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(THE HORMIC THEORY

(Advanced Psychology)

BY

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To

DR. AMARANATHA JHA, M.A., D.LITT., F.R.S.L.,
in token of love and gratitude.

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PREFACE

During the first four decades of this century William McDougall was an outstanding leader in undisputed command of a large section of modern psychology. His premature death in 1939, an event which he foresaw on purely biological grounds, has laid on us the onerous responsibility of systematising and giving publicity to his Hormic theory. Articles and pamphlets on McDougall's Hormism do, no doubt, exist in a widely scattered form. But the need of the hour is a compact systematic treatise, nay a series of treatises, expounding all aspects of the Hormic theory. The present work is the first of the series of monographs, to be followed by others, dealing with the important aspects of Hormic psychology.

McDougall was never a back-number in psychology while alive, and since his death his influence has been steadily spreading. It will be an act of self-delusion to imagine that the star of McDougall has begun to set. There is no school of psychology which has not been irritated into vital activity by hormic stimuli, no psychologist who has not fallen a willing victim to the seductive charms of McDougallian hormism or who has not turned into a violent antagonist, and no section of Sociology, Political Philosophy or Philosophical History which has not benefitted by its alliance with our school. These facts point to the urgent need for presenting Hormic Psychology in a systematic form.

The author of this book has confined himself to a study of the foundations of the conative aspects of Hormic Psychology. The cognitive elements in Hormism have been purposely omitted from the plan of this book. This volume is divided into three parts: the first part essays a critical analysis of the conative and affective elements of the Hormic theory. An attempt has been made to trace the evolution of the theory, and to show that its origin in

Social Psychology is much more promising and satisfying than its later stages in *An Outline of Psychology* and *The Energies of Men*. Chapters three, four and five throw new light on McDougall's psychology. The author is no blind admirer of McDougall, but a discriminating friend and critic ready to apply the probe and the prune where they are needed. He does not hesitate to attack the vulnerable points in the McDougallian theory, and to point out how they may be strengthened by material drawn from the Psycho-analytic school as well as from other contemporary schools.

The Second part of the book discusses the relationship between McDougall and the leaders of the other schools. The aim here is not so much the patching of the weak-points in Hormism as reconciling the conflicting rival schools with one another in order to bring about unity in psychology. Behaviourism, Gestalttheorie, Psychoanalysis, Factor theory and Middle-of-the-road psychology are all examined and shown to fit into an organic scheme of unified psychology. An attempt is made in the last chapter of this section to draw the attention of the students of psychology to the intimate relationship between *McDougall and Hindu Psychology*.

The Third part of the book is an attempt to offer a psychological solution to the burning problems of the day in the fields of Aesthetics, Sociology and Political Science.

The Second and Third Sections of the book are mostly original, and throughout the author has kept two aims steadily in view—to make hormic psychology the rallying ground for those who wish to serve under the banner of unity, and to reconcile Western with Eastern Psychology. These goals explain the many apparently novel and tortuous pathways carved by the author out of the unyielding rock of academic psychology.

It may be asked why no mention is made of McDougall's contribution to the psychology of perception, memory

and meaning in the First Section, and why in the Second Section, Jung and Adler are conspicuous by their absence, and why in the last section the field of Education has been left severely alone and untouched. The answer is that the author is not unaware of these omissions. This is the first of a series of monographs on Hormic Psychology. Others will follow, perhaps written by more competent and erudite scholars. For the present, select we must out of the vast mass of material available to us, and the mode of selection is bound to be intimately personal.

The substance of some of the chapters of this monograph appeared formerly in a different form in the papers contributed by the author to the pages of the following journals :

Allahabad University Studies
 Journal of the Annamalai University
 The Philosophical Quarterly
 The Annals of Sri Venkateswara Oriental Institute
 The Review of Philosophy and Religion
 Prabuddha Bharata
 The Indian Journal of Psychology
 Kane Memorial Volume
 The C. R. Reddy Memorial Volume, and
 The Annamalainagar Miscellany

The author is deeply grateful to the editors of these periodicals for their kindness in according to him permission for making free use of the material contained in the papers published under his name in the above journals. To *M/S Methuen and Co.*, as well as to the heirs and administrators of the estate of the late Professor William McDougall, the author is indebted for permission to reproduce certain lines and passages from the Professor's works.

The author is grateful to Dr. Amaranatha Jha, M.A., D.Litt., F.R.S.L., for permission to dedicate the book to him.

The study of McDougall has inspired the author to undertake fundamental research in psychology. The writer of this monograph will consider himself amply rewarded for his labour if the younger generation of psychologists will get similarly inspired by a study of *The Hormic Theory*.

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THE HORMIC THEORY

CHAPTER I

A Preliminary Exposition of the Hormic Theory

INTRODUCTION

'It is too simple to be true!' said a critic who was not very friendly to McDougall's psychological theory. We must admit that the theory is really simple, so simple that it can be expressed in two simple sentences, (1) 'Animal as well as human behaviour is *purposive*'; and (2) 'Purpose implies a *purposing mind*.' Yet this theory has exercised a profound influence not only on academic psychology, but also on the social sciences and animal biology. In psychology McDougall's hormism has produced a Copernican revolution, shifting the centre of interest from the barren field of abstract cognitive analysis to the real and living realm of feeling and conation. It has engendered in the psychologist a hitherto unknown degree of self-confidence and a spirit of hopefulness in his capacity to solve the riddles of life. To the student of the social sciences it offers, in the place of unscientific and self-contradictory *ad hoc* psychologies which each one of them constructed for one's own narrow purposes at variance with and often in defiance of the others, a thoroughly tested, reliable, and scientific psychology of human nature. And to the animal biologist, by forcing him to recognise the existence of *mind* even in the humblest of living creatures, hormic psychology opens up a vast vista of knowledge and experience hitherto hidden from him by mechanistic biology. Not only in these major fields, but in other minor ones too McDougall's influence is being felt. Moreover, there is not a writer of any importance in psychology and the social sciences who does not refer to the great leader of the hormic school. What, then, are the outstanding features of this psychological theory which

is known as the *hormic theory*? It is to the task of supplying an adequate answer to this question that we shall address ourselves in this monograph. An attempt will be made to analyse the theory, and to set forth its implications. At the same time the critical evaluation of the more significant contributions of the theory to the elucidation of baffling psychological problems will be made, and what is of the utmost importance, it will be shown how the defects in the theory may be rectified, and in what directions it may be fruitfully extended. The extended hormic theory which may be called the Neo-Hormic theory, will be the result of a synthesis of McDougallian hormism and Freudian psycho-analysis. This Neo-Hormic theory will be presented as the crown and consummation of all other contemporary psychological theories. And finally, the theory will be tested out in the more important fields of human social organisation. This task is undertaken, because we feel that when the conflicting schools of psychology come to realise the need, as they must do very soon, for sinking their differences and for evolving a single all-embracing psychological theory, they will find that in the hormic theory there is the foundation, well and truly laid, for a unified psychology.

The Background.

Such an outstanding and epoch-making psychological theory as the hormic theory could not have come into existence without a significant history behind it. But, the purely historical aspect of the development of the theory is not of any great interest to us. What we need is a critical evaluation of the significant antecedents of the theory in the evolution of psychology. In common with other contemporary schools, the hormic school revolted against the barren intellectualism and excessive introspectionism of the later nineteenth century. Associationism with its atomistic conception of mental structure and function found for itself a fresh source of a strength and support in mechanistic biology and chemistry, and also in

the physiology of the *muscle-nerve* preparation type. By 1900, a very interesting period of transition was reached in the evolution of psychology, wherein the germs of the brilliant contemporary theories seem to lie unreconciled by the side of the old principles which were soon going to be thrown overboard. At the commencement of the century psychology was still looked upon as the science of consciousness, yet greater emphasis was laid on behaviour. Associationism was there, but a cloud of distrust and suspicion was beginning to envelop the shady 'mental chemistry' of the associationist. But the most surprising tendency was the disregard that was developing for brain studies in spite of the ascendancy which physiological psychology was gaining over the minds of leading psychologists. It is against this background that we have to view the contributions, not only of hormic psychology, but also of other contemporary schools. But in the case of McDougall there is an important middle ground which enters into and colours the foreground. This middle ground is represented by behaviourism. *An Outline of Psychology* which along with *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology* constitutes the most valuable contribution of McDougall to contemporary psychology, is in fact one long and sustained argument against the conclusions of mechanistic psychology. We have, therefore, to view the hormic theory as a protest not only against the older intellectualistic schools, but also against the modern mechanistic behaviourism.

Some one has remarked that a student taking up the study of McDougall's psychology for the first time may be led into the belief that our author is a behaviourist, because great stress is laid here on 'performance' as against 'experience', and because animal studies figure most prominently in the opening chapters of his more important publications. It is true McDougall attaches great value to the study of animal behaviour, but that does not make him a behaviourist. Behaviourism and purposivism are poles apart. Their agreement is, in

effect, only negative. It is similar to the pact which two extremists, mutually opposed to each other, may enter into for the purpose of defeating a common enemy. Behaviourism and purposivism took up a revolutionary attitude towards associationism and condemned it more emphatically. But there the agreement ended. As soon as behaviourism and purposivism emerged from the distant background, the latter separated itself from and protested against the aims and methods of the former. For behaviourism the subject matter of psychology is behaviour. The movements of the organism in time and place are studied by this young science without any reference whatsoever to introspective methods. The conditioned reflex is the principle *par excellence* of the behaviourist for explaining all the highly intricate and complex forms of human behaviour. The behaviourist sees nothing mysterious in personality, which is merely 'the sum total of an individual's reactions and tendencies to reaction.' Personality can be studied by the matter-of-fact methods of science. The study of behaviour, prediction of the future acts of behaviour, and their control on the basis of the mechanistic S-R formula are the main aims of the behaviouristic movement in psychology. Against every one of the principles implied in the method and aims of this movement McDougall protested very strongly. So, we have to consider the development of purposivism against this middle-ground of S-R psychology. Purposivism exposes the inherent defects of behaviourism, corrects these defects, and then, after assimilating all that is of value in mechanism, towers over it in its new-found strength drawn from the correct understanding of the hidden springs of human behaviour.

Some Relevant Aspects of McDougall's Life and Work.

Before we enter into a critical discussion of purposivism, we should consider two topics apparently of minor importance, but having some significant bearing on the general nature of McDougall's psychology. These are,

(1) the influence of McDougall's early life on his psychology, and (2) the value of our author's earlier work in the field of neurology.

All obituary surveys of William McDougall's life and work have been drawn freely on his autobiographical sketch in *The History of Psychology in Autobiography*. This article is a mine of information about the way in which McDougall's mind developed, and incidentally it throws light on certain obscure characteristics of purposivism. We may refer at once to the question which has been uppermost in the minds of many students of hormic psychology, 'Why did not McDougall found a school of psychology as Watson did or the Gestalt leaders did?' The answer is to be found in McDougall's autobiographical essay. McDougall confesses there to a compelling sense of isolationism that was dominant in his mind. He could not toe the line with members of a group, although they may have been of his own way of thinking. Always he stood outside the group 'critical and ill-content'. This inherent mental trait is largely responsible for the utter indifference which McDougall displayed for the benefits to be derived from founding a school of hormic psychology. Had he been more aggressive, the hormic theory would have been better understood, and more widely recognised as the most satisfactory principle for the explanation of human behaviour. This fact was brought home to the mind of our author in a very poignant manner in his later life. In the preface to *Psychological analysis and Social Psychology* (published in 1936) McDougall writes, 'I have realised too late that I might have done much more for my chosen science, had I from the first spoken with a less modest voice. It seems to me probable that, had I at the outset put forward my views in a more self-assertive and clamant fashion, I might have been acknowledged as the leader of a powerful and perhaps dominant school of psychology, instead of remaining a well-nigh solitary outsider playing a lone hand; I might even put over the type of psychology which I be-

lieve to be most nearly true, and to be indispensable for the advance of all the social sciences. For, in psychology, far more than in any other field of science, the prestige and authority of a like-minded group would seem to be essential to the success of any theory or system.* The unfortunate mental trait to which McDougall has frankly confessed has forced him to stand aloof as a solitary outsider, and has deprived him of the power to create a like-minded group. The loss is all on our side of the students of psychology.

There is another biographical incident of great importance to us. It relates to the genesis of the central hormic thesis, and illustrates strikingly the non-rational and intuitive origin of all great scientific hypotheses. While McDougall was lecturing to his class in the year 1903, he made one day the sweeping statement that 'the energy displayed in every human activity might in principle be traced back to some inborn disposition or instinct.' He realised that this statement was without any precedent, and that it was absolutely original and prophetic. But, later as he developed the thesis in his monumental works he realised how true to nature it was. First an intuitive insight, and then the rational development that is the way in which science has developed. The great truth underlying the hormic theory revealed itself all on a sudden to the gifted mind of McDougall in a flash of insight, and then it was patiently developed by the founder of hormic psychology. And in the process of development the theory has undergone radical changes, not always for the better.

The second topic worthy of treatment in a preliminary approach to psychology, is the significance of McDougall's work in the field of physiological psychology. We attach special importance to this work, because it exemplifies the operation of the hormic principle even in the early physio-

* *op. cit.*, p. v.

logical contributions of McDougall. In a series of brilliant papers contributed to *Mind* and *Brain* McDougall showed how the synapse is the real seat of consciousness. As a fruitful corollary to this position, he developed a theory of inhibition which is eminently purposive. Inhibition was, and is still to a large extent to-day, looked upon merely as an obstructive or negative process. McDougall laid bare the positive foundations of inhibition: There is here a re-distribution, not merely a simple damming up, of energy. And this re-distribution takes place at all levels of neural activity. Viewed in this light, the principle of inhibition fits in with the psycho-analytic accounts of 'displacement' and 'sublimation,' as well as with the behaviouristic account of 'the conditioned reflex.' This conception of inhibition is of special importance to us because it places purpose at the very foundation of even the mechanistic aspects of biology and psychology.

The Orienting Category of Purpose.

In estimating the value of McDougall's contribution to psychological theory, it is well to point out at the outset the orientation he has given to the entire field of the study of human nature in its many aspects by the introduction of the category of *purpose*. Causation is the ruling concept in the physical science, and evolution in the biological sciences. The social sciences were wandering aimlessly without any such category or guiding principle. Facts had been gathered by the thousand, but they were like so many loosely scattered, disorganised, and dis-oriented iron filings in a non-magnetic field. McDougall brought into this chaotic mass the powerful electro-magnet of the category of purpose, and immediately the disorderly mass marshalled itself into an orderly sequence of events. Working with its aid, and under its guidance the psychologist has no difficulty in unravelling the tangled skein of human behaviour, social as well as individual, sub-conscious as well as conscious. Truly may it be said that the introduction of *the concept of purpose has produced a*

revolution in psychology as deep and significant as the Copernican revolution in mathematical physics, or the Darwinian revolution in biology.

The introduction of the oriental concept of *purpose* into psychology was the result of the objective observation of animal behaviour carefully controlled by rigorous scientific standards. McDougall noted and analysed out certain characteristics of the behaviour of living organisms. They are spontaneity, movement; persistence of activity independently of the continuation of the stimulus, variation of the direction of the persistent 'movements in order to overcome obstacles, cessation of movement when the goal is reached and the needs of the organism are satisfied, preparation for the new situation towards the production of which the action contributes, improvement in the efficacy of behaviour with successive repetitions of the act, and finally the total reaction of the organism to the behavioural situation. Wherever we notice all these seven characteristic of behaviour we may safely argue for the purposiveness of the activity of the behaving agent. Purposiveness is the essence of mental activity, and is an expression and manifestation of mind. *The view that all animal and human behaviour is purposive, and that purposive action is fundamentally different from mechanical processes is the corner-stone of the hormic theory.*

The Biological Basis of Hormic Psychology.

In connection with, and in support of his hormic hypothesis McDougall has made a very elaborate study of animals at all levels of the evolutionary scale—from the humblest amoeba to the most developed primate next to man. This has given rise to the belief that McDougall has made psychology biological and that this biological foundation has made psychology much more scientific than it would be without it. The implications of this statement are far-reaching. It is true that animal studies constitute a most important section of McDougall's major works, but it is not biology of 'dissection' that our author

presses into his service, but biology which deals with the *mind* of the animal and with purposive behaviour of living creatures. McDougall makes his position very clear in his essay in '*The History of Psychology in Autobiography*.' He points out there that the most serious fault of the ineffective psychologies of the late nineteenth century was their compromising attitude towards mechanistic biology. This attitude made them blind to the essentially teleological nature of animal behaviour, and therefore, tended to reduce psychology to the level of mechanistic physiology. By his refreshingly original and inspiring attitude to biology McDougall has raised biology up to a higher level, and has forced the students of animal life to recognise the presence of mind in the creatures whose behaviour they are studying.

. Mental Structure and Mental Function.

The consideration of purpose in the realm of animal and human behaviour leads us to the next great contribution of McDougall to psychological theory. Purpose implies a purposing mind. What then is the nature of this mind? In answering this question McDougall draws a distinction between structure and function which has great value for students of psychology. The distinction, let us point out at once, is not the usual distinction between neural and cerebral structure and mental function which is somehow to be associated with that structure; nor is it the distinction on the basis of which the puzzling distinction between neurosis and psychosis is drawn. It is an epoch-making distinction between *mental structure* and *mental function* that McDougall attempts to draw for the first time in the history of psychology. This distinction is bound to revolutionise our outlook in psychology, particularly in abnormal psychology.

The method of inferring structure from function is used very widely in contemporary science. The minute details of the structural organisation relating to electrons and genes, which by their very nature are invisible, have

been drawn with astonishing skill. That which is unobservable is made to generate observable behaviour under known conditions. And from the observed results the structure of the unobservable organisation which has given rise to these results is inferred by the hypothetico-deductive method. It is in this way that the organisation of electrons and protons in an atom, of atoms in a molecule, and of genes in a chromosome are reconstructed and presented to us. These, of course, are not artefacts, but at the same time it must be remembered that they are only mental constructs or conceptual hypotheses based, no doubt, on perceptual facts. While such a procedure is believed to generate 'hard objective facts' in the physical and biological sciences, there is no reason why it should not yield the same result in psychology. McDougall employed this well-tried scientific method for establishing those facts which constitute the core of the hormic theory.

The implication of this procedure is so little known even to those scientists who make an extensive use of it in their researches, that it is necessary to elaborate it to a certain extent. Spectroscopy is now an important branch of experimental physics. The spectroscope yields, when it is employed in the experiments relating to the structure of the nucleus of matter, a negative with certain characteristic lines. These lines are made the starting point for an elaborate process of hypothetico-deductive reasoning at the end of which (after passing, no doubt, through the highly abstract and symbolic realm of mathematics) a picture is presented to us of the way in which the electrons dance round the protons. Between the final conclusion and the original premises the connection is remote, hypothetical, and inferential. Yet the layman believes that the scientist *sees* electrons just as we see books and ink-stands on our table. Great indeed is the ascendancy over the lay mind that the scientist has secured! Similarly from the colour of the eye of the fruit fly the experimental geneticist infers not only the existence, but the exact

position of the gene in a particular chromosome in the cell. Here again the man in the street is blissfully unaware of the fact that the gene is a mental construct. But when the self-same method is employed in psychology, and equally objective conclusions are drawn by the 'hard rigorous scientific method' and presented to the lay public, the reaction is different. Every lay man has a mind, and therefore, is not the owner of a mind competent to criticise the conclusions of those who meddle in minds? However, we may assure the lay public that so far as the methodology of the investigation of mental structure goes, hormic psychology is on a level with mathematical physics and experimental biology.

McDougall attaches very rightly great importance to the distinction between mental structure and mental function. The concluding sections of the opening chapter of his great work *An Outline of Psychology*, is devoted to this topic. 'Mental structure is', he says there, 'that enduring, growing framework of the mind which we infer from the observed manifestations of mind in experience and in behaviour; and . . . this develops, grows, and even when the mind is at rest endures. . . .'* Next to the introduction of the orienting concept of purpose into the erstwhile chaotic field of psychology, this distinction between mental *structure* and mental *function* ranks as the most significant contribution of McDougall to contemporary psychology.

The Instinctual Structure of Mind.

The next contribution of McDougall is the analysis of mental structure as inferred scientifically from behaviour. This is the foundation of hormic psychology, and in one sense at least, is the most valuable gift of McDougall to the whole race of psychologists and sociologists. After a very careful examination of behaviour among animals, primitive men, and civilised nations, McDougall came to the epoch-making conclusion that *mind is instinctual in*

* *op. cit.*, p. 41.

essence. He has proved convincingly that the foundations of human behaviour are in no wise different from those of the instinctive activities of the higher animals. All human conduct without any exception whatsoever is inspired by instinctive motives. At birth we, just like the higher animals, inherit a few instinctive dispositions. These innate tendencies force us to attend spontaneously to certain groups of things, to experience certain emotions when we so attend to them, and to behave in a particular manner towards the self-same objects. The difference between animal instincts and human instincts is that while the former are rigid and specific, the latter are elastic and generalised in their function.

After an extensive comparative study of primitive tribes and the higher mammals, McDougall concluded that there are about fourteen innate, inherited instinctual dispositions common to man and animals. These inborn tendencies undergo considerable modifications in the civilised society of human beings, so that it is not easy to recognise their primitive features in the refined accoutrement of modern man's polite behaviour. Yet the scientific psychologist and the psycho-analyst can easily uncover the hidden motives and lay them bare in all their primitive instinctual nakedness.

The Hormic Revolt

We are too near the event to realise fully the profound significance of the revolution that has taken place in psychology. Freud and McDougall have blazed the trail through the uncharted jungle of the human mind for all future psychologists. The utter futility of analytic psychology confined to cognition was keenly felt by the early sociologists and economists who began to theorise on their own account on the nature of human behaviour. The *ad hoc* psychologies of authors like Pareto, Le Bon, and Trotter have had a most pernicious influence on the development of our science, and to this deplorable effect has been added the not less retarding influence of the

crude creations misnamed psychologies of writers on ethics. To wipe out these popular psychologies is not easy, and will take a long time. McDougall has essayed the formidable task of setting things right by the publication of his *Social Psychology*. In spite of the simplicity, directness, and convincingness of the theory propounded by the leader of the hormic school, misunderstandings of its fundamental doctrines persist in the minds of many leading psychologists. We shall, therefore, clear the atmosphere of confusion by presenting the foundations of the hormic theory in sharp outline.

What is an Instinct ?

It has been mentioned already that hormic psychology gathers facts of mental structure from a careful observation of facts of behaviour. This process has shown that mind (of the animal as well as of man) is a 'bundle of instincts', to put it rather crudely and bluntly. There is nothing more and nothing less than 'instinct' in the mind of any member of the whole range of living organisms from the humblest amoeba to the proudest human being. What then is an instinct? 'An instinct is an innate disposition which determines the organism to perceive (to pay attention to) any object of a certain class, and to experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which finds expression in a specific mode of behaviour in relation to that object.* In an oft-quoted passage McDougall expresses in language which reaches poetic heights, the great importance of these instincts. 'We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instincts or of some habit derived from an instinct, every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated

* An Outline of Psychology, p. 110.

formidable battery of scientific evidence which shattered to shreds the mechanistic and tropistic conceptions of animal behaviour. Our behaviour has an unmistakable instinctive basis, and animals display remarkable intelligence in many of their acts of adaptation to the environment. Instinct and intelligence are to be used, not as contradictory and mutually exclusive, but as complementary principles of explanation of behaviour. In fact intelligence is a part of instinct, and is subservient to it. 'The chief lesson', says McDougall, 'I would have the student learn from the behaviour of insect is that instinct and intelligence are not two diverse principles of action or of guidance of action. Instinctive behaviour is indistinguishable from intelligent behaviour by any outward mark. . . . Intelligence operates only and always in the service of the instinctive impulses to action.'* The conclusion is a great achievement in itself, backed as it is by an indisputable range of scientific evidence. Its implications, however, are of utmost value to the general hormic theory. It bases cognition and the development of cognitive abilities firmly in conation, making the latter the living stem of which the former are only branches. It dispels the illusion of the old type of psychology that cognition is independent of conation, and is different from it in essence.

The second error which McDougall corrects is a purely scientific one, and so much more difficult to tackle, and which even when disproved does not fail to exercise fascination over men's minds. Instinct is not to be identified with the congenitally determined pre-adaptation of the nervous system to react in a special way to specific stimuli. This is the biological view of instinct, and on this view instinctive behaviour is merely one kind of vital adaptation of organism. Biologists, at any rate some of them, tend to regard instincts as combinations of reflexes, and in any case there is no attempt in biology to rise

* *An Outline of Psychology*, pp. 92-93.

above the level of the body. Biology, as we have seen already, is interested only in the body of the animal, and its view of instincts is bound to be narrow and unsatisfactory. Psychology should not be misled by this type of biology.

Having dispelled the illusions besetting the concept of instinct, it becomes the duty of the hormic psychologist to describe the true structure of instinct. The first point that the hormic theory urges is that instinct is a fact of innate mental structure or organisation inferred from facts of behaviour. We are familiar with the marvellous models of life-like wax figures which move their limbs and organs in a very realistic manner. One who has a knowledge of the working of electrical machinery pertaining to these models can, by a careful observation of the movements of these figures, reconstruct the structure of the mechanism hidden inside. Similarly the leader of hormic psychology with a mind rich in information relating to animal behaviour, has constructed a picture of the instinctual structure of mind which initiates purposive behaviour. This picture, let us assert, is scientifically accurate, and may, without any hesitation, be accepted as their guiding principle by those who seek a true understanding of human nature.

Let us repeat here the hormic definition of instinct which we have given elsewhere. 'An instinct is an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action.' There are then, three distinguishable elements in the innate mental structure designated instinct. The first is the perceptive aspect, the second is the central or emotional aspect, and the third the executive, active, or behavioural aspect. If we keep our mind constantly alert, and do not succumb to the

usual temptations besetting the spatialisation of mental facts, then we can see clearly the significance of these three aspects in the diagram given below.

An Instinctual Unit.




Fig. 1

Diagram representing the tripartite division of an Instinct.

1. The perceptual aspect, 2a. The emotional aspect, 2b. Expressions of the emotion.
 3a. The behavioural aspect—preliminary stage.
 3b. " " " —final or consummatory stage.

Let us for the sake of simplicity consider a fundamental instinct, the instinct of *flight* or *escape*, with its concomitant emotion of *fear*. In its most primitive and elementary form, as it operates in the minds of very young children, it is stimulated by sudden loud, rasping noise, sudden loss of support, and physical pain. These excipients of the instinctive structure of the mind generate the emotion of fear, and the resulting behaviour is the loud cry of the child. In the case of the adult, the 'objects' which excite fear may be many and varied, their number and quality being determined by experience. But, running through all of them, we may detect one common characteristic, namely, anticipation of pain, physical or mental. Experience teaches the adult to be afraid of many things and persons, and often the springs of fear sink

deep down into the unfathomable (or unconscious) strata of the mind. The person who is the 'patient' may not know why he is afraid or even of what. Similarly, on the behavioural side too the adult has learnt to check and control his actions so that he might put on the mask of courage. So, the first and third aspects of an instinct are subject to considerable modifications in adult experience, and the only aspect which remains constant is the central effective or emotional aspect.




Fig. 2.

Conditioning, according to Pavlov, of the perceptual and behavioural aspects of the instinctual aspect of the mind.

NP 1 4 Natural stimuli of the perceptual aspect

CP 1....4 Artificial or conditioned stimuli replacing

NP 1...4

NB 1....4 Natural aspects of behaviour

CB 1... 4	Learnt or conditioned behaviour replacing
-----------	---

NB 1...4

The emotion pertaining to or concomitant with the instinctual structure of mind has, therefore, been held by McDougall to be of considerable importance, as it enables us to identify the instinct at work. '... the afferent or receptive part and the efferent or motor part are capable of being greatly modified, independently of one another and of the central part, in the course of the life-history of the individual; while the central part persists throughout life as the essential unchanging nucleus of the disposition.

Hence, in man, whose intelligence and adaptability are great, the afferent and efferent parts of each instinctive disposition are liable to many modifications while the central part alone remains unmodified. . . . the emotional excitement . . . is the only part of the total instinctive process that retains its specific character and remains common to all individuals and all situations in which the instinct is excited . . . each kind of emotional excitement is always an indication of, and the most constant feature of, some instinctive process.* An emotion, then, is the central, invariable, distinctive characteristic aspect of every instinctive process. This simple relationship, which is scientifically accurate, between instinct and emotion, was perceived clearly for the first time in the history of psychology by McDougall, and its formulation in clear terms is one of the outstanding contributions of our author to psychological theory. We shall return later to a detailed discussion of this very important topic of the nature of instinct-emotion relationship. At this stage, however, in order to make the hormic picture of the structure of instinct complete in all its details, we must notice the connection between the expression of emotion, and the expression of the instinct in the form of action or behaviour.




Fig. 3

The expressions of the Emotions and the Instincts.
The dovetailing between 2b and 3b is to be noted.

* Social Psychology, p. 29.

When an instinctual structure of the mind is stimulated by an appropriate excitant, then, there surges up a specific emotion which has its own bodily counterparts. These expressions of the emotion, both peripheral and visceral have been studied carefully and recent developments in endocrinology have served to throw valuable light on the whole problem of the utility of these neuromuscular and glandular activities. In fear, for example, the occurrence of the heightened activity of the adrenals, and the heart, the cessation of the digestive activities, the withdrawal of the blood-stream from the face, stomach, and intestines, and its concentrations in the muscles to be exercised in flight, and such other activities have been carefully studied, and has been shown how these are all directed towards one definite aim, namely, that of helping and accelerating the activity appropriate to the instinct, of which the emotion is the central aspect. Flight is the natural activity pertaining to the instinct of escape, and all the 'expressions of the emotion' of fear are organised to serve the cause of flight. The expressions of the emotions fit snugly into the activity of the instinct and further that activity. This observation is true generally of all instincts, and it is well to remember that sustained and patient experimentation is at the foundation of this hormic conclusion.

We should remind ourselves that our discussion is confined to the primitive natural level of mental structure, and that the more sophisticated levels of behaviour will be dealt with later. No purpose will be served by confusing the higher sentimentative level of human behaviour with the primitive instinctual level, and applying the principles properly belonging to the latter for the elucidation of the former.

The picture, then, that we get of the elements of the hormic structure of the mind is that each of these elements (or instincts) is excited by certain natural stimuli which in the course of experience may be replaced by many artificial ones, having sometimes very remote and slender con-

nections with the original excitants. The process of conditioning which has come to exercise a widespread (but not altogether healthy) fascination over the minds of psychologists belongs here. Conditioning is identical with the process of grafting practised by fruit-growers. Without the living stem the graft is worse than useless. The instinctive structure is the living dynamic stem on which the grafting process known as conditioning is to be carried out.

The appropriate excitant having been received by the instinct, there surges up the emotion, the constant central aspect and help to sustain or accelerate it. But, as in the case of the first aspect, the last also is subject to very considerable modifications through experience. It is supposed to be the high-water mark of the so-called civilised behaviour of the modern age to inhibit completely the natural activity appropriate to the basic elements of human nature. Such inhibition carries with it the inhibition of the more marked outward expressions of the emotion of that instinct.

The Hormic List of Instincts.

The significant question now arises, 'How many of these basic elements (called instincts) which hormic psychology has isolated and analysed with such clarity, are there in the human mind? McDougall has given different answers in his different epoch-making books, and this fact has been used as one of the arguments against the validity of the hormic theory. We are familiar with the phenomenon of the steady increase in the number of chemical elements. From a little over seventy the number has come up to a little less than one hundred. Yet, no one has felt the need for attacking the foundations of chemistry because this science has been adding to the list of its elements. If through addition to knowledge it is found that there is need to add to the basic elements of the constitution of human nature, one need not take any objection to the expansion of the list of instincts. If we keep this im-

portant consideration in mind we shall not easily be tempted to do injustice to the contributions of hormic psychology in this field.

• A Comparative Statement of Fundamental Mental Structures as developed in McDougall's Three great works.

(The letters within brackets indicate the order in which the elements are discussed in the works mentioned.)

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1	AN OUTLINE 2	ENERGIES 3
1. Flight (<i>fear</i>) (a)	Escape (<i>fear</i>) (f)	Fear (d)
2. Repulsion (<i>disgust</i>) (b)	Repulsion	
3. Curiosity (<i>wonder</i>) (c)	(<i>disgust</i>) (e) Curiosity	Disgust (b)
4. Pugnacity (<i>anger</i>) (d)	(<i>curiosity</i>) (c) Combat	Curiosity (e)
5. Self-abasement (<i>subjection</i>) (e)	(<i>anger</i>) (d) Self-submission	Anger (j)
6. Self-assertion (<i>elation</i>) (f)	(<i>subjection</i>) (h) Self-assertion	Submission (i)
7. Parental Instinct (<i>tender emotion</i>) (g)	(<i>elation</i>) (i) Parental or Protective Instinct (<i>tender emotion</i>) (a)	Self-assertion (h) Protective or Parental instinct
8. Reproduction (h)	Mating (<i>lust</i>) (i)	(f) Sex (c)
9. Gregariousness (i)	Gregariousness (j)	Gregariousness
10. Acquisition (j)	Acquisitiveness (<i>ownership</i>) (k)	(g) Acquisition (m)

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1	AN OUTLINE 2	ENERGIES 3
11. Construction (k)	Constructiveness (creativity) (l)	Construction (l)
12.	Food-seeking (gusto) (d)	Food-seeking (a)
13.	Appeal (distress) (m)	Appeal (k)
14.	Laughter (amusement) (n)	Laughter (n)
15.		Comfort (o)
16.		Rest or Sleep (p)
17.		Migration (q)
18.		Some simple bodily needs (r)

The table on pages 23-24 sets forth clearly the developments of McDougall's conception of the number and nature of the fundamental elements of human mental structure. In the earliest work, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, (1908) the list is short, containing only seven major and four minor instincts, the line of distinction being decided by the fact that the former have well-defined emotions, while the latter lack such clear identifying central affective tendencies. Distinctness of emotion is here made the test for the recognition of an independent instinct. In *An Outline of Psychology* (1923) the name instinct is still retained, though there are included in the list, which is nearly twice as long as the first list, many instincts which do not have any clearly distinguishable emotions. McDougall chooses to name the affective aspects of these, after the instincts themselves with the prefix 'feeling

of'. It will be noticed that there are very few changes in the names of the instincts. But, when we come to *The Energies of Men* (1932) we meet many fundamental changes. The term 'instinct' is abandoned and replaced by 'propensity'. A new conception of 'ability' is introduced. The names are altered, and in many instances the propensities are given the names of the emotions. The *emotion test* is abandoned, and the list of elements is nearly trebled. Alongside these changes, a fundamental change in McDougall's view of instincts is noticeable. A criticism of this change will constitute the main theme of one of the later chapters of this monograph. For the present it is enough for our purposes to note that there is an evolution in the hormic conception of the instinctual structure of the human mind.

The Hindu and Hormic Lists of Instincts.

We may, in passing, make a remark of great interest and of some importance to our general theme. Ancient Hindu psychologists working in the field of aesthetics, put forward a list of mental elements similar to McDougall's first list. In the *Rasa* scheme of the ancient Hindu literary critics eight fundamental propensities are recognised. These are anger, fear, disgust, wonder, assertion, mirth, love, and sympathy. The first eight elements mentioned in the first column of the comparative table seem to have been admitted by Hindu psychologists, except submission which was entirely identified with fear. Sympathy is not considered to be a separate instinct by McDougall, but only a special characteristic of all instincts. The ancients seem to have had an intuitive insight into the psychological constitution of the human mind and many of their observations seem to be fundamentally correct. But the observations stand in need of rigorous scientific verification. Experimental foundation for the *Rasa* doctrine is indicated as a desideratum, and such a foundation is provided by hormic psychology. In the *Rasa* doctrine then we have

a happy meeting ground for Hindu aesthetics and Western psychology.

Hormic Orientation to Psychological Studies.

McDougall's psychological theory has given a definite orientation to psychological studies. It has made it possible for the psychologist to organise the topics of his study round a central dynamic point. One of the major requirements of a well-developed science is that its parts (that is, the component topics of study in that science) should be thoroughly organised. A science which lacks internal organisation in its limbs is in a sorry plight indeed. And psychology was in that unenviable condition for a long time. Through over-emphasis on the cognitive aspects, the affective and conative parts were hard to fit into a purely intellectualistic psychology. The work of William James suffers from this defect. And many elementary textbooks lack internal cohesion. Starting with a consideration of the general nature and aim of psychology, the authors enter into a description of the nervous system, and then proceed to discuss *attention, sensation, perception, memory, imagination, reasoning, feeling, emotion, will, and the self*. Each chapter might very well constitute a monograph by itself. Even in a recent work such as Woodworth's *Psychology* the situation is not different. The order of chapters is changed, but the same incoherence persists. There is no binding principle running through all the chapters, uniting them and conferring point and purpose on them. In other words, psychology as expounded by these authors lacks a great orienting principle. And McDougall's hormic theory, for the first time in the history of psychology, has endowed the whole science with an orienting concept, the concept being the hormic theory itself. *Purpose* is the orienting concept for which psychology has been waiting all these years. Its entry into our science has given the proper direction to all the topics usually discussed in psychology, and has generated a vital and dynamic inter-relation between them. The following

diagram indicates at a glance the result of the hormic orientation to psychological studies.




Fig. 4.

Major topics of study.

- A. Basic activities, instincts & sentiments.
- B. Cognitive topics.
- C. 1 and 2 emotions & feelings.
- D. Reflex, habit & voluntary action.
- E. Character and personality.

Reorganisation, according to hormic principles, of the topics of study in an introductory course in psychology.

(The dotted lines and arrows indicate the sequence of topics).

The central theme of the whole psychological study of men and animals is *purposive behaviour*. Hence, the opening chapters of a properly written book on psychology will deal with behaviour, and with the innate mental structure whose function is behaviour, that is, the instincts (or the basic elements of structure) will be the main theme of the introductory chapters, and lest the confusion which persists should last longer, it will be shown how these basic elements are organised into sentiments, and how these sentiments are the immediate activating cause of behaviour. The detailed analysis of the structure of the basic innate elements of mental constitution will be made, and the relationship between the cognitive, affective, and conative aspects will be clearly displayed. In the next section the various topics of traditional cognitive import will be dealt with, but at every stage, and even at the risk of

causing inconvenience by repetition, it will be pointed out that perception, attention, memory, learning, intelligence, etc., have no meaning and no function apart from conation. All these processes will be displayed as merely the results of the flowering out of the first aspect of the instinctual structure of the mind. They will be shown as so many ways in which the first or perceptive aspect of the basic structure of the mind works. In the third section the nature of emotion and feeling, and the affective tone of the working of the instinctual structure will be discussed. The last section will deal with the active side of mental structure. Will, choice, habit, decision, etc., will be covered by this section. The ubiquitous 'conditioned reflex' will also find a place here, and it will be shown how this type of reflex can flourish only on a conative basis. And finally the crowning problem of personality will be taken up, and all the threads will be gathered up in the hormic discussion of character. Thus, nothing that was discussed by the older types of effete psychology will be lost sight of. All the topics will be preserved; they will be made living and dynamic members of a purposefully organised system of study controlled and animated by the hormic principle. Such a well-oriented system of psychology has been made possible in the present age by the genius of McDougall and Freud.

CHAPTER II

Instinct, Behaviour and Sentiment

THE HORMIC THEORY AGAIN

We have already hinted at the fact that there are certain misconceptions about the hormic theory standing in the way of an adequate appreciation of its merits. The influence of pre-established ways of thinking is so great over our minds that we fail to see the correct connotations of words when they are used in a special sense in psychology. McDougall has used ordinary words in a special sense and so there is a great deal of misunderstanding, sometimes wilful, but often through ignorance, of the main principle of hormic psychology. There are two misconceptions in particular that should be guarded against; *the identification of instinct with behaviour, and of instinct with sentiment*. In order to remove these misconceptions the hormic theory must be stated again. The theory has been expounded in a most admirable manner by McDougall himself in *An Outline of Psychology*. He says there that 'the view that all animal and human behaviour is purposive in however vague and lowly a degree, and that purposive action is fundamentally different from mechanical processes, may be conveniently called *the hormic theory*.'* Proceeding further McDougall says, 'starting from the position that there is more than physics and chemistry even in the humblest animal, it (the hormic theory) comes to view the history of life as a striving toward the individuality which is expressed most clearly and richly in man's conscious nature, and finds, therefore, in that goal toward which the whole creation moves, the true interpretation of its earlier efforts.'

