo craft have begun to show some initiative. On the whole, it would be rash to say whether in the five weeks which have elapsed since, say, the sinking of the *Yenisei* in Dalny Bay, the *recorded*

points in favour of the two combatants are seriously unequal.

The preparations for land operations elsewhere than in Korea, which Japan has made under cover of an impenetrable veil of secrecy, may be all to her credit. This remains to be seen. Certainly, the secrecy itself, and the uncertainty created by it, are advantages of some worth. But there are two other considerations which at this stage of the war are of singular interest. One is the fact that, as far as can be conjectured, Japan's own estimate of the early course of the war has been doubtfully justified. Probably she never dreamed of being able to secure such results as the first week showed in less than a month, and yet she may have hoped to have accomplished in six weeks more than she actually has done, in the way of crippling the enemy's ships beyond repair, perhaps even of adding some of them to her own fleet. The security of the Vladivostok squadron cannot but be a little disconcerting; and Port Arthur is proving, perhaps, rather a harder nut to crack than Japan may have fancied would be the case. The Command of the Sea is a priceless asset, but, beyond assisting the landings in Korea, it has not hitherto been of paramount advantage, nor will it be until the ice disappears all along the coast-line.



THE *YENISEI* LAYING A SUBMARINE MINE.

In a word, Japan's early successes themselves may have thrown out her calculations somewhat, if only by making Russia far more cautious in her naval movements, and so postponing, perhaps indefinitely, a decisive fleet action.

What might have suited Japan far better than the present condition of affairs would have been one or two naval actions of first-rate importance, in which the superior quality of the Japanese battleships and cruisers would have been effectively demonstrated. Six weeks would have been well spent if, after some such vigorous trial of strength, Japan could have proceeded to the execution of her plans for a land campaign, convinced that Russia would not again seek to question her enemy's complete supremacy at sea, at any rate for many months.

Possibly even more upsetting has been Russia's success in keeping open the Siberian Railway. Probably not one critic in ten who studied the prospects of the war before it actually broke out expected that the line of communication between Moscow and Harbin would remain unsevered for six weeks. Nor is it to be doubted that the Japanese confidently anticipated an early interruption. The attempts on the Sungari Bridge and on the great bridge over the Volga seemed to show that deliberate designs to this end must have been formed, while the rumour that the raids of the Chunchuses have owed something to Japanese instigation and leadership has never been denied. But, whatever ground there may be for these and similar suggestions, the fact remains that in this third week of March to which we are more particularly referring, the Siberian Railway is still at work, carrying not only troops, but stores and munitions of war, to Harbin.

The mention of the name of Harbin in this connection makes an easy stepping-stone to a brief review of the strategical problem which at this point presents itself to Japan, and in the consideration of which Harbin, as we shall see, is a very significant factor. Let us study the map carefully, and endeavour to comprehend, at any rate, the chief elements of a very interesting military situation. Harbin, as there has been previous occasion to mention, is the great junction at which the Siberian, or rather, as it is here, the Manchurian Railway bifurcates to Vladivostok and Port Arthur. The word "bifurcates" is used advisedly, because in military geography we often have to take very serious note of two- or three-pronged forks in the shape of communications, and the more closely we study our war map in this instance the more numerous significant forks of this sort we shall discover. Later on, we have to deal with a very big two-pronged fork indeed, the handle of which is the Siberian Railway to a point a little east of Chita, one prong being the continuation of the railway to Harbin and thence to Vladivostok, the other the great Amur River which runs by Blagoveshchensk to Khabarovsk, where two fresh "splayed-out" prongs occur, one the continuation of the Amur to Nicolaievsk, the other the Ussuri Railway to Vladivostok. But now we are chiefly concerned with the fork which at Harbin has two prongs of rail to Vladivostok and Port Arthur, and, it may now be added, a third prong in the shape of the Sungari River, which flows to Khabarovsk and there joins the Amur.

The importance of Harbin, more especially now, when the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur can no longer seriously dispute the supremacy of the sea with Japan, is obvious. As a local base of operations it has the clear disadvantage of being fed by a single line of vulnerable rail; but hitherto, as we have seen, that line has

ARREST OF JAPANESE SPIES DISGUISED AS COOLIES.

been kept open, and we have at present no right to assume that future interruption will take place. Here, then, in the heart of Manchuria, we have a great military centre, from which Russia can feed with men and stores both her great



MAP OF THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY.

terminal fortresses, and can further send out armies either to operate in Manchuria itself, or, theoretically, to threaten Korea. One has to say "theoretically" in this instance because, practically speaking, Russia is not at this moment in a position to threaten Korea: and is, in fact, adopting a very different attitude towards the Belgium of the Far East.

Harbin is one of the industrial wonders of the world, and it is said that even the Russians who created it are utterly surprised at its astounding progress. Mr. John Foster Fraser, who visited it in 1901, described it as "for all the world like a 'boom' American town." It had then sprung into existence in a few years, big stores and hotels were being pushed up, and, since the place was a magnet to all the adventurers in Russia, its resident population was a very mixed one, and murders averaged two or three a week. Shortly before the commencement of the war Harbin had some 30,000 inhabitants distributed between Old Harbin (the Chinese town), New Harbin (the Russian city), and Harbin Quay, a line of wharves and workshops along the Sungari River, which is here about twice

Photo. Mr. J. Foster Fraser.
COSSACK TYPES.

as broad as the Thames at London Bridge. Since the outbreak of hostilities we may be sure that the aspect of Harbin has changed considerably. It is quite possible that the theatres, public gardens, and hotels are still moderately thronged; but, with a thousand or more fresh troops arriving from Russia every day, and growing apprehensions as to the capacity of Port Arthur and Vladivostok to hold out against repeated attacks, with, above all, the certainty that almost immediately the Japanese will effect fresh landings, possibly at highly inconvenient points—with all these distractions Harbin has other things to attend to besides amusement. Temporary barracks have to be run up to accommodate troops, stores must be forwarded, supplies reckoned and husbanded against the "rainy day" which may occur at short notice if there are hitches on the line from Russia. Apart from all this, we may surely take it that Admiral Alexeieff is looking ahead and surrounding this vital spot with a system of entrenchments suited to the case. A few months ago, perhaps, no thought was farther from the mind of the average Russian than that the Japanese would ever succeed in making their way to Harbin, but the war has already produced such painful surprises that many possibilities are now admitted which would have been scouted two months ago as wholly ridiculous. Moreover, the Russians will not have forgotten that during the Boxer troubles the Russian garrison at Harbin was closely besieged, and, although the Harbin of to-day is very different, the contingency of Chinese pressure on a place so well worth the looting is hardly to be disregarded.

With Harbin duly strengthened, Russia possesses a centre in Manchuria towards which, as the ice begins to show signs of breaking up along the coasts, Japan must be casting many an anxious glance.



Photo: Topical Press Photo Agency.
RUSSIAN MILITARY POLICE IN MANCHURIA.

But long before she can hope to grasp the handle of that particular strategical fork there are subsidiary prongs to be dealt with, for Russia's methods of getting at the inside of the Manchurian pie have been singularly searching and comprehensive. We need not go into the matter at all deeply or technically—the niceties of strategy would be out of place in a work of this character—and in this chapter we shall only touch the fringe of Korea, which demands, and will receive, separate treatment. But the attentive reader must be asked to take note at this point of Liao-yang, some fifty miles to the south of Mukden on the line from Harbin to Port Arthur. Here in reality we have another "fork," although in boldly outlined maps the fact may not be apparent. One prong, of course, is the continuation of the line to Port Arthur, the other a road which runs over the formidable Motien Pass to Antung, at the mouth of the Yalu River.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LINIEVITCH.

At the end of the third week of March it is understood that General Linievitch is at Liao-yang with a considerable force, aggregating, it may be, some 50,000 of all arms. How many more there are at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, on the Yalu, and at Harbin is quite uncertain, but for the purposes of this chapter such knowledge is not urgently needed. What is sought is to convey a general sketch of the position which, broadly speaking, Russia is now holding with a view to a possible advance of the Japanese by land. It would be difficult to explain this more simply than by accentuating the importance of Harbin and Liao-yang, from the former of which Russia is linked up with both Port Arthur and Vladivostok as long as those two fortresses remain in her possession; while from the latter a force can be detached either to dispute a Japanese landing at Niu-chwang or elsewhere in the Liao-tung Peninsula, or to support the Russian troops on the banks of the Yalu. To the reader who will take the small trouble required to grasp the elementary facts herein involved with the aid of a map, much of the following narrative will be simplified. For, whatever modifications may occur in the plans of either side, it is impossible to alter the present significance of the places named from the standpoint of military geography

Incidentally, one can hardly be surprised at the satisfaction expressed by Russian military critics at this stage, as

THE UNENDING MARCH EASTWARDS: A FAMILIAR SIGHT ON THE WAY.

day after day passes without any recorded Japanese attempt at disembarkation on a large scale elsewhere than in Korea. For every twenty-four hours mean the arrival of another batch of troops from Russia, accompanied by a certain quantity of stores, and in these days when the spade is hardly a less important military weapon than the rifle and sword, an extra week's work in the construction of entrenchments may mean great things in a later phase of the campaign.

It would be, of course, extraordinarily interesting if we could now flit over to the side of Japan and ascertain the exact view she takes of the strategical situation of which the above is the sketchiest possible outline. But, even if a year hence a careful study of all the circumstances of the case enables us to gauge pretty accurately how the matter stood at this particular moment, the wisdom which comes after an event may be no sure guide to the shaping of Japanese military counsels at such a critical juncture. When a country goes to war by land and sea simultaneously, considerations arise which may make it essential for that country to have three or four alternative plans, any one of which is liable to sudden and serious modification by the failure of either the land or sea force to accomplish all that is expected of it. With the Russians, who are acting at present on the defensive, and acting only half-heartedly at sea, the case is different, and the course much clearer. But Japan, however resolute, however anxious to adhere to one direct plan of campaign, is faced by a very complex problem, to the solution of which her naval successes have not carried her as far as might perhaps have been expected from all that has been written and talked in the last few years as to the advantages of the Command of the Sea.

The one thing she can, with complete confidence, hope to do is to carry a large force to any point of the coast from which she may wish to operate without fear of interruption *en route*. In the first place she has the men. Apart from the force she has already despatched to Korea, she has probably at least 150,000 Regular troops which are in perfect readiness for work, admirably armed and equipped, and behind these are at least another quarter of a million men who can be more or less effectively put into the field if necessary. Her transport facilities are exceptional, for she has the splendid vessels of a great steamship line to fall back upon in this respect. Her Navy can afford not only to render it almost impossible for Russian ships to waylay her transports, but also to assist disembarkations. But beyond this Japan cannot go with any certainty. She may be able to effect a landing, or several landings, with comparative ease, and subsequently her troops may cover themselves with as much glory as her ships have done. But from the moment she commits herself to an advance on land an altogether new set of conditions will come into force, and we may be very sure that this fact is nowhere more clearly realised than at Tokio.

Some idea of the complexity of the problem which lies before Japan at this moment may be set forth in a few words, which will be rendered all the fewer and simpler by the account already given of the Russian position. In the first place it is clear that until the Siberian Railway is cut the Russians can continue to pour troops into Harbin until a military strength is attained with which Japan

can hardly expect to cope except on the defensive, and only then at very great cost to herself. For Korea must be held at all costs, and Russia may be far better able six months hence to afford a couple of hundred thousand troops for the invasion of the Hermit Kingdom than Japan will be able to afford half the number for its protection. If Japan could march straight upon Harbin, beat the Russians there, and then pull up the railway for some hundreds of miles, she might be able to make terms which would realise all the aims she had in view when she entered upon this great war. But, while it is generally an excellent thing to make an enemy's capital—as Harbin in the present to all practical intents and purposes is—a main objective, fortresses and large mobile forces must not be neglected, and with Port Arthur and Vladivostok yet to fall, and, perhaps, 50,000 or more



JAPANESE TROOPS EMBARKING AT KOBE

Russians at Liao-yang, an advance on Harbin, even supposing such a bold step were not hindered by other obstacles, would have to be accompanied by other precautions, such as the isolation of the fortresses and adequate pressure on the Liao-yang position.

The alternative most favoured by European observers at this stage is a concentrated effort to capture Port Arthur and Vladivostok, and to hold these and Korea against Russia in the confident hope that the blow thus administered to Russian prestige will be sufficient to bring about a lasting settlement of the points in dispute as regards Korea and Manchuria. To this suggested line of action the obvious objection is its possible lack of finality; but one can readily understand how in any case the idea of regaining possession of Port Arthur appeals to Japan as a primary aim, and how little likely she is at this point to commit herself to land operations in which this is not an essential feature.

Such in brief is the condition of affairs at the outset of the military operations, outside Korea, to which we shall shortly give individual attention. There are, of course, a number of other subsidiary considerations which have to be taken into account in reckoning the pros and cons of the strategical situation. The nature of the country and the extent to which it can furnish any sort of supplies are, it goes without saying, matters of first-class importance in this connection from the purely military standpoint; but this is not a purely military history, and accordingly these and other similar features will be more particularly discussed in connection with the actual operations themselves.

What appears a more convenient object of attentive study at this point is the military talent available on either side. Here again much may be left to be revealed by actual experience. But there are one or two extremely interesting personalities, Russian and Japanese, to which a few "forewords" may usefully be devoted, in the full confidence that at one time or another some mention of these distinguished and capable leaders will be necessary in circumstances perhaps not favourable for a halt for the purpose of dwelling on personal characteristics.

On the Russian side allusion has already been made to General Kuropatkin and his Chief of the Staff, Lieutenant-General Gilinski. Of another leading Russian General, the great Grodekoff, it is inexpedient to say more at present than that he is being regarded as a sort of reserve force in connection with a situation which, as Governor of Eastern Siberia, with headquarters at Khabarovsk, he may have at least assisted in creating.

But a few words must be given to General Linievitch who is now sixty-six years of age, and who won a reputation as a gallant fighting officer as far back as the Crimean War. In the war with Turkey in 1877 he was severely wounded, but he recovered sufficiently to distinguish himself considerably in 1878 by forcing the River Kiutrischi in the teeth of strong opposition, with the result that the Turks, after a vigorous counter-attack, were compelled to retire. In 1894 General Linievitch commanded the Russian forces in the Far East, and was present when the international expedition for the relief of the Legations entered Peking. It is an interesting historical fact that the first sovereign to wire the

Russian Commander-in-Chief his congratulations was the Mikado of Japan, by whom General Linievitch has been decorated with the highest Japanese order.

Another Russian leader of great prominence is Major-General Sterpetski, who has been commanding in Southern Manchuria since the Boxer risings of 1900. Manchuria show that he expects his soldiers to undertake nothing which he himself also cannot do. He is, therefore, beloved by his men, in whom he trusts implicitly, and upon whom hitherto he has relied without fail. He has been responsible for peace and order in Manchuria from the beginning of the Boxer crisis,

THE RED CROSS IN THE FAR EAST: JAPANESE LADIES MAKING LINT AND BANDAGES IN THE HOUSE OF PRINCESS KOMATSU.

Here is an interesting portrait of this officer by Mr. Angus Hamilton, the well-known authority on Korea, and, indeed, all Far Eastern matters. "Sterpetski is eminently a soldier. Almost a child of nature in the simplicity of his character, he is loyal to his country, self-centred in his interests, and determined to maintain them at any cost. As a leader in the field, his exertions in the past four years in since which time his force, engaged in continuous active service, has been unspared. Equally, however, he has not spared himself, and, swift to strike in the hour of his raids, terrible in his reprisals, energetic and determined in his efforts to crush the disturbance as he was, there has been no moment when he would not have been found encouraging his comrades from the very front of his columns. He

is middle-aged, stout, and short in stature. He is unmarried, and he has spent his whole life within the lines of his camps, the companion of his soldiers, the diligent student of the art and practice of war."

Another interesting personality on the Russian side is that of Lieutenant-General Smirnoff, who is designated as the successor of General Stoessel, the Commandant at Port Arthur. General Smirnoff is reputed to be one of the best tacticians in the Russian Army, but he is also a first-rate fighting soldier, and his breast sparkles with fourteen decorations, several of them gained in the Russo-Turkish War, in which he won great distinction. Funnily enough, his name signifies "meek" or "peaceful," but his nickname in the Russian Army, a reminiscence of his exploits against the Turks, is "Seven Devils!" General Smirnoff is a man of fifty; he has commanded both a regiment and a brigade, and was formerly Fort Commandant at Warsaw.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GILINSKI.

Other prominent Russian generals are Major-General Velitcho, the military engineer, who is described as "practical, experienced, and independent," and who, having served on Kuropatkin's staff at the War Office, will doubtless be actively employed at one stage or another of the operations; Major-Generals Krondrat-

kenko and Artamanoff, commanding the Siberian Rifle Brigades; and Prince Louis Napoleon, who has been entrusted with an important cavalry command.

Field-Marshal Yamagata commanded the Japanese Army in the war with China, and is now Chief of the War Council. He is described as the Moltke of Japan, and

JAPANESE TROOPS LEAVING TOKIO.

Of the Japanese generals by far the most famous is the veteran Field-Marshal Marquis Yamagata, now about seventy years of age, who, even if he does not leave Japan for the seat of war, will undoubtedly be largely consulted in all that relates to the conduct of the campaign. during the operations in Korea in 1894–5 he attracted the special notice of military students in Europe by his successful use of the principle of converging columns—in other words, forces started from separate points and meeting "in the nick of time" to confuse and overwhelm an

enemy. The stock example of this in European history is the battle of Königgrätz or, as some call it, Sadowa, and mention of the subject here seems appropriate in view of the probability that further examples of the same class of operation may be forthcoming in this campaign.

FIELD-MARSHAL MARQUIS YAMAGATA.

Field-Marshal Count Oyama, another famous commander in the war with China, the leader of the "Second Army of Japan," and "the man who took Port Arthur," is described as tall, stout, and of a very quiet, gentle, and amiable disposition, having no real fondness for war, in spite of his military successes. He is nearly sixty-one. General Nozu, who is by many of the Japanese regarded as their greatest soldier, is about the same age. He is a keen sportsman, and has been in his time a noted wrestler. He has a fine reputation for courage and daring, and in the war with China accomplished a notable feat by the capture of Ping-yang, in the teeth of a desperate resistance by the pick of the Chinese troops, in a single day.

Generals Kuroki and Oku stand high in the Japanese military hierarchy; but it is expected that equal if not greater prominence will be given in this campaign to General Baron Kodama, who has been called the Kitchener of Japan, and whose chief characteristic is said to be "the electric rapidity with which he thinks and decides." He is a little over fifty, and is considered the best tactician in the Japanese Army.

A COSSACK STATION IN MANCHURIA WITH TRIBAL SIGNS OVER THE MEN'S HUTS.

(In addition to the curious tribal signs, the picture contains several interesting military symbols. The flag-rest denotes the house of the Commandant and Headquarters Staff. All Russian Government property is painted black and white stripes.)

Lieutenant-General Yamaguchi also enters on the war with an excellent reputation, having commanded the Japanese forces in China during the Boxer troubles and the advance to Peking.

These are the more conspicuous of the generals on both sides with reputations to lose or to enhance. It is safe to prophesy, however, that other names as yet obscure or unknown will leap into celebrity before the war is many months old.

FIELD-MARSHAL COUNT OYAMA.

CHAPTER XI.

KOREA—AN INDOLENT PEOPLE—JAPAN THE AWAKENER—FIRST MILITARY STEPS—FROM SEOUL TO PING-YANG—TO THE SOUTH OF THE YALU—FIRST SHOTS ON LAND.

IN his introduction to this narrative Mr. Diósy gave a brief but pertinent explanation of the connection of Korea with the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan. He pointed out that, apart from the geographical position of Korea, which makes it, in the picturesque Japanese phraseology, "an arrow pointing at Japan's heart," the Island Nation had created for itself in the Korean Empire industrial and commercial interests which would alone entitle it to predominance in that quarter. The present conflict was only just commencing when Mr. Diósy wrote those words. Their complete justification is only to be found in the war itself. The history of the negotiations showed that the importance attached by Japan to the Korean question was altogether different from the view which her Government, at any rate, took of the Russian occupation of Manchuria. But the matter stands in a still clearer light as we begin to examine the earnest, whole-hearted fashion in which, from the outset of the actual war, Japan set Korea in the forefront of her aims and obligations, and demonstrated to the world at large her fixed resolve to keep the "Hermit Kingdom" for ever out of reach of the claws of the Russian Bear.

A great deal has happened since, on February 8th, the first shot of the war was fired by the *Korietz* outside Chemulpo harbour, an episode followed the same evening by the landing of Japanese troops, of which a brief description was given in Chapter II. Chemulpo has now relapsed into comparative obscurity, and there is little except the sunken *Varyag*, which endeavours are being made to raise, to recall the lurid happenings of that eventful week. The military interest in Korea has shifted to the north of the peninsula; and even Seoul, the capital, with its evidences of "progress" in the shape of gas-lamps and an electric tramway, its resident Emperor, and its variegated intrigues, is but of mild attractiveness compared with Ping-yang and the banks of the Yalu. But we must not be in too great a hurry to transport ourselves to those centres of greater activity. For, if we are rightly to understand the significance of the operations which the Japanese Army is carrying out within easy reach of the frontier that divides Korea from Manchuria, we should at least have a general idea of the broad lines of policy on which Japan is proceeding as regards this curious country, and of the very practical steps she is taking to consolidate a rather difficult and delicate position.

Undoubtedly the Koreans do not love the Japanese, in spite of all that Japan has done for them. They may respect, and they certainly fear, the go-ahead, vigorous nation which dealt China such

a slashing blow in 1894, and is now trying conclusions with Russia herself; but there is no love lost between the two peoples, and the Korean has very little wish to be "improved" out of the state of sloth and corruption in which he has wallowed for centuries. His mountainous country may teem with mineral wealth, and other new means may be indicated to him of rising to distinction and affluence, but he recks little of any prospect likely to need energy or industry for its realisation. "The prevailing impression in the country and among the people is one of intense inertia, an absolute lack of interest in anything, coupled with a strong distaste for novelty," writes Mr. Clive Bigham, who marched from Vladivostok along the coast to Gensan, and thence across the peninsula to Seoul, and so speaks with some authority. In the country districts the national indolence is fostered by the ease with which a livelihood can be obtained; in the towns corruption flourishes; but nowhere, except among the foreigners, is there any competition, any desire for further knowledge, any strenuous idea of life and duty.

Japan, of course, was well aware of all this when she threw down the gauntlet to her giant adversary, and prepared to shed the last drop of her blood rather than let Korea become simply an outlying province of Russia. She knew that in her self-imposed task she would get no real assistance from the lazy Koreans, and might, further, have to deal with troublesome political opposition in the Korean capital. For, at the commencement of the war, a number of foreigners were occupying advisory posts in connection with the administration, and draining the Korean exchequer to the extent of nearly £20,000 a year. The situation was complicated by the exist-



"Koreans at Home."

PALACE GUARD, SEOUL.

ence of a Korean "army" of 15,000 badly armed and utterly inefficient soldiers, often a source of positive alarm to the peace-loving inhabitants. Lastly, Korea, before the war broke out, had intimated its intention to preserve neutrality in any conflict between Russia and Japan, a proposition fraught with all sorts of doubtful possibilities. Indeed, it is suggested that at one time, smarting under its early reverses, Russia threatened to take a very serious view of the apparent violation of this neutrality, in the hope, it is said, of embroiling France and Great Britain; and it is quite probable that the secret history of the diplomatic embarrassment thus produced would make very interesting reading.

KOREAN CIVIL OFFICERS.

We need not, however, concern ourselves too closely with the "might-have-beens" of this situation. The point, so far as this narrative is concerned, is that Japan paved the way for her military operations in the north of Korea by entering, shortly after war was declared, into a treaty with that country which amounted to a virtual protectorate. Subsequently, by the despatch of the Marquis Ito as Envoy to Seoul, a better personal understanding with the Emperor of Korea was established, and the groundwork laid for a number of administrative reforms.

We have seen how, literally, the first warlike act of the Japanese, after the rupture of diplomatic relations with Russia, was to despatch some thousands of troops to Chemulpo, and thence to Seoul. By this means a grip on the Korean capital was gained which was never afterwards released. The subsequent withdrawal of the Russian minister in consequence of the new relations between Korea and Japan, and further landings of troops at different points, brought into stronger relief Japan's determination both to oust Russian influence from Seoul and to secure the peninsula from invasion. With particular energy and forethought the construction of the railway from Seoul to Fusan at the south-eastern extremity of the peninsula was pushed forward, and a little later three thousand military engineers, under command of a major-general, were set to work on another light railway designed to run northwards from Seoul to Wi-ju on the banks of the Yalu.

One can have nothing but feelings of admiration for the extraordinary vigour

and long-headedness which characterised these proceedings. Knowing, as they do, every inch of Korea, we might have supposed that the Japanese would rest content with the advantage which this topographical knowledge gave them in their military operations in this country. There are older nations, again, which, in similar circumstances, would have simply treated Korea as, for the time being, a subject state, and taken good care not to be troubled by defects in its existing civil or military administrations. But Japan is nothing if not thorough and precise. Whilst her own military preparations in Korea are proceeding with the clockwork regularity which characterises all her landings and movements of troops, she has been quietly reforming a civil service, effecting a reduction of a useless armed rabble, and hurrying on the construction of four or five hundred miles of rail!

Let us now consider in some detail the Japanese military occupation of Korea, and the later advance of what will come to be called Japan's "First Army" to the north of this rocky peninsula and, perhaps, beyond. By way of preface, it may be briefly stated that in the Japanese military system the chief war unit is the division, aggregating some 14,000 men. Four brigades, each containing four battalions, constitute the usual division, and three or four divisions, with cavalry and artillery, constitute the usual "army."

The force landed at Chemulpo on February 8th was a brigade of the 12th Infantry Division, and we have already seen how beautifully the landing was managed. In a later despatch than the one quoted the *Times* correspondent gave some further details which must enhance our admiration of the manner in which this, the first operation of the war outside Japan itself, was carried out. "Everything worked," we are told, "as if the troops were moving from one Japanese island to another. Nothing was required or requisitioned locally except pilots, all of whom, for the whole coast, were secured. Everything came over with the invaders. As the first brigade arrived at Seoul, with mushroom rapidity wooden barracks and stables were constructed." During the following few days the remainder of the 12th Infantry Division, the commander of which is General Inouye, was landed, and with this force Japan at once took a military step which placed her occupation of Korea upon a sound basis.

To understand the position we must once more open our war map and look northwards, where the Yalu marks the border between Southern Manchuria and north-western Korea. On the Korean side of the river lies Wi-ju, and by later reports from the local officials at this place it is established that, some days before the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan, the troops of the former had actually crossed the Yalu and had thus commenced what were unmistakable acts of war. The passage is said to have commenced on February 2nd, and from that date until February 15th the number of Russians crossing totalled 4,500. Of these 3,000 remained at Wi-ju, 1,000 moved to Cho-san (108 miles above Wi-ju), and 500 proceeded to An-ju, which is between forty and fifty miles north of Ping-yang.

Ping-Yang was the scene of some very brisk fighting in the Chino-Japanese War of 1844-5. From it there are roads of sorts leading both to Seoul and to Gensan, or, as it is sometimes called, Wonsan (most of the more important places in

Korea have two or three names), on the east coast of the peninsula. Northwards the route runs to Wi-ju on the near bank of the Yalu, and from the other bank over the Motien Pass to Liao-yang and thence to Mukden. A little to the southwest of Ping-yang lies Chinnampo on

Photo: Imperial News Agency.

FUSAN.

an important inlet, which, however, in February was frozen, the harbour not becoming practicable until the end of the first week in March. Otherwise it would have saved Japan a deal of trouble to have landed all the troops not required for the occupation of Chemulpo and Seoul at Chinnampo. As it was, the only means by which she could secure Ping-yang at the earliest possible moment was to march a sufficient force northwards from Seoul, taking at the same time the precaution of holding Gensan.

The march northwards was duly accomplished by General Inouye's division, and a truly laborious task it must have been. While the frost holds, the "going" along the rough rice-field tracks is bad enough, but when it thaws the resulting sloughs give endless trouble, especially to the artillery which accompanies the force. But the Japanese are famous marchers, and they are admirably equipped. Their clothing is described as a little heavy for marching purposes, since, in addition to a blanket, each man carries a garment resembling the *poshteen* of the Indian

Frontier, a coat of skin with the hair inside. But such "wraps" are keenly appreciated when the day's march is done, and are the wisest possible precaution against the intense cold which will be met with further north. A correspondent describes in glowing colours the "splendid fettle" in which the troops flies, it is 120 miles from Antung on the Manchurian bank of the Yalu to Liao-yang. It is largely this difficulty of keeping the troops supplied which must hinder Russia at this moment from making a more vigorous demonstration in Korea. But she is also clearly deterred by the boldness of Japan's early move-

By permission, from "Koreans at Home."

WEST GATE, SEOUL.

land, and says that "the enthusiasm and confidence inspired by the successes of the sister service are exhilarating to see."

As General Inouye's division trudges northwards through snow and ice and slush we may take a look at the Russians on both sides of the Yalu. These are mostly Cossacks and infantry of the Siberian Rifle Brigades, and their position can hardly be regarded as enviable. For, apart from the bitter cold, they are badly placed as regards supplies, since the country is poor and, even as the crow ments, for her cautious action henceforward is in marked contrast with her premature passage of the Yalu as far back as February 2nd. She maintains to some extent her position, and her Cossack patrols penetrate some distance into the interior. But she makes no effort to seize Ping-yang, and presently, as the Japanese position grows in strength, the Cossacks and mountain artillery which have occupied An-ju fall back, and leave the place clear for the pushful enemy.

Meanwhile, General Inouye's division has pressed on and occupied Ping-yang,

COSSACK SCOUTS GATHERING INFORMATION FROM KOREAN NATIVES.

Here we have a definite operation accomplished, which, although completely bloodless, and not very exciting to read of, is full of quiet significance, and one which may be pregnant with future dramatic results.

For the Japanese now hold both ends of the important defensive line Ping-yang—Gensan, and any southern movement which the Russian general might dream of making is as effectually barred as would be the attempt of a Russian force to creep down past Gensan from Vladivostok. Of the country between the two points mentioned no serious strategical notice need be taken, so mountainous and difficult it is, and so impracticable it would be for any but a smaller Russian force than could be risked in such circumstances.

General Inouye now sets to work both to render his hold on Ping-yang secure, and to send out detachments north and east so as to interpose a screen between himself and the enemy, which is particularly desirable in order to disguise the exact nature of the coming reinforcements. In this latter respect he is hardly at an advantage as compared with the Russian general at Wi-ju. Man and horse for man and horse—a less careful qualification might be both misleading and unfair—the Japanese cavalry are hardly as efficient for reconnoitring purposes as the Cossacks. The latter, we may be sure, better mounted than their adversaries, buzz round the detached Japanese posts like flies, thereby carrying out the picturesque precept of the well-known Russian general, Dragomiroff, and probably these keen-sighted scouts glean a fair idea of what is doing at Ping-yang itself. Certainly there is much going on which is worth the watching. The position which General Nozu captured in such brilliant fashion from the Chinese in 1894 is now in a fair way to becoming a most important Japanese *point d'appui*. Entrenchments are being thrown up by the engineers who have accompanied the division; supplies are being accumulated; and every conceivable preparation is in progress for the accommodation of a force much more imposing than that which has marched up from Seoul, although we must not forget that to the latter belongs the credit of pioneering this most business-like and effective occupation of the country.

At the end of the first week in March the ice in the inlet on which Chinnampo stands has broken up, and it becomes possible to land troops here for quick despatch to Ping-yang. Accordingly, a little fleet of Japanese transports has arrived, and disembarkation takes place of nearly the whole of the remainder of the "First Army" of Japan, which now appears to consist of four divisions, under command of General Kuroki. It is pretty clear that only about three-fourths of this force will be available for an advance beyond Ping-yang, since about 3,000 men have been required as a garrison for Seoul, and doubtless for other defensive work in Korea, and as a reserve at Ping-yang, the balance of a division will be required. But the course of events seems to show that the Japanese idea is to have, by way of a start, some 55,000 men in Korea, of whom rather over 40,000 will constitute a mobile force for service beyond the Korean frontier if necessary.

Incidentally, this fact has a technical military interest to which attention may be briefly drawn. It shows the handiness of the division as a war unit specially

adapted to the purpose of a maritime nation. We, who o late have dabbled in Army Corps, notwithstanding the manner in which the only Army Corps means two weak Army Corps, with two bloated Army Corps staffs, in addition to the Army staff; but with the divisional system, one Army staff and four strong



DIAGRAMATIC MAP SHOWING TROOPS IN MOVEMENTS OF JAPANESE KOREA.

we sent to South Africa was immediately broken up and, practically speaking, disorganised, ought not to be above taking a lesson from the practical success achieved by the Japanese with their divisions in Korea. With the Army Corps system, an army of 50,000 men independent, but coherent, divisions produce the same result with infinitely less cost and fuss. Where great armies of 150,000 men are concerned, it is different; but such forces are not commonly set in motion by maritime nations like Japan, or, for the matter of that, ourselves.

After this short but, perhaps, not uninstructive excursion into the region of professional detail, let us return to the divisions being disembarked at Chinnampo. The scene is a cheerless one, for the coast is still white with snow, and there is not much life about the small seaport other than that provided by the incoming transports with their attendant warships. In the harbour there are lying a number of Chinese junks, and these are promptly annexed by the business-like Japanese for landing purposes. A junk may not have the air of speed which pervades an Atlantic liner, and it may not be as trim as a well-found yacht. But it is a distinctly roomy craft, and for disembarking, at any rate stores, where no hostile opposition is to be feared, no better "naval omnibus" could be desired. Accordingly, the landing is accomplished with great ease and smoothness, and regiment after regiment comes ashore and proceeds along the Ta-tung River to Ping-yang. The march is about twenty-four miles, a distance which the sturdy Jap soldiers probably think little of covering in one day.

Of the stores and munitions of war which are landed we may be sure the most tender care is taken. For upon the arrangements which are now about to be made at Ping-yang may depend much of Japan's success in her future land campaign. As the number of troops landed increases, so the preparations which General Inouye's division has been making become more and more significant. The conclusion is that Ping-yang, in connection with Chinnampo, will henceforth not only be a strategic point, but a base of operations, and its importance may be expected steadily to rise until it fulfils all the requirements of this exacting position. The idea is a suggestive one, and inspires added respect

From a Japanese Drawing.

JAPANESE WAR ARTISTS AND CORRESPONDENTS AT WORK.

A FEAT OF HORSEMANSHIP: RUSSIAN CAVALRY CROSSING A RIVER.

for the extraordinary soundness of reasoning which has characterised every Japanese movement hitherto. By making Ping-yang at any rate an advanced base, not only is a quantity of unprofitable marching avoided—for it will be months before even a light railway can be constructed between Ping-yang and Seoul—but the Korean capital is kept clear of all disturbing military movements. Further, an immense amount of military preparation can, if necessary, take place without anyone outside the authorities at Chinnampo and Ping-yang being much wiser. The former is, it is true, a treaty port, but the trade is insignificant, and with the skill which the Japanese have hitherto shown in masking their proceedings, and a censorship of the most rigid sort, a Japanese general at Ping-yang would have far less difficulty in keeping his own counsels than if he were surrounded by the watchful eyes of foreigners at Seoul and Chemulpo.

For the transport of stores between Chinnampo and Ping-yang the Ta-tung River affords facilities, and the road is at once taken in hand by Japanese military engineers and greatly improved. Let us follow a Japanese regiment along till we come to Ping-yang itself, a big, walled city, lying along the north bank of the Ta-tung, and consisting chiefly of rude huts among which the lofty buildings round the gateways are conspicuous. Many an officer and soldier who fought in the 1894 battle of Ping-yang is now entering it under very different conditions, and it may be taken for granted that reminiscences are exchanged and high hopes of equally thrilling experiences expressed. Historically, the changed situation is full of peculiar interest. A decade back Korea was being "rescued" from China, the great Conservative Power of the Far East; to-day an attempt is being made to prevent her falling into the grasp of the great octopus of the West. Ping-yang and the Yalu settled the former question decisively. Ping-yang and the Yalu may have much to say to the solution of the latter-day problem. But it is still Korea which is in dispute, still Japan which is Korea's champion; still the Koreans, queerly-hatted, sluggish, and unspeakably dirty, in spite of their fair outward raiment, who look on, and groan inwardly because the trim Japanese soldiers are pouring into Ping-yang, and making it far more like a great entrenched camp than a peaceable city of folk who want simply to be left alone. Yet honesty and fair treatment are conspicuously shown by these vigorous intruders upon Korean indolence. They pay for everything they require, and do not simply take what they want and ride away, as the Cossacks who have been prowling through the adjacent villages are said to do. The one complaint against them is that they are too fond of making "lump" payments to some leading official, to whose fingers much of the money sticks, after the fashion of Korea where money and officials are concerned.

By the end of the third week in March the Japanese position at Ping-yang is pretty clearly defined. There are about 40,000 troops in readiness for a move, and already the advanced guard has taken up a forward position, occupying lines uniting the towns of Ka-san, An-ju, Yeng-pieng, and Pak-chen. These lines, which have been fortified by the Japanese, cover a front of about forty-five miles. The exact disposition of the advanced guard is not known; but General Misht-

chenko, who is commanding on the Yalu, reports that there are 3,000 Japanese at An-ju and 1,000 at Pak-chen. At Chinnampo there are said to be about forty Japanese men-of-war and transports lying at anchor.

By the Russians there is thought to be indecision among the Japanese, and they speak as if the advance of the latter had been suspended. But the commander of the Japanese Army has good reason not to hurry forward. In the first place, his eventual advance has probably from the first been intended to coincide with another great movement. Secondly, the ice has not yet disappeared from the streams between Ping-yang and Wi-ju, the bridges over which have been destroyed by the Cossack patrols, and there are few things more baffling to the military commander than a river in which loose masses of ice are jostling one another. Thirdly, it may be that it is desired to get, at any rate, into some sort of touch with the Japanese troops at Gensan on the east coast.

Between Ping-yang and Gensan there is, as has been mentioned, a route, but it is a very difficult one, for the spinal range of mountains which runs down into the peninsula has to be crossed, and between Gensan and Yangtok, which is less than half-way to Ping-yang, there are five passes to be negotiated, which the frozen snow now renders especially trying. It will probably assist the later comprehension of this narrative if it be mentioned here that evidently the Japanese have been making strenuous efforts to "get through" from Gensan to Ping-yang. About this time an official Russian report stated that Cossack scouts, about thirty miles to the north-east of Ping-yang, had captured Japanese scouts coming from the east with a Korean guide. The latter declared that 8,000 Japanese infantry, with several field-guns, had recently reached Yangtok. Russian cavalry were said to have been despatched in the hope of checking the Japanese movement from Gensan, which must not be overlooked at this stage of the operations, and is extremely interesting even if it does not lead, as it may, to important and definite results. For such a speedy joining of hands over such an intervening space of rocky country, while hardly for the present a strategical necessity, shows how thoroughly every detail of these Korean operations has been planned, and how reluctant the Japanese are to leave any sort of gap in their line through which the enemy can conceivably creep.

With the Russians entrenched at Wi-ju, on the south bank of the Yalu, the Japanese advanced guard only forty miles further south, and patrols on both sides scouring the intervening country, we may say that the opposing forces are fairly face to face on land, and it can only be a matter of days before a serious collision takes place. Meanwhile, there are incidents of which one reported by General Mishtchenko on March 23rd may serve as an example.

It is about eleven o'clock in the forenoon, and two sotnias of Cossacks are reconnoitring a little north of An-ju. Cossack regiments, it may be mentioned, are, at war strength, from about 600 to about 1,000 strong, and contain from four to six sotnias, which correspond fairly closely to our squadrons. The object of this reconnaissance is to discover whether the enemy have yet crossed in any strength the Cheng-cheng river, which flows a little to the north of An-ju.

The Cossacks are not picking their way

with any particular effort, for they are familiar with the neighbourhood, having, in fact, but recently evacuated it. They are, of course, aware that the Japanese Japanese sharpshooters who manned the walls. Boldly, then, these fine fellows press along, looking ahead for evidence of the enemy rather than troubling to

A CHARGE OF JAPANESE INFANTRY.

in considerable force are not far off, for they have made several previous reconnaissances, in one of which, before the Japanese occupation of An-ju, they even rode up to within half a mile of Ping-yang itself and exchanged shots with the collect topographical details. The sotnias are divided, and about a dozen miles to the north-west of An-ju, near Pak-chen, one of them comes in sight of a mounted outpost of the enemy, numbering some thirty men.

JAPANESE TROOPS DISEMBARKING AT CHEMULPO.

The Japanese are on the alert, and, noticing that the Cossacks outnumber them, signal to other cavalry and infantry in rear to come up to their assistance. The Cossacks also send back for reinforcements, and a brisk little affair seems imminent. But a patrol which knows its business is aware that that business does not consist in unnecessary fighting, but in obtaining information and maintaining contact with the enemy when contact has once been gained. Accordingly, although we have here all the materials for a smart engagement, and both sides are keen to come to blows, the matter resolves itself into the burning of a little gunpowder, a few casualties, and a prudent retirement, which is not followed up. In fact, a typical "set-to" between an advanced post and an adventurous patrol, and one which is extremely characteristic of the opposing forces concerned. It might be pushing comparisons too far to suggest similarity between the dashing tactics of the Cossack horsemen and the Japanese torpedo craft, but there is no doubt that the Russian irregular horse, operating from the Yalu, are giving the Japanese Army a good many more anxious moments than the Japanese Navy ever experienced from the earlier movements of the Russian fleet!

As hinted above, the skirmish is soon over, but before it closes those engaged have come to pretty close quarters. The Cossacks advance to within 400 paces of the post and open fire. A Japanese officer and one man are seen to fall, and a horse is killed. These are among the earliest casualties in the land campaign, only one similar incident having been previously reported. The Japanese fire in reply, but cavalrymen are seldom the best of shots, and the Cossacks are unscathed. Fresh volleys are exchanged, and now some Japanese infantry, of whom there are two companies posted at Pak-chen, come running up, and the Cossacks know that their chances of escaping untouched by carefully aimed infantry fire are ethereal. Accordingly, they retire, and as the Japanese cavalry are in no strength, and their ponies are no match for the Cossack horses in speed and endurance, the patrol is not pursued.

Here, then, we have the land forces of Russia and Japan actually in touch, shots exchanged, and the blood of gallant soldiers shed. A trivial commencement, perhaps—far less dramatic than the first midnight torpedo attack on Port Arthur. But great tragedies, even in literature, often begin tamely enough to make the unsophisticated wonder how from such futile openings any real emotion, passion, or action can be evolved.

From a Native Drawing.

JAPANESE INFANTRY CROSSING A RIVER.

CHAPTER XII.

A FIRST ENGAGEMENT—RUSSIAN HOPES AND FEARS—COSSACKS ON THE MOVE—SHARP FIGHTING AT CHONG-JU—FORWARD TO THE YALU—RUSSIANS EVACUATE KOREA—FIRST STAGE OF THE LAND CAMPAIGN ENDED.

IT is about ten o'clock in the morning of March 28th, when the first real collision takes place between the land forces of Russia and Japan. The Russians, under General Mishtchenko, are still entrenched at Wi-ju on the south bank of the Yalu; the Japanese are still pushing forward from Ping-Yang. For the last three days the Cossacks have been endeavouring to draw the Japanese patrols into an action, but the latter are not to be tempted, and retire on contact beyond Chong-ju, a place of some importance, which lies about 30 miles to the west of An-ju. It will assist the reader who has only a small scale map at hand if he bears in mind the fact that, although as the crow flies the Japanese advanced posts are now only some 40 miles south of the Yalu, the interval by the main route is considerably greater. From Wi-ju the route runs in a south-easterly direction for about 18 miles to Chölsan; thence in a southerly curve for about 22 miles to Koak-san; thence to Chong-ju about 15 miles. About half-way between Chong-ju and An-ju lies Kasan, of which some mention will be made in the following narrative.

On March 27th General Mishtchenko has learnt that four squadrons of the enemy's cavalry are posted near Chong-ju, and he judges this to be a favourable opportunity for an opening engagement. Accordingly, in the early morning of the 28th, he himself moves towards Chong-ju

with six sotnias of Trans-Baikal Cossacks, most, if not all, belonging to the Argunsk Regiment. It would appear that this force aggregates about 500 men, and it may be assumed that they are one and all in hard fighting condition, and yearning for a satisfactory trial of strength with an enemy now regarded with something akin to respect.

There are various reasons which make General Mishtchenko anxious to come to blows with the advancing Japanese. For weeks past his own movements have been in the nature of a retreat, although that fact has been cleverly disguised by highly coloured statements, and obscured by the skill and daring with which the Cossacks have been used to hamper the work of the Japanese patrols. It is a serious matter to be retiring through a country never abounding in supplies, with the clear knowledge that the inhabitants understand perfectly well the reason for the movement. The Russians have hardly endeared themselves to the Koreans by their system of paying for what they require, and the loss of prestige occasioned by continued retreat cannot but increase the unwillingness of the natives to part with food for which at best only a village herdman or a dishonest "official" receives any sort of compensation. Already the news of the Japanese advance in force, and of further landings at Chinnampo, is beginning to spread over Northern Korea, and the fact that all this has been accomplished without any marked effort on the part of the Russians to meet and hurl back an enemy whom but a few weeks ago they affected to treat with sublime contempt cannot but impress even the lazy and indifferent subjects of the Hermit Kingdom. Of actual opposition there is no fear, but the meanest native of a country through which foreign troops are moving can do something to help or hinder the latter, and the Russian position, even on the Yalu, is not so strong and comfortable that it would not be vastly improved by a successful endeavour to stem, even temporarily, the tide of Japanese progress northwards through Korea.

By this time General Kuropatkin is



THE CITY OF PING-YANG

probably known to have arrived—at any rate, at Harbin—which, as a matter of fact, he reached on March 26th, and it is very possible that General Mishtchenko has actually received a message from the redoubtable Commander-in-Chief, indicating, perhaps, that a still further retirement may become ultimately necessary, but that, in any case, a brisk cavalry affair might add convenient lustre to the Russian arms at this particular juncture. Be this as it may, the knowledge that the idol of the Russian Army is now in actual control of the operations in the field would naturally stimulate to further exertions the troops in immediate contact with the enemy.

There is, perhaps, yet another reason why General Mishtchenko should earnestly desire an immediate collision of a more serious character than such trivial affairs as that of the 23rd, to which reference was made in the preceding chapter. The troops under his command have been having an unmistakably hard time ever since they commenced the retirement from the neighbourhood of Ping-Yang, and painful stories are told of the pitiable plight to which they have been reduced in the matter of food and fuel. For the latter they have been thankful to use the telegraph poles, while the former is often simply a matter of organised plunder. Many of the horses have died or are dying through want of forage, and a Cossack without his horse is in a bad way indeed, until he can lay hands on another. But the Russian soldier, especially he who has already had a prolonged taste of Manchurian service, is no stranger to privation and other hardship. What may trouble him at this period even more seriously than the want of food, the bitter cold, and the possible loss of his beloved mount is the strong apprehension lest there may be something uncannily wrong in the present situation, something which his tendency to superstition makes him brood over with a sense of growing fear and sick presentiment. In a previous chapter we have seen how the Siberian peasantry were cheered by encouraging portents in the sky, and how glad they were to believe that St. George himself was about to lead

ND THE RIVER TA TUNG.

the troops of Holy Russia to victory. Now in Manchuria we have another phase of Slav superstition to record. Here there have arisen strange rumours to the effect that the Japanese are possessed of wonderful magnetic stones endowed with magical properties, by the use of which the adversaries of the owners are rendered incapable of fighting. To us such foolishness may seem incredible, but, of course, many superstitions no less childish are from time to time current among our own native troops, and in the Russian Army in Manchuria there are thousands of soldiers who are to all intents and purposes Asiatics in their ideas. Anyhow, the Russian officers recognise the seriousness of such fancies, for they sedulously endeavour to inspire confidence among their men by performing magnetic experiments in their presence, doubtless in order to show their own command of "magical powers." It is said, nevertheless, that the men continue to lament their hard fate in being sent to fight sorcerers, and if this unfortunate spirit is at all observable among Mishtchenko's Cossacks, we may rest assured that he will be additionally thankful to give them, if he can, some tangible evidence that Japanese magic cannot withstand prosaic lead and steel.

After this necessary introduction, let us rejoin the six Cossack sotnias which are working towards Cheng-ju on the morning of March 28th. About ten o'clock the scouts come in sight of the place, and shortly afterwards, as the main body incautiously approaches, fire is opened by the Japanese, of whom, it seems, there are one squadron of cavalry and a company of infantry in or about the town.

Two sotnias—we may call them squadrons without serious inaccuracy—of the Cossacks now occupy an adjacent eminence about 600 yards distant, and a brisk engagement ensues. Three other sotnias come up, and the Japanese are subjected to a heavy cross-fire. "Notwithstanding this and our commanding position," to quote the complimentary words of the Russian report, "the Japanese gallantly held their ground, and it was only after a fierce fight of half an hour's duration that they ceased fire and sought refuge in their houses."

It is not difficult to form in the mind's eye a vivid picture of this stage of the engagement. Five or six hundred men on one side, and perhaps a couple of hundred on the other, can make a pretty hot fight of it at a range of less than half a mile, if they are so disposed, and there is not likely to have been any lack of disposition in this case. One can imagine the Cossacks particularly eager to make an impression and yet not caring to make a dash at an enemy of whom about half are infantry armed with quick-firing rifles. Accordingly, their horses are probably withdrawn some little distance behind the hill, while a considerable firing line pours what lead it can into the space occupied by the stubborn enemy. The Japanese, on the other hand, are not much better placed either for offence or defence. For a single squadron and a single company of infantry to advance against six squadrons would be purely foolish, and the smart seizure by the Russians of a dominating position makes an effective defence by no means easy. Still, it is not Japan's *rôle* to give in, more especially on such an occasion as this, and it is easy to understand the determination with which this little force clings as long as it possibly can to its advanced position, before retiring to the shelter of the town. It is probably at this stage that most of

the recorded casualties occur: As to these, the Russian and Japanese accounts differ considerably, but the truth seems and one wounded, both belonging to the cavalry.

Shortly after the Japanese have retired



AREA OF FIRST JAPANESE ADVANCE.

to be that about a score on either side were killed or wounded. The Russians had three officers severely wounded, one of whom subsequently dies, while the Japanese own to one lieutenant killed among the houses in the outskirts of Chöng-ju, three fresh squadrons of Japanese cavalry come at full gallop along the road from Kasan towards Chöng-ju. Two of these squadrons enter the town and

join the Japanese firing line, but the third, according to General Mishtchenko, falls back in disorder under the repeated volleys from the Cossack position.

For another hour the engagement continues, the Cossacks making every effort to prevent the Japanese from leaving the streets and houses of the town, and the Japanese doubtless chafing at being cooped up without any chance of doing effective damage. Altogether a somewhat curious position, and one very different from the traditional *rencontre* of cavalry with cavalry. Possibly, had the company of Japanese infantry been absent, the Cossacks would have shown more pushfulness, and in that event would doubtless have been met with equal "go" by the Japanese. But in any case the undersized mounts on both sides would have rendered "shock tactics" of rather trifling account. In the actual circumstances it is inevitable that the combat should be to all intents and purposes a mounted infantry one, and, professionally speaking, both sides appear to merit admiration for the manner in which they sustained a difficult, and perhaps to neither an altogether congenial, part.

Whether the presence of the infantry company does or does not determine the character of this engagement, its conclusion is certainly due to infantry intervention. While the Cossacks are still firing into the town, four companies of Japanese infantry are seen doubling up the Kasan road. Clearly the time has come for the Russians to retire, since the presence of such a marked preponderance of Japanese rifles can have but one result. Accordingly, General Mishtchenko gives the word to "Mount," and a pretty little exhibition of discipline takes place, which shows that the Cossacks can run the best regular cavalry close in the matter of that most trying operation, a retirement in the face of a superior enemy. One sotnia covers the movement, keeping up a steady fire on the Japanese position, and the remainder, withdrawing in perfect order, form up in line behind the hill. The wounded are placed in front, and the retirement, according to General Mishtchenko, is "carried out with the deliberation of parade."

There is something quite Russian in this fine performance. Not a few similar instances have occurred in great wars of the ease with which the soldiers of the Tsar can on emergency be handled in circumstances calculated to shake the discipline and steadiness even of seasoned troops. One such instance may be recalled in which the famous Skobeleff took a leading part. It happened in the struggle with Turkey in 1877 that some Russian infantry had shown unsteadiness in the presence of the enemy, and the matter came under the immediate notice of the White General himself. His method of correction was characteristic. Halting the regiment well within range of the enemy's rifles, he deliberately drilled it as if on parade, putting it through exercises which, of course, in the circumstances were utterly meaningless, and which must have considerably astounded the watching Turks. We may be very sure that that regiment, after its release from this spectacular ordeal, went forward with considerable vigour, and never again wavered or lost touch, at any rate in any action in which Skobeleff was present.

As might be expected, this favourable opportunity for an advance was

JAPANESE CAVALRY ENCAMPMENT AT SEOUL: FARRIERS AT WORK

seized by the Japanese, and in the face of a heavy fire the Jap cavalry charged up the hill, accelerating, perhaps, the Russian retreat. General Mishtchenko says in his report that "the Japanese squadrons, which had been thrown into disorder, were evidently unable to occupy promptly the position evacuated by the Russians, and the infantry arrived too late." But it seems that, while preserving the "deliberation of parade," the Russians did not linger long in a neighbourhood which would shortly have become unpleasantly warm. Some attempt at pursuit may have been made, but we may regard the action as over from the moment that the last Cossack in the rear-guard sprang into his saddle and galloped off. We have General Mishtchenko's word for it that the Russian rear-guard "arrived quietly" at Koak-san, where it made a halt of two hours in order that the wounded might receive attention. At nine o'clock in the evening the force reached Chöl-san, which lies one march south of Wi-ju

Meanwhile the Japanese, not a little elated, it may be imagined, by the retirement of this considerable force of Cossacks, proceeded, with shouts of "Banzai!"—the Jap equivalent of our "Hurrah!"—to occupy Chong-ju, the inhabitants of which may well have been somewhat bewildered by the strange revenges brought by the "whirligig of Time" in the past few weeks. First a Russian advance, than a Russian retirement, a Japanese advance, a Russian attack, a brisk engagement, with bullets by hundreds falling among the houses, and finally a Japanese occupation, and pretty clear evidence that many thousands more Japanese soldiers will follow in the near future! For what was only lately one of the most secluded corners of the wide world, north-western Korea, is being "opened up" at a singularly rapid rate, and it is hard to say whether, where such vigorous reformers as the Japanese are at work, there is much chance that Chong-ju will ever return to its primitive state of contented sloth.

Without delaying to dip deeply into Korean futurities, let us briefly examine an engagement which, insignificant as it is, has a curious interest in that the conditions under which it was fought cannot possibly be repeated. Indecisive though the conclusion may have been from the standpoint of those who think that a victory is impossible unless it is accompanied by a decided difference in the recorded tale of casualties, we are here face to face with one or two strong facts which unmistakably illuminate even General Mishtchenko's simple and, on the whole, impartial narrative. The latter, again, is in itself a wholesome corrective of that class of criticism which seeks to find a professional reason for everything done in the course of a campaign, and fails to make allowance for considerations like those mentioned at the beginning of this chapter as having probably influenced the Russian commander in his movement on Chong-ju. Thus it has been suggested that the latter was merely what is called a "reconnaissance in force," with a view to gleaning information of the strength of the advancing "First Army" of Japan. But General Mishtchenko had previously reported fully and accurately as to the Japanese advance, and he himself says that his movement was made as a direct result of information that a Japanese force worth attacking was posted near

Chŏng-ju. Here, clearly, was no reconnaissance in force, but a deliberate attempt to force an engagement in which there was every prospect that the Russians would succeed in inflicting a sharp reverse upon the enemy, thus commencing the land operations with what might easily be worked up into a Russian "victory."

admittedly gallant defence, and with losses evidently about equal to those inflicted on the attack. The advantage, such as it is, rests with Japan, and in a first collision even the small superiority here exhibited may be of very real significance, always supposing it does not lead to overconfidence.



JAPANESE FIELD TELEGRAPH SERVICE.

The attempt failed, and failed somewhat signally, notwithstanding General Mishtchenko's heroic attempts to magnify the probable losses of the enemy. At no point in the engagement is Russian superiority indicated. Five hundred Cossacks occupying a commanding position fail to dislodge a couple of hundred Japanese; the former retire on the appearance of reinforcements, the latter remain masters of the field, after an

Mr. McKenzie, the war correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, who was the first to send to England any detailed account of this engagement, remarks that it was characterised by many instances of individual bravery on both side. Thus, Lieutenant Basil, a Russian officer, fell wounded when about 100 paces from the Japanese. A sergeant who attempted to rescue him was mortally wounded. Another took the sergeant's place, but was shot.

Then two Cossacks tried together, and were successful.

"Another incident," says Mr. McKenzie, "shows the individual initiative of the Japanese soldier. A Japanese private, who had been isolated, saw the main party of the Russians pushing on towards the south gate. He immediately hid himself, and waited until the Russians were near. He then deliberately shot the Russian commander, thus throwing the force into confusion. The private escaped, but was wounded later in the day."

After the engagement at Chong-ju the Japanese advance continues steadily, and the First Army, numbering 45,000, and consisting, it is said, of the Imperial Guard and the 2nd and 12th Divisions, moves forward towards Wi-ju by three routes. The reader should bear in mind that the advance of a great body of troops like this is, at the best of times, a very different matter from the simple movement of a small unit like a battalion or a brigade. Even where there are good roads and spacious camping-grounds, the mere distance between the head and tail of a column 15,000 or 20,000 strong makes it, as a rule, undesirable to move more than that number along any one route if anything like coherence be desired. Even when a division some 12,000 strong is moving with text-book precision, the distance between the van-guard and the rear-guard may be not far short of ten miles; and, where the roads are bad, it goes without saying that the stringing-out of a large mixed force will be greatly increased.

Perhaps we may never know exactly how difficult was this advance of the First Army of Japan northwards from Ping-yang, but it is important that an attempt should be made to understand what a frightfully wearing and tedious process it must have been. In the first place, magnificent as is the spirit of the troops, the fact that many of the men are suffering from frost-bite and that the horses, or rather ponies, are in dreadfully poor condition, makes it extremely hard to maintain that regular, even if slow, rate of progress which is of immense importance where large bodies of troops are concerned. Again, the snows are beginning to melt and the ice on the streams to break up, the country becoming a vast morass, and the difficulties thus being sensibly increased. The progress of the artillery in such disheartening circumstances is naturally slow to a painful degree: Six ponies are attached to each gun; yet, even with these, the wheels frequently stick so fast in the mire that serious delay—which, of course, is communicated to the rest of the column in rear—is incurred. There are few sights more depressing on the line of march than that of a gun to all appearance hopelessly bogged, the drivers doing all in their power to help the straining teams, the deep-sunk wheels refusing to budge an inch, and, perhaps, thousands of eager troops halted because of this one hindrance. Not all the forethought of the Japanese General Staff, not the most spirited endeavours on the part of the artillery officers and men, can prevent countless delays of this sort on the march upwards from Ping-yang to the Yalu; and it is small wonder that the rate of progress is hardly such as to satisfy impatient students of the war, who cannot comprehend what war in such conditions is.

Yet, slow as is the rate of advance, it is sure, and the Japanese take care to make it good by neglecting no precaution.

Their movement, as an *Express* correspondent observes, is most circumspect and methodical. At each step they are careful to leave behind fortified posts and stores of provision and ammunition.

A COSSACK OF THE LINE.

At the same time they study to ingratiate themselves as far as possible with the natives, although in this respect they do not seem altogether successful. For in Northern Korea there are numerous firebrands, known as Tonghaks, who were largely instrumental in precipitating the Chino-Japanese War of 1894, and these are evidently bent on again giving trouble. They have revived an ancient prophecy that in May of this year the present Korean dynasty will be overthrown and a new era begun, in which the Tonghak supremacy will be unpleasantly marked by massacres of all who have failed to support the revolutionaries. Along the lines on which her troops are marching Japan has no difficulty with these scamps; but the presence of disaffection further inland is not without serious drawbacks, and here and there short shrift has to be

given to Tonghaks who have been caught red-handed in the act of inciting the country-folk to disturbance, or of levying blackmail in rice and money.

From Chong-ju the advanced guard of the Japanese First Army moves with what briskness it may, first to Seng-cheng, some twenty miles to the westward, and then to Chölsan, to which, it will be remembered, the Cossacks under General Mishtchenko retired on the evening of March 28th. It had been expected that some sharp Russian opposition would be forthcoming at Seng-cheng, but none was encountered, and on the arrival of the advanced guard at Chölsan about April 2nd it must have been pretty evident that there would be no further fighting until the Russian entrenchments at Wi-ju were reached.



THE TORTOISE TOWER, SEOUL, KOREA.

But here, surely, some stand would be made, if only in justification of Russian efforts to strengthen their positions at this point. Those positions would seem to be easily defensible, and, even allowing for the difficulties of a retreat with a river in rear, there is no question as to the moral effect which a stubborn Russian resistance here would have, more especially after such a detrimental engagement as that at Chong-ju. Yet as, on April 4th, the Japanese cavalry scouts approach Wi-ju, which lies on the south bank of the Yalu, close to its mouth, it becomes evident that the Russian posts have been abandoned, and a closer scrutiny reveals the fact that the Russian troops have all retreated across he river!

At first sight the casual reader may not understand the significance of this discovery. The Russians, pressed by a strong advancing Japanese force, have abandoned their intention to hold a position on one bank of a river, and have quietly retired to the other side. That does not seem a great matter, but it is one which assumes a very different aspect when we remember that the river in question forms the north-western boundary of Korea, and that, by retiring across it, the Russians have to all intents evacuated a country which only a few months back they had invaded with the evident hope of

making their occupation a permanent one. This entry of the Japanese cavalry into Wi-ju on the morning of April 4th marks a seriously important stage in the land operations of the war, the expulsion of the Russians from the country which, from the first, Japan had made the chief bone of contention between her and her giant rival. Even after their naval reverses at Port Arthur the Russians talked big about an invasion of Korea, and the exploits of the Cossack cavalry in that region were looked forward to with a mixture of happy self-confidence and braggart contempt for the land forces of Japan.

KOREAN NOBLES AT MEAL.

Yet now, less than two months since war broke out, Russia has been simply squeezed out of Korea, and has ce tainly not added to her military reputation in the process, except in so far as the incidental work of the Cossack patrols is concerned. What a different record might have been set up if, at that interesting juncture, when there were only some 300 Japanese troops in Ping-yang, the Russians had made a descent in force, overwhe'med the then puny garrison, and, by holding the place with the utmost tenacity, upset half the arrangements for the great landing at Chinnampo! In justice to the Russian Army, the considerations which were stated on page 136 must not be overlooked, for it is one thing to suggest what might be accomplished easily under favourable considerations, and another to carry it out when troops are stale from hardship, and the question of supplies is one of hourly increasing anxiety. But, even supposing such a *coup* as that indicated had been impracticable, the fact remains that the Russians did nothing to stem, and very little indeed to hinder, the Japanese march northward, and that the record of their movements in Korea from the beginning of March is one of more or less continuous retreat, only varied by the futile performance at Chong-ju.

For the Japanese, April 4th is, indeed, a day of triumph, and one can imagine with what solid satisfaction the First Army takes possession of Wi-ju in the knowledge that the occupation means, practically speaking, the complete withdrawal of the enemy from the country. Here is Japan's first manifestation to the civilised world of its military as well as its naval capacity to " stand up to " its huge

JAPANESE ON THE MARCH: MEN IN PLACE OF PACK-PONIES AND DRAFT ANIMALS; JINRICKSHA-MEN AS TRAINED TRANSPORT CARRIERS.

adversary. Northern Korea, associated in Japanese military history hitherto with notable defeats of an Eastern enemy, henceforth will shed yet greater lustre on the arms of the Island nation as the scene of the literal expulsion by force of arms of the picked troops of a mighty Western military Power. Whatever gloss may be put upon the circumstances by explanations of strategical necessities, there is no getting over the elementary fact that the Japanese Army on landing found the Russian troops in occupation of a considerable portion of Korea, and that they turned them out. Only one engagement, a trivial one, occurred during the process, and that terminated in the maintenance of the Japanese position, coupled with conviction on the part of most dispassionate observers that the Russians only saved themselves by a timely retreat from very severe handling if not destruction.

While by the arrival of the Japanese advanced guard at Wi-ju a definite stage of the land campaign is reached, and no developments on a large scale are to be immediately expected, the situation is full of interesting points, and productive of some little action, to which we may profitably give attention before breaking the thread of the military narrative.

BUYING THE WAR NEWS—ST. PETERSBURG

CHAPTER XIII.

FACE TO FACE ON THE YALU—JAPANESE DELIBERATION—TRANSPORTS IN THE ESTUARY —RUSSIANS PREPARE TO OPPOSE THE PASSAGE—A FIERY BARRIER—A JAPANESE PATROL CUT UP.

"THE Yalu River," writes Admiral Ingles, "is not a second Ganges. People have gained an idea that in the Chinese War battleships and great cruisers went high up the stream, and then they fell to fighting, and that thus we got 'The Battle of the Yalu.' Nothing of the kind. The fight was at sea, and why it has been so called has never been explained. The river is a very broad, very shallow stream, and the longest in the peninsula; its low reaches at this time of year are in flood." The gallant Admiral, from whose vivacious commentary on the naval operations of the war the readers of the *Daily Telegraph* have derived continuous and very pleasantly imparted instruction, goes on to mention that navigation up the Yalu is only possible for a matter of fifty miles from its mouth, and then occurs the first rapid, beyond which even the Chinese do not take the smallest of their junks. Even the estuary is difficult, for, while the Yalu has three mouths at most times of the year, its delta, or islands, are completely submerged during the melting of the snows which occurs at the beginning of April.

The Japanese having arrived on the south bank of this baffling stream are naturally looking forward to crossing it, but there is much to be done before such a proceeding can be even remotely feasible. In the first place a partial concentration, at any rate, of the First Army is necessary. This does not present any particular difficulty now that the Russians have evacuated the south bank of the river, but the process will take time, notwithstanding the elaborate precautions which have been taken to make sure of the communications. There are stores, if not troops, yet to come up from Ping-yang, and, though the rivers have been bridged, notably the Cheng-cheng to the north of An-ju, across which the Japanese have thrown a pontoon bridge 200 yards long, it is not easy to maintain such temporary structures when the streams are in flood through the melting of the snows. As has been already mentioned, the First Army is advancing on Wi-ju by separate routes, and it is not to be expected that in such a country at such a season any uniformity in the rate of marching will be possible. All this would tend to delay, even if the Japanese were in any hurry to attempt a passage which any sort of resistance from the opposite bank might render extremely hazardous.

As a matter of fact, the Japanese are not in any violent hurry. The precise nature of their operations at this juncture is a little obscure, but it is reported that a great fleet of transports appears about this time in the estuary of the Yalu, and it is conjectured that on this is carried the Second Army, which may now be landed at Yongampo, a port a little to the west of Wi-ju. Here is indicated an interesting development indeed, and one the sig-

nificance of which may appear at a later stage. For the present we may be content to confine ourselves to the two banks of the Yalu in actual occupation by the opposing forces, and, by way of a change, may now flit over to the north side, and endeavour to form some idea of the Russian movements.

It appears that, on the retirement of the Russians from Wi-ju across the river, the disposition of the Russian forces on the north bank of the Yalu undergoes some change. It is said that only a small detachment of 250 Cossacks with sixteen guns is now left at An-tung, the greater part of the former garrison of the latter having been withdrawn a few miles up the river to Kiu-lien-cheng. It should be noted that the main road—the Peking road, as it is called—runs from Antung along the river bank to Kiu-lien-cheng, and thence through Feng-hwang-cheng over the Motien Pass to Liao-yang and Mukden. The Russians are said to be using Feng-hwang-cheng as a sort of advanced base for the Yalu operations, but the present intention evidently is to make Kiu-lien-cheng the point of greatest resistance.

A BATTERY OF FIELD GUNS ON THE WAY TO ICHON.

At Kiu-lien-cheng, according to a well-informed *Chronicle* correspondent, there are 3,000 Cossacks, 10,000 infantry, and 3,000 artillery. The river between Kiu-lien-cheng and Wi-ju is three miles wide, with two sandbanks on the Manchurian side, which are occasionally occupied by the Russian sharpshooters. These details are important aids to the comprehension of a very interesting situation. Where two

great forces are facing one another with only a river between them, the smallest item of intelligence concerning the strength of the two armies, the most insignificant topographical feature, must not be neglected. For, even if they do not leap into sudden and brilliant prominence, such minutiæ may serve to explain why this or that apparently wise step was not taken by one of the two sides concerned.

Now that they have definitely withdrawn to the north bank of the Yalu, the Russians are evidently bent on pursuing a much more vigorous policy than they adopted during the retirement in front of the Japanese advance from An-ju. Doubtless this is largely due to an added feeling of security, since on this side of the Yalu they are to some extent at home, and have not to be constantly on their guard against both Korean treachery and the possibility of having their retreat cut off by Japanese cavalry. Supplies may not be plentiful, but they are fairly certain, entrenchments are being thrown up on all sides, giving a sense of "something to lean against," and there is talk among the troops of various special devices which may be adopted to prevent the Japanese from attaining any foothold in Manchuria.

One of these is a remarkable appliance which has only recently come to the banks of the Yalu from St. Petersburg. The process is a secret one, but, from tests which were carried out a year or two back during the great Army Manœuvres at Tsarskoë Selo, it is known to result in a tremendous wall of flame which can be produced, even in the middle of a stream, by the agency of a special liquid. The latter is pumped along tubes, which can be buried in the earth, the pumping station being removed some miles, if necessary, from the banks of the river in which it is desired to erect the fiery barrier. In the experiment made at Tsarskoë Selo it is recounted that the proceedings commenced by the construction of a bridge of disused boats. "Then a small, oily patch was seen to appear in the middle of the stream close to the bridge. It gradually grew larger, and at the end of three minutes the patch was 200 yards in length. Flames then burst out, and soon they attained an immense height, constituting a formidable curtain, which completely hid the bridge. . . . After seven and a half minutes the working of the apparatus which caused the fire was stopped, the flames died away in two minutes, and it was seen that the bridge had been completely destroyed."

Time will show whether it will be found possible to work this remarkable engine on the banks of the Yalu, but the fact that the necessary apparatus and materials have been despatched to this point is not without interest, as showing that the Japanese have not by any means the monopoly of up-to-date war devices. Indeed, there are few armies in which greater attention is paid to the application of science to warfare than the Army of the Tsar: and if, so far, there has been no indication of this fact in the conduct of the Russian military operations, the explanation may be that the latter have not been sufficiently developed, and that many of the "newest ideas" have not yet been passed from Harbin to the field army.

But the Russians at Antung and Kiu-lien-cheng are not content with merely throwing up entrenchments, or even with the installation of apparatus to produce lofty screens of fire. They

are evidently now being directed by a vigorous mind, and time after time they exchange shots across the river with the Japanese, and in some cases actually cross the river, and come to close quarters with the enemy. Most of these attempts are foiled, but one which is reported by General Kuropatkin to have taken place on the night of April 8th is said to have resulted in a considerable loss of Japanese lives.

According to the Russian version of this incident, which is not mentioned officially by the Japanese authorities, a Russian detachment of sharpshooters is ordered on the night in question to cross to the left or south bank of the Yalu opposite Wi-ju. It will be remembered that the Japanese cavalry had only arrived at Wi-ju on the 4th, and that consequently on the 8th there is still no large number of troops in occu-

ON GUARD: A JAPANESE SENTRY AT PING-YANG.

pation of the place. The Russian detachment, which is under the command of Lieutenant Dimidovitch and Sub-Lieutenant Potemkine, begin by crossing first to the Island of Samalind in the river, where they find work ready to their hand that will render any prolongation of their adventurous journey unnecessary.

For in the dim light the Russians discern three boats approaching the east end of the island, and it is presently evident that this is a Japanese patrol of some fifty men, who are clearly bent upon a mission similar to that upon which the Russian detachment is engaged. The latter bides its time until the Japanese have landed, and then opens fire. The result is little less than a massacre, for, according to the Russian official report, nearly all the Japanese are shot, bayoneted, or drowned, and the Russians sustain no losses.

On subsequent occasions the Japanese obtain some compensation for this unfortunate loss, but during the greater part of April nothing occurs to modify seriously the situation on either bank of the Yalu, so far as recorded collisions are concerned. The Russians cross and recross the river, and skirmishes of small importance occur at intervals. But there is no great movement, although the arrival of a number of those stormy petrels, the war correspondents, about the beginning of the third week in April seems to indicate that this will not be long delayed. Meanwhile the naval operations have been progressing briskly, and to these we may now revert, leaving the development of the land campaign to a later chapter.



Photo: Bulla, St. Petersburg.

CZAR REVIEWING A COSSACK REGIMENT.

CHAPTER XIV.

PORT ARTHUR ON THE ALERT—THE RUSSIAN FLEET IN EVIDENCE—RENEWED BOMBARDMENT— ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO SEAL THE HARBOUR—THE SPIRIT OF THE JAPANESE NAVY—A GLORIOUS FAILURE—STIRRING TALES OF HEROISM—EASTER AT PORT ARTHUR.

AFTER the tremendous bombardment of March 10th, of which an account was given in Chapter IX., Port Arthur enjoys for more than a week a welcome rest from attack. The interval is employed by Admiral Makaroff in pushing on the repairs to his fleet, which has sustained considerable damage from the high-angle fire of Admiral Togo's battleships on the 10th, and, of course, the entrance to the harbour continues to be watched with unceasing vigilance. The tension after such a nerve-shaking bombardment is not likely to be released, and it is probably only the stern orders of Admiral Makaroff, and the moral effect of that fine officer's presence, which prevent the waste of much valuable shot and shell on imaginary hostile craft during this period. At night a particularly sharp look-out is kept, the searchlights on either side of the harbour entrance sweeping the intervening space and rendering it impossible for even the smallest boat to pass in unperceived But, naturally, the main object of those who work these mechanical sentinels is to discover the enemy out at sea, since, if a destroyer steaming nearly thirty knots is not discovered until abreast of the forts, there is, as has been already evidenced, a chance of her dashing into the inner harbour, wreaking mischief there, and emerging unscathed.

At midnight on March 21st the vigilance of the fort garrisons is partially rewarded. A searchlight beam thrown out to sea shows two Japanese destroyers creeping up under cover of hoped-for darkness towards the outer roadstead. Such a discovery after ten days of incessant watching means much, and there is, perhaps, rather more fuss made over the circumstance than is, strictly speaking, necessary. In cooler moments, perhaps, a wiser policy would have permitted a somewhat closer approach, followed by a carefully directed fire, or attempted interception by a superior force of Russian destroyers, of which there are doubtless several actually under steam for patrolling purposes. But nerves are nerves, and the Russians have good reason to nip in the bud any such enterprise on the part of the Japanese. So with a roar the guns in the forts hurl their greeting at the oncoming intruders, and two gunboats, the *Bobr* and the *Otvajny*, join in the noisy performance. The destroyers, belonging, as it subsequently appears, to one of the two Japanese flotillas, both of which are at this moment outside Port Arthur, are forced to retire, but are not injured by the Russian fire.

At about four o'clock in the morning three more Japanese destroyers make their appearance, and these, too, are met with such a storm of shell that they, in turn, give up as hopeless the attempt to run the gauntlet of the forts.

Four hours later the main Japanese

fleet is seen approaching Port Arthur. The Russians may well feel some pangs of disappointment and irritation as they note the unimpaired strength of this massive force, with its six battleships, six armoured cruisers, six second- and third-class cruisers, and eight destroyers. Here is indicated no diminution of Japan's naval strength, and, clearly, if in previous engagements or bombardments her fleet has suffered damage, it has been speedily and effectively repaired. It is fortunate that there are now comparatively few civilian inhabitants left in Port Arthur. Even for the sailors and soldiers who form the garrison the prospect of the next few hours is not a particularly pleasant one, for another bombardment is clearly intended, there is every chance that it will be skilfully conducted, and not much hope that it can be usefully replied to.

Yet Admiral Makaroff rises finely to the occasion. As soon as the enemy's ships are descried on the horizon, he gives an order which must cause something of a thrill among all concerned. The Russian Fleet is to weigh anchor and leave the harbour! The process commences at seven o'clock, the cruisers leading, with the *Askold*, flying Admiral Makaroff's flag, at their head, and the battleships following. It is afterwards reported by Admiral Togo himself that, during the bombardment, there are five Russian battleships, four cruisers, and several destroyers outside Port Arthur, and this circumstance cannot but reflect the very highest credit upon the Russian Admiral. The latter's flag is hoisted on a cruiser which a few weeks back lay sinking in the inner harbour, several of the battleships have been hardly less seriously damaged, and yet Makaroff has not only a respectable squadron at his disposal, but, further, like the brave and sagacious sailor that he is, prefers to move them out into the roadstead rather than leave them inside the harbour, whence they can only fire blindly at the enemy. In the history of naval warfare the extraordinary vigour displayed by Admiral Makaroff in patching up a terribly knocked about squadron, and his resolute exit from Port Arthur at its head on March 22nd, will always rank as an interesting performance, and one not without its lesson to those who underrate the difficulty of putting a well-built warship permanently out of action.

We left Admiral Togo bringing his splendid fleet within long range of Port Arthur, and have now to note his arrangements for the coming bombardment. This time he despatches part of the fleet in the direction of Pigeon Bay, which, as will be seen from the bird's-eye view of Port Arthur on page 106, lies on the west side of the Liau-ti-shan peninsula, a little to the north of the Light-house. The battleships *Fuji* and *Yashima* are ordered to make an indirect bombardment from the direction of Liau-ti-shan against the inner side of the port, and only 12-inch guns are to be used.

The bombardment lasts until after noon, and one hundred shells are fired at Port Arthur, and about the same number at the environs of the town. The Russian battleships return the fire over the Liau-ti-shan promontory, and make very fair practice, for many of their shells fall near the *Fuji*, without, however, doing any damage.

At three o'clock the Japanese Fleet withdraws, having, it is said, knocked some more holes in the forts, and destroyed certain electrical works in connection with the searchlights. The

"THE JAPANESE ARE COMING"—A SCENE AT THE SIGNAL STATION ON GOLDEN HILL AT PORT ARTHUR.

latter object, if achieved, is a useful one, but in a place so well stocked with machinery as Port Arthur, the searchlights are not likely to be all dependent on one source of supply, and in any case the loss is not irreparable. In fine, the actual mischief done does not appear commensurate with the effort made, unless it be true that the Japanese in the recent bombardments have been firing Russian shells which they have appropriated from a Russian transport.

Another, but a shorter, respite for the much-tried Port Arthur garrison follows, and it is not until the early morning of Sunday, March 27th, that the enemy reappears. It is only half-past three, and it is still dark when a flotilla of Japanese destroyers is revealed at about two miles from the harbour entrance in company with four steamers, each of about 2,000 tons burthen.

It will enable the succeeding narrative to be easily followed and understood if at this point we hie back to the attempt made on February 24th, and described in Chapter V., to seal up Port Arthur by sinking old merchant vessels at the entrance. That attempt, it will be remembered, failed, but the result was by no means discouraging. At any rate, Admiral Togo thinks the experiment worth repeating, and there are hundreds of willing volunteers for the dangerous duty of piloting the "sinkers" to their places. It is said that on the last occasion 2,000 Japanese bluejackets offered themselves, sending in their applications written, according to an old Samurai custom, in their own blood. There is plenty of the same spirit left, and, when it becomes known that another attempt is to be made, those who escaped on the last occasion by the skin of their teeth now clamour to be re-employed, and passionately urge their "claims" to be selected. Admiral Togo gives way as regards the officers, whose precise knowledge of the exact spots to be picked out for sinking the next batch of ships is naturally valuable. But fresh crews of petty officers and men are chosen, and some modification is made as regards the class of merchantmen selected. Evidently with a view to giving those concerned in the attempt a better chance of working to the right spots, ships not quite so old are prepared for the operation, and on one of them a Hotchkiss quick-firer is placed in the hope of doing a little extra damage at the outset to a Russian destroyer. The names of the merchantmen selected are *Chiyo Maru*, *Fukui Maru*, *Yahiko Maru*, and *Yoneyma Maru*.

As some indication of the spirit animating the Japanese Navy in these dare-devil attempts, we may usefully borrow from a Japanese newspaper the report of an impressive scene which preceded the departure on one of the "sinkers" of a contingent of five volunteers selected from the crew of the *Asama*. In the presence of all the crew, assembled on the upper deck, Captain Yatsushiro brought out a large silver bowl presented to him by the Crown Prince. He filled it with water, drank with each of the five volunteers, and made a speech, of which the following is an official translation:—

"In ordering you to this mission, which will almost certainly be fatal, I feel as I would if I were sending my beloved children to their death. Yet had I a hundred children, I could not but wish that they might all have the privilege of going upon such an heroic errand, or had I but one child I would

equally desire that he might be chosen to face death in the performance of such a glorious duty. You, my brave comrades, have been chosen for this duty, and I adjure you to work, even when wounded and maimed, still work to the end. Above all, never fail in strict and solely for use in case of wounds or injury. Remember, you represent the *Asama*, and do not forget that it would be a disgrace to have it said that men from the *Asama* risked their lives under the incitement of wine. I shall long for the glorious moment when you may



Photo: R. J. W. Haines.

OFFICERS AND CREW OF THE *ASAMA*.

prompt obedience to the orders of your commander. I do not need to say that you should be ready to give your lives for honour and duty, and that while you should not think of gaining fame by sacrificing yourselves needlessly, you should not shrink from death in the performance of duty. I give you wine to take with you, not to be drunk for the stimulation of your courage, but return to us, if the Almighty so decrees, after the successful fulfilment of your duty, and when we may testify our joy by drinking to you in the wine you now take with you. Go, therefore, my brave comrades, with perfect faith in the grace of heaven and courageous submission to the will of God, perform with serene confidence the task entrusted to you."

The united Japanese squadron leaves

its base for Port Arthur on March 26th, the merchantmen being escorted by a flotilla consisting of the destroyers *Shirakumo*, *Kasumi*, *Asashio*, *Akatsuki*, *Akebono*, *Oboro*, *Inazuma*, *Ikadzuchi*, *Usugomo*, *Sazanami*, and *Shimonome*, and the torpedo-boats *Karigane*, *Aodaka*, *Misasagi*, *Tsubame*, *Managuru*, and *Hato*. The moon is shining during the earlier hours of the night, but towards midnight it is obscured, and it is in utter darkness that, in the immediate neighbourhood of Port Arthur, the four merchantmen and the torpedo flotilla alone advance towards the harbour entrance.

The great searchlight on Golden Hill is working, and at about two miles from the entrance the white streak falls upon the intruders. To use the words of the graphic narrative furnished by the *Times* correspondent, the Russian watch is roused to suspicion, the searchlight beam sweeps backwards and forwards in frenzied agitation, the surprise is at an end. A solitary gun flashes, and immediately the garrison and land batteries spring to the guns.

"In three minutes," says the writer quoted, "the Japanese craft are enclosed in a semi-circle of gun flashes as the concentrated fire of the forts and the picket destroyers pours into them. The sea all round is churned into a turmoil by the striking shell. But there is no hesitation. The torpedo escort opens out to allow the transports through. The officers of the latter, their eyes glued to their points, with the men standing to their stations at the lifeboats, steer directly into the inferno of screaming, rushing shell-fire."

The *Chiyo Maru* leads the way, and, with the searchlight full upon her, and amid a hail of shell, makes for the eastern entrance, and casts anchor about 100 yards from the western beach of Golden Hill. The fuse is set, the crew and the engineers clamber into the lifeboat, and a few minutes after they have pushed off the charge in the hold explodes, and the *Chiyo Maru* sinks in the appointed place.

The *Fukui Maru* steers to the left of the *Chiyo Maru*, and is about to anchor well in the fairway when she is met by the Russian destroyer *Silni*, and torpedoed. A warrant officer named Sugino is actually below setting the fuse when the Russian torpedo strikes the steamer, and he is killed by the explosion. In charge of the *Fukui Maru* is Commander Hirose, who distinguished himself by his cool gallantry in sinking the *Hokoku Maru* on the occasion of the previous attempt to block the harbour. He took the *Hokoku Maru* furthest up the entrance to Port Arthur, and, when the ship was beginning to sink, he remembered that he had left his sword on the bridge, and returned and secured it, just escaping the suction as the ship sank. For his fine display of courage on that occasion he was promoted Commander, and he now proceeds, at the cost of his life, to win fresh laurels by an act of still more splendid heroism.

The *Fukui Maru* is settling visibly after the torpedo explosion, and Commander Hirose has given the word to his crew to take to the lifeboat. He then discovers that Sugino is not present, and three times he searches through the sinking ship for the missing warrant-officer. At last, finding the endeavour hopeless, he joins the others in the boat. But the delay has been dangerous, and the boat rows away under a hot fire from the enemy. A shell strikes the gallant officer on the head, and the greater part of his body is blown away, only a

mangled portion of flesh remaining in the boat. This mournful relic of a glorious deed is afterwards interred in Japan with much ceremonial, and the name of Hirose remains ennobled in the fighting annals of his country. It is a gracious supplement to this record that, when the Russians subsequently found what was believed to be Commander Hirose's body, they buried it with full naval honours, mindful both of the heroism of the deceased and of a similar act of respect performed by the Japanese towards the dead bodies found on the Russian *Varyag* after the action off Chemulpo.

INNOCENT VICTIMS OF THE BOMBARDMENT AT PORT ARTHUR: JAPANESE SHELL FALLING AMONG CHINESE FISHING-BOATS IN THE HARBOUR.

Reverting to the actual work in hand, the *Yahiko Maru* steers to the left of the *Fukui Maru* and blows up. Hitherto all has passed off as arranged, in spite of the vigorous opposition encountered. Although two Russian gunboats and a destroyer are engaged, in addition to the forts, three out of the four merchantmen have been steadily guided to the points selected, and successfully sunk either by their own crews or with the enemy's assistance. But now a hitch occurs. The *Yoneyma Maru* reaches the harbour entrance and fouls the stern of the Russian destroyer. The latter opens fire with a six-pounder, and at such close quarters are the two vessels that the Japanese are actually scorched by the flame of the discharge. Notwithstanding this collision, the *Yoneyma Maru* succeeds

in gaining the middle of the fairway, when she is struck by an enemy's torpedo. The momentum brings her towards the left shore, and she sinks sideways, with her bows towards the western side of the entrance. This means that a considerable space is still left between the *Yakiko Maru* and the *Yoneyma Maru*, and that, to this extent, the attempt to block the entrance has failed. There can, however, be no question as to the ability with which the plan was conceived, or the magnificent steadiness and superb self-devotion with which it was carried out.

Among the various incidents of this stirring performance the tale of the gallant deed of Lieutenant Masaki, who commanded the *Yoneyma Maru*, deserves to be specially mentioned as a pendant to Commander Hirose's splendid endeavour to save Sugino. The story is finely told by Mr. Douglas Young, the special correspondent of the *Daily Express*, who interviewed, at Kobe, some of the men who took part in the sinking of the merchantmen. Mr. Young first mentions that Masaki was struck on the ear by a splinter just as his ship was entering the Port Arthur roadstead. He still stuck to his post on the bridge, and after fouling the *Silni*—the Jap sailors say he tried to run her down—he was thrown out of his course. According to Admiral Togo's report, just quoted, this was due to the momentum given to the vessel by a torpedo, and the account given by Mr. Young differs in this and one or two other details which, however, are not essential. As the *Yoneyma Maru* struggled on, "the forts on Golden Hill opened fire on the doomed merchantman, while the men on board got everything ready to blow her up when she reached the desired position. At this moment Lieutenant Shimada was hit by a shell, and fell desperately wounded. Masaki, with blood streaming from his shattered face, proceeded to anchor. Then a Russian shell hit the funnel, smashing it to pieces. Masaki was struck again by a splinter in the shoulder, but he manfully held to his command.

"Everything was now ready for blowing up the vessel. The crew took to the boats, Lieutenant Masaki being the last to leave. They were clear away when the intrepid commander decided to recover the supposed corpse of Lieutenant Shimada. He returned to the *Yoneyma Maru*, and found that his comrade was still living.

"Amid shouts of encouragement, he placed the wounded man in a small boat, and rowing with his uninjured arm, with Shimada's head resting on his knee, succeeded in rejoining the other boats. A few minutes later the *Yoneyma Maru* blew up, while the Japanese sang a war song.

"This singing nearly proved their undoing, for, guided by the sound, the Russians discovered the whereabouts of the boats, and poured in a volley of shot and shell.

"But the gallant Japs escaped, and, successfully keeping out of the beams of the Russian searchlights, drifted about until, guided by their war song, a Japanese torpedo-boat picked them up."

It is a complete marvel that any of the crews of the sunk merchantmen should have escaped. The actual casualty list includes Commander Hirose and three petty officers, including Sugino, killed; a lieutenant mortally wounded; and a lieutenant, an engineer, and six petty officers and men slightly wounded. All the rest of the crews are safely picked up by the Japanese destroyers which, throughout the proceedings, have been displaying signal daring in support of the attempt

to sink the merchantmen. Notably the *Aodaka* and *Tsubame* merit and receive the special commendation of Admiral Togo by penetrating to within about a mile from the harbour entrance. Here they encounter the Russian destroyer *Silni*, into whose boilers a Japanese shell finds its way, causing a violent escape of steam and the subsequent stranding of the vessel on a reef.

At daybreak the Japanese torpedo flotilla withdraws to the shelter of the main Japanese fleet, which is waiting ten miles away. One can imagine the interest with which Admiral Togo receives the report of his brave assistants, and the pride, mingled with a shade of disappointment, with which he listens to the stirring tale of a fine piece of work all but successfully accomplished. It is noteworthy that in dealing with this particular attempt Admiral Togo's own report is singularly full and detailed. In reference to most of his own impressive performances the Admiral has hitherto been curiously laconic. "As previously arranged, the fleet arrived at Port Arthur on such-and-such a date, and bombarded it from — a.m. to — p.m. Our ships sustained no damage," is the gist of most of Togo's previous communications. But in dealing with the attempts to block the harbour entrance, and particularly with this one, the Admiral "lets himself go" a little, and becomes quite enthusiastic, more particularly with reference to Commander Hirose. Evidently the whole performance is one which appeals to him strongly. He is further, of course, not unmindful of the desirableness of encouraging officers and men on whom he may yet again have to call for similar displays of reckless courage and cool steadiness.

While the Japanese emerge from this morning's work covered with glory, and rejoicing in some measure of success, the Russians have much to their credit both in the matter of vigilance, and by reason of a very fine individual exhibition of fighting quality. When the enemy's torpedo flotilla and the accompanying merchantmen were discovered by the searchlight on Golden Hill, there were two gunboats the *Bobr* and *Otwajny*, and the destroyer *Silni*, on guard duty. The two former, which had taken the place of the battleship *Retvisan*, joined with the forts in shelling the intruders, but the *Silni*, commanded by Lieutenant Krinitzki, took a still more active part. As has already been noted, this vessel ran out to meet the merchantmen, and torpedoed first the *Fukui Maru*, and afterwards the *Yoneyma Maru*, preventing by the latter proceeding the full accomplishment of the Japanese design. Subsequently the *Silni* found itself opposing single-handed the bulk of the enemy's torpedo flotilla, and eventually, as we have seen, she came to grief in an encounter with the *Aodaka* and *Tsubame*. Lieutenant Krinitzki, though wounded, stuck manfully to his post, and eventually succeeded in getting off his stranded vessel and entering the harbour.

About half-past five on the morning of March 27th the Japanese fleet approached the Port Arthur roadstead, doubtless in order to verify the reports concerning the sunk steamers. The forts on the "Tiger's Tail" opened fire, and the Russian Fleet also steamed out boldly, lined up in the roadstead at about nine o'clock, and fired a few shots at the enemy, who presently drew off in a south-easterly direction, and by ten had disappeared from the horizon.

On March 29th the garrison of Port Arthur celebrated the sixth anniversary of the Russian occupation, the day being

marked by a religious service and a military review. There have been a good many military reviews held, especially by Russian troops, in this great stronghold of the Far East, but none, perhaps, more suggestive of a strange variety of reflections than this. Yet we may be sure that Great White Tsar himself were commanding in person.

Yet there are constant anxieties. Admiral Makaroff, in spite of his gallant bearing, is subject to them, and personally supervises every night the measures taken to prevent a surprise. Repeatedly

THE GREAT WHITE TSAR.

no trace of apprehension as to the future, no diminution of soldierly pride, no lack of parade smartness coupled with the hard-set look of fighting efficiency which comes of a considerable spell of active service, is observable among the Russian troops on this memorable occasion. Pride and self-confidence hall-mark Russian military ceremonial at all times, and in such circumstances as these it is the clear duty of all concerned to present as brave and impressive an appearance as if the

he sleeps in his clothes, and on Easter Eve he spends the night in a guard-boat, as there is strong belief, subsequently proved to be groundless, that a great Japanese attack will be delivered that evening. The usual Easter night service in the church is held, but the windows of the building are carefully blocked, and after the service those who have attended it must find their way to their homes in utter darkness.

The incidental gossip of Port Arthur

A DUMB VICTIM: THE EFFECT OF A SHELL AT PORT ARTHUR.

during this period is not without interest, and comprises a number of incidents, grave and gay, which indicate the presence of a certain amount of movement and interchange of ideas. The local paper, the *Novi Krai*, still makes its appearance, but begs to be excused for occasional irregularity, owing to a tendency on the part of the Chinese, who work the presses, to fly for shelter as soon as a bombardment begins. That the *Novi Krai*, in spite of such drawbacks, can provide capital descriptive fare, may be gathered from the following extract from its columns, sent by Reuter's correspondent at St. Petersburg as a testimony to the behaviour of the cruiser *Bayan* during the bombardment of March 22nd :—

" The bursting shells bowled over man after man until the decks were slippery with blood. Amidst this hell the captain stood unmoved in the conning tower, calmly telephoning his orders to the captains of the guns. His wonderful coolness had a remarkable influence on all the officers.

" The cockpit was soon crowded with wounded, thirty-nine men being brought down before the fight ended.

" Amid the crash of the guns, the hiss of the flying projectiles, and the thunder of their explosions, the smashing of splinters, and the din of the working engines, the surgeons laboured quietly among the wounded on the hospital operating table. Although some of the men suffered frightful agony, few groans were heard, in spite of the fact that anæsthetics were only administered in one case.

" When the battle ended and the enemy began to draw off, the officers on the bridge cheered. The cheering extended down to the hold, the stokers and even the wounded joining in. The captain signalled ' Full speed ahead ! ' after the retreating Japanese, but he had not gone far before the flagship signalled the *Bayan* to return."

Here is another little bit of local talk about that same bombardment, which is not without interest. When the Russian squadron was returning to port after its sortie, repeated rifle shots were heard in the direction of Pigeon Bay, and Admiral Makaroff, thinking that probably the Japanese were attempting a landing there, sent a messenger hurriedly to make inquiries. It transpired that the sounds of firing came from some ranges at which a Russian battalion commandant was calmly putting his men through rifle practice, " without paying any attention whatever to the bombardment ! "

The Paris correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* tells a very romantic story with a tragic ending, which must have been current about this time in Port Arthur. Among the men of a Siberian regiment stationed here " was a soldier named Liatnikoff, who was popular with his comrades, but was often ' chaffed ' about his effeminate appearance. He had been selected as servant by a young officer at whose quarters he lodged. One unlucky day, while he was on an errand, he fell and broke a leg. Liatnikoff expressed a very strong wish not to be taken to the hospital, and as he was being conveyed thither he took a penknife out of his pocket and deliberately severed an artery in his left arm. As the soldier on his arrival there was being undressed to be put to bed the surgeons, to their amazement, perceived that he was not what he had represented himself to be. Liatnikoff, in fact, was a beautiful girl barely eighteen years of age. Blood-poisoning supervened, and

the patient had only been three days in the hospital when all hope of recovery had to be abandoned. The young woman sent for the officer in whose service she had been, and implored him to marry her, reminding him that it was her devotion to him which had led her to pass herself off as a man in order that she might follow him to the Far East. His brother officers are also said to have pleaded her cause, but for some unexplained reason he would not listen to them. As soon, however, as he had heard of the death of the poor girl who had loved him so well, he returned to his quarters and blew out his brains."

On March 31st Admiral Alexeieff pays a brief visit to Port Arthur, and is received in great state by Admiral Makaroff, Generals Stoessel and Smirnoff, and all the civil and military authorities. He visits the warships *Petropavlosk*, *Pallada*, *Retvisan*, and *Tsarevitch*, and presents the captains of the *Bayan*, *Novik*, and *Askold* with gold swords of honour, adorned with the ribbon of the Order of St. George, and the inscription 'For Gallantry."

Easter and the first week of April at Port Arthur thus pass without untoward occurrence, and with doubtless some tendency to restored confidence on the part of the garrison. Admiral Makaroff is proving the saviour of a situation which looked far gloomier in some respects a few weeks back than it does now. What he has done at Port Arthur, too, is evidently appreciated at home, for strenuous efforts are being made to comply with his request for more torpedo craft, which are being despatched in sections by the railway, and with the help of which the gallant Admiral may possibly some dark night succeed in levelling Admiral Togo's fleet with his own. At any rate, there is no harm in hoping, and hopefulness reigns accordingly. But one of Fate's great ironies is in store for Port Arthur, which is soon to be sadly awakened from its passing dream of an early triumph for its unfortunate squadron.



ADMIRAL ALEXEIEFF REVIEWING TROOPS AT PORT ARTHUR.



Photo: C. Cozens, Southsea.

LINE OF SIX OBSERVATION MINES READY FOR LAYING OUT. THE MEN ARE JOINING UP THE ELECTRIC CABLE

CHAPTER XV.

MINING AT MIDNIGHT—A SKILFUL RUSE—THE RUSSIAN FLEET DECOYED OUT TO SEA—AN EXCITING CHASE—AN AWFUL CATASTROPHE — A FEARFUL BLOW FOR RUSSIA—A THREE DAYS' ENGAGEMENT

AT midnight, on April 12th, sleepers at Port Arthur are awakened by the now familiar roar of cannon, which betokens the detection by the searchlights of a hostile approach at the entrance to the harbour. Many have now become so accustomed to these alarms that they treat the disturbance with comparative indifference, although to the older heads in the garrison it may occur that of late the attentions of the Japanese Fleet have been growing increasingly serious, and that possibly here may be the beginning of that grand attack which was foreshadowed for Easter, and which, in any case, is not likely to be long delayed.

In the forts themselves the excitement is undoubtedly keen. Four searchlights are working, and the scene which they partially reveal is one which is highly suggestive of a more than usually vigorous attempt on the part of the enemy to wreak some particular mischief on Port Arthur. In all there are, perhaps, a dozen torpedo craft within the space swept by the searchlights—from the official Japanese report it appears that three flotillas, two of destroyers and one of torpedo boats, were engaged in this enterprise—and with them is a much larger vessel, which is evidently engaged on some special business, though precisely what it is not easy to discover amid all the fuss and fury

that are now raging. Shells by scores are dropping into the water all round this vessel as she moves swiftly about the roadstead, but she bears a charmed life, for she is evidently undamaged when, her mysterious errand accomplished, she runs out to sea.

Anticipating the official reports, it may now conveniently be stated that this strange visitor which has ventured thus boldly—for her bulk is considerable, and it is said that the concentrated beams of the four searchlights show up her every spar and rail—is a new addition to the Navy of Japan, the *Koryo Maru*, a torpedo transport of 2,700 tons. Her description and her present mission correspond with those of the ill-fated *Yenisei*, the Russian ship which sank on February 11th at the entrance to Talien Bay.

For the work on which the *Koryo Maru* has been engaged is that of laying mines under the special direction of Captain Oda, who was recently decorated by the Mikado for his invention of a process said to increase greatly the efficiency of these instruments. Incidentally it may be mentioned that, according to the Tokio correspondent of the *Daily Express*, the mines carried on board the *Koryo Maru* are filled with an explosive purely Japanese in origin, claimed to be far more powerful than lyddite, mélinite, or any other existing explosive, and to be effective under conditions in which most explosives are useless. It is the invention of a former professor at the Tokio University, Dr. Shimose, who devoted twenty years to experimental work in connection with explosives, and whose name, with that of Captain Oda, certainly deserves record in connection with the episode of which the *Koryo Maru's* performance at Port Arthur is the opening chapter.

Before leaving the *Koryo Maru* it must be noticed that her commander's work, like that of the heroes who sunk the merchantmen, has been most methodically and skilfully carried out, in spite of the terrific fire to which she has been subjected. On previous occasions the Japanese have made most careful observations of the manner in which the Russian ships have left and re-entered the harbour, and they have come to the conclusion that a certain course is habitually steered in order to avoid the mines which the Russians themselves have laid for the protection of the entrance. The *Koryo Maru* naturally takes equal care to shun the Russian mine area, but she leaves several deadly mementoes of her own visit along the course which the Russian vessels have been seen to steer. One mine in particular is dropped to the south-east of Golden Hill, a mile outside the harbour entrance.

After the *Koryo Maru* has run out again to sea, one of the destroyer flotillas, which has been covering her performance, discovers, towards morning, a Russian destroyer, the *Strasny*, which is evidently making for Port Arthur from Dalny. The Fates are unkind indeed to this poor little vessel, which has no chance whatever against three or four ships of her own class and of, at least, equal speed and fighting weight. Pursuit and interception follow, the six-pounders of the Japanese destroyers converge on the one frail hull, and in ten minutes the Russian ship is sinking. The Jap sailors are endeavouring to save the unfortunate men when, in the dim light, the big Russian cruiser *Bayan* is discerned coming swiftly in this direction, and, as dawn will render her quick-firers fatal to the Japanese destroyers, the latter are compelled to abandon the work of rescue.

After this rather dramatic introduction we may take breath, and endeavour to discover the *raison d'être* of this new enterprise on Admiral Togo's part, and, at the same time, to correlate any further measures he may be taking in what will prove to be a great historical event. In this we are assisted by the despatches of the Special Correspondent of the *Times*, who, with the aid of his despatch-boat, the *Haimun*, and an extremely effective system of wireless telegraphy, renders particularly brilliant service to his paper and the public at this juncture.

It appears that Admiral Togo, having ascertained that the entrance to Port Arthur is still practicable, has evolved the following new scheme for the destruction of the Russian Fleet. The first step is to be the mining of the practicable passage into the harbour, the next the setting of a lure in the shape of a weak squadron outside the port in order to entice the Russians out. Admiral Togo himself, taking advantage of the fogs on the coast, intends to lie off with the main Japanese Fleet, and pounce upon the Russians at sea if they succeed in getting clear of the mines.

We have seen how the first step was accomplished by the *Koryo Maru*, and now, thanks mainly to the *Times* correspondent, who adds many interesting details to Admiral Togo's official report, we are enabled to follow pretty closely the preceding and succeeding course of events.

The Japanese must have left their base on the 11th, as Admiral Togo states that on that day the "combined fleet commenced, as previously planned, the eighth attack upon Port Arthur." The *Koryo Maru* and her attendant torpedo craft reached Port Arthur, as already narrated, at midnight on the 12th, and immediately covering them were two first-class and four second-class cruisers, constituting the Third Fleet, or the Decoying Squadron, of the ensuing narrative. From a map, perhaps the most remarkable of its kind ever published, which was printed in the *Times* of April 21st from materials transmitted by cable from Wei-hai-wei, it is clear that the ships in this squadron were the armoured cruisers *Tokiwa* and *Asama*, and the second-class cruisers *Chitose*, *Takasago*, *Yoshino*, and *Kasagi*.

At 4.30 a.m. on April 13th the *Times* steamer is nearing Port Arthur in dirty, rainy weather, when it comes in view of the remainder of the Japanese combined fleet steering a course similar to that which the *Haimun* is taking.

Here in "line ahead" are the six great battleships of the Japanese Navy, the *Mikasa*, Admiral Togo's flagship, which he has only left for a few minutes during the past two months, leading. Following are the *Asahi*, *Fuji*, *Yashima*, *Hatsuse*, and *Shikishima*, these six splendid vessels forming the First Fleet. In rear comes the Second Fleet, comprising, also in line ahead, six first-class cruisers, the third and fourth being the two new ships, the *Kasuga* and *Nisshin*, which were bought from the Argentine Government, and are now making, it is authoritatively announced, their first public appearance.

Forty miles from Port Arthur the *Times* correspondent sees the *Kasuga* and *Nisshin* suddenly join the battleships, the other four cruisers of the Second Fleet remaining behind, with a destroyer division and a despatch-boat maintaining communication. The six battleships and the two new cruisers now go forward at full steam.

We must now return to the Third

or Decoying Fleet, which appears outside Port Arthur at about 8 a.m. on the 13th, just as the three destroyers of the Second Flotilla has sunk the Russian destroyer *Silni* and evaded the cruiser *Bayan*. The latter vessel, noticing the approach of the Japanese cruisers, now turns her attention to them, and with *Bayan*, which has been signalled to return, form up in line, and hurry at full steam against the enemy, at the same time opening a long-range fire.

The Third Japanese Fleet, which is commanded by Admiral Dewa, now proceeds to enact to perfection its part of decoy. Tardily answering the Russian



Photo: *Symonds, Portsmouth.*

THE QUARTER DECK OF THE *ASAHI*.

notable gallantry her commander engages the hostile squadron single-handed.

Naturally, these movements have been duly observed in the harbour, whence Admiral Makaroff now sallies forth with the *Petropavlosk*—which he uses on this occasion as his flagship—the *Pobieda*, *Poltava*—also battleships—and the *Novik*, *Diana*, and *Askold*. These, with the fire, and gradually retiring, it entices the enemy some fifteen miles south-east of the port, having meanwhile apprised the First Fleet, by means of wireless telegraphy, of the course of events. Here, it may be said, ends the second chapter of this remarkable episode, and the opportunity may be utilised for a few remarks upon a situation which is not only full of

RUSSIAN NAVAL TYPE.

dramatic possibilities, but also exceedingly instructive and interesting from a variety of standpoints.

