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Under the Editorship of

WILLIAM F. OGBURN

The University of Chicago

MEYER F. NIMKOFF
THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

Marriage and the Family

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THE FAMILY

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To Peter

Editor's Introduction

FOR TWELVE YEARS many thousands of students have studied Dr. Nimkoff's text, *The Family* — and I am sure these students have a better adjustment to life and more happiness because of what they learned from this book.

But during these dozen years our knowledge of the family has not remained unchanged. Science is dynamic. Sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists have been increasingly active in researches about the family as a social institution, as a builder of the personality of children, and as a source of happiness for all members of the family. These researches, as is the custom, have been reported in the scientific journals and in monographs, which are not very accessible to large classes of students.

So it became necessary to revise *The Family* to include the new material. However, Dr. Nimkoff found that the new knowledge was so extensive and the emphasis and interests had shifted so much that it was necessary to write a new book, a task which required several years.

Though this book is a new one, it retains the features which made the original edition such an outstanding success. These characteristics are balance and reliability. Too often books on the family, an emotional subject, have emphasized unduly some special interest of the author. These books have been too pious, too pessimistic, too ethnological, too historical, too sentimental, or too physiological. They were therefore tracts, not texts. Being tracts, they were collections of opinions about facts, or opinions without facts. Dr. Nimkoff has always stayed close to his data; and he has a good eye for data which are reliable. He rides no special hobbies and exploits no particular prejudices. The book is also distinguished by exceptional clarity of style, a quality for which Dr. Nimkoff is well known.

Teachers found these qualities in the original edition especially attractive. It was the large number of teachers who used the book in

colleges, junior colleges, teacher's colleges, and in fact in institutions of practically every kind, which accounts for the widespread popularity of the volume. It is my belief that teachers will like the revised edition even better, and that they and their students are fortunate in having so excellent a new treatise on an important social institution.

WILLIAM F. OGBURN

Preface

THE GREAT MAJORITY of the young men and women reading these lines will within a relatively short time marry and rear families of their own. The prime requisite of a course on the family is to furnish these students knowledge which will be useful in their own domestic experience. Earlier courses on the family were not so oriented about the students' needs. They were theoretical in nature, devoted to the family as a social institution. More recently, the growth of the functional viewpoint in education has led to the introduction into the curriculum of practical materials concerned with preparation for marriage and parenthood. In some schools this has resulted in the organization of two distinct and separate courses, the traditional course on the family and the newer course on marriage, but in other institutions it has been shown that the two may be advantageously combined. It is such a combination that the present volume undertakes to provide. The retention of the theoretical material furnishes a desirable frame of reference, while the inclusion of practical topics vitalizes the course for the student. Constant care has been exercised by the writer, however, lest fantasy be substituted for fact, since the amount of tested knowledge in these practical fields is still meager.

The central thesis of this book is that scientific inventions and discoveries, especially those related to the means of production and embodied in technology, are the most influential factors in social change and furnish the principal key to an understanding of the prevailing patterns of family organization. Therefore the history of the family as a social institution is best considered in relation to the evolution of material culture. Parts One and Two of the present volume trace the striking changes in family organization from the earliest period of hunting culture, through the intermediate stage of farming, up to and including the modern industrial era — a series of momentous changes which may be dramatically described as the rise and decline of the family as a social institution. In agricultural society based on the

plow, the family reached great heights of power and prestige because of its manifold functions of economic production which in turn magnified the family's educational, protective and status-giving rôles. The Industrial Revolution led to the transfer of many of these traditional functions of the family to industry and the state, thereby reducing the stature of the family as a social institution. However, the loss of traditional functions by the family brought compensatory forces into play, resulting in the marked accentuation of the residual affectional functions. Here, then, is the principal explanation as to why the modern family has become the great agency concerned with the problem of human happiness. It is to the solution of this problem that the latter half of the book (Parts Three and Four) is devoted.

Marriage and the Family, which displaces the writer's earlier text on *The Family*, was first planned as a revision of the latter, but has turned out to be an entirely new work. In the preparation of the new materials, the writer has had the benefit of the critical reading of portions of the manuscript by Ruth Benedict, Ralph Linton, E. Franklin Frazier, J. H. Kolb, Willard Waller, William C. Cobb, Arthur L. Wood, and Stanley H. Chapman, whose assistance he gratefully acknowledges. He wishes to express special thanks to Ernest W. Burgess for his generous permission to use his schedules for the prediction and measurement of marital happiness. The writer's principal obligation is to William F. Ogburn, whose detailed and incisive comment on the whole manuscript has been of immeasurable value.

MEYER F. NIMKOFF

Bucknell University

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Part One

INTRODUCTION

PART ONE of this book introduces the reader to the family as a social institution. Each of us knows the family at firsthand, but personal experience does not necessarily provide us with any real understanding of the organization of the family. Our experience with family life is like our experience with language. We learn to speak our native tongue in the normal course of growing up, often without realizing *that the language has a complicated grammar. Later on, in school,* we make a deliberate effort to learn the structure of the language and new uses to which it may be put. We discover that other languages are differently organized. So it is with the family. It too has an organization which, to be understood, must be carefully studied. It, too, assumes a number of forms, each with distinctive features. By considering these types in a variety of cultures, as we do in Chapters 1 and 2, we provide a basis for understanding the family as a general phenomenon, that is, as a social institution. Such knowledge should also help us the better to comprehend our own family system.

Chapter 1

ORGANIZATION OF THE FAMILY

THIS BOOK is about the social institution which more than any other affects the happiness of modern man. Whether our childhood is a time of joy or one of sorrow depends largely on the kind of parents we have, and for most of us the chances of happiness in adulthood turn mainly on the marriage we make and the kind of parents we ourselves become. The family is not, of course, the only institution affecting happiness. The church may also be a great source of comfort, but its influence is less pervasive, and when effective is more likely to be felt during the later years of life than during the early ones. The school may give us knowledge which facilitates the adjustment of personality, but does not often concern itself directly with our emotional development, nor does the school ordinarily reach us during the first five or six crucial years of learning which the family virtually monopolizes. As for the other major institutions, the economic organization is primarily concerned with the standard of living, and the state with the protective function.

Happiness is not, of course, the only function of marriage and family life. The family exists to perpetuate the race by bringing children into the world and caring for them until they can manage their own lives, so that in due course they will grow up and mate and continue the cycle of the generations. These functions of reproduction and child care are obviously primary because they are indispensable to the perpetuation of the species. But uppermost in the minds of young persons contemplating matrimony in western society is the expectation that marriage will bring great personal happiness.

In times past in our society, happiness was not emphasized as a function of marriage, and this is still true in many cultures, especially

those of the East. The idea that the most important thing about marriage is an obligation on the part of husband and wife to make each other happy is modern and revolutionary. Imagine the situation in a Puritan New England community two hundred years ago. Marriage was not directly for happiness, although happiness might result from the successful performance of its functions. Great emphasis was placed on the economic factor in marriage. Marriage was highly advantageous to the hunter and farmer, who would be sorely handicapped in the struggle for existence without a wife. A man usually looked for a wife who was a good cook and housekeeper; a woman sought a good provider. She could not afford to be too exacting in her choice, because the only possibilities open to her other than marriage were continued support by her relatives or employment as a domestic servant. Marriage for her was a refuge from economic and social insecurity.

One married, too, because it was a religious duty. Did not the Scriptures command us to "be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth"? What if one were unhappy in marriage? Men and women were placed in this vale of tears to beget new souls and to save their own, not to seek for personal happiness. Did not Adam and Eve forego their right to happiness when they ate of the Tree of Knowledge? And as to the wife particularly, must she not remember that Eve was fashioned from Adam's rib, not from the bones of his head, and that, therefore, woman must not presume to equality with man? Rather, woman was made to serve man and to be obedient to his wishes. Puritan theology was apparently well adapted to a social order characterized by intense economic struggle, a low standard of living, limited economic opportunities for women, and a short life expectancy.

The colonial family differed from the modern family in many ways. In the earlier period, the family was generally larger; there were more households with more than two generations present, and a greater number of economic, educational, religious, and social functions were centered in the home. The organization of family life in colonial times is described more fully in a later chapter.[1] The foregoing brief, comparative statement is presented here to indicate that the family is not a static but a dynamic institution, and that, over a period of time within the same society, the organization of the

[1] Chapter 3.

family may be greatly modified. The range of variation in family organization is, however, not adequately represented by a comparison of recent and colonial American patterns. To understand how flexible the family really is, we must turn our attention to people with a culture radically different from our own.

The Family and Culture

Take, for instance, the Hopi Indians, who had been long established in northern Arizona when our Pilgrim Fathers were settling New England. When a Hopi marries, he goes to live with his wife in her mother's house. Sometimes he comes from another village, and so is somewhat a stranger in his mother-in-law's house. His status is higher than that of an invited guest but lower than that of a full-fledged member of the family. The household may be large, consisting of the older woman and her husband, her married daughters and their husbands, her unmarried sons, and her daughters' unmarried children. The men co-operate in tilling the fields and reaping the harvest, and the women cultivate vegetable gardens. Oddly, the men spin and weave cloth and make moccasins.

The children take the mother's clan name and are deemed related only to their mother, so that a chief three-fourths Navajo is regarded as pure Hopi because his mother's mother was a Hopi.[1] Property is inherited through the mother's line, and a son does not inherit from his father or his father's family. Both sexes co-operate in building houses, but the women alone own them, and they are always inherited by women, as are also the fields. A sacred office, which is valued highly, is passed down from a father to his brother or to his sister's son, who are members of his clan, but not to his own son, who is an outsider. The boy accompanies his father to the fields and gets practical vocational instruction from him, but his religious education comes from his mother's brother, who serves him also as a sort of general mentor and disciplinarian.[2] So in many ways, the Hopi boy feels closer to his uncle than he does to his own father. In case of divorce, the husband leaves and returns to his mother's or his sister's house. The children remain with their mother and their mother's family, little disturbed by the change.

[1] Robert H. Lowie, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940), p. 457.

[2] Wayne Dennis, *The Hopi Child* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1940).

The organization of the Hopi family is chiefly around the blood ties between mother and children, and brothers and sisters, rather than around the marital ties binding husband and wife. The Hopi family is a different kind of family from our own. These differences are analyzed more fully in the next chapter, but they are mentioned here to indicate the marked variations possible in family organization. Unless the reader has traveled widely or done considerable reading about the customs of other people, he may have the idea that the type of family life with which he is familiar is universal. He may erroneously assume that family organization is everywhere like that in the United States today — a small unit of two generations, living apart from their kin in a separate domicile, tracing descent through both parents and inheriting property through both. Actually, family organization is highly varied the world over, and one of the purposes of this book is to describe the significant variations and the conditions that cause them. Man has a few basic domestic problems, such as finding a mate, reproducing his kind, and rearing the young, but the means at his disposal for solving these problems are numerous and highly diversified. Many roads lead to home.

What the Family Is

With these brief sketches before us, we may now undertake to frame a formal definition of the family as a more or less durable association of husband and wife, with or without children, or of a man or a woman alone, with children. This definition, it will be noted, stresses the sex and parental functions which are crucial to the institution. These are primary functions essential to the continuance of the family. This definition also indicates that the minimal structure of the family consists of two mates, or one parent and offspring.