We need a name for the fundamental property expressed in the incessant adjustments and adventures that make up the tissue of life. We are directly aware of that pro-

* op. cit., p. 72,

perty in our conscious activities as an element of 'drive', 'urge' or felt tendency toward an end. Psychologists call it *conation*, and give the name *conative* process to any train of conscious activity which is dominated by such a drive To this element of drive or urge, whether it occurs in the conscious life of men, and the higher animals or in the unconscious activities of their bodies and the (presumably) unconscious behaviour of the lower animals, we propose to give a single name—*horme*. In accordance with this proposal all the purposive processes of the organism or hormic processes, conative process being the sub-class whose members have the special mark of being conscious. . . . the *hormic* processes undergo a 'development in which they become organised into ever wider and more complex hormic systems. . . . conation rises from the level of blind, or purblind, impulse to that of clear-eyed desire and eventually from the level of desire seeking an immediate good to that of will fixed upon a distant and perhaps ideal goal. Meanwhile subserving this advance in the character of the *horme*, there is a parallel development in its organisation—showing itself first in the emergence of its psychological organs and in the correlation of their functions, then after birth, in the co-ordination of the powers of sense and movement in systems of ever increasing complexity and effectiveness, and lastly in the gradual building up of great conative hierarchies, which determine the form of the man's individuality and are the measure of his life's achievement *

The general foundation of the hormic theory as sketched above is based on Professor Nunn's programme.† McDougall has accepted the programme, and the structure that he has built upon this foundation is being discussed by us. Two points in the discussion have to be singled out for special mention, because of the widespread misunderstanding of the hormic theory in the popular mind

* *Ibid*, pp. 72-73.

† Nunn, T. P., *Education, Its Data and First Principles*.

arises out of them. In the first place, it should be remembered that McDougall uses the term *instinct* in a highly specialised and technical sense. Its connotation is as rigorously defined as that of *force* in physics or of *species* in biology. It is no excuse for muddled thinking to say that instinct is used very loosely in popular speech, and so McDougall should have avoided the term in his system. Force and species too are used vaguely and loosely in popular speech. Yet no scientist is worried by this double usage. Why should a concession given to the physical and biological sciences be denied to psychology? McDougall did give in to his critics by removing the term instinct from his psychology and by using propensity in its stead. But he need not have yielded even an inch of his ground. It is this apparent climb down on the part of McDougall that is responsible for a great deal of confusion in the subsequent development of his system.

Instinct and its Motor Mechanisms.

Instinct, as a fact of mental structure, embraces three aspects, the cognitive, the emotional, and the behavioural, and no one of these, taken by itself, may be called instinct. Popular misconceptions arise out of a tendency to get pre-occupied with the last aspect alone. We can, however, understand this fallacy and sympathise with the deficient mentality behind it, for the popular mind is not gifted with powers of analysis, nor does it know how to argue from observed facts to causes which control the facts. But when scientists commit the same fallacy we are puzzled and often discouraged. Long lists of instinctive activities are given by the behaviourists and others who place undue emphasis on the working of the neuromuscular mechanism of instincts. Hunting has been very widely described as an instinct; eating is another instinct; and so are swallowing and digesting. Commenting on this tendency to multiply the number of innate capacities, McDougall writes, 'they postulated

strange instincts of all kinds as lightly and easily as a conjurer produces eggs from a hat, or a phrenologist discovers bumps on a head.* 'Lightly to postulate an indefinite number or variety of human instincts is a cheap and easy way to solve psychological problems, and' is an error hardly less serious and less common than the opposite error of ignoring all the instincts.† It will be seen at once that hunting, eating, swallowing, and digesting are merely so many stages in the last aspect of the food-seeking instinct. In the same way many reflexes and acquired motor skills are used in the service of the innate instinctive structure of the mind, just as a well-organised rail-route may be used in the service of commerce, travel, business, pleasure, and military transport. The muscular activities mentioned above are not instincts, but only parts of instinctive organisations which are mental in essence. If we remember that an instinct, as the term is used in hormic psychology, is a fact of mental organisation, this blunder of identifying motor activity with instinct can be easily avoided. An instinct does, of course, involve instinctive activity, but it embraces much else besides. It includes an emotion and a cognitive deposition. To neglect these two factors, and to call the activity alone instinctive is inexcusable in hormic psychology. McDougall is very clear on this point. 'I see no reason', he says, 'why the complex co-ordinated movements should be regarded as the expression of so many distinct instincts. In my view they are essentially the expressions of mechanisms.... We have to regard such motor mechanisms not as instincts, but merely as the instruments of instincts.‡

A proper understanding of the relation between instinct and behaviour is of the utmost importance to hormic psychology. In the early days of academic career McDougall looked upon psychology as 'the positive

* Social Psychology, p. 7.

† Social Psychology, p. 75.

‡ Outline of Psychology, pp. 116-117.

science of the conduct living organisms.' Even the extreme behaviourist can find nothing in this definition that will not gladden his heart. McDougall attaches such great importance to social behaviour that he lays it down almost as a dictum that no psychology can lay claim to recognition as a science unless it is in a position to explain the behaviour of man in the group. Behaviour, therefore, is of the utmost importance to the hormic psychologist. It is, however, not the behaviour of a machine, or an automaton, but that of a living organism. The organism has a mind, and it is this mind, and in its structure and dynamic working that the final explanation of behaviour should be found. When McDougall found that his emphasis on behaviour was likely to create the impression that he was a behaviourist, he made haste to clarify his position by demonstrating that behaviour as studied by the proper type of psychology points unmistakably to the existence of a behaving mind. 'An instinct is something different', says our author, 'from the instinct of the mechanistic behaviourist.....; for them (the mechanists) an instinct is merely an action-pattern, a system of reflex arcs in the nervous system which, on being appropriately stimulated, leads to nervous excitation through a fixed system of channels to a certain group of muscles and glands. In contrast to this, the instinctive dispositions of hormic psychology generate an impulse towards a goal of a certain type; and this impulse may express itself in strivings that may take a multitude of forms, and bring into play a variety of muscular and other executive processes according to the circumstances; this variety being greater, the greater the creature's power of intelligent appreciation of the circumstances and of intelligent adaptation of its actions to these circumstances.*

Instinct, then, is not to be identified with the motor mechanism of instinct. Yet, certain psychologists are

* An Outline of Psychology, p. 19.

still committing today the old fallacy of identifying the motor mechanism with the innate mental structure which activates the mechanism. They refuse (one is tempted to say wilfully) to read aright the findings of McDougall. They persist, despite McDougall's warning, in mistaking the part for the whole. But they have themselves to blame for the confusion they have introduced into their psychologies.

Instincts, Drives, and Motives.

So great and irresistible is the power of illusion that the mechanistic psychologist has thrown over the minds of the students of human nature that it is necessary for us to employ all our energy in our efforts to dispel it. We have to adduce additional evidence in support of our contention that what the mechanist speaks of as instinct is not the whole of instinct, but only a part of it. Let us note in the first instance that neuro-muscular mechanisms are in themselves inert mechanisms which require to be driven, by some impulse, by a stream of energy derived from some instinct. This is a fact of great importance, and the failure to understand it aright has led to a deplorable fallacy in psychology. Wundt, James, and even Woodworth have identified instincts with habits and have spoken of the 'drive' of habits. Animals trained to perform feats in the circus ring, it is claimed, repeat the trick over and over again, when they are off the ring, as though the habit they had acquired had an irresistible drive in it. But, says McDougall, 'we have to remember that, in the training of such animals, great use is commonly made of the feeding-instinct. The animal is kept hungry and rewarded with a piece of food, when he has done his trick. And, when we see a dog, taught in this way, spontaneously and repeatedly walking on his hind legs, or a sea-lion pertinaciously balancing a ball, we may infer with some confidence that he is 'playing up' for more food; in other words, that he is impelled, not by any 'drive' from the acquired habit, but by the impulse of the

feeding instinct, which operates now through this newly acquired mechanism, just as it may and does operate through and 'drive' various innate motor mechanisms.* The motor mechanism, then, of instinct, is not to be taken as the whole of instinct. The very life of the mechanism resides elsewhere in the innate mental structure of the organism.

It has to be noted that the same motor mechanism may be made to serve the needs of several instincts. For instance, the muscles involved in running may be made use of by the mating, the combative or the escape instinct. This fact is difficult to understand in terms of the mechanistic hypothesis which identifies instinct with its expression on the behavioural side.

Facts of a slightly different order also go a long way to support the contention of this section. The distinction between motives and intentions is of very great importance to our understanding of human behaviour. The consistent mechanist purposely overlooks this distinction. For him, motives are merely physical and chemical processes. Of the existence of mental processes behind the bodily activity he has no conception. But the fallacious nature of this attitude will be revealed when we consider a concrete instance. Such an instance has been analysed by McDougall:† Here is a solitary pedestrian on a deserted road. He is suddenly confronted by a sturdy beggar, and the result is that the former pulls out a few coins from his pocket and hands them to the latter. Now, the intention of our pedestrian is clear enough. It is to pass the coins on to the beggar. But what was the motive—was it fear, pity or display? One has to approach the donor of money and study him at close quarters. It may also be necessary to question him, before the real motive is discovered. Whereas it is easy to get at the intention, by noting the outward act of behaviour, it is very difficult to guess the inner motive which constitutes

* An Outline of Psychology, p. 181.

† An Outline of Psychology p. 121-124.

the driving power of behaviour.

Every fact considered so far points unmistakably to the conclusion that our neuro-muscular mechanisms are not instincts, but are only the instruments of instincts.

Instincts and Sentiments.

The error of identifying instincts with their motor mechanisms is serious enough. But there is another error which is much more serious and deplorable, because it clouds the issue raised by hormic psychology. This is the error of ignoring the role assigned to sentiments by the hormic psychologist in the control of human behaviour. We shall, therefore, turn our attention to the consideration of the nature of sentiments, and of their relationship to instincts.

The critic of hormic psychology objects to the view of human nature sketched above, because it reduces man to the level of the mere animal. 'Is not man', asks the critic, 'moved by noble and divine ideals? Is he not a seeker after truth, beauty, and goodness? How could you reduce all his ambitions, ideals, hopes, and aspirations to the primitive instincts which belong to the animal level of existence?' As a first answer to these questions, we should like to draw the attention of the critic to the ghastly scenes at the battle-front. The blood-curdling spectacle there is enough to convince us that man is still a creature moved by primitive emotions and impulses. The veneer of human civilisation is very thin indeed. It takes very little to break this thin crust, and reveal the passions boiling and seething underneath. McDougall is perfectly right in holding that *man is but an instinctive animal*.

In the second place it should be pointed out early that McDougall has not reduced man to the level of the animal. He has not taken away from man his crowning glory—his intellect. He has shown that man is moved by 'sentiments' and that these sentiments are the immediate, activating causes of human behaviour. What, then, are

these sentiments ?

A fruitful analogy drawn from the realm of chemistry will serve as a valuable introduction to our study of 'sentiments' in hormic psychology. Chemistry analyses every conceivable object in this universe into elements. All the beautiful and soul-stirring things of the world, the awe-inspiring mountain ranges, the mighty cataracts and water-falls, these and myriads of other objects, high and low, are all resolvable into organic and inorganic compounds, and these compounds in their turn are analysable into elements. The chemical union of these elements in different ways and different degrees and proportions gives rise to the rich kaleidoscopic world of the senses. So, in a sense, the world and all the things therein are composed of elements. Now, when the chemist asserts this proposition—that the world is made of elements—no one objects; yet no one finds the elements scattered about in a free and loose condition on the surface of the earth. In the same manner, when the hormic psychologist says that the instincts are the foundations of human behaviour, we are to understand him as saying that the immediate cause of human behaviour is a sentiment, and that these sentiments may be analysed into their components, namely, the primitive instincts and their emotions. Sometimes, we do find the elements in a free condition in the bosom of the earth; so too on occasions even the most highly cultured person is moved by primitive emotions. When, therefore, man as a rational being is contrasted with the animal as a creature of instinct, all that is meant and should be meant, and all that can be substantiated by the most advanced typed of scientific psychology of our day, is that while the animal has remained at the instinctual level, man has risen from that level, and has reached the stage of cultured sentiments. Both man and animal, however, begin at the same primitive instinctual level.

Let us now study how the sentiments are formed. McDougall has shown that the human mind is structured at birth, but is not rigidly or infinitely structured. The

mind is not a static thing; it is a living, dynamic, growing entity; and the inherited structure of the mind undergoes considerable modification in the lifetime of the individual. The environment plays an important part in shaping the growth of the human mind. The inherited structure, which exhibits itself in certain types or patterns of action was originally called *instinctive* by McDougall, but later he replaced the term *instinct* by *propensity*. He says, 'In my earlier efforts to throw light on the nature of man, I attributed instincts to the human species. This broad usage of the word has involved me in endless controversy. In this book I have used the word in a stricter sense, and have preferred the good old word 'propensity' to designate those factors of our constitution which I formerly called 'instincts'. This concession to my critics does not imply any radical change of view... * Whatever the name, the fact of innate structure is indisputable. This native structure is very simple in the lowest types of living beings, while, as we ascend the scale of life, it becomes more complicated, losing a good part of its rigidity on its perceptive and executive sides. Even in the case of the humblest of living beings we can distinguish between a native ability and native propensity. 'A propensity is a disposition, a functional unit of the mind's total organisation, and it is one which, when it is excited, generates an active tendency, a striving, an impulse or drive towards some goal... † The definition of innate 'ability' is a more difficult task. An innate propensity functions always in conjunction with an innate ability. The food-seeking propensity, for example, functions in conjunction with the ability to perceive the object which is suitable as food, and with the ability to perform the action necessary for securing and consuming the prey. 'Ability' has two aspects—the perceptive and the executive. But McDougall says, 'This distinction is not an absolute one. It may well be that every ability

*Energies of Men.

† Ibid, p. 118.

is both cognitive and motor. The simplest motor ability functions under the guidance of sense-impressions, if only those from the motor organs themselves. And every cognitive ability seems to have some natural mode of expression in bodily movement or other bodily changes. But we must recognise that in some abilities the executive or motor aspect, in others the cognitive aspect, greatly predominates.*

Of the innate propensities, man has a certain number; seventeen according to *'The Energies of Men'*. There are in addition, certain very simple propensities subserving bodily needs, such as coughing, sneezing, breathing, etc. These seventeen propensities (vide list on p. 22-23) constitute the foundation of human nature.

When a propensity is actively at work, it is accompanied by a definite and appreciable feeling. This feeling, the subjective aspect of the experience when an innate propensity is in operation, was called emotion by McDougall in his earlier works. Emotion and instinct were considered by him to be reciprocal. When this view was subjected to criticism by other psychologists, it was altered by its author. 'I now see', says McDougall, 'there is no sufficient ground for regarding a conative part as distinguishable from the emotional or affective part.† McDougall need not have given in at all to his critics. He ought to have held fast to his original position. We shall deal with this point in the next chapter; in the meantime we must note that the conative aspect is a fundamental aspect of the experience generated by the working of an innate propensity.

Innate propensities, innate abilities and their conative affects are the elements of the primitive structure of the human mind. They are innate and inherited, and constitute the raw material, as it were, of the edifice of life. In the lower animals the innate structure is very rigid, and little capable of modification. A particular type of wasp

* *Social Psychology* (23rd edn.), p. 495.

† *Ibid.*, p. 400.

will rather die of starvation than eat a grass-hopper or spider when its usual food, the caterpillar, is not available, though the former are as nutritious as the latter. In the case of man, on the other hand, the innate structures are fluid. We have already mentioned the fact that the human mind is partially structured at birth. The innate propensities represent this limited structuring at the time the living organism is born. This partially structured mind is capable of infinite structural modification or organisation with the advancing age and experience of the individual. Man commences his mental organisation by building up his elementary propensities round concrete objects or persons. When, for example, the sex, protective, self-assertive, submissive, appeal, acquisitive, and comfort propensities get organised round a woman, the sentiment of (sexual) love is formed: when anger, fear, and disgust are organised round a person, the sentiment of hatred is generated. In this manner the human mind organises within itself, out of the fundamental propensities, several concrete sentiments. Let us consider a few simple, and familiar examples of the way in which sentiments are formed. A *freshman from an up-country school enters the University*, and registers for a course in Biology. He attends the first lecture delivered by the Professor, and is charmed by the way in which the great scholar presents the vital connection between biology and everyday life. The young man is struck with *wonder* at the vast learning of the teacher, and is moved to *self-submission*. The two fundamental impulses of *wonder* and *submission* are blended in the student's mind and organised round the professor into the sentiment of ADMIRATION. When *fear* is added to *admiration*, then AWE is generated. It is the sentiment that overpowers as when we witness a huge mountain or a mighty waterfall. If GRATITUDE which is itself a blend of the *tender emotion* and *admiration* be added to awe, we get the sentiment of REVERENCE. And from the concrete, man proceeds to the abstract sentiments, building up patriotism, honour, loyalty, and

such others. The moral sentiments belong to this higher level. These sentiments, as well as the fundamental propensities into which they may be finally resolved, are often in conflict. This conflict is inevitable because in the first instance the human mind is dynamic and is constantly moving up from the lower to the higher plane, and in the second place, the organisation of human society is such that the family, the nation, the club, and the group pull a man in different and often opposing directions. This conflict has to be resolved; and when a series of conflicts has taken place and resolved, then we find that the sentiments, concrete and abstract, get arranged into a scale of values with a dominant sentiment or master-sentiment at the top, the other sentiments taking rank below this according to their importance in relation to it. Animals are capable of forming only concrete sentiments. Man alone has the ability to rise to the level of abstract sentiments, and to attach different values to them. Hence, in his case alone there arises the need for an abiding scale of values. In the mind of well-balanced persons there exists such a permanent scale of values. He or she has organised all the sentiments in such a manner that there is always one dominant sentiment ruling over all the others, and these do not ordinarily shift their places in the scale of values. Even when the need for some slight rearrangement or adjustment arises, the dominant sentiment is never moved out of its place. It continues to be the sovereign sentiment. While the formation of scales of sentiment values is a process which takes place in the minds of all persons, the establishment of a permanent scale is within the reach only of the genius, or the moral giant. He who achieves a permanent scale of values has won the most coveted thing in human experience—a stable character. With the vast majority of human beings, however, the scale of sentiment values is a shifting thing. Do we not often hear it said of a great man, as though it were an achievement to be proud of, that he is one person at home, another at the place of business, a third different

man in his club, and yet a fourth personality in the games field? Our scale of values is constantly changing, because the master-sentiment at one moment yields place to another at the next. At home the master-sentiment may be *Srangara*, at the office it may arise out of *Bhaya*, at the club out of *Karuna*, and on the sports field out of *Vira*. Unless constancy of the master-sentiment is achieved, it cannot be said that a stable character has been formed.

Sentiments and Complexes.

There are two sources from which confusion is likely to creep into the brilliant scheme of 'sentiments' put forward by McDougall. The first is the popular source arising out of a misunderstanding of the expression itself. The word 'sentiment' has a loose popular connotation, and in spite of McDougall's warning, there is a tendency to import the popular meaning into *hormic* psychology. 'Sentiment' has a strictly scientific connotation which has been outlined in the last section. There is no excuse now for any failure on the part of the lay public to understand the term correctly. The second source of confusion arises out of the neglect to distinguish between 'sentiment' and 'complex'. McDougall himself has taken pains to draw this distinction on correct lines. 'There is at the present time', he writes, 'some lack of agreement among psychologists as to the use of these two words. Some writers treat them as synonymous. Both are used to denote acquired trends, or the settings of our conative tendencies that are acquired through individual experience. The best usage, I think, restricts the term 'complex' to acquired conative settings which are in some degree morbid, by reason of their lack of harmony with the rest of character. Adopting this usage, we shall have the word sentiment as the most general term to denote all acquired conative trends; and 'complex' will be used to denote sentiments that are in some manner and degree morbid or pathological. . . .'*

*An Outline of Psychology, pp. 417-418.

'Such a sentiment or complex is a structural and functional unity, . . . Such a system may become relatively isolated from the rest of the structure of the mind; it thus becomes a 'complex' in the pathological sense of the word.'*

It is true that the two expressions 'sentiment' and 'complex' are used in these quotations as though they were alternative terms, but the distinction in meaning is plain enough. A 'sentiment' when it becomes abnormal or morbid turns into a 'complex'. A sentiment, we may add, functions at the conscious level, while a complex functions at the unconscious levels indicated by Freud.

The Hormic Scheme of Sentiments and Its Significance.

McDougall has shown how his scheme of sentiments is of great value to the student of psychology who is seeking a proper understanding of character.† In fact, we get in the scheme, the first scientific analysis of the development of human character. Moreover, the scheme may be used for giving the correct orientation to our outlook on problems in æsthetics, politics, and cultural history. In the third part of this monograph we shall indicate lines along which this hormic formula may be used for solving some of the difficult problems which face the student of human affairs.

* Abnormal Psychology, p. 159.

† Social Psychology, pp. 431-432.

CHAPTER III

Evolution of the Hormic Theory of Emotions and

A Reconstruction of the Theory of Sentiments.

INTRODUCTION.

McDougall's theory of instincts, the outstanding contribution of the hormic school to psychological theory, has passed through three stages in the course of its evolution from its very promising and clear beginnings in *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908), through the hesitant stages indicated in *An Outline of Psychology* (1923), to its rather doubtful endings in *The Energies of Men* (1932). The central affective or emotional aspect of the instinctive structure of the mind which occupies a very prominent place in the earliest formulations of the theory is slowly but steadily pushed to the background. Finally in the Supplementary chapter (ch. VIII) added to the last edition of the *Social Psychology* (1936) the emotional aspect is merged in the conative aspect, and is made to lose its individuality completely. Should such a fate have overtaken the central part of the instinctive structure of the human mind? We contend not only that such a fate need not have overtaken the emotions, but also that the three-fold scheme should be made the foundation for the hormic theory of sentiments. Moreover, it is our firm belief that what is of value in the hormic theory for æsthetics and sociology may be preserved from disintegration only by keeping intact the three-fold analysis of '*Social Psychology*'.

The Three Stages in the Evolution of the Hormic Theory.

In the first edition of the '*Social Psychology*' the emotions and instincts are, to use a significant American phrase, tied together. The relationship between them is

reciprocal. Each instinct has its own specific emotional quality and the presence of an emotion is an unmistakable sign of the operation of the corresponding instinct. After analysing the instinctive structure of the mind into the perceptive, affective and conative phrases, McDougall says, '...the instinctive mental process that results from the excitement of any instinct has always an affective aspect, the nature of which depends upon the constitution of the most stable and unchanging of the three parts of the instinctive disposition, the central part.' Again he says, 'Each of the principal instincts conditions, then, some one kind of emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it....'* In short, the instinct is to be identified by the specific emotion pertaining to it. Moreover, instincts are divided into seven principal, and three minor ones on the basis of the specificity or non-specificity of the emotions concerned.†

When we pass from the *Social Psychology* to *An Outline of Psychology* we discover a certain hesitancy in the tone of the statement of the relationship between instincts and emotions. It is true that in discussing the relationship between motives and intentions, and between instincts and emotions, McDougall reiterates the view set forth in the *Social Psychology*. He there says, 'Some psychologists have explicitly accepted this scheme‡ for the development of commonsense psychology, but very many, in view of the difficulties that arise in the course of its detailed application have rejected it. Yet, I hold fast to the scheme as essentially on the right lines.'§ In spite of this avowal there is a long apologetic introduction in the pages immediately preceding this quotation. In the chapter specifically devoted to the discussion of 'emotions' we notice a distinct change in McDougall's attitude. 'When we are afraid, we feel the impulse to retreat or escape

* *Social Psychology*, p. 40.

† *Ibid.*, p. 69-70.

‡ The scheme outlined in the *Social Psychology*.

§ *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 128.

from the object, which frightens us; when we are angry, we feel the impulse to attack the object that angered us; . . . It is true that we become introspectively aware of the impulse only 'when we do not give ourselves up to it, but arresting or suspending it, turn our attention from the object to ourselves.'* This statement fits ill with the theory as formulated in the earlier work, which the author claims he still subscribes to. If emotion is the invariable concomitant of the working of an instinct, then there is no need to arrest the progress of the latter in order to become aware of the former. To admit the need for the obstruction of conative activity is to depart from the hormic theory as defined in the *Social Psychology*. Moreover, the list of instincts, is enlarged, and though each instinct has still its peculiar emotion, yet, in the case of some instincts such as gregariousness, and construction, the emotion is vaguely described as the feeling pertaining to them.† The change in McDougall's attitude is certainly arresting, though it is not a change for the better.

If now we pass on to *The Energies of Men* we are surprised to find a more striking change in McDougall's views on emotion, so striking that there is room for the admission that there is just a grain of truth in the James-Lange theory of emotions. The original theory of instincts is completely rehabilitated, the terminology altered beyond recognition, and a new conception of innate mental structure introduced. There is no question, any longer, of recognising an instinct by its emotional concomitant. The list of instincts is still further extended to include rest, sleep, migration, comfort, etc. The change in the theory of emotions is complete when we discover McDougall asserting 'I have become convinced that, in describing a typical instinctive disposition as consisting of three distinguishable parts, I was in error in one

* An Outline of Psychology, p. 320-321.

† Ibid, p. 324.

respect, namely, in drawing the line of separation between the second and third parts. As I now see, there is no sufficient ground for regarding a conative part as distinguishable from the emotional or affective part.*

The Forces that shaped the Evolution of the Hormic Theory of Sentiments.

We shall not, as is customary with critics, accuse the author of a change of front, when we discover that he has made drastic alterations in his fundamental conceptions. Sometimes, ~~as in the case of Freud, we find that~~ it is a true mark of the greatness of a highly developed mind to contradict itself. Nearly three decades intervened between McDougall's first formulation of the hormic theory and his final statement, and we should naturally look for a considerable development of the original formula. We should, therefore, ask ourselves the question, 'Is the passage of time alone enough to account for the phenomenal changes in the hormic theory of emotions?' The answer to the question seem to be in the negative. The evolution of McDougall's theory is to be accounted for, in part at least, by the force of the criticism to which it was subjected by psychologists who did not subscribe to the hormic principle. What, then, is the nature of the attack directed against the hormic theory of emotions?

We may group the various types of criticism urged against McDougall's theory under three broad headings: (1) the mechanistic or behaviouristic, (2) eclectic, and (3) psycho-pathic types. The first will not be considered here, because it is negative and destructive in its effects. We shall discuss the second and third, taking Woodworth's views as representative of the former, and MacCurdy's of the latter. Woodworth occupies the middle-of-the-road position in psychology. His eclecticism permits him to accept what is valuable in all schools of psycho-

* Social Psychology, p. 495.

logy. Woodworth recognises the value of McDougall's contribution to social psychology, and holds that the conception of innate mental tendencies is bound to stand. But his complaint is that the hormic theory of human nature is sketchy. It cannot be accepted as the last word in the explanation of human behaviour. So, he pleads for an extension of the hormic theory in two important directions. In the first place it should be recognised that an emotion as a subjective state accompanies certain simple bodily conditions, such as thirst, discomfort, fatigue, etc. And in the second place the hormic conception of instinct-emotion relationship should be extended so as to cover native capacity and native interest. Of native capacities with their native interests, Woodworth mentions as the most significant, the æsthetic, moral, and intellectual capacities. The eclectic critics feel the need for extending McDougall's theory both below and above so as to embrace certain elementary conative drives, and the exalted ideals which make life worth living.

In addition to these significant suggestions pointing to the possible directions in which the hormic theory may be fruitfully extended, Woodworth offers certain criticisms of the fundamentals of McDougall's position. Objection is taken to the high degree of inertia of the organism implicit in McDougall's definition of the powerful impulses. Woodworth contends that 'any mechanism once it is aroused, is capable of furnishing its own drive, and also of lending drive to other connected mechanisms.' Viewed as a whole the criticism of Woodworth as the representative of the eclectics is sympathetic and constructive, although there is tendency to over-emphasise the neuro-muscular elements in instinctive behaviour.

The criticism of psycho-pathologists is drastic and destructive to a certain extent. The main point here is the complete denial of the concomitant occurrence of instinct and emotion. Emotion is the result of the

hindrance offered to the smooth working of an instinct. In the absence of a conflict there can be no emotion. So long as the organism is engaged in activity, it is not aware of any emotional experience, but when the action is thwarted, then there arises the painful feeling of frustration, and with it, the emotion. Thus the psycho-pathologists generally tend to speak of emotions as arising when instinctive activity is hindered. On their hypothesis, no emotion can exist so long as the organism is intently engaged in the pursuit of its goal. This criticism is entirely unfriendly to the hormic psychologist.

That McDougall's thought has been, in the course of its evolution, influenced by these criticisms goes without saying. In some instances McDougall has completely given in to his critics. We have had occasion to refer to the lengthening of the list of instincts. In the last list McDougall has included the elementary bodily drives for which Woodworth put up a strong plea. In another important matter too, McDougall appears to have given a favourable reception to Woodworth's suggestions. In *The Energies of Men* the term 'instincts' is replaced by 'propensities' geared to 'abilities', and our author speaks of 'innate abilities' and 'capacities' almost in terms of the Woodworth scheme. These extensions and modifications are but natural, and do not clash with the main position. But what is disturbing is the way in which McDougall seems to give in to his critics of the extreme type, represented best perhaps by MacCurdy.

After summing up McDougall's discussion of the conative impulse, and the derived emotions, MacCurdy points out that the leader of hormic psychology comes very near contradicting himself. Self-contradiction is patently visible in McDougall's account of the James-Lange theory. The impression that our author is steadily yielding ground to his opponents is further strengthened when we read McDougall's description of the flow of impulses in *The Energies of Men*. 'If on any occasion when some propensity is strongly excited within you, the

situation is a familiar one with which you can deal by some well-defined activity, your energy flows out in such activity; you vigorously act or plan to act. Such overt outwardly directed activity, involving well-defined cognition and well-directed striving, seems to drain off into these channels the greater part of the energy released; and in consequence, the emotional disturbance of the internal organs and their reflex effects on consciousness are proportionately slight. On the other hand, if there is no obvious line of effective action . . . the liberated energy of the impulse finds its way more freely into the internal organs, producing greater disturbance of their functioning; hence under such conditions, the emotional quality of the experience is more prominent.*

To sum up the relationship between instincts and emotions in the later stages of the hormic theory is quite unsatisfactory. McDougall recognises several innate propensities for which, he says, there are no specific emotions. Moreover, he gives great prominence to the conflict of innate propensities as the originator of emotions. Need he have introduced these innovations into the original hormic theory? No, he need not have introduced them. But, before we pronounce a final judgment on the question, we have to consider another factor which may have contributed to the radical changes in McDougall's views of emotions and instincts.

Sentiments and Emotions.

The scheme of sentiments outlined in the last chapter, brilliant though it is on the whole, is vague in certain parts, and this vagueness is responsible, to some extent, for the readiness with which McDougall gave in to his critics. If the three-fold analysis which is the foundation for the hormic theory of instincts and emotions had been carried over into the realm of sentiments, then the original theory would not have deteriorated to the extent to which

*The Energies of Men, p. 150.

it has done in *The Energies of Men*. Let us, therefore, examine the source of confusion in McDougall's conception of sentiments.

In his *Social Psychology* McDougall defines sentiment as 'an organised system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object... a sentiment is a growth in the structure of the mind that is not natively given in the inherited constitution... it is the organisation of affective and conative life...'* At this early stage of the homio theory where the three-fold distinction between the cognitive, affective, and conative aspects of the innate mental structure is clearly drawn, we notice a tendency to under-estimate the terminal, and to over-estimate the central aspect in relation to the formation of sentiments. In *An Outline of Psychology*† there is a slight improvement in the conception of sentiment. The cognitive aspect receives what is justly due to it, but even here there is no evidence of an attempt at a three-fold analysis of sentiments. In *The Energies of Men* there is complete deterioration of the situation. The centre of emphasis is shifted to the cognitive aspect. We are told that the 'distinctive feature of each sentiment is the cognitive ability (or system of cognitive abilities) which is its centre or nucleus.'‡ This shift from the central to the afferent part is to be noted, because it indicates a certain degree of haziness surrounding the very conception of sentiment. 'The essential nature of a sentiment', says McDougall, 'the scheme or plan of it, is then, a mental system in which a cognitive ability... has become, althrough the individual's experience, functionally linked with one or more native propensities... The centre of any such system (of any sentiment) is the cognitive ability... and this may grow into an extensive system of abilities.'§ Great importance is attached to the role of cognition in sentiments, but at the same time we

**Social Psychology*, p. 137. •

†*Op. cit.*, pp. 417-421.

‡*Energies of Men*, p. 223.

§*Energies of Men*, p. 223.

find that the need for the three-fold analysis is felt to a certain degree, but it is felt after a partial abandonment of the very object which will satisfy it. It is, therefore, necessary to make a clearer analysis of sentiments which will conform to the scheme formulated, in the *Social Psychology*.

Reconstruction of the Theory of Sentiments.

In its normal course of development the human mind organises the elements of its innate structure round objects, persons and ideas, and generates sentiments. Let us consider the formation of the sentiment of hatred. This sentiment, directed towards a bully, for example, is the result of the organisation of the propensities of combat, escape and repulsion round the (visual image of the) person or round the 'idea' of the same person. The bully stimulated in the first instance in the mind of the person who has organised the sentiment of hatred for him, the propensity of repulsion by his mean, cowardly and brutal treatment of a defenceless victim. Witnessing such acts of cruelty repeatedly, and sympathising with the victim, the person next had his combative propensity excited in himself. And in the fight that ensued he realised the physical superiority of the bully. The escape propensity was the last to be called into action. All the three propensities were then welded together into the sentiment of hatred.




Fig. 5—Diagram representing the formation of the Sentiment of Hatred.

In attempting to understand McDougall's theory of

sentiments we may derive some help from the above diagram. The three circles in the line represent the component propensities and the single circle at the top stands for the 'sentiment'. The weak point in the diagram is the representation of the propensities (which have a three-fold structure), and of the highly complex sentiment, by figures which suggest simplicity of structure.

We have to raise a very important question now: 'Are we to understand by a sentiment the result of the organisation of emotions or of instinctive propensities? Is hatred the result of the organisation of anger, fear, and disgust, or of the propensities of combat, escape and repulsion? After scanning the pages of McDougall's works, we feel that this question cannot be answered in an unambiguous manner: The impression we get is that our author uses the term sentiment sometimes for the resultant of the interaction of emotions, and at other times for that of propensities. There is, no doubt, a reason for this. In his *Social Psychology* McDougall uses two distinct terms instinct and emotion to indicate the innate mental structure and its central aspect, whereas the afferent and efferent parts do not receive any specific names. Thus corresponding to each major instinct there is a specific emotion, both receiving clearly defined names, while the cognitive and conative parts are not so named.

If now we go back to our analysis of hatred we find that the bully who presented different aspects of his own person when he excited the propensities of repulsion, combat and escape separately and at different times now appears as the blend of all three aspects when he serves as the 'object' of, and excites the sentiment of hatred. The perceptual aspects of the three elementary propensities are blended in the corresponding aspects of the sentiment. As the result of this complex, blended, single excitant on the cognitive side, the psychic central part or the affective part of the sentiment is aroused and experienced by the organism. This affective blend of disgust, fear, and anger—the sentiment par excellence of hormic

psychology has received adequate treatment at the hands of McDougall. But the final activity or behavioural aspect of the sentiment is as vague and analysed as the cognitive aspect. The course of action to which the sentiment of hatred leads is very complex. It is neither fight nor flight, but a curious blend of the facial expression (sometimes of the vocal too) of combat, and repulsion with a tendency to retreat from the 'object' of hatred. The following diagram sets forth clearly the facts as analysed by us.

Fig. 6




Fig. 6. Schematic Representation of a Formation of Sentiments (as analysed in this paper).

HATRED.

- h_1 —the afferent or cognitive aspect of sentiment, being in this case the Bully or the 'idea' of the Bully as the blend of $r_1 \times c_1 \times e_1$.
 h_2 —the SENTIMENT proper, the affective aspect, the resultant of r_2 (disgust) $\times c_2$ (anger) $\times e_2$ (fear)
 h_3 —the resultant of $r_3 \times c_3 \times e_3$ —; keeping at a safe distance, the facial expressions of all the propensities, vocal expressions, etc.

REPULSION.

- r_1 —the meanness and cruelty of the bully; r_2 —disgust; r_3 —wry face, retreat, spitting, etc.

COMBAT.

- c_1 —the bully as a hindrance to assertion and sympathy; c_2 —anger; c_3 —fighting.

ESCAPE.

- e_1 —the bully as a source of pain; e_2 —fear; e_3 —flight.

We notice clearly the advantages which this diagram has over the simpler scheme of McDougall-Fig V. Our contention is that since there are three distinguishable aspects of sentiments as well as of propensities, these aspects should receive distinct names. The absence of such a clear-cut terminology has led to a certain degree of confusion of thought. We are alive to the obstacles in the way of framing such a precise terminology. McDougall has pointed out in his *Social Psychology* that the emotional aspect alone is unchanging, while the afferent and efferent aspects are subject to infinite varieties of change through conditioning. Moreover, the excitant of a propensity is not a specific object, but a class of objects, not ordinarily grouped together in any scientific scheme of classification, but only thought together in this context, because they have this common capacity for stimulating the innate mental structure of the organism. A similar difficulty besets the 'executive' aspect of propensities. Even so, it should be possible to frame a terminology which would keep the three aspects separate. If this terminology becomes an accomplished fact in the case of propensities, then it would be easy to extend it to the scheme of sentiments; for here, as McDougall has pointed out, the excitants are specific individuals or ideas, and the activity is not so generalised as in the case of propensities. When we secure a precise and comprehensive terminology on the lines suggested herein, we shall have rescued the hormic theory from the tragic fate to which it seems to be drifting in *The Energies of Men*.

The fact is that in spite of the brilliant essay which opens his book, *Religion and the Sciences of Life*, and in spite of his inspiring pronouncements on the findings of psychic research, McDougall has fallen into the trap which lies hidden in the path of every Western scientist. The temptation to look on the body as the final arbiter in all disputes concerning the mind has proved too strong even for our author. If, instead of yielding to the influence of those who deduce everything mental from the body;

McDougall had struck to the position that the mind is the directing agent in all innate activities, then he would not have abandoned the three-fold scheme outlined in the Social Psychology. It is this three-fold scheme alone that will make the hormic theory practically useful in the fields of politics, æsthetics, and cultural history of man.

CHAPTER IV

The Hormic Conception of Sympathetic Induction.

INTRODUCTION

The crucial test for a psychological theory of human nature is its applicability to the elucidation of the difficult problems arising out of the social behaviour of man. Sociology, then, is the field on which rival psychologies have to fight out their battle for supremacy. And in this field the phenomenon of *Sympathetic Induction* is most significant, because it gives the clue to the correct interpretation of the behaviour of man in the group. Hormic psychology, we may safely assert, is most advantageously situated for the explanation of this phenomenon. Sympathetic induction, however, though it relates to the central aspect of the innate structure of the human mind, yet cannot be understood fully without reference to the afferent and efferent aspects. We shall, therefore, turn our attention first to a general consideration of suggestion, sympathy, and imitation which belong to the cognitive, affective, and conative aspects of the mind respectively.

Hormic Orientation to Suggestion, Sympathy and Imitation.

There are several reasons why suggestion and imitation have defied analysis down to the present day, in spite of the brilliant attempts made by several psychologists to track them down to their sources. In the first place, these terms have been taken over into psychology from popular speech, and have, therefore, brought with them all the confusion incident to the loose usage of words in ordinary language. In the second place, sociologists have linked all kinds of pseudo-psychological connotations to these words. It is not, therefore, surprising to find that in spite of the brilliant attempts at analysis made by Bain, Ribot, Spencer, James, Stout, Shand, Drever, and Wester-

mark, these terms are puzzling us by their elusive nature. Yet, it must be admitted that some kind of unity is present behind all the various types of suggestion and imitation. How are we to conceive of the unity behind the diversity of utterly unlike experiences? We are now in a position to suggest a hormic formula for bringing out the unity behind all types of suggestion and imitation.

Psychologists who, before McDougall published his *Social psychology*, analysed suggestion, sympathy and imitation completely mishandled the problem. They did not notice the inter-relationship between the three mental phenomena, and so committed the strange blunder of viewing them as separate instincts. Therein lies the secret of the failure of their attempts to get at the root of the problem. When all the three experiences are viewed together, then there springs to light a very simple formula which solves many of the difficult problems of analysis.