Taking the Japanese point of view first, the use of wireless telegraphy in this connection is of engrossing importance, and it would be difficult to imagine a set of circumstances in which the new power thus placed in the hands of naval commanders could be more effectively illustrated. Here we have two squadrons between which ordinary communication has been lost for many hours. Both are at sea, and the distance between them at the time the wireless telegram announcing the pursuit by the Russian Fleet is despatched cannot be less than some thirty-five miles. The weather is dirty, and even from the tallest mainmast in one squadron the keenest eye glued to the finest telescope could not discern the smoke ascending from the other squadron's funnels. Yet the wireless message is as promptly taken up and acted upon as if it had been shouted through a megaphone over a distance of a few score yards. The result might have been the same had the distance been far greater, for, in the cases of the *Times* despatch-boat, messages are recorded as having been successfully despatched over an intervening space of 150 sea miles, and, though equal distances have not yet been covered by wireless telegrams between two vessels at sea, it may be regarded as certain that the Japanese Fleets were working well within the limit of their capacity in this interesting connection.

While, in any case, wireless telegraphy is thus shown to be of signal service in naval operations where reinforcements are urgently required, our admiration of Japanese ingenuity is sensibly increased by their brilliant adoption of this up-to-date method of communication in the execution of a most thoughtful and wary manœuvre. The more one looks into this plan of decoying out the Russian Fleet with an inferior force and then summoning a far larger fleet to assist in forcing an engagement on favourable terms—putting aside the subsidiary device of mining what is left of the fairway into the harbour—the more one is struck with the directness and sufficiency which seem to mark all Admiral Togo's tactics, and which of themselves seem to constitute a model method of warfare where such an unstable element as the sea is concerned. For the rest, the operation, from the Japanese standpoint, has been no more complicated or less successful than several which have preceded it, although one may safely imagine that, when



Photos: Daziaro, St. Petersburg.

RUSSIAN NAVAL TYPE.

that wireless telegram reached the *Mikasa* about nine o'clock on the morning of April 13th, even the cool commander of the Japanese Fleet must have been strangely stirred by the possibilities—only partially to be realised—of the next few hours.

Let us now join the Russian Fleet as it steams its best after Admiral Dewa's retreating ships. The gallant Makaroff may well be proud of the show which his squadron makes, in spite of previous vicissitudes, this murky April morning. The largest vessel in it is the *Pobieda*, of nearly 13,000 tons, a nominal speed of 19 knots, and having a weight of broadside fire of over 2,500 lb. But the *Petropavlosk* and *Poltava*, which are sister ships, are also powerful vessels of some 11,000 tons, a nominal speed of 17 knots, and a weight of broadside fire some 800 lb. heavier than that of the *Pobieda*.



THE *PETROPAVLOSK*.

The *Bayan*, too, is a fine armoured cruiser of nearly 8,000 tons, a nominal speed of nearly 22 knots, and, for a fast cruiser, a powerful armament.

In view of subsequent happenings it is interesting to note that the *Pobieda* is well-known in this country, for she was one of the foreign warships which came to Spithead in 1902 to do honour to King Edward on the date originally fixed for the Coronation. She visited Portland, too, in December, 1902, when outward bound to the Far East.

Still greater interest is attached to the *Petropavlosk*, named after the harbour in the White Sea which the Allies attacked unsuccessfully in the war of 1854-5. She is described as in some respects a small copy of our *Royal Sovereign* class —a very expensive copy, too, for, with her guns and her engines, which were of British manufacture, she cost over a million sterling.

Admiral Makaroff, who has a fancy for changing his flagship, is, as has been stated, on board the *Petropavlosk*, which is commanded by Captain Yakovlev, and has a complement of about 700 all told. The Grand Duke Cyril, the son of the Grand Duke Vladimir, is present on the ship, which has on board a distinguished non-combatant in the person of Vassili Verestchagin, the well-known war painter. This famous artist, at the age of sixty-two, has come to the Far East to get material for future pictures, and only arrived at Port Arthur a day or two ago. He has asked to be shown a sea-fight, and is on board the *Petropavlosk* by direct invitation of Admiral Makaroff.

The gallant Admiral himself has reason to be in good spirits. Only last evening he is said to have telegraphed to his Imperial Master that he hoped almost immediately to fight a decisive action with the enemy's fleet, and a chance has arisen, with almost startling suddenness, of realising this anticipation. Possibly emboldened by their previous successes, the Japanese have this time sent but a weak cruiser squadron against Port Arthur, and, if only he can come up with it, he may be able, with the considerable force at his disposal, severely to punish, if not to annihilate these rash intruders.

It is quite likely that such an experienced and sagacious sailor as Makaroff has some misgivings as to the appearance of the Japanese Navy in such small force on this occasion. He knows what manner of man Admiral Togo is, and, since he came to Port Arthur, he has received more than one reminder of Japanese craftiness. Yet there is something quite natural about the behaviour of this cruiser squadron, which may well have lost touch with the main fleet by faulty timing, or through a score of accidents which may occur in dirty weather. Hope runs high, but none the less vigilant watch is kept on the horizon for any speck or sign that may indicate the presence within dangerous proximity of a superior enemy.

Suddenly the wind freshens, and the mist which hangs over the sea is partially dispelled. Sharp eyes descry what is clearly smoke, for which the chase is not responsible, and the ruse is guessed. A signal is run up on the *Petropavlosk*, and the Russian Fleet, till now in pursuit, puts about and makes for Port Arthur at full steam.

In chase at their utmost speed come the six battleships of Admiral Togo's squadron, together with the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*, which, as we have seen from the

narrative of an eye-witness, must have been signalled to join the battleships as soon as the Admiral received his wireless message from the Third Fleet. For a short time the reinforcing squadron may have remained wholly shrouded by the mist, but the dispersal of the latter at a critical moment is a cruel blow to Admiral Togo's hopes. The chance of overtaking the flying Russian Fleet is slender, but the effort is made, and a glorious spectacle it must have afforded. On the Russian side the *Petropavlosk* still leads, the *Bayan* and *Novik* bringing up the rear. The Japanese apparently pursue in two lines, the leading one composed of the five battleships *Mikasa*, *Asahi*, *Fuji*, *Yashima*, and *Hatsuse*, with the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga* a little to the right, or, to speak nautically, on their starboard beam. On the port quarter — in other words, to the rear and a little to the left—of the *Hatsuse* comes the battleship *Shikishima* leading the second line, which is composed of the four second-class cruisers of the Decoying Squadron. The *Asama* and the *Tokiwa*, are detached from the main force and take post considerably to the left, possibly for purposes of observation or to guard against a flank attack by torpedo craft. The battleships have hoisted their fighting flags, and are bowling along at 18 knots, a speed at which they must have overtaken the Russian squadron had the chase been a slightly longer one. But the fortune of war is in this respect unfavourable to Admiral Togo. The Russian ships have not been enticed out quite far enough, and the unlucky lifting of the mist has just given Admiral Makaroff time to win back to the shelter of the forts.

It is nearing half-past ten, when it becomes evident that the chase is over. The Russian ships are rapidly coming under the guns of the Golden Hill forts, and their pursuers are preparing to abandon the attempt to overtake them.

M. VASSILI VERESTCHAGIN

As shown in the *Times* map alluded to above, the Russian squadron is about to form single line, the battleships leading, for the purpose of entering the harbour. The *Petropavlosk* is within little more than a mile of the harbour entrance, and most of the ship's officers have gone down to breakfast. According to one account Admiral Makaroff himself is in his cabin, but another version speaks of him as being on the bridge with Captain Yakovlev, the Grand Duke Cyril, and the latter's aide-de-camp, Lieutenant von Kuke. Two officers of the watch are examining the harbour entrance preparatory to taking the flagship in at the head of the squadron. The *Petropavlosk* is covered with signal flags, the last signal made being for the torpedo-boats to enter the harbour.

Suddenly a fearful explosion takes place, followed by another. The *Petropavlosk* has run on one of the *Koryo Maru's* mines! Huge gaps are torn in the great warship's hull, the water rushes



PLAN INDICATING ADMIRAL TOGO'S STRATEGY WHICH DECOYED ADMIRAL MAKAROFF OVER THE JAPANESE FIELD OF MINES.

in, flames burst out on all sides, the vessel lists heavily, and, in an incredibly short time—two minutes, it is said—the flagship sinks with Admiral Makaroff and 700 souls aboard!

Here is the actual sinking described by an eye-witness who was watching the return of the Russian squadron from Golden Hill—

"Suddenly, in the forefront of the right side of the *Petropavlosk* a white column arises, a double, dull report is heard, and the entire vessel is swathed in curling clouds of orange-brown smoke. 'Broadside!' somebody exclaims. Through a field-glass one can discern the fall of many objects from aloft, the topmast shattered, and tongues of fire everywhere. 'She's sinking,' they tearfully cry around me. The *Petropavlosk* begins to settle down slowly, bow foremost, turning over on her right side. Now the bow is no longer visible, and the foremast is slowly descending, the roundhouse is still seen, and the chimneys are ful of water. Now they, too, have vanished, just as if they had dropped clean off.

GRAND DUKE CYRIL

"The other mast is now sinking. There is the turret, with the guns, going slowly beneath the surface, and there is the stern disappearing. Now the left screw is seen still slowly revolving, and human figures are discernible slipping down the side of the ship. All this soon gives place to tongues of fire; suddenly there is a last flare, and all is over. The *Petropavlosk* is no more!"

No effort of imagination is needed to picture the awful surroundings of this tragic catastrophe on the ship itself. Image after image of appalling dreadfulness forms in the mind's eye as one thinks of those tremendous two minutes and all that was packed into them. For most of those below swift and merciful suffocation must have brought about the end almost instantaneously, and one is thankful to be spared the painful thought of the gallant Makaroff battling for a period of protracted agony with certain death. But where a mine explosion is followed, as doubtless happened in this case, by the bursting of boilers and the blowing up of a well-stored magazine, there cannot but be many individual cases of terrible suffering. It is said that not a single man who was between decks at the time the explosion occurred succeeded in escaping. "The men on deck were thrown in all directions, those who fell into the water swimming and grasping the wreckage, which gradually rose to the surface from the vortex caused by

the sinking ship. The remainder of the squadron stopped and lowered their boats, while the torpedo-boats sped as quickly as possible to the rescue of the survivors." The Japanese would willingly have assisted in this humane task, and subsequently expressed their profound regret that they were prevented from doing so by the strong southerly wind which would have rendered it impossible for their boats to rejoin the squadron. About thirty only were saved, including the Grand Duke Cyril, who had an almost miraculous escape. The force of the explosion was such that Captain Yakovlev, who was thrown against a stanchion, was killed, but the Grand Duke Cyril, who was also hurled across the bridge, was only partially stunned, and being a fine swimmer he managed, after clearing the ship, to keep himself afloat until picked up. The painter Verestchagin was on deck when the explosion occurred, but it is surmised that, owing to his advanced age, he was powerless to save himself from the tremendous suction of the sinking vessel.

It is not surprising that this fearful catastrophe should have thrown the whole Russian line into confusion. The *Times* correspondent says that the vessels could be seen firing indiscriminately into the water in their immediate front, in the hope of destroying other hidden engines of destruction. This precaution notwithstanding, the battleship *Pobieda* runs on to a mine and is badly damaged, but manages nevertheless to crawl into the harbour with a large hole blown in her bow on the water-line, and three compartments filled with water.

Eventually the remainder of the Russian squadron, covered by the fire of the Golden Hill batteries, and favoured by the mist which still hangs about the harbour approaches, gains the inside of Port Arthur by noon. Shortly afterwards Admiral Togo withdraws his whole force, which retires in different directions, and, concentrating in the evening, anchors at sea within striking distance of Port Arthur. The wind has freshened into a gale, and night falls drearily and heavily on a day long to be sadly remembered as including one of the most grim and tragic episodes in the naval annals of the world.

It is difficult to describe the effect of this terrible catastrophe both on Russia and on the civilised world in general. The news of the disaster reached St. Petersburg on the morning of April 13th, but was withheld from the public until late in the evening. Owing to the Easter holidays the populace were in a merry-making mood, the Easter joybells were ringing cheerful peals, and there was no suspicion that anything untoward had happened. Towards evening the thronging of carriages before the palace of the Grand Duke Vladimir attracted attention, and the rumour began to spread that some calamity had occurred. Between eight and nine o'clock a brief official report was published, in which it was admitted that, apparently, Admiral Makaroff had perished, but no estimate was given of the number of lives lost. Even this attenuated account produced a feeling of stupefaction, and, as eye-witnesses remarked, it was painfully interesting to watch the holiday crowds issuing from the brilliantly-lighted booths, dancing saloons, and popular theatres, buying copies of the Government report, and then falling into gloomy little groups to discuss the disaster, the dimensions of which few were able at first to comprehend.

The Tsar himself was profoundly

affected by the sad intelligence, shedding copious tears when the details were communicated to him, and displaying the keenest solicitude for the bereaved Madame Makaroff, to whom an officer was sent in a special train with kind messages of Imperial condolence. The great Autocrat of all the Russias then commanded that the melancholy news should be given to the whole world, as he put it, and proceeded to arrange for a requiem service. In a despatch from St. Petersburg, sent on the evening of the 14th, the Special Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* gives a brief but vivid description of the impressive scene during the solemn ceremony in the spacious church of the Admiralty, near the banks of the Neva: "Within that vast temple the Marine Minister, the heads of the Staff, admirals and captains, the whole Diplomatic Corps, and the bowed figure of Madame Makaroff are gathered together amid lugubrious surroundings to offer the last tribute of respect to the heroic dead who perished thousands of miles away. Grey-bearded priests, garbed in black and silver, moving among the flickering wax tapers and dense clouds of incense, the melancholy chant of subdued lamentations, and the impressive words of the touching funeral service attune the hearts of all to sentiments of sympathy and sorrow. For Russia has been stricken, and as yet the bulk of the nation has not realised how terribly."

Throughout the Western world the news of the untimely death of the gallant Makaroff aroused feelings of the deepest regret, coupled with a singular volume of personal reminiscence tending to show how widely and thoroughly the late commander was both loved and esteemed. Seldom, indeed, has a soldier or a sailor of modern times passed to his rest amid a more universal chorus of respect and liking. While he could hardly be classed with naval leaders of the very first rank, it was recalled that his record was a very fine one, especially as regards eminence in the scientific branches of the naval profession. He had commanded both the Mediterranean and the Baltic squadrons, but to the world at large was better known, perhaps, as the author of several thoughtful works on naval tactics and construction, and as the designer of the "ice-breaker" *Yermak*.

It was in connection with the building of that remarkable vessel by the great Elswick firm on the banks of the Tyne that Admiral Makaroff became widely known to Englishmen, with whom he was a general favourite. His breezy heartiness of manner was, indeed, more characteristic of the English than of the Russian naval officer, and his hardihood and devotion to sport caused Alexander II. to refer to him, when quite a junior officer, as "my Englishman." A whole-souled, large-hearted man, he was adored by his brother officers, and when, in March, he left Nikolaieff railway station for the Far East, his tunic was found to have been completely stripped of its buttons by comrades who, in Russian fashion, had taken this means of capturing a parting souvenir. To the poor of St. Petersburg he was a generous friend, more lavish than his means justified in the distribution of largesse in the shape of small coins which he was wont to carry about in a special pocket for the purpose, a pocket which Madame Makaroff one day, with thrifty prudence, took pains to sew up. By the Russian sailors he was regarded with genuine reverence, and we have already seen how the Russian soldiery regarded him as

the reincarnation of the dead Skobeleff, under whom, by the way, Makaroff fought at Geok Tepé in the Turkoman campaign.

It is an interesting circumstance that Admiral Makaroff's death was genuinely deplored in Japan, where the satisfaction created by the very substantial success surrounding Admiral Togo's latest effort was restrained in a very marked degree, as far as public rejoicing was concerned, by the loss of such a gallant and distinguished adversary. At Nagoya, on the night of April 15th, this chivalrous sentiment found becoming outlet in a great and solemn procession, a thousand white lanterns for the souls of those drowned in the sinking of the *Petropavlosk* being carried by the crowd, while banners were held aloft bearing the inscription, "We sorrow unquenchably for the brave Russian Admiral Makaroff."

ADMIRAL TOGO

Let us now return for a brief space to Port Arthur, where, on the night of April 13th, we left the Russian Fleet

BEFORE THE BATTLE: A RUSSIAN PRAYER FOR SUCCESS.

sadly diminished, but otherwise secure in harbour, and Admiral Togo's three squadrons anchored at sea some distance from the fort.

On April 14th Admiral Togo resumed operations, three destroyer flotillas and a flotilla of torpedo-boats being sent forward at 3 a.m., followed three hours later by the "Third Fleet," which had acted as decoys on the previous morning. The Russian ships were not seen outside the fort. All efforts to draw them out proved unavailing, and even the forts declined to open fire.

On the morning of the 15th, Admiral Togo again brought his battle Fleet up to the fort, with the intention of making an effective demonstration. On arrival, three of the Russian mines were discovered and destroyed. At 10 a.m. the battleships took up a position opposite the roadstead, whence they could shell the Golden Hill and other batteries, while the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga* were detached and sent round to Pigeon Bay, in order to bombard a new fort on the west of the Liau-ti-shan Peninsula, and also to try anew the effect of high-angle fire on the inner harbour. The two new cruisers acquitted themselves admirably, silencing the new fort, and showing their armament to be in every way satisfactory. The bombardment, which continued intermittently until about one o'clock, was replied to by both the Russian ships and forts, but no damage was admitted by the Japanese.

"Thus ended," writes the *Times* Correspondent, "the three days' engagement which, in the opinion of most, has destroyed any faint hope which may have existed that the Russians might be able to equalise again the balance of naval power in these seas."

On the gravity of the misfortune to Russia there is no need to expatiate. But there is no question that this new disaster has considerably altered the complexion of affairs, has sadly damped Russia's expectations of any but military successes, and in many circles caused even the frank proposal to abandon Port Arthur to be regarded with very much greater tolerance than would have been accorded to the bare suggestion of such a possibility a few days back.

The Russian Government, however, maintains a bold front. Admiral Alexeieff himself proceeds to Port Arthur, and hoists his flag on the battleship *Sevastopol*, in supersession of Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky, who had taken over command of the squadron on Admiral Makaroff's death. Meanwhile, a successor to Makaroff has been substantively appointed in the person of Admiral Skrydloff, who was recently selected to lead the fleet which it is proposed to send from the Baltic to the Far East in August. Admiral Skrydloff is a bold and dashing officer, who is regarded in Russia as standing next to the late Admiral Makaroff in professional capacity. Like his predecessor, he has commanded the Russian Mediterranean Squadron, also the Black Sea Fleet, and he represented the Russian Navy at the Spithead Review, on the occasion of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee. Tall, bearded, and of commanding appearance, he is distinguished for brilliant gallantry in action. But it is understood that he does not intend to emulate Makaroff's daring tactics in the matter of sorties. He tells a French Correspondent who interviews him that his first care will be for the preservation of his ships, which he intends to keep jealously for a great occasion. "Between ourselves," he

adds, "I shall put as my address on my visiting cards 'Port Arthur and Vladivostok,' as I shall see my two squadrons, united or otherwise. I shall go about, in case of need, between Port Arthur and Vladivostok."

It is, perhaps, somewhat unfortunate that Admiral Skrydloff does not make any particular haste to take up his new command, but expends at least a valuable week in paying farewell visits, and receiving the presents in the shape of "ikons," or sacred pictures, and other offerings which are always showered on popular Russian commanders on their departure for the front. This fact is recalled with some bitterness in official circles at St. Petersburg three weeks later, when events at Port Arthur have culminated in a situation of still greater gravity for Russia than was indicated by the sinking of the *Petropavlosk*.

For we are nearing a really critical period of the War, and one in which the extraordinary folly of the Russians in trusting too implicitly to national and personal prestige will be exhibited in a still clearer light than hitherto. Admiral Skrydloff has talked very impressively about the good care he means to take of his ships, and of his intention to hie to and fro between Port Arthur as occasion may require. The "irony of fate" is seldom seen to more painful perfection than in connection with some of the larger incidents and accidents of war, and very possibly this is a reflection which occurs somewhat sadly, a little later, to Admiral Makaroff's rather self-assertive successor. With Admiral Togo continuing his daring efforts to block the only narrow exit from Port Arthur, with the Japanese Army only biding its time to isolate the fortress completely, Admiral Skrydloff may find his declared tactics strangely difficult to put into practice.



Photo: Renard, Kiel.

THE *POBIEDA.*

CHAPTER XVI.

AT VLADIVOSTOK—THE MYSTERIOUS SQUADRON—A DESCENT ON GENSAN—THE SINKING OF THE *KINSHIU MARU*—NO SURRENDER—FANATICAL HEROISM.

AS narrated in Chapter VIII., a detached squadron of the Japanese Fleet bombarded Vladivostok on March 8th, subsequently searching the bays in the vicinity of that frozen harbour in the hope of discovering some trace of the Russian Vladivostok squadron. The latter was known to consist of four powerful cruisers, the *Rossia*, *Gromoboi*, *Rurik*, and *Bogatyr*, which, in the first week of the War, had sallied out and, after a brief cruise, in the course of which only a Japanese merchantman was sunk, had returned to Vladivostok. The uncertainty surrounding the subsequent movements of these four ships had caused the Japanese a good deal of trouble. The sudden appearance of four such heavily armed vessels at an inconvenient juncture might upset the best laid Japanese plans, more especially for the landing of troops; and as long as such a daring commander as the late Admiral Makaroff directed Russian naval operations in the Far East, it was impossible to foretell what use he might make of this squadron. As we have seen, the bombardment of Vladivostok failed to draw any response either from the forts or from the inner harbour, and the subsequent reconnaissance of the bays did not reveal any signs of the Russian ships. Accordingly, for the rest of March and part of April the whereabouts of the Vladivostok squadron remained a mystery and, as such, a source of many and curious speculations.

By the light of subsequent events it is clear that these four big Russian vessels had not been engaged in any of the adventurous enterprises attributed to them, but had been quietly resting at anchor in the grand harbour at Vladivostok, which is sufficiently large and well screened to enable even a fair-sized squadron to escape observation from outside. During the bombardment, it is said, two of the cruisers were in dock, the other two lying in the northern portion of the Golden Horn, where they could not possibly be seen by the Japanese. Possibly if the whole squadron had been in fighting trim, some more active part might have been taken by it. But the ice in the harbour was thick, and, in any case, the bombarding squadron was of sufficient size and strength to render an attempt to try conclusions with it at sea a very risky experiment.

The Japanese appear to have made several efforts during March to ascertain the position of the Vladivostok squadron, and it is probable that, until a still later date, this part of the theatre of war was watched as carefully as circumstances would permit. But the Japanese Fleet was much occupied in other directions. Port Arthur was not yet "bottled up," the landings on the north-east coast of Korea had to be protected, and there were other land operations in prospect, in connection with which naval assistance might be required. Moreover, there is a double approach to the harbour at Vladivostok which renders it exceedingly difficult to scrutinise at all closely the comings and goings of ships using this northern base. Further bombardment



THE *ROSSIA*.

would have been futile, and so, after the first week in March, Vladivostok enjoyed for a space complete immunity from the alarms which made Port Arthur such a lively place of residence, while the presence of the squadron gave it an air of security and importance which was doubtless much appreciated by what remained of the civil population.

It would seem that, in spite of the intimation issued at the commencement of the War by the Commandant, General Vorognetz, that civilians were to leave the place, there are still, at the beginning of April, about 5,000 people in Vladivostok, besides the naval and military element. The authorities have been making strenuous efforts to provide against future isolation, and the Commissariat Department has even been looking ahead to the extent of purchasing in advance large quantities of grain, to be delivered after the harvest for use next winter. But, these displays of prudence notwithstanding, there is considerable present privation. There is much interruption to communications, owing to the flooded state of the rivers, and supplies from the surrounding country only trickle in at intervals and in small quantities. The Bank having removed to Khabarovsk, there is also a scarcity of money, and altogether the conditions of existence in the "Sovereign City of the East" appear to be anything but hilarious. Still it is an interesting circumstance that here, as in so many historical cases where towns have been threatened with siege and famine, human nature asserts itself not unpleasantly, and spirited efforts are made to keep disagreeable possibilities in the background. Many owners of private houses have placed them at the disposal of the authorities for use as hospitals, and entertainments are constantly given on behalf of the sick and wounded. But the latter are not numerous, and, according to all accounts, the prevailing spirit is one of cheery good feeling heightened by individual acts of beneficence. With special gratification it is recorded that the only monastery in the district comes to the relief of the



PANORAMIC VIEW OF

1. Residential quarter behind cliff. 2. Barracks. 3. Arsenal and dockyard. 4. Cathedral. 5. Floating dock. 6 Naval club. 7. Anchorage for Russian man-of-war. 8. Admiralty buildings.

troops with several carloads of provisions, from which detail it may be conjectured that the Commissariat is indeed in rather a parlous state.

Exactly what is taking place in the way of military movement at this period in the district of which Vladivostok is the centre is a little hard to discover, and it is very possible that, in the large operations of the War, this interesting point may continue to remain somewhat obscure. But it is evident that the Russians have not thought it necessary to keep a large garrison boxed up in complete idleness at Vladivostok without doing something towards averting a possible Japanese descent upon some point of the coast-line farther south. In particular they have thrown up strong entrenchments at Possiet Bay, and have established telegraphic communications between that place and Vladivostok. They have also mined the entrance to Pallas Bay in anticipation of an attempt on the part of the enemy to land troops hereabouts preparatory to an advance on Harbin. From Vladivostok to the mouth of the Tumen River, where North-Eastern Korea begins, is Russian territory, and there are in this district a number of villages peopled by Cossacks, whom for years past Russia has been helping to emigrate to the Far East with an eye, perhaps, to military as well as agricultural possibilities. The able-bodied men among these villagers have been mobilised, and are a considerable source of strength to Russia at this juncture, not only because they are Cossacks, but by reason of their complete acclimatisation and local experience.

It is expedient to dwell upon details like this, because they may help to explain why the Japanese have not, before this, attempted either to isolate Vladivostok, or even to threaten Harbin itself. We can now see, too, with added clearness, why, when the Japanese occupied Korea, they did not content themselves with merely getting a strong grip on the north-western corner. If they had neglected to land at Gensan, or, as it is sometimes called, Wonsan, on the east coast, subsequently coupling up their position there with that to the south of



VLADIVOSTOK. PORT AND TOWN.

9. Artillery depôt. 10. Eastern Bosphorus Strait (the one entrance to the harbour). 11. Torpedo boat canal, running into Novik Bay. 12. Powder magazine. 13. Wharf and shell magazine. 14. Battery behind hill. 15. Officers' quarters. 16. Terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway. 17. Mount Semenoff, signalling station, fort and battery.

the Yalu, they would simply have invited a dangerous Cossack raid from the Vladivostok district. A raid into Eastern Korea did indeed take place, but the Japanese were able to disregard it, as they never could have done if they had not, partially at any rate, blocked this possible line of Russian advance. In a word, there is reason to believe that, just as the "mystery" of the Vladivostok squadron was an important feature of the naval situation for a good many weeks in the first stage of the War, so the military possibilities connected with Vladivostok and the country between it and the Tumen River were of much greater account from both the Russian and Japanese standpoints than might be supposed from the recorded course of events.

After this necessary, if somewhat lengthy, preface, we come to the commencement of the fourth week in April, when the ice in the Golden Horn has broken up, and there is a chance for the Vladivostok squadron not only to get to sea—which it can do at the worst of times with the help of an ice-breaker—but also, if necessary, to return hurriedly to the shelter of the harbour forts. Indeed, it is time for the squadron to justify its existence. As we have seen in Chapter XV., things at Port Arthur have been going from bad to worse. The gallant Makaroff, after galvanising his command into what in the circumstances was astonishing activity, has perished in the sunk *Petropavlosk*, and as yet Admiral Skrydloff has not had time to replace him. There have been fresh alarms, and isolation of the southern stronghold must be imminent. Surely there is work which four strong ships like the *Rossia*, *Gromoboi*, *Rurik*, and *Bogatyr* can do, if not to intimidate the enemy, at least to give him to understand that Russia has still a fleet, if only a small one, "in being" in Far Eastern waters. The squadron, it should now be understood, is under a fresh commander. Baron Shtakelberg has returned to St. Petersburg, and Captain Reitzenstein, who was acting as Commodore when the squadron sunk the hapless *Nakanoura Maru* on February 11th, has been superseded by Rear-Admiral Jessen.

At daybreak on April 23rd the squadron, accompanied by torpedo craft, leaves Vladivostok and puts to sea. On the following day the *Rurik* returns to harbour, while the three remaining ships proceed boldly to Gensan. They arrive off this place on the morning of the 25th, and heave to about five miles from the entrance to the bay.

The sudden apparition of the enemy at Gensan must have caused considerable surprise and some little consternation. The civilian inhabitants are said to have stampeded at once, and the garrison may well have been somewhat disconcerted, as it only consisted at the time of some 800 men, with a few guns which would have been of little use against the Russian warships' armaments. A bombardment was naturally expected, with possibly a landing to follow. But the Vladivostok squadron has no such rash and wasteful proceedings in view. Ammunition is hardly too plentiful at Vladivostok, and operations on land are best left to the growing military forces under General Kuropatkin. But it must be admitted that the actual performance of the Vladivostok squadron on this occasion, if marked by commendable prudence, is hardly inspiring as regards conception or results. Nor is it such as to cause the little Jap garrison of Gensan any serious uneasiness.

JAPANESE ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTING A TIMBER ROAD FOR TROOPS

What happens may be told in a few words. Two destroyers are despatched by Admiral Jessen into the bay, and these, as they run in towards the shore, descry at anchor a little Japanese trading steamer of about 500 tons, called the *Goyo Maru*. The destroyers hail the crew of this humble craft and order them to betake themselves to shore forthwith. The commander of one of the destroyers now boards the *Goyo Maru* and takes possession of her papers and flag—these trivial details are chronicled in the Russian despatches as if they were great exploits—and the poor little merchantman is then sent to the bottom by a torpedo. This operation, which has lasted about four hours, being concluded, the two destroyers steam proudly out of the bay and rejoin the three cruisers. Later in the day the squadron steams northward in the direction of Vladivostok.

At this point a very interesting circumstance has to be taken into account, which shows how many and various are the chances of naval warfare. There could have been few things more ardently desired at this time by the Japanese than that a sufficient portion of their Fleet should encounter the Vladivostok squadron on the high seas and, if possible, remove once for all this standing menace to both the naval and military Japanese plans of campaign. Conversely, perhaps, the last thing in the world which the Russians wanted was to endanger the most active portion of their remaining Navy in the Far East by bringing it into sudden contact with any but a greatly inferior force of the enemy's ships. Yet no sooner does the Vladivostok squadron put to sea, and recommence to win a glorious reputation by sinking unarmed merchantmen, than by the merest chance it escapes falling in with a strong Japanese Fleet which at this very moment is seeking to carry out a fresh attack on Vladivostok. While Admiral Jessen is coming southwards, Admiral Kamimura is going north, and, while the two Russian destroyers are blowing up the hapless *Goyo Maru*, the Japanese squadron might have been pounding Vladivostok had its movements not have been hampered by an impenetrable fog. Finding it impossible to effect his purpose Admiral Kamimura steamed southwards, and must again have passed within a short distance of Admiral Jessen's ships, the fogs which constantly shroud these waters making it impossible for either squadron to catch sight of the other. It is said that, while near Gensan, Admiral Jessen intercepted a wireless telegram which, although indecipherable, warned him that the Japanese Fleet was in the neighbourhood. It is possible that this may have accounted for his rather rapid and undignified withdrawal from Gensan, but the point is unimportant. The serious reflection is that only an accident of the weather prevented what might have been a really important naval action at sea, one which could not but have had a very practical bearing upon the whole course of the War.

Let us now return to the Vladivostok squadron, which has evidently been fired by its recent success to seek fresh triumphs. About six o'clock on the evening of the 25th it sights another small Japanese trading steamer, which is stated to have had on board war stores. The crew of fifteen Koreans and twelve Japanese having been placed in safety, a new laurel is added to the wreath of Russia's naval triumphs by the sink-

ing of this fresh victim "by means of a pyroxyline cartridge fired from the *Gromoboi.*"

A few hours later a real slice of luck falls in Admiral Jessen's way. Early in the morning of the 25th, a few hours before the arrival of the Vladivostok cruisers, a Japanese transport, the *Kinshiu Maru*, had left Gensan, having on board a detachment of the 37th Infantry Regiment bound on a reconnaissance in Northern Korea. After landing and examining Yiwon and the neighbourhood of Hamyengdo the troops were reembarked, and were returning to Gensan, when, most unfortunately, the *Kinshiu Maru* fell in, off Sinpho, about eleven o'clock in the evening, with Admiral Jessen's three cruisers and two destroyers. It is said that at first the Japanese mistook the Russian ships for part of Admiral Kamimura's squadron, but in any case the mistake made was very quickly discovered. The *Kinshiu Maru* was ordered to stop instantly, one of the destroyers approached her, and the ship's captain, accompanied by a few of the officers, went on board the *Rossia*, where they were apparently detained.

ADMIRAL JESSEN.

It was now intimated to those on board the *Kinshiu Maru* that they must surrender within an hour or be sent to the bottom. Some of the crew had previously taken to the boats, and only soldiers and bluejackets were now left on board. The major in command of the detachment bade his officers and men please themselves as to how they should act. The majority of them decided that they would remain where they were and that there should be no surrender, but, to quote the translation of the official report, "a desperate lieutenant, with seven men, proceeded in a boat to fight the Russians!"

At half-past one in the morning the Russians launched a torpedo at the *Kinshiu Maru*, but it did not explode. The Japanese soldiers were paraded on deck and exchanged shots with the enemy, who naturally replied, killing a number of the officers and men.

"At two o'clock," to quote once more the *Daily Telegraph's* condensed translation of the Japanese official report, "the Russians discharged another torpedo, which struck the *Kinshiu Maru* near the engine-room, and, exploding, broke the vessel in half. The bluejackets then launched the port boats, which were sunk by the guns.

"The Japanese officers retired to their cabins and committed suicide, while the soldiers bayoneted each other. Finally, only fifteen were left alive, and these kept on furiously firing at the Russian ship at a range of 200 metres, until the water reached their knees.

"They then jumped into the water and were rescued by the boats, though they were still under fire. They shouted

'Banzai' and then steered to the west and escaped.

"On the night of April 26th a sergeant with thirty-seven men reached Bayoto, and another boat with eight soldiers arrived at Raiyoka at noon on the 27th. With them were six coolies and three merchants.

"The *Kinshiu Maru* received over 100 shots, and was quite honeycombed. Only sailors and coolies were taken aboard by the *Rossia*, and not a single soldier surrendered."

It is difficult to read the account of this remarkable episode without experiencing some rather mixed sensations. But it is an episode in regard to which it is emphatically desirable to "clear our mind of cant," and, if we do this, there does not seem a great deal left to criticise or rave about. As regards the action of the Russian squadron there can be little real question. By obstinately refusing to surrender, and by subsequently offering armed resistance, the Jap soldiers courted destruction as surely as if they had formed themselves into a square on the battlefield and challenged an overwhelming enemy to "come on." Of course, it would have been more humane, if it had been possible, to overpower them, and to have sent a prize crew aboard the *Kinshiu Maru*. But time pressed, a prize crew could not be spared, and it would have been folly to hamper the movements of a raiding squadron by attaching a slow steamer to it.

There is a strong Western repugnance to the idea that suicide is an honourable means of avoiding capture by a civilised enemy; but *Hari-Kiri* is an ancient Japanese custom, and when some of the Japanese soldiers on the *Kinshiu Maru* adopted this historical, if revolting, method of self-destruction, it is not surprising that others should have followed their ghastly example. For the rest, it is impossible not to admire the fanatical courage displayed by the Japanese soldiers on this occasion in circumstances in which some irresolution might have been excusable. Certain it is that their behaviour was most strongly approved in Japan, the Tokio journals commenting in glowing terms on the display of the "true soldierly spirit which is an invaluable national asset."

According to the Russian account, seventeen officers, presumably belonging to the *Kinshiu Maru*, were taken off by the Vladivostok squadron, together with nearly 200 of the crew and coolies. The casualties of the military detachment were 2 captains, 2 first lieutenants, and 1 second lieutenant, 1 ensign, 73 privates, and 2 interpreters, all killed. Of the surviving soldiers several were wounded.

Admiral Kamimura, on reaching Gensan and learning that the *Kinshiu Maru* had not returned, set out in search of her, and succeeded in picking up some of the ill-fated transport's boats. Afterwards he made fresh attempts to attack Vladivostok, but was foiled by recurring fogs.

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RUSSIAN TROOPS DETRAINING AT PORT ARTHUR.

CHAPTER XVII.

LIFE AT PORT ARTHUR—RUSSIAN CONFIDENCE—JAPANESE CAUTION—ANOTHER ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSION—MORE JAPANESE RUSES—A SUPREME EFFORT—THE HARBOUR BLOCKED—A LANDING.

PORT ARTHUR once more, and this time with increasing urgency, claims our attention. The history of this great stronghold during the first three months of the conflict between Russia and Japan is one of the most interesting chapters in the annals of modern war. Seldom, if ever, in such a short space of time has a place of arms falsified so many predictions, thrown out so many calculations, and yet contrived to illustrate so many of the eternal rules of naval and, to some extent, military strategy.

As we look back over the events which have followed in rapid succession since the attack on the midnight of February 8th, we cannot fail to be struck with the persistence shown by the Russians in regarding Port Arthur as a position in which, whatever misfortune might occur, whatever blows might be suffered, things would eventually right themselves by mere virtue of Russian prestige, and of the extraordinary pains which Russia has taken to render this wonderful fortress absolutely impregnable. There is something almost pathetic in the tenacity with which even official circles in St. Petersburg cling to the belief that even the death of Admiral Makaroff, perhaps the one man in Russia

who might have saved the situation at Port Arthur, does not seriously compromise their chances at this critical spot in the theatre of war. For there is more than mere "cheery optimism" in the accounts received from Port Arthur as late as the last week in April. Here are extracts from a telegram received at St. Petersburg on April 24th, which show how national pride, stiffened by impressive surroundings in the way of mighty ramparts and big guns, can blind even intelligent spectators to the presence of grim realities. "A surprising state of tranquillity," says the sender of the telegram, "prevails here. The troops and sailors, as well as the inhabitants, are exhibiting extraordinary indifference to the state of siege. The sinking of the *Petropavlosk* with Admiral Makaroff and his entire staff did not in any way shake the belief that Port Arthur is impregnable, and the speedy defeat of the Japanese is inevitable!" The same correspondent adds that it is only by night that one realises how liable Port Arthur is to sudden attack. Then, as we have previously remarked, the city is plunged in profound darkness, and only the roadstead is lit by the great searchlights. But by day a band plays on the boulevard, "which is thronged with elegantly dressed people and numbers of children at play," and "the restaurants and shops are crowded with customers." Even allowing for some exaggeration—for we know that a large proportion of the civilian residents of Port Arthur have departed, never in all probability to return—there is something very remarkable in this picture of a place which in two and a half months has undergone bombardment after bombardment, in addition to seeing its naval strength repeatedly diminished by the triumphant attacks of a daring enemy. Even if we discount heavily the throngs of fashionably garbed ladies and the numbers of playful children, even if we ourselves refuse to believe that they exist at all, save in the imagination of the correspondent, it is clear that at St. Petersburg such reports are taken quite seriously, and that all the terrible mischances which have occurred in connection with Port Arthur are still looked upon as quite unlikely to have any disastrous ending.

Some may feel disposed to make comparison between Port Arthur at this stage and other places which have been closely pressed by a vigorous enemy. A certain amount of instruction might be derived from such a process, more especially if one took into account such widely different cases as, say, Paris and Ladysmith; but such comparisons are very deceptive. The fact seems to be that, while states of siege constantly bring out remarkable qualities on the part of the besieged, the result varies curiously, not only according to national character, but by reason of a score of other circumstances peculiar to the case in question. What probably has a good deal to do with the indifference of Port Arthur to its surroundings and prospects, gloomy as they are, at the end of April, is the fact that, as yet, the place is not wholly isolated. Though a state of siege exists; though the fleet can hardly be termed "in being"; though the effects of the bombardments are clearly visible; though at any hour of the day another bombardment may commence, and at any hour of the night another desperate attempt be made to block the harbour entrance already studded by nine sunk Japanese merchantmen; there is still communication even

by rail with Liao-yang, Mukden, and Harbin, and through these with Russia itself. There is always something reassuring to the timorous mind, and sometimes to minds of stronger fibre, in the thought that an escape to the rear remains practicable in the last resort. While to the naval and military garrison no such reflections are permissible, the civilians who have remained at, or returned to, Port Arthur are not to be blamed if they take comfort from the thought that isolation having been postponed so far may never occur. But Russia as a whole may yet come to rue the blind fatuity which caused her first to expend such lavish care in the fortification of a place which, above all, needs a dominant fleet for its successful protection; and, secondly, to view with such airy indifference possibilities which one blow after another have been bringing nearer and nearer into the domain of grim accomplished facts.

Let us look now at Japan's attitude in regard to Port Arthur. That, too, at first sight seems remarkable as an extraordinary mixture of reckless daring and almost timid caution. Here we have little destroyers running into the very jaws of the Port Arthur dragon, and creating sometimes serious havoc. We see mines laid, and merchantmen planted in the fairway, with a disregard of risks which is almost sublime. We see bombardments carried out with a scientific accuracy which conveys a real lesson even to the most highly trained navy in the world. But we see no attempts to push the advantage beyond a certain well-defined point, no present endeavour to effect the landing by which alone Port Arthur can be isolated and eventually reduced.

It is a marvellous exhibition this, of self-restraint, and there will have been many to misconstrue it, and to doubt whether a bolder policy would not have produced more practical as well as earlier results. But Japan has acted throughout from a fulness of knowledge by the side of which the most brilliant guesses of Western critics are not of much account. Not only does she know her own strength and weakness, but she knows all that is worth knowing of the innermost secrets of the enemy, and there is probably not a nook or cranny of the Port Arthur defences which is not carefully marked on maps and plans in the office of the General Staff at Tokio. Further, with that marvellous astuteness which the Oriental brings to the assimilation of Western ideas, Japan has grasped the fact that in the reduction of Port Arthur the naval problem must be completely solved before the military problem can be attempted by a Power whose resources, neither on sea nor on land, are illimitable. Lastly, in the naval operations against this stronghold no undue risk can be taken, no enterprise sanctioned, such as will endanger a supremacy which may yet be threatened by political complications. Hence the knockings at the door, so to speak, of Port Arthur, the incursions of torpedo craft, the safe bombardments, and, above all, the efforts to "bottle up" what is left of the Port Arthur Fleet so securely as to make the ships little more than badly-placed forts.

When these preliminaries are got through to the point of placing the Port Arthur squadron decisively out of action, then will be Japan's time to act on another plane. We are nearing this point now, and it is advisedly that the foregoing remarks have been inflicted on the reader as a preparation for a

very beautifully arranged and dramatic event. The isolation of Port Arthur is a magnificent example of combined naval and military strategy, which can only be properly understood if the steps leading up to it are regarded from some other standpoint than that of a mere succession of stirring deeds of heroism and impressive discharges of big guns.

After the bombardment of April 15th, which Admiral Togo describes as belonging to "the eighth attack on Port Arthur," the Japanese, for quite a considerable time, left the fortress severely alone, and, as we have seen, the band played on the boulevard, the ladies promenaded, and the children played without any tragic interruptions. A rather painful sensation must have been caused by the bringing in of the large launch of the *Petropavlosk* and other relics of the disaster of the 13th. Again, on April 22nd, a lamentable accident occurs which shows how strangely unskilful or careless the Russian sailors must be in the handling of mines, notwithstanding such terrible lessons as they have already received in connection with these dangerous engines. On the day in question some steam launches are engaged in laying mines in the Port Arthur roadstead when, to quote Admiral Alexeieff's despatch to the Tsar, one of the mines "explodes prematurely," and a lieutenant and twenty men are hurried into eternity. One almost shudders to think of what may yet happen in connection with the Russian mines which have not yet "exploded prematurely" in the neighbourhood of Port Arthur. For, where such unhandiness is so tragically demonstrated, it seems doubtful whether any accurate observation has been made by the layers themselves of the actual minefields, and many a future fatality will doubtless occur before this harbour is free from its hidden dangers.

During the night of April 27th, Admiral Togo allows his torpedo craft to attempt another of the ruses which sailors are particularly fond of introducing into the performance of a dangerous enterprise. For some nights previously the Japs have taken advantage of the fact that the Russians have been trying to intercept the enemy's wireless telegrams. A string of mock messages has been despatched, purporting to come from Admiral Togo, and conveying imaginary orders to land near Port Arthur, to attack with submarines, to send fireships into the harbour, and so forth. Naturally the interception of these messages has caused the Russians a deal of unnecessary worry. On the night of the 27th, the Japanese "break out in a fresh place," possibly with the intention to make the Russians believe that, after all, there was some genuineness in the captured communications. Stringing together a number of rafts on which inflammable substances are collected, they set these afloat, and tow them to within five miles of the entrance to the harbour. Here the combustibles are set on fire, the result being a great sheet of white flame, which is carried by wind and current towards the land. Under cover of this fiery screen eight torpedo-boats, towing a launch laden with mines, slip round to a spot near that where the *Petropavlosk* was sunk. Presumably the idea is that efforts may be made to recover bodies or treasure from the sunken battleship, and that, in furtherance of such intention, another Russian warship may come out and be similarly destroyed. The mine-layers are, however, detected by the searchlights and driven off. The mines have been suc-



THE INVESTMENT OF PORT ARTHUR: IN ONE OF THE FORTS GUARDING THE RUSSIAN HARBOUR.

cessfully laid, but their whereabouts having been observed, they are subsequently searched for by the Russians and destroyed. Unsuccessful as the attempt has proved, it must have been somewhat discouraging to the inhabitants of Port Arthur to find the enemy so unwearying in his attentions, so full of fresh resources, and so clearly bent upon the destruction by one means or another, of what is left of Russia's Navy in this harbour.

The beginning of May marks a very important crisis in the history of Port Arthur. Developments now occur on the Yalu, to which detailed reference will be made in a succeeding chapter, and which in the meantime have an important bearing upon Admiral Togo's operations. For throughout the War, so far, nothing is more remarkable than the perfect harmony between the movements of the Japanese Navy and Army, and no student of what has happened could fail to anticipate that any important change of the condition of military affairs on the banks of the Yalu would be promptly followed by increased activity on the part of the ships engaged in harassing Port Arthur.

Hitherto some uncertainty has existed as to the base from which the Japanese Fleet is working; but now it becomes clearly evident that they have been using more particularly the Blonde Islands at the south of the Elliot group, which lies some fifty miles to the north-east of Port Arthur. The whole fleet, it appears, is regularly coaled at sea by ships sent at intervals from Nagasaki and Moji, which also bring ammunition and other supplies.

On May 2nd, Admiral Togo, having been duly apprised of the Yalu developments referred to above, prepares to deliver a fresh and, perhaps, final blow against the freedom of egress which the Russian warships in Port Arthur still enjoy. This time the effort is indeed on a grand scale, and a mere enumeration of the ships and crews shows what risks Admiral Togo is ready to take in furtherance of an object now of really supreme urgency.

There are no fewer than eight large steamers set aside for this final blocking operation. Their aggregate tonnage is 17,313 gross, and their ages vary from eighteen to twenty-five years. The Russians, therefore, are probably not far wrong in estimating the cost to Japan of these very efficient "fireships" as little short of £200,000. According to the Russian account each steamer is equipped with a small quick-firing gun. The crews of the steamers aggregate 159 men.

The steamers start at night on May 2nd, escorted by the gunboats *Akagi* and *Chokai*, the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th destroyer flotillas, and the 9th, 10th, and 11th torpedo-boat flotillas. The expedition is in charge of Commander Hayashi.

A stiff south-easterly wind is blowing, and as night wears on this freshens into a gale. It becomes impossible to keep the ships together, and Commander Hayashi makes the signal to stop the operation. This signal is repeated until two o'clock in the morning, but somehow, to use Admiral Togo's simple language, "does not reach." One is inclined to suggest that, perhaps, the commanders of the steamers are possessed, like Nelson, of only one serviceable eye apiece, and are disposed to use their blind eyes for the observation of unwelcome signals.

Be this as it may, the eight steamers proceed, not at all in touch, but quite

united in the resolution of their crews to carry out their tremendous object to the bitter end.

Meanwhile, one of the torpedo flotillas, of the steamers, the *Mikawa Maru*, commanded by Lieutenant Sosa, comes upon the scene. Hearing the guns roaring, Lieutenant Sosa believes that some of


PORT ARTHUR & DALNI
SOCIETY BAY (HULWAN)
Kinchau Bay
Liaotishan Channel
HWANGHAI OR YELLOW SEA
PORT ARTHUR
DALNI
Victoria Bay
Talienwan
Port Adams
PORT ADAMS
Sanshilipu
Shihoy-chong
Tienkiangku
Seshilipu
Tasuetau
Liyipöntau
Nankwan-tau
Lienhwatau
Hwasiautau
Hulushan B
Kinchau
Shwantieku
Shwishiying
Yangshuku
Siautseku
Pingtu
Liaotishan
Pigeon B
Ellis Saddle I
Ashton I.
Coffin I
Flat I.
Entry I.
Sullivan B
Fishbourne
Osborn Pt
Denham I.
Chukiaku
Chisanlitartse
Sanlitshwong
Mt Sampson
Siausangcha
Taifangchen
Liushutun
Kaotun
Nansantau
Pangtau
Tengku
Inner Chan
Tuphongtse
Siwatse
Nanshan
Putushan
Yingchengtse
Huapo
Overhanging Pt
Cove Pt
Muchong
Milne I
Muchishengtau
Kuotun
Kiakiatun
Peikiatun
Lepo
Kukiatun
Santauling
Paotaitse
White Ho Pt
Cone Pt
Sonkiosingtau
Fraser I.
Shangtau
Round Pt
Ridge Pt
Tungkuanshan Bay
South Pt
Sandhill B
Petermann Pt
Chönkapu
Tower H
Darwin I.
Long I.
Drury I.
Liyipöntau
Ripon I.
Mardarwin Hd
Warren Cliff
Meukiyangtse
Nanhuoling
Stokiahoo
Double Pt
Santauku
Disaster Pt
Odon Cove
Hooper Pt
Tietau
Leven I.
Hudson Pt
C Collinson
Ellis Saddle
Shitau
Litun
St Albin Hd
Gt Sheepe Hd
Yang-chungtau
Tachingkau
Pauchun
C Liaotishan
Liaotishan
Koyangchou
Chaopanchui
Liuhsuchui
Lungwangtung
Maotau
Siaopingtu
Kuantiau
Shimiaotse
Yingshuku
Pingtu
Nansantau
Persantau
Sanshantau Ch
Tengku
Entry Pt
Hunter Pt
Victoria Bay
Talienwan
Kaotun
Liushutun
Taifangchen
Siausangcha
Mt Sampson
Kinchau
Kinchau Bay
Meukiyangtse
Warren Cliff

harbour entrance and shows the way most conveniently to the *Mikawa Maru*—the forts as well as the gunboats are belching fire, and there are mines everywhere save in a narrow channel, which in such conditions it is hard to pick out. Lieutenant Sosa recks little of these grim obstacles. At full speed he forces

From a Native Drawing.

OLD JAPAN.
A street in Yedo fifty years ago.

along his vessel, rams the boom at the harbour entrance, breaks it, and reaching the centre of the inner entrance, anchors and blows up his ship. As the vessel sinks the crew gather on the prow, and with one loud shout of "Banzai!" go down to glorious death.

Following the *Mikawa Maru* comes the *Sakura Maru*, which anchors near a projecting rock at the mouth of the harbour, and is also blown up and sunk. According to a Russian eye-witness the Japanese upon this second "fireship"—this is the description habitually given in the Russian accounts of these blocking operations, although, as a matter of fact, the vessels are not being used as fireships at all—climb upon the masts and, brandishing lanterns, make signals to their comrades. Boats are lowered by the Japs, but the idea of escape is evidently accounted of small importance as compared with the businesslike completion of the work in hand. The chance, too, is a well-nigh desperate one. The boats are swept by a veritable hailstorm of bullets and fragments of shell, but it is recorded by the Russian corres-

pondent quoted above that "never a flag, handkerchief, or rag is waved in sign of readiness to surrender." It is interesting to note that, even in this extremely "warm corner," Japanese artifice is displayed by the escaping crews. At intervals all the men on a boat cease rowing and pretend to be dead or wounded. Then in a lull they spring to life, seize their oars, and ply them lustily.

On the heels of the *Mikawa Maru* and the *Sakura Maru* come the *Totomi Maru*, *Yedo Maru*, *Otaru Maru*, *Sagami Maru*, *Aikoku Maru*, and *Asagawo Maru*. It is now about three o'clock in the morning, and the scene must be one of extraordinary picturesqueness and exciting activity. On the Russian side there are three warships, the *Otvagny*, the *Giliak*, and *Gremiashtchi*, engaged, besides the forts, and the firing, which has already lasted for an hour, is, practically speaking, continuous until 4 a.m. On the *Otvagny* is Admiral Alexeieff himself with General Gilinski and Captain Eberhardt of the Naval General Staff. General Gilinski, whose portrait was given on page 126, is, it will be remembered, Chief of the Staff to General Kuropatkin, and has doubtless come to Port Arthur to confer with Admiral Alexeieff as to the military measures now to be taken with reference to the situation on the Yalu. General Stoessel, whose supersession by General "Seven



From a Native Drawing.

NEW JAPAN.
A main street of Tokio of to-day.

Devils" Smirnoff has, apparently, been postponed *sine die*, is on the fortifications, and Rear-Admiral Loshchinsky, Chief of the Defence Force of Port Arthur, is on board the *Giliak*.

Some mixed reflections must arise in the minds of these high officials as they look out on the bewildering scene before them. All round them is the deafening roar of their own guns, and yonder, in the narrow channel, mines are exploding; little quick-firers barking; steamers are blowing up and sinking; boats are struggling in a rough sea flecked with patches of white froth caused by the bursting of shells on impact or by the hail of bullets from machine guns and rifles on shore; and Jap destroyers and torpedo-boats are darting hither and thither trying to save the survivors from the sunken ships. A spectacle, indeed, of lurid fascination to anyone, but how strangely thrilling to men like Alexeieff and Gilinski, the former knowing that for much of the results of this night's work he will be held morally responsible by his Imperial Master and by his countrymen generally; while the latter, fresh from the arrogant atmosphere of St. Petersburg officialism, is having his eyes opened somewhat suddenly to the sort of spirit which animates these "yellowskins." Holy Russia knows well and can appreciate fanatical courage. The Army which presented arms to Osman Pasha when he came forth to surrender Plevna, his superb defence of which had cost Russia such a terrible price, can respect a brave enemy. To Alexeieff the sight of the sinking merchantmen must have appealed with particularly gloomy force. But to Gilinski the vision of these scores of men, not only recklessly indifferent to the preservation of their lives, not merely filled with what Lord Wolseley calls "that dreadful two o'clock in the morning courage," but doing their difficult work as cleverly, as completely, as if in broad daylight and with no enemy within a hundred miles—such a vision must bring something of a quick sensation of doubt and apprehension lest for Russia's Army, as well as for her Navy, there may be trying times in store.

To return to the steamers, some of these, as they near the harbour entrance, not only meet the full brunt of the Russian fire, but run upon sunken mines, which cause numerous casualties, and must have hindered the operation had not an ample margin in the number of steamers been provided.

Some interesting details are furnished in a Reuter telegram from Tokio which is apparently based upon Admiral Togo's official reports. Thus it is established that the *Totomi Maru*, though it does not get quite so far in as the *Mikawa Maru*, strikes against the boom, and sinks athwart the passage, blocking nearly half of it.

When the *Yedo Maru* reaches the entrance and is getting out her anchor, Commander Takayanagi is shot in the stomach and killed. No confusion or delay is caused by this serious loss. Sub-Lieutenant Nagatu assumes command, and under his orders the anchor is let go and the ship sunk.

Two other vessels, believed to be the *Otaru Maru* and the *Sagami Maru*, enter the mouth of the harbour and sink. Putting aside the *Sakura Maru*, which, as we have seen, lies on a projecting rock, there are now five vessels sunk actually in the entrance to the harbour, and, as all are laden with stones, the blocking of the fairway, at least for cruisers and battleships, appears to be

fairly complete. There are two steamers yet unaccounted for, one of which, the *Aikoku Maru*, strikes a mine five cables from the mouth, explodes and sinks, carrying with her, it is feared, her Lieutenant, Uchida, the Chief Engineer, Aoki, and eight of her crew.

One ship, believed to be the *Asagawo*, appears to have had her rudder broken, and to have blown up at the foot of Golden Hill.

In his official report Admiral Togo says: "The undertaking, when compared with the two last attempts, involved a heavier casualty on our side owing to the inclemency of the weather and increased preparation for the defence of the enemy. We could not save any of the officers and men of the *Otaru Maru*, *Sagami Maru*, *Sakura Maru*, and *Asagawo Maru*, and I regret that nothing particular could be learned about the gallant way in which they discharged their duties, although the memory of their exemplary conduct will long survive in the Imperial Navy.

"The destroyer and torpedo flotillas, besides resisting the enemy bravely, fought against the wind and waves. The torpedo flotilla closely approached the mouth of the channel and rescued more than half of the men. Torpedo-boat 67, which had a steam-pipe broken by a shell, was disabled, but her consort, torpedo-boat 70, went to her assistance and towed her away. Three of the crew were wounded.

"The destroyer *Awovta* had her port engine damaged by a shell and one sailor was killed. A sailor in the torpedo-boat *Hayabusa* was also killed by a shell."

Some of the incidents of this remarkable episode forcibly illustrate the frenzied enthusiasm of the Japs in connection with such desperate enterprises. It is recorded that a sailor, who had escaped from his steamer after it had been sunk, managed to struggle ashore under Electric Cliff. Here he was surrounded and called upon to surrender, "but in answer he rushed wildly upon the Russians with a revolver and bravely met his death. Another Japanese bluejacket," continues this Russian account, "was drowning when our men dragged him from the waves, but once out of the water he endeavoured to strangle himself with his neck-tie." Later, one captive officer performed *Hara-kiri*, declaring that he would rather die than go back "with shame" to his country.

It must be recorded to the credit of the Russians that, in spite of the unwillingness of the Japanese to be taken alive, and notwithstanding the heavy sea, every possible effort was made to effect rescues, and thirty men, of whom fifteen died immediately either from their wounds or by their own hands, were picked up, covered carefully with cloaks, and carried ashore.

The crews of the steamers, as noted above, aggregated 159. Of these 36 returned safely, 18 were wounded, 15 were known to have been killed, and 90 were missing. Of the latter we have seen that 30 were rescued, but that of these one-half died. The total loss of life therefore was 80, the officers killed and missing being returned at 15. Posthumous honours were at once conferred by the Mikado upon the gallant dead, and their families pensioned, all the surviving officers, too, being decorated.

Thus terminates an exploit which, save for its two predecessors, is without any precise parallel in the history of warfare. Even in Russia the "unparalleled heroism and fury" with which the crews

of the steamers fought is clearly recognised, and a St. Petersburg correspondent adds that "indescribably profound" is the impression produced by this extraordinary fearlessness, which positively courts death, and by the complete mastery of the technical side of war displayed by the Japanese. In a passage which seems to mark the beginning of a great awakening the *Novoye Vremya* admits that Russia has greatly underrated its enemy. "The cowardice of the Chinese led us to draw false conclusions respecting the bravery of the Japanese." The important St. Petersburg organ adds, rather sadly, that evidently, while Russia has failed to understand Japan, the Japs have thoroughly studied Russia.

It will be readily understood that these sentiments are widely echoed in other countries of the civilised world. It is felt that, apart from the measure of success actually achieved, there is something strangely impressive in the persistence shown by the Japanese in their efforts to attain an object surrounded by no halo of sentiment, as in the case of an attempt to relieve a beleaguered garrison, and certainly remote from anything akin to desperate self-preservation. In the first instance discretion was undoubtedly displayed by the selection of a method of destroying Port Arthur's usefulness as a naval base, which is far less costly than any direct attack could possibly be; secondly, caution has been exercised in not risking any but small fighting ships within range of the fort guns. But, the scheme once framed, it has been carried out with a dogged resolution and a superb gallantry which are not surpassed even in our own splendid annals of naval and military heroism.

Admiral Togo having thus vigorously responded to the call made upon him by the progress of events on the Yalu, is able to devote his energies to the advancement of the land campaign, of which there is presently a striking development of peculiar interest to Port Arthur.

From quite the commencement of the war a great deal of strategical interest has been centred at Niu-chwang, a place of considerable importance on the Liao River at the head of the Liao-tung Gulf. A glance at the war map issued with the opening chapters of this publication will show that a Japanese control of Niu-chwang, if it ever comes about, will effect a double object by threatening Mukden and by isolating Port Arthur. For the first two months of the war Niu-chwang, which is sometimes alluded to by the name of its port, Ying-kau, does not come into serious prominence, since the estuary of the Liao is blocked with ice, and any idea of a landing is quite out of the question. But a great deal of speculation exists as to the future proceedings at this point, and in the middle of March a considerable exodus of civilian inhabitants takes place. About this time the Russians take serious steps to place Niu-chwang in a state of defence. Early in April there were four or five thousand Russian troops at Niu-chwang, and these on April 6th were reviewed by General Kuropatkin, who seems to have hastened on the defensive preparations. For, ten days later, we hear of a fairly elaborate scheme of fortification, together with a scheme of submarine mines worked from one of the forts. In our own House of Commons, too, a good deal of discussion is aroused by the withdrawal of the British gunboat which has been lying,



THE COSSACK AND HIS HORSE: A DEVICE FOR SECURING COVER DURING A SKIRMISH.

frozen-up, in the Liao, and fears are expressed lest in its absence British interests, and perhaps lives, at Niu-chwang may be endangered.

It is clear that, with the Port Arthur harbour entrance now more or less effectually sealed, with the ice in the Liao broken up and, what is still more important, melted, above all with a marked forward movement taking place from the Yalu, there is a strong chance that, before long, some change will take place in the prospects of Niu-chwang, a change which may seriously affect the condition of Port Arthur. This view receives dramatic confirmation by the receipt of news at the latter place early in the morning of May 5th to the effect that a number of Japanese transports have arrived off the east coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, obviously with the intention to effect a landing near Pi-tsu-wo, which lies about sixty miles north-east of Port Arthur.

Pi-tsu-wo is a place with a history which goes far to explain the present proceedings. Here it was that the Japanese concentrated their Second Army in the war with China in 1894, after the First Army had crossed the Yalu. From Pi-tsu-wo the road, after crossing the peninsula to Pu-lan-tien, can be followed to Niu-chwang, but there is also a south-westerly route to Kinchau, which is about thirty miles from Port Arthur. According to the first intimation of the landing which was received by the Ministry of War at St. Petersburg, a number of the enemy's transports bore down upon Pi-tsu-wo on the morning of May 5th, and the Russian posts thereupon retired from the shore. The papers of the post-office were removed, and the Russian inhabitants abandoned the town. It was afterwards reported that the enemy had landed about 10,000 troops by the evening, and despatched two columns of about one regiment each, one in a westerly direction and another in a south-westerly direction.

The effect of this intelligence upon the Port Arthur garrison, as may be readily imagined, is electrical. The immediate result is the departure of Admiral Alexeieff to rejoin, by Imperial Ukase it is said, the active Army. As the news of the Japanese landing must have reached Port Arthur about eight in the morning, and Admiral Alexeieff leaves at eleven, it is sufficiently clear that early and complete isolation of the stronghold is apprehended, and colour is lent to this view by the fact that the Grand Duke Boris Vladimirovitch has also left Port Arthur. The command of the fleet in harbour is temporarily entrusted to Admiral Vitgert.

Towards evening a passenger train which, notwithstanding the tranquility said to prevail in the place—as if tranquility in such obviously alarming circumstances were possible—has left Port Arthur crowded with passengers and with about 200 sick, meets with a dramatic experience. As it nears Pu-lan-tien station a Cossack is observed making frantic signals, and the train slows down to hear what he has to say. "Go back," he shouts, "the Japanese are coming!" But it is decided to press on, and a mile and a quarter before reaching Pu-lan-tien a group of Japanese infantry are observed on an eminence about 1,500 yards to the east of the line. A puff of smoke is seen, and the bullets come pattering round the train. The passengers throw themselves on the floor of the carriages, but two sick soldiers are unfortunately wounded.

The ambulance carriages are said to be flying the Red Cross flag, but it is quite possible that, in the doubtful light, and at 1,500 yards range, this was not noticed by the Japanese, who would be the first to deplore any departure from the humanity they have always observed. Save for the casualties mentioned, the train, which is naturally travelling at its best speed, succeeds in reaching Pu-lan-tien without further mishap.

Later it is reported that the Japanese have actually cut the line, and so, for a time, it is believed that at last Port Arthur is completely isolated.

This gloomy belief proves to be unfounded as far as the immediate present is concerned. It is true that, immediately after the landing near Pi-tsu-wo small forces of Japanese have reached the rail and cut it in several places, but they have apparently retired, since a train full of ammunition for Port Arthur has been got through, and Pu-lan-tien station, according to an explicit Russian statement, is, on May 10th, being held by the Russian Frontier Guards. The railway has been repaired by the 4th Railway Battalion under command of Colonel Spiridonoff, and the pluck shown by that gallant officer in taking the train-load of ammunition through to Port Arthur in such apparently perilous circumstances seems fully deserving of the commendation it receives from General Kuropatkin. For all that was known to the contrary, the Japanese might be lying in wait at several points of the journey, and it was necessary to make careful preparations for blowing up the train in order to prevent its valuable contents passing into the enemy's hands.

For the greater part of this anxious time a portion of Admiral Togo's Fleet has been observed at intervals cruising round Port Arthur, and on May 11th a report is received at Tokio from him to the effect that since May 6th a number of explosions have been heard taking place at Port Arthur. It is suggested that the Russians are blowing up their ships preparatory to evacuating the fortress, but the more hopeful Russian view is that attempts are merely being made to clear away some of the sunk merchantmen, and to blow up obstacles to the Russian line of fire on land.

Hitherto no explicit reference has been made to what occurred on the banks of the Yalu, but the time has now come when this development can be appropriately revealed. Perhaps the simplest method of doing this will be to quote the stirring order issued by General Stoessel, the Commandant of Port Arthur, on May 6th :—

" On April 30 and May 1 the enemy crossed the Yalu in great force, and our troops fell back on positions which had been previously selected.

" Yesterday the enemy effected an important landing on the Liao-tung Peninsula, south of Pi-tsu-wo, and in the vicinity of Kin-chau Bay.

" Now our work is beginning.

" Naturally the enemy will destroy railway communication, and endeavour to drive our troops back to Port Arthur and besiege this fortress, Russia's bulwark in the Far East.

" Defend it until the arrival of the troops which are coming to relieve us.

" I consider it my duty to call upon you to display unceasing vigilance and caution, and you must be ready at all times to demean yourselves towards your general with the dignity and order beseeming the glorious troops of Russia.

" No matter what happens, you must not lose your heads, but remember that

everything is possible in war, and that we shall be able, with the help of God, to cope with the arduous task imposed upon us."

It will be noted that General Stoessel alludes to more than one Japanese landing, and it is a fact that another and important disembarkation took place. But we may conveniently leave any detailed allusion to this operation to a future date. What we have now to deal with is the immediate effect of a Japanese landing in the Liao-tung Peninsula on the position at Port Arthur. We have seen that, at any rate, the Russian authorities are under no illusion on the subject, although some temporary hopefulness may have been inspired in the minds of the Port Arthur garrison by Colonel Spiridonoff's exploit. It appears, moreover, that at a ceremonial parade at Port Arthur held on May 6th, General Stoessel, in a speech to those present, definitely alludes to the "new phase the war has taken, whereby Port Arthur is threatened on the land side," and expresses firm confidence in the endurance of the garrison. The soldiers and sailors answer the Commandant's stirring address with cheers, and this seems an appropriate moment at which to leave Port Arthur, and to turn to the exciting work which, more especially during the past ten days, has been accomplished first on the Yalu, and afterwards between the right bank of that river and General Kuropatkin's headquarters, now at Liao-Yang.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ON THE YALU—OPPOSING FORCES—JAPANESE PREPAREDNESS—THE RIVER AND ITS ISLANDS —THE TWO POSITIONS—PRELIMINARY EFFORTS—THE PASSAGE OF THE YALU.

AT the close of Chapter XIII. the Russians and Japanese were face to face on the Yalu, and already some few shots had been exchanged by sharpshooters and patrols. It was then the beginning of the third week in April, and, although no great movement was observable, it was evident that big events were imminent, and careful preparations were being made on both sides of the stream for an early and possibly hand-to-hand struggle.

It is impossible to have any proper understanding of what is about to take place in this interesting vicinity unless one makes on effort to obtain at any rate an outline idea of the circumstances. It is sometimes possible to make a battle quite interesting without entering into any explanation, save such as can be briefly interposed in an exciting narrative. But that is generally out of the question nowadays, when large bodies of troops are concerned, and more especially, perhaps, when in the course of the proceedings a considerable river has to be crossed. The operation about to be described occupied in all six days, five of which were taken up in what may be termed preliminary fighting. It is clear that even the most thrilling account of such a protracted engagement—for it really was one engagement, although for the purpose of this narrative it will be convenient to separate the passage of the Yalu from the resultant battle—would become exceedingly obscure, and very probably tedious as well, without some knowledge of the ground traversed and of the units engaged.

Accordingly, let us commence by making a steady and impartial survey of both forces, and then try to form a general idea of the problem each has to face—the one having as its object to cross a most troublesome river in the teeth of severe opposition, and then to carry a difficult and stubbornly defended position; the other compelled by various reasons to stand on an unwelcome defensive, and endeavour to hurl back a numerically superior enemy known to be in first-class fighting trim, and to be greatly heartened by successes already achieved.

Let us take the Russians first. During the last two weeks in April the Russian force on the Yalu appears to have grown considerably until it approximates the strength of a full-grown Army Corps. As a matter of fact, the force was a mixed one, consisting of a variety of units among which were included the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 22nd, 23rd, and 27th Regiments of East Siberian Infantry, each containing three battalions; one battalion of the 24th Regiment; five batteries of field artillery, each of eight guns; a battery of eight machine guns; a sapper battalion; and a number of Cossacks. It is estimated by the Japanese that there were altogether some 30,000 Russians on the right bank of the Yalu, but it is doubtful whether more than two-thirds of that number, at the

very most, took part simultaneously in the fighting at any one stage. The Cossacks, under General Mishtchenko of Chong-ju renown, seem to have been operating mostly at the mouth of the Yalu, where various feints were made by the Japanese, doubtless for the express purpose of keeping them occupied. It is also suggested in a thoughtful study of the operations by the military correspondent of the *Times*, to which the present writer is indebted for much assistance, that several regiments not engaged in the final struggle were holding points either on the upper reaches of the river or on the line of communications.

One Russian division, the 3rd, was fairly complete, and was under the command of General Kashtalinski, a gallant and level-headed officer who until recently had been in command on the Yalu, having superseded General Mishtchenko, but who himself had just been superseded by General Sassulitch commanding the 3rd Siberian Army Corps.

Probably the main difficulty which the Russians had still to encounter was that of supplies. Even 20,000 Russians consume a good deal of food, and, although until now the line of communications with Liao-Yang had been quite secure, the business of feeding continuously such a large force at such a distance from any really well-supplied base must have been terribly trying. It is important to emphasise this point, as it bears directly upon the action of the Russian military authorities in regard both to the resistance offered at this point and to the subsequent movement in retreat. It may never be known how great an effort it was even to keep 20,000 or 30,000 men on the Yalu during these few weeks, and it is quite certain that the amount of positive privation suffered by the Russian troops themselves in this dreary interval will always remain obscure.

For the rest, the Russians appear to have worked as hard, and to have been as vigilant, as circumstances would allow. Entrenchments were thrown up and occupied day in and day out until the conditions must have been frightfully detrimental to both health and *morale*. The appearance of some of the soldiers killed in the fighting showed that they must have lived actually in the trenches for days, and the marvel is that in such circumstances they fought as well as they did. For even with British soldiers it has been found—the siege of Sevastopol is the historic case in point—that prolonged sojourn in trenches is not the best preparation for desperate fighting.

Let us now turn to the Japanese, whom we left gradually increasing their forces on the south bank of the Yalu until the whole of the First Army, consisting of the Guards Division, and the 2nd and 12th Divisions, are concentrated in the fourth week in April in the vicinity of Wi-ju, and to the south-east of that town. We have already seen what difficulties the Japanese had to encounter in their march northwards, but a touch of graphic colour may be borrowed at this point from a despatch sent off from the Yalu on April 28th by Major MacHugh, the *Daily Telegraph's* special correspondent with the Japanese Army, who says:—

"The Japanese troops are now in position. Their march was accomplished in the face of terrible difficulties. The roads were nearly impassable, but the Japanese succeeded in getting through with their transports and guns. I am filled with admiration for the excellence of their organisation and its smoothness of working.

"Between Ping-Yang and Chong-ju the Japanese almost re-made the road. Miles of it were repaired, timber being used as a foundation across the rice fields, and new bridges were built across the large rivers. The Japanese engineers carried out this work with rough timber cut from the neighbouring woods, and with this material they erected strong and durable bridges.



Photo: Illustrated Press Bureau.

JAPANESE PIONEERS BUILDING A BRIDGE: SHOWING FORM OF PONTOONS.

"An enormous army of coolies and pack-horses has been employed in carrying stores to the front. Coolies cover the roads, both coming and going, like ants, each with a weight of 150 lb. on his back. Large numbers of small carts, drawn by three soldiers each, are also employed, and by these means the Japanese staff have placed an ample supply of stores at the front."

It is an interesting and immensely important feature of the Japanese preparations for the crossing of the Yalu that a large number of howitzers and other heavy guns should be included in their artillery, as it was in ours in South Africa. The Japs have clearly studied every recent campaign to the fullest advantage, and, as will be seen, their precautions in this particular case have not been wasted. At the same time it will be understood that the transport of these large guns must have added most seriously to the difficulties of an already exhausting march, and it is a matter of legitimate speculation, whether, in such circumstances, a little of the right kind of Cossack raiding would not have proved singularly effective.

Another significant and extraordinarily valuable adjunct to the coming operations of the Japanese is the pontoon train. Most civilians at one time or another have seen pontoons, which may be generally

described as flat-bottomed punts, constructed of wood and canvas and covered in on the top, which are set afloat in a stream with beams and planks laid on them so as to form a floating bridge. The Japanese pontoon is a model of ingenuity and efficiency, being 24 feet long and 4 feet wide with a buoyancy of 5,500 lb. "It is divided," the *Times* military correspondent tells us, "into two halves, each of which can be used as a boat, while these again are divisible into three sections, two of which form a load for a pack animal. Thus roadless and mountainous country has no terrors for the Japanese pontooner, and some of us may recall with a shudder those enormous and ponderous barges which were dragged painfully about the valley of the Tugela by long teams of oxen, and may wonder what the Japanese Attaché thought of the art of British war."

The supply arrangements of the First Army are evidently perfect, and the Commissariat has no difficulty in providing for a force probably more than twice as large as that which is faring so hardly on the opposite bank of the river. Even though the surrounding country may not yield much in the way of food—for the Russians during their previous occupation seem to have gutted the villages pretty thoroughly—the transports have brought ample supplies to Chinnampo, which are being stored in great quantities at Ping-Yang and thence brought up as required to Wi-ju.

The First Army of Japan is, as has been mentioned, commanded by General Baron Kuroki, an officer of whom Colonel Vannovsky, formerly Russian Military Attaché in Japan, had the presumption to say recently that much was not to be expected, on the ground that the General was over sixty years of age. It is true that Baron Kuroki is about as old as Lord Roberts was when the latter went out to South Africa to give the whole world a lesson in strategy and leadership, and the Russians will find, as the Boers did, that three-score is not necessarily the limit of military activity even in these days when young generals are as common as they were in Napoleon's Army. Kuroki is of the school that trusts little to chance, although by birth a typical Satsuma and, as a natural consequence, a man of the highest spirit and courage. In the Chino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 he was largely engaged at headquarters, in conection with mobilisation and other Staff matters, until the campaign was nearly over, but was given a division in time to share in the victory at Wei-hai-Wei. He is now universally regarded as "a first-class fighting man, whose policy consists in not hurrying his preparations but making everything ready, to the last button. When all is in order he strikes, and he strikes hard."

The Japanese are evidently burning with anxiety to commence the conflict, and are confident of victory. These sentiments are reflected in the boldness of the scouts, who constantly cross the river and even penetrate some distance into what is really the Russian position. It must be taken into account that, excellent as is, in any case, the spirit of the Japanese soldiery, it is being notably inflamed in the present instance by the reports received of the heroic attempts made by the Japanese Fleet to bottle up the Russian ships in Port Arthur. It is probably only by the exercise of the severest discipline that the Jap soldiers are restricted at this point from dashing into emulative exploits of quite an insane description, and it speaks volumes for Japanese military system that the First



A TOILSOME MARCH SOME DIFFICULTIES OF THE JAPANESE ARMY IN KOREA

Army was kept so completely in hand as it was until the time came to make a call upon it.

And now let us endeavour to form some notion of the tract of country over which the fighting is about to take place. This is no easy matter, for the Russian position appears to have originally extended for about 20 miles, although ultimately it became contracted to about 4 miles. Moreover, owing to the splitting up of the main stream of the Yalu by islands, and to the existence of a considerable tributary, the Ai river, which plays an important part in the fighting, it is only by the exercise of care and discrimination that confusion can be avoided.

The first point to remember is that the Yalu at Wi-ju is about three miles wide, and is divided by two islands into three streams, of which the central stream alone requires bridging, the other two being fordable waist-deep. The island near the Russian side is called Cheun-song-do, that before Wi-ju, Kin-tatao. These islands consist of low sandy plains only a few feet above the water, with very little in the way of anything that can be used as cover.

It is rather a pathetic circumstance that, throughout the early movements on the Yalu, there should still be some Koreans living in the islands that lie between the opposing forces. These poor wretches have dug holes under their houses, and into these they crawl hurriedly as soon as the firing begins. It would, perhaps, be difficult to find the doctrine that "there's no place like home" more quaintly exemplified.

Two or three miles above Wi-ju the river forks like the upper part of a capital Y. The stream nearer to the Russian position is the Ai tributary, which is fordable breast high and has a soft bottom. The other stream is the Yalu proper, and just above Wi-ju this is again split up by an island called Kulido; but higher up, at Sukuchin, which is thirteen miles above Wi-ju, it runs in a single stream.

Let us now take the land positions, more especially on the Russian side, commencing with the heights overlooking the Yalu below Antung, which is clearly marked even on small scale maps, and lies a little to the west of Wi-ju. It should be mentioned that the Yalu, after its confluence with the Ai, runs almost due south into Korea Bay. The capital Y, then, may still be conveniently retained as affording a fair general outline on which to dot down the main geographical features in question.

On the left hand of our Y, quite at the bottom of the supporting stroke, we may place the southern extremity of the Russian position. Here, on the heights of Antushan and Niang-ning-chin, are placed Russian batteries, and there is a strong force at Antung, a little higher up, about the middle of the supporting stroke of the Y. But the main Russian position is, as was foreshadowed on page 163, Kiu-lien-cheng, which lies on rising ground not far from the river, rather to the north-west of Wi-ju, and with a considerable command of the opposite bank. Between Kiu-lien-cheng and Wi-ju, as noted in Chapter XIII., there are two sandbanks, one the continuation of Cheun-song-do already mentioned, and another smaller one. Kiu-lien-cheng, or the "Fort of Nine Continuations," was for a time held by the Chinese in 1894, who doubtless trusted to its solid masonry battlements to deter the Japanese from any attempt at attack. But after the Japanese under Yamagata had crossed the Yalu, and

scaled the walls of Kiu-lien-cheng, they found the place deserted. According to the accounts of all the correspondents, the Russian position along the Yalu, and especially at Kiu-lien-cheng, was anything but an inviting one, with its frowning hills rendered still more formidable

others if it be mentioned here that Kiu-lien-cheng becomes in Japanese Kiu-ren-jo, and in Russian Turentcheng.

From Kiu-lien-cheng the main road runs, as we have seen in Chapter XIII., to Mukden through Feng-hwang-chen.



SKETCH MAP OF THE BATTLEFIELD OF KIU-LIEN-CHENG.

by miles of entrenchments and numerous batteries. But the Japanese certainly possessed an important advantage in knowing every inch of the ground, and in having actually traversed it before with a view to an attack upon the same objective.

It may save confusion in cases where the succeeding narrative is collated with

Six or seven miles to the west of Kiu-lien-cheng lies Hohmutang, where the roads leading to Mukden and Kiu-lien-cheng respectively converge, and also one running southwards to Antung (which is also connected by a road along the river with Kiu-lien-cheng).

To the north of Kiu-lien-cheng, and along the right or western bank of the

Ai river, runs a long ridge at the south of which is Makau, and at the north Youshukow. At both these points the Russians have batteries, but this, the northern extremity, or the extreme left, whichever one prefers to call it, of the Russian position, is insecure. For the wedge-shaped piece of country lying in the fork of the capital Y is still higher. Right in the fork is Husan, or Tiger Hill, which is described as being to the Kiu-lien-cheng position exactly what Hlangwane Hill was to Colenso. Northward from Husan the high ground continues to Yu-chasan, which is nearly opposite Youshukow.

JAPANESE CAVALRYMAN.

We have now come round by easy stages to the right "prong" of our Y, which, as we have noted above, is the stream of the Yalu proper, and on the left bank of which is Suku-chin, with Wi-ju thirteen miles to the south-west, and thence the main road running to An-ju and Ping-yang.

The proceedings on both sides of the Yalu estuary prior to the Japanese attempts to force the passage are rather interesting, if obscure, and it is evident that some very fine work is done at this period in the way of reconnaissance. Both sides are particularly anxious to discover where the enemy's guns are located, and strenuous efforts are made with this end in view. On April 21st the Russians make a particularly bold feint, crossing the river in four junks from the shore near Antung, as if they intend to land at Wi-ju. Evidently the idea is to make the Japanese reveal their artillery positions, but General Kuroki is not to be caught napping in this fashion. Not a single gun speaks from the Japanese bank, but some Japanese infantry wait until the junks are well in the stream and then open a brisk fire, killing, it is said, sixteen of the enemy. In covering the retreat of this unfortunate party, the Russians find it necessary to use their guns, and thus reveal the whereabouts of some of their own batteries.

The Japanese operations during the last week of April are singularly secretive and misleading. Although, as has been noted, the ground on the Russian bank has a considerable command over that on the Japanese side, the latter has numerous small depressions in which movements can be made secure from Russian observation, and the Japs have even gone to the length of erecting screens along the roads to conceal the passage of troops and material.

In one important detail the Japanese succeed in fooling the Russians very cleverly. Opposite Wi-ju lies, as mentioned above, the long sandy island of Kintatao. On this the Japs make a great show of activity, collecting here a quantity of bridging material as if they intended to cross and deliver a direct frontal attack on Kiu-lien-cheng. But,

before the actual passage is attempted, the greater part of this material is carefully removed behind the aforesaid screens to a point much further up the stream. The amount of ammunition which the Russians subsequently waste in shelling an imaginary enemy on Kintatao island is believed to be considerable.

On April 25th a Japanese naval detachment appears in the mouth of the Yalu. The detachment consists of gunboats, torpedo-boats, and a flotilla of steam launches under the command of Rear-Admiral Hosoya, and its arrival at this interesting juncture is pretty clear proof that a crossing is imminent. Warships of large size cannot ascend the shallow Yalu, but vessels of light draught, armed with quick-firing guns, may be extremely useful not only for purposes of actual offence, but also as a means of decoying away a considerable portion of the enemy's forces to the coast. As a matter of fact, it is believed that the majority of General Mishtchenko's Cossacks are kept usefully out of the way by this means, for in the course of the next few days there are several references to encounters between the Japanese steam launches and the Russian cavalry—a somewhat unusual occurrence in warfare. It seems that on arrival at the mouth of the river the naval detachment loses no time in getting to work, for some of the vessels are reported as having ascended the river on the 25th, and come under the ineffective fire from the enemy's artillery, presumably that posted at Xiang-ning-chin, nearly opposite to Yongampho. Russian cavalry appear in the delta of the river, but retire when fired upon by the detachment. The following day the steam launches are again engaged, being fired upon by a body of 100 Cossacks. A Japanese torpedo-boat comes into action, and the Cossacks beat a retreat, leaving many wounded. On the whole, Russian experience in this connection does not favour the theory that a Cossack, who at the best of times is seldom a good marksman, is a suitable antagonist to pit against a bluejacket working a 6-pounder.

RUSSIAN DRAGOON.

On April 26th commences the series of operations and actions which may be fitly described as the "Passage of the Yalu," and which for the purposes of this History will be distinguished from the resultant and culminating action of May 1st, sometimes called the "Battle of the Yalu," but quite as accurately, and more conveniently, designated the "Battle of Kiulien-cheng."

The enemy's front, as we have seen, occupies about 20 miles at the commencement of the operations. Against this General Kuroki launches three splendid divisions, the Imperial Guard, or Guards Division, commanded by General Baron Hasewaya, which originally occupies,

roughly speaking, the centre of the Japanese position, resting on Wi-ju. The Japanese left opposes Antung, and is occupied by the 2nd Division, commanded by General Nishi. On the Japanese right is the 12th Division, commanded by General Inouye.

It now becomes necessary to allude to the special artillery preparations of the Japanese commander. General Kuroki understands the value of massed guns, and, accordingly, he has placed secretly in position to the south-west of Wi-ju a force of artillery immensely superior to any which the Russians can conceivably bring into action at any stage of the fight. This artillery is most cleverly masked, and, as we shall see, is not used until the fighting for the passage is far advanced. Besides at least 24 field-guns, there are in position a number of howitzers and, it is said, some of the 4·7 in. naval guns which we ourselves found so extremely serviceable in South Africa. The batteries are arranged so that a terribly destructive fire can be brought to bear either upon Kiu-lien-cheng itself or upon the Russian left flank.

The first day (April 26th) is occupied in preparations for bridge-laying, and the work done consists in attacking and dispersing the enemy on the islets and in occupying the latter. This duty is entrusted to detachments of the Guards and the 2nd Division, which carry it out with conspicuous dash and thoroughness. The two divisions already commence to bear to the right with a view to an eventual turning movement, and so we find the 2nd Division occupying Kintatao Island, and the Guards crossing to Kulido (or, as it is called in some accounts, Kurito), higher up. The 2nd Division meets with no opposition and has no casualties, but the Guards evidently have some pretty stiff fighting, for they have twenty-five wounded, and the enemy are seen to carry many dead and wounded towards Kiu-lien-cheng. During the greater part of to-day the Russian artillery fires intermittently upon Wi-ju, but General Kuroki, not caring as yet to reveal the positions of his masked batteries, permits no reply.

April 27th and 28th are occupied chiefly in an attempt to gain a footing on Husan or Tiger Hill, which is held by a portion of the 22nd East Siberian Infantry. After the Guards have occupied Kulido Island in some strength, Husan is subjected to a searching fire by sharpshooters and the enemy evacuate, but subsequently, on the 29th, reoccupy this important position.

On the 27th, two gun-boats, two torpedo-boats, and two steamers of Admiral Hosoya's squadron ascend the Yalu and silence the Russian artillery at Antushan.

Thus at no serious risk of incurring heavy losses the Japanese are occupying the attention of the enemy along nearly twenty miles of front, and all the while are concealing the direction which they intend their main advance shall take. Meanwhile the Russians, of course, are not idle, and keep up a pretty steady fire upon Wi-ju, but without much effect. The reoccupation of Husan by the light infantry of the 10th and 12th Regiments of East Siberian under Staff Lieutenant-Colonel Lind appears to be carried out with great determination, notwithstanding the stubborn resistance offered by two battalions of the 4th Regiment of Guards infantry, with a few cavalry and mountain guns, also of the Guards. According to the Russian account this operation causes the enemy some loss, ten dead and twenty-eight wounded Japanese being left on the position.

On April 29th the main bridging operations are commenced. A portion of the 12th Division crosses the Yalu at Sukuchin and disperses the enemy in the immediate neighbourhood, while the Japanese engineers labour incessantly to construct bridges adapted for the passage of a great force of all arms. The work is one not only of terrific labour but also of deadly peril. The water is so frightfully cold that men are repeatedly being overcome by numbness and drowned At some stages of the operation it is necessary to enter the water in order to lash the pontoons more securely, and Jap after Jap strips and plunges into the icy stream only to be overcome by cramp and perish. All the time the bridge is under construction the builders are under fire, for the shrapnel keep on bursting overhead from the batteries on the Russian left at Makau. While the 12th Division is busy at Sukuchin the Guards on Kulido are also preparing a bridge to Husan.

The night of the 29th closes with a fierce artillery duel between some Russian guns which have been brought up on a sandy neck to the east of Husan and the Japanese right. The Russians have to-day evacuated their last island in the river, which has on it a village a mile long. Before leaving they apply petroleum to the wretched huts, and the village blazes all night, illuminating, as the *Daily Chronicle* correspondent picturesquely remarks, the dark-crested Manchurian hills for miles.



JAPANESE FIELD GUN.

Early in the morning of the 30th the bridges at Sukuchin are completed, and the 12th Division begins crossing a little before eleven. At 10 a.m. the masked Japanese batteries have opened a tremendous fire on Kiu-lien-cheng, and this continues until 5 o'clock in the evening, the object clearly being to occupy the attention of the Russians and prevent them from interfering seriously with the crossing of the 12th Division. The result

A RUSSIAN COLUMN CROSSING A STREAM IN S.E. MANCHURIA.

of this timely intervention is that, although there is severe firing on all sides, the 12th Division only loses two men killed and twenty-five officers and men wounded.

The crossing of the 12th Division and its advance towards the Ai naturally causes a second Russian evacuation of Husan, and the withdrawal of the troops formerly holding it to the right bank of the Ai.

The 2nd Division follows the 12th across the bridges at Sukuchin, leaving, apparently, detachments on the islands in order to harass the enemy's centre. The pressure on the Russian right is kept up by the naval flotilla, which advances to the neighbourhood of Antushan, and fights at close range with 400 of the enemy's cavalry and infantry.

Meanwhile the Guards have completed their bridge to Husan, notwithstanding heavy interruptions from the Russian artillery at Makau. In the evening they, too, cross, and thus by nightfall on Saturday, April 30th, General Kuroki has all his three divisions across the Yalu proper, and within striking distance of the enemy's left. To all intents and purposes the Russian flank has already been turned; the "Hlangwane Hill" of the position has been captured; the Russians even now are a little dubious as to the exact movement which will be made against them on the morrow; and the Japanese have an artillery superiority which is already manifest, but which will be still more conspicuous when the crucial stage of the forthcoming battle is reached.

STRETCHER BEARERS OF THE JAPANESE MEDICAL STAFF CORPS.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE BATTLE BEGUN—THE RUSSIAN POSITIONS—THE FORDING OF THE AI—TERRIBLE LOSSES—THE JAPANESE ASSAULT—A GALLANT DEFENCE—THE RUSSIANS ENVELOPED—RETREAT—THE LAST STAND—LOSSES—AN EPOCH-MAKING VICTORY.

IT is daybreak on the morning of Sunday, May 1st. The mists are rising from the river, and a glorious day is dawning, when, with a sudden roar, the Japanese artillery, in position near Wi-ju, burst into terrific action. The recesses of the hills opposite are searched with shrapnel, and bursting shells fall thick and fast into the Russian lines. Artillery which has been posted by the Japanese on the islands in the river joins in the cannonade, to which the Russian reply is weak and fitful. The Russian artillery on the hill north-west of Youshukow, which is a special menace to the infantry attack, is silenced, and by 7 o'clock all is ready for the tremendous development which is to show once, and perhaps for all, whether the Japanese Army can hold its own with that of the Great White Tsar.

Meanwhile, in the bright morning light, the three divisions of the Japanese First Army have been revealed on the left flank of the Russian position. To the Japanese right is still General Inouye with the 12th Division; the centre is still, and will continue to be, occupied by the Guards Division; while the 2nd Division, although probably at first in rear of the Guards, will shortly resume its old place on the left. Throughout the vicissitudes of this tremendous conflict, Japanese tactics are as consistent as is Japanese strategy, and, indeed, as a trained observer remarks, the whole battle is a model of fine leadership.

The Russians endeavour to adapt themselves to some extent to the circumstances of the coming attack, but it is doubtful whether even now they realise fully the gravity of the situation. General Kashtalinski, like the able soldier that he is, has grasped the fact that the left flank of the original position, for which he is specially responsible, has been turned, but last night he received orders from General Sassulitch to hold his ground. Accordingly he remains with three battalions of the 22nd East Siberian Regiment watching the fords of the Ai river; the 12th Rifle Regiment is on the hills behind, supported by a couple of batteries and some machine guns.

The combatants are now separated by the Ai river, and in grim silence the Russians in their trenches await the oncoming of the attacking Jap infantry. It is not difficult to imagine the concentrated yearning to come to blows which animates almost more particularly the defenders in this great engagement. For weeks succeeding an inglorious withdrawal from Korea they have watched the enemy collecting his strength for the delivery of a great blow, and now has come the supreme moment when the weary waiting and privation of this exhausting time is to come swiftly and tragically to an end. What wonder if the Russian infantryman grips his rifle with fierce exultation, and the pride of the Russian gunner in his weapon is tinged with the lust of blood, as each

feels the moments slipping away which separate him from actual collision with a well-hated foe.

For the rest the situation, so soon and so terribly to be resolved into one altogether fresh and even more tremendous in its consequences, is one of awful solemnity. Only a little strip of sand and water separate great and representative forces of the West and the Far East, and, though the result of contact cannot be decisive, the issue must be dreadfully significant, not only for Russia but, perhaps, for the whole civilised world. A dozen complications of almost appalling moment hang on the eventual success of Russia and Japan in this great war, and, while this is but a first serious land engagement, possibly of many, the utter failure of one or other side to fulfil its expectations cannot but have a vitally serious bearing upon the future of the campaign. To the student with a touch of sentiment in his composition an added tinge of gravity is lent to the scene which unfolds itself this fine Sunday morning by the fact that now, for the first time, Japan plays the part not only of attacker, but of an actual invader. It is true that Manchuria is in reality Chinese, but for many months past it has been recognised by all the world as temporarily in effective Russian occupation, and, when last night the three Japanese divisions crossed the Yalu at Husan and Sukuchin, they invaded, to all political intents and purposes, Russian territory as surely as they threw down the gauntlet to Russia by sea by their attack on Port Arthur now nearly three months ago.

While we are indulging in these grave and really edifying reflections the "ball"—to use an old-fashioned military description not without a certain quaint significance—which has been opened by the Japanese artillery, commences in deadly earnest. Since 5 o'clock the 12th Japanese Division has been deploying on a four mile front, a movement which is rendered very much easier than it might otherwise have proved by the absence of a pushful force of Russian cavalry. Unhampered by any of those desperate charges which have sometimes told heavily on deploying infantry, the 12th Division "sorts itself out," and advances boldly to the fords of the Ai, covered by its own field artillery and by the flanking fire of the long range guns at Wi-ju.

Had the advance been taking place over solid ground the Division would have the appearance of long thin wavy lines presenting a comparatively unsubstantial mark to the defenders' fire. But owing, it is suggested, to the necessity for closing in upon the practicable fords, the Division, or a considerable portion of it, reaches the river bank in column. Kashtalinski's infantry are not slow to take advantage of this inviting solidity. The Japanese come swinging on with a thin protecting fringe of skirmishers, when suddenly from the Russian trenches, in which until now grim silence has been preserved, there bursts a perfect hurricane of musketry fire. The skirmishers drop by scores, the column reels, and the Japanese casualties at this point come to be numbered in hundreds. Still they press on across the stream, the men frantic to get at the enemy, the more thoughtful of the leaders anxious to gain temporary shelter in the "dead angle" at the base of the hills ahead. As the companies gain the opposite bank rapid extension takes place, and the smallest hillock of sand is used as a screen from which to pour shot after shot

into the Russian position. "Never," says Mr. Donohoe of the *Daily Chronicle*, who watched the action from an eminence in rear of the Guards Reserves, "even in South Africa, have I seen troops so unprotected exposed to so murderous a fire."

Although in trenches and on the defensive the Russians are in a hardly less enviable position. General Kashtalinski reckons that his position is being cannonaded by thirty-six field guns, in addition to the enemy's position artillery, and it is evident that the defenders are being frightfully shaken. At hundreds of points the shrapnel screaming overhead has hailed down bullets into the trenches, and moving stories are told of the gallantry displayed by the grand Siberian Infantry in these depressing circumstances.

While the advance of the Japanese 12th Division is being kept in check as far as possible by two battalions of the 22nd Siberian Infantry, the 12th Siberian Rifle Regiment, which, as noted above, has been posted on the hill in the rear, now comes forward, covered by the fire of the scanty field artillery and machine guns at General Kashtalinski's disposal, and assists to man the trenches.

While the 12th Japanese Division has thus been delivering a fairly direct, if very costly, attack upon its objective, the remainder of the Japanese First Army has been playing its allotted part with no less resolution and success. The Guards Division has crossed to the left of the 12th, and is advancing in the direction of Hohmutang, where, as explained in the preceding chapter, four roads converge, and through which the main route runs to Feng-hwang-chen and Mukden. Here lay the original centre of the Russian position held by the 12th Siberian Rifles with the 11th Regiment in reserve.

The 2nd Japanese Division crosses in rear of the Guards and slips down the river side towards Antung, where it is believed there is still a considerable force of the enemy. Here at the commencement of the fighting were the 9th and 10th Regiments of East Siberian Infantry, with two batteries constituting the original Russian right.

It is now noon, and the position is as follows. The Japanese attack extends from beyond Youshukow right away to Antung, and is being pressed with irresistible force and tenacity, notwithstanding the terrible losses suffered by the 12th Division at the Ai fords. The 12th Division itself has swarmed up the steep rocky hillsides in front of it like ants, and already on one of the topmost Russian parapets a Japanese soldier has unfurled the Japanese flag, and the Japanese spectators on the walls of An-ju have welcomed the glorious sight with shouts of "Banzai!" The Russian positions on Youshukow and Makau have been stormed, and a battalion of the 22nd East Siberian Infantry, which was holding Kashtalinski's extreme left, completely routed.

Lower down, the Guards and the 2nd Division are driving the original Russian right and centre on to its left, while still further south the naval flotilla is at work, having started up the river at half-past nine, and bombarded Antushan and other villages along the bank. Never was pressure on a long and difficult position more skilfully and systematically exercised, and it is unquestionably to this policy of giving the defenders no rest, and constantly confusing them by fresh attacks in unexpected places, that the success of this elaborate operation is largely due. But no mere tactical dexterity could have produced such results

THE BATTLEFIELD AS SEEN FROM THE RANGE OF HILLS TERMINATING AT HUSAN (TIGER HILL).

The town of Kiu-lien cheng is seen in centre of picture, 3 miles distant. In the distance are faintly discerned the Yalu River and the islands which were successively occupied by the Japanese.

as are already being gained by the Japanese, without the exhibition of extraordinary courage and persistence. The frowning hills—heights some of them are—are splendidly held, at any rate during the earlier phases of the fighting, and it is only the sublime ardour of the Japs, their reckless indifference to death, and the fine leadership of their officers, which save them from being hurled back at a dozen points in dangerous confusion.

The 2nd Division, in their advance on the left, meet with a painful experience. They have mounted a hill commanding the Russian line of retreat, when suddenly two shells from their own artillery drop among them, falling short, and burst. When the smoke lifts, twenty-seven dead bodies mark the occurrence of one of those unhappy accidents which will happen even in the best-regulated battles. But the Japs, though momentarily disconcerted, swiftly rally and go forward once more. Wherever there are occupied trenches ahead of them they dash at these with magnificent *élan*, and, where there is no immediate objective, still they move on, knowing that the tremendous pressure they are exercising is gradually squeezing the Russians into a contracted space, the prelude to a final stand or a general retreat.

The condition of the Russians is becoming more and more critical. Already the 12th Rifle Regiment has been taken from the old centre to strengthen General Kashtalinski's position to the left of Kiu-lien-cheng, and the General, who throughout the action appears to receive little consideration from his superior, General Sassulitch, is beginning to be sorely pressed. Towards noon he ascertains that, as mentioned above, the battalion of the 22nd Regiment on his extreme left has been routed by the right of the oncoming 12th Japanese Division, and that his left flank is thus being turned.

At 1 o'clock in the afternoon General Kashtalinski at last receives a reinforcement in the shape of two battalions of the 11th Regiment, and a battery commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Mouravsky. These have been sent by General Sassulitch with an intimation that in due course the 9th and 10th Regiments will follow from the neighbourhood of Antung, and that, meanwhile, Kashtalinski must continue to hold his ground.

The manifest obstacle to the accomplishment of this heroic task is the fact that a Japanese enveloping movement has now commenced, all three divisions closing in gradually on the Russian position near Kiu-lien-cheng.

Yet Kashtalinski faces the situation manfully, and does the best possible with the scanty troops at his disposal. Seeing that the advanced position occupied by the 12th and 22nd Regiments is no longer tenable, he orders the 11th Regiment, which has come to his assistance, to occupy a commanding position in the rear from which they can fire on the enemy from two sides. He then, under cover of this fire, withdraws the 12th and 22nd Regiments, and the batteries and quick-firing guns which are also in his first position.

The operation is only carried out with extreme difficulty. The Japanese keep pressing forward, and Colonel Mouravsky's battery, not being able to take up a satisfactory position, is severely handled and loses its commander. The 12th Regiment is intercepted by the Japanese and has to cut its way through. A company with quick-firing guns loses half its men and all its horses, and one of the batteries, withdrawn from the first posi-

tion, finds it cannot ascend the steep slopes with only half its horses, and so returns to its original place and fights to the bitter end.

But the palm for dogged bravery must be given to the 11th and 12th Regiments, which hold out against overwhelming numbers until 3 o'clock, when the arrival of the 10th Regiment from Antung enables a general withdrawal to be carried out. In the list of casualties furnished by General Sassulitch the losses of the 11th Regiment are returned at over 200 killed and over 300 wounded, while the 12th Regiment had nearly 300 killed and some 400 wounded.

The Russian retreat is, of course, in the direction of Feng-hwang-chen, and, although both General Sassulitch and General Kashtalinski speak warmly of the manner in which the *morale* of the troops is maintained, there is reason to believe that much disorderliness prevails. In the position recently occupied several guns have been abandoned, but there is ample excuse for this in the fact that so many of the horses have been killed, and that the attack has been pressed home with such extraordinary vigour by an overwhelming enemy. Apart from this, however, there is evidence that the flight was a somewhat precipitate one, even Russian officers who were taken prisoners admitting that the only bodies which retreated in order were five or six infantry battalions and two artillery companies.



RUSSIAN FIELD GUN.

According to Chinese reports a painful incident of the retreat takes place near Feng-hwang-chen. Some 2,000 infantry posted on a hill near the latter place mistake 300 comrades who have been limping along sadly from Kiu-lien-cheng for the enemy. They open fire upon the advancing body, and over 100 are killed and wounded before the ghastly mistake is discovered.

At Hohmutang, about 7 o'clock in the evening, a final Russian stand is made, and of this a more detailed account is given by the *Times* correspondent in a despatch from Antung than is at first forthcoming with regard to any other

treat. These two bodies, accompanied by mountain guns, hurried right and left respectively of the main road, the reserve of the remaining division following more leisurely along the road itself.

"Fearful of losing the fray, the flank-

AT CLOSE QUARTERS.

stage of the engagement. It appears that no sooner was the capture of the position at Kiu-lien-cheng assured than the Japanese brought up the reserves of two of the attacking Divisions, and sent them after the retreating Russians in the hope of cutting off the enemy's re-

ing bodies in their haste outstripped their guns, and, after advancing parallel to the road until abreast of the retiring enemy, suddenly closed in, completely surprising the Russians, who were forced to take up a defensive position at Hohmutang, six miles from Kiu-lien-cheng.



A FIGHT BETWEEN DESTROYERS.

"The body pursuing in the rear quickened its movements, and all three simultaneously engaged the Russians. A desperate fight ensued, the Russians at short range using their guns with deadly effect. The Japanese greatly outnumbered their opponents and inflicted terrible losses with their rifle fire. Without guns the Japanese might well have retired and waited for support, but the men, jealous of the laurels earned by their comrades earlier in the day, were wild to get at the enemy. With loud cheers all three bodies with bayonets fixed charged the Russian position in almost solid masses. Such impetuosity, backed by superior numbers, could not be withstood, and the Russians hoisted the white flag in token of surrender.

"With the Russians were 20 guns, all of which fell into the hands of the Japanese; 20 officers were taken prisoners, and 400 men, more than half of these being wounded. The Japanese estimated their own casualties in this short fight at 300. The Russians must have lost treble that number."

According to the Japanese official accounts there were 5 Japanese officers and 160 men killed in the battle, and 29 officers and 666 men wounded; total 860. The heaviest loss was incurred by the 2nd Division, which had 1 officer and 84 men killed, and 318 wounded.

Of Russian dead bodies the Japs actually buried 1,362, and they received nearly 500 wounded into their hospitals. In addition to the wounded, 20 officers and 138 men were taken prisoners, and, as trophies of the fight, 28 guns remained in the hands of the victors. It must be appreciatively recorded that the Russian dead were buried with military honours, that the wounded were treated with extreme tenderness, and that their swords were returned to the Russian officers on the latter giving their *parole*.

The total losses of the Russians must have been considerably in excess of the above figures. It is said that some 700 wounded were carried into Feng-hwang-chen, and altogether the casualties may well have numbered nearly 3,000.

On the night of May 1st the Japanese bivouacked in and round Kiu-lien-cheng. It is a painful circumstance that during the night bands of Chinese should have wandered over the battlefield stripping the dead of their clothes and accoutrements, but the Japanese, worn out by their hard day's fighting, are hardly to be blamed for not foreseeing and preventing this shameful outrage. On learning next morning that it had occurred they were greatly incensed, and, after offering rewards for the apprehension of the guilty Chinese, established a system of patrols, which should effectually prevent the recurrence of such abominable practices.