But the accounts given above show that the family is not limited to these persons or these functions. It may be much larger, and may include grandparents, relatives, in-laws, grandchildren, and adopted children, all forming a group which is sometimes called an extended family. The structure of the family is not fixed but varies in different cultures. Likewise the functions of the family are flexible. The family may do few or many things. In addition to the sex and reproductive functions mentioned in the definition, the family may render economic services to its members, may help to educate them,

give them religious guidance, furnish recreation, protect them against dangers of various sorts, and provide affection and companionship. It is important in appraising the significance of the family in any culture, therefore, to ascertain what functions are performed, in what manner, and to what degree. The family is best interpreted in terms of its varying functions.

The Family and Biology

The discerning student has probably wondered, as he has read these paragraphs, whether man's biological make-up does not contribute something to his family organization. The fact that human beings are of two sexes means that mating will occur in all cultures, and the lengthy period of dependence of the human young guarantees that family organization will be universal. Does this mean that the biology of man dictates the terms of his family organization?

The family is not limited to man, but exists among the lower animals wherever the young are dependent upon parents for survival. If we limit our illustrations to the vertebrate series, from fish to man, on the ground that a similarity of basic mechanisms makes the comparison more significant, we find in certain species of fish little or no family life. This is the case, for example, among the cod. The female cod lays eggs and the male fertilizes them, but a single cod lays as many as nine million eggs; so it is not surprising that she does not mother her offspring. The young, moreover, are self-reliant from the beginning.

Among birds generally, family life is more highly developed. Both parents may co-operate in nest-building and in incubating the eggs. For example, the ringdove female sits on the nest at night and is relieved by her mate during the day. After the squabs are hatched, the parents co-operate in feeding them. Parental care among birds varies according to the needs of the offspring, but is at most short-lived, and as soon as the young become independent, the attitude of the parents changes from solicitude to hostility.[1]

When we consider the mammals, we find family life much more fully developed. With few exceptions, the developing embryos are carried within the mother's body for varying gestation periods. After birth, the young feed on the mother's milk and keep warm and safe

[1] Georgene H. Seward, *Sex and the Social Order* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1946), p. 43.

nestled close to her body. Even after they are no longer physically dependent upon the mother, they maintain association with her to a greater or less degree because of their social interdependence, resulting from earlier conditioning. The longer the period of physical dependence of the young, the stronger will be the bonds linking mother and offspring. That maternal response outlasts the physical dependence of the young is strikingly illustrated by an experiment involving chimpanzees. The behavior of mothers when confronted by their offspring after a full year's separation was scored on a five-point scale ranging from zero, representing complete indifference, to one hundred, indicating violent agitation, loud cries, and efforts to retrieve the infant. For comparative purposes, the mother was also confronted with a strange baby. The experimenter held the young animal in his arms before the mother's cage and noted carefully her reactions. For a series of five chimpanzees, the maternal reaction to own offspring was recorded as more than twice as intense as that to the strange baby.[1]

Among the lower animals, mating and maternal behavior has been most extensively studied in the rodents and in the prehuman primates, which afford an interesting and significant comparison because they represent the lower and higher ends of the mammalian series. Observers are impressed by the relatively greater uniformity in family behavior at the lower levels. There is a single dominant pattern, and variations are at a minimum. The explanation given is that the behavior of the lower animals is largely determined by internal factors, especially the inherited nervous and glandular mechanisms. Rodents, for example, show marked facility in mating even when afforded no opportunity for learning. Young males who are isolated after weaning show about as much skill in mating as males who are not isolated.[2] Chimpanzees, on the other hand, show more variation in sexual prowess, and those who are isolated from the group may be highly inept at love-making.[3] The latter behave like immature males and require a period of trial and error in order to

[1] The scores averaged 41.8 and 18.7 for the first test and 35.4 and 15.8 for the second test held eleven days later. K. W. Spence, "Réaction des mères chimpanzés à l'égard des enfants chimpanzés après séparation," *J. Psychol. Norm. Path.*, 34:475–93, 1937. Cited in Seward, *op. cit.*

[2] F. A. Beach, "Comparison of Copulatory Behavior of Male Rats Raised in Isolation, Cohabitation, and Segregation," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 60:121–36, 1942.

[3] R. M. Yerkes, "Conjugal Contrasts Among Chimpanzees," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 36:175–99, 1941.

acquire facility. Since the isolated chimpanzees do not know precisely how to behave, it is clear that the internal neural and glandular mechanisms are not by themselves effective agents, and that the chimpanzees like other subhuman primates are greatly influenced by external factors. These factors are generally subsumed by social psychologists under the head of the learning process. This process reaches its fullest expression in the case of man, because of his more highly developed brain and especially because of his capacity for speech. The results of man's great capacity for learning accumulate, are preserved, and are transmitted from generation to generation.

The relatively long period of dependence and immaturity of the human young makes possible extensive conditioning by culture and social experience. By way of comparison, the infant guinea pig is able to get along independently after days, or at most, weeks; the baby chimpanzee is able to walk in from three to six months and may operate independently in perhaps twice that time; but the average human infant does not even walk until he is eighteen months old, and the time of complete self-reliance is measured in years, not months. This long period of dependence and flexibility makes possible extensive molding of the child's behavior by external factors. The influence of the external, cultural factors is reflected in the great variety of patterns of human family behavior existing in different societies, in contrast to the uniformity found among the lower animals.

The question as to whether the biology of man determines his family organization can now be answered by saying that it does so only in the sense that it sets limits and determines broad outlines. That is to say, man's family life would be altered if his sexual nature were different. Suppose man had the biology of the ants rather than of the mammals, what would his family life be like? In ant society, one female is selected as the collective mother, and all the other females are destroyed or transformed by special treatment into neuters. Likewise, one male is selected to fertilize the group mother; after this is done, all the other males may be liquidated or transformed into sexually neutral individuals. Ant society is non-sexual. The highly engaging and distracting business of mating, or marrying and giving in marriage, has been eliminated, and the individuals devote themselves entirely to their life careers. The young produced

by the group mother are cared for by a group of neuters who make this their life work. The family does not exist.[1]

The biology of the human mother indicates that she, and not the father, will generally be chiefly concerned with the physical care of the young. We should expect the mother to clean, feed, warm, fondle, groom, and protect her young where such behavior occurs among mammals. For the feeding process at least a definite physiological basis is discernible in the mammary glands which, following labor, become distended, causing distress until relieved by feeding or by artificial means. Because of the gestation and suckling mechanisms there is less need for the father's assistance than in some lower animals like birds. A survey [2] of maternal behavior in sixty-four preliterate societies shows that in most of them the mother has almost complete care of the young infant. But there are some irregularities. For example, in the Marquesan Islands the mother is relieved of the responsibility of child care, which is largely relegated to the secondary husbands. Every wife has at least two husbands because of the extreme poverty of the region and the difficulty of supporting a family, and because the men outnumber the women more than two to one. The scarcity of women has resulted in marked emphasis on the erotic, which is reinforced by the use of sex as a substitute for economic security. Maternal functions are subordinated to the elaboration of erotic techniques, and the breasts as feeding organs are sacrificed to their sensual uses. The mother accomplishes the feeding of the infant by mixing a doughy paste, laying the infant on his back and dropping some of the food on his mouth. The child gulps and sputters and swallows what he can. The example of the Marquesan mother is instructive in showing that, even for behavior like care of the infant, for which a definite physiological basis exists, biology does not necessarily dictate the behavior. One could never guess from an analysis of the biology of the Marquesan female what the actual behavior of Marquesan mothers would be.

[1] There are reformers who advocate a similar social system, in which children will be cared for by the state, thus relieving the individual parents and making it possible for them to pursue their life careers without interference from the children. Jennings observes that many of these advocates are motivated by a desire for a fuller and freer expression of their sexual impulses. In ant society, the system has resulted, not in the freeing of the sexual impulses, but in their obliteration. If socialized child care in human society should entail the same consequences, possibly the enthusiasm for the system would abate. H. S. Jennings, "The Biological Basis of the Family," in *Family Life Today* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), pp. 3–23.

[2] Clellan S. Ford, *A Comparative Study of Human Reproduction*, Yale University Publications in Anthropology, number 32 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), p. 82.

The reason that biology does not determine family organization in detail is that only physical structure is inherited, not behavior, and a given structure may be capable of a variety of functions. Thus, the sex structure of man dictates that mating will occur in every society, but it does not determine whether one man may have only one wife, as in the United States, or more than one wife, as in India and China, or less than one wife, as in the Marquesan Islands. It is not possible to tell by looking at the biological structure of a group of infants from many lands what type of marriage they will enter into when they mature. One can make a better guess if one knows in what cultures they will grow up, for the social heritage, not the inherited nature of man, determines the organization of the human family.

The variety of customs relating to a single physiological function: sex

That culture determines human family behavior is indicated by the great variety of customs relating to a single physiological function like mating. Some societies place a high value on sex as a source of pleasure and as a means of reinforcing affection between male and female. For example, the Trobrianders [1] have a naturalistic, uninhibited attitude toward the sexual function. They permit freedom of sexual expression in childhood, with due regard to the incest taboos and the accepted etiquette of privacy and moderation. Children at a tender age make a game of sex, and the attitude of their parents is one of indulgence. As a result, the interest in marriage is gradual and progressive, and the danger of sexual traumas and perversions is minimized. At least it is reported that there is little deviant sex behavior in Trobriand society, and adjustments between husbands and wives are conspicuously good.

Quite the contrary position is that held by the Manus of New Guinea,[2] who believe that sex is sinful and properly used only for reproduction. Sexual interests are subordinated to the accumulation of wealth and property, and marriage itself is the occasion for a variety of financial transactions that obscure the personal factors involved. Manus financiers invest in marriages much as we invest in corporations. Betrothal occurs at an early age, and the relatives of

[1] B. Malinowski, *The Sexual Life of Savages in Northwestern Melanesia*, 3d ed., 2 vols. (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1932).

[2] Margaret Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1930).

the boy pay shell money and dog teeth to the bride's family, with the understanding that later they will make a commensurate return in pigs and oil. The married couple are an incidental and convenient means of effecting a series of economic exchanges. Whether the preoccupation with financial gain is the cause or effect of the strained relations between husband and wife is not clear, but the marital relationship lacks warmth and tenderness. The husband conceives of his wife as a drudge, fit only for childbearing and housework. The Manus bride does not anticipate marriage with pleasure. It is said that there are no romantic myths or love-songs in the Manus culture, and that the language does not even have a word for love.

The same physiological impulses are, then, a source of vibrant happiness and enduring companionship in Trobriand culture, and a source of crippling frustration and marital antipathy in the culture of the Manus. These are, of course, two extremes, and many cultures occupying intermediate positions could be detailed if space permitted. Clearly the influence of biology in family experience is subordinated to the influence of the social heritage.

Conflict of Culture and the Biological Nature of Man

If the family heritage were a direct and full expression of the original nature of man, there would never be a clash between the two. The family organization would always be consistent with man's biological needs. Actually, some culture patterns do clash with man's organic nature. For example, the attitudes toward marriage which a Manus girl learns from her mother cause her to develop hostility toward her husband. Such an attitude disposes to frigidity and other sexual neuroses, and is definitely harmful. The teachings of the Manus mothers are part of the tradition of the culture, not greatly unlike the Puritan tradition of our own society of a few generations ago. A Manus child, therefore, learns from his culture behavior which is definitely harmful.