McDougall's analysis of the innate structure of the human as well as of the animal mind has revealed the existence of certain innate propensities geared to certain equally innate abilities, perceptive and executive. In the simpler language of our author's earlier work, the innate instinctive structure of the human mind displays three aspects, namely, a perceptive, an affective, and an executive aspect. Now each instinctive structure is stirred to activity by certain excitants. But all the instincts, and their concomitant emotions have another type of excitant. They are also excited by the perception of the outward manifestations of their working in any member of the same species. The perception of the cry of fear or snarl of anger emitted by one of their number moves all animals of the same species to a corresponding emotion. The uplifted tail or the attitude preparatory to head-long flight will excite all animals to a similar course of action. This fact of innate structure which enables the mind to vibrate in unison with other minds is what we term *Sympathy*. Sympathy is the result of the identity of mental structure among animals belonging to a given species. The action resulting from the

sympathetic experience of emotion is] *imitation*. *Suggestion* is the ability of the animal to perceive and grasp the meaning of the expression of an emotion (or an instinct) in any other member of the same species. *Suggestion, Sympathy and Imitation* are merely the three different aspects of the animal mind excited, not by the natural 'object' of the 'instinct' (or its emotion), but by the expression of the working of the instinct (or its emotion) in any member of the same species. This hormic formula for the elucidation of the true nature of, and of the relationship between suggestion, sympathy and imitation was framed by McDougall in 1908 in the first edition of his '*Social psychology*'. Condemning the attempts of certain psychologists to class suggestion; sympathy and imitation as instincts, and characterising these processes as pseudo-instincts, McDougall says, 'They are closely allied as regards their effects, for in each case the process in which the tendency manifests itself involves an interaction between at least two individuals; one of whom is the agent and the other is the person acted upon or patient; and in each case the result of the process is some degree of assimilation of the actions and mental state of the patient to those of the agent. There are three forms of mental interaction of fundamental importance for all social life both of men and animals. These processes of mental interaction of impression and reception, may involve chiefly the cognitive aspect of mental processes, or the affective or the conative aspect. In the first case, when some presentation, idea or belief of the agent directly induces a similar presentation, idea or belief in the patient, the process is called one of suggestion; when an affective or emotional excitement of the agent induces a similar affective excitement in the patient, the process is one of sympathy or sympathetic induction of emotion or feeling; when the most prominent result of the process of interaction is the assimilation of the bodily movements of the patient to those of the agent, we speak of imitation.*' This formula is simple and sound in all

**Social psychology* (23rd edn.), pp. 77-78 (italics ours).

its essentials. All types of suggestion and imitation, including those exhibited by abnormal persons, may be explained on the basis of this formula. But McDougall, in his later writings did not give the whole-hearted support it deserves. In *An Outline of Psychology* and *The Energies of Men* he has separated suggestion and imitation from each other and from sympathy; and has treated them independently. This is due to the fact that his general theory of instincts, and his view of the relationship between instincts and emotions, have undergone considerable modification as indicated in the last chapter. As a result of his changed attitude to instincts, McDougall has forsaken his view as outlined in the *Social Psychology*, and has linked suggestion to one special instinct, namely, the instinct of submission. All forms of suggestion (including hypnotic suggestion) are explained as due to the functioning of this submissive instinct in the patient. This is the attitude which McDougall takes up in his *Group Mind and Abnormal Psychology*. This attitude which is in conflict with that taken up in the earlier works is the natural corollary of his analysis of gregariousness in *An Outline of Psychology**. If gregariousness is considered to be an instinct whose sole natural goal is the mere physical contiguity of the members of the species, then the fitting in of suggestion and imitation as effective factors in group life can be achieved only by some such artificial hypothesis as that suggested by McDougall in his later works. But, when we estimate sympathy (active and passive) at its full value, then we find that it is at the basis of all kinds of group behaviour, and also of the higher forms of intellectual and moral life where the patient forms a pattern of conduct after his chosen ideal. We have no hesitation in affirming that the original formula of our author as set forth in his *Social Psychology* is perfectly adequate to the explanation of all the facts.

There is a metaphysical implication of far-reaching

*Op. cit., pp. 153-154.

significance in the view of sympathy emphasised by us, and it is of a flavour which may not be pleasing to many Western minds. If sympathy is descriptive of an innate and fundamental fact of mental structure, and if it establishes, not only the identity of structure and function of the minds of individuals belonging to the same species, but also identity of nature, then if it could be shown that sympathy operates between animal and human minds, we must admit that all minds are one, and that the psychic continuum is of a piece throughout, though it is differentiated into separate personalities in the phenomenal world. In other words the hormic interpretation of sympathy leads to an advaitic view of the self. Instead of being frightened at this conclusion, and instead of sidetracking the main issue, let us frankly accept the implication and work it out for all it is worth.

Suggestion and imitation, then, have no driving power of their own. They cannot, by themselves, activate an instinct. The impulse or energy activating them has to come from some fundamental propensity which is excited through sympathetic vibration of the mind of the individual concerned.

This hypothesis is not unknown to the psychologists of the West at the present day.* Shand, for instance, recognises the susceptibility of the emotional structure to excitation by the expression of a corresponding emotion in another member of the same species. Stout† connects imitation with interest. When interest is analysed, we discover that it is nothing but the feeling attaching itself to the object of an instinct. But, as we have already noticed; no one but McDougall appears to have grasped the fact that suggestion, sympathy and imitation are but three different aspects of the same mental experience. Unless the significance of this fact is fully grasped it will not be the results of suggestions and sympathy.

* Shand, *Foundations of Character*, p. 49.

† Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, pp. 56-58.

In explaining the tortuous and indirect channels through which suggestion and imitation operate in human beings, it is necessary to note that the innate ability of man is capable of endless modifications through 'conditioning' on the perceptual as well as the executive side. One may imitate some monotonous and apparently useless action, but careful analysis will reveal therein the operation of an impulse drawn from some fundamental emotion. Psycho-analysis has revealed the secret sources of instinctive energy in many instances of meaningless repetition of activities. McDougall has also shown that the main-springs of human activity are not the crude primeval instincts as such, but the highly developed sentiments, concrete and abstract, organised into an abiding scale of values as indicated in the last chapter. In explaining, therefore, a given case of suggestion or imitation it will be safer to look for the sentiment or the complex which is the immediate excitant of action, and then track in down to the fundamental emotions.

✓ We receive support for our hormic formula from several sources. The first comprises sociological works dealing with the behaviour of the crowd, specially under the stress of a great national crisis. Trotter's *Instincts of Herd in Peace and War* is typical of this class of literature. The author of this work has analysed the behaviour of the crowd during the last world war. After pointing out the insufficiency of self-preservation, nutrition and sex as principles for explaining human conduct, Trotter postulates 'gregariousness' as a primitive and fundamental instinct in man by whose operation alone many of the intricate aspects of human behaviour may be accounted for. But what Trotter means by 'gregariousness' is not what McDougall means by the same expression. All the phenomena of suggestion and imitation resulting from the sympathetic vibrations of the emotions are connoted by the term. And after a lengthy and illuminating discussion, Trotter comes to the conclusion that 'Man is suggestible, always, everywhere, and under any circum-

stances.' The author has hit upon the right approach to sympathetic induction. Had he pushed his analysis to its logical conclusion, he would have reached the formula that we have proposed with its foundations laid in the hommic theory.

We derive additional support for our view from the recent psychological analysis of 'Empathy'. Warren's Dictionary of Psychology mentions two definitions of empathy, one of which is aesthetic and the other psychological. The latter defines the terms as 'a mental state in which one identifies or feels himself in the same state of mind as another person or group.' We are now familiar with the vastness of the field over which human sympathy operates. Even the so-called inanimate objects, can, under certain conditions, evoke sympathetic vibrations in the human mind: Nature, animate and inanimate, is knit together by one single bond of sympathetic feeling. We have to remind ourselves here of the advaitic conception of the self.

The Sympathetic Induction of Emotions and Sentiments.

The concept of induction is so important for a correct understanding of human behaviour in many obscure fields that we may dwell on it a little longer. We have already analysed the central or emotional aspect of our innate mental structure into the mental experience proper, and its bodily manifestations called 'the expressions of the emotion'. In fear, for instance, there is first and foremost the mental experience or the emotion proper; then, on the bodily side we have pallor of the face, dryness of the mouth, shrinking and trembling, perspiration, horripilation, goose-flesh, cessation of the digestive processes, heightened activity of the adrenal gland, increase in blood-pressure, rushing of energy, through the diversion of the blood stream to the muscles of the leg, etc. These *expressions* of the emotion of fear are admirably suited to further the behavioural

aspect of the instinct of escape. In every instinct, the emotion and its expressions help to accelerate the activity which is the natural goal of the instinctive impulse. It is in the expressions of the emotion pertaining to a given instinct that we have to look for the secret of induction.

It has been noted already that every instinct is set going by certain 'objects' or 'ideas' of those objects. Now, there is a peculiarity of the instinctual structure of our mind that has far-reaching consequences. On the cognitive side an instinct is so organised that it is aroused to its full intensity, not only by the perception of the 'objects' which are its natural excitants, but also by the perception of the 'expressions' of the emotion as displayed by a member of the same species. Thus each instinct, as well as the emotion which goes with it, has two classes of stimuli; one is the natural object which serves to excite it in the mind of the living organism, and the other comprises the perception of the expression of that emotion in the behaviour of another member of the same species. Sympathetic induction of emotions arises out of the operation of the second class of stimuli.

Let us, following our usual plan, represent the facts of induction diagrammatically.




Fig. 7—Sympathetic Induction of Fear.

The operation of Escape in an organism which has not actually perceived the "object."

E_1 —The cognitive aspect of "escape" stimulated by natural objective excitants.

E_2 —Fear; E_3 —Flight.

The operation of Escape in an organism which has actually perceived the object of Escape.

E_2 —The Emotion of Fear.

E_3 —The Expression of the Emotion of Fear.

It will be noted, that the excitants of the propensity comprise not only the objects denoted by E_1 , but also, by e_3 the expressions of the emotion in an animal of the same species. As an example we may consider the behaviour of the wild horse. This creature is moved to fear not only when it perceives a terrifying object, but also when it hears the *neigh of fear* given out by another wild horse. In the latter case, the horse has not directly sighted the source of danger, but the expression of the emotion of fear in another member of its kind has served to induce fear in its mind, and the result is headlong flight.

We have now to take note of a fact to which McDougall does not give sufficient prominences. Sympathetic induction works not only at the primitive instinctual level, but also at the higher sentiment level. Among persons who have reached more or less the same stage in the scale of sentiment values the exhibition by speech, gesture and other perceptible forms of expression of any sentiment will induce the same sentiment in the minds of beholders. It is this *sympathetic induction of the sentiments* that is the foundation for aesthetic experience of the higher order.

Sentiments, as we have indicated in the last chapter, have a three-fold structure just like the fundamental emotions. There is a central part (h_2 , Fig. VI) composed of the blending of the emotions of the instincts that enter into the constitution of the sentiment, and an initial cognitive (h_1) as well as a final (h_3) behavioural part. These parts are again compounded of the original elements. Now, when the central part is aroused through sympathetic induction, that is, through the perception of the expression of a similar sentiment in the face and speech and gestures of a cultured person; then the mental energy that is released will travel both backward and forward and arouse the cognitive and behavioural aspects. In other words sympathetic induction of sentiments, as well as of emotions, arouses cognition and conation too.

The facts of induction set forth in the above para-

graphs lend strong support to our contention that the three-fold analysis of structure with which McDougall started his hormic career should be maintained without any drastic changes. If the central aspect be omitted or merged in the efferent or conative part, then e_1 should be merged in e_3 . The expression of the emotion will then cease to have an independent status in the psychological analysis, and will certainly cease to have any special significance for aesthetics. If, in all our analyses, we confine ourselves to cognitive abilities and conative propensities, then it will not be possible for us to speak of 'sympathetic induction', because the expression of an emotion is natural and constant while the final efferent activity of the instinct to which the emotion belongs is varied and individual. As McDougall himself has pointed out, 'the cognitive and behavioural aspects are subject to endless conditioning, while the central aspect is not. If the three-fold structure be replaced by the two-fold one, then we should postulate on the afferent side such an extensive scheme of modification of the original mental structure as would admit of the possibility of the perception of each individual efferent activity serving as the excitant of the propensity concerned. This, however, is out of the question.

The difficulty on the two-fold scheme' increases in magnitude when we consider sentiments and their induction. Here the afferent (or cognitive) and efferent (or conative) aspects are complicated by the union of the corresponding parts of the propensities that enter into the constitution of the sentiment. It would be difficult to throw any light on the intricate problems relating to aesthetic experience, if the central aspect be merged in the final, because aesthetics in its concrete setting is the result of the sympathetic induction of sentiments. The bodily 'expressions' of the emotion of anger, specially the snarl or growl or cry of anger, induces the same emotion in other members of the same species within hearing. The energy released works forward, and produces the beha-

viour appropriate to the instinct of which the emotion is the central part; it works also backward, and by a kind of back-stroke, arouses under certain conditions, an *idea* of the *object*, or *class of objects* which constitutes the natural excitant of the combative propensity. Now the same process occurs in the case of sentiments also. The perception by the well-informed and cultured




Fig. 8

audience of the expression (E_e) of a refined sentiment (E_2) (say *love* in the courtship scene in *Sakuntalam*) excites the same sentiment (e_2) (understanding sentiment as the product of the organisation of the central or emotional aspects of the several propensities that enter into this compound) in their minds. The energy works backward and arouses the 'idea' of the 'object' (e_1) which, for each individual member of the audience is the unique excitant of love. The excitant for a sentiment, it should be noted, is a specific object for each individual and not a class of objects common to the species. When the love-making, therefore, of Sakuntala and Dushyanta is enacted, the aesthetic expression of Singara through speech, music and dance induces sympathetically the corresponding sentiment in the mind of the audience. The mental energy, thus released, will work forward and make each man or woman think of *his or her own lover and love experiences*. The sympathetic induction of the sentiment does not (and

should not) result in the audience falling in love with the hero or the heroine. If it did produce such an abnormal result, as it might in the case of depraved minds, then the consequence will be painful. On the afferent or final behavioural side, the energy released by the induction of sentiments will be consumed in intense and concentrated appreciation, and incipient imitative movements, with a final outburst of applause at the close of the scene, relieving all the pent up feeling.

These facts are covered by the three-fold analysis of emotions and sentiments which have supported in the last chapter, and so we hold that the original form of the McDougallian hormic theory is superior to the later modified form.

A Defence of the Hormic Theory of Sympathetic Induction.

In spite of its many merits, the theory of induction has been challenged by certain psychologists. A few apparently serious objections against the theory have been raised by Allport* but these may be easily answered and the theory defended against criticism.

'Sympathy, as McDougall has taken care to point out, is not an instinct in itself, but only an aspect of the methodology of the working of every instinct.' It is necessary to remember this point in our discussion.

The first objection urged against the theory of induction is that it presupposes the maturation of complex innate perceptual dispositions. And as maturation is not proved, the principle, it is claimed, turns out to be fallacious. Let us examine the evidence against maturation. Professor Allport makes use of the data gathered by Sheppard and Breed† on the pecking instinct in chicks, and comes to the conclusion that the experiments discredit

* Allport Social Psychology, p. 646.

† 'Maturation & Use in the Development of an Instinct', Jr. of An. Behr., 1913.

the maturation hypothesis, and point to habit as the basis for the supposedly innate foundation of the pecking behaviour of the birds. As against the conclusion drawn by the Professor, we may cite the observations of Woodworth. After a brief description of the pecking experiment Woodworth draws on data identical with those used by Allport, conclusions in favour of maturation. The delayed chicks display some preliminary awkwardness, just as caged birds do in flying. But soon they catch up with the much-exercised chicks. Maturation is thus established beyond doubt, and Allport's arguments against sympathetic induction in this context, lose their force.

There is a deep-seated source of confusion in Allport's denial of innate dispositions. Along with many psychologists Allport identified the McDougallian instinct with the motor mechanisms of instinct. An *instinct* is a fact of mental structure. It is a mental disposition. It includes, no doubt, the motor mechanism, but also much besides. To identify instinct with the motor mechanism is to identify the whole with one of its small parts. Any argument urged against the efficacy or even against the existence of the part has no validity when applied to the whole. But, even granting that the entire motor mechanism required for the service of instinct has to be developed through exercise, it does not follow that the instinct is not innate. We have seen enough of the picture to reject Allport's conclusions based on maturation.

The second argument against sympathetic induction is based on the alleged results of experiments relating to the identification, on the intellectual plane, of emotions by photographs of their facial expressions. It is argued that if sympathetic induction be a fact, then, the ability to name the emotions portrayed by photographs would have been much higher and more universal than it is now. Here again we have data enough to dispute the conclusion put forward. Feleky's experiments seem to indicate that there is a high positive correlation between the pose and the judgment. Woodworth has summed up the results in

a striking diagram which shows that in the case of many emotions the percentage of correct judgments is as high as 75 to 85*. Apart from this concrete evidence which disproves Allport's conclusion we have to notice a fallacy in the whole argument. In sympathetic induction we are concerned with the immediate experience of an emotion, and not with its identification by its external expression. When one hears the cry of fear or of pathetic appeal, one does not stop and think out, on the intellectual plane, the connection between such a cry and the emotion which may have produced it; and then experience the emotion, but all at once the cry touches off the relevant part of the dynamic structure of the mind, and an emotion is experienced. There is no connection whatever between successful reading of the significance of a facial pose, and the capacity to feel the emotion it indicates. He who is very slow or even dull at the identification of emotions may experience those emotions sympathetically very readily and in full strength. The confusion, once again, is due to the fact that mental structure is ignored, and the emotion is identified with a part of itself, namely, its bodily expressions. Hormic sympathy does not deal with the understanding of the situation, but with the immediate experience of a primitive emotion or sentiment in all its strength. Therefore, the second objection of Allport is wide of the mark; it does not touch the essential point of sympathetic induction.

The third objection brings out another source of confusion in the popular misunderstanding of the hormic theory. The argument of the objector runs thus: if two men are fighting and if neither of them is our friend, then sympathetic induction of anger does not occur in our minds. If, on the other hand one of the combatants, particularly the weaker one, is our friend then we experience sympathetic anger very powerfully. This objection, we are constrained to point out, shows clearly that Mc-

* Woodworth, Psychology, 1940 edn., p. 414.

Dougall's theory has not been understood properly. In the first place, the working of impulses in their crude form is to be found mostly in animals, and so it is in the gregarious animals we have to look for the examples of the working of induction. In such animals, we find that induction invariably occurs in the circumstances envisaged by Allport. In the case of man, McDougall has taken special pains to point out, in connection with his theory of laughter, that such induction will not occur, and should not occur always. Life will be intolerable if every one of us is to suffer sympathetically with every little pain of each one of our neighbours. There is a safety valve in our minds against the tyranny of induction, and that is laughter. We may laugh at two people fighting. The absence of anger in such a case does not invalidate the principle of induction. Of all the creatures on earth man alone laughs, for man alone possesses the capacity for suffering sympathetic pain acutely.

There is another source of confusion in the popular mind in regard to McDougall's theory. The hormic distinction between primary emotions and blended emotions, between primitive propensities and cultured sentiments has not been understood. The immediate motive to human behaviour is a sentiment. And, just as induction operates on the lower emotive level, so it works on the higher sentimentative level too. As man is a creature of 'sentiments' it may be that the lower level is often suppressed. Under such conditions the higher level will function, and induction will operate only with sentiments. In other words, the sight of any two angry persons fighting will not evoke anger, for such a spectacle will touch only the lower level, while if one of them is a friend, the sentiment is immediately activated and induction functions powerfully. The fact has been noted by Allport, but its significance has been missed by him.

One of the examples cited by Allport against induction really goes to support the hormic theory. A boy and a girl are taken out in a cart. The cart is upset and the

children are thrown out. Both are bruised and alarmed. The girl sets up a howl, and then the boy begins to cry. The cry of the boy is, we should say, the result of sympathetically induced feeling. Allport objects to this view and says that if the girl had not cried the boy would have been silent. We agree; but then there would have been no induction in such a case. If the girl alone had been thrown out, and bruised, contends Allport, while the boy remained unhurt in the cart, then the wail of the girl would have evoked no response. Common observation points to the opposite conclusion. Little boys and girls have been known to cry when listening to painful stories dramatically rendered by the narrator.

The three objections raised by Allport have been met, and we may claim that the criticisms levelled by him at the theory of sympathetic induction have failed to touch even the fringes of the problem, because the homiic theory is concerned with the mental structure of the behaving agent, while Allport's criticisms are aimed at the outward expression of behaviour. That this is so is indicated by the alternative theory of 'the conditioned emotional response' propounded by Allport. In spite of the clear indications to the contrary, we notice in the alternative theory a determined attempt to link conduct to conditioning. We know all the defects of conditioning as a principle of explanation. Pavlov himself has accepted the limitations of the principle. Yet, it is a matter for surprise that it is put forward as a final explanation of behaviour which is mental in essence. Professor Allport's account is a very good description of what happens, and can be observed objectively, when emotions are induced sympathetically. It is not an explanation in any sense. We never learn to experience in this way. The whole account is unsatisfactory because it does not reach down to the deeper springs of conduct, and when we reach the mental level we discover that the only acceptable principle of explanation for the behaviour described by Professor Allport is the homiic principle.

The real test of a psychological principle is to be found

in its applicability to the elucidation of social behaviour. McDougall has succeeded in explaining how a concourse of people may be quickly turned into a panic-stricken crowd by some 'object' of fear. 'A few persons near the stage of a theatre see flames dart out among the wings; then, though the flames may be invisible to the rest of the house, the expressions of the startled few induce fear in neighbours, and the excitement sweeps over the whole concourse like fire blown across the prairie.'* Here, induction works on the primitive plane of crude fear, and produces a general panic. There is all the difference between giving a complete description of human behaviour merely on the bodily level, and explaining such behaviour, by tracing it to its root causes. And as hormic psychology succeeds in getting at the springs of behaviour in the human mind, it is certainly the best type of psychology that we have at present.

* Group Mind, p. 25.

CHAPTER V

Affection in Orexis.

INTRODUCTION

It is a characteristic of all types of 'depth psychology' that they emphasise, as against the barren, superficial, associationistic psychologies of the last century, the dynamic and affective elements in experience. These elements in human nature were either totally neglected or reduced to the status of mere appendages of the intellect by the psychologists who flourished in the last century, but whose influence counts for nothing at the present day. McDougall and Freud, on the other hand, place the affective and conative factors at the very heart of psychology, and as 'pleasure' is an important element in these factors we shall now turn our attention to a consideration of "Affection in Orexis."

The Hormic Theory of Pleasure.

Hormic psychology has stressed, as we have noted already, the essentially conative nature of all our experience. In the analysis of the goal-seeking activity of man, this school has assigned to each element its rightful place. Conation, affection, and cognition have been put in proper relation to one another. But, with respect to *pleasure* there is unfortunately a certain degree of vagueness in McDougall's brilliant analysis of mental structure and function. We shall trace the source of this vagueness and attempt to remove it by our analysis of the hormic conception of the relation between conation and its affective tone.

Our experience, which is conative and goal-seeking in its essence, is concrete. It has many aspects which we seek to identify and distinguish by our psychological analysis, but it must be remembered that mind being non-spatial, immaterial, and dynamic cannot be cut up into parts of the spatial order. With this reservation in mind we may point out that hormic psychology has stressed the

need for a three-fold analysis of the instinctual structure of the mind into the cognitive, emotional and conative factors. In any concrete act of behaviour all the factors are operative. And now the question is, as behaviour is goal-seeking, should we not speak of the mental tone of successful goal-seeking as contrasted with the tone of unsuccessful goal-seeking? Of course, we should. Hormic psychology, therefore, distinguishes between 'pleasure' or pleasantness and its opposite, 'unpleasure' or unpleasantness.

What is 'pleasure' or pleasantness? On the hormic scheme we note that when the organism is striving successfully towards its goal, the instinctual (or sentimentative) structure of the mind (with its three-fold native endowment) is working smoothly. Under this condition satisfaction is experienced at the mental level. It is this satisfaction, this halo playing round the dynamism of mental structure that is termed 'pleasure' or 'pleasantness'. In the same manner we may speak of the halo of 'unpleasure' or 'unpleasantness' when the striving towards the goal is unsuccessful, and when there is considerable thwarting of the innate dynamism of mental structure. In the totality of concrete mental experience which we may represent by the following diagram, we distinguish between the working of the instinctual structure I of the mind and the




Fig. 9.
The Hormic conception of Pleasure.

affective tone of pleasantness and unpleasantness—P, U—Within I we may, of course, distinguish between I₁ (the perceptual aspect) I₂ (the emotional aspect) and I₃ (the behavioural aspect) of the innate structure. But we are at present, concerned only with the affective tone which accompanies the working of the whole of I. 'Pleasure' or 'pleasantness' and its opposite, then, 'are not in themselves springs of action, but at the most of undirected movements; they serve rather to modify instinctive processes, pleasure tending to sustain and prolong any mode of action, pain to cut it short.* 'None of the doctrines', says McDougall, 'of the associationist psychology was more profoundly misleading and led to greater absurdities than the attempt to exhibit pleasure and pain as the source of all activities. What could be more absurd than Professor Bain's doctrine that the joy of a mother in her child, her tender care and self-sacrificing efforts in its behalf, are due to the pleasure she derives from bodily contact with it in the maternal embrace? Or what could be more strained and opposed to hundreds of familiar facts than Herbert Spencer's doctrine that the emotion of fear provoked by any object consists in faint revivals in some strange clusters of ideas of all the pains suffered in the past upon contact with, or in the presence of, that object?†

The Three Stages in the Evolution of the Hormic Theory of 'Pleasure.'

There are three stages in the development of the hormic theory of 'pleasure' just as there are three stages in the evolution of the general theory itself. The first stage is outlined in McDougall's *Social Psychology*. In discussing the role of pleasure in human and animal activity, McDougall has in view the urgent need for refuting the mechanistic theories of behaviour, a point to which we have drawn attention already. These theories, with their insistence on the non-existence of mind, cannot take cognisance of 'pleasure'

* *Social Psychology*, p. 37.

† *Ibid.*, p. 37 f. n. 2.

and 'unpleasure' for these are mental qualities. If we could establish the efficacy of the affective tone in controlling the course of behaviour, then we shall have dealt a death blow to mechanistic behaviourism. McDougall, therefore, is concerned with the task of showing the great influence of 'pleasure' in guiding action. So, in the first supplementary chapter to the *Social Psychology* (23rd edition) McDougall upholds the role of pleasure in behaviour. But, it must be clearly pointed out that at this early stage pleasure is given just what is due to it, neither more nor less. It is conceived as the concomitant of successful striving towards the goal. 'In each case the strength of desire of the conative tendency, seems to be quite, or almost quite, independent of the quality of, and, of the intensity of its hedonic tone. While, on the other hand, the hedonic tone seems to be manifestly conditioned by the conative tendency, its quality by the success or failure of the striving, its intensity by the strength of the tendency.'* 'Pleasure and pain are always conditioned by the success and failure of conation respectively.'† It is clear that there is no suggestion of the casual efficacy of pleasure in these statements. We wish to stress this point, because it is the departure from this firm position that has landed McDougall in great difficulties.

The second stage of the development is to be found in McDougall's *An Outline of Psychology*. The author's general attitude towards pleasure has not undergone any change, for he still maintains the primacy of conation, and the dependence of feeling on conation.‡ But in discussing the role of pleasure in animal learning he makes certain remarks which contain the germs of the surprise in store for us in *The Energies of Men*.

'The correlation of pleasure with success or with progress toward the end of action, and of displeasure with failure and thwarting of action must be accepted as funda-

* *Social Psychology*, p. 318.

† *Ibid.*, p. 318.

‡ *An Outline of Psychology*, pp. 268-271.

mental. And it is more than a correlation; we find that in ourselves pleasure sustains, prolongs, and confirms the modes of striving which bring pleasure, that is the successful modes. Pain or displeasure on the other hand checks us. To this fundamental feature of its nature, the mind owes its directive power to guide and improve our modes of striving towards our goals. When we encounter a second time circumstances under which we have striven successfully, the satisfaction we have attained on the former occasion revives and colours our anticipation, reinforcing and sustaining our efforts. . . It is this way that the pleasures and pains of the past guide our actions in the present.*

There is evident here an anxiety to assign to pleasure and pain greater force and effectiveness than would be admissible on the ground that they are merely concomitants of mental functioning. We notice a drift towards the position where causal efficacy will be assigned to pleasure. It is admitted that 'pleasures' and 'pains' of the past guide our actions in the present, that is, the revived memory of the pleasures and pains of the past influence present action. How exactly they influenced action in the past, that is at the time of their first occurrence, is the question.

The answer to the question is to be found in *The Energies of Men* which marks the third stage in the evolution of the theory of pleasure. Here McDougall definitely assigns causal efficacy to pleasure and unpleasure. After clarifying Thorndike's position, and giving support to it on the psychical plane, our author asserts definitely that pleasure exercises causal efficacy over behaviour. Further, there is an elaborate defence of the way in which pleasure, which is temporally consequent on the attainment of the goal, may still be viewed as an antecedent directing the course of action towards the goal, for cause must precede the effect. It is at this point that McDougall introduces the concept of 'foresight' in learning. While discussing Thorndike's experiments with the cat in the puzzle box,

* An Outline of Psychology, pp. 191-192.

particularly to the second trial of the animal. McDougall says, 'How . . . can the pleasure which does not arise until the crucial movement has ceased and been followed by many other movements and the sense impressions that evoked it? Causes must precede their effects . . . This, I think, is the main ground of the general reluctance to accept Thorndike's law of effect . . . The key to the riddle is . . . foresight or expectation . . . As you foresee the attainment of the goal and the steps necessary to the attainment of it you experience something of the pleasure of success.'*

Starting with a position where pleasure merely plays round conation as a halo, and passing through one or two stages where feeling is given greater and greater prominence, McDougall finally arrives at the conclusion that pleasure has causal efficacy in behaviour. This is unfortunate, and as in the case of the relationship between instinct and emotion, the position in *The Energies* does not seem to be an improvement on the earlier works. Here, at any rate, the attitude taken up in *Social Psychology* is the best and nearest the truth. Hormic psychology cannot tolerate the assignment to pleasure (or its opposite) of any independent function. If pleasure be conceded to have causal efficacy, then it will not be difficult to transform it into a goal of action, or even *the* goal of action. The decline to hedonism will then be speedy and irretrievable, and that way lies the ruin of hormism.

'Pleasure', or to be correct, the pleasant tone of experience, we should insist, is merely the concomitant of action. It is a halo, just as the rainbow is the invariable concomitant, and a halo playing round the media which refract light. We may even look upon pleasure as a catalytic agent, but we can never grant it causal efficacy.

Defects in McDougall's Conception of 'Pleasure'.

The hormic theory of the affective tone of pleasure

*The Energies of Men, pp. 352-357.

as formulated by McDougall contains certain imperfections, and these have to be removed in the interests of the theory itself. Perhaps, the most satisfactory way of approaching the theory with a view to correcting the defects in, is through a critical survey of Professor Flugel's paper on the subject under discussion.* The Professor was at one time closely associated with McDougall, and he has had, in addition, the great advantage of a thorough acquaintance with psycho-analysis. Yet, he experiences considerable difficulty in presenting the hormic theory in such a way as to embrace all the relevant facts. One wonders whether there is not, in the mind of Professor Flugel, a suspicion about the complete validity of the hormic explanation of pleasure. The Professor's conclusion is that hedonism has been almost completely banished from the realm of psychology. It lingers perhaps, only in a very small tract of the vast area which it once occupied. This conclusion is very encouraging, no doubt, to the supporters of McDougall, but there are discouraging references in the body of the paper to hedonistic elements in such avowed purposivists as Stout, Ward, and Freud. The difficulty that Professor Flugel experiences in establishing the sway of hormism over the whole range of affective tone of experience is, to a certain extent at least, due to the defects inherent in McDougall's system. Barring these defects, we must assert that it is a lack of clear understanding of the hormic point of view that is responsible for the obstacles encountered by Professor Flugel. Hence we shall make an attempt to establish the sway of hormic psychology over the whole realm of feeling by such additions to, and elaborations of, the original McDougallian formula as may be found necessary.

In dealing with any psychological problem from the hormic point of view it is necessary to emphasise at the outset two important points :

* Feeling and the Hormic Theory, *Char. & Per.*, VIII, 3, 1939, pp. 211-229.

(1) We should never lose sight of the fact which both McDougall and Woodworth stress so frequently, that the substantives used in psychology are really either verbs or adverbs masquerading as nouns. The substantial usage is a relic from the old type of faculty psychology.

(2) Though hormic psychology gives great prominence to the innate propensities of the human mind, yet it should be remembered that the immediate activating forces of human behaviour are drawn not directly (at least in many instances of concrete behaviour) from the primitive instincts and emotions, but from the highly complex and organised '*sentiments*'.

And in dealing with the specific problems of 'affection', we have to make the following further observations :

(3) The affective tone (usually distinguished as pleasure or pain) as a characteristic of behaviour, and is, in consequence, to be treated as an adverb.

(4) There is an affective tone which is concomitant with behaviour on the higher plane of *sentiments*, concrete and abstract. That which operates on the lower plane of elemental propensities is different from the tone referred to above. We should not confuse the one with the other.

(5) The effective tone of unpleasantness should not be mistaken for the sensation of pain.

When a clear psychological analysis of pleasantness has been made, and the meanings of the terms clearly fixed, then there should be no excuse for an indiscriminate use of the expressions—*pleasantness, pleasure, feeling and affection*.

Professor Flugel's paper introduces, at the very opening of the discussion, the very source of confusion that we want to avoid. In a preliminary statement of the hormic position the Professor uses the four terms mentioned in the last paragraph to indicate the same aspect of experience, namely, its affective tone. 'Feeling' refers to the totality of the affectively toned experience from which

psychological analysis has isolated the *tone* for special investigation. Pleasant feeling and pleasure are meant to indicate the affective tone of pleasantness, and may, with advantage, be dropped from our terminology. For the sake of simplicity and clarity of thought we shall speak of 'pleasantness' and 'unpleasantness' (remembering that these are qualities of experience), and of 'the affective tone,' as a common term embracing both 'pleasantness' and 'unpleasantness'.

McDougall himself is responsible for the confusion of ideas found in Professor Flugel's paper. In his early works he says, '... pleasure and pain are not in themselves springs of action, but at the most undirected movements; they serve rather to modify instinctive processes...'* Not only is the word 'pleasure' used here as the synonym of 'pleasantness' but 'pain' is also used as the opposite of 'pleasure'. In the later work the second defect is set right. The author recognises the difference between *pain* as a *sensation* and *pain* as the unpleasant affective tone of experience.†. But the words *feeling* and *pleasure* are used freely almost as synonyms. The only means for removing all traces of confusion is to hold fast to the simple terminology mentioned above. It is in this direction that we wish to suggest a slight, but very necessary, improvement in the hormic vocabulary of McDougall.

There is another source of confusion in Professor Flugel's paper for which McDougall is certainly not responsible in any sense. We have seen in the previous chapters how hormic psychology has laid bare the innate and inherited structure of the human mind. The elemental propensities that constitute the foundation of the structure have been carefully analysed, and it has been shown how these propensities are built into sentiments, concrete and abstract, of varying degrees of complexity and value. It should be noted, however, at this point, that civilised man,

*Social Psychology, p. 37.

† An Outline of Psychology, p. 267.

in spite of the several centuries of 'civilisation' which forms his boasted heritage, has not achieved yet any tolerable organisation of his sentiments. His character is as yet ill-formed. And so it is that his mental structure which functions now and then on the high level of cultured sentiments, often slides down to function on the lower level of primitive propensities. It becomes necessary, therefore, to distinguish between the affective tone of the lower level and that of the higher. Such a distinction was made by McDougall in his *Social Psychology*. Our author there speaks of *happiness* as belonging to the higher level, and of *pleasure* as belonging to the lower. 'What is happiness?' he asks, 'Is happiness merely pleasure, or a sum of pleasures, and if not, what is it?' and in answer he says, '... pleasure is a qualification of consciousness of momentary duration, or, at most, of a fleeting character, and it arises from some mental process that involves but a mere fragment of one's whole being. Happiness arises from the harmonious operation of all the sentiments of a well-organised and unified personality. While this distinction between 'pleasure' and 'happiness' is* clear, and in consequence there is no excuse for mistaking the affective tone of the lower 'emotional' level of experience with that of the higher 'sentiment' level, there is, unfortunately, room, for confusion in regard to that aspect of the hormic principle which we discussed in third and fourth chapters. We have seen how the three aspects of mental structure were abridged into two with consequent loss of clarity and of psychological effectiveness. There is no merit in thus merging the colourful emotional aspect of human nature in the conative aspect. On the other hand, we have seen, how there is great danger in this artificial division of experience into cognitive and conative aspects, losing sight of the emotional aspect altogether. In the previous chapters we have argued for the retention of the three-fold analysis of the instinctual structure of the human mind. With a hormic theory improved and reconstructed

* *Social Psychology*, pp. 132-134.

in the manner sketched in the last chapter we may proceed to fix the status of affection in orexis. We may start with a provisional definition of the affective tone of experience. 'Pleasure is the affective tone which accompanies mental and bodily processes when all goes well, and the vital strivings of the individual are being realised.' The effective tone of pleasantness (or 'pleasure') is the result of nature's friendly contacts with the human mind in its fundamental striving after life. It accompanies the normal and healthy functioning of all biological and psychological processes.

Starting with this provisional definition, and with an improved hormic theory of the structure of the human mind sketched out already, we may proceed to make a critical evaluation of Professor Flugel's estimate of McDougall's 'pleasure-pain' hypothesis, and through such a critical evaluation arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the role of affection in orexis.

Reconstruction of the Hormic Theory of Pleasure.

The initial approach to the whole problem of pleasantness is misleading in Flugel's paper. The question is raised, 'Do we strive (and therefore act) because we feel? Or do we feel because we strive?' The relationship between conation and feeling is conceived in temporal terms, and the problem is to discover which is the antecedent, and which the consequent. On the correct hormic theory, the affective tone is neither antecedent to nor consequent on the conative drive, but is concomitant with the smooth and normal functioning of the innate mental structure. An affective tone is after all the tone of an experience. It is dependent for its very existence upon the concrete experience. How, then, could it have any causal efficacy by itself? The fallacy is due to a misunderstanding of the nature of mental structure. When that structure is understood in terms of the hormic theory, then, the question raised at the beginning of this paragraph will cease to have any meaning. It is in the very nature of mental structure to work out its function, and in the course of such func-

tioning the effective tone occurs concomitantly as an integral part of the total experience.

The entire argument and its refutation may be stated in a slightly different way, emphasising another aspect of the problem. It is said by those who have not grasped the full significance of the hormic view of mental structure, that the prior existence of the affective tone of unpleasantness generated by a consciously felt unsatisfied need is an invariable condition for experiencing pleasantness resulting from the progressive satisfaction of the need. The unpleasant pangs of hunger must first be experienced before pleasantness can be generated by the act of enjoying a good meal. Common experience, it is said, justifies this view. We contend that this a misrepresentation of the facts of the case. According to the hormic theory the functioning of the instinctive structure is always affectively toned, either pleasantly or unpleasantly. In the so called precondition of an unsatisfied need for the experiencing of 'pleasure' what has really happened is that the structure has been stimulated, but the functioning is neither normal nor healthy. There is obstruction to smooth working, and is it any wonder that the unpleasant feeling tone should occur as a concomitant of the hindered experience? As soon as the hindrance is removed, the structure begins to function smoothly and normally, and has, therefore, a pleasant affective tone. Hence there is no question of an antecedent 'pain' for the experience of 'pleasure'. We have either a smooth functioning of innate propensities (or acquired sentiments) toned pleasantly, or hindrances to such functioning with an unpleasant affective tone. To say that conation, as such, can exist without any affective tone, and can then give rise to pleasantness or unpleasantness is not to give a hormic account of experience or a true account either.

The distinction between 'pure' and 'impure' or 'mixed' pleasures which Plato drew long ago in his *Philebus*, and which certain modern philosophers uphold is a natural corollary of the mistaken view of the relationship between

conation and affection which we have criticised above. An 'impure' or 'mixed' pleasure depends on a pre-existing want whereas a 'pure' pleasure, it is claimed, implies no such want. Pure pleasures are classified into intellectual, aesthetic and sensory pleasures. As a consideration and critical examination of the last type will sweep away the fallacies inherent in the theory under criticism here, we shall devote our attention to it in the following paragraphs.