So ends the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, and, before we proceed to follow the operations which form a sequel to it, it seems desirable to examine briefly from various standpoints the actual course of this remarkable engagement.

The first point that presents itself is the Russian attempt to minimise the importance of the battle by representing it merely as the result of a wish to lure the Japanese on into Manchurian territory. To this view the cold logic of subsequent events may oppose sufficient objection, but in any case it is obvious that the military commander who seeks to lure on an enemy at the cost of two or three thousand casualties and nearly thirty guns is a strategist of very doubtful order.

The simple fact of the case seems to

be that, originally, the intention was to lure the Japanese on, and that, with this end in view, the plan was not to fight any serious action on the Yalu, but to withdraw skilfully, and either meet the enemy at the Motien-ling Pass, or await him at Liao-yang. This plan was, however, changed, and at the last moment General Sassulitch, an Army Corps Commander, was placed in charge of the position, and every effort made to strengthen it. While the Russian operations were yet in a state of transition the Japanese attacked, and General Sassulitch, very possibly against the wishes of General Kuropatkin, fought a defensive action against an immensely superior enemy, and neither supported his subordinate, General Kashtalinski, properly, nor made adequate arrangements whereby an orderly retirement could be effected.

There is no question that the Russians were sadly hampered, and a good deal confused, by the Japanese plan of attack. Until the latter was fully developed, they seemed to anticipate that an attempt would still be made to cross the Yalu opposite Wi-ju, and not until it was too late to save the situation did they change front in order to meet the main attack from the Ai river. A more stubborn retention of Tiger Hill, a strong opposition to the crossing at Sukuchin, and a clearer appreciation of the value of the positions at Makau and Youshukow, might have produced different results; but it is hardly fair to the Russian Army to speak too confidently on these points. For one thing, they were entirely outclassed in the matter of artillery, and there is no doubt that the Japanese naval flotilla was of the greatest use to the attack by keeping Cossacks and infantry occupied on what was first the Russian right, and afterwards the Russian rear, which might have been employed to much better purpose on the other side of Kiu-lien-cheng.

Of the Japanese strategy and tactics throughout it is impossible to speak in terms of exaggerated admiration. In all the preparations for the actual fighting General Kuroki displayed a master mind, and although it is possible that the plan of the attack in outline had been arranged at Tokio, there must have been many details for the conception as well as the execution of which the military genius of the Commander of Japan's First Army was solely responsible. To the professional critic two questionable points present themselves: the huddling of the 12th Division at the Ai ford, and the passage of the 2nd Division along the bank of the river in order to "sweep up" the Russians supposed to be in force at Antung. The former has already been partially explained by the possible necessity for closing in at the fords, but the process involved heavy loss, and it may be doubted whether the Japanese anticipated quite such a warm reception as they received at this point from Kashtalinski's entrenched infantry and machine guns.

The enveloping movement, in furtherance of which the 2nd Division proceeded towards Antung, was finely conceived, and the end possibly justified the means. But it is an interesting speculation whether still better and more decisive results could not have been attained by prolonging the line of envelopment to the right, instead of to the left, thus making a much wider flanking movement without wasting so many troops in frontal attacks. Had the Russian left been completely enveloped probably the whole of the defence would have been disorganised and anything approaching a retirement rendered practically impossible.

It is extremely difficult at the time of

writing to estimate with any accuracy the number of soldiers engaged in this momentous conflict. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, it was estimated by the Japanese that during the last week in April there were 30,000 Russian troops on the Yalu, but it is doubtful whether more than two-thirds of these were ever at one time engaged in the actual fighting. One estimate places the number of Russians who fought at Kiu-lien-cheng as low as 9,000, the distribution being 2,000 west of Antung, 2,000 at Antung, and 5,000 at Kiu-lien-cheng. On the other hand, five distinct regiments of infantry are mentioned in the Russian despatches, in addition to artillery, and it is hardly conceivable that these would

JAPANESE INFANTRY REINFORCING THE FIRING LINE.

have in the field less than, on an average, 2,500 or 3,000 men apiece.

Whatever the Russian force may have been, it, or a part of it, fought a very gallant fight against tremendous odds, numerical and otherwise. The Japanese Division ordinarily contains some 15,000 men, and in war it sometimes is swollen by the addition of a reserve brigade. General Kuroki must therefore have had 45,000 men, and may have had 60,000 or even more under his orders on this eventful Sunday.

But of far greater importance than considerations of strategy, tactics, or arithmetic in this connection is, of course, the moral effect of Japan's victory over a Russian force strongly posted and deliberately accepting battle. In future there can be no question of reckoning soldiers of the Mikado as inferior to those of the Tsar. They meet on even terms, even if the Japanese have not already secured a moral predominance which may stand them in good stead. Had they merely turned the Russians out by weight of numbers the effect upon the minds of dispassionate observers would have been considerable. But that they should have inflicted upon the enemy such a serious, such a shattering defeat is one of those things which no amount of Russian optimism or feigned indifference will explain away. Sunday, May 1st, 1904, the day when Kuroki beat the Russians on the Yalu, is something far more than a glorious date for the Army of Japan. It marks the opening of the eyes of Europe to an altogether fresh view of the struggle in the Far East, and there are those who, looking ahead, may even feel a premonition that here, perhaps, is dimly indicated a great future crisis in the whole world's history.

GENERAL SASSULITCH.

CHAPTER XX.

AFTER THE BATTLE—THE PROBLEM OF PURSUIT—SCENES ON THE BATTLEFIELD—THE ADVANCE—A DETACHED BRIGADE—A DIFFICULT COUNTRY—CAPTURE OF FENG-HWANG-CHENG—A LENGTHY HALT.

THE situation after the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng seems at first sight, no doubt, extremely simple. One army in retreat, another flushed with victory and with its mobility unimpaired—what could be more natural than that the latter should follow swiftly on the heels of the former, and endeavour to deal it further blows while it is still "on the trot"? Such things are possible, such things have happened in warfare before. Why should they not happen now, and the Japanese crown their brilliant success on the Yalu by added, and almost equally profitable, engagements with a partially demoralised enemy?

But fighting is never, perhaps, a more complicated business than it sometimes is on the morrow of a big fight. A commander may be yearning to follow up an advantage to the very uttermost, may know that, if he does not do so, he will be classed with dozens of leaders who have won but poor names in history because they have not planted blow upon blow, and have been content with single and indecisive triumphs. But he may be held back by considerations of first-class importance, considerations which may not dawn upon his home critics, or even upon his immediate subordinates, for months, and may even then be imperfectly understood. On the whole, it may be said that there are few more doubtful positions, in nine cases out of ten, than that of a general who, having won a considerable victory, can neither stay where he is, nor feel that by a vigorous and brief pursuit he can convert his success into a decisive triumph.

That is the position of General Kuroki, commanding the First Army of Japan, after the passage of the Yalu and the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng. He has inflicted upon the enemy a defeat of extraordinary significance, one from the moral effects of which, at any rate, they will not recover perhaps for years. But there is, of course, no finality about an engagement with a mere fraction of the enemy's forces, and to remain on the ground won would be merely to throw into the fire such advantage as has already been gained. On the other hand, General Kuroki knows perfectly well that any pursuit of the retreating Russians must be a very restricted performance, in the execution of which he may conceivably, through no fault of his own, lose some of the credit he has acquired by battle tactics of a very high order.

Let us first take a glance at the topographical situation in which the Japanese commander finds himself. He is now on the direct road to Liao-yang, which lies about 120 miles, as the crow flies, almost due north-west from Kiu-lien-cheng. At Liao-yang is General Kuropatkin with probably not less than 80,000 men under his direct control. To the north of Liao-yang runs the railway to Mukden, where Admiral Alexeieff has his



MAP OF THE LIAOTUNG PENINSULA.

a, Road from Kiu-lien-cheng (see map on p. 151).

viceregal headquarters, and to the north of Mukden again, also connected with it by railway, is Harbin. Westward from Harbin stretches the Siberian line to St. Petersburg. At the very outset, then, Kuroki is face to face with the tremendous fact that in turning the Russians out of Kiu-lien-cheng he has merely passed the fringe of an immense sea of warlike possibilities, and that extraordinary caution is necessary in making henceforth every forward step. Incidentally the Japanese have had a taste of Russian fighting quality in the gallant stand made by the 11th and 12th Regiments, and, though it has been found that the entrenchments at Kiu-lien-cheng were wretchedly constructed, it is admitted that the positions were well chosen. With an enemy capable of stubborn and skilful resistance there are points of the country to be covered in the coming advance which even the leader of such a fine and enthusiastic army as Kuroki's may well view with some misgiving.

Again, in such a movement as is now about to be undertaken, the Japanese are seriously handicapped by the poor quality of their horseflesh. We have seen what care was taken during the passage of the Yalu to keep the Cossacks drawn away from the main fighting area, and it may be not unfairly surmised that this would not have been done had the mounts of the Japanese cavalry enabled them to meet their opponents in this respect on even terms. When the 12th Division was landed at Chemulpo it was particularly noted by the *Times* Correspondent that the cavalry and transport horses were not good enough to do the work expected of them. They came from Southern Japan, and had none of the well-known stamina and qualities of the hardy Mongolian ponies, nor were they to be compared with the superior horses from the North of Japan. Here we have another serious impediment to pursuit on the orthodox lines, as, for example, when Ziethen's dragoons thundered after the broken French on the night of Waterloo.

But by far the most serious consideration which General Kuroki has to take into account at this interesting and deeply important juncture is the fact that he is only to a very limited extent his own master. He is something very much more, of course, than a mere pawn in the game, but, none the less, he has little controlling influence except as regards the, comparatively speaking, minor movements of his own three divisions. In Tokio there is a little council of big-brained men to whom the Army which has just carried the Russian position at Kiu-lien-cheng by assault is but one of at least three armies. All the latter may soon be in motion, and their combined operations again must be largely dependent upon the success of the Fleet. The magnitude of the War in the Far East begins to be realised when once it becomes necessary to "think in armies," instead of merely reckoning by divisions and brigades. Further, the most impatient of us will be inclined to admit that even generals who do not do exactly what we, with a mere map before us, think they ought to with 50,000 or 60,000 troops, may be pardoned for obeying the behests of those who may soon have 200,000 soldiers, besides a powerful Navy, disposed on their great war-game area.

Having thus attempted to define the restrictions which hamper Kuroki at the close of the fighting before Kiu-lien-cheng, let us turn to what he can do,

and does do, with vigour and success. About forty miles, as the crow flies, from Kiu-lien-cheng lies Feng-hwang-cheng, which, as noted in Chapter XIII., has been used by the Russians as a sort of advanced base for the Yalu operations. On this the Russians retreated after their last stand at Hohmutang, and, as far as there are probably few after such a hard day's fighting, should be able from the heights this side of the river to see something at least of the ground over which the day's struggle took place. The Yalu almost laps the feet of Kiu-lien-cheng village, and its confluence with the Ai should be dimly discernible. Well assured may we be that those Ai fords will remain photographed on the minds of every Jap soldier who a few hours ago faced the withering hail of Russian bullets at that point, and who now looks down on the sandy banks bathed in moonlight that is wholly peaceful. There are no dead bodies now in evidence at this fateful spot. Burial parties have been busily at work, and those who perished in that costly passage are now

BIVOUAC OF JAPANESE CAVALRY.

this, it is permissible to General Kuroki to pursue as smartly as he can. Beyond Feng-hwang-cheng a new situation will present itself, with which we shall deal in due course.

But before we leave the battlefield of Kiu-lien-cheng let us attempt to conjure up a scene which must have a singular, if somewhat lurid, interest for the imaginative reader. It is a moonlit night, and the wakeful Japanese, of whom

lying decently interred, and not without touching memorial to their reckless bravery. "Last night after the battle," writes Mr. McKenzie, the brilliant Correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, "I witnessed a weary soldier who had gathered some neat bunches of violets from the fields placing them over each of his fallen comrades' graves." Nor are the enemy forgotten. Many of their dead are being buried already with every mark of respect and honourable recognition of their stubborn courage. There are, as noted in the last chapter, ghouls abroad in the foul shape of wandering Chinese scoundrels, who are busy rifling the bodies of the hated Russians, but this can only be in the trenches and parts of the battlefield remote from watchful eyes, for whom in general the scene is one of strange tranquillity.

The Japs who bore the brunt of the day's fighting are bivouacking upon the ground they have won. They are warmly clad, but have latterly discarded the second greatcoat—a blanket coat with fur collar—with which they were specially provided for the advance from the south during the cold weather. Such an extra burden, in addition to a rather elaborate kit, in which even a toothbrush is included, would have been a heavy handicap in the work of the past day, and will be quite as gladly dispensed with in the stiff marching to come. As for sleep, that comes soundly enough to the unwounded, and has to be struggled manfully against by those whose turn it is for "sentry-go." For, be the victory ever so complete, be the enemy ever so remote, the force that bivouacs on the battlefield must mount its guards and post its sentries with just the same rigorous exactitude as in quarters.

In the field-hospitals there is a painfully subdued hum of business as the wounded of both sides are dealt with by the skilful Japanese surgeons, whose tenderness excites the grateful admiration of the Russians coming under their friendly hands. The Japanese won an enviable reputation for their army hospital arrangements in the war with China, and this reputation they are finely maintaining now. The most modern appliances and the greatest scientific ability are available even in such surroundings as these for the alleviation of the ghastly sufferings which fighting, however refined and up-to-date, brings in its gloomy train. A Russian doctor is among the prisoners, and he subsequently speaks with the warmest admiration, coupled perhaps with some mental comparisons, of the extraordinary perfection to which the Japanese have brought the "merciful accessories" of cruel war.

In the quarters of all the generals there is also some degree of activity, for reports have to be received, orders issued, and arrangements made for the continuance of the advance. The three divisions are, of course, widely separated, but it may be safely assumed that some at least of the higher commanders have managed to meet and exchange congratulations on the result of the day's fighting. For General Kuroki there is much hard work immediately to be done. Last night, from Wi-ju, he telegraphed to Tokio, with which he is in communication presumably by way of Seoul, to the effect that he intended to assault at dawn. To-night, his message is a much longer and even more significant one. He will already have telegraphed some details of the fighting, but the last stand of the Russians at Hohmutang does not take place till

seven o'clock in the evening, and the heavy casualty list at this point is rather a sad appendix to the previous record. But we may take it that before he retires to his well-earned rest on this memorable night, the fine old Satsuma has not only cabled through a terse summary of the whole day's proceedings, but has received very possibly a few words of acknowledgment of his fine performance and expressive of his Imperial Master's warm commendation of the exertions of himself and his brave army.



JAPANESE GENERAL OFFICER AND STAFF.

The morning of May 2nd finds the First Army of Japan moving steadily, if somewhat slowly, after the retreating Russians. Its pace may perhaps be regulated by a circumstance of which little notice was taken at the time except in a telegram from the Tokio Correspondent of the *Times*. It appears that on April 20 General Kuroki, in anticipation of his victory at Kiu-lien-cheng, had detached a mixed brigade under Major-General Sasaki, which, marching eastward, had crossed the Yalu at Changseng, some thirty-five miles north-east of Wi-ju, and had commenced to move on Feng-hwang-cheng by a mountain road. An allusion has already been made to the fondness of the Japanese, and more especially of their great strategist, Field-Marsal Yamagata, for converging columns. It may well be that after the battle of Kiu-lien-cheng General Kuroki desired to give full effect to the movement of the column under General Sasaki, and, possibly learning that it was being delayed by the extremely difficult nature of the country through which it was working, steadied his own advance. At any rate, not until May 3rd do we hear even of the Japanese scouts as having compassed more than twenty miles from Kiu-lien-cheng. On the day

in question the Japanese cavalry had a sharp encounter with a Cossack patrol at Fang-hen-cheng, which lies about halfway between Kiu-lien-cheng and Feng-hwang-cheng, and, driving them back, pursued them for several miles.

The road at this point is rather interesting as a study in topography. It runs between two ranges, one about 3,000 feet high to the north—this is the Feng-hwang range—and another about 2,000 feet high, which runs up to the Yalu and ends at right angles with the mountains which skirt the right bank of that river. The two ranges along the road from Kiu-lien-cheng to Feng-hwang-cheng are mostly about 2,000 yards apart, but come closer together at Kau-li-mon, "The Door of Korea," where formerly there began a strip of uninhabited land forming the frontier between China and Korea. From Kau-li-mon the road declines gradually towards the west, but at the west end of the Feng-hwang range it turns towards the north and takes the wayfarer quickly into Feng-hwang-cheng. (See map on p. 247.)

It was confidently expected that the Russians would make a vigorous stand at Kau-li-mon, and for a time they evidently intended to do so. Earthworks were thrown up on the hills north and south of the village, and reinforcements, including artillery, were brought up from Feng-hwang-cheng. But either a panic had set in, or reports had arrived of the gradual advance of General Sasaki's brigade, or General Kuropatkin had determined that there should be no serious fighting until he himself could supervise the Russian operations. For we hear of no opposition at Kau-li-mon, and on May 6th the capture of Feng-hwang-cheng itself takes place without difficulty. The first entry is made by General Sasaki's brigade, which may well be congratulated on such a brilliant termination to what must have been a terribly exhausting march.

The Russians burn some of their ammunition before evacuating Feng-hwang-cheng, but in an official report furnished by General Kuroki it is stated that 357 shells for mountain guns, 188,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 1,720 coats, and 40,000 loaves of bread, besides other supplies, tools, and telegraph stores, fall into the hands of the victorious Japanese.

The arrival of the Japanese at Feng-hwang-cheng is a matter of great importance, apart from the moral effect of the Russian retirement, and the substantial character of the booty. Feng-hwang-cheng is the junction of three roads, with two of which—one coming from Liao-yang, the other running to Kiu-lien-cheng and Antung on the Yalu—we have already made acquaintance in the course of this narrative. The third road runs to the west for some forty miles to Siu-yen in the Liao-tung Peninsula. It is expedient to take note of Siu-yen, from which a road runs in a north-westerly direction to Hai-cheng, while another road to the south-east terminates at Takushan, in Korea Bay.

What follows during the next fortnight is extremely interesting from a military point of view, but it is not easy to make it attractive to the lay reader. The operations of the Japanese, moreover, are shrouded in a certain obscurity which may never be completely dispelled, even by the publication of detailed official reports. At the same time an attempt may be made to convey a general idea of a situation which, as foreshadowed at the commencement of this chapter, is an altogether fresh one, so far as the First Army of Japan is concerned.



JAPANESE INFANTRY AND TRANSPORT CROSSING A PONTOON BRIDGE.

The first point to be noticed is the fact that the main bodies of both the Russian and Japanese forces are now separated by quite an inconsiderable interval. The distance between the headquarters of General Kuropatkin and General Kuroki is about eighty miles, or about as far as it is from London to Southampton. Of course, in neither case are the armies bunched up in crowded masses round the General's headquarters, and it is in the extent of the line occupied by the two forces, and in the direction which the lines take, that much of the interest of the present situation lies.

It is, unfortunately, impossible to give these data with complete accuracy; but it may be reckoned roughly that the Russian front extends from Hai-cheng, which lies about forty miles south-west of Liao-yang, to the Motien-ling Pass, which is some thirty-five miles south-east of Liao-yang on the road to Feng-hwang-cheng. This brings the actual distance between even Feng-hwang-cheng and the left of the Russian position down to about forty-five miles. But the Japanese line is also an extended one, running south-west and north-east from Feng-hwang-cheng, and here, too, there are troops considerably in advance of the General's headquarters. As a matter of fact, it is reported on May 19th that a Japanese advanced division is in touch with the enemy near the Motien-ling Pass, where a considerable force of Cossacks has its headquarters.

Before this contact is established, however, a good deal of work is done on both sides, and not a little desultory fighting takes place. The weather has become much warmer, and, although the country is difficult by reason of the recent rains, both opponents are in excellent condition, and capable of covering distances which would be deemed a heavy pull upon many European troops, at any rate in peace manœuvres. Both sides work hard to strengthen their positions with earthworks, and there is every indication that each regards the other with considerable respect.

It is already sufficiently obvious that General Kuroki was fully justified in not dashing in headlong pursuit of the Russians after the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng. Such a course might have provoked a series of stubborn stands like that at Hohmutang, which would have cost the Japanese dear and produced little real advantage. But, by pressing on steadily, with General Sasaki's brigade converging on Feng-hwang-cheng from the right, Kuroki has secured a new position at no loss, and is now within striking distance of the main Russian Army. But he cannot strike as yet, except at a risk which he is far too level-headed to take, even if he were given a free hand by the controlling council at Tokio. He may have as many as 60,000 troops with him, but General Kuropatkin has more, and is, moreover, in a position the strength of which is known to the Japanese by their experience in the war with China. The Motien-ling Pass is one of those awkward places which a few men armed with machine guns can defend against an army, and, as through this the main road to Liao-yang runs, there is no safe course open to General Kuroki except a great turning movement, carried out either by a force detached from his own army, or by one of the two other armies which Japan has available for the purpose.

Accordingly, General Kuroki, although at first he seems by the Russian reports to be advancing from Feng-hwang-cheng, does not trouble himself for the

present to do more than establish contact with the enemy, and declines altogether to be drawn by Russian taunts as to his "apparent indecision" into anything like a forward move. For some three weeks after the capture of Fenghwang-cheng the principal work of the First Army consists in throwing up earthworks, deliberate extensions of the line occupied, and reconnaissances, chiefly in the direction of the Motienling, in the course of which a fair number of casualties occur on both sides.

The Russians are not less cautious. It might be supposed that General Kuropatkin, seeing before him an army numerically a good deal inferior to his own, would advance boldly against it, and seek to destroy it, as has been done before in several historical instances by generals operating on what are known as "interior lines." It is sometimes the best of policy, when one anticipates the descent upon one's position of two forces individually inferior, but collectively superior, to one's own, to issue forth and attack the two opponents in detail. Whether this course would be the best that General Kuropatkin could follow in this case, it is impossible to judge until much more material is available. The main point, however, as far as this narrative is concerned, is that the Russians do not attack, but merely allow their Cossacks to buzz about the enemy's front and even to harass his rear and communications. The Cossacks are extremely well handled at this juncture by General Mishtchenko, and it is very possible that their discoveries have much to do with Kuropatkin's resolution to continue on the defensive until a further development of the Japanese plan of campaign on land takes place. Whatever may be the exact state of the case, the fact remains that the last week in May finds the armies of Kuropatkin and Kuroki still facing one another in the region between Liao-yang and Fenghwang-cheng, none but minor engagements between patrols having taken place, and no disposition having been shown on either side to hasten the next development of an ominous situation.

Photo: Correspondents of the Charles Urban Trading Co., Ltd., London and Paris.

GENERAL KUROPATKIN BEING RECEIVED, UPON ARRIVAL AT THE FRONT, BY GENERALS RENNENKAMPF AND GREKOFF.



From photo. by Mrs Bishop, F.R.G.S.

THE TEMPLE OF THE FOX, MUKDEN

CHAPTER XXI.

THE SECOND ARMY OF JAPAN—LANDINGS IN THE LIAO-TUNG PENINSULA—AN AFFAIR NEAR KIN-CHAU—PORT ARTHUR ISOLATED—A LANDING AT KAI-CHAU—NIU-CHWANG ALARMED—FIGHT NEAR TAKUSHAN—SURVEY OF LAND OPERATIONS.

IT will be remembered that in Chapter XVII. mention was made of the landing on May 5th of a Japanese force near Pi-tsu-wo, on the east coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, and that in General Stoessel's Order to the Port Arthur garrison, quoted on page 219, there is an allusion to another landing in the vicinity of Kin-chau Bay. It has already been hinted that these landings presage a very important development. It may now be clearly stated that here we have the first indication of Japan's movement to the front of her Second Army under the command of General Oku.

army has not come direct from Japan. As a matter of fact, it has been lying in readiness at Chinnampo, in the estuary of the Ta-tung River, and it is not put on board for its second trip until May 3rd or 4th. The existence of the Second Army has been clear for some time, but there can be few who have guessed its precise whereabouts at the end of April, although the actual revelation is not at all surprising. It may be surmised that something in the nature of a very elaborate precaution is indicated here. If the First Army had sustained a reverse on the Yalu, or had even

A WELL-ORGANISED DISEMBARKATION: SCENE ON THE BEACH AT CHEMULPO.

failed in the attempt to turn the Russians out of Kiu-lien-cheng, it would manifestly have been extraordinarily convenient to be able to reinforce it with, at any rate, a portion of the Second Army, which could readily have been moved up from Chinnampo by way of Ping-yang.

Assuming a moderately successful passage of the Yalu, the original Japanese idea is said to have been a landing of the Second Army *en masse* in Korea Bay at Taku-shan. But the victory at Kiu-lien-cheng was more complete than had been anticipated, and consequently a change took place in the Japanese plan. Evidently the moment is thought to be a propitious one for the isolation of Port Arthur, and it is believed that this can now be carried out by the three Divisions of the Japanese Second Army, leaving other troops to be landed at Taku-shan as originally arranged.

Accordingly, on May 3rd, Chinnampo sees signs of extensive preparations for a move on the part of the eighty odd transports which are crowding the estuary. For some time past the most careful precautions have been taken to prevent the leakage of information regarding the Japanese movements. Chinnampo has been placed under martial law, and no one has been allowed to leave the town or enter, an ordinance which, however, three Europeans succeed in evading by putting off in a junk and making for Chemulpo.

The Second Army is evidently at full strength, with reserve brigades, for it is estimated to number 70,000 men. These are crowded on to the vessels, as a Reuter's Correspondent says, like rats, no fewer than 3,800 being put on board one ship. Every deck is so packed that it is impossible for the men to take any exercise, and the majority cannot even get fresh air. But not a grumbling word is heard. The First Army in its march northwards was stimulated by the news of the Navy's exploits; for the Second Army there is the added incentive of anxiety to emulate the glorious deeds of the Guards, and of the 2nd and 12th Divisions before Kiu-lien-cheng.

The Second Army of Japan consists of the 1st Provisional Division, the home headquarters of which is at Tokio, the 3rd Division from Nagoya, and the 4th Division from Osaka.

We have already seen how, on May 5th, the Japanese landed near Pi-tsu-wo, sending a detachment to that place to destroy, it afterwards appears, the telegraph line, and another detachment across the peninsula to Pu-lan-tien, to cut the railway. The damage to the railway is at first inconclusive, and, as noted in Chapter XVII., a Russian train is taken through to Port Arthur over the repaired line by Colonel Spiridonoff, the Japanese retiring temporarily from Pu-lan-tien. But they return quickly, and by May 13th the railway and telegraph have been cut in various places, and to the north-east of Pu-lan-tien the line has been torn up for some miles. By the middle of May, then, Port Arthur is as completely isolated as was Ladysmith, and with far less chance of relief, since General Kuropatkin at Liao-yang, who alone could render assistance, is being something more than "contained" by General Kuroki.

Almost simultaneously with the landing at Pi-tsu-wo another disembarkation takes place in Kin-chau Bay. On May 16th, after a number of minor skirmishes, a warm engagement takes place between the Japanese and a Russian force sent out from Port Arthur and Dalny on what

is virtually a sortie. The casualties on both sides appear to be about 150, but the Japanese being evidently in greatly superior strength, drive the three Russian regiments sent against them southwards, and take possession of a line of hills extending four miles, and lying a mile and a half to the north of Kin-chau. The latter is thus partially dominated, and the Japanese lines are now only some forty miles from Port Arthur.

COSSACKS COLLECTING BULLOCKS FOR THE GARRISON AT NIU-CHWANG.

On the same day as the engagement near Kin-chau, a fleet of Japanese transports, accompanied by warships, appears before Kai-chau or, as it is sometimes called, Kai-ping, which lies about twenty miles south-east of Niu-chwang. There are shore defences here and a small Russian garrison, upon which the warships open fire, silencing the batteries and causing the troops to retreat. A Japanese force lands, and proceeds to Ta-shi-chao (the "City of the Big Stone Bridge"), which lies at the junction of the Manchurian Railway with the line to Yingkow (the port of Niu-chwang). Here the Japs destroy four miles of railway, and then re-embark from Kai-chau.

As may be imagined, this proceeding causes some sensation in Niu-chwang, the European inhabitants of which confidently anticipate that the Japanese will forthwith advance and occupy the town. The Russian garrison retires, but, when it becomes known that the Japanese have re-embarked, they gradually return and re-occupy the place in some force. A correspondent at Niu-chwang during this period describes the Russian officers as quite bewildered and disheartened, and unable to form lasting plans. Some of them, after bidding touching farewells, return in a few hours with their personal baggage, and proceed as if nothing had happened. A mile south of Niu-chwang entrenchments are commenced by the troops, but are almost immediately abandoned. The General commanding, Kondratovitch, is praised for the firmness and rectitude of his civil administration, but it is believed that the higher authorities at Mukden are responsible for the vacillation displayed in handling the Niu-chwang garrison.

The exact meaning of this sudden descent upon Kai-chau is not very clear, but it is surmised that the landing was merely a feint to cover other operations. Another suggestion of perhaps greater weight is that this is merely a prelude to a more important development, in which a genuine occupation of Niu-chwang and a forward movement upon Liao-yang will be included. Be this as it may, the incident serves to keep Niu-chwang in evidence, and to remind us of its strategical importance both as regards Liao-yang and Mukden, and with more remote reference to Port Arthur. For, although the main line from Mukden to Port Arthur does not pass through Niu-chwang (the port of which, as noted above, is fed by a branch line from Ta-shi-chao), the town is on the main road, and main roads usually increase in importance when railway communications have been badly damaged.

On May 19th yet another landing takes place at Taku-shan, in Korea Bay, under the protection of a squadron commanded by the Admiral Hosoya, who so ably conducted the naval operations in the Yalu preparatory to, and during, the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng. Admiral Hosoya begins by bombarding the coast, along which it is probable that there are assembled a few Russian troops detached from the Russian right, and sent forward from Hai-cheng through Siu-yen. There is no serious opposition, and a force of bluejackets is rapidly landed and the Japanese flag raised on a commanding position. The disembarkation then proceeds in the usual clockwork fashion, and in this case it is evident that the Japs have come to stay. For on the following evening a brisk little engagement takes place seven miles north of Taku-shan, which is clear evidence that in this landing there is no mere feint, nor that only a reconnaissance in force is intended.

It is about 7 p.m. when a sotnia of Cossacks is observed by a force of Japanese infantry to be working in the direction of Taku-shan, evidently with the intention of obtaining what information it can with reference to yesterday's disembarkation. The Cossacks must be advancing somewhat incautiously, for the nimble Japanese manage to work round to their rear and surround them. In such a case cavalry have very little chance, except by cutting their way through the enemy and trusting to their horses' heels. Apparently the Cossacks think at first of offering a resistance. But the ring round them is complete, and, before they succeed in getting away



A CONFLICT BETWEEN OUTPOSTS.

in the direction of Siu-yen, they have left an officer and nine men dead on the field, and two officers and four men in the hands of the enemy. The incident is not magnificent even from the Japanese standpoint, but it can well be imagined that, for infantry who have only just been landed, and who have seen no previous service, it is a great encouragement to have thus at the outset inflicted a sharp blow at the enemy's cavalry, with, as it appears, the loss of one man only.

Owing to the secrecy with which the Japanese have veiled the composition of the forces which have been disembarked at various points of the Liao-tung Peninsula and at Taku-shan, it is impossible to define the early movements of the Second Army much more fully and clearly than has been done in the foregoing succinct narrative. But what has been said will at least give a fair idea of the manner in which the Japanese are gradually effecting a double object, that of isolating Port Arthur, and of supporting a future forward movement upon the heart of the Russian position.

With regard to the isolation of Port Arthur, that is practically complete, so far as immediate investment is concerned. The railway is broken up beyond hope of early repair, and a line is being drawn across the narrow neck of land between Kin-chau Bay and Talien Bay, a line which the Japanese are fortifying strongly, and arming with quick-firing guns as a protection against a determined sortie by the garrison. Strategically speaking, the isolation is even now not complete, for it is conceivable that a Russian force could be, at this eleventh hour, detached from Liao-yang and sent down into Liao-tung Peninsula with the object of getting the Japanese at Kin-chau between two fires. But there are practical objections to any such bold movement, and in any case we may shortly see this one doubtful feature in the Japanese position remedied.

Already, with only two armies indicated, the Japanese have not only crossed the Yalu and cut off the land communications between Port Arthur and Liao-yang, but are beginning to threaten Kuropatkin from another quarter, perhaps from two other quarters, besides from the line which runs north-east and south-west from Feng-hwang-cheng. There is added pressure yet to come, but the time has not yet arrived to indicate its nature and source. Let us leave the principal land operations at this interesting point, and revert first to Vladivostok and Korea, and afterwards to a survey of the work of the Japanese Fleet, more especially in the vicinity of Port Arthur.



From photo supplied by Sir W. G. Armstrong, Mitchell & Co., Ltd.

TORPEDO TUBE AS USED ON JAPANESE WARSHIPS.

CHAPTER XXII.

KOREA AND VLADIVOSTOK—INTERESTING POSSIBILITIES—COSSACKS ATTACK AN-JU—A WARM RECEPTION—FURTHER RAIDING—VLADIVOSTOK RE-VISITED—LOSS OF THE *BOGATYR*—ARRIVAL OF ADMIRAL SKRYDLOFF.

WHAT may be termed the interludes of war are often extremely interesting, and sometimes, too, highly instructive, because they seldom fail either to have a direct bearing upon the results of a campaign or to illustrate and explain its progress. In such an extended conflict as that between Russia and Japan there are necessarily a great many "interludes" which cannot be examined in a narrative of this sort without rather obscuring the main story; but there are some which may well be recorded, more especially, in this instance, those in connection with Vladivostok and Korea.

Hitherto the part taken by these two sections of the area included in the theatre of war has not been very impressive in point of downright warlike episodes. Off Chemulpo we have seen a naval action of a sort, that in which the *Varyag* and *Koriets* were sunk; we have witnessed important disembarkations, and a steady march of a large body of troops northwards to the Yalu; and we have had to record a brisk little engagement at Chong-ju. But not until the opposite bank of the Yalu was reached, and Manchuria entered, was there any fighting on an extensive scale. Nor is it likely that for some considerable time to come, if ever, will Korea again be the scene of important collisions between the Russian and Japanese forces. Still, it is quite impossible to understand this war properly without keeping Korea in view, not only as one of the two original "bones of contention," but also as the source of a curious variety of dramatic possibilities. Without attempting to force comparisons, Korea is to those who are following the Russo-Japanese War rather like what Natal was after the relief of Ladysmith to those who were interested in the course of events in South Africa.

Similarly, Vladivostok has not hitherto been surrounded by any of the same sensational actualities as have enlivened the existence of Port Arthur. It has been bombarded, it has been pinched in the matter of supplies, and it has sent forth a squadron which, in the course of two or three cruises, has sunk some merchantmen and a transport. But, inglorious as its record has been, doubtful as it is whether it will for some time to come witness any more thrilling developments, Vladivostok must not be neglected, any more than Korea, as a place to be periodically "brought up to date" in the minds of those who are trying to realise the War as a whole, and not as a jumble of scattered episodes.

Giving precedence to Korea, to which we bade *au revoir* on the evening of April 30th, when General Kuroki's army crossed the Yalu in order to turn the Russians out of Kiu-lien-cheng, we find ourselves on May 10th at An-ju, between forty and fifty miles north of Ping-yang, the position of which may be

picturesquely realised from the graphic map given on page 139. Here there is a little Japanese garrison of about 200 infantry, doubtless bemoaning their hard luck in being left behind, while their comrades have been winning glory on the Yalu, and are now coming into actual touch with the enemy between the Motien-ling Pass and Feng-hwang-cheng.

An-ju possesses what might by a bold stretch of imagination be called a fort, but is really only an old-fashioned sort of castle, with walls which even mountain artillery would soon reduce to dust. Still these walls are fairly high, and the stones of which they are constructed are of good size, affording moderate protection for infantry against musketry fire.

Japanese military discipline is strict, so even thus far in rear of General Kuroki's advance such posts as are being held exhibit no slackness on the part of their garrisons. There is, moreover, a definite inducement to alertness in the fact that the conduct of the Koreans of late has given some trouble, more especially as regards the destruction of the telegraph wires which carry messages between Kuroki's army and Seoul. Again, there have been various reports that Cossacks are commencing to raid into Korea by way of harassing the lines of communication.

On the morning of May 10th, we may picture a Jap sentry looking out from the castellated walls of An-ju, and seeing in the distance a little blur on the horizon gradually materialise into a group of horsemen. He gives the alarm, the officers of the garrison mount the walls and scrutinise the oncoming body with their glasses, and it is quickly discovered that here is unquestionably a force of Cossacks some hundreds strong, who, from the dispositions they are making, are evidently "bent on business." The garrison is at once fallen in, told off to various points in the walls, and arrangements made for the supply of reserve ammunition. No thought of surrender enters any mind, but, as a measure of ordinary precaution, a message is despatched north and south to the nearest posts stating the circumstances, and suggesting the despatch of reinforcements. For it is clear that there are other objects to be usefully attained besides a stubborn defence of An-ju. The Cossacks must be given, if possible, a sharp lesson, and, though the glory may be greater if the small garrison can win the coming fight unaided, the Japs are far too sensible to leave more than they can help to chance.

Let us now travel over to the attackers whose presence before An-ju this fine May morning needs some explanation. The exact strength of the force appears doubtful, but it is said to be the greater part of a flying column consisting of 600 Trans-Baikal and 100 Ussuri Cossacks which a fortnight ago started from Liao-yang, and has been marching at the rate of over twenty-five miles a day.

The despatch of this raiding column from Liao-yang is indeed a bold stroke on General Kuropatkin's part, and one which he may have regretted when the news of the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng arrived. For it is a fact that these Cossacks who have arrived before An-ju on the morning of May 10th are in total ignorance of the battle, and are consequently but ill-prepared for the sort of reception they are about to encounter. Had the results of the passage of the Yalu been known at Liao-yang before the column started, the latter would doubtless have been warned to approach very cautiously posts known to be held



THE SINKING OF THE *PETROPAVLOVSK.*

by infantry among whom a proportion of marksmen were certain to be found. Further, the whole idea of the column is based upon a misconception. It imagines that by attacking An-ju it is striking at the real lines of communication between Kuroki's army and its base. But, although Ping-yang must continue to be a base of a sort, and of a very important sort, Kuroki's advanced base, since the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, has been shifted to Antung, to which supplies can readily be brought by sea. To the lay mind the mistake may not seem serious, but in a military sense such errors as that which underlies this foolish attack on An-ju afford a very grave example of the risk of sending out raiding columns "in the air," *i.e.* without any means of either reinforcing them or keeping them posted in the course of events.

It is said that the Cossacks before An-ju number some 500, but that half of them are not in any mood for fighting. Provisions are beginning to run very short, and an ill-fed force which has ridden some 350 miles through a difficult country in less than a fortnight, may well require a little pulling together. However, the officers insist, and a considerable proportion of the column settles itself down to "make it warm" for the Japanese garrison.

It is very soon evident that, as at Chong-ju, the Cossacks have their work cut out for them, and the "yellow-skins" are going to give a good deal more trouble than was at first anticipated. From the quaint old walls of the castle the bullets come whistling, not only independently, but in ugly and well-directed volleys, which effectually bar any attempt to carry the place by a bold swoop. Moreover, the walls are, as has been said, fairly high, and against such obstacles cavalry without artillery are of small account. Still, the Cossacks are probably aware that they are in superior force, for they continue the fight, notwithstanding the fact that a number of them have been killed and wounded, and that at least one officer has been picked off by the Japanese sharpshooters.

Towards evening a reinforcement of Japanese soldiers comes from the direction of Ping-yang, and in the morning further help arrives from both north and south, and the Cossacks retire hastily eastward, carrying their wounded with them, and leaving no fewer than sixty-three of their number killed on the field. The Japanese casualties are officially stated to have been four killed and six wounded.

The Cossacks continue raiding in Korea, but they appear to have had quite enough of the western parts, and bear off to the north-east, evidently with the intention of joining hands with other Cossacks who have been operating in the Ham-yeng-do province, and have even approached to within forty miles of Gen-san. On May 19th some 300 of them attacked Ham-yeng, or, as it is sometimes called, Kan-kow, where there is a "castle" occupied at the date mentioned by some 300 Korean troops. The attack, which was made at seven o'clock in the evening, was evidently not intended very seriously, and resolved itself into a mere interchange of shots, resulting in the death of one Korean soldier and the retirement of the Russians towards the north-west. But the incident is interesting as showing Russian activity in this quarter, and may also serve the useful purpose of establishing a connection in the present nar-

rative between Korea and Vladivostok, to which we are about to transfer our attention.

For it is clear that these last Cossacks who have been operating in the north-east of the Hermit Kingdom have no connection with the main body of the Russian forces under Kuropatkin at Liao-yang, but have been detached from a command which has its centre in or near Vladivostok. It has already been explained in Chapter XVI. that in the region between Vladivostok and the Tumen River, which forms the north-east boundary of Korea, there are numerous Cossack villages, and it is now becoming clearer that in this quarter are collected a large number of Russian troops, whose subsequent movements will require to be very attentively watched.

Thus working northward we come once again to Vladivostok, which at the beginning of May is probably unconscious of a new danger with which it is about to be menaced. This is the establishment by the Japanese of a fresh naval base at Port Lazareff, which lies on the northern side of the bay at the southern extremity of which Gen-san is situated. This base will assist the Japanese greatly in maintaining the constant watch upon Vladivostok which is absolutely necessary in view of the continued existence of the Vladivostok squadron. Port Lazareff appears admirably chosen for the purpose in view, and, as the entrance is protected by mines, little fear is entertained of any descent from Vladivostok by Admiral Jessen and his four big cruisers.

Evidently the intermittent appearance of Japanese torpedo-craft, coupled it may be with the news of the Russian reverse at Kiu-lien-cheng, is getting gradually on the nerves of the Vladivostok authorities. For about the middle of May a fresh order is issued by the Commandant, General Vorognetz, directing the withdrawal of the civilian residents, who forthwith betake themselves beyond the Amur River. A casual indication of the prevailing scarcity is furnished by the unusual appearance of the Vladivostok daily paper, the *Oriental Courier*. This organ is now reduced to half its former size, and, as the supplies of printing paper have given out, thin grey packing paper has to be used, a humiliating resort for the leading paper of the "Sovereign City of the East"!

But Vladivostok has other troubles besides panicky proclamations and an ill-printed newspaper. Admiral Jessen has lately been making a so-called "sortie" with his squadron, and in one of the very thick fogs which are of such frequent occurrence in the Sea of Japan a Russian ship runs ashore outside Vladivostok. This is the cruiser *Bogatyr*, one of the newest vessels in the Russian Navy. For a time the magnitude of the disaster is not understood in Europe, or is minimised by officials anxious to believe that there will be no difficulty in rescuing the vessel.

The *Bogatyr* is a big protected cruiser completed in 1902 by the Vulcan Company at Stettin, who secured the contract in competition with French and American shipbuilders, and she is similar in armament and tonnage to the unfortunate *Varyag*. She is the fastest of a group of eight vessels of the *Pallada* class, and can steam twenty-four knots. Her displacement is some 6,700 tons, and she carries twelve 6-in., twelve 3-in., and ten smaller guns, and represents an expenditure of at least half a million sterling.

The hopes at first entertained of saving the *Bogatyr* prove groundless, and eventually Admiral Jessen decides upon blowing her up to avoid any chance of her falling into the hands of the enemy, who, with superior appliances, and in the security afforded by their supremacy at sea, might succeed in making some use of the vessel or of her machinery. The guns are removed, and there is no loss of life, but the blow is a heavy one to the only mobile squadron which Russia now possesses in the Far East.

At this juncture Admiral Skrydloff arrives to take charge of the Russian naval forces in the Pacific. It is a painful circumstance that his advent at the front, like his appointment, should follow on a naval disaster, and there is a special irony in recalling his former design of dividing his attentions between Port Arthur and Vladivostok. The Admiral has not made any undue haste to take up his duties, for the fourth week in May has now commenced, and Port Arthur has for some days been sufficiently isolated to preclude any chance of an entry by rail or road. Admiral Skrydloff has suggested to Admiral Alexeieff that he should be permitted to attempt to land at Port Arthur in a Chinese vessel, but the Viceroy not unnaturally declines to sanction any such wild-goose project.

Whether in consequence of this refusal or otherwise, there is said to be considerable friction between the two authorities, and it is even reported that Alexeieff declines to receive Skrydloff at Mukden.

ADMIRAL SKRYDLOFF.



EFFECT OF THE FIRST BOMBARDMENT UPON THE NEW TOWN, PORT ARTHUR.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE BREAKING-UP OF DALNY—EXPLODED HOPES—"SWEEPING" FOR MINES—A TORPEDO-BOAT LOST—A CRUISER ALSO—STILL FURTHER LOSS—SINKING OF THE *HATSUSE* AND *YOSHINO*—A GOOD NAVAL RECORD—BELEAGUERED PORT ARTHUR.

ON May 12th it is reported at St. Petersburg that Admiral Alexeieff has notified to the Tsar the destruction by the Russians themselves of the docks and piers at Dalny. Later telegrams indicate that the whole port of Dalny has been destroyed, and, naturally, the news creates a considerable sensation throughout the civilised world. Eventually it is discovered that the self-inflicted damage is not so great as was originally reported, the attempts to blow up the docks not having proved successful. But the iron pier running out into Talien Bay has been wrecked, and various launches, steamers, and engineering works have been blown to atoms. Further, a number of civilian residents, both Russian and Chinese, are put on board junks on which they make the best of their way to Chifu.

It appears that this wholesale sacrifice of what has cost the Russians during the past few years some millions of roubles is not the outcome of any sudden counsel of despair, but has for some time been contemplated in view of the complete isolation of Port Arthur by land as well as by sea. The idea is that any scheme of defence which would include Dalny would either absorb an immense number of men and guns, or weaken the chances of successful resistance by distributing a comparatively small force

over a number of points. Accordingly it has been resolved gradually to bring in all the troops in Kwang-tung, which is the southern extremity of the Liao-tung Peninsula, into the circle of the Port Arthur defences, and in the meantime to render it difficult for the Japanese to use Dalny hereafter as a ready-made base of operations against the great southern stronghold.

Although there is ample military justification for this measure, its adoption must be terribly distasteful to Russia, which has made tremendous efforts to convert Dalny into a great commercial emporium, the complement of Port Arthur, and a sort of apology for the latter's existence. While Port Arthur was to be the pivot of Russia's warlike defence of its policy of annexation, Dalny, a score of miles to the south-east, was to be an advertisement of her anxiety to spread civilisation and to foster trade. From the *Daily Telegraph* a short but striking extract may be quoted, showing what use Russia made of her acquisition of Talien Bay on the same "lease" as that on which she secured possession of Port Arthur :—

"Other nations might have thrown this sheet of water open, and left a town to be evolved in the old slow way. Not so Russia. She sent business experts, and engineers to survey the site and prepare plans, and, hey presto! a contract had been signed with a contractor to construct, complete in every detail, a seaport town at the end of the great Siberian line. It was stated that it was intended to spend £5,000,000 on this one project, and although labour was cheap it does not appear that this figure was excessive, in view of the many-sided character of the task of creating an entrepôt for Manchuria. Dalny was the foundation-stone of Russia's commercial régime in the Far East. Amid a series of barren hills, the shores of the bay shallow and shelving, Russia set to work. The mud was to be dredged away to give more deep water space, docks excavated, warehouses and shops built, a great railway depôt created at one point on the long, artificially-retained sea-front, spacious boulevards and wide macadamised streets made, a large hotel with every comfort erected, shady gardens planted, and away from the hum and bustle and tarry smells of the great commercial settlement plans were prepared for a model suburb. Dalny, in fact, was to be the Garden City of the Far East, a place in which it would be a profit and a joy to live.

"With lightning rapidity the town, with all its adjuncts, began to grow; great tracts of land were reclaimed from the sea; a miniature mountain was cut off; dredging operations were taken in hand, not of the petty character seen at Portsmouth or Plymouth, but by the square mile; and almost before the world was conscious of what was happening, Dalny existed."

It would seem that Russia had not been conspicuously successful in attracting a resident population to Dalny, as she had to that other astonishing product of her Far Eastern policy, Harbin. But she is very patient, and might ultimately have succeeded fully in realising her magnificent project but for her fatuous inability to understand Japan. As it is, a mass of confident hopes, a host of proud ambitions, and, perhaps, some few really philanthropic aspirations, are blown to dust in the explosions which take place "by order" at Dalny in the second week of May.

This indication of the Russian intention presently to abandon Dalny is followed by a smart demonstration of a very different sort of policy on the part of the Japanese. Realising, doubtless, the desirableness of obtaining a foothold on this side of the Peninsula, as well as in Kinchau Bay on the west coast, they undertake with characteristic thoroughness the difficult and dangerous task of sweeping one or two of the inlets in the neighbourhood of Dalny clear of the mines with which they are known to be studded. As a commencement Kerr Bay, which lies to the north-east of Talienwan or Dalny Bay, and has a good and sheltered anchorage, is selected for this operation.

Early in the morning of May 12th Rear-Admiral Kataoka arrives in Kerr Bay in command of the Third Squadron, consisting of the armoured cruiser *Nisshin*, the cruisers *Itsukushima* and *Miyako*, and the 2nd, 6th, 12th, 20th, and 21st torpedo-boat flotillas. The cruisers are detached with orders to make a "demonstrative bombardment" against the land batteries, while the torpedo-boats are engaged in "sweeping" the bay and taking soundings.

The work proceeds steadily, the cruisers finding no difficulty in silencing the land defences, doubtless owing to the withdrawal of the heavier guns to Port Arthur. The *Miyako* is fortunate in discovering a Russian guard post, held, it is estimated, by ten companies, among which the cruiser drops a few shells with dramatic results. While reconnoitring on the west shore of Kerr Bay two of the torpedo-boats discover a telegraph line, and Lieutenant Hotta lands with four bluejackets, scales the heights under the protection of the ships' guns, and destroys it. The soundings are completed by three o'clock in the afternoon, but the "sweeping" operations are not concluded until six, and are accompanied by a sad accident.

Three Russian mines are discovered and successfully destroyed. But a fourth explodes prematurely under Torpedo-boat No. 48, and cuts her in two. Boats from the squadron hurry to the rescue, and seven wounded are picked up, but as many more are found to have been killed.

The blow is not a very serious one to Japan, which is particularly well supplied with torpedo-boats, and can manufacture these craft in her own yards. But Torpedo-boat No. 48 is the first warship which the Japanese have lost in the war, and the old adage that misfortunes never come singly is about to be verified in their case with painful distinctness.

On May 14th the sea-sweeping operation was resumed under cover of Admiral Kataoka's cruisers. Some resistance was offered by the Russians, who had constructed a temporary battery on the promontory between Kerr Bay and Talien-wan, bringing six field guns into action with which to harass the Japanese torpedo-boats. The squadron shelled the earthworks protecting this battery, but the gunners stubbornly maintained their position, and must have caused the torpedo-boats no little annoyance. These, however, defying the constant fire, toiled on steadily, and discovered and destroyed five mines. The work for the day had been suspended when the *Miyako* struck a mine which had not been detected. It blew up under her port quarter, and in twenty-two minutes she sank, two sailors being killed and six wounded.

The *Miyako*, although classed as a cruiser, was not much more than a des-



THE SECOND ATTEMPT TO BLOCK PORT ARTHUR.

patch-boat, being a small vessel of 1,800 tons, with a speed of twenty knots. She had a peace complement of about 220 men, and it is a striking instance of the varying deadliness of mines, that of this considerable crew only two should have been killed, while the loss of Torpedo-boat No. 48 should have occasioned three times as many fatalities. The difference is to be attributed to the part of the vessel under which the mine exploded. Between the two minutes in which—to take another example—the *Petropavlovsk*—whose sinking was accelerated by other explosions—went down, and the twenty-two minutes which the *Miyako* took to settle into her grave, there is an interval which may mean the saving of many scores of men who would otherwise be drowned between decks, or scalded to death by escaping steam.

It is typical of the dogged persistence of the Japanese character that, notwithstanding this second and more serious loss, the work of removing the mines from Kerr Bay should have been steadily prosecuted on the following day. Eight more mines were destroyed in spite of continued "interruptions"—to use Admiral Kataoka's own phrase—caused by the enemy's battery, to which two or three field guns had been added. "There are many more mines left," says the Admiral, "and the work of destroying them will be continued."

The streak of ill-luck which has marked the mine-clearing operations in Kerr Bay fades into insignificance when compared with the disastrous record of Sunday, May 15th. On this morning three Japanese battleships and several cruisers are manœuvring near Port Arthur, presumably with the intention of either making a bombardment, or of screening the passage of transports, or with both these objects in view. They are about ten miles south-east of the Liau-ti-shan promontory, when the magnificent battleship *Hatsuse* strikes a mechanical mine, which explodes under her stern, and damages the rudder so badly that she finds it necessary to ask one of her comrades to tow her. A vessel is about to approach for this purpose when the *Hatsuse*, alas! runs on to another mine, and in half an hour the great warship goes to the bottom. Three hundred officers and men are saved by the boats from the cruisers, including Admiral Nashiba and Captain Nakas, but, as the peace complement was 741, and may have been increased for war purposes, the loss of life must have been between four and five hundred at a low estimate.

Before entering into details of this disaster it may be recorded that the sinking of the *Hatsuse* is witnessed by Rear-Admiral Vitgert, commanding the Fleet at Port Arthur, who not unnaturally seeks to make the most of such an opportunity of harassing the enemy. Under his orders a flotilla of sixteen destroyers puts out swiftly to sea, and the *Novik* steams out into the passage to support them if necessary. But the Japanese are by no means dumbfoundered by the disaster which has overtaken them, terrible as it is. The cruisers meet the advancing destroyers with a heavy fire, repulsing them, and, having effected what rescues are possible from the sinking *Hatsuse*, the squadron draws off.

But the tale of Japan's misfortunes is not yet complete. On the same Sunday morning as that on which the *Hatsuse* has met her doom Admiral Togo receives from Admiral Dewa a wireless message

saying:—"To-day, at 5 a.m., while returning from the work of blocking Port Arthur, I encountered a dense fog north of Shan-tung Promontory. The *Kasuga* collided with the port stern of the *Yoshino*, which was sunk. The *Kasuga's* boats saved ninety of the *Yoshino's* crew. A dense fog still continues."

The loss of a battleship and a cruiser in a single day means far more to Japan than it might mean to her adversary. For she has no means of replacing, at any rate the *Hatsuse*, by hurrying on the construction of vessels in yards of her own, and the laws of neutrality forbid her acquisition of warships in the "open market." Meanwhile, in the sunk *Hatsuse* alone, she has lost one-sixth of her fighting strength in first-class battleships, and, indeed, more than one-sixth, for the *Hatsuse* was one of the four most modern vessels in the Japanese Navy, the remaining two being of considerably inferior strength. She was built by the great Elswick firm on the Tyne, and was launched in midsummer, 1899. In general design she resembled our *Majestic*, but with improvements due to her later date, which are said to have placed her on an equality with our *Implacable* class. She had a displacement of 15,000 tons, was 400 feet long, with a beam of 76½ feet, and she could steam nineteen knots. She carried a principal armament of four 12-in. guns, fourteen 6-in., and some twenty 12-pr. and smaller pieces. With four submerged torpedo-tubes and a considerable belt of armour she was, for offence and defence, one of the most powerful battleships afloat, and her appearance will be familiar to many in this country, for she was the representative vessel of Japan at Spithead at the funeral of Queen Victoria.

Photo: Symonds & Co., Port.

JAPANESE NAVAL TYPE: A COMMANDER.

The *Yoshino* was of a very different class from the *Hatsuse*, being only a protected cruiser, that is to say, having no vertical armour but a steel deck, from 1.7 in. to 4.5 in. thick, over her "vitals." Her displacement was 4,150 tons, and her speed at her trials, in 1892, was twenty-three knots, but must have since been considerably reduced. Notwithstanding her age and comparatively light armament—her principal guns were four 6-in.—the *Yoshino* was no mean loss, apart from the fact that her peace complement was 360 officers and men, and that, therefore, she must have gone down with nearly 300 officers and men aboard. She was always a fast, handy ship, and was the leader of the celebrated "Flying Squadron" in the war with China.

It goes without saying that these severe losses in men and ships occasioned the greatest grief at Tokio, besides, it may be appreciatively added, calling forth an expression of sincere regret from the Russians, more especially

at Mukden, where a handsome tribute was paid to the numerous proofs which the gallant Jap sailors had given of their courage. But in the Japanese Navy the disaster was not admitted to be one calculated to shake in any way the resolution of the nation, and stress was laid on the fact that the accidents were such as might



Photo: West & Son, Southsea.

THE *HATSUSE*.

happen to the ships of any Power, and were to be classed with the risks inseparable from naval warfare.

But, as regards the sinking of the *Hatsuse*, a good deal of feeling was aroused in quarters altogether remote from either of the belligerents. Not only in Great Britain, but also in the United States, the question was actively discussed whether the fact that the Japanese battleship was destroyed by a mine laid ten miles from land was not a matter into which, on international grounds, some enquiry should be made, and, if necessary, a firm protest lodged. It was pointed out that, while the use of mines to defend harbours or roadsteads is, of course, unquestionable, the laying of these engines beyond territorial waters is a most serious danger to others besides belligerents. There is also the terrible risk incurred by innocent merchant ships from mines which, not having been properly anchored, have floated out to sea, to be considered. Russia warmly repudiated the suggestion that any mines coming under the latter category were hers, and professed herself ready to pay any indemnity in general cases in which it could be proved that her mines had done damage to innocent ships. But the feeling of doubt and apprehension as to future catastrophes arising from the reckless use of mines in this war was not appreciably lessened by this defiant attitude. Even when the *Petropavlovsk* was sunk by a mine laid under conditions to which no exception

could be taken, there had been a strong feeling throughout Western Europe and America that this ghastly method of shattering a brave enemy's strength was a sort of "hitting below the belt," profoundly objectionable in the interests of civilised humanity. But, when it became clear that for many months the vessels of non-combatants crossing the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Pe-chi-li would run fearful risks of being suddenly blown to pieces, the desire to restrict to the utmost the use of such frightfully indiscriminate engines of destruction was widely and strongly voiced. It is not possible as yet to gauge the effect of these protests, but a hope may be expressed that, out of such lamentable and appalling incidents as have been chronicled here in this connection, some good may come in the shape of an international resolve to place the use of submarine mines at any rate under stringent limitations.

The operations of the Japanese Fleet in the week commencing on this fateful Sunday, May 15th, are marked by great activity, and are, evidently, closely connected with the landings and projected landings in the Liao-tung Peninsula. After repelling the attack of the Russian destroyers which emerged from Port Arthur during the sinking of the *Hatsuse*, several Japanese gunboats and a torpedo-boat flotilla proceeded into the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, and made extensive reconnaissances, varied by occasional bombardments of the shore defences. "On the afternoon of May 17th," runs one typical despatch, "our squadron dragged for mines, and entered Kin-chau Bay, the gunboats steaming into the inner part of the bay. We fired upon the Kurily Bridge, upon a train full of troops which was passing, and upon the buildings, etc. The enemy must have suffered damage." All these repeated "demonstrations," coupled with the disembarkation of troops at various well-selected points, cannot but be a reminder to the Russians that, notwithstanding her recent losses, Japan's naval supremacy is not only still unquestioned, but capable of constant and very substantial proof.

But the main point in connection with the above-mentioned and other similar operations carried out during this period by the Japanese Fleet, is that they are no longer part of a purely naval campaign, but are chiefly connected with the commencement by Japan of her work on land. Indeed, as was remarked at the time, the loss of the *Hatsuse* itself may be regarded as due to the requirements of military strategy, since, even if a bombardment had been intended that morning, it would have been a purely demonstrative one to cover one of the landings contemplated or in progress.

During the night of May 19th several flotillas of Japanese destroyers, backed up by gunboats, make a daring reconnaissance near Port Arthur. A terrific cross-fire is kept up by the forts, and a Russian shell strikes the destroyer *Akatsuki*, killing a lieutenant and twenty-four men. The purposes of the reconnaissances are, however, effected.

At this point we may profitably break off our narrative of the Japanese naval campaign, to resume it in detail when the trend of the combined operations by sea and land shall have become more clearly apparent. Looking back, it is impossible not to be struck with the wonderful cohesion which has characterised Admiral Togo's movements, a cohesion the entire credit of which he would be the last to take to himself. At



A COSSACK PATROL AT PORT ARTHUR SIGHTING THE ENEMY'S TORPEDO BOATS.

every step there has been strong evidence of master-minds working at Tokio, and working all the more freely because they are well aware that the "pre-arranged plan"—to which Admiral Togo so constantly refers in his modest despatches—will be faithfully carried out with as little embroidery and as few deviations as possible. When one thinks of the nature of the work attempted, the gradual destruction and bottling-up of what was once a powerful fleet, the repeated bombardment of one of the strongest fortresses in existence, and, superadded to this, the protection afforded to the transport and disembarkation of troops on a really extensive scale, the first four months of war seem to bristle with lessons even for the premier Navy in the world. At the end of the first week in May it could have been said that these wonderful results had been achieved with, practically speaking, no loss at all. Even as it is, the price that, owing to a grievous accident, has been paid has not been excessive, and, whatever results may follow, a juncture has been reached of which, and of the manner in which it was reached, the Japanese Navy has a right to be frankly and always proud.

We may now usefully direct our attention to Port Arthur, which, at the date to which we have brought down our narrative of events both by land and sea, the commencement, namely, of the fourth week in May, is literally and completely in a state of siege. By sea, of course, there is no exit except, as we have seen, for destroyers—it is somewhat significant, perhaps, that on the 15th even the small cruiser *Novik* did not venture beyond the harbour entrance—since, even if the wrecks of the Japanese merchant-

men have been partially cleared away, the larger vessels of the fleet are not likely to risk the Japanese counter-mines. By land, too, as explained in the preceding chapter, the barrier erected by the Second Army of Japan is now practically insuperable, except possibly by a sortie *en masse*. It is true that within the last few days General Stoessel's adjutant, accompanied by twelve Cossacks, has managed to dash through with a message from his Chief to General Kuropatkin at Liao-yang. But even such isolated enterprises will soon be difficult when the Japanese have drawn a line right across the isthmus of Kin-chau, which a single horseman will find it difficult to penetrate. At present the Russians hold Kin-chau somewhat strongly, but, as noted above, the position is assailable from the sea, and presently we shall witness a determined and successful attempt to rush it by land. Dalny is being evacuated, and it is questionable whether any sort of communication can much longer be maintained with the outside world. In a word, Port Arthur is isolated, and its siege by a resolute, resourceful, and powerful enemy has to all intents and purposes begun.

It is instructive to note Port Arthur's chances of holding out against such a close investment, followed in all probability by a vigorous assault, as that with which she is threatened. As a matter of fact, it is always rash in such cases to speak with any confidence, for there are often incidents and accidents in a siege which throw out the most careful calculations, just as happens in the ordinary battle, which, by the way, has been happily described as being in most cases nothing more than an abbreviated siege. Still, in a siege where attackers and defenders know their business, and where the siege itself has long been contemplated as almost certain to happen, there are some pretty stable factors, and these we may now discuss briefly, as far as our necessarily limited information avails us.

First, as to the garrison of Port Arthur, it appears to be generally agreed that this will number about 30,000 all told, including the troops which will eventually come in from Dalny and Kin-chau. Of these about 10,000 are sailors, who are mainly employed in connection with the fortress artillery, and between whom and the soldiers there does not seem to be the best sort of feeling existing. The latter declare bitterly that they looked to the Fleet to protect them from such a pass as that to which Port Arthur has been reduced, while the former may now, perhaps, retort that such opportunities as the Russian Army has hitherto enjoyed of proving its superiority to the Japanese land forces have not been used to conspicuous advantage. The commencement of the siege, however, should serve to diminish such unworthy bickerings, more especially as General Stoessel and Rear-Admiral Vitgert appear to be the right sort of commanders to induce soldiers and sailors to pull heartily together in such a situation as is now imminent.

To provide adequately for the defence of such a place as Port Arthur, and to leave a margin for sickness, sorties, wastage, and other contingencies, a garrison of 30,000 is by no means excessive, and, indeed, it is said that General Kuropatkin some time back offered General Stoessel reinforcements. But the latter, doubtless with an eye to the supplies, declined, saying he had sufficient men for his purpose.

As to supplies and ammunition, there

is no means of knowing at all accurately what is the extent of Port Arthur's resources; but it is confidently declared by the Russians that in both respects the garrison can hold out comfortably for nine months or a year. This is as it may be, but the fact remains that, as regards supplies, the quantity of stores available is probably subject to heavy discount by reason of the tendency of Russian officialism to the rankest form of corruption where the fighting Services are concerned. The reserve of flour is said to be ample, but there have been ugly rumours as to the quality of the immense stores of canned goods which have been accumulated in the fortress in view of an investment. In the matter of water there is likely to be no difficulty, as the ordinary supply is obtained by condensing sea-water, for which there is adequate machinery, and an immense stock of coal, upon which, it is hardly necessary to state, the Fleet does not make very heavy demands.

It has been rather fashionable to speak of Port Arthur as being "Ladysmithed," but, when it comes to a consideration of the position of the defence, the comparison set up by the loose use of such expressions is manifestly absurd. Ladysmith was a position which was of no real strength, natural or artificial, but Port Arthur, whatever may be its drawbacks, has at least been rendered by the skill of Russian engineers—of whose ability we had some experience before Sevastopol—an extraordinary example of defensive possibilities. As a protection against attack on the land side there is



DALNY: THE RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT.

now said to be a triple row of forts, each position being fronted by a moat with a hedge of barbed wire beyond, and at numerous points there are bomb-proof shelters capable of withstanding the projectiles even of siege artillery. It is difficult to have any conception of the industry and ingenuity which have been thrown into this work, and which, from the early days of Port Arthur's existence as Russian leasehold property, have been backed up by expenditure of the most lavish description. But it is, perhaps, sufficient to say that modern fortification leaves little to chance, and, though it is folly to call the strongest fortress impregnable, it is equally ridiculous to ignore the wonderfully increased capacity for resistance conferred on a garrison by a system of really up-to-date scientific defences on a thoroughly coherent and harmonious plan.

But, of course, scarp and counterscarp, parapet, bomb-proof shelter, galleries, flanking fire, and every other attribute of latter-day permanent fortification are apt to fail unless the men available are of the right sort as regards the dogged, persistent endurance which is so often the chief factor in the defence of a closely invested town or fortress. Here again the Russians have an important asset in their national character, as we found to our cost in the Crimea. The same qualities may do more than all the triumphs of military engineering to render Port Arthur something more than a hard nut to crack. For time is a consideration, and, if Port Arthur can hold out for many months, the resources of Russia may eventually render that possible which now seems absolutely hopeless.

Such considerations have a dual interest, for they not only indicate chances of a stubborn resistance, but increase the gravity of the pressure likely to be applied. Japan, as has been said, knows nearly if not everything there is to be known, even of the secrets of Port Arthur's defences.

With the keenest interest, then, and very mixed feelings, may the nations of the world look for the next development in what is now an accomplished fact, the Siege of Port Arthur by the naval and military forces of Japan.

JAPANESE METHOD OF TRANSPORTING GUNS.

SONG TO BEGUILE THE WAY: COSSACKS *EN ROUTE* FOR THE FRONT IN A HORSE-BOX ON THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE CHUNCHUSES ONCE MORE—THE ATTITUDE OF CHINA—A DOUBTFUL NEUTRALITY—OTHER RUSSIAN EMBARRASSMENTS—INSANITARY HARBIN—OFFICIAL DIFFERENCES—THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY—WAR SCANDALS—INTERNAL TROUBLES—A DISPIRITED TSAR.

AT a very early stage of this narrative we have seen the Russians embarrassed by the presence in Manchuria of a formidable race of brigands known as Chunchuses, or "Red-beards." During the first few weeks of the War the Siberian Railway was much hampered by the sudden descents of the "Red-beards" who, it was shrewdly suspected, were at least instigated, if not actually led, by Japanese officers, and the number of troops locked up in the work of protecting the line from the attentions of these daring and hardy enemies was of itself a serious draft upon the Russian fighting line.

The Russian military authorities have latterly made important overtures to the Chunchuses, and have even, it is whispered, attempted to buy them over with subsidies of hard cash. But the "Red-beards" have an old score to settle with the holders of Manchuria. When the nations of Europe and America, in addition to China herself, and Japan, began to take somewhat seriously Russia's fluent promises to evacuate the Chinese territory she had so ostentatiously occupied, the Russians had used the Chunchuses very cleverly and unscrupulously as a reason for not clearing out of the province in question. As long as these terrible brigands threatened the very existence of a line so beneficent to the trade of the civilised world in general, the presence of Russian troops to keep them in check was surely necessary. It is suggested that, by way of emphasising this proposition, several outrages by the Chunchuses were "made to order," reprisals following as in the historic case of the massacre of the Chinese at Blagovestchensk on the Amur. Be this as it may, the animosity of the "Red-beards" against the Russians is evidently deep-seated, and all attempts to propitiate them even with Russian roubles appear to have failed.

About the middle of May there come grave reports from Harbin and Liao-yang as to the increasing trouble given by the Chunchuses, and it is regarded as highly significant that they should venture to carry on their depredations so openly, and at such a short distance from the Russian military headquarters. On May 14th a collision takes place which, although resulting in some success for the Russians, is a sharp indication of the dangerous character of the Chunchus movement. On this day news having been received that the "Red-beards" have appeared in some villages about nine miles west of Liao-yang, detachments of Russian riflemen, mounted and unmounted, are sent out against them. No Chunchuses are found in the villages where they had been reported, and the natives on being questioned give evasive replies.

As the force is leaving a village some two miles nearer to Liao-yang, it comes

upon a considerable band of Chunchuses, who have evidently been concealed by the residents. The "Red-beards" boldly occupy the outskirts of the village, and are attacked by the Russian troops, who dislodge them after a heavy fusillade. The Chunchuses leave twenty dead on the field and a quantity of rifles and ammunition, and the Russians, also, have two soldiers killed and three wounded.

Another attack by Chunchuses had been made on the previous day on the coal mines at Yan-tai, which are on a branch line ten miles north of Liao-yang, and here again the brigands, although severely handled—it is said that they lost fifty killed and that seventeen were taken prisoners—fought with desperation. Among the prisoners were two Japanese officers who had been previously captured by the Russians, but had afterwards escaped. The Chunchuses are said to have admitted that they were in the pay of the Japanese, and had been supplying them with information.

It is clear that the successes of the Japanese at Kiu-lien-cheng and elsewhere greatly increase the danger to be apprehended from this source, and it is not surprising that the Russians should feel great uneasiness as to the future operations of these roving bands of desperadoes, who are excellently armed, capitally mounted, and in league, apparently, with both the natives and the enemy. But even this is hardly an excuse for a step which the Viceroy of the Far East takes about this time with the Tsar's consent, doubtless as a special counterblast to the Chunchuses' operations.

The step in question is an announcement that the convicts in the Russian penal settlements in the Far East will be given arms and be allowed to participate in the task of enabling Holy Russia to crush the Japanese. The bare suggestion of such an outrage upon civilisation is regarded with disgust by those who are well aware that the penal settlements in question contain not political prisoners, but murderers and criminals of the lowest type. To employ such abandoned ruffians in the ranks of the Tsar's regiments would be an insult to the brave Russian Army, and might lead to shocking barbarities in warfare, to the mere possibility of which an enemy so chivalrous and humane as Japan has every right to object. It is earnestly hoped by all right-thinking men that Russia will abandon a project so peculiarly at variance with the known character of her kindly ruler.

Apart from the Chunchuses, the Russian military authorities in the Far East are beginning to feel grave doubts as to the intention of China to preserve her loudly-proclaimed neutrality. At an early stage of the War the Chinese Government moved General Ma, with some 16,000 regular troops, to within easy distance of the Manchurian border, and from time to time there have been other military movements reported which, although by no means unnatural measures of precaution in the circumstances in which China finds herself, are greatly resented by the Russians. The latter recognise the danger to which their rear might be exposed if the Chinese troops became inflamed by Japanese successes, and went suddenly on the warpath against an army they have little reason to love. Accordingly Russia, through her diplomatic representatives, urges most strongly a stricter preservation of Chinese neutrality, and complains that she is waging war in a hostile country—a complaint which, taking into consideration all the circumstances of her presence in Manchuria, is, perhaps, a little thin.

China replies by a solemn asseveration of her resolve to maintain neutrality, and Japan declares that it is her wish, too, that China should not be drawn into the conflict if only for the reason that overt Chinese hostility to Russia would enable the latter to draw supplies from Chinese territory which she is now precluded from doing by Chinese neutrality. But all the declarations in the world cannot get rid of several elementary facts. One of these is the presence of considerable bodies of well-drilled and disciplined Chinese troops in positions from which they could conceivably cause the Russian Army a good deal of trouble. The admitted fact that there are a number of Japanese officers in the Chinese Army is also not without significance. Lastly, there is always the trouble that in China a rebellion may occur, like that of the Boxers, which the Imperial Government is quite powerless to control, and which might spread with alarming rapidity were the secret societies to circulate an order that the present opportunity of taking the Russians at a disadvantage was not to be neglected. All this affords serious food for thought at a juncture when collisions between the Russians and Japanese on land are becoming frequent, and any indication of the boasted and assumed superiority of the Russian soldier is rather conspicuous, so far, by its absence.

But infinitely more serious to the onlookers is the terribly grave contingency which may be attached to Chinese interference in this momentous quarrel. It is not absolutely certain that the French would regard such interference as compelling them to take an active part in co-operating with Russia—a step which would be followed as a matter of course by our fulfilment of the terms of our alliance with Japan; but the situation is clearly one of the greatest delicacy and danger, and its existence cannot be disregarded in any faithful narrative of the War.

Associated with, and yet distinct from, the attitude of China as a gigantic, if unwieldy, whole, is the question of the growing unfriendliness with which the Russians are being regarded by the Chinese with whom they come into contact at such places as Mukden, Liao-yang, and Harbin. At Harbin especially the behaviour of the Chinese inhabitants is becoming independent to the point of insolence, and the authorities find it difficult to prevent individual Russian officers and soldiers from chastising Chinamen by whose effrontery they have been exasperated.

Particularly is trouble experienced in the matter of supplies. The Chinese at Harbin have, as usual, the market almost entirely in their hands, more particularly as regards vegetables. During the early part of the War they gave little trouble, but latterly have become, as most Orientals do in such circumstances, very defiant and extortionate in their prices, which they utterly decline to abate. It is difficult to exaggerate the genuine seriousness of such an attitude as this in such a country as Manchuria, in which the question of supplies is constantly becoming acute. The trouble is, moreover, accentuated in this case by the deep-seated grievances of the Chinese against the Russians, who but a few months ago were treating them often with the greatest cruelty and injustice.

Russia has many other difficulties to contend with. The magnitude of her resources is unquestioned, the ability of her generals undoubted, the patriotism of her troops obvious. But deep within the

CHUNCHUS SUSPECTS BROUGHT BEFORE A RUSSIAN OFFICER.

Russian official system lies the canker of corruption, and at every point this, coupled with amazing unreadiness and an utterly indefinite plan of operations, is beginning to be evident. Natural obstacles under such conditions assume still graver proportions, and difficulties arising from personal shortcomings are increased tenfold.

Among the troubles which beset the Russians at this period is the state of Harbin, the great junction at which the Siberian Railway is split up into two lines running to Port Arthur and Vladi-

vostok respectively. Owing to the failure of the authorities to pave the streets, to organise a corps of scavengers, or even to make drains, this important centre is becoming a vast insanitary quagmire, and pestilence in the horrible forms of cholera and typhus seems inevitable. At times the state of the streets is such that the inhabitants are blockaded in their houses for two or three days, and the spring sun is now causing disease to germinate in a manner which occasions the gravest anxiety among the medical officials concerned. When the strategical significance of Harbin is considered, when it is remembered that hither are being brought all the wounded from the south, and that through Harbin almost every Russian soldier who goes to the front must pass, it will be understood what a serious matter this is, and what good reason General Kuropatkin has for his vigorous denunciation of commanding officers who leave their camps at Harbin in a state which cannot but lead to the ravages of a worse enemy than gunpowder or steel.

Another trouble is the unfortunate state of strained relations between Admiral Alexeieff and General Kuropatkin—a deplorable condition of affairs in an army with which all is going well, but simply appalling in one which has already been subjected to serious reverses, and is being hotly pressed by a resolute and powerful enemy. It is said that Kuropatkin has complained in strong terms to the Tsar of the interference of the Viceroy with his plans, an interference which has been largely responsible for the defeat at Kiulien-cheng. The Tsar, there is reason to believe, has the greater confidence in the Commander-in-Chief, but there is a very strong Court faction in favour of Alexeieff, whose power may possibly have increased since the possibility of a combined opposition to him on the part of Kuropatkin and Makaroff has been removed by the latter's tragic fate.

The Siberian Railway continues running, but the actual transport of troops during April and May does not seem to be as large as might have been expected from the grandiloquent declarations of the Russians as to the number of troops they would put into the field in June or July. The railway is now being actively supervised by the Minister of Ways and Communications, Prince Khilkoff, and this energetic official is making strenuous endeavours to improve the rate at which military trains can be sent through to Harbin. But, up to the time of the thaw on Lake Baikal, the number has not exceeded six daily, and, even when this comes to be increased, the fact that huge quantities of stores as well as of men have to be despatched from Russia, greatly reduces the colossal figures in which Russian dreams as to overwhelming reinforcements are clothed.

The business of guarding the line alone is a heavy drain upon Russian resources. The task is, as has already been explained, entrusted to a separate corps of Frontier Guards, which is composed of fifty-five sotnias of mounted men, and fifty-five companies of infantry, with six batteries of artillery, numbering some 25,000 all told.

It may be computed that by the fourth week in May Russia has in round numbers rather over 250,000, and under 300,000 men in the Far East. But not more than 150,000 are available for the purposes of a field army, and of these probably Kuropatkin has not more than 80,000 under his immediate control at Liao-yang.

Still, none the less, the fact that the

Siberian Railway is still running, and that progress is being made with the circum-Baikal section, by which the passage across the Lake will be avoided, must be taken into careful consideration, and due regard had to the steady accumulation of men and stores which, on arrival at Harbin, can be sent off to the south or east as occasion may require. The possibilities of transport by the Sungari River, which flows past Harbin and later joins the Amur, must also not be overlooked in the gloomy process of estimating the effect of the embarrassments with which Russia has to struggle at this period of the War.

In Russia itself there is a good deal to impede the smooth conduct of affairs at the front. There are enormous numbers of men which can be drawn upon, and the military organisation on paper is very complete and impressive. But mobilisation does not appear to proceed by any means as quickly as it should considering the gravity of the situation. As for the preparation of naval reinforcements, it is still doubtful at the end of May whether anything practical can be done in this direction, owing to the difficulties of coaling a squadron *en route*. Meanwhile, the Russian Navy has sustained a severe blow in an extraordinary mishap to the new battleship *Orel*, which has been stranded near Kronstadt in shallow water, owing to strange neglect, or, as is otherwise hinted, deliberate outrage in regard to the sea-plugs, which are found to have been left open. Another battleship, also in course of construction, the *Borodino*, meets with a minor accident which, however, necessitates careful and rather tedious repair.

As far back as the middle of March a painful case of treachery was discovered at headquarters, a cavalry captain attached to the Chief Commissariat Department having been detected in a correspondence with some Japanese officers staying at Vienna with reference to the sale of a secret plan of mobilisation. The offender was promptly arrested, tried, and executed, and there is no reason to suppose that other leakages have occurred. But the incident deserves mention as indicating one of many dangers to which a European army is liable at the hands of trusted officials who, through wild extravagance or otherwise, have been reduced to desperate forgetfulness of all that is due to honour and patriotism.

An almost equally painful scandal is caused by the abominable malversation of funds collected through the agency of the Red Cross and other philanthropic organisations which have arisen since the outbreak of the War. It is openly stated that many members of the aristocracy, Court ladies, and officers of the Guards, have been employed at high salaries in the administration of these funds, and the most unprincipled misappropriations have taken place. Eagerly as the Tsarina has thrown herself into the gracious work of assisting the despatch to the front of comforts for the gallant troops, the taint of these odious rumours is not easily dispelled, and many large subscribers stipulate strictly that the expenditure of their money shall be under proper control.

But far graver in reality than the gravest of individual scandals is the practical certainty that the continued failure of the Russian Army to vindicate its existence is helping to bring about a terrible state of unrest throughout Russia generally. Terrible stories are told of reigns of terror, of wholesale executions, of secret burials behind inviolable cordons

of soldiers. Regiments which in the ordinary course would have gone to the front are being, it is said, retained at home to overawe the civil population, only the reservists being sent to fight the Japanese. It is possible that there is some exaggeration; on the other hand, where the police are so powerful much may be screened which actually happens.

But in any case, where there is so much smoke there is sure to be some fire, and there is little doubt but that the internal condition of Russia towards the end of May is certainly not that of a country which is united in its determination to overcome all obstacles, and wipe out the memory of all reverses, by showing the right kind of sentiment at home as well as the right kind of valour in the fighting line.

A sad figure in this gloomy picture is that of the Tsar. A vacillating autocrat at best, he has displayed the obstinacy which so often goes with weakness; has allowed himself to be hopelessly misled by unscrupulous counsellors; and is now in a slough of confusion and mistrust from which self-extrication seems well-nigh impossible. Holy Russia has had rulers of various extreme kinds—extremely strong, extremely proud, and extremely vicious—but seldom has one of them afforded such a painful spectacle of nervous incapacity as that which is now constantly and publicly presented by the unfortunate Nicholas II. The irony of the spectacle deepens as we realise in what a brief interval the dreamer of dreams of Universal Peace has developed into the helpless agent in the prosecution of a particularly devastating and far-reaching war.

SIBERIAN CONVICTS, UNDER WARD OF SOLDIERS, WORKING UPON THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY.

CHAPTER XXV.

LOOKING BACK—A CHOICE OF THREE COURSES—CONTEMPORARY HISTORY—NO LIGHT TASK—HISTORICAL RETROSPECT—THE GERM OF THE WAR—A PARALLEL—HOW RUSSIA COURTED TROUBLE—BLUFF AND PREPAREDNESS—WEST AND EAST.

THE time has now arrived when the reader may usefully be invited to follow the writer in a rather extended retrospect. The latter, again, must be prefaced by a few remarks in the nature of a "personal explanation." When this work was first projected there were three courses open to those concerned in its production. The first was to wait until the War was sufficiently advanced to allow of the accumulation of material on which to base carefully elaborated descriptions and matured judgments. The second was to make the story a contemporary one, and, at the outset, to trust largely to the telegraphic correspondence in the Press for details. Between this lay the middle course of commencing the publication forthwith, but of antedating the narrative so that, by the time the outbreak of war was reached, letters from Press correspondents would be arriving to supplement the earlier and necessarily more meagre cables.

After very careful consideration the second course was adopted. The first was open to the obvious objection that it may be years before the materials for an ideal history of this great War can be collected, sifted, and arranged. To take an instructive and topical example, one of the most important military histories which has ever been issued is that of the South African War, compiled under conditions which offer unexampled facilities for the production of a work of this kind

Yet in Midsummer, 1904, only two out of five or six volumes of the "History of the War in South Africa" had appeared, and a good many months must necessarily elapse before the completion of this monumental undertaking is in sight. In the meantime there are other histories of the Boer War—"Cassell's" among them—from which countless readers have probably obtained a far more vivid and, on the whole, perhaps, a not less accurate idea of the great struggle in question than they might find possible after a conscientious study of such a mass of detail and closely reasoned argument as the more complete record will ultimately present.

The "middle way" suggested in connection with the present work seems safe and easy. But it was dismissed as a half-measure which would secure neither the fulness and complete accuracy of a history produced with real deliberation, nor permit the narrative to be invested with that added dramatic interest which arises from a nearly contemporary publication.

Accordingly, after an Introduction by Mr. Diósy, every word of which is as much to the point to-day as it was when it was written, the present record was made to commence with an actually warlike episode, the firing of the first shot of the War, followed swiftly by a narration of the midnight attack upon Port Arthur on February 8th. The subsequent course of events was somewhat closely followed at first, not because it was thought desirable to be promptly up-to-date, but because until lately the operations have been marked by certain rather baffling delays which, coupled with the reticence more especially of the Japanese authorities, have been the cause of some tribulation to contemporary chroniclers.

But, notwithstanding this drawback, it may be claimed that the foregoing narrative is what it professes to be, namely, as full and as accurate an account of the War as was possible at the time of writing, and that such minor deficiencies as were inevitable are of small account compared with the vivid presentment of occurrences while the latter are still fresh in the public mind. Of the various sorts of history, to many the most fascinating is that produced in what the Germans so aptly call the *Sturm und Drang* of current movement and action. Nor should even the careful student disdain to seek material for his final estimate, more especially perhaps of great wars, in narratives of engagements and other operations published within a few weeks of the events themselves. Such contemporary records may lack complete impartiality; they may not possess great depth of focus, but they can be, and often are, much more graphic and realistic than more pretentious histories produced when time has cooled righteous indignation, and details of deep human interest have become obscured by larger issues on which the true historian is anxious to lay stress.

Yet it must not be supposed that this story is the result of mere casual glances at the telegrams in the daily papers, coupled with a lively imagination and a strong desire to "make pictures" out of every episode which lends itself to that process. Long before the War broke out the present writer made extensive preparations for following the course of a campaign which he felt was inevitable, and in which he was, for various reasons, peculiarly interested. Nor, since the commencement of hostili-

ties, has any labour been spared to supplement the facts available in the Press by other information only accessible to those who make a special study of such matters. As regards the newspaper accounts, a number of these have been geographical points by reference to the best available maps.

Incidentally, a warm tribute may be paid to the general accuracy of the Press despatches sent under extremely trying conditions. In no recent campaign has



RUSSIA'S ADVANCE IN THE FAR EAST, 1858 TO 1898.
By permission, from "The New Far East," by Arthur Diósy.

most carefully collated with a view to securing the utmost accuracy possible in cases where on the spot there has been a divergence in the details gathered by industrious correspondents, and the greatest pains have been taken to verify the censorship been more strict, nor the temptation to supply deficiencies of fact by imaginative effect more strong. Yet, on the whole, there has been a singular absence of reckless and of baseless assumption, a circumstance of peculiar im-

portance to the present writer, who has had exceptional opportunities in the early stages of the War of discovering the true worth of the telegraphic information in the various leading papers. Of his indebtedness to this or that particular source it will, perhaps, suffice to say briefly that in specific cases due acknowledgment has been made and will continue to be made. But the general scheme of this narrative is the writer's own. Here and there the views of others are necessarily reproduced, although not necessarily copied. "Great wits jump" more harmoniously in regard to the eternal principles of warfare than in connection with most scientific studies, possibly because those principles are so constantly receiving such practical and forcible demonstration. Nor is it the aim of this publication to puzzle its readers with new and striking propositions in regard to strategy and tactics, but rather to explain any "problems" in a popular style, and by methods which the great majority of experts will probably agree in considering satisfactory.

After this personal preface let us proceed to the historical retrospect foreshadowed in the opening sentence of the present chapter. Already from time to time in the course of this narrative it has been necessary to glance at facts and happenings lying a little apart from the actual sequence of the warlike operations. For the history of a great struggle like this has many aspects besides those connected with purely naval and military science. A famous writer once spoke rather disparagingly of "drum and trumpet history," but at least it may be claimed for the right kind of war chronicle that it is, nay, must be, comprehensive. For this reason our record of the campaign in the Far East has already contained something of political, geographical, and ethnographical interest outside the tale of weary marches on land, swift movements by sea, and desperate fighting generally. And now a point has been reached at which a still broader view may well be taken. A distinct stage of the War has been completed, and a situation produced into the details of which we shall presently enquire. Is not this a favourable opportunity for a dive into the sea of the Past, and an attempt to bring to the shore of the Present some more of those big facts which alone can make real history of mere annals of heroic blood-letting?

With the causes of the Russo-Japanese War Mr. Diósy has dealt with admirable clearness in his Introduction to this History. In that lucid statement will be found summarised both Russia's aim at the attainment of complete supremacy in Asia, and Japan's determination to withstand that far-reaching effort as far, at any rate, as the integrity of Korea was concerned. Sixteen weeks of war have brought both Russian purpose and Japanese resistance into stronger relief; but they have done more. They have revealed what could not have been guessed with absolute accuracy even by the shrewdest student of history, politics, and war. They have not only allowed us to isolate, as it were, the bacillus of war; they have not only shown in a very striking manner with what uniformity that bad bacillus works when similar conditions favourable to its development are present. They have sharply defined the central fact that, at the commencement of 1904, Russia was no more ready to fight Japan than Spain was ready to fight the United States in

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR: WIVES AND CHILDREN OF RUSSIAN OFFICERS LEAVING DALNY FOR THE WEST.

1898; than France was ready to fight Germany in 1870; than, to take an earlier and still more instructive example, Persia was ready to fight Macedon in 334 B.C. With these revelations have been combined a number of others tending to demonstrate with peculiar force and completeness the marvellous insight of the great Greek writer who first discovered that history is self-repeating, and who, in a memorable passage, may be said to have foreshadowed the French Revolution. History repeats itself! There were few indeed who, when Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia, would have cared to prophesy that in a few weeks comparisons would be drawn, and seriously and effectively drawn, between the Russo-Japanese War and those bygone conflicts which successively humiliated Persia, France, and Spain.

It has been said that the first-named of these three past wars is likely to prove a more useful parallel than the other two, and this point has been made the subject of some deeply interesting remarks by clever writers. The comparison has been strengthened by allusion to the fact that, when Persia clashed with Macedon, she was not really an effete and worn-out nation any more than Russia is, but was merely badly organised for any important warlike effort. For years she had relied on her prestige and apparent strength to impose her will upon others, and in many cases the fear of bringing such vast possibilities into hostile movement was sufficient to check any serious opposition to her ambitions and ideas of self-aggrandisement. In time she struck upon hard rock in the shape of Macedonia, already converted into a compact military organisation by the genius of Philip, who was assassinated just when his dream of successful resistance to Persia might have been realised. The crossing of the Hellespont by Alexander has some points of general resemblance to the crossing of the Yalu by the Japanese, not as a military operation, of course, but as the commencement of, to all intents and purposes, an invasion of a huge Empire by a small but hardy nation. The comparison may be fancifully enlarged, but no further attempt need here, for the present at any rate, be made to extend it. It has merely been introduced as a lesson in history, one which may be pursued or not according to the reader's taste, but which even in a bare statement has a certain vigorous significance.

Attempts have been made to emphasise the connection between race-hatred and the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan. But the truth seems to be that race-hatred is itself a product rather than a cause, and that it is not at all safe to draw any very large deductions from its existence. The Russians have been taught to hate the "yellowskins," and the Japs have been indoctrinated with the idea that the Russians in general are treacherous, greedy, and unscrupulous to the last degree. But it is idle to seek the origin of the War in such crude sentiments, and equally foolish to think that the latter will have any effect upon the continuance of the struggle. As a matter of fact, there is so much in common between Russia and Asia that, but for conflicting aims, Russians and Japanese might be the best of friends. There are thousands of soldiers in Russia's vast army who are quite as Asiatic in their ideas and habits as even the Japanese of the provinces, and in both the cis-Ural Russian and the Jap there are qualities of simple faith, of

kindliness, of good humour, which would go far to produce a bond of friendly intercourse in happier circumstances.

But Russia, like the Persia of classical times, is swayed by forces in which national temperament and characteristics have long been crushed to make room for the realisation of giant ambitions and the satisfaction of devouring earth-hunger. One after another she has taken in the Central Asian tribes, and would by this time have absorbed Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, but for the counter influence of Great Britain exercised through India. Spreading Far-Eastwards, she had attained one of her objects by securing a, comparatively speaking, warm-water terminus for the Siberian Railway at Port Arthur. That was the crisis, the turning-point—for this is what a crisis really means—in her latter-day history. Few fairer prospects have ever been open to any nation than that which Russia had before her in 1903. Of tremendous weight in the councils of Europe, she had secured in Asia a foothold comparable only with that won at an infinitely greater expenditure of blood and time by Great Britain herself. As long as she was content with what she already possessed there was no one to interfere with her, and there were several steadying influences, such as Great Britain's anxiety to keep the peace in southern Asia, and China's existence as a great conservative force in the north-east. There is little that Russia could not have achieved, and achieved cheaply and with glorious credit, had she been content to work peacefully and in good faith towards the improvement of her splendid position. A Siberia teeming with mineral wealth: two Far-Eastern ports linked up with St. Petersburg itself by rail; industrial centres, like Harbin, already in a state of astonishing prosperity—these, and a score of other advantages, Russia risked by a "forward policy," as fatuous in its execution as it was objectionable in its design and scope.

Never did a nation more deliberately seek war than did Russia in this instance. Not merely because she prepared for war, but because her preparation was both offensive and inadequate. If having made Port Arthur impregnable she had assembled there and at Vladivostok a fleet so obviously superior to that of Japan that the latter would not, in common prudence, have ventured upon any hostilities unless she had actually attacked, Russia might conceivably have attained her wished-for supremacy by sheer weight of metal. But she made the fatal mistake of multiplying her actual strength by her own inordinate conceit, and of looking to mere "bluff" to make up for real deficiencies, more especially in sea power. This, too, in the face of a nation which had been watching her every movement for years, was inspired with a longing to pay off old scores as regards Russia's acquisition of Port Arthur, and had, ever since her own war with China, been preparing steadily for a possible collision with a more formidable foe.

Never has national arrogance been more recklessly displayed than it was in this case. Russia had increased her armaments in the Far East considerably during 1903, more especially as regards the despatch of ships from her Baltic squadron to swell the Fleet under the newly appointed Viceroy of the Far East. But even in this respect she took no proper care to secure that large



THE FIRST ATTACK UPON PORT ARTHUR: THE TORPEDOING OF THE *TSAREVITCH*.

preponderance which alone would have justified her offensive attitude. She remained blind to the fact that her best warships were not so modern or so powerful as those of Japan, and she fell into war, while her naval superiority was little more than nominal, without any regard to Japan's immense advantages as regards dockyards and arsenals. How she could have imagined that, with such indifferent preparation, she could not only secure but retain the command of the sea in opposition to an enemy which showed such naval aptitude as Japan did in 1894, passes comprehension. Yet she must have confidently anticipated some such result, or she would have surely hesitated to court the fearful damage more especially to her prestige, which could not but follow a clear loss of supremacy at sea.

There can be but one explanation of an attitude so completely at variance with the rules of common caution. To the very last, one half of Russian officialdom must have believed that "bluff" would deter Japan from entering into war until Korea had been effectively occupied, as it doubtless would have been in the spring. The other half may well have been ignorant of the real strength of Japan, and of the real weakness of Russia in the Far East, and doubtless trusted to the mere names of the Tsar and his Viceroy to overcome any trifling opposition that might be offered to Russian designs. Such insane ideas were fostered by the absurdly exaggerated accounts of enormous reviews of ships and men at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, and by the half-contemptuous procrastination displayed in the negotiations with Japan. The notion gained ground, even among some European nations which might have known better, that Russia was putting the final touches to her work, was making assurance doubly sure, was waiting until she felt that she had merely to shake her warlike crest to inspire at any rate Japan with panic fear.

Yet in the early days of 1904 Russia was remaining nearly passive, save for a final naval reinforcement which Japan first discounted by purchasing the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga* from the Argentine Republic, and then rendered impossible by destroying the fancied Russian naval superiority in a single night. She was taking no sound measures to consolidate her military forces in the Trans-Baikal region. The Eastward movement of her troops, hampered as it was by the difficulty of keeping them supplied, had been only imposing when exaggerated by doubtful reports. She evidently had no definite plan of campaign in the event of war. Port Arthur had been fortified most strongly, but little had been done for Vladivostok. Nearly everything, in a word, was being left to chance, in the confident hope that once more the watchword "Mighty Russia and the Tsar!" would make up for all deficiencies. "Everything is ready, Sire, to the last gaiter-button," was the assurance which Napoleon III. received from Marshal Lebœuf on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War. Similarly, no doubt, Nicholas II. learnt from Alexeieff that no detail was lacking to demonstrate Russia's capacity, if necessary, to grind Japan to powder. Yet less than three months of war was needed to show that on land as on sea the only real superiority possessed by the Colossus of the North lay in the latter's extraordinary belief in the power of bluff as opposed to the results of unwearying patience, marvellous tenacity, and forethought covering the

minutest details in the way of warlike preparation.

There is, as has been suggested before in this narrative, some temptation to carry the comparison with what happened in 1870 a little further and to compare Japan's readiness with that of Prussia. But it has already been shown that any such attempted parallel is unfair to Japan as well as otherwise misleading. An added point is that the struggle for which Japan had been gathering her strength for ten long years was of more serious moment to her than a war with France could in any event have been to Prussia. Had France been successful the formation of the German Empire might have been delayed, and German commercial progress rudely checked. But in a few years the country would have recovered itself as completely, if not perhaps so quickly, as France did. For Japan the outlook, in the event of failure to withstand the first shock of a collision with her mighty antagonist, is altogether different. This war means to her a struggle for existence, and, in the clear knowledge that it is so, her preparations have been on a scale which, taking the relative size and wealth of the two countries into account, must be reckoned more elaborate and effectual even than those of which the corner-stone was the genius of von Moltke.

The fact that Japan had to prepare for a long and arduous series of naval operations, as well as for a land campaign, alone differentiates her case from that of Prussia. What has happened in the past sixteen weeks further raises her on this account to a level never reached in modern history by any nation in the world. Ready by land and sea! What country has been clearly, indisputably, this since war became a matter in which armies run into hundreds of thousands of men, and each one of a half-a-dozen ships in a single squadron may mean an expenditure in money alone of over a million sterling? Without pursuing reflections which might take an invidious turn, let us try to consider what sacrifices such requirements have imposed upon a country like Japan, which, but a short two score years ago, had not emerged from a state by the side of which the England of Norman times compares, in some points of civilisation, rather favourably. What patient self-abnegation on the part of the manhood of a nation just beginning to "find itself" is involved in the institution of a military organisation which, at a stroke of the pen, can put a quarter of a million trained soldiers at least into the field! What repression of legitimate domestic ambitions is indicated in the careful husbanding of resources which enables Japan to spend million upon million in the acquisition of warships of the most modern type!

The teaching of history in the case of both these two now belligerent nations seems to merit a few passing remarks. What will, perhaps, strike the intelligent observer more forcibly than any other aspect of this great struggle in its preliminary stage is the fact that here the East seems to be moving for once very much more quickly than the West, and that this does not seem at all in accordance with the established rule of things. It is true that Russia cannot be described as a type of Western progress, and that in many parts of that vast, and often barren, country the march of civilisation is represented at best by a thoroughly corrupt and unscrupulous officialism. "Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar" is an old adage

sometimes easy of effective application even to the townbred Slav. But still Russia in Europe is European in many attributes with which unassisted Asiatic progress has little in common. Or nation or tribe which is not absolutely controlled by a European Power. One makes the latter reservation because there are Asiatic communities — the Parsees, for example—which for culture

RAL BARON KAKUBEI YAMAMOTO, MINISTER OF JAPANESE NAVY.

rather, to put it in another way, the average Russian, since at any rate the emancipation of the serfs, has a clear right to regard himself as belonging to a higher order of civilisation than the average Asiatic belonging to an average and conduct will put many a European community outside Russia to shame.

Yet Russia, owing to the fatal gulf which separates her governing power from her people, is being taught a costly lesson by Japan without having made

any serious effort at all to avoid that humiliation. It is not because she has not had lessons in the past; it is not because her people are inert or cowardly; it is not even because she has attained to such wealth and grandeur that, like the Rome of the Cæsars, the India of the Moghuls, she has become luxurious to the verge of decadence. There is, as has been constantly urged in these pages, much to admire in the Russian national character; there is even a great deal which commands respect in the work of the autocrats and statesmen who of late have controlled her destinies. But her progress has not been on the right lines. The Russian Ship of State is like an immense, but old-fashioned, cargo-boat into which have been put engines of the very finest type such as might be suitably fitted to a first-class cruiser. The result has been that she has been driven at too high a speed for her frame, and the hull may at any moment show sign of having been badly strained in the process.

The Far Eastern policy of Russia is in some respects a grand conception, and the construction of the Siberian Railway as one of the first foundations of that policy is something of which any country and ruler might be proud. But, while she has gone far and fast in this direction, she has not taken the precautions necessary to prevent a sudden, perhaps complete, check to her progress. This is the more surprising because, in Central Asia, Russia has been for the most part singularly successful in her gradual advances. Latterly she has, let us hope, met a sufficiently high wall of prejudice in Afghanistan; but elsewhere, notably in Turkestan, she has not only made good her foothold, but has conferred many benefits on populations formerly ranking very low indeed in the social scale. In Manchuria she has never, despite apparent prosperity, played a great part. To the Chinese she has been hard and sometimes terribly cruel, while her cynical disregard of solemn undertakings, the tortuous character of her negotiations with Peking, her flagrant efforts to dominate Korea through the medium of a timber concession, had long ago disgusted fair-minded European observers. But her real folly consisted in her overbearing attitude towards Japan, an attitude which she failed to back up by a reserve of promptly available force.

And what of Japan? Volumes have been written in which the astonishing rise of this country from a condition of semi-barbarism to a recognised position among the great Powers of the world has received appreciative record, and indeed the theme is an inspiring one. But it is not always that the true inwardness of this extraordinary development is realised. In order to examine it properly we must not rush too hastily into vague estimates of national character, but rather take sober calculated views of political factors, just as we have recently done in the case of Russia. The latter's early failure to justify her attempted expansion towards the Far East was, as we have seen, largely due to the fact that in Russia there is not that true relationship between the Government and the governed which there must be in any well-ordered State, whatever are the principles on which it is ruled. Japan's triumph has sprung chiefly from the Mikado's shrewd realisation of the fact that a Constitution would eventually give his country just the backbone it required, rendering it a healthy, hardy, vertebrate creature instead of a mere

iridescent jelly-fish. That is the true germ of Japan's success, just as it has been the germ of success in the case of another and greater Island Nation. The New Constitution of Japan was at first regarded with some amusement by Western nations, who smiled to see the most artistic and apparently informal nation in the world arraying itself in mass, in which many old national faults were crushed into insignificance. Henceforth good government became the mainstay of Japan, and, thanks to her insular position, she was able to lay the foundations of her future greatness without interference, which might have hopelessly retarded her development. Her progress was amazingly fast, but she

From a Native Drawing.

THE PRIME MINISTER ADDRESSING THE LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT AT TOKIO.

European garments and aping Parliamentary forms of procedure. But it soon became evident that the Mikado, in fulfilling his promise to give his people a Constitution, had taken the very best means of securing not only their advancement but their protection against Western aggression. By its means he welded them, or rather they welded themselves, into a purposeful had everything in her favour—an enlightened ruler, a ductile people, a fertile country, and more than enough native shrewdness on the part of her progressive politicians. Having addressed herself to the great problems of defence, she sought and obtained the best advice, profited by the examples of others, put herself into the hardest sort of training, spent money royally, and

took care to have good value for it in the way of ships, and guns, and other war material. When trouble arose with China she gave the world a glimpse of her capacity, and showed what good government, superadded to Oriental aptitude, had done for her. Europe had another such warning in the short struggle which culminated in Königgrätz. But, just as in 1870 France had failed to realise, or had forgotten, or had blinded her eyes to the fact, that in 1866 a new military star of the first magnitude had arisen in the sky, so in 1904 Russia failed to profit by the warning she in common with others had received ten years before. What may be the ultimate result of these errors on the one part, and earnest strivings on the other, remains to be seen. But already in the operations against Port Arthur, and in the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, we have seen history made of a pattern which may cause the more thoughtful to wonder how much longer the East and the West will serve as terms of any but mere geographical expression and of no further significance.

JAPANESE SCOUT.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE FIRST PHASE ENDED—A GENERAL SURVEY—SOME ADDITIONAL POINTS—OPERATIONS AGAINST PORT ARTHUR—A HERO'S FUNERAL—ENGINES OF WARFARE—HIGH ANGLE FIRE—SINKING OF THE *YOSHINO*—TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY—SOME LESSONS—THE ONLOOKERS.

HAVING touched lightly and discursively on some historical aspects of the War, it remains to dot the i's and cross the t's of the preceding narrative in regard to certain points as to which, at the time of writing, there was no very complete information available. It has already been indicated that, at the end of the third week in May, a new stage of the operations was about to commence. The present, therefore, is a most convenient juncture at which to supply unavoidable deficiencies and, at the same time, to "take stock" generally, with a view to arriving at a correct estimate of the business that has been done in the period under review.

To the first phase of the War may be roughly assigned the preliminary operations, chiefly naval, against Port Arthur; the landings in Korea, and the advance of the First Army of Japan to the Yalu; the Passage of the Yalu, the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, and the advance to Feng-hwang-cheng; and the landing of the Second Japanese Army in the Liao-tung Peninsula and the consequent isolation of Port Arthur. In the foregoing narrative other movements have been dealt with, such as those in connection with Vladivostok. But, although these belong to the first phase of the War from the chronicler's point of view, they have reached no definite stage, and there is, accordingly, not much to be gained by subjecting them, for the present, to any detailed scrutiny by the light of later information.

Of the first great episode of the War, the midnight attack upon Port Arthur, there is little to add to the description given in the first chapter of this work, unless it be by way of emphasising the completeness with which the Russian garrison was taken by surprise. It is even reported, says a correspondent, who was residing at Port Arthur at the time of the attack, that a Russian naval officer on shore in the New Town, when his attention was directed to the firing on the fort, remarked airily, "Ah, they are carrying out some night manœuvres. Such things must be; for some day, perhaps, we shall have to deal with the Japanese!" The same correspondent gives a thumb-nail sketch of Port Arthur which may be useful in following the later operations against that place. It is, he says, like most of the Russian settlements in the Far East, "rather an agglomeration of villages than a town. It consists of a port, of old and new Russian towns, miles apart; of old and new China towns; of garrisons, batteries, stores, and markets, all isolated. Many of the residents knew nothing of the night torpedo attack until long after daylight. To some the first notice of hostilities was the bursting of shells in the town itself."