Learning involves the discipline of the native impulses which are presumably of biological value, or which are so in the natural state. The more learning there is, the greater the possibilities of modifying the original tendencies. There is a longer period of learning for human offspring than for any other animal. Actually, man continues to learn throughout his lifetime, although the greatest concentration of learning occurs in infancy, childhood, and youth.

PLATE 1. CONJUGAL GROOMING

Is grooming a learned behavior trait among chimpanzees as it is among human beings? Yerkes believes it represents a pattern of social response from which some of our forms of social service, like nursing, may have evolved. Top picture from MALINOWSKI, SEXUAL LIFE OF SAVAGES IN NORTHWESTERN MELANESIA (*Routledge and Sons, Ltd.*). *Bottom picture from* R. M. YERKES, "*Genetic aspects of grooming, a socially important primate behavior pattern,*" JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, *1933.*



American Museum of Natural History

PLATE 2. WOMEN'S WORK AMONG THE ESKIMOS

Upper: Eskimo woman pulling thread through teeth. She is probably wetting sinew in preparation for twisting it on the cheek or thigh; or, if there is a needle on one end, she may be drawing sinew across the lips before sewing.

Lower: Chewing skins to make them supple. Eskimo women do so much chewing on skins that they frequently wear their teeth down to the gums. There is a sharper division of labor between the sexes in most preliterate societies than in our own today, and woman's work is clearly defined.

Man's great capacity for learning means that his social heritage has abundant opportunity to discipline and modify his initial tendencies.

We have here, in the clash of culture and the biological nature of man, one of the important causes of family problems. Illegitimacy may be cited as an example. Our culture prohibits mating apart from marriage, but the original biological tendencies of man recognize no such limitations. The insistence of our culture that mating be confined to marriage probably entails no great strain on man's biological nature, provided marriage occurs at a reasonably early age. But a considerable number of persons in our society postpone marriage until quite late in life for various reasons — preparation for a profession, for example. About ten per cent of both sexes reach the age of forty-five without ever having married at all. This is certainly an anomalous situation from a biological standpoint. There is, of course, no certainty that delay in marrying, or even failure to marry, will entail biological strain in every case. The sexual impulses of man are flexible and may be sublimated rather than given direct expression. Many persons choose not to marry, and the choice may carry social approval, as in the case of those who enter religious orders. Unmarried mothers and fathers are generally quite young, and probably most of these cases could be avoided if marriage occurred at or about the time of puberty, as in many preliterate societies. Hence, it would appear that cultural demands for late mating are not primary. Although Trobriand youth give expression to their sexual impulses, their illegitimacy rate is less than a fourth of that in the United States. The explanation probably lies in the earlier age at which they marry and in the virtual universality of marriage for women.

When a clash occurs between culture and the biological nature of man, the solution lies in some readjustment in the culture, since it is obviously not possible to change the biological nature of man. Thus, the effort might be made to reduce the illegitimacy rate by sex education which would successfully discipline the emotions and by the wider diffusion of such knowledge. It is also possible to try to foster conditions that would make early marriage a reality for all or nearly all women, although this might not be easy to do in our increasingly complex civilization. The first approach undertakes to adjust the individual to the existing social situation by a more effective process of conditioning; the second aims to adjust the cultural pattern to

the needs of the individual. Which procedure to follow, or whether to follow both, is partly a practical problem in social engineering and partly a matter of the values and ideologies of the reformers.

The maladjustment of biological man and culture is probably the chief key to marital problems. This is so because marriage entails a sexual adjustment, even though sex is a natural function. The teachings and practices of the group regarding sex modify the original biological tendencies and either facilitate or hamper marital adjustment. Normal animals who are reared with their kind have no difficulty in mating satisfactorily, unlike many individuals in our culture and in other cultures. The conflict of sex and culture also underlies marital infidelity, premarital incontinence, and many other family problems considered in later chapters.

Culture Lag as a Cause of Family Problems

Another fundamental cause of domestic difficulties is maladjustment between the different parts of culture due to the fact that one part changes faster than another. To illustrate, the modern industrial system affords women many opportunities for employment outside the home. Modern schools and colleges offer instruction to men and women on equal terms in preparation for careers. After marriage, many women find that their small homes and small families do not provide full scope for their energies, and they seek outside employment. This may lead to difficulty with their husbands, many of whom grew up in homes where the mother did not go out to work for pay. The picture of an ideal wife which the husband carries in his mind is often fashioned after his mother. But times have changed, and have produced a new type of wife who may be wedded to an old-style husband. The cultural change is, then, the cause of the divergent conceptions of the wifely rôle which results in conflict.

Even more common is the conflict between the generations caused by rapid social changes. In a stationary society where conditions are much the same from generation to generation, what parents know their children also know, and what parents believe their children also believe, because the body of knowledge is stable. Since the children probably learn most of what they know from their parents, their respect for the parents is great. Filial piety is conspicuous in stable cultures like that of old China. However, when culture changes rapidly, as ours does at present, things are greatly

different. The children depend not on their parents for knowledge, but on the schools, the press, the radio, and other media. The children may have appreciably more education than their parents. The young are exposed to the newer developments and viewpoints, while their parents may maintain the attitudes and beliefs developed during the early period of their own learning a generation ago. Parents may be disturbed by a daughter who wants to fly, study electronics, espouse collectivism, wear a bare midriff evening gown, and stay out half the night on an unchaperoned date. The differences in amount and kind of learning and experience of parents and children may be barriers between them and lead to friction. Sometimes these differences are so great that parent and child scarcely seem to speak the same language.

It is curious that culture should create human problems when its function is to solve them. Why this should be so is not entirely clear, but one possible explanation is that an innovation in culture may be designed to solve some particular problem, and in so doing another problem is created. Thus, the high heel is a successful innovation in the realm of culture known as aesthetics. At least the high heel is greatly admired and widely adopted. Its deleterious effects on the arches of the foot, the spinal column, and the nervous system of the wearer are unfortunate by-products. Its value as a fashion carries more weight than its menace to health. Likewise an anti-naturalistic teaching regarding sex may be formulated to buttress the position of the church and the economic institutions and it may succeed in doing this very well. It may result in more industry, more thrift, and more concern with supernatural values, as in the case of the Puritans, even if it means less happiness in marriage. Thus, innovations in culture have secondary social effects, which may be anticipated or not, and beneficial or not. The inventors of television have been interested primarily in developing an instrument for recreation, and have admirably succeeded. But television may have other effects which were not intended or anticipated by the inventors. If television becomes as common as radio, it is possible that young children will be attracted to the motion pictures flashed on the television screen and will prefer to stay at home at night instead of playing on the city streets or going to the movies. This might be a factor in strengthening family life and in reducing juvenile delinquency. If so, it will certainly not be any part of the inventors' purpose, but an unexpected derivative effect of television.

Psychogenic Differences as Causes of Family Problems

Many family problems are caused by the two types of cultural situations described above, but is it correct to assume that culture is responsible for all our domestic troubles? Animals with little or no culture may have conjugal difficulties. Observations on the sage grouse of Wyoming showed that fewer than 3 per cent of the males made 87 per cent of the matings.[1] The monopoly is not so complete among the simians, but even so many males remain unmated. Zuckerman [2] describes a colony of baboons consisting of seven polygamous family groups and five monogamous parties. One male had eight females, three had three each, and three had two each. Some of the family groups included one or more sexually mature "bachelors" who accompanied the family parties in their movements, and who had access to the females only when the overlord was asleep or ill or absent. These accounts show that the presence in nature of an approximately equal number of males and females offers no guarantee that all the males will have an opportunity to mate. The even sex ratio may be a factor making for monogamy, but it is offset by the variability in size, strength, and virility of the males, and by the tendency of the more dominant males to appropriate a number of females, leaving some males without mates. A number of human males remain unmated, too, for cultural if not for natural reasons, but the evidence from the simians indicates that some males would have a mating problem even if we had no culture. An unmated biologically normal and mature female, however, is probably rare or nonexistent on the primate level.

Once mated, some animals have problems of conjugal adjustment. At least they seem to do better in certain unions than in others. The behavior of a chimpanzee female, Dita, as mate to Pan and to Bokar, offers an interesting illustration.[3] With Pan, Dita was timid, passive, fearful, distrustful. Comparable behavior in a human being would perhaps suggest an anxiety neurosis. Dita was subordinate to Pan at all times and took no liberties with him, even when the situation warranted. They both participated in an experimental situation in which small bits of banana were rolled down a chute into their cage.

[1] W. C. Allee, "Analytical Studies of Group Behavior in Birds," *Wilson Bulletin*, 48:145–51, 1936.
[2] S. Zuckerman, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932), pp. 225–26.
[3] Robert M. Yerkes, *Chimpanzees* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), p. 85.

Dita was hesitant about accepting the food when Pan was present. In similar experiments with other couples, it was observed that the male normally yielded the chute to the female during oestrus. But even at such times when Pan stayed away from the chute, Dita was reluctant to claim the food. What caused her to react so fearfully to Pan is not known, for he did not treat her roughly so far as was observed, but the experimenter states that the reaction was unmistakable. With Bokar, on the other hand, Dita was free, playful, self-confident, and friendly. In making these characterizations we cannot be certain that we are not reading human evaluations into chimpanzee behavior, but the evidence indicates that Dita was well-adjusted to Bokar and ill-adjusted to Pan.

The illustration just given suggests that psychogenic differences between mates, reflecting perhaps marked differences in glandular functioning and temperament, may be the basis of friction between mates on the animal level. Differences in learned behavior may also present obstacles. Human beings are of course cultural beings, so that it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the natural group factors in a particular marriage.

The Interrelationship of Institutions

So far we have discussed the family as if it were the only social institution, or as if it existed in isolation from all the other institutions. Actually, the family is only one of a cluster of institutions, all of which are interrelated and interdependent. This idea of the interrelationship of institutions is important because it suggests that the family cannot be adequately understood apart from its place in the social order. For example, family life in the United States today is closely related to industry, government, education, and the church, to mention only the leading institutions. Industry furnishes jobs for most husbands and for many wives. In so doing, it takes them out of the home and separates them from each other and from their children. Such separation does not often occur in a farming economy, and the farmer and his family may not depend upon outside sources for a living. So the family is different in agrarian and industrial society. While modern industry takes one or both parents out of the home for a portion of the day, the school does the same for children over five or six years of age. The school thereby relieves parents in considerable measure of responsibility for the protection and educa-

tion of their children, functions which in earlier times the parents themselves had to assume. Education is a function of the government, which renders many other services for the family. So, too, does the church influence the family. In the United States, only monogamy is permitted by the leading churches as well as by the law. The Mormons abandoned polygamy as a price of admission to the Union, but small groups of dissenters still believe in plural marriage and practice it. Some of the major religions of the world, like Buddhism and Mohammedanism, endorse plural marriage. So the family in Oriental countries may be different from ours because the religion is different. Within the United States, the family life of Roman Catholics is in important respects unlike that of Protestants. Subsequent chapters of this book emphasize the interrelations of the family and other social institutions.

The transfer of functions

The interdependence of institutions implies connections between their functions and, hence, the possibility of the shifting of functions from one institution to another. During the past two hundred years or so, economic production has been shifted from the home to industry. Many functions of education have been transferred from the parents to teachers, while much responsibility for protection and care has been shifted to policemen, firemen, the armed forces, physicians, and nurses. To understand what has happened to the family throughout the ages, and especially in modern times, we must follow the shifts in functions from the family to other institutions. These shifts are reflected in changes in stature, power, and authority of the institutions involved, and are, therefore, highly significant.