Professor Flügel cites a warm bath, a pleasing colour, and a lovely tone, as examples of pure sensory pleasures. Professor Allen in his book, *Pleasure and Instinct*, devotes several chapters to the discussion of the problem that we are now considering. He too draws a distinction between 'pleasures and unpleasures which appear to arise directly from bodily conditions . . . and those connected with such instinctive tendencies as ambition and self-assertion . . .' The two psychologists agree in holding that McDougall's theory is applicable to the second, that is instinctive, but not to the first or sensory type of experience. It must be said that Professor Flügel makes a very laudable attempt to push the hormic theory, as he understands it, as far as possible. But in the end he confesses that there is one small field which defies his attempts at the application of the hormic explanation, and that is the field of sensory experience. Let us, therefore, direct our efforts to the task of overcoming the resistance offered by this field.

Those who assert the immediacy of the affective tone, of sensation and of its independence of conation have not grasped the significance of the hormic position. At any rate, they have not understood the hormic view of the status of cognition in experience. Cognition is an outgrowth of conation in the development of the human mind which is instinctual in essence. McDougall has demonstrated, and so have other psychologists of his way of thinking, that intelligence invariably functions in the service of instinct. The development of the cognitive structure of the mind occurs only in the interests of the proper

and efficient functioning of the instinctive structure. Sensation and sensory discrimination have no existence apart from conation. While asserting the validity of this position, we should at the same time remind ourselves of two facts connected with the status of sensory experience. The conation which is the basis of a given sensory experience need not be of the elementary type. It may belong to the higher level of 'sentiments'. Then, in the second place, the dependence of a sensory experience on the conative structure of the mind may not be visible on a superficial examination. Often, it will be necessary to apply psycho-analytic method to reveal such dependence. We should also note that it is wrong to postulate a 'want' as the antecedent of a sensory experience and its affective tone.

In the light of the three observations we have made above, let us examine the illustration cited by Professors Flugel and Allen. A warm bath, a sweet tone, and a beautiful colour are 'pleasant' in themselves. Are they? What would be the affective tone of these sensory experiences, if they were forced upon one suffering from high fever? The answer is obvious, and it was seen by Professor Flugel. He is prepared to admit that the hormic theory is adequate to the demands made by many experiences. But he thinks that there are certain simple sensory qualities which baffle the hormic psychologist. Our contention is that they appear to be baffling because cognition is given an independent status which it does not possess. The smell of a rose has been given as an example. To those of us living in the South, there is another flower whose fragrance has an intensely pleasant affective tone. It is the jasmine. The fragrance of this flower is not pleasant to all people. As a matter of fact Westerners find the jasmine rather strong and unpleasant. The extraordinary attractiveness of the smell of jasmine is due to its associations with social and religious functions in our life which have a most important and abiding interest for us. The bride and the bridal chamber are unthinkable without

the jasmine. Love of the most exalted type, human as as well as divine, is associated with the fragrance of this pure white flower. Similarly we shall find on careful analysis, that a simple colour or musical note is associated with deep-lying conative tendencies of the human mind. Simple green is not so simple as we seem to imagine. It is restful to the eyes, and has deep physiological effects. To the adult mind it may have a significance stretching far beyond the spectral value which the physicist associates with it. The ancient Hindu aesthetic philosophers studied the effect of these so-called 'simple sensations', and reduced their emotional values to some sort of order. Each *raga* or *ragini* has a particular colour scheme associated with it. The reference here is not to synaesthesia, but to the excitation of our emotions by a *raga* operating in conjunction with other physical factors which are the natural stimuli for the various sense organs. So, the simple sensory experiences (not excluding such very simple ones as the perception of contours) owe their affective tone to the emotional qualities embedded deep in them. A sensation existing by itself is a psychological myth.

In this connection we may, with profit, remind ourselves of the very valuable work done by the Gestalt psychologists on the nature of the various sensations. When the intensity of a physical stimulus (such as light) is just below the threshold of sensation, it has been found that the stimulation of another sense organ (the cochlea, for example) has the effect of producing a visual reaction to the otherwise invisible stimulus. This phenomenon of inter-sensory interaction has been widely investigated and the results have been used for supporting the Gestalt position. The concept of the Gestalt does receive support from this new field of experimentation, but more than that, we hold that what is behind Gestalt, namely, the conative drive which generates the Gestalt and holds it together is clearly indicated by the new hypothesis of structural and functional relationship between sensations. Unity of sensation, and the dependence of sensation, even

the so-called pure and simple sensations, on conation, are now becoming established facts.

Our conclusion, then, is that sensory experiences are merely parts of total experiences, wherein conation plays the most significant part.

Before concluding the discussion of this problem and passing on to the next, we wish to point out that several obstacles confronting the hormic psychologist will vanish if he will admit the validity of psycho-analysis and psycho-analytic theory. Not only the working of the conative structure of the mind at the sub-conscious and unconscious levels, but also the formation of complexes and their working at these hidden levels should be recognised. Such an admission will produce a new hormic theory in which the healthy elements of the now conflicting schools could be made to supplement one another and to raise psychology to the level of a respected science.

Let us now turn our attention to 'intellectual feelings'. Professor Flugel, it is true, defends the hormic theory in this field, and concludes that a good case has been made out for the hormic theory of 'pleasure' in this field. But the defence ought to have been carried out much more aggressively. In the first place it should be claimed in the most emphatic and unequivocal manner possible that according to the hormic view, there is no cognition without conation. The Professor discusses in this connection the example of a geometrical problem. The solving of such a problem, it is claimed, yields pleasure, but implies no antecedent need. In some cases at least conation is not the antecedent of pleasure. The defence against this position which Professor Flugel offers is very weak. When we undertake to solve a mathematical problem it is clear that our *interest* has been aroused in the process, and wherever there is interest we may take it for granted that there is a felt need or some fundamental urge at work. Even though it may be argued that there is no ground for assuming the operation of any very complex sentiment in the case of a

small boy* who is engaged in solving a geometrical problem, it must be conceded that *curiosity* is present in his mind and is providing the necessary drive for attacking a difficult problem. It is somewhat on these lines that Professor Flugel defends the hormic theory of the affective tone in the intellectual field. But we are constrained to state that the charge against hormism, and the defence are based on a distorted view of McDougall's theory. Whenever the structure of the mind functions at all, it functions as a whole; that is, the cognitive, affective behavioural aspects of propensities and sentiments function together and simultaneously. To speak of one of the phases functioning before or after the others is to go back to faculty psychology. On hormic principles cognition can function only along with affection, and the affective tone will be either pleasant or unpleasant according as behaviour is furthered or hindered.

In conclusion, we have no hesitation in asserting that the hormic theory of the affective tone of our experiences is both valid and adequate. Difficulties confront only those who have not grasped fully the distinction between mental structure and mental function which McDougall has explained clearly in his *An Outline of Psychology*. A felt need which in itself is unpleasant has been believed to be the fundamental requisite for behaviour. This position, we contend is untenable and in any case, it is not the position held by hormic psychology. It is not true to say that an unpleasant state of want gives the initial impulse, and that under its control the organism learns gradually what will satisfy that want and remove the displeasure. The fact is that an innate mental capacity (or its acquired modification) begins to unfold gradually until its full possibilities are realised. If this process of unfolding is smooth and progresses steadily towards its goal, then the accompanying affective tone is pleasant, if hindered, it is unpleasant.

PART II

Hormism and other Contemporary Schools.



CHAPTER VI

Hormic and Middle-Of-The-Road Psychology

WHAT IS MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD PSYCHOLOGY?

In attempting an estimate of the relationship between hormic psychology and the other schools, it is well to begin with a consideration of the middle-of-the-road psychology, because in its non-committal attitude we find a suitable point of departure for approaching the other and avowedly antagonistic schools of psychology. Woodworth is the accredited exponent of this non-committal school, and so let us commence our discussion with a critical account of the Woodworthian attitude to psychological studies.

Woodworth, it is believed, occupies the middle-of-the-road position in the world of modern psychology. In the concluding chapter of his book *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*, he refers to the 'great middle body of psychologists who do not admit allegiance to any of the schools'. Woodworth claims to belong to this body which refuses to adopt the system or theory of any of the schools to the exclusion of all the others. Yet we should note that the middle-of-the-road men have no objection whatever to make use of what is best and nearest the truth in all the contending psychological theories of the present day.

A psychologist who occupies the middle-of-the-road position may take one of the two possible attitudes towards the other schools. He may be a kind of eclectic attempting to gather together the attractive parts of the rival doctrines in order to produce a synthetic theory of his own, or he may grant recognition only to the *hard facts* established by the schools, and refuse to consider the conflicting hypotheses based on these facts. The first attitude is unwelcome in scientific psychology, because it is a convenient cloak for mental lethargy. Woodworth

is certainly not an eclectic; and Columbia is one of the most vigorous centres of psychological activity in America. Experimental work relating to every conceivable field of pure psychology is being carried on at Columbia, but at the same time the workers there are managing to keep clear the unhealthy rivalry between opposed schools which is injuring the fair name of psychology. We are tired of witnessing the conflict between rival schools in psychology. Not that theoretical conflicts are unknown in the physical sciences. They do occur frequently, but the combatants in that field have an uncanny capacity for keeping their differences a secret from the world outside, while psychological conflict are carried on in the open. The Woodworthian attitude is, therefore, refreshing. Moreover, it contains promise of a unified system of psychology to be born soon. But the question is, 'Is a mere accumulation of bare facts of any scientific value?' A plain description of objective facts appears to be the ideal of contemporary science. The search for causes seems to have received a setback. But in dealing with psychological facts one is invariably led on to the pursuit of casual connections. Casual sequences apart, even the most cautious phenomenologist in science has to make use of working hypotheses. Woodworth has a clear-cut working hypothesis which he uses with considerable effect in dealing with psychological facts. Let us analyse this hypothesis, and see where it leads us.

The Basic Concepts of the Woodworthian Hypotheses

There are four different parts or aspects of the Woodworthian hypothesis that are all of equal importance to the professor's psychological outlook. They may be considered as falling under four different concepts, namely, the concept (1) of *dynamism*, (2) of *sets* (3) of *drives*, and *motives* or of *activity in progress*, and (4) of *purpose*. Among these dynamism takes precedence over others, because it is the foundation for the others. And the dynamism of Woodworth is a puzzling concept demanding careful analysis,

Dynamism.—Dynamic, as opposed to static, is an epithet that we use of anything that is on the move, and not stagnant. In the physical world the concept of dynamism comprises movement, and the object that moves. In popular usage we apply the word dynamic to a person who is super-normally active and forceful, and can get action out of others, sometimes even out of the most lethargic. So, energy is of the very essence of dynamism. This energy should, of course, be canalised; but to speak of the canal as being dynamic is not justifiable. The machine is dynamic, but it derives its dynamism from the energy which is directed into it by the designer or the operator of the machine. To speak of the levers, gears, wheels, cranks and shafts as dynamic is not correct. In what sense, then, are we to understand the term 'dynamism' in psychology?

The Woodworthian concept of 'dynamism' is expounded clearly in the two articles on 'Dynamic Psychology' in *The Psychologies of 1925 and of 1930*, and in the chapter with a similar title in Edna Heidbreder's 'Seven Psychologies'. It is not easy to express the essence of this type of dynamism in a few sentences, for there are conflicting elements operating within the concept. "Dynamic Psychology is concerned with tracing the sequence of cause and effect in the stream of psychological events," Woodworth himself states the essence of the dynamic attitude in his own manner, and it is clear from his statement that this type of dynamism is intimately associated with behaviourism. This fact has not escaped the notice of the author of 'Seven Psychologies' who says that 'with behaviourism Woodworth is distinctly sympathetic, perhaps more so than with introspectionism'. If this were the whole picture, then we should have no quarrel with dynamism, for dynamism would be identical with behaviourism, and would share the latter's fortunes for good or ill. But this is only a part of the picture, and the other parts possess elements of great survival value. These elements must be saved by developing them in the proper direction.

In studying the nature of human behaviour modern psychology has taken up a biological attitude. But, there is a serious error in importing the wares of biology wholesale into the realm of psychology. 'Life' in biology is still a mechanical concept. In spite of the well-conceived and well-directed efforts of the field biologists, the animal organism is still looked upon merely as a 'body' by the majority of biologists. Psychology on the other hand, cannot set aside the *mind* of the living organism. The existence of mind even in the lowest organisms has been proved beyond doubt. The psychologist, therefore, will be at fault, if he refuses to see beyond the body of the animal, and the environment which provides the stimuli for bodily reactions. Real dynamism resides, therefore, not in bodily mechanism, not even in the interaction between the world and the body, but in the mind, which in its functions controls the body and the world which is the environment of the body.

There is a striking example in Woodworth's *Psychology* which illustrates the point that is being urged here. A man has just risen from his seat, and is opening the door of his room to go out. Some one questions why he is turning the knob of the door, and the reply is that he is doing so in order to open the door, and get to the garage. "Why should he go to the garage? Because he wants to take some people to the station. And here the matter is dropped by Woodworth. This is a good example of the description of activity on the behavioural level. But it gives no clue as to the real motive to behaviour. One is at liberty to ask, 'Why should the man help his friends by taking them to the station?' If dynamic psychology cannot answer this question, then it is not really dynamic, but static. It deals only with the levers and wheels and cranks and shafts, and not with the energy which drives them, and also not with what is of greater importance, the source of that energy. The answer to the question that we have raised, lies ready at hand in *hormic psychology*: 'Because they are the man's friends; they are persons who activate

the gregarious and sympathetic and other propensities in the mind'. These fundamental propensities and their compounds are the real causes of behaviour. It may, however, be asked, 'Why do these propensities work in the mind?' The answer is, that the structure of the human mind is such that they must work and will work. The structure, as determined by careful study, should be taken as the last stage beyond which psychology as a science cannot go, and should not go. True psychological dynamism, then, is of the mind, and of mental energy, and not of the body.

Woodworth himself is not satisfied with behaviourism. He is prepared to grant the validity of the results secured by introspection. And he is prepared, unlike the behaviourist, to discuss the nature of motives and emotions in his psychology. But he too commits the fallacy of confining the discussion to the workings of the body. A detailed knowledge of the mechanism of the bodily organs is thoroughly inadequate for psychological purposes. The psychologist must needs seek for purposes, goals, motives and needs in the mental organisation of the animal as well as of man. Woodworth is not prepared to accept this position, and so Woodworthian dynamism turns out to be a half-way house between mechanistic behaviourism and purposivistic hormism. And as in the case of all half-way houses, no one can stay or would like to stay therein. One must push ahead to the destination.

It is worth while enquiring why such an unsatisfactory position was championed by a great psychologist. The answer may be found by referring to a significant chapter in McDougall's *An Outlines of Psychology*. The author there discusses, as we have indicated already, the problem of identification of instincts with their motor mechanisms, and shows how such identification has led to confusion, because the motor mechanism is only a part of the whole, a mere tool to be used in the service of the instinct. In Woodworthian 'dynamism' this unfortunate identification of motives with their motor mechanisms has been made,

and it is this identification that is responsible for all the difficulties and confusions in Columbian Dynamism.

Woodworth's psychology is really *bio-static*, not *psycho-dynamic*. The proper sphere of work for the dynamic psychologist lies in the emotional and instinctive functions of the mind, and not in the intellectual faculties, nor even in the physiological mechanisms of the body. Therefore those who occupy the bio-static half-way house of 'S-R' psychology should go ahead and reach the truly dynamic psychology of McDougallian hormism.

The Theory of Sets.—The psychological theory of pseudo-dynamism which we have just considered serves as the foundation for the superstructure having the theory of *sets* as one of its main pillars. Woodworth speaks of goal sets, place-sets, and situation sets, and makes extensive use of this group of sets for explaining learning and motivation. What, then, are these sets? Warren's *Dictionary of Psychology* gives the following definitions of 'Set' as used in psychology :

- (1) a temporary condition of the organism which facilitates a certain type of activity.
- (2) a condition of readiness for some specific type of mental performance.
- (3) a temporary state of sub-excitation of a reflex path (neural).

We notice that in addition to a definition on the mental plane, two other definitions are given. (In fact there is a fourth definition in the dictionary which relates to organic sets). In regard to the general definition given above we may at once raise the question, 'What is it that has brought in the *temporary condition*?' We have no hesitation in answering that the cause of the *temporary condition* lies in the hormic structure of the mind. The sub-excitation of the neural path requires an exciting agent. The cause of this excitation may, no doubt, be found in some other part of the nervous system, but this regressive chain of causation will have to end somewhere, and then

we shall be forced to look for the real cause in the *purpose* which the activity serves in the total economy of the mental life of the organism. In the same way we find that an examination of the concept of 'sets' in Woodworthian psychology leads us to the same conclusion, namely, that it finds its culmination in the concept of purpose as understood by hormic psychology.

It should be noted that the concept of 'sets' is not a new one in psychology. Its origins may be traced to the earliest days of the reaction-time experiment. At the start it had a very simple meaning as a working hypothesis. At the present day it has acquired an extended connotation, and has got transformed into an explanatory principle. Therefore we should examine it very carefully and find out whether it can stand the strain that is being imposed upon it by the mechanistic psychologists.

There are certain questions that should be answered before we can accept 'set' as an explanatory principle. What exactly is a 'set'? Woodworth's answer is, 'Imagine a machine that can be set for doing one or another sort of work, and you have the idea. Yes, we have the idea, and along with it its weaknesses too. Who is to set the machine for 'doing one or another sort of work?' What is the purpose of the machine in its being set in that particular way? The machine idea is not self-explanatory. It points, as its inevitable conclusion, to the man who makes or works the machine, and the purpose for which it exists. Woodworth admits that 'set' is something temporary, something that changes with each new task. It is, no doubt, convenient for him to confine himself to the immediate antecedents of activities, but in psychology a long range view is absolutely necessary. A 'set' is merely the immediate antecedent of activity or behaviour. We, however, want to probe into the depths of behaviour, and discover the real motives at work. When we do so, we find that 'set' resolves itself into 'purpose' in the hormic sense.

The concept of 'sets' in the plural, embracing goalset, situation set, etc., receives careful treatment in the chapter

on Learning in Woodworth's *Psychology*. The rat oriented towards the door, and the chimpanzee towards the cup in the delayed reaction experiments are cited as examples of 'goal set'. Here 'goal-set' is only a descriptive epithet. Why are the animals goal-set towards a particular goal? Surely because they are hungry, and there is food in the goal. The true explanation of the animal's behaviour is, therefore, to be found in an instinctive impulse. 'Place set' is used to describe the behaviour of the animal in a maze where the 'goal' is neither straight, simple nor visible. But by this time we have realised that neither the 'goal set' nor the 'place set' will operate if the animal that is 'set' is neither hungry, afraid nor curious. The goal, no doubt, is not seen, but it is a powerful factor in stimulating a fundamental propensity. But for the effective operation of the latter from the very beginning no 'place set' would have worked.

The point that we are stressing here will become clear if we consider Woodworth's application of the concept of 'set' to motivation. We are told that 'purpose' implies fore-sight, and that we cannot credit a rat with foresight of the goal when the latter is invisible. So, 'goal set' should be used as the principle of explanation of the behaviour of the rat in the maze. Here, consistently with the bio-static principle which Woodworth upholds, the whole situation of the rat in the maze is viewed in terms of bodily activity alone. This attitude is not different from that of behaviourism. A mere factual description of activity without any reference to the real springs of behaviour is all that is aimed at. If, on the other hand, we go down to the root of the matter, we discover that the *hungry, angry, terrified, or lusting* rat is the creature which is behaving as it does in the maze, and when its need is satisfied, it takes no further interest in the maze. Even the well trained rat will go to sleep in the maze if its innate impulses are not activated. Instincts, emotions and impulses then, are the main springs of animal activity.

The whole question of 'sets' has been thoroughly dis-

cussed by Professor G. L. Freeman* who says that 'instead of relating sets to a particular class of responses, Woodworth by implication makes them a tentative activation of the response which they anticipate.' Professor Freeman directs his attack against a really weak point in the doctrine of 'sets'. 'The preparatory set', we are told, 'consists in going as far as possible towards the execution of the act without actually releasing it.' It is seen readily enough that this description applies to muscular activity. On the mental side it distorts the picture, and even on the muscular side it does not get at the root of the matter. Freeman clinches the point of the whole argument when he speaks of 'sets' within 'sets'. The 'goal set', the 'situation set' etc., are all valid descriptions, but they are utterly inadequate as explanations. Composing an essay, for example, is the goal-set for an advanced student of psychology. The 'goal set' is itself a part of the 'set' for securing the degree which may be a part of the 'set' for personal distinction or for pleasing the guardian or the teacher. Each one of these in its turn is highly complex, and may involve one or more *sentiments* in the hormic sense. So, it turns out that 'set' can be understood only in terms of the sentiments, concrete and abstract, which are invariably the true motives to human action.

There is a significant remark in the Fifth chapter of Woodworth's *Psychology* which throws light on the problem of 'sets'. 'A 'set' is something temporary, something which changes with the environment and with the job on hand.' Now, what is it that determines the job on hand which in its turn determines the 'set'? Why should this determination be temporary? To answer these questions we must go down to the fundamental *propensities* and *sentiments* of hormic psychology. Woodworthian psychology stopping as it does with the pseudodynamism of the muscle, and the nervous system, is incapable of helping us. Vagueness is assuredly the characteristic of the psychology of human behaviour which refuses to take into consideration

*"The problem of set", *Am. Jr. psychol.* LII, 1939.

the real motives to activity. Until we resolve the 'sets' into their mental constituents we shall never understand behaviour. Such resolution is possible, not on the pseudo-dynamic principles of Woodworth, but only on the truly dynamic theory of hormic psychology.

Drives and Motives—Closely allied to the concept of 'set' is that of 'drives'. 'Animal drive' is a behaviouristic term meant to account for animal behaviour purely on the mechanistic plane. But in Woodworth it has a different connotation. Our author starts by speaking of 'drives', and 'reaction tendencies' as though they were synonymous, but is soon dissatisfied with the identification of the terms. So he introduces a nice distinction between the internal conditions of the drive and the external goal of the reaction tendency. We may perhaps compare these to visceral and glandular conditions, and the objective stimulus which are both parts of the response of the living organism to the environment. It will however be noticed that Woodworth has used the words *goal and reward*. A goal or reward is not something that acts on the organism just as a magnet does on iron filings. Unless the goal is chosen as a desirable thing there will be no action. The choice of a goal or acceptance of reward as desirable points directly to mental dispositions of a hormic nature. Woodworth himself admits the fact that *drive* is more than what a behaviourist means by it, but his half-way-house attitude prevents him from reaching the destination and admitting the truly hormic nature of drives. Instead of admitting frankly that *drives* are only instincts in action, he makes a heroic attempt to keep the term at the mechanistic level by speaking of its behavioural aspects. Our author discusses *desire and choice* resulting from drives. But in regard to these concepts we may take only one of the two possible attitudes; either they should be accepted completely and their causes traced to the fundamental mental dispositions, or they should be rejected completely and the living organism reduced to a machine. No middle position is tenable.

Our position is strengthened by a further analysis of 'drives'. According to Woodworth a drive is an *activity in progress*. When you have mounted your cycle you continue to turn the pedal crank. It is an activity in progress. So, pedalling is a drive. Each stage in an activity in progress is the drive for the next. This is somewhat analagous to the chain reflex theory of instinct which succeeds in clouding the main issues without explaining the nature of instinctive activity. If an activity is in progress, we have to ask, in the first place, what determines the *direction of progress*. What is it that sets the rat or the cat moving in the maze or the problem box? Certainly it is the native propensity of hunger, lust or fear, and the direction of progress is determined by the goal of the propensity which when reached will satisfy the organism. Apart from native propensities and their natural goals no explanation can be found for an activity in progress. A purely physical explanation is of no use in psychology. The following words of McDougall written in criticism of the theory of *drives* are of special value to us :

'Those who identify instincts with mere motor mechanisms of the nervous system claim that an individually acquired mechanism, or habit, is essentially of the same nature as the innately organised mechanism which they regard as an instinct . . . they assert or assume that habits have the same impulsive power, the same power of driving us on to action and of sustaining effort or activity . . . The clearest and most consistent exposition of this view, which attributes impulsive power to habits, has been given by Professor Woodworth. He uses the convenient term 'drive' to denote the impulsive energy of an instinct ; and he maintains that just as each instinct drives, or has, or is, a 'drive', so also in the same sense a motor habit drives, or has, or is, a 'drive'. This is a view which I cannot accept. It would seem, then, that the motor habit is always acquired and used for some end, in the service of some purpose, and is not itself a source of purpose of motive

power or 'drive'.*

Further light is thrown on the question by a consideration of Woodworth's definition of 'motives'. A *motive* according to Woodworth is just an *activity in progress*. At the commencement of the chapter on *Motivation* in his *Psychology* we find a preliminary analysis of motives. Making use of the S-R formula as his basis, Woodworth tries to show that motives are merely responses to continuing stimuli. As against this position we should state that often we find that activity continues after the cessation of the stimulus which started it. How are we to account for this phenomenon? Woodworth says that such continuing activity is simply an activity that has got started and is not yet finished. One fails to understand how this will serve as an explanation of *motivation*. And to add to the confusion Woodworth admits that the motives of hunger and fear are used by animal trainers for controlling the beasts whom they want to tame. 'Reward and punishment', admits our middle-of-the-road psychologist, 'would be impossible with a creature that had no preferences, no needs, no appetites or aversions.' Frankly speaking these statements are paradoxical, and puzzling. As Freeman points out, the position upheld by Woodworth is very vague and confusing. Considerable concessions are made by him to the truly dynamic principles of hormic psychology, and yet a sudden halt is called and the progress of his theory is reversed. Every half-way house is, by its very nature, an unsatisfying structure. And Woodworthian psychology, as we have already pointed out, is a half-way house. In the quotations given above we see clearly in what direction we should move on in order to find the true picture of human motives.

Purpose

There is no more accurate or effective analysis of *purpose and purposive behaviour* than that given by William McDougall in his '*An Outline of Psychology*'. The problem

*An Outline of Psychology, p. 180.

has been solved for us once for all. We may, here and there, add to or alter the superstructure, but the foundation has been well and truly laid. Purpose is mental in essence, and can be understood only in terms of the hormic structure of the mind. To say that purpose is 'activity progressing towards a foreseen goal' is to argue in a circle. For activity in progress demands purpose, and purpose according to Woodworthian pseudo-dynamism demands activity in progress.

Conclusion

In conclusion we find that real dynamism is of the mind, and not of the body. So, the truly dynamic psychologies are those of McDougall and Freud and their disciples. Middle of the road psychologies depending on behaviour, and yet claiming to deal with human motives will be forced, sooner or later, to move on towards complete hormism. The concepts of *set*, *drive*, *activity in progress*, *motive* and *purpose*, used by Woodworth have been shown to contain hormo-dynamic elements in them. If these elements are developed fully without any prejudice, then they will be transformed into the corresponding principles of explanation in hormic psychology. Columbian dynamism, therefore, must find its crown and culmination in McDougallian hormism.

CHAPTER VII

Hormism, Behaviourism, Gestalt Theorie and the Factor School.

INTRODUCTION.

One can recall without effort the ebullient joy with which *'The Psychologies of 1925'* and *'The Psychologies of 1930'* were greeted at the time of their publication. But the passage of time has sobered down our enthusiasm, and we have good reason to question the wisdom of those who would perpetuate the rivalry between conflicting psychological schools. The sorry spectacle of a science torn asunder by internal strife is to be witnessed only in psychology. We do not have rival and mutually conflicting *chemistries or physices*. Why then, should we have rival psychologies differing from one another in fundamentals? It is high time that a determined attempt were made to find ways and means for synthesising the current psychological doctrines, and for forging out of the rival hypotheses a single unified theory which will stand the test of time. A few leading ideas will be put down here which will be helpful in preparing the ground for the great event to be, in the history of our science, namely, the birth of a unified psychological theory.

Recent Tendencies towards Unity.

That the resolution of the conflict between rival psychological schools with a view to the establishment of a single theory acceptable to all psychologists has been a long felt need in the realm of psychology, is indicated clearly by one or two significant facts. In the first place we have to remind ourselves of the existence of the great middle body of psychologists of whom Woodworth is the reputed leader. Of about forty five leaders of psychology who have presided over the annual meetings of the Ame-

rican Psychological Association only eight have been adherents of the schools. That is an encouraging fact, but the middle-of-the-road men have done nothing to bring about unity between the contending parties. On the other hand, they have, as ecclectics, taken what they consider to be valuable from each school, and have unwittingly accentuated the separatist tendencies in psychology. With the best of intentions they have merely served to add one more school to the existing number of rival schools. Unity, therefore, cannot be achieved by way of ecclecticism.

In the second place, the threatened continuation of the publication of the Five year psychologies has not materialised. Let us trust that we have seen in *'The Psychologies of 1930'* the second and the last of the series. It is a matter for profound thankfulness that during the last decade and a half psychology has not split up further into numerous sub-groups. It is well to remember in this connection that nearly quarter of a century back Carl Murchison sounded a serious note of warning when he published *'The Psychologies of 1925'*. He drew the attention at the time of the leaders of psychology to the incipient dangers lurking in their tendency to refer to their rivals in terms of caricature, and also to the unfortunate inheritance by the young students of the science of fixed theoretical beliefs from their bigotted elders. This timely warning was lost on the then contending parties within the field of theoretical psychology, and it is a thousand pities that it was so lost.

While rival psychological theories were thus growing strong in their new found strength, there was running at the same time substratal or subconscious current of feeling in the direction of unity. This current however was inarticulate, and to some extent is still so today. We should therefore do our best to make it articulate and create suitable channels for its flow in the proper direction.

At this stage of our argument one may well raise the question whether there is any positive evidence for the existence of a feeling towards unity in psychological theory. We believe there is. Allport,* Conklin,† Dashiell‡ Hull, § Lewin || and others have essayed, in recent times, solution to the problem of unity from various points of view. And a very recent and well informed paper by Ericksen ¶ has raised the question of unity in almost the same terms as we are raising here. But many of these attempts at unity are directed towards unity in method. * Methodological unity is good in its own way, but it is utterly inadequate for our purposes. Unity in the fundamentals of psychological theory is the need of the hour, and it is towards the attainment of such unity that suggestions will be made in the following sections of the chapter.

A Classification of Current Schools.

Our first task is to settle what the contemporary psychological theories are which should be taken seriously by us, and between whom unity should be established. In so far as this problem is concerned, we receive valuable guidance not only from the contributor to *'The Psychologies of 1925'* and *of 1930'* but also from Woodworth, Heidebreder, Muller-Freienfels, Murphy, Flugel, Higginson, Pills-

* Allport, G. W., The Psychologists Frame of Reference, Psychol. Bull 1940, 37, 1-28.

† Conklin, E. S., The Status of Academic Psychology, Pres. Add. Mid. Western Psychol. Assn. 1939.

‡ Dashiell, J. P., Some Rapproachments in Contemporary Psychology, Psychol. Bull. 1939, 36, 1-24.

§ Hull, C. L., Conflicting Psychologies of Learning, a way out, Psychol. Rev., 1935, 42, 493-510.

|| Lewin, K., Formalisation and Progress in Psychology, Univ. Iowa Studies, 1940, 13, III, 9-42.

¶ Ericksen, S. C., Unity in Psychology, Psychol. Rev. 1941, 48, 73-82.

bury and Spearman.* Following the broad lines of distinction drawn by these reputed leaders we may settle without difficulty which are the schools that count in the contemporary world of psychology. *The Psychologies of 1925* mentions the following six groups; Behaviourism, Dynamic psychology, Gestalt, The Purposive Groups; Reaction Psychology and the Structural Psychology. The next volume, *The Psychologies of 1930*, adds five more to the list, namely, Associationism, Functional Psychology, Russian Psychology, Spearman's Factor School, and the Psycho-analytical Schools. No considerable additions to these lists have been made by those who have enumerated distinctive schools in the critical histories of psychology. Of the schools mentioned above we may dismiss Associationism and Structuralism as having only an antiquarian interest for us. Functionalism too will have to share the fate of these two pared off unhealthy excrescences in the rapidly developing body of our science. We are thus left with Behaviourism, Reaction Psychology, Configurationism, Purposive Psychology, Psycho-analysis, Dynamic Psychology and the Factor School. The last named school of which Spearman is the leader, requires special treatment, and will be considered by us in the concluding sections of the chapter. The Dynamic Psychology of Woodworth as we have shown in the previous chapter, is not dynamic at all. It is mostly behaviourism with an admixture of introspection, bio physics and bio-chemistry. Its strong affiliations with mechanistic behaviourism are revealed in Woodworth's contributions to *'The Psychologies of 1925'* and *'1930'*. We should remind ourselves of the conclusion that we have already drawn in the last chapter that Wood-

*Woodworth, R. *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*.
 Hebb, D. O., *Seven Psychologies*.
 Muller-Freienfels, R., *The Evolution of Modern Psychology*.
 Murphy, G., *An Historical Introduction to Psychology*.
 Flugel, J. C., *Hundred Years of Psychology*.
 Higginson, G. W., *Fields of Psychology*.
 Pillsbury, W. B., *The History of Psychology*.
 Spearman, C., *Psychology Down the Ages*.

worth's psychology is not psycho-dynamic, but bio-static, and should therefore find its crown and culmination in hormic psychology.

With dynamism disposed off in this manner, we have on our hands a group of theories which may be very conveniently classified under three broad and fundamental heads, namely, (1) Bio-static, (2) Gestaltic, and (3) Psycho-dynamic groups. The first group will include Behaviourism, Russian Psychology, and Reaction Psychology, and also Woodworthian Dynamism; the second will embrace all the varieties of the Gestalt including the latest developments in the field-force theories, and the last will comprise Purposivistic and Psycho-analytic groups. The first group is mechanistic, and the third purposivistic or teleological. The second occupies a middle position between the two extremes. The first group of theories looks for antecedents in the past, the third for goals in the future, while the second is concerned with the play of forces in the present. This scheme is admirably suited for our purposes, for we can straight way point out that as the past must flow into the present, and both past and present find their destiny and fulfilment in the future, so too mechanistic and gestalt schools must find their fulfilment in purposivistic psychology. In fact his scheme is eminently suited for establishing unity in psychology as it shows how mechanistic and bio-static as well as field theories are merely so many branches grafted on to the living tree of purposivism or psycho-dynamism. We are, however, passing this alluring scheme by, because there is another scheme which is much more solid, though perhaps less attractive because more abstract. And to this scheme we shall now turn our attention.

Suggestions of a Scheme for Unity.

It is well to remind ourselves at the outset that unity in psychology is very different from unity in the physical and biological sciences. In psychology unity is creative and organic, while in the physical sciences it is negative and

destructive of conflicting elements. The organism whose behaviour is studied by psychology is a living organism, is highly complex and complicated, and has a unique biographical history of its own. It has, as a great idealist said, traded with time and bears on its constitution the marks of its past history. There are many approaches to a knowledge of such an organism. Introspection, statistics, conditioning, operationism, analysis of mental structure and function, or any other instrument of study may make its appropriate contribution to psychological research. We can find unity in psychology only in so far as we can integrate the various approaches to the study of human nature. Mechanistic, field-dynamic, and purposivistic theories have made significant contributions to our understanding of man and his mind. We shall not neglect any one of them, but shall display them as occupying different levels in a well constructed scientific scheme. We shall display them as parts of a closely integrated organic scheme. In the organic unity that we shall seek, no single theory or group of theories will be merely negated or thrown overboard, but all will be preserved and kept in subordination to the most important theory.

The scheme for unity that we need is ready at hand. It is none other than the scheme of the empirical and the exact sciences. There are four stages or steps in an exact science. The first step is *the collection of data*, the second is *structural analysis*, the third is *functional analysis*, and the last is *explanation*. The first step in any empirical science consists in examining, describing and classifying the objects with which it deals. Controlled observation and experimentation belong here. Psychology too, like other sciences, will have to gather its data by the use of the rigorous methods of observation and experimentation. Now, all the three theoretical groups—the mechanistic, field dynamic, and psycho-dynamic groups—gather their data in the rigorously-controlled way prescribed by the requirements of this stage. All of them, therefore, pass through the first stage, and to that extent have unity or community of

purpose and method.

The second stage consists in the finer analysis of the phenomenological data. This stage is really akin to the method of analysis employed in the physical sciences. But we must remember that a huge cloud of dust was raised in the attack on Associationism carried out at the beginning of this century. In spite of all the loud protests made against elementalism, analysis is being employed extensively by all schools of psychology. The field-dynamic school is, perhaps, the only school which protests consistently against analysis. But, it is interesting to note that the defenders of *personalism* are attacking Gestalt psychology on the ground that it is too analytical. Still, let us grant that structural analysis is taboo within the region of field-dynamism. The other two groups employ this type of analysis, but whereas the bio-static or mechanistic psychologies stop with this stage, the psycho-dynamic theories push ahead to the final stage. That is a very important consideration which should be borne in our mind when the organic unification of theories is being essayed by us.

The third stage, that of functional analysis is the stage which 'discovers the conditions or laws of occurrence of the various elements with which science is concerned.' In psychology this stage consists in the analysis of the conditions of interaction between the organism and the environment. This is the stage which is the sole concern of field-dynamism. Gestalt psychology is the psychology of functional analysis *par-excellence*. But it stops with this stage. The psycho-dynamic group also makes use of this kind of analysis, but once again it should be noted that it pushes ahead to seek for a final explanation of the laws revealed.

The last stage is the stage of explanation, the crown of all the previous stages. Without final explanation, collection of data and the discovery of uniformities through structural and functional analysis, are vain and

fruitless efforts. And in psychology, explanation of behaviour is to be sought in the structure and function of the mind of the behaving organism. The psycho-dynamic group is the only one to arrive at this stage. Hormic psychology and psycho-analysis are the only theories competent to offer a final explanation of behaviour.

A Tentative Conclusion.

In order to clarify our position we may gather up the threads of our argument, and make a brief summary of the conclusions reached thus far. If we discard those psychologies that have merely an antiquarian value, we find that it is possible to classify all the contemporary theories under three broad heads—the mechanistic or biostatic theories, the field theories, and the psycho-dynamic theories. Unification of these three theoretical groups is to be achieved by displaying them as steps or stages in a completely organised scientific scheme of explanation. The ordinary scheme of the exact sciences is pressed here into our service, and it is suggested that the mechanistic theories may be viewed as being wedded to structural analysis, the field theories to functional analysis, while the hormic or purposivistic theories alone reach the final stage of explanation. Mechanistic and field theories must find their culmination in the hormic group.

A Digression—Methodological Unity.

The possibility of a vigorous protest against our scheme by the adherents of behaviourism and configurationism has not escaped our attention. Both schools will loudly acclaim that their theories are as explanatory as the hormic theories. That claim will have to be examined, and we shall conduct that examination presently. In the meanwhile we have to digress for a while in order to estimate the value of certain recent attempts at the unification of conflicting psychological theories. We have in mind, in particular, the methodological approach to the problem

of unity in psychology. We shall analyse this approach and show how it does not get beyond the second stage of our scheme.

In dealing with the methodological search for unity in psychology, we have to pay special attention to Operationism and the Postulational Technique. In the operational methods of approach to psychology a concept is defined in terms of the corresponding set of operations. In fact it is identified with the set of operations necessary for verifying it. From our point of view the main question is, how far does Operationism succeed in conferring unity on the conflicting psychological theories? Operationism does not touch even the fringes of our problem. It is not even a method; it is only a kind of orientation to scientific thinking. Behaviourists, Gestaltists and Purposivists may all be Operationists without giving up their loyalty to their exclusive schools. Operationism is inadequate as a unifying principle, because it does not encourage us to interpret our experimental results in terms of the larger theory out of which the problems arise.

Postulationism is in a slightly better position. After the reputed leader of Postulationism presented his 'miniature' system as a model of scientific method, several mathematically minded psychologists avidly assimilated the new technique, but no one has succeeded in improving on the first attempts of the great master, Hull. So, in essentials postulational technique remains today as Hull shaped it. A system of scientific theories should, according to Hull, (1) be internally consistent, (2) constitute a deductive system with the minimum number of assumptions, and (3) be such that the deductions made can be checked with the empirical fact. We may express the main feature of the technique in a slightly different manner. There are two elements in a postulational system, (1) a set of propositions, and (2) an unexpressed method of drawing conclusions. The former is composed of postulates and theorems, these being developed out of the postulates by the unexpressed method. Since theorems are

derived from postulates, these postulates constitute the corner stone of the edifice of postulational technique. It is demanded that these postulates be consistent, complete and independent. We should add two further demands, clarity and deducibility. Now, it may be asked, 'Have not psychologists from time immemorial employed this technique in the development of their theories?' They have it is true, but they were not consciously aware of the foundation on which they were building. Proclaiming postulationism as *the* means for the salvation of our science, several psychologists have diligently engaged in the construction of miniature systems. During the last three years the pages of the Psychological Review have been filled with accounts of these systems. The question for us is, 'Do these systems bring us any nearer to unity in psychology?' Upon the answer to the question will depend the value of postulationism for our purpose.