Clearly there has been no exaggeration in this narrative of the disquieting effects upon Port Arthur of the bombardments. Speaking of that on February 9th, this eye-witness says: "The immediate effect of the firing in the town was general consternation of the civilian population. Men ran anywhere for shelter; the streets were deserted. Hours after the firing ceased people congregated in small groups and told their experiences; they thronged the Bund and quays to inspect the havoc wrought by the shells, and to receive from each other the moral encouragement they needed. That same evening saw the first rush for the railway station and a crowding to the passenger steamers in the harbour. That night the town was in total darkness. Men were busy disposing of their goods and making plans to leave. Much property changed hands. The next day, and the next, and the next, the exodus continued; processions of stretcher-bearers conveyed the wounded from the port to the hospitals; the dead were buried twenty at a time. Port Arthur was impressed."

Yet it appears that this first lesson was not entirely effectual. For "Japan has not yet wounded deeply the self-esteem of the Russian. He is even now more confident of victory than he was before. It is right; we are at war; Japan will be taught a lesson she will never forget—such are the words of men who belong to a race of which this present generation has not yet learnt the first word of the 'lesson' with which it threatens Japan. But the boastings, the idleness, the insincerity, all are of the junior officers only. The really responsible men, those in high positions, now know, if they did not realise before, how dangerous the position of the Russian Empire in the Far East has become, and how slight is the hold she has upon the territory she believed she had acquired with her railway concession outside the Great Wall of China."

Written with reference to what occurred in February, these words form a singularly instructive prologue to what occurred in March, April, and May, and go far to justify the severe estimate formed in the preceding chapter of Russia's strange misconception of her own weakness and her adversary's strength.

In the interests of accuracy it is, perhaps, expedient to state that the attack on Port Arthur by the *Asagiri* and *Hayatori*, as described in Chapter V., was not the first action in which the Japanese destroyers had been engaged. In the early accounts of the first torpedo attack it was stated that torpedo-boats were engaged, but it has since transpired that here, too, the destroyers were in evidence. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd flotillas of these craft were sent against Port Arthur, but apparently only two of them carried out the attack. This correction enables us to quote an account of the operation given by a Japanese officer who actually took part in it. He says:—"The two flotillas steamed straight into the enemy's fleet at anchor, keeping a parallel formation. After firing their torpedoes the left flotilla turned to port, while the right turned to starboard, and steamed back again in the same formation. Just before delivering the attack the *Oboro* came in collision with the *Ikazuchi*, and bent her bow slightly, and as she raised a good deal of spray in consequence she had to be run at half speed, but she did well. Then the torpedo turntable on board the *Inazuma* jammed through a piece of wood being washed into the cog by the sea, so the commander turned her over to the

other side and fired. Our torpedo-boat destroyers went so close that they could plainly see men rushing about the decks with lamps in the enemy's ships. Each boat fired one 18-in. Whitehead torpedo, and three took effect. The Russians did not open fire till we were almost out of range, fearing perhaps to hit their own ships. Yet during the confusion three out of the four Russian patrolling torpedo-boats sank, taking each other for Japanese, so there are a less number of torpedo-boats and torpedo-boat destroyers in Port Arthur than is believed in Europe."

The apparently foolish neglect of the Russians to remove the cruiser *Varyag* and the gunboat *Koricts* from Chemulpo has been explained by the fact that the Japanese intercepted the Russian wireless messages directing the two doomed ships to withdraw. It is now established that the Japanese ships which took part in the action off Chemulpo were the *Asama*, *Chiyoda*, *Naniwa*, *Niitaka*, *Takachiho*, and the *Akashi*, a despatch-boat. The torpedo-boats remained spectators throughout. The battle commenced at about four and a half miles with a shot from the *Koricts*, and was at its warmest when the interval narrowed to about three miles.

Of the Port Arthur reconnaissance and blocking operations perhaps the most active episode was the fight between Captain Asai's and Captain Matoussevitch's destroyer flotillas, resulting in the loss of the *Stereguteby*, as narrated in Chapter VIII. But greater inspiration is unquestionably to be derived from the second attempt to sink Japanese merchantmen in the harbour entrance, that extraordinary act of gallantry which culminated in the death of Commander Hirose, of which a brief account was given in Chapter XIV. Allusion was made on page 173 to the great public funeral which was accorded to the hero's remains, and, as details of these impressive rites have since arrived, we may take the opportunity of studying a ceremonial both closely associated with the War and intensely characteristic of Japanese sentiment. A peculiarly graphic account is that furnished by Mr. E. J. Harrison, the Tokio correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, who, after alluding to Commander Hirose's varied claims to distinction—he was a noted scholar and athlete, as well as a first-class fighting man—gives the following picturesque description of the Shinto burial honours.

"The weird wail of the 'shono-fue,' a peculiar pipe blown by the priests, intimated the approach of the procession. Here the foreigner recognised old Japan. Soon came the contrast, for, just as the two mounted policemen, who headed the procession, hove in sight, the naval band struck up with splendid effect the superb funeral march of Chopin. And yet, after all, this seeming incongruity was not so very incongruous, for was not Chopin himself a native of the land which of all others, perhaps, had most reason to hate the name of Russia? The guard of honour consisted of two hundred bluejackets from Yokosuka—fine, sturdy fellows, whose faces testified to an unfeigned sorrow. Perhaps the sentiment of comradeship had something to do with their unwonted grief, since the romantic friendship between Sugino, the warrant officer, and the Commander shows how broad and deep were the sympathies of Hirose. . . . Following the guard of honour came two Shinto priests, 'kannushi,' dressed in white, and riding in a carriage of American make; then the 'sakaki,' or *Cleyera Japonica*, the sacred

tree of the Shinto religion, borne by bluejackets, with a flag bearing the name and rank of the deceased.

"The coffin lay on a gun-carriage, drawn by thirty bluejackets, and on either side walked three officers, class-mates of the Commander at the Naval College. Miss Kaoru Hirose, the little niece of the deceased, was chief mourner, dressed all in white, the mourning colour of the Japanese.

"The route lay through some of the most picturesque parts of the capital, which in turn offered strong contrasts. Here on the one hand might be seen some of the few remaining 'nagaya'—the severely simple white-plastered two-storied barracks which in feudal days surrounded and protected the 'Yashiki' of the 'daimio,' and served to accommodate the two-sworded retainers, ever spoiling for a fight; on the other, numerous modern dwellings in foreign style, tenanted by both Japanese and foreigners, might be accepted as a concrete indication of the reality of the nation's compromise with the spirit of ancient conservatism. Much of the way was along avenues of cherry trees, the falling flowers of which covered the ground with a light pink carpet. There was little ritual at the shrine. Common wood benches served to seat the principal mourners, and the altar was severely simple. A white banner, bearing the name and rank of the deceased in Chinese ideographs, surmounted the coffin, and two of the 'sakaki' were erected at the side of the altar.

Photo: Church Missionary Society.

JAPANESE SHINTO PRIEST OFFERING *SAKÉ*

"The rites, known as the 'shokonsai,' were opened by the chief priest, a venerable old man. Lights and offerings, including salt, water, rice, *saké*, cakes, fish, fruit, dried sea-weed, and vegetables, were brought in one by one and placed on a shelf in front of the coffin. The chief priest read a funeral address, a chronological recital of the career of the deceased, in that strange monotonous sing-song affected by the Japanese on these occasions, and then came Lieutenant Matsumura. This officer was wounded during the first attack on Port Arthur—Hirose perished in the second—and was only recently discharged from Sasebo Naval Hospital. He read a message from Admiral Togo, warmly eulogising the bravery of the deceased. Several orations followed, and during the intervals the priestly orchestra elicited ear-piercing strains from the 'shono-fue.' The British Minister, Sir Claude Macdonald, and General Sir Ian Hamilton, the latter

in uniform, took part in the ceremony, and nearly every other foreigner present showed himself eager to follow their example.

"The grave had been dug at the summit of a hillock, in sight of the spacious Aoyama barracks, and in the hollow below the firing party of blue-jackets was stationed. Three volleys were fired, the band striking up a few bars of an inspiriting march after each, the mourners threw earth into the open grave, and the public ceremony came to a close."

THE GRAND DUKE BORIS VLADIMIROVITCH

Of the sinking of the *Petropavlovsk* with Admiral Makaroff and Grand Duke Cyril on board and Grand Duke Boris as an eye-witness, some fuller accounts have been received since Chapter XV. was written, but none which satisfactorily clears up the mystery of her extremely rapid disappearance. It is suggested that she struck more than one mine, but it is thought that this would not account for her submersion in two minutes. The theory as to the bursting of the boilers has been noticed, and we may add the conjecture that some loaded torpedoes on board the *Petropavlovsk* were exploded by the shock of contact with the mine, and that the vessel's bottom was literally torn open.

Be this as it may, it is abundantly clear that the Oda mine, of which some mention was made on page 181, is indeed a marvellous engine of destruction. From details now available, it is understood that this "torpedo-mine," as it is called, possesses the special merit that it can be dropped overboard without any special precaution, and that it adjusts itself automatically, whatever the depth of the water. It does not drift from its position, it ignites without fail, and it is said to develop a destructive energy far greater than that of any mechanical mine hitherto in use. Of the deadly efficiency of the Oda mine the sinking of the *Petropavlovsk* is in any case a striking proof. But an almost more important point in this connection is that the possibility of the disaster was really due to the facility with which this class of mine can be laid. The actual process of dropping her mines at midnight on April 12th is said to have occupied the *Koryo Maru*, whose exploit was described at the opening of Chapter XV., only about a quarter of an hour. To this she must have largely

owed her escape from the fire of the Russian forts. There is now some question whether either the *Koryo Maru* or the attendant torpedo craft suffered any interruption at all from the shore batteries during this momentous short period, since, according to one later account, the search-lights, though busy, at first failed to bring the approaching Admiral hesitated long before exposing his men to such terrible risk. For had even one well-planted shell struck the *Koryo Maru*, she would have been likely to fare as ill as the ill-fated *Yenisei* fared at Dalny.

While on this subject it may usefully be recorded that, besides the Oda mine and the well-known Arisaka quick-firing



HOLE BLOWN IN SIDE OF THE RUSSIAN SHIP *PALADA* AT THE FIRST ATTACK UPON PORT ARTHUR.

enemy into their field. But if the operation of mine-laying had been protracted, as it would necessarily have been if the ordinary mines had been used, discovery would almost inevitably have followed. A well-informed correspondent, after remarking that this was the first occasion on which Admiral Togo ventured to send a torpedo-transport within point-blank range of the Russian batteries, alludes to the rumour that the rifle, the Japanese have introduced several improvements of their own in war material and naval appliances, of which it is possible we may hear more in the course of this instructive war. One of these is the Yamanouchi gun-platform; another the "Ijuin fuse," invented by a Japanese Admiral, and said by gunnery experts to be a remarkably efficient contrivance; the third, the "Miyabara" water-tube boiler, de-

signed by a Japanese Chief Engineer who received his scholastic and technical education in this country.

The *Times* correspondent, who supplies much of the foregoing information with reference to the mine-laying at midnight on April 12th, makes a curiously realistic reference to the work done on the morning of April 15th by the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*, as described on page 194 of the present work: "The first duty of the two cruisers was to silence this fort, which feat they seem to have accomplished without any difficulty. Then they commenced to bombard the harbour and town with high-angle fire. The remaining vessels of the Japanese squadron treated the affair as a kind of picnic spectacle. They lay off the harbour's mouth just beyond effective range of the forts, and the officers watched the flight of the cruisers' shells, shouting 'Banzai!' whenever a good hit was scored. The Russians had to suffer it all tamely. They failed to inflict the smallest damage on the *Kasuga* and the *Nisshin*, which kept constantly moving throughout the operation."

There is something rather painfully familiar in the idea of treating a bombardment as if it were a cricket-match, and "Well hit!" or "Well bowled!" were correct expressions to apply to the effect of twelve-inch shells. But sailors have always been prone to speak thus airily of the flight of huge projectiles, of which none understand better than themselves the real power. "They're bowling pretty straight, sir," was the cheery remark of one of our own bluejackets in the Crimea to an officer who, he thought, would appreciate the metaphor, although the ball that was "coming down" was a shell from a gun of then considerable calibre.

"Japanese naval officers," we are told, "evidently place much faith in high-angle fire. Possibly their judgment is influenced by the serious consideration that their fleet cannot be reinforced throughout this war; every ship disabled means so much permanent loss of fighting power. They therefore possess a very vivid appreciation of the familiar arguments that, whereas a warship's armour and ordnance are limited, a fort's are unlimited, and that the havoc wrought by a shell striking a vessel may be great beyond comparison with the havoc wrought by a shell striking a fort. At all events, they do not attach conclusive importance to the experiences of either Farragut or Seymour. They claim, on the contrary, that the injury inflicted by high-angle fire, judiciously directed, is much greater than experts have hitherto been disposed to admit, and that the enemy's inability to protect himself against such fire is as demoralising as the immunity enjoyed by those using it is valuable. Port Arthur, however, is specially vulnerable to high-angle fire, so that no general theory can be based on the results achieved there."

Before leaving the preliminary operations against Port Arthur, some interesting details may be added to the account given in Chapter XXIII. of the sinking of the cruiser *Yoshino* by collision with the *Kasuga*. It appears that the heavy loss of life was due to no want of precaution, but to a truly lamentable accident. The *Kasuga* struck the *Yoshino* on the port side near the engines, and the blow destroyed the dynamos, leaving the ship in the darkness of a particularly dense fog. Directly the collision took place the collision-mats used on such occasions were promptly got out and hung over the hole, but the latter

was too big to allow of any successful attempt to stop the inrush of water. The ship began to settle quickly with a heavy list to starboard, and Captain Sayegi ordered the whole crew on the upper deck. Five boats were now lowered on the starboard, and one on the port side, but before the former could get clear the ship lurched to starboard and went down, all five boats being smashed by the masts and davits.

"The captain himself never left the bridge, but stood there while the crew were getting into the boats, and cried 'Banzai!' to them. When last seen he was shaking hands with Commander Hirowatari in a last farewell. Lieutenant Naito sprang overboard and swam to the only cutter, that on the port side, which escaped and rowed to the *Kasuga*. He returned at once with three of the latter's boats, but found no trace either of the *Yoshino* or her crew, apart from six men who had already been rescued by the cruiser *Chitose*."

Not a great deal needs to be said by way of supplementing the details already given of the advance of the Japanese First Army through Korea. But some very interesting details are now available concerning the transport and supply operations, to which appreciative general reference has been made on several previous occasions. In particular a British military correspondent in Korea writing to the *Times* has given some valuable information regarding the manner in which the Japanese utilised and supplemented the existing transport facilities in a country of doubtful roads and an indolent population.

The Korean road at best is but an unmetalled track deeply rutted by the heavy wheels of the rough country bullock carts, and after a thaw or rain it becomes, as we have seen, a morass. Indeed, during the rainy season proper, which lasts from the middle of June till the end of August, travelling in Korea is said to be quite out of the question, since not only are the roads impassable, but the smallest streams become raging torrents, a river having been known to rise as much as twenty-nine feet in a single night. It may be well to bear these last facts in mind in view of future possibilities, and, in the meantime, although the difficulties which the Japanese had to contend against in the winter and early spring were not quite so formidable as here indicated, they were undoubtedly serious, more especially during the melting of the snows.

"The usual Korean means of transport," says the correspondent above referred to, "are pack animals and coolies. The oxen of the country are of an especially fine and massive breed, short-horned, docile, and capable of doing a vast amount of work; 300 lb. is considered an average load for a bull to carry daily on a long journey. Unfortunately for the Japanese, a scourge of that ubiquitous cattle disease, rinderpest, has recently decimated the cattle in the north-west of Korea, so that the best form of local transport is unobtainable. The small Korean pony is a marvellous animal to carry weight; 200 lb. for thirty miles a day is only what he is used to doing all his life. No amount of hard work cures him of biting and kicking whenever he gets the opportunity. For this reason the ponies are all slung up at night to rafters overhead, in such a helpless position that they are unable to hurt one another. Fixed in this manner they are fed on a hot water mash of beans out of a trough.

"The Japanese military authorities have bought up every available quadruped capable of carrying a load; but the

number obtained is microscopic compared to that required for such a large army as three divisions. The Japanese, therefore, have to depend almost entirely on the means of transport which they have brought with them from their own country. Each one of the thirteen divisions of which the army in Japan is composed has a train battalion, which in peace time forms a school of instruction for the whole of the regimental and other transport of its own particular division. In this battalion soldiers serve for three years as in other branches of the army, but a large reserve of drivers is obtained by training four batches per annum for three months each in the elementary principles of horse management and the packing of loads, after which they are passed into the reserve. In war time the train soldiers act as superintendents to the various transport columns, while the drivers lead and look after one pony each. On mobilisation the battalion is broken up, and provides men and material for the transport of regimental baggage, hospitals, ammunition, columns, and pontoons. The latter are carried on small four-wheeled trollies pulled by one pony each. The ordinary transport cart has two wheels, no sides, and is capable of carrying about 350 lb. It is pulled, as a rule, by one pony led by a man, but in emergency may be drawn by three or four soldiers or coolies. These carts seem exceedingly handy and useful. Their track is so narrow that they can be taken along almost any mountain path or through the streets of Korean towns."

As regards "supply," there are in each division four supply columns which carry three days' ordinary rations for man and horse, also one reserve ration for men. The soldiers carry two days' reserve and one day's cooked ration in their knapsacks; while there is also one day's ordinary ration in the regimental baggage. Each horse carries one day's forage, and that for two more days is supposed to be in the regimental heavy baggage. Thus, in all, six days' forage and five days' ordinary and three days' reserve rations for men are with the army. Besides the supply columns of one-horse carts and pack animals, the Japanese have enlisted thousands of so-called "military coolies" who pull light hand-carts capable of conveying about 200 lb. of baggage. These men are the rejections for height of this year's conscription—that is, they are below the *minimum* height for infantry, five feet two inches, but are otherwise medically fit. They are chosen from among the agricultural classes, who are used to pulling carts; for in Japan manual labour largely takes the place of draft animals.

Of the supply arrangements a very picturesque description is also given by Mr. McKenzie of the *Daily Mail*, who comments on the appearance of the above mentioned "military coolies" in every town between Seoul and Ping-Yang. He adds:—"One man, in officers' war uniform—free, that is, from all superfluous decoration—takes possession of a temple or a palace, and gigantic stocks of food and clothing rise, as it were, from the earth. Here is a mountain of red blankets, here an avalanche of coolie loads of rice. Here come men from fifty miles away, bringing cattle. In Tho-san they are slaughtering chickens and in An-hop they are gathering pigs, while the advance guard of the Japanese fighting men is eighty miles away.

"You enter a village, knowing that it is at least two days before the first soldiers, pushing on from Seoul, can reach there. At the entrance to the village you

RECOVERING THE BODIES OF THE VICTIMS OF THE *PETROPAVLOVSK* DISASTER, AT PORT ARTHUR.

will probably find a newly-erected notice-board, with a large map showing every house and road around, and with minute directions below for billeting. You go some miles off the main road to find one or two cavalry vedettes there, and a civilian bargaining with the Koreans about the purchase of their pigs and rice. And very likely an army of coolies is setting out in another direction for soldiers who are coming by a side road.

"The same foresight is shown in every detail. The rice is made up to the exact weight for a coolie to carry. These weights are further calculated, so that so many of them go to a pony or ox load. Picked natives are decorated with stripes of red, to show that they are now in the service of his Imperial Japanese Majesty's Transport Corps. At this time the Japanese do not haggle over money. Coolies are paid wages scarce dreamed of by them before, and the price of pack-ponies has gone sky-high. I had to pay 144 dollars for the hire of three pack-ponies from Seoul to Ping-yang."

The trouble of the Japanese Commissariat officers has been two-fold. As regards the supplies available in the country itself, these are, comparatively speaking, insignificant. The country is wretchedly poor, thanks largely, it would seem, to the easy-going ways of the inhabitants, and the Koreans, however willing to make hay while the sun shines by getting big prices from the Japanese, have next to nothing to sell, and in many cases have themselves been reduced by the hardness of the past winter to eating crows. On the other hand, there has also been great difficulty in bringing over stores from Japan, as all the transport has been badly wanted for the troops. In a word, the problem has been a frightfully perplexing one, the solution of which might well have been hopeless to any nation less terribly in earnest than Japan.

The wonderful prevision of the Japanese General Staff is shown by the vigour with which, all this time, the construction of the military railway from Seoul to Wi-ju, to which reference was made on page 133, is being pushed on under General Yamana. Steamer loads of material have been arriving constantly at Chemulpo, and work on various sections of the line has been progressing so briskly that it is confidently expected that Ping-yang will be reached at the beginning of December. Nor is this the sum of Japan's energetic performance in Korea in rear of the advance of her First Army. At Seoul her influence is beginning completely to dominate the political situation. Early in April the Korean Emperor's palace had been destroyed by fire, and to this untoward event considerable significance was at first attached. The disaster was regarded by the populace as a sign of Buddha's wrath against the ruling family, and disturbances might have occurred but for the prompt measures taken by the Japanese and British authorities on the night of the fire to avert an outbreak. Later, the gradual introduction of Japanese protégés into the Korean civil service appears to have had a good effect, and the continued receipt of tidings of Japanese successes cannot but have had a reassuring influence upon the Emperor and his Court.

As an interesting additional detail pertinent to this portion of our survey, it may be mentioned that the salvage operations in connection with the sunken ex-Russian cruiser, *Varyag*, in Chemulpo Harbour, have been steadily pushed forward, and there now seems a distinct

possibility that in due course this powerful vessel will be added to the Japanese Navy. Already all her guns and other movables have been taken to Sasebo, but the work of raising the great ship is said to present very grave difficulties, as she lies port side down in the soft mud, which is continually oozing in through the cruel rents made by the Japanese shells.

Reverting to the Japanese advance, it may be long before such really complete and authentic details are available concerning the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng as will enable the careful student to follow each movement of that momentous fight with absolute accuracy. But it may now be placed on record that the brunt of the day's work was borne by about 5,000 Russians and about 25,000 Japanese, the former occupying the Russian front of some five miles from Kiu-lien-cheng to the Ai river, the latter being the force actually engaged in forcing the Russian line. According to the *Times* correspondent, whose messages, despatched some days after the battle took place, have a special value for their statistical accuracy, the Russian force originally consisted, as surmised, of an army corps of two divisions, the component parts being sixteen battalions of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, forty-eight guns, and two companies of pioneers. Of these, three battalions at Antung and six in reserve at Hohmutang took no part in the battle of May 1st. The posts on the line of communications and the detachments elsewhere reduced the number by 2,000, and there was a further notable diminution of fighting strength by casualties and by withdrawals for the purpose of removing guns and wounded. The last-named allowance brings into relief the inadequate nature of the Russian hospital arrangements, since, in modern war, it is always considered important to minimise the number of men lost to the fighting line by the necessity of rendering service to the wounded. In the old days it used to be a military axiom that it was more useful in a battle to wound your enemies than to kill them, not for humanitarian reasons, but because a wounded man requires two men to take him to the rear, and that thus three fighting men were placed *hors de combat!* But the latter-day excellence to which Army hospital work in the field has attained has discounted the value of this old saw, and nowadays men in the fighting line are seldom encouraged to neglect their proper business for that which is far more efficiently and, as a rule, most devotedly performed by bearer companies working under such protection as is afforded by the Red Cross.

"On April 30th," says the above quoted correspondent, "the shelling of the Russian camp and picketing lines, which the Japanese saw through a gap in the hills at a point of seven miles down the river, caused great slaughter of men and horses. Those who were wounded lay where they fell and received the Japanese fire time after time. This, added to the insufficient protection afforded by the flimsy earthworks and shallow trenches against the plunging fire from the howitzers, accounts for the extraordinary proportion of killed to wounded."

It is added that "the preliminary artillery fire on May 1st completely shook the Russian line, which retired before the Japanese attack was driven home. The retirement was precipitate, resembling a rout rather than an ordinary retreat. The reserves at Hohmutang made no move in support of

the body surrounded two miles away. When the Russians were attacked at Hohmutang they fought desperately, and only surrendered at the point of the bayonet just when the Japanese guns arrived."

The information which has come to hand since the early accounts of the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, and of the subsequent advance of General Kuroki's Army to Feng-hwang-cheng, confirms the impression that General Sassulitch took more on his shoulders than General Kuropatkin intended him to do in the matter of attempting to check the Japanese on the right bank of the Yalu. The subsequent swift removal of Sassulitch from his command indicates that at least he had not acted to the satisfaction of his superior officer, and the suspicion is strong that his failure was largely due to a hope of distinguishing himself by a successful contest of the river passage. But his generalship was doubtful throughout, and was further hampered by his uncertainty as to the points the Japanese intended to select for their crossings; by the tremendous weight of the Japanese artillery fire; and by the exceedingly smart work done by Admiral Hosoya's squadron, consisting, it now appears, of the old battleship *Fuso*, six gun-boats, eight torpedo-craft, and some armed launches, the crews of which occupied the attention of large numbers of Russian troops between Antung and the mouth of the river. First boldness, then indecision, and finally ignominious muddle, seem to have characterised Sassulitch's tactics, and the effect of this baneful sequence was observable until, after a leisurely pursuit, the retreating Russians hurriedly evacuated Feng-hwang-cheng. On the still worse demoralisation which must have ensued had not General Kashtalinsky, who was wounded in the course of the battle, displayed brilliant courage and determination in carrying out orders which he knew to be based on a totally wrong conception of the situation, it is hardly necessary to dilate.

MARSHAL KODAMA, SUB-CHIEF OF THE JAPANESE GENERAL STAFF, AND SPOKEN OF AS THE LORD KITCHENER OF JAPAN.

This chapter may be appropriately concluded with a brief reference to the attitude, at the stage which we have now reached, of those interested but not engaged in the War itself. Such a subject can, of course, be only dealt with here very discursively and in quite general terms. For it is still to some extent the business of diplomacy to be secretive, and some of the Governments of the onlooking nations may have taken stronger lines in their relations with one or other

or both of the belligerent nations than has been apparent even to the best-informed private individuals. But it is seldom that, in such cases, some reflection of what has occurred does not appear in the Press, even of countries whose organs of public opinion are closely controlled by official checks. Moreover, the tendency of diplomacy nowadays is far more in the direction of open and straightforward dealing than it used to be formerly, when the statesmanship of Europe was embarrassed by dozens of smaller questions, many of them chiefly of personal significance, around which queer growths of intrigue had clustered till the original issues had well-nigh disappeared.

It is hardly too much to say that, thirty or forty years ago, such a war as this between Russia and Japan would have almost inevitably been followed not leisurely but promptly by at least one European collision. It is true that Prussia and France, Russia and Turkey, England and Afghanistan, Bulgaria and Servia, China and Japan, the United States and

JAPANESE CAVALRY OF THE LINE.

Spain, Turkey and Greece, have all been at war during the past forty years without any embroilment of third parties; but in none of these cases was the inducement to outsiders to break the peace so great as it has been in the case of the Russo-Japanese struggle. Apart from any question of taking sides, the mere fact of Russia's preoccupation could not but tempt more than one European Power to assume an attitude towards a neighbour which Russia's support of that neighbour would have rendered very bad policy a few short months ago. But, so far, there has been no rupture even in the Balkans, where trouble was looked upon by many competent observers as certain to occur as soon as Russia found herself with her hands full. Europe has kept its head and its balance during four critical months, and, although the danger is by no means over, it is a splendid tribute to the increasing "common-sense of most," of which Tennyson wrote so hopefully, that it should have been hitherto averted.

As has been pointed out, the present most serious source of trouble lies in the doubt whether China will be able to preserve her neutrality, and the mere fact that there is no greater present peril than this—disquieting as it is—is of itself reassuring. For China is Russia's own equal in the art of extricating herself from a compromising situation, and, even should her troops or her populace violate her neutrality, she may find some way of escape short of being dragged into a war in which other European nations besides Russia might take a hand.

For the rest, the attitude of Europe has been wonderfully full of dignity and restraint. With the eyes of the world upon her, France in particular has afforded a spectacle of correctness, combined with a characteristic regard for sentiment, which is wholly admirable. Full of sympathy for the reverses suffered by her ally, and quietly conscious of her own grave obligations in certain contingencies of the war, she has readily accorded a chivalrous recognition to Japanese gallantry, and naval and military capacity. To take a single instance out of many: when General Mishtchenko wrote home privately that "those little Japs are real soldiers," an enemy "who should be respected if not feared," this warm encomium was at once forwarded to Paris by the St. Petersburg correspondent of a French paper, and duly appeared in the *Petit Parisien* as one of a series of similar appreciations in the leading Paris journals.

The attitude of Germany has been less open, and the suspicion has gathered force that, in offers to Russia of support in the event of certain complications, the Kaiser has been more profuse than Russia's own ally. But here are diplomatic depths into which there is no occasion to dive for the purposes of this narrative. Nor need we at present, at any rate, seek to investigate at all closely the effect which the course of the War is having upon Turkey, that astonishing "Sick Man" whose temperature rises and falls according to no known rule of diplomatic medicine. Certain it is that Turkey is deeply interested in the Far Eastern struggle, and it is very possible that, but for the presence of Austria, Russia's official helpmate in the business of Macedonian reform, the Porte might have been quite unduly exhilarated by the blows which her old enemy has received at the hands of an Asiatic adversary. But here, as elsewhere, the "common sense of most" has so far been

instrumental in preventing an exhibition of feeling which the existence of Russia's Black Sea Fleet might make inconvenient from many standpoints.

Of the English-speaking nations it is sufficient to say that the United States has from the first criticised the events of the war with greater frankness than, perhaps, any European country, and has animadverted with especial vigour on the recklessness displayed in the matter of sowing the Far Eastern seas with mines which may be a great source of danger and may possibly do untold harm to neutral shipping in the future. Russia, through Count Cassini, her representative at Washington, has made vigorous endeavours to secure a more friendly recognition by the United States of her part in the present struggle; but "Uncle Sam" has continued to view the course of affairs with a shrewd insight into the value of facts as opposed to fancies.

Of Great Britain's attitude the correctness has been admitted even by the leading Russian journals. This country is naturally inclined to favour its ally, and there are reasons why a check to Russia's progress in Asia cannot be wholly distasteful to us. But we have no cause, and, if we had, we should lack the disposition, to exult in the humiliation of a great Power bound to us by ties of Royal family connection, as well as by those of existing political friendship. Least of all would we care to glory in the reverses and sufferings of a brave Navy and Army, largely due to that over-confidence and under-estimation of the enemy's strength to which we ourselves, as a fighting people, have repeatedly shown ourselves to be addicted.

VICE-ADMIRAL URIU, WHO COMMANDED THE JAPANESE FLEET WHICH SEIZED CHEMULPO AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE MILITARY AND NAVAL SITUATION—STRATEGICAL DEVELOPMENTS—POSSIBLE CHANGE OF PLAN—OBJECTS NOW IN VIEW—BRITISH NAVAL AND GERMAN MILITARY TEACHING—ENVELOPMENTS—RUSSIAN STANDPOINTS.

AT the close of the third week in May a military and naval situation has been developed which is full of interest even to the lay reader, to whom the niceties of strategy do not appeal. Hitherto, owing to the secrecy in which the Japanese plans have been shrouded, it has been necessary to use the greatest caution in attempting to construct a clear and coherent narrative out of such details as have been available. But the veil is now beginning to be lifted, and we shall presently be able to resume our story with a surer grasp of the end and aim of each particular movement than has been possible up to this point. To do this, however, it will be necessary to take yet one more step in the "taking stock" process to which already two chapters have been devoted. In the first of these, a glance has been given at the historical aspects of the War in its earliest stage; in the second some additional details were given, and certain lessons and circumstances discussed, in connection with the leading episodes of the conflict up to date. The object of the present chapter will be to set forth in as simple language as possible the technical aspect of the situation as it appears to those who are obliged to study these things professionally.

It may be objected that the War is quite interesting enough to those who look at it purely from a civilian standpoint, without seeking to examine it through naval or military magnifying-glasses. Also, there are not a few amateur critics who are confident of their ability to foretell what will happen, and to explain the reasons for what has happened, without any assistance, more especially from a popular historian. Yet there is assuredly a very numerous class indeed which does like to have the true inwardness of an epoch-making war explained to it, and which is not ashamed to admit that sometimes it finds the course of a many-sided campaign rather difficult, without assistance, to understand. Again, it sometimes happens that the amateur critic, even he who conscientiously sticks little flags into big maps whenever two patrols exchange half-a-dozen shots, fails to see things in their true perspective. It is not pretended by the present writer that, in attempting to play the guide, philosopher, and friend in this direction, he will be able to satisfy all the requirements of those who yearn for knowledge, or to impart much added knowledge to those who think they know enough already. But he may reasonably hope that, in the course of his occasional surveys, he may teach some of the one class to think for themselves, and, perhaps, induce the other to expend a little additional care in mastering first principles before dealing with very complicated developments.

There are some who seem to think that the great fascination of the study of the



GENERAL KUROKI, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE FIRST JAPANESE ARMY.

art of war consists in the resemblance of the latter to a game of chess. This is a serious mistake, for the similarity alluded to is quite occasional, and, where it does exist, often misleading. As a simple matter of fact, the average campaign has a much stronger likeness to a game of draughts than to one of chess, more especially nowadays, when the size of armies necessitates more directness and simplicity than formerly. But there is an essential difference between War and, practically speaking, any sedentary game—a difference of which special heed should be taken in this instance. It is the possibility that at any time one of the combatants may make two or more moves to his adversary's one. This is particularly the case in a war in which navies as well as armies are engaged; but, even where only land operations are concerned, it is a matter of the greatest significance. In neither chess nor draughts is there anything comparable with the simultaneous march of two or three armies upon one objective, and not infrequently the failure to realise what a paralysing effect such a simultaneous advance may sometimes have upon a defending-force, is a great stumbling-block to the study of a campaign.

We shall probably see this two-moves-to-one capacity exemplified on a very large scale at a future stage; but evidence has not been wanting already of its existence as a factor in the preceding operations. On the very first day of the War, Admiral Togo made a double move, while his adversary remained motionless, by sending torpedo flotillas to Port Arthur and a squadron to Chemulpo, with striking results in both cases. But this was an instance of diverging attacks, and does not carry out the idea of the preceding paragraph so well as the capture of Feng-hwang-cheng by General Sasaki's brigade, which came upon the place by a roundabout march while the position was still forming the objective of General Kuroki's main army.

Some may ask why it is that a war like that between Russia and Japan should lend itself more freely to this unequal sort of strategy than other wars ancient and modern. The answer may seem a little complicated, but it conveys some deeply interesting truths, and a little trouble may well be taken to understand it. In the first place, what may be called an up-to-date war is perhaps chiefly distinguished from an ancient war not so much by the changes in the war material, or by alteration in tactics, as by the use of the telegraph. When a nation wants to make two moves in the field to the enemy's one, it splits up its forces, but keeps them linked by telegraph wires, not necessarily running from one army to another—that would often be impracticable—but all communicating with a common base.

Thus, when two armies are landed at points far apart on a coast, and are ordered to converge gradually on one place, they can now do so with an exactitude almost hopeless in the old days, unless there was a complete absence of opposition. For the commander of A army, on arriving at a halting-place, has merely to send a message by his field telegraph to headquarters to say where he is, and, this having been transmitted to the commander of B army, the latter knows exactly how far the A army has got towards the common goal, and quickens or steadies his own advance accordingly. By this means two considerable forces can be made to arrive simultaneously within striking distance of the same objective, and, by splitting

up the force, a very great gain in mobility has been effected, and infinite labour saved, especially where the country is mountainous or otherwise difficult to permit of the easy passage of large bodies of troops.

It is an added special feature of the Russo-Japanese War that, while the Japs have a great advantage in being thus able to direct two or three armies against one objective by the use of the field telegraph, the absence of an existing network of telegraphic communication may make it impossible at times for the Russians to keep thoroughly in touch with the advancing enemy. All that can be done by scouts and patrols will doubtless be done, but there are points at which the Japanese might land and proceed inland for many miles before any intimation of their approach could reach the Russian headquarters. In a civilized country the first appearance of an enemy is, of course, promptly telegraphed to headquarters, unless exceptional success has attended hostile efforts to circumvent the local signallers.

When it is remembered that to the advantages they possess in this respect the Japanese have added the secrecy only possible in the case of an Island Power which, moreover, has resolutely muzzled all the newspaper correspondents, much of the situation reached at the beginning of the fourth week in May is explained. There are some campaigns in which it does not matter a great deal whether your enemy is or is not pretty fully aware of your movements. For instance, when Lord Kitchener took his army to Omdurman, it would probably have made not the slightest difference to the result if he had previously sent the Khalifa a polite note saying that on September 2nd he intended to attack him with some 25,000 men. But in dealing with Russia, Japan unquestionably scored some of her first points by concealing as far as possible her intentions, and by thus causing her enemy a great deal of purposeless labour and waste of strength in defending points not seriously threatened. The Japanese mastery of the details of this kind of craft has been shown repeatedly in minor events of the War, such as the frequent feints upon Port Arthur, and the mock preparations for the passage of the Yalu at Wi-ju. But these are on quite a different plane from the veiled strategy which has been the leading feature of the first phase of the War, and which has in reality cost the Russians a heavier price than even the sharp collision at Kiu-lien-cheng.

The initial influence of the Command of the Sea upon the success which Japan has gained in this direction may seem to have been unduly ignored in the foregoing reflections, and some sticklers for the priority of the Sea Service may cavil at the phrase "Military and Naval Situation" which occurs in the synopsis of this chapter. But it must be remembered that we are now dealing with broad issues and future consequences rather than with the exact process by which the present situation was reached. What the Japanese Fleet has accomplished is of enormous importance. It has blocked the Russian Fleet from interfering with the movements of the Japanese armies, it has greatly assisted the latter, and it has subjected the main Russian stronghold to a wearing series of preliminary attacks. But the interest of the present situation is more military than naval, and in its development the telegraph is playing an almost more important part than Admiral Togo's

A PICTURESQUE STREET IN MUKDEN.

ships. The latter have paved the way for the land operations, they have helped them on, and will continue to do so; but for the strategical developments of the future we have to look mainly to the War Council at Tokio and its telegraphic communications with the two or three armies already in the field, to which in due course a fourth, perhaps a fifth, may be added.

A curious supplement to what has been said, and quite justifiably and appropriately said, as to the secrecy which has shrouded Japanese strategy hitherto, now demands consideration. There are two sorts of secrecy in relation to military movements—one which has regard to their conception, the other to their execution. As far as the last are concerned, the effectiveness of Japanese methods has been proved by actual fact. Even the acutest European critics have been forced to fall back upon mere conjecture, not invariably accurate, as to what the next move of the Japs might be, and the extent to which the Russians have been misled has been clearly shown by their vacillation in such cases as, for instance, the premature evacuation of Niu-chwang. But it is possible that even the Japanese have not been able throughout to prevent that dangerous sort of leakage which consists in the betrayal of plans long before the latter can be put into practice.

It is impossible to speak with complete confidence on this delicate subject. But there is no gainsaying the fact that a very explicit and circumstantial statement has been made by more than one correspondent to the effect that a betrayal of Japanese plans actually did take place, and that the Japanese General

Staff was compelled in consequence to modify some of its original intentions. The story in which the name of the culprit is given—is that an officer of rank belonging to the Staff was found to have betrayed his trust, and to have sold official secrets through a Russian attaché at Tokio who had been his fellow student in Germany. The Japanese officer, having excited suspicion by his extravagant style of living, is said to have been secretly court-martialled and shot, but in the meantime the suggestion is that already the military plans of Japan had been foiled to some extent by the singular preparedness of Russia at certain points, the real importance of which was supposed to be unknown outside the "Elder Statesmen" and the Japanese General Staff.

It must be admitted that some colour is lent to this story—which, as far as the knowledge of the writer goes, was not contradicted by the Japanese military authorities—by a certain want of sequence in the early military operations. It may, perhaps, not be the case that Japan was embarrassed in this way, and that from the first her plans were adhered to. But there is at least some ground for the belief that the original idea provided for a speedier investment of Port Arthur, and possibly even for a larger move against Harbin itself. There were at one time certain indications of a contemplated landing in Possiet Bay, and there is little doubt that, if a brisk offensive on a great scale had been taken by Japan early in March, the Russians, if not forewarned, would have found themselves badly pushed to meet it. As it was, Russia was able to employ the intervening time in bringing up a great many more troops and supplies from home, and

COSSACK REGIMENT AT LIAO-YANG.

the opposition which must now be encountered before Liao-yang and Mukden can be passed, must be much more severe than it would have been two months ago.

Without, then, putting too much faith in what may prove to be a doubtfully accurate statement, the latter must not be wholly disregarded until the Japanese authorities see fit to meet it with a complete and unequivocal denial. If, on the other hand, the story should be absolutely true, it will not only explain a good deal, but should increase our admiration for Japanese astuteness and capacity. The elaboration of an alternative plan of campaign is always an extremely complicated and laborious task, and if, in this case, it was done after the War had actually broken out, the Japanese General Staff is indeed to be congratulated on a great feat.

Of course it is not to be supposed that the Japanese plans could have been altogether upset by any such leakage as that indicated. As far as Korea was concerned there would in almost any event have been no modification, and the clockwork character of all the operations in this quarter shows pretty clearly that the occupation of and advance through the Hermit Kingdom were executed precisely as had been arranged very possibly some years back. Any changes that might have taken place—and, let it be emphatically repeated, there is no sort of certainty as to the making of any changes whatever—would have been in the selection of an immediate objective, and in the arrangements for isolating Port Arthur. But enough has been said on the subject, which has chiefly been introduced to show how possible it is for big operations to be delayed or complicated by the leakage of information, and that no nation, however secretive, however patriotic, can afford to disregard risks of this painful sort.

Let us now turn to the objects which recent developments have shown to be actually in view by the Japanese, and to the processes likely to be employed in bringing these objects within the domain of practical politics. First, let us reckon the unquestioned accomplished facts. These are: (1) Korea occupied; (2) an army pushed forward from Korea towards Liao-yang and deployed evidently with the idea of joining hands with other troops landed in Korea Bay, and (3) Port Arthur isolated. Everything seems to point clearly to an attempt to carry Port Arthur by storm, and subsequently to envelope the Russian position at Liao-yang, or, if Kuropatkin withdraws hence, at any point at which a stand may be made. Port Arthur must be attacked by land as well as by sea—of that there can be no question. Nor is it altogether safe to delay much longer a comprehensive move against the main Russian Army. When land forces are set in motion in an offensive campaign, protracted periods of preparation for clashing with the enemy are seldom productive of anything but diminished "go," and sometimes mean sickness and other troubles.

But it is not all plain sailing, even for the finely organised army of Japan, this double effort to reduce a mighty stronghold, and to cope with a large force strongly posted and led by a man who, whatever his limitations may be, has as yet been guilty of no serious error, and may now rise fully equal to a great occasion. The previous operations against Port Arthur and the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng sink into insignificance beside what is really a great Operation of War,

and one which may be rendered strangely difficult by unforeseen contingencies. For we have no right to suppose that Kuropatkin has been wholly idle, or intends to remain so, until the moment chosen by Japan to attack him. In his rear, movements may be taking place which may have unexpected seriousness some weeks hence, and Port Arthur may develop a yet more stubborn resistance than that which it is pretty certain to offer in any case. Accordingly, the situation is not without real gravity for Japan, and, even if her methods of attacking the problem prove ultimately successful, it may be that the wear and tear involved will create a strain on her resources which could be far better borne by her opponent.

The operation will be rendered intensely interesting by the fact that in all probability it will illustrate in a very striking fashion the influence upon Japan of European teaching. In naval matters Japan has, of course, closely followed British methods, and no finer compliment could be paid to the British Navy than the extent to which the Japanese have first copied us, then proved the excellence of our original design. The dashing manner in which the Japanese destroyers have been handled has, in particular, been borrowed from British naval practice; while it is an interesting circumstance that, notwithstanding the demonstration of the value of the torpedo and the mine, the Japs have, since the War began, contemplated the construction of more battleships on the latest British models. The whole naval strategy of Japan, moreover, has been clearly based upon the broad views taken of the functions of a navy by British experts; while the spirit which animates the Japanese naval officer and bluejacket is wonderfully like that which has always marked the *personnel* of the greatest Navy in the World. There is, of course, a distinction with a difference owing to the slight tinge of Orientalism which still clings to Japan, and sometimes assists her in the prosecution of particular designs. But the Japanese Navy is as nearly British as any but the American Navy could be, and throughout the naval operations of this War we may look to see the influence of British example sharply defined whenever the Fleet of Japan has to show any unusual activity.

In the matter of her Army, Japan has taken another model, and has followed it with equal thoroughness, and, so far, with equally conspicuous success. From the first, the modern Army of Japan was organised on German lines, and, since conscription was introduced into the country in 1874, the effort to impart German thoroughness and precision to every detail of the military machine has been continuous and conscientious to the last degree. It may well be that Japan has in some ways outstripped her teachers, for she has evidently studied closely the methods of other European countries, and has profited in respect of various details in which the Germans have preferred to remain staunchly conservative. But the general foundation of the Japanese military system is German, and this effect has been emphasised by the training which many Jap officers have received in Germany itself. It is an interesting circumstance that, shortly after the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, Major-General Meckel, one of the leading German professors of the art of war, formerly Military Instructor in Japan, and the reputed author of a very striking military study entitled "A Summer

Night's Dream," received a very flattering cablegram from the Japanese General Staff at Tokio. The message conveyed was to the effect that the victory on the Yalu had been won by officers who had learnt their tactics from the German veteran, a courteous acknowledgment which the latter may well have been proud to receive from the victors in such a hard-fought fight.

As has already been indicated, the influence of German ideas upon the Japanese Army was early shown by the careful forethought displayed in the matter of preparation, the exhaustive system of collecting military intelligence, and the precise and elaborate manner in which every detail, more particularly of the disembarkations, was carried out. We have found the Japanese to be fully ready in every sense with plans of campaign. Their information concerning the enemy's movements and the countries in which they were about to operate has been so complete, that here they have almost surpassed their instructors. For it is on record that, in the advance through Korea, the dealings of the military authorities with the villagers were facilitated by the fact that, in anticipation of this war, little biographies even had been prepared of all the village headmen! The plans adopted to lessen confusion in the landing of troops have already been noticed, as has been the German regularity with which, when any movement has been decided on, troops and guns have followed in due course and at the appointed intervals.

But these matters pertain chiefly to strategy, or the art of generalship, as it is practised sometimes long before contact with the enemy has been established. In the presence of the enemy the business of using troops is called tactics, and, though the boundary line between tactics and strategy is sometimes hard to define, the distinction here drawn will suffice to mark the additional fact that in tactics, as well as in strategy, German influence upon Japanese methods has fully justified the Japanese General Staff in despatching to Meckel a telegram which may become historic.

For at Kiu-lien-cheng there was a double exhibition of German tactics which is very instructive both as regards that particular battle and the probable aspects of several future engagements. The crowding of the Japanese at the Ai ford was doubtless due to some extent, as has already been suggested, to natural causes; but it must not be forgotten that the Germans, notwithstanding our experience in South Africa, are great believers in the advantages of attacking in a dense formation when a force has men to spare for this purpose. The idea is that those terrible panics, to the occurrence of which the German author of the "Summer Night's Dream" bears lurid testimony, are best avoided by packing the men together, so that, however deadly the carnage, the places of those who have fallen will be speedily filled, and the attacking column, frightfully diminished maybe, but still compact and full of "go," shall be enabled to advance irresistibly to the final stage of the attack. This theory may have been at the bottom of the huddled crossing of the Ai, which cost the Japanese so many casualties, and it is certainly the keynote to the fighting of an action of which it will become necessary to give a description in the next chapter.

Again, at Kiu-lien-cheng we saw an illustration of those ideas of envelopment which are now becoming apparent on

a larger scale in the working of the Japanese armies against Liao-yang and Port Arthur. The wars of the future, says Hœnig, a very well-known German military writer, will be mostly "wars of circumvallation," which is a form of envelopment, and there is no doubt that envelopment in one form or another is the favourite object of German tactical movements. Like the advance to the attack in close formation, it presupposes those big battalions on the side of which a great man once impiously said that Providence is wont to fight. Further, it assumes immense labour in the execution of preliminary preparations, the utmost care in procuring accurate information of the enemy's movements, and considerable activity in drawing in the net when once it has been spread. But it is notably effective, more especially as regards moral effect, for the bravest troops, who will cheerfully face any odds as long as the enemy are fairly and squarely to their direct front, may become unsteady when they begin to perceive attackers closing in upon them, sometimes from all points of the compass.

COOLIES CARRYING MEDICAL STORES.

With the aid of a little imagination it is possible to construct an extremely interesting parallel between the manner in which the enveloping process was carried out at Kiu-lien-cheng and that in which it is being attempted before Liao-yang. Further, the fact that the 2nd Division in the former engagement was sent down the river, evidently with the intention of occupying the attention of the troops in Antung had any troops remained there and given trouble, may be taken to resemble dimly the landing of the Second Army in the Liao-tung Peninsula in order to effect the reduction of Port Arthur. Curiously enough, the parallel can here be extended by comparing the work of Admiral Hosoya's squadron at the mouth of the Yalu—*mutatis mutandis*, of course—with that of Admiral Togo before Port Arthur. Returning to the main attack, we find the 12th Division at Kiu-lien-cheng crossing the Ai and taking initiative in deploying against the enemy's main position, very much as General Kuroki's whole Army, after the passage of the Yalu, of which in reality the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng is a part, was the first Japanese force to deploy in opposition to the Liao-yang position; being subsequently supported by the Third Army, just as the 12th Division was assisted in the process of envelopment by the Guards Division on the right bank of the Yalu.

And now let us try to look at the situation from the Russian standpoint. The difficulties which confront the military authorities are indeed serious; but it is altogether a delusion to regard the position of affairs as in any way hopeless, and, to give the Russians due credit, there is no suggestion of despair, and very little indication of unabated confidence in their attitude. Of course, with them the question of Port Arthur's capacity for resistance is the immediate paramount consideration, and the subject gives rise to much besides mere controversy. There is no doubt that, although the fall of Port Arthur might not mean any very serious check to the prosecution of the War, it would certainly be attended by such a loss of prestige, and by such an encouragement to the enemy, that the effect would be far-reaching and perhaps permanent. Accordingly, from the moment that the isolation of Port Arthur became an established fact, there has been in some Russian quarters a strong feeling that steps ought to be taken to relieve the pressure on the stronghold from the land side. It is understood that Admiral Alexeieff is strongly of this opinion, as is indeed natural considering the extent to which the "Viceroy of the Far East"—the significance of the title is gradually becoming a little thin—was responsible for the pinnacle of importance that Port Arthur has attained. The belief is current that Admiral Alexeieff has pressed these views upon the Tsar, and the latter, "torn asunder by every wind of doctrine," has asked General Kuropatkin whether it would not be practicable to relieve the beleaguered fortress, in preference to trusting the prestige of Russia to the hazard of a siege. But the military Commander-in-Chief has explained that in the present condition of the land operations such a movement is, in his opinion, most undesirable, if not impossible. Accordingly, the Tsar issues a sort of Imperial mandate to the Port Arthur garrison in which the Fleet is enjoined, as a last resort, to cut its way out and rejoin, if possible, the Vladivostok squadron, no Russian ships being allowed to fall into the enemy's hands.

We shall probably never know with exactitude the secret history of the Russian military policy in the two or three weeks succeeding the isolation of Port Arthur. But there is ground for supposing that the tension between Alexeieff and Kuropatkin has been extremely severe, and there is probably a good deal of significance packed up in the remark attributed to a Russian General in St. Petersburg, "Kuropatkin has not yet defeated the Japanese, but he has beaten Admiral Alexeieff."

There are other suggestions of very singular import in connection with this period. In some directions the Russians can be quite as secretive as the Japanese, and, with a man of Kuropatkin's known capacity, it is difficult to believe that all this time he has been merely engaged in levelling up his forces at Liao-yang in order more effectively to meet the Japanese onslaught. At one time it seemed as if he would be warranted in detaching a considerable portion of his army and sending it into the Liao-tung Peninsula with the object, not only of "relieving" Port Arthur, but of trying to catch the Japanese Second Army between two fires. But it may well have been the case that such a course was prevented by a previous and much broader distribution of the Russian forces, which would have rendered any such detachment as that proposed a source of undue weakness to the Haicheng—Liao-yang position, whether as regards defence or a possible offensive. For a long time past there has been much uncertainty as to the proceedings of General Linievitch, one of the most able and trusted, as well as most experienced of the Russian leaders in the Far East. The suggestion now is that General Linievitch is really in command of a very large force, of which the Trans-Baikal Cossacks under command of General Rennenkampf form the vanguard, and the *rôle* of which is to lie on the flank of the Japanese advance. Already the Cossacks have made themselves felt both in rear of General Kuroki's position at Feng-hwang-cheng and in north-eastern Korea, but, so far, their movements have been disconnected and rather desultory. The possibility of a Russian descent on a large scale from the region of which Vladivostok is the chief centre has long ago been foreshadowed in these pages. Whether it now takes shape depends largely on the extent to which General Kuropatkin continues to be given a free hand, and on the capacity of the Japanese to outflank again this flanking movement by naval and military operations on the coast between Vladivostok and Gensan.

The position at the beginning of the fourth week in May is thus one in which very careful regard must be had to contingencies on the Russian side, as well as certainties on that of the Japs. It cannot be said that Russia has as yet recovered from her neglect at the outset to take proper precautions in the way both of offence and defence. Nor is there yet any sign that the loss of naval supremacy can be repaired. Rumour follows rumour as to attempts more or less successful to persuade the Sultan to permit a portion of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to pass out of the Dardanelles, and dates are confidently given for the sailing of the Baltic Fleet. But there are other Powers besides Turkey interested in the keeping the Russian warships in the Black Sea the right side of the Dardanelles forts. With regard to the Baltic Fleet, there is now not only the difficulty of coaling *en route* to be considered, although that is regarded by

experts as insuperable. For, even supposing the voyage by the Suez Canal only occupied sixty-three days—a minimum calculation—some 65,000 tons of coal would be consumed by the twelve warships of the squadron, of which about 50,000 tons would have to be carried by colliers and trans-shipped at sea.

But outside this difficulty there now arises the question whether, if Port Arthur should fall and Vladivostok be blockaded, the squadron, on arrival at its destination, would be in the ignominious position of having no base whatever, and no source of further coal supply. Lastly, the despatch of practically the whole of the Baltic Fleet to the Far East means the withdrawal of the greater part of the naval defences of the Empire, a grave risk to take when the political condition of Europe can hardly be regarded as one of absolute tranquillity. But apart from the sea, and even apart from the possible fall of Port Arthur, it must be repeated that the Russian military position at the stage we have now reached is one of no mean strength. Envelopment may be a very effective process, but it has the disadvantage or drawing out armies into long thin lines which may for a considerable distance be crumpled up by a determined counterstroke on the part of a solidly-placed enemy. In other words, attempted envelopment of the Russians at Liao-yang will not necessarily mean paralysis of such Russian strength as lies outside that position. The reverse is probable, and it is even possible that, as a result of continued Japanese pressure, we may see Kuropatkin's remarkable display of passive resistance followed by an interesting exhibition of calculated activity.



GENERAL RENNENKAMPF.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE NARRATIVE RESUMED—THE OPERATIONS AGAINST PORT ARTHUR—JAPAN'S SECOND ARMY—ADVANCE UPON KIN-CHAU—THE BATTLE OF NAN-SHAN—A DESPERATE STRUGGLE—DEVOTED GALLANTRY—HEAVY CASUALTIES—OCCUPATION OF DALNY—ANOTHER NAVAL BOMBARDMENT.

LET us now pick up the thread of our narrative at the point at which we left it as far back as Chapter XXI. We have since progressed in other directions, and have also indulged in various retrospects. But the sequence of our record will be found to have been strictly preserved, and, if we now revert to the operations in the Liao-tung Peninsula, the commencement of which was described in the chapter referred to, we may hope that our chronicle will continue to march forward with the well-ordered precision of a military movement.

Some readers, moreover, may find compensation for the rather discursive nature of the last three chapters in the fact that the resumption of our story takes place at a juncture likely to be followed by stirring events. Here in the Liao-tung Peninsula we may surely expect something more thrilling than the encounters between outposts and small detached parties, which are all that can for the present be looked for in the region separating Kuropatkin at Liao-yang from Kuroki at Feng-hwang-cheng. General Oku's army, the Second Army of Japan, has landed, not, for the moment, to take part in any great combined movement by land for the purposes of envelopment. It is obviously bent upon one single piece of work, an attack upon Port Arthur, in which it will be assisted by the Fleet, but in the military performance of which it is, as yet, and may continue to be, solely engaged. Well may that Army be proud of the massive enterprise entrusted to it, and well assured may the onlookers be that General Oku will lose no time in striking the successive blows which will be necessary before Port Arthur becomes for a second time the prize of Japanese valour and determination.

Very different are the conditions in which this terrific task is being attempted from those in which Port Arthur was "rushed" in 1894. Then, as now, the initial Japanese landing took place near Pi-tsu-wo, but from that moment any real comparison fails. For, apart from the fighting quality of the present garrison of Port Arthur, apart even from the extraordinary strength of the present inner defences of the place, a wonderful alteration has taken place in the system of outer defences, which include advanced positions, of which one near Kin-chau is the first, and a belt of entrenchments extending over ten miles. These last are said to be connected by forts, of which there is one at every 1,000 yards, and mines and barbed wire entanglements have been liberally provided. In negotiating these obstacles there will be, we may be sure, very little of the "marching and countermarching and then going into winter quarters" of the older style of strategy. Moreover, while

the services of field engineers will no doubt be requisitioned largely in order to secure such protection as is possible for the attackers, there must be times when shelter will have to be abandoned, trenches left, the support of great siege guns temporarily held in abeyance, and the onslaught made in a tempestuous mixture of set determination, lust of battle, utter indifference to death, and—grimmest of factors in such cases—cold steel.

The Second Army of Japan consists, as we have already seen, of three divisions, the 1st (Tokio), 3rd (Osaka), and 4th (Nagoya), and it has already been recounted that General Oku has met with considerable opposition in the concentration of this large force, and its movement southwards in the direction of its great objective. On May 16th a sharp engagement, as has been already related in Chapter XXI., took place with considerable casualties on both sides, the result being that the Japanese forced the enemy back and took possession of a line of hills about a mile and a half to the north of Kin-chau. Here their guns were said to dominate the latter, but, as will be presently seen, the advantage thus secured is slight, as the first real resistance to the Japanese advance is to be made by the Russians not at Kin-chau, but at a strong and elevated position further south.



SKETCH MAP OF THE KWANG-TUNG PENINSULA.

While the Japanese are making the most of their temporary success by the construction of batteries, and by completing their preparations for a critical stage of their coming attack, we may usefully examine the "lie" of the ground over which the last is to be accomplished. For the operation about to be described is not a matter of a short, sharp day's fighting, but one of a continuous, and at times positively desperate, struggle lasting from May 21st—it will be recalled that for some time past the term of the First Phase of the War as here narrated has been placed at the end of the third week in May—until a glorious culmination is reached on the evening of the 26th. It is a little strange that both the first great military performances of the Japanese in this campaign, the Passage of the Yalu terminating in the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng, and the forcing of the neck of the Kwang-tung Promontory with the Battle of Nan-shan as its *finale*, may each be said to have occupied in all six days. But, while the actual fighting in the later operation was more severe, the area was much more restricted, and, partly as a natural consequence, the resulting "butcher's bill" much heavier.

A glance at the map will show that the Liao-tung Peninsula narrows near Kin-chau to a neck of land in parts barely two miles in width. This neck connects the Kwang-tung Promontory, on which

Port Arthur and Dalny are situated, with the mainland of the Peninsula. On the west of the neck lies Kin-chau Bay, on the east one of the inlets of Talien-wan, known as Hand Bay. To the south of Hand Bay is a little promontory running in an easterly direction, on the extremity of which is a heavy Russian battery of eight guns firing seawards, and affording a serious check to any attempt on the part of Japanese warships to operate in Hand Bay.

About two miles south of Kin-chau, and in what would appear to be the very narrowest part of the neck, is Nan-shan Hill, the centre of the present Russian position. This is strongly held by a force of which the main body is the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, commanded by General Fock. The Russians have made great efforts to improve the position, evidently with the intention to make a most determined stand, which they confidently anticipate will be successful. In front of the position there are mines and wire entanglements, and it is said that there are ten strong forts "of a semi-permanent character," in which a variety of heavy guns have been mounted. The nature and extent of the defending artillery will become apparent at a later stage of the narrative, but for the present it is sufficient to say that it must have been greatly superior to any which the Japanese could here bring in opposition to it.

The defect in the position is that it is commanded by Mount Sampson, four miles to the east, but, as the *Times* military critic observes, with this exception it has everything in its favour, being short and strongly fortified, having its flanks secure, and being held by a garrison more than ample for its defence. "If a Russian division of 8,000 to 12,000 men, backed up by fifty or more siege guns and sixteen quick-firing field-guns, cannot hold 3,000 yards of front, strongly entrenched, and secure on the flanks, against the rush of infantry in the open restricted to a frontal assault, it is hard to say what position it can expect to defend with success."

The determination of the Russians to hold this narrow neck at all costs is very easy to understand. Even the lay reader will appreciate the fact that not often can the land approach to a vitally important citadel, such as Port Arthur to all intents and purposes is, be barred by an unbroken line of works only 3,000 yards long. As a matter of fact, the Russians here had the choice of two advanced positions, the one of which Nan-shan Hill was the centre, and another a little in rear. The latter would not have been commanded, as the former was, by Mount Sampson, but it had the disadvantage of being six miles long, and consequently required more than three times as many men to hold it properly. Although a division was hardly necessary to hold the entrenchments at Nan-shan, probably two divisions would have been necessary to render the line in the rear reasonably safe, and these would have constituted a heavy drain upon the total garrison of Port Arthur.

As the *Times* military critic remarks, so long as this neck was in Russian hands, not only was the road to Port Arthur obviously barred, but a sally-port also remained open through which General Stoessel might hope to march to co-operate with the expected, or at all events promised, advance of the army of succour from the north. The skill of Russian military engineers is well-known; the bravery and endurance of Russian troops, more especially when acting on

the defensive, is a matter of history. Well, then, may General Stoessel and his divisional commanders, Fock and Smirnoff, have been confident of being able to repulse the Japanese heavily at thus erected. In particular they will have realised the deadly significance of the enemy's artillery superiority, and the disadvantage under which they themselves suffered in not being able to derive



GENERAL OKU, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SECOND ARMY OF JAPAN.

this point, and, possibly, even to follow up the advantage of re-establishing communication with Liao-yang.

The Japanese, on the other hand, can hardly have been under any illusions as to the formidable nature of the barrier a full measure of support from their ships. The problem presented to General Oku was, indeed, a terribly serious one, which might well have daunted even a resolute and daring leader. For here the chances of being



LAST MILITARY HONOURS TO JAPANESE WARRIORS: SHINTO FUNERAL RITES.

able to deliver any but a frightfully costly frontal attack were very remote. We have already noted the presence of the heavy battery on the Liu-shu-tun Promontory, which made it impossible for the Japanese gun-boats to operate in Hand Bay, and we have now to consider the shoal water in Kin-chau Bay and on the west side of the Promontory generally, which rendered it difficult for warships to support any landing on the left flank or in the rear of the Russian position.

As to artillery, it would have been a serious matter to wait until more siege guns could be brought from Japan, and, indeed, any sort of delay was objectionable owing to the approach of the rains which are due about the end of June. Accordingly, the alternative lay between more or less complete inaction and what are known as "Algerian tactics," from the fact that chiefly by dashing frontal attacks the French foothold in North Africa was won and maintained. One can imagine that it is with something of painful reluctance the Japanese commander arrives at a decision which he is perfectly well aware must mean the sacrifice of many hundreds of his gallant troops, without the least certainty of being able to effect the object in view.

On May 21st General Oku commences his operations against the Nan-shan position by a careful reconnaissance, at the same time gradually bringing up his own artillery from Pi-tsu-wo and other points further north in the Liao-tung Peninsula. The first reconnaissance is with a view to ascertain the weight of the enemy's artillery on Nan-shan Hill, and pains must have been taken to draw the enemy's fire. For, according to the official report of the day's proceedings, "observation and enemy's cannonading showed enemy had at Nan-shan Hill, south of Kin-chau, four 15-centimètre shrapnel, ten 9- to 15-centimètre cannons (10.5 centimètre shells proved range 8,500 metres), two 12-centimètre quick-firers, besides at least ten forts." The Japanese reconnaissance further showed the foothills to be protected by wire entanglements and mines.

May 22nd, 23rd, and 24th appear to have been largely occupied in bringing up the infantry divisions behind Mount Sampson and in further reconnaissance. On the first day, according to General Oku, the "attacking force commenced operations prearranged," from which we may infer that, in addition to the preparations noted, positions were selected for such artillery as the Japanese were able to bring into action to the east of Kin-chau. On May 23rd a reconnaissance discovered the presence of the heavy battery of eight guns on the Liu-shu-tun Promontory, of which mention has already been made above. This battery was posted at a point marked in some maps as Huashangtao, and formed a sort of detached post in extension of the real right of the Russian position. It commanded, as has been mentioned, the waters of Hand Bay, and was later supported by the Russian gun-boat *Bobr*.

Evidently the reconnaissance drew the Russian fire freely, and it indicates the acute observation of the Japanese officers that they were able to estimate from fragments of the enemy's shells the calibre of the various guns opposed to them.

On May 24th the reconnaissance was pushed up to within easy distance of Kin-chau, which, it was found, was still occupied by a small force of Russian infantry and artillery. On May 25th Kin-chau was attacked, the artillery on Nan-shan Hill being simultaneously engaged

to divert their attention. The place, however, does not seem to have been definitely occupied by the Japs until the following morning, and would, doubtless, have been untenable by daylight for any the high wind and rough sea. A gun-boat squadron, consisting of the *Tsukushi*, *Sai-yen*, *Akagi*, and *Chiokai*, and the 1st torpedo-boat flotilla, duly arrived in Kin-chau Bay at noon on May



BATTLE OF KIN-CHAU: POSITIONS OF THE FORCES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE OPERATIONS.

length of time as long as the Nan-shan Hill forts were active. This attack on Kin-chau was probably made on the understanding that a naval force would co-operate from Kin-chau Bay. Such assistance was unfortunately lacking owing to 25th, but, from the causes noted, was obliged to take shelter instead of co-operating, as intended, with the batteries on shore.

A word must be given in passing to the share taken by the gun-boat squadron

in these intensely interesting operations. In the first place, it will be noted that the squadron is emphatically not one of first-class ships, which Admiral Togo might well have been reluctant to risk against powerful land batteries, even if in such shoal water he could have brought battleships and cruisers within effective range. Two of the gun-boats, the *Akagi* and the *Chiokai*, are 600-ton vessels only, and consequently of light draught; the *Tsukushi* is an old Elswick ship of 1,370 tons, and the *Sai-yen* is the old Chinese vessel *Tsi-yuen* of 2,264 tons, which was captured in the Chino-Japanese War. Between them these four ships only carried fifteen guns of moderate calibre.

The above may not seem a very exciting prelude to a very dramatic piece of hard fighting, but it is very possible that in reality there was much of thrilling interest in these preliminary operations, and it is quite certain that in any case they were conducted by the Japanese with consummate skill. This has been specially recognised by German military critics, one of whom says that the account of the careful reconnaissance and other preparatory operations reads like a chapter out of a modern text-book on tactics, and that the whole six days' fighting will become "an academical example for analysis in the study of war." While the lay reader can hardly be expected to wax equally enthusiastic over a performance which it is almost impossible to invest with any picturesqueness or variety, he may be induced by these considerations to pardon the writer for delaying any account of the final rush until the steps leading to it shall have at least been outlined.

At midnight on May 25th the situation is as follows: The Nan-shan Hill position is guarded by some three-score guns in position and eight machine guns, fronted by several lines of shelter trenches, wire fences and mines, with quick-firers in the intervals—"the whole constituting an almost permanent fortress, garrisoned by one division of infantry, two field batteries, garrison artillery and marines, evidently with the intention of effectually checking the Japanese advance." The Russian gunboat *Bobr* is also about to take up a position in Talien Bay which will enable it to render effective assistance in the morrow's fight without being itself exposed to any fire but that of light field-guns posted on Mount Sampson.

From the Japanese commander's point of view the position of affairs is a terribly anxious one. After five days' fighting he has only broken off the husk of the hard nut he has to crack before this, the chief advanced position of the Port Arthur defences, can be considered won. Such artillery preparations as he has been able to make can have had but trifling effect upon the extremely strong position in front of him, the mere weight of metal behind which cannot but tell terribly upon the infantry attack that must now be directed upon it. If ever there were a case in which a commander was justified in shrinking from a nearly hopeless task, here it is. A repulse is probable, and repulse or success cannot but mean enormous casualties. For the attack can only be delivered at best in circumstances resembling those which proved so costly at the Ai fords in the Battle of Kiu-lien-cheng. It is necessary for General Oku to use the full strength at his disposal in order to have the least chance of producing an impression upon such a defence as this, and there is no room for the proper deployment of three

divisions of infantry. The alternative is that huddling which means such frightful loss whenever well-directed artillery and machine gun fire have to be faced. Russian superiority lies in the quality of the Japanese infantryman, the leadership of his officers, and the co-operation of the gun-boats in Kin-chau Bay.

JAPANESE OFFICERS DRAWING THE FIRE OF THE RUSSIAN GUNS AND EXAMINING THE SPLINTERS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE ARTILLERY IN THE FORTIFICATIONS ABOVE.

Owing to the presence of the Russian gun-boat in Talien-wan the advance from behind Mount Sampson will be exposed on the left to a galling fire to which no sort of useful reply can be made, and the only counterpoise to the huge weight of

General Oku's sentence is for carrying out the attack to the bitter end. It is a momentous conclusion and, as an able critic aptly remarks, "no one who has felt the overwhelming responsibilities of command at such a moment can fail to

recognise and admire the splendid audacity which decided to throw at once for the whole stake."

It is just 2.35 a.m., and a foggy morning, when on May 26th the Battle of Nan-shan opens with an artillery duel which lasts three hours. In this the gun-boat squadron in Kin-chau Bay joins, and the Russian batteries reply with spirit. This artillery duel probably transcends in noise and viciousness anything of the sort that has occurred hitherto in the course of the War, for the reply of the Russian artillery to the Japanese opening fire at Kiu-lien-cheng was insignificant, and there is a great difference between the sustained passion of a combat of guns like this at Nan-shan and the stately deliberation of a naval bombardment.

In about three hours the Japanese fire appears to have told a little on the defence, and the moment is held suitable for the infantry advance.

On they come, the splendid little infantry of the Island Nation, the 4th, or Osaka Division, on the right; the 1st, or Tokio Division, in the centre; and the 3rd, or Nagoya Division, on the left. The formation is a close one, partly from choice, partly from necessity. Even if German ideas of solidity in frontal attacks were not prevailing with the Japanese leaders, the extent of ground available does not permit of any but a narrow front. Thus, when the 4th Division has made its first rush through Kin-chau, it has to contract its front to half the normal extension in order to carry the works immediately in front of it, being exposed all the time to a concentrated fire from the whole length of the Russian position. At an earlier stage there is said to have been so little room for deployment that battalions of infantry had to stand waiting in the sea.

The 3rd Division on the left is terribly exposed throughout the advance. From ten o'clock in the morning it suffered greatly from the enfilading fire of the Russian gun-boat in Talien-Wan Bay, and later it is persistently shelled by a four-gun battery a little to the south of Nan-shan. As a matter of course, the Tokio men in the centre have their full share of the miles of guns along the Russian line of works. Yet all press forward until they have gained positions actually not more than 300 to 500 yards from the enemy's advanced trenches.

It is at this point an episode occurs which gives some idea of the awful possibilities of a frontal attack. Between the Russian outworks and the advancing attack lies a village called Mauchiaying. About midday the energy of the Russian defenders in the works between this village and the main line of defence appears to be exhausted by the fire from the Japanese gun-boats in Kin-chau Bay. Two Japanese battalions are told off to make a desperate effort to carry the works. What follows is best told in the words of the *Times* correspondent, who tells the story, and whose narrative is here merely transformed into the historic present:—"At first the straggling walls of Mauchiaying give them some cover, under which they have a moment's breathing space. Then the gallant little infantry press on again up the breast of the slopes of the Russian position. It is an almost impossible task. As yet the defenders are not sufficiently shaken. An avalanche of concentrated fire from the infantry in the trenches, the machine guns in the Russian works, and the quick-firing field artillery supporting the defences strike the Japanese full. They melt away from the glacis like solder before the flame of a blow-pipe. A few

who seem to have charmed lives struggle on till they reach the wire entanglements. It is a vain, if heroic, effort. Wasted within fifteen minutes, these two battalions cease to exist except as a trail of mutilated bodies at the foot of the Russian glacis."

For a time after the failure of this attack it seems as if it were hopeless to expect success. To all ordinary intents and purposes the Japanese have already been repulsed, and it is not too much to say that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the operation would have been discontinued at this point. But General Oku and his Army are made of truly stern stuff. While for the moment the infantry are checked, a tremendous effort is made by the Japanese guns on Mount Sampson, and the Japanese gun-boats in Kin-chau Bay, the two smallest of which, the *Akagi* and *Chiokai*, have stood in boldly, to concentrate their fire on the Russian left, and so to make an opening into which the point of an infantry wedge can be driven.

The attack now becomes little more than a succession of "forlorn hopes." Again and again the glorious Japanese infantry advance, and assault after assault is delivered upon a series of desperately defended positions. Sometimes the tide of onslaught slackens, for the Russians stick doggedly to their positions, and are only ousted as wave follows wave of attackers in a frenzy of fighting fury at the sight of their dead comrades. Many Japanese are hopelessly entangled in the obstacles at the foot of the slopes, but the Russian mines, on which the defence have evidently counted, prove harmless. And hereby hangs a tale which is finely illustrative of Japanese contempt of death.

After the first attack has proved fruitless, the Japanese scouts creeping warily ahead discovered the existence of these mines, and it is determined to locate them by the heroic process of sacrificing a certain number of men. Hundreds of soldiers immediately volunteer for an enterprise which seems to promise certain death, and these devoted fellows are placed at the head of the second advance. Without hesitation they rush forward, expecting every moment to be hurled into eternity, or at best to escape with ghastly wounds. As they near the fateful zone, however, they find that the heavy rains have washed away the earth which had covered the mines, the latter being left exposed. The conducting wires are joyfully cut, and danger from this source is happily at an end. It is painful to be compelled to add that most of the gallant volunteers are subsequently killed in the succession of attacks upon the main position.

It is now about six o'clock in the evening, and the fight has been raging with little or no cessation for fifteen hours. It is said that the Japanese have charged the main position on Nan-shan Hill nine times, and it is added in one account that the ammunition of the Japanese field artillery is running short. The time comes for a supreme effort, and, after a final hail of artillery fire, the 4th Division presses irresistibly forward on the Russian left.

The Osaka men, of which this Division is composed, have been twitted in bygone days with lack of courage; but after the Battle of Nan-shan it will require some hardihood to level such a taunt against these splendid fighters. Already they have distinguished themselves on the extreme right of the Japanese line by working their way along through the shoal water to Kin-chau Bay, under the partial

protection of the gun-boats. While thus engaged they have encountered the Russians, and a hot fight has been carried on by the two forces both waist-deep. "When the Russians finally retreated," says the Reuter despatch in which this episode is narrated, "the water was literally crimsoned."

And now the 4th Division crowns its glorious record of a glorious day by being the first of General Oku's larger units to make an impression on the Russian position. The Russian left begins to give way before the Japanese right; the Japanese centre and left, sadly shattered as they are, pull themselves together in order to follow the example of the Osaka men, and with a roar of triumph the greater part of the Second Army of Japan surges forward in one grand victorious onslaught.

Still at every parapet there is resistance shown, and defenders and attackers cross bayonets at many points until the 4th Division has made good its foothold on the Russian left, when the whole line of deference begins to waver. The attack never falters, the men leaping over the bodies of their dead comrades, and literally hustling the Russians out of their trenches. In about an hour the last phase of this awful struggle is over. The Russians retire, in utter confusion from the more advanced parts of the position, but in decent order from the less exposed parts.

About half-past seven in the evening, while the Japanese guns are shelling the fugitives, a great cry of "Banzai! Banzai!" goes up as the Japanese flag waves in triumph over the forts which yesterday Russia deemed to be impregnable, and which were impregnable save to troops of altogether extraordinary merit, magnificently led, and animated by a courage and resolute tenacity never surpassed and not often equalled in the annals of warfare.

As the Japanese, worn out but proudly happy in the consciousness of a great work greatly accomplished, sleep the sleep of the victors on the ground they have won, we may well look back on what has occurred, look around on the situation which has been created, and look forward to a future of marked significance.

First, it is necessary to devote a few lines to the part played in the Battle of Nan-shan by the Japanese gun-boat squadron. We have already noted how the squadron joined in the opening artillery action, and how the *Akagi* and *Chokai*, taking advantage of their light draught, approached as close as possible to the shore. At this stage a Russian shell glanced off the foredeck of the *Chokai*, and a lieutenant and two men were killed, and two others were wounded. At 8 a.m. the gun-boats, thinking that the enemy's forts had been silenced, temporarily suspended their firing.

A portion of the torpedo-boat flotilla now commenced firing on the railway lines, while another portion, supported by the *Tsukushi* and the *Sai-yen*, availed itself of the rising tide to steam nearer inshore and cover the advance of the extreme right of the 4th Division, as already narrated.

Subsequently, from time to time, the squadron assisted the land operations by judicious bombardment, and the Army's indebtedness to it was in due course warmly acknowledged by General Oku. It must have been handled with an admirable combination of boldness and skill, for, notwithstanding its near approach to the shore, and the warm attentions it received from the fort batteries,

none of the ships suffered any damage except the *Chokai*. On board the latter there were fresh casualties at the close of the day's work, a shell having exploded beside one of the guns, with the result that the captain of the ship was killed and a sub-lieutenant and three men were wounded. At 7.30 in the evening the squadron, to use the simple language of the despatch narrating its operations, "stopped fighting and returned to the naval base."

STORMING THE HEIGHTS AT NAN-SHAN.

Let us now take a glance at the results of all this desperate and continuous fighting. First let us see the price that has been paid by the victors, a price at first sight so heavy that one is inclined to wonder if it be not altogether excessive, considering that as yet only the fringe of the Port Arthur defences has been reached. The official return of the Japanese casualties on May 26th gives a total of 4,204, whereof 749, including 33 officers, are reported killed, 3,455 having been wounded, including 100 officers. Probably this means that about 12 to 15

per cent. of the total force engaged were put *hors de combat*, and, although this proportion is small compared with that shown by the returns of casualties in many important battles, it may seem a heavy bill to pay for the capture of a single position. Yet, when one comes to reckon the frightful obstacles which the gallant Japanese had to encounter, the cramped space in which they operated, the extraordinary strength of the enemy's works, and the advantages possessed by the Russians in the matter of superior artillery, and of enfilading fire, the wonder begins to grow that the losses were not even more severe. But the main point is, of course, the fact that the figures given are, as we have seen, the price of success, not the added penalty of failure. If General Oku had lost two or three thousand men in the futile effort to storm such a position, surprise could not reasonably have been expressed. With a thousand or two more casualties to have hurled a Russian division in a single day from what were to all intents and purposes semi-permanent fortifications is a feat which no competent military student can criticise even on the score of "expense."

Of the Russian casualties it is impossible to speak very definitely, as the information available is, to say the least, conflicting. General Stoessel reports that the Russian losses were 30 officers and about 800 men, killed and wounded. But either this is a very doubtful estimate, or the proportion of killed to wounded must have been altogether exceptional. For the explicit statement furnished officially by General Oku is that the Japanese military administration commission and gensdarmes carefully buried the corpses of 10 Russian officers and 664 men found at Nan-shan and in its vicinity, besides 30 which were buried by the Japanese troops in the neighbourhood of the camps. In another report General Oku says that a number of Russian officers and men were taken prisoners, together with 68 cannon, 10 machine guns, one locomotive, three search-lights, 50 mines, many rifles, and much ammunition.

The news of the loss of the Nan-shan position was published in St. Petersburg on the Russian holiday commemorating the Emperor's coronation. The despatches posted on the bulletin boards were all from foreign sources, and the Government made no effort to suppress or minimise the evil tidings. The Press, on the other hand, endeavoured strenuously to belittle the significance of the event, special editions being sold in the streets announcing a Russian victory and Japanese losses of 15,000 men! Even less imaginative prints assured their readers that the defence of the Nan-shan position was really a matter of no consequence, and that, if anything, the capacity of Port Arthur to stand a siege was now vastly improved. "Despite these words of comfort, however," writes a St. Petersburg correspondent, "the gloomiest pessimism prevails almost everywhere. A military authority with whom I have conversed on the subject assures me that, after having read the accounts of the attack on Kin-chau, he entertains little expectation that Port Arthur will be relieved, and hopes only that when the end approaches the battleships may effect their escape under cover of night."

It is this foreboding spirit which invests the news of the Battle of Nan-shan with peculiar meaning, more especially, of course, for the nation most intimately concerned, but to a scarcely less extent for all intelligent spectators. For this

great conflict marks yet another and wholly distinct stage in the appreciation of Japanese fighting capacity. Important as was the victory on the Yalu, this is even more so, for here was no question of divided Russian counsels, nor even of elaborate Japanese dust-throwing in Russian eyes by means of feints and carefully masked batteries. Nor had the Japanese any real superiority of force. In artillery they were positively inferior, and in the attack of such a position the numerical advantage possessed by Japan amounted to very little. The Russians had quite enough men and to spare for their purpose, and they may never again meet the Japanese under much more favourable conditions for inflicting a heavy blow at the cost of comparatively insignificant losses. The absurd theory that it was not intended to dispute the position seriously may, of course, be lightly dismissed. Even Russian generals cannot afford to leave 700 corpses on the field and 78 guns in the enemy's hands merely as a handsome present to a pushful adversary. The sum of the whole matter is, that the Russians selected their position at Nan-shan with consummate skill, and held it, on the whole, with praiseworthy stubbornness. But they were simply driven from it by better fighters than themselves. Nor does it need special prescience to foresee that the officers and men who wore down the Russian resistance on this occasion will leave their mark yet again on the armies of the Tsar, even if the latter ultimately succeed in bringing apparently overwhelming forces into the field. For it is not too much to say that General Oku had at Nan-shan a harder battle to fight than if he had met the Russians in the open with only three divisions to their four.

As to the question whether the Battle of Nan-shan proves the efficacy of the German theories regarding frontal attacks, the sound conclusion probably is that no single action of this sort can demonstrate what must largely depend on circumstances. We ourselves found "Algerian tactics," even with our extended lines, very deadly in South Africa, not merely because, as the Germans prefer to think, our leadership, distribution of forces, and marksmanship were at fault, but because the enemy's powder was so unusually straight. If the Russians had shot like the Boers, even the Japanese might not have carried Nan-shan Hill. On the other hand, it is not every country that can afford 4,000 casualties in the preliminary stage of a simple operation. While, therefore, there is nothing that succeeds like success, and, admitting that the Japanese were justified here in their adoption and brilliant illustration of German views, this is no reason why the British Army should, on the strength of this one example, seek to ignore the hard and convincing lessons it has learned in its own recent practice.

Let us, above all, remember in regard to the Battle of Nan-shan that it was essentially one of those collisions in which for a time the balance trembles, and it seems as if a feather would turn the scale. If the tenth attempt had failed, as had the previous nine almost equally desperate onslaughts, what assurance have we that an eleventh effort would have been possible? Further concentration of artillery fire might not have been feasible in view of the failure of ammunition, and the Japanese might have been compelled to fall back, undaunted maybe, and ready to resume the operation on the morrow, but terribly shattered, and no nearer their object than the day before.

RETREAT !

Where would, then, have been the striking demonstration of the value of a closely formed frontal attack? Surely it is idle to argue seriously from such touch-and-go performances, in which a glorious and important victory is only separated by the incidents and accidents of perhaps half an hour from a mortifying and costly repulse.

Early on May 27th the Japanese took up the pursuit, and found that during the night the enemy had evacuated the Liu-shu-tun promontory, leaving four guns, which fell into the hands of a detachment under General Nakamura. A further retreat towards Port Arthur was evidently in progress, and the Japanese pressed as close as was prudent on the heels of the fugitives, driving them through Nan-san-shi-li-pu, a station on the branch line to Dalny, eight miles south-west of Nan-shan.

Meanwhile, Dalny itself has reached an exciting crisis in its history. As soon as the result of the fighting on May 26th becomes known the small Russian garrison left in the town falls back on a line parallel with that taken by General Stoessel's force, destroying the railway culverts behind it. In the town itself a state of anarchy immediately ensues. Such European non-combatants as can get passages hasten off in Chinese junks to Chifu. Only Chinese officials are left in power, and these allow the gaol, which contains about 200 cut-throats, to be forced. For two or three days the town on which Russia has lavished so many millions, in the hope of making it the great commercial emporium of the Far East, is at the mercy of a gang of desperadoes. Yet, evil as is this chance, it is from the Russian standpoint, perhaps, preferable to what follows. For on May 30th a detachment from General Oku's victorious army enters the town, and Dalny becomes, temporarily at any rate, Japanese. Order is, of course, promptly restored, and a careful survey shows that the prize is, indeed, a valuable one. The great pier, as mentioned in Chapter XXIII., has been destroyed, and some steam launches have been sunk at the mouth of the dock. But the other piers and docks are still in good order, and over 100 warehouses and barracks, besides the telegraph office and railway station, are found to be uninjured. Some 300 railway cars are also reported by General Oku to be still usable.

The significance of these captures is obvious. There is much to be done before Talien-wan, or Dalny Bay, can be freed from the mines which have been sown with reckless prodigality, but still with considerable ingenuity, in this important field. Further, as the smaller railway bridges on the branch line have been destroyed, it will necessarily be some time before the latter can be used for any heavy traffic. But, none the less, Dalny, with its existing piers and docks, is a very desirable acquisition to a country which may require to land further military forces in the Liao-tung Peninsula, and which, in any case, may well be grateful for such a grand ready-made sea-base for its further operations against Port Arthur. If only, then, because it has been so rapidly followed by the seizure of Dalny, the Battle of Nan-shan is far the most important success which has as yet attended the Japanese operations on land, and may even ultimately prove more far-reaching than Admiral Togo's brilliant triumphs by sea.

Photo: J. F. J. Archibald.

ADMIRAL ALEXEIEFF, VICEROY OF THE EAST, REVIEWING TROOPS AT NIU-CHWANG.

CHAPTER XXIX.

FURTHER OPERATIONS AGAINST PORT ARTHUR—RENEWED BOMBARDMENT—THE JAPANESE CREEPING CLOSER—THE BELEAGUERED GARRISON—MOVEMENTS FURTHER NORTH.

AFTER the battle of Nan-shan the Japanese set to work very methodically to draw as close a cordon as possible round the Gibraltar of the Far East. Already during the later preliminary operations leading up to the great fight on the 26th, Admiral Togo had resumed his task of keeping a large portion of the Port Arthur garrison busily occupied, and on May 24th a considerable bombardment is reported to have taken place. On the night of the 28th, according to a Mukden despatch, yet another attempt was made by the Japanese to block the harbour entrance. Merchant vessels are said to have been sent in under escort, and the despatch adds that they were discovered by the Russian searchlights, one Japanese gunboat and two destroyers being sunk. No confirmation of this damage inflicted upon Admiral Togo's ships appears to be forthcoming, and it is possible that in the doubtful light the entire purpose as well as the details of this attempt were obscured. For there is reason to believe that Admiral Togo has now, for a time at least, abandoned the idea of blocking the harbour by merchantmen in favour of sowing the roadstead with Oda mines, in view of an eventual effort on the part of the ships within to escape in a body. The Russians are well aware of this future danger, for they continue to sweep the Port Arthur roadstead, just as the Japanese have been sweeping Dalny Bay, and between May 18th and 21st have taken up eleven mines sown by the indefatigable enemy.

In the early morning of May 30th a very daring reconnaissance was carried out under Admiral Togo's orders by four Japanese gunboats, two destroyers, and two torpedo-boats, with the object of discovering what is the state of the channel, and whether any new guns have

been placed in position. The eight vessels carry out their dangerous work with great skill and daring, notwithstanding a heavy fire from the land batteries. They note that a new Russian searchlight station has been erected, and that one or two new forts have been constructed on the Liau-ti-shan Promontory. The new searchlight is believed to have been due to the enterprise of Colonel Spiridonoff, who, as described on page 219, succeeded in bringing in a train-load of ammunition and, as it now appears, other material, into Port Arthur just before the fortress was finally isolated. That last train is said to have contained some badly-wanted dynamos, without which not only would the new searchlight have been an impossibility, but even the old ones might have been useless, now that communication with the power-station at Dalny is cut off. For it will be remembered that Dalny is now in the hands of the Japanese, having been finally evacuated by the Russians after the Battle of Nan-shan.

The naval reconnaissance just alluded to is attended with some little damage to one of the gunboats, which is struck by a shell, one petty officer being killed, and three bluejackets wounded. The operation is insignificant except as showing the unremitting activity of Admiral Togo during this period. In point of fact, it merely forms an incident in the general blockade which the Japanese Navy has now established round the coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, south of a line between Pi-tsu-wo to the east, and Pu-lan-tien (Port Adams) to the west. The blockade, it has been officially declared, will be strictly maintained, and the Port Arthur garrison presently discovers that this is no idle threat.

Nevertheless, the beleaguered fortress is not wholly without means of communication with the outside world. Some results have been attained with wireless telegraphy, and carrier-pigeons are being used with fair success. There are also instances of daring escapes, one in particular of a Russian officer who left Port Arthur in a Chinese junk which was stopped by the Japanese off Kin-chau and searched. The officer, however, being hidden under some fishing-nets, escaped detection, and subsequently made his way to Niu-chwang.

Inside Port Arthur, in spite of the "tall talk" in Russia as to the capacity of the fortress to hold out for a year if necessary, there is much parsimony exhibited in the distribution of rations. All the available supplies have been "pooled," and heavy punishment is inflicted on those who secrete provisions or sell them. Notwithstanding this, salt is being sold privately by some of the commissariat officers at the sensational rate of ten shillings an ounce, and is being carefully husbanded against the chance of an outbreak of scurvy. For there are no fresh vegetables, and little milk or sugar. The chief ration is biscuit, of which 10 oz. a day per head, with 4 oz. of canned meat, is issued. These details are furnished by a *Daily Express* correspondent, who has obtained them from a fugitive Chinese trader. The latter adds that the civil population are being subjected rigorously to martial law, and that the strictest discipline is maintained on all sides. General Stoessel makes several stirring addresses every week to the garrison, and the men reply with shouts of "No surrender!"

At the same time, the besieged garrison cannot but feel the effect of the continuous and increasing pressure put upon them. From time to time the Japanese

continue to bombard the forts and town, and according to all accounts the damage done to the latter is very extensive, the important building of the Russo-Chinese bank, for instance, having been totally destroyed. Considerable apprehension,

The state of the Port Arthur roadstead, and the anxiety felt on this account by the authorities, may be gauged from an incident reported by Admiral Togo as having been witnessed by the Japanese destroyer flotilla engaged in blockading



SKETCH MAP SHOWING POSITIONS OF THE RIVAL ARMIES AT THE END OF APRIL, 1904.

too, must be felt at the gradually decreasing stock of coal, of which apparently an immense quantity has been expended since the commencement of the siege to very little purpose. By the middle of June it is estimated that the supply has dwindled to 3,000 tons of Japanese coal and a still smaller amount of Cardiff.

Port Arthur. It was about half-past seven in the evening of June 4th, and two Russian gunboats, some destroyers, and steam launches appeared to be engaged in sweeping the roadstead for mines. Suddenly one of the gunboats is blown up and sunk, "probably," Admiral Togo drily observes, "by our mines." The remainder of the vessels hastily flee

inside the harbour, and it may readily be imagined that a disaster of this sort does not add to the popularity of mine-clearing as an occupation calculated to relieve the monotony of a siege.

In the second week of June the Chinese begin to leave Port Arthur with the permission of the Russian authorities, who, however, are by no means generous in the matter of providing the refugees with food. Several junks, in fact, leave the place without having succeeded in obtaining any provisions at all, and are supplied by the Japanese cruisers which stop them for purposes of examination.

Meanwhile, the Japanese by land as well as sea are drawing the net closer round Port Arthur. Early in June sufficient progress has been made with the mine-clearing operations in Talien-wan to allow of the use of one passage through the shallows. The work is now being carried on with the assistance of Japanese shell-divers from the Kushiro province, who have volunteered, and are said to be wonderfully expert. An idea of the magnitude of the task may be gathered from Admiral Togo's report that between June 3rd and June 6th no fewer than forty-one mines were discovered and exploded.



SKETCH MAP SHOWING POSITION OF THE RIVAL ARMIES AT THE END OF MAY, 1904.

At Dalny large stores of siege material and supplies are being accumulated. This base is linked up with the army of investment now slowly advancing nearer and nearer towards the defensive works which form a great semi-circle to the north of Port Arthur. All the useful eminences are being prepared with cement platforms for the reception of siege artillery, and daring reconnaissances are being carried out right up to the defensive works themselves. Sentries are posted at fifty yards' interval, and we may take it that there is very little chance of getting between these vigilant watchers without suffering considerable damage in the process.

On June 13th a Japanese torpedo-boat flotilla, accompanied by a steamship called the *Taihoku Maru*, is carrying out some mine-laying operations by night, when a mine explodes, and an officer and 19 men are killed, and 2 officers and 7 men are wounded on board the *Taihoku Maru*. As the damage to the latter is unimportant, it may be presumed that the explosion took place before the mine was lowered, and the loss of life is a striking illustration of the deadliness of these Japanese mines under almost any conditions. The following day at noon, while a destroyer flotilla and three torpedo-boat flotillas are firing on the enemy ashore near Shao-ping-tao, in order to facilitate a reconnaissance which is being carried out by the troops, an incident takes place which shows that even now the Russian ships at Port Arthur have some freedom of action. With the help of tugs the cruiser *Novik* comes out into the roadstead, accompanied by ten destroyers, and sharp firing is exchanged. The Japanese, by gradually retiring, endeavour to entice the enemy, but the latter are not to be drawn, and after three hours' ineffectual firing re-enter the harbour.

We must now turn our attention to the more northern portion of the Liao-tung Peninsula, where some stirring events, a detailed description of which will be given in a subsequent chapter, are about to take place.

While for the present Dalny forms a convenient new sea-base for the operations against Port Arthur, and while these operations are, for the time being, distinct from those being carried on elsewhere in the theatre of war, it is clear that the Japanese cannot afford to allow the difficult and dangerous work of investing Port Arthur to be carried on without doing all that is possible to protect it from interruption. There is still a possibility that the Russians may attempt a relief of Port Arthur from the north, and although the most favourable time for such a movement may have passed, the anxiety of Alexeieff to render some assistance to his beloved Port Arthur may yet, and, as a matter of fact, is about to, produce serious results in this direction.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Japanese should in the early part of June take special precautions with regard to the Liao-tung Peninsula, in addition to the naval blockade which, as noted above, is being maintained by Admiral Togo from Port Adams on the west round to Pi-tsu-wo on the east coast. Exactly what these precautions are it is impossible at the time of writing to explain in detail, and for the purposes of this narrative it is unnecessary to do so. But the intention of the Japanese to interpose a thick screen between the enemy and what is going on in the neighbourhood of Port Arthur is clear, and this object is satisfactorily achieved partly, perhaps, by

fresh disembarkations, and certainly by a concentration of a considerable force on the line between Pu-lan-tien (Port Adams) and Pi-tsu-wo. Simultaneously, detachments from Admiral Togo's fleet range along the north-west coast of the Peninsula, paying special attention to the neighbourhood of Kai-ping (otherwise Kai-chau), a previous demonstration against which was described in Chapter XXI.

The naval operations last from June 6th to the 12th, and consist chiefly of minor bombardments, more it would seem with the idea of producing a moral effect than in the hope of inflicting material damage. For the time has not yet come for final pressure to be put upon the most important point of this part of the coast, namely, Niu-chwang, which is still in more or less fitful Russian occupation. The word "fitful" is used advisedly, for it is reported that once more the appearance of the Japanese in the neighbourhood of Kai-ping causes a sudden Russian evacuation of Ying-kow, the port of Niu-chwang, although it cannot have been many hours before the Russians are again in evidence in this important quarter.

Meanwhile, on land the Japanese throw out advanced parties from Port Adams, clearly with the intention of obtaining the earliest possible intimation of any distinct Russian movement southwards. Their prudence and vigilance receive early justification, for it soon becomes evident that there is in contemplation a Russian attempt to exert considerable pressure on the new barrier which the Japanese have thrown across the Peninsula.

At first, however, only desultory fighting takes place to the north of Port Adams. The Russians are preparing the way for their advance by reconnaissances, and the Japanese, by continuing to throw out mobile detachments in front of their main line of resistance, baffle inquiry as to the strength of the latter, in addition to keeping continuously in contact with the enemy. On May 30th a fairly brisk affair occurs, of which the Russian and Japanese accounts are very conflicting, but which may, perhaps, be fairly outlined as follows:

For some time before the Battle of Nan-shan the Russian cavalry had been pushing down the Liao-tung Peninsula in the hope of harassing General Oku's Army, and in the course of a recent reconnaissance some horsemen of the Frontier Guard, led by Colonel Koschouba and Count Armfeldt, had captured a Japanese forage convoy. With a view to avenging this loss, and checking further audacity on the part of the Russian cavalry, a body of Japanese horse, supported, it would seem, by three battalions of infantry, moved out under command of General Akkiama from Port Adams, towards the station of Wa-fang-kau. Here were stationed two sotnias of the Russian Frontier Guard, which the Japanese cavalry proceeded to attack. A sharp fight ensued, the Russians in the meantime sending word to a detachment consisting of Primorsky Dragoons, Cossacks, Chasseurs, and a battery of artillery, which was known to be on its way from Vandiazlin under command of General Samsonoff. According to the Russian official despatch this detachment received the message about noon, when it was three miles from Wa-fang-kau. General Samsonoff immediately ordered an advance at the trot, two squadrons of the dragoons being sent to support the Frontier Guards, and one sotnia and a detachment of chasseurs being told off to protect and reconnoitre the Russian

right flank in the valley of the Fu-chau River. About 1 o'clock two squadrons of Siberian Cossacks, having crossed the railway, attacked the leading squadron of the Japanese cavalry and inflicted considerable loss on it. It is difficult from the various accounts of what followed to obtain at all a clear idea of this action, very highly coloured. Speaking of the Cossack charge, one Russian correspondent, after remarking that the lance was here used for the first time, says "they speared the troopers through and through and then wounded the horses. Like a raging torrent the Cossacks destroyed everything in their passage, and only

Photo: J F. J. Archibald.
RUSSIAN INFANTRY IN FULL MARCHING ORDER, AT NIU-CHWANG.

since both Russians and Japanese claim to have driven their adversaries back. But there seems no question that the Russian cavalry charged with great impetuosity, and that the lances used by the Cossacks were very fairly effective. The Japanese admit that they had 26 killed, including one officer, and 37 wounded, including 4 officers, but the Russians claim to have annihilated one entire Japanese squadron, and to have severely handled another. They themselves return their own casualties at 17 killed and 23 wounded.

Some of the accounts of this affair are stopped before the discharge of six machine guns which vomited on them a torrent of bullets, which, however, did not cause them any perceptible loss. Our battery, commanded by Captain Ivanoff, had already been placed in position, and after some trial shots kept up a fire of surprising accuracy. The shells burst in the midst of the crowded enemy, who were posted on a hill in serried ranks. The performance did not last long. The Japanese were scattered. At that moment a storm burst over the scene. The rattle of the machine guns and the roar of the artillery mingled with

the thunder-claps. Flashes of lightning answered the flash of guns. In the attacks of the Japanese cavalry I was astonished at the courage exhibited. By no means disconcerted by the sustained fire directed against them, they threw themselves on us with the war cry 'Banzai!' without the least hesitation. But they met with a similar resistance on the part of our Cossacks, our dragoons, and our Frontier Guards, who finally made them beat a retreat. In endeavouring to save themselves certain Japanese officers took off their boots in order to be better able to run. The Cossacks have collected some of these shoes as trophies."

It is rather a curious commentary on the above account that, according to General Kuropatkin's own statement, the Japanese should have halted at a distance of less than three miles from the station of Wa-fang-kau, where they took up a position and proceeded to fortify it. Perhaps the fairest inference from the several contradictory descriptions of the fighting is that the Russian cavalry did obtain some superiority in the action, but that the arrival on the scene of the Japanese infantry changed the complexion of affairs, and that the Russian force eventually withdrew. If the success of the Russians had been so complete and shattering as Russian accounts would indicate, there would have been serious confusion on the one side and hotly pressed pursuit on the other, nor would the Japanese have either desired, or been in a position, to remain, practically speaking, on the ground on which the affair took place.



Photo: J. F. J. Archibald.

THE DEFENCE OF NIU-CHWANG BY THE RUSSIANS.

Troops carrying through the streets of the town the electric cables which were laid down to connect the mines in the Liao River with the Observation Station.

For ten or twelve days after the action at Wa-fang-kau the Japanese in the northern part of Liao-tung continue to strengthen their forces round Port Adams, General Oku coming up from the south to direct the new concentration at this point, which is said to have a front, looking northwards, of about ten miles. Fighting between advanced parties continues to take place, but until June 13th, when, as will be seen later, the situation in this quarter suddenly becomes dramatic, there is no development of particular interest.

It is necessary at this point to make another rapid survey of the position of both combatants, for it is evident that big happenings are imminent. To Russian preparations and movements a separate chapter will presently be devoted, but the present seems a convenient point at which to cast a glance at the gradual but sure changes which are taking place in the Japanese operations.

The fortnight which succeeds the Battle of Nan-shan may seem to have made little alteration in the general scheme of Japanese advance, but in reality the progress made has been very considerable. General Kuroki's army still faces that of Kuropatkin, but, thanks to the reinforcements landed at Takushan, it has been able both to extend its front and to present to the enemy a barrier through which parties of Cossacks may continue to penetrate, but which Kuropatkin has no present chance of breaking down by any large forward movement. In particular Siu-yen, which lies some thirty-two miles to the north-west of Takushan, has been definitely occupied by the Japanese, and sharp fighting has taken place at Saimatse, about thirty-five miles north of Feng-hwang-cheng, resulting in a temporary Russian retirement.

The exact nature of the force landed in Korea Bay at Takushan is not yet absolutely certain. According to some accounts it simply consists of reinforcements directly pertaining to General Kuroki's army; according to others we have here the Third Army of Japan in three divisions, commanded by General Nozu. The latter is the view taken in the map published on page 353 which shows the disposition of both combatants at the end of May. In a campaign in which such extreme reticence is observed something must occasionally be ventured, and there is much to support the theory in question, although as late as June 24th the Russian Staff evidently regard the armies of Generals Kuroki and Oku as the only large Japanese forces in the field.

Be this as it may—and the point is not at present one of first-class importance—the matter requiring immediate attention is the fact that the Japanese forces, whatever they are, which are fronting the main Russian position centred on Liao-yang, are not as yet in touch with General Oku's Army in the Liao-tung Peninsula. The Russians may be said to be in sufficient strength during the first half of June to close the greater part of the interval between Siu-yen and Port Adams to the Japanese, with the result that General Kuroki remains a little longer in a condition of masterly inactivity. The process by which the Russian wedge between the two Japanese forces may be removed, and the Japanese advance co-ordinated, is likely to prove a very beautiful piece of strategy, the details of which belong to a later stage, but the possibility of which is best foreshadowed at this point.

This chapter may be suitably closed with a reference to a significant develop-

ment which is about to take place in the higher control of the Japanese military operations. It has now been determined that Marshal Count Oyama, who has been acting hitherto as Chief of the General Staff at Tokio, with General Baron Kodama as Vice-Chief, shall proceed to the front as Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in Manchuria, with General Kodama as his Chief of the Staff. Marshal Oyama's place at Tokio is taken by the veteran Marshal Marquis Yamagata, with, it is said, the title of Generalissimo of the Army of Japan. General Kodama is succeeded as Vice-chief of the General Staff by Major-General Nagaoka. Simultaneously a number of important promotions both naval and military are announced. Admiral Togo and Admiral Yamamoto, the Japanese Minister of Marine, have been promoted to the rank of Kaigun Taisho, the highest rank in the Navy, and Rear-Admirals Saito (Vice-Minister of Marine), Uriu, and Dewa are promoted to the rank of Vice-Admiral. Several Lieutenant-Generals commanding Divisions, together with Lieutenant-General Kodama, are promoted to full General, all in recognition of meritorious service.

Photo: Topical Press Photo Agency

VICE-ADMIRAL SAITO, VICE-MINISTER OF THE JAPANESE NAVY.

The promotions are self-explanatory, but may be adduced as evidence that the Japanese themselves concur in the view we have taken that the first phase of the War was concluded some three weeks ago. The appointment of Marshal Oyama and General Kodama to executive commands has greater significance, since it clearly means that a combined movement is about to take place, requiring the presence in the field of an officer of the highest rank, together with that of the man who, as noted on page 128, is looked upon as the "Kitchener of Japan." There is something curiously impressive in this forceful system of employing men like Oyama and Kodama in the home control of the various armies in the field during the earlier stages of a campaign, and then, at the psychological moment, sending them out to translate into tactical action the result of their carefully worked-out strategy. It may be suggested that here we see a marked advance upon the plan not unknown in this country, not to speak of Russia, of commencing a war in a hurry, with a very imperfect idea of the requirements to be met, without any proper strategical plan of operations, and then, as the result of some rather painful surprises, despatching to the front in a hurry the best military talent available.

But it must be remembered that Japan in this connection enjoys a great advantage in the striking personality of the Emperor—an advantage which, without impropriety, it may be said we ourselves should enjoy, if this country were unhappily embroiled in another great war during the reign of our present King. Where from the outset the last word as to great naval and military operations can be made to rest with a Sovereign of exceptional sagacity and experience, a solidarity is imparted to strategical plans and their accomplishment, the effect of which can hardly be exaggerated. With the Emperor still the real head of both the Navy and the Army, the transfer of the great office of the General Staff at Tokio from the control of one Marshal to that of another is quite unlikely to affect the course of the subsequent operations. Certainly it will not, we may be sure, affect the precision and regularity with which every future move will at least be attempted if not accomplished.