PLAN OF THE BOOK

How the functions of the family have changed since earliest times and how the modern family has come to be what it is are sketched in the next two chapters (2 and 3) of this book. This discussion gives us the necessary background for understanding the modern American family, in which the reader presumably has the greatest interest. The diverse ecological, economic, racial, and ethnic aspects of contemporary American family organization are then pictured in considerable detail in Chapters 4–8. This section of the book is concluded by Chapter 9, which undertakes to provide perspective on our family

system by considering how the family is related to the rest of the social order in the United States and in other modern cultures.

The changes that have occurred in the modern family have brought into sharper focus the problems of happiness in marriage and parenthood. These problems are closely related to human personality, for immature and unwholesome personality resulting from psychogenic or cultural factors, or both, is at the root of family maladjustment. Consequently, considerable attention is given in Chapters 10 and 11 to the analysis of personality and the factors that facilitate and hinder its normal development. This interest in the human side of the family is continued in a series of chapters (12–16) concerned with the processes and problems of courting, selecting a mate, and adjustment in marriage. The final section of the book (Chapters 17–20) is concerned with the marked disorganization of modern family life under the impact of rapid social change and with a consideration of the practical programs which are being advanced in the interests of family reorganization and family happiness.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What does the word "dynamic" mean, when applied to the family as a social institution?
2. Why is happiness now regarded as a more important function of family life than in times past?
3. What are the primary functions of the family? The secondary? Are the same functions secondary in all cultures?
4. What does man's biological make-up contribute to his family organization?
5. How does family behavior among the lower animals differ from that of human beings?
6. In what ways is the influence of biology in family experience subordinated to the influence of culture?
7. Show how the maladjustment of biological man and culture is a cause of family problems.
8. What is culture lag and how does it create domestic difficulties?
9. How do psychogenic differences cause family problems?
10. Why is the concept of the interrelationships of institutions important?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. The type parts of the structure of major social institutions (Chapin).
2. The nature of social organization, according to Sumner.
3. Clellan S. Ford, *A Comparative Study of Human Reproduction.* Yale University Publications in Anthropology, number 32 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945).
4. Compare the Table of Contents of this book with that of two other books in the same field. Indicate the significance of similarities and differences noted.
5. A comparative study of family organization in the Trobriand Islands and in the United States. See Joseph K. Folsom, *The Family and Democratic Society*, chap. I (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1943).
6. Examples of culture lag as a cause of family problems in the United States today.

SELECTED READINGS

Chapin, F. Stuart, *Contemporary American Institutions.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935.

An operational definition of institutions, the family included. The data are chiefly on local government, politics and business, but these afford suggestions for re-examining the structure and functions of the contemporary American family in the light of research.

Cooley, C. H., *Social Organization.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922. Part V, "Institutions."

Although abstract and philosophical, furnishes clues to the interrelationships of institutions and the individual.

Cooley, C. H., *Social Process.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922.

See especially Chapter II, a classic statement of organization as the unconscious co-ordination of adaptive behavior.

Groves, Ernest R., *The Family: Its Social Functions.* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1940.

The most comprehensive and incisive discussion of family functions in print. General and theoretical.

Kulp, Daniel H., *Country Life in South China.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1925.

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where nearly all the men belong to the same clan and have the same family name.

MacIver, R. M., *Society: A Textbook of Sociology*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1937.

This book replaces the author's earlier work, *Society: Its Structure and Changes*. An able, lucid analysis of social organization. The terminology follows English rather than American usage.

Sumner, W. G., and Keller, A. G., *The Science of Society*, vol. I, Part I. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927.

Sumner's pioneering analysis of social organization is still in vogue. The above title elaborates upon the discussion of institutional structure and function begun in W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1906), and introduces the concepts of the trifold types of social institutions: those of societal self-maintenance, self-perpetuation, and self-gratification, although these are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Chapter 2

THE FAMILY AND THE EVOLUTION OF MATERIAL CULTURE

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS emerge as the end products of a long evolutionary process, and they cannot be adequately understood without some knowledge of their antecedents. To see our present-day family in proper perspective is to see it in the light of its historical development. This necessitates a study of the family as we find it in simpler societies. We may regard the five hundred or so existing societies of the simpler peoples as so many significant experiments in social organization, and an inquiry into how variable and flexible the family has been in different cultures may be valuable in suggesting the limits of its ability to meet changing conditions. A study of the family in the earliest hunting cultures and of the changes that occurred in it as the material culture developed into our present civilization will afford us a better understanding of family life today and of its possible changes in the future.

THE BEGINNINGS OF FAMILY ORGANIZATION

THE EARLY FAMILY

The family is found in every society known to us, no matter how simple its material culture. Unlike the state or church, the family as a social institution is always present in the simplest cultures and is probably contemporaneous with group living. There is often on the lowest cultural level no constituted, separate leadership that may be called government, probably because no need exists for any such special instrumentality, since the family and various associations

are sufficient for the maintenance of order in the group. Religion, too, is widespread among rudimentary peoples, but in some primitive cultures may lack separate organization. A reason for believing that the family is older than the church is that family life is discernible among the higher apes, but religious behavior is not. The apes probably had to await a fuller development of intellect and imagination. The roots of family experience thus go deeper into the biological nature of man than do those of any other institution except perhaps the economic organization, which rests principally on the hunger drive. The earliest cultural organization was doubtless around sex and hunger, and whether we call it family or economic organization is merely a matter of viewpoint, for in the most elementary societies the two are virtually one. The economic activities are simple and are discharged by families; the father hunts the larger animals; the mother, with the help of the children, gathers wild vegetables, roots, herbs, nuts, fruits, and berries; and the mother prepares the food for consumption. Some hunting of big game like the walrus, buffalo, or caribou may be done by hunting parties made up of men from different families, and some consumption, as at feasts and ceremonials, may be done by a group larger than the individual family, but the family is the principal economic institution, operating through the division of labor between the sexes. Hence, whether one says that the economic life of primitive hunters is organized on a family basis, or that family life is organized for economic as well as biological purposes, is largely a matter of emphasis.

Simian origins

What the family was like before culture reached this stage of evolution is a matter of speculation. While existing primitive societies do throw light on the development of the family and also permit some inferences as to its origins, they unfortunately afford no direct information on the latter, since all present cultures are highly developed compared to those of earliest man. Nor does archeology help us much, for unlike chipped flint and bone, social institutions leave no remains to be dug up.

The evidence from the primates is not good because of the difficulty of observing their habits in the wild state, but it is known that among them male and female live in a more or less durable union. There is difference of opinion as to whether they are mo-

nogamous or polygamous, but it is generally agreed that they are not promiscuous. The gibbon and orang-utan [1] are presumably strictly monogamous, while the chimpanzee, gorilla, and baboon are sometimes monogamous, sometimes polygamous, depending perhaps on the strength of the male and on various adventitious factors. Chimpanzees live in individual families which form bands, sometimes numbering up to fifty members, that forage together for food, but otherwise keep out of one another's way except for occasional fights over females. As earlier noted, in one baboon band described by Zuckerman,[2] there were five monogamous family units, three males that possessed two females apiece, three with three females each, and one, the biggest, with eight. Each family group with its young, and sometimes with an unmated male or bachelor who attached himself to the group, had its own separate existence within the larger band. The evidence from the simians provides a strong basis for the belief that mankind from its beginnings has never been without the family. But the family organization of the apes lacks the customs, standards, and sanctions which characterize the cultural family of even the most rudimentary people. On the origins of these cultural patterns the simians throw little if any light.

The Family in Hunting Cultures

When we find man today even in the simplest societies, he has a highly developed family life. The simplest cultures, from the standpoint of technology, are those of hunters, but there is a good deal of variation even on this level. They all live on roots, nuts, berries, greens, grains, and seeds, supplemented by land and water animals. Some hunters rely chiefly on plant food, like the Hupa Indians who live on acorns, while others depend largely on meat, like the Plains Indians with their buffalo. The food-gatherers are sometimes referred to as the lower hunters, the others as the higher hunters, but there are actually many variations because of differing combinations of gathering and hunting and because of a good deal of difference in

[1] Because the orang-utan is arboreal, it is particularly difficult to learn its habits, but it is thought that the orang-utan forms no group larger than the individual family. Yerkes concludes, though with many misgivings because the evidence is so poor, that in all probability both monogamy and polygamy are discoverable in each of the anthropoid types. Robert M. Yerkes and Ada W. Yerkes, *The Great Apes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), pp. 542–43.

[2] S. Zuckerman, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932).

the richness of material culture. Australian hunters have a very rudimentary technology; the North American Indians a highly developed one. Some hunters, particularly those who (like the Coast tribes of British Columbia) are fishers rather than hunters, live on a higher level than some agriculturalists possessing more advanced techniques for getting food, but in general this is not true. Generalizations may safely be drawn about hunting peoples, only by keeping these variations in mind.

Family and community as forms of economic organization

The economic functions of hunting societies are performed by the family with the assistance of the local community. Hunters live in small groups of families which band together for mutual aid and protection. The size of the band is limited by the amount of food and raw material which can be secured from the environment with the rudimentary techniques and limited transportation available. As a result, hunting bands tend to be small and scattered over a wide area, with settlements ranging from approximately ten to fifteen to one hundred to one hundred and fifty persons. They live in family groups which are frequently related, the elder males being brothers or cousins, so that a community of hunters may be just a few "enlarged families." If such a family consists of an old man and his wife, their two sons and their wives, with from three to four children apiece, it will contain about a dozen people. Four such households comprise an average Australian hunting community.

The smallness of the band makes the individual family a highly important functional unit. Indeed, the family becomes the most important economic organization. When the nature of the hunting activities does not permit of small bands, single families carry on alone. For instance, the Copper Eskimos, who live in villages during the winter when hunting is good, break up into small bands during the warmer season; and then in midsummer, when little but fish is available, further break up into separate families which carry on more or less independently for the season.[1] The irreducible unit is likely to be the family, and not, as might be imagined, individuals living separately. An important reason for this is the great utility of the family as an aid in survival. The division of labor between husband and wife makes for greater efficiency than would exist if

[1] Edward Moffat Weyer, Jr., *The Eskimos* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), p. 112.

the hunter tried to manage alone, and if the woman sought to support herself and her offspring. When the Eskimo hunter returns from his mission in the late afternoon, hungry and tired, he finds hot food awaiting him which the women of his household have prepared. They take his skins and furs which are wet and frozen, and make him warm and comfortable. When his garments are returned to him, they will have been brushed clear of snow and ice, and beaten and even chewed for long hours by the women in order to make the skins soft again. The hunter would be greatly handicapped if he had to do these things himself.

Sex division of labor

In the primitive family, labor is divided rather sharply according to sex. There are few places where men and women share the same jobs, as Figure 1 indicates. In general, the men do the hunting and fighting, while the women care for the children and manage the household. We have already mentioned that the Eskimo women scrape and rub and chew the skins in order to soften them, a task at which they work so steadily that their teeth are finally worn down to the gums. They sew boots, stockings, pants, jackets, caps, mittens, and coats with a bone needle and thread made from sinews. They do the lesser hunting of rabbits and foxes. They have the care of the pups, keeping the litter in the house. They are responsible for trimming the seal-oil lamp, cutting the old wick down or supplying the new wick and blubber. On the other hand, the men manufacture the hunting tools, knives, harpoons, and spears and keep them in repair. They fit up the sledge and ice the runners. They harness and care for the dogs, and they have the principal responsibility in building the igloos, although the women help by patching up the cracks and taking care of the interior.