We have already hinted at the fact that apart from ~~a~~ a conscious attempt at methodological analysis, there is nothing new in postulational technique. In another place we have drawn attention to the lack of self-sufficiency in postulational sets.* But the most serious defect of postulational psychology as pointed out by Bergmann and Spence† is that a clear distinction has not been drawn between the logical-mathematical postulationism confined to a formal language system developed as the consequence of a basic set of relations between undefined terms, and the hypothetico-deductive postulationism of the exact sciences; it is the latter type that is made use of in psychology, and it points at once to empirical verification as its fulfilment, losing thereby its claim to self-sufficiency.

This subject of the mathematisation of psychology is

* Naidu, P. S., Postulates Sets, Jr of Ann. Univ., 1938, 7, 67-70.

† Bergmann, G., and Spence, K. W., Operationism and theory in Psychology, Psychol. Bull., 1941, 48, 1-14.

of absorbing interest, but our digression has already reached an inordinate length. We shall, therefore, club together all the attempts at the quantification of psychological data, and discuss their common defects and limitations. Any attempt at mathematisation of scientific data is bound to spatialise them. This is exemplified in a striking manner in topological psychology. Mental processes are non-spatial. They occur in time, and until a non-spatial, non-discrete system of mathematical concept functioning in a temporal-perpetual-flow-continuum is invented, qualification is bound to be of very limited application in psychology. We should remember that when all is said and done, that figures cannot speak louder than facts. And facts in psychology are qualitative. It has already been pointed out that mathematisation of data may be resorted to by all the schools without their having to move even an inch away from their position. All that mathematisation has achieved is a first stage analysis of the raw data collected by observation and experiment. It stops there, and so it stops at the second stage of the scheme outlined by us.

A final Scheme for Unity.

(a) Status of Mechanistic Psychologies.

Let us now pick up the thread of the story at the point where we dropped it. We have to start with the discussion about the nature of the bio-static or mechanistic group of theories, comprising Watsonian behaviourism, Pavlovian conditioning, and Tolman's purposive behaviourism. What status are we to accord to this group in our scheme? After the slashing and devastating attack which McDougall *has delivered against behaviourism, one may be tempted to ignore behaviourism altogether. But behaviourism has persisted, and has continued to influence vast numbers of psychologists. We cannot afford to neglect it. Moreover, we do not want to eliminate any

* *The Battle for Behaviourism*, Kegan Paul, London, 1937.

contemporary psychological school of any value from our scheme. We shall assimilate all of them. It should be noted in the first instance that the mechanistic schools employ analysis. They do, no doubt, protest against the Lockean process of reducing the cognitive factors of our total experience to elements belonging to the region of the sense-manifold, but they swing to the other extreme of analysing the behavioural complex of the living organism to reflexes. The result is as unsatisfactory, and as partial as the achievements of the 'mosaic' psychology of the nineteenth century. Instead of 'sensations' and 'ideas' we now get 'reflexes' and 'sensory-motor arcs', and both are equally useless for our purposes. However, we are stressing this exclusive preoccupation of mechanistic psychologies with the analysis of the motor aspect of our experience because it helps us to fix their position in the scheme we have outlined. These bio-static psychologies are concerned with the reduction of the complex motor activities of living organisms to their neuro-muscular components. The technique employed is of a piece with the muscle-nerve preparation of physiology. Hence, the entire procedure stops with structural analysis of behaviour. It does not get anywhere near the fringes of functional analysis. To the superficial analysis of the structure of objective facts of behaviour is added the fallacy of reification, and the whole is presented as an 'explanation' of the activity of the living organism. Tropism and conditioning came to the rescue of behaviourism when the latter showed signs of breaking down. And all the three together constitute a formidable challenge to the seeker after unity in psychology.

Let us now take up the 'conditioned reflex' of Pavlov. Its foundation is the S-R formula of behaviourism. The sensory motor arc which connects S with R is believed to be composed of innately organised neural pathways in the cerebro-spinal and autonomic systems. S and R, are the natural stimulus and response respectively. As the result of conditioning processes S may be replaced by any other

conceivable stimulus, and R may change so completely as to become unrecognisable. Now, if the living organism is so much a machine composed of muscle-tissues and nerve-cells, why then should this process of conditioning not be extended to that machine par excellence, the robot? These robots are innately organised to react to electrical stimuli. Why not condition them to react to steam instead? That, however, is impossible, because they lack what is present in a living organism, and is the bed-rock on which the integrity of the S-R function rests, but which is completely ignored by Watsonians and Pavlovians, namely *a mind*. Pavlov himself has pointed out the severe limitations under which the conditioned reflex works.* The decerebrate dog is nearest the machine, and yet it is found that such a dog can never be brought under the influence of the conditioned reflex. The dog must be kept hungry, and somehow its interest must be sustained, otherwise he goes to sleep. These facts point to supra-physiological factors controlling the behaviour of the dog under the process of being conditioned. So, it is clear that an exclusive physiological system is inadequate to formulate any comprehensive explanation of behaviour in either dogs or men. We must, for a complete explanation of behaviour fall back on a psycho-biological point of view. The oversimplification of explanation in Pavlovian psychology has been achieved at the cost of mental process which has been eliminated, and which constitutes a formidable challenge to reflexologists. Data drawn from recent experimental studies, force on us the conclusion that some form of mental process must be assumed to be operative in animal behaviour. It is clear that the hypothesis of mind has become a desideratum even in mechanistic psychology.

We may now take up the whole group of bio-static theories, and see what is wrong with them. McDougall's evaluation of these theories cannot be improved upon. In

* Pavlov, I., *Lectures on the Conditioned Reflex*, Allen Unwin, London, 1928.

'The Battle For Behaviourism' the leader of 'hormic' psychology discusses the failure of the mechanistic hypothesis even within the realm of physical science, and shows how 'some physicists have found that they can make better progress if they reject this mechanical hypothesis and make non-mechanical assumptions.' Then our author remarks, 'In the sphere of human nature and conduct, this mechanistic hypothesis has never shown itself to have any value or usefulness as a working hypothesis.' McDougall has expressed the utter barrenness of mechanistic psychology. It is not surprising that within the realm of behaviourism the need for taking purpose into consideration was being keenly felt. And the result was that Tolman's *purposive behaviourism* was born. Taken along with the work of Krechevsky and Maier, Tolman's treatise points the direction in which mechanistic psychology ought to move in order to reach its goal. In spite of 'molar definitions' 'means-end concepts' and goal-gradients', Tolman's psychology is frankly purposivistic. The recent trends in behaviourism, then, are frankly anthropomorphic.

Our conclusion, then, so far as mechanistic theories go, is that they are inadequate to explain behaviour. They are engaged in the important, but only the preliminary task of collecting objective data and classifying them. Their rough analysis is structural, and they stop dead at the second stage in our scheme. While according to them by recognition, and expressing our readiness to make use of the data gathered by them, we must emphatically assert that for interpreting facts and explaining them, we must make use of the category of *purpose*. 'Purposive striving is the fundamental category in psychology, just as evolution is in biology, and mechanistic causation is in the physical sciences. Behaviourism, therefore finds its fulfilment in hormic psychology.

Status of Gestalt Theorie.

The next group of theories to be considered is the

'field group'. Spearsman's authoritative and incisive criticism of this group is most valuable for our purposes. It is a pity that the learned Professor has branded this group with a very caustic phrase, 'The confusion that is Gestalt Psychology'. There are elements of survival value in the theoretical foundations of the Gestalt school, and in any case the findings of this group are far in advance of the mechanistic group. And the type of analysis employed here is infinitely superior to the elementary analysis of mechanistic psychologies. We are inclined to assign to this group a higher status than that we have accorded to behaviourism. Gestalt psychology may be considered as belonging to the stage 'functional analysis' in our scheme, and treated as of greater value than behaviourism for the purpose of explaining behaviour.

We may dismiss at once two of the latest developments of Gestalt, namely, isomorphism and encephalography. The work of encephalography is still in a very nebulous stage. We cannot determine how many artefacts have crept in. As for isomorphism, McDougall condemns it in unmistakable terms. 'I would submit' he says, 'that no one of the principles of Gestalt psychology is new except one (isomorphism) which is I think demonstrably false.' Gestalt psychology started aright by emphasising the fact of wholeness and closure, but later in trying to locate the origin of the force of Gestalten, some of the Gestaltists made the mistake of looking for it in the nervous system. This is a distinctly retrograde step. If this tendency is persisted in, then there is every danger of the Gestalt school sliding back to the position of the mechanistic school. Luckily, however, the more significant contributions of the Gestalt school lie elsewhere namely in the field-dynamism of Lewin*, and we should base our estimate of configurationism on this hypothesis

Of the major criticisms of Gestalt theorie, those ad-

* Lewin, K., *Principles of Topological Psychology*, N. Y., 1936.

vanced by Muller*, and Rignano† are negative, and the former in particular harks back to elementalism. We may set aside both of them. Scheerer‡, on the other hand, following the trend inaugurated by Stern, offers a criticism of configurationism based on Personalism. Gestalt, according to this critic, is too analytic. It tries to solve the problem of subjectivity by objectifying it. The criticisms of Petermann and Helson are really most helpful to us. Hartmann§ in summarising Petermann's|| contentions points out that certain Gestalt ideas, especially the key idea in the system exhibits a remarkable teleological tendency. Gestalt turns the problems of psychology into postulates and then claims to have solved them.

Before offering a final criticism and evaluation of Gestalt psychology we should take a peep at the field theory of Lewin. The static relationship between subject and stimulus conceived by behaviourism is set aside by Lewin as false. A dynamic relationship is postulated instead. In the psychological 'life-space' of Lewin the organism and environment are indissolubly linked into an organic unity. This topological conception is certainly superior to the elementalistic analysis of stimulus and response. It is dynamic in the restricted sense, while dynamism is utterly outside behaviourism. But the great questions which Gestalt cannot answer are; 'How do organisations come into existence?' 'How are configurations produced?' 'What is the urge to the formation of Gestalten?' *Closure*, *nearness* and other terms are merely descriptive. They do not get to the root of the matter. The central concept of *wholeness* in Gestalt psychology is

* Muller, G. E., *Komplex theories and Gestalt theorie*, Göttingen, 1923.

† Rignano, E., *The Psychological theory of Form*, Psychol. Rev., 1928, 118-135.

‡ Scheerer, *Die Lehre van der Gestalt*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1931.

§ Hartmann, G. W., *Gestalt Psychology*, N. Y., 1935.

|| Petermann, *The Gestalt Theory*, N. Y., 1932.

itself a puzzling term. It is Spearman who points out that we should draw a distinction between *subjective* and *objective gestalten*. Gestaltists are never clear as to which of these they mean to indicate in any given context. But even Spearman misses the deep significance of the distinction he has drawn. Granting that there is an objective Gestalt as distinct from the subjective, and that the Gestalt school is legitimately entitled to deal only with the subjective gestalt, the question still remains 'What is it that urges on the formation of this subjective Gestalt?' The urge to the formation of wholes, and to the holding of these wholes together can be investigated and explained only by hormic psychology. The conative nature of Gestalt organisation is brought out clearly and convincingly by the very example which Spearman chooses for his purpose. Several strangers arrive in London. One organises the city as a configuration of streets to and from the great shopping centres. Another links them into a pattern round the Museum, and a third makes the places of recreation the hub of his plan, and so forth. The variety is endless. But why is it so? Because interests are different; ends and goals pursued by different individuals are different. The nature of conation determines the nature of the field-organisation.

So far, then as the field-group goes we conclude that it is eminently fitted to occupy the stage of functional analysis. And like the mechanistic group, this group too, points to hormic psychology as its crown and fulfilment.

The Status of Hormism.

We come now to the last group of psychological theories, the Hormic Group, comprising McDougallian purposivism and Freudian psycho-analysis. These and others which are affiliated to them are the only theories competent to explain human behaviour. They occupy therefore the highest rung of the ladder we have been building up. The general basis of those theories has been clearly ex-

pounded by T. P. Nunn.* McDougall's formulation of the hormic theory in his major works is based upon the concept of the *horme* first used in the psychological sense by Nunn. The hormic theory is truly explanatory of human behaviour. Every other theory ranks only next in importance to the hormic so far as insight into human nature is concerned. But there is a certain defect in McDougallian hormism to which we should not be blind. McDougall's psychology deals with the conscious and sub-conscious levels of the mind to the complete neglect and purposeful exclusion of the deeper unconscious levels. Psycho-analysis is concerned with the unconscious depths of the human mind. Both psychologies are of the hormic type but there are many fundamental points of difference between them. The fact is that McDougall's psychology requires supplementation by Freudian psycho-analysis. When it is so supplemented and extended as indicated in the succeeding chapters, then it will be found to be the most satisfactory basis for establishing unity among conflicting psychological theories; and for gaining an insight into the true nature of the human mind.

Status of the Factor School.

Before concluding we should try to fit Spearman's Factor theory into our scheme. As has been hinted at, already, it is not easy to find a place for factor analysis in the three-fold classification of current psychological theories mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. But that need not trouble us. McDougall's analysis of the instinctive structure of the mind comes to our rescue. Spearman's factor analysis relates to the cognitive aspect of this structure. This cognitive aspect is, no doubt, dependent on the conative part, but its features have to be studied apart from other aspects of the mind. Spearman has done great service to psychology by analysing this cognitive aspect and by revealing the factors operating therein. We may, with justification, consider the factor

* Nunn, T. P., Education. Its Data and First Principles.

theory as dealing with the first aspect of the instinctive structure of the mind, the structure which is the foundation of the psycho-dynamic psychologies. Factor theory is therefore an organic part of the purposivistic group.

Final Conclusion.

We have analysed the recent solutions to the problem of unity engaging the minds of many prominent leaders of psychology. In particular, we have examined the methodological attempts at a solution of the problem, and found them defective. Unity can be achieved only by the unification of the current psychological theories which are in conflict with one another. As a first step towards the resolution of the conflict, the significant theories have been classified under three main heads, the *bio-static*, *field-dynamic*, and *psycho-dynamic* groups. There is no point in trying to suppress the findings of any of these groups. They must all be absorbed into an organic scheme. We have suggested such a scheme, and have also found a place therein for the factor theory of Spearman. Finally we have shown that psycho-dynamic theories constitute the corner stone of the whole edifice of psychology. Mechanistic and Gestalt psychologies find their crown and fulfilment in hormic psychology. Purpose is the category of psychology, and in the absence of that category psychology degenerates into neurology and reflexology. Unity in psychological theory is to be achieved by displaying all other theories as subordinate limbs of the life-giving and life-sustaining hormic theory comprising McDougallian purposivism and Freudian psycho-analysis.

CHAPTER VIII.

Freud and McDougall.

INTRODUCTION.

We enter now upon the task of displaying the relation between and of essaying a synthesis of the two psychological schools in whose hands lies the future of our science. Freud and McDougall easily take the front rank among psychologists as they have left behind them an imperishable heritage of priceless value. They have brought into existence two new types of psychology having much in common, but also characterised by radical points of difference. And both systems outshine in brilliance all the others because of their unique ability to solve the many intricate problems in the field of group behaviour.

Freud and McDougall took off from entirely different starting points, and their lines of approach to the main problems of human behaviour are also different. Yet, they reached the same conclusions. Should they then be allowed to stand as they do stand at present in opposition to each other? Should not a strenuous attempt be made to reconcile the one with the other and to evolve a dynamic purposive psychology which will present a harmonious synthesis of the enduring elements in psycho-analysis and hormic psychology. In the preface to McDougall's 'Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology' we read, 'Frankly then, these lectures are published in the hope of hastening the fusion of these two closely allied and complementary systems, a fusion or synthesis which while rejecting the errors of both systems shall combine the best features of both.*' An attempt will be made here to indicate the lines along which hormic psychology should be supplemented by the findings of psycho-analysis, for it is our firm conviction that McDougall's system stands to gain a great deal by affiliating itself with that of Freud.

* op. cit., p. vi.

Freud and McDougall. Point of Affinity.

Of the many systems of psychology that are now in the field, psycho-analysis and hormic psychology alone are truly dynamic. The Woodworthian system, as we have already shown, has the least claim to the title dynamic. Dynamism without purpose and without goal-seeking is a contradiction in terms in the field of psychology.

Psycho-analysis and hormism have also another characteristic in common. They are non-spatial, that is, they do not locate the mind in the nervous system. It is possible to master these two great systems without any knowledge of physiology.

McDougall discusses in his 'Abnormal Psychology' the features which his system possesses in common with psycho-analysis. Both schools recognise purposive striving towards a goal as the fundamental fact of human behaviour. And, as this hormic striving exhibits a certain universality among all the members of a given species both in regard to the goal to be reached as well as the means for reaching it, both systems accept the innate inherited structure of the mind as a fact. It is also asserted that this instinctual structure, in virtue of its essential dynamism, will develop through maturation and activity, and generate complex structures known as *sentiments* in McDougall's system, and as *complexes* in psycho-analysis. Finally, the nature of mental energy as distinct from physical energy is also recognised. These are the common features, and they augur well for the success of a clearly conceived and well directed attempt at a synthesis of the two systems.

Freud and McDougall. A Contrast.

Among the outstanding characteristics of psycho-analysis, differentiating it from hormic psychology we may note the following :

In the first place, psycho-analysis is partly hedonistic, It is pan-sexualistic and monistic in its conception of the instincts, and it attaches great importance to the UNCON-

SCIOUS. In the second place, the distinction between instinct and sentiment is not clearly conceived by Freud. Lastly, the entire mechanism of repression operating in the region of the preconscious and the unconscious is described in such puzzling terms that it is very difficult to get a clear picture of 'mental topology' as conceived by Freud. To these points of difference we may add one more; psycho-analysis is deterministic, and Freud is claimed to have had the great merit of having carried determinism into the realm of the Unconscious.

McDougall's Estimate of Freud.

In discussing the points of difference which he turns into so many defects of psycho-analysis, McDougall speaks as though the Freudian has everything to gain by association with the hormic psychologist, while the latter has nothing to learn from psycho-analysis. McDougall attempts to demonstrate in his *'Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology'* how Freud has been moving steadily towards his own position. Starting from a pan-sexualistic scheme of instincts, Freud first recognised the existence of a group of non-erotic instincts, adding the death instinct and the aggressive instinct to his list. In Freud's 'New Lectures' McDougall finds evidence for the development of still another instinct, the instinct of fear. If only, argues our author, Freud had recognised the independent status of tender impulse, disgust and self-assertion, then his conversion to hormism would have been complete:

McDougall's criticism of Freud amounts merely to this, that the great leader of psycho-analysis, with his vast experience of human nature, and breadth of vision was able to stand up to new facts as often as they appeared, and meet their challenge. A lesser man would have been puzzled by the new experience, and would have held fast dogmatically to the old position. Freud saw what McDougall failed to see or saw only dimly, that the dynamism of the human mind demanded an evolutionary account of the origin and growth of its innate structural

elements, the instincts. The various instincts must have evolved from a common matrix. We see at once how instinctual energy of great strength is needed to keep the original matrix together, and, as elsewhere in nature, there arises another source of energy, which pulls the parts apart. Freud conceived these conflicting forces as Eros and Death. Out of the interplay of these two fundamental instincts arise all the fourteen instinctive propensities described by McDougall in *'An Outline of Psychology'*. Our author had vague glimpses of this process of the evolution of instincts, while discussing some of the individual propensities. Freud was dealing all his life with severe cases of mental illness, and he had opportunities which McDougall had not, of observing the primitive stages in the evolution of mental structure.

Why should an enlargement of the list of instincts be considered to be sign of the refutation of the initial stages? Has not McDougall himself added to his original list? What we need at the present moment is a clear account of the ontogeny and phylogeny of each instinct, and this need has been met in part by Freud's psycho-analysis. Let us therefore, have both pictures, the hormic picture of instincts, and the Freudian evolutionary picture, and let us supplement the former by the latter. Then, perhaps, we shall have taken a long step towards our goal of understanding human nature in all its puzzling complexities.

Another region wherein McDougall claims that Freud approaches his own psychology is that of the Unconscious. Here again we have good reason for holding that it is McDougall's psychology that needs correction and supplementation by psycho-analysis. McDougall's arguments bearing on this problem may be summarised thus; Freud's Unconscious is a very vague expression. In the early stages of psycho-analytic theory Freud used the term to indicate both the structure and function of the deeper mental strata. The distinction between mental structure and function is a fundamental one in psychology, and

unless such a distinction is drawn real progress in psychological theory is not possible. Freud himself recognised the need for such a distinction in a vague manner, and coined a new expression, the 'ID', to denote structure apart from function. So, it may be conceded that Freud is steadily moving towards the hormic position.

The distinction between structure and function is very important, but in emphasising it McDougall has overshot his mark. There is a strong temptation in McDougall's mind to assert a simple and direct connection between mental structure and function. Structure, it is believed, reveals itself wholly and undisguisedly in function, so that from an analysis of function, the corresponding structure may be inferred without much difficulty. We believe that there is a suggestion in McDougall's hormic psychology that such inference is possible even in the case of sentiments. This is exactly the point where hormic psychology has gone wrong, and needs to be set right by psycho-analysis. The type of simple and direct inference contemplated above is possible with mental structures operating at very primitive levels. But in the case of civilised man, with his manifold repressions, sublimations, phobias and neuroses the connection is remote, tortuous and misleading so that often the wrong structure is suggested by a given function. Psycho-analysis has rendered valuable service in warning us against a too hasty inference of structure from function. McDougall, however, is reluctant to admit this point. Somewhere in his works he analyses his own dreams and gives us such a naïve and unscientific interpretation of the symbolism that we are forced to wonder whether one so rigorously trained in inductive methods could conceive of such an explanation. The tortuous and elusive road by which the structure of a civilised man's mind traverses before its functions blossom out can be surveyed and mapped only by psycho-analysis.

The third important field where Freud is supposed to approach McDougall's system is that of feeling. The

original hedonism of psycho-analysis has been replaced by truly hormic principles. The 'pleasure principle' reigned supreme in the initial stages of psycho-analysis, though, even then, the hormic nature of the instinctive structure of the mind was noted by Freud. After the last war, the great leader of psycho-analysis gave up his staunch advocacy of psychological hedonism, and in his work *'Beyond the Pleasure Principles'* he introduced radical changes into the original theory. The 'Reality Principle' is recognised as being deeper and more fundamental than the 'Pleasure Principle'. Let us give credit where it is due. In this field it is the psycho-analyst who has to take a lesson from the hormic psychologist. Pleasure is never the goal of action. It is merely the concomitant of the successful striving towards the natural goal of any instinctive impulse.

There is yet another region where the psycho-analyst and the hormic psychologist may meet and exchange ideas with mutual profit, and that is the region of 'suggestion' (including hypnotic suggestion). The concept of suggestion is a puzzling one in hormic psychology, and has undergone transformation at several points. In his *'Social Psychology'* McDougall explains suggestion on the basis of the principle of the symyathetic induction of emotions. On this principle suggestion refers to the result of induction in respect of the cognitive aspect of the instinctual structure of the mind, and this explanation is certainly the one most adequate to the facts. But later, McDougall shifts his ground and bases suggestion on submission. He is constrained to seek the aid of the instinct of submission because of the difficulty he experiences in explaining hypnotic suggestion. This new ground, we contend, is full of quicksands, because the independence of the instinct of submission itself may be called into question*. Freud's 'Group Psychology' we hold, gives us a more accurate picture of suggestion than

* Naidu & Kalathinathan, Is there an Instinct of Self-Submission Rev. of Phil. & Reln. Oct. 1938.

does McDougall's 'Abnormal Psychology'.

We may point out incidentally that McDougall too has changed his views frequently. In the third chapter we have indicated the stages through which the hormic theory has passed in the course of its evolution. The status of cognition is not readily intelligible to an average reader of '*An Outline of Psychology*.' The theory of 'Moral Sentiments' as well as that of 'Belief and Doubt' is full of pit-falls. There are as many and as serious defects in hormic psychology as McDougall thinks there are in psycho-analysis.

We contend, therefore, that the fusion of hormic psychology and psycho-analysis should be hastened. An important step in the direction of such fusion has already been taken by Freud. It is now the turn of the hormic psychologist to respond to the gesture of compromise and meet the psycho-analyst half way. Such a response on the part of the former would have been made had McDougall recognised the limitations of his own account of the instincts and the need for supplementing it by an evolutionary account based on the psycho-analytic scheme. We shall address ourselves now to this task of essaying an evolutionary account of mental development.

Freud and McDougall—A Synthesis through an Analysis of Regression.

The task of reconciling Freud with McDougall through an evolutionary account of instincts will be rendered easy if we start with an analysis of the phenomenon of 'regression', for here in this striking mental abnormality we get a glimpse of the stages through man's mind should have passed before it reached the present level. Let us undertake a detailed analysis of Regression.

We are familiar with *regression* in the biological scale of evolution. Certain animals seem to be losing the organs they gained after a severe struggle with the environment, and what is more surprising, they seem to be regressing to a more primitive level of existence. It

is easy to speak of them as freaks of nature, and pass them by without any further thought about the reason why they are regressing. But *there* they are as a challenge to our intelligence, and until this process of back-sliding is explained biology cannot be said to have fulfilled its mission. Such an explanation can be found only by taking the *purpose* of the process into consideration. Purpose then is bound to become in the near future the guiding principle, not only for psychology and biology, but also for physics and chemistry.

In the scale of mental evolution too the process of Regression plays an important part, and sometimes an overwhelmingly dominant part. What evidence other than the unfortunate condition of the 'civilised' nations of the world today is needed for the power which regression wields over the human mind? Whole nations have adandoned the high ideals which they cherished, and have gone back to a primitive, arboreal state of existence. The civilisation which they built up patiently and with much toil and sacrifice has disappeared almost overnight. The grand edifice of Western culture raised up with great effort, brick placed upon brick carefully and meticulously, the binding cement laid evenly and with great precision—this edifice has crumbled to dust. The nation which gave birth to Kant and Hegel, Goethe and Schiller, Wagner and Mozart; the country which fostered Leonardo da Vinci and Michael Angelo; and the land of the rising sun which used to be associated with all that is gentle and beautiful in life—these have regressed to a level of life not far removed from that of the pre-historic monster which, red in tooth and claw, delighted in a career of destruction, and finally destroyed itself. Regression is stalking in our midst. We should bestir ourselves, check its progress if possible, annihilate it completely.

Sigmund Freud was the first scientific psychologist to gain a clear understanding of regression in the individual mind, and of its potentialities for evil. He believed that

regression played a part in generating all neurotic symptoms. After Freud, McDougall studied the problem, but did not arrive at any definite conclusion. We shall, in the first instance, analyse regression according to hormic and psycho-analytic principles, and then we shall offer suggestions for a synthesis of Freud and McDougall.

Neurological Explanations of Regression.

Before starting in our journey of exploration we have to consider and dispose off the neurological explanations of regression. Hughlings Jackson has made a significant contribution to neurological studies of regression, and the conclusions of this study have been summed up by Maurice Nicoll*. Mental regression resulting in a primitive type of behaviour cannot be explained in terms of the deterioration of parts of the nervous system. There is a widespread belief among the neurologists that symptoms of nervous diseases may be linked up with brain lesions. It is this belief that Jackson is anxious to dispel. He concludes that 'disease only produces negative mental symptoms' and that 'all elaborate positive mental symptoms' are the outcome of activity of nervous elements untouched by any pathological process.'

Jackson has rendered great service to psychology by exposing the fallacies of neurology, but he has not stressed sufficiently the *purposive* nature of the function of the nervous system. He has made a very valuable contribution to our study by his analysis of neural functions into three hierarchical levels, and by suggesting that regression may be associated with the dissolution of the higher levels. Yet he is not able to shake off the influence of the concept of mechanical causation as the predominant factor in the functioning of the nervous system. Contemporary psychology has shown clearly that the body is merely

* Maurice Nicoll, 'Regression', in H. Crichton Miller's *Functional Nerve Diseases*, Oxford, 1920, pp. 102-105.

a tool of the mind. We admit that the nervous system is an element, and an important element too, in generating the disorder that we are now considering, but it is only a part of the whole situation. There are other and more important parts in the causal whole determining this particular type of neurosis. These are mental in origin, structure and function, and to these we must now turn our attention.


A General View of Regression

Regression, as the term clearly indicates, is the phenomenon of retracing of the steps of an orderly progressive movement of life towards a goal. There is impoverishment of life in regression. The patient flies back from the realities of life to a primitive state of security which he enjoyed in his infancy. Life, as we know, is constant struggle; it is intense dynamic activity in an environment which is presenting problems to us in perpetual succession. Progress in the real sense is only possible through the solution of the tough problems which face us constantly. Progress, in fact, consists in overcoming obstacles and passing beyond them to meet fresh problems. Now, when a living organism is up against a problem there are three ways in which the situation may be met. In the first place, the obstacle may be overcome through intense effort and perhaps some suffering too: in the second place some sort of compromise may be made and though the problem is not solved yet life may be carried on under seemingly normal conditions; and lastly, the organism unable to cope with the situation may fall back on its inner line of defence. This last reaction to life is *regression*. It is really beating a retreat in the face of difficulties into a fortified position.

The Hormic Theory of Regression

It will be helpful to our general understanding of the nature of regression if, at this stage, we refer to Section A

Fig No. 10.



Schematic Representation of the Evolution of Dynamic Mental Structure.

(S=Sex, P=Parental Instinct, C=Constructivity, S.S=Self-Submission, S.a=Self-Assertion, G=Gregariousness, R=Repulsion, Ac=Acquisitiveness, F=Food-seeking, Ap=Appeal, Co=Combat, Cu=Curiosity, E=Escape, L=Laughter. Laughter has been eliminated, because it is not instinctive in the true hormic sense).

The diagram represents the evolution (and Regression) of mental structure from the instinctual matrix (or *élan vital*) through seven stages up to the highly cultured self. Section A represents McDougall's conception, Section C represents Freud's conception, and Section B is our contribution.

McDougall starts at stage 4 (not stage 1)—the stage of 14 fundamental instincts, and takes us through stage 5 (of concrete sentiments), and stage 6 (of abstract sentiments) to the organised self. Only a few samples of sentiments at each stage, have been chosen for inclusion in the diagram. Freud is pre-occupied with sex (Section C) and its evolution and repression along the directions of the arrows shown in the diagram. Stages 3, and 2 represent the levels of evolution through which the McDougallian instincts have passed. Regression, then, is not only regression from stage 7 to 4, but also to stages 3, 2 and 1.

of Fig. 10. This section represents McDougall's conception of the evolution of mental structure. It indicates the direction along which progress, racial as well as individual,

has been made. It indicates also the stages along which human civilisation has developed. But the price which this progress and this civilisation demand is *eternal vigilance*. Sentiments of the higher order, and scales of sentiment values are very fragile objects. A slight hindrance to their smooth working is enough to dissolve them into their primary components. Great mental effort is needed to keep intact the higher sentiments which man has built up. The sentiments are acquired characteristics. They have to be built up patiently and preserved with the utmost vigilance. Even a highly cultured person discovers that if he is off his guard for a moment, his mental structure degenerates to the primitive level. And when there is some powerful hindrance to the functioning of the higher sentiments, there is a permanent degeneration to the original instinctual level of behaviour. The first conception, then, of regression that we get from hormic psychology is the regression of highly cultured sentiments to their primitive components, namely, the fundamental instincts. Behaviour has sunk, or regressed, to the instinctual level.

This picture of regression is simple and clear, and ought to have been accepted by McDougall, because it is based on the fundamental conceptions of his hormic psychology. Yet, we find that in the chapter on 'Regression' in his *Abnormal Psychology* the leader of hormism displays a strange reluctance to accept a hormic explanation of regression. He says, '...I would regard it (regression) as a biological rather than a specifically psychological process, that is to say as a process which though purposive in a sense, like all biological processes is not governed by any explicit or conscious purpose*'. This is a strange confession from the pen of one whose psychology is avowedly purposivistic. Earlier in the chapter McDougall admits, though in hesitant terms, the validity of the concept of purpose in explaining regression. '...I have

* McDougall, *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 295.

no prejudice', he says, 'against giving the fullest possible recognition to purpose, desire, and sub-conscious motivation in general; but in respect of regression, it seems to me that the psycho-analysts go too far in this direction.'* When we enquire into the causes of this hesitation we discover the defect in the McDougallian conception of the evolution of mental structure and we also get certain hints as to how this defect may be remedied.

It will be profitable to state in advance our main conclusion, because it throws light on the point under discussion here. We have noted already in outline the evolutionary conception of mental structure which hormic psychology presents to us. Regression, according to this conception, is the reversal of the process of mental evolution. Now the question is this, 'Does this regression or reversal of evolution stop at the level of the fourteen instincts as conceived by McDougall? Are these instincts immutable?' No, They must have evolved from simple beginnings. If they have, then regression may extend downwards to the very beginnings of primitive mental structure. McDougall has a strong prejudice against theories which concern themselves with the evolutionary antecedents of his battery of fourteen instincts. Psycho-analysis takes us back to the earliest stages of mental evolution. McDougall is reluctant to turn his attention to these stages, and is therefore opposed to psychoanalysis. If McDougall had been an arm-chair psychologist of the nineteenth century, the defects in his theory would not have troubled him. But he was constantly testing his theory in the fields of social and abnormal behaviour, and often he had to face failure. It is in the face of these failures that he makes certain significant confessions which reveal to us the need for the extension of the hormic theory in the direction of psychoanalysis.

One would naturally expect elucidation of the difficult points connected with regression from the case histories of

* *Ibid*, p. 293.

patients whom McDougall treated in his clinic. But it is exactly here that the greatest disappointment meets us. Four cases are recorded, and in no one of them do we get any clear understanding of the nature of regression. It is with some reluctance that McDougall admits that 'in some cases, the substitution of infantile for adult modes of activity is unmistakable', but he is emphatic that 'in most of such cases, it is not possible to point to forms of bodily or mental activity that are specifically childish or infantile.'* No wonder then, that following this wrong lead McDougall was not able to cure his patients, and had to confess that in one striking case he had to suffer 'the mortification of seeing the patient regress gradually under his own hands in spite of all his efforts.'

What then is the psychological explanation that McDougall has to offer for regression. Now, in order to understand his explanation and its limitations, let us restate the correct hormic view of regression. Hormic psychology holds that mental structure expresses itself in mental function, and this leads finally to bodily behaviour. Behaviour at every stage is the dynamic expression of structure which is mental. The foundation or the fundamental frame-work of this structure is racial, innate and inherited. This foundation is composed of native propensities and dispositions (or, if we could overcome our prejudice against a good old term, of *instincts*). These instincts are the life blood of a living and growing mind. They express themselves in all their primitive strength and nakedness in the behaviour of the child, but soon they change into civilised *sentiments* of varying grades of refinement. These cultured sentiments are the main springs of adult activity. But sometimes it happens that the elaborately built superstructure of sentiments breaks down completely. The smooth covering falls of revealing the bricks within. The adult instead of keeping a firm hold on himself and guiding his behaviour in the light of his hard won sentiments regresses to a more primitive

* *Ibid*, p. 285-292.

level of conduct, and lets himself be moved by savage instincts and their emotions. This is regression. *Regression* is thus a process of mental degeneration from a higher level of evolution to a lower or primitive level. This is the picture of regression built according to hormic principles, and should have been accepted by McDougall.

Instead of conceiving regression in mental terms McDougall strikes out a strange path and offers a physiological explanation of this pathological condition. 'I seek to render my conception of regression more definite', says he, 'by likening the nervous system to a tree. . . If in a tree the most recently formed parts are injured, if in any way, as by frost or fire, their vital activities are checked or suspended, we observe a new outburst of growth and vital activity in the older, more primitive parts, namely, we see buds growing out from these parts. . . This seems to be truly analogous to the process of regression. The highest or most recently developed parts of the cerebral cortex represent the growing points of the human organism and are analogous to the growing points of the upper branches of the tree. Arrest of their functions is followed by a new outburst of vital activity in the lower, older parts, which had been rendered quiescent by the flow of vital nervous energy to the more recently organised parts. Just as the tree injured at the top puts out new buds below, so the nervous system, when the vital activities of its latest organised parts are arrested, puts out new buds below, i.e., resumes or reanimates its infantile functions.'*

The explanation of regression suggested here is purely physiological, and figurative at that. We have already rejected neurological explanations of this mental disorder. One wonders why the founder of hormic psychology has abandoned purposivistic principles, and has sought refuge in neurology. We can see two reasons for this attitude of McDougall, firstly the unreasonable antagonism to Freud, and secondly the as yet unbridged gulf between the hormic

* An Outline of Abnormal Psychology, ps. 294—295.

theory and psycho-analysis. When this gulf is bridged then and then alone will hormic psychology be able to probe into the root cause of mental disorders.

McDougall's Antagonism to Freud

It is matter for keen regret that McDougall is unduly prejudiced against Freud and his psycho-analytic theory. This prejudice arises out of certain strong tendencies in hormic psychology. McDougall holds to a pluralistic theory of instincts, while Freud's theory in the earlier stages was monistic and pan-sexualistic. The Unconscious is one of the main pillars on which psycho-analysis rests, while the very name of the unconscious is to be shunned by the McDougallian. In an earlier section of this chapter we have discussed the relation between McDougall and Freud. McDougall himself has seen the need for the synthesis of hormism and psycho-analysis, but what stands in the way is the gap between the two different conceptions of instincts in the two systems. The *many* must after all have evolved from *one*, and when the steps or stages of the evolution of the plurality of the McDougallian instincts from one instinctual matrix is traced, then it will be seen how hormism and psycho-analysis are complementary to each other.

McDougallian prejudice against psycho-analysis expresses itself with great vigour in the field of regression. 'I cannot find sufficient grounds', says McDougall, 'for acceptance either Freud's or Jung's view of regression.' According to the one, the patient becomes dominated by the sexual desires of his infancy; according to the other, the collective unconscious impels the patient to seek to return to the protected security of the infantile condition. According to both, the regression is a purposive activity, a striving towards a goal, prompted by unconscious desires. Now, I have no prejudice against giving the fullest possible recognition to purpose, desire and sub-conscious motivation in general, but in respect of regression, it seems to me that the psychoanalysts go too far in this direction.

And I hold also that they give to the principle of regression too wide an application.* As we have noted already, it is the narrow view of instincts which is responsible for this peculiarly un-hormic view of regression. So, we may with confidence assert that an evolutionary view of instincts will serve to clarify the position in hormic psychology, and also help in unifying the various purposivistic theories of human nature.

Freud's account of Regression

Before we take up the question of the evolution of instincts let us turn attention to Freud's theory of regression. Three types of this abnormality are discussed by Freud in his *'Interpretation of Dreams'*. These are (1) topical regression (2) temporal regression, and (3) formal or functional regression. In all the these three forms Freud is concerned with the regression of sex to its more primitive and infantile forms of expression, but the general aetiology of the process that he presents to us is remarkably lucid. He speaks of the regression of a later and more developed function to its infantile stages when it meets 'powerful external obstacles which prevent it from attaining the goal of satisfaction.' This is exactly the aetiology that we have offered in regard to the regression of the human mind from the highest cultural level to the lower levels of instincts. The cultured sentiments regress to their elementary components when they meet powerful external obstacles. Freud is, of course, preoccupied with the lower levels of evolution, and so he is thinking of the regression of sex to its primitive levels. The dissolution of the higher and more developed forms of the sex instinct to its lower stages in infancy are depicted in forceful language in the *'Interpretation of Dreams'*, and in addition, Freud presents to us the picture of the regression of the non-erotic instincts such as, fear and the ego instinct. Interesting light is also thrown on the general theory of regression by Freud's discussion of dream mechanism. We

* An outline of Abnormal Psychology, p. 292, 293.

see here how on the cognitive side too the process of regression follows the same general laws as on the conative side. Freud's work in the clinic allowed him no time for the theoretical studies relating to other instincts, and it is only later in his life, when he had some leisure, that the great leader of psycho-analysis was able to turn over in his mind the implications of the case histories of some of his patients, and was led to recognise the existence of the non-erotic instincts. So, for the present we may note that the Freudian picture of regression (as represented in sec. C of Fig. 10) is confined to the regression of the sex impulse to its infantile forms of manifestation.

The Evolution of Instincts

Our diagram brings out clearly the gap between the lower levels of mental evolution as conceived by Freud, and the higher levels as described by McDougall, and to the bridging of the gap between the two we shall address ourselves. It may be noted incidentally that this attempt to reconcile the hormic and psycho-analytic theories is being made here for the first time.