WATER TOWER ON THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY.
(*From Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia."*)

Photo: J. F. J. Archibald.

A RUSSIAN COMMANDER AT NIU-CHWANG.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION—KUROPATKIN AT LIAO-YANG—HIS DIFFICULTIES—FRICTION WITH ALEXEIEFF—PROPOSED RELIEF OF PORT ARTHUR—INTERVIEW AT MUKDEN—A MOMENTOUS DECISION—KUROPATKIN OVERRULED—COSSACK RAIDS.

SOME interesting particulars are available concerning the condition of affairs at Russian military headquarters during the first few days in June. As yet the actual military situation has not been seriously modified by the Battle of Nan-shan, although there is reason to believe that the receipt of detailed intelligence concerning that great operation has produced a very general feeling of uncertainty as to the capacity of Port Arthur to make any prolonged resistance against such soldiers as the Japanese have now fully proved themselves to be. But for the moment all is much as it was before General Oku embarked on the six days' fighting which culminated in the storming of Nan-shan, and resulted in the evacuation of Dalny and the investment of Port Arthur. The Russians still hold a line fronting their main position at Liao-yang, a line which may be said now to have its right resting on Niu-chwang and its left on Saimatse, thirty-five miles north of Feng-hwang-cheng. In advance of this line there are detachments, as we have seen in the last chapter, pushed down into the northern portion of the Liao-tung Peninsula. General Kuropatkin is still at Liao-yang, General Liniévitch at Vladivostok, and there are Cossacks scattered in a variety of places, their main operations being carried out in North-Eastern Korea

The first reinforcements which General Kuropatkin will receive from Russia will consist of the mobilised reservists of the 10th and 17th Army Corps, but early in June the order is given for the mobilisation of the 1st or St. Petersburg Army

Corps, which it is intended to send to the front as a more or less complete unit under the command of Baron Meyendorf. The latter is a veteran soldier of great distinction who has reached the age for retirement, but has begged to be allowed to go to the front in order to earn on the battlefield the St. George's Cross, "the only decoration he does not as yet possess." Unfortunately, as has been hinted before, the Russian plans of mobilisation are not working very smoothly, and in the manufacturing districts exemptions are being freely allowed owing to fear of Socialist propaganda. It must also be borne in mind that between an Army Corps in Russia and one ready to take the field under General Kuropatkin there is a gap of some forty days' travelling. Accordingly the troops at the front still consist mainly of Siberian Rifles and Infantry with perhaps a score of battalions of the 10th and 17th Army Corps.



THE RUSSIAN ST. GEORGE'S CROSS, AWARDED FOR VALOUR ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

The weary waiting until a sufficient number of troops shall be at his disposal to enable him to take the offensive must be profoundly vexatious to a man like Kuropatkin, who, for all his dash and personal gallantry, is said to be a profound believer in the virtue of numbers. His present position forcibly recalls the remarks he made when he first accepted the mandate to take up the military command in Manchuria. "We must be patient," he said, and to an intimate friend he added: "The first month they will say that I am inactive; the second month that I am incapable; and the third month that I am a traitor, for we shall be repulsed and beaten without serious consequences for what will follow, or, indeed, for the result of the operations. I shall let people talk, and stick to my resolve only to advance in July, when I shall dispose of the overwhelming masses that I require."

Some very graphic accounts are given by various correspondents of the Russian military headquarters at Liao-yang. The latter is described by Mr. Douglas Story, the representative of the *Daily Express*, as "a square-built, drab-tinted Chinese city that has sprawled incontinently over its mud walls into suburbs and subsidiary hamlets." To its south and west is the railway station where General Kuropatkin lives in a railway car, the officers of his Staff being scattered about in wagons, huts, and the cottages of the railroad administration. "As in all modern warfare, there is an utter absence of the pomp and panoply of battle. Guns there are none. The only flag is an enlarged handkerchief marking headquarters The number of sentries would not satisfy a provincial German mayor. The scientific factor alone is prominent. The officers are directors of engineers or commissariat or transport. The men are electricians, and telegraphists, and railway administrators. The air is ruled with telephone wires, as a usurer's cash-book with money columns. The officers in uniform are but exalted messenger boys carrying despatches from the brain in the railway car to the men in shirt-sleeves at the telegraph office. Twentieth century war is reduced at headquarters to the appearance of a stockbroker's office."

General Kuropatkin has not settled down even to this condition of sedentary activity without having made a very complete inspection of the forces at his disposal. There is no point in the line held by the troops under his immediate command which he has not actually visited; no circumstance of the situation with which he has not striven to become personally familiar. Even now he makes a point of welcoming the troops as they come in, and does his best to foster in every way that curious idea of family kinship which forms such a remarkable bond of union between all ranks of the Russian Army.

But strong, self-reliant, capable man as he is, Kuropatkin cannot but at times find the burden of his position very oppressive. He has before him an enemy whom he is too good a soldier not to view with increasing respect, and the story goes that he is beginning to awaken to at least one trait in his adversary's character of which he was not previously aware. His former conception of the Japanese as soldiers is said to have made full allowance for their bravery, but to have included an altogether wrong estimate of their strategical capacity. He believed that the Japanese would sacrifice much real efficiency to theatrical effect, and has been somewhat disagreeably surprised to find that not only have they a full measure of dash and daring, that not only can they "stand punishment" to an almost incredible extent, but that their strategy and leadership are alike of the highest order. He recognises now that no sort of liberty can be taken with men who, whatever the operation may happen to be in which they are engaged, appear to be controlled by brains fully equal to those to be ordinarily found in any European War Office. Such discoveries are emphasised by the continued presence of an army in front which cannot be safely attacked, by the probability that this army, supported by others, may advance before appreciable Russian reinforcements can be accumulated, and by the unpleasant consciousness that nothing has as yet occurred to render a Russian army certain of being able to beat a Japanese force of even equal numerical strength.

Among special additional causes for disquietude Kuropatkin cannot but reckon his increasing commissariat difficulties and the doubtful quality of many of the guns at his disposal. It is true that, for the time being, Port Arthur is in a sense off his hands as regards supplies, and Mukden is able to look after itself to some extent, as it is drawing a certain amount of provisions up from the sea through Niu-chwang. But outlying detachments can only with extreme difficulty be kept furnished with food, not only because there is no great superfluity of the latter, but because there is so little transport available, and the roads are almost everywhere in a terrible state. The Chunchuses are continuing their daring attacks upon the railway, and several untoward breaks in the communications increase the difficulties of a Commander-in-Chief to whom every day lost in this way means from one to two thousand fewer troops at hand, with added commissariat troubles.

As regards artillery, there can now be little question as to the Russian inferiority in all save the fortress guns mounted at Port Arthur. It is definitely stated that of some three hundred field guns at General Kuropatkin's disposal, less than half are of later date than 1898. This is the more serious, of course, in view of the proved efficiency of the Arisaka quick-

firing field gun, and the full supply there seems to be of this powerful and accurate weapon in the Japanese armies.

General Kuropatkin's outward show of confidence and sangfroid in the face of these embarrassments is quite remarkable. Now, too, that he has settled down in earnest to his task, he inspires perhaps more zeal in the real workers around him than if he imitated the rather reckless personal habits of his old chief, Skobeleff. A portrait of him furnished by Reuter's correspondent at Liao-yang describes him as working practically all day, except for half-an-hour's siesta after luncheon, and occasionally relaxation in the form of good literature. Despatches from leaders in the field are brought to him at all hours of the day or night, but his rule is to rise at seven and retire at midnight, after drawing up his daily message to the Tsar, in which the situation is summarised. It is added that the Russian Commander-in-Chief sets a general example of abstemiousness to his officers, eating of simple dishes and partaking sparingly of wine.

A striking indication of General Kuropatkin's increasing apprehension lest he may not be able, at Liao-yang or Mukden, to stem the tide of the Japanese advance, is afforded by the preparations which begin to be in evidence about this time for fortifying Harbin against the contingency of the siege. A Moscow correspondent of the *Times* writes, under date May 28th, that he has learned from an unusually well-informed Russian source that this fortification is to be carried out without loss of time and irrespective of expense. Some time previously it had been mentioned that a number of heavy siege guns were being despatched to the Far East by rail, and it now transpires not only that these are intended for Harbin, but that a further considerable number of heavy guns are to be removed for the same purpose from Kronstadt and other first-class fortresses.

But a more serious trouble, perhaps, than any which has arisen in connection with supplies, or men, or war material, has been that which has its source in divided counsels. The friction between Admiral Alexeieff and General Kuropatkin has of late been growing extremely severe, and the operations of General Oku's Army in the neighbourhood of Port Arthur have brought about a crisis in the relations between the Tsar's two leading representatives in the Far East, which cannot but be attended by grave consequences.

Some revelations recently made concerning the manner in which Admiral Alexeieff became Viceroy of the Far East go far to explain why General Kuropatkin can hardly be expected to regard his superior now at Mukden with any special friendliness. They also illustrate with painful clearness that weakness and susceptibility to casual influences which have rendered the Tsar so hopelessly incapable of controlling the work of his representatives in the Far East with the necessary mixture of firmness and confidence.

It is now pretty generally understood that Russia was involved in war largely through the evil counsels of M. Bezobrazoff, formerly a Secretary of State, but now in retirement in Switzerland. M. Bezobrazoff had previously held an appointment in the Far East, and, on returning to St. Petersburg, was influentially recommended to the Tsar, in whose favour he rose rapidly. When in the summer of 1903 General Kuropatkin was despatched to the Far East, the Tsar, "who is at times seized with distrust in

GENERAL KUROPATKIN, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES.

his Ministers," sent M. Bezobrazoff after Kuropatkin "with a view to exercise some kind of unofficial control over the General's movements, and over the report he was expected to deliver." It will be remembered that General Kuropatkin's journey culminated in a great council held at Port Arthur, and attended by a number of high officials. At this it was decided to recommend the institution of a separate Viceroyalty of the Far East, and it is conceivable that General Kuropatkin may well have imagined that his own claims to be given the new appointment would be favourably considered. But there were other forces at work. Immediately after the council was closed M. Bezobrazoff returned to St. Petersburg, sought an audience with the Tsar, and submitted his unofficial report. As a result of his interview the Tsar nominated Admiral Alexeieff for the Viceroyalty, and Kuropatkin on his return, to his and almost everyone else's astonishment, learnt that the recommendations he was about to make officially had been anticipated, and that Alexeieff had already secured the coveted post.

The memory of this intrigue has naturally rankled, and it was not to be expected that Kuropatkin would do more than outwardly patch up his difference with the man who had so clearly gone behind his own back in a great affair of State as well as one of personal interest. We have seen how General Gilinski, a man of notable tact, has been specially appointed to Kuropatkin's Staff, in the hope that he would prove a useful intermediary between the latter and the Viceroy. But from the first there must have been serious disagreement, intensified by Alexeieff's repeated interference in matters which should surely have been left to the Commander-in-Chief's sole discretion. Attention has already been drawn in Chapter XXIV. to the existence of these troubles, and the probability that to them the reverse at Kiu-lien-cheng was partly due. It is now suggested that when Niu-chwang was evacuated one day by order of Kuropatkin, it was re-occupied the next by command of Alexeieff, and it may be readily understood that such a state of affairs has become almost intolerable to a high-spirited man like the Russian Commander-in-Chief.

Towards the end of May and at the beginning of June Alexeieff's friends at Court, for whom he has doubtless to thank the former zeal and industry of M. Bezobrazoff, bring all the influence they can possibly collect to bear upon the Tsar in order to procure an attempted relief of Port Arthur. We have already seen that the Tsar has referred the matter to General Kuropatkin, and has been assured by the latter that in the present condition of affairs the thing is impossible. But the determined manner in which General Oku has set to work in the Liao-tung Peninsula, and, above all, the failure of the Russians to hold even such a strong position as that at Nan-shan against a Japanese attack, have re-opened the question, and a controversy of extraordinary warmth and some acrimony ensues; one, moreover, which is destined to have very tragic results.

The Battle of Nan-shan was fought on May 26th, and we may reasonably take it that the severity of the blow was increased for General Kuropatkin by the knowledge that here was an argument which his opponents might well turn to their advantage. Doubtless he had said, "What need to talk of relieving Port Arthur yet? Why not wait until the Japanese have blunted their bayonets,

and lost thousands of their soldiers, in a futile attempt to storm the advanced defences of Port Arthur, defences which nature and art have combined to render impregnable?" What a peculiarly bitter reflection for the Commander-in-Chief it must have been that now, in addition to being saddled with much of the responsibility of this past misfortune, he would have renewed pressure put upon him to retrieve the Russian losses by an operation probably still more ineffectual and costly than the stand made at Kin-chau and Nan-shan.

On May 27th, whether by Alexeieff's desire or on his initiative it matters not, Kuropatkin arrives about 5 o'clock in the evening at Mukden by special train. There is the usual official reception, but the Commander-in-Chief does not linger over this ceremony, and forthwith visits the Viceroy at the latter's quarters. Here there is considerably more show and comfort than in connection with General Kuropatkin's own unostentatious and very mobile establishment at Liao-yang. Indeed, several of the correspondents have remarked upon the singular difference of the surroundings in the two cases, from which we may infer that Admiral Alexeieff is careful to maintain, if only for the purpose of impressing the Chinese, a measure of Viceregal pomp. Russian officials, too, when they aim at being ostentatiously comfortable, and desire to create a favourable idea of their greatness and distinction, can generally succeed in producing a mixture of Eastern and Western magnificence which is highly effective from the spectacular standpoint.

A great deal of personal as well as of historical and political interest is centred in this interview. Both men concerned are men who have made history, but there is a wide difference in the methods they have adopted. Both are men of action, but the action in the one case has been as distinct from that in the other as the work of a miner who toils with pick and shovel is distinct from that of the user of dynamite. Of the two, Kuropatkin's seems, from the English standpoint, the simpler, more direct, more straightforward character, a suggestion, perhaps, to be qualified by the reflection that as yet he has not been severely tried in any very tremendous ordeal. Alexeieff has undoubtedly risen to his present eminence as the result of intrigues, some of which may have been rather unscrupulous; for his rise to the Viceroyalty was entirely unexpected, so little had he apparently done to deserve such an exceptional elevation. On the other hand, it must be remembered that intrigue, more especially intrigue for personal advancement, is part and parcel of Russian official life, and there are probably few details of Alexeieff's career, including the sops which he is said to have thrown to the Russian Court in the shape of promised concessions and other profitable contingencies in Korea, which are not viewed with cynical tolerance in Russian society. There must, moreover, be something more than mere dexterity and obstinacy about a man who has contrived to retain his position in spite of the terrible reverses which his policy has already produced; in spite even of the appointment as Commander-in-Chief, with the privilege of independent communication with the Tsar, of a man who knows "by what by-paths and indirect crook'd ways," he himself became the Emperor's greater representative. Whatever faults Alexeieff may have, he is no weakling, and in the East, perhaps more particularly the Far East, it is often

better to be strong and wrong than it is to be right and flabby.

To turn to the interview, which seems to have been a stormy one, and which lasts until 10 o'clock, when Kuropatkin takes his departure and returns forthwith to Liao-yang. Our authority for what occurred as a result of this "violent discussion" is that of the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Echo de Paris*, whose information is evidently of the best. He says that each of the two commanders sent a detailed report to the Tsar, Admiral Alexeieff insisting upon the necessity of saving Port Arthur in order to keep a base for the Fleet, and in order to avoid the evil effect which the capture of the fortress would have on Russian prestige. He pointed out that, to judge by the manner in which the Japanese had stormed the Nan-shan position, it was not certain that they would not sacrifice an enormous number of men in order to take Port Arthur. The Russian Army must, therefore, advance to its rescue.

General Kuropatkin's argument was that it would be folly for him to leave his strong position at Liao-yang in order to make any forward movement. With General Kuroki fronting him, and other Japanese forces at Takushan, it would be most imprudent to attempt a flank march from Liao-yang in the direction of Port Arthur. He preferred to keep to his original plan, and to remain at Liao-yang until he had 400,000 men *(sic)*, leaving Port Arthur to defend itself. He considered, moreover, that the capture of Port Arthur would have no tactical importance.

Admiral Alexeieff and General Kuropatkin asked the Tsar to decide between them. The latter, on receipt of the two reports, assembled at Tsarskoe Selo a grand Council of War, which lasted several hours, and at which General Sakharoff, Admiral Avellan, and M. de Plehve, the Ministers of War, of Marine, and of the Interior, were present.

Here, again, must have been an extraordinarily interesting discussion, one in which it would seem that the Tsar played a somewhat different part from that which would probably have been taken by most of his Romanoff predecessors. Indeed, one can hardly imagine some of the greater Autocrats of All the Russias condescending to consult anyone on such a point. That Nicholas II. derived much comfort from the consultation is doubtful, since he cannot but have perceived the force of General Kuropatkin's contention, and have felt the unwisdom of, so to speak, throwing good money after bad in an almost hopeless speculation. For the naval argument triumphs. Port Arthur, Admiral Avellan contended, must be kept as a base, a base "all the more necessary as the Baltic Fleet would not know where to go if Port Arthur were to fall." The damaged prestige card is also played for all it is worth, and the specially bad effect which the loss of Port Arthur would have on an agitated China, is carefully foreshadowed. Accordingly, the advice of the Council of War is that General Kuropatkin shall be instructed to attempt the relief of Port Arthur, but warned to proceed with extreme caution.

Alas, poor Kuropatkin! Seldom has a leader in the field been more unhappily placed than he is by this unfortunate decision. Obedience is imperative, and obedience can hardly mean anything but failure, except by a miracle. Even success would bring him little credit, for it would be said that he only undertook the operation under compulsion. But success is the last thing likely to happen in

TRIED FOR HIS LIFE: A JAPANESE SPY BEFORE A RUSSIAN COURT MARTIAL HELD IN A MANCHURIAN TEMPLE.

the circumstances. The only hope left is that the consequences of failure may be minimised. There is probably no more loyal servant of the Tsar than the gallant Kuropatkin, but even he may find his loyalty severely tested at the trying moment when he receives the Imperial mandate. Surely he must envy Kuroki and Oku their tenure of commands in an Army which is not sacrificed to senseless indulgence of naval *amour propre*. For Kuropatkin knows well that the chances of any favourable turn in the tide for Russia can no longer depend—at any rate, for many months to come—on any naval consideration. He is well aware of the real condition of the Port Arthur fleet, and is under no delusions as to the capacity of the Baltic squadron to intervene effectually in the affairs of the Far East. Yet to satisfy naval exigencies he must risk thousands of the troops which he has been accumulating with such patience in a hopeless attempt to save a fortress, the fall of which would in reality simplify his own plan of operations considerably. How different this from the beautiful harmony which so clearly exists in the combined naval and military operations of the enemy! Kuropatkin, we may be sure, is not so wedded to the belligerent methods of Holy Russia as not to be able to recognise that Japan will indeed prove difficult to overcome, if her present advantages are thus materially increased by Russia's failure to use what strength she has to a right purpose.

While Kuropatkin regretfully prepares to carry out the Imperial behest by detaching a force for the relief of the beleaguered fortress in the south, we may cast a further glance at the Russian position in a quarter somewhat remote from those two centres of dissension, Mukden and Liao-yang.

Careful attention has been given in preceding chapters to the progress of affairs in Korea, and in Chapter XXII. allusion was made to an attack made on May 19th by a Cossack detachment on Ham-yeng, a rudely fortified town to the north of Gen-san. Later reports indicate that the Russians subsequently burned 500 houses in the suburbs of Ham-yeng, and partially destroyed the longest bridge in Korea, which spans the Song-chun river. The force, which is estimated at about 1,000 men with 12 guns, retires, but reappears later, causing the headlong flight of the Korean garrison. By the end of May Ham-yeng was in Russian occupation, some 300 troops being engaged in fortifying the hill immediately south of the town.

There are about 2,000 Japanese soldiers at this time in Gen-san, and on June 3rd a detachment of about thirty of these under a Japanese lieutenant fall in, a few miles north of Gen-san, with a Cossack detachment of five-and-twenty men, and, having drawn the enemy into an ambush, kills three and wounds severely two of the party. The engagement, trivial as it is, has some interest as being the first collision by land on this coast, and also as indicating the extended scope of the Cossack raids in this quarter. It may be added that as the Russians are burning the Korean villages in their retreat, the natives suddenly fell on them with old flintlock muskets and various other weapons, killing two and wounding several.

The roving Cossack bodies make no present attempt to attack Gen-san, but branch off westward, and we hear of them or kindred bodies harassing the Japanese line of communication between An-ju and the Yalu. The Japanese affect to regard these operations with uncon-

cern, and denounce the brutalities inflicted upon helpless villagers as wanton raids, to be classed with the sinking of small merchantmen by the Russian squadrons. It is true that these operations at present appear rather aimless, that they do not cause the enemy much direct damage, and that innocent natives are treated in some instances with considerable severity. But there is another side to the argument, which in fairness to Russia should be stated. Korea having accepted what is virtually a Japanese protectorate, is clearly at war with Russia, and the latter is perfectly justified in seeking to make the Koreans realise that fact. Her methods are certainly not of the kid-glove order, but if they were the Koreans would probably fail to understand them. It is, moreover, obviously to the advantage of Russia to create the impression in Korea that the latter country has been hasty in entering into an alliance that exposes her inhabitants to a succession of outrages, against which the allies are powerless to afford protection. The Cossack raids in Korea may not be a very lofty sort of warfare, but may still prove to assist the Russian cause materially, and the Japanese make a serious mistake if they really despise operations merely because they have not first-class military importance and cannot be dealt with strategically. Some of the Boer operations in the last South African War were of this description, and the amount of trouble they gave us was certainly not contemptible.

For the rest, there is still some chance that these apparently desultory performances may be the designed prelude to a movement on a larger scale. While it is not desired to carry the tale of this chapter chronologically beyond about the first twelve days of June, we may in this case look a very little ahead, and take note of a special telegram from Gen-san to the Paris edition of the *New York Herald*, which is dated June 18th, and appears not without significance. The correspondent reports that the Russians have built a bridge across the Tumen River, using junks for pontoons. They have also restored the telegraph wires from Kyengseng to the north. An unconfirmed rumour states that a large additional force of Russians is crossing the Tumen and proceeding south.

This hint may serve to remind us that the Russians, as well as the Japanese, have what Kipling finely calls a "far-flung battle-line," and that we must keep our eyes constantly moving over an enormous tract of country if we wish to obtain a correct estimate of the immense strategical problems involved in this great War. Let us not forget that the distance from Vladivostok to Port Arthur, even as the crow flies, is some 550 miles, and that the responsibilities of the big bearded man in the railway-car at Liaoyang, which constitutes the Headquarters of the Russian Field Army, extend over a yet longer line of country, much of it most difficult, and most of it very imperfectly mapped. If then there are surprises yet in store from this quarter, we must be ready with our tribute of admiration for a man who can keep Vladivostok possibilities in view while forced, against his better judgment, to waste his growing strength in an attempt to do for Port Arthur what is not expedient, even if it be remotely possible.

RUSSIAN TRANSPORT TRAIN.

CHAPTER XXXI.

A BATTLE PROSPECT—RELIEVING ARMY FOR PORT ARTHUR—POSITION AT TELISSU—JAPANESE AT PORT ADAMS—OKU'S ADVANCE—FIGHTING ON JUNE 14TH—BATTLE OF TELISSU—ARTILLERY ADVANTAGE—HORRORS OF A RETREAT.

SHORTLY after daybreak on June 15th a portentous spectacle is revealed amid the hills and brushwood on both sides of the railway some thirty miles north of Port Adams. Here in a strong position lies massed a Russian force mustering over 30,000 of all arms, with nearly 100 guns. Such solidity, such strength, such genuine fighting efficiency, would seem to ensure, if not an easy victory against almost any army which the Japanese could at this moment bring to bear upon this point, at least ability to brush away attacks, and to resume if necessary an irresistible advance.

But a great body of troops occupying a narrow front has its limitations, and its peculiar risks. A further survey of the scene that is now about to be enacted in a parallelogram measuring some twenty miles by ten, shows that not only is this powerful detachment from the main Russian army at Liao-yang being boldly attacked by a slightly superior Japanese force, but that the threshold has been reached of a great enclosing movement from which the Russians may only be able to escape with terrible loss. Already the points from which the Japanese guns are roaring in the grey dawn of this close summer day indicate that a ring of fire is being gradually formed, from which, as the day wears on, the crowded masses of the enemy cannot but suffer frightfully. Soon we shall see the artillery preparation slacken, and, bit by bit, the enveloping process will be rendered more distinct by the advance of great columns of infantry. The Russians, who have taken an early offensive, will find the pressure on one of

their flanks greater than they can bear. The offensive will shrivel up, not only from the fiery blast of opposition, but also from "lack of nourishment," since forces which should have supported it are needed to meet the attacks which are being developed on right and left, and which will even threaten the rear. A critical moment will arrive when, if the Russian commander persists in attempting to hold untenable ground, his troops, exposed the while to a pitiless storm of deadly fire, annihilation or surrender must ensue. At that critical juncture a retreat will be ordered, and at a ghastly cost the Russian army will be extricated from a position which in a few more hours might have meant one of the most awful disasters in which any modern army has been involved. Even as it is, the Russians will have suffered a shock from which immediate recovery is hopeless, which may seriously compromise the whole military situation as far as Russia is concerned, and which will certainly assist the forward movement, in strong and elastic co-operation, of the armies of Japan now in the field.

It is, indeed, a great and eventful struggle that is thus foreshadowed in the very early morning of June 15th. To those who have followed this narrative at all closely, even the rough outline given in the preceding two paragraphs may convey something of cause as well as of effect, since, from the position of the opposing forces, it will be readily understood that here we have the almost inevitable result of the Russian decision to attempt the relief of Port Arthur, the making of which was narrated in the preceding chapter. But in any case the

GENERAL STACKELBERG.

Battle of Telissu—by some called Wa-fang-tien, by others, again, Wa-fang-kau—can neither be satisfactorily described in an outline sketch, nor fairly delineated merely by broad splashes of picturesque description. It is a very important action, in some respects far in advance of the culminating engagements on the Yalu and at Nan-shan; and, while not unmindful of its more graphic aspects, we must not let such an important stage in our narrative pass without some detailed examination of the steps by which it was reached, as well as of the actual developments themselves.

We left General Kuropatkin in our last chapter ruefully making preparations to carry out the Imperial injunction to make an attempt to relieve Port Arthur, and "at the same time to exercise extreme caution."

It says much for the steady, unostentatious work which the Commander-in-Chief has been doing since his arrival at Liao-yang, that no delay takes place in taking the necessary preliminary measures. For many weeks General Kuropatkin has been busily organising and welding into compact units the troops at his immediate disposal, and consequently he is enabled with very little difficulty to set in motion what may be described as a moderately strong army corps, with a cavalry brigade and the artillery usually attached to three Russian divisions—namely, about 100 guns. The command of this force is given to Lieutenant-General Baron Stackelberg, and it must have proceeded southwards by way of Haicheng during the early days of June, its concentration effectively covered by the cavalry screen which has for some time been standing across the north-western corner of the Liao-tung Peninsula, and troops from which were in evidence on May 30th at the fight near Wa-fang-kau station, described in Chapter XXIX.

We have no precise knowledge at the time of writing of the movements of General Stackelberg's force prior to June 13th, and, having regard to the results of the action of the 15th, it is not likely that any very full details will ever be published. But it seems that Telissu, situated between Wa-fang-kau and Wa-fang-tien, and twenty-eight miles north of Pulantien (Port Adams), was not a mere halting-place on the line of advance, but a point of concentration, and was specially chosen with a view to an attempt to force the Japanese barrier between Pu-lan-tien and Pi-tsu-wo. Indeed, it is possible that on June 13th the concentration was hardly complete, since even on June 15th fresh troops were brought up by rail, which may well have been not reinforcements, but merely the remainder of the battalions required to make up three divisions of infantry. Some such supposition as this seems needed to account for the prolonged halt at Telissu, which would otherwise have been a strange proceeding on the part of a relief force, whose business clearly it was to push forward as quickly as possible in order to avoid a descent upon its flank by the Japanese forces known to be at Takushan.

On June 13th, in any case, we have the Russians in force under General Stackelberg at Telissu, with their outposts pushed out beyond Wa-fang-tien in the direction of Port Adams. Their main position was intersected by the railway which runs northwards through Kai-chau to Haicheng. Their left rested on a point, probably a little to the east of the railway, while their right appears not to have extended to any great extent beyond Ta-fang-shen,

some six miles to the west of the line.

The ground occupied is very broken, and is described as consisting mainly of a series of low, irregular hills and brown kopjes, which rise occasionally to a height of 500 feet. The railway cutting follows the gorges, and, winding up from the south-west, comes the Fuchau river. The latter, a little north of Telissu, enters a defile through which, and through others parallel with it, lay the only practicable line of retreat from the Russian position.

There is no need to complicate a simple account of a not very intricate battle by a number of names only marked on a few not generally accessible maps. But it may be mentioned that three or four miles nearly due south of Telissu is a village called Lung-wang-miao, with another called Ta-fang-shen some five miles to the westward. Three or four miles south of Lung-wang-miao, again, is Lung-kia-tun, and a little to the south-west of the latter is Yuhoton.

TYPICAL RUSSIAN PIONEER FAMILY IN MANCHURIA.

The Russian position had the obvious advantage that its centre rested on the railway, and that consequently reinforcements could be brought up even at the very last moment. It was inherently of considerable strength, and, if a broad front had been occupied throughout and the cavalry suitably employed on the flanks, any enveloping movement might

have been frustrated. But, from the first, the Russian tendency was to fight on a front which, although at the outset it may have seemed a fairly broad one, contracted with great rapidity, until on the morning of the decisive battle the Russians were, as will be seen, bunched up round Telissu, and subsequently driven with great loss through the defiles to the north. It is almost needless to add that these defiles in the rear constituted the main defect of the position. But, in the circumstances, and more particularly if he intended almost immediately to advance to the attack of Port Adams, General Stackelberg is hardly to be blamed so much for not securing a good line of retreat as for inviting attack in a position in which his fine force was unduly cramped.

But, whatever the virtues and defects of the Telissu position may be, it is time now to leave it and return to the Japanese, whom we left in Chapter XXIX. anticipating some such Russian movement as is now in evidence by massing a sufficient force along the Pu-lan-tien—Pi-tsu-wo line. General Oku has come up from the south, and is at Pu-lan-tien on June 12th, when a scout brings in news of the undoubted presence of a large Russian army at Telissu.

It would seem that considerable credit is due to the Russians for their cavalry screen work in the north-east corner of the Liao-tung Peninsula during the early part of June. After the action at Wa-fang-kau, on May 30th, they appear to have demonstrated steadily in front of the Pi-tsu-wo—Pu-lan-tien line under General Kharkevitch, with the result that they were able to veil the movements in rear very effectively, as well as to obtain the earliest possible information of any movement likely to interfere with the concentration at Telissu. Many small encounters appear to have taken place during these few days, the Japanese being naturally as anxious as the Russians to get timely intelligence of any marked movement on the enemy's part. But the Japanese have the advantage of working within easy distance of a base at Port Adams, while the Russians deserve, perhaps, the greater credit, as they are probably dependent even for their supplies upon Haicheng.

The force which General Oku has at his disposal at Port Adams has been carefully concealed from enemies and friends alike, and its exact constitution must remain for the present a matter of conjecture. But it can hardly consist of less than three divisions, with a proportionate force of cavalry, while Russian accounts place the number of guns as high as 200, probably an estimate which may be safely halved. When the news comes in of the Russian concentration at Telissu, General Oku's decision is quickly arrived at. He will at once march out and attack the enemy, and there is abundant reason for this prudent resolve. In the first place, it has been throughout the campaign the Japanese plan to take the initiative; and although the Japanese superiority is not here so manifest as it was at Kiu-lien-cheng, and, numerically speaking, at Nan-shan, they have the enhanced *élan* which comes from previous victories, and the quick-firing Arisaka field-guns alone constitute a formidable advantage. Moreover, the Japanese commander is doubtless well aware of the disadvantage attached to the Telissu position, and will willingly risk something for such a splendid chance of inflicting a really serious blow upon the Russian armies. Finally, the great moment is now approaching when a com-

bined forward movement must be made, unless the various troubles which the rainy season entails are to be laboriously undergone. If the army intended to relieve Port Arthur can be beaten back from Telissu with sufficient vigour, an excellent opportunity will arise for coming into line with the forces at Feng-hwang-cheng and Takushan. In a word, the Russians have played into the Japanese hands by their concentration at Telissu, if only enough weight can be brought on the latter to secure its evacuation without such Japanese losses as will preclude a subsequent advance.

A JAPANESE COUNCIL OF WAR IN THE FIELD.

Accordingly, General Oku's force moves out from Pu-lan-tien and the vicinity on June 13th. The main body advances along the railway, the right by the Tasha river, the left by three

roads, the westernmost of which is the highway leading up to Fu-chau. The cavalry ride far away on the extreme right by a road leading from Pi-tsu-wo to Hiyugyochin.

Marching on such a broad front as this indicates, as the *Times* military critic observes, a confident reliance not only on the power of modern arms, but also upon Japanese skill and intelligence in battle. Further, from the outset, some indication of the idea in view is afforded by the plan of a centre sufficiently strong to act as something better than a containing force, and of wings prepared to overlap and surround the Russian flanks.

As the Japanese columns progress, the cavalry rout small parties of the enemy, and the infantry drive in many of the enemy's outposts, the columns bivouacking after a march of twelve miles.

On the morning of June 14th the advance is resumed, the left wing moving independently to Na-kia-ling, some twenty miles to the south-west of Telissu, while the centre and right reach the line Chia-kia-tan—Ta-ping-kau, which lies about eight miles south of Telissu. The country is hilly and the advance difficult, but the Japanese infantry and artillery press on steadily, while the cavalry push ahead and reconnoitre the enemy's position. This is found to extend from Ta-fang-shen on the west of the line to Lung-wang-miao on the east. Already 25 infantry battalions, 17 squadrons of cavalry, and 98 guns are present in the Russian fighting line.

It is now midday of June 14th, and the work of the Japanese centre and right consists mainly in pushing back advanced parties of the enemy, until about three o'clock the line Yuhoton—Lung-kia-tun is reached, when the battle may be said to begin in earnest.

By this time the Japanese artillery has taken up positions not only along the new line reached by the centre and right, but also on the heights to the west of Telissu, which have been occupied by the Japanese left wing. From 3 to 5 p.m. a cannonade is directed on the Russian positions, but no further advance is made until nightfall, when the Japanese centre moves round to the north-westward, the left pushing forward in a north-easterly direction, while the right remains in position opposed to the Russian left.

The object of this interesting manœuvre is not hard to understand. The intention is to envelop and press the enemy into the defiles north of Telissu, the Japanese detachment on the right keeping the enemy's left at Lung-wang-miao sufficiently occupied to prevent its supporting the Russian left and centre.

At daybreak on June 15th, then, the Japanese are already enveloping the contracted Russian position, and, as soon as it is sufficiently clear—for until 5.30 the morning is foggy—the artillery of the right and of the centre, which has now worked round to the Fuchau river, opens fire.

Meanwhile, the Russians have not been idle. They too have had hopes of carrying out a successful envelopment of the enemy's right, and have taken the offensive against the Japanese right and centre accordingly. The Russian infantry appear to have advanced with great determination, and the Japanese right must have suffered severely. In the early stages of the battle it received notable assistance from the Japanese cavalry, which galloped up and dashed against the enemy's flanks and rear. But the Russian reserves came up, and until 3 p.m. the fighting in this quarter is extremely hot. Twice the Japanese right has to be

reinforced from the reserves, and if the flanking movement on the left had not been carried out with singular skill and vigour the Russians under command of General Gerngross might have completely altered the character of the result. As this movement are found to be badly wanted elsewhere, and even the reserves of the Russian centre, which has dashed against the Japanese centre now steadily advancing along the valley of the Fuchau river, have to be diverted to the right



JAPANESE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE RUSSIAN POSITION AT TELISSU—JUNE 13, 14, 15.

it was, with the aid of a skilfully concealed battery, they somewhat more than held their own, and subjected the Japanese to heavy losses.

But all hopes of a Russian envelopment of the Japanese flank are soon at an end. The troops destined to carry out flank. This last consisted largely, at the commencement of the fight, of Cossacks and Dragoons, who were doubtless being held back in the hope that effective use might be made of them at a later stage on what was believed to be the Japanese left flank. But by about ten o'clock it

became evident that the Japanese left wing had worked round sufficiently far to overlap the Russian right completely, and Cossacks and Dragoons now find themselves threatened by infantry and guns. They charge with desperate gallantry, but are hurled back, and the shrapnel begins to burst continuously among the devoted horsemen.

According to one account, it is at this moment that a train steams right up to the Russian lines laden with troops. These leap from the carriages, form up, and are almost instantly engaged; an interesting episode, and one which aptly shows how the extremes of modernity and antiquity may meet even on the battlefield. At first sight, the appearance of a train steaming up with reinforcements in the midst of a hard-fought action seems to indicate a pretty advanced stage of latter-day science as applied to the art of war. Yet, when we think of the war-chariot bringing up its contributions of fighting men to hotly contested sections of very ancient battlefields, one realises how easily old principles can be found at the bottom of much new practice.

Returning to the Russian right, now being laid bare by the rain of Japanese shrapnel, against which the reserves that General Stackelberg has hurried to this point are powerless, the beginning of the end is now apparent. The Japanese advantage runs from their left to their right in a diminishing scale. On the left they have little before them: in the centre they have met and are now turning the Russian main onslaught: it is only on the right that the issue remains doubtful. But when one of an enemy's flanks is laid bare and his centre shows signs of wavering, the fighting on the other flank can hardly readjust the balance. Thus at about two o'clock the Battle of Telissu is to all practical intents and purposes won, and it is to the credit of the Russian commander that he realises this fact, and does not commit the fatal error of remaining on the ground until the Japanese envelopment is so complete that his line of retreat, defective as it is, is cut off.

The first effects of the intention of the Russians to retire is probably observable at the railway station, upon which Japanese shells are now beginning to fall. There are several trains in the station, and these file out one after the other, some packed with wounded, others carrying away valuable stores.

Meanwhile, the fighting continues, the Japanese artillery having secured complete predominance, which they use with deadly effect against the inferior guns of the enemy. Of this General Stackelberg affords evidence in his despatch announcing his defeat. He mentions that during the engagement the 3rd and 4th batteries of the 1st Artillery Brigade were literally cut to pieces by the Japanese shells. Of 16 guns 13 were rendered completely useless and were abandoned. One cannot withhold sympathy from the gallant Russian gunners, who stuck manfully to their posts in spite of this overwhelming superiority of power in the enemy's fire. The infantry, too, are to be sincerely pitied for their exposure to a storm of shrapnel which is said to have been of quite awful severity. The Russian trenches, as at Kiu-lien-cheng, appear to have been wretchedly constructed, and the deadly rain of bullets, which shrapnel shells on bursting send down, swept these with merciless completeness. Many of the wounded Russians afterwards interviewed in Liao-yang allowed not a murmur concerning their sufferings or the doubtful generalship of which they were the

RUSSIAN COSSACK ARTILLERY.

victims to pass their lips. "Their only grievance," says a correspondent of the *Russkoe Slovo*, "was that our inferiority in artillery had made the day go against them."

It has been doubted by critics whether too much may not be made of the Japanese artillery superiority in this engagement, and one brilliant writer goes so far as to say that "in the position taken up by General Stackelberg round shot or Greek fire would have been almost as damaging," since that position was turned on both flanks and exposed to fire at effective ranges from front, flanks, and rear. Such an assertion, if properly supported, might go far to neutralise the effect of the preceding paragraph, and so, in passing, a word of notice may be devoted to it. In point of fact, there seems sufficient evidence to show that, only because the Japanese guns were what they were, the Japanese left and centre were able to make such a marked impression, and that only in the very last stage of the battle was the Russian left flank effectively turned. For some considerable time it seemed as if the "boot were on the other leg," and, had the Russian centre succeeded in getting home on the Japanese centre, instead of being crumpled up as it seems to have been, largely owing to the resistance it encountered from the Japanese quick-firers, the elaborate flanking movement of the Japanese left wing might have proved futile. The question may seem a contentious one, but it is really of sufficient interest and importance to justify its being sandwiched into the narrative at this point. Whether quick-firing artillery has or has not contributed largely to the winning of a battle in which some 70,000 troops are engaged is a matter of very grave moment, and the writer deems it a duty not to shirk an allusion to the subject, technical and controversial though it may be.

But to resume our narrative. At 3 p.m. the tide of battle finally turns. The Japanese centre, assisted by the left, has begun to press the Russians back from Ta-fang-shen on to Telissu, and General Stackelberg, seeing that further resistance is hopeless, gives the word to retreat. The melancholy order is evidently accepted with reluctance. In his despatch the Russian General says that many of his troops positively refused to retire until the order had been repeated, and doubtless this brave obstinacy is most clearly exhibited on the left, which, as the Japanese official accounts show, fought stubbornly to the last. The word once given, the aspect of the battle changes rapidly. Here and there a semblance of order is preserved, but there is little doubt that, for the most part, the retirement is a hopelessly confused one, particularly in the case of one section of the force, which has met with a very nerve-shattering experience. Having already commenced a retirement in the face of the advancing enemy, it falls at 1 p.m. into a trap set for it by the Japanese Commander, who had despatched two companies of infantry and one battery of artillery to lie in ambush for it. This ruse—one seldom attempted in the course of a battle—proves fearfully successful, and 700 or 800 Russians are so severely handled that further fighting is for them out of the question.

To the north of Telissu there are three roads by which General Stackelberg claims to have executed his retreat; but to all intents and purposes the beaten Russian Army is now in the lower tube of a funnel, and suffers accordingly, although the Japanese do not press the pursuit.

There is sufficient reason for this, perhaps, in the fact that the troops have had both hard marching and hard fighting in the last few days, and the prospect of meeting formed reinforcements sent down from Haicheng may also have been taken into consideration. But the real cause of the Japanese reluctance to follow up the victory probably lies in their cavalry deficiency, to which allusion has already been repeatedly made. There do not appear to have been more than 3,000 cavalry at most with General Oku's force, and many of these have been heavily engaged in co-operation with the Japanese right. The remainder, mounted on tired ponies, were probably quite unequal to the work of a pursuit which might otherwise have been pressed with very important results.

But, this disability notwithstanding, it may well be that the Japanese artillery did much to increase the horrors of the Russian retreat. Indeed, it is probable that here for the first time we see a notable practical illustration of the employment of field-guns in pursuit, which is regarded by the up-to-date artilleryman as a highly significant feature of modern tactics. There are occasions when guns properly handled can damage a retreating army even more than the sabres of pursuing horsemen. Along a road crowded with fugitives the troopers of a victorious army can but hack and thrust until their arms are tired, and their blades drip with a butchery sometimes hardly profitable even from war's cruel standpoint. There are times, too, when a few resolute men will turn, and with their last cartridges take a heavy toll of the pursuing squadrons. Far more complete, far less exhausting to the victors, far more deadly, sometimes, to the vanquished, are the effects of fire from a few guns posted at the close of the battle on an eminence overlooking the line of retreat. The fugitives press on with incredible swiftness, and that utter abandonment of all hope and of all mental and physical resistance which characterises a *sauve qui peut*. A dull feeling of satisfaction creeps into some experienced minds at the absence of the dreaded thunder of pursuing hoofs, the glitter of the descending sword, the thrust of the relentless lance. But another terror comes flying overhead to take the grim place of these. A dull resonant boom is heard in the distance, a shell screeches overhead and bursts, and down come the shrapnel bullets from the sky, quite as "ghastly dew" as ever the writer of "Locksley Hall" foresaw in his visions of the airy navies of the time to come. Stricken down by such far-ranging messengers of destruction, the fate of the poor wretches in a retreat is terrible indeed. For them there is the very minimum of hope unless they can limp painfully on until, after many hours of wellnigh intolerable suffering, they can stagger to the point at which their scattered comrades are beginning to pull themselves together.

But there is little need to expatiate on such horrors in detail Let it suffice to say that, while the Japanese return their losses at under 1,000, those of the Russians are variously estimated at from 3,500 to more than double that amount. Fourteen guns and some hundreds of prisoners fell into the hands of the Japanese

The hardships of the retreat must have been increased by a storm of great severity which broke out during the battle, and was attributed by some observers to the tremendous discharges of artillery. Many of the Russians had left

their great-coats in the trenches, and had to spend several nights in the open, seeking what rest they could find on the bare, sodden ground.

At the close of the day the Japanese, as at Kiu-lien-cheng and Nan-shan, bivouac on the battlefield, and it is not difficult to imagine the state of exultation which prevails. It is probable that a large proportion of those present have been in action for the first time, and with these the triumphant satisfaction of having shared in the past day's work may well produce feelings of pride and ecstasy. Kiu-lien-cheng may have been invested with the peculiar glory attached to the first action in a campaign, and the storming of Nan-shan Hill may have been a more toilsome operation. Yet Telissu has its own glory, and those who claim part or parcel of that glory may well be pardoned for "letting themselves go," as we may be sure both Japanese officers and men do here and there before they seek their well-earned rest.

Leaving the conquerors to their glowing reflections, let us turn once more to the sorrowful remnant of General Stackelberg's force, which trudges wearily on until it reaches Kai-chau. For, although it has the railway at its disposal, such trains as are available are required for other purposes, especially for the carriage of the many wounded who are being laboriously collected by the ambulances. At Kai-chau the troops fall into

"BANZAI!"

CELEBRATING A VICTORY:
A STREET SCENE IN TOKIO

shape a little, and a great effort is made to obliterate such traces as can be removed of the defeat, for the word goes round that Kuropatkin is coming to inspect the force. On the 20th the Commander-in-Chief arrives, and, like the good soldier he is, does his best to put fresh heart into the dispirited officers and men. In the course of his stirring address, he says, amid a storm of cheers: "I will see you soon again. We must settle with the Japanese promptly. If we do not, we shall not be able to go back to our homes." He also interviews separately the regiments which have specially distinguished themselves in the battle, and presents 250 St. George's Crosses to those recommended for that coveted distinction. It is not always that a beaten force is on the way to recovery of its efficiency and self-respect so soon as is here indicated, and it would be a grave mistake to underrate the significance of such effects, produced by the genuine quality of the Russian army, and by the sympathetic soldierliness of its illustrious Commander-in-Chief.

DR. SHIMOSE, THE INVENTOR OF THE SHIMOSE EXPLOSIVE, WHICH HAS MADE THE JAPANESE ARTILLERY FIRE SO EFFECTIVE.

CHAPTER XXXII.

EFFORTS TO RELIEVE PRESSURE ON PORT ARTHUR—BOLDNESS AND INITIATIVE—JAPANESE OVER-CONFIDENCE—CRUISERS LEAVE VLADIVOSTOK—SINKING OF JAPANESE TRANSPORTS—A SCENE OF BUTCHERY—KAMIMURA IN PURSUIT—SOME LESSONS—ANOTHER RAID.

WHEN the great Council of War assembled by the Tsar at Tsarskoe Selo came to the momentous and wrong-headed conclusion that a big effort must be made to relieve Port Arthur, it is probable that Admiral Alexeieff, as well as General Kuropatkin, received urgent instructions on this head. There is evidently still some means of communicating, at any rate occasionally, with the beleaguered garrison, and there is every reason to believe that the naval authorities at Port Arthur are made duly aware of the preparations on their behalf. In addition, it appears to have been suggested to Admiral Vitgert, commanding the fleet at Port Arthur, that, simultaneously with the appearance of General Stackelberg's force to the north of the Pu-lan-tien—Pi-tsu-wo line, a naval demonstration on the part of the blockaded squadron about June 14th might have a good result. This, doubtless, accounts for the sudden appearance outside the harbour on the date in question of the cruiser *Novik* and the ten destroyers, as narrated in the course of Chapter XXIX.

But yet another performance is to be synchronised with General Stackelberg's great and, as it turns out, abortive effort. Admiral Skrydloff at Vladivostok is also advised of the coming attempt to relieve the southern stronghold, now hemmed in on every side, and it goes without saying that this energetic officer is delighted to have a chance of sending his one "fleet in being" to sea with the full approval of his authorities. Probably he cherishes a hope that the time is not far distant when, even if Port Arthur falls, some portion of the ships now lying torpid in that harbour may be able to slip out and join him, thus enabling him to assume the dashing *rôle* which his temperament favours. In any case, he is eager to display activity, and welcomes an order which will justify him in running some measure of risk. Already, it is understood, he has taken his three cruisers some distance out to sea, and it is quite possible that his torpedo-craft have been employed in some daring and far-reaching reconnaissances. For it is clear from the subsequent exploits of his squadron that the Russians at Vladivostok have some very good information of the enemy's movements, which they are hardly likely to have acquired except by fairly direct methods.

By the light of later intelligence there is good ground for thinking that, if a man like Admiral Skrydloff had been in command at Vladivostok, more particularly during the month of April, a different complexion might have been given to the earlier stages of the naval campaign. For it transpires that there were many opportunities which might have been seized by the Vladivostok squadron, not merely to harass the Japanese maritime

communications, but even, if desired, to join the Port Arthur Fleet. With such an addition to his force as the *Gromoboi*, *Rurik*, *Rossia*, and the now missing *Bogatyr*, such a commander as Admiral Makaroff would probably have taken steps which might have, at any rate, deterred the Japanese from such audacious attempts as that of laying the mine or mines which sunk the *Petropavlosk*. The close discussion of such lost chances may seem rather superfluous, but a glance at the subject is instructive as indicating yet another of the numerous disabilities from which Russia suffered at the outset of the War. Wherever, too, even a gleam of success rewards a bold achievement, we are reminded of the possibility, faint though it is, that the naval balance may still be redressed to Russia's advantage by the operation of that unequalled driving force which lies in vigorous personality. The story about to be told is not a thrilling one, and it is far from illustrating any very magnificent heights of naval enterprise. But it does show boldness and initiative, the two qualities of which the Japanese Navy appears hitherto to have had the monopoly. In the military side of warfare it is often the case quite early in a campaign that all the boldness and initiative in the world are, practically speaking, powerless to alter materially a foregone conclusion. But the torpedo assuredly, the mine occasionally, and the submarine problematically, modify the conditions of naval warfare to such an extent that an undaunted and skilful commander is often himself worth many ships to the most severely handled fleet.

Reverting to the receipt at Vladivostok of the intelligence that an attempt is to be made to lessen the pressure on Port Arthur, we find Admiral Skrydloff, as hinted above, not only eager to assist this project, but prepared with useful information to this end. He is evidently aware that Japanese transports are still crossing the seas, and that in some instances the Japanese are so convinced of their naval supremacy that the transports are unaccompanied by ships of war. It is, probable, too, that he has been made acquainted with an incidental circumstance strangely suggestive of over-confidence on the part of the Japanese at a stage when no precaution should have been lacking in regard, more especially, to every sort of naval movement, however trivial.

For some time past it had been in contemplation by the Japanese authorities to give the foreign Naval Attachés and correspondents, and also some of the prominent members of the Japanese Diet, a chance of seeing for themselves the naval bases and other points of interest in the theatre of war. Accordingly, the captured Russian steamer *Manchuria* was fitted up for the reception of some sixty guests of the Navy Department, and on June 12th the ship left Yokosuka, one of the great Japanese dockyards, on a month's voyage. No secret was made of the vessel's departure, and the details of the trip were allowed to be telegraphed to Europe from Tokio. It is not at all unlikely that this news was telegraphed on from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, and that Admiral Skrydloff was seized with a desire to take advantage of Japan's audacity in attempting a "personally conducted tour" of this sort while Russia had still a mobile squadron in Far Eastern waters. In truth, the very idea of this tour could not but have been intensely exasperating to a man like Skrydloff, who would in particular resent the employment on such an errand of

a vessel only recently captured from Russia herself. Indeed, it is conceivable that he may at once have formed the idea of intercepting the *Manchuria*, or rather, to give it its new name, the *Manchu Maru*, and of thus providing the whole civilised world with a proof that Japan's Vladivostok under command of Vice-Admiral Bezobrazoff who came out to the Far East, as did Skrydloff, after the death of Makaroff at Port Arthur. Admiral Bezobrazoff flies his flag on the *Rossia*, and his general orders are "to assume the offensive against the mari-

MAP OF VLADIVOSTOK HARBOUR AND VICINITY.

command of the sea was not quite so absolute as she imagined.

Whether this may or not have entered Skrydloff's mind can, however, only be guessed. The known act is, that on June 12th his three cruisers, *Gromoboi*, *Rossia*, and *Rurik*, of 12,336, 12,200, and 10,940 tons respectively, steam out of

time communications of the Japanese Army."

Now, as the strength of a chain is the strength of its weakest link, so the offensive possibilities of a squadron are largely restricted by the speed and coal capacity of the ship which in these important respects has the least effi-

ciency. This in the present case is the *Rurik*, whose nominal speed is eighteen knots, but which is not likely now to be able to steam much more than fifteen. The *Rurik's* bunkers, too, are believed to have a capacity of not more than 2,000 tons, which means that, steaming at a moderate pace—say eleven knots—she could go for about twelve days, and cover rather over 3,000 miles, without coming to a standstill for want of coal. At first sight this seems to indicate a very fair scope of operations, but it must be remembered that it is between 600 and 700 miles from Vladivostok to the Straits of Korea in a "bee-line," and that, even in the best-planned raids, some deviation from the straight is necessary. Accordingly, it may be taken for granted that, before the squadron leaves Vladivostok, Admirals Skrydloff and Bezobrazoff most carefully discuss every detail of their enterprise by the light of the *Rurik's* capacity to stand a strain which may at any moment be greatly increased by the appearance on the scene of a Japanese squadron.

One can well imagine that a good deal of excitement prevails at Vladivostok when it becomes known that the cruiser division is about to put to sea. There is very little doubt that, as at Port Arthur, the arrival of the gallant but ill-fated Makaroff galvanised the garrison into renewed activity and confidence, so the presence of Skrydloff and Bezobrazoff at Vladivostok has done much to dispel the dull monotony of the previous condition of affairs. For the part played by Vladivostok in the campaign has hitherto been a dreary one. It has suffered bombardment, it is being pinched by lack of supplies, it has lost one of its four big ships by an inglorious accident, and, beyond the sinking of the *Kinshiu Maru*, described in Chapter XVI., it has nothing but a few sunk merchantmen to the credit even of its squadron. With fresh hopefulness, then, must the garrison learn that the new Naval Commander-in-Chief is about to assume the offensive, even though that offensive cannot at present take the shape of directly disputing Japan's supremacy at sea. At the same time it is probable that the more thoughtful of those who are still at Vladivostok realise somewhat clearly that, the more successful Admiral Bezobrazoff is in carrying out his raid, the more promptly and vigorously will the Japanese take measures to remove, if possible, such a standing menace to their security as a mobile Vladivostok squadron, with active Admirals in control and command, must necessarily be.

The three cruisers leave Vladivostok, as noted, on June 12th, probably in the early morning, and they should present a goodly appearance, since all are powerful ships, and advantage will have been taken of their inactivity, and of the dock accommodation in the Golden Horn, to get them into the best possible trim for real work. They steam due south, and on the morning of June 15th are advancing from the north towards the Straits of Shimonoseki, which separate Hondo, the central Island of Japan, from the southernmost Island known as Kiusiu.

When within about twenty miles of the Straits the Russians perceive on the horizon two steamers, which they chase but cannot overhaul, owing to the long start obtained by the fugitives. At the same time a third ship is seen, and the Russian Admiral signals to the *Gromoboi* to capture her. The vessel proves to be a transport of over 3,000 tons burden belonging to the Nippon Yusen Kaisha,

the famous Japanese passenger steamship line. Her name is the *Izumi Maru*, and she is *en route* from China, carrying chiefly sick and wounded. The Russians signal to her to stop, but she pays no heed. The *Gromoboi* opens fire, and the *Izumi Maru*, having been struck by several shells, heaves to. Those on board are seen to be leaping into the sea, and the *Gromoboi* now signals that the ship must be completely abandoned. In compliance with this peremptory order two boats are lowered, and the *Gromoboi* takes on board the crews of these, as well as the men in the water whom her own boats have succeeded in rescuing. The *Izumi Maru* is then sunk by the *Gromoboi's* guns. It is satisfactory to be able to add that the non-combatants are released the next day and transferred to a Japanese steamer, which brings them in due course to Maizuru.

VICE-ADMIRAL BEZOBRAZOFF.

Shortly after 9 a.m. two more large vessels are sighted to the south-east. These are found to be the transports *Hitachi Maru* and *Sado Maru*, both of 6,000 tons register, the former carrying troops and stores, the latter some men of the Telegraph Corps, and about a dozen officers, in addition to stores and pontoons. The *Hitachi Maru* is leading by seven miles when the Russian squadron comes into view at about 8,000 yards. On perceiving the three Russian ships the transports put about, and steam back towards Moji, at the entrance of the Shimonoseki Straits, at full speed. But the Russians are too quick for them. The *Rossia*, which is leading the Russian squadron, proceeds in pursuit of the *Sado Maru*, while the *Gromoboi* is ordered to capture the *Hitachi Maru*.

The accounts of what follows show some discrepancies, but it seems clear that in the case of the *Hitachi Maru* there is little chance given to non-combatants to escape. The ship is commanded by a British officer, Captain Campbell. Mr. Bishop, the Chief Officer, and the Chief Engineer, Mr. Glass, are also British.

The Russian official account says: "After several shots had been fired warning the transport to stop, without effect, the guns opened in earnest against the vessel, and she stopped. Those on board, however, paid no attention to the signal to abandon the vessel, and only after several more shots had been fired did they begin to lower their boats. The transport settled down very slowly, and consequently the *Gromoboi* received orders to expedite the sinking."

According to the *Times* correspondent at Tokio the Russians opened fire on the *Hitachi Maru* at 1,000 yards, and continued firing till within 500 yards. Ten shells struck the unfortunate vessel, killing many of the men and disabling the ship. Later the Russians "rained shrapnel on the *Hitachi Maru* from a distance of 200 mètres for nearly two hours, finally torpedoing and sinking her at 3 p.m. The first discharge of shrapnel killed and wounded over 200 men."

From this it would seem that many non-combatants must have been butchered without being given any sort of chance to escape. Surely something less than ten shells were required to bring the ship to a standstill, and some facilities might well have been given to the non-combatants to take to their boats. But the Russians appear to have been inflamed by the sight of the troops on board, and by the hope of causing substantial loss to the Japanese fighting line. As regards the soldiers, there is probably no real question of inhumanity any more than in the previous case of the *Kinshiu Maru*, since they certainly would not have surrendered. Indeed, it is said that they even tried to get ammunition in order to fire on the Russians, but the cruisers came to close quarters before this was possible. Most of the regimental officers—there appears to have been one battalion at full war strength on board—committed suicide with their revolvers or swords. Excellent discipline seems to have been maintained, Lieutenant-Colonel Suchi, commanding the troops, merely ordering one corporal to jump overboard and endeavour to swim ashore in order to give a report of the disaster.

The scene on board the *Hitachi Maru* during the time that the *Gromoboi* was pouring shot and shell into her must have been a truly awful one. The decks could have looked like little else than shambles, and it is said that when the doomed vessel sank, and hundreds of men and horses were struggling in the sea, the water was literally red with blood. In the midst of this ghastly carnage the British officers, it is almost needless to add, remained at their posts, and the Japanese were afterwards loud in their praises of the gallant foreigners who thus bravely met their fate under an alien flag, "setting more value on their duty than on their lives."

The total number of those who were saved from the *Hitachi Maru* was about 150, and it is believed that about 1,000 were killed or drowned.

It is possible that the Russians may have soon begun to feel some compunction for their action in this case, for, while all the Japanese accounts agree in attributing great inhumanity to those engaged in sinking the *Hitachi Maru*, it is admitted that much clemency was shown to the combatants on board the *Sado Maru*. The latter vessel heaves to more promptly than the *Hitachi Maru*, and one of the four British officers goes on board the *Rossia* and returns with two Russian officers and a number of seamen. One of the Russian officers now descends to the captain's cabin and holds a long conversation with him. It is understood that a time limit is imposed, that the captain asks that it may be extended, and that the Russian officer politely regrets his inability to grant the request, inasmuch as consideration for the safety of the Russian squadron forbids delay. At the close of this conversation the Russian officer makes prisoners of the combatant officers on board.

Meanwhile, the other Russian officer

ADMIRAL SKRYDLOFF.

stands by the gangway, and, speaking Japanese, orders all on board to leave within an hour, warning them that, at the expiration of that period, the ship will be torpedoed. Ten boats are now lowered, and about 600 non-combatants leave the vessel. Four of the boats capsize, but there does not appear to be any great loss on this account, and the remaining six boats, crowded with men, head for Tsu-shima and Iki-shima, these islands being visible in the distance.

About 400 men resolve to perish with the vessel, against which the *Rurik* now launches two torpedoes. The vessel begins to show signs of sinking, and the Russian squadron, to use the cynical language of the official report, "considering the matter at an end, and in view also of the growing darkness," proceeds on its cruise.

The 400 Japanese left on board the *Sado Maru* have been cheering and preparing their weapons in order to commit suicide, when suddenly they notice the departure of the Russian ships. The Japanese may be indifferent to death, but they have also a very sane appreciation of the value of life, especially when it can be preserved without loss of honour. Accordingly, prompt efforts are made to stop the leaks caused by the torpedoes, and preparations are made for the construction of a raft. For twenty hours the vessel drifts, and, eventually, all those left on board are saved, an interesting instance of the vicissitudes of war. In all nearly 1,000 escaped with their lives from the *Sado Maru*, the number of those drowned or killed being thus relatively small.

Meanwhile, the Russian squadron has become aware of the fact that a Japanese cruiser has been watching it, and is doubtless glad to have the cover of night for a speedy withdrawal from a neighbourhood likely soon to become dangerous. The squadron has certainly done considerable damage, since about 1,000 brave soldiers, and three fine steamers, aggregating 15,000 tons, and having on board a quantity of valuable stores, constitute no mean loss. But the blow to Japan might have been an even harder one, for it afterwards transpires that on this morning of June 15th there were no fewer than 13 Japanese transports in the channel not far from the point where the *Hitachi Maru* and *Sado Maru* were caught, and the Russian "haul" was, therefore, not so great as it might well have been.

The Russian squadron after leaving the Shimonoseki Straits proceeds in a north-easterly direction, and is next heard of very early in the morning of the 18th as having arrived in the Tsuguru Straits. It has thus steamed continuously for about 700 miles at about 11½ knots. It is said that on the afternoon of June 16th the squadron sinks two sailing ships near the Oki Islands, but no mention of this exploit is made in the Russian official account, which states expressly that no other vessels were seen except those already reported and the British steamer *Allanton*. The latter was met and stopped in the Tsuguru Straits, the captain declaring that he was proceeding from Murovan to Singapore with a cargo of 6,500 tons. "The examination of the crew, the inspection of the ship's papers, and certain irregularities in the log, coupled with the fact that the steamer had previously conveyed contraband of war to Japan, led us to doubt," says Admiral Skrydloff in his report to the Tsar, "the neutrality of her cargo, and she was sent to Vladivostok under guard in charge of Lieutenant Petroff. There her case will be examined by the Prize Court."

After the meeting with the *Allanton* the squadron seems to have cruised about the Tsuguru Straits without any definite result, returning safely to Vladivostok on June 20th. During its raid it must twice have narrowly escaped encountering a superior force of Japanese ships, and the story of the risks it ran in this direction is an instructive and rather exciting one. In the first place, Admiral Togo was actually taking measures to cope with the Vladivostok squadron at the very time when the latter was putting to sea. A Japanese squadron bound for the Sea of Japan was off Fusan, the port (sometimes called Masanpo) at the south-eastern corner of Korea, on June 13th, the day after Admiral Bezobrazoff left Vladivostok. "Fortune," as the *Times* Special Naval Correspondent remarks, "favoured the Russians. They kept eastward, bound for the south. The Japanese kept westward, going north, hoping that if the Russians were at sea they would follow the route of their previous cruise when the *Kinshiu Maru* was sunk. The squadrons missed one another. The Russians reached the track of the transports, destroyed them, and retired north."

It would seem that the above-mentioned Japanese squadron is distinct from the command of Admiral Kamimura, who is believed to have been on June 15th at Sasebo, when he became aware that the Vladivostok cruisers had appeared off Oki Island and were steering southward. Admiral Kamimura, on receipt of this intelligence, immediately despatched torpedo-boats to guard the channel between Tsu-shima and Iki Island, ordered westbound steamers to take refuge at Takeshiki, and telegraphed to Moji Harbour to postpone all departure from the west. The further action taken by this energetic, though hitherto rather unlucky commander is best told in the words of his own despatch, which is a model of clearness and brevity, as, indeed, every Japanese despatch seems to be :—

"I also ordered, by wireless telegraphy, the warships at Takeshiki and the scouting vessels to come to their appointed rendezvous, while the main fleet was doubling the southern end of Tsu-shima.

"The weather was thick and stormy, and we were continually losing sight of the vessels following us.

"When off Kanzaki I ordered our torpedo-boat flotilla to come out to force the enemy from the north, at the same time changing our course to the north of Oki Island.

"Meanwhile, the cruiser *Tsushimo*, following the enemy, maintained close touch with them, and reported at noon that the enemy were fifteen miles to the south of Oki. Later, at 1.30 p.m., she reported that the enemy were five miles south of Oki.

"Then the weather thickened, and she lost sight of the enemy altogether.

"We hastened to the south of Oki Island, but did not sight the enemy owing to the fog.

"The *Tsushima*, by wireless telegraph, reported herself within our line, and we then gave chase to the northward. The storm increased, but we raised our speed, and went to a certain place, where we expected to intercept the enemy in the morning.

"Our torpedo-boats were searching all night, but without result.

"At daylight on June 16 we reached our destination, and the weather was clear, but no sign of the enemy was to be seen. We continued our search on June 17th, and steered to the south.

"The cruisers, while reconnoitring in the afternoon, 100 miles north-east of Tsu-shima Island, received a wireless message, stating that the enemy were off Hokkaido, so I returned to my base in the Straits on June 19, having proved unsuccessful."

It goes without saying that the loss of the *Hitachi Maru* and *Sado Maru*, and the failure of Kamimura to overtake or intercept the Russians, occasioned a good deal of criticism in Japan and elsewhere. Of this criticism the most justifiable is that directed against the policy of sending transports to sea without a warship escort. Admiral Kamimura seems to have done all that could possibly have been done with a limited number of ships, and was certainly most unfortunate in the matter of the weather. Admiral Togo is clearly to be exonerated from the charge of having neglected Vladivostok, since he had actually despatched a squadron in that direction, notwithstanding his preoccupation in the matter of Port Arthur, and the blockade of the Liao-tung Peninsula generally. But there seems little excuse for the error committed in allowing transports crowded with men and stores to go to sea without any protection whatever, more especially after the lesson already taught by the sinking of the *Kinshiu Maru*. The Japanese have now paid somewhat dearly for their neglect of due precautions, and there is little likelihood that they will again be caught napping. But it is well to point the moral of such an incident as the sinking of the *Hitachi Maru* and the *Sado Maru*, more especially as the lesson conveyed has a significance quite outside the present conflict.

REAR-ADMIRAL KAMIMURA.

To the world at large this episode shows first that the Command of the Sea is a term which must not be too loosely used, since a maritime supremacy which is not absolute is hampered by most serious limitations. Those who are familiar with Captain Mahan's epoch-making work on Sea Power can understand how it was that Nelson's storm-tossed ships stood between Napoleon and the realisation of the latter's dreams. But there was a marked difference between the complete and lasting supremacy achieved by Nelson's Navy and the present only partial, and possibly only temporary, superiority gained by Admiral Togo. Until the Vladivostok squadron is either effectually bottled up or destroyed the Japanese are foolish to presume upon what they have accomplished—splendid as their record is—because the work is as yet only three-quarters done. A further lesson lies in the clearness with which the value to a maritime nation of a Navy which is not only efficient but large is here indicated. It is true that wireless

telegraphy does much to assist the commander who has only a few ships at his disposal and a large area of ocean to watch. But, failing a supremacy by sea which is so absolute and convincing that no warship of the enemy dares to leave harbour, the strain of guarding a number of points at sea is very great, and can only be endured satisfactorily by a Navy of the largest size. The Fleet of Japan has shown itself to be as superbly efficient as its best friend, the Navy of Great Britain, could desire. But those who have studied its responsibilities present and future know well that, if it were half as large again as it is, Admiral Togo would have little difficulty in finding steady and important work for every additional ship, officer, and man. For those—a happily small and decreasing class—who cavil at our own Navy Estimates, the number of ships required to render futile such a menace as the Vladivostok squadron has been to Japan should be a useful warning.

Let us now return to Vladivostok, to which, as noted above, Admiral Bezobrazoff's cruisers returned on June 20th. It is evident that, during their absence, the authorities have taken into consideration the probability of early Japanese reprisals, for a telegram from Vladivostok to the *Novoe Vremya*, dated June 17th, states that the Commandant has just issued yet another Order of the Day urging Government *employés* and other inhabitants of the town to send their families out of the fortress immediately. Notice is given that families remaining without sufficient reason may be expelled if circumstances require it. It is added that there are good grounds for the issue of this order, since the women and children in the town still number nearly 3,000.



THE JAPANESE TRANSPORT *HITACHI MARU*, SUNK BY THE VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON.

On June 21st a division of Russian torpedo-boats, which had been carrying out an independent raid under the command of Captain Vinegradsky, returns to Vladivostok after a week's absence. This division has also done some damage to the enemy's smaller shipping, having

captured several trading and transport schooners, one of which it has brought back with it to the base. The division has also approached the port of Esashi, on the island of Hokkaido, but has been prevented from entering the port by fog.

About a week later Admiral Skrydloff makes another bold essay in the raiding line. On June 30th the Japanese Consul at Gen-san reports that early in the morning six Russian torpedo-boats entered the port, fired about 200 shots upon the settlement, and sank one steamship and one sailing vessel. They then rejoined three ships outside the harbour and disappeared. Two Japanese soldiers and two Koreans were slightly injured, and two dwellings were burned. The Japanese Consulate was hit by a shell, but the damage done was small. As in the previous descent on Gen-san, described in Chapter XVI., the inhabitants fled at the first shot to the shelter of the hills. The heavy rain made it impossible to discover the direction in which the squadron had gone, and a Japanese fleet which started off north in the hope of finding the enemy was completely baffled. On July 1st three Russian warships are reported to have appeared in the Genkai Gulf to the south-west of the Shrimonoseki Straits, and about 7 p.m. the same evening the squadron is sighted between Tsu-shima and the Oki Islands by Admiral Kamimura's squadron. Admiral Kamimura attempts to reduce the distance between his ships and the Russians, but the latter, finding themselves observed, steer north-north-east at full speed. At nightfall the Japanese Admiral orders his torpedo flotilla to get close to the enemy at any cost, and the swift little craft bound willingly ahead. The Russians, however, open fire heavily on the torpedo flotilla at 5,000 yards, and then, suddenly extinguishing all their lights, slip away in the darkness on an unknown course.

Although this last raid has produced no result of any positive importance, it emphasises strongly the force of the arguments based on the previous expedition. The Japanese authorities affect to treat these operations just as they do those of the Cossacks in Korea, with contempt, and the raids are certainly not very dignified exhibitions of Russian naval strategy. But they are at least skilfully calculated to do what the Japanese General Staff believes they are intended to do, namely, "arouse popular indignation to the extent of compelling the Government to detach part of Admiral Togo's forces for the purpose of blocking both exits of Vladivostok, and thus relieving the pressure on Port Arthur." Whether these tactics will succeed is another matter, but our modified admiration must not be withheld from Admiral Skrydloff, who has at least succeeded somewhat smartly in creating a remarkable sensation with only three cruisers and a few torpedo-craft.

Strong as the Japanese Government may be, the power of the Opposition, more especially, perhaps, in a country which is still new to the blessings of a Constitution, has still to be reckoned with, and, even among such devoted patriots as the Japanese, there are not wanting some very plain-spoken critics of the warlike methods which are now being adopted. We Britons ourselves have had, as a belligerent nation, similar experiences, and ought not to be surprised by the singular freedom with which, in some Japanese circles, the situation created by the performances of the Vladivostok squadron is discussed. We have it on the authority of the Tokio correspondent of the *Daily Express* that

Admiral Kamimura is for a time regarded as a most incompetent person by reason of his inability to capture the Russian cruisers, and the probability that his recall will be demanded is quite seriously foreshadowed. But a peculiar and essentially Japanese flavour marks the suggestion made in some quarters, that the gallant Admiral should expiate his failure by committing "Hara-kiri!"

Incidentally, the second attack upon Gen-san reveals a rather strange neglect upon the part of the Japanese to provide this rather important place with at least some more effectual protection against these inconvenient attentions than is afforded by a small infantry garrison. If a destroyer or two could not have been spared, at least it would not have been difficult to mount two or three large guns in such a way that the enemy's torpedo-craft would think twice about entering the port and damaging the shipping. Had a small battery, even of old-fashioned 40-pounders, been in existence at Gen-san on June 30th, there might have been an excellent chance of sinking two or three of the enemy's torpedo-boats, and thus restoring confidence among the Korean inhabitants. The responsibility of protecting the latter does not seem to be weighing very heavily on the Japanese, either on the coast or in the interior, and this circumstance may not be without ultimate effect upon the consequences of the War.

It may seem but carping criticism to draw attention to these comparatively trifling matters when the general naval and military policy of Japan exhibits such unquestioned genius and capacity, and when so few Japanese errors have been made. But mistakes are almost always more instructive than successes, and no nation should be secure from criticism as to details merely because it is correct in its broad plans and successful in their general execution.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

AFTER TELISSU—THE JAPANESE ADVANCE—OUTPOSTS—OCCUPATION OF SUN-YAO-CHEN—JOINING HANDS—A GLANCE AT NIU-CHWANG.

WE left the Japanese Army under General Oku, at the close of Chapter XXXI., bivouacking on the battle-field of Telissu, the troops worn out with an exceptionally hard day's fighting, and the surgeons busy with an exceptionally heavy list of wounded. It is now ascertained that the total casualties, at first reported to be under 1,000, amount to 1,163, made up of 217 killed, including 7 officers, and 946 wounded, including 43 officers. The humane necessity of burying on the following day many hundreds of the enemy's dead is an additional grim reminder of yesterday's fierce struggle, and it must have been with some feelings of relief that the rear-guard of General Oku's Army eventually leaves the scene of this hard-won, if glorious and important, victory.

General Oku's objective now appears to be Kai-chau (Kai-ping), but a really more significant end in view is to join hands with General Kuroki's Army and the Japanese force—whatever it may be—that is based on Takushan. According to unofficial reports General Oku has an important preliminary to attend to before he can make any serious advance It is stated that his army has only been provisioned for the battle, and that this circumstance, combined with others to which attention has been drawn, had much to do with the Japanese failure to press the Russian retreat. The suggestion is that on the morrow of the battle, namely, on June 16th, General Oku threw out outposts, and that his main force withdrew towards the sea in order to draw supplies from the Fleet. This may well have been the case, for the Japanese and Russian armies seem to have lost touch for some days, and it was not until June 21st that the former had reached a point only thirty miles north of Telissu.

The point in question is Sun-yao-chen (variously called Siung-yue-cheng and Sen-iu-cheng) which lies on the railway twenty-five miles south-east of Kai-chau. Before we bring the Japanese hither it may be of interest to describe their movements in some detail. In the first place, it must be noticed that the advance is by no means an easy one even for a victorious army. There has been a good deal of rain since the afternoon of the battle, and it is becoming evident that the regular rainy season will begin in a few days. The roads, such as they are, are only practicable for small and light carts, and the passage of artillery must be extremely difficult

But the Japanese have something in their favour. On their left flank they have the sea, from which they doubtless continue to receive supplies without the possibility of let or hindrance on the part of the Russians. To the east of the rail, again, up to within about twenty miles of Kai-chau, there is a strip of mountainous country, the passes and defiles of which the Japanese take the wise precaution of guarding, thus securing that

' SCIENTIFIC FANATICS ', GENERAL OKU'S TROOPS STORMING ENTRENCHMENTS AT KIN CHAU

flank also, and making it impossible for the Cossacks to pass round and harass the communications with Port Adams.

On June 19th the Japanese are between six and seven miles south of Sun-yao-chen, their front occupying the whole interval between the mountainous district to the east of the line and the seashore. Their line of advance posts is strongly occupied by cavalry, of which nine squadrons are observed by the Russian patrols, with a screen of infantry. On June 20th a collision takes place between the Japanese mounted patrols and the Cossacks, and the latter report considerable movement among the enemy's cavalry and infantry. The Russian outposts, it should be mentioned, are now some three and a half miles south of Sun-yao-chen, the interval between the two screens being, therefore, only some three miles.

From the above it will be seen that theoretically, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say temporarily, a new situation has been developed in the five days which have elapsed since the Russians were driven in some confusion from the battlefield of Telissu, and to the lay reader it should be interesting to note such little changes in the course of a separate operation of wars, if only for the reason that they tend to vary the monotony of a fighting record. Of course, if the Japanese had been able to press hotly and continuously on the heels of the Russians after the Battle of Telissu, there might have been no subsequent situation at all, as far as the shattered army of General Stackelberg was concerned. It is in order to prevent any "subsequent situation" that an army which has been victorious generally does its best to pursue one that is vanquished, since it is only occasionally that a battle is in itself sufficiently punishing to the beaten force to prevent its pulling itself together a few days later, if not pursued, and, if it is the right sort of army, again "facing the music."

We have seen how the Japanese were prevented, or, at any rate, abstained, from pursuing after Telissu, and we now have the natural consequence, namely, a pulling-together on the part of the beaten Russians, and a temporary resumption of a new position The main body of General Stackelberg's Army is at Kai-chau, where, as noted at the close of Chapter XXXI., it is reviewed and "heartened" by General Kuropatkin on June 20th. But its outposts are duly pushed out to a little south of Sun-yao-chen, and thus, for the moment, we see the Russians again re-formed with their faces to the foe, and an intervening screen, the double duty of which is to veil the movements of the army behind it, and to give timely notice of the approach of the enemy in front.

An enemy can never be said to be beaten until he has lost the power of thus pulling himself together and presenting a fresh front, and accordingly it is customary, even for a powerful antagonist who has won one victory, to proceed with great caution when he finds the fugitives of a few days back once more acting as a coherent force. It may be that there is no intention on the latter's part to make a real stand. But the mere fact that they are evidently bent on disputing a further advance indicates that no liberties must be taken, and it is only a very reckless and foolish commander who in such cases pushes forward too precipitately, and gives a re-formed enemy a chance of retrieving his recent defeat.

Unfortunately for the Russians their present stand cannot well be other than a temporary one. It might have been

possible for General Kuropatkin so to strengthen General Stackelberg's army that the latter could, with some hopefulness, have given battle to the south of Kai-chau. But the pressure exercised by General Kuroki's army and the Takushan force has made this a very doubtful policy. Accordingly, all we shall see, as the immediate result of the new development described above, is a cautious but determined advance by General Oku, and a gradual falling-back on the part of the Russian advanced posts—perhaps the commonest process in warfare, and the least attractive to the lay reader. Yet it is really a very interesting part of the business of war, this pushful pressure on the one hand, and this skilful reluctance to give way on the other. Sometimes, too, it leads to very important results, especially in the direction of giving the retiring force a clearer idea of the enemy's strength.

In the present case, the forward movement of the Japanese is resumed at eight o'clock on the morning of June 21st. The Russians can, of course, only see the work of the advanced guard, but they watch this carefully, and General Sakharoff is afterwards able to give a very clear and simple account of the operations in a telegram to the General Staff at St. Petersburg. Naturally he does not enter into minute details, but that need not prevent us from trying to realise a scene which, if of no great significance, and, in fact, of a very ordinary sort, is typical of much that happens in the conduct of what may be called everyday warfare.

All night the advanced guard of General Oku's army has been bivouacking behind a screen of sentries supplied from a chain of outposts extending along the whole of the Japanese front. The Commander of the Advanced Guard appears to have under him about a division of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and thirty-two guns. It is not certain whether on this occasion the outposts were furnished by the cavalry or infantry, but it is more than probable that infantry sentries, and not cavalry vedettes—a cavalry sentry is usually called a "vedette"—are posted at intervals of from fifty to one hundred yards along a front extending perhaps ten miles. There is no more trying and anxious work than outpost duty, and it is one which we may be sure is performed with scrupulous care and conscientiousness in such a model army as that of Japan. During the night there have doubtless been several alarms caused by the approach, imaginary or real, of the enemy's patrols, or of adventurous single scouts endeavouring to pierce the screen and obtain some glimmering idea as to when the coming advance is to take place. But such transitory excitement is confined to the outpost screen, behind which the considerable body of troops forming the advanced guard sleeps comfortably secure in the assurance that no vigilance will be wanting on the part of the sentries, no discretion on that of the Commander of the Outposts, to prevent anything in the nature of a surprise or other disagreeable interruption of a well-earned night's rest.

Probably on the afternoon of June 20th the Commander of the Advanced Guard receives his final orders to move forward on the morrow, and he, in his turn, passes the intimation on to the Commander of the Outposts. Very early in the morning of June 21st the latter gives orders for the sentries to be withdrawn, and gradually the long line of human specks disappears, the sentries falling back on their picquets, the picquets on

their supports, until the chain of outposts becomes once more a series of compact units ready to take their appointed places in the advance.

At 8 a.m. the whole of the Japanese advanced guard is set in motion, and marches forward along both sides of the railway towards Sun-yao-chen.

We must now turn our attention to the Russians, whose cavalry scouts have, ever since daybreak, been carefully scrutinising the Japanese position. Observing the signs of the enemy's advance they have promptly reported these to the commander of the Russian outposts—the latter are composed of mounted troops—who will have previously received instructions from Kai-chau as to the course he is to adopt in the event of the enemy's resumption of the forward march. As there is so little interval between the two lines of outposts there is no time to be lost, and probably none is lost in converting the thin screen of vedettes into more solid bodies capable of offering some resistance to the enemy's advance.

Probably a little desultory fighting takes place south of Sun-yao-chen, as the Japanese press steadily forward, and the Russians fall slowly back. There is no special need for concealment on either side, and on that of the Japanese it is impossible. Now and then a little bunch of Cossacks as it retires will work up to some rising ground and draw rein. The officer commanding descries at long range a party of the enemy's cavalry, gives the word to dismount, and a volley is fired, and, before the light smoke has floated away, the Cossacks have mounted, and are continuing the retirement. Or a Japanese cavalry detachment, pushing vigorously but cautiously onward, may espy a knot of the enemy's horsemen emerging from behind a hill, or for a moment silhouetted against the sky-line, and a similar performance takes place. Such fighting means very little in actual casualties, but the manner in which it is conducted is a very good test of the efficiency of opposing armies. In this case there is, we may be sure, a very pretty exhibition of capacity on both sides, the one force seeking to carry out the idea of a great engine moving irresistibly forward in spite of every obstacle, the other displaying its *moral* by a dignified retirement as far removed as it is possible for a retirement to be from a flurried retreat.

The first halting-point in the backward progress of the Russian cavalry is Sun-yao-chen itself, but it is soon evident that any stay here will be out of the question. Accordingly, the bulk of the outposts continue to fall back until eventually they are only a little to the south of Kai-chau, where the main body of General Stackelberg's Army still rests. But a fringe of detachments will still be in touch with the advancing Japanese, and these in due course report that about noon a concentration of the enemy takes place in the direction of Sun-yao-chen.

The Japanese are very cautious, since, for all they know, there may be a position at Sun-yao-chen, towards which the Russian cavalry have been luring them. Their nine squadrons of cavalry are therefore working alertly to the front, and with them are guns ready to commence an engagement on broader lines, if necessary replying to the enemy's fire, and "keeping the ball rolling" until other artillery and infantry shall have come up into action. But it gradually transpires that these precautions, which have been rendered necessary by the skilful retirement of the Russians, are really

superfluous. As the Japanese force approaches Sun-yao-chen, the enemy becomes more and more evanescent, until sign that no stand at Sun-yao-chen itself is intended. Other bold horsemen now push up to the outskirts of the town, and

AFTER THE FIGHT: BIVOUAC ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE.

Most of the Japanese soldiers are educated men. During the present war many of them are keeping diaries, which they post up at the close of each day.

leading scouts on the flank are probably able to report that Russian mounted detachments have been observed still retiring to the north of the station, a sure find no trace of the continued presence of the Russians. All the time large columns of Japanese infantry have been converging to this point, and, towards

evening, Sun-yao-chen is finally occupied by a force comprising, according to the Russian official despatches, more than a division of infantry, a cavalry brigade, and thirty-two guns.

What follows during the next two days is for the most part merely a repetition of what took place to the south of Sun-yao-chen, Kai-chau being substituted for the latter as far as the Russians are concerned. General Oku throws out a line of outposts about four miles to the north of Sun-yao-chen, the new Russian outpost screen being about eight miles further north. A little more fighting takes place, but of a purely sketchy character, and on June 23rd the Japanese continue their advance towards Kai-chau. The way is led by the cavalry in three detachments, followed by dense lines of infantry, and, behind these, infantry in columns. Towards evening the Japanese line of outposts lies several miles nearer Kai-chau, the left only about nine miles north of Sun-yao-chen, but the right curving up northwards and resting on a village called Moetsia-tung, which is occupied by infantry with machine guns.

Here, for the present, we may leave General Oku's Army as far as the advance on Kai-chau is concerned. But we must not neglect to note that at this point an extraordinarily important stage of the Japanese land operations has been almost automatically reached. For now at length we come to the long-expected, patiently striven-for, and carefully worked-out joining of hands with the Japanese forces now threatening General Kuropatkin from Feng-hwang-cheng and Takushan. The linking up of the latter with General Oku's Army cannot yet be complete, for some days will necessarily elapse before the force which has marched up from Port Adams through Telissu and Sun-yao-chen can be sufficiently concentrated to admit of easy co-operation with bodies still some fifty miles to the east, with only mountainous routes communicating. But it is clear that touch has been established, and this in itself is a notable achievement. To realise its full significance it is necessary to look back and note the various stages by which it has been arrived at, and, having done this, we shall indeed be apathetic if we are not stirred to admiration by the careful strategy, the singular foresight, and the wonderful accuracy of calculation which have produced such a brilliantly impressive result.

Let us attempt to realise what it means, this consummation of a grand strategical design covering an area which would hardly be included in a square with sides 500 miles long. First, there is the attainment of a naval supremacy which, if not absolute, is at least sufficient for the swift and thorough execution of the preliminary operations of a land campaign, the transport of troops and war material, the disembarkation of these, and the accumulation of supplies at carefully selected bases. Then we have southern and central Korea dominated by the landing and march up the main road of a division to be joined in the north by the two remaining divisions of the First Army of Japan. The latter crosses the Yalu and hurls the Russians back from their strong position at Kiu-lien-cheng. This done, the Second Army lands in the Liao-tung Peninsula, and breaks through the outworks of the Port Arthur defences by winning the battle of Nan-shan and occupying Dalny. Fresh troops are landed, and General Oku is left free to strike north and cope with the effort which Kuropatkin is forced

against his better judgment to make for the relief of Port Arthur. Meanwhile General Kuroki with the First Army



MAP SHOWING POSITIONS COVERING LIAO-YANG.

pushes on to Feng-hwang-cheng, and receives support from a considerable force landed at Takushan. He extends his front until its left rests on Siu-yen, the importance of which was duly recognised in Chapter XX. (see p. 252), and as to which we may have more to say later. Then he rests in order to allow his colleague to work up into line, neglecting no precaution necessary to render his own position secure, and doing his best to occupy the attention of the enemy in front. Meanwhile, General Kuroki

crushes the attempt to relieve Port Arthur, and, pressing onward from Telissu, comes into touch with the Japanese forces in position on his right. Each of the three chief points in the Russian position—Liao-yang, Hai-cheng, and Kai-chau—to the last of which the presence of General Stackelberg's unfortunate force gives new prominence—is now most seriously threatened, and the Russians are now faced by possibilities in the way of pressure with which their previous experiences, uncomfortable as they have been, afford no real comparison.

While the writer does not propose to yield to the temptation to linger over this splendid result of elaborate strategy coupled with perfect leadership, he would draw attention to one salient point in this remarkable connection. The situation which has now been created to the very great advantage of the Japanese might easily have been compromised, if not altogether wrecked, by any one of at least half a dozen failures to reach an unusually high standard of achievement. It is never easy to bring about such a co-ordination of large forces as this, even where simple, straight-forward working, with the minimum of opposition, is involved. But the Japanese have had little to help them save their own military genius and the quality of their troops. Neither Korea nor the Liao-tung Peninsula are first-class countries in which to move troops, and the passage of the Yalu and the approach to the Nan-shan position alone presented difficulties which might well have upset ordinary calculations. At the outset of the campaign the climate of Korea gave an infinity of trouble to a nation which has always made a point of paying heed to the well-being of the man in the ranks, instead of simply trusting to his endurance, after the Napoleonic fashion. But, of course, the real measure of Japanese success in the great combined operations which have produced this notable concentration of force in Manchuria must be taken from the amount of opposition encountered. The "might-have-beens" of battles like that of Nan-shan and Telissu —Kiu-lien-cheng is not such a serious consideration—are quite sufficient to raise the question whether General Oku's performances in the Liao-tung Peninsula, preparatory to his arrival at Sun-yao-chen and extension to the right, do not render the resultant junction of forces one of the most wonderful of the many wonderful things that have happened in war.

Before we leave this portion of our subject we may profitably give a glance at Niu-chwang, not because any grave change has yet taken place in the prospects of this important place, but in order to bring the record of its existence a little more closely up to date in view of imminent possibilities. In any case, the position of Niu-chwang at this juncture is of very singular, and, in some respects, quite unique, interest. Within thirty miles events of the very highest importance are taking place, and yet at Niu-chwang the foreign residents have little but native rumour to feed their curiosity; and at times it must seem as if the place were completely detached from the theatre of war. Doubtless this is partly due to the fact that the Russian camp is some three miles east of Niu-chwang, and that the Russian officers are very guarded in their references to what is going on, especially to the southward. The principal news comes from Mukden, with which communication is drawn closer by Admiral Alexeieff's paternal interest in a place on which he appears

to be largely dependent for supplies. As late as the last week in June a proclamation is issued by the Viceroy practically closing all traffic on the Liau river between Niu-chwang and Mukden, and ordering all food stuffs to be held at the disposal of the Russians.

A field telegraph has, by the end of the third week in June, been laid between Niu-chwang and Kai-chau, but no sooner is it finished than it is cut in three places and five miles of wire are carried away. This, says Reuter's correspondent, was the work of Chinese in the pay of the Japanese, which shows the Russians that they cannot hope for the friendship of the Manchurians. He adds that large robber bands, which the Japanese have supplied with 1,000 modern rifles and much ammunition, are giving the Russian outposts to the north-east of Niu-chwang a great deal of trouble.

Telegraphing on June 28th, the same correspondent expresses much apprehension as to the future behaviour of the brigands in the neighbourhood. They had on the previous night attacked a village two miles south of Niu-chwang, and it is feared lest, if the Japanese do not arrive within the next few days, the brigands will become bolder and enter the town, which is practically without protection. The Russians have now only about 70 men in the town proper, with a few Chinese, who are believed to be in league with the desperadoes outside the city walls.

An interesting reminder of the real position of Niu-chwang in regard to the operations, and also an instructive indication of what is taking place to the south, are afforded by the statement that on June 27th two Russian regiments which had come up from Kai-chau, possibly in consequence of the increasing pressure exerted by General Oku's Army, have marched towards Ta-shi-chao, which lies at the junction of the Manchurian Railway with the branch line to the Port of Niu-chwang (Yingkow). Ta-shi-chao will be remembered (see page 259) as having already had an interesting warlike experience in the shape of a visit from a Japanese force which had landed, and which subsequently re-embarked, at Kai-chau.

FROM THE CARRIAGE WINDOW IN EASTERN SIBERIA.
(By permission, from "The Real Siberia," by J. Foster Fraser.)

CHAPTER XXXIV.

WITH GENERAL KUROKI—STRATEGICAL MOVES—THE FOREIGN ATTACHÉS—AN AFFAIR OF OUTPOSTS—THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PASSES.

WE have now to revert to the Japanese forces operating on a line running S.W. to N.E. a little in front of Feng-hwang-cheng. The latter, which is General Kuroki's headquarters, may still be taken as the centre of the Japanese position as far as the First Army of Japan is concerned, but the presence of the force landed at Takushan, which the Japanese official despatches are now beginning to call "the Takushan Army," makes any precise division of the Japanese line into centre and flanks at this juncture rather misleading. Indeed, if we may assume that General Oku's Army has now come up into line, that Army would constitute the real Japanese left, the centre being held by the Takushan Army, and the right by General Kuroki's Army. But it is premature, and also unnecessary, to attempt these hard and fast definitions until some clearer indication is forthcoming that the three armies in question are not only in touch but also in co-operation. For the present our business is to bring the work of General Kuroki's Army and of the force landed at Takushan up to a date which will coincide as nearly as may be with General Oku's consolidation of his position to the south of Kai-chau —in other words, to the end of June or the early days of July.

General Kuroki's halt at Feng-hwang-cheng may seem a rather tedious one, even to those who understand that he is resting in order to give General Oku time to work up the Liao-tung Peninsula after the isolation of Port Arthur. But it is certain that the First Army of Japan does not find the interval hang heavy on its hands for lack of occupation. In the first place, General Kuroki looks to his communications in rear, and by the end of the first week in June the road to Antung has been greatly improved: a light railway is said to be in course of construction, and a number of desirable bridges on the route have been built. In addition, the greatest possible care has been taken to provide the advanced posts with a really useful chain of fortifications. When, a little later, the foreign Attachés and correspondents are taken on a tour of these works, they are surprised to find with what pains they have been prepared, and experienced critics make the observation that European armies in similar circumstances would not have been at such considerable trouble. But the Japanese are nothing if not thorough, and clearly foresee the necessity of throwing up parapets and shelters which will not only serve present purposes, but may possibly be required to withstand torrential rains.

A passing allusion has already been made in Chapter XXIX. to the occupation of Siu-yen and to sharp fighting at Saimatse, and the time has now come to make rather more detailed reference to these happenings. Apparently, about June 6th, General Kuroki sent out four strong columns to reconnoitre the roads towards Liao-yang, Hai-cheng, Saimatse, and Siu-yen, with special orders as to driving the Russians out of the two last-

named places. On June 7th one of these columns occupied Saimatse, which lies about thirty-five miles to the north of Feng-hwang-cheng, after some brisk fighting in which the Japanese had three men killed and twenty-four wounded, the enemy leaving twenty-three killed on the ground, besides two officers and five men taken prisoners. General Kuropatkin telegraphs later that his troops have re-occupied Saimatse; but the Japanese have no intention of abandoning their attempts to gain control of this important point, and, by June 25th, we find it definitely in their hands and marking, for the time being, the extreme right of the Japanese position instead of, as formerly, the Russian left. Saimatse is of considerable value to an enemy operating against either Liao-yang or Mukden, as it controls a road by which both these places can be reached without the necessity of tackling the Motien Pass.

On June 8th the column reconnoitring towards Siu-yen, with help from the force landed at Takushan, occupied Siu-yen, driving a force of the enemy, consisting of 4,000 cavalry and six guns, towards To-mu-chan (sometimes called Shi-mu-cheng) on the Hai-cheng road, and Kai-chau. This movement appears to have been very skilfully carried out by converging forces which ultimately squeezed the Russians out of the place, in spite of a pretty stout resistance, in which three Japanese soldiers were killed and two officers and twenty-eight men were wounded.

With reference to Siu-yen, which absolutely controls the roads to Hai-cheng and Kai-chau, and the importance of which has been carefully foreshadowed in the present narrative, the *Times* military critic makes some suggestive observations. "It may have been noticed," he remarks, "during the earlier weeks of the campaign north of the Yalu that Siu-yen was long allowed to remain in Russian hands, and that all the activities of the First Army were directed towards the Motien-ling and districts far away to the north-east. It was not the correct game for the Japanese to draw the enemy's attention to Siu-yen early in the day, since this would have exposed their hand too much. Even as late as June 2nd the valley was still in Russian occupation, and it was only on the 8th that a column occupied the valley and drove out the Cossacks. Siu-yen is an ideal assembly ground for a large army in the mountains. It stands in a high and healthy open valley, fifteen miles by ten, with dry, porous soil, and it is traversed by three pure water streams. From the south it can be reached by three rough but fairly good cart tracks, passable in all seasons, leading from Pi-tsze-wo, Ta-chuang-ho and Ta-ku-shan. These tracks are bordered by steep hills, rising sharply from the valleys and covered with brushwood and coarse grass. From Siu-yen roads radiate in all directions, and even if circumstances compelled an army to remain in this valley during the rain, its situation would be infinitely preferable to that of another in the Liao Valley, exposed to the dreaded summer diseases of July, which may take a heavy toll of the Russian army. The Siu-yen-Hai-cheng road is well cultivated, save here and there a sandy waste, and the side valleys on each side of the road are not without a fair proportion of crops."

It is probable that the reconnoitring columns which, simultaneously with the movements to Siu-yen and Saimatse, work towards Hai-cheng and Liao-yang, contrive to pick up a good deal of useful information. At any rate, it is known at

Feng-hwang-cheng that at Liao-yang the Russians have guns of position mounted on the city wall, and that a great semi-circle of trenches has been dug in the plain to the south of the city. It is suggestive of very well-organised military intelligence operations that the Japanese should be further aware of the faulty construction of these trenches, which are certain to be flooded in the rainy season now imminent. Such a detail as this could hardly have been ascertained except by scouting of the most daring description, or by a singularly efficient system of espionage.

During the whole of June the fighting in front of Feng-hwang-cheng is pretty continuous and, tactically speaking, it has considerable importance. But the general reader will not care to be wearied with a detailed record of minor skirmishes, and will doubtless be content with a passing reference to one affair of a little more than usual interest by reason of the fact that it must have been witnessed by a group of highly interested observers who were, moreover, extremely competent to deliver an opinion on what they saw.

The foreign military Attachés with General Kuroki's Army may well have chafed secretly at the delay which has been taking place in the business of coming to hand-grips with the main force of the enemy, although, of course, they will have clearly comprehended the necessity for such tactics. It is, no doubt, extremely interesting to watch a thoroughly well-found army settling itself for a spring, and at the same time taking good care that, when the moment for its spring comes, it will have all the advantages which first-rate condition and a good "take-off" will give it. But there is to men who have seen, and taken a prominent part in, very considerable operations of war—like General Sir Ian Hamilton, for example—something a little fatiguing in bare reports of a succession of small combats which are felt to be a mere prelude to a movement of the first magnitude. Accordingly, we may take it that the Attachés gladly avail themselves of every chance offered by General Kuroki to inspect the outposts, on the off-chance that something in the nature of an actual collision may be witnessed.

On June 22nd a small slice of luck comes in the way of the Japanese Commander's distinguished guests. The rains which have been rather heavy of late have temporarily ceased, and in the high ground occupied by the Japanese the paths were quickly dried. The Attachés, accompanied by a strong escort, are visiting the Japanese outposts on the right flank near Saimatse, when a sudden Russian attack is developed by two regiments of cavalry, a regiment of infantry, and some guns, to a total number of about 4,000. The cavalry are understood to be part of the division under General Rennenkampf, which for some time past has been opposing the Japanese flank, though not to much serious purpose. The country is particularly mountainous in this quarter, and the Cossacks not only find the going difficult, but are a good deal harassed by want of forage and also by the attentions of native brigands. Presumably, they have on this occasion been specially reinforced by infantry and guns for the purpose of testing the strength of the Japanese outposts.

Any doubts the Russians may have had as to the capacity of the outposts to resist attack are quickly set at rest. It is true that the Japanese are fortunate in having a timely reinforcement, for the

AT BAY: RUSSIANS ATTACKED IN A VILLAGE.

escort which has accompanied the Attachés is promptly made use of. One can imagine the keen satisfaction with which the new arrivals receive permission to take part in the fray, while we may be sure that all the Japanese soldiers engaged fight none the worse for the knowledge that some of the keenest military eyes in Europe are watching their performances.

An affair of outposts is seldom, if ever, of first-class importance, and the present one is clearly no exception to the general rule. Presumably the sentries give good warning of the approach of the enemy, and the Japanese commander, observing no indication that the attack is being backed up by a really large force, determines to hold his ground. The fighting is evidently pretty warm, for the Russians lose five killed and twenty wounded, and the Japanese have a major killed and nine men wounded. But the Russians do not succeed in making an impression, and towards sunset they retire, more or less satisfied with the information they have obtained as to the strength of the outposts on the enemy's right flank.

Towards the end of June the rains commence in earnest, and the business of conducting serious military operations begins to assume a totally different aspect. As yet the Japanese do not suffer very greatly from the tropical downpour, as the mountain tracks by which they move dry quickly owing to the porous nature of the soil. But the Russians are quite differently situated. The Hai-cheng plain is described already as a sea of mud, and a little later, practically speaking, the whole of the Russian main position will become one in which the intelligent co-operation of large forces will become extremely difficult. There is another special difficulty, too, attached to warfare in the plains of Manchuria during the rainy season. This is the rapid growth of the grain called kao-liang, or sorghum, which in appearance resembles maize, and which, in the rains, shoots up to a height of about twelve feet. As this crop covers three-quarters of the Liao Valley its significance in a warlike sense may readily be understood. It is stated that the Russians during the Boxer troubles in 1900, found movement among the kao-liang stalks so difficult that they made no attempt to advance before Ta-shi-chao and restore their damaged railway until well on in September.

On June 26th the Japanese commence a concerted effort to win the crest of the mountains which separate General Kuroki's and the Takushan Army from the valley of the Liao, in which lie Hai-cheng and Liao-yang.

In order to understand the effect of this new movement—the first important advance which the Japanese forces, now between Siu-yen and Siamatse, have made since General Kuroki arrived at Feng-hwang-cheng from the Yalu—we must give a rapid glance at the Russian position, which has of late been gradually altering in character. For many weeks we saw the bulk of Kuropatkin's army massed at Liao-yang, a position in which he had the advantage of operating on what are known as "interior lines." Later we have the Russian Commander-in-Chief despatching the force under General Stackelberg to attempt the relief of Port Arthur, and this force, after its defeat at Telissu, does not fall back on Liao-yang, but remains for a time at Kai-chau, the bulk of it, apparently, being afterwards withdrawn a little further north to Ta-shi-chao. Thus the Russians have, practically speaking,

abandoned their interior lines, and are now standing on the defensive in two fronts, a southern and an eastern. Probably the advanced guard troops of the southern front are still at Kai-chau, from which, about June 26th, a reconnaissance in force was being made towards General Oku's position at Sun-yao-chen. At the same date the advanced guard troops of the Russian eastern front were posted before the three passes known as the Fen-shui-ling, Motien-ling, and Ta-ling.

This Fen-shui-ling must not be confused with the Northern Fen-shui-ling, which is near Saimatse on the road from that place to Liao-yang. The Southern Fen-shui-ling is thirteen miles north-west of Siu-yen, and here the Russians had for three months been preparing to offer a most vigorous resistance to the Japanese advance. According to the *Times* correspondent at Tokio, they had erected semi-permanent forts and even barracks, and abundant stores and supplies had been collected. The hills commanding the defile were strongly intrenched. Covered ways had been made, and the position was further protected by obstacles such as wire entanglements, pits, and palisades. Fourteen battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, with thirty guns, defended the position, which was impregnable by direct assault, without enormous sacrifices. Accordingly, outflanking movements were decided upon, and three columns were organised from the Takushan Army, a front of twenty miles being covered. One column under Colonel Kamada moved against the western heights of the Pass; a second, under Major-General Asada, took the eastern heights as its objective; and a third column, under Major-General Mariu was sent by a westerly *détour* to threaten the enemy's right rear. Attached to this column was an auxiliary force, which was sent forward on the night of the 25th with orders to capture a line of hills to the westward, and so cover General Mariu's flanking march. This force fought an independent action which lasted all the 26th, the Japanese bivouacking at sundown and renewing the attack before dawn on the 27th. Three Russian battalions and eight guns were in position, but the Japanese succeeded in finally carrying the heights.

By 11 a.m. on June 27th General Mariu's column had worked round to the westward, driving back two of the enemy's battalions, and establishing itself in a position threatening the right rear of Fen-shui-ling.

General Asada's column also encountered some 2,000 of the enemy, which it had to drive back before gaining, on the night of the 26th, a position on the slopes of the eastern heights of the Pass. Here guns were posted, but when these opened fire at 5 a.m. on the morning of the 27th, it was found impossible to make headway against the Russian artillery in the forts, which had the advantage of firing with ranges previously marked. However, General Asada continued his pounding, and also detached a regiment which, diverging eastward, succeeded by 10 a.m. in getting round the enemy's left.

Colonel Kamada's column, on the night of June 26th, moved against the western heights, and by 7 a.m. had captured a position from which Fen-shui-ling could be enfiladed. Like General Asada, Colonel Kamada at once opened fire, and, under cover of the cannonade, sent his infantry to work round the Russian right.

Thus, by 8 a.m. on June 27th, another of those tactical successes has been gained which are only arrived at by the

most careful calculation combined with vigorous and complete accomplishment of preliminary steps. General Mariu is marching to the Russian right rear; on the western heights is Colonel Kamada with his artillery in position raking the Pass, and with his infantry creeping round the Russian right; while on the eastern heights General Asada is shelling the forts, one of his regiments having already outflanked the Russians on their left.

The Russians are not slow to perceive how completely they have been outmanœuvred, and by 8 a.m. their artillery has ceased firing, and preparations for a general retreat have been commenced.