Division of labor is an efficient device for getting work done, since specialization tends to develop skill. But is division of work on the basis of sex desirable? In the United States today, the Bureau of the Census lists hundreds of positions in which women are employed along with men. Under our practice there may be some gain in closer companionship between the sexes, and some social gain in tapping the creative capacities of both sexes, but the primitive emphasis on sharp division of labor along sex lines makes for efficiency by avoiding duplication and lessens the danger of friction resulting from competitive striving for power.



FIGURE I. SEX SPECIALIZATION IN OCCUPATIONS

Proportionate division of labor (in 224 representative tribes throughout the world). Size of figures shows approximate degree in which each sex participates exclusively, predominantly, or together with other sex. Heavy lines beneath figures indicate approximate total per cent of male or female participation in each occupation (black space for males, white space for females). In primitive societies, the division of labor according to sex is generally sharp. Men and women engaging in the same activity generally handle different aspects of the common task. Although there are exceptions, man's work is based on his superior strength, woman's on her childbearing and home-making functions. Reproduced from Amram Scheinfeld, *Women and Men* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company), p. 293. Data from study by anthropology group at Yale University, under direction of Professor George P. Murdock.

Disciplinary and protective functions

The hunting family has important functions besides the economic ones which it performs alone or in conjunction with the local community. For instance, the hunting family often carries a much heavier responsibility for the conduct of its members than the family in our own urban culture at the present time. With us, if a child troubles the community, his parents are permitted and even expected to try to correct the fault. Failing in this, the authorities take over. The family may chastise the child, but only within limits, or the authorities will step in, this time in defense of the child. The authority of the family is thus strictly limited. By way of contrast, a traveler among the Eskimos reports the case of a boy who had long been a nuisance to the community. On one occasion he called out, "A boat, a boat!" and when a crowd gathered, he pelted them with rotten birds' eggs. We are told that one night the mother of this boy strangled him in his sleep with a noose of sealskin.[1]

Yet the Eskimos are not a cruel people. They take good care of their children and are kind to them, perhaps (from our point of view) excessively so in some respects. If a child cries in the middle of the night, his mother will awaken and brew tea to pacify him. Children are fed in preference to adults and may be given the last bite of food available in the household. "Children First" could be an Eskimo motto. Though the Eskimos are perhaps exceptional in the affection they show for children, hunters generally are exceedingly lenient with young children. A comprehensive survey [2] of all of the major tribes of Amerinds in North America, north of Mexico, reports that corporal punishment, particularly of children up to the age of eight or nine, is at a minimum. The action of the Eskimo mother in taking the life of her son was extreme and exceptional, but she had scarcely any choice in the matter if the group was to be protected. A simple hunting society is not equipped with reformatories, and exile virtually means death.

In our society the action of the mother would be regarded as murder for which she would be held to account, but in hunting societies murder is usually regarded as a private or family affair when committed by a member of the local group, and the community as a

[1] Peter Freuchen, *Arctic Adventure* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1935), pp. 123–24.

[2] George A. Pettit, *Primitive Education in North America: Its Processes and Effects* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, 1940).

whole does not intervene. To understand this, we must note that such societies may have little or no formal government. An informal council of older or influential men handles problems affecting the whole group, such as ceremonial offenses, breaches of the marriage law, or disturbances caused by outsiders, but under any circumstances as much responsibility as possible is reserved to the family. If a member of Family A kills a member of Family B, the murderer or some member of his family will be killed in turn by one of his victim's relatives. From this it is easy to see the development of blood feuds such as are known to us in our Southern mountains and elsewhere, where the transition from the family to civil authority has not yet been fully effected. Actually, feuds among primitive peoples are not permitted to continue indefinitely, and various honorable methods of settlement are provided by custom, such as compensation in goods and ceremonial redress.

Our description of the family in hunting cultures, though brief, reveals a strong institution, with many important economic and protective functions supplementing the basic sexual and reproductive ones. The local group shares in the performance of certain of these economic and protective functions, but the frequent absence of formal governmental organization often leaves the family predominant. On the lowest levels of material culture, then, the family functions as man's most powerful ally in the struggle for existence.

THE FAMILY AND THE GROWTH OF CULTURE

But the family was destined to achieve even greater stature as civilization developed. In due course, two great developments gradually transformed the hunting life and replaced it with new forms of economic organization. One was the domestication of animals, especially large ones like cattle, which meant a continuous supply of food and also of power. The second was agriculture, or the planting of seeds or tubers, which likewise meant greater abundance and stability of the food supply, since many kinds of seeds could be stored. The opportunities to develop the soil were more abundant than those to tame the horse, cow, llama, or caribou because of the distribution of the raw materials, and because few large wild animals breed well in captivity. Hence agriculturalists far outnumbered

pastoralists. The two types of systems developed independently, and are on a par as levels of economic culture. In some places hunting evolved into the one, elsewhere into the other. Planting is generally regarded as having developed out of woman's work, while the exceedingly difficult business of taming the big wild animals was naturally man's work — a distinction which has great significance for the relationship between the sexes, as we shall shortly see. Later, with the development of the plow and the diffusion of domesticated animals, the two cultures combined into the type of farm that is so familiar to us.

Hoe Culture

In the early stages of agriculture, the soil was worked with the hoe rather than the plow. It will be recalled that in hunting cultures the women collect wild vegetable food, and so it is generally believed that women were responsible for the invention of horticulture, the dibble (digging stick), and the hoe. In any case, in societies where clearing, digging, and planting are regular practices, women do the field work, using the digging stick as the principal tool. Edible roots, grains, and fruits come to constitute a bigger part of the food supply, but the men are still principally concerned with hunting and fishing. The harder work of clearing the land is frequently done by the men, and the men usually do the major part of the work in the fields where horticulture is practiced intensively, as among the Pueblo Indians.[1] Still, it is evident that women perform more varied and important economic functions in this type of economy than in hunting cultures. So it is not surprising to find that the women in hoe cultures generally occupy a more favorable position than women in hunting cultures. For instance, investigation has shown that the largest percentage of groups in which the bride's consent to marriage is required is to be found on the hoe level.[2] In contrast, it is observed that the status of women is generally lowest in pastoral cultures, where the care of the flocks and herds is almost invariably a male occupation. These findings suggest that the position of woman, with its vital bearings on family life, is dependent on her economic rôle in the group.

[1] Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1920), p. 183.

[2] L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1930), p. 158.

In the hoe culture there are no large domestic animals, only small ones like poultry and pigs. The arts are developed beyond those of the hunting stage, but metal work is still lacking, and textile products and pottery are rudimentary. Still the hoe culture carries certain important implications for family life. For one thing, it represents a step toward more permanent settlement with better housing. In the hunting cultures, the food in a given region ultimately becomes exhausted or difficult to obtain; so the band moves on a short distance to a region where the prospects are better, and returns to the original area when the food supply is replenished. The mobile life of hunters prevents the development to a high level of housing, pottery, or other crafts. However, horticulture sometimes represents but little advance over hunting, because methods of working the soil are poorly developed and the group must likewise move on when the soil is depleted.

Plow Culture

The tendency to establish more permanent settlements, with advanced housing and a larger population, is greatly promoted by the use of the plow and draft cattle. This is the level of highest agriculture, utilizing irrigation, manuring, and rotation of crops. Flocks and herds are kept on the farm. The handicrafts have become highly developed and organized into specialized industries in metal, woodwork, and textiles. Pottery is now turned on the potter's wheel and glazed. The existence of such specialized industries brings regular trade. This is the picture of the level of material culture in the Near East, extending from the early historical period — that is, from 5000 or 6000 B.C. to the present. The plow belongs to Egypt, Babylonia, India, and China, one of which is thought to have originated it and transmitted it to the rest.[1] The plow was introduced into Europe about 1000 B.C. but was unknown in the New World when Columbus visited it. The Aztecs built a great culture, including the domesticated llama, but they never acquired the plow. Nor did the highly developed cultures of the Negroes of Africa, which were in good position to borrow from the civilization of the Nile, advance beyond the use of the hoe in farming.

Intensive farming, whether done by plow or hoe, and the keeping

[1] Robert H. Lowie, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1934), p. 28.

of herds led to the development of a higher standard of living; that is, to appreciably more wealth. This meant that it was possible for the group to support a larger population, and so larger communities developed. Under the hunting culture, local groups were small because a large area, from one square mile to as much as ten or more square miles, was needed to support one person. The Tasmanians, who possessed the lowest material culture of all preliterate groups visited by modern man, numbered only from two to five thousand, yet they inhabited an area of twenty-six thousand square miles, half the size of New York State.[1] By way of contrast, the farmers of Peru were able to support a population of possibly three million. In the agricultural economy, wealth accumulates in houses, which tend to be more substantial than those of hunters; in pottery, which hunters lack; in the numerous products of the spinning stick and the loom; in the usufructs of the land; and in domestic animals. Land at first continues to be held in common ownership and is parceled out by the group to individual families for their use, but the products of the land belong to those who work it. If the planting and harvesting are done co-operatively, the food belongs to the families collectively. In due course, since agriculture tends to foster individual ownership of farm lands, land becomes an important source of wealth.

The development of wealth in agriculture, in animal breeding, and in the steady growth of the handicrafts, meant that the family was steadily gaining in stature as an institution. Strong from the beginning, it was becoming more and more powerful. This came about because the family was well adapted to the new economic developments, and so could be elaborated as an economic institution. When farming is mentioned, the family comes quickly to mind, so closely and appropriately are the two related.

To sum up: Man has inhabited the earth for over half a million years. How he lived during most of this long span is a matter of speculation, but when we first find him at the lowest level of material culture he is a hunter, fisher, and collector of wild food. His economic life is organized about the family, along lines of division of labor between the sexes. At the beginning of culture, perhaps about one hundred thousand years ago, it is probable that the great-

[1] George Peter Murdock, *Our Primitive Contemporaries* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 1.

est part of man's organized existence was spent as a hunter and that the family played a major rôle in the long economic struggle for existence. Only ten or fifteen thousand years ago, two revolutionary inventions, agriculture and the domestication of animals, made it possible for man to begin his career as a farmer and breeder of livestock. The family, being well adapted to the new changes, was further developed as an economic institution, and farm and family became a significant combination. This partnership was strengthened about five thousand years ago when the people of Egypt and Babylonia, after learning to smelt copper and then later to mix it with tin to make bronze, invented the first cart and the first potter's wheel. These inventions and others that followed increased the standard of living greatly. As the economic organization grew, the family which was the vehicle of this economy grew likewise, and increased in importance.

The stages of economic culture (hunting, hoe, herding, and varied agriculture) outlined in preceding paragraphs offer us a valuable frame of reference for our analysis of primitive family customs, but certain observations must be made regarding these stages of development. They are descriptive only of the level of economic culture reached by a group, and in no way imply evaluation of other aspects of the culture. Thus, it is not suggested that the Australian aborigines who have a rudimentary hunting culture are less advanced in their development, all things considered, than the African natives who are farmers. In their religious and ceremonial life, for instance, the Australians have developed beyond many peoples with a more advanced material culture.[1] It is, however, very difficult to evaluate religious life in terms of higher or lower order, or sometimes even in terms of relative complexity. Material cultures are more easily classified in a series than are social organizations, because the superiority of a new tool over an old one is readily determined by its physical performance, while the value of a social organization cannot be determined by any such simple test. The stages of material culture can thus be used as pegs on which to hang the various customs pertaining to family life. This enables us to determine what relationship, if any, exists between these customs and the factor of technology. In this manner we have already observed that the status of

[1] William E. Lawrence, "Alternating Generations in Australia," *Studies in the Science of Society*, ed. G. P. Murdock (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), pp. 319–54.

woman tends to be highest in hoe cultures and lowest in pastoral societies. We shall consider other correlations in later paragraphs.