It is a matter for surprise that McDougall did not make any attempt to fill in the gap. He seems to have been indissolubly wedded to his scheme of fourteen instincts. And our surprise is heightened when we find that McDougall has realised in his brilliant essay on 'Mental Evolution', contributed to the symposium volume, *'Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge'** the need for studying the progressive development of mental structure. In this essay our author gives us, the evidence for mental evolution, the two ways in which this evolution has been conceived, and finally the manner in which mind has progressed from simple and humble beginnings in the amoeba to its complicated and highly evolved form in man. And all the time McDougall is pre-occupied with the evolution of mind as a whole. Of the successive differentiations followed by inte-

*This volume was published by Black & Son, London, 1925.

gration of the simple undifferentiated instinctual matrix of the mind, McDougall has somehow lost sight. Yet, in the essay mentioned above, our author comes very close to the concept we are emphasising here. But at the critical point he switches off to consider 'the evolution of higher from lower forms of mind.' His analysis leads him to postulate the progressive scale of purposiveness with which every student of hormic psychology is familiar.* The main point, however, is missed.

† For a long time instinct was dogmatically regarded as something immutable. It is perfectly legitimate, however, to supplement the theory of the evolution of species by a theory of the evolution of instincts. If one species grew out of another, and if the instincts are the prime movers of the living organisms, then the inference is inevitable that instincts have undergone transformation according to a progressive scale of evolution. Evidence for such evolution is available to us from two important sources so far as human instincts are concerned. In the first place the evolution of the highly coordinated patterns of movement pertaining to specific instincts has been traced from the simple uncoordinated movements of general excitement or restlessness of the infant by certain leading contemporary psychologists.‡ This evidence relates to the purely psychological aspect of the evolution of instincts, but it is enough for our purposes. Behaviour is generated by mental antecedents, and the development of behaviour may be taken as the outward expression of the development of its mental progenitor. Now, arguing on lines similar to those which the embryologist employs in speaking of ontogeny and phylogeny, we may conclude that the evolution of instinctual behaviour as noticed in the child is an epitome of the general evolution of instincts in the race. Thus is the conception of the evolution of the many

*McDougall, *An Outline of Psychology* pp. 48.

†Dashiel, *Fundamentals of Objective Psychology*.

‡Tiffin Knight and Josey, *Psychology of Normal People*.

instincts from one instinctual matrix justified by the observations of contemporary psychologists.*

The second source of evidence in support of our main thesis is drawn from McDougall's works. In the course of his analysis of the instincts of mammals and man, McDougall throws out significant suggestions as to the possible manner in which some of these fundamental dispositions may be conceived as having grown out of others.† McDougall points out that the *acquisitive* instinct is in the 'process of differentiation from the *feeding* instinct, and that various species illustrate stages of this differentiation.' In the same way the *constructive* instinct is dependent on home-making, and this is just, one aspect of the *parental* instinct. *Repulsion* functions primarily in the service of food-seeking and sex, and so it may be considered to have arisen out of a partial differentiation of both fundamental instincts. *Appeal* arises when anger fails. . . . the instinctive cry of distress is evoked as a further reaction, when the combative instinct fails to attain its goal. . . . Of *assertion* and submission McDougall says that for the maintenance of social order without waste of energy these two instincts must operate in *gregarious* animals. They have differentiated evidently from primitive gregariousness. A notable attempt has been made recently to show that submission is but a mild form of fear.‡ Assertion may on similar grounds be identified with anger. In any case assertion and submission have their roots in other instincts. For the present let us agree with McDougall and hold that they are rooted in gregariousness. On McDougall's own showing, then, *acquisitiveness*, *repulsion*, *construction*, *appeal*, *submission* and *assertion* may be looked upon as rooted in food-seeking, parental instinct, combativeness, and gregariousness. Alongside these we have to place escape, curiosity, and sympathy. Among these instincts which may be considered to be more fundamental than the four-

* An Outline of Psychology, pp. 121—165.

† Vide F. N. 2.

teen with which McDougall starts, there are two which serve merely as preliminaries to other instincts. They are curiosity and combativeness. They have no specific "object" of their own, but they function in connection with other instincts. Primitive passive sympathy is not a separate instinct at all, but only a general aspect of the functioning of all instincts. Hence, we are left with five fundamental instincts, food-seeking, escape, the parental instinct, sex, and gregariousness. These five must have an evolutionary history behind them. How, then, are we to conceive of the stages through which these five instincts have passed? Once again we get the clue for the further expansion of our main conception from McDougall's own writings. Our author remarks, in the course of his analysis of the food-seeking instinct, that this impulse is probably the first tendency to be differentiated from the *elan vital*. That is exactly the point that we have been emphasising here in this discussion. The *elan vital* or the instinctual matrix is the primordial impetus from which all instincts have evolved. We may assume a first differentiation of this original impetus into a positive and a negative impulse, the former tending towards the maintenance and continuation of the individuation of the living organism, and the latter tending to subordinate and sometimes even to sacrifice the individual to the group. The positive impulse may now be looked upon as having differentiated into, food-seeking and escape, and the negative into parental, sex and gregarious instincts. Thus the whole scheme of the evolution of mental structure from the primordial *elan vital* to the highest and the most complicated sentiment has been reconstructed by us.

The result of our discussion is summed up in Fig. 10 and the explanatory note affixed to the diagram indicates the various parts of our discussion. We have indicated how the whole battery of instincts may be viewed as having evolved from the primeval life urge or the *elan vital*. We have by this evolutionary conception bridged the gulf between McDougall and Freud, and have shown how they constitute

two aspects of the same psychological theory. McDougall's hormic theory begins not at the first and the earliest stage of evolution, but in the middle of its course. We should trace the fourteen instincts of the McDougallian scheme down to their beginnings, and then we shall come upon Freud's conception of sex, and when this is traced to its origins we shall find the *elan vital* as the matrix from which the complicated structure of the human mind has evolved through long and tortuous paths.

CHAPTER IX

Extension of the Hormic Theory

The hormic theory may be extended in several directions. The facts discovered by the other schools which are of a compelling nature, but which have been overlooked by this theory may be examined, and it may be shown that they do not conflict with the hormic point of view. We have shown in the last chapter how McDougall himself has pursued this line of extension in regard to the facts revealed by psycho-analysis. When his book 'The Energies of Men' was first published, the reviewer in *Mind** voiced forth a bitter complaint that the author had neglected the psycho-analytic school. The complaint was not that McDougall did not accept the theory of psycho-analysis, but that he did not even discuss it. The publication of '*Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology*' has removed the cause for such a complaint. McDougall admits in this work that Freud's system is nearer to hormism than any other psychological school. The three main lectures composing the body of the book indicate how through the gradual and progressive recognition of certain instincts of the non-erotic type, Freud has so completely overhauled his pan-sexualistic outlook that he is on the point of repudiating his fundamental libido dogma. The Neo-Freudian doctrines outlined in the 'New Lectures', '*Group Psychology*' and '*Civilisation and its Discontents*' recognise aggression, unconscious guilt, deep-seated fear, the tender impulse and suggestion. Having made the admission that some of the major propensities of human nature are independent of the sex-propensity on the one hand, and of one another among themselves on the other, it is claimed by McDougall that had the great leader of psycho-analysis developed his view he would have arrived at the theory very similar to

**Mind*, N. S., vol. xliii 1934.

the hormic theory. This claim is, of course, rather exaggerated, and we have seen in the last chapter the exact relation in which psycho-analysis stands to McDougallian hormism.

The facts on which Freud bases his theories are beyond dispute, and any psychological school worth the name must explain those facts. McDougall says, 'It is not so much that one cannot accept many of Freud's statements of facts; but rather that all his statements of fact are made in terms that imply unacceptable theories.'* And some of the facts are plain enough, but do not come under the hormic hypothesis as it stands today. These facts are of a very disturbing nature, and of great social significance. While McDougall has attempted to make his theory cover several of these facts, he has brushed aside those that do not seem to fall in a line easily with his hypothesis. We have in mind the realm of the Unconscious in particular. An extension of the hormic theory is bound to come, but in what direction is the question. We have no hesitation in saying that, in the first instance, it should be in the direction of the Unconscious of psycho-analysis.

Objection has been taken by certain critics to the pluralistic and individualistic nature of instincts as described by McDougall. "An instinct is a concrete fact of mental structure and, even after allowing for certain instincts like those of combat and curiosity which derive their impulse from other instincts or lead to them, there are certain instincts which are unique and hence independent of one another. That is the position taken up by McDougall, and it leads to the postulation of a plurality of mental patterns. Our author points out that there are no such things as fixed mental patterns called instincts, but only dynamic tendencies termed propensities in his *'Energies of Men'*. Still when independent propensities are spoken of, there is a danger of relapsing into the fallacy of faculty psychology. To surmount this difficulty, one of the

*Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology, p. 18.

sympathetic critics of McDougall, Dr. Garnett, proposes, in his book *Instinct and Personality*, to locate the instinctive patterns in the nervous system. This is, perhaps, a possible direction in which the hormic theory may be extended. It is contended by the doctor that the concept *instinct* is an abstraction, and that it points to an assumed physical structure which produces certain effects on the behaviour of a living organism. On this showing it is better to conceive of an instinct as 'an innate neural structure'. The unity of mind is thus preserved by pushing the organised patterns down to the physical level. The urge of life, as well as the urge to life, is no doubt mental, but the differentiation of the urge into patterns of behaviour is the result of certain specific organisations in the nervous system. Such localisation of the instinctive action-patterns in the body taken with a certain novel concept of 'expectation', it is claimed by Dr. Garnett, explains all aspects of human behaviour including those controlled by the unconscious levels of the mind.

Dr. Lundholm, one of McDougall's colleagues at the Duke University extends, in his monograph, *Cination and Our Conscious Life* the hormic theory in another direction. He traces the independent instinctive tendencies to a fundamental basis. Accepting the URGE as a primal fact of mental life the Doctor proceeds to show how this urge differentiates into various tendencies under the guidance of what he calls primordial *curiosity*. The nature of this curiosity can be studied only through introspection. Its main aim is to serve comprehension. Controlled and directed by this primordial curiosity cination goes through three stages of differentiation. The first is to be found in the mental life of a simple hypothetical organism, the second in the organisms of the pre-neural level, and the third in the animal with a well organised nervous system. The fully developed instincts are formed at the third level. This hypothesis while postulating a process of differentiation of instincts in the mental make-up of the organism preserves the unity of mind. It is, therefore, better than the view which attempts

to cover up the difficulties by locating the differences in behaviour patterns in the nervous system. The latter view is dangerously near mechanistic behaviourism. When it is admitted that all the complexity and adaptability of purposive behaviour is merely the working out of a certain neurone pattern, then what is required to set the organism going is just a stimulus, which may very well originate from the external world. He who adopts this attitude need take but one more step to join the ranks of the mechanistic behaviourists.

McDougall has already sounded a note of warning against the temptation to identify instincts with motor mechanisms. While criticising the views of Shand and Lloyd Morgan, he says, 'I see no reason why these complex co-ordinated movements should be regarded as the expression of so many distinct instincts... We have to regard such motor mechanisms not as instincts, but merely as the instruments of instincts.*' There are complex and well organised motor mechanisms in the body, but these are merely the tools of instinct. Any motor mechanism may be used by any instinct there being no rigid connection between a given instinct and a particular type of neural organisation. 'We must therefore define any instinct by the nature of the goal, the type of situation that it seeks or tends to bring about.†'

In the analysis of meaning Dr. Lundholm displays rare insight. What is of interest to us is the Doctor's assimilation of the Gestalt position in his extension of the hormic theory. In McDougall's early discussions of perception and meaning there is no reference at all to the Gestalt theory and even in *'The Energies of Men'* only a passing reference is made to this very original and ingenious theory. The founders of Gestalt, we are told, are antagonistic to any theory which recognises an enduring mental structure. The Gestalt emphasises the function of

* An Outline of Psychology, pp., 116-117.

† Ibid. p. 193.

the mind to the utter exclusion of the structure, and such emphasis is claimed to be the source of all the fallacies in psychology. Dr. Garnett in his book, 'Instinct and Personality' makes a very promising start with his analysis of meaning, but breaks off at the point where we should expect a discussion of the Gestalt position. Dr. Lundholm on the other hand clearly proves that the very essence of the perception of the Gestalten is conation or the primeval urge. At the very commencement of his position he points out the intimate relationship between conation and meaning. Making use of his peculiar hypothesis of Primordial Curiosity the Doctor shows how psychologically unlike elements are integrated into a Gestalten and perceived against a specific background. The point of special interest to us is that throughout the discussion the factor of conation is stressed as being of primary importance.

These extensions of the hormic theory have covered several important regions, but they have also neglected other regions of equal importance. There is, for instance, a neglect of many of the facts brought to light by psychoanalysis. The cause for the neglect is deep seated. McDougall and those who have attempted to extend his hormic theory, proceed on the following set of postulates: 1) body and mind are unlike each other, 2) body and mind interact, 3) the urge of life is an indisputable fact, 4) mental energy and physical energy are unlike each other, and 5) the behaviour of living organisms is purposive or goalseeking. Add to these the fact that the great leader of the hormic school speaks deprecatingly of unconscious motivation, then the explanation for the limitations of hormism is easily found. The postulates mentioned above do not check the temptation of the contemporary psychologist to yield to the seductions of mechanism. For after all, as Bergson has pointed out, teleology is only inverted mechanism. It seems as though Dr. Garnett has nearly fallen a victim to materialism. He has located the instincts in the nervous system, in spite of McDougall's protests,

yet it is he who points the way to a better and more satisfying psychology.

In the preface to his work, *'Conation and our Conscious Life'* Dr. Lundholm raises this significant question, 'May not mind extend even into the realm of plants?'. We of course have no hesitation in affirming that it does so extend. In the course of developing his thesis, the Doctor suggests that the individual mind may be a part of a vast psychic continuum. That an Occidental psychologist should postulate an endless psychic continuum with which the individual mind could make contact is very significant indeed. And in speaking of the memory continuum the learned Doctor envisages the working of a Master Mind which 'swayed by some supreme urge in one visionary synthesis embraces the ocean of experience.' In another place the Doctor admits the possibility of the transmigration of souls. Strange utterances these from a Western scientist! Perhaps they are not so strange when we notice the direction in which the sciences of the West have been moving in recent times.

Dr. Garnett frankly admits the insufficiency of any theory of instincts which does not take into account the fact that man strives after ideals. Instead of making vague suggestions, and raising hesitant questions Dr. Garnett takes a confident stand and devotes a whole chapter of his book *'Instinct and Personality'*, to the discussion of 'the ideals'. He speaks of desires that are not of the flesh, namely, the desires for truth, beauty and goodness. It is highly significant that starting from purely psychological foundations the learned Doctor has arrived at a striking metaphysical conclusion.

We may now proceed to point out the only direction in which the hormic theory may be extended in a satisfactory manner. In the first place there should be a frank recognition of the existence of the Super-Conscious. This aspect of the mind has been sadly neglected by the West. In the second place the entire group of postulates mentioned above should be rehabilitated. The urge of

life, and the urge to life are facts, but this urge should not be viewed as having a dual origin. Energy is the same wherever it is found. This view is, perhaps, not so repulsive to the contemporary scientist as it would have been a few decades back. The concept of the interchangeability of matter and energy has smoothened the path for the entry of this new principle. Body, we suggest, is the concretisation of mental effort. When it is possible to conceive of the crystallisation of immaterial energy into matter, there should be no difficulty in conceiving of the body as the condensation of mental energy, for after all the body is the tool of the mind. The behaviour of such a body, it is said, is purposive or goal seeking. It must be understood that the goal is sought after by the mind which uses the body as its tool, and not by the body itself. But what is this goal, or rather what is the supreme goal of all mental striving? Homic psychology of the present day contemplates only biological goals. Dr. Garnett speaks of a triad of spiritual goals. We have to rise above all these, and strive to get a glimpse of the cosmic spirit for identification with which the individual spirit is striving. Primal energy (Sakti) activates the living organism, and the natural goal of the activity is the merging of the individual in the Universal Spirit.

We propose the following as postulates for a Neo-Homic Psychology :

- (1) The dynamic psychic continuum is real, and the only real.
- (2) The individual psychic entities are differentiated points in this continuum.
- (3) Primal energy (Sakti) which is the essence of the individual mind is to be looked upon as urging the individual mind to union with the continuum.
- (4) Energy is the same wherever it is found. 'Sometimes it works simply as such, but often it concretises itself into bodies which may serve as tools

for the mind. In the form of bodies energy generates its own opposite.

- (5) The ideals of Truth, Beauty and Goodness are three aspects of the continuum comprehended by man of the present day.
- (6) The three aspects are the highest aspects beyond doubt; yet they are only aspects which stand between the Universal Mind and the individual mind. When the final goal is reached, these ideals will cease to exist.

The formidable objection may be raised that these are not postulates, but highly speculative hypotheses. Our answer is that they have been asserted in unhesitant language by the most highly evolved minds whose experience is as concrete as the experience of the experimental scientist in his laboratory. We have no hesitation in saying that it is on experimental evidence that they have made these statements.

The ancient seers with their finely developed intuition saw the truth, and now contemporary experimental scientists of the highest order are working up inductively to the same conclusion on the basis of experimental evidence. Experimental physics, experimental biology, and experimental psychology point without any ambiguity to the existence of a super-sensuous reality

Part III

Applied Hormişm

CHAPTER X

The Psychology of Culture.

INTRODUCTION

What is Culture?

The spirit of our age is at war with itself, tearing its own body to pieces and paving the way for the final destruction of civilisation. When the situation is examined carefully, it is found that the disaster that threatens the whole world is due to the conflict of cultures. Aryan culture is arrayed against Semetic, White against Coloured, American against Negro, and Brahmin Aryan against Non-brahmin Dravidian. The war of cultures is threatening to assume unmanageable dimensions. What, then, is this culture under whose banner so many people are preparing to take the field?

Cultural objects, that is, objects that are believed to be the expressions of the culture of individuals or groups that have produced them, are diverse in their nature and wide in their extent. From the cave drawings and the stone implements of primitive man to the pyramids of Egypt and the Ajantan paintings and frescoes it is a far cry indeed. Yet all these objects are equally representative of the respective cultures of their creators. And the Futurist and Impressionist drawings too! They represent a very significant aspect of contemporary culture. Philosophy, art and science, language and literature, music and dance, painting, sculpture and even food (according to an eminent sociologist) are expressions of culture. What is the significance of designating this bewildering mass of objects by a common name? There must be some unity among them justifying the common name. They express an inner something of which they are but different products.

Treatises on Culture, and their number is legion, are

not very illuminating. They fail to orient us properly in the midst of the vast mass of facts of culture gathered by painstaking research workers. Taylor, the great authority on primitive culture says, 'Culture... includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.' There is utter confusion here between *culture* and *civilisation*, and between such widely differing aspects of experience as art and knowledge. Moreover, there is an implication that culture can be acquired by man only as a member of society. When we turn from Taylor's *Primitive Culture* to the well known Encyclopaediae, we find that they are not any more illuminating in the matter. *The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* tells us that the most essential element in the psychology of culture is that which relates to the intellect and the will with the accompanying contrast between the life of culture and that of activity. This definition neglects completely the affective aspect of human life which is the sole basis of culture, and exalts the intellect which plays only a subordinate part in cultural life. *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* has a long article on culture which is full of brilliant suggestions. At times we feel that we are being taken to the centre of the problem, but at the critical moment a sudden halt is called, and thereafter there is a steady sliding down-wards. 'Culture comprises inherited artefacts, goods, technical processes, ideas, habits and values... The real component units of culture are the organised systems of human activities called institutions.' This article recognises the need for a psychological analysis of culture, but lacking the proper psychological foundation, it is not able to come to grips with the problem. *The New English Dictionary* defines culture as 'Cultivation, tending, cultivating or development of the mind, faculties, manners, etc., improvement or refinement by education and training.' Apart from the suggestion regarding cultivation, this definition is the least illuminating of all definitions given so far. Our need at present is an orienting concept, which will reduce to some pattern

the vast mass of cultural facts and objects, just as a magnetic field reduces to a comprehensible pattern the widely and wildly scattered iron filings within the field. In the light of a simple orienting concept we should be able to grasp the meaning of cultural objects, and their proper relationships to one another and to the mind that created them. Any simple cultural formula is bound to be psychological for the very obvious reason that culture is the ordering of the mind in its endeavour to reach or create a better order of things than that which it finds in its environment. We propose to frame in this chapter the simple psychological formula needed for understanding and interpreting human culture in its broad outlines. This formula will be tentative in its application, and will bear modification and expansion, indefinitely, but it will be sound in essentials, and will be a very safe guide for exploration.

Culture and Civilisation, A Contrast.

It is necessary to make a slight digression at this stage in order to point out the difference between *culture* and *civilisation*. The two terms are really opposed to each other in connotation. Civilisation stands for a certain aspect of life in the West which is the antithesis of culture. In the proper type of mental organisation there ought to be complete harmony between the inner mental culture of an individual or group, and the outward expression of that organisation in cultural objects. True culture consists in this harmony between the inner and outer aspects of the organisation of sentiment-values. When such harmony is absent, or when disharmony is introduced out of set purpose, then culture ceases to have any meaning. In the so called civilised life of today, lived according to Western standards, there is complete lack of harmony between the inner organisation of sentiment values and its outward expression in conduct. One may boil inwardly with fierce hatred or anger, but one should not express these feelings. One should put on an appearance of calm and friendliness. Insincere conduct is tolerated, nay even prescribed for

keeping up appearances. This is civilisation, and such civilisation is not culture. Civilisation demands a certain type of sophisticated conduct in society without any reference to the question whether such conduct is or is not in conformity with the motive which animates the person concerned. Culture on the other hand demands strict conformity of conduct with motive, of outward expression with inner sentiment. Civilisation is the means of getting on in this world, while true culture is the means of getting to the other world.

The Hormic Orientation to Culture.

Let us now pick up the main thread of our argument and turn our attention to the psychological analysis of culture. The formula that we propose to put forward as the one most adequate to the facts, and most useful for interpreting cultural objects, will be gathered from the hormic theory of McDougall which we have studied in the first and second parts of this monograph. In the third chapter we have discussed the formation and development of sentiment-scales which constitute the main elements of human culture. Now culture is the organisation and maintenance of an abiding scale of sentiment-values with a dominant master-sentiment which is never dethroned from its place of sovereignty. Culture is the cultivation of the mind, of its fundamental innate inherited structure, in such a way as to evolve a permanent scale of values. What we have called culture is what McDougall means by character but the words do not matter.

Just as the individual mind produces individual culture, so also the group produces its group culture. In the formation of group culture, social forces play a very important part. Institutions, social, political and religious are the results of group culture.

It is a fundamental law of the human mind that it must express itself in some manner or other. Culture, therefore, which is only another name for the organisation of the mind in a particular way, must express itself in a suitable

manner. The simplest type of expression is conduct. He who has formed a sentiment will behave in a particular way with regard to the object or person round whom he has built that sentiment; and he who has formed abstract sentiments will order his daily conduct in a regular manner; and finally, he who has built up a permanent scale of sentiment values, that is, he whose mind is truly cultured will have evolved a beautiful type of conduct pattern. With such a person first things are always first, and last things last, without any possibility of interchange of their places.

But conduct is not the only expression of culture. The cultural organisation of the human mind finds expression, very often, in new objects and institutions created by the individual or the group. When culture finds expression in this manner in an object or objective situation created by the human mind, then a cultural object comes into existence.

To sum up, culture is the culturing or cultivation of the human mind. It is the process of mental organisation wherein the fundamental innate, inherited structure of the human mind which is elastic, is built round objects and persons according to the general plan discussed in the third chapter. At the commencement, the innate propensities are organised into concrete sentiments, and then, at the next stage abstract sentiments are formed, and finally an abiding scale of sentiment-values is created by the dominance of one supreme sovereign, master-sentiment in relation to which all other sentiments, concrete as well as abstract are arranged in a suitable hierarchical order. A perfect and finished culture is one in which the scale of sentiment-values is permanent. As human culture can never reach perfection, we can speak only of a comparatively permanent scale of sentiment values; but, there is one abiding feature of this relatively permanent scale, namely the master-sentiment. In the absence of a master-sentiment there can be no culture worth the name. Cultural objects are the outward manifestations of the

nature of the culture of the individual or the group. They come into existence as the result of the creative activity of the mind which must perforce express itself (and its culture) in some unique objective situation.

The Application of the Hormic Theory of Culture to the Interpretation of Cultural Objects.

Armed with this hormic formula of culture we may proceed to interpret the meaning of a few cultural objects created by man. Art, philosophy and science; music, dance and drama; folk-tales, taboos and traditions; architecture, sculpture and painting; social and political institutions and every conceivable type of human organisation—all these are expressions of the culture of the individual or the group. They are outward expressions of the manner in which an abiding scale of values has been organised in the mind of individuals or groups by those who created the cultural objects. We have to note that the group in forming its culture is mainly under the influence of a dominating individual who is ahead of the other members of the group, and so imposes his scale of values on others. He is, what we call, the group leader. An outstanding leader is one who sets up a new scale of values and makes the group also accept the scale. Of these outstanding leaders there are two types, the destructive and the constructive. The destructive leaders are those who, setting aside all that the group has conserved from the past impose an absolutely new scale of values on the group. The breach which they attempt to create between the past culture, and the present is very wide, but their attempts will finally break down. For the time being, it is true the group is dazzled by their audacity, and succumbs to their seductions, but soon their hollowness is discovered, and what is best in the past regains its footing in their minds. The constructive leaders, on the other hand, are those who, realising the shortcomings of the present, attempt to raise the level of the group by a new scale of values which is a continuation of the old. Tyrants, dictators and totalitarians are the destructive leaders, while

poets, artists and religious leaders are constructive in their leadership.

Our hormic formula is fully adequate to the analysis of all kinds of cultural objects from the cave drawings of the primitive cave man to the most exalted type of fresco painting found in the caves of Ajanta. All cultural objects may be analysed and explained by seeking, in the first place, the sentiment values of the individual or the group expressed in these objects. The cave man's mind was dominated by two propensities, the fear of the wild animal and the supernatural; and the ever haunting but never satisfied craving for food. Hunger and fear in all their varied and brutal forms were, for the cave-dweller, the two compelling propensities guiding his conduct. The sentiments that he built up were dominated by these two motives. Hence it is that we find him taking infinite pains to paint or carve the outlines of deer and other animals that serve as his food, or the elephant, the bear and the lion which are the excitants of his fear propensity.

As our illustrations are meant to be types we shall now take a very long step covering many centuries and approach the cultural objects of modern Western peoples. McDougall has shown, in his brilliant analysis of Western character, that the dominant sentiment in the Western scale of sentiment values is self-regard. Every other sentiment is subordinated to this motive.* The self-regarding sentiment rules over and controls all other sentiments in the mind of men and women of the West. Within this sentiment, self-assertion plays a most prominent part. It is true that the propensities of appeal, gregariousness and protection also enter as components into this sentiment, yet they are all subordinated to self-assertion. Team-work and club-life are often cited as examples of forces with counteract the influence of self-assertion in Western life. But, we should like to point out that the element of competition is the very life and soul of the team and the club. Games without points and scores, matches and

*An Outline of Psychology. ch.

tournaments in which both the contending parties can win without *defeating* the opponent, elections without individual canvassing, and government without party leadership, these are unthinkable to the Western mind, and to the Eastern too which has fallen a prey to Western modes of thinking and acting. And competition thrives best on the soil of self-assertion. So it is that every cultural object of the West is clearly expressive of the self-assertive ego. It is round this ego that everything is organised in the West. When, for example, we compare the Western way of family organisation with the Eastern, we notice at once the dominant power of the ego in the former. Joint family life is impossible for the Westerner who holds to the dictum, 'one roof, one woman'. Consider again the powerful hold which self-assertion has over the minds of men of letters. The drive of the acquisitive propensity is so powerful that no author ever thinks of effacing his personality, and no mental product is allowed to go into the world without the label of the producer. The lure of copyright is so great that even legitimate quotations are forbidden. In the realm of religion too the individuality of the ego is considered to be of supreme value. Social service is shot through and through with the sense of individuality of the person rendering the service. Western national life of the present day with its totalitarian tendencies is a significant example of the dominance of the individual self even in group life. Truly the self-regarding sentiment is the master sentiment of the Western citizen.

As against the self-regarding sentiment of the West, we in our country have enthroned the Parabrahm-regarding sentiment as the master sentiment in our scale of values. It is often said by those who do not understand the Hindu philosophy of life that the Hindu conception of salvation is selfish. This is an utterly mistaken view. The self or ego, as conceived by the West is a thing of little value for the Hindu mind. The supreme ideal is Parabrahm. Everything Hindu symbolises this ideal.

Family organisation, domestic architecture, national festivals, village government by panchayat, these and other expressions of the cultural organisation of the Hindu mind indicate without any ambiguity the supreme importance attached by us to the complete subjugation of the self to Parabrahm. Above all it is in the peculiar type of temple architecture of the Hindu that we find the fullest expression of the Parabrahm regarding sentiment. From the early *vimana* to the latest complicated plan of sacred architecture in which the *prakaras*, *gopurams*, and other adjuncts play an important part, we can trace, no doubt, the evolution of the temple through all its complex stages of development; but we must note that underlying all the multifarious manifestations of the different types of cultural organisation in the different epochs of the religious life of the Hindus, the principle of the Parabrahm regarding sentiment reigns supreme as a sovereign over all other sentiments.

We shall consider another cultural object and show how our formula is adequate to the explanation of the mysterious nature of the monument we are examining. The object contemplated here is the Egyptian pyramid, with its adjunct the Sphinx. Scholars have puzzled their minds over unnatural hypotheses relating to these sacred structures. The pyramid is neither a structure meant for taking astronomical observations, nor is it a mere tomb for the mighty monarchs of old. Paul Brunton has unravelled the mystery of the colossal edifices in his marvellous book; '*Search in Secret Egypt*'. He there points out that the pyramid was built solely for the purpose of securing the exacting environment for the initiation ceremony—the participation mystique in which the individual soul was made to realise its oneness with the cosmic soul. The ancient Egyptians too had organised their sentiment-values in much the same manner as the ancient Hindus of the Upanishads. For both these mighty ancient minds the supreme ideal in life was the realisation here and now, of the unity of the individual soul with the cosmic soul.

Hence it is that we find these colossal edifices the pyramids towering high above every other structure, and ending in an apex signifying the eternal aspiration of the self for union with the supreme Godhead. The Sphinx is not the puzzle-propounding monster intent on devouring the unwary passer-by, but the beneficent guardian spirit welcoming the individual ripe for final initiation, and keeping watch over the secret entrance to the participation chambers in the heart of the pyramid. It is Brunton who discovered the subterranean passage which invariably connects the Sphinx with the pyramid. Truly may it be said that *tattvam asi* was the inspiring ideal of the cultures that gave birth to the sentiment values which expressed themselves in the colossal pyramids of Egypt, on the one hand, and the massive temples of our country on the other.

The Hormic Theory and Andhra Culture.

Up to this point we have been applying the hormic formula for culture to the analysis of cultural objects in a very wide and general field. Let us now narrow down the field of investigation, and test the validity and adequacy of the formula in a specific region. We may, to start with, interpret the culture of *Andhra Desa* (the Telugu country) in terms of our psychological formula. Armed with the hormic formula of culture, we shall analyse certain Andhra cultural objects in order to get an insight into the manner in which the Andhra genius is attempting to organise its sentiment values.

At the outset, the significant remark ought to be made that sophistication is utterly alien to the Andhra spirit. The anti-thesis between culture and civilisation does not obtain in the Andhra land. Nothing suspicious is hidden underneath a smooth and glossy outer surface. The cultural objects in the Andhra country are the direct and unvarnished expressions of the way in which the Andhra mind has been organised. This characteristic straight-forwardness is, in a sense, helpful to the analyst of culture.

The conclusion that we shall essay to establish through

an analysis of the cultural objects produced by Andhra genius is that there has been, and still is, a *perpetual conflict between self-assertion (virya) and sympathy (karuna)* in the Andhra group mind. Occasionally one of the components dominates over the other, and temporarily assimilates it.

Analysis of the Cultural objects of the Andhra Country.

Sculpture—The earliest remains of the cultural objects of the Andhra nation are the sculptures at Amaravati. Amaravati, as we are aware, is the lineal descendant of a more important city, Dharanikota, dating back to 200 B.C. Historical research bears testimony to the indigenous nature of the Amaravati sculptures. Vincent Smith is of opinion that these sculptures owe nothing to Gandhara influence. Speaking of the Amaravati stupa, the learned historian says in his '*Fine Art in India and Ceylon*' 'The authority of the Kushan kings, however, did not extend as far south as Amaravati, which was then within the dominions of the powerful Andhra dynasty of Deccan.' We may take these stupas as typical expressions of early Andhra Culture.

In the Amaravati Sculptures we notice a central uprising dome, surrounded by a writhing mass of men and animals. The former is suggestive of the sentiment of *virya* with its dominant emotion of *vira* (self-assertion), while the latter points to primitive passive sympathy of the *Elan Vital* with itself. The life energy having first scattered itself in innumerable centres of animal organism, is drawing these towards itself through the psychic force of sympathy. Already at the commencement of the Andhra cultural evolution, we notice the conflict between *virya* and *karuna*. A similar conflict is to be found in the stupas, also dating back to the second century B.C., at Jaggayyapet, thirty miles to the North West of Amaravati. This conflict tends to sink down to the unconscious levels of the group mind. In interpreting aesthetic works the sub-conscious, and unconscious levels of

the mind will have to be taken into consideration, and often it will be necessary to refer to the elaborate symbolism of psycho-analysis behind which the psyche entrenches itself. The apparent and the trivial acquire tremendous significance when we delve into the unconscious levels. But, luckily the specimens that we have chosen are comparatively easy to interpret.

So far then, as the plastic arts are concerned we hold that they are the expression of the struggle between *virya* and *karuna* in the Andhra group-mind.

The Andhra Script. From the great and massive monuments of the Andhradesa we shall now come down to what appears to be microscopically small and insignificant, namely, the Andhra script. To the psychologist of the twentieth century nothing is insignificant. Psycho-analysis has taught us the profound significance of what common sense (or popular ignorance) considers to be insignificant. Even apparently trivial acts of behaviour are symptomatic of deep seated conflicts and repressions in the human mind. The script of a nation, when viewed phylogenetically reveals the hidden tendencies of the group-mind. The evolution of the three letters, *a*, *k* and *r*, of the Andhra alphabet indicates the conflict that had taken place in the Andhra mind.

Stages in the evolution of three letters of the
Andhra Alphabet.

୧	୨	୩
୨	୨	୨
୨	୨	୨
୨	୨	୨
	୨	୨
୨	୨	୨
୨	୨	୨
୨	୨	୨
୨	୨	୨
୨	୨	୨

Fig. 12.

Each one of these letters starting with a high, domineering tendency in the Vengi stage, and passing through several stages wherein their assertiveness was gradually toned down, finally ends in the fifteenth century stage in which the rounded form clearly denotes the influence of sympathy.

Telugu Literature. For purposes of our analysis we should have welcomed indigenous Andhra literature of the Pre-Nannayya period. But unfortunately Telugu litera-

ture is silent about the most glorious period of Andhra history. It is, as a great historian of Telugu Literature remarks, 'A remarkable instance of national loss of memory.' We have to content ourselves, therefore, with the mere mention of the well-known men of letters in the age of translation. Srinatha, the typical man of the world, the *vira* par-excellence, was the prosperous author who knew how to get on in this world. Potanna, on the other hand, was pre-occupied with the world beyond. He typifies *karuna*. Between them, the two leaders of Telugu literature illustrate the relation between the tendencies that we have been emphasising.

Traditions and Customs. The traditions and customs of the Andhradesa bristle with illustrations of the conflict between *virya* and *karuna*. We have selected two examples at random to emphasise our contention.

The legend about the origin of the Balija sect runs thus: Goddess Parvathi desires to beautify herself, but finds that she has no ornaments suited to her dignity and god-like eminence. She prays to Siva for the fulfilment of her desire. Siva consults Brahma who suggests a severe penance as the means for securing what Parvathi desires. The penance is performed, and as a result of Siva's austerities there springs into existence a Mahapurusha, the primal Balija, bearing all the articles needed for a sumangili's toilet. These then are presented to Parvathi.

The Mahapurusha himself is the embodiment of *virya*, while *karuna* is revealed in his attitude to Parvathi. It is his sympathy with the mother of the worlds that made him bring her the welcome gifts.

Thurstone in his '*Castes and Tribes*' describes thirty different types of the Gauri Vratam, a ceremony very dear to the heart of the Andhra ladies. The elaborate technique of the Vratam invariably involves gifts to sumangilis given with the hope of an adequate return, from the presiding deity, Sri Gauri. Self-assertion, sympathy and even touches of fear are all suggested by the ceremony of bes-

towing gifts on married women.

Music.—One has to be very guarded in speaking about Andhra music. Though Mr. V. Subba Rao remarks in *'The Four Arts Annual'* for 1935 that 'the Andhras are most emotional and sensitive to new impressions, and follow few innovations, yet the alarmingly increasing tendency to make free use of the Hindustani style, reveals the success of self-assertion in subduing karuna and assimilating it so completely as to leave no trace of its influence. We remarked at the outset that one of the components of the psychic complex may occasionally annihilate the other element in the total sentiment. Here in Andhra music we witness the beginnings of such annihilation of karuna by self-assertion. If the Semetic influence filtering through the Hindustani style of music be not controlled, as it was controlled in the Vijayanagar style of architecture, then we shall witness the annihilation of Andhra music.

Painting.—The crowning phase of Andhra culture is to be found in, what we consider to be the high water-mark of Andhra paintings of Damarla Rama Rao. We are impressed with the profundity of sympathy portrayed, for example, in the masterly scene in which the exiled Yaksha in Meghadutam appeals to the passing clouds to carry his message of poignant grief to his beloved in the far distant land. The aesthetic genius of Mr. Rao has caught and fixed on the canvas for us the depth of feeling of primitive passive sympathy of the hero. In the case of painting, sympathy has over-mastered self-assertion. This subduing and assimilation of virya is a step in the right direction, in which Andhra culture ought to develop if it is to be true to the highest ideal of our national genius.

Quo Vadis.—If our main contention that Andhra culture is the result of a conflict between virya and karuna be granted then two questions of supreme importance present themselves to us and demand satisfactory answers. How long should this conflict be permitted to last? And,

in what manner may the conflict be resolved? The psychology which helped us to analyse the mental elements in the culture of Andhradesa is the only psychology that is competent to answer these questions.

We are prepared to grant that conflict is the very essence of life on this earth, and that the resolution of one conflict will lead on to the generation of another. But every single conflict resolved represents a step taken in the direction of progress. So, the conflict in Andhra culture should be resolved as soon as possible.

'Man' says a great writer on art, 'has the mystical institution of universal transformism. Through transmigrations, by passing from one appearance to another, and by raising within himself, through suffering and combat, the moving level of life, he will doubtless be pure enough one day to annihilate himself in Brahma.' This significant statement suggests the direction in which the conflict should be resolved. Virya should first be annihilated, and whatever be the psychic forces left over, successive annihilations should take place until pure Prabrahmanandam results.

Explanation of the Diagram:




Fig. 13. Schematic representation of the evolution of the Para Brahm regarding Sentiment through six stages.

- I The elementary emotions of the structure of the mind.
- II The stage of the formation of the concrete sentiments.
- III of the abstract sentiments.
- IV abstract sentiments of a high order.
- V The stage of the final conflict between the positive and negative self-feeling resulting in the resolution of the conflict after the formation of the Para-Brahm regarding sentiment.
- VI The Para-Brahm regarding sentiment.

(N.B.—The organisation of the concrete sentiment takes place as the result of a felt need. Only a few of the concrete sentiments are represented in the diagram since we wish to give an idea of the way in which these are formed in some outstanding instances.

III & IV represent the lower and the higher stages of the abstract sentiments. It will be noticed that the Santa Rasa enters only in the fourth stage; even here it is only manifested in part. Its final realisation comes only at the last stage.

The elements begin to manifest their elemental nature in the conflict between the positive and the negative self-feeling.

The conflict is finally resolved when Brahmanandam is realised.

Bhagwan Sri Ramkrishna showed that this stage can be reached and yet the individuality of the self maintained only by the favoured few. Ordinarily when this stage is reached individuality is annihilated.)

The Hormic Formula and Tamil Culture

Let us now turn our attention to Tamil Culture, and apply the hormic formula to the interpretation of the cultural objects of Tamilnad. We may state at the outset the conclusion of our analysis, and then support it by evidence drawn from various cultural fields. On the mental side Tamil culture is rooted in the sentiment of sympathy or *karuna* with submission as the essential component of that sentiment. But the analyst engaged in the task of unravelling the mysteries of Tamil culture will meet very often 'objects' misleadingly expressive of 'assertion' which is the primitive impulse opposed to 'submission'. He has to be on his guard, for Tamil culture being much more advanced than Andhra culture is much more sophisticated. It possesses the unwelcome features of western civilisation which force man to pretend to be what he is not, and to feel what he does not. Moreover, as we have already pointed out, we should seek the aid of psycho-analysis in the task of probing the depths of racial culture. When these precautions are taken, then there should be no difficulty in getting at the foundations of Tamil culture.