There are those who, even with some knowledge of the subject, affect to despise "manœuvring," and it is a fact that the size of modern armies often renders this impossible, since, where an immense front is held, the time which would be occupied in working round an enemy's flank might mean dangerous delay and other risks. But it will be long before the right kind of manœuvring ceases to be applicable to many operations of war, and he will be a foolish general who neglects methods which may enable him to effect comparatively impossible objects at comparatively insignificant cost. Of such manœuvring the concerted attacks on the Fen-shui-ling are a splendid example: but it must be carefully borne in mind that the actual struggle for the Pass cannot fairly be regarded as an entirely distinct and independent performance. It is quite conceivable that if the Taku-shan Army had attempted the difficult feat of driving a large Russian force out of the Fen-shui-ling a week or two after it had landed, it would either have been disastrously repulsed, or have suffered very sanguinary losses. Some weeks ago it would have been no easy matter to organise, much less to carry out, such an elaborate combined movement as this. Here were then large forces of Cossacks working among the mountains between the Russian and Japanese positions, and these might have sadly hampered the accurate timing necessary to make the advance of the three columns effective. The Cossacks have now mostly been drawn away to the Russian southern front, and the incessant fighting which has been carried on by General Kuroki's Army has been largely effective in forcing the Russians to occupy only a few advanced positions instead of holding the whole forward line more or less strongly. Thus, while the combined manœuvring which preceded the capture of the Fen-shui-ling is very noteworthy and extremely interesting, it must not be too freely accepted as a self-contained achievement, but rather as a brilliant supplement to all the tedious work of the previous four or five weeks.

But, although the Japanese have by 8 a.m. on June 27th already tactically won the Fen-shui-ling, we must not forget that there is still work to be done before the fruits of this not inconsiderable triumph can be tasted. Although the Russian retreat has commenced, there are still brave Russian troops in the trenches, and these are protected by some ugly obstacles.

General Asada's troops on the slopes of the eastern heights of the Pass are apparently the first to take advantage of the Russian inclination to retire. With the help of the Engineers gaps are made in the palisades, the entanglements are cut, and then, with a rousing "Banzai!" the infantry rush the position in front of them, and gain the summit of the eastern heights at 11 a.m. From this

SOME OF THE *PERSONNEL* OF A MANCHURIAN TROOP TRAIN.

point they can see the Russians in full retreat, after destroying their magazines and stores, in the direction of To-mu-chan (Shi-mu-cheng) on the Hail-cheng road. General Asada orders up his artillery, and, planting it on the heights, he inflicts considerable loss upon the vanishing enemy. It is afterwards found that the Russians have left ninety dead on the main line alone, besides losing eighty-eight prisoners, including six officers. The Japanese, too, have suffered somewhat severely, having 180 casualties, but this loss is, of course, insignificant compared with that which must have resulted from a frontal attack.

Nor does the struggle for the Fen-shui-ling end even here. For during the afternoon of June 27th the Russians, evidently maddened at the thought of having lost the control of such an important gateway, make an attempt to recapture the position with three battalions and sixteen guns. Time after time they attack, but the Japanese have quite made good their foothold, and at 7.30 p.m. the Russians are finally driven back.

While a portion of the Takushan Army is engaged in the capture of the Fen-shui-ling, General Kuroki is making an equally successful, and less laborious, attempt to gain possession of other important passes. On June 26th the Ta-ling was occupied by five Russian battalions and sixteen guns. On the morning of the 27th the Japanese attacked the position with, according to Russian accounts, about one division of infantry—the Guards, it is reported—and three batteries of artillery. A short but sharp engagement ensues, which results in a Russian withdrawal towards To-mu-chan. The Japanese do not, however, hold this Pass, possibly owing to the fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult to bring up supplies and guns, without which any effective occupation is impossible. For the same reason the Russians, although they are at first reported to have regained their lost ground, make no present attempt in that direction, and for some time the two forces bivouac on each side of the Pass, the Japanese probably secure in the thought that having once outflanked the position they can readily render it again untenable by similar tactics.

But the advantage of a successful flanking movement is demonstrated yet more clearly in the case of the formidable Motien-ling, in which it has been confidently expected that the Russians would make a stubborn stand. The Pass is one which has been regarded by experts as affording quite extraordinary facilities for defence, and General Kuropatkin had evidently relied upon his position here to offer a serious barrier to the pushful enemy. As at Fen-shui-ling, important works appear to have been constructed, and the Pass is held by 2,000 men of all arms under the command of Count Keller. The Japanese, however, have made acquaintance with the Motien-ling before, and, not only in the course of the war with China, but in the ten years that have since elapsed, have lost no chance of completing their knowledge of this mountainous district. When, therefore, the time comes to force this important Pass the Japanese appear dramatically on the Russian flank by means of a mountain track, and Count Keller's force retires to the strong field-works near Lien-shan-kwan, from which the approach to the Pass is commanded. On June 30th the Japanese advance in greater force and occupy the Motien-ling, at the same time sending forward troops to deal with the Lien-shan-kwan works. Evidently here

again a flanking movement is carried out, for the Russians desert their well-planned and elaborate entrenchments without firing a shot.

We may look forward a little into July in order to place on record here the circumstance that at dawn on July 4th the Russians, under cover of a thick fog, attack the Japanese outposts at Motien-ling with great determination. Three separate assaults are delivered by two infantry battalions, and some very severe hand-to-hand fighting with the bayonet follows. This must have been a most vigorous little engagement, for the Japanese had fifteen killed and thirty wounded, including an officer, and the Russians, who were eventually repulsed and chased westward for four miles, left thirty dead and fifty wounded on the field.

Meanwhile the northern Fen-shui-ling near Saimatse is occupied without fighting, on June 29th, by a detachment from General Kuroki's right, thus finally giving the Japanese armies a new and advanced line, from which the approaches to Ta-shi-kao, Hai-cheng, Liao-yang, and even Mukden are controlled. But it does not follow that any immediate advance will take place, for the nature of the country is being completely altered by the torrents of rain. In the valleys the flooded rivers are taking up more and more space, and, convenient as the mountain paths may be for incidental operations, they do not afford facilities for such an advance as will be necessary before combined pressure can be put on the Russian position.

On July 6th Marshal Oyama, to whose appointment as Commander-in-Chief reference has already been made, leaves Tokio, accompanied by General Kodama and his Staff. The scene at the departure of the veteran leader for the front is one of extraordinary enthusiasm. The whole city is decked with flags, and the streets are lined with cheering crowds.



COSSACKS AND A CHINESE CART.
(By permission, from "The Real Siberia," by J. Foster Fraser.)

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE FLEET AT PORT ARTHUR—REPAIRS—THE HARBOUR ENTRANCE—THE SQUADRON EMERGES—A REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT—TOGO ON THE WATCH—AN ACTION EXPECTED—BAFFLED HOPES—TORPEDO ATTACKS.

AT the commencement of the fourth week in June there is probably a good deal of suppressed excitement at Port Arthur, at any rate in higher naval circles. During the past fortnight there has been a considerable exodus of Chinamen employed in the dockyard, and we may be very sure that this would not have been permitted by the authorities unless there could be a prospect that the services of these skilled artificers could be safely dispensed with. It is, of course, important to relieve a besieged fortress as far as possible of the burden of non-combatant inhabitants, but the work in the machine shops on the damaged ships has been extraordinarily heavy, and the Chinese employed in them have until lately been worth a great deal more than their food. But about the second week in June, as has been noticed in Chapter XXIX., permission is being freely accorded to the Chinamen to leave Port Arthur, from which we may infer not only that the work on the injured war vessels has begun to slacken, but that an attempt is about to be made by the Fleet which may render the further presence of a large number of hungry dockyard hands unnecessary.

Incidentally it may be mentioned that some of the Chinamen who have found their way this time from Port Arthur to Chifu speak rather disparagingly of the manner in which the repairs to the damaged Russian ships have been carried out. According to these, perhaps, rather doubtful witnesses, the method chiefly adopted has been to place sheets of steel over the holes made by shells and torpedoes, without any attempt to replace the crushed ribs. This may serve to explain something of what follows, and, in any case, does not seem improbable in view of the labour necessary to repair at all thoroughly warships which have been really badly knocked about.

As a matter of fact, there are some cases of "crippled ducks" at Port Arthur in which complete restoration to activity is impossible with the appliances locally available. Thus, the *Retvisan*, which was torpedoed on the night of February 8th, is described as having been badly holed below the water-line in the vicinity of her engine-room. "Her pumping and other auxiliary machinery was buckled and smashed, and her frames, angle ribs, and plating buckled and thrown out of alignment over a considerable area forward and aft of the rent made by the well-aimed Japanese torpedo. The structural damage caused to the vessel altered her alignment to such an extent that her main shafting buckled badly. . . . The only use to which the *Retvisan* could be put after her mauling was that of a floating battery." Another badly damaged ship was the *Tsarevitch*, which suffered great injury to her main steering gear. In this case, however, the Russians have been lucky in being able to supply,

before it was too late, a deficiency which could not have been locally dealt with. Allusion has already been made twice to that useful train which Colonel Spiridonoff succeeded in pushing through to Port Arthur almost immediately before the place was isolated. It seems that, in addition to war material and electric lighting plant, that last train carried a new rudder sent out by the French firm which built the *Tsarevitch*. Otherwise this fine battleship could never have made for the open sea under her own steam without serious risk of coming to grief.

When these and numerous other disabilities come to be considered, it is not surprising that some incredulity should have been aroused by a telegram published throughout Russia on June 20th, in which Admiral Alexeieff categorically stated, on the authority of the Admiral Commanding the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, that every one of the damaged Russian battleships, cruisers, and torpedo-boats at Port Arthur had at last been restored to full and complete efficiency. It was felt by those who understood what structural damage to a warship means, and who had some knowledge of the dockyard accommodation and facilities at Port Arthur, that restoration to full and complete efficiency was in the circumstances absolutely out of the question. Still, a coming revelation was to show that at least some remarkable results had been attained, and that in what is known as "repository work" the Russians had been quite extraordinarily successful considering their limitations. Later, perhaps, a doubt may be engendered whether the action of the authorities in encouraging a number of skilled workmen to leave a dockyard in which their services may yet be required was not a little premature.

But, before we pass to the revelation in question, we may profitably study another circumstance which renders the difficulties of the naval situation at Port Arthur extremely grave, however heroic and fortunate may have been the efforts made to remove the traces of torpedo and shell explosions on the various ships. This is the state of the entrance channel leading into the harbour, which, apart from the sunken merchantmen, is such as to hamper greatly a squadron wishing to get quickly out to sea. The present depth of the channel at low water, according to a well-informed French writer, is six metres (1 metre = 3·280 feet). "Consequently," says the *Times* military critic, commenting on this statement, "the *Novik*, with a draught of 5m.70, is alone able to leave or enter port at all hours, a fact which explains the constant activity of this cruiser. On the other hand, such ships as the *Pobieda*, *Poltava*, and *Peresviet* draw 8m.30, and as the mean depth at high water is at present only 8m.70, it is only during the comparatively brief period of high tide, and only then by day, that the battleships can put to sea. Whether due to the sunken steamers or to natural causes, the channel is extremely narrow, so much so that it takes half an hour for a battleship to leave port. Even by interpolating cruisers between battleships . . . the number of vessels that can go out in one tide is limited. It may be recalled that when the squadron put to sea before war was declared the operation took three days. Even after the first losses it was unable to put to sea at one tide, and can only accomplish this feat to-day in five hours with the utmost difficulty."

The significance of the foregoing details with reference to repairs and tides will presently be apparent. For the

moment we will revert to what was said at the commencement of this chapter as to the probable state of excitement in Port Arthur when it becomes known that, whether completely or incompletely restored to a state of efficiency, the Fleet is obviously once more in something like working order, and that evidently some early advantage is to be taken of this fact. One can understand that, although some regret may be experienced at the possible departure of the squadron to seek a junction with the cruiser division at Vladivostok, the garrison may contemplate with pride and satisfaction the chance that in the near future the naval strength of Russia may be reasserted. There is also the prosaic fact to be considered that, as long as the ships remain in harbour, they are of very small practical use, and for defence purposes might be almost dispensed with in view of the heavy armament of the Golden Hill and Tiger's tail forts. On the other hand, their daily consumption of stores is very considerable, and really hearty co-operation of the sailors with the military portion of the garrison does not seem possible. Well then may the beleagured soldiers and civilians feel that if the naval authorities are justified in asserting that their waterfowl can swim, even if they cannot fly, the sooner that interesting statement is demonstrated on an impressive scale, and in a practical fashion, the better.

Turning now abruptly to the Japanese, we find that at Tokio the prevailing impression seems to be that the condition of affairs as regards the Port Arthur Fleet is well-nigh hopeless. Telegraphing on the evening of June 21st, the *Times* correspondent at the Japanese capital says that accounts received in Japan from Chinese sources indicate that success has hitherto not attended the Russians' strenuous efforts to free the entrance to Port Arthur. The *Novik's* recent passage out—this occurred on June 14th, and will be found referred to in Chapter XXIX. of the present narrative—was only accomplished with the help of tugs. "The destroyers," the correspondent remarks, "alone are able to leave the harbour, and are occupied in removing mines." He adds, "there is nothing now to indicate an intention on the part of the Russians to make a sortie with the squadron. Apparently, General Stoessel is staking everything on his capacity to resist the Japanese assault, and if he fails he will blow up the remnants of his squadron."

But, notwithstanding this confidence at Tokio in the immobility of the Russian squadron, the sagacious Togo has been leaving nothing to chance. He has noted the specially vigorous efforts which the Russians have been making during the last few days to clear the passage, and, in view of a possible sortie, has given instructions that a plan similar to the one followed on April 13th is to be adopted. In other words, an effort is to be made to decoy the Russian fleet by means of a weak cruiser squadron, while the battle squadron remains within easy striking distance. Such, at least, is the *Times* correspondent's account, although it seems strange that Admiral Togo should again so soon employ this particular ruse. It may be added that, in any case, the trick appears to have been quite unsuccessful, since apparently the Russians mistook what may have been intended as a decoy squadron for scouts. The detail, however, is not one of paramount importance. The main point is that on the morning of June 23rd Admiral Togo was evidently some distance—thirty miles

it is said—from Port Arthur, and he does not seem to have been apprised of the events of the past night quite so quickly as might have been expected from the previous efficient working of the Japanese system of wireless telegraphy.

For it is not until 11 a.m. that Admiral Togo receives the astonishing message from the picket ship stationed off Port Arthur that a large portion of the enemy's Fleet has emerged from the harbour, and that the operation is still in progress!

As far as can be gathered from the rather conflicting accounts of this exciting episode, only three Russian battleships and four cruisers had succeeded in getting out of the harbour during the night of the 22nd. They are said to have been piloted out by merchantmen in order to unmask any newly-laid mine-field. Further, the exposed flank to the eastward had been guarded by a destroyer flotilla accompanied by the small cruiser *Novik*. During the morning of the 23rd the laborious task of working the big ships out of the harbour was continued, and about 2 p.m. the Japanese decoy or scouting squadron, whichever it may have been, witnessed a very remarkable spectacle. Temporarily at anchor in the roadstead lay, with one exception—the



Photo: Renard, Kiel.

RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP *PERESVIET*.

sunk *Petropavlovsk*—all the battleships which Russia had at Port Arthur at the commencement of the War, namely, the *Tsarevitch*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Vitoff, the *Retvisan*, *Poltava*, *Sevastopol*, *Peresviet*, and *Pobieda*, together with the cruisers *Bayan*, *Pallada*, *Diana*, *Askold*, and *Novik*, and fourteen destroyers. In all a fleet of twenty-five warships, barely one-half of which it had been thought a week ago were fit for duty. The mere appearance outside the harbour of this squadron is a lasting testi-

mony to the vitality of the Russian Navy, and to the reluctance of those controlling its destiny in the Far East to acknowledge that a ship is *hors de combat*, even though she may have been battered almost out of recognition, and—to quote the single case of the *Askold*—have sunk apparently never to rise again.

In the history of the War up to date there has hardly been any episode more dramatic than this striking apparition outside Port Arthur of a "Fleet in being," previously believed, even by experts, to have consisted mainly of ships merely waiting for the moment when the melancholy order should be given for them to be blown in pieces in order to escape falling into the enemy's hands. Nor is it easy to avoid a feeling of regret that, after such a marvellous exhibition of skill and industry in the matter of effecting most extensive and difficult repairs, the resuscitated Port Arthur Fleet should not have made, if not a better fight, at least a more spirited dash for liberty.

While the last ships are emerging from the harbour the covering destroyers have a smart fight with three Japanese divisions of destroyers which have arrived on the scene and come swiftly into action. With the assistance of the *Novik* this first Japanese attack is beaten off.

At 2 p.m. the Russian squadron, preceded by a flotilla of mine dredgers, and covered by the torpedo-craft and the little *Novik*, steams in line ahead towards the open sea, the *Tsarevitch* leading. Having emerged from the roads without a mishap, it shapes a course southward, and sends back the mine-dredgers to port under an escort of armed picket boats.

It is at this juncture, at a little past 6 p.m., when the Russian Fleet, which now has the decoy or scouting cruisers on its port beam, sights the main Japanese Fleet coming up behind the latter. A thrilling period follows, during which both the Russian and Japanese commanders must be the prey of very conflicting emotions. One can imagine the former counting with the keenest anxiety the number of his antagonist's vessels, in order to reckon his chances of a successful engagement. He is probably under no illusion as to the inferiority of his own individual ships, but he may well have hoped that the strain of assisting the land operations, as well as the desire of wreaking vengeance on the Vladivostok squadron for the loss of the *Hitachi Maru* and *Sado Maru*, may have caused considerable detachments to have been made from Admiral Togo's squadron. The latter commander, we may be sure, is full of eager expectation that now at last the moment for which he has longed and waited so patiently has arrived. Since his last encounter with a representative portion of the Port Arthur Fleet he has lost one of his finest battleships, the *Hatsuse*, but he has still a noble squadron under his command, and his ships are all in first-class fighting trim. Small wonder then, that he gives chase, and that every Japanese naval officer and bluejacket under him feels his blood tingling with the glorious prospect of testing on the open seas the relative merits of the two main fleets of Russia and Japan.

The Japanese official reports are silent as to the exact constitution of Admiral Togo's squadron on this momentous occasion, the Admiral merely saying that he "advanced with the whole fleet except vessels on special mission." But the Russian report says that the Japanese squadron, which was steaming in divisions in line ahead, was found to be composed of four first-class and one

JAPAN'S GREAT DISASTER: THE SINKING OF THE BATTLESHIP *HATSUSE*.

second-class battleship, four armoured first-class cruisers, seven second, and five third-class cruisers, one scout and one steamer, as well as thirty torpedo-boats in two divisions. This force will have included the decoy or scouting squadron, which is leading the battleships in line ahead, at a mile interval, with the three destroyer divisions on the port beam. The battleships are followed also at a mile interval by the first cruiser squadron.

The Japanese ships, steaming at full speed, rapidly gain on the Russian squadron, and between six and seven both fleets hoist their battle-flags and, to quote the *Times* correspondent, to whom the writer is chiefly indebted for the account of this notable operation, it seems that the naval battle of the War is imminent. And what a battle it would have been! Fought in the Strait which lies between the Kwang-tung and Shang-tung Promontories, at the entrance to that great Gulf of Pe-chi-li, in which so many of the dim possibilities of Asiatic politics are locked up, it could hardly have been otherwise than decisive, and might conceivably have foreshadowed the early termination of the War. Although, too, only two or three hours of daylight remained, who knows what terrific blows might not have been exchanged even in this brief interval, without reckoning the chances of a continuation of the grim conflict far into the watches of a moonlit night? But it is not to be. The fleets are not to separate without some sharp fighting, but it is time to dispel the illusion that a greater combat will take place, and that in another hour the 12-in. guns of the battleships may be roaring; swift cruisers may be striving to outmanœuvre ships of their own class in order to bring a heavier weight of metal to bear upon their sides; and the little destroyers eagerly seeking for their opportunity to rush in and disable some monster, a single discharge from one of whose smaller guns at a less preoccupied moment would wreck them hopelessly. For we are on the heels of what, apart from the humanitarian aspect—it must not be forgotten, by the way, that a decisive victory is not always an inhuman thing—may surely be classed as one of the sharpest disappointments of modern war.

Having greatly lessened the distance between his fleet and that which he is pursuing, Admiral Togo for some time steers a parallel course at a range of about nine miles, and then bears in. The Russians immediately change their course as many points, and this manœuvre is repeated several times, until the Russians are steering due west. It is now about 7.30, and the Russian Admiral decides to put an end to a situation which is rapidly becoming acute. He is under the impression that the Japanese are preparing to place a division of cruisers and torpedo-craft between him and the Kwang-tung Promontory in order that, during the night, they may force, by persistent torpedo attacks, some of the Russian ships to break their formation, thus leading up to an advantageous engagement in the morning. Admiral Togo's actual procedure does not seem to warrant this belief, and the probability is that, had the Russians continued on their course, they would have experienced something heavier than persistent torpedo attacks in the course of the next few hours. Be this as it may, the Russian Commander comes to one definite conclusion, namely, that he will not fight, and proceeds to act on it by putting over his helm and steering directly for Port Arthur.

Admiral Togo, hitherto bitterly disappointed, we may be sure, at this clouding over of a glorious prospect, signals to his Fleet that he will give chase, and the ships, wheeling to the right, now come into the formation known as "line abreast." But it is growing dark, and "line abreast" is not a formation which can with safety and convenience be retained. Accordingly "line ahead"—of which an illustration was given on page 96—is re-formed, and, as the squadron nears Port Arthur, the Japanese Admiral signals to his destroyers to go in and attack.

Under the command of Captain Asai the three torpedo flotillas respond gladly to this inspiring command. At their first onslaught the Russian Fleet is thrown out of its alignment, and it is only with a semblance of its former impressive regularity that the squadron reaches the roadstead and casts anchor between ten and eleven o'clock, the rearmost ships still heavily engaged with the attacking mosquitoes. It is bright moonlight, and the search-lights are working, but again and again during the night the daring little torpedo-craft dash in and out, braving the ships' fire, chancing the mines, and now and again speeding one of their deadly messengers on its errand of destruction. Only with the most careful deliberation are the Russian ships able to enter the harbour in this doubtful light, and it is morning before all are through the narrow channel. Meanwhile, the Japanese claim to have sunk a battleship of the *Peresviet* type, and to have damaged the *Diana* and the *Askold*. It is only fair to add that the Russians repudiate these losses, but the Japanese declare their conviction that three torpedoes took effect on three ships, and the strict accuracy of the Japanese reports has hitherto been remarkable. On the other hand, the Russian despatches have more than once been found to be misleading, both as regards the loss sustained and the damage, sometimes wholly imaginary, which is stated to have been inflicted on the enemy.

The Japanese account of the cost to them of this affair is quite explicit. "Destroyer *Shirakumo's* wardroom damaged, three men killed, one surgeon, two men wounded. Torpedo-boat *Chidori* received one shot aft engine-room, but no casualties. Torpedo-boats 64 and 66 slightly damaged. No other damage."

Whatever uncertainty may prevail as to the actual damage done to the Port Arthur Fleet by the Japanese torpedo-craft on this remarkable occasion, there is no sort of dubiety as to the incompetence and vacillation displayed by the Russian commanders mainly concerned. In such a connection it is well to quote opinions which are beyond suspicion of partiality, and partly for this reason, partly as striking evidence of the feeling aroused at St. Petersburg by the news of the attempted sortie and its results, the following excerpt is given from the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Echo de Paris*. The telegram is dated June 23:

"Public opinion has not been very deeply affected by the reverses on land, as it reckons upon the large forces under General Kuropatkin to restore the fortune of the Russian arms. It is, however, exasperated by the naval defeat of June 23, which was not even the result of a battle. This evening an Admiral observed to me that the naval situation, which had become favourable, had again been terribly compromised by a lack of vigilance which was inconceivable after the experience acquired at the beginning of the War. The Russians had again lost the naval

superiority, and if Port Arthur were seriously menaced from the land side there would be nothing left for the fleet but to let itself be sunk with honour, as it was henceforth incapable of fighting with any chance of success. The night of June 23 might be considered as fatal for the maritime power of Russia in the Far East as was that of February 8. Fleet on the occasion of the sortie had been succeeded as Commodore by Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomsky of the *Peresviet*, upon whom the command at Port Arthur had previously devolved for a time on the death of Admiral Makaroff. There is also very little doubt that the silence observed at first by Admiral Alexeieff with reference to the sortie,



Photo: Renard, Kiel.

RUSSIAN CRUISER *DIANA*.

"That section of the public acquainted with the facts is highly indignant at the negligence of the Admirals. This feeling finds expression in exceptionally violent reproaches against Admiral Alexeieff for surrounding himself with the nonentities who have remained masters at Port Arthur since the death of Admiral Makaroff."

It is significant that some refugees, who, about a fortnight later, reached Chifu from Port Arthur, reported that the Admiral who commanded the Russian coupled with attempts on the part of several Russian Press correspondents at the front to suggest that Russia had gained a naval victory instead of having sustained a not inconsiderable reverse, have accentuated the growing popular distrust of the Viceroy and his methods.

On the night of June 27th Admiral Togo strikes yet another blow at the Port Arthur squadron. This time the instrument chosen is the 12th Torpedo-boat Flotilla, which makes its way into the roadstead, but is discovered by the

watchful search-lights. The forts open a heavy fire, but the valiant little ships take no notice, and proceed to surround the Russian guardship, a battleship or a cruiser with two masts and three funnels, which is keeping watch and ward near

tagonists, and doubtless the forts slacken fire for fear of hurting friend as well as foe. A Russian destroyer is seen to capsize and sink, and Torpedo-boat Flotilla No. 12 runs out again to sea, doubtless well satisfied with its fine performance.



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RUSSIAN GUNBOAT *BOBR* ON THE LIAO RIVER AT NIU-CHWANG

the base of Golden Hill. Torpedoes are launched, and one takes effect, for the big ship sinks swiftly, with a tremendous explosion and an uplifting of huge volumes of water as she settles into her grave. By this time the Russian destroyers are rushing to the attack. They are promptly met by their smaller an-

No mention is made by Admiral Togo of any damage to the ships, but the enterprise has not been without loss, fourteen being reported as killed, with three wounded.

On June 28th, a Russian destroyer, under command of Lieutenant Burukoff, arrives at Niu-chwang, having success-

fully run the Japanese blockade. Her officers not only protest that Admiral Togo's account of the proceedings on June 23rd is exaggerated, but declare that during the last five days the Russian Fleet has made two cruises in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. A charming picture is drawn of the condition of affairs prevailing inside Port Arthur. "The blockade is not effective, as the enemy remains out of range. The population, which comprises many ladies, among the number being Mme. Stoessel and Princess Lieven, is full of enthusiasm. The bands play every day, and, finally, provisions are plentiful and cheaper than at Niuchwang. Perfect confidence prevails." In order to provide an equivalent for the above for native consumption, the Chinese at Niu-chwang are duly assured that the Japanese Fleet has been completely destroyed!

For some days at the end of June the Japanese ships continue to throw shells into Port Arthur without however doing much damage. The object is doubtless to assist the land operations, which are progressing rapidly, and to which attention will be devoted in separate chapters. Meanwhile, the mine-clearing operations in Talien-wan have also been proceeding briskly, and the Bay is believed now to be fairly safe. But there is still danger to be apprehended from submarine mines. On July 5th the old wooden Japanese cruiser *Kaimon*, while carrying out a special mission outside Talien-wan in a thick fog, strikes a Russian mine and sinks, three officers, including Commander Takahashi, and nineteen non-commissioned officers and men, being missed. The remainder of the crew are saved, and the vessel itself is no great loss; but the incident is a painful reminder of terrible possibilities still to be reckoned with.

Before leaving this portion of our subject, a note may usefully be made of a remarkable reference made on July 3rd by the leading Tokio journal to certain contingencies in regard to the Port Arthur Fleet. The journal in question, carefully weighing, we may be sure, its words, professes trust in Germany's neutrality, but expresses apprehension lest she may consent to allow the Port Arthur squadron, in the event of its escape, to take refuge at Kiao-chau, where the Russians might land their armaments and save the ships. The eyes of some careful students of international politics may have been opened a little by the subsequent statement that "should Germany adopt such a course Japan would reluctantly be compelled to regard her as Russia's ally, and to appeal to the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance." There is no present necessity to attach undue significance to such an observation, unsupported as it is by the weight of official authority, but none the less the pronouncement, with all irresponsibility considered, brings once more before us the existence of those hidden fires on the thin crust overlaying which the Russo-Japanese War is being waged with such reckless indifference on the one side, such deadly earnestness on the other.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE PORT ARTHUR PROBLEM—QUESTION OF ASSAULT—COMPLICATIONS—PRELIMINARY MEASURES—SIEGE OPERATIONS—EARLY FIGHTING.

IT is quite possible that to many students of the Russo-Japanese War the most irritating, and in some respects the most tedious, operations to follow hitherto have been those directed by land against Port Arthur. To some it may have seemed unaccountable that such a desperate performance as the Battle of Nan-shan, described in Chapter XXVIII., should not have had a prompter sequel in the shape of an assault which, relatively, could hardly have been more costly than the attack on the Nan-shan position, and which, if successful, would have solved the first and, perhaps, the biggest problem of the War. All along it has been understood that the Japanese were prepared, if necessary, to make these sacrifices forthwith, and to justify them by the time saved, not to speak of the desirableness of checking Russian efforts to recuperate behind the walls of this massive stronghold!

There is, perhaps, something to be said for this line of argument, at any rate theoretically. Just as in an ordinary battle a commander sometimes deliberately expends hundreds of gallant soldiers in order to produce a certain effect as rapidly as possible, in order to save time, or in order to prevent the enemy from massing inconveniently, so in sieges an apparently reckless assault sometimes pays very well. But, of course, the conditions must be reasonably favourable, a good deal more favourable, at any rate, than they were in the case of Port Arthur, even after the first advanced position of the defenders at Nan-shan had been carried with brilliant success.

If we take a backward glance at the position of affairs shortly after the Battle of Nan-shan, we shall quickly understand how many obstacles lay in the path of a further Japanese advance against the land defences of Port Arthur, putting aside the immense strength of those defences, and the immediate weakness of the Japanese in heavy artillery. As regards the attack on Nan-shan, the situation had been altogether different. Although here, too, the Russians were most strongly placed, with numerous guns of position to oppose to the Japanese field pieces, the Japanese had, in the first place, no other work claiming their present attention, and, secondly, were in strength amply sufficient for the object they had in view. The earliest business of the three divisions of the First Army of Japan landed under General Oku was to isolate Port Arthur effectively, and this could not be said to be done until General Stoessel's "sally-port" on the Kin-chau isthmus had been captured. Again, to have employed more than three divisions in achieving this object, difficult and risky as the work was, would have been absurd, since, as we have seen, there was not room even for this force to move without being badly crowded. Accordingly this, the first real operation of the siege, was adventured, and the end justified the means.

But immediately after the Nan-shan engagement the conditions changed alto-

gether. It is true that an important advantage has been secured by the occupation of Dalny, but the counterbalancing disadvantages are very great. By this time the Japanese plan of campaign in Manchuria is beginning to mature, the rainy season is approaching, and the Second Army, or the bulk of it, will be wanted further north to co-operate with the First Army and the force landed at Takushan. This call to the north is emphasised by the news that an army is being detached from the main Russian force at Liao-yang for the purpose of relieving Port Arthur. The relieving expedition must be met and crushed, to prevent the Japanese lines of investment from the bare chance of being taken between two fires. The question of numbers, also, takes a different shape. Even if three divisions can still be left before Port Arthur by landing fresh troops from Japan—a course which is, as we shall see, pursued—such a force would be of no use for the purpose of "rushing" a stronghold like this. It takes the equivalent of two Japanese divisions to garrison this great fortress properly, and, that being the case, we may take it that an attempt to "rush" the place with less than, at least, 100,000 men would have been utterly hopeless. It is conceivable that if two or three times the number of men who fought at Nan-shan had hurled themselves against Port Arthur in the very early days of June, a sufficient number might have got in to ensure a capture, but the sacrifice of life would have been truly awful. Moreover, the Japanese could not possibly have concentrated 100,000 men at this point without seriously compromising their success in other directions. It is not easy to say precisely what they did do in the matter of providing troops for the investment, while at the same time permitting General Oku to march northward, meet General Stackelburg's relieving force at Telissu, beat it back, and then join hands with the other two armies in Manchuria. But it is very certain that it was not contemplated at Tokio to supplement the costly assault on Nan-shan by immediately throwing a still larger force at the chain of powerful forts which constitute the inner defences of Port Arthur. The Japanese plan of campaign evidently includes many deliberate sacrifices, but such sacrifices are carefully calculated, and, intensely eager as the General Staff must be to have the Port Arthur question finally disposed of, the operations in Manchuria cannot be starved for lack of men, more especially now when war wastage on a large scale is likely to commence.



THE JAPANESE VICTORIA CROSS.
The Order of the "Kinshi Kunsho" (Golden Kite) conferred for conspicuous valour in battle on land or sea.

Accordingly, what appears to have been done is this: General Oku takes up north with him the 3rd and 4th Divisions, and is, apparently, reinforced with other troops before he issues from Port Adams to fight General Stackelburg at Telissu. He leaves behind him the 1st Division, which fought under him at Nan-shan, and thus commences forthwith the investment

AN EPISODE DURING THE BATTLE OF NAN-SHAN.

Every man who took part in the third attack on Nan-Shan Hill fell before the Russian fire, and in the lull which followed the Russians could be seen peering over their earthworks at their fallen adversaries.

of Port Arthur. A little later the 11th Division arrives from Japan, and the land operations before Port Arthur now proceed under command of General Nogi.

On June 28th the Japanese landed the 6th Division of 20,000 men at Kerr Bay, and in the course of the ensuing week three large transports and a number of smaller ones arrived at Dalny, bringing an independent artillery brigade with heavy siege guns and provisions for the 11th Division.

Thus by the beginning of July we have three complete divisions at full war strength allocated to the siege of Port Arthur, and these, with the artillery brigade, and a constant stream of reinforcements, should indicate the presence within striking distance of the fortress itself of at least 60,000 or 70,000 men, from quite an early stage of the proceedings. This in itself is a very remarkable achievement considering the calls which Japan has had to meet in other directions, and the not inconsiderable losses which she has already incurred in forcing the Nan-shan position, and in confronting Kuropatkin with the armies of Generals Kuroki and Oku and the force landed at Takushan.

And now let us pause awhile to examine the nature of the task which lies before this besieging force, and to discuss briefly and discursively the steps likely to be taken to effect the reduction of such a mighty stronghold as Port Arthur unquestionably is.

An excellent general idea of the fortifications of Port Arthur will be gained by a study of the plan given on page 437, in which the principal works are very clearly marked, and useful notes are added on the positions taken up in the siege of 1894. But, of course, it is hopelessly impossible to denote by any one plan, or in any such concise description as can here be given, the real strength of a fortress upon which years of toil and millions of money have been expended. It would need a volume to picture at all accurately the manner in which fort, so to speak, works in with fort in this massive scheme of defence; how escalade is guarded against, protection from reverse attack secured, communication maintained, and so forth. Then there is the question of armament, one of almost overwhelming magnitude in a fortress, the artillery park of which alone contains 500 field guns of various patterns, in addition to the great pieces mounted in the forts. At best, in a popular work of this description, a vague outline only is possible of a gigantic system of permanent fortification, in which Russian military engineering has found its highest expression since the days when General Todleben gave the Allies such trouble half a century ago.

Of the various accounts of Port Arthur as a fortress, which are accessible to the general public, perhaps the best is that given in anticipation of the war by a writer in the *Broad Arrow* of January 23rd and 30th, 1904. From this we may borrow the statement that the land-fortifications are semi-closed works, with their "gorges," or entrances, protected by loop-holed masonry walls of enormous strength. In the great ditches which surround these formidable works there are covered passages known as "kapponiers," from which, as well as from galleries in the escarps and counterscarps, a fire can be directed against any storming party that has swarmed into the ditch, and is preparing to scale the parapet. The guns, which range from 5.9-in. to 11-in. breech-loaders, are mounted *en barbette*, on disappearing

carriages, or on over-bank fire carriages of the Poutiloff pattern. The total number of the guns actually mounted in the fortress is given as 400, but of these a large proportion belong to the batteries on the sea-face. Another interesting description of the defences of Port Arthur is given by a writer in the German *Reichswehr*, who describes the perimeter of the fortress as divided into seven sectors, four on the land and three on the sea front. This authority, however, includes both as land and sea sectors certain forts and batteries in the neighbourhood of White Wolf Mountain, which seem to partake of the nature of outworks, and so are not included in the scope of the plan given on page 437. White Wolf Mountain, it may be remarked, lies about two miles to the south-west of the base of Tiger's Tail. Of the five remaining sectors mentioned by this writer one is made up of the works on Golden Hill (Forts Nos. 10 and 11 on the plan), another of the Forts (Nos. 12, 13, and 14) on Tiger's Tail. The first land sector would seem to correspond with Forts Nos. 7, 8, and 9 on the plan; the second with Nos. 4, 5, 6; the third with Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The fourth (land) and seventh (coast) sectors are the "outworks" just mentioned as being grouped near White Wolf Mountain.

The first land sector has three large and nine small works armed with nearly 100 guns. The works in the second sector occupy the plateau north of the town, and prevent No. 1 sector from being enfiladed from the land side. The third sector comprises the heights west of Port Arthur, and protects the preceding sector from reverse attack on being turned. This is said to be the weak point of the whole defence, as the hills are narrow, low, and separated by "dead" ground, *i.e.*, ground which cannot be reached by the fire of the guns in the forts, and in which an enemy can therefore collect and take breath for a final rush. This sector is one and a half mile in extent, and comprises several closed works with many open batteries, and sixty guns of medium calibre.

From the above selected details it will readily be seen that even on its weakest side Port Arthur is a place of uncommon strength, and that, even assuming a pretty complete knowledge on the part of the Japanese of the details of its design and armament, there is little hope of capturing this huge monument of engineering skill by a *coup de main*. On the other hand, it may well be that the up-to-date besiegers will depart rather freely from the old-world deliberation with which the reduction of fortresses used to be carried out, and will impart a good deal of vigour and freshness to the time-honoured process of "laying siege."

Siege operations, from the earliest dawn of history, have exhibited a good deal of sameness, and yet have always been rather favourite objects of study alike to the military expert, the historian, and the general public. Probably such sieges as that of Troy, which lasted ten years, and that of Nineveh, in which Sardanapalus held out for seven, were unspeakably tedious to all concerned. Yet they have cast a glamour not only over contemporary history, but over posterity to an extent scarcely paralleled in the case of any other sort of warlike operation. The sieges of Jerusalem and Byzantium have attained historical prominence out of all proportion to their military significance; while the details of the defence of Mafeking will probably be remembered by many schoolboys of the next generation who have forgotten

the date of Salamanca, and are uncertain as to the whereabouts of Plassey. Doubtless it is the personal factor which enters largely into this estimate. The blood is naturally stirred by the thought of heroic endurance exhibited by a handful of sturdy defenders holding out, perhaps, against an enveloping army. Or one likes to read of glorious assaults, of desperate forlorn hopes, of terrible hand-to-hand encounters, in which the besieged have all the advantages which an artful defensive can give them, while the attackers are inspired by fury born of baffled hopes and mad determination to win at all costs a coveted prize. But, apart from all this, it is a fact that sieges have always had a singular attraction for those engaged in them, in spite of the serious discomfort involved. The mixture of stately deliberation, and what Kipling's Mulvaney would call "sumpshuous fightin'," of scientific preliminaries with headlong collisions, of passive resistance with exhilarating counterstrokes, has always appealed strongly to those who have actually participated in sieges of the less lurid sort. There has even been a period in history—the time of Marlborough and Turenne—when sieges were regarded as a fashionable amusement, in which more especially the French Court delighted, judging by the frequency with which, in all the panoply of puff and powder and beautiful millinery, it used to attend these interesting operations.

The methods of "laying siege" which have been adopted in successive ages have a close family resemblance. The establishment of a preliminary blockade was practised by Asiatics at a very early date, while the Greeks and Romans habitually used works of circumvallation in addition to their superior "engines" in the way of "tortoises," rams, catapults, and movable towers. In the Middle Ages mining was freely resorted to, and modern shell fire was more clearly foreshadowed by machines which threw bars of hot copper, or, for a change, putrid carcasses. But a preliminary blockade and then a cautious advance under artificial cover, with a view to obtaining a "superiority of fire"—these are features which in one form or another have marked the opening of nine-tenths of the more important sieges of history from time immemorial to the present day. The main difference has been in the method of obtaining the artificial cover necessary to enable the besiegers to draw closer to the walls or ramparts of the place besieged. In modern times the system adopted has been the opening of successive "parallels," or lines of trenches, connected by other zig-zag trenches so arranged as to expose those advancing along them as little as possible to the fire of the besieged. But the latter-day process of laying siege has been largely modified by the nature of the artillery employed, and we may take it for granted that, in besieging Port Arthur, the Japanese have given more thought to the emplacement of their siege guns than to the elaborate devices by which military engineers have hitherto assisted infantry to creep gradually closer to the ramparts it is proposed eventually to carry by assault.

At first sight it may seem as if in a very modern siege the advantages lie altogether on the side of the defence, provided that really adequate care has been taken to make the fortress all it should be as regards its power both of resisting attack and inflicting damage on the attackers. We see Port Arthur with its 400 guns, many of them of the largest

size and the greatest power, with parapets said to give no chance to the escaladers, with every sort of device for subjecting an attack to a deadly flanking fire, and many may wonder how the Japanese can hope to deal successfully



THE DEFENCES OF PORT ARTHUR.

with such active opposition as is here involved. How—to ask an elementary question—will it be possible for them to obtain that superiority of fire without which an assault must be either impossible or too dreadfully costly to contemplate seriously? It has taken the Russians years of peace to mount their hundreds of big guns in the most advantageous positions. Will it not be hopeless for the Japanese to attempt to bring up artillery of equal weight and power in the time at their disposal? Even should they succeed in performing this tremendous task, does it follow that they will succeed in overcoming the defending artillery so completely, and in breaking up the enemy's ramparts so effectively as to render a subsequent assault feasible?

The answers to these questions do not necessarily indicate the course the siege of Port Arthur may take. That is as yet wholly uncertain ; but it is none the less interesting to discuss by the light of a little technical knowledge such possibilities as surround the situation at the close of June. First, let us look back a little to the quotation made from the pages of the *Reichswehr* with reference to Port Arthur's defensive capabilities. It will be noted that particular use is made of the term " sector " in this connection, and that the perimeter of the fortress is assumed to consist of several of these sectors ranging from perhaps half a mile to a mile and a half in length. Now, the modern art of laying siege is not necessarily to attack the entire perimeter, but to concentrate attention upon one sector, and, by breaking down the defence at this one point, to pave the way for entry and capture of the whole. For every scheme of fortification is liable to the same defect as a chain, the strength of which is the strength of its weakest link, and when one sector in the perimeter has been weakened to the breaking point, the end is not far off.

The main object of the besiegers then must be to establish a superiority of fire over one sector of the defence, and in order to do this it is not necessary to bring up anything like so many guns as there are in the whole fortress which is undergoing siege For the defenders could not in any case crowd all their guns into this one sector, even if they could readily move such monsters in the face of a pretty continual bombardment. Moreover, they cannot with safety denude any portion of their perimeter of guns lest the enemy's infantry should promptly select that portion for an overwhelming assault. We now begin to perceive that the defenders of a first-class fortress can hardly be assured of the latter's impregnability. As an able critic remarks, " against the high-angle fire of heavy howitzers, in positions invisible to the enemy, supported by the sweeping, scythe-like action of shrapnel fired by high velocity guns, fortress defence soon experiences the sense of all its inherent weakness. With ample bomb-proof cover and resolute troops, the enemy may not be driven out ; the hotter the fire the less the chance either of reinforcement or retreat. But a closed work can be so wrecked and overwhelmed by the converging fire of distant batteries that its main armament may be reduced to impotence during the progress of the succeeding assault." It is, therefore, quite conceivable that, with a number of guns quite inferior to Port Arthur's copious armament, the Japanese may silence the works in the sector chosen for attack without much difficulty. This once done, and the Japanese infantryman afforded a chance of coming to close quarters with the bayonet, the guns in other sectors may be rendered useless, and the fortress may fall with but a tithe of its ammunition expended.

The co-operation of the Navy, too, must be intelligently reckoned in any estimate of Japan's capacity to reduce a fortress the weakness as well as the strength of which may prove to lie in its marine aspects. We have seen already the Japanese battleships bombarding Port Arthur from Pigeon Bay, and a glance at any map of the Kwangtung Promontory will show that there is not a point in the area of the Port Arthur defences which cannot be reached from one side of the promontory or the other by modern naval guns. Knowing as they do to a nicety the position of all

the works in the scheme, it may not be impossible for the Japanese ships to drop 12-inch shells into forts which, however admirably equipped with ordinary bomb-proof shelters, will hardly refuse admittance to these persuasive projectiles.

While, then, it may be freely admitted that the siege of Port Arthur is a task of unusual gravity, and one which the Japanese in particular are certain to approach with becoming caution; but it must not be supposed that the obstacles involved are in any way insuperable. In point of fact the Japanese are probably far better placed as regards the comparatively speedy reduction of Port Arthur than we should have been had it become necessary to lay regular siege to Pretoria. Not only have they a sufficiency of men, with facilities for prompt reinforcement, but they can bring up siege artillery with particular ease and readiness now that Dalny is in their occupation, and the weary work of clearing the mines from Talien-wan has been practically completed. Interruption is to all intents and purposes out of the question, unless Kuropatkin succeeds in hurling back the combined armies in the north with more vigour than seems at present likely to be exhibited. The only really disturbing factor, outside the sacrifices which are looked upon as inevitable, is the continued existence of the Port Arthur Fleet, and its recently renewed activity. In all other respects the Japanese have already secured advantages which are quite extraordinary, considering the short time which has elapsed since the land operations against Port Arthur were commenced, and the possession of which cannot now be neutralised by anything which the Russians, either inside or outside the beleagured fortress, can conveniently do.

The first occurrence of serious fighting by land in the vicinity of Port Arthur is recorded as taking place on June 26th. There had previously been some minor struggles for positions to the east of the town, but on this occasion the attack made by the Japanese was a very vigorous one, and is said to have been delivered by, practically speaking, the whole of the infantry force available. This would mean that both the 1st and 11th Divisions—the 6th had not yet been landed—were engaged, to the number of about 40,000 men. Unfortunately no Japanese official report is available, and the Russian despatch is somewhat meagre and difficult to follow without the Russian staff map, in which some of the most interesting heights are marked by figures only.

As far as can be gathered from the unsatisfactory information procurable, the operation commenced at 4 o'clock in the morning of June 26th, with a bombardment by Japanese warships in Siao-ping-tao Bay, which lies about 14 miles east of Port Arthur. This bombardment is said to have been directed against the whole coast towards the north from the bay to Mount Uitselo, and under cover of it the Japanese attacked two heights, evidently close to the coast, which were held by East Siberian Riflemen. The latter having made a stubborn resistance, and finding their rear threatened by a Japanese detachment landed for the purpose, retired, after suffering heavy losses, to the heights of Lung-wang-tang, some eight miles east of Port Arthur. The Japanese attacked this new position in very great force, but the Russian despatch claims that they were repulsed. General Gilinski, however, admits that on the following day there was "some outpost firing," and he adds quite

casually—his despatch is dated June 30th —" the Japanese are emplacing batteries on the summit of the Lung-wang-tang Mountain." From which it would seem that, despite these repulses, the Japanese are not to be denied, and that by the last day of June their guns were on a convenient height only eight miles from Port Arthur, and considerably less from the line of forts.

There is reason to believe that the fighting on June 26th was very severe. The Russians admit having seven officers wounded and 200 soldiers killed or wounded. It is added that the Russian mines " exploded at the proper time, blowing up at least 50 Japanese." According to unofficial reports received in Tokio the Japanese casualties numbered about 100, while the Russians left 40 dead, and lost two machine guns and a quantity of rifles and ammunition.

It is extremely difficult to give any clear accounts of the early fighting in front of Port Arthur, owing to the meagreness of the accessible information, much of which, moreover, is clearly untrustworthy. Some idea of the quality of the rumours which prevailed during this period may be gleaned from the sensation created about the middle of July by a report, to which the Russian General Staff gave currency, to the effect that on the 10th and 11th the Japanese had made a desperate attack on Port Arthur, and had been repulsed with a loss of 30,000 men. The " 30,000 story," as it came to be called, was widely circulated and believed, until the Japanese finally issued a categorical statement declaring that on the days on which they were stated to have been so badly defeated there had been no fighting whatever, except, possibly, some desultory firing between outposts.

On July 4th there was evidently a pretty stiff encounter in which, according to some accounts, the Russians took the offensive and obtained some success. The *Times* correspondent at Tokio, however, telegraphing on July 10th, favours the idea that, though the Japanese casualties on the 4th were heavy, the troops, assisted by the Fleet, succeeded in capturing Miaotsui Fort, mounting eight guns, which affords a good emplacement for bombarding the eastern section of the defences. He adds that the Japanese are evidently advancing in two columns, the first, as we have already seen, moving against the east side of Port Arthur from Dalny, the second concentrating on Shui-shi-ling (" Naval Camp "), which lies three or four miles north of Port Arthur. Shui-shi-ling, which will be easily found on the plan on page 437, is strongly fortified, and is regarded as a " cardinal outwork," to gain possession of which the Japanese are prepared to undergo heavy losses. In the war with China in 1894 the Japanese occupied this place strongly before they took Port Arthur, and used the hills as a position for their siege guns.

At this point we may now leave the siege of Port Arthur, as to the speedy termination of which the utmost confidence prevails among the Japanese. The *Express* correspondent at Tokio declares, indeed, that the fall of Port Arthur and the defeat of General Kuropatkin's Army are being anticipated with almost amusing certainty, the only doubt being as to which event will occur first! " All the manufacturers of Chinese lanterns are busy turning out thousands of these effective illuminations in all kinds of quaint designs—torpedoes, shells, warships, and guns. Thousands of the lower classes are out in the forests gathering

PREPARING TO WELCOME THE JAPANESE: STRENGTHENING THE DEFENCES AT PORT ARTHUR.

twigs and leaves for the decoration of houses and restaurants, and the flag-makers are also very busy, for there is a huge demand for Japanese and British flags. The restaurants and tea-shops are putting up decorations, consisting chiefly of leaves, flags, and flowers, in readiness for the many dinner and tea-parties that will be held on the great day. Many well-to-do people in Tokio intend, as soon as Port Arthur has fallen, to visit the fortress, especially those who have lost relatives in the fighting around it. Accordingly, shipping companies are making arrangements to take touring parties at special rates. There is some apprehension, however, as to whether the War Office authorities will step in and prohibit anything of the sort."

Such confidence may or may not be justified by the event; but public exhibitions are premature and hardly to the taste of Western nations. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the Japanese are not the only people who have counted warlike chickens before they were hatched, and that some excuse for these anticipations may be found, not only in the previous successes which Japan has already won, but also in the arrogance displayed by Russia before the War taught her that Japan was not to be crushed by bluffing forecasts of humiliation and defeat.



A TYPICAL JAPANESE GUNBOAT, THE *AKAGI.*

(This boat rendered valuable service in the attack upon the Nan-Shan heights.)

CHAPTER XXXVII.

RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS—ALEXEIEFF AT MUKDEN—KUROPATKIN AND THE GRAND DUKE BORIS—HOME AFFAIRS—THE GERMAN EMPEROR AND HIS RUSSIAN REGIMENT—STOPPAGE OF BRITISH STEAMERS.

THE time has now arrived for another of our periodical reviews of the situation from the Russian standpoint. The latter does not, perhaps, present so many features of activity and attractiveness as does the steady advance of the armies of Japan or the brilliant operations of her fleet. But there is much of very real interest in Russian movements at this period, and it may well be that some of the developments, to the recording of which this chapter will be devoted, will have results of deep significance outside the area of the War. For we seem to be nearing a point at which Russian indifference to international opinion may produce some awkward complications. There is also a growing danger lest the professed neutrality of certain European nations may not prevent them or their representatives from doing and saying things which the belligerents may be justified in construing into acts of unfriendliness. Such side issues may not hitherto have been regarded as matters of great moment in dealing with ordinary wars. But this is not an ordinary war, and it is absolutely necessary to its proper treatment that, whenever an unmistakable sign of outside possibilities in connection with it occurs, it should be noted, and its tendency carefully examined. Hitherto the ring has been kept with creditable strictness. But there are flushed faces and clenched fists to be observed among the spectators, and the world will be fortunate if it escapes a lurid sequel to the present orderly combat.

But, before we pass to the indications which seem to justify these forebodings, we may direct our attention first to the Russian movements in the field, and then to Russia at home. As regards the former, not a great deal of change has taken place since the defeat at Telissu of General Stackelberg's force produced such an unhappy modification in General Kuropatkin's plans. That a good deal of change was intended is probable, but Commanders-in-chief in Manchuria have to reckon with a rainy season, which defies even the marvellous endurance of the Russian soldier, and there is reason to believe that Kuropatkin has very recently had a striking illustration of this fact. The precise course of events at Liao-yang during the closing days of June and the early days of July, is extremely difficult to realise, the Russian censorship of all foreign correspondence being most strict; while naturally great reticence is observed as to proceedings which are open to sharp criticism on the ground of vacillation and unwise postponement. But the following is accepted by a high authority as an accurate account of what occurred at this interesting period. The passage is extracted, with one or two omissions, from the war commentary in the *Times*. It commences by recalling the capture of the

passes on June 27th, of which a detailed account was given in Chapter XXXIV. :

"That night Kuropatkin at last realised his position and ordered a retreat upon Hai-cheng, a movement which ought to have been begun, at the latest, eight days earlier, and to have been continued to Liao-yang on the evening of the 27th, also at the latest. Kuropatkin was now to experience the full meaning of time lost in war. His force at Kai-ping, in the greatest danger, could not respond to his injunctions to retire, since at the same moment that the irruption of the Japanese over the passes was in progress it was engaged upon a reconnaissance in force right away down to Sun-yao-cheng, twenty-two miles further south, in search of the coy Japanese, and it could not retire until this reconnaissance had returned.

"But worse was to follow. Kuropatkin himself returned to Hai-cheng in his *train de luxe*, and thence, upon receipt of disquieting news from his left, continued on to Liao-yang, and made fresh dispositions for a general rearward movement upon this town. It was too late; and though Reuter's Agent significantly dated his despatches from "The Russian Headquarters, Liao-yang," he might have added that it was a headquarters without an army.

"On the 28th, the morning indicated for the commencement of the retreat, *afflavit Deus*, the rain began to come down in torrents. The downpour continued without intermission, certainly for three days, and perhaps for longer; the bivouacs of the army at Ta-shi-chao and Hai-cheng were inundated, carts and their teams were swept away, and soldiers had to choose between swimming along the Imperial highway or drowning.

"As to all the consequences of a mischance, which should have been fully anticipated, we are still in doubt. But we hear, and can believe, that the troops setting out were obliged to return, and that Kuropatkin, finding his army could not follow him, made a virtue of necessity, counter-ordered the retreat, and rejoined his troops by rail to face the music."

The position of Kuropatkin with the main forces of Japan pressing in upon him, and with little freedom of movement for his own troops owing to the encompassing sea of mud, is sufficiently embarrassing. But he appears not to lose heart, and during the next fortnight labours unceasingly to cope with a situation which presents many puzzling features. It remains to be seen whether he will make any determined stand at Ta-shi-chao, but we may discount the future to the extent of saying that time will show that Kuropatkin, during the first two weeks of July at any rate, deserves admiration for his manly attitude, and his vigorous determination to make the best of a bad business.

It must not be forgotten that throughout these trying times Kuropatkin has still to deal with the opposition, direct and indirect, of Admiral Alexeieff at Mukden, whose anomalous position is becoming more and more intolerable. An insight into the state of affairs in this direction is afforded by the special representative of the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger* at Niu-chwang, who remarks that the performances of the Viceroy are beginning to constitute a positive danger to the prospects of Russia in the campaign, as well as a serious hindrance to General Kuropatkin. "He appears," says this plain-spoken correspondent, "to assert his right to retain a considerable body of troops around his person in Mukden,

much to the disgust of the officers, who are said to refrain from mutiny only from the consciousness that a representative of the Tsar cannot be got rid of by violent means. Admiral Alexeieff himself lives in his state car on the railway. A roof has been constructed over the car, and flowers have been planted around it. The Viceroy countermands military orders, and detains reinforcements as they arrive by inspecting them, while his Chief of Staff is sent two or three times a week to Ta-shi-chao in order to observe the movements and dispositions of General Kuropatkin."



REMOVING THE BIG GUNS FROM THE FORT AT NIU-CHWANG.

Nor have the Commander-in-Chief's personal embarrassments been confined to Viceregal interference. There has been grave trouble at Liao-yang owing to the behaviour of the Grand Duke Boris, some very strange details of which subsequently reach the *Berliner Tageblatt* from an authoritative source. The Grand Duke while at the front had been guilty of many indiscretions, and so moved was General Kuropatkin by what came to his ears that he summoned the royal offender to his presence, and peremptorily ordered him to get rid of certain undesirable persons in his *entourage*. "Your Excellency appears to forget," said the Grand Duke, "who stands before you." "No, I do not," retorted the General. "Your Imperial Highness is merely a lieutenant in an infantry regiment, while I am the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces. You, as a subordinate, must obey, or take the consequences." The story goes that the Grand Duke, mad with rage, drew his sword and slashed savagely at the General. The latter avoided the full force of the blow by stepping back, but the sword is said to have grazed his nose, inflicting a disfiguring wound. The Com-

mander-in-Chief remained for some days in his quarters, and in the meantime sent a strongly-worded complaint to the Tsar. The Grand Duke was accordingly recalled, and ordered to betake himself in disgrace to Archangel. Even if the story be not minutely accurate, the fact of its appearance in a responsible German paper is suggestive, and it may be taken for granted that, at any rate, the behaviour of the Grand Duke was of a gravely objectionable character. Nor can one fail to sympathise with a Commander in the field who has difficulties of this sort to deal with, in addition to the anxieties inseparable from a conflict with a numerous, skilful, and hitherto successful enemy.

Still further trouble has arisen in connection with the Military Attachés, and much comment is aroused by the recall of Colonel Audeoud and another officer, who represent the Swiss Government, and are said to have incurred General Kuropatkin's displeasure. Colonel Audeoud, on his return to Berne, disclaims any knowledge of General Kuropatkin's motives in taking this unusual step, and declares that he himself has habitually observed a most discreet attitude. The incident is not of serious significance, but it seems, when taken in conjunction with other evidence of friction, to foster the view that things at Liaoyang about this time are not in a very comfortable state, and that the work of the Commander-in-Chief is not being rendered smoother by a completely harmonious environment.

On the other hand, General Kuropatkin probably derives a full measure of consolation from the fact that week by week his forces are growing, and that in this way the might of Holy Russia is beginning slowly to assert itself. Latterly the Russian authorities have been rather vague in their statements of the performances of the Siberian and Manchurian railways; but there is reason to believe that these are now working with great regularity, and that the number of troops now at Kuropatkin's disposal is appreciably larger than it was even such a short time back as the date of Telissu. Perhaps no better proof of this could be cited than the attention which the Russians are paying to their hospital trains, which, we may be reasonably sure, would not have been so well looked after had the railway not been able to meet satisfactorily the demands made on it for the transport of sound soldiers to the front.

An interesting and instructive account of the Russian arrangements for the transport and care of the wounded is given by a Kieff correspondent, who writes, under date of July 12th, that the twenty-sixth military hospital train fitted out by the Russian Ministry for War has just left Kieff for Irkutsk. "The whole of the Manchurian and Siberian Railway lines," he adds, "has been systematically split up into sections, and numbered hospital trains, replete with the best surgical and other appliances obtainable, have been apportioned to these sections. The staff of each train includes three or more fully qualified doctors, from six to ten nursing sisters of the Red Cross Society, and from thirty to forty hospital assistants. Each train has accommodation for from two hundred to three hundred wounded and sick. The hospital train referred to above is destined to run solely between Irkutsk and Kazan. Here the hospital train and hospital steamer or barge services link up. From Kazan the seriously wounded will in future be despatched to various hospital

establishments in the vicinity of the Volga, Sheksna, and other waterways by barge, or specially-fitted light-draught steamer. The special department of 'military communications for the transport of the wounded' is at present perfecting an organised system of transport into home centres by water, and, to judge by the extensive preparations being made all the way from Astrakhan to Cherepovitz, the arrival of considerable numbers of Russian wounded is clearly anticipated. The kindly co-operation of the management at Franzensbad and other foreign water-cure resorts, who have offered to allow Russian wounded officers and others to take advantage of their facilities for treatment free of charge for stated periods, is much appreciated in military circles in Russia."

But, admirable as these domestic arrangements for the care of the sick and wounded seem, there appears to be considerable one-sidedness about Russian humanitarian methods. It will be recalled that an important result of that great Hague Convention, which had its origin in the peaceful aspirations of the Tsar, was the suggested institution in all civilised wars of a "prisoners' intelligence bureau." With the article of the Convention which deals with this point Japan has faithfully complied, and has furnished to the Russian authorities full reports every ten days. It is declared in Tokio that, notwithstanding this excellent example, Russia has failed sadly in her duty to humanity by neglecting to furnish any but spasmodic and unsatisfactory reports regarding the considerable numbers of Japanese prisoners in her hands. The consequence is that hundreds of Japanese families are being kept in an agony of suspense concerning the fate of their relatives. This is an altogether different question from that of the "atrocities" in the field of battle, with reference to which a certain amount of conflicting but, on the whole, rather trivial evidence is forthcoming on both sides. There are wild beasts in most armies who occasionally do unspeakable things under the influence of battle fury, but whose performances are no more typical of those armies than the inmates of a criminal lunatic asylum are typical of a country's intellect and character. But it is a black blot on Russia's credit that in this matter of the prisoners' intelligence bureau she should have displayed cold-blooded apathy and neglect, while Japan has been taking such extreme care to act humanely with regard to the numerous Russian captives in her power.

Mobilisation in Russia is proceeding more or less actively, the 5th and 6th Army Corps now being under orders for the Far East. Early in July the Tsar, who appears of late to have taken up a stronger attitude, reviews a portion of these troops, and wishes them "God-speed," both in his own name and that of the Tsaritsa. It is to be hoped that this Imperial solicitude has the desired effect, for there are queer stories afloat of the reluctance of the Russian soldiers to respond to the mobilisation orders. It is even said that in one district young fellows are taking drugs known to produce serious illness in order to avoid military service. Probably this unsoldierly spirit is fostered by the reports which are beginning to be circulated as to the privations to be endured at the front. It must be remembered that a certain number of sick and wounded are now coming back to Russia, and these, we may be sure, are telling stories which would never have passed the censor had they been committed to paper.

Not that the censorship has been wholly successful in suppressing unfavourable descriptions of the state of affairs in the Far East. Of one of the methods by which it has been evaded a rather amusing story is told. About the middle of May the mother of one of the Jewish surgeons who had been sent out from Warsaw to the War received a letter from her son, which duly bore the stamp of the censor, and which, on the face of it, was written in a most contented spirit. The writer stated that he was in good health, that admirable order prevailed among the troops, who were certain of victory, and were amply supplied with necessaries, and that there was so little illness that army surgeons had hardly anything to do. The letter concluded with a request that some Hebrew books should be sent to him. The titles of these would have roused the censor's suspicions if he could have translated them. They were, "Famine and Destitution," "Consequent Fearful Epidemics," "Scarcely any Sanitary Appliances," "Demoralisation of the Army Constantly Increasing," "End of Discipline," and "Wish I were taken Prisoner."

Other leakages take place, as, for example, a letter from an officer in high command to a brother officer apparently at Niu-chwang, a translation of which is given by Reuter's correspondent at that place. The writer speaks of the brave Russian soldiers as going into battle like sheep to the shambles. "None can deny their loyalty, but until they are properly officered their loyalty is wasted." The officers are described as constantly quarrelling, and fighting so vigorously for their own interests that the common enemy is forgotten. "Everyone, from the Viceroy and General Kuropatkin down to insignificant subalterns, quarrels, and is unwilling to obey orders. . . Jealousy and suspicion are rampant throughout the army. The members of our secret service are so busy spying on each other that they cannot apprehend spies, and Japanese agents carry on their work with impunity."

It is not surprising that, in view of the reports which must now be growing common even in Russia of this unfortunate condition of affairs at the front, mobilisation continues to be hampered by irregularities. It is specially unfortunate that a bad example should be set by officers of the reserve, who constantly transgress by several days the period fixed for mobilisation, and in some districts fail to put in an appearance at all. So serious does the scandal become that an Order of the Day is issued by the General Staff dealing with the subject in vigorous terms, and announcing that the heads of the various recruiting departments will be held personally responsible for any future negligence. Such incidents are not particularly inspiring, but they afford valuable evidence of the doubtful working of methods of conscription in the case of unpopular wars.

In connection with the present mobilisation an episode must be recorded which at the time gave rise to serious discussion, and of which the last may not be heard for many months to come. One of the regiments going to the front enjoys the distinction of having the German Emperor as its Colonel-in-Chief. This is the 85th (Wiborg) Infantry Regiment, and it was only in accordance with Continental military custom that, on its being ordered to the Far East it should receive some sort of message from its Imperial Chief, just as did our own Royal Dragoons, another corps of which the

RUSSIAN BIVOUAC
IN A MANCHURIAN TEMPLE.

German Emperor holds the Colonelcy, when they went out to South Africa. But it was noticeable that, while in the case of the Royal Dragoons the Kaiser's message was correctly brief and simple, in that of the Wiborg Regiment he was quite singularly profuse in his felicitations. Not only did his telegram convey to the corps his congratulations on the prospect of meeting the enemy, not only did he express pride in the fact that his Wiberg Regiment would have the honour of fighting for the Emperor, the Fatherland, and the Russian Army, but he took pains to add, "My sincere wishes accompany the regiment. God bless its standards!"

Considering that Japan is, diplomatically speaking, a perfectly friendly nation as far as Germany is concerned, it is very natural that the publication of this remarkable telegram in the military organ, the *Russki Invalid*, should have aroused considerable comment. Even in Berlin the message was regarded in many quarters as "a demonstration too friendly in the manner of its expression not to deserve criticism." In St. Petersburg hopes were at first freely expressed that the message foreshadowed the abandonment by Germany of her position as a mere onlooker of events in the Far East. A day or two later, however, those Russian organs which had supported this view somewhat ostentatiously retracted, evidently "by order," what they had said. It is interesting to note the excellent behaviour of the Tokio Press, which even treated the telegram in a bantering spirit. It supposed that "the usual explanations and extenuations" would follow, and expressed a hope that his Majesty would invoke the blessing of Heaven on the Japanese standards, "whereby very perfect neutrality will be attained." But there is little doubt that the message rankled a good deal in Japan's bosom, and that it will be long before it is forgotten.

While on the subject of mobilisation a note may be added on the financial strain which the constant stream of reinforcements is causing. So serious this is, that it has been decided in future to mobilise Army Corps which have only a small division of cavalry attached to them, the transport and keep of horses being found to involve intolerable expenditure. It is somewhat remarkable to find a country that has hitherto affected to regard the cost of military operations with sublime indifference thus keenly affected by a question of roubles in relation to an arm on which it specially prides itself. The explanation possibly is that the famous Russian war chest, the possession of which was supposed to give the Army of the Tsar such an important advantage, has been sadly impoverished by the heavy drafts made upon it by the fortification of Port Arthur and other Far Eastern enterprises of the days before the War. But, in any case, Russia is wise to be careful, for it is estimated by experts that the campaign is already costing her the comfortable sum of 1,800,000 roubles (£191,520) a day.

Towards this vast expenditure a certain amount of contributions are forthcoming in the way of War Subscriptions, but as to these there does not seem to be any marked enthusiasm on the part of the public. The millionaires of Moscow are described by Russian correspondents as very niggardly in their contributions, so much so that the Governor of the city, the Grand Duke Serge, pointedly asked the most wealthy of them why they gave so little in proportion to their known

possessions. The reply was strongly typical of the view taken of the War by the Russian commercial classes. It was to the effect that the merchants and manufacturers looked upon the War as "a frivolous and useless enterprise, which could only end in failure and industrial ruin; that it had already caused immense losses to the trade and industry of Russia, and that they considered it more patriotic to spend 10,000 roubles a day, as the speaker was doing, in paying workmen, though there was no work for them to do, and thereby preventing them from joining the Socialist agitation, than to assist in continuing a war which could only inflict endless miseries on the Russian people."

Among the lower classes the War is rendered unpopular by the pressure exerted by the officials, in spite of the Tsar's announcement that all contributions are to be purely voluntary. In the villages the Government Commissioners tell the head of each commune that the latter will suffer if a certain sum, which the Commissioners themselves fix, is not forthcoming. In the towns everyone who makes an application to the authorities is informed that, unless he subscribes to the War, it will not be granted. It is hardly surprising that in these circumstances the people of Russia should not expend much enthusiasm upon an enterprise which, in spite of the heroic attempts to obscure the defeats that have been sustained, in spite of the popular confidence in Kuropatkin and his brave soldiers, is felt to have involved Holy Russia in humiliation not easily to be ignored or forgotten. Into darker aspects of the public discontent, to which some allusion has been made in previous chapters, we need not yet pursue our enquiries further. During the last quarter of a century in Russia there has secretly been put together all the machinery for making the most of any sort of popular feeling against the tyranny and rapacity of Russian officialism. But, active as Socialist and other propaganda unquestionably are at this juncture, they have not as yet been able to influence the conduct of the War beyond hampering, as already noted, the process of mobilisation, and producing an occasional outburst of undisciplined objection to the methods of compulsory service.

The chief sop which the authorities continue to throw to a public particularly weary of the repeated disasters encountered by the Port Arthur Fleet is the existence and preparation for early despatch to the Far East of the Baltic Squadron. To such an extent have anticipations clustered round the latter that one would suppose it to be an organisation of altogether irresistible strength, the mere sailing of which from Russian shores will strike complete dismay into the enemy, and bring about a speedy termination of the War. But the truth seems to be that, putting the difficulty of coaling *en route* aside, there is little or no chance that more than one of seven battleships which are talked of in this connection will be ready for despatch to the Far East this year. There remain six cruisers and some torpedo craft which, no doubt, would be a welcome reinforcement to Admiral Skrydloff if they ever succeed in reaching him, but the presence of which in Asiatic waters will hardly give Russia any overwhelming superiority over the splendidly efficient Navy of Japan, even assuming the escape of a fair proportion of the Port Arthur Fleet. Lastly, there still exists the fear that Port Arthur may fall, and with it the *point d'appui* of the reinforce-

ing squadron. In fine, save for the purpose of propitiating a populace which is too ignorant to understand clearly the points involved, the Baltic Squadron has no present practical importance as far as the War is concerned, and a great deal must happen and be done and undone before any reinforcement from Kronstadt can help to restore Russia's lost naval prestige in Far Eastern waters.

But there are other Russian ships in Europe besides those in the Baltic. In his Introduction to this publication, Mr. Diósy drew attention to the enclosure of the Black Sea Fleet by the International Treaties regulating the passage of warships through the Dardanelles, and foreshadowed the complication that would inevitably arise if the treaties in question were set at naught. Although so far there has been no absolute violation of these engagements, there have been attempts on the part of the Russian Government to play fast and loose with the question of the Dardanelles passage in a manner which, even at an early stage of these happenings, produced the gravest misgiving not unmixed with indignation on the part of the maritime countries of Europe.

For many years past, and more particularly since 1886, when it was reorganised, the Russian Navy has been supplemented by what is known as a Volunteer Fleet, a number of merchantmen which in time of war can be armed and used to some extent as cruisers. This Fleet has its own management and capital, and in peace time provides, or rather, used to provide, for the regular traffic between Odessa, Port Arthur, and Vladivostok, also undertaking the tea-trade and passenger traffic between China and the Black Sea, and the transport of troops from Odessa to the Far East. The Fleet is at all times under the orders of the Russian Admiralty, and some of the latest additions to it are very fine vessels. One or two have fallen into the hands of the Japanese since the commencement of the War, but there are still a fair number remaining in the Black Sea and clearly in want of employment, since the regular traffic to Vladivostok and Port Arthur is not likely to be resumed for some little time, and even the tea trade with China is, so far as sea-transport is concerned, liable to dramatic interruptions.

From quite an early date in the War Russia has availed herself somewhat offensively of the right of search possessed by belligerent nations during the course of hostilities. We have already seen her destroyers stopping British liners in the Red Sea, and more recently have had to record the seizure of the British ship *Allanton* by the cruisers of the Vladivostok Squadron. To the first we, as a nation which has always upheld the right of search, could raise no objection even though the source from which the destroyers obtained their coal appeared suspiciously obscure. The seizure of the *Allanton* was a matter of a different complexion, and aroused strong protests on the part of the shipping community and the Press, which pointed out that in this and similar cases the right of appeal from the judgment of the Prize Court affords small alleviation of a very serious grievance.

But the growing irritation as to Russian performances in this direction rose to fever pitch when it transpired that Russia proposed to exercise the right of search and even seizure by means of Volunteer Fleet cruisers which she had previously passed through the Dardanelles on the flagrantly false pretence that they were in no sense war-ships, and

were even entitled to sail under the Red Cross flag.

It appears that early in June two cruisers of the Volunteer Fleet, the *Smolensk* and the *Peterburg*, were designated for "Government service outside the Black Sea." Even their commanders in the proper Turkish quarters, the steamers safely passed the Dardanelles forts. When they had reached Constantinople the officers were informed that the ships had been raised to the rank of second-class cruisers, that they were destined for the East, and that all on



SKETCH MAP SHOWING POSITION OF THE RIVAL ARMIES AT THE END OF JUNE, 1904.

were, however, kept in the dark as to their real *rôle* and destination. The orders of the commanders were sealed, and the senior officers and certain junior officers who unexpectedly received a rise in rank were enjoined to observe the strictest possible reticence. By flying the Red Cross flag, and possibly with the help of pressure and persuasion exerted board were to consider themselves on active service. Certain quick-firing guns, which were now found to be among the Red Cross equipment of these innocent merchantmen were, it was intimated, for use if necessary, while, as the ships' cargo was largely coal in bags—even the decks being laden—it was evidently hoped that a long career of usefulness

lay before them. On June 9th the two newly-fledged cruisers entered the Suez Canal, thus giving the lie to certain cynical official assurances from St. Petersburg that those two vessels had never left the Black Sea!

On June 18th a considerable sensation was caused by the stoppage of the German mail steamer *Prinz Heinrich* by the *Smolensk*, which confiscated a portion of the mails, thereby exciting immediate and profound excitement in Berlin. The Imperial Chancellor, Count von Bülow, at once instructed the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to protest against the action of the *Smolensk*, and in the German Press the dubious character of the latter gave rise to heated discussion. It was argued that if the *Smolensk* were a warship she could not have passed the Dardanelles; if the *Smolensk* were not a warship she could not have stopped the *Prinz Heinrich* and confiscated the mails for Japan. The *Kölnische Volkszeitung* adds the significant declaration that "every ship has her own individual and certificated character; secretly to alter this in any way has hitherto been peculiar to filibusters."

But there is worse to come. On July 9th the Peninsular and Oriental Company's intermediate steamer *Malacca*, carrying passengers and cargo from London to China and Japan, sails from Suez for Singapore. She has on board some 3,000 tons of cargo, including, as is usual, a quantity of Government stores. Among the latter are about twenty tons of explosives for Hong-kong. At about half-past ten in the morning of July 13th the *Malacca* is stopped by the Volunteer Fleet cruiser *Peterburg*, about seventy miles north of Perim. The Russian officer who is sent aboard objects to the *Malacca's* cargo, especially, it seems, certain steel plates and foodstuffs taken on at Antwerp. The ship's manifest is also declared to be faulty, and, notwithstanding the angry protests of the captain, the *Malacca* is held in arrest for a couple of days, when the *Peterburg's* consort, the *Smolensk*, appears, and further action is taken by the Russian "cruisers." It is asserted that in the interval some of the *Malacca's* European crew are taken on board the *Peterburg* and offered bribes to give information. The captain naturally objects to this proceeding, and is threatened with arrest! His increased exasperation, and that of the passengers, may be imagined when, on the arrival of the *Smolensk*, a Russian prize crew of forty is sent on board the *Malacca*, the British flag, which the captain had taken the very British precaution of causing to be nailed to the mast, is torn down, the Russian flag is hoisted in its place, and the vessel is taken to Port Said, where she arrives on July 20th, and is detained by the Egyptian Government.

The sequel of this remarkable incident will be narrated presently. Meanwhile, however, it is interesting to note the manner in which the Queen of the Ocean acts when there is reason to believe that unwarrantable liberties have been taken on the high seas with the British flag. It seems that not until Monday, July 18th, is any official news forthcoming of what has happened to the *Malacca*. We shall see later how diplomacy deals with the question; but it is deeply gratifying to British sensibilities to be able to add that on this same Monday the world is read a lesson in sea-power which it is not likely to forget. From Suez, like a giant bloodhound slipped from its leash, the mighty cruiser *Terrible* goes south, with orders, it is said, to watch these two

unmannerly. Russian craft who fly the Red Cross Flag one day and pose as warships the next. There are no more impressive cruisers in the world—the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga* perhaps excepted—than the *Terrible* and her sister ship the *Powerful*, both, to all intents and purposes, fast battleships of over 14,000 tons, and capable of steaming over 22 knots an hour. As the *Terrible* speeds southward from Suez the bulk of the British Mediterranean Fleet leaves Malta for a cruise, the first port of call being, curiously enough, Alexandria. This is merely the British Navy's way of showing its readiness to deal with all possible eventualities in any quarter in which it "has interests." When the news came of the confiscation of the *Prinz Heinrich's* mails, the German Press commented with some bitterness on the fact that not a single German warship was anywhere near the spot where the outrage had occurred. But, before the British Press could comment on the seizure of the *Malacca*, a first-class British cruiser was half-way down the Red Sea, and eleven great British battleships and four cruisers were within easy distance of the Mediterranean end of the Suez Canal.

THE DARDANELLES: LOOKING TOWARDS CONSTANTINOPLE.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

TEN YEARS AGO—JAPAN'S WAR WITH CHINA—PORT ARTHUR IN 1894—THE OPERATIONS IN LIAO-TUNG—COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS.

THE present seems a favourable opportunity for a somewhat extended reference to the operations of the Japanese in 1894 in a theatre of war which included many of the chief points of interest in the present struggle. It is not intended to deal with the Chino-Japanese War in detail; to do so would take up not one, but a dozen chapters of this publication, and entirely obscure the original narrative. But there is a peculiar interest attached to the 1894 operations, more especially as regards Port Arthur, because comparisons and contrasts are furnished of very real significance from the standpoint alike of the historian, the soldier, and the student of national character.

It may be mentioned for the benefit of those who wish to pursue this subject rather further than seems desirable in a work of this kind, that a useful Epitome of the War between Japan and China is published by the Intelligence Division of the War Office. But the military facts contained in this chapter are derived chiefly from a very succinct account of the Japanese attack on Port Arthur in 1894, by Lieutenant W. Hyde Kelly in the *United Service Magazine* for July, 1904. This source of information has been freely supplemented, as will be seen, by references to the vivid description of the operation given by Mr. Hilliard Atteridge in the "Wars of the Nineties," and by utilising extracts from "Heroic Japan," which appeared in a special article in the *Daily Telegraph* of May 30th, 1904.

Before we come to look closely into the matter of the Port Arthur operations, a few general remarks are necessary in order to emphasise the similarities and differences in these two campaigns, between which an interval of a bare décade lies. The similarities are chiefly connected with the shortness of the interval. In all wars waged in the same theatre there is one stable factor, the climate; but, when one comes to look into the heart of things, it will be found that in nine cases out of ten that is the only factor which is invariable after the lapse of a considerable number of years. It may be true that national character remains more or less the same in the majority of cases, but even here remarkable changes can and do take place. A hardy nation may become enervated by prosperity, or a stronger admixture of fighting races may stiffen a country's backbone. A wonderful change may be wrought by the right kind of military training, of which perhaps no better example exists than the case of the Egyptian soldier, who stood fast as a soldier should under Kitchener, but fifteen years before was slaughtered like a sheep under Hicks Pasha. It might be thought that strategical considerations would not be altered much by the effluxion of time; but strategy depends

AT CLOSE QUARTERS: JAPANESE DETACHMENT ATTACKED BY COSSACKS.

largely on communications, and communications, especially in the East, have changed a very great deal in the last fifty years. To take a familiar instance, the strategy necessary to deal with a possible rising in India is very different now from what it was in 1857, if only by reason of the network of railways and telegraphs which enables striking forces to be sent with the utmost despatch to threatened parts. Natural features remain much the same, of course, but a bridged river, and a mountain pass through which a decent road has been blown and hacked by skilful pioneers, are very different obstacles from the raging torrent and almost impenetrable defile which stemmed, perhaps, the advance of impetuous invaders of a few generations back.

In a short ten years, however, there is not usually much movement as far as the face of the country and strategical considerations are concerned. Consequently, in 1904 we see the Japanese following closely in their own footsteps left in 1894, attaching, as then, first-class importance to obtaining a naval superiority which should enable them to take their troops by sea, and land them at whatever point might be deemed favourable, and operating by land in Korea and in the region of the Motien-Ling, and against Port Arthur. Nor is the manner in which they set about these tasks very greatly in advance of the ability displayed in 1894, although here and there some notable instances occur of the thoroughness with which lessons of intervening warfare have been absorbed. There is the same perfect organisation, the same care for the individual soldier, the same perfection of transport and supply arrangements, the same clockwork precision, the same admirable leadership. The most serious progress made has been in the naval direction, where not only vastly increased strength has been attained, but where extraordinary results have been accomplished by special training, more especially in the matter of handling torpedo craft and of gunnery. In the army the greatest advance made has been in the matter of quick-firing artillery, and, what is almost equally important, and does not necessarily follow as a matter of course, the training required to use such improved weapons to good purpose.

As to the differences: first, there is the railway, which speaks for itself; secondly, the immensely improved fortifications of Port Arthur; and finally, of course, the character of the resistance. Taking the last and most serious consideration into special account, there is no question that from the opening of the war with China the Japanese regarded the Celestial soldiery with complete contempt, which was heightened by the miserable show it made under infamous leadership. But they have never ceased to respect the Russian rank and file, however clearly they may have perceived that the latter also were badly led and directed. Although the Japanese soldier has shown himself man for man the equal of his Russian antagonist, and has more than once repulsed him, or turned him out of a strong position, when the real odds were by no means in favour of Japan, the fact remains that the Russian fighting-man must be taken, and is taken, by his present enemy very seriously. This means that, more especially as regards Port Arthur, the Japanese preparations have had to be largely modified, and that contrasts between the two campaigns will occur to which the succeeding narrative of what happened in 1894 will lend particular emphasis.

As Lieutenant Hyde Kelly remarks, the naval battle of Hay-yang-tai on September 17th, 1894, had left the Japanese in complete command of the sea, only some six or eight vessels being left in the Chinese fleet, which now cruised in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li to convoy transports laden with troops to Port Arthur, or wandered rather aimlessly from Port Arthur to Wei-hai-wei. The capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese would deprive what remained of the Chinese fleet of its most important base, and would also largely assist the Japanese operations against Peking.

As in the present campaign, the Japanese had already commenced their land operations before they set to work to attack the great fortified stronghold of Port Arthur. Already the First Army of Japan, 35,000 strong, was in the field under the command of Marshal Yamagata, whose task it was to clear the banks of the Yalu and the Motien Pass from the Chinese troops under General Sung, and in 1894, as in 1904, it was to the Second Japanese Army that the operations against Port Arthur were primarily entrusted. As we shall see, this Army was able in the earlier campaign to bring the work to a triumphant conclusion; while in 1904 only one division of General Oku's original force appears to have been left before Port Arthur. But it is interesting to note another partial coincidence, as to which we may anticipate a little. We have in previous chapters of the present narrative seen how General Oku was, in the first instance, called northward by the attempt of General Stackelberg to relieve Port Arthur. It is worth mentioning that in the 1894 campaign, also, an attempt was made to get the Japanese between two fires in the lower portion of the Liao-tung Peninsula. For, when the fate of Port Arthur was sealed, General Sung, having collected some 8,000 troops from the north, made a desperate attack upon the Japanese at Kin-chau, but was repulsed—although the Japanese garrison was but 1,500 strong—having suffered much the same sort of rude shaking as General Stackelberg experienced at Telissu.

But, to return to the actual attack on Port Arthur. The Second Army of Japan in 1894 was very much smaller than that of General Oku. It consisted of the 1st Division under General Yamagi, a brigade of the 6th Division under Major-General Hasegawa, a siege train, line of communication troops, etc., in all about 29,000 fighting-men, under the command of the Marshal Oyama, who in 1904 is Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Armies in Manchuria.

Three further points of resemblance between "then" and "now" present themselves. In the first place, the Second Army was in both cases kept waiting for some time in the Ping-Yang inlet before it sailed directly for the Liao-tung Peninsula. Again, the main landing was in both cases near Pi-tsu-wo. Finally, the first struggle was for a position on the Kin-chau Isthmus. After that the points of resemblance mostly disappear, and equally instructive contrasts begin to be observable.

In 1894, the first batch of the Second Army disembarked on October 24th at the mouth of the Hua-yuan River. An advance party was pushed forward on the 25th to Pi-tsu-wo, twenty-four miles in the direction of Port Arthur, and the 1st Division followed on November 1st.

On the evening of November 5th the Japanese 1st Division arrived before Kin-chau. It will be remembered by those

who read Chapter XXVIII. of the present narrative that the Russian position, of which Nan-shan Hill was the centre, was about two miles south of Kin-chau, and that the Russians made no serious attempt to defend the latter, which was from an early stage in the fighting commanded by the Japanese guns. The Chinese, instead of taking advantage of the extremely strong Nan-shan position, made the thoroughly Chinese error of garrisoning Kin-chau—doubtless because it was a "walled town"—with 6,000 men, and holding a small position in front of it.

The result of this foolish proceeding was soon apparent. The position in front of the town was easily rushed by the Japanese infantry on November 6th, and artillery having been hurried up was brought to bear upon the town itself. Supported by the guns, two regiments of infantry (six battalions) advanced towards the walls. After an artillery preparation of two hours, the 2nd Regiment (2nd Brigade) blew in the north gate and entered the town, the Chinese garrison taking to its heels southward pursued by the 1st Brigade. The Japanese loss was quite trivial, a marked contrast indeed to the 4,000 casualties on May 26th, 1904.

Dalny was not then in existence, but Talien-wan was commanded by six Chinese forts armed with modern guns. Just as the evacuation of the Russian position at Nan-shan in 1904 meant the evacuation of Dalny also, so in 1894 the retreat of the Chinese from Kin-chau was followed by a prompt withdrawal from the forts commanding what is now sometimes known as Dalny Bay. During the night of November 6th the defenders of these forts joined the fugitives from Kin-chau in making the best of their way into Port Arthur, and on the 7th the forts fell into the hands of the Japanese. The latter now shifted their base of operations against Port Arthur to Talien-wan, just as they did in 1904. They had not, of course, the facilities which the existence of Dalny afforded for the landing of heavy guns and other war material and stores, but, on the other hand, Talien-wan was not strewn with mines as in the more recent case.

Thus Japan, almost without striking a blow, came into possession both of the first line of the Port Arthur defences and of a new and convenient base which allowed the line of communication with the Hua-Yuan River to be dispensed with, and the troops to be absorbed into the fighting line. By November 13th the bulk of the Second Army was concentrated at Kin-chau, and four days later it moved forward in two columns, encamping on November 20th at Tu-cheng-tu and Shuang-tai-kau, which lie about six miles north and nine miles north-east, respectively, of Port Arthur. On November 20th Marshal Oyama called his senior officers together and explained his plans for the assault on the following day. These plans are admirably reproduced by Mr. Hilliard Atteridge as follows, and should be studied in connection with the map of the Port Arthur defences given on page 437.

"The troops were to form up at 2 a.m., ready to march from their camps between Shuang-tai-kau and Tu-cheng-tu, so as to be put in position before Port Arthur by dawn. They were to march in three columns; on the right General Yamagi, with the main body, consisting of the bulk of the 1st Division; in the centre General Hasegawa's brigade; on the left a small column of all three arms, moving between Hasegawa's troops and the sea,

and guarding the flank of the advance against a possible sortie from the forts on the north ridge. At dawn the fleet would open fire on the forts nearest the sea. The artillery of the 1st Division on the right would come into action against the forts on the Itzu plateau, taking up a position on a ridge facing the north side of the plateau, and distant about a mile from the forts. In this position the guns could also be brought to bear on the gap leading to the town. On the left of the field artillery, and a little to its rear, the heavy guns of the siege train were to come into action near the village of Shui-shi-ying" (the "Naval Camp"), "firing first at the Itzu plateau and the Pine Tree Hill Fort (Sung-shu-shan), and in the second stage of the fight devoting all their attention to the western forts on the ridge. Hasegawa was to occupy the high ground of Shui-shi-ying, facing the ridge forts, on which he was to open fire.



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RUSSIAN WAR CRAFT IN HARBOUR AT DALNY, BEFORE ITS EVACUATION.

"During this bombardment General Nishi, with the 1st Brigade of Yamagi's

Division, was to work round to the west or south-west flank of the Itzu plateau. For the greater part of the way his march would be concealed from the Chinese by a lower range of hills running north and south. In fact, he would be under cover until his troops moved over the crest of the range opposite their objective and deployed for the attack. All this time his movements would not in any way mask the fire of the Japanese batteries. It was expected that, by the time Nishi was ready to advance, the guns of the Itzu-shan would have been silenced, and their garrisons very much demoralised by the Japanese shell fire. The forts would then be attacked by Yamagi's two brigades, Nishi moving against the flank, and Nogi against the front of the plateau, the artillery meanwhile concentrating its fire on the ridge, especially on Sung-shu-san and the Er-lung forts. As soon as the Itzu-shan forts were taken, Yamagi's and Hasegawa's columns would make a converging attack on the western forts of the ridge, and, after clearing Sung-su-shan and the Er-lung of the Chinese, rush down into the town."

It will be understood, of course, that the forts in 1894 were not, either as regards trace or armament, what they are ten years later; but the scheme of defence was relatively a strong one, and the garrison quite sufficient, had it been of the right fighting quality, to make a stubborn resistance. There were about 14,000 Chinese in the fortress. The forts on the north were garrisoned by 3,300 men, with 3,700 in reserve; 2,000 manned the eastern defences. The coast defences were held by 4,100, and there were about 1,000 raw levies round the dockyard.

At 2 a.m. on the morning of November 21st, the Japanese columns were in position for, if necessary, an immediate attack. The 2nd Brigade, with two mountain batteries, supported by the 1st Brigade, were north-east of Itzu Hill. Hasegawa's Brigade formed the central column, with the flanking column mentioned in Mr. Atteridge's summary of the plan of attack two miles to the left rear.

The following is the description of the early morning cannonade given by the authors of "Heroic Japan," who had the advantage of consulting the official Japanese records. (The spelling in the extract is altered to coincide with that of the plan on page 437.)

"The night was clear and the moon shone with a placid, silvery radiance. There was not a breath of wind; all was silent. But as the day broke the field siege guns burst into flame, and with their thunderous cannonade roused the enemy from their sleep. The van of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, under Major-General Nishi, suddenly made its appearance to the north-west of the western fort on Itzu-shan. Mountain artillery, siege guns and field guns, forty cannon in all, began pouring a continuous stream of iron into the three devoted forts on this 'Chair Hill,' for that is the signification of Itzu-shan. The Chinese defended themselves stoutly.

"The forts on Sung-shu-shan, as well as the coast forts, replied to the Japanese attack with reverberating volleys from their large guns. It seemed as if the tremendous uproar would rend the very heavens. The shells from the various forts, moreover, inflicted much damage on the besiegers, while every shot from the Japanese side told. After what seemed about an hour the Chinese fire slackened, and then ceased alto-

gether. The 3rd Regiment, who had continued to advance while the attack was going on, then scaled the hill from the right side, and rushed with wild cheers on towards the forts, which they carried at the bayonet's point. At 7.30 a.m. the 1st Battalion reached the left flank of the second fort, and hands of the Japanese. This was at about eight o'clock in the morning."

After the capture of the Itzu-shan forts there was sharp fighting between the 1st Regiment, which had moved to the assistance of the 3rd Regiment, and a party of 1,000 Chinese who attacked with some vigour, but were driven back in

JAPANESE SIEGE ARTILLERY IN WINTER.

carried the place by storm. Shortly afterwards the 2nd and 3rd Battalions followed the road taken by the 1st. While this was being done the forts on Peiyu-shan (this is doubtless the unnamed fort to the east of No. 3 on the plan), and Sung-shu-shan kept up an incessant fire on the advancing Japanese. But after the fall of the third fort the first and second were easily taken. The three forts of Itzu-shan thus fell into the half-an-hour. By this time the Chinese retreat was being effectively cut off, a process in which the Japanese Fleet assisted by steaming round towards the west coast, and firing on the fugitives in that direction. Eventually the Chinese concealed themselves as best they could in the Liau-ti-shan Promontory. The remainder of the operation is thus graphically described by the authors of "Heroic Japan":—

"The Japanese field artillery now advanced to the attack of the Sung-shu-shan forts. The Chinese there, already greatly intimidated by the capture of the Itzu-shan forts, were preparing to flee for dear life, leaving the forts undefended, when some shells from the field guns hit the powder magazine, causing a terrific explosion. The forts were at once silenced. This occurred shortly after 11 a.m.

"The assault upon the forts in Er-lung-shan and Chi-Huan-shan had meanwhile been begun by the mixed brigade under Major-General Hasegawa. The brigade had no field artillery, while their siege guns failed to reach the forts; mountain guns were therefore brought into requisition, which occasioned an immense amount of labour. The Itzu-shan forts having been occupied by the 1st Division, the soldiers were now led around to the rear of the two hills. The Chinese were thus brought under a cross-fire, being attacked simultaneously in front and the rear, and therefore speedily gave over the contest; the seven great forts and these two hills behind were silenced at about the same time. It was then a little after mid-day.

"All the inland forts having thus been successfully captured in the forenoon, an advance was made upon the coast forts. Field-Marshal Oyama commanded the 1st Division to attack the port itself, while the Mixed Brigade was partly to cover the flank of the 1st Division, and partly to intercept the retreat of the enemy to the north-east. The left column now joined the Mixed Brigade. Highest among the coast forts stood those on Huang-chin-shan (Golden Hill). They contained cannon of very heavy calibre, easily turned in every direction, whose range included not only the inland forts, but even those in the place occupied by the Japanese artillery. There was one gun in particular which had greatly annoyed the besiegers at long range, throwing shells in the direction of the Itzu-shan, Er-lung-shan, and Sung-shu-shan forts. It was thus absolutely necessary to attack this high fort first of all, and, in order to carry out this plan, the 2nd Regiment, which had been left to guard the field-guns, was ordered to advance to the assault. So soon as the order was given the 2nd Regiment rushed into the town, shooting down all opposition, and engaging in a hand-to-hand encounter. Veering around the men then stormed the forts on Huang-chin-shan. These were one and all occupied shortly after 4 p.m. The Mixed Brigade had in the meanwhile carried Lao-li-tsui by assault.

"At this moment strains of military music were heard coming from the parade ground inside the town. This was soon recognised as the music of the band belonging to the Staff of the 2nd Army. They were playing the grandly impressive National Anthem of Japan—'Kima ga yo.' As the triumphant music echoed over the hard-fought field, the Japanese troops gave vent to their loyal enthusiasm in cheer upon cheer.

"The next day the Japanese troops advanced to attack the remaining forts, but found them deserted. The Chinese had decamped to the last man."

A careful study of the above very interesting and picturesque details will clearly show what an immense difference there is between the past and present attacks on Port Arthur at nearly every stage of that formidable operation. But a further glance at the sketch given in Chapter XXXVI. of this narrative will also reveal the fact that the Japanese are

BELEAGUERED PORT ARTHUR. A BRISK MOMENT IN A RUSSIAN BATTERY.

well aware of the difference in question, and are under no illusion as to the enhanced difficulty of the task that lies before them to-day, when Port Arthur is garrisoned by real soldiers.

Although casualties afford no very accurate basis in such a connection, it may be mentioned that the Japanese losses in the capture of Port Arthur in 1894 were only 66 killed, 350 wounded, and about a dozen missing. It is hardly necessary to point out that, putting the Nan-shan battle on one side, this figure is not large compared with the casualties already inflicted on the Japanese by the Russians in the first few days of the fighting round Port Arthur, and that the latter have not been the price of any considerable success, or have been set off by much greater losses on the Russian side. At Nan-shan, as we have seen, victory was only won at a great sacrifice, and, although the Russians may be blamed for not having clung to the bitter end to such a fine position, the contrast between the fighting here and at Kin-chau in 1894 is sharply significant.

Into a comparison of the strength of the defences in 1894 and 1904, respectively, it would be hopeless to enter now with any chance of attaining really accurate results. But it is obvious that the Russians have some advantage in being forewarned by the procedure in the Chino-Japanese War of what might happen if the Itzu forts were not held with sufficient stubbornness and skill. It may be taken for granted that they have left as little as possible to chance in this quarter, and they are backed up by the circumstance that their garrison is numerically twice as large as was the Chinese garrison in 1894, and probably at least ten times as full of pluck and resistance.

On the other hand, the Japanese have one or two points in their favour which can be readily discussed without having recourse to technicalities. The first of these is the undoubted moral advantage possessed by those who have accomplished a feat once, and are full of lively confidence in their ability to accomplish it over again.

Keenly though the Japanese may appreciate the increased difficulties that lie before them, they are naturally uplifted by the thought that, even in the teeth of Russian opposition, they have overcome the preliminary obstacles which barred their way in 1894, and which must once more be surmounted before the vital attack upon Port Arthur can with hope of success be delivered. There is added cause for hopefulness in the reflection that there can be little concerning the strength and weakness of the Port Arthur defences which is not known to, and has not been duly provided for by, the Japanese General Staff. A modern fortress is very full of deadly traps for the unwary, and even to those who know its secrets it affords plenty of deterrent risks. But really accurate intelligence in such cases does more than lessen the tale of inevitable loss. It tends to make even the intelligent private feel that he is not being hurled upon some dim mysterious enterprise, but is engaged in an operation which his superiors think it something more than possible to bring to a glorious conclusion. We may take it for granted that there is no clearer idea in the brain of the Japanese soldier than the conviction that he is being not only properly led, but that his actual leaders are being properly directed by *men who know*. If we want an example of the confidence which is inspired by this frame of mind, we have one ready to our hand

in the case of Lord Kitchener. The British soldiers who fought under his direction in the Khartoum Expedition were not inspired with any particular reverence for his leadership, but they knew him to be in truth what he supremely is, an Organiser of Victory, who leaves no stone unturned, not only to provide his own force with all that it is possible to give it in the way of transport, supply, and equipment, but also to find out all there is to find out as to the best way of getting at the enemy's vitals. Of all substitutes for the galvanic influence which is only exercised over great armies by the very greatest of commanders, perhaps the best is the reputation for not acting unless, and until, the chances of victory are three to one in favour of the offensive.

Another advantage which the Japanese have to-day, and which was only possessed by them to a limited degree in 1894, lies, it is almost needless to add, in the co-operation of their ships. We have seen how, when Port Arthur was held by the Chinese, the Japanese fleet took little part in wresting the fortress from them. But the case may be, as has been technically explained in Chapter XXXVI., very different in 1904. Although we may be sure that Admiral Togo will not recklessly adventure his splendid ships against the long-range guns of the forts on the sea-front, the bombardments upon which he will now enter will probably be more scientifically destructive than any he has carried out hitherto, and, if he succeeds in taking any of the closed forts in reverse, the assistance lent to the siege guns will be of incalculable value.

Finally, we may take it that the siege artillery now being used is, itself, in weight and power altogether superior to that which was posted on the ridge north of "Naval Camp" in 1894. Further, it is practically certain that there will be many more guns, and that these are being dispersed so as to bring a terrific concentration of fire from perhaps a dozen different points on any given sector of the defences. The effect of such a cannonade cannot but be very impressive even against improved defences resolutely manned, for it goes without saying that the guns will be worked with the maximum of scientific skill, and that very little powder and shot will be wasted in producing mere "sound and fury, signifying nothing."

For the present we may now leave the problem of the attack of Port Arthur, in regard both to its former solution ten years ago, and to the attempt now being made to solve it under very different conditions. The careful reader has now before him ample material to enable him to realise the immensity of the task involved, and also, perhaps, to gain some idea of the manner in which that task is now about to be attacked a second time by such a nation of endless warlike possibilities as Japan.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE SECOND ARMY—DELIBERATE MOVEMENTS—THE RUSSIAN POSITION—ADVANCE ON KAI-CHAU—A REAR-GUARD ACTION—OCCUPATION OF KAI-CHAU—THE SITUATION.

IN Chapter XXXII. we followed, chiefly by the light of the Russian official despatches, the advance of the Second Army of Japan under General Oku from Telissu to Sun-yao-chen, leaving it on June 23rd with its outposts thrown out in the direction of Kai-chau (Kaiping). The secrecy still observed by the Japanese General Staff at Tokio makes it impossible to state with absolute confidence the movements of this Army for the remaining days of June and the first few days of July. But the despatches of General Sakharoff, who appears to be acting as General Kuropatkin's Staff representative at Kai-chau, together with other incidental information, enable a pretty shrewd guess to be made as to what is going on by way of prelude to General Oku's continued advance, and to the Japanese occupation —presently to be described—of Kai-chau.

General Oku has much to keep him occupied during this interval, and it is not in reality at all surprising that he does not hurry forward with any particular alacrity from the neighbourhood of Sun-yao-chen.

In the first place, although by no means wanting in initiative and daring, the commander of the Second Army is one of Japan's most cautious and sagacious leaders, and the experience and wisdom he has acquired in a long career —he is now fifty-seven years of age— are of special value in the avoidance of mistakes due to precipitancy at this important juncture. Again, he is not by any means a free agent, and it is essential that his rate of movement northward should be governed largely by the operations of his colleague in command of the First Army, even if both he and General Kuroki are not already to some extent restricted by the imminent appointment of Marshal Oyama as Commander-in-Chief. It must be remembered that not until four days after General Oku threw out his outpost line to the north of Sun-yao-chen did the passes fall to the troops of the First and Takushan Armies, and it is clear that, until this preliminary to anything like concerted action had been satisfactorily completed, any very free movement on General Oku's part might have proved risky. For the Takushan Army's *rôle* for the present seems to be to afford assistance to whichever of the other two armies requires it. But it does not follow that it can readily afford such assistance to both the First and Second Armies simultaneously. On June 27th, as described in Chapter XXXIV., the Takushan Army co-operates with General Kuroki by capturing the southern Fen-shui-ling in a very masterly manner. Later, as we shall see, it works in very effective unison with the Second Army. But it is doubtful whether its strength would have allowed it to strike both right and left, and at the same time to keep up that appearance of wall-like stability to

its immediate front, which is necessary for the success of a gigantic enveloping movement.

Apart from these considerations, General Oku has to look to his communications and supplies. The latter he probably continues to receive for the most part from the sea, and there is very little doubt that the Japanese soldiers by this means fare a good deal better than their opponents. It is also very possible that reinforcements for General Oku's Army are being landed at points on the coast at or below Sun-yao-chen. The Japanese are extremely reticent on this subject; but the Russian despatches seem to indicate a distinct increase in the numbers of the enemy, whose "vast encampments" evidently produce some depression in General Sakharoff's spirits. Certainly the Japanese are well prepared for effecting reinforcements by sea, for a detachment from Admiral Togo has made a study of the west coast of Liao-tung, taking soundings at places likely to be found useful for disembarkations.

A JAPANESE FIELD HOSPITAL: BRINGING IN THE WOUNDED DURING AN ACTION.

Reports forthcoming at the beginning of July show that General Oku's Army at this period was in capital "fettle," the health of the troops being excellent; but it is believed that the cavalry experience considerable difficulty in the matter of fodder. However, the rains will soon produce an ample supply of herbage, and some assistance in other respects will now be lent by the rail. For all the bridges between Port Adams and Wa-fang-tien have been repaired, and trains are now running, which doubtless serve to bring up to the new front such local supplies as are available in central Liao-tung. It is particularly noted in the reports from General Oku's Army that the Chinese everywhere are welcoming the Japanese, readily supplying vehicles and labour, and accepting Japanese notes in payment.

At the commencement of July the Russian force immediately opposed to General Oku appears to consist of a division commanded by General Sampsonoff, which occupies Kai-chau; to the south-east of Kai-chau is another force under command of General Tschirikoff; and to the eastward of Kai-chau are General Mishtchenko's Cossacks, which seem to have been pretty busily engaged in reconnaissance work ever since the early days of the Russian occupation of Northern Korea. Even assuming that General Tschirikoff has a whole division under him, the barrier to the Japanese advance would not seem a very serious one. But the probability is that by this time all intention of making a vigorous stand at Kai-chau has been abandoned by the Russians, and that the troops mentioned are only in position as a screen, which in due course will be withdrawn to the accompaniment of rear-guard action.

At this point it is expedient to examine a little closely the condition of affairs on the Russian side, since that may help to explain the leisurely advance of General Oku on Kai-chau. On page 209 mention was made of the march towards Ta-shi-chao of two Russian regiments which had come up from Kai-chau; and in Chapter XXXVII. again there is an indication of a considerable Russian concentration at the former place. The supposition is that when the passes fell, General Kuropatkin would have been glad to bring in all his forces to the south of Liao-yang, and that he did in fact actually order their withdrawal. But on June 28th there was a terrific downpour of rain which lasted for several days, and rendered the proposed retreat—which, as a matter of fact, was strategically the best thing to be done—out of the question. Accordingly, a very large Russian force remains in position at Ta-shi-chao, and, as the latter is only some fifteen miles north of Kai-chau, it is clear that in any case the Japanese advance from Sun-yao-chen must be carried out with caution.