VARIATIONS IN FAMILY ORGANIZATION

The Conjugal Family

A common form of the family among preliterates is our own type, an organization consisting of husband and wife and offspring. Each family is an independent unit, functioning apart from other units of the same sort. Sometimes additional members may be added to the group, like relatives or adopted children, but there is no formal connection between the simple biological family and any larger domestic organization.

The conjugal family emphasizes privacy and the cultivation of strong sentiments of affection between mates, but it has certain serious disadvantages from the standpoints of continuity and economic efficiency. Such an organization is formed at marriage and dissolved at death. The children, at an age when they could be of greatest economic value to the family, leave it to form families of their own. These new units are likely to be less efficient than the parental ones, since the young are less experienced. Where property is involved, continuity is effected through rules of inheritance. But such a small family is, on the whole, not the most effective unit for performing certain economic and social functions.

The Consanguine Family Organization

In the light of the foregoing observation, we shall not be surprised that the biological family of parents and children is not the only type of family organization. Indeed, a much more common variety among primitive peoples is a family where the emphasis is on blood kin; that is, brothers and sisters, or parents and offspring. The ties between these individuals are in many ways stronger than those between mates. When the primitive husband goes to live with his wife's family, he is regarded as being a bit of an outsider. Family means "kin," and the person one marries is not kin. The wife's brother continues to have great influence with her, and gives her advice on how to rear her children. If discipline has to be administered he, and not the child's father, provides it. Relatives on the mother's

side are counted far and wide, while the husband's relatives are not considered kin. The blood group or clan remains primary in inheritance, in feud obligations, in defining economic responsibilities, and especially in ceremonial affiliations. Indicative of the special importance of the blood tie among preliterates is the fact that it involves religious considerations,[1] while marriage may be a secular matter.

Why the emphasis on kin? It may be noted that organization based on blood ties possesses certain elements of stability lacking in the marital bond. Children are brought up together from infancy. They need not be limited in number to two and they may continue to function as a unit even after they are married. Where the blood tie is the basis of domestic organization, the unit is referred to as the consanguineous family.[2] This type of organization does not exist among the simians, while the simple biological family does; hence it is thought that the blood type probably represents a higher level of social evolution than the conjugal type. However, with the further evolution of material culture, the consanguineous family has tended to disappear, particularly in the western world.

To emphasize still further the importance which preliterate peoples attach to the blood tie, it may be noted that even where the prevailing type of domestic organization is the conjugal and not the consanguineous, preliterates attach more importance to the blood factor than we do. In our society today a husband may inherit his deceased wife's separate property, and vice versa; and the property of both spouses descends legally to the children of the remaining spouse unless there is a will to the contrary. In the absence of such special testamentary disposition, a husband's claims to his deceased wife's property take precedence over the claims of her parents and blood kin. Among primitives, the situation is reversed. Almost never does a husband inherit property from his wife or a wife from a husband, nor do the children have prior rights to property belonging to both parents. Instead, the property descends to the blood relatives of the deceased spouse. We should expect this to be true in unilateral societies where descent is traced only through the mother or only through the father, in which case the other parent is regarded as an

[1] Simon Marcson, "Some Methodological Consequences of Correlational Analysis in Anthropology," *American Anthropologist*, 45:588–601, October–December, 1943.

[2] Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936), chap. X.

outsider, belonging to a different clan; but among societies with bilateral kinship as well, property descends, not from the husband to the wife, but to his blood relatives. Among the bilateral Arapaho, for example, a dead man's brother lays claim to his property, and the wife and children may be left destitute. Likewise, upon the wife's death among the bilateral Kai of New Guinea, all her property goes to her brothers.[1] Thus, the system of consanguinal inheritance exists even where the family is bilaterally organized, where the children are regarded as related to both parents, and where no formal clan organization exists.

In the consanguineous family, the marital tie is minimized to the point where one of the parents is not regarded as related to the children. That is to say, a system of unilateral kinship obtains in such families, with descent traced through the mother's line or the father's line, but not through both. A matrilineal family comprises a woman, her children of both sexes, the children of her daughters, of her daughters' daughters, and so on. The woman's husband does not belong to this group, but belongs instead to his mother's clan. In case of divorce, he may return to his mother's or his sister's house. Where descent is patrilineal, the family consists of a patriarch, his children, and the children of his male descendants through males. As to why certain societies are organized on the one basis rather than the other, there seems to be no apparent logical reason, and the causes must be sought in the cultural history of the particular people. Both systems occur on all levels, but pastoralists appear to be decidedly patrilineal.[2]

The marital tie is minimized by the practice of having the husband or wife take up residence at the home of the other's people. If the husband comes from another village, he will be somewhat a stranger in his mother-in-law's family. This is because primitive communities are small and have the character of isolated places as a result of the poorly developed means of transportation and communication. If the husband goes to live with his wife's family, the system is one of matrilocal residence; if the converse, one of patrilocal residence. Patrilineal societies, it appears, are invariably patrilocal, while matrilineal cultures may be either matrilocal or patrilocal. Prob-

[1] Ruth Benedict, "Marital Property Rights in Bilateral Society," *American Anthropologist*, 38:369-72, July–September, 1936.

[2] L. T. Hobhouse *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

ably somewhat more than one half of all preliterate societies practice patrilocal residence, but it is difficult to fix the ratio because sometimes we find a combination of the two, or a shift from one type to the other.



FIGURE 2. STRUCTURE OF THE MATERNAL FAMILY

In the maternal family system the conjugal relationship is not so important as it is with us, whereas the unilateral blood ties are emphasized a great deal more. The descendants of a son are counted in the family line of his wife.

Exogamy and Endogamy

In societies organized on the clan basis, members must go outside the group to marry, and in some cases a mate must be chosen from outside the community. The reasons for exogamy — the requirement that marriage take place outside the group — are not entirely clear, but are consistent with the incest taboo, which is universal. Among the many hundreds of existing cultures, the marriage of mother and son is universally prohibited, and with rare exception the union of father and daughter. In a few cases, as in ancient Egypt, Hawaii, and Peru, brothers and sisters have been required to marry, but this occurred mainly among the ruling class who were thought to be divine and whose blood therefore had to be kept pure. Such prescription of inbreeding (endogamy) may coexist with exogamy, as

is clear from the laws in the United States which prevent the marriage of first cousins, while enjoining marriage with someone of the same race.

As suggested, the reasons are not clear for the prohibition of marriage between members of the same clan who are real or hypothetical kin traced through either the mother's or father's line. In the case of the Chinese, for example, those who have the same surname may not intermarry. However, some light is shed on this problem if it is understood that primitive peoples do not have the same kind of kinship system that we do. For instance, a Zulu native will use the same term in addressing his brother's and his sister's children that he does in speaking of his own sons and daughters, and the children of his father's sister are classed with his brothers and sisters.[1] Primitive communities are generally small, including only a few families containing perhaps twenty to thirty persons, to all of whom kinship is attributed. As the group expands, the kinship terminology remains the same, so that all the members of the larger unit are still classed as relatives even though they may actually not be related by blood.

As to the origin of the incest taboo, there is no positive knowledge, only much speculation. Because of the universal character of the phenomenon, some of the earlier authorities [2] sought to account for it on an inherent or instinctual basis, but this explanation has been discredited, since no such taboo exists among the primates, nor can any specific physiological foundation for such an aversion be found in man. If, moreover, there is an instinctive revulsion against incestuous union, why the taboo with severe penalties imposed for violation? This question has been raised by Freud,[3] who argues that there is no inherent revulsion against incest but rather an inherent inclination toward it. This theory of the Oedipus and Electra complexes, however, is also of doubtful validity when held to have a universal or instinctive basis.[4]

Another hypothesis is that primitive man avoided inbreeding because of its dysgenic effects. This explanation is difficult to accept,

[1] Robert H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology* (New York: Douglas C. McMurtie, 1917), p. 111.

[2] Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1920). Lowie cites with approval Hobhouse's instinctual theory.

[3] Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo* (New York: Dodd Mead Company, 1927).

[4] Robert Sears, *Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts* (New York: Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 51, 1943).

since inbreeding produces ill effects only when there is identical weakness on both sides, and it may produce strength if the genes bring together good traits, as every breeder of plants and animals knows. There is, thus, no biological reason why cousins should not marry if the stock is good, although, if there is any defect present, the chances are greater that cousins will share it and thus reproduce it than will unrelated persons. The widespread existence in primitive society of so-called cross-cousin marriage as a preferential pattern, as will shortly be shown, would also seem to suggest that eugenic considerations were not determining factors back of the incest taboo.

A further interesting point [1] is that individuals who grow up together in the same household do not develop sexual interest in each other. It is known that in the relation between the sexes distance lends enchantment, and the alluring stranger generally allures partly because he is strange. There is an old Finnish custom of sending a daughter on a long visit to relatives who live at a distance, in order to interrupt the habit of association with her family. On her return, she was received as a complete stranger and married to her brother.[2] The practice is an interesting one, for it shows the desire of the agricultural family to keep intact its organization of valuable workers, and it shows also that there is no innate abhorrence of inbreeding; but it still leaves unexplained the reason for the taboo against incest. Probably the most illuminating observations on this score are made by Malinowski,[3] who sees in incest a condition likely to disrupt the social organization of the family. Since social status and social rôles are dependent on age distinctions, patterns like filial respect and obedience would be seriously disturbed by incestuous unions. At the same time, marriage outside the group (exogamy) would have the effect of extending the area of peace and friendship and of diminishing the area of hostility among adjoining groups. Perhaps the most satisfactory interpretation of the incest taboo, therefore, is that it helps both to preserve the balance of family organization and to encourage the enlargement of the area of good will among men.

[1] Jeremy Bentham, *The Theory of Legislation* (London: Trübner and Company, 1871); E. B. Tylor, "On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 18:245, 1888–89.

[2] W. I. Thomas, *Primitive Behavior* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937), p. 194.

[3] B. Malinowski, *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927).

Moiety-exogamy

Exogamy, in strict usage, means marriage outside the clan or other in-group (e.g., village), which ordinarily leaves the individual a wide area of choice within the other clans of the tribe. But sometimes the margin of choice is further restricted when the tribe is divided into two large exogamic groups called moieties, and members of one moiety are limited in their choice of mates to members of the other moiety,[1] as is the case with the Aruntas whose system is diagrammed below:



The Southern Aruntas are divided into two large exogamic groups, or moieties, the Nakrakia and Mulyanuka, each of which in turn consists of two *marriage classes*. The working principle is this: a child belongs to the same moiety as his father but to the other marriage class. When he is ready to marry, he must select a mate from the other moiety, but may choose from either class. For example, if a Bulthara man and a Purula woman are married, their children belong to Panunga. A Panunga child must wed a member of Purula or Kumara. This illustration suggests how much more complex the organization of mating may be in a simple society than in our own, and how much more limited may be the number of potential mates available to any one person. The much larger size and greater mobility of modern communities mean that the individual nowadays has a bigger field from which to choose a marriage partner.