Let us start with the Tamil script. The smooth well-rounded and closed structure of the letters, in contrast to the long drawn out scrawly shape of the Urdu script, is highly suggestive of the sympathetic and submissive impulses, as against the assertiveness of the latter. Consider again the sounds. The harsh guttural finds no place in the Tamil scheme. The plosives and expletives are conspicuous by their absence. The smooth sweet silvery flowing sounds are the natural expression of a non-assertive, mild and sweet organisation of mental structure.

If from the alphabet we turn to classical Tamil literature, we are confronted by a remarkable phenomenon. Running through the entire range of the Tamil classics like an unforgettable refrain, there is a peculiar *sringara* motif. It is the echo of the love life of the simple pastoral folk who inhabited the different types of land in the Tamil-

nad. Not only drama and poetry, but even grammar is leavened with this erotic sentiment. In no other literature is grammar sweetened by the psychology of love. And in the elaboration of the theme itself, the joys and sufferings of the heroine are stressed, and *sringara* is placed on a high pedestal, all other sentiments being subordinated to it. One can see without any difficulty the undisputed sway of *karuna* here with special emphasis on 'submission'.

Folk tales reveal in a striking manner the racial mind and the manner of its organisation. The typical Tamil folk tale relates the sufferings of Nallathangal, the sweet and good sister. Her life is a striking example of one long-drawn out suffering and tireless 'submission'.

Tamil costume and ornaments are also expressive of the sentiment which we claim is the foundation of Tamil culture. The comely flowing drapery, unlike the gaunt forking pants worn by women of certain other parts of the country underlining very forcibly the bifurcation of the human trunk, this comely garment of the Tamils sets off the pleasing contours of the body without gross suggestions. It is a brilliant example of art wherein 'nature is to advantage dressed.'

In the realm of Tamil architecture, both domestic and sacred, the element of submission is present. Consider the typical plan of a dwelling house, with its *kudam*, *muttram*, *tazhvaram*, etc. A certain degree of group life is stressed. The individual has to submit to the needs of the group. In temple architecture too, the element of submission is present. The wealth of carvings in the place of worship, consisting sometimes of a bewildering mass of human and animal figures, the important place accorded to the tank; the provision for feeding large numbers and other similar features emphasise the human element suffused with *karuna*.

In dancing, music and painting too Tamil culture is overwhelmingly 'sympathetic'. The *Thevaram* is the

most suitable medium for the outpourings of passionate, reverential devotion to the deity. The dances indigenous to Tamilnad are those mentioned in *Silappadikaram* outside the *Arangettrukkathai*. Of these, the dance of the shepherdesses is typical, and the denouement in this dance sequence emphasises the 'submissive' element. Consider again the mural paintings at *Sittannavasal*, which are typical of Southern paintings, and contrast these with the Moghul type. The pictures speak for themselves.

We have noted here only a few examples. We may, however, extend our observations to the origins of South Indian Temple architecture, to portrait sculptures, to the field of social festivities, and to ancient Tamil political organisations. The final result will be the same. Throughout the field of cultural organisation we shall find that *karuna* and 'submission' are the key-notes for the interpretation of the Tamil mind. These elements, then, are the foundations of Tamil culture.

Final Estimate of the Hormic Formula for Culture

The psychological formula for the analysis of culture based on the hormic theory which we have put forward is to be treated as a scientific hypothesis requiring co-operative verification at the hands of many workers in the field of psychology, anthropology, ethnology, aesthetics, sociology, comparative religion etc. The formula is sound in fundamentals. As a result of the joint endeavours of research scholars it may be found necessary to modify it in parts, but it will, in its foundations, stand the severest tests that may be imposed on it.

In order to give the formula its shape it is necessary to make a comparative analytical study of the cultural products of a given age. Works of art, literature and philosophy, discoveries and inventions in science; social, political and religious institutions of a given age, and above all the cultural creations of the rare and gifted individuals belonging to that age should be carefully analysed with the object of discovering the scale of sentiment-values and the

master-sentiment organised by the spirit of that age, the spirit which while expressing itself in multifarious ways, maintains a fundamental unity in its foundations. Then, an attempt should be made to study the various cultural *epochs* of a given nation in order to discover the stages of evolution of the spirit. This is bound to reveal the fact that in the case of any nation worth the name the general frame-work as well as the foundation of the scale of sentiment values has remained the same. If any nation has overturned its scale at any stage, then we shall find that this reversal is only temporary in the case of these people who have built their values on a solid foundation, whereas in the case of others it is symptomatic of the instability of the foundations that they alter their fundamental values. In the case of our country there arises now and then a temptation to copy the Western scale of values, but the attraction is only temporary. The Parabrahm regarding sentiment asserts itself very soon. In the West on the other hand we find that great upheavals, affecting the very foundations of national life occur at regular intervals. The West has yet to discover a fundamental scale of values. The study of cultural development of an ancient nation will teach us many lessons. It will point to us the direction in which fruitful reforms could be undertaken. It will also point out the futility of attempts at reversing the scale of values which has stood the test of time.

The research into culture suggested here will, when accomplished, teach us how to bring about harmony between nations which are now carrying on warfare against one another. It will also teach us how, in the long run, man may achieve international harmony by evolving a universal scale of sentiment values acceptable to all men on earth. Such, in brief, is the benefit that hormic psychology, in its applied branches, is capable of conferring on mankind as a whole.

CHAPTER XI

The Hormic Approach to Aesthetics

Art and Traditional Psychology

A work of art, be it a picture, a statue, a melody, a dance sequence or a novel, is, in essence, the product of human activity. It is, first and foremost, the result of human endeavour, and as such, a psychological approach to an understanding of its inner nature is indicated as the most fruitful approach. Besides, certain tendencies in recent aesthetic doctrines point to the need for this psychological approach. Art, no doubt, is couched in a particular medium; the artist must express himself in some sensuous medium. An analysis of the various media, a discussion of the relation between the form and matter of fine art, a consideration of the relative values of diverse parts within the whole form, these and scores of similar questions in aesthetics, have been tackled with commendable results. But sometimes, these discussions have been carried on with such utter disregard of the human element in art that they have led to misleading conclusions of a deplorable type. Birkhoff's *Aesthetic Measure* is an example of the extremist tendencies in the objective treatment of aesthetic form. An attempt is made in this book to devise algebraic formulae for measuring aesthetic values. So complete is the divorce between form and matter that purely abstract mathematical concepts are considered adequate for explaining aesthetic experience. We do not propose to condemn this highly objective and abstract treatment of art. It has its place in aesthetics; it is valid, but it is not adequate. The study of aesthetic principles underlying balance, harmony, proportion, symmetry, and the golden measure, are all necessary, but what is necessary in a greater measure is the study of the mental factors underlying the perception and enjoyment of the mathematical properties of a work of art.

While this danger to aesthetics arising from an over-emphasis on objective analysis may be easily recognised and guarded against, there is another which is difficult to ward off. It is the enemy masquerading in the guise of a friend. There is a certain type of psychologising in aesthetics which is more destructive of the soul of art than the extremist tendency in objective analysis. We may mention as an example the attempt to reduce aesthetic experience to states of attention, and the aesthetic object to the object of attention controlled by the factor of interest. This pseudo-psychology is the off-spring of that strictly useless type of cognitive psychology based on atomism, associationism, and sensationalism which flourished in the last century. Attention there is, no doubt, in aesthetic contemplation and enjoyment, but to reduce the entire aesthetic experience to attention is just like reducing the movement of a powerful engine to the movement of its wheels. What really moves the engine is the mighty power of some form of energy-steam, electricity or gasoline. There lies the secret of movement. Similarly the secret of aesthetic experience is to be sought not in attention, but in the deep-seated urges, conscious and unconscious, which move the human mind.

Yet another psychological theory which fails to do full justice to aesthetic experience is exemplified in Dewey's *Art as Experience*. Dewey, no doubt, gives to human nature the place of prime importance in aesthetic experience, but he insists on the continuity of aesthetic with ordinary experience. Aesthetics, according to Dewey, must affiliate art to practical life, by interpreting the former as an intensified or idealised form of the common experience found in the latter. Such a view naturally leads to an over-emphasis on the formal aspect of art on the one hand, and to an undue elaboration, leading in some instances to an over-valuation, of the active elements in the production of an aesthetic object. Dewey, for instance speaks of *doing* and *undergoing* in aesthetic experience, and he means to connote by these expressions the purely behaviouristic

elements in the creation and enjoyment of art. To enjoy a work of art, then, we must experience in ourselves all the movements and strain and muscular effort that went to its making. An exquisite rendering of one of Sri Tyagaraja's kritis on the violin cannot be enjoyed unless you reproduce in your neuro-muscular structure all the movements, incipiently perhaps, that the violinist has to go through. This is carrying too far the pragmatic elements in psychological theory, and Dewey has fallen a victim to the seduction of pragmatic psychology. This type of psychologising is not helpful in aesthetics.

Let us now turn our attention to a certain type of psychological aesthetics which comes nearest to the hormic position. In a brief but exquisite essay on 'The Psychology of Art' contributed by Professor Cyril Burt to the volume 'How the Mind Works' edited by himself, we find many valuable suggestions for a proper understanding of the psychological principles underlying aesthetic experience. Art has often been compared to play on the one hand, and to day-dreaming on the other. Both are 'exciting, passionate, emotional, but useless.' By the term *useless* is meant the absence of utility. Art and industry are opposed in this respect. A work of art is without utility, while utility is the very heart and soul of a product of industry. The latter is a means towards an end, while the former is an end in itself. But, though a work of fine art is non-utilitarian, it is not purposeless. It serves to drain off the energy of unsatisfied emotions. It performs an indirect service to the artist. The play theory of art, because it neglects this element, and also because it does not do justice to the unconscious elements in aesthetic experience, is not quite adequate to our needs. It has therefore to be supplemented by another which compares the work of the artist to a day dream. In comparing art to day-dreaming, the psychologist has thrown a flood of light, by his penetrating insight into dreams and day dreams, and on the working of the artist's mind. Professor Burt has kept these considerations prominently in view in his analysis of the psychological conditions

leading to the creation and enjoyment of art. But, he too has fallen a prey to the misleading influences of the barren cognitive psychology of the nineteenth century which forces even those gifted with an insight into the conative elements of aesthetic experience to land on the infertile ground of formal relations. We must avoid all these pitfalls and maintain a clear and purposeful course on the path of psychological aesthetics.

The Hormic Theory and Aesthetics.

When we follow up the significant clues in Professor Burr's analysis we find that in his approach to aesthetics the psychologist must, perforce, take up the subjective attitude to a greater extent than the objective towards the aesthetic situation. Many psychologists have not appreciated to the full the significance of this subjective approach. Hence they failed to produce any satisfactory result by their analysis.

The psychologist in analysing aesthetic experience must single out and distinguish between the urge to the creation of an aesthetic object, and the urge to the enjoyment of the object thus created. In other words, the psychological analysis must show, as far as possible, how the mind of the great artist works when he creates a masterpiece, and how the mind of the appreciative critic works in understanding, evaluating and enjoying that masterpiece. Underneath the working of these two types of mind there operates the same urge, the same kind of mental experience, and it is noteworthy that the hormic school alone among the contemporary schools of psychology is competent to deal with this mental urge. William McDougall has provided for us in his armoury of instincts, emotions, sentiments and sentiment-scales, powerful tools for dealing with the problem of aesthetics.

In the first part of this monograph we dealt with the hormic conception of the fundamentals of mental structure. We devoted particular attention to the study of sentiments, and to the process of sympathetic induction,

These studies which cover chapters III and IV are of great importance in psychological aesthetics. Now, an outstanding feature of instincts, sentiments and sentiment-scales is that they must *express* themselves. The energy generated by these highly dynamic mental structures must find some suitable channel for its out-flow. So far as the ordinary man is concerned his sentiments are of the routine type, and his daily routine conduct is in itself a sufficient channel for the expression of these sentiments. The way in which a person behaves at home, in the place of his business, in his club, in the play-ground and at social gatherings is an expression of the sentiments and scales of sentiment-values that that person has formed. But for the great mind, that is the mind that has formed a great sentiment, these ordinary channels of expression are utterly inadequate. Some unique sentiment, some high and powerful scale of sentiment-values, is struggling to be born in the mind of the great man or woman. He or she must perforce carve out new channels of expression for the out-flow of the extra-ordinarily powerful energy of the high and unique sentiment that has taken possession of his or her mind. It is then that genius creates a great work of art. It is then that a Tyagaraja pours forth his soul in rapturous melodies; it is then that the high-souled Ajantan artist-monk creates a Padmapani or Vajrapani; it is then that a Leonardo or Michael Angelo brings into existence immortal pictures of undying fame. Great painting and sculpture, sublime music, soul-stirring dances and dramas, these and other great works of art have all been created by gifted minds under the inspiration of a high and noble sentiment.

Great art, is the product of a great mind, a genius seized with a high, noble, and unique sentiment for which the normal channels of expression are inadequate. A new, and hitherto unknown channel has to be carved out, and that results in the creation of some unique work of fine art.

We have, with the help of hormic psychology, analysed

ed the nature of aesthetic experience in the mind of the creative artist. It is now necessary to deal with the mind of the appreciative critic who enjoys a great work of art.

The appeal of art, even of great art, is not universal. In the presence of the finest types of classical music or painting many persons of the present generation are unmoved, and feel quite cold and unresponsive. Art is not democratic; there is something forbiddingly aristocratic about it, and *hormic psychology* has a ready explanation for this fact. We have noted already in Part I that every instinct is set in motion by certain specific 'objects', or ideas of those objects. Now, there is a peculiarity of the instinctual structure of the human mind which has far-reaching consequences for aesthetics. This peculiarity is the susceptibility of the elements of mental structure to 'sympathetic induction'. The process of induction reveals that on the cognitive side the instinct is so organised that it is aroused to its full intensity not only by the perception of the 'objects' which are its natural excitants but also by the perception of the 'expression' of the emotions as displayed by a member of the same species. This process has been analysed by us in the fourth chapter of the first part of this monograph. Now sympathetic induction operates universally in the case of the primitive basic emotions of the first level of mental structure, the level which contains anger, fear, sex-lust etc. But it is otherwise with the highly cultured sentiments of the third and higher levels (vide fig 13). Here induction will operate only among minds which have formed similar sentiments and sentiment-scales. Art, it has been shown, is the 'expression' of an exalted sentiment. Sentiments are not innate, but are acquired in the course of individual experience. And unless a 'sentiment' approximating in some degree at least to the great sentiment in the mind of the creative artist which give birth to the aesthetic object is present in the mind of the onlooker, it will leave him cold and unmoved. When therefore, an appreciative critic contemplates a great work of art, what happens is that through the pro-

cess of sympathetic working at the high cultural level, a sentiment similar to the one which gave birth to it is stimulated in his mind, it being assumed that the onlooker's mind belongs to the same level as the mind of the artist. When you are thrilled by the subtle nuances of Bhairavi, Kalyani, or Sankarabharanam as expounded on the Vina by a master musician, then there vibrates in your heart a sympathetic chord set in motion by the induction of the sentiment which kindled the heart of the composer. If, on the other hand, you are one given to the enjoyment of street ditties, song-hits of the talkie and barrel organ music, then great music will leave you cold and unmoved. The appeal of great art, which is also true art, then, is only to Sahradayas.

We have indicated how the usual type of the psychological approach to aesthetics, confined as it is to the analysis of the objective situation in art, is barren and unilluminating. Among those psychologists who take the subjective elements into consideration, there are many who over-emphasise the cognitive to the exclusion of the conative factors. Here again we find that the analysis is not helpful to a clear understanding of the aesthetic experience. The secret of this experience lies in conation, and purposivistic psychologies alone are competent to deal with conation. Hormic psychology which is purposivistic in essence shows how the aesthetic object is the product and the excitant of some unique sentiment-pattern. The gifted artist soon discovers the inadequacy of the ordinary channels of expression for the 'great idea' in his mind. So he creates a new aesthetic object. And, if in the mind of a cultured contemplator of this 'object' a sentiment, identical with, or similar to the sentiment of which the aesthetic object is both the expression and the excitant, has been formed, then a full-blooded rich aesthetic experience with its concomitant affective tone, ensues; the intensity of the experience depending upon the degree of similarity existing between the sentiments of the artist, and the enjoyer of the 'object' produced by the artist. In other

words, aesthetic experience is the result of the sympathetic induction of the same emotion in the mind of the on-looker as that which was functioning in the mind of the artist when he created the 'object'. This theory, based on the sympathetic induction of emotions and sentiments, is the only theory that seems to fit all the known facts, and the clue for propounding it is supplied to us by hormic psychology.

CHAPTER XII

Hormic Orientation to the Conception of Liberty

INTRODUCTION.

While collectivists all over the world are crying themselves hoarse over the dogma 'the state is absolute; outside the state there is nothing', while Fascist and Communist leaders declare that the individual citizen of the state should be deprived of 'all useless and possibly harmful freedom', while independent nations are being reduced to a state of servility almost over-night, while even in democratic countries repressive laws are being put on the statute book, while these events are happening, it is but right that we should, in a calm atmosphere and in the cold light of reason, analyse the nature of the ideas that seem to inspire the activities of political leaders of today. We affirm emphatically that an objective and scientific evaluation of the theoretical doctrines behind practical policies, is the surest corrective to the unbalanced and frenzied behaviour of the leaders of the masses in the contemporary world.

The need for a comprehensive psychological analysis of political doctrines is pressing at the present moment. Burke, Leslie Stephen and others of their way of thinking have inveighed vehemently against political philosophy. Burke used very picturesque language for describing political philosophy as 'the great Serbonian bog, 'twixt Damietta and Mount Cassius old, where whole armies have sunk', and Leslie Stephen exclaims, 'Happy is the nation which has no political philosophy!' Even today, adherents of this school of thought are not few in number. It is this trend of thought with its unfortunate ascendancy over the Western mind that is responsible for the divorce of politics from psychology and metaphysics, and of late from ethics too, so that at the present moment it is claimed that political action is outside the jurisdiction of the moral standard.

As against this tendency in the political field, centrifugal to what is best and highest in human nature, a healthy reaction has already set in. Bosanquet has pointed out the importance of an understanding of the fundamental principles to a rational handling of practical problems. Professor Joad's book, *Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics*, has established beyond doubt that political problems must be tracked down to their psychological and ethical foundations. If the progress of clear thinking had kept pace with vigorous activity in the political field the world would have been very different from what it is today. The best citizen would have been the best man too. But we find a different state of affairs in the contemporary world. So, it is none too soon to review critically the most fundamental idea which guides the destinies of nations in the modern world, namely, the idea of Freedom or Liberty.

When the student of human nature essays a psycho-philosophical analysis of political ideas, he is amazed at the amount of loose thinking that is covered up by such neat expressions as 'liberty', 'progress', 'supreme good', 'happiness' etc. The Spencerian formula for freedom, the credo of the Utilitarians, is a striking example of vague thinking in political philosophy. Walter Lippmann's ideas of 'higher law', 'good life', and, 'good society' carry on the same Spencerian tradition of studied vagueness. Even Bosanquet flounders when he comes to deal with the question of liberty. It is necessary, therefore, to analyse the concept of freedom, before we adjudge its status in the contemporary world.

The Defects of the Unscientific Analysis of Freedom

There are two reasons why the various analysis, each brilliant in itself, of freedom have not yielded any fruitful results. The first is that all theoretical discussions as well as all practical considerations based upon them, have emphasised the external conditions of freedom to the exclusion of its inner psychological springs. As a conse-

quence of this over-emphasis on the environment, the illusion has persisted that freedom is some kind of tangible, but tantalising stuff. The fact is, that freedom is merely an attribute of behaviour. In the second place, the goal of freedom has never been understood clearly. Sometimes liberty is taken as an end in itself, at other times it is considered to be a pre-condition of 'good life', the goodness of the good life being left undefined. What is needed, therefore, is a psychological analysis of freedom which will fill its empty and ever changing form with rich contents.

In the well known accounts of freedom, the rights of the individual citizen to free thought, speech, and association, and to the free enjoyment of the fruits of his own labour have been upheld. But, at the same time it has been laid down that such enjoyment of freedom should not interfere with similar enjoyment by the other members of the group. There is the rub. Freedom seems to imply a negation of itself, and when this negation is carried to its logical conclusion, freedom gets emptied of all its contents, and retains only a meaningless form. It is exactly at this point that a psychological analysis is indicated

Hormic Analysis of Freedom and Authority.

Freedom is not a noun; it is an adverb masquerading as a substantive. Freedom is free behaviour. Action or behaviour is denoted by a verb, and an attribute of action by an adverb. Contemporary psychology has established beyond doubt that the so-called 'faculties of man', indicated by nouns in common usage, such as memory, will, and reason are fictitious entities, and that what is real is either an activity or a characteristic of an activity. Freedom, in fact, stands for a certain type of human behaviour. Politics, economics and other social sciences make free use of the pseudo-substantives, really standing for activities or characteristics of activities, and the sooner these words are deprived of their illusory connotation, and shown up in

their true colours, the sooner will clarity of thinking be achieved.

Freedom, then, is free behaviour, and in analysing behaviour three factors have to be taken into consideration, namely, 1) the behaving self, 2) the body of the self which is the seat of activity, and 3) the environment in which the self acts through the body. The third factor has been dealt with thoroughly by political theorists and sociologists. A distinction has been drawn between the physical, biological and social environments, and the fact that the question of freedom can arise only in connection with the social environment, has been argued out. In fact, the attention given to this aspect of the problem by the non-psychologists is so great and exclusive, that 'freedom' is conceived solely in terms of its external conditions. The second factor, the 'body' of the free agent has received some little attention at the hands of the students of sociology and political science. But political theorists take up sometimes a deterministic or behaviouristic attitude, identifying the body as far as its function goes, with the physical environment, while at other times they look upon it as the seat of real freedom. This confusion in thinking, resulting from shifting attitudes is very annoying, but it is the natural consequence of lack of psychological training. The first and the most important aspect of freedom has been neglected by those who are outside the fold of psychology, and even among psychologists there are many who brush aside the question of liberty as of no consequence. Yet, as we have pointed out at the commencement of this chapter the concept of liberty stands in urgent need of psychological analysis.


'Freedom' or 'free behaviour' is unhampered or unhindered behaviour. When we speak of a hindrance or obstacle to behaviour we imply thereby that behaviour has a direction and a goal. This direction, pointing to a specific goal, is also implied in two aspects of the modern political theories of freedom. These are in the first place, the insistence on the condition that in the exercise of his

freedom the individual should be confined to the region delimited by the option given to others for the exercise of their freedom; and in the second place, the view that lower freedom should be suppressed in the interests of the higher. Herein lies the clue which we should follow up in our psychological analysis.


In order to understand behaviour, free or unfree, we have to look for its motivating causes, not in the external environment, but in the dynamic structure of the mind of the behaving agent. The real spring of action lies in the mind, not in the external world. We have seen in the opening chapters of this monograph how contemporary hormic psychology has succeeded in its task of tracing behaviour to its root causes, or its mainsprings, in the mind. It has been shown that the innate propensities impel, when activated, the organism to pursue a certain course of action in order to reach a specific goal. Each propensity imposes a directional effect, determined with respect to the goal to be attained, on the behaviour of the organism. 'Free' behaviour is merely behaviour which is progressing smoothly towards its goal, this being prescribed by the innate psychological structure of the mind of the behaving agent. In the abstract this definition of freedom is complete. But freedom in this sense is possible only for the lone individual, for a Robinson Crusoe on the desert island. In human society, he who claims complete freedom of behaviour for himself, and acts on that claim is bound to tread on the toes of others. So, political theorists have found it necessary to delimit the field for the exercise of freedom. The need for such control of freedom will become evident when the structure of a competitive society is analysed.

Under normal circumstances, so long as one goes about his business, earning his wage, maintaining his family, and pursuing his hobbies or indulging in harmless or inoffensive enjoyments, one is free to do as one pleases. Each individual moves freely along his own line of action, towards his own goal. Even so, now and then, in thought


at least, each individual sends forth a line of obstruction cutting across the free line of action of his neighbours. Jealousy, envy, covetousness and ambition have free play in the minds of members of social groups. One covets the wealth of another, another is jealous of the natural gifts for leadership which a lucky neighbour possesses. But very soon these hindrances, operating merely on the imaginal level are withdrawn by their agents, and once again behaviour progresses smoothly.



Behavioural lines proceeding parallel to one another without mutual interference.



Behavioural lines of I_2 , I_3 and I_4 cut short at M_2 , M_3 and M_4 respectively through the greater speed of I_1 in reaching M first. (Indirect interference).



● Behavioural lines cut short through direct interference.

When we consider a competitive society of the modern type, the situation seems to be entirely different. In such a society which often goes by the wrong name of co-operative society, a single object M is desired by many members of the group at once. Consider a mining claim

in an uncharted area. He who has the skill to reach the spot first and 'Peg out' his claim establishes his right for the exclusive possession of the area. Here speed of action on the part of one individual has acted as a source of effective hindrance to the behavioural progress of all the others, these latter being slower. The behavioural line of 1_1 reaches M , while those of others are cut short before the goal is reached. There is another way in which 1_1 can succeed in getting sole possession of M . He may threaten 1_2 with physical injury if he the latter continues to compete, and thus cut short the latter's line at M_2 ; he may buy off 1_3 and terminate his line of action at M_3 ; he may mislead 1_4 into seeking another claim. In this way 1_1 may have all the hindrances removed by playing upon the different innate propensities of other competing individuals. But there is really no freedom here. The entire course of action is beset with obstacles.

The argument so far has been confined to the level of primitive propensities. It must, however, be remembered that the immediate motive to human behaviour is a 'sentiment.' This fact complicates the problem of freedom still further, for a sentiment is the result of an organisation of many fundamental emotions, and if a single emotion is subject, on the behavioural side, to several limitations and obstacles in a competitive society, then a sentiment will suffer from very many restrictions. Each individual of a group will have built up several sentiments round other members, and round objects in the environment, and all the sentiments will crave for satisfaction. There will be crossings and recrossings of several behavioural lines of action giving rise to hindrances of innumerable types. Freedom if there is any in such a field of action, is very restricted in scope. Of absolute freedom there is no trace.

Freedom, then, on our analysis, is freedom of the individual members of a group to act without hindrance in pursuing the goals of sentiments or primitive propensities. Such freedom is vouchsafed to the individual

member by his group only when he does not hinder other members in the pursuit of their own goals. This restriction often ends in determination, and finally in complete negation of freedom. Why are these restrictions imposed? Are they due solely to the presence of other members in the group, or to some other factor? In other words, is freedom an end in itself, or is it a means for an end? The answer usually given to this question is very significant. We are told that freedom is a means for an end. Freedom is freedom from something else. It is not the supreme value. It is a value which must be estimated in terms of something higher than itself.

We may approach this aspect of the problem from a different angle. If freedom is merely the freedom of the individual to pursue and reach without hindrance the goal of his own propensities and sentiments, then there will be utter chaos in a society of competing individuals, each one of whom is pursuing goals which are bound to conflict with one another. So, it is said, society should control the exercise of individual freedom. In other words liberty or freedom should be subject to the *authority* of society. The act of behaviour whose main characteristic is connoted by the term *authority*, demands the inter-relation of two persons, the agent who asserts authority, and the patient who submits to him. The propensities of self-assertion and self-submission are dominant over the other propensities in the minds of these two persons, respectively. He who dominates or commands is self-assertive, and he who obeys is self-submissive. The peculiarity of the former propensity is that as an essential constituent of its natural excitant, it demands the stimulation of self-submission in another individual. When such submission is secured, its usual course runs smooth. But when the individual of whom submission is demanded offers resistance, then submission may be enforced through the excitation of the propensity of fear. Fear may be stimulated either directly through the threat of physical pain, or indirectly through the threat of formidable hindrances to the progress of other propensi-

ties, such as acquisitiveness, gregariousness, or the parental propensity. In both cases the desired result is secured, that is, authority succeeds in enforcing obedience, but in the latter case anger also is stimulated, and this, in conjunction with fear, generates the sentiment of hatred against the commanding agent. If from the lower stages we proceed to the higher level of sentiments, we find that the agent exercising authority attempts to activate the aesthetic, moral and religious sentiments in the mind of patient in order to secure obedience.

It is unnatural to speak of authority commanding in its own right. The exercise of authority can be justified only in terms of the end sought to be realised. What then constitutes the proper title to command? What is the legitimate sanction for authority? The only natural sanction for authority is the liberty of the individual.

But what is liberty? To what end is freedom? Let us remind ourselves that liberty and authority are characteristics of human behaviour. So, the question is, 'What is the nature of the activity which is considered to be free, or in the interests of which freedom is demanded?' It is here that hormic psychology proves its superior worth.

The elementary propensities which have been shown by hormic psychology to be the components of the human mind, are in several instances antagonistic to one another. Submission and assertion, acquisitiveness and sympathy, disgust and sex-love, are a few of the warring pairs of propensities. In the early stages of development, individual as well as racial, almost all propensities obtain full freedom of action. But very soon conflicts appear, and then either the subordination or suppression of an elementary propensity becomes necessary. Sentiments then come into existence, and get arranged into a hierarchical scale of values, with a master sentiment at the top. We have indicated in a previous section how the Para-Brahm regarding sentiment is the only master-sentiment which has absolute worth in its own right. So, on our view, the goal of freedom is the ParaBrahm-regarding sentiment.

Freedom or liberty is the characteristic of human activity which aims at the organisation of the ParaBrahm-regarding sentiment.

Hormic psychology of the West has rendered invaluable service to political men by its brilliant analysis of sentiments, emotions, and propensities, but by assigning the sovereign place to the self-regarding sentiment it has undone all the good it has done in the analytic sphere. The self-regarding sentiment is based on self-assertion and even where it rests on gregariousness it turns out that selfishness is the most powerful constituent of the sentiment. It is true that in the West self-regard is the main-spring of all human activity. But, it is one thing to describe the nature of self-regard as a fact, and another to hold it up as an ideal. Hormic psychology commits the fallacy of transgressing into the normative realm, and prescribing self-regard as the master-sentiment for human beings.

The ParaBrahm-regarding sentiment is unique. It reconciles the warring propensities with one another, gathers them up into its own texture, and finally annihilates them. It is, in the truest sense, the natural end of human behaviour, and as such, is the only ideal worth striving for.

That action, then, is free which aims at the ideal of the ParaBrahm-regarding sentiment. LIBERTY is liberty for the free and unhindered progress of activity towards the achievement of that ideal. Authority is justifiable only when it prescribes to itself this liberty of the individual as the sole aim. Neither the possession of mere strength, nor the acquisition of knowledge, through wide experience, nor even the achievement of moral excellence can justify the exercise of authority by one individual over another. Such authority is based on a system of dragooning or regimenting all individuals according to some rigid plan which cuts at the very root of liberty as conceived by us. There are as many paths of liberty as there are individuals. As each individual pursues the path of liber-

ty in his own unique way, it should be the sole purpose of authority to preserve the liberty of the individual.

Authority, therefore, should be exercised in such a way as to safeguard the liberty of the individual to pursue the path leading to Parabrahm. The plan that we propose to put forward for the exercise of such authority may appear to be startlingly novel, but it is consistent with the results of our hormic analysis of liberty. The agent exercising authority, in order to keep the individual on the path of liberty, should not stimulate the anger or fear propensities of the patient by displaying self-assertion, but should appeal to sympathy by the display of a similar propensity in his own behaviour. Coercion, if coercion is necessary, should be self coercion, that is 'authority' should impose on itself any physical or mental pain that may be considered to be necessary. We shall elaborate this point in the concluding section of this chapter.

Status of Freedom in Modern Europe

Before we estimate the status of freedom in Modern Europe it is necessary to examine a certain type of argument which concludes that freedom is a dangerous possession in the hands of man. Europe, it is contended, has always been under the sway of authority of one kind or other, ecclesiastical, political or military. In Ancient Greece there was some kind of political liberty, but the state so entwined itself with the life of the individual that there was very little personal liberty. During the middle ages the Church exercised supreme authority over all aspects of individual and group life, and when the church was dethroned, monarchy was enthroned in its stead. For over seventeen centuries authority ruled supreme in the West. Whenever any attempt was made to undermine authority the result was the destruction of the stable foundations of civilisation. Even the French Revolution ended in transforming the 'sovereignty of the people' into a military dictatorship. Only for a brief period during the nineteenth century and that only in England and France,

did liberty assert itself over authority. But liberty has had a sorry downfall, and authority is coming to its own again. Authority, therefore, is the basic idea in European civilisation. Its form has been changing, but its content has remained unaltered. Authority alone will save Europe from the danger which is now threatening it.

Such is the line of argument advanced by the champions of authority, but despite the imposing array of historical evidence adduced, the argument is as idle as a similar argument which may be advanced in support of the reign of ignorance. 'Mankind has, for millions of years, been steeped in ignorance. Knowledge is only of recent origin. Compared with the reign of ignorance, that of knowledge is of negligible duration. Mankind has never been, and will never be in love with higher knowledge. And with the recent growth of dictatorship, ignorance is coming to its own again. Hence knowledge is not a desirable object for mankind.' The argument bears on its face the stamp of absurdity!

Ultimate values cannot be brushed aside by these spurious arguments. Knowledge and liberty are supreme values, and though they are of recent origin, their potentiality for good is so great that they will ultimately triumph over the forces of evil and ignorance. They will humanise man in spite of himself, in spite of his defeatist tendencies and inferiority complexes.

Underneath the tragic pleading for authority there is hidden an ugly fact which psychology should drag into full light and expose it in all its ugliness. The liberty which the West has been striving for is liberty for self-regard. Within this scheme of self-regard, the elemental propensities of sex, acquisitiveness, and anger are to have free play, and the individual is to have perfect liberty in the exercise of self-assertion. When liberty of this kind is achieved the individual becomes so much of an individual, so much isolated from others in his province of liberty that the feeling of appalling loneliness and

desolation begins to creep into his mind. Gregariousness begins to assert itself, and the Western man is so terrified of his loneliness brought about by liberty, that he seeks some desperate measure for regaining the sense of his lost kinship with his fellowman. It is at this critical stage that war is welcomed, often unconsciously, as a source of relief from loneliness and boredom. The man who has achieved liberty now craves for something which would rekindle in his bosom the emotion for collectivism, the emotion for living, enjoying and dying with his fellow-beings. Since war is apparently the only means for achieving this end, he hugs warfare to his bosom. That is why modern dictatorships are without exception, military in character. The pursuit of liberty, paradoxically enough, seems to lead in the West to the destruction of all that is highest and noblest in human personality. The cause of this tragedy is plain enough, though practical politicians are turning a blind eye towards it. It is the ill-conceived and misdirected pursuit of utilitarian liberty. So long as self-regard is made the foundation of political activity, so long will the *laissez faire* of liberalism be followed by the tyranny of dictatorships, so long will pointless liberty be dogged by inhuman authority, and all will move round in a blind circle, leading man nowhere. The only way of getting out of this impasse is to give direction to liberty. Liberty which is now ill-directed may be well directed and its empty form may be filled with rich content by replacing the self-regarding sentiment by Para Brahm-regarding sentiment in the European scale of values.

Understanding freedom and authority in the sense in which the terms have been defined here, we have now to consider what their status is in the contemporary world. The types of government obtaining in the contemporary world may be divided into two classes, the *catastrophically collectivistic* and the *gradually collectivistic*. With the downfall of liberalism, the democratic governments of the West have, in consequence, launched forth schemes for

curtailing individual liberty. It is plain that they are moving slowly but steadily in the direction of totalitarianism. Socialism in democratic countries is merely another name for economic collectivism, and evidence is not lacking to indicate that other and more undesirable aspects of collectivism will be embraced with enthusiasm by the Western governments. These governments have become either suddenly totalitarian, or have set their feet marching definitely along the road to collectivism.

The political activities of the collectivistic governments of the present day are guided solely by economic forces. The economic motive is all powerful in the minds of the executive, of the legislatures and also of the masses in all countries. It has suppressed the higher values which in the spacious days of liberalism guided the lives of individuals and groups. The most significant objective expression of this economic motive is PLANNING. A psychological analysis of planning will place us in a position of strategic advantage for purposes of exposing the true nature of liberty and authority in the modern world. Planning is the operation by which the executive in the gradually collectivistic states conceive a particular end as well as the means for that end, and thereafter force the citizens to work up to that end by the means prescribed by the state. In economic planning the acquisitive and self-assertive propensities of the planner are fiercely stimulated, while the dragooning and regimenting of the individual citizens who are conceived merely as so many tools in the hands of the dictators, generate submission and fear in the minds of the ordinary men and women. The entire scheme of activity moves on the plane of primeval emotions generating intense self-seeking and engendering morbid sentiments. Individual initiative and freedom are incompatible with the ideology of planning. Individual human personality as such is, in the eyes of the planner, a thing of no value.

The spectacular success which the planners have

achieved in the economic realm has emboldened them to extend their activities to cultural fields. In the dictatorial countries everything is neatly planned out for the individual citizen who has only to fit himself snugly into the inhuman system just as a little cogwheel of a huge machine falls slick into its place under the deft fingers of the clever mechanic.

Of liberty either as conceived by us or as conceived by the liberal party there is no trace, while fierce self-regarding authority debasing human personality is very much in evidence in the collectivistic states of the present day. Lenin said, "The world cannot be made happy unless it is *deprived of freedom*, which is nothing but a torment and a burden to it, and unless men are by force maintained in a condition of earthly bliss thought out by the authorities in accordance with reason." Mussolini wrote, "The Fascist state organises the nation, but leaves a sufficient margin of liberty to the individual; the latter is *deprived of all useless and possibly harmful freedom*, but retains what is essential, the deciding power in this question cannot be the individual but the state alone." Both Communism and Fascism repudiate the value of individual liberty; but while the former justifies totalitarianism in the interests of the material welfare of the individual, the latter accords no recognition whatever to the claims of the citizen. Communism revolts against using the individual as a means for the ends of capitalism, but does not scruple to use him as *means for its own ends*. It places the individual at the focus of all governmental organisation, for the avowed object of all its activities is the achievement of "a condition of earthly bliss for the individual." The end of the "good life" for the communist is the enjoyment in an equal measure by all individuals of the 'goods' of this earthly environment. This being his supreme goal, he despises, religion, philosophy, and even morality.

If at this stage we pause to examine the doctrine of communism from our standpoint, we find that the com-

munist has thoroughly misunderstood the structure and function of the human mind. He believes that the end of the good life is the constant titillation of the sense organs. Instead of guiding the fierce sex, food-seeking combative and other propensities towards Para-Brahm, the communist arrests the growth of personality at the low level of concrete sentiments. Man must be made to enjoy earthly bliss. Even so he is not free to choose what he will enjoy. He must enjoy as he is told; and the voice that tells him is that of comrades Lenin and Stalin.

There is one invaluable act of service which communism could have rendered had it been guided along right lines, and that is the annihilation of acquisitive propensity. Whereas many of the elemental propensities may be ennobled or sublimated, this which has more of animality in it than even the sex propensity, resists all finer influences. So it must be rooted out of the human mind, and completely destroyed. The destruction of the sense of proprietary right over things and persons is the first condition of progress towards true liberty. * Communism could have achieved this true liberty had it worked for the annihilation of the acquisitive propensity. But it has only succeeded in stimulating this dread propensity very fiercely under the cloak of abolishing private property. The worker or labourer is called upon to give up the little he has in order that he may enjoy a bigger share in the plenty that others have. Nationalisation of land or the tools of production only means that every one is invited to enjoy what every one else has, and to have one's own acquisitive propensity stimulated as often and as fiercely as one desires. Communism therefore is worse than other forms of government in this respect.

In its insistence upon earthly bliss communism differs profoundly from Fascism, but in its insistence on the supremacy of the dictator's will it is whole-heartedly at one with the latter. As against communism, Facism denies the materialistic conception of life and claims to enthrone religion in the heart of the individual. Still, it must be

remembered that in the Fascist state the individual is reduced to a state of nonentity and his personality is only a means to the ends conceived by the dictator.

At first sight it may appear that Fascism is superior to Communism in that it suppresses some of the elemental passions in the individual mind. By the renunciation of material bliss, the acquisitive, and by the denial of class-war, the combative propensities are suppressed. Yet this is only an illusion, for the Fascist governments are out to fight and conquer in the name of the state. The acquisitive and combative propensities are very vigorously stimulated in the individual mind, but they are directed towards 'objects' desired by the dictator.