Finally, the Japanese, who probably have suffered, like the Russians, some inconvenience from the heavy rains, have their attention still further taken up by a reconnaissance in force, which the enemy carries out apparently with great boldness and skill on July 4th. According to the Russian despatches, the reconnoitring troops succeeded in driving back small bodies of the enemy's advanced guard, and eventually seized the railway station at Sun-yao-chen and the heights three miles east of the town. The Japanese, in due course, dislodged the intruders, but may well have been impressed by their vigour and determination. On the following day a Russian patrol carried

the reconnaissance yet further by pushing through to the rear of the Japanese line of observation at a point some fifteen miles east of Sun-yao-chen. The information thus gained may have been instrumental in confirming the intention not to dispute the possession of Kai-chau. But it shows, in any case, a very keen appreciation of the military requirements of a situation which might otherwise have seemed rather undignified. There is an assertiveness which is rather refreshing in this sudden demonstration of activity, and the behaviour generally of the Russians at Kai-chau since they pulled themselves together after Telissu is in favourable contrast with the inertia which seems to have set in at Liao-yang.

At last the Japanese make a move. On July 6th they commence operations for occupying Kai-chau, and from the morning of that day until the afternoon of July 9th there is fighting, not very deadly perhaps, but very much in earnest, and very interesting from the professional standpoint. For here we have one of those highly attractive performances known as rear-guard actions, which bring out the highest qualities of a retreating force, and sometimes give the force in pursuit more trouble than they seem to be worth. It needs first-rate troops and a brave and skilful commander to retire in the presence of a superior enemy with the minimum of loss and with the maximum of continued opposition to the enemy's further advance. Some of the historical examples of rear-guard actions are among the most interesting of all operations of war, and, although in the present instance no special brilliancy of conception or execution is noticeable, and the absence of detailed information makes the fighting rather hard to follow, it is evident that the work on both sides reflected no little credit on troops and leaders alike.

In the first place, it should be mentioned that, on the part of the Japanese, the movement towards Kai-chau must be considered not only as a separate performance, but as belonging to the great "co-ordinated advance" of the three armies now opposed to General Kuropatkin's forces. The signal for this co-ordinated advance has only just been given by the capture of the passes. Between July 1st and 3rd General Kuroki has made one step further by pushing to the immediate east of Liao-yang. It is now General Oku's turn to roll up, as the *Times* correspondent at Tokio puts it, the other end of the Russian line seventy-five miles away.

The position at nightfall on July 5th is, as far as one can judge, as follows: The advanced guard of General Oku's Army is at Erh-tau-ho-tse, which is only twelve miles south of Kai-chau, and it is hardly likely that it has any very precise idea of the number of the enemy directly in front of it. For all General Oku may know, the Russian force at Kai-chau has been strongly reinforced from Ta-shi-chao, and it may be necessary to fight a battle of some dimensions before Kai-chau can be occupied. On the other hand, the Russians by their recent reconnaissance have ascertained that General Oku is in stronger force than they, perhaps, imagined, and probably by this time they have fully decided to retire from Kai-chau without offering battle. Accordingly, most of the stores and a considerable portion of the troops are withdrawn, and the first stage of a long rear-guard action commences.

But why, the reader may ask, is it necessary to have any rear-guard action at all in such a case? Why should not

the Russians " fold up their tents like the Arabs, and as silently steal away," leaving the Japanese to enter Kai-chau when and how they please? They have done this once or twice before in the present campaign, notably at Feng-hwang-cheng, and in a sense at Sun-yao-chen also. But in both those cases the conditions were different. Whether the Russians do or not eventually make a stand at Ta-shi-chao, it seems certain that it was their intention to make the latter a point of strong resistance at the commencement of July, and it would have been very poor generalship to evacuate in undignified haste a position only fifteen miles off. To do so might, indeed, have been to court a serious disaster. For if the Japanese had seen any sign of a scuttle out of Kai-chau—and we may be sure that they were vigilantly on the watch—they would have at once dashed forward, and would probably have driven the retreating force pell-mell on Ta-shi-chao, subsequently attacking the latter position before the defenders had recovered from the confusion consequent on having perhaps 20,000 of their comrades hurled back upon them.

The Russians, of course, know enough of the elementary rules of warfare to avoid running risks of this sort. Accordingly, they determine to make the Japanese occupation of Kai-chau as difficult and tedious as possible. They evidently succeed in this design, for, as already mentioned, the fighting lasts for four days. Nor is it likely that the bulk of the force originally at Kai-chau was at any time engaged. The greater probability is that the Russians were for the most part represented only by Sampsonoff's Ussuri Cossacks, and that these contested almost every inch of ground in very stubborn fashion, deluding the attack, perhaps, into the belief that their numbers were much greater than they were. This is one of the main features of rear-guard fighting, and by some commanders has been demonstrated to perfection. It will be understood that the great object of the rear-guard is to check the pursuit, to give time to the main body to conduct its retirement in an orderly manner, and finally, to withdraw itself without suffering undue loss. This is achieved by alternate or successive retirements of portions of the rear-guard force, the portion which has retired taking up a fresh position a little further on. It devolves upon the portion that is left behind to make as brave a show as possible, in order to disguise the fact that any retirement has taken place. Sometimes a retirement is so gradual, and so skilfully concealed, that at the last only a few men are left, making as much show as possible by rapid and continuous firing, and when these have melted away, the enemy rushes up not only to find the rear-guard gone, but a little later to come on him in another good position as full of fight and resistance as before.

It is not quite certain whether the whole of the four days from July 6th to 9th may be classed as rear-guard fighting pure and simple, for the evacuation of Kai-chau by the main body of the Russian force may not have commenced until the 7th or 8th, and technically speaking, until it did commence the force south of Kai-chau was not a rear-guard, but an advanced guard. But the point is not of real importance, having regard to results. In any case, we may take it that the whole of the fighting in the period mentioned was of the character described, the Japanese advancing very cautiously because they did not

know whether at any moment the presence of a very large Russian force might not be revealed; the Russians clinging to successive positions, and foiling every effort of the enemy to turn their flanks. To speak of the fighting as an important Japanese victory seems absurd. The losses on both sides appear to have been trivial, and the fact that the Russians caused the Japanese to expend four days in contesting a few miles of ground, is pretty clear evidence that the latter did not have it all their own way, in spite of their greatly superior numbers.

GENERAL SAKHAROFF, KUROPATKIN'S STAFF REPRESENTATIVE AT KAI-CHAU.

The Japanese advance began, as noted before, on July 6th, the troops marching to the west of the railway as the ground on that side was more level. Contact with the enemy seems to have been established forthwith. The Russians to the number of about 1,600 were holding the heights to the east and north-east of Erh-tau-ho-tse, and these heights had to be cleared by the Japanese before any definite progress could be made. Fighting continued on Thursday and Friday, the Russians making a stubborn resistance in successive strong positions among the mountain passes. An attempt was made by the Japanese to turn the Russian flank by sending along the seashore six squadrons of cavalry, but the latter appear to have been successively held by the Cossacks. The general advance of our Japanese could not, however, be stemmed, and on the evening of Friday the 8th, General Oku's Army was in position only four or five miles south of Kai-chau, with its right wing thrown forward in preparation for a turning movement. On Saturday morning at daybreak, the Japanese commenced a hot artillery fire from the heights captured on the preceding day. After this preparation they advanced against the outer positions occupied by the Russians in front of Kai-chau, driving the enemy, at eight in the morning, to his last line of defence around the town.

The Russians were now posted on the top of high precipices, and here they held out until about noon, when they were again forced to withdraw, their retirement covered by Russian guns posted on the high hills to the north of the town. The Japanese promptly occupied the last line of the enemy's defences, and for a space pursued the Russians in the teeth of the artillery fire from the hills. The latter was, how-

ever, found to be rather galling, and, accordingly, the Japanese guns were brought up into fresh positions, and succeeded during the afternoon in silencing those of the enemy. By the evening the Japanese were in possession of Kai-chau and the heights to the immediate north of the town.

The eventual descent upon Kai-chau appears to have been a swift and sudden one, and Mr. Ernest Brindle, the *Daily Mail* correspondent at Niu-chwang, mentions the interesting fact that a handful of 150 men who had been left behind with orders to destroy the railway station had not time to do so, but retreated hastily, leaving even their personal effects behind them.

With the exception of this important omission, the Russian rear-guard appears to have carried out its retirement with singular skill. One regrets to have to record the fact that among the Russian killed was Captain Count Nyrodt, of the General Staff, who fell after the abandonment of the last position, and to whose brilliant performance of his duty as Chief Staff Officer with the rear-guard the comparative success of the retirement was due. The writer says "comparative success" advisedly, for a careful study of the available information supports the view that, although the Japanese achieved their object, their actual achievements are hardly so praiseworthy as those of their adversaries. As has been remarked before, casualties are no real criterion of defeat. The Japanese won a real victory at Nan-shan, although their losses were very much more severe than those which they inflicted on the Russians. In the present instance the Japanese had 24 killed and 129 wounded, and the Russians declare that their total losses in killed and wounded did not exceed 200. Considering that the Japanese could not have had less than 50,000 men moving at Kai-chau, the Russian garrison of which on July 6th can hardly have been more than 20,000, while the rear-guard, which did most of the fighting, was probably only a few thousands strong, the palm must surely be awarded to the latter for a genuinely superior performance.

On the other hand, there is no gainsaying the fact that by the occupation of Kai-chau the Japanese have gained a very important advantage. In the first place, communication now becomes much more easy with the Takushan Army, since there is a useful route to Siu-yen in place of the mountain paths which connect the latter place with Sun-yao-chen. Supplies can still be drawn from the sea, and the railway to the south can still be utilised as a means of communication with Port Adams and with the force investing Port Arthur. Finally, the Japanese are now admirably placed for bringing pressure to bear not only upon Ta-shi-chao, but also upon Yingkow, the Port of Niu-chwang. For in the former case the Second Army will have the assistance of the Takushan Army, while in the latter it can readily call the Navy to its aid.

The value of the co-operation of the Takushan Army becomes apparent very quickly. Evidently forewarned of General Oku's movements, the commander of this force, presumably General Nozu, sends a column with a view to threaten the rear of the Russians at Kai-chau. This column, marching by two roads, finds the enemy on the 9th posted on hills commanding both roads. The Russians hold their position on the southern road till evening, but on the

northern road, where they had only two battalions and one battery, they are driven back. On the morning of July 10th the Japanese on both roads combine to drive back the enemy from the high-

mander of the Takushan Army. Accordingly, they seem to have detached forces to watch the roads between Siu-yen and Kai-chau, in the hope that these would act as a wedge driven between the two

RUSSIAN INFANTRY, WEARING THE WHITE SUMMER TUNIC, ENTRAINING NEAR ST. PETERSBURG.

lands of the southern road. The Russians retire toward Ta-shi-chao.

The probable meaning of the above is that, while the Russians at Ta-shi-chao clearly anticipated that the force at Kai-chau would have to retire, they were anxious to forestall the resulting communication between Oku and the com-

Japanese Armies. Doubtless it was these forces which the Takushan Army column encountered, and by driving them in upon Ta-shi-chao it must have rendered General Oku an important service. Moreover, the linking up of the two armies is now virtually complete, and we may take it for granted that their united

strength is at least equal, if not considerably superior, to the Russian force at Ta-shi-chao. Indeed, the Russian calculation gives them a joint strength of seven divisions, which, with reserve brigades, would make up a total strength of about 140,000 men.

But, whatever this strength may be, the Japanese evidently do not intend to presume upon it. No sooner have they occupied Kai-chau than they proceed to throw up earthworks, evidently with the special intention to protect their left flank, a Russian descent upon which might mean serious interference with their receipt of supplies from the sea. These field-works are begun on July 10th, and on the 13th a Russian engineer officer discovers on the heights north of Kai-chau, between the railway line and the so-called Imperial or Mandarin Road, a redoubt and more than ten infantry trenches, each sufficient to contain a company. A tower standing near the road was seen to be surrounded by trenches, and three or four batteries of artillery were observed.

While these defensive precautions are being taken, General Oku's cavalry make determined reconnaissances in the direction, and to the south-eastward of Ta-shi-chao, minutely scrutinising such of the Russian camps as are visible behind the outpost screen, and taking careful stock of the considerable works which the Russians are throwing up in front of their position. For the enemy have been very industrious in this respect during the break in the rains, additional batteries being placed at vital points, and guns mounted in emplacements excavated out of the hillsides. Some 4,000 Chinamen are said to be assisting in the work, and it is very suggestive of Japanese persistence in espionage that among them should be discovered a Japanese captain in disguise.

For ten days General Oku continues in seeming immobility in front of Ta-shi-chao; but experience has taught us that these intervals are not usually employed by Japanese commanders or their troops merely in reconnaissance and field fortifications. In all probability exhaustive preparations are being made for what may prove one of the most significant movements of the campaign. In the meantime we may profitably study a very interesting sketch of Ta-shi-chao and the country in the neighbourhood, which was published in the *Times* of July 16th, and is written with special reference to the prospect of an important engagement. Ta-shi-chao village, we are told, stands on the right bank of a small stream with many affluents, which flows north-west to the Liao river, joining it to the north of the Russian railway terminus near Yingkow. "The whole of the left bank of this stream is flat open country for a considerable distance, but about midway on the road to Ta-shi-chao to Yingkow and to the south of it there is an isolated hill known as the Ta-ping-shan (great level mountain), which rises to a height of 200 feet, and commands all the surrounding plain. It is almost certainly crowned by works and held by a strong garrison. On the right bank—that is to say, on the north side of the aforesaid stream, and stretching some distance west of Ta-shi-chao village and northwards nearly to Hai-cheng—there is a tumbled, billow-like region of hill country offering some advantages for defence. The highest points of these hills are said to be not to the eastward, as we should expect, but to the west and north of Ta-shi-chao. The highest point is said to be the isolated hill known as Yao-chi-san.

due west of Ta-shi-chao village, with its southern slopes falling down to the stream at its feet. This point is 1,000 feet high and has a distinguishing temple on its summit, besides, doubtless, many Russian defences. The railway and the wretched track known as the Imperial road to Mukden cross the stream between this hill and the village. Both these bend westward until the branch line junction is reached. Here they separate, the railway threading the hills and passing west of Hai-cheng, while the cart track bends a little further west and then runs to Hai-cheng, following the western limit of the hilly country.

GENERAL COUNT NOZU.

"Immediately around and for some distance up stream to the east of Ta-shi-chao there is open country, and it was probably here, on the banks of various small affluents of the main stream, that the Russian camps were observed by General Oku. It would be the natural place to expect to find them. North and north-west of village and junction other hills rise irregularly, the highest point to the north being at an elevation of some 900 feet. These hills appear to lie in more or less isolated clumps and ridges, those which seem to offer themselves as natural positions for an army rising to 300 and up to 700 feet, exclusive of the two points already named. This hilly district apparently connects north-west of Ta-shi-chao with the mountains traversed by the Ta-ku-shan force, and the

lie of the ground appears to suggest an attack from the north-west, since to south and west there are flat, open plains devoid of good positions for the enemy's guns save at Ta-ping-shan. Five tracks lead into this district from the country now occupied by the Japanese, the four northerly ones all coming from Siu-yen and the southerly track from Kai-ping (Kai-chau). The road furthest to the north comes from Si-mu-cheng (To-mu-chan) and leads to Hai-cheng; two others debouch at the head waters of the main stream upon which Ta-shi-chao stands, and a fourth leads out of the hills some way to the south of the stream, leaving a broad track of level country to be crossed before the Russian position on the hills west, north and north-east of Ta-shi-chao can be gained. Tactically the whole position may be and should be strong, and if at this season the nature of the crops south of the stream do not impede movement, there is here a fine field of action for the Russian cavalry. If this description, gathered from accounts and sketches by an Englishman who is acquainted with the district, is approximately correct, the natural line for an attack would seem to be from the north-east and north, utilising the hills which give cover to an advance from this side. The position should be quite secure from assault from south and west—that is to say, from the direction of Yingkow and Kai-ping (Kai-chau)."

It goes without saying that the course of events at and in front of Ta-shi-chao is causing the greatest excitement at Niu-chwang. The position of the Russians here is peculiarly uncomfortable, for they can do little to stem a determined Japanese onset, and yet they are naturally inclined to hold on to the last moment before retreating on Hai-cheng. For it is of some advantage to them to have the control of the Liao river, and further they cannot honourably retire without blowing up the Russian gun-boat *Sivoutch*, which lies aground in the river. The officers of this unfortunate vessel are stated in Reuter's telegram to be calmly awaiting the inevitable, and to have saddled horses waiting at the quay-side so as to be ready to escape on the approach of the Japanese! Whether the blue-jackets are included in these discreet preparations is not mentioned.

CHAPTER XL.

GENERAL KUROKI'S ARMY—THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED—ADVANCE FROM FENG-HWANG-CHENG—A RUSSIAN GENERAL WOUNDED—BATTLE OF MOTIEN-LING.

ANTICIPATORY allusion has already been made at the close of Chapter XXXIV. to the attack delivered by the Russians on July 4th against the Japanese outposts at Motien-ling. Later information confirms the view that this was a very brisk little affair, partaking of the nature of a night-attack, for it was hardly daybreak, and the fog appears to have been much thicker than the ordinary morning mist. The Japanese outpost attacked was evidently surprised, and the picket retired on its support—only one company being involved—closely pursued by the Russians. A very fierce bayonet fight ensued, and matters would have gone hardly with the Japanese, who were largely outnumbered, but for timely assistance lent by two fresh companies who came up to reinforce. These opened fire from a neighbouring wood, and the Russians, believing that the reinforcement was a strong one, retired under a heavy fire. The incident recalls dimly, and on a very minor scale, the fog battle of Inkerman, and is further a good example of the risks to which night-attacks so-called—which are commonly night-marches culminating in an attack at or just before daybreak—are exposed. In this particular case the whole idea of the movement seems to have been a mistaken one, for, even had it been successful, the small force engaged could not have maintained its ground against the greatly increased numbers which would immediately have been directed against it.

On July 5th, 1,300 cavalry of the Russian Chichinsky Regiment attack the new Japanese position at the north of Fen-shui-ling, near Saimatse. This attack is repulsed without much difficulty, the Japanese having only four killed and three wounded. These trivial attacks, which appear of no value for reconnaissance purposes, and have not sufficient backing to justify our regarding them as serious attempts to regain lost ground, are rather puzzling. Indeed, the *Times* correspondent, telegraphing from General Kuroki's headquarters on July 7th, seems fully justified in remarking that the disconnected efforts of the enemy during the past fortnight indicate an absence of preconceived plans, and constitute almost conclusive evidence that General Kuropatkin is without sufficient force to take the initiative.

In a very marked contrast to this is the attitude of the Japanese. As to the possession of adequate strength for the accomplishment of the purpose in hand, Kuroki may not be in a position to cope with Kuropatkin's main force without the assistance of the Takushan and Second Armies; but he has all the troops he needs to enable him not only to maintain his ground, but also to continue that steady, if slow advance, which sometimes paralyses an enemy even more effectually

than rapid forward movements. Both this and the existence of carefully preconceived plans are illustrated in a striking manner by the proceedings on General Kuroki's right during the first few days of July, in the course of which he pushes boldly up to the eastward of Liao-yang, occupying on the 6th Hsien-chang, 30 miles north-east of Saimatse, from which a Japanese detachment expels 300 Russian cavalry without sustaining any loss whatever. Those who have read the preceding chapter carefully will have noted that these movements have their counterpart, on the extreme left of Japan's combined front, in General Oku's advance on Kai-chau, and consequent "rolling-up" of the Russian right.

Of late, some important changes have taken place with regard to the movements of General Kuroki's Army. Now, for the first time during the War, the Military Attachés and Special Correspondents are permitted to accompany the troops in their advance, instead of remaining behind with General Kuroki's Headquarters. The Correspondents are mostly attached to the Staffs of the Divisional generals, and are thus often enabled to get a near view of the actual operations, a welcome change from their position hitherto. Of the British Military Attachés present with the Second Army, it is arranged that Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton shall remain with General Kuroki, while Colonel Hume accompanies the "Western Column." Precisely what is meant by this last term it is difficult to say, but contemporary information from a Russian source leads one to suppose that at this date the Japanese armies in Manchuria are distributed roughly as follows: On the left we have General Oku with three or four divisions fronting Ta-shi-chao; in the centre the so-called Takushan Army, the strength of which is still uncertain, but which is said to contain the 10th Division, and to be now in actual co-operation with the Guards Division—the latter, it will be remembered, formed part of the original First Army—in the advance towards Hai-cheng. The remainder of the First Army, namely, the 2nd and 12th Divisions, are stated to be marching from Feng-hwang-cheng in the direction of Liao-yang and Saimatse respectively. In other words, one of General Kuroki's original Divisions appears to have been detached for the purpose of assisting the pressure on Hai-cheng and Ta-shi-chao, while his remaining two Divisions form a western and eastern column, the one maintaining the pressure on Liao-yang while the other looks very much as if it were intended to work gradually round from the north-east of Saimatse to the north-west, eventually, perhaps, threatening Mukden itself. Of course, this is only problematical, but the present probabilities lie in this direction, and a very instructive direction it is.

Feng-hwang-cheng may now be considered as having been left behind by the First Army, and, though there is nothing to indicate the exact location of General Kuroki's Headquarters, it may be assumed that they are not far in rear of the Motien-ling. The country through which the army has been advancing since it left Feng-hwang-cheng is described as "a succession of wooded hills, with narrow valleys lying between. The country is intersected by streams, and the roads are rocky and winding. There are many steep passes, and the engineers have to carry out an immense amount of road-building."

DEPARTURE OF A JAPANESE REGIMENT FOR THE FRONT. SCENE AT THE RAILWAY STATION. KOBE.

The climate is certainly trying, one day being oppressively hot, while the next brings a heavy chilling rain, which spells great discomfort for an army with but few tents available. "But neither sun nor rain affects the ardour of the troops, who are in fine condition and confident of victory. They are all keen to meet the enemy. The men are wonderfully hardy. There has been remarkably little straggling or dropping out of the line on the march."

Where cultivation is possible in the surrounding country the Chinese are busy working in the fields, regardless of the operations. They complain that the Russians have confiscated all their grain and provisions, and they willingly assist the Japanese to the best of their ability.

The Russians have left other traces of their recent presence in this region besides regrets among the unfortunate natives they have robbed of their little stores. On the Peking road over the Motien Pass, through which they retreated, there is a succession of fresh graves surmounted by wooden crosses with roughly pencilled names. One can imagine the passing Japanese columns glancing with kindly sympathy at these pathetic memorials of a worsted foe. Their quarrel is not with the individual soldier of the Tsar, nor do the better educated among them blame him for acts which are often foreign to his kindly, simple nature. To a nation which, like Japan, pays studied honours to the gallant dead, it must appeal to find that in all the turmoil of retreat the Russian troops have found time to raise rude emblems to the memory of their comrades, whom they have borne wounded from the battlefield, but have failed to bring to a better haven of earthly rest than a wayside grave.

During the first fortnight of July the Japanese Intelligence Department is very busy. Telegraphing from Liao-yang on July 12th, Reuter's agent remarks that General Kuroki's scouts have actually reached the inside of the Russian outworks, fifteen versts (a verst is, roughly speaking, 1,200 yards) east of the Russian Headquarters. Two have been captured, but two escaped, doubtless with useful information. As a matter of fact, there seems to be a good deal going on beyond the Motien-ling which will repay observation. The Russians are largely increasing their forces in this quarter, and the view is held that this may be with an intent to keep General Kuroki and the force to his left fully occupied, and to prevent any flank movement against the line of communication, or, as it may prove, line of retreat, from Ta-shi-chao to Liao-yang. A simpler explanation would seem to be that recent reinforcements render it more convenient for General Kuropatkin to push troops forward among the mountains than to keep them concentrated in the muddy vicinity of Liao-yang. In any case, as will be seen, this increase of the Russian force is about to have early results.

On July 14th there is some sharp fighting on the Japanese right, the origin of which is a little obscure owing to the unfortunate fact that, while the Russian report states that the Japanese were attempting to capture a defile near Saimatse, the Japanese account makes the Russians the aggressors. Both sides claim to have repulsed the enemy, but the Japanese state explicitly that the enemy left ten killed and wounded on the field, and the Russian official despatch admits sixteen wounded, and records the death of a Captain of Dragoons. In view of the contradictory accounts as to

the why and wherefore of the fight, the latter is mainly interesting by reason of its bringing disaster to an officer who has already been mentioned several times in this narrative, and whose portrait will be found on page 332. This is General Rennenkampf, whose division of Cossacks is thought to have originally operated southwards from Vladivostok, but who has recently been occupied in harassing the Japanese right. In the skirmish just mentioned General Rennenkampf is badly wounded, but remains on the field with his men. He is afterwards found to be suffering from a fractured thigh.

On July 15th the *Times* correspondent at General Kuroki's Headquarters telegraphs:—"This army is still inactive. The strength of the Russians beyond the Motien-ling has been greatly increased, but they are showing no sign of acting on the offensive. We have had ten days of fine weather, and rain is now probable. The Japanese line of advance is not determined."

Two days later this state of tactical and meteorological uncertainty gives place to a much more dramatic situation. Very early in the morning of July 17th the Russians once more take the offensive, and deliver attacks against several of the Japanese positions, notably that at the Motien-ling, the fighting being so severe and extended as to justify the application to it of that often misused term "battle."

In order to get even a general idea of this action, or group of actions, it is necessary to take as a starting point the Russian idea as to the disposition of the forces under General Kuroki's command. It will be remembered that in Chapter XXXIV. (page 418) it was recounted that the Japanese, having occupied the Motien-ling, proceeded to turn the Russians out of their strong field-works near Lien-shan-kwan, from which the approach to the pass is commanded. It is at Lien-shan-kwan that the Russians believe the main force of the Japanese to be now concentrated, and they are further under the impression that the Japanese advanced guards have been strengthened in the neighbouring passes. "In order," says General Kuropatkin, "to determine the strength of the enemy, it was decided to advance on July 17th against his position in the direction of Lien-shan-kwan." But it was impressed upon the commander of the force that he was not to start with the object of capturing the pass, but to act according to the strength of the forces he should find opposed to him. The commander in question is General Count Keller, who has already distinguished himself in connection with the Motien-ling by allowing himself to be manœuvred out of it, without offering any sort of useful opposition to the determined enemy.

General Keller is given the equivalent of two divisions, that is about two dozen battalions, with some cavalry and artillery, wherewith to effect his object. A general reserve is formed and left at Ikhavuan, and the main attack is confided to Major-General Kashtalinski, whose name will be recalled in connection with the engagement at Kiu-lien-cheng. General Kashtalinski's central column consists of fourteen battalions and twelve guns. The original idea seems to have been that this central attack should have been supported by a flank movement of one battalion on the right, while a left column, consisting of three battalions, was to be dispatched against a pass to about three miles north of the Motien-ling. But in such a country a column of

fourteen battalions soon becomes split up, and this fact, combined with the bringing up of battalions from the reserve, is doubtless accountable for the division of the battle in the Japanese official report into no fewer than five distinct sections. As the fighting is not of first-class tactical interest or importance we need not trouble ourselves greatly with this discrepancy, but be content with a general outline, suppressing, meanwhile, a number of places which are mentioned in the reports, but cannot be found in any accessible maps.

The main attack is delivered on the Motien-ling position at 3 a.m. in the morning of Sunday, July 17th. A fortnight back a Japanese outpost had been, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, surprised in the Motien-ling, and, though they quickly recovered themselves, and drove back a superior force of the enemy, it is not improbable that some rather caustic remarks were made by General Kuroki as to the necessity for more complete vigilance. In any case, there is no lack of alertness among the Japanese outposts near Lien-shan-kwan this misty Sunday morning. The alarm is promptly given, and, while the outposts prepare to fall back gradually, artillery comes into action on the Wu-fang-kwan hills to the south of the pass, while a regiment of infantry under General Okazaki moves rapidly to a position previously allotted to it in the contingency of any such movement as that now indicated.

The Russians advance, closely following up the outposts which they have driven in, until, at 5 a.m., they have reached the high land at the west of the Motien-ling with a force which soon comprises the whole of the fourteen battalions allotted to General Kashtalinski for the central movement. They deploy for the attack, but, owing to the incredible activity and good shooting of the Japanese, the advance is held in check from the start, although the defenders are outnumbered by three or four to one.

From 7 to 9 a.m. the engagement rages fiercely, the Japanese artillery posted on the Wu-fang-kwan heights doing especial damage without any adequate response on the part of the enemy. For the unfortunate Kashtalinski finds that his long and cumbrous field guns cannot be brought into action owing to the nature of the ground, and he has to rely for assistance, as far as artillery is concerned, on a single mountain battery. Under cover of the latter, first a single battalion, and then three battalions, advance against the heights, but are repulsed, the Japanese holding their ground not merely with tenacity, but, as will afterwards be seen, with a complete control of the situation.

About 8 a.m. General Keller sends three battalions from the reserve to reinforce General Kashtalinski, but it is all to no purpose. Between 9 and 10 a.m. a Russian retirement takes place, and then, with admirable audacity, the Japanese, who have been reinforced by part of a regiment and some cavalry, assume the offensive, and take up the pursuit. The latter continues for half-a-dozen miles, when seven Russian battalions rally and take up a position where, covered by four guns, they stand until the evening and then finally retire.

Meanwhile, four other fights have taken place among the passes. In the first instance, a Japanese reconnoitring company falls in with a Russian battalion and, both sides being reinforced, a sharp struggle ensues, resulting in a Russian retirement at 1 p.m. In another case,

a Russian regiment attacks a Japanese battalion, but subsequently retires, simultaneously with the retirement of the central attacking force from the Motien-ling. The third instance is that of an attack by a battalion of Russian infantry and a troop of cavalry on a Japanese outpost, consisting of one company posted to the north-west of a place called Hsimatang. Here the fighting is very severe, the Russians attacking with great spirit at 8 a.m., and the Japanese company losing all its officers and non-commissioned officers. The Russian force is increased to a whole regiment, but the Japanese company is also reinforced, and by 4.30 the Russians retreat, the Colonel commanding having pinned on the breast of a dead man's tunic a visiting card, on which he had written: "We trust the Japanese will treat our dead and wounded kindly." Finally,

JAPAN'S SCIENTIFIC WARFARE: THE FIELD TELEPHONE CONNECTING UP AN ADVANCED POST WITH HEADQUARTERS.

another attack on an outpost must be recorded, in which eight companies of Russian infantry and one or two troops of cavalry took part. In this case the Japanese infantry were reinforced by engineers, and drove the enemy back in a north-westerly direction at 1 p.m.

The Japanese losses in these various engagements are returned at forty-three killed, including four officers, and 256 wounded, including fifteen officers. The Russian loss is admitted to have exceeded 1,000, and the Japanese buried 200 bodies after the battle.

The Russians, as has been already mentioned, attacked with the equivalent of two divisions, the force including parts of the 3rd, 6th, and 9th Divisions. The fiercest fighters were said to be the men of the newly arrived 9th Division, whose fine physique was also noted with admiration by the Japanese. According to some accounts the Japanese were only represented by a brigade and a battalion, but it may have been that, in one way or another, a considerable portion of the 2nd Division, under General Nishi, was engaged. In a congratulatory telegram, despatched direct to the 2nd Division by the Mikado, his Majesty stated explicitly that the odds in favour of the Russians were as two to one.

As has already been suggested, this battle is not of first-rate significance from a professional standpoint, and, indeed, is mainly interesting by reason of some rather remarkable omissions. The inability of the Russians to use their artillery lends point to what has been said before as to their inferiority in this arm, not only as regards quick-firing, but also mountain guns. But it is not only in respect of their ordnance that the Russian conduct of mountain warfare does not come up to that of their nimble adversaries. They do not seem to have realised that, in several other directions, specialisation is necessary in order to succeed in such operations as these in the vicinity of the Motien-ling, and that nimbleness and good shooting are more to the point than fine physique and apparently overwhelming superiority in point of numbers. Mountain warfare is a thing apart, and it is only carefully trained and specially equipped troops that can hope to excel in it, especially where vigorous adversaries are concerned.

As regards the guns, it should be recorded that among the skilled observers at the headquarters of General Kuroki's Army there was a disposition to think that the Japanese themselves did not make full use of their opportunities in this respect. It is suggested that when the offensive was assumed by them their guns were unaccountably left in position, instead of being taken on with the advance in order to increase the enemy's punishment. This may conceivably have been due to a fear lest the appearance of fresh Russian reinforcements from another point of the compass might find the guns in unfavourable circumstances from which they could not readily be extricated. Or it might have been thought that in such a close country, where no great stretch of landscape is visible, even mountain artillery would have few chances to assist what was to all intents and purposes a pursuit from about nine o'clock onwards. But presumably these excuses were duly taken into consideration by the foreign attachés and correspondents, and the fact seems significant that, in spite of them, a despatch commenting on the Japanese neglect to make the best use of their advantages was allowed to pass the censor.

Putting this aside, there is much to admire in the very conspicuous ability with which, generally speaking, the Japanese rose not only to the occasion but above it. It is one thing for a well-posted force to hold its ground in the face of a strong attack delivered over a considerable front by a force largely superior in numbers, and by no means deficient in dash and determination; but it is quite another matter for a heavily outnumbered defence to take the initiative, and, after repulsing the enemy, to accelerate his retirement by a vigorous counter-attack. The art of delivering counter-strokes is one which has not received any excessive amount of illustration in the history of warfare, and it will not be surprising if in future text-books the Battle of Motien-ling becomes a rather favourite example of this effective means of reaping the reward of a good defence. Incidentally, it may surely be claimed of the Japanese that they are by nature peculiarly fitted to excel in this difficult direction. "The more active the defender," says that sagacious German authority, General Von Der Goltz, "the less he will feel himself bound to the first position he has chosen, and the stronger will he be. Motion and activity develop in war to a source of strength."

In the Motien-ling we see for the first time the Japanese acting on the defensive, and, from the moment the Russian attack is developed, the main characteristic displayed by the Japanese is "motion and activity." Not only are they ready, but they are full of life and go. They do not merely, like the Boers, pick out useful stones or other shelter, and from behind these pour an admirably aimed fire upon the hapless attack, preparing, meanwhile, if pressed, to vault on the back of a pony and gallop off to safety. Such tactics are by no means to be deprecated in conditions such as those in which the Boers fought. But they might be fatal in a case where the security of a main body rests on the manner in which the outposts do their work. In sharp contrast to them is the Japanese plan of combining marksmanship with a stubborn defence, and supplementing both by an alert readiness to go forward the moment an opportunity presents itself for such a movement.

On July 18th and 19th the Japanese preference for the offensive again asserts itself strongly, and with equal success. When the earlier accounts of this operation were received, considerable confusion was created, and possibly some still exists, by reason of the different names selected by the correspondents to designate the place where the fighting occurred. Chanton, Kiaotun, Chowtow, are among some of the variations adopted, and, as at first the details of the operation were rather obscure, it looked as if more than one sanguinary engagement had been fought. Happily, however, one of General Kuroki's crisp reports arrived in due course, from which the principal events of the two days mentioned can be reconstituted with sufficient accuracy, and from which it is clear that Chanton, Kiaotun, and the rest are the same as either the Shaotiense or Shanchutse of the official despatch.

On page 480 a reference will be found to the division of General Kuroki's Army into two columns, one maintaining the pressure on Liao-yang, while the other may perhaps be destined to threaten Mukden itself, and is, in any case, working round in what will eventually be a north-westerly curve. On July 17th we have seen a portion of the left or

westerly column, represented by the 2nd Division, attacked in the Motien-ling. We have now to turn our attention to the right column. This is about to take as its objective a place called Hsihoyen, which lies about fifteen or twenty miles to the north of the Motien-ling, and from which a road runs west by way of An-ping to Liao-yang, and east to Saimatse. It is clear that Hsihoyen is a very important place for the Russians, who, by holding it, not only block one of the roads to Liao-yang, but greatly hinder any attempt to threaten Mukden. General Kuropatkin has recognised this by causing the position to be strongly occupied by troops posted behind important defensive works. The position itself is one of very great natural strength. It is accessible by a narrow road only, and the defensive works are on rising ground from 60 to 300 feet in height, and command the approach for a considerable distance. The left is protected by an unfordable river, an affluent of the Tai-sze-ho, and the right cannot be turned except by a long détour of sixteen miles over a series of precipitous hills. It is almost needless to add that the approach is blocked by wire entanglements.

Here the Russians have, under the command of a lieutenant-general, four battalions of the 34th Regiment, three battalions of the 36th Regiment, one regiment of Cossacks, and thirty-two field guns.

The Japanese do not seem to be at all well posted as to the details of this force. In his first despatch, General Kuroki speaks of an enemy of unknown strength being encamped near Hsihoyen, and mentions that it was believed to be retiring northwards.

On July 18th the main body of the right column of General Kuroki's Army arrives in the vicinity of Shanchutse, which, again, lies near Shaotiense, some fifteen miles west of Han-chang, places which are only to be found on a few large scale maps. A battalion is sent out to reconnoitre, and is engaged by two battalions of the enemy. A fierce fight ensues, in which one company of the Japanese battalion loses its commander and all its officers.

At 6.30 p.m. the Japanese advanced guard and another battalion joins the fighting line, but at sunset the enemy are still holding their ground. The Japanese bivouac in battle order, and it is well that they neglect no preparations, for during the night the Russians make two counter-attacks with, it is said, bands playing, a rather remarkable accompaniment to a night operation. However, neither the bayonet nor the blare of trumpets avails against the wakeful Japanese, who repel the Russian counter-attacks at every point.

What follows is a singular proof of the ability of the Japanese generals to make up their minds swiftly in circumstances hardly favourable to calm deliberation. There lies in front an extremely strong position, strongly held by an enemy who has over thirty field guns to oppose to the Japanese mountain artillery, and who, so far, has suffered no disadvantage. However, Hsihoyen has to be occupied somehow, and evidently the Japanese have a sufficiency of troops. Indeed, though the point is not laboured in the Japanese despatches, the odds in the fighting in the Motien-ling and other passes on the 17th were probably here reversed. There is no discredit to the Japanese in this, more especially as the Hsihoyen position was one which few generals would care to tackle

SIR CLAUDE MACDONALD (BRITISH MINISTER) AND SIR IAN HAMILTON (BRITISH MILITARY ATTACHÉ) BEING RECEIVED BY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN.

unless the force at his disposal were double of that acting on the defensive. But, having stated the disparity in the one case, it is only fair to the Russians to indicate the probability that a similar disparity existed in the other.

Be the odds what they may, the Japanese commander does not hesitate long in making his arrangements. A force, the composition of which is not stated, moves out in the darkness on the long weary trudge, varied by hard climbing, which is necessary in order to turn the enemy's right. One hopes that some day there will be forthcoming more than a bare allusion to that difficult turning movement of sixteen miles, rendered at least doubly long by the steep hills which had to be scaled *en route*, and accomplished for the most part in that peculiarly trying heat which varies the monotony of tropical rains. It is certainly a movement which could only be dreamed of by a general with absolute confidence in both the spirit and the stamina of his troops, and the brilliant success which eventually attends it is merited alike by the boldness of its conception and the sturdy vigour of its execution.

For the rest, the preparations for the coming action are very simple. At midnight the artillery takes up two positions, one on the heights to the south of the enemy's camp, the other a concealed one in the valley, from which an indirect fire —a term used when the gun is fired at a target which cannot be seen—alone can be employed. The main body advances against the enemy's front, and a detachment moves against his left.

The action commences at dawn on the 19th with an artillery duel, which lasts from 5 to 9 a.m., when the fire slackens on both sides, the Russians having made little or no good use of the superior weight and range of their guns.

The Japanese report is silent as to the progress of the fighting between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., but the probability is that it was of rather a desultory nature, the Japanese commander evidently being anxious to defer any important frontal movement until the flanking column should have a chance of appearing on the scene.

At 3 p.m. the turning movement is completed, and the gallant troops who have achieved it make a spirited dash at the enemy's right. The main body assumes the offensive forthwith, the Japanese artillery redoubles its fire, the enemy's infantry resists stubbornly, and what General Kuroki, studiously moderate in his language, calls "a violent conflict," ensues.

About five o'clock the Japanese resort to the time-honoured expedient of escalade. Escalade is usually applied to the scaling of the walls of a fortress by means of ladders, and is not often employed against any but permanent or semi-permanent fortifications. But even Russian field-works are sometimes rather formidable in character, and, moreover, the eminences to the south-west of Hsihoyen on which the Russians are posted are distinctly precipitous. Accordingly, the Japanese are well advised in fitting together the scaling-ladder lengths with which their well-equipped column is provided, and bringing them up to the foot of the steep heights from which the enemy's rifles are cracking. No small loss is suffered here, we may be sure. But the Japanese are not to be denied. One man falls, another takes his place, even as at the Ai fords before Kiu-lien-cheng and at Nan-shan, and by 5.39 p.m.—the scrupulous accuracy

of the official report is rather impressive —sufficient attackers have scrambled up the ladders, and the heights are carried with the usual shouts of "Banzai! Banzai!" After this the action becomes easy for the Japanese. The Russians are not only being rudely handled in front, but they know that their line of retreat is threatened by the Japanese left. By 8 p.m. they have cleared out of a very awkward situation, retiring in the direction of An-ping, and the whole position is in the hands of the Japanese.

This success, noteworthy as it is, has been won at some cost. On the Japanese side there are seventy-two killed, including two officers, and 452 wounded, including sixteen officers. One of the two officers killed is Major Hiraoka, who was the Japanese Military Attaché with the British Army in the Transvaal during the war in South Africa. It is said that to Major Hiraoka is due the strictness with which the war correspondents with the Japanese Army have been muzzled, he having been greatly impressed with the disadvantages attached to our loose methods of Press censorship on an important campaign. A very gallant and accomplished officer, his death is much lamented.

The Russian losses are not officially reported, but are believed to have exceeded 1,000. They left on the field 131 corpses.

The effect of this action is apparent to anyone who will take the trouble to glance at a map and note the improved strategic lines which the Japanese have secured for their advance. But for the present no advance takes place, and only minor outpost affairs are reported. In one of these, noted by General Kuropatkin as occurring on the night of July 19th, a Japanese post is surprised by a detachment of Russian sharpshooters and a squadron of Cossacks, and twenty-one Japanese are said to have been bayoneted. From caps and other objects which were picked up it appeared that the outpost was composed of men of the 4th Regiment of the Guards. On July 22nd a force of Russians attempted to break the Japanese lines at Li-ho-ling, but were driven back with seventy casualties, the Japanese having only three wounded. Again, on the same day, 800 Russians with two guns having occupied Han-chang were driven out, presumably by a detachment from Hsihoyen, leaving six dead and twenty-six wounded on the field, while the Japanese only lost one man killed and one wounded. It is true that these last two accounts are not official, but they are reproduced by the *Times* correspondent at Tokio, and are just the sort of skirmishes that might be expected to occur when one force is pressing steadily onward to the heart of the enemy's defence, while the other is uneasily attempting to lessen by minor demonstrations a pressure which it cannot successfully meet by a general encounter.

Before leaving General Kuroki's Army, we may look back a few weeks to the period of its sojourn at Feng-hwang-cheng, in order to reproduce a very striking scene which was enacted by the 2nd Division, and of which Mr. E. F. Knight, the renowned war correspondent of the *Morning Post*, has given a notable description. An account of a Japanese funeral ceremony in Tokio has been given in a previous chapter, but the procedure followed in the case of Commander Hirose, impressive as it was, lacked something of the peculiar dignity which surrounds a memorial service for those slain in war held in the field itself.

Mr. Knight's beautiful word-picture is quoted from the *Morning Post* of July 28th :—

"It was certainly a most impressive ceremony, and the grand scenery formed a magnificent setting to the spectacle. About a mile from our camp a mountain spur—steep, thickly wooded, broken here and there by grey crags and bare streaks of ruddy earth, in pleasing contrast to the dark green—projects into the broad cultivated plain extending to the picturesque range, of which the beautiful Phœnix Mountain is the culminating point. This spur, after descending steeply for about two-thirds of the way down, forms an almost flat grassy terrace, from the edge of which there is a gentle slope to the plain below. On this terrace the ceremony, which opened at nine in the morning, was celebrated under the blue sky—the site being such a one as our Druids of old might well have chosen for a similar honouring of the dead after battle. On the plain below, fronting this natural altar, such troops of the 2nd Division as were available, about 8,000 men of all arms, were drawn up in brigade formation, the infantry being on the right, the cavalry in the centre, the gunners and sappers on the left, all the men wearing their khaki uniforms, which showed up well against the reddish plain. On the terrace itself, where the officiating priests had prepared a sacred enclosure, were Prince Kuna; General Baron Nishi, commanding the 2nd Division; Generals Shibuya Fuji and Matsumaya; officers of the Headquarters Staff and others; the foreign military attachés, and the foreign correspondents. The outer enclosure was formed by flags, red, black, blue, yellow, and white, symbolical of the five elements, earth, fire, water, metal, and wood. It was within this enclosure that the priests celebrated before us the honouring of the dead, according to the rites of the Shinto religion, the national creed of Japan. The essence of this religion is practically ancestral worship, and so here this day the prayers were offered to the deified forefathers of the race, and more especially to Hachu-man-gu, a famous Japanese general who lived 2,000 years ago, and who is now regarded as the god of war. Grand was the scene before one as one looked from the terrace down the grassy slope towards the plain, where the soldiers were drawn up, and beyond them over the cultivated fields, some green with young crops, others bare and ruddy of hue where the Chinese farmers were peacefully ploughing, the great Phœnix Mountain forming a noble background to the vast landscape. And impressive, too, was the spectacle if one stood below, near the motionless ranks of the soldiers, and looked up the green slope at the sacred place on the terrace where the Shinto priests had prepared and consecrated their open temple of the gods, for from here the steep wooded height seemed to rise like a perpendicular wall behind this wind-swept natural altar."

Mr. Knight here proceeds to describe several details of the Shinto rites, of which mention has already been made in Chapter XXVI. of this narrative. He continues :

"From the plain below, where the troops were drawn up, the bugles sounded the general salute and the ceremony opened. First the priests, approaching the altar with genuflections and chanting of prayers, stood before it and reverently clapped their hands thrice in unison—the Shinto highest salutation to the dead. Then the chief priest, taking from the

table in his hands the large pine branch I have mentioned, waved it thrice solemnly over the altar, then moving from place to place slowly he waved it in like fashion thrice over the tables of offerings, his fellow-priests, General Nishi and his staff, and the foreign military attachés, in the order as I have given it; and lastly, facing the troops, he waved it to and fro in front of them—and, after saluting the altar, read an oration, of which the following is a close translation:

"'We have assembled here on this sacred ground outside the walls of Feng-whang-cheng on this the 19th day of June, in the thirty-seventh year of Meiji, to do posthumous honour to the memory of those brave officers and men of the 2nd Division who have died.

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RUSSIAN TROOPS ON THE MARCH, ALONG THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY.

this, as it was explained to us, being an act of purification or sanctification. Next, a soldier brought up the various offerings of grain, fish, fowl, and fruit, and the priests, receiving these in their hands, laid them on the altar with many prayers and genuflections. The chief priest, after bowing low before the altar, read from a scroll a long prayer, in which he presented the offerings.

"General Nishi next came forward,

"'You, brave dead, bade farewell to your native soil with the rest of us last March, and took part in the memorable attack on Chiu-lien-cheng on the 1st of May, having reached the banks of the Yalu in the face of hardships and privations. This fight, which was, in fact, our initial one, was one well calculated to make manifest to the world the merits of our Army, and also to have its effect on the spirit of our soldiery. But, as

the saying goes, "Japanese courage never fails, until death has subdued it." And now the whole world knows what occurred. The enemy's defences, made strong by nature and art, were for us easily-won prizes. The glory of Japan has been exalted thereby, and the prowess of our men has been whetted at the edge.

"'Most of you fell on that memorable day, and at this very moment we fancy that we see you so gallantly fighting. A few more men have died in the later skirmishes, and many have fallen a prey to disease, unrewarded for their meritorious deeds. Our hearts bleed at the thought of you, brave noble dead. Rest in peace, precious souls; rest comforted in the sweet consciousness that your brilliant exploits shall be emblazoned in golden letters on the pages of history, and that your grand example of self-sacrifice shall be handed down from generation to generation.

"'Situated as we are at the front we are ill-provided to make fit preparations for the occasion, and meagre are our offerings; but we commend our praise and our gratitude to the consecrated memory of the dead.'

"Having completed this oration, General Nishi again saluted the altar. Then the general, Prince Kuna, the Japanese officers present, and the foreign military attachés, each in turn, took up from the table on which they were spread one of the smaller white-bound boughs, and laid it on the altar. This brought the Shinto ceremony to a close. The troops presented arms and were marched off the ground. All the Japanese present followed the impressive ceremony with reverent attention—not only those who were followers of the myriad-deitied Shinto faith, but also those who were Christian or Buddhist, for this symbolical tribute of honour to the brave dead appeals to men of any creed. The proportion of Christians among the officers of this army is far larger than we had supposed possible before we came to Japan, and of the officers I meet the majority appear to be Methodists. The Shinto ceremony over, two Buddhist priests, clad in rich silken robes, conducted a similar service in honour of the slain, with the accompaniments of genuflections and chanting, the burning of incense, and the beating of gongs. The same altar was used by them, but on it were now placed lighted candles and flowers. In front of the altar was a censer of burning charcoal, and into this at the close of the service the general, the Japanese officers, and the foreign attachés, each in turn, and in the same order as before, threw a stick of incense."

CHAPTER XLI.

RE-APPEARANCE OF THE VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON—A "DEPLORABLE ACCIDENT"—THE CRUISERS IN THE TSUGARU STRAIT—THE SINKING OF THE *KNIGHT COMMANDER*—INDIGNATION IN GREAT BRITAIN.

"THE Vladivostok Squadron, consisting of two warships and four torpedo-boats, was seen off Hokkaido yesterday morning Thus runs a Reuter telegram from Tokio, dated July 14th, and it is not easy to measure accurately the amount of disquietude and, in some quarters, gloomy foreboding, created by this short and simple message. Ever since Admiral Skrydloff arrived at Vladivostok there has been grave uncertainty as to the possible performances of the Vladivostok Squadron, and, while here and there the news of the reappearance of the latter on the high seas may be regarded as likely to provide one or two sensationally interesting incidents, there is a growing feeling that such raids may portend real mischief to other interests besides those of Japan. The seizure of the British steamer *Allanton* has produced a distinct feeling of apprehension in this country lest fresh similar incidents may take place to emphasise our distrust of Russian methods. But it is safe to say that in no quarter is the possibility seriously entertained of any such outrage as that which is about to be placed to the Vladivostok Squadron's credit.

Before proceeding to discuss the details of the incident in question, it may be briefly remarked that about a fortnight has elapsed since the Vladivostok Squadron, under command of Vice-Admiral Bezobrazoff, succeeded in giving Admiral Kamimura the slip on the night of July 1st. Of the interval which has elapsed since the latter event—which will be found described at the end of Chapter XXXII.—there is no authentic record as far as either the squadron or Vladivostok itself is concerned. But it is conceivable that the continued presence of such an exceedingly active individual as Admiral Skrydloff will have produced several changes in the daily life of the garrison, besides, in all probability, securing for Vladivostok a rather more favourable attention from Harbin in the matter of supplies. Indeed, there does not seem sufficient reason why at this time the commissariat conditions at Vladivostok should not have greatly improved, and, though business is doubtless at a standstill, the place should not be wanting in life and movement. It is true that the local daily paper has finally ceased to appear; but in a garrison news circulates quickly, and apparently little of importance can take place in the town or harbour which cannot be included in a comprehensive survey from one of the neighbouring hills.

A recent incident of interest may have been the arrival of two German ships which have been purchased by Russia, presumably for the purpose of adding them as second-class cruisers to the Vladivostok Squadron. Some obscurity shrouds the existence of these vessels, but a significant reference is made to them in a despatch from its St. Peters-

burg correspondent published by the *Petit Parisien* on July 19th. The correspondent states that a "deplorable accident" has occurred at Vladivostok, one of the two German ships above-mentioned and a Russian torpedo-boat having been destroyed by striking mines when entering the harbour. No other allusion to this episode is forthcoming, but it is hardly likely to have been reported by the St. Petersburg correspondent of a French paper unless on good authority. Assuming the accuracy of the report, one can understand the uneasiness likely to be caused at Vladivostok by the fear lest fresh disasters may arise from mines either faultily laid by the Russians themselves, or left behind him by Kamimura as a souvenir of his last visit. Of the actual loss itself, Vladivostok, perhaps, recks little, for it is not to be compared with that of the *Bogàtyr*, the only fighting ship of the squadron which has as yet been lost, and that through an accident. Russians are, as regards their fighting strength, habitually full of cheery optimism, and the loss of a single torpedo-boat and a merchantman would probably be received with composure, as long as the *Rossia*, *Gromoboi*, and *Rurik* remained to uphold, after their fashion, the honour of the Russian Navy.

Reverting to the appearance of the Vladivostok Squadron off Hokkaido, or, as it is sometimes called, Yezo, the northern Island of Japan, it will have been noted that only "two warships," with four torpedo-boats, are reported. From what follows it seems probable that these vessels, after being sighted on July 13th, either returned to Vladivostok, or were joined by the remaining cruiser of the squadron, the torpedo-boats returning independently to harbour. For the next message with reference to these inconvenient rovers is dated Tokio, July 20th, and is to the effect that the *Rossia*, *Gromoboi*, and *Rurik*, unaccompanied by torpedo-boats, had passed Tappi Cape in the Tsugaru Strait—the latter separates Hokkaido from Hondo Island, and in some maps appears as Sangar Strait—at half-past three that morning. At seven they were discerned from Hakodate, steaming eastward. Their discovery was at once reported to Tokio, and warnings were sent to the shipping on the east coast. "Merchantmen are hurriedly seeking cover," is the conclusion of the message. The despatch is followed a few hours later by another to the effect that a small Japanese coasting steamer, called the *Takashima Maru*, has been overhauled by the Russian squadron to the eastward of the Tsugaru Strait, but has been magnanimously released, probably because its destruction could hardly have compensated Russia for the cost of sinking her. On parting from the *Takashima Maru*, the Russian squadron steams to the south-east at full speed.

To some, perhaps, the meteoric fashion in which these cruisers flash through the Tsugaru Strait is a little remarkable; but it must be remembered that the Strait lies only about 400 miles nearly due east of Vladivostok, and that consequently the squadron which entered it in the small hours of Wednesday morning probably only left harbour on Monday night. The chances of its being sighted on Tuesday were remote, for it would have been impossible for the Japanese to keep continuous watch and ward in the hope of bringing about an action with the squadron in the Sea of Japan. The difficulty of watching the two entrances of Vladivostok Harbour has already been noticed, and, when this and other circumstances are taken into consideration, it will be

SKRYDLOFF'S PURSUER: REAR-ADMIRAL KAMIMURA, THE WATCHER OF VLADIVOSTOK.

understood that a swift and powerful division of cruisers, acting on information procured by an adventurous torpedo flotilla, might well hope to reach the Pacific from Vladivostok by way of the Tsugaru Strait without interruption.

The Russian ships are next sighted at 7 a.m. on July 21st off Iwate Prefecture, steering southward. Since releasing the *Takashima Maru* they have captured one small steamer and sunk another. At noon on July 22nd they are seen near Ibaraki, still going southward, and another glimpse is caught of them the next morning to the south of Cape Idzu, which lies about ninety miles south-west of Tokio. They are evidently steaming slowly in order to economise coal, and speculation is rife as to their intentions. Some think that a serious attempt is to be made to threaten Tokio; but a more likely suggestion is that interruption of the trade between America and Japan is aimed at. All possible steps are taken in Japan to suspend the traffic, but considerable apprehension is expressed as to the safety of steamers already *en route* from Canada and San Francisco.

It presently becomes clear that these apprehensions are fully justified. On July 25th the English Press publishes a telegram from Tokio containing the sensational intelligence that the Vladivostok cruisers have sunk the British steamer *Knight Commander*, bound for Yokohama from New York. At first the British public can hardly believe the news to be true, although the seizure of the *Malacca* and other extravagances on the part of the volunteer cruisers in the Red Sea have in some measure prepared it for surprises of this character. It is felt that the marked difference in the status of the Russian vessels concerned puts matters in this case on quite another plane, and the utmost reluctance is shown to accept the assertion that Russian naval officers of rank and experience have committed such a breach of international law without extraordinary and altogether improbable provocation.

But, as the facts become gradually known, no improvement in the statement of the case is apparent. The *Knight Commander* was a screw steamer of 6,394 tons, and traded between the United States and the Far East. The crew numbered sixty, of whom twenty-one were Lascars. The ship is stated to have carried on this cruise no explosives nor munitions of war, but among her cargo, which consisted chiefly of rice and flour, was a quantity of iron work for railway bridges, which, it is suggested, was being carried from New York for use in Korea. The *Knight Commander* sailed from New York on May 6th, and from Manilla on July 11th.

It is said that the *Knight Commander* was thirty-five nautical miles off Cape Idzu when, at half-past seven in the morning of July 23rd, she met the three cruisers of the Vladivostok squadron. It is not difficult to imagine the curiosity mingled with apprehension with which the European portion of the crew must have regarded this formidable apparition. Probably at Manilla they will have read that the squadron has been roaming the seas in rather an arbitrary fashion, and may even have heard of the seizure of the *Allanton* in the Tsugaru Strait about June 18th. They cannot therefore be altogether surprised at meeting the Vladivostok cruisers, although they may well have hoped that by this time the Japanese Navy would have been able to prevent such an ugly demonstration within easy distance of Tokio Bay. As to the appearance of the cruisers, that is not by any

means reassuring. Very grim and forbidding they look, and, by all accounts, a good deal the worse for wear, as far as man-o'-war spickness and spanness are concerned. They are crowded with men, doubtless with a view to placing prize crews on useful captured vessels. Altogether, the captain and crew of the *Knight Commander* may well regret a *rencontre* which must cause delay, and may even, it is doubtless anticipated, cause the vessel to be sent to the Vladivostok Prize Court for adjudication on her questionable cargo. For the captain, at any rate, must be aware that Russia has declared a number of innocent articles of merchandise to be contraband of war, on the ground that they may assist the enemy in his hostile operations, and it can hardly be denied that unfavourable construction may conceivably be put on the ironwork carried by the *Knight Commander*, if it be assumed that it is intended for the bridges on the Korean railways.

Whatever may be the doubts and fears entertained on the *Knight Commander* as to these debatable points, the period of uncertainty is a short one. There is a brief colloquy, after which the amazing announcement is made that within half-an-hour the crew must come on board one of the Russian warships. In haste and confusion the order is obeyed, since resistance to it is out of the question. And then, without more ado, the British steamer *Knight Commander* is sunk!

At three o'clock the Vladivostok squadron falls in with another British steamer, the *Tsinan*, from Australia. This vessel is stopped and boarded by an officer from the *Rossia*, who expresses himself with remarkable frankness. He says that the Vladivostok squadron has received instructions from St. Petersburg to treat the British flag with great respect, but that if the *Tsinan* has railway material on board she, too, will be either seized or sunk. As railway material is not commonly imported by Japan from Australia the *Tsinan* passes muster in this respect, and her captain is then informed that he will be required to carry the *Knight Commander's* crew of Lascars to Yokohama. The Lascars are accordingly sent aboard, and the captain of the *Tsinan* is ordered by the Russians to blow off steam, and not to allow his ship to move until the warships have disappeared beneath the horizon. The European members of the *Knight Commander's* crew are detained on board the cruiser *Rurik*, and the squadron steams off in the direction of Tokio Bay.

When, through the *Tsinan's* arrival at Yokohama, the fate of the *Knight Commander* became generally known, the matter at once assumed a very serious aspect. It was felt on all sides that here was a question altogether separate from that of the seizure of the *Malacca*—to which further reference will duly be made in the course of this narrative—and that complications of the greatest gravity might ensue unless the incident were promptly and effectively dealt with. The Prime Minister, on being approached, intimated plainly that a breach of international law had been committed, a protest was lodged with the Russian Government, and an enquiry opened in Japan by Sir Claude Macdonald, the British Minister at Tokio. But, apart from these obvious steps, the whole episode was closely discussed by the Press, and a general conclusion arrived at that the Russian ships had acted in a manner which was utterly unwarrantable, and which we, as the premier maritime nation of the world, could not but warmly resent. As the sinking of the *Knight*

Commander is not only a direct outcome of the War, but is likely to rank hereafter as a very significant historical event, a few remarks may serve both to explain the situation, and to reflect a very notable exhibition of popular feeling.

In common fairness, the Russian view of the case must be stated. According to a telegram received by the Tsar from Admiral Skrydloff, with reference to the cruise of the Vladivostok Squadron, the *Knight Commander* only stopped after a fourth shot had been fired at her. On the vessel's being boarded it was found that it was carrying to Japan a cargo of from 3,500 to 4,000 tons, composed mostly of railway material. Admiral Skrydloff continues: "Having established the fact that the *Knight Commander* was undoubtedly carrying a contraband traffic for a belligerent party, and not being able to bring her to the nearest Russian port, owing to her not having enough coal on board, without manifest danger to the squadron, we sank the *Knight Commander*, after taking off all her crew and removing her papers."



MAP OF JAPAN.

It should be added that some of the Russian newspapers contended that the Commander of the Russian Squadron acted throughout in accordance with the Russian prize code, which enables captured vessels to be sunk if they cannot be safely taken to the nearest Russian port.

In looking at the incident of the sinking of the *Knight Commander* from the British standpoint it will be seen that, in the first instance, a very debatable question arises as to what may fairly be called "contraband of war." According to the Russian view, nearly everything comes under this heading, even provisions; but the British Government has already given Russia to understand that, in the matter of foodstuffs not intended for the consumption of the Japanese Army and Navy, she cannot accept the Russian definition. It remains to be seen whether a similar objection will be lodged in the matter of railway material, but it is sufficiently clear that a belligerent Power, by pressing the definition of "contraband of war" to its utmost limit, can do a great deal to paralyse the commerce of non-belligerent nations, unless some international agreement on the subject is shortly and definitely arrived at.

But it is in the second aspect of the *Knight Commander* case that the more serious question arises whether a neutral vessel, even if it be carrying unquestionable contraband of war, can be sunk until its status has been determined by a properly constituted Prize Court. If a warship can take the law into its own hands in every case, in which to carry out legal formalities would be incon-

venient, the law becomes a perfect farce, and the most frightful injustice may be done, the most terrible losses inflicted upon trade, almost at the whim of a harsh and unscrupulous naval commander.

Everything, of course, hinges on the question of neutrality. If a vessel flies the flag of a belligerent nation, and is unfortunate enough to fall into the hands of an opponent, it runs, whatever its character, an obvious risk, the extent and nature of which depends largely upon the humanity and opportunities of its captor or captors. It may be said, of course, that when a ship belonging to the mercantile marine of a neutral Power violates the neutrality to which its Government is pledged, it forfeits the right to be considered from any but a hostile standpoint. But even neutrals who have misbehaved have rights under the usually accepted code of international law, and one of these is that a vessel carrying what is alleged to be contraband of war shall be taken to a port belonging to the belligerent Power into whose hands she has fallen, and there judged by a properly constituted Prize Court, from whose decision there may or may not be an appeal. It is monstrous that if a warship does not find itself in a position to carry out this formality it should be content merely to take over the crew and passengers of the unfortunate vessel, and should then be permitted to sink the latter without any further question being raised. If such practices were recognised internationally as legal, there is no end to the difficulties which might arise, more especially when the term "contraband of war" is subject to such elastic interpretation as that which the Russians put upon it. The suggestion that the Admiral commanding the Vladivostok Squadron was justified in his action by



Photo: F. G. O. Stuart, Southampton.

THE *MALACCA*.

the Russian Admiralty regulations governing the treatment of prizes may suit Russian ideas of justice, but not necessarily ours. If a Government chooses to lay down laws as regards the treatment of foreign shipping which are utterly inequitable and objectionable from a foreign standpoint, it must not be surprised if those laws are not regarded as internationally binding. A strong nation may, of course, impose its will upon a weak one in such matters; but Great Britain does not happen to be a weak nation, and her maritime interests are very precious to her.

Accordingly, the British public takes the *Knight Commander* case very seriously, all the more seriously, perhaps, because the *Malacca* incident has shown a disposition on Russia's part to take very strange advantage of her belligerent position. The general indignation does not find expression in any particular exhibition of Jingoism; but the nation is behind the Premier in his emphatic statement that an act has been committed which is contrary to international usage, and for which, accordingly, an explanation must be asked. We shall see later the upshot of this, as of the *Malacca* incident. But, meanwhile, it is well to place on record the circumstance that already the Vladivostok Squadron has discounted its somewhat dubious success in the matter of sinking transports and unarmed merchantmen belonging to its antagonists by wounding the susceptibilities, if not by provoking the resentment, of at least one first-class European Power.

Returning to the actual movements of the squadron, it would seem that for some days it hung about the neighbourhood of Tokio Bay, evidently on the look-out for shipping from America. Its complete achievements during this period are not recorded; but it is admitted by Admiral Skrydloff himself that on July 24th the German steamer *Thea*, bound from America to Yokohama with a full cargo of fish, was sighted and stopped. "She was regarded as a legal prize, and after her crew had been taken off, the *Thea* was sunk, owing to the impossibility of bringing her to a Russian port."

There is little doubt that there were some narrow escapes about this time of vessels coming from America with cargoes, which, under Russian rules, might be classed as contraband. Considerable anxiety was felt for some days about the Pacific mail steamer *Korea*, from San Francisco, which was known to be carrying a cargo of £200,000 in gold for Japan, and other contraband of war. It is very possible that the squadron had been specially advised of the sailing of this vessel, for it is understood that for some time past the Russian Government had been represented at the leading ports of the world by agents, whose business it was to ascertain and report whether contraband cargoes were being shipped to Japan. This, of course, was a perfectly legitimate precaution, and one could have had, in general, but little sympathy with steamship owners who deliberately violated the neutrality declared by their Governments, and suffered the ordinary penalty of carrying contraband for the sake of extra profit. At the same time, the average British newspaper reader probably learnt with very distinct satisfaction that on July 29th the *Korea* arrived safely at Yokohama, having escaped the clutches of the three valiant commerce destroyers which were doubtless lying in wait for her.

At about noon on July 30th the squadron, fearing, perhaps, that further delay

would be dangerous, proceeded once more to the Tsugaru Strait. At about three o'clock, near the northern coast, a Japanese third-class cruiser, with three torpedo-boats, was sighted, and behind it a sailing vessel with four torpedo-boats. Simultaneously, there appeared on the left coast of the Strait a coast defence battleship. These followed, for some distance, the Russian Squadron, which was steaming slowly at eleven knots possibly through fear of mines; but of course an attack by the Japanese in such circumstances would have been madness. Moreover, it was probably anticipated that the Vladivostok cruisers would shortly run up against a much stronger detachment of the Japanese Fleet, which was known to be looking out for it. By extraordinary good luck the Russians completely evaded the latter, by which it was never even sighted, and in due course the three cruisers, with their spoils, consisting chiefly of ships' papers and a number of captive passengers and sailors of various nationalities, regained the Golden Horn.

OVERLOOKING VLADIVOSTOK.
(*From Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia."*)

It should be mentioned that in this cruise the Vladivostok Squadron was commanded by Rear-Admiral Jessen, Admiral Bezobrazoff having, it is understood, been transferred to Port Arthur. It was by Rear-Admiral Jessen's order that the *Knight Commander* was sunk, and in other ways he may claim to have established a very objectionable record. It is estimated that his cruise has caused 200,000 tons of chartered shipping to be detained for ten days, involving a loss of a million and a half pounds sterling.

One might be inclined to feel some small admiration for the audacity of the Vladivostok Squadron in perpetrating this raid, but for the fact of its encounter with the Japanese third-class cruiser and the coast defence battleship which it met in the Tsugaru Strait on July 30th. It is conceivable that considerations of prudence may have deterred Admiral Jessen from opening fire with big guns, which might have warned a larger Japanese squadron of his presence in the Strait. But that, after sinking and seizing a few unarmed merchantmen, he should have done nothing but show his heels to a third-class cruiser and a coast defence battleship, is a sad blot upon the honour of the Russian Navy, the officers and men of which must have been ashamed of such an exhibition of cowardice.

It remains to be seen whether Nemesis will overtake the Vladivostok Squadron; but it is stated on high authority that its exploits have not only produced difficulties abroad which will not easily be settled, but have also stimulated the Japanese to fresh efforts in the direction of the capture of Port Arthur. If that prize can be grasped by Japan, and if, simultaneously, the Russian ships in Port Arthur Harbour cease to be a possible menace, the turn of Vladivostok will not be long in coming. The Russians themselves seem to have a forebodding of this, for there is noticeable at the end of July a significant renewal of interest in the northern port, which has been left so much to itself since the War began. On July 30th it is telegraphed from St. Petersburg that Admiral Alexeieff is expected at Vladivostok, and on August 1st the *Echo de Paris* publishes an interesting despatch with reference to certain military preparations said to be on foot for the defence of the "Sovereign City of the East." The despatch confirms the report that the 1st Army Corps is to be sent shortly to reinforce General Linievitch's Division at Vladivostok. General Kuropatkin may find it difficult to spare any such substantial detachment, but the suggestion is not without importance as showing that the Russians are alive to the peril which must soon encompass their alternative stronghold in the Far East.

THE MAIN STREET, VLADIVOSTOK.
(*From Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia."*)



RUSSIAN CYCLIST SCOUTS.

CHAPTER XLII.

THE SECOND ARMY OF JAPAN—RUSSIANS AT TA-SHI-CHAO—THE JAPANESE ADVANCE—BATTLE OF TA-SHI-CHAO—A NIGHT ATTACK—THE RUSSIANS RETIRE—THE JAPANESE AT NIU-CHWANG.

WE have seen how, from July 10th to July 20th, the Second Army of Japan, under command of General Oku, continues in seeming immobility in front of Ta-shi-chao (page 376). We have further been enabled, by the light of an interesting description, quoted at the end of Chapter XXXIX., to gain some idea of the country which lies ahead of the Japanese troops during this period. It is a country offering several marked advantages for defence, the main features being an irregular chain of hills, running, for the most part, from S.W. to N.E., and fronted on the south and west by flat open plains which afford few, if any, positions for attacking artillery. Here the Russians are posted on the Ta-ping-ling and other eminences to the south-west and south of Ta-shi-chao, their position extending about ten miles, with the right resting on a village some five miles from the sea-shore, and their left on a point a little east of the road from Kai-chau to Hai-cheng. On their right they have a considerable force of cavalry, with which they probably hope to roll up the Japanese left if a chance presents itself of dashing down between the hills and the shores of the Liao-tung Gulf.

There is no mistaking the fact that the

Russians not only have a capital eye for ground, but that they make, as a rule, the very most of a good defensive position. By taking up, in this instance, a line cutting obliquely, the direct line of advance from Kai-chau to Ta-shi-chao, and preparing to demonstrate with their cavalry on their right, they render it extremely difficult for the Japanese to make any sort of impression, more especially as the strong defensive works they have constructed at admirably selected points are held by an ample sufficiency of first-class troops. It is estimated by the Japanese that the enemy have altogether in front of Ta-shi-chao about five divisions and 100 guns, and, while the Russian official reports state that the numbers were not so great, there is reason to suppose that the bulk of the 4th Siberian Army Corps, consisting nominally of three divisions, was on the ground, together with the 1st and 9th Divisions belonging to the army formerly led by General Stackelberg. The whole force is commanded by General Zarubaieff, and cannot aggregate much less than 50,000 men at a very low computation.

General Oku may well have found the state of affairs somewhat difficult to deal with, even after ten or twelve days of close observation of the enemy's movements, and careful scrutiny of the adjoining country. The situation is not wholly unlike that at Nan-shan, with the exception that the ground is less contracted. There is the same security enjoyed by the Russians in the matter of attempted flanking movements, and the Japanese have an added disadvantage in not being able to obtain, as they did at Nan-shan, effective assistance from their ships. Some of the gunboats might, perhaps, succeed in throwing a few shells into the extreme right of the Russian position should they care to venture into such shallow water as is here indicated. But the damage would be extremely trifling, and could not affect the main attack. The latter must evidently be, in the first instance, a frontal one, and with so many good troops, and guns so strongly posted, the experiment can hardly be other than a costly one.

At a later date, the Russians declare that they had no intention of obstinately defending the Ta-shi-chao position, and that they had not thrown up any special defences. In justice to General Oku, and to the manly fashion in which he faced, for the second time, a very trying situation, involving an inevitable and serious sacrifice, the faithful historian must be permitted to doubt this statement. The Japanese state explicitly that the defences here are the best and most extensive they have as yet encountered. Folds of roofed-in trenches are extended round the steep hills, and gun emplacements, protected by wire entanglements, bar the ravines. Not only this, but all the evidence available goes to show that the Russians have for weeks past been increasing their forces at this point. The mere fact of General Zarubaieff's presence is suggestive of an obstinate defence, for an Army Corps Commander would certainly not have been detached for the mere purpose of keeping the enemy in check. Again, there is a subsequent report, based on the statement of captured Russian officers, that General Kuropatkin himself looked on at one stage or another of the fighting near Ta-shi-chao, and this would hardly have occurred had the position been regarded as being on the same plane as that in front of Kai-chau.



SKETCH MAP SHOWING THE JAPANESE ADVANCE TO KAI-CHAU, TA-SHI-CHAO, AND YING-KAU.

There is, of course, every reason why the Russians should seek to make a strong stand at Ta-shi-chao. For, as has been noted several times previously, the place lies at the junction of the branch line to Ying-kow, and a Russian retirement from it means an end to Russian supremacy at Niu-chwang. It is difficult to understand why the Russians should so strenuously repudiate the suggestion that their intention was to do what it was obviously the right thing for them to do, namely, to cover Niu-chwang, so long as they considered the latter worth holding. If they had previously evacuated Niu-chwang, and had made every other preparation for a gradual falling-back on Hai-cheng and Liao-yang successively, they might have had some excuse for not defending Ta-shi-chao obstinately. But, as things are, we must either receive the Russian declaration that it was not intended to dispute Ta-shi-chao seriously with polite incredulity, or must lay a very bad strategical mistake to the account of General Kuropatkin and his lieutenants.

Before plunging into the tactics of a rather interesting and certainly very important operation, we may step aside for a moment to connect Ta-shi-chao with a remarkable incident, to which attention was drawn in Chapter XXX. On pages 365-6 of this story it was narrated how, in the summer of 1903, the Tsar sent M. Bezobrazoff to dog the heels of General Kuropatkin, who was then on special duty in the Far East, and how Bezobrazoff stole a march on Kuropatkin by hurrying home and securing the Viceroyalty for Admiral Alexeieff. Here is a little reminiscence of Ta-shi-chao, which appeared in the *Times* in the form of an extract from a private letter :—

"As I write, a scene comes vividly before me. I was at Ta-shi-chao exactly a year ago—to be precise, on July 14th—and was present when Bezobrazoff, in the middle of a restaurant car swimming in champagne, and full of officers 'vivified' with wine, made a speech about the success of his mission, and so on. I little thought that I was witnessing something almost historical, and that a year later the Japs would be converging on that little station, which looks for all the world like a little place in Somerset. Three hours later we met poor Kuropatkin down the line. As someone said with absolute truth in the *Times* a few weeks ago, Bezobrazoff was bolting back to Petersburg to get the ear of the Tsar first. Had not Kuropatkin been too proud to race Bezobrazoff across a continent, this trouble might have been averted. But Kuropatkin ostentatiously stayed at Liao-yang to inspect, and arrived in Petersburg to find Alexeieff Viceroy of the Far East, though the appointment was not made public until two or three weeks afterwards. I did not see Kuropatkin that night, but had a talk with his Chief of the Staff ; it was midnight, and we strolled up and down the track; he talked English, had something of that amazing Russian candour, and it was from the contemptuous way in which he spoke of Bezobrazoff that I first got an inkling of the true situation."

The ends of poetical justice would, perhaps, have been better served had we found, *mutatis mutandis*, Admiral Alexeieff in command at Ta-shi-chao on July 14th, 1904, with M. Bezobrazoff as his Chief of the Staff. But the extract, which, even if discursive, links up the little place that looks for all the world as if it were in Somerset with one of the probable chief causes of the Russo-Japanese War, has a quaint interest of its own.

And now to business. It is a very interesting fact that what in reality is the first move in the operation against the Russian position near Ta-shi-chao, is not made by General Oku, but by that useful "Takushan Army" which has already done much excellent service in an unostentatious and, as far as official despatches go, rather shadowy sort of way. It will be remembered that on the morrow of the occupation of Kai-chau, the Takushan Army put out a feeler, and, finding some detached Russian forces south-east of Ta-shi-chao, drove them in on the latter place (page 475). Now, on the eve of General Oku's attack on Ta-shi-chao, the Takushan Army again protrudes a detachment in the direction of Tomuchan (Shimucheng). At Pan-ling, which lies immediately to the east of Tomuchan, this detachment envelops the 17th Siberian Rifle Regiment, and drives it northwards, the Russians leaving fourteen killed and three prisoners. The engagement is, in itself, trivial, but the occupation of Pan-ling betokens a pressure from the north-east on General Zarubaieff's position near Ta-shi-chao, which he evidently finds, at a later date, uncomfortable, and which may have

From Stereograph Copyright: Underwood & Underwood, London and New York.
JAPANESE IMPERIAL GUARDS

helped to determine his actual movements on the night of July 24th.

But we must be careful not to anticipate too much. Let us rather return to General Oku's Army, which, on the morning of July 23rd, drives in the Russian outposts, and advances to a position, the left of which rests on the Kai-chau—Hai-cheng road, while the right is away to the eastward, and rests on a point some eighteen miles south-east of Ta-shi-chao. It is now found that the enemy's greatest concentration is to the west of Ta-ping-ling, and accordingly the front is changed, and at dawn on July 24th the advance of the deployed forces is in a westerly direction.

By 9 a.m. on July 24th the Japanese had come under the fire of the artillery on the Russian main positions, and from this time until evening it is evident that the attackers suffered severely. It is impossible to follow the fighting closely, for the Japanese official report is very meagre, the Russian despatches are very vague, and a graphic description, furnished by Mr. Ernest Brindle, the war correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, suffers from the absence of tactical detail. Mr. Brindle watched the action of the 24th from a tower on the outskirts of Niu-chwang, and the spectacle which he witnessed must, indeed, have been a moving one. But, as he himself frankly confesses, it was impossible to follow the course of the fighting very accurately, and when his account was sent off he was apparently under the impression that the battle was over by the evening of the day on which it commenced. His bright descriptions constitute, however, a useful supplement to the official account, and enable us to realise the extraordinary tenacity displayed by the Japanese in the face of a truly devastating fire.

It would seem that the attack was carried out mainly by the right wing of General Oku's Army, which showed extraordinary bravery, and, at one point, actually succeeded in penetrating the Russian line. But the difficulties of the ground were very great, it was impossible to obtain effective artillery positions, the enemy made an effective counter-attack, and the column was compelled to fall back. This is probably the incident alluded to by Mr. Brindle in the following vivid passage:—

"The Japanese retired to the hills, and to those looking on from a distance appeared to suffer a repulse. Puffs of white smoke and red flashes denoting bursting shells and shrapnel came from the Russian guns in ceaseless succession. The Japanese fire at the time was of a spasmodic nature, which ceased at noon, when a fresh Russian battery east of Ta-shi-chao disclosed itself and thundered across the intervening valley to the next hill.

"At two o'clock in the afternoon three rings of smoke that followed the crest of the mountain slightly north-east of the Russian position indicated that the Japanese were stationed at a new point. These rings increased and spread out in vast half-circles.

"The ridges of the highest surrounding hills soon showed a line confused and broken of Japanese, who began a descent to the next range. Surprised by this unexpected strategy, the Russians moved ten guns to the top of a long, low hill, the dark brown colour of which stood out with startling conspicuousness from the green grass and the white and red rocks that filled out the landscape.

"A terrific cannonade ensued for twenty minutes, and it became impossible to follow the progress of the fight be-

cause of the thick clouds of smoke. Presently there came a breeze, and the curtain lifted showing the Japanese line ten miles from Ta-ping-shan, on a precipitous height to the east dominating the whole country. The Russian guns were still firing, and appeared to be making good practice. The noise was tremendous. There was one continual roll of thunder, punctuated each moment by thuds that shook the earth."

The fighting round the fortifications on Ta-ping-ling was evidently of the most desperate character, and it was at this point the Japanese sustained their heaviest losses.

As to the direction of the attack, it seems that this must have altered more than once, the fighting at times being much of the same character as at Nan-shan. "The Japanese did, indeed, make a number of consecutive attacks," says one of the Russian official accounts, and with our experience of Japanese heroism and indifference to death it is easy to imagine column after column hurling itself on the strong Russian defences, and falling back reluctantly with ranks shattered and ploughed by the deadly hail of shot and shell from the defenders' guns. On four occasions, according to General Zarubaieff, the fighting in the centre was at close quarters with the bayonet. But clearly the Japanese could make no headway against troops which had not, like themselves, been shaken by artillery fire, and, save in the one instance already recorded, in which, too, the foothold gained could not be maintained, penetration of the position was out of the question.

Eventually, in view of the enemy's heavy cannonade, and the impossibility of making any useful artillery response —for the Russian batteries "though completely masked, searched the whole zone of the Japanese advance, whereas the Japanese guns had to manœuvre in full view"—the infantry attack was suspended. At nightfall the Japanese bivouacked in close touch with the enemy.

The result of this day's fighting is, not to put a fine point on it, a distinct Japanese reverse. Practically speaking, no advantage has been gained, except a very dearly bought knowledge of the strength of the Russian defences, and the losses, though not a quarter of those sustained at Nan-shan, are sufficiently severe to render it doubtful whether it is possible to make another frontal attack with any chance of success. There remains one hope, that of capturing the position by a nocturnal *coup de main*, and with characteristic boldness General Oku takes what some generals might consider a greater risk than that which would be involved in another direct assault by day.

For night-fighting is always risky. Even where the ground is fairly level, and every sort of precaution is taken, mistakes in direction will occur, and the confusion which takes place when the troops begin to press in on one another is hardly to be imagined by those who have had no experience of the process. Again, the most trifling thing at night will often produce a panic among even the best of troops, and a panic once started is not always as quickly stayed as was the case in the bivouac before Tel-el-Kebir. Even that queer scare, of which Mr. Frederic Villiers gives a notable description in his "Pictures of Many Wars," seemed likely at one moment to prove serious. "In the twinkling of an eye the men, with suppressed curses, were struggling to their feet and fixing bayonets, and huddling together in square formation, apparently to resist cavalry. Even the

DEATH, THAT RECONCILES ALL MORTAL FEUDS HATH MADE THEM ONE

After the great engagements in Manchuria friend and foe are often to be seen stretched side by side in the fields of battle. Above the heads of the Russian fallen are frequently planted the icons, or sacred pictures and symbols

supports scrambled to their feet as the panic wave passed over the desert. 'For God's sake, what's the matter?' whispered the officers, as they tried to suppress the excitement of the men. But to this day there is no valid answer given for this remarkable scare. It was called the nightmare of that famous march. The excitement soon died out, but there was little further sleep."

If such alarms can take place during the bivouac before a night march, what panics are not possible during the march itself, when each soldier feels that every moment is bringing him closer to an enemy who, for all he knows, for all his leaders may know, is thoroughly on the alert, and may at any instant crumple up the attack by a charge of cavalry, or by suddenly opening fire from a long line of guns?

Well, then, may any leader hesitate to resort to a night attack, even when his troops are fresh, and the ground before him is not calculated to produce mistakes in direction, and consequent huddling of units between which a distinct interval ought to be preserved. But General Oku has not even these points in his favour. His men have been fighting for fifteen hours, and in that time have been repeatedly repulsed with grievous loss. They cannot but be weary, in spite of their indomitable pluck, and a night march is doubly trying to tired men. Nor is the "going" at all of the best. Even if a fair start can be obtained on level ground, there are hills to be negotiated by at least some portion of the attacking force, and what in daylight is a mere mound is at night a mountain, as far as its capacity to deflect a straight advance is concerned.

Yet General Oku takes the risk, and he takes it with an audacity which is curiously complete. For he does not resort to that easier, but still difficult, form of night operation which consists of a march under cover of darkness with the intent to deliver an assault at the first streak of dawn. He elects to adopt the still more risky process of a real night attack, such as is only undertaken by the commander of a large force in very exceptional circumstances. As a rule, such attacks are only delivered by small bodies in order to harass the enemy and to create a panic. In attempting a real night attack with a force which he expressly states was a strong one, General Oku, on this occasion, touched a pinnacle of tactical daring which lifts his exploit in conception, at any rate, higher even than Tel-el-Kebir.

The preparations for the night attack must have been made early in the evening, for it is evident from the result that no time was lost. No details of the preliminary arrangements are given, but we may take it that they followed the usual course on such occasions, with the addition, maybe, of one or two improvements, which the experience gained in long and careful training has suggested. For it is probable that the Japanese, with their accustomed thoroughness, have made a very special study of military night operations, just as they have of the difficult and dangerous business of manœuvring torpedo-craft at night with lights out. For otherwise, it is hardly conceivable that such an enterprise as the present one would have been undertaken with so little hesitation, and so smartly carried to a successful conclusion.

It is not hard to picture the scene that takes place when the order is circulated among General Oku's gallant troops for the delivery of a night attack. One can imagine both officers and men,

fatigued as they are, brisking up not a little at the thought of once more getting to close quarters with the enemy, without having to undergo the fearful preliminary shattering which has so heavily discounted the chances of every heroic assault made during the past day. One can imagine, too, the General and his Staff discussing, with some anxiety, the prospects of the operation; for it goes without saying that they cannot regard it with anything like real confidence. If a night attack had afforded any great hopes of proving the nearest and best way into the heart of the enemy's position, we may take it for granted that this expedient would have been tried before attempting a series of costly frontal attacks by daylight. But General Oku, doubtless, sets to the advantage of the effort he is about to make the fact that the Russians, notwithstanding their successful defence, must be a little exhausted, and may well be alarmed to the verge of panic, to find their restless enemies pressing on them during the hours of darkness.

As to the preparations for night fighting, these are usually somewhat elaborate, for it is necessary that each unit in the force selected for the attack should have the most precise instructions as to the direction to be taken and the rate of progress to be maintained. As a rule, reliance is placed on compass bearings, and we may be sure that in an up-to-date army like that of Japan, in which every cavalry trooper carries a field-glass, there is no officer unprovided with a compass, the dial of which is treated with luminous paint, or with some similar contrivance for reading bearings in the dark. For, of course, the use of matches or lights of any sort is altogether prohibited in well-ordered night operations. Native guides will doubtless be dispensed with by the Japanese on this occasion, as the distance to be traversed is so short, and has actually been covered by many of the troops during the past few hours; but specially selected officers will have been detailed to lead the attacking columns, and others to check the distance traversed.

There is a weird difference between the setting-out of a force on a night operation and the forming of troops for an attack by day. In the latter case there is always a plentiful braying of bugles, varied by shrill whistle signals, and the barking of commands by word of mouth. Nor is it long before the cracking of rifles begins, and grows in frequency until, in a short time, there seems to be an almost continuous roar, interspersed with an occasional crash produced by volleys of musketry, or with the *pup-pup-pup* of the comprehensive Maxim. In a night attack there are none of these noisy accompaniments. From quite the start—if the operation be in good hands—there is not a bugle sounded, and every word of command is given in a low tone. Above all, it is impressed upon every man in the ranks that on no account must he fire his rifle, and care should be taken to see that no fire-arms are loaded. For the success of a night attack depends, first, on surprising the enemy, and then on the free and frequent use of the bayonet. It is hard to imagine a greater military crime than that of the man who "looses off" his rifle, during more especially the early stages of a night attack, for he not only may be wrecking an elaborate plan of operations, but he is certainly endangering the lives of scores, perhaps hundreds, of his comrades.

In almost complete silence, then, we

may imagine the Japanese columns moving off, probably at about eight o'clock on the night of July 24th. The usual method adopted where there are two or three columns employed is for them to march independently to what is known as the "point of assembly," after which the advance is continued in some compact formation until the "point of deployment" is reached. The troops are then formed for the assault, the signal for which may be given by a rocket. But it is very possible that in this case the point of deployment coincided with the point of assembly, and, in any case, the Japanese may have introduced some telling variations from our own practice, an outline of which has merely been given in order to enable the reader to realise an interesting and effective operation.

General Oku tells us that his night attack was delivered from his right, and that a strong force carried at 10 p.m. the enemy's first position east of Ta-ping-ling, thereafter attacking two more of his positions.

The nature of the fighting which took place at these points is very obscure. The Russian official despatches are curiously reticent as to the whole matter of the night attack, and, indeed, one can hardly gather from them that it took place. They speak of "a fusillade" which "lasted until late in the night," and it is declared that "the position was abandoned because the commanding officer did not deem it possible to accept battle the next morning while defending a position with a front of sixteen kilomètres." General Sakharoff adds the evacuation of the Russian position was a complete surprise for the Japanese.

This is rather an interesting example of the difficulty sometimes experienced by victors and vanquished in seeing eye to eye as regards the means by which a battle has been lost and won. The weak point of the Russian contention is that, if the evacuation was really carried out deliberately for the reason stated, it was a poor exhibition of rather cowardly incapacity. The Russians had already defended their ten-mile front with success for one day, and there was absolutely no reason why they should not again have repulsed the enemy had he ventured on another daylight frontal attack. It may have been that General Zarubaieff was conscious of some pressure from the direction of To-mu-chan, near which the Takushan Army was beginning to assert itself, and this might have justified his gradual withdrawal from the Ta-shi-chao position, the strongest part of which could then have been held till the last movement by a rear-guard. But a planned hasty evacuation after a successful defence seems an ignominious proposition, and even the well-wisher of the Russian Army will prefer to think that the only reason why the Ta-shi-chao position was so promptly abandoned was because it really was captured by a brilliantly successful night attack on a large scale.

A well-known character in one of Mr. Surtees's sporting novels cynically remarks that it does not matter much whether a horse kicks his rider off through playfulness or vice—the actual result is much the same in both cases. And so, whether General Zarubaieff had made up his mind to retire, or whether General Oku caused or accelerated his departure, does not, after all, make much difference to the course of events. General Oku says that at daybreak all the Japanese corps on the Ta-ping-ling were occupied on the heights eastward of Shang-hsi-tan—which lies six or seven

miles south-east of Ta-shi-chao—"after which the enemy began to retire toward Ta-shi-chao."

Assuming that at least a remnant of the enemy would be still in position, the Japanese commenced the morning's work with a brisk artillery fire, but the Russian reply was so feeble that an immediate advance was made, and by 7 p.m. Shang-shi-tan was occupied without resistance. Here it was found what a strong position the enemy had been holding, and admiration was expressed of the manner in which he had turned the natural advantages to the best account with trenches, forts, and defences of felled trees.

A pursuit of the retiring Russians is now organised, but in all probability the Japanese troops are too utterly worn out to carry it on with the vigour necessary to produce demoralisation in the enemy's ranks. At noon a large column forming the Russian rearguard is observed to pass Ta-shi-chao, moving northward. The Japanese follow this for some distance beyond the town without at first entering the latter, and then discover that the Russians, before retreating, have set fire to Ta-shi-chao itself, and to the railway station.

Thus ends the battle of Ta-shi-chao, a stubbornly-contested, and, as far as the night attack goes, a remarkable affair, in which the Japanese had 146 killed, of whom ten were officers, and 925 wounded, including forty-seven officers. The Russian casualties are not accurately known, but, according to the statement of captured officers, they amounted to about 2,000. It is also reported that among the wounded were Generals Sakaloff and Kondratovitch.

Despatches from St. Petersburg show that, notwithstanding the self-assertiveness of General Zarubaieff, the Russians were profoundly impressed with the results of the Ta-shi-chao battle, the Russian war correspondents dwelling, in particular, on the extraordinary mobility and capacity for concentration displayed by the Japanese in connection with this action. It is added that the Russian troops are grumbling a good deal at the constant retreats, or, as the generals prefer to call them, "strategic retirements." Stress is laid upon the extreme difficulty of carrying away the wounded in such mountainous country as that round Ta-shi-chao, and it is said that in many cases badly hurt men have been obliged to walk, in spite of the suffering entailed. Excellent as is the spirit of the Russian soldiery, and marvellous as is their endurance, the voicing of such complaints shows that General Kuropatkin is now beginning to be confronted with an enemy almost as formidable as that which is keeping his forces so continually on the trot. For it is an evil day for an army on the defensive when the men begin to grumble at the plans of their leaders, and to point to the sufferings of the wounded as illustrating the cynical disregard of those in authority for the unfortunate pawns in their badly-played game. It is otherwise, of course, when an army's occasional reverses are being set off by notable triumphs, or, even, as in the case of that awful retreat from Moscow, which is the historical example of such painful movements, when the memory still survives of the Commander's previous great victories. But the Russian Army in Manchuria has no such conditions to inspirit it. Perhaps the nearest approach to a genuine Russian success hitherto has been this very repulse of the Japanese from the Ta-shi-chao position on July 24th, and it is easy to understand that when, after even this

moderately promising performance, another "strategic retirement" should be talked of as imperative, the Russian soldier begins to lose heart and patience. Doubtless his confidence in Kuropatkin much as if he had in person led the forward movement at Telissu, or taken a brisk offensive at Ta-shi-chao.

The natural sequel of the retreat of the Russians from the Ta-shi-chao position



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MAJOR-GENERAL FUKUSHIMA. THE GREATEST LANGUAGE EXPERT OF THE JAPANESE ARMY, WHO SPEAKS SEVERAL SIBERIAN DIALECTS, AND HOLDS A HIGH POSITION ON THE GENERAL STAFF.

is still great; but it is probably now being recalled that it is a good many years since Skobeleff's former right-hand man held an active command in the field, and to the rank and file the good work which the Commander-in-Chief has been doing at Liao-yang may not appeal as is not long in coming about. At last the crisis has arrived for the Port of Niu-chwang (Yingkow), where, for the past forty-eight hours, extraordinary excitement has been prevailing. From an early stage in our narrative, Niu-chwang has been carefully kept in view,

the probability of dramatic events in this quarter having, from the first, been clearly indicated. And now, as so often happens in war, the actual *dénouement* is rather tame. The explanation, of course, is that in many warlike cases the preliminary operations leading up to some important result are themselves so comprehensive, so thorough, and so detrimental to the enemy's capacity for further resistance, that at the last the "action of the piece" seems to crumble away, and there is nothing left but a little shouting. A recent instance of this was the capture of Pretoria, which, at one time, was expected to offer a tremendous barrier to our troops if only by reason of its powerful forts, equipped with all sorts of up-to-date aids to a stubborn defence. But, as we all remember, the actual entry of the British troops into the town was a very commonplace affair, for the simple reason that the work had been done weeks before our army approached those ugly fortifications. So with Niu-chwang, where, at the commencement of the war, it seemed as if the Russians could not but make a determined stand for political, as well as military, reasons. Yet, at the last, as we shall see, there is no stand at all. One afternoon the place is in the military occupation of Russia, the next in that of Japan, and the translation involves, as far as one can gather, the loss of not a single life, not even the firing of a single shot!

The Treaty Port of Niu-chwang (Yingkow) is, Mr. Clive Bingham tells us, the shipping place for the bean-cake trade. This article, manufactured throughout the two southern provinces, comes down the Liao River at normal times in hundreds of junks, and is sent in large quantities to South China, the Yang-tse, Japan, and Korea. Skins, furs, cereals, and timber are also exported, though to no very great amount. Great Britain is considerably interested in the piece-goods business, and the Germans and Americans are also well represented. In 1899 it was feared that Niu-chwang would suffer greatly from the competition of Dalny; but, as has been noted, the latter, in spite of the efforts made by Russian officialism to popularise it, never succeeded in attracting an adequate resident population. The more recent vicissitudes of Dalny are likely to increase Niu-chwang's future commercial chances very considerably; but, in any case, the place is of marked importance, and the transfer of the administration from Russian to Japanese hands is a matter of commercial moment to three continents.

It is understood that if General Kuropatkin could have had his own way Niu-chwang would have been evacuated long ago, but that the occupation had been continued up to the last moment by order of Admiral Alexeieff. On July 24th came the Commander-in-Chief's final and peremptory instructions that a complete withdrawal is to be made, and the ensuing night and next morning, accordingly, some remarkable scenes are witnessed. During the hours of darkness the entire Russian civil population leaves the place, and in the morning 600 infantry, with six guns, and 300 cavalry evacuate the forts commanding the entrance to the Liao River. The Russian settlement is now set on fire, and a quantity of Russian property destroyed. Apparently a good deal of Chinese property suffers in the process, and it is not improbable that the Russians are leaving behind them liabilities which are not likely to be discharged. For Mr. Brindle, the *Daily Mail's* corre-

spondent, mentions that the burning of the Russian settlement was watched by thousands of Chinese, "many of whom were rich, and have lost heavily."

The railway station is also set on fire, and here the Chinese rush in and carry off everything they can lay hands on. The Russian commercial flag is left waving over the Russian Administration, and only M. Grosse, the Civil Administrator, and another official are left to represent the former masters of Niu-chwang.

The foreign residents, as may be imagined, have been going through a very anxious time. For the Russian evacuation means that they are left temporarily at the mercy of the Chinese population, and of the desperadoes who are known to be hovering about the town. There are no foreign gunboats in the roadstead, and unless the Japanese come very quickly mischief may be wrought which it will be impossible to repair. In the afternoon a band of robbers actually enters the settlement and begins pillaging some of the shops. The foreign residents have organised patrols, and these are about to deal with the marauders when the shout goes up, "The Japanese are coming," and the bandits quickly melt away.

Within ten minutes of the arrival of the Japanese the Russian flag on the Administration building is hauled down, and is replaced by the tri-colour of France.

At five o'clock a detachment of Japanese cavalry, one hundred and fifty strong, enter Niu-chwang to the accompaniment of noisy demonstrations of joy on the part of the Chinese; while a cordial welcome is accorded by a number of the foreign residents. Very spick and span the Japanese detachment looks, men and horses, all, it is said, in the pink of condition, and the troopers exciting admiration by the completeness of their equipment. The officers intimate that they are under orders to return forthwith to Ta-shi-chao, but, at the urgent request of the British and American Consuls, they consent to remain overnight. After a tour of inspection, they encamp in the foreign settlement, having, it seems, made one prisoner, a Russian soldier, who, whether through negligence or by design, has not accompanied his comrades in their retreat. The Russian, says Mr. Brindle, "with an assumption of indifference, fanned himself with his cap. With a smile, one of the Japanese handed him a fan, on which were the national colours, and the Russian used it vigorously while a revolver was pointed at him." A trivial incident, but one quaintly typical of much that may happen before the struggle between Russia and Japan comes to an end.

Mr. Brindle is careful to add that the general deportment of the Japanese cavalry is such as can give no offence to any nationality. The officers are clearly men of tact, and when, at a conference which takes place between them, the Russian ex-civil Administrator, and the French Consular Agent, the latter states that the Russian buildings are now under the protection of the French flag, the courteous Japanese raise no objection.

On the morning of the 26th the cavalry detachment departs, leaving a small guard with a lieutenant in charge. The following day a battalion of Japanese infantry arrives, and also the Japanese Administrator, Major Takayama, who proceeds to issue a notice to the inhabitants stating that the Port of Niu-chwang is now under the control of the Japanese, and that life and property will be pro-

tected. The infantry battalion is now withdrawn some three miles to Niu-chia-tun, leaving at Niu-chwang only such number of soldiers as is deemed necessary for police purposes.

In the course of the next few days the Japanese succeed in effecting considerable changes at Niu-chwang. Very shortly after their entry the last representative of Russian officialism takes his departure, and the only interest which remains is the Russo-Chinese Bank, as to which a rather curious situation is created. This bank was organised and financed by the Russian Government for the purpose of furthering Russian interests in the Far East, and now has a strong foothold in China and Manchuria. Loans in force in Niu-chwang alone are said to amount to over five millions sterling. The Russians, before leaving, have handed over their interest in the bank to the French Consular Agent, but the appointment of the latter not having been made till after the opening of hostilities, the Japanese now decline to allow him to administer the funds of the bank, and there seems an excellent chance that the latter will fall into the hands of the Japanese as "legitimate spoils of war." A double Nemesis would thus overtake Russia. In the first place, it will seem strange if an institution which has done so much to further Russian interests in the Far East should now, by becoming Japanese property, help to thwart them. Again, it is an instance of poetical justice that Russia, who declined to recognise the United States Consuls appointed to An-tung and Mukden, although they had been appointed before the outbreak of war, should now be confronted by a Japanese refusal to acknowledge her ally's Consular Agent, whose appointment is of later date.

For the rest, the Japanese, as the *Times* correspondent at Peking, who makes a special visit to Niu-chwang, remarks, "step quietly into possession, displaying that wonderful power of controlling the Chinese, and inspiring confidence, which was so marked a feature in their work of occupation at Peking after the Boxer trouble." Large numbers of Japanese traders are now returning, and it is anticipated that the port will "now quickly recover from the effects of Russian domination, with its ruthless squeezing and corruption." At first some annoyance is caused by the publication of an order, signed by Marshal Oyama, to the effect that all neutral ships shall remain away from Niu-chwang, but the restriction is quickly removed, and Ying-kow is thrown open to trade, the importation of contraband of war destined for the Russians being alone forbidden. Major Takayama is shortly succeeded as Administrator by Major Yokura, and the circumstance is made the occasion of a farewell dinner, at which the foreign Consuls and the Commissioner of Customs are present, the assemblage showing that pleasant relations have been established between the new administration and all foreign interests.

On August 1st a Japanese battleship, a cruiser, and three gunboats arrive at Niu-chwang. For some days previously, search has been made in the Liao River for mines, and a number of these engines have been discovered and removed. By the 3rd, a large depôt of army supplies has been established at the burnt Russian railway station under a guard of 2,000 men, and transport and hospital ships were hourly expected.

Thus, quietly and methodically, is effected the Japanese occupation of Niu-chwang, which is a far greater blow to the



THE SEAMY SIDE OF WAR: WOUNDED RUSSIANS RETURNING TO LIAO YANG.

Russians than might have been supposed from the military surroundings of the event. Strategically, it sets a seal upon the Japanese operations in the Liao-tung Peninsula—other than those in the immediate vicinity of Port Arthur—and does so with such completeness that any chance of a Russian recovery in this direction seems utterly and finally hopeless. There is now no link missing in the chain which stretches from the northern shores of the Liao-tung Gulf to the mouth of the Yalu, and south of a line drawn from Ying-kow to An-tung the country—Port Arthur excepted—is as completely under Japanese control as Korea itself, that other great peninsula to the domination of which Japan devoted early and close attention. There is something peculiarly impressive in this fresh instance of Japanese thoroughness, and one cannot but smile at the quiet tenacity with which this result has been achieved in the face of repeated counsels to Japan to hurry her course by making an earlier descent upon Niu-chwang.

For the rest, a great success has been achieved by lowering the prestige of Russia, more especially among the Chinese

It is said that the Chinese have long been confident that the Japanese would have no trouble in occupying Niu-chwang, and that for some time before the actual event a Chinese official was waiting in the neighbourhood to take over the Customs. But the *fait accompli* has always a significance of its own, and when the news of the Battle of Ta-shi-chao and its sequel was known in the tea-shops of Peking, some other sentiments besides those of satisfaction at the success of Japan are likely to have been freely expressed by the Chinese. In the hands of officials like Alexeieff, Russian self-aggrandisement has been too marked, her methods too coarse, and it is not surprising that China is willing to forget the drubbing Japan gave her ten years ago in the pleasure she experiences in seeing a more real enemy humiliated to-day.



A GLIMPSE ON THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY.
(From Foster Fraser's "The Real Siberia.")

CHAPTER XLIII.

RUSSIA'S TREATMENT OF NEUTRAL SHIPPING — THE *MALACCA* INCIDENT — THE DARDANELLES—DOUBTS AND FEARS—THE QUESTION OF CONTRABAND—THE *KNIGHT COMMANDER* AND THE *HIPSANG*.

IN fulfilment of the promise made on page 454, a halt will now be called in the march of warlike events in order to give the sequel of the *Malacca* incident, and to discuss briefly one or two other cases which have arisen out of Russia's treatment of neutral shipping. The question is one of quite extraordinary importance, not only as affecting the chance of foreign interference in the war, but also in its general relation to the subject of the rights and limitations of belligerents. An opportunity may be found later to put the legal aspects of the matter before the readers of this narrative. In the meantime, a plain statement of actual happenings, with, perhaps, a few discursive comments, may serve to recall what, at one time, threatened to be a very grave situation indeed, and what may still prove to have some inconvenient, if not serious, results.

In the brief reference already made to the seizure of the *Malacca*, several details have been omitted which subsequent events have surrounded with some interest. It appears that the examination which took place after the *Malacca* had been boarded by the Russians was conducted by a special set of officers of the Russian Intelligence Department, who were apparently on the *Petcrburg* for this particular purpose. What follows is one of the most disgraceful proceedings ever laid to the charge of what, according to the Russian admission, were duly commissioned naval officers. According to the statement of the Secretary to the P. and O. Company "a number of the ship's people were sent on board the *Petcrburg* to be examined in reference to the nature of the cargo, and were, in fact, offered inducements to give such information as would justify the seizure. . . The Russians thought they had got a rich prize, and were prepared to bribe the officers of the ship in order to assist them towards that consummation." The *Times* supplements this information by details communicated to it by a trustworthy correspondent, who states explicitly that Captain Street, of the *Malacca*, was offered £2,000 as a present for himself if he would say that he had contraband on board. "Of course he indignantly refused. Other European members of his ship's company who were taken on board the Russian ship stated on their return that they, too, had each been spoken to separately, and, in turn, offered money to give evidence that the *Malacca* was carrying contraband."

It is a painful thing to be compelled to record such shameless actions on the part of the accredited representatives of a civilised and, diplomatically speaking, friendly Power. But there is no questioning the evidence of the P. and O. officials in the matter, and any Russian attempt to repudiate a charge so clearly substantiated may be dismissed as futile. The incident, of course, does not materi-

ally affect the main points at issue; but it does materially affect British capacity to place reliance upon the honour of Russian officers in carrying out duties of great delicacy and of grave international concern. Beyond this, the idea of offering a bribe to the captain of the *Malacca* to give false evidence in order to hurt his employers is not without a humorous side, which few of the hundreds of thousands who have come into contact with that peculiarly British institution, the "P. and O.," could fail to appreciate.

As showing the extraordinary elasticity of the Russian notions regarding "contraband of war," it may be mentioned that the Russian officers who boarded the *Malacca* had the assurance to state that any dry biscuits on board the ship, in contradistinction to sweet biscuits, constituted contraband! Such a definition would, of course, condemn every British ship on the seas, and it is amazing that a proposition so childishly ridiculous could ever have been advanced by the responsible officers of a Great Power.