Preferential mating

An interesting custom, found in one third or more of all primitive tribes, is the inheritance by a man (usually a younger brother) of his deceased brother's widow.[2] Numerous references to this practice of the levirate occur in the Old Testament, and it would seem to represent an interesting type of family insurance against insecurity. The obligation among the Hebrews to take such a widow was partic-

[1] Choice may be even further restricted to a portion of the members of the other moiety, so that only one quarter of the population of the opposite sex is available as potential mates, or even only one tenth.

[2] Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1920), p. 33.

ularly strong where the brother had died young, before children had been born of the marriage, for wherever it was possible it was the duty of every male to raise seed to the memory of his departed brother. Also, in some primitive cultures, if a man loses his first wife, he marries her sister, a practice referred to as the sororate. A variation of the practice is for a man to marry the sister while the first wife still lives. Under these conditions the death of the wife and mother does not disrupt the family as it otherwise would, and the functions of the group continue with a minimum of disturbance.

A further variety of preferential mating is so-called "cross-cousin" marriage, where preference is shown for marriage between the children of a brother and sister, with concomitant avoidance of the parallel-cousin union, or the marriage of children of two sisters or two brothers. The system as it exists among the Trobriand Islanders is diagrammed below:



FIGURE 3. DIAGRAMMATIC GENEALOGY OF CROSS-COUSIN MARRIAGE

Cultural rules and biological principles are not always in conformity. The regulations of marriage among many preliterate peoples are very complicated and one may well wonder how they originated. Marriage is a social as well as a biological function. Bronislaw Malinowski, *The Sexual Life of Savages in Northwestern Melanesia* (New York: H. Liveright, 1929), p. 97.

Why such unions should be preferred is not definitely known, but an interesting speculation is that in Trobriand they represent a compromise between the love of the father for his own children and the matrilineal system that exists in the society. Under the latter, a man's son's children are regarded as belonging only to the female line, which means that in a sense the children are lost to the original family, or at least to the father. But if the son's marriage is with his father's sister's daughter, the matrilineal arrangement may prevail and the son still be kept within the family.[1]

Forms of Marriage

Ours is a strictly monogamous family organization, with no other arrangement permitted, but in the great majority of preliterate cultures polygyny is the preferred type.[2] Even so, in such societies only a small fraction of all the men will have plural wives and most will have only one, because of the difficulty of supporting a larger number. For instance, we are told that among the Menabe of the hills of Madagascar, the men are allowed to have a number of wives, but two thirds of the families are monogamous.[3] The approximate equality of the sexes in any society is also a strong factor for monogamy, but this factor may be outweighed by the tendency of the stronger males to deprive the weaker ones of their portion. Although polygyny is compatible with the excess of women which generally exists in elementary societies of hunting people because of the greater death rate of the males who do the hunting, interestingly enough polygynous marriages are more common among pastoral peoples [4] than among hunters,[5] which suggests that an excess of women is not crucial to polygyny and that cultural factors are more important.

One reason for a greater incidence of polygyny among herders is that at this level of achievement the material culture has attained a rather high degree of development, which leads to more emphasis on

[1] This explanation, however, does not hold in other cultures where other varieties of cross-cousin marriage obtain.

[2] In their large sample of primitive societies of all levels of material culture, Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg found 378½ tribes that were polygynous, 72 that were strictly monogamous, and 31 that were polyandrous. *Op. cit.*, p. 159 ff. Note that the total for the third column should be 63½, not 57½.

[3] Ralph Linton, *The Tanala, A Hill Tribe of Madagascar* (Chicago: Anthropological Service, 1933), pp. 132–33.

[4] Some women are obtained by capture among pastoral nomads, but the number is probably seldom great enough to affect the sex ratio very much.

[5] Hobhouse *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

goods and wealth and class differences than among hunters generally, and extra wives become an impressive way in which a rich man may display his wealth and his power. Also in pastoral society the work of the women is not so important as in hunting and agricultural society, for the care of the herds which furnish most of the food and wealth is man's work. Yet it must not be thought that primitive women regard polygyny as a great burden, for on the contrary it affords them many advantages which they enjoy and seek to perpetuate. Under polygyny, the chances of getting married are greater for women than under monogamy. Besides, if there are a number of women in a household they may take turns preparing meals or caring for the children, and so the work is lightened; they enjoy the pleasure



FIGURE 4. CULTURAL VARIATION IN FORM OF MARRIAGE

Among preliterates, polygyny is the most common permissible system of mating and polyandry the least common, but even in polygynous cultures, most marriages are actually monogamous because of the pressure of the sex ratio and because of economic factors. The chances of death are often much greater among male adults than among females. The categories used above obscure differences for sub-classes, as between higher and lower hunters, and between hoe and plow culture. Data from L. T. Hobhouse *et al.*, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1930), pp. 159 ff.

of one another's company; and they can join together in collective bargaining to the disadvantage of the head of the household. This does not mean that jealousy does not exist in the polygynous household, for it does.[1] But jealous or not, women accustomed to polygyny are as ardent in support of their system as we are in support of ours.

In the Hobhouse survey, not a single "higher" pastoral tribe was found with compulsory monogamy, but the practice was most common among the lower agriculturalists, where it existed in 25 per cent of the cases. These findings are in keeping with the status of women on the two levels. It will be recalled that women occupy a relatively unfavorable position in pastoral societies and a relatively favorable position in hoe cultures. But since strict monogamy also exists among people with the crudest material culture, like the Andaman Islanders and the Veddahs of eastern Ceylon, there is reason to believe that monogamy was an early development.

Polyandry, the most infrequent type of organization, is interesting because it goes counter to the fundamental biological tendency of the male to demand exclusive possession of the female, if we may judge from the behavior of the simians. Here again is evidence that the cultural influences may transcend the biological. In some places, as among the Eskimos, polyandry is associated with a scarcity of women, but such scarcity is rare, since almost everywhere women outnumber men because the hazards of life are greater for the male than for the female. A shortage of women may be due to the practice of female infanticide. Among the Todas, for instance, there are from 127 to 259 males for one hundred females, because of infanticide. But what gives rise to infanticide? The usual explanation is extreme poverty and a country in which the services of women are not valued highly, but there are much poorer groups than the Todas who do not practice either infanticide or polygyny. The Tibetans are polyandrous but lack infanticide. And the Chinese are infanticidal without being polyandrous. Poverty and infanticide may be factors in polyandry, but they are not universal or sole factors, and must be

[1] As an illustration, rivalry between the women in polygynous West African households reveals itself in "bitter songs of allusion" and in the favoritism which each mother shows toward her own children. Among the Yoruban and Dahomean peoples, each family inhabits a compound, a group of houses surrounded by a wall or hedge. Each wife has a separate dwelling, while the husband has a house of his own where each wife lives with him in turn. The mother-child tie is strengthened by this arrangement. M. J. Herskovits, *Dahomey*, vol. I; P. A. Talbot, *The Peoples of Southern Nigeria*, vol. II.

Bettmann

PLATE 3. A NEW ENGLAND FARM KITCHEN ABOUT 1850

The farm family of the early nineteenth century was a tower of strength built upon a foundation of economic self-sufficiency. With few exceptions, what the family required, it produced itself. The family was larger than now, since even young children were useful in the kitchen and on the farm.

Bettmann

PLATE 4. THE PARLOR OF A NEW ENGLAND HOME OF THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

Since the villages in which most families lived were small and there were few houses other than those occupied by families, the home of the era before the Industrial Revolution was the center of social, educational, recreational, and religious activities. These multifarious functions made the home a highly important institution.



PLATE 5. AN AMISH BARN-RAISING PARTY

The Amish family, because of cultural isolation, retains many of the features of the farm family of centuries ago. As in an economy without money, the Amish exchange labor. From the SUNDAY SUN, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND.

considered along with other economic, religious, and ideological factors in particular instances. For instance, in the remote mountains of the Himalayas, where arable land is scarce, a number of brothers marry one wife and all the offspring are regarded as the children of the oldest brother. When the brothers die, their estate becomes the property of the sons, who in turn marry one wife. Polygyny is, accordingly, associated with a system of land tenure that prevents the subdivision and fragmentation of holdings, and transmits an estate intact from generation to generation.[1]

Group marriage, or the union of a number of males with a number of females, need only be mentioned in passing, since there is some doubt if an established instance of the practice can be found. A few cases have been cited by ethnologists, but these appear to describe a transitional state of affairs rather than any permanent arrangement. Thus, when Toda infanticide was abandoned under white influence, the sex ratio fell from 140.6 in 1871 to 127.4 in 1901,[2] and the persistence of the habit of sharing wives was continued with some modification, a group of brothers now jointly taking two or more wives instead of the single one as before. Group marriage as a possible form of organization is in any case to be distinguished from general promiscuity, which in primitive society is nonexistent among adults, although it sometimes occurs among youth. The moral code of primitive peoples may sometimes not resemble ours, but always there is strict regulation of some sort, with punishment for violation of the code.

Status of Women

The important question of the relative status of women in primitive and in modern society has already been touched upon in preceding paragraphs, but the answer is complex and involves a number of additional considerations. There is the question of the division of labor and the related question as to which sex works the harder. As has been stated, primitive men generally do the hunting and fighting, while the women care for the children and manage the household. There is not a little variation, and scarcely any jobs are exclusively reserved to the one sex or the other throughout the primitive world. Thus, spinning is usually done by the women in

[1] Y. S. Parmar, *Himalayan Polyandry* (Lucknow, India: Lucknow University Library, 1943).
[2] R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 46–47.

primitive society, but among the Hopi it is done by men. Contrariwise, farming with a plow is almost invariably a function of the men, but in modern Kafirstan the women do the plowing.[1] Such variation notwithstanding, there are certain jobs that are usually regarded as men's work and certain other jobs that are women's work, and seldom in any given society do the two sexes share the same jobs.

As to the relative difficulty of the work done by men and women, it is not easy to make a general statement, since the type of work is so different for each sex, but there is no justification for believing that the women commonly are drudges and the victims of exploitation. Women's work may be more monotonous, regular, and unremitting, but the work of the men, as in hunting and fighting, is more strenuous and hazardous, and nearly everywhere their wives generally outlive them.[2]

The treatment of women is another aspect of their status, as is also the degree of their participation in government and their legal position in the group. As to the first of these, it is generally true among primitives that the men have the "right" of chastisement over the women, and this right is exercised with the approval of the women. The origin of this pattern is not clear, but there may be a suggestion in the fact that the male gibbon is always bigger than his mate and may handle her roughly if she displeases him. There are some places where the men do not chastise the women, but none where the women chastise the men. Political activities, primitive women usually leave to the men, but there are exceptions, one of the most notable being the Iroquois matrons who exercised considerable political influence, extending even to the election of the chief, who had, however, to be a male. In this connection it may be pointed out that a considerable discrepancy oftentimes exists between the legal rights of women and traditional practice, either of which may be greater or less than the other, just as at present in the United States the legal basis exists for having a woman president without much expectation that this is likely to come to pass. Even so, it is

[1] Franz Boas, ed., *General Anthropology* (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1938), p. 299.