In the Hegelian conception of the state, which is claimed to be the foundation for all totalitarian governments, there lies hidden a fallacy which has not been unearthed by political philosophers. The myths of the corporate personality and collective will of the state have been exposed by various thinkers, but no one has attacked with vigour the view of the state as the final goal of human organisation. Hegel is disloyal to the central thesis of his own metaphysics when he says, 'The state is the divine idea as it exists on earth . . . it is the absolute power on earth, it is its own end and object. It is the ultimate end which has the highest right against the individual.' If the process of dialectical evolution is eternal and infinitely progressive, as it ought to be in a thorough going Hegelian scheme, then to arrest it at the level of the state, is to do violence to the state itself. For the state must be gathered up in that which is the anti-thesis of the state, and both the thesis and the anti-thesis must be gathered up in the higher synthesis of internationalism. The Communist may contend with poor show or reason that a classless state is an end in itself. If he is to be true to his own principles then he can never admit that the dialectical process suddenly stops at the state. If we pursue the dialectical process to its logical conclusion, we shall reach the Upanishadic Bahman as the final goal of evolu-

tion. Neither Fascistic or Communistic thinkers have had the courage to work out the conclusion of the premises which they have accepted with great gusto.

The state then is the concept which inspires the political practices of the collectivistic governments. As it is its own end, the state is outside the pale of the moral law. 'All is for the state, and there is nothing outside the state.' So long as the individual conforms to the standards of the state his actions are tolerated. The individual is believed to have liberty only when he has learnt 'to desire what the state desires, to have no purposes but the official purposes, to feel free because they have become habituated to conform.' Since the state is beyond morality, it is intolerant of criticism of any kind. Freedom of speech and expression, and liberty of the press are to be ruthlessly suppressed. There is to be no such institution as the party in opposition in the totalitarian states. The dictator ridden governments would suppress, if they had the means for it, even freedom of thought. Truth is what the dictator dictates to the masses. All research in science and the humanities should be directed towards the exaltation of the state. All associations within the state, whether voluntary or otherwise, are to be conscripted into the service of the Government. 'Nothing outside the state' is to be the guiding principle for every little act in the totalitarian state.

By a process of psychological jugglery collectivistic thought identifies the personality and will of the dictator with the supposed personality and will of the state. When this identification is achieved, we find that authority is supreme and liberty non-existent in the totalitarian states. And it is authority which injures him who exercises it, and him who submits to it. Fierce self-assertive authority dominating over the individual through the arousal of submission and fear results in the stultification of personality. Mussolini declares quite openly that 'the principle that society exists solely through the well-being and the personal liberty of all the individuals of which it is

composed does not appear to be conformable to the plans of nature, in whose workings the race alone seems to be taken into consideration and the individual sacrificed to it.'

In order to understand the enthusiasm which Fascism, Nazism and Communism have evoked in the bosoms of Europeans, we have to study their national temper. For a short while after the first world war, democracy flourished in Germany, Italy and Russia. But democracy had a quick and sorry downfall in all these countries, due mainly to the clash between its ideals and those of contemporary European states. Pareto, the great sociologist, observed as early as 1893 that what strikes one in the politico-social life of Italy is 'the entire absence of political parties, and an enormous extension of the functions of the state.' This state of affairs prepared the way for totalitarianism, and for the dominance of the Mussolinian ideology of 'a party which entirely governs a nation'. The Germans never wanted democracy, nor individual freedom either. With the submissive temper of the Russian mind forged by prolonged subservience to autocracy we are familiar. In such favourable European soil does dictatorship thrive and grow from strength to strength. But dictatorship is not without its subtle economic and political tactics. Under the guise of maintaining security it has deprived the individual of all liberty, as though the two were mutually exclusive. It has managed to keep aglow the bellicose tendencies of the European mind by carefully staged foreign expeditions. Above all, it has transplanted emergency war measures from the battlefield and the war office to the peaceful homes in the state. In the achievement of these purposes dictatorship has taken mean advantage of that irrepressible tendency in man to worship something outside himself. It has debased humanity on the plea that the vulgar masses are to be sacrificed to bring to birth the 'noble man', the dictator. This dictator is believed to confer real liberty on the individual when he terrorises the citizen into sub-

ordination. The dictator's atrocities are justified on the ground that he alone possesses the peculiar gift of intuiting the 'good' which the vulgar masses desire and grope for blindly, but never succeed in getting. Dictatorship kills the spirit, deadens the mind and paralyses free life. It relies on the primitive elements in man's nature, and kills the more lately evolved faculties.

Of ennobling liberty, then, there is no trace, while ferocious self-regarding authority is very much in evidence in the contemporary totalitarian states.

We have already remarked that in spite of the powerful hold which totalitarian authority has over the minds of men at the present day, liberty will soon assert itself. And when it does assert itself, will it find a congenial home in democracy? It is tragic to have to assert that it may not. Democracy has fallen so low that Mussolini was bold enough to exclaim, 'Where is the shade of Jules Simon, who in the dawn of liberalism proclaimed that the state must labour to make itself unnecessary, and prepare the way for its own dismissal?' Democracy is in the doldrums because it has failed to give direction to individual liberty, and because the political machinery which it has evolved for enthroning the rule of the majority is steadily paving the way for dictatorship. Mussolini is perfectly right when he says that 'Democracy is a regime nominally without a king, but it is ruled by many kings—more absolute, tyrannical and ruinous than one sole king, even though a tyrant.' As regards liberty, democracy has emptied it of all content, and has left the undirected individual so much to himself that he welcomes any occasion for feeling at one with his fellow beings. It is this craving for oneness with the rest of the creation that is responsible for the flourishing of totalitarian states, and for the wars which these states are waging. But is war or a dictatorial regime necessary to secure for the individual the satisfaction of one of the deepest needs of human nature? No. They are not necessary. But democracy has committed the stupendous psychological blunder

of mistaking gregariousness for sympathy. Gregariousness after all pertains to the body. Human beings are not gregarious in the same way or to the same extent as are the ants and the bees. Our normal instinctive course leads us to intermittent co-operation for certain purposes, and not to constant co-operation for all times. THE ANT HILL AND BEE HIVE CIVILISATIONS ARE MEANT TO SERVE AS GRAVE WARNINGS TO HUMAN BEINGS, AND NOT AS MODELS FOR IMITATION.

If the cultural basis of the West had been the Para-Brahm-regarding sentiment, instead of the self-regarding sentiment, then in the normal course of daily life the urge for fellowship would have found a free and natural channel of expression. It is tragic that the West should be blind to the fact that the deep unconscious nature of man is urging him, in spite of himself, towards the realisation of Para-Brahm.

Programmes in an endless variety have been suggested for the reform of democracy, but not one of them is radical enough. In the first instance it should be clearly recognised that collectivism has come to stay. Democracy instead of offering fight to and suffering at the hands of collectivism, should calmly assimilate the latter and emerge as collectivistic democracy. In the second place, liberty of the individual as defined by us should be the chief concern of the governments under the influence of spiritualised democracy. Lastly power politics and prestige politics should be crushed out of existence, and replaced by service politics.

Conclusion.

From the time of Aristotle down to the present day, the main problem, as yet unsolved, for the practical philosopher has been the reconciliation of authority and liberty. Any attempt at a solution through the annihilation of liberty will lead finally to the annihilation of the

solution itself, for there will always be a part of human personality, the part most valuable for creative activity, which will refuse to be assimilated by the totalitarian state. If the totalitarian declares that 'Outside the state there is nothing,' then, our reply to him is, 'The state itself, then, is nothing.' For, creative man is always outside the state. Democracy has attempted to solve the problem of reconciling liberty with authority by creating authority through consent, but this consent has often been obtained by disregarding the minority. Mill has pointed out that obedience to the political majority in a government is never the result of natural impulse, but always the result of coercion. Mill's contention is indisputable, because authority has always been exercised through self-assertion and self-regard. If we are not to move blindly round a circle, but are to take at least one significant step in advance, then in the field of government self-assertion should be replaced by sympathy.

We have said that the liberty of the individual, the only natural sanction for authority, should be the main concern of the governments of future. In a spiritualised democracy, the sole purpose of whose existence is the liberty of the citizen, the only person who can be entrusted with the task of governing the country is he who has renounced the world. He should be one who has, through the successful organisation of the Para-Brahm-regarding sentiment in his own mental structure, achieved Brahm realisation. He should, in other words be a Jivan-Mukta. As in Plato's Republic, there should be a panel of Jivan-muktas, who would take turns at ruling the country, each spending half the year in solitary meditation and the other half in administering the affairs of the state. These *sannyasi* rulers, being jivan-muktas, will know how to maintain the liberty of the individual through the exercise of authority. They will make wise laws, but in enforcing the laws, they will never exercise self-assertion, but only sympathy. If punishment be necessary, they will inflict such punishment on their own body, offering it as a

sacrifice, if necessary. They will not be afraid of criticism, nor will they plead for the voluntary suppression of differences of opinion. In their own interests they will submit themselves and their policies to unsparing criticism by their opponents. In exercising authority inside the frame-work of the government, there is always the danger of the self-assertive propensity being rekindled even in the minds of *jivan-muktas*. The only ballast for the self-assertive disposition is submission. The rulers should, therefore have the submissive propensity constantly stimulated in their minds by welcoming and even demanding criticism of themselves. When the voice of criticism is silenced then liberty is in great danger.

Every limb of government, composed as it ought to be of individuals who have achieved a greater or lesser measure of success in renouncing the world for attaining *Para-Brahm*, will be inspired by the high ideals of sympathy and service. Vicarious suffering inflicted on the bodies of government servants for misdeeds committed by the citizens will be the means for the preservation of law and order, and for the administration of justice in a spiritualised democracy.

The plan that we have sketched out for keeping individual liberty alive is merely an extension of the political principles advocated by Bergson, Hocking and Lippman. Bergson, the true liberator of the human spirit in the contemporary world, but accused of having generated totalitarian ideology, says of the 'Noble Individual', that he is not 'the master of society. He is rather the servant who can help society further along its way.' He is not the enemy of democracy. He is its agent. This *jivan-mukta* ruling the state according to our scheme will not thunder forth as some idle ministers of mushroom growth have done, 'I have been elected by a majority. Am I to govern, or am I to be intimidated by the threats of the minority? I shall crush the minority.' He will in a spirit of humility serve the state and offer himself readily as a burnt offering at the altar of the minority. That is the type of individual

who, according to the Bergsonian theory is fit to hold the reins of government.

Lippman has investigated the possibility of working out the principles of collectivistic democracy in the economic realm. The state, according to him, is to hold itself responsible for maintaining a high standard of individual life, and for the operation of the economic order as a whole. But the liberty of private transaction is to be preserved by controlling production and not consumption. To keep individual enterprise in equilibrium, and to correct the abuses of capitalism, the government is to transform itself into a 'gigantic public corporation ready to throw its weight into the scales to redress the balance of private transaction.'

Hocking is a political philosopher who believes in the possibility of uniting liberalism with collectivism. His brilliant ideas have been expounded in his writings, and we have taken the essence of the ideas of these three thinkers and have built our programme thereon, making use in addition of the main tenets of hormic psychology for giving the correct orientation to the political principles of modern philosophers. That our programme is not altogether utopian is proved by two significant events in the political world of our day. Mr. Henry Ford suggestion of the placing of a line of non-belligerents between the belligerents in China. In our own country plans have been laid for the formation of a 'Peace Brigade'. Writing in the columns of the Harijan about his scheme for a non-violent army of volunteers, the Mahatma says, 'instead of one brave Pashupathinath Gupta who died in the attempt to secure peace, we should be able to produce hundreds. . . Such an army should be able to cope with any emergency, and in order to still the frenzy of mobs should risk their lives in numbers sufficient for the purpose. A few hundreds, may be a few thousands, such spotless deaths, will once for all put an end to the riots.' 'Surely a few hundred young men and women giving themselves deliberately to mob fury will be any day a braver method

of dealing with such madness than the display and use of the police and the military.' The significant change that we have introduced in the above scheme is that the we have made the members of the Peace Brigade also members of the police and the military. Such a change is justified by the striking remark which the Mahatma made when he heard of the use of force by the Congress Governments. 'To the extent that the Congress ministers have been obliged to make use of the police and the military', wrote the Mahatma, 'TO THAT EXTENT IN MY OPINION WE MUST ADMIT FAILURE.'

In the spiritualised democracy the individual will have his liberty scrupulously maintained by the exercise of authority. He will enjoy all the advantages of both democracy and collectivism without groaning under their disadvantages. He will not be called upon to renounce his liberty in order to escape want. In the name of security he will not be deprived of freedom. In our scheme liberty will be divorced from liberalism, and planning from totalitarianism, and both will be wedded to democracy. Both will be filled with rich and significant content, the former by being guided towards ParaBrahm-regard, and the latter by being spiritualised. The individual will have endless opportunity for continuous initiative. He can experiment with himself, think differently or act differently from his neighbours without danger to his happiness. In short, the condition of 'effective opportunity to share in the cultural resources of civilisation' which Dewey lays down for the 'full freedom of the human spirit and of individuality' will be fulfilled in a spiritualised democracy.

M. Romain Rolland writes, 'In a world crisis it is in India I repose my absolute faith for the emancipation of the human race.' The voice of Rolland is really the voice of ravaged Europe in great agony. If our country is to carry the message of hope to anguished Europe, then we must present to the West a spiritualised political programme, which is not a cheap imitative mixture of Communism*

and Fascism, but one which is native to our soil, and is impregnated with our spiritual genius. Politics MUST be spiritualised, and one effective way of elevating political activity to the highest level within reach of human capacity has been indicated in this chapter.

CHAPTER XIII

Hormism and Hindu Philosophy

INTRODUCTION.

The hormic theory of mental structure and function is so simple and true to nature that we may expect to find it as one of the main pillars supporting the culture of ancient peoples who have made significant contributions to the ennoblement of the human mind. And we do find the essence of this psychological theory at the foundation of Hindu philosophy and psychology. We propose, therefore, to discuss, in this chapter, the hormic foundations of the Hindu view of life as set forth in our sacred books as well as secular treatises.

The Horme in the Gita.

McDougall's hormic psychology bids fair to conquer and assimilate, as we have already seen, all its rival schools. The outstanding contribution of the hormic school is the discovery that the *horme* is of the very essence of the structure of the human mind. But this discovery was anticipated long long ago in the fifth century B. C., if we accept Sir S. Radhakrishnan's conclusion regarding the date of the Gita, by the great Teacher of the Gita.

McDougall as we are aware protested against the lopsided intellectualism of the late nineteenth century psychology, and stressed the role of emotions and the play of motives in human action. Human conduct depends upon native impulses, and these are non-rational just because they are ultimate.

McDougall's theory of the mind is not a partial theory, because it takes the whole mind into account, giving instinct and intelligence each its proper place in a complete hormic scheme of psychology. And our author himself asserts that the germs of the theory are not new, but very

old in origin. But McDougall did not know that the conception of the *horme* and that of purposivistic action as the central themes of psychology are really very ancient, and that they are to be found in Hindu philosophy.

Three basic principles of supreme importance emerge from a careful examination of the foundations of hormic psychology. They are : (1) the human mind is fundamentally a unity, (2) the *horme* or the primal urge to activity is of the very essence of the mind, as this mind lives and moves in this phenomenal world, and (3) this *horme* differentiates itself into the diversified impulses of the instincts or propensities of McDougallian psychology.

The hormic theory was clearly present before the mind of the great Teacher of the Bhagavad Gita when he propounded his doctrine of 'desireless action'. The author of the Gita has very deep insight into human nature ; he has a thorough knowledge of the psychology of the human mind. We have no hesitation in affirming that the Gita exposition of the doctrine of action, especially in *Adhyayas* II, III and VI is based on the second hormic principle enunciated above. The ordinary uninformed views of the Gita associate its teachings with passivity and inaction. But, be it noted that Sri Krishna 'wrote *effort* large and luminous on his own incomparable life and proclaimed *action* repeatedly and triumphantly' in the Song Celestial. The call to action rings persistently through every chapter of the Bhagavad Gita.

The author of the Gita is intensely interested in man, and the Song Celestial, therefore, concerns itself with the problem of conduct. The solution which the Gita offers to ethical problems is based upon a psychological analysis of the *gunas* of the mind. The Gita emphatically discourages inaction (III, 27 and 32). In the fourth and twentieth verses of the third chapter, and the forty-first verse of the fourth chapter, Sri Krishna preaches renunciation, yet immediately after he insists upon practical performance of duty. Such an attitude tantalises Arjuna,

who asks, 'If the method of discernment of knowledge without action be held by thee more excellent, then why does thou urge me to work?' This question elicits a long answer (III, 3 to 35) which discusses the teachings of the Veda, Samkhya and Yoga regarding work. 'Activity is natural to man, and no view of life which overlooks that feature or minimises its importance can be right.' Man must work, and work is inevitable, nay more, it is right." In the remarkable utterances in the twentieth, twenty-first and twenty-second verses of the third chapter, Sri Krishna points out that even the liberated *jivanmuktas* should work so long as they are in the world. A little farther on (III, 27) it is asserted that this work is done entirely by *gunas*. And so Sri Krishna urges Arjuna to work. This is no empty precept. That the hormic urge to work is natural to the mind is fully recognised in this context. This primal urge is present even in the minds of those who have secured liberation. This is clear proof of the fact that the horme has been held by the Teacher of the Gita to be of the very essence of the mind.

We gain further support for our view when we analyse the Gita exposition of renunciation. Sri Krishna preaches not renunciation *of* action, but renunciation *in* action. He does not recommend the rooting out of desire as such, but only the rooting out of desire for the fruit of action, and the desire for selfish gain. In the fifth chapter we are told that true renunciation and true performance of work are not opposed. 'Who is the true renouncer?' Not he who attempts to remain completely inactive, but he whose work is done in a spirit of detachment.' The Samkhya method of inaction is condemned in unmistakable terms in this chapter. The opening verses of the sixth chapter emphasise again the oneness of renunciation and performance of work. 'For none stands even for a moment not doing work; every one is made to do action helplessly by the modes of *prakriti*.' Sri Aurobindo writes in his *Essays on the Gita* (1, 54), 'Man embodied in the

natural world cannot cease from action, not for a moment, not for a second ; his very existence here is an action.'

The Gita therefore stresses the need for action, and prescribes action as the means for deliverance. This action should however, be desireless action, that is action performed without a desire for the fruit. But such action is not purposeless action. It has a very vivid and intense purpose. 'On me place your mind, sacrifice to me, reverence me, and you will certainly come to me,' says Sri Krishna. When the great Teacher made the demand for desireless action of his devotees, he was not making a demand impossible or even difficult of fulfilment. He knew full well that he was prescribing a course of conduct which did not cut across the grain of human mental structure. He was speaking to his devotees in terms of the hormic structure of the human mind.*

*(1) The following verses bear out our contention :

Bhagavad Gita III, 1-8.

If, O Janardana! devotion is deemed by you to be superior to action, then why, O Kesava! do you prompt me to this fearful action? You seem, indeed, to confuse my mind by equivocal words. Therefore, declare one thing determinately, by which I may attain the highest good.

The Deity Said,

O sinless one! I have already declared that in this world there is two-fold path—that of the Samkhyas by devotion in the shape of (true) knowledge; and that of the Yogins in the shape of action. A man does not attain freedom from action merely by not engaging in action; nor does he attain perfection by mere renunciation. For nobody ever remains for an instant without performing some action; since the qualities of nature constrain everybody to some action.

III, 33

Even a man of knowledge acts constantly to his own nature. All beings follow nature.

IV, 16-20

The truth regarding action is abstruse. He is wise among men, he is possessed of devotion, and performs all action, who

The Hormic Theory and The Rasa Doctrine

We have seen, in the last section, how the teaching of the Gita is based on psychological principles which are essentially hormic in their outlook. Further elaboration of these principles was carried out by workers outside the sacred field in the realm of aesthetics and literary criticism. The *Natya Sastra* of Bharata, and the great commentary on it by Abhinavagupta; the vast literature relating to the diverse *Alamkara* theories, and the ancient Hindu works on sculpture, painting, music and dancing—these and writings of a similar nature contain a mass of psychological data which will repay amply the labours of scientifically trained research workers. The data culled from these sources should be critically treated and reduced to a system. The results of any systematic work that may have been done by our ancients are lost to us mainly through the fault of

sees inaction in action and action in inaction. The wise call him learned, whose acts are all free from desires and fancies, whose actions are burnt down by the fire of knowledge. Forsaking all attachment to the fruit of action, always contented, dependent on none, he does nothing at all, although he engages in action.

V, 1-3,

O Krishna ! you praise renunciation of actions and also the pursuit (of them). Tell me determinately which one of these two is superior.

The Deity said,

Renunciation and pursuit of action are both instruments of happiness. But of the two, pursuit of action is superior to renunciation of action. He should be understood to be always an ascetic who has no aversion and no desires.

VI, 1-3.

He who, regardless of the fruit of action, performs the actions which ought to be performed, is the devotee and renouncer, not he who discards the (sacred) fires; not he who performs no acts. Know, O son of Pandu ! that what is called renunciation is devotion, for nobody becomes a devotee who has not renounced (all) fancies. To the sage who wishes to rise to devotion, action is said to be a means,

our scholars. Successive generations of Samskritists have, in the field of aesthetics, shown a tendency to get pre-occupied with literary criticism, rhetoric and poetics to the exclusion of the vital psychological foundations of the subjects of their study and research. And modern students of Samskrit display a curious disinclination to question or even to examine impartially the doctrines of the ancients. The result of this state of affairs is that a reconstruction of the original psychological foundations of the ancient Hindu aesthetic doctrines has become exceedingly difficult, and demands an unusually strenuous effort of our creative imagination. However, let us make that effort and present a comparative and critical account of the *hormic* and *rasaic* doctrines.

That the *rasa* theory rests upon a carefully conceived psychological foundation goes without saying. The propounders of *rasa* had a deep and clear insight into the nature of the human mind, and their analysis of mental structure is suprisingly *hormic* in its main features. But there is a profound difference between *hormic* psychology and *rasa* psychology. To the *hormic* psychologist the structure of the mind as he conceives it is essentially a *conceptual construct*. In the physical and biological sciences the so called laws and theories are mental constructs or conceptual generalisations, based no doubt on experimental data, yet partaking of the nature of working hypothesis, pragmatically true for the present, but subject to revision when new facts come to light. To the Hindu aesthetic thinker on the other hand, the *rasa* view of mind, with its metaphysical back-ground, is an *a priori* principle from which deductions have to be made for explaining our concrete experience. This difference between the empirical and the *a prioristic* attitudes of the West and the East respectively should be constantly kept in mind, because our chief aim is to discover the foundations of Hindu aesthetics.

When we take up the *rasa* doctrine for scientific analysis we discover at once that the *rasaic* elements belong to

different levels of mental organisation as conceived by hormic psychology. Bhayanaka, bibhatsa, adbhuta and raudra belong to the primitive emotional level; hasya and karuna and vira to the higher sentimentative level, while smgara is very near the top of the hierarchy of sentiment values. The source of this confusion is very deep seated. As Dr. De has pointed out in his *Sanskritic Poetics*, the origin of the confusion may be traced to the vagueness of the conception of rasa in the Nāṭya Sastra. Bharata's cryptic formula is well known. The great master of kala does not explain the origin of rasa, instead he indulges in the far-fetched figure of the concoction of a beverage in order to show how rasaic enjoyment is produced by the mixing up of various bhavas. The vagueness and confusion noticeable in the Nāṭya Sastra increase a hundred fold when we consider the accounts of the sthāyi-bhavas, vibhavas, anubhavas, sancari bhavas, vyabhicari bhavas, etc., given by the writers on aesthetics. The relationship that they establish between these elements of experience is so confusing that one has to turn away from them in despair.

The simple hormic analysis of the instinctive structure of the human mind set forth in the first part of this monograph will, if applied to Hindu aesthetics, introduce order and coherence into the disjointed bhavas lying loose in the aesthetic doctrine. At the very outset it, must, be noted that the peculiar mental experience indicated by rasa is the result of an advanced stage of culture. It is, therefore, highly complex in its structure. We should, therefore, analyse the complex rasa into its elements, and commence our study with the elemental and fundamental bhavas.

Hindu psychology too starts with the innate endowment of the human mind. But the distinction between mental structure and mental function was not drawn by our ancient thinkers. This distinction should be stressed, and a start should then be made with the foundations of the rasa doctrine. When such a course is followed, it will be found that the sthāyi bhavas are undoubtedly the

most elementary and fundamental units of mental structure, corresponding to the instinctive propensities of McDougallian psychology. But as we have already indicated, there is some confusion about their real nature. Krodha, bhaya, jugupsa, and vismaya may be looked upon as fundamental. Hasya, should be interpreted as laughter, and rati as simple sex passion. Soka is not elemental, and so it should be replaced by the tender emotion which is the basic element in this complex sentiment. Utsaha, in the same manner, should be replaced by self-assertion. With these modifications we may accept the foundations of the rāsa theory.

It should be noted that hormic psychology recognised several mental elements besides the rāsa elements, but we may confine ourselves to the ancient Hindu list, because we want to build up a psychological structure suited to our aesthetic doctrines. In this connection it is interesting to note that McDougall in his earlier work, the *Social Psychology*, recognised only the following 'instincts' and 'emotions'; the instinct of flight with its concomitant emotion of fear, repulsion with disgust, curiosity with wonder, pugnacity with anger, self-assertion and submission with elation and subjection, and the parental instinct with tender emotion. The sex instinct with its emotion of lust, and a few minor instincts were added to the list. There is, as we have pointed out in the first chapter of this monograph, a notable resemblance at many points between the Hindu and McDougallian lists of the psychological elements, and as the latter is based on objective data, we need have no hesitation in accepting the revised rāsai foundations suggested above as satisfactory for our purposes.

Having fixed the number and nature of the fundamental elements, we should proceed to analyse the structure of these elements. Careful experimentation and inductive analyses reveal the existence of three aspects in each element; the cognitive, the affective or emotional and the behavioural aspect. Each sthāyi bhava is roused to activity by certain stimuli which generate a specific emo-

tion, and lead to a characteristic response. Let us at this stage reintroduce our diagram representing the structure of an instinct in fig. 15, and see how and where the




Fig. 15. Structure of a Sthayi Bhava.

various, anubhavas, sancari and vyabhicari bhavas fit into the diagram. Each sthayi bhava (or primitive unit of mental structure as represented in our modified scheme) is excited by its specific vibhavas. As the result of this excitation there arises an emotion whose expressions constitute the anubhavas and sattvika bhavas. When an emotion is excited, it is accompanied by two kinds of bodily changes, one composed of glandular discharges and the movements resulting therefrom under the control of the autonomic system, and the other of movements directed mostly by the rolandic motor region. These are the sattvika bhavas and anubhavas. The last or the conative (active or behavioural) aspect of the natural sthayi bhava has been neglected by the rasa theorists, because they were not concerned with the treatment of emotions under natural conditions, but only under the artificial conditions created by dancing, drama and poetry. If the natural conditions be analysed it will be seen that the last aspect is very important indeed, because it safe-guards the organism. The anubhavas and sattvika bhavas are only subsidiary to the executive aspect. They reinforce and facilitate those movements which the organism must make to serve biological ends.

When we enter into the region of vyabhicari bhavas

and sancari bhavas, we find confusion doubly confounded. The main reason for this is the neglect of psychology by alamkara theorists, and their exclusive preoccupation with literary criticism. We should now take up the task of investigating the foundations of the bhavas in rasa. The relation between sthayi bhavas and some of the vyabhicari bhavas is somewhat analogous to that between the chemical elements and the compounds produced by their union. The compounds may, no doubt, be analysed into their corresponding elements, but they exhibit certain 'emergent' properties not found in the elements, and may not be predictable from a knowledge of the properties of the elements alone. The human mind is dynamic, and hormic psychology teaches us that the primitive mental elements get organised into sentiments of different degrees of complexity. Sometimes the intellectual elements form the dominant components of the complex sentiments, but more often the emotional elements occupy the whole stage. We should keep the elements and compounds apart in our analysis, if we are to secure any degree of clarity in our thought. Many of the sancari bhavas and vyabhicari bhavas are compound sentiments, some are derived emotions, and to add to the confusion, a few are merely physiological states. This confusion has been introduced even into the vibhavas, for the alambans are the natural excitants of native propensities and acquired sentiments, while the uddipans are the results of conditioning.

Our conclusion is that the rasa doctrine should be thoroughly analysed from the scientific point of view. When such an analysis is completed it will be found that the psychological foundations of rasa are identical with those of McDougall's hormic psychology.

Suggestion in Hindu Aesthetics.

The phenomenon of suggestion has been a baffling problem for Western psychologists as well as for Hindu philosophers, and is still puzzling them, because their mind is not properly oriented towards this problem.

Suggestion is a psychological phenomenon, and to approach it from the purely literary or aesthetic point of view is to commit a most serious fallacy. The entire history of our aesthetics bears evidence to the futility of the non-psychological approaches to the problem we have taken up. From the legendary Bharata Muni down to Jagannatha Pandita questions of aesthetics have been handled with an astounding child-like naïvité that is surprising to us. These scholars were *engaging their minds on the superficial aspects of a profound psychological problem*. They could not help it, because scientific psychology was then unknown.

Even in the West, in spite of scientific advances, this particular problem has been mis-handled. The proper type of psychology for analysing 'suggestion' was born only in 1908 when McDougall's *'Social Psychology'* was published. The old arm-chair intellectualistic psychology was puzzled by the different types of suggestion. There is, in the first instance, suggestion which leads to intellectual assent; then, there is poetic suggestion through metaphor and simile which induce pleasure in contemplating them; there is æsthetic suggestion which produces a profound mental change; and finally there is hypnotic suggestion. How are these, and other types of suggestion leading to belief and action to be brought together, and a consistent theory of action evolved out of them? No answer to this question was forthcoming until hormic psychology appeared on the scene, and propounded a theory to solve the riddle of suggestion.

Hormic psychology insists on securing an understanding of the structure and function of the human mind before problems relating to the fields of aesthetics, literary criticism, economics, politics and sociology are taken up, for all these are only problems of applied psychology. Before you attack problems in the field of any applied science, you should grasp the fundamentals of the general science or sciences on which the applied part is based. The fundamentals of such a pure science of hormic

psychology on which the applied fields mentioned above are founded have been set forth in the first part of this book. Let us apply the hormic theory of sympathetic induction to the elucidation of the phenomenon of suggestion.

The psychological experience connoted by the term 'suggestion' in Ancient Hindu aesthetics is identical with the 'sympathetic induction' of compound emotions which constitute the central part of sentiments, by excitants of a purely aesthetic origin. *Rasa*, or AESTHESIS, may be defined as the mental counterpart of the totality of experience generated in a cultured person by the sympathetic induction of blended emotions belonging to the sentiments by excitants of a purely aesthetic origin. In this way of looking at the genesis of *rasa*, we have to distinguish between the cognitive and affective elements in the mental process of induction. That is, when a dramatic scene is being enacted, or a dance recital is being given, we should first understand that these *Natyic* performances are the outward expressions of the highly cultured sentiments which the dramatist wants to convey to the audience through the gestures of the danseuse or the actor, as well as through dialogue, music and scenic effect. When the audience, or at least the cultured part of it, rises to the high sentimentative level demanded by the author, then it will catch, as it were, the infection of feeling through the visible and vocal representations of the mental state. Sympathetic induction of sentiments takes place at the moment when this infection catches. In this type of induction we have to distinguish between the feeling that is induced and the intellectual elements that follow thereafter. 'Suggestion' has been used in Hindu Aesthetics to indicate the total process. We object to this usage, firstly on the ground that the cognitive bias in the connotation of the term is greater than the conative, whereas in the concrete experience of *rasa*, the affective and conative elements are dominant, secondly, 'suggestion' is an unanalysed psychological concept in Hindu aesthetics,

and an uncritical acceptance of the concept will land us in difficulties. Hence the hormic analysis as outlined in the first part of this monograph should be accepted as the most suitable foundation for the *rasa* doctrine.

It now remains for us to discuss briefly whether the *rasa* theorists understood the process of sympathetic induction in the hormic sense. At the outset of our discussion we must refer to Bharata's cryptic verse defining *rasa*. The main question in regard to this verse is: 'How do the *vibhavas*, *aunbhavas*, *vybhicari*, *sancari* and *sattvika bhavas* bring about the state of relish known as *rasa* in the subject's mind?' No answer to this question is to be found in Bharata. There is just a hint in the verse mentioned above as to the way in which dance and drama induce *rasa* in the minds of the audience. That hint is contained in the two concepts of '*samyoga*' and '*nispatti*'. But the hint stops as a hint, without any further elaboration or elucidation. Because of the vagueness of this hint, the key *sutra* of the *Natya Sastra* lends itself to innumerable interpretations. And Bharata's successors did evolve widely differing, and often conflicting theories out of the original *sutra*. One may deplore the vagueness which fostered the growth of disharmony among *alamkara* theorists, but it is out of this conflict that psychological ideas blossomed in the minds of literary critics and aesthetic thinkers of our country.

We have seen that the seed of the tree which was to yield the blossom of the psychological theory of suggestion is to be found in Bharata's original verse. Long before the *Dhvanikaras*, there were others, notably *Lollata*, *Sankuka*, and *Bhatta Nayaka*, who seem to have taken one or two significant steps along the path leading to the goal of *rasa*. *Lollata* locates suggestion in cognition, and *Sankuka* in imitation. Both give hesitant and superficial answers to the great question of the origin of aesthetic, because they have made no attempt to get at the psychological foundations of suggestion. Yet it must be said to the credit of these two thinkers that instead of accepting

uncritically the position of Bharata, as Bhamaha, Dandin, Vamana, and Rudrata had done, they attempted to explain the basis of the sympathetic induction of emotions. From our point of view such an attempt, though yielding no fruit, marks a clear advance over the position of the predecessors of Sankuka and Lollata. In Bhatta Nayaka we find a further advance. Rasa is now sought to be located in the mind of the rasika, and that is the right way of tackling the problem. The sthaya bhava is the foundation of rasa. An element of bhoga enters and finally the state of supreme relish is sought to be raised to super-mundane levels. A further advance is made in Abhinavagupta's conception of rasa-vyanjana. But it is only when we come to Visvanatha that we find a clear description of the origin and development of 'suggestion'. In a short chapter devoted to the subject in his Sahitya Darpanam, the author deals with the nature of this psychological process. But the confusion that we have been complaining against persists here too. Therefore, the only way of improving the existing state of affairs in Hindu aesthetics is to give the proper psychological orientation to the several theories, and such orientation can be effected only through the introduction of the hormic principles of William McDougall into Hindu psychology.

ments as formulated by McDougall. The great value of this conception, nay even its clarity, has been sacrificed to the demands of hostile critics. We have shown how by maintaining the purity of the conception of Emotions formulated in '*Social Psychology*' McDougall might have succeeded in making his view of sentiments clear, scientific and workable in the field of Sociology and Social Psychology.

The Fourth Chapter deals with the Sympathetic Induction of Emotions, a concept of vital importance in Group Psychology. Any psychology which fails to explain this phenomenon and the part it plays in group life is unworthy of recognition at our hands. Suggestion, Sympathy and Imitation have been very hard nuts indeed to crack for the nineteenth century psychologists. Many of them, particularly the slaves of cognitive analysis, have broken their teeth and are still howling with pain. Hormic Psychology was the first to explain these processes clearly by relating them to the three aspects of the instinctual structure of the mind. It is seen how, the threefold analysis of the instincts, for maintaining whose original purity of conception we have been arguing, helps us to explain the induction of sentiments. Sentiments are, as we have seen already, the immediate excitants of cultured behaviour, and it is in the sentiments that we must look for the secret springs of the refined social, aesthetic and moral life of the civilised person. Sympathetic induction of sentiments is a challenge to all psychologists, and the hormic psychologist is the only person who can take it up boldly.

The Fifth Chapter deals with the Hormic theory of pleasure. As in the case of instincts and emotions, this theory has gone through three stages in its evolution, and has suffered the same vicissitudes. The lines along which McDougall's theory may be improved are indicated; the distinction, which is intelligible only on the basis of a hormic conception of the mind, is drawn between pleasure and happiness. This chapter concludes the First Section

of this book devoted to the elucidation, and critical examination of the conative elements of Hormic Psychology. The cognitive elements in McDougall's Psychology have not been considered, as they are not vital to our purpose. We have made a sustained effort to offer suggestions for the reformulation and extension of the McDougallian hypothesis wherever we felt such a treatment was needed in the interests of scientific psychology.

Part II

The Second part of the book is devoted to a critical examination of the relation between Hormic Psychology and the other living schools of psychology. The Sixth Chapter, the opening chapter of this section, starts with an analysis of the Middle-of-the-road psychology of the Woodworthian type. In spite of the loud protests of the leaders of this school, it is found that they are as much imbued by the partisan spirit as the avowedly sectarian schools of psychology. The basic concepts of the Woodworthian hypothesis are analysed to bring out the well-defined hypothesis hidden in them. We point out that Woodworthian psychology is not dynamic but static. No traveller can stay for ever in a half-way house which is all that the Middle-of-the-road psychology may claim to be, and the final goal of this psychology is hormic purposivism. Woodworthian bio-static psychology must find its crown and culmination in the psycho-dynamic theories of McDougall and Freud.

The Seventh Chapter is devoted to an examination of the relationship between McDougall, Watson, Pavlov, Kohler, Koffka and Spearman. The curse of contemporary psychology is the presence of rival schools, and the need of the hour is unity in psychological theory. How may this unity be brought about? This chapter examines the various attempts made in recent times towards the establishment of unity in psychology. Many of these relate to method only, not to the theoretical foundations. Two or three alternative schemes for achieving unity are mention-

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ed. Finally a scheme based on the foundations of the experimental methods of the positive sciences is put forward as the most suitable means, under the present conditions, for bringing about unity. In this scheme it is shown that mechanistic, field-dynamic and psycho-dynamic schools constitute a progressive scale of values leading up to purposivistic psychology as the crown of all psychological whole, each contributing its share to the successful functioning of the total organism. Thus there is no reason why rivalry should prevail among the psychologists whose efforts are, after all, mutually complimentary. A suitable place has been found for the Factor School too. The entire scheme is presented as a tentative solution to the problem of unity to be elaborated and, if need be, modified, in the light of future developments in psychology.

The Eighth Chapter deals with the relationship between Freud and McDougall. Our author claims that Freud has been steadily moving towards his own position, while he himself has stuck to his original theory. Hormic psychology, therefore, has nothing to gain from Psycho-analysis, while the latter has everything to gain from its affiliations with the former. We do not agree with this view. This chapter shows how McDougall begins where Freud ends. Without the Freudian foundation the McDougallian superstructure will prove to be a castle in the air. Through an analysis of 'Regression' we show here how the theory of instincts propounded by McDougall, is in urgent need of being supported and supplemented by the evolutionary conception implied in psychoanalysis. McDougall's psychology must be viewed as the continuation and completion of Freud's psychoanalysis. Our scheme for unity covers, in this way, the whole field of contemporary psychology.

The last chapter of this section deals with the question of the extension of the Hormic theory. The proposals of Drs. Garnett and Lundholm have been examined and incorporated into a new scheme which is based on a synthe-

sis of the Hindu and Western views of life. Hormic Psychology is essentially axiological and at the same time scientific. This may seem strange and paradoxical, but it is true. And an axiological psychology must finally end in metaphysics.

Part III

In the Third and the last Part of the book we address ourselves to the task of applying our psychological theory to social fields. The challenge of Sociology is urgent and inescapable for the psychologist. To justify his claim to a place among the recognised scientists, the psychologist has to tackle a few at least of the major sociological problems. The Tenth and the opening chapter of this section deals with the concept of Culture. The various non-psychological views of Culture are examined and condemned as defective. The need for a psychological theory is stressed and a Neo-Hormic formula for culture is propounded. This formula is then applied to the solution of a few of the general problems of culture, and to the detailed analysis of Andhra and Tamil Culture. Cultural objects are analysed with a view to discover the nature of the mental organisation which generated them, and in every case a suitable Neo-Hormic formula is suggested.

The Eleventh and the Twelfth Chapters essay a psychological analysis of Aesthetics and Politics. The basic problems are taken in each field, and with the aid of hormic psychology a proper orientation to thinking is given in these fields. Finally in the last chapter the implicit hormic elements in Hindu Philosophy and Psychology are rendered explicit. Hindu thought stands in need of hormic orientation, while Western psychology will gain in depth and clarity if it is extended along the lines indicated by Hindu Philosophy.