After the seizure of the *Malacca*, the British engineers were turned out of the engine-rooms, Russian engineers taking their places. Before Suez was reached, however, the bearings became heated, and the Russians were obliged to ask the British engineers to set matters right.

While the *Malacca* was being taken to Suez under the flag of the Russian Navy, the feeling in Great Britain on the subject of the seizure had been growing very warm, and if the Government had not clearly indicated that it was taking prompt measures to secure an adjustment of the difficulty a very serious outburst of public indignation would undoubtedly have occurred. As things were, considerable restraint was exhibited, the prompt demonstration on the part of the Mediterranean Fleet of its capacity to deal with any sort of ultimate complication having inspired remarkable confidence.

What passed between the British and Russian Governments on this interesting occasion is a Foreign Office secret not likely to be revealed. But the early upshot was that the Russian Government admitted that a mistake had been made, and instructions were issued for the release of the *Malacca* at the first port she should touch on her journey from Port Said, which, unfortunately, she had already left in charge of her "prize crew" when the settlement was arrived at. In order, presumably, to "save the face" of the Russian Government, the British Government consented to a formal fresh "examination" of the *Malacca*, on the understanding that a British Consular statement to the effect that the explosives on board were Government property would be accepted.

On July 27th the *Malacca* entered the port of Algiers, and the officer commanding the "prize crew," not knowing what had occurred, informed the French naval authority that he required 600 tons of coal and a good supply of water and provisions of all sorts, as he wished to continue his voyage for the Russian port of Libau. The Russian Consul at Algiers now boarded the *Malacca*, and was followed by the British Consul. A conference then took place, at which the Russian captain and a British officer belonging to the *Malacca* assisted. One of the hatches was opened, and the stores carried for the British Government were shown to be duly marked with the broad arrow, the operation lasting only five minutes. The

THE ACTION AT WA-FANG-KAU, OR TELISSU: THE RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS BEFORE THE JAPANESE.

Russian crew was landed, the Russian flag was hauled down, the British flag hoisted afresh, and the *Malacca*, in due course, continued her voyage for her original destinations.

It would be going too far to suggest that this was regarded as an altogether satisfactory termination of the *Malacca* incident. As a matter of fact, there were many who considered the attitude of the British Government in the matter of the seizure itself, apart from other considerations to which attention will be given presently, to be lacking in firmness and self-assertion. It was pointed out that the tearing down of the British flag, before the vessel had been adjudged by a Prize Court to be guilty of carrying contraband, was not in accord with the usual practice, and that in all the circumstances of the case it would have been more consonant with the dignity of Great Britain if the vessel had not been allowed to leave Egyptian territorial waters. On the other hand, it was felt we ought not to bark unless we were prepared to bite, and there was no anxiety to go to war over a question of this sort if any sort of honourable pacific settlement could be arrived at. Accordingly, the news of the release of the *Malacca* was received with general satisfaction, by no means impaired by the reflection that Russia had not been needlessly humiliated in the process of admitting her error.

Unfortunately for the growth of this friendly sentiment, the Russian Admiralty, apparently exasperated at the failure of designs upon the *Malacca*—as to which it is believed that particular instructions had been issued on the strength of special information conveyed by untrustworthy spies, took upon itself to cause the publication in the *Official Messenger* of a so-called statement with reference to the *Malacca*, and the employment of the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, a statement containing at least one inaccuracy. Here is the text of this document :—

"From the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War the Imperial Government took measures to prevent the transport of contraband of war to Japan by vessels of neutral countries. In the regulations sanctioned by the Tsar on February 14th, 1904, which Russia proposed to follow during the War, a list was given of articles regarded by us as contraband of war.

"It was also declared that the military and maritime authorities would reserve to themselves the right of rigidly executing the decision contained in the regulations for naval prizes sanctioned by the Tsar on March 27th, 1895, and in the instructions confirmed by the Council of the Admiralty on September 20th, 1900, regarding the procedure for stopping, visiting, and seizing, as well as for carrying off and delivering over vessels and cargoes seized.

"The vessels *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, of the Volunteer Fleet, having received a special commission, the term of which has already expired, on proceeding to their destinations acted in accordance with the above decisions, and while passing through the Red Sea stopped and visited all suspected vessels which they encountered in those waters.

"It was under these conditions that the commander of the *Peterburg* stopped, among others, the British vessel *Malacca*, the captain of which refused to show the ship's papers relating to the cargo, a refusal which led to the seizure of the vessel, and the decision to send it to Port Alexander III., Libau, with a view to throwing light on the matter.

"Nevertheless, in view of an official statement of the British Government that the *Malacca* was carrying British State cargo, the Imperial Government, acting in agreement with the British Government, decided that a fresh 'visit' should be paid to the seized vessel at the nearest port on its route in presence of a British Consul.

"The 'visit' took place at Algiers. The British Consul-General officially certified that the military stores on board the *Malacca* continued to be the property of the British Government, and that the rest of the cargo was not contraband of war. Taking this attestation into consideration, the Imperial Government decided to liberate the cargo and the vessel.

"This decision must not, however, be interpreted as a renunciation by the Imperial Government of its intention to despatch alike cruisers and warships in general to prevent the carrying of contraband of war for our enemy."

The inaccuracy referred to is the allegation that the *Malacca* was seized because the captain refused to show the ship's papers relating to the cargo. To this statement the P. and O. Company give an absolute contradiction, and the word of the company will certainly carry more weight with Englishmen than that of officials who have attempted to further their strange enterprise by flagrant experiments in corruption.

Again, while the Russian Admiralty is hardly to be blamed for trying to conceal the fact that it has yielded reluctantly to pressure, it is hardly gracious on its part to make the concession of the British Government as to the re-examination of the *Malacca* appear as a surrender of the original position taken up by this country. For the whole point of the British grievance was that the *Malacca* ought never to have been stopped at all by the *Peterburg*, which had no sort of right to pose as a warship after having passed the Dardanelles as a merchantman and flown the Red Cross in the Suez Canal. It will be seen that the Russian official statement avoids any reference to this question. But the remark that the "special commission" given to the *Peterburg* and the *Smolensk* had already expired, is pretty clear evidence that the British Government had spoken with considerable plainness on the subject of the departure of ships of the Volunteer Fleet from the Black Sea as merchantmen with the idea of becoming warships as soon as ever they had passed the Dardanelles.

As far as the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk* are concerned, the question has now been settled. Instructions have been duly issued to those vessels, and they are subsequently reported to be flying once more the Russian mercantile flag. It is further understood that the other Volunteer steamers which are in the Black Sea will not be permitted to play similar pranks to those which have caused so much ill-feeling in the case of the *Malacca*, and, as will be seen, in that of several other neutral ships. Certain assurances are given to the British Government on this point, which the Prime Minister appears to consider satisfactory. At the same time, it is evidently deemed desirable to take no chances, and there is a significant mention in a Russian paper of an incident which takes place about this time in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and which shows that the British Navy is, as usual, keeping its weather eye open. For the Russian steamer *Rossiya*, which arrived at Odessa on the evening of July 29th, appears to

have had an interesting experience. When approaching the Dardanelles she became aware of a very large, powerfully armed British cruiser—probably H.M.S. *Lancaster*, one of our newest ships, of nearly 10,000 tons, and with a speed of twenty-three knots—which was evidently a port of assembly, it is pretty clear that if the next question of the Dardanelles takes in the near future an acute form, this country will not be wholly unprepared with the sort of arguments which experience has shown in such cases to be the most effectual.



SKETCH MAP SHOWING POSITION OF THE RIVAL ARMIES AT THE END OF JULY, 1904.

in the neighbourhood "on business." For on the appearance of the *Rossiya* the big British cruiser steamed round her, and examined her very carefully before allowing her to pass. When it is added that the British Mediterranean Fleet is about to engage in grand manœuvres, and has selected Smyrna as

Before leaving this portion of a subject which must necessarily be treated with some reserve, it seems expedient to say a few words as to the first cause of difficulties which ought never to have arisen between two nations, one of which is most anxious to observe the correctest neutrality, while the other should be



THE SEIZURE OF THE *MALACCA*: A BOAT'S CREW FROM THE VOLUNTEER STEAMER *PETERBURG* ABOUT TO BOARD THE LINER

too preoccupied with her work in the Far East to be looking for trouble nearer home. It has been pointed out that many of the disabilities of Russia at the front have been, if not due to, at any rate, aggravated by, the constant and conflicting intrigues among the immediate surroundings of the Tsar. It now seems that the anti-British influence of the Grand Duke Alexander Michailovitch at the Russian Admiralty is largely responsible for the *Malacca* incident, and for the state of tension as regards the Dardanelles. Throughout the negotiations with the British Government, the Russian Admiralty has taken a stand which is utterly opposed to the more reasonable and pacific counsels of the Russian Foreign Office, and Count Lamsdorff, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has utterly failed in his efforts to persuade the Marine Department to abandon its dangerous policy. Time will show whether from this unfortunate state of affairs a better understanding may be evolved; but it is, historically speaking, strangely interesting that, at such a critical period of the War in the Far East, European complications of the first magnitude should be fostered by the reckless interference of Russian Court animosities with the course of international politics.

It now remains to revert briefly to the doings of the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk* before instructions reached them to resume their mercantile character. On July 24th the German steamer *Scandia*, a Hamburg-American vessel of 4,800 tons burden, arrives at Port Said flying the Russian naval flag, and manned by twenty-eight Russians, including three officers. The *Scandia* is carrying a general cargo and rails for Japan. Instructions having been telegraphed by the Russian Government to Suez and Port Said with reference to captures made by the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, the *Scandia* is released at sundown. The next day a similar procedure takes place in regard to the British steamer *Ardova*, Liverpool-owned, which is bound for Manila with a cargo of coal and explosives, consigned from the United States War Department for the use of the troops in the Philippines. On July 26th another P. and O. vessel, the *Formosa*, arrives at Suez, having been seized and provided with a prize crew by the *Smolensk*. She is released at eight o'clock the next morning. Finally, on July 27th, the German steamer *Holsatia*, which has been seized by the Russian Volunteer steamers, arrives at Suez with a "prize crew" on board, and is at once released. Other captures would, of course, have been made, but by this time the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk* have received their instructions, and their career of questionable usefulness has come to an end. Considerable annoyance has been caused to two great Powers; Russia, at considerable expense to herself, has gained no tangible advantage whatever; and the question of reparation has still to be considered. On the whole, then, the "special commission" given to the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk* can scarcely be described as a radiant success.

On the other hand, the work done by these two ships in a few days is an extraordinarily strong reminder of the possibilities arising out of an unscrupulous exercise of the right of search undoubtedly possessed by belligerents which use genuine warships for the purpose. Had Russia been represented in the Red Sea by real cruisers which had seized the *Malacca* on the ground that she was carrying contraband dry biscuits to

Yokohama, public indignation in this country might not have stopped short of mere protests. For the seizure and possible future confiscation of a valuable British liner on such trumpery pretexts as this would have been construed as a wanton and intolerable attack on British commerce. Yet, in such a case, the illegality complained of in connection with the actual *Malacca* incident would have largely disappeared. The imperative necessity, then, for some valid international agreement as to what is and is not contraband, is emphasised in a very marked manner by the performance of the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*.

Again, the general inconvenience to the world's carrying trade, which can be caused even by a second-rate naval Power, provided it happens to be a belligerent, has seldom, if ever, been so sharply demonstrated as in this case. Russia herself, at the moment of the *Malacca* and *Scandia* seizures, was hardly in a position to assume a dictatorial attitude at sea towards Germany; while it may safely be assumed that a collision between the British and Russian Navies would not have been a very comfortable proceeding for the latter. Yet if, instead of the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk*, Russia were now to send a couple of destroyers with a few colliers into the Red Sea, she might contrive to stop British and German liners, and subject them to an inconvenient delay, without incurring the least risk of reprisals. Germany, doubtless, can make—it is suggested that she has made—arrangements with Russia which will insure her against a repetition of what has occurred. But if anti-British sentiments are to be fostered in Russia by those who have the ear of the Tsar, there is grave danger lest the "right of search" may still be used in such a manner as to cause this country something more than passing annoyance. Considerable anxiety on the subject is manifested in England in the early part of August, for it is felt that, in certain contingencies, a pitch of exasperation might be reached, in which the consciousness of superior naval power might produce some very awkward developments.

The irritation and uncertainty arising from the *Peterburg* and *Smolensk* episode are naturally intensified by what has occurred in the Far East in regard to Russia's treatment of neutral shipping. Of several cases which have arisen, those which concern this country most are the sinking of the *Knight Commander* and the *Hipsang*, and the capture of the *Allanton*. In the matter of the last-named, there is an appeal to St. Petersburg; but the very arbitrary manner in which the case appears to have been dealt with in the Vladivostok Prize Court has produced strong doubts of the impartiality of that tribunal, and its competence to adjudicate on matters in which British shipping interests are so closely concerned. It is felt that here, again, the fact that Russia has declared a quantity of articles to be contraband of war which are not recognised as contraband by other nations, puts even absolutely innocent traders at a complete disadvantage. It may be mentioned that even cotton appears in the Russian list, and the possibility that a valuable ship laden with cotton may be captured by the valiant Vladivostok cruisers, taken to Vladivostok, and legally confiscated, is naturally regarded with dismay by the English shipping community. So general is the feeling of apprehension created by the uncertainty as to the further lengths to which Russia may go in her inter-

pretation of the term contraband, that at the beginning of August the P. and O. gives formal notice of the discontinuance of its service to Japan.



THE GERMAN SS. *SCANDIA*, STOPPED IN THE RED SEA.

The sinking of the *Knight Commander* has already been described, and it only remains, at any rate, for the present, to record the fact that, as might have been expected, the Vladivostok Prize Court upholds the act as a perfectly correct and proper proceeding. But the matter is not likely to remain here, and it is almost needless to add that, if it were to do so, a precedent would be established which in future wars might operate with deadly effect against other shipping besides that of Great Britain. An interesting point in connection with the sinking of the *Knight Commander* is that she was sent to the bottom because she was carrying railway material to a Japanese port. It will be remembered that among the ships stopped by the Volunteer steamers in the Red Sea was the *Scandia*, which was released at Suez upon a formal declaration that she had no contraband on board. Yet it is definitely stated by the *National Zeitung*, of Berlin, on the authority of information from Essen, the centre of the great Krupp factories, that the *Scandia* was carrying 400 tons of grooved rails, consigned to Japan. This fact must have been known to the Russians, who, nevertheless, accepted the German assurance that the *Scandia* carried no contraband. Yet a British steamer carrying rails, and encountered by Russian warships, is held to have been caught so completely *in flagrante delicto* as to justify the latter in dispensing with even the small formality of a Russian Prize Court examination.

The cases which have arisen out of the action of the Vladivostok Squadron are viewed with the greater bitterness in this country because, had the Vladivostok Squadron been engaged in its proper business, that of fighting, they would

probably have never occurred. There is something extremely repugnant to British notions of fair and square warfare that powerful ships, which turn tail the moment they sight even far less heavily armed vessels of the enemy, should so deliberately go about the business of destroying neutral shipping on what seems sometimes the most frivolous pretexts.

The sinking of the British ship *Hipsang*, belonging to the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company, is not on all fours with that of the *Knight Commander*, and, on the facts as originally reported, it was doubtful whether any outrage had been committed. The Russian authorities had issued very clear, and apparently not unreasonable, instructions as to the passage of neutral shipping within a certain distance of the coast defences of Port Arthur, and the Russian statement is to the effect that the *Hipsang*, which carried three Europeans and eighteen Chinamen, passed Pigeon Bay early on the morning of July 16th. The forts are said to have fired four shots across the *Hipsang's* bows, but Captain Bradley, the commander, refused to stop, whereupon a torpedo-boat ran out and sank the vessel. The Chinese rushed the boats, and the Europeans had to save themselves by swimming, and were finally rescued by the Russian torpedo-boat. The captain and crew were all kept in custody until August 2nd, when they were ordered to leave Port Arthur in a junk, which was provided for them. They were given no provisions, but, happily, fell in with a German steamer, which took them on board and landed them at Chifu.

It is only fair to Russia to state that at least one incident has occurred in which a praiseworthy readiness has been exhibited to act in compliance with the international laws respecting neutral shipping. In the early stages of the War a Liverpool steamer, the *Foxton Hall*, was detained at Port Arthur, and the owners lodged a claim for loss



THE SS. *KNIGHT COMMANDER*, SUNK BY THE VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON.

and damage. Early in August it was announced that the Russian Government had duly paid compensation in this case, and frank gratification was expressed throughout the local shipping community at what was regarded as a speedy and favourable settlement of the claim.

But one swallow does not make a summer, and there is no question that a most serious outcome of the first six months of the Russo-Japanese War has been the feeling excited by the seizures and sinking of neutral shipping by the Russians. Nor has the feeling been confined to British shipowners. In the case of Germany, as already hinted, certain considerations of policy may have prevented the same display of resentment as marked the receipt in this country of the news of the seizure of the *Malacca* and the sinking of the *Knight Commander*. But even in Germany there has been plain speaking as to the confiscation of the mails on board the *Prinz Heinrich* (see page 454), and the sinking of the *Thea*, in the course of the last cruise of the Vladivostok Squadron. In referring to the latter, a Hamburg journal describes Admiral Jessen's proceedings as a "ludicrous anachronism," and a survival of the "robber romances of the middle ages," for which Russia will have to pay a heavy price. Nor are the United States at all disposed to acquiesce tamely in the high-handed exercise by the Russians of their right of search. Had not the *Ardova*, which was carrying U.S. Government stores to Manila, been at once released, it is understood that prompt action would have been taken at Washington, and it is clear that the whole situation as regards the treatment of neutral shipping by the belligerents is being watched throughout America with the closest attention. The United States, it should be observed, are interested in the case of the *Knight Commander*, the cargo of which was of American origin, but in this instance the authorities at Washington have been glad to allow the British Government to take the necessary action on behalf of both owners and consignees.

It must not be supposed that Japan has been any more backward than Russia in asserting her right of search when occasion has seemed to render stoppage and search desirable. On July 8th, the British steamer *Hsiping*, belonging to the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company, is said to have been not only searched, but captured by the Japanese, on the ground that she was laden with contraband of war. But, in the first place, the Japanese have other work for their warships than the administering of pin-pricks to foreign Powers; in the second, they carry out the ungracious task of search with courtesy and discretion; and, thirdly, their Prize Courts at Yokosuka and Sasebo are conducted with conspicuous fairness, and in the strictest accordance with modern international usage. Even in such favourable conditions, grievances no doubt arise, but they are insignificant compared with those inspired by Russia's blunt indifference to the most ordinary principles of equity, as accepted by the vast majority of civilised communities.

CHAPTER XLIV.

JAPAN'S STRATEGY—CAUTIOUS COUNSELS—DAREDEVIL HEROISM—NAN-SHAN, TELISSU, HSIHOYEN—NAVAL POLICY—PREPAREDNESS—A MIGHTY ARSENAL—NAVAL CADET COLLEGE—HOSPITALS—DOMESTIC SACRIFICES.

NEARLY six months of hard and almost continuous fighting have brought the Japanese to a second great turning-point in the history of their operations against Russia. The first was reached, as was explained in Chapter XXVI., about the end of the third week in May, by which date the Japanese First Army had driven the Russians back from the Yalu and advanced to Feng-hwang-cheng; the Second Army had been landed in the Liao-tung Peninsula, and a third force at Takushan; and Admiral Togo, if he had not succeeded in completely blocking Port Arthur, had, at any rate, reduced the Russian Fleet in that harbour to comparative inactivity. At the close of the third week in May a second phase of the War was commenced, which may be said to have lasted up to about July 30th, and to this period belong General Oku's successes at Nan-shan, Telissu, and Ta-shi-chao; the commencement of the siege operations against Port Arthur; and the capture and occupation of the Motien-ling and other passes by the First Army and the Takushan force. The interval includes, of course, numerous other episodes from the Russian and international standpoints; but these are the big events as far as Japan is concerned, and it is important to understand the nature of the situation they have helped to create before seeking to enter a third phase in which some wholly different conditions are involved.

What we have to remember is that, up to July 30th, we are still in the stage of, if not preliminary action, at any rate of preparatory effort, as regards Japan's great scheme of offensive strategy. Very patient, very thorough, have been Japan's naval and military counsellors in their method of tackling the innumerable details connected with the groundwork of their plan. But it is quite clear that they themselves are under no illusions as to the risks they run by trying to secure a decisive, far-reaching, and lasting triumph, instead of making an heroic attempt to bring matters to a swift issue by a *coup-de-main*. It is not too much to say that up to July 30th a single marked Russian success by land or sea would have caused the Japanese an amount of added labour altogether out of proportion to the actual loss or damage sustained. The case is rather similar to that of a fine piece of machinery, the various parts of which have to be produced separately in different workshops before they come to be finally "assembled" into the complete engine, or whatever else it is that is under construction. It may happen that an injury to some small part prior to assembling may cause a delay more vexatious and more costly than would be a comparatively serious accident to the completed machine.

The fact that the Japanese have fully grasped this significant truth is reflected in the extreme caution they have dis-

played throughout this second phase of their operations. There has been no lack of dash and heroism, but the strong feature of this period is the keen desire evinced by the Japanese not to leave undone anything which may serve to minimise the chance not of present but of future disaster. Judged by some standards they may at times have seemed almost unduly and unnecessarily prudent. But nothing succeeds like success, and when in the closing days of July we find the Japanese armies in splendid readiness for their first really concerted movement; when we remember that a cordon has been drawn round Port Arthur which must surely render the ultimate capture of that stronghold a mere matter of time and needful sacrifice; when to these considerations we add the well-nigh unimpaired fighting capacity of Admiral Togo's fleet, Japan's conduct of the business of war seems to exhibit some impressive advantages. Nor ought the consummate discretion which Japan has displayed, more especially throughout June and July, to lessen the interest with which we may well study lessons in practical warfare transcending in several important respects even those to be learnt from the tremendous struggle of 1870-71.

The anxiety felt by the Japanese themselves during the second phase of the War must have been very great, judging from various signs collected from a number of different sources. It is true that, outwardly speaking, there was a singular absence of anything like demonstrative feeling both among the troops at the front and at the leading Japanese towns. Dr. George Morrison, the famous Peking Correspondent of the *Times*, was in Japan during the first three weeks of June, and had an opportunity of witnessing the reception by the Japanese people of the news of the victories in the Liaotung Peninsula and of the disasters to the transports. "Nothing," he says, "could be more striking than the equanimity with which the news of victory and disaster alike was received." He comments, too, on the fact that the Japanese official communications reflect the self-restraint of the people in their singular freedom from vainglory and arrogant boasting. But another correspondent of the same paper, alluding to previous mishaps, says somewhat significantly, "To all outward appearances it would seem that the Japanese have felt their losses very slightly. Naval officers will talk to you of the end of their comrades in the *Hatsuse* and *Yoshino* with a smile; in short, they will converse of the death of their men in a spirit which strikes us of the West as uncanny and devoid of feeling. But I am inclined to think that the loss of the *Yoshino* and *Hatsuse* on the same day really made a great impression upon the Navy, and it almost confirms me in the view which has constantly arrived at the back of my mind, 'that it is only in success that we know the Japanese.'"

It will be recalled in this connection that, when Admiral Kamimura failed to overtake the Vladivostok Squadron after its exploits in the Shimonoseki Straits, the Japanese were distinctly disheartened by his want of luck, and that in some quarters it was even suggested that by way of expiating his failure he should commit suicide. On the other hand, it will be admitted that even such losses as those sustained at Nan-shan were regarded with complete equanimity in consideration of the success which accompanied them.

It seems a little difficult to reconcile

A MÊLÉE IN A THUNDERSTORM: COMBAT BETWEEN COSSACKS AND JAPANESE CAVALRY AT THE BATTLE OF TELISSU.

these somewhat conflicting views of the Japanese attitude, but it is rather easier to do so when we take into account the nature of the incidents in question, and the effect which each had upon this second phase of the War with which we are dealing. Even among the less educated classes in Japan there seems to be a fairly accurate notion of what is really a serious blow to the country's fighting power, as compared with what comes under the category of eggs that have to be broken in order to make an omelette. But, even if we put all exhibitions of personal feeling on one side, we find in the whole conduct of the Japanese warlike operations throughout June and July something which seems to indicate an almost nervous anxiety not to make mistakes. No doubt this is partially due to the desire not to let one movement get too far ahead before its corresponding movement in some other part of the theatre of war is also well advanced. But there is little doubt that, after the Battles of Telissu and Ta-shi-chao, there was a hesitancy due to elaborate caution which, however justifiable in a weak army, is not always so praiseworthy in a strong one. The redeeming feature is that the end was duly reached, and that what had to be done was done without counting the cost in men, at any rate. But the history of warfare affords no plainer example than this of the occasional disabilities which a very elaborate plan of operations may impose upon generals seeking rather to carry out their appointed tasks than to display the initiative and capacity for following up a success, which are the attributes of the highest form of leadership.

It will probably be necessary later to return to these and similar strategical considerations. Meanwhile, as a set-off to what has been said above concerning Japanese military caution, let us revert to the Nan-shan battle, which was described in Chapter XXVIII. by the light of the earlier despatches, but of which some interesting additional details have been furnished, more especially by the *Times* Special Correspondent above quoted, presumably Mr. Lionel James, who acted in a similar capacity for the leading journal in South Africa, and has otherwise a notable record of service. Here is his account of the actual storming of the Russian position, an account which both supplements and confirms that compiled by the present writer :—

"The right wing of Oku's Army occupied Kin-chau early on the 27th (June), and meanwhile the gunboats, preceded by a flotilla of torpedo craft, slowly felt their way into Kin-chau Bay to a nearer range than they had occupied on the preceding day. They had to advance with extreme caution, as there was every reason to apprehend that the Bay was mined. General Oku allowed his men but a brief respite after the leading division had captured Kin-chau. His field artillery was massed on the lower spurs of Mount Sampson and in the plain south-east of Kin-chau, and the fire concentrated on the two Russian works between which the railway passes. But a far more deadly preparation was in store for the Russians. By continuous sounding the gunboats had been able to work right round past the left rear of the foremost Russian works, and to open a searching shell-fire upon the defences they thus unmasked. The little torpedo craft also, creeping in to an annihilating range, filled the reverse of the Russian works with rapid fire from their spiteful six-pounders. The inferno of shell fire can well be imagined. But it was not

yet a one-sided struggle, and from dawn till dark the Russian, grim and dogged, held his own. And what a mark the Russian gunners had! It is doubtful, with perhaps the exception of Omdurman, whether gunners ever had an easier target than was given to the Russians that day. Out in the blue bay the black hulls of the gunboats, and on the isthmus three divisions—that is, between 30,000 and 40,000 men—were moving southwards across the narrow span. Forty thousand men massed over six square miles, for Kin-chau is only four miles from the summit of the Russian position and is under two miles across. So narrow is it that the stress of the advancing Japanese front pressed the flank battalions into the sea, so that men with their rifles held horizontally on their shoulders were wading chest deep in the water. Two peaks and a rib of hill rise athwart the Kin-chau isthmus. This was the sole cover afforded to the Japanese Army. Behind this the leading division massed. About noon, according to the evidence of the officers of the gunboats, two half-battalions of the 1st Regiment of Infantry debouched from the cover of the peaks, and the fire of the supporting artillery redoubled. It was to be an attempt to carry the nearest Russian work with the bayonet. Fifteen hundred yards had to be crossed, eight hundred down a slope to the deceptive cover of a miserable fishing village, and then a final seven hundred, the gentle upward slope of the Russian glacis. Down the slope the line of the glistening bayonets swept. Then there crashed the dreaded roll of small-arm fire. The Russian infantry had been waiting for the assault. Scourged, decimated, disordered, the forlorn hope reached the treacherous cover of the village. A moment to breathe, and to enable the officers to pick the line of advance, and then a brief struggle to win a way up the glacis. A gallant effort, a few brave souls butchered in the toils of the wire entanglements, and the forlorn hope had failed—had been annihilated, except for the paltry few who found safety amongst the crumbling walls of the fishing village. As the assaulting column melted away, the artillery preparation reopened with increased energy. And thus the afternoon passed into evening. Between the lulls in the preparation other desperate assaults were attempted. But, though the field artillery gave respite to the Russian defenders, the ships had no mercy for them. One by one the vulnerable points in the line were searched out and rendered untenable. There is a limit to the amount of punishment that the best troops can sustain if the attack is from the rear as well as from the front. That limit will be reached much sooner if the troops have already suffered bombardment, as had the Russians in Port Arthur. Just before nightfall the limit came. A heavier assaulting force from the 4th Division found that it could face the diminished fire of the defenders. It struggled up to the entanglements and the abattis. Fresh lines of gleaming bayonets joined. The chafing columns of infantry behind it were let loose. The great shout which precedes victory broke out from ten thousand throats, and in a great glittering wave the bayonets were into the nearest work. It was all over. The Russians broke and fled. The Kin-chau heights were won."

Of the countless acts of personal devotion and gallantry which must have occurred during the Battle of Nan-shan, one highly typical is related by the Tokio Correspondent of the *Daily Express*.

"In one of the charges on the enemy's entrenchments the 1st Regiment of Infantry suffered very severely. The Commanding Officer, Colonel Ohara, fell with a severe wound in his forehead. He struggled up to encourage his men, but was too weak to stand. On seeing him again fall, two privates ran forward to his aid and tried to persuade him to retire, at the same time protecting him from further injury. The officer refused to leave the field, however, and the privates, seeing that persuasion was hopeless, hastily threw up a trench, amid a hail of the enemy's shot, and laid their commander in it."

Another action as to which some interesting additional information is now available is the Battle of Telissu (see Chapter XXXI.), which was fought on June 15th. A Vienna Correspondent quotes some telling extracts from a letter written by a Russian doctor a week after the battle was fought, in which particular stress is laid on the terrific fire of the Japanese artillery. Incidentally it is explained how the Japanese came to be accused, as they afterwards were, of firing on the Red Cross. "As the fire was increasing in intensity a communication reached the hospital, which had established itself in a small wood to the rear of the Russian position, that there were many wounded in the firing line. Three hospital wagons with Red Cross attendants and two doctors at once started and came under fire as they drove to the front. A horse was shot and shrapnel shells burst all round the wagons. 'See,' writes the doctor, 'that is how the stories originate that the Japanese fire on the Red Cross. The Red Cross acts imprudently and the blame is thrown on the Japanese.' The writer adds that the wounded soldiers as they were brought in constantly ejaculated: 'This is no battle, it is a hell.'

"General Stackelberg went from position to position, but the Japanese fire increased in intensity, until the Russians seemed to be confronted by an overwhelming force. The Russian strength was 35,000 men. At seven in the evening the Russians asked for a truce to bury their dead and tend their wounded. The Japanese consented, so that the Russian dead and wounded were brought in undisturbed. Early next day the Japanese opened fire again, while their infantry stormed hill after hill, the rapidity of their movements being marvellous. At one o'clock General Gerngross made a counter attack to cover the retreat of the right wing, but soon the whole Russian Army was in flight, while the Japanese shot better and more quickly than ever and silenced one battery after another. The Russians lost nine guns, some of which there was not even time to spike, and were compelled to abandon six guns which the doctor alleges that they had captured."

The only other engagement to which we can usefully recur in this chapter by way of filling in unavoidable gaps due to imperfect information is, perhaps, that which led to the capture of Hsihoyen by the right column of General Kuroki's Army on July 19th. An attempt has been made to do justice to this remarkably brisk bit of fighting in Chapter XL., and details received later do not substantially alter the impression then formed of the general course of the action and its outcome. But it appears that a special interest is attached to the fighting at Hsihoyen by reason of the extended formations used by the Japanese with very satisfactory results. It has been pointed out how at Kiu-lien-cheng,

Nan-shan, and on one or two other occasions, the Japanese used the close German formation for the attack, and suffered serious losses accordingly. The view underlying the use of the close formation is that, increased casualties notwithstanding, a more decisive result is likely to be attained by the greater cohesion and momentum which is afforded at the "time of impact." It is most interesting that, after several important but dearly-won successes with the system advocated by German experts in particular, the Japanese should have made a trial—and it would seem a very encouraging trial—of the looser method of which the British Army in South Africa was repeatedly the exponent. Such an example is not only gratifying to ourselves as confirming the practical experiences which we have naturally hesitated to sacrifice to German theories. It also gives an excellent idea of the restless anxiety of the Japanese to go ahead in all that relates to the conduct of war, and not to be content with systems



FIGHTING THEIR BATTLES OVER AGAIN: A STREET SCENE IN HIROSHIMA, JAPAN.

merely because they are successful, if the adoption of those systems is found to mean extravagant sacrifices.

But in general, as one attempts to examine closely the individual operations of this remarkable War, one is brought back to the same starting-point, namely, that the Japanese success is first and chiefly due, not to caution, not to heroism, not to a sagacious willingness to learn fresh lessons in the course of the War itself, but to utter and complete readiness. Of this so many military examples have been given that more are scarcely needed—at any rate for the present. But since the second phase of the War has commenced some very striking explanations have been made of the naval preparedness of Japan, and to these it is now not only expedient but highly appropriate to devote attention. The months of June and July have not, it is true, been particularly fruitful in Japanese naval successes. But we are on the eve of great naval happenings, and it is fortunate that, before bringing to a close the record of the past six months of war on land and sea, we have been afforded a really useful glimpse into the true inwardness of Japanese naval as well as military efficiency.

First, a reference must be made to an article of altogether extraordinary interest and importance which appeared in the *Times* of June 18th, and in which the Tokio Correspondent of the paper gave as closely as he could remember the words used to him one evening in May by Captain Arima, the officer who commanded the first and second blocking operations at Port Arthur. After alluding to the signal progress made by the Japanese Navy in 1903, Captain Arima remarks :—"We model ourselves nautically upon England, of course, and we are very conscious of the benefit we derive from doing so. Yet the growth to which I allude was in some measure due to departing from English traditions. It was at the close of 1902 or the beginning of 1903 that we recognised the imminence of a crisis such as must tax all our naval and military capacities to the utmost; recognised that if our Navy was to do the country real service it must at once learn how to fight. You will say, doubtless, that a Navy has no other business at any time. Yes ; but what I mean is that the drills and evolutions laid down for Navies in time of peace are not adapted sufficiently to the conditions likely to exist in time of war. We set ourselves to devise a programme such that men following it closely in tranquil days would not be embarrassed by startling novel circumstances in the hour of conflict. I cannot enter into details, but I may say that before this War broke out we had already passed through most of the unpleasant experiences incidental to manœuvring in the face of an enemy. The work that has to be done by torpedo squadrons operating at night without lights was not strange to us. We had learned its difficulties and—at some cost—its dangers."

Captain Arima goes on to speak of the Japanese naval artillery. "We had learned," he says, "the potency of guns fired with full charges ; and our men, observing the efficiency of the Ijuin fuse and the destructive force of the Shimose explosive, had acquired confidence in their ability to meet any enemy. With such weapons as modern science supplies nothing is needed except accurate handling. If an officer gives his gun detachment the right range, trained men may be trusted to hit the target nine

times out of every ten. Practice had convinced us of that months before the war broke out; and though it is a hard thing to judge chances of distance correctly when the gun platform is moving at a speed of eleven or seventeen knots, our conviction is that, the range once found, an officer ought never to lose it because of a calculable alteration in his own position."

The Japanese had also laboured to equip their squadrons with all appliances likely to be needed for repairing on the spot injuries received at an enemy's hands. It is a remarkable fact in this connection that during the first three months of the War not a single Japanese ship, not even a torpedo-boat, was compelled to return to harbour for docking purposes, although it is well known that on more than one occasion a certain amount of damage was sustained.

CAPTAIN ARIMA.

"As to our general strategy," Captain Arima remarks, "it has been largely guided by the consideration that our Navy is not elastic. Whatever resources we take into the fight must suffice us until the finish. Our first thought, therefore, was to expose our squadrons to a minimum of danger so long as their destructive potency was not thereby impaired. We have not courted conflicts at close ranges. We have avoided them, preferring to utilise to the full the immense potentialities of modern cannon. Hence our frequent employment of high-angle fire. When the *Nisshin* and the *Kasuga* opened their career in Pigeon Bay they fired up to a range of 12,000 metres and their shells were effective. It is not our experience that this high-angle fire is specially severe on a gun. Besides, we have no lack of guns. But the gun-platform suffers. All things considered, however, the advantages appear greatly to outweigh the disadvantages."

Such a statement of naval policy is, of course, rendered many times more impressive by the subsequent record of the actual performances of the Japanese Navy, performances of which as yet we have had a foretaste only. But even as a bare statement Captain Arima's quietly confident remarks cannot fail to convey the idea of extraordinary thoroughness, and of that deadly form of earnest enthusiasm which of itself is such a long step towards the equalisation of apparently long odds.

We may now turn for fresh information to the records of the remarkable tour which, as mentioned on page 388, is being carried out at the invitation of the Japanese Government by the Foreign Naval Attachés and Correspondents, and some prominent members of the Japanese Diet, on the *Manchu Maru*. It will be remembered that this vessel left Yokosuka on June 12th. Yokosuka itself is an interesting place, and is

regarded affectionately by the older Japanese officers as the cradle of their Fleet. It has three dry docks, the largest 450 feet long, with one still longer in course of construction. Small cruisers, too, can be built here, and one has been recently launched, a third-class ship, every detail of which, guns and machinery, is of Japanese manufacture. But Yokosuka dwindles into insignificance when compared with the famous arsenal at Kure, off which the *Manchu Maru* anchored on the fourth day from the commencement of her cruise.

Kure lies in a bight among the mountains, and the sudden transition from the delicate scenery of the islands of the Inland Sea to the smoke and noise of the Japanese Pittsburg is remarked by all the favoured visitors on this interesting occasion. But considerations of the picturesque soon give way to more practical reflections as the wonders of this hitherto well-guarded storehouse of warlike secrets are revealed to admiring eyes. Here in the most truly concrete form is exemplified Japan's naval readiness for war in all that relates to material. It is, too, curiously typical of the Island Nation that even this knock-down evidence of her up-to-dateness has been withheld until much of the astonishment which it would otherwise have created has been forestalled by actual proof in other quarters.

From various accounts the following passages in a letter from the Special Correspondent of the *Standard* may be selected as indicating some of the most pointed lessons which the growth in fifteen years of this great arsenal conveys to Europe :—

"Kure is a fine example of the progress made by Japan during the last few years. It is essentially Japanese; you will not find a European in all the numerous workshops. Whether it be an armour plate which is being moulded into shape, or an 8-in. gun, it has been designed, cast, and completed, in every detail, under the supervision of Japanese engineers and constructors. Western people, who imagine that Japan has still a great deal to learn from their higher civilisation, would have their eyes opened by a visit to Kure. The fact is that the Japanese have learnt their lesson so well that they bid fair to excel their tutors in their own special studies. With what legitimate pride does the head of a large firm in Sheffield or at Armstrong's show his visitors the process of making an armour-plate, or the casting of a big gun, as something not to be seen anywhere else in the world. Yet out in the Orient, 15,000 miles from England, amidst the most beautiful surroundings, they are doing exactly the same thing on just as large a scale. And all this by a nation whose modern history dates back thirty years. It means that the finest fighting race in the world, with the most abundant supply of cheap labour of any nation, are determined to cry "Halt" to the progress of the European in the Far East. "The Orient for the Oriental"—that will be the motto of Japanese statesmen during the next generation; and whether it be by force, or whether it be by commercial supremacy—which is the more likely and also the more effective course, and one best suited to the needs of Japan—European nations will find themselves gradually driven back.

"Surely no other people take such a conscientious interest in their work as the Japanese. The labourers are contented with their lot and are happy; you never see a sullen face such as is only too



HUMAN BIRDS OF PREY: CHINESE BANDITS ROBBING THE DEAD.

common among English and Continental workmen. Trade Unions are unknown, pay is small, and work is hard ; but what does that matter if their country is to benefit by their labours? There are no private interests in Japan at the present time ; all are content to work for the common weal. The humble coolie driving a nail into the plate of a torpedo-boat does not lose interest in the nail as soon as it is driven home ; he follows each movement of the boat in the little sheets on which the latest war news is distributed, and when she sinks a battle-ship he goes to his friends and proudly tells them that he has contributed towards the achievement. That is the spirit of the Japanese nation, and that is the spirit which will make them the paramount Power, without a rival, in Eastern Asia. One engineer told me that he had spent ten years in England amid dockyards and furnaces in order to study his profession. During the whole of this time he never returned to his country, and saw nothing of his family or friends. The Government paid for his education, and now he is paying back the Government."

The passengers of the *Manchu Maru* were personally conducted over the immense Kure workshops by Admiral Yamanouchi, "to whose enthusiasm and long residence in England is due the perfection of the Kure plant." Some secrets, more especially those relating to the manufacture of the Japanese powder and explosives, were politely withheld, but even from a brief inspection it was easy to ascertain many significant facts. The Arsenal employs 15,000 men with 2,500 recruits and coolies in addition, and big guns and shells are being turned out in quantities amply sufficient for Japan's purposes. The guns are fitted with a new endless screw mechanism which is a Japanese invention, and the Japanese claim that their naval ordnance is power for power the lightest and simplest in existence. Mines and torpedoes are made at Kure, and some startling exhibitions were given with the latter. A detail which appears to have greatly impressed the correspondents was the training of engineer and stoker recruits, the latter being busily and quite enthusiastically engaged in shovelling stones into wooden coops, which they emptied and filled repeatedly by way of practice in stoking.

The ship-building and repairing operations were, of course, carefully scrutinised, and presented several points of great interest. Only a single torpedo-boat, the *Aotaka*, the identical boat which torpedoed the *Retvisan* on the night of February 8th, was under repair. For months the only refitting done at Kure had been to the cruiser *Kasuga*, which, when she rammed the *Yoshino*, sustained slight damage. At the time of the *Manchu Maru's* visit a first-class torpedo-boat and two destroyers were under construction. But Japan has much higher aims in view. Admiral Yamanouchi declares that by next January the armour-plate mill, supplied with 10,000 horse-power and trip hammers up to 8,000 tons power, will be completed, and two battleships of 14,000 tons each will be begun for complete construction in Japan!

There is no doubt that the publication in the leading journals of Europe of details concerning the great Japanese Arsenal at Kure created a notable impression. Most Europeans, with the possible exception of the Russian peasantry and other similarly benighted communities, must have been aware of the existence of Japanese home establish-

ments for the production of war material, but even to experts the revelation of the actual facts must have come as a surprise. In fifteen short years to have not only instituted an Arsenal of such magnitude, but to have kept it up to such a high standard of completeness, efficiency, and modernity, is in its way a more remarkable achievement than the creation of a first-class Navy with imported ships. The ease with which Japan can supply all her possible requirements in the way of guns and ammunition is a factor of extraordinary importance in the prosecution of such a war as that upon which she is now engaged. The statement that at a pinch twenty torpedo-boats can be turned out complete at Kure in a month gains added weight from the unrivalled record which the Japanese Navy has established in the actual use of these destructive crafts. But with many these reflections, serious as they are, must be temporarily thrown into shade by the dazzling contingencies of a future in which Japan will no longer be compelled to base her naval strategy on the fact that her existing Fleet is inelastic. When the keel of Japan's first battleship is laid at Kure a new chapter in the annals of the world will be commenced, and we may be sure that the Island Nation of the Far East will not be backward in filling that chapter with brisk incident and progressive history.

Before we leave the *Manchu Maru*—to return to it possibly at a later date—a few words must be given to another institution which its passengers were privileged to visit in the early days of their deeply instructive tour. This was the Naval College for Cadets at Edajima, where all the officers of the Japanese Navy are trained with the exception of the engineers, who receive a special education at Yokosuka. There are about 600 cadets always in residence at Edajima, this total being distributed into three divisions according to the number of terms served. Some idea of the keen competition for cadetships may be gathered from the fact that for the next examination, when less than 200 vacancies will be offered, more than 5,000 candidates have entered. The age of candidates is sixteen, and when the competitive test is passed a most rigorous medical examination has to be faced. But when this ordeal is over "the cadet ceases to be the child of his parents, and becomes the child of the Government, which feeds him, clothes him, and educates him, not one single item of expense falling on his parents." The course lasts for three years, after which the cadet cruises for a year in one of the training-ships—often visiting England and America. It is an interesting circumstance that among the forty odd instructors at the College there is an Englishman who is present for the express purpose of teaching the English language.

The training at the College is intensely practical, the central idea being that the cadet should know more especially his gunnery and torpedo work before he joins his ship. The model room at the Edajima is said to have greatly impressed the foreign Naval Attachés; it includes among other fine pieces of work a magnificent model of a first-class Japanese battleship, over forty feet long, and complete in every detail. There is also a wooden erection on the drill ground representing exactly the deck of a modern battleship, the guns on the starboard side of which look out on the bay, and so can be trained for practice purposes on any passing vessel.

As for sports and pastimes, here is an extract from the *Standard* Correspondent's letter, which gives a vivid idea of the extent to which the hardening process is applied to officers of the Japanese Navy :—

NURSES IN TOKIO.

"By way of ending the day's work the six hundred naval students indulged in an amusement, if it can be described as such, peculiarly Japanese. It so astounded all the foreigners who were looking on that for a long time it seemed almost impossible to believe that this was a recognised part of their training. We saw the quiet students of two hours previous converted into a horde of yelling, fighting savages, attacking one another with a fury which threatened destruction to all, kicking, shoving, and hitting with closed fists wherever a face appeared amid the dense mass of struggling, yelling humanity. There are two sides of about three hundred men in each. One side, the defending one, has a pole stuck in the ground, round which the defenders gather in a dense ring. A bugle is then blown, and the attacking party, with an awful yell, which when once heard can never be forgotten, charge at full speed on the devoted circle round the staff. The two sides meet with such violence that the first three or four ranks are thrown down and trampled on by those coming behind, whose object is to capture the pole. The combatants mount upon each other's heads, fighting with the greatest courage and desperation. When the pole is borne down the fight

is over, and all seem to be perfectly good friends again. The injured covered the ground after the fight we witnessed, but only one man was attended by the surgeon, and the rest were able to limp off the field."

From these striking evidences of the fashion in which, both as regards *personnel* and material, Japan has been, and is still, preparing for war, we may now turn to other aspects in which this extraordinary nation presents examples that Western civilisation would find difficulty in improving upon. Attention has already been drawn to the excellence of the Japanese Army Medical system as regards actual service in the field. It now remains to make a brief allusion to the beautifully managed Army Hospitals at Hiroshima, whither all the wounded soldiers are brought as rapidly as possible from the front in two Red Cross and four Army Hospital steamers, which are kept pretty constantly running for this humane purpose. There are at Hiroshima four hospitals, the Staff and three Branches. Except in serious cases, only first aid is given, says the *Standard* Correspondent, to the wounded on the field, and they are then despatched first to the Staff Hospital, where the very severe cases are kept, the lighter cases and convalescents being sent on to the No. 1 and No. 2 Branches, while the No. 3 Branch is kept for sick soldiers. As soon as the wounded are well enough they are sent from Hiroshima to hospitals in different parts of the country, and to the homes of the men. The largest of the head-

THE PRICE OF VICTORY: JAPANESE WOUNDED SOLDIERS ENTERING TOKIO.

quarters hospitals is No. 1 Branch, where the Principal Medical Officer has under him a staff of 370, of whom 28 are doctors and 50 nurses. The smallest hospital of the four is the Staff, but the buildings are of a more permanent character. It is evident that everything is done that can possibly be done to alleviate suffering and promote recovery, and that the labours of the American and Red Cross doctors and nurses are much appreciated by the Japanese. It would seem, however, that Army nursing is taken more as a matter of course in Japan than it is in this country, for it is stated that, though the Japanese Red Cross Nurses are ladies, they are treated more as servants. They are described by an American lady doctor at Hiroshima as sympathetic and willing, but lacking in practical experience and knowledge and in "the faculty of making the patients obey."

This chapter may fitly be concluded with a purely domestic allusion. At its commencement note was taken of the attitude of the Japanese people generally towards war news, but no indication has yet been given of the effect which the War itself has had upon the inner life of the community. A deeply interesting letter from Murasaki Ayami, a Japanese lady who is acting as the Special Correspondent of the *Bystander* in Yokohama, supplies the deficiency with pathetic picturesqueness. After recounting the personal sacrifices made by the Emperor and Empress of Japan, with a view to swelling the war funds, this lady writes: "It is when living in the midst of the people, and when coming in daily contact with them, both in the towns and in the country, that the full realisation of the miseries and tragedies resulting from the war is borne in upon one. A few days ago I wandered through an old cemetery that lies half hidden on the summit of the sacred island of Enoshima—a cemetery where little Buddhas and grey headstones mark the last resting-place of countless sleepers; a mound, freshly covered, where the offerings of food and the flowers not yet faded told of a recent sorrow; and from the old caretaker I heard this story. Oharu Nashisawa, the girl-wife of a non-commissioned officer, who was killed in the engagement in the Yalu Valley, on hearing the news of his demise, resolved to follow him, and thereby lighten her father-in-law's household expenses. She accordingly bade farewell to her family, and, arraying herself in her costliest garments, placed her husband's portrait in the tokonoma*, and falling on her knees before it, cut her throat with a small dagger."

Murasaki Ayami tells us that already want and misery among the poorer families whose fathers and husbands have been ordered to the front are being keenly felt. But the spirit of even the humblest is magnificent, and throughout the patient endurance of privation, and the still more terrible burden of sudden bereavement, the whole nation is sustained by the one sentiment that Japan will win.

One touching detail more. At many of the temples and places of worship in Japan women may be seen "who, after prostrating themselves before their gods and chanting a prayer or two, raise their hands to their heads and cut off their hair—thus not only signifying that they are widows, but registering the vow that they will not marry again. The severed locks are then bound with a broad band

* An alcove found in all Japanese rooms, reserved for the household's most sacred belongings.

of white paper and hung up at the entrance to the inner chapel, there to remain until a sufficient number of such offerings has been collected to weave into rope, as the rope made from human hair is said to possess an amazing strength, and is much valued in the field and on the ships where cords of great durability are required."

"A nation terribly in earnest" is the description given of the Japanese by one who knows them well. In this chapter a discursive attempt has been made to show how that earnestness extends through every stratum of Japanese life, from the strategy of the general in the field to the votive offering of the poor little soldier's widow at home. It is well that in the contemplation of great scenes the eye should occasionally rest on some detail, provided that the latter strikes no jarring note. But at best an effort to give an idea of Japanese earnestness by means of isolated instances must fail. Japan has organised her present greatness on broad lines. It is only by taking broad views of her achievements and of her future possibilities that one can rightly estimate that remarkable combination of attributes which bids fair at least to treble her chances in this epoch-making War.



Drawn by Kubota Beisen.

OLD JAPAN.

View at Ōsaka in the Period An-sei (A.D. 1854-1860).

By permission, from "The New Far East," by Arthur Diósy.

CHAPTER XLV.

RUSSIA AND THE SECOND PHASE—NOTES ON PAST BATTLES—LIFE AT LIAO-YANG—THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY—HOME AFFAIRS—DOMESTIC TROUBLES—A USEFUL PRESS—PUBLIC DISTRUST.

FOR the Russians the second phase of the war may seem at first sight to have been more disastrous than was the first, and, if we judge only by results, this view will hold good. But the actual incidents of the fighting from the end of the third week in May until July 30th cannot be said to be so really damaging to Russian prestige and prospects as were those of the previous three and a half months. It is true that in no case did the Russians score a distinct success; that the Japanese soldiers repeatedly proved themselves man for man better than their opponents; and that, throughout this period also, the Russian strategy was the strategy of almost unqualified retreat. But to the practised eye there is a marked difference between the handling of all the Russian forces during June and July and the performances of February, March, April, and May. Certainly it is a much brisker interval, as far as actual fighting is concerned, and it will be noted that in almost every case the Russians betray no unwillingness to fight, and show a pretty stubborn front in the actual conflict. That they are out-classed and outgeneralled is another matter, the actual aspect of which really supports the assertion that, if the Russian strategy had been on a level with the fighting qualities displayed during this phase by the brave Russian soldiers, the Japanese would have found at the end of July their position far more difficult, and their prospects far less brilliant, than is really the case.

In a word, the Russians have during the last two or three months sacrificed to the attempted retention of Port Arthur their main chances of any sort of immediate success. In the circumstances it is hard to find fault with Kuropatkin's original design to remain more or less concentrated at Liao-yang, until he could gather sufficient forces to enable him either to accept battle at Liao-yang as soon as it was offered, or to advance and try to sweep the enemy out of Korea, or the Liao-tung Peninsula, or both. Port Arthur either was or was not defensible for a few months on the strength of its own resources. If not, it should have been abandoned, as one of Russia's best and most clear-headed generals, Dragomiroff, suggested from the first. If it was confidently felt that the place could stand a siege, it might have been allowed to take its chance. But, when the siege had once been definitely commenced, no relief ought to have been attempted until Kuropatkin was completely ready for a forward movement.

The second phase of the war gives in the defeat of Stackelberg at Telissu what may prove to be the key-note of the whole campaign, namely, blundering brought about by utterly foolish and improper interference. It is not by any means certain that a bold policy would

STACKELBERG'S FUTILE ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE PORT ARTHUR: THE RUSSIAN SHELTER-TRENCHES STORMED BY THE JAPANESE.

not have served Kuropatkin very well if he had adopted it in the early part of May, instead of being forced against his will to adopt it in the early part of June. If, the moment the news of the landing at Pi-tsu-wo of the Second Army had arrived, he had hurried down sufficient troops, meanwhile "containing" the First Army and the Takushan force, as he should have been able to do without much difficulty, the Army of General Oku might, as has been previously hinted, have found itself in an awkward position, and the siege of Port Arthur might have been indefinitely postponed. But, as has been seen, this possibly golden opportunity was lost, and then, when it was too late, Stackelberg was despatched "to relieve Port Arthur," evidently at the Tsar's personal instance, and Kuropatkin's plans were from that moment thrown out beyond hope of recovery.

Looking back over the main incidents of this second phase we shall not find so much that seems deserving of fresh or renewed comment in the case of the Russians as we did in that of the Japanese. This, of course, is only natural when one side is engaged in the elaborate movements necessary to effect a series of envelopments, while the other is mainly content with what is little else than a succession of rearguard actions. There are, however, one or two details which may serve both to render the foregoing narrative a little brighter and clearer, and to prepare the ground for the operations of the very important and dramatic phase that is to follow.

The Russian failure, as well as the Japanese success, at Nan-shan is better explained by the supplementary account of the *Times* Correspondent quoted in the preceding chapter than in any of the earlier despatches. It was not clear before that the Japanese gun-boats succeeded in taking a part of the Russian position in reverse; that is, in working round so that they could throw shells into the rear of the Russian trenches. This explanation makes it much easier to understand why, after having withstood a series of repeated attacks from dawn till evening, the Russians should not have been able to hang on a little longer to a position which was so strong by nature, and the artillery defending which was so greatly superior to the artillery of the attack. But, of course, with their rear constantly harassed, the Russians may well have weakened a little in the defence of their front, and of that slight falling-off in stubborn opposition the Japanese were swift to take advantage. It is easy to be wise after the event; but it will readily occur to the student of the campaign that a few heavy guns firing seawards and to the south-west of the extreme left of the Russian position might have made all the difference, and turned what was a hardly-won victory for Japan into a very damaging repulse.

From Nan-shan to Telissu is a short step, chronologically speaking, but, as we have seen, in this interval the Russian chances of success are sadly diminished by the interference of Alexeieff at St. Petersburg with the now well-developed policy of Kuropatkin. On General Stackelberg's tactics the battle itself is the best commentary. He was simply out-classed, but he seems to have made the elementary mistake very common in a third-rate type of general, of showing boldness in an entirely wrong place. Had he shown it by hastening his concentration and attacking General Oku at Port Adams, a different result might have been recorded. But he seems first to

have chosen the Telissu position with an idea of defending it, and then to have taken the offensive without properly securing his right flank from an enemy whose known tactics have hitherto included, wherever possible, a wide turning movement.

Of General Stackelberg himself, of whom a striking portrait was given on page 373, a very unfavourable account appears in the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger*. According to this authority the loser of Telissu "resides in his own special train fitted up with every luxury. His wife and her sister are with him. In the hot weather Cossacks are employed with a hose to pour a continuous stream of water on the roofs of the cars. Water is scarce, and the troops are thus deprived of drinking water to enable General Stackelberg's cars to be sprinkled. Although there is abundance of room in the long train, General Stackelberg has refused to grant an inch of space for the accommodation of wounded officers."

One of the heroes of Telissu is General Sampsonoff, who is said to have performed prodigies of valour, and who is apparently a very popular commander among the Russian soldiery. It will be remembered that he was previously in charge of a considerable force which came into sharp collision with the Japanese at Wa-fang-kau, as narrated in Chapter XXIX.

Talking of Wa-fang-kau, in which, according to the Russian account, the Cossacks covered themselves with much glory, it may be remarked that, since that action, these dashing horsemen have had little chance of distinguishing themselves. General Mishtchenko is still roving along the Russian front for purposes of reconnaissance, and, judging from the fulness of the Russian Staff reports, this duty is thoroughly and efficiently performed. There are Cossacks, too, still at work in Korea, but the force generally has by no means come up to the expectations formed of it, and far greater real importance has been attached hitherto to the work of the Russian infantry. To some extent this is explained by some damaging criticism in the *Russkoe Slovo* by a well-known Russian writer, M. Nemirovitch Danchenko, who comments on the way that, more especially, the Trans-Baikal Cossacks have been officered for the purposes of this war. It seems that in many cases officers of the Imperial Guard have been sent from St. Petersburg to supersede the old Cossack officers in the command of sotnias, and this is naturally resented by troops who are peculiarly clannish in their ideas. To command a Cossack sotnia properly, urges M. Danchenko, one must be a Cossack born, and the soldiers will follow such a leader through fire and water. Such frank Russian admissions of faulty military procedure are not common, and are on that account the more valuable in explaining minor causes of failure. It may be remarked that M. Danchenko does not confine his criticism only to the Cossacks, but makes particular reference also to the Caucasian Volunteer militia, of whom, also, great things are expected. These, he points out, are to be commanded by excellent officers of the regular cavalry, who, however, do not even speak the language of their new soldiers, and are completely ignorant of their customs!

This foolish method of officering units which require particular care in handling is, of course, the more disastrous in a military system, one of the chief results of which is to stifle initiative on the part

of the individual soldier. Throughout the Russian Army the troop or company officer generally has to think not only for himself but for each and every one of



GENERAL SAMPSONOFF.

the men under him if he expects the best results in anything like unfavourable circumstances. It is only occasionally that the Russian soldier acting independently can be found to display such level-headedness, not to speak of marksmanship, as that exhibited by a spy named Volkoff, whose adventures, recounted in the Russian papers, are transcribed as follows by the St. Petersburg Correspondent of the Central News :—

"I shaved my hair in front like a Chinaman, tied on a pigtail, and put on a Chinese dress with slippers and hat. On the 19th (July), while a cross fire was going on, I seized the opportunity, and slipped away into the Japanese lines.

"They were at the moment advancing towards our troops, and were so busy that no one noticed me, and I passed safely through their position, and towards evening came to the village of Arthaisa."

After visiting several other villages, and gleaning information as to the Japanese forces, Volkoff's real adventures began. "Suddenly," he says, "a cavalry detachment of about twenty men with an officer came towards me. The officer rode out and asked in Chinese where the Russians were and what was their strength.

"I decided to sell my life dearly, for I knew it would be forfeited if I were captured. I pulled out my revolver, and as the two soldiers approached I fired two shots at them. Both of the men fell.

"Then I fired at the officer, bringing him to the ground, and afterwards emptied the revolver at four other men. The soldiers lost their heads and galloped away, and as they did so I saw the four men I had shot fall severally from their saddles, badly wounded.

"Then I jumped on one of the horses, and galloped away for my life. I had to pass through the enemy's lines, but fortunately I soon saw our outposts, and I rode in, and was immediately taken into the presence of General Sampsonoff, and told my story."

Of the fighting in the Passes it is impossible to form a really clear idea without much more information than is likely to be available perhaps for a year or two after the war is over. Here again we have to distinguish between carefully co-ordinated attacks on the one hand and, for the most part, isolated defences on the other. As regards the Motien-ling, it is now suggested that, in spite of its

wonderful reputation; the Pass was not really defensible. According to the Special Correspondent of the *Standard*, "the position is a forest-clad mountain about one thousand feet above the river and valley, and traversed by a steep and winding path. The mountain is crowded with angles and 'dead' ground, on which large bodies of them could lie in perfect security. The slopes are steep, and there is no field of fire. The Russians had, therefore, formed a correct estimate of the tactical features of the Pass, and had not wasted their energies on any defensive works." This is an interesting new view which, as the Correspondent quoted remarks, is not necessarily upset by the first Russian attack upon the Japanese outpost in the Motien-ling. This attack of July 4th may have been an effort not so much to recover a valuable position as to retard a threatening advance. But, on the other hand, we have the evidence of experts that the Motien-ling properly defended is a very serious obstacle indeed, and it will be remembered that, as described in Chapter XXXVI., a subsequent and very resolute attempt was made on July 17th to recover the Pass by General Kashtalinski, acting under the orders of General Count Keller. We have also to take into consideration the fact that the Japanese in all their arrangements leading up to their attacks upon the Passes, appeared to regard the Motien-ling, with which they had become closely acquainted in 1894, with much respect. It must, then, be regarded for the present as a rather debatable question whether the Russians were justified in evacuating the "Heaven-Reaching Pass" with such celerity, or, to put it in another way, whether they were not seriously to be blamed for allowing such a position to be so easily turned.

Let us now leave the area of actual fighting and find our way gradually to Russia. We may pause a while at Liao-yang, of which already a brief account has been given in Chapter XXX. To this may be added a striking little word photograph by Mr. Charles Hands of the *Daily Mail*, describing the Liao-yang railway station and the country to the south:—

"The open trucks laden with guns, the big horse wagons, the trucks of ammunition carts, the trucks filled with pontoons and other engineering appliances, the heavily-laden cars of all sorts of stores, but, above all, the cars and cars and cars—covered box cars—whose cargoes are the square-jawed, short-nosed, sturdy



GENERAL MISHTCHENKO.

Siberian soldiers—these tell of war. On the further side of the lines there is a row of booths like a fair, where the Chinaman is making his speedy fortune

by selling all sorts of rubbishy food and other wares to the passing soldiers.

"Outside the railway station, away to the right, a distinct mountain marks the beginning of the series of hills which lie between Liao-yang and the fighting to the south. On the west no mountains, but a flat alluvial plain, every visible square inch of it cultivated like a nursery garden, stretches smoothly away to the horizon, beyond which the broad Liao stretches its impassable barrier. To the northward, again no mountains—only the long Liao valley, through which a low embankment, like a single upturned furrow, holds up the railway line above the muds and the floods of the soon-coming rainy season. Little culverts innumerable intersect it, and here and there considerable bridges where water-courses and rivers coming from the hills to the eastward make their way across the valley to the Liao. The watercourses are dry now, but the stones and boulders which strew the deep channel show the force with which the waters rush down from the mountain-sides."

From Mr. Douglas Story of the *Daily Express* we may borrow a couple of anecdotes which he relates as part of a budget he acquired in "the Earl's Court of Liao-yang," the little pleasure-garden that has been laid out beneath the shade of the Ta-Pagoda, where in the evening the band plays and the Russian officers congregate. "It was here I heard the story of Captain Worolsoff, the sole survivor of Colonel Müller's battery of artillery from the cruel fight of Kiu-lien-cheng. I had seen the captain in hospital, lying very quiet and very grey, with a leg shattered by fragments of a Japanese shell. He had told me nothing of the deed that had brought this disaster upon him, had merely taken from a purse at his bedside a jagged piece of iron and passed it to me, quietly smiling—sufficient comment from a soldier.

"I heard his tale in the shade of the imperturbable pagoda, learned how, on that bloody first of May, he had stood by his guns as on parade, holding his men to their posts, demanding from them all the niceties of discipline—head back, chest out, shoulders square, feet properly at attention—till every officer of the battery was dead or wounded, and he at length, too, fell crippled by a bursting shrapnel."

It was in this garden, too, that a little incident occurred which shows the Russian officer in a more chivalrous light than that in which he sometimes appears to us through his own indifference to our sort of sentiment. The news had come that a message of condolence had been received from the Japanese with reference to the sinking of the *Petropavlosk* and its gallant sailors. "An officer rose and proposed a toast to the enemy. The toast was received and drunk in all sincerity by those kind and simple soldiers of the Tsar."

From Liao-yang we pass to Mukden, which is now becoming crowded with soldiers, but which is soon to lose some of its official importance by reason of the Viceroy's departure for Vladivostok. There would seem to be lively times in store for both Liao-yang and Mukden in the near future. Such forebodings may extend even to Harbin itself. It is, perhaps, significant that Kuropatkin has recently ordered the removal from Harbin of all the numerous hangers-on whom a variety of inducements has tacked on to the skirts of the Russian forces in the Far East, and who, in the event of a possible retreat to this great junction, would have been an unmitigated nuisance.

Between Harbin and Moscow the Siberian Railway has been working steadily, but it is becoming very evident that General Kuropatkin will have to wait a long time before he can receive sufficient reinforcements to enable him to take the field with the four or five hundred thousand men which he regards as necessary for his purpose. Various estimates are given of the carrying capacity of the line, but all accounts agree in placing the number of troop-trains very low in consequence of the absolute impossibility of decreasing the number of trains carrying supplies. The most likely calculation is that rather under 20,000 men are being carried every month, and, if this be accurate, Kuropatkin's outlook is rather gloomy, for his "war wastage" has been considerable, especially in the past two months, and, if he has received 40,000 fresh soldiers, probably a quarter at least of these will be required to replace recent casualties. Meanwhile there is much to be said for the energy with which during the progress of the war the construction of the Circum-Baikal line has been attacked and carried on. It is now hoped that trains will be running on this section at the end of September in time to escape the beginning of the autumn storms, which are very dangerous to navigation on the lake.



KUROKI'S LINES OF ADVANCE TO LIAO-YANG

In Russia itself we see little change in the conditions which have prevailed since the outbreak of the war, unless it be in the daily increasing unpopularity of the orders relating to mobilisation. It was mentioned in a previous chapter that cases had occurred of the taking of drugs by reservists in order to produce sickness and thus secure exemption from military service, but latterly more tragically effective measures have been adopted to this end. Towards the end of July three soldiers at Schlüsselburg, who were under orders for the front, committed suicide by hanging themselves, and on the 25th of that month a very painful incident occurred at Peterhof, where the Tsar was at the time in residence. A detachment of troops was entraining for the Far East when one of the soldiers suddenly left the ranks and threw himself under a passing engine, the wheels of which severed his head from his body. Even where such ghastly protests are not forthcoming the resentment expressed against the mobilisation orders is loud and deep. In St. Petersburg the students indulge in a street demonstration, and many arrests are made; while in provincial districts the reservists who have been called up have to be carefully restrained from talking among themselves, and the populace ventilates its indignation more freely than might have been thought possible in police-ridden Russia.

In the last week of July occurs the assassination of M. Plehve, the Minister of the Interior, who was responsible for the massacre at Kishineff, and whose severity has become a byword throughout Europe. It is a thoroughly Russian tragedy. The Minister's carriage passes along the street, a bomb is hurled, the Minister is killed with many other innocent persons, a man is arrested, Nihilists are proud and happy, the Tsar is deeply moved, another Minister of the drastic sort is appointed, and the old reign of cynical injustice dashed with political assassination bids fair to start afresh. The incident does not affect the war materially, except possibly by widening the gulf between Russian officialism and the Russian public. Least of all does it seem to affect the incapacity of the Tsar to view the course of events in the Far East from the standpoint of his country's welfare, now in such grave danger of being hopelessly sacrificed to ignorant obstinacy and scarcely honourable pride.

Unfortunately both Russian autocracy and bureaucracy have the most useful sort of allies in both the Church and the Press. According to the Russian Correspondents of the *Times*, "the Russian Clerical Press asserts that the policy of the Russian Government which led to the war was not only just and right, but in accordance with the precepts of Scripture. In an article entitled 'Our Struggle with Japan from a Biblical Point of View,' the *Strannik* says that 'Russia has a providential mission to extend and maintain the Orthodox faith over the whole world. If Manchuria were left in the possession of the Chinese they would not feel the necessity of accepting Christianity, and would remain for ever in Japanese darkness. Hence the law of God forbids the restoration of Manchuria to China.'" The *Russia Palomnik*, a paper which circulates largely among the peasants, argues that the Emperor of Japan is Antichrist, and that it is therefore the duty of Holy Russia to make war upon him. The *Tserkovni Viestnik* declares that the war now waged by Russia is in accordance with the will of



THE CAPTURE OF KIN-CHAU.

The old Chinese walled town of Kin-Chau was the point d'appui from which General Oku launched his final attack upon the Russian works on the Nan-Shan heights. It was held by a regiment of Siberian Rifles and a field battery. At sunrise, after a most sanguinary struggle, the place was carried at the point of the bayonet by a Japanese brigade.

God. He ordered the Jews to exterminate the Canaanites, and the Japanese are the Canaanites of the 20th century!

Less pardonable than these ramblings is the injunction of the *Moscow Gazette* to the Russian commanders not to give any quarter to the Japanese: "Our great General Suvaroff," it says, "when he fought against the civilised French, very often gave the order 'no quarter' to his troops. This was not cruelty or barbarism; it was necessity. And now necessity forces us, in this war with a half-savage and barbarous nation, to adhere to Suvaroff's rule of 'no quarter.' In our war with Japan we are like a man attacked by a viper. It is not enough to frighten it and leave it to hide in a bush; it must be destroyed; and we must do this without considering whether England and the cosmopolitan plutocracy object or not. To burden Russia with thousands of Japanese prisoners spreading dysentery, typhus, and cholera among the Russian people would, perhaps, be in accordance with humanitarian principles, but would be very unwise. No quarter and no prisoners should be our motto."

THE LATE M. PLEHVE, RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR THE INTERIOR.

It is needless to swell the volume of evidence which goes to show that even now official Russia is trying to blind itself and others to the realities of a situation brought about chiefly by a combination of blind arrogance and insane unpreparedness. Such examples as have been given have been selected from a great mass of material with a view to showing some of the broader methods adopted. But much might be added as to the vagaries of the Russian censorship, the obvious "cooking" of news, and the wholesale "blocking" of articles in the foreign papers likely to instruct the Russian public as to the real state of affairs at the front. It is almost refreshing that, even among the middle and lower classes, such processes should not be entirely successful.

Whether the bravery of the Russian fighting soldier will prevail, notwithstanding the dissatisfaction at home, remains to be seen. But in a war which after six months has produced little else but a succession of retreats and several ugly reverses, a nation has no dazzling outlook which is beginning to realise that in the balance with its slain sons and sorely taxed resources must still be weighed a heavy mass of ingrained official duplicity and ineptitude.

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE SECOND PHASE ENDED—THE SITUATION—NAVAL REFLECTIONS—MILITARY POSSIBILITIES—COUNTING THE COST.

IT has already been pointed out that the war has now passed through two great phases, the first terminating about the end of the third week in May, the second about the end of the last week in July.

Let us now ascend in an imaginary war-balloon of a paulo-post-future type of construction, and take stock not only of the whole area of operations, but of a variety of considerations, international as well as Russo-Japanese, which combine to render the end of July an excellent point at which to round off, as it were, one section of this story.

First, as comparatively little has been said in the two preceding chapters about naval matters, let us deal with the positions arrived at by both Japan and Russia in regard to their respective fleets. In order to emphasise the fact that the last week of May and the months of June and July constitute a distinct naval as well as military phase, it is expedient to anticipate a little, and to state that in August we shall see a new set of naval conditions evolved out of an occurrence altogether different from, and in advance of, anything that has yet taken place in the course of the war. There is no need to go into greater detail at present. It is sufficient to say that, while the efforts that have been made hitherto by Admiral Togo to bring about a fleet action at sea have been unsuccessful, the very near future will bring us in sight of that tremendous development, with results which are of world-wide interest and instructiveness.

Having thus lifted a corner of the "cloth," behind which the next naval scene in our drama is being set, let us review briefly the naval events of the past ten weeks, and note how clearly they convey the idea of being merely preparatory to a great and comprehensive episode. The record is a meagre one as far as actual collisions are concerned. The main happening of that sort has been the one described in Chapter XXXV., when, to the general surprise, the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, to the number of twenty-five—six battle-ships, five cruisers, and fourteen destroyers—emerged from the harbour and steamed out to sea. It will be remembered that on this occasion, as on the fateful April 13th, when the battle-ship *Petropavlosk* was sunk, the battle-flags were hoisted and a general action seemed imminent, but the Russian Admiral's heart failed him, and he hurried back to Port Arthur. Some damage was inflicted on the Russian Fleet by the Japanese destroyers; but the engagement has no decisive results, and Admiral Togo has still to keep watch and ward over the entrance to Port Arthur, lest any junction should take place between the ships he worked so hard to cripple and bottle-up during the first phase of the war and the Vladivostok squadron, now at the zenith of its activity. He has, however, the satisfaction of feeling that his gun-boats and torpedo-craft have helped materially

to win the battle of Nan-shan, and further, he has no additional losses to deplore like that of the *Hatsuse* and *Yoshino*, which, for Japan, cast such a gloom over the third week in May.

Incidentally it may be mentioned, as a supplement to the details already given of the cruise of the Naval Attachés and Correspondents on the *Manchu Maru*, that the latter were given on July 17th a sight of the Japanese Fleet, and were even invited on board the flagship *Mikasa*. The Admiral welcomed the Naval Attachés of seven nations in his private cabin, and afterwards received thirty Correspondents in the ward-room. All appear to have been greatly impressed by the magnificent spectacle presented by the war-worn but still spendidly efficient Navy of Japan, and, after a pleasant interchange of courtesies, the guests gave three hearty cheers for the Admiral's continued victory. No special significance is attached to this interesting meeting, but it merits record as a somewhat unusual accompaniment of a state of naval warfare, and it accentuates the transitional character of the period with which we are dealing.

The performances of the Vladivostok squadron need no comment beyond that which they have already received; but here, again, it may be remarked that the first fortnight of August has in store one of the strange revenges which the whirligig of Time is so fond of bringing. In this second phase, as to some extent in the first, we have seen the *Gromoboi*, *Rossia*, and *Rurik* using their great strength, not in valiant opposition to the enemy's warships, but in the sinking of transports and the harassment of foreign trade. We have seen Admiral Kamimura foiled time and again in his efforts to catch these three big conger-eels, and we have seen Russia gloating over the latter's exploits as if they were glorious naval victories. Poetical justice demands a change of scene, and for once the demand is to be met with dramatic swiftness and completeness by historic actuality. The end of July marks the real term of the original Vladivostok Squadron's career of impudent destructiveness and fortunate escape from the consequence of its actions, legal and otherwise.

Let us turn now to the military situation, the critical nature of which could hardly be more sharply defined than it is. "The prelude to concerted action" is the simple and satisfactory definition of the work of the Japanese Armies during June and the first thirty days of July; but as we shall see, a fresh act will commence on July 31st, for then it may be said that the real co-operation between General Oku's, General Kuroki's, and the Takushan armies begins. But we must take the Russian Army also into our purview if we are rightly to grasp the character of the stage at which we arrived. Here, too, there are signs of a turning-point. There may be more retirement, more desultory attempts to stave off the day of ultimate collision. But we have a military beginning of an end defined far more clearly for Russia at the close of July than it has been hitherto, and of this no one seems more conscious than Kuropatkin himself. In this case the march of events does not allow us to anticipate; but it may be readily foreshadowed by the most casual reader of the foregoing narrative that much must happen during the ensuing month of a totally different character from what has happened before. Japan has worked patiently and effectively in

this direction, nor has Russia, in spite of reverses, been idle. There is much in the position at the end of July to make us think that Japan, having brought her converging armies almost to a point—mathematically speaking, they are now set round an arc of a very small circle—has only to go forward, complete the envelopment, and crush her adversary so badly that he will have little further fight left in him for months to come. But we must not jump too hastily to conclusions. Japan knows better than any other nation but Russia—perhaps knows better than even Russia herself—what it will cost her to bring Kuropatkin finally to bay, if it be possible to force a battle on him, and she rightly approaches the task with deliberate caution. Of Russia, it may be said that it is idle to be premature in predicting utter defeat for an army, the soldiers of which are not only dogged and tenacious, true fighters, and, when properly led, capable of extraordinary feats, but also, in a marked degree, self-recuperative. We have had occasion throughout the first six months of the war to remark this quality as one strongly distinctive of Russian modes of warfare.



RUSSIAN PRISONERS GOING ON BOARD JAPANESE TRANSPORTS *EN ROUTE* FOR JAPAN.

Just as the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, after having been torpedoed, shelled, and otherwise knocked about so badly that even experts were inclined to regard a large proportion of the ships as entirely *hors de combat*, has twice succeeded in making a gallant show of strength—though not of pluck—outside Port Arthur, so, after such a damaging defeat at that at Telissu, Stackelberg's troops soon re-formed, and not many days later

were presenting a very fairly bold front to the foe. The force, again, which fell back from the Nan-shan position after an experience of a distinctly nerve-disturbing character, took its place without more ado in the defence of Port Arthur, and assisted with becoming spirit in rendering the investment of that fortress a frightfully difficult and costly operation. Where troops lack this recuperative power it is often safe to generalise from precedents, but, where the power is present, even if one cannot say with Napoleon III. *tout peut se rétablir*, one should make allowances for possible upsets of even the most expert calculations and the most likely predictions.

The time has not yet come for us to rule pages of our narrative into grim columns showing the cost in blood and treasure of this great conflict. But it may be very roughly deduced from expert calculations that up to the end of July the Japanese Army, apart from Port Arthur, as to which no trustworthy figures are yet available, has lost about 11,000 killed and wounded, and the Russians from two-and-a-half to three times that number. The proportion of wounded to killed in the case of Japan is reckoned by the *Times* military critic at four to one, the proportion being rather less in the case of Russia. In addition, the Russians have lost 113 guns and 18 Maxims. At the end of the first six months of the war it is estimated that, if it continues another six months, the total expenses spread over the year will amount to one hundred and sixty millions, of which one hundred millions will have been spent by Russia.

Here our narrative of the first two phases of the war comes to a close. But, inasmuch as grave issues of international concern have arisen since war broke out, some of which still remain undecided, a more fitting conclusion to this, our First Volume, will be found in the succeeding chapter, in which an expert treats learnedly yet lucidly of a wide subject with which none but a real expert is competent to deal.

A MAIN THOROUGHFARE IN DALNY.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF WAR.

By AN EXPERT.

Introductory.

IT may possibly have occurred to many of the readers of this History that they would like to know something, if only a little, of the International Law (including the Law of Neutrality) bearing upon the various incidents which have taken place in the course of the Russo-Japanese war, more especially those in connection with maritime matters. Among these may be mentioned, more particularly, the cases of the Russian gunboat *Mandjur*, the *Enping*, *Hsiping*, *Mombasa*, the German mail steamer *Prinz Heinrich*, and the British vessels *Malacca* and *Knight Commander*.

The object of this Chapter, therefore, is to present, as briefly and in as popular a form as the subject permits, the more important rules relating to the proper conduct of hostilities. The task of dealing with so extensive and intricate a subject in the space of this article is not by any means an easy one; but the reader will no doubt derive a certain amount of interest from its perusal, if not a great deal of information.

The Law of Neutrality alone is a very extensive subject, and it is not possible to do more than deal very briefly with it here.

I.—General Course of Hostilities.

As a general rule, war is the last method resorted to by a State to obtain redress for injuries or wrongs done to it by another Power, and recourse should not be had to hostilities until all amicable means of procuring satisfaction have been tried. Of the various methods of amicably arranging disputes between nations, we may mention Agreement between the Powers, or Agreement through the intervention of another Power, and Arbitration.

Should amicable measures prove unavailing, the affronted Power may adopt certain *forcible* methods of obtaining redress—*falling short of actual war, however*—such as Pacific Blockade, Embargo, Reprisals, Retorsion, or Naval Demonstration. Let us mention these shortly. The Blockading of the ports or coasts of an offending Power has frequently been resorted to in modern times as a method of exacting redress. Some recent instances of blockades were that of Formosa by France in 1884, of Greece by the fleets of Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Russia, and Italy in 1886, and Crete in 1897. It may be mentioned here that *pacific* blockades differ from those effected during hostilities in this respect, that in the former case the blockading forces cannot seize the ships of third parties; but once war has commenced, any neutral ships which may try to run the blockade are liable to be captured and confiscated. Embargo signifies the provisional sequestration of ships or property. Being merely an act of sequestration, the ships or other property are released as soon as disputes are at an end; but should war break out they are liable to confiscation.

An example of Reprisal was the bombardment of Foochow by the French in 1884. It is, in its ordinary sense, the seizure by a Power of property on the high seas, or in the territory or territorial waters of another Power. Reprisals are either public or private, the former being where a State authorises its officers or agents to seize the property or citizens of another State, and the latter being those in which the State gives Letters of Marque to private individuals. This latter form is, however, seldom adopted in time of peace.

In the Chino-Japanese war of 1894, Japan did her best to discourage acts of reprisal or revenge, it being her wish to carry on the war by civilised methods as

far as possible; and she prohibited the employment of privateers, and strictly forbade plunder, even of the most trivial character. There is a limit even to Japanese patience, however; and in the present war, owing to an attack in February, 1904, by the Russian Vladivostock squadron upon two unarmed merchant vessels, one of which was sunk with a loss of 100 lives, the Japanese Government threatened the severest measures of reprisal, more especially as Japan had given Russian merchantmen freedom of her seas until the 16th February. In fact, this act of the Russian squadron was regarded as a case of outrageous piracy. Retorsion merely means retaliation. It is usually resorted to in cases of discourtesy, unfriendliness, injustice, or harshness.

A state of war is usually set up by the first open act of hostility, and it is no longer necessary for one Power to address a formal Declaration of War to the other. In the war of 1894 between China and Japan, a formal Declaration was made by the latter on August 1st, 1894, China's being issued the next day. A state of war had, however, been in existence as long before as the 25th July, for on that date a Japanese squadron engaged some Chinese warships which were escorting transports with troops on board. One of these transports, the *Kow Shing*, was fired on and sunk, and the incident caused considerable outcry and discussion at the time. Moreover, at the same date Asan had been captured by the Japanese. In the present war Japan broke off her diplomatic relations with Russia on the 6th February, 1904, and the war commenced with the first act of hostility on the part of the Russians, their gunboat *Korietz* having fired on some Japanese transports and their escort off Chemulpo. On the 11th February, 1904, Japan delivered her formal Declaration of War, and on the same date Declarations of Neutrality were made by Great Britain and all the other great powers.

Our space will only allow of our touching very lightly upon the effects of war on property and persons. With respect to *treaties*, the effect of war is to abrogate some and suspend others. Property acquires an "enemy character" according to circumstances. With a few exceptions, property of the enemy can be seized in any place where hostilities may be carried on; and as a general rule, an enemy's property found at sea is liable to seizure and confiscation, unless it is connected with its owner's neutral domicile.

As regards the effect of war upon persons, we naturally consider *combatants* in the first place. Members of the *public* armed forces of the enemy, being combatants, armed, and offering resistance, are liable to direct destruction of life and limb, by the laws of war; and on surrender, to treatment as prisoners of war. Where hostilities arise between two countries, one of which is to a certain extent subordinate to the other, the question arises whether the armed combatants in the subordinate country should be placed in the category of belligerents or not. Of late years the tendency has been to acknowledge them as belligerents, and Great Britain acted on that principle in the Boer War with regard to the irregular combatants of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. The same question arose in the Franco-German war of 1870, with respect to the *Francs-tireurs*, and Count Bismarck announced to the French Government that only those Frenchmen who could at *rifle-shot distance* be recognised as soldiers would be considered and treated as such by the Prussians. By the *Conference of Brussels*, 1874, bodies of men under some responsible leader, conforming to the usages of war, and sufficiently distinguished by certain marks, are to be recognised as entitled to belligerent rights.

The giving of Quarter may be mentioned in connection with the subject of hostile relations between persons. At the present day quarter is granted except under very exceptional circumstances. The general duty to give quarter, however, does not protect an enemy who has personally broken the laws of war, who has stated his intention not to give quarter, or whose government has committed acts justifying the making of reprisals. In the Chino-Japanese war quarter was as a rule freely given by the Japanese. There was one notable ex-

ception, however, after the capture of Port Arthur. This was a massacre of men, women, and children, which lasted for four days, until only some thirty-six Chinamen were left alive, and these were only spared in order that they might bury the dead, and in their caps were placed papers with the inscription, "This man is not to be killed." With this exception the war with China was waged on the part of the Japanese in accordance with the best of modern traditions. As a matter of fact the Japanese denied that the Port Arthur atrocities were committed by their regular soldiers, and alleged that they were the work of some drunken coolies who were attached to the army. The following Proclamation, which was made by Count Oyama to the army on the 22nd April, 1894, says much for Japan's humanity:—"Belligerent operations being properly confined to the military and naval forces actually engaged, and there being no reason whatever for enmity between individuals because their countries are at war, the common principles of humanity dictate that succour and rescue should be extended even to those of the enemy's forces who are disabled by wounds or disease." The Proclamation added that Japan had signed the Geneva Convention in 1886, and that "her soldiers had already been instructed that they are bound to treat with kindness and helpfulness such of their enemies as may be disabled by wounds or disease." By way of a contrast to the Port Arthur massacre we may mention that when Wei-hai-wei was taken the Japanese released all the Chinese soldiers and foreigners, with the exception of one Von Hanneken, an American who had broken his *parole* given on the occasion of the sinking of the *Kow-Shing*.

With regard to the treatment of sick and wounded, humanity imposes upon combatants the duty of treating them properly; and by the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1868 the sick and wounded must be collected and tended, and whilst they are in military hospitals or hospital ships they are to be treated as neutrals. Surgeons and others engaged in tending sick and wounded are also regarded as neutrals; and military hospitals and ambulances are neutralised so long as they are occupied by sick or wounded. The following episode, which took place at the battle of Kin-lien-cheng, is only one of many such-like: A Russian soldier, by name Sorokine, was wounded in the eyes, and retired from the fighting line supported by one of his comrades. Suddenly two Japanese soldiers appeared, one bearing the Red Cross flag. The other motioned with his rifle as a sign for the unwounded Russian to go away. The Japanese soldiers then skilfully washed and dressed their patient's wounds, and he was handed over to his own people. In connection with this subject it may be stated that at a banquet recently given in New York to Baron Kentaro Kaneko (formerly Minister of Justice and of Agriculture and Commerce) he made a stirring speech, in which he stated that since the outbreak of the present war the Japanese had treated the Russian wounded soldiers and sailors with the utmost kindness, and had even buried drowned Russian soldiers with Christian ceremonies. The Baron added that "when the numerous wounded Russian soldiers were taken to our Red Cross hospital after the battle of the Yalu, the Japanese soldiers brought cigarettes and wine out of their scanty rations to comfort them."

Whilst dealing with the subject of the effect of war upon *persons*, a few words with respect to *prisoners* may not be amiss. In the absence of treaties laying down different rules with regard to them, prisoners may be ransomed, kept until the war is over, or exchanged absolutely or on certain conditions (as, for instance, on their "*parole*" not to serve again during the war or until exchanged). If a prisoner attempts to escape he may be killed during his flight; but should he be recaptured he can only be punished with closer confinement. If he should, however, join in a plot for a general escape of prisoners, he may be punished with death. Where practicable, prisoners must be supplied with reasonable food, clothing, and shelter; and in some cases they are given a monetary allowance.

The question has frequently arisen as to whether *Newspaper Correspondents* are

liable to be made prisoners. Some authorities have decided in the affirmative, but presumably they can only be detained for special reasons; and as a matter of fact *anybody* can be made a prisoner for special reasons. The French Official Handbook for the use of officers directs newspaper correspondents to be detained so long only as military necessity may warrant. At the commencement of this war the Russian authorities drew up some most stringent regulations to be observed by war correspondents with the Russian army. In connection with this question, it may be remembered that early in the war the *Fawan*, a vessel chartered by the *Chicago Daily Press* correspondent, was captured by two Russian "destroyers." Officers and marines were placed on board, and the correspondent and crew were sent below and heavily guarded for a time. The *Fawan* was ultimately released, however, and nothing more came of the incident.

As our readers are aware, wireless telegraphy has been largely employed in this war by both combatants, and Admiral Alexeieff is said to have threatened to treat as a spy a newspaper correspondent who made use of wireless telegraphy within the zone of operations of the Russian Fleet.

We will now pass to another subject, namely, some of the *methods of waging war*, and in this connection there does not appear to have been any employment by the Japanese of *Privateers*, either during the Chino-Japanese war or the present one. The parties to the Declaration of Paris, in 1856, decided to abolish privateering, which is chiefly plundering, and all the civilised Powers have signed the Declaration except Spain, Mexico, and the United States. Some regrettable incidents occurred, however, on the part of the Russian volunteer squadron, which we shall refer to later on—notably, the seizure of the P. and O. Liner *Malacca*, and some other British and German vessels. Among the other methods of warfare which are forbidden by the laws of civilised nations may be mentioned *assassination*, or murder by treachery; but killing by surprise (ambush for instance) is permissible. It is also unlawful to poison food or water which is likely to be consumed by an enemy; also the use of poisoned weapons. Guns, also, must not be loaded with nails, glass, or scraps of metal, etc. Happily the present war appears to have been carried on without recourse to these methods.

With regard to projectiles, more especially of the explosive type, the Declaration of St. Petersburg (1868) forbids the use of any projectile which, being filled with a fulminating or inflammable substance, shall weigh less than 400 grammes (*i.e.*, a little less than 1 lb.). By the *Brussels Conference* of 1874 it is laid down that "the laws of war do not recognise in belligerents an unlimited right to choose the means of destroying the enemy." This question was also dealt with by two of the Declarations at the *Congress at the Hague*. The 2nd Declaration had for its aim "the prohibition of the use of any projectile having for its sole object the dispersion of asphyxiating or injurious gas." This Declaration met with the unanimous assent of the Powers; but to the 3rd Declaration, prohibiting "the use of balls which readily expand or flatten themselves in the human body," Great Britain would not agree, as it struck at the use of the "dum-dum" bullet.

As regards the employment of the French "mélinite" and the German "roburite," the ground for maintaining that they do not transgress the 2nd Declaration of the Hague Congress is, that neither their *sole* or even main object is the dispersion of noxious or injurious gases, but simply the same object as the ordinary shell—namely, destruction by concussion or explosion, any formation of gas being incidental and trifling in amount. On the other hand, the amount of destruction or suffering inflicted is immaterial if the result attained is considered to be proportionate. For instance, no objection is made to the legitimate and proper use of mines or torpedoes, and it is perfectly permissible to ram a vessel and sink her with all hands.

In the course of a paper on "Problems of Neutrality connected with the Russo-Japanese War" read at the Royal Naval

College, Greenwich, by the Rev. Dr. Lawrence, the lecturer referred to the floating of mines *on the high seas*, and the destruction, by a Russian mine, of the Japanese battleship *Hatsuse*, and consequent terrible loss of life. The lecturer observed that there were no precedents for guidance in dealing with the matter. It seemed to him, however, that every sound principle was against a belligerent transforming any part of the open sea into a mine field. At the same time, if mines placed in belligerent waters, where they might be properly used, got loose, and floating about interfered with neutral navigation, then the case was on all fours with that of a stray shot which, missing one of the belligerent ships, might perchance do damage to a neutral vessel in the vicinity. Vice-Admiral Harris, who occupied the chair on the occasion of this lecture, expressed his opinion that while belligerents certainly had a right to lay mines within the three-mile limit, it was undoubtedly an interference with the rights of neutrals to place them ten miles out. Suppose, he said, we were at war with France, and each side laid mines ten miles out in the Channel, life would not be worth living for any merchant vessel using those waters. Of course, the mines in the Yellow Sea might have broken adrift, and he hoped that was the case. It is believed in naval circles that this question will be brought to the attention of the Hague Tribunal, in order that a clause bearing on it may be added to the rules of law which the tribunal has laid down.

Abuses of flags of truce, of the badges or flags of the Geneva Convention, or of the military insignia or uniform of the enemy, are breaches of the laws of war. An instance of abuse of the white flag appears to have occurred at the battle of Nan-shan (Kin-chau). It was stated by a wounded Japanese officer that the reason why the Japanese losses in that battle were so heavy was that the Russians displayed a white flag and apparently surrendered. "We advanced," he said, "and were on the point of passing them when the enemy fired point blank, killing and wounding many of our men." It may not be generally known that while the enemy is not bound to receive a flag of truce, the bearer of one is inviolate, and may not be fired upon, injured, or even taken prisoner.

The principal instance of *bombardment* was, of course, that of Port Arthur. The bombardment of unfortified and undefended places is forbidden, except where it occurs in connection with the destruction of valuable naval or military establishments, or where supplies are forcibly withheld. In the Chino-Japanese War, on the 18th and 19th January, 1895, a Japanese squadron bombarded Tung-chow in order to divert the attention of the Chinese troops from Yung-chow, the point at which the Japanese force was to land. The operation, never intended to be more than a diversion, was altogether insignificant, but the missionaries in Tung-chow formulated a complaint that the Japanese *wantonly bombarded a peaceful town*. There was no doubt, however, that it was defended by forts, which replied to the Japanese fire. It is now the practice to give notice permitting women, children, and other non-combatants to leave places which are about to be bombarded; but it seems that this notice is not legally necessary.

The use of *savage auxiliaries* by one civilised Power against another, although it is strictly condemned, can hardly be termed illegal; and savage troops may undoubtedly be employed where they are regularly embodied, trained, and led by European (and now presumably by Japanese) officers.

The use of *spies* is allowable, but in the event of their capture the penalty is death by hanging after trial by court-martial. During the Franco-German War of 1870 the Germans treated as spies persons crossing their lines in balloons. These were severely punished, although the death penalty was not enforced; and now, by the Declaration of Brussels, balloonists are no longer treated as spies, and their *status* as prisoners of war is defined by the Official Manual for officers of the French army.

We now come to an important subject, namely, that relating to *ships* and *maritime relations* during hostilities. The

ships of an enemy, both warships and merchant vessels, may be attacked and captured in their own ports and waters, in the ports and waters of the attacking Power, and on the high seas; but they cannot be interfered with in *neutral* ports or waters. Government ships of a belligerent may be captured unless engaged in exploration or scientific investigation; unless they are *cartel-ships* (*i.e.*, public or private vessels employed exclusively as transports for the conveyance of exchanged prisoners); or are hospital ships flying the Geneva cross, and designated as such, and other vessels carrying sick and wounded under that flag. The enemy's *private* ships may be captured, except those lying in the enemy's ports at the commencement of hostilities; but enemy ships entering territorial waters after war has commenced are liable to seizure and confiscation. Fishing boats engaged in *coast* fishing, and their gear, are exempt from seizure, but not those engaged in *deep-sea* fishing. In connection with the subject of fishing-vessels, and as an illustration of the splendid patriotic feeling among all classes of the Japanese, it may be mentioned that early in the war the poor deep-sea fishermen (whose livelihood is ever a very precarious one) were preparing to set out for the fishing grounds off the Korean coast, but they first consulted the naval authorities at Tokio as to whether they could do so with safety. On being advised to abandon their project on account of the risks to which they would be exposed in wartime, the fishermen resolved to utilise their craft as a volunteer fleet for use in their country's service as opportunities should offer themselves.

Belligerent vessels which at the outbreak of war are on a voyage to a hostile port from a hostile or a neutral one, and vessels which have commenced loading at an enemy's or other foreign port (not having issued from such port), are usually exempted from capture during a specified period; and permission is occasionally granted for an enemy's vessels with cargo for a hostile port to enter and leave same safely. A difficulty will be remembered which arose in connection with the Russian gunboat *Mandjur*, which the Chinese, on the 17th February, 1904, had warned to leave Shanghai, under pressure of the Japanese Consul. As the Russian captain did not seem at all inclined to clear out, representing that he was awaiting orders from his Admiral, the Japanese stationed the *Akitsushima* cruiser at Woosung, under orders to keep an eye on the gunboat. On the 27th March the Chinese Foreign Office advised the Taotai at Shanghai that the Russian Minister at Pekin had agreed to dismantle the *Mandjur*, which operation was completed on the 31st March, the *Akitsushima* leaving immediately afterwards.

During the course of the war there have been many incidents illustrative of the right of *visitation and search* of vessels of different nationalities. The object of this visitation and search, it may be explained for the benefit of the lay mind, is to ascertain the nationality of a ship and the nature of her cargo. The right is strictly a belligerent one, and does not exist in time of peace, except by Treaty. The warships or government vessels of neutral Powers *cannot at any time* be visited and searched by a belligerent; and an enemy's *private* vessels may only be stopped, visited, and overhauled in time of war *on the high seas*, with the object of discovering whether they or their cargoes are *contraband of war, or otherwise liable to seizure*. Piratical vessels, or those suspected of being pirates, can be visited at any time. Respecting this right, which is frequently abused, a strong attitude was assumed by Captain Presbitero of the Italian cruiser *Marco Polo*, who reported that on the 14th March, 1904, near Suda Bay, he came across the Russian *Dmitri Donskoi*, also a cruiser. The Russian (which had previously stopped several men-of-war and merchantmen) fired a blank shot across the bows of the *Marco Polo;* but Captain Presbitero, who questioned the Russian's right to dictate to a neutral warship, declined to stop, and forthwith continued his voyage to China without further molestation. The Japanese, on the other hand, seized the Norwegian steamer *Hermes* on the 9th February, . 1904, near Port Arthur,



A TEMPLE PRISON-HOUSE: JAPAN'S HANDSOME TREATMENT OF HER RUSSIAN CAPTIVES.

Russian prisoners from Nan-Shan and Kin-Chau in a Buddhist Temple at Matsuyama, Japan.

and took her into Nagasaki. Near Chefoo, also, they took three other Norwegian merchantmen, the *Lena*, *Activ*, and *Sentis*, all of which were found to be laden with coal for the Russians. On the same date the Russians were kind enough to sink a British steamer, the *Fuping*, at Port Arthur. The *Fuping* was leaving the harbour, and when abreast of the Russian guardship, the latter, without giving any warning, fired three shells, two of which hit the British ship in the bows and seriously wounded five Chinese passengers. The *Fuping's* papers being subsequently found to be all in order, the Russian captain apologised to the British commander, alleging that it was a *mistake!* The other British steamers, the *Frankby* and *Ettrickdale*, laden with coal for China, were also stopped by the Russians, but were subsequently released. They also detained for eight days the Norwegian steamer *Mathilde*, on a voyage to Nagasaki, but she was afterwards released. An unfortunate incident, however, occurred in connection with the *Hsiping*, a British steamer which, through stress of weather, sought shelter on the 10th February in the roadstead of Port Arthur, as did also the British steamer *Chingping*, and the German steamer *Pronto*. When night came on the Russian authorities ordered the lights on all these vessels to be put out. Subsequently a Russian war-vessel came into harbour and commenced firing on the ships, the *Pronto* receiving most of the shots. The forts also commenced to fire on both the Russian man-of-war and the merchant vessels! Next day the Russians ordered the *Hsiping* to proceed to Dalny, where she was detained for four days under guard, in spite of the protests of her captain, the Russians alleging that their mine-transport had been blown up and no one knew the positions of the mines. Finally the *Hsiping* was allowed to continue her voyage to Shanghai. Among other British ships captured and detained were the *Foxton Hall* and the *Rosalie*. The British India Mail Steamer *Mombasa* was chased in the Red Sea by a Russian fleet, after two shots had been fired across her bows, but after a long examination she was allowed to proceed. More recently some incidents took place which threatened serious consequences at the time, namely, the seizure of the German Mail Steamer *Prinz Heinrich* and the British liner *Malacca*, also the sinking of the British steamer *Knight Commander*, all of which exploits were effected by the so-called Russian "volunteer" squadron.

With respect to a *volunteer* navy, its legality largely depends upon the amount of control which the Power employing it exercises over the ships and their crews. It stands to reason, however, that if a merchant vessel starts on a voyage as such, she must retain that character till her voyage is ended; and if she throws off the guise of a merchantman and assumes that of a warship, she cannot be considered other than a pirate.

Before proceeding to consider the Law of Neutrality it may be added that, for the purpose of protecting neutral Powers, and deciding as to the validity of captures and adjustment of claims, all civilised Powers establish Prize Courts. The jurisdiction of such Courts extends not merely to captures by warships of their own flag, but also to exceptional captures during peace. A Prize Court must be a duly constituted one, sitting in the territory of the captor, or of his ally, but not in neutral territory. Japan organised, in the Chino-Japanese War, a Prize Court, issued Prize Laws, and even despatched law officers to the headquarters of the army and to the flagships of her navy, in order that they might advise on such questions of International Law as should arise during the war.

Neutrality.

One of the most important questions at the outbreak of the war was the position which China would take up, and whether she would pronounce her neutrality and abide by it. Early in February she issued Imperial Edicts announcing that war had broken out between Russia and Japan, and that, seeing that those nations were friendly with her, she must declare her neutrality. The Viceroys and Governors were therefore enjoined to maintain neutrality, preserve order, and protect

merchants and property. At Pekin the authorities were specially warned against allowing evil rumours to spread; the importance of protecting foreign legations and churches was emphasised; disturbers of the peace were threatened with severe punishment, and grave offenders with decapitation.

Being neither judge nor party, a *neutral* must exhibit such absolute impartiality that neither of the belligerents may obtain any substantial advantage or privilege over the other; on the other hand, a *belligerent* must pay scrupulous respect to the sovereignty of his neutral neighbours. A neutral is not permitted to give armed assistance to either party, even though he may have promised to do so before the war; he may not lend money to either side, or guarantee such loan; he must not permit the passage of belligerent troops through his territory, or the levying within it of troops for belligerent service; nor may he give or sell armed ships or other instruments of warfare to a belligerent. Furthermore, he must prevent and cancel all acts of hostility, either in the neutral territory itself or in the adjacent waters, prohibit the exercise of any belligerent jurisdiction therein, disarm and intern any troops attempting to traverse neutral territory, and set at liberty all prisoners of war found within its borders. A *belligerent* must not carry on hostilities within neutral territory; use neutral harbours for fitting out expeditions, recruiting men, or obtaining supplies of arms and stores; nor use neutral territory as a base of operations. He must scrupulously observe all regulations of neutral states as to the admission of their cruisers and their prizes into neutral ports, and the amount of innocent supplies they may take on board; must disarm and intern their troops driven across neutral frontiers, and make reparation to any state whose neutrality he may have violated.

The subject of *visitation and search* of vessels has already been dealt with at some length, and it need only be added that by the 2nd Article of the Declaration of Paris: "The neutral flag covers enemies' goods, with the exception of contraband of war"; and by the 3rd article, "Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag." With regard to *convoy*, it seems clear that the right of search cannot be defeated by the acceptance of convoy, and resistance on the part of convoying ships renders all the convoyed vessels liable to capture.

The subject of *contraband of war* is an important one, there being great diversity of opinion as to what articles may be classed as contraband, and frequently treaties are entered into between nations, in which are specified the various articles which are to be considered by them as contraband; and belligerents generally publish a list of the articles to be so treated. Provisions, being articles of ambiguous use, are not, as a rule, contraband; but they may become so under certain circumstances. In the case of the *Frau Margaretha*, on the 25th July, 1805, Dutch cheese on a voyage from Amsterdam to Quimper was held not to be contraband, whilst *on the following day* Dutch cheese fit for naval stores, going on a voyage from Amsterdam to Corunna on the ship *Zelden Rust*, was condemned owing to the proximity of the destination to the naval port of Ferrol. In 1885 France, during her war with China, declared rice contraband. Articles of widest usage are generally contraband, as horses, sulphur, saltpetre; and materials for naval construction, such as timber, spars, engines, engine fittings, sail-cloth, rope, copper, hemp, and tar, have been considered contraband by mutual consent; also money, clothing, and unwrought metals. Coal was declared contraband by France in 1859 and 1870; but during the Franco-German war England considered that it ought to be determined by its destination.

Early in the present war (February, 1904), in reply to a Cardiff firm who had approached him, Lord Lansdowne said: "I am to state, generally, that coal is an article *ancipitis usus*, not *per se* contraband of war, but if destined for warlike, as opposed to industrial, use, it may become contraband. Whether in

any particular case coal is or is not contraband of war is a matter *primâ facie* for the determination of the prize courts of the captor's nationality, and so long as such decision when given does not conflict with well-established principles and rules of International Law, his Majesty's Government will not be prepared to take exception thereto. I am to add that his Majesty's Government are not at present aware that any declaration on the subject has been made by either of the belligerents." On the 10th February Japan published a notification of the various articles to be deemed contraband, among which *coal* was included. This was followed by the Russian regulations, issued in March following, which included "every kind of fuel, such as *coal*, naphtha, spirits, etc." Raw cotton was also specified as contraband in the Russian schedule; but, in answer to various enquiries, it was stated that the declaration applied only to raw cotton suitable for the manufacture of explosives, and not to cotton yarns or tissues. It has been stated that the Japanese Government foresaw the probability of coal being declared contraband, and consequently had for years been laying in large stores of Welsh coal, which was imperative for the use of torpedo-boats and destroyers, owing to its smokeless character.

As regards *telegraph cables*, those between points in the territory of an enemy are generally subject to such treatment as the necessities of war may require; but cables between the territory of an enemy and neutral territory may be interrupted within the territorial jurisdiction of the enemy. A submarine cable between two neutral points is generally held to be inviolable, although censorship may possibly be exercised over it, as Great Britain did in the West Indian ports during the Spanish-American War. In March, 1904, the Japanese Consul at Chefoo warned the Great Northern Telegraph Company that any attempt to repair the cable between Chefoo and Port Arthur would be deemed a breach of neutrality, and the Company replied that no attempt would be made to do so without the permission of the Japanese Government. As regards *despatches*, these are commonly classed as contraband. By hostile despatches is not meant ordinary mails.

In concluding this article one cannot refrain from paying a tribute to Japan for the way in which she has observed the rules of International Law in her present conflict, her chivalrous treatment of her wounded and prisoner enemies, and her strict compliance with all the laws and usages of neutrality.