[2] For example, in North Greenland, exclusive of Thule, in 1921, there were 96 girls per 100 boys in the age group 0 to 9 years, but 115 females per 100 males in the age group 10 years and over. (Kaj Birket-Smith, "The Greenlanders of the Present Day," *Greenland*, 2:22, 1928.) The approximate equality of the sexes in childhood indicates that the practice of infanticide is rare in Greenland.

obvious that modern American women, with their personal, civil, and economic rights, enjoy a status more nearly like that of the men than do primitive women generally. Judged by modern standards, the position of the latter is unfavorable.[1]

Divorce

Another interesting inquiry concerns the relative stability of primitive and modern family life. Discussions of primitive divorce are handicapped by the fact that no reliable statistics are available; but certain crude comparisons can be made, keeping in mind some of the more important factors influencing the stability of marriage, such as economic considerations, religion, and children. The principal tie between mates in preliterate society is generally the economic one. The strength of this varies with the number and nature of the economic functions performed which are rather extensive in agricultural society but few and simple among early hunters. Lack of numerous important economic ties between mates constitutes a serious threat to permanent union, especially when speedy remarriage is possible, as it generally is among preliterates; therefore, the emphasis rests on filling the marital rôle rather than on playing it with any particular person. Religion, through its teachings and prohibitions, often operates to conserve marriages, but among primitives, marriage and divorce are almost always secular in nature and have no connections with the religious life. Children, especially when they are small and dependent, also help to keep a marriage intact, and they doubtless serve to do so in primitive society, although the effect is probably less than with us today because of the greater security which the children of broken homes find in their small communities made up almost entirely of relatives and friends. This is especially true where the family is organized on the consanguineous basis, as it generally is. Observers are agreed that divorce occurs rather infrequently among those who have been married a long time. The Comanche Indians, for instance, had a high divorce rate; there were considerably more divorces, according to one observer, than there were adult couples,

[1] The position of women is generally higher in hoe cultures than in plow cultures. Women were found to have an inferior status in 73 per cent of the agricultural and 87.5 per cent of the pastoral tribes in the Hobhouse sample. (*Op. cit.*, pp. 174–75.) Important geographic differences were noted, with Asia, Oceania, South America, North America, Africa, and Australia taking positions in this order when arranged according to increasingly favorable status, but the results have been criticized as being based on inadequate criteria.



FIGURE 5. A YUKAGHIR LOVE LETTER

(After Jochelson.) The above letter, scratched on a sheet of birch bark in frigid Siberia, shows that the romantic sentiment is not an exclusive trait of our culture, but exists among preliterates too. Conventional symbols are used. The figure at the left, resembling a folded umbrella, represents the boy, the beloved one; the wider figure of the same design depicts the girl who is writing to him; the crossed stripes above her signify grief, while the connecting bars mean love; and the incomplete house betokens desertion. A translation might be: "Thou goest hence, beloved, and I bide alone. For thy sake I weep and moan." Psychoanalysts might see other meanings in the symbolism. From Robert H. Lowie, *Are We Civilized?* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929), p. 130.

not because everyone had been divorced, but because the difference had been made up by the numerous repeaters who changed partners as many as eight or ten times. But even among the Comanches divorces became infrequent after the age of thirty-five.[1]

The situation among preliterates is not uniform. There is considerable variation for different places, depending on a number of factors, like the existence or nonexistence of certain ideologies, the

[1] Ralph Linton, in correspondence with the author.

payment of a bride price, and a clan organization.[1] Some very rudimentary peoples like the Veddahs of Ceylon have strict taboo against divorce. These differences on purely legal grounds are comparable to our own differences in divorce laws, like those between South Carolina which outlaw divorce and those of Nevada which make divorce easy. The payment of a bride price acts as a deterrent to divorce, since the price may have to be returned by the bride's parents if she leaves her husband. Likewise a strongly extended family organization is able to bring pressure upon its members to prevent them from dissolving their marriages. Mechanisms of bride price and the extended family help to give the Tanala of Madagascar an exceedingly low divorce rate.

Factors Affecting the Form and Functions of the Family

The variation observed in the divorce rate, status of women, sexual division of labor, forms of marriage, and other domestic phenomena of preliterates brings to the fore the important question of the factors responsible for such differences. We have seen that a number of these data are correlated with the level of material culture. There is more polygyny on the higher economic levels; the status of the male is highest in pastoral and plow cultures; housing is more highly developed in settled agricultural society; matrilocal residence is associated with hoe culture, and patrilocal residence with pastoral culture; an increase in the practice of giving some consideration for the bride, such as price, gift, service, or exchange, occurs as the level of economic culture advances. This approach is a promising one and doubtless further correlations could be established if more research were undertaken.

However, the reader has doubtless observed that these correlations are not perfect, and in some cases, as with the ease of divorce in preliterate societies, no relationship whatever with the level of culture has been established. This means that technology, even though in general the most important single determinant of family organization,

[1] Hobhouse and his associates obtained information on 271½ tribes and reported that no divorce was permitted in 4 per cent; divorce at the will of either party or by mutual consent existed in 48 per cent; divorce at the will of the husband only 23 per cent; divorce for specified causes only, such as sterility or adultery, in 24 per cent. There were only a few places where divorce might be secured only at the will of the wife. The figures just given indicate that usually divorce is available on equal terms to both sexes. No correlation was found between ease of divorce and level of material culture. However, these findings on divorce have been criticized by some anthropologists as being based on inadequate data.

is nevertheless not the sole factor, and that in particular situations it can be outweighed by other considerations. Additional factors are the amount of property, the size of the community, the state of the other social institutions, the biology of man, the sex ratio, the power of tradition, and diffusion. Since the rôle of a number of these factors was indicated in the discussion of the various forms of marriage, the status of woman, etc., a single additional illustration may suffice to show how one or another of these factors may offset the influence of technology. In general, although women appear to have a lower status in hunting and pastoral cultures than in hoe societies, the status of women is lower in the garden cultures of Melanesia and South America than in the hunting tribes of the Veddah and Andaman Islanders, while the pastoral life does not appear to have been hostile to the status of Hottentot women.[1] The explanation lies in historical and geographical considerations; that is, in the diffusion among these peoples of patterns of behavior developed elsewhere. Borrowing helps to explain why peoples with diverse material cultures share certain family practices. Once established, a conception tends to persist because of sheer inertia, and because of the need to set the ideological norm.

Evolution of the Family

With this discussion of the family life of primitives before us, the question may now be asked as to whether family life since early times has moved in any particular direction or followed any pattern of evolution. Writers of the past century thought they detected such evolutionary development in social institutions. According to Herbert Spencer, the evolution of institutions proceeded from the simple to the complex, and from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.[2] This principle, however, lacks universality, and does not describe all institutional change. Family life in the United States today may be more varied or heterogeneous than that of times past, but it would seem also to be considerably more simple than, perhaps, the agricultural family of colonial times.[3] Another common belief of the last century, now abandoned by ethnologists, was that all modern social institutions have evolved through a definite series of

[1] Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 197–98.
[2] Herbert Spencer, *First Principles* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 6th ed., 1910).
[3] See Chapter 3.

stages, with each stage dependent upon the one preceding. Finding monogamy established in modern society, Lewis Morgan argued that in the beginning the exact opposite, or sexual promiscuity, must have prevailed. This was supposed to have been followed by family organization around the female with a varying number of males, ushering in a matriarchal, matrilocal, and matrilineal organization. In due course, it was thought, this arrangement yielded to one in which a male was associated with a varying number of females, and this in turn was followed finally by monogamy with bilateral descent.[1]

This "ideal series" of Morgan, as it is sometimes called, shows how completely the thinkers of his day, under the influence of Darwin, were possessed by the fervor of the evolutionary doctrine. The theory of original promiscuity remained in vogue until the publication of Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage* in 1891, which marshaled evidence to show that the family, not the horde, was in earliest times as now the basic social unit and that monogamy existed among men from the beginning. "Monogamy prevailed almost exclusively among our earliest human ancestors," wrote Westermarck. "Pairing between one man and one woman, though the union be often transitory . . . is the typical form of sexual union from the infancy of the human race." [2] Westermarck has since been supported on a number of counts by extensive investigation which has disclosed no evidence of general promiscuity, while clearly demonstrating the existence of strict monogamy among some peoples with a rudimentary culture. In holding that monogamy was the exclusive form of marriage among simple peoples, however, Westermarck misjudged the evidence from the higher apes. As has been shown, monogamy is practiced by them but not exclusively, for polygyny also exists.[3] We conclude that monogamy was probably an early form, but not necessarily that it was the only one. Concerning the earliest human family, there can be no direct evidence, hence no definite knowledge, only speculations based on inferences from the studies of mammalogists and ethnologists. Such evidence as we have on different primitive peoples representing a wide range of material

[1] Lewis Morgan, *Ancient Society* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1877).

[2] E. Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1891; 3d ed., 1902).

[3] Westermarck's principal critic has been Robert Briffault, *The Mothers* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927, 3 vols.).

culture justifies the conclusion that no great evolution is discernible in family organization comparable to the impressive development which has occurred in tools and technology. The picture is rather one of considerable variation and change. As the material culture accumulates and man moves from the hunting to the agricultural level, we find the family — already a key institution — waxing in magnitude and power. The imposing rôle of the agricultural family in the western world up to about the middle of the nineteenth century is the principal topic of our next chapter.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. In what respects is the family the same in all societies? In what respects different?
2. What reasons are there for believing that the family is older than the church? Vice versa?
3. Why do we know so little about the prehistoric origins of the family?
4. Of what value for understanding human family origins is knowledge of family behavior of the higher apes?
5. How do the economic and protective functions of the family in hunting society compare in scope with those of the modern family?
6. What significance do you attach to the sharp division of labor along sex lines in primitive society?
7. Which of the theories regarding the origin of the incest taboo is most acceptable, and why?
8. Are there any examples of preferential mating in modern society?
9. What factors favor monogamy, polygyny, and polyandry?
10. Why is the Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg survey of primitive social organization an important study?
11. How does the emphasis on blood ties in primitive society differ from ours?
12. What factors affect the divorce rate among preliterates?
13. How does the evolution of the family differ from the evolution of technology and material culture?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. Similarities and differences in the family behavior of the great apes.
2. Becoming a Kwoma. (See Selected Readings.)
3. Brother-sister marriages of the Ptolemies.
4. Theories of the origin of the incest taboo.
5. The relative status of women in primitive and modern society.
6. Divorce and remarriage in a primitive society.
7. The maternal family of the Apaches (Morris E. Opler, *An Apache Life-Way*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941).

SELECTED READINGS

Dennis, Wayne, *The Hopi Child*. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1940.

A valuable study of the education of the child in a society dominated by the ideal of co-operation. Contains information on courtship, mating, and family life.

Hobhouse, L. T., G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, *Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1930.

Invaluable for its objective data on the family patterns associated with the various levels of material culture, although some of the correlations have been criticized as unreliable.

Linton, Ralph, *The Study of Man*, chapters 10 and 11. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936.

New light on primitive family behavior.

Lowie, Robert H., *Primitive Society*, chapters 2–8. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1925.

Mature, scholarly discussion of the structure of preliterate family systems.

Malinowski, B., *The Sexual Life of Savages in Northwestern Melanesia*. New York: Liveright, 1929, 2 vols.

A celebrated description and analysis of the family system of a preliterate people, the Trobriand Islanders. The title of the book is misleading, since the total family system is considered, not merely the sexual life. Other distinguished studies of family life by the same author are: *The Family Among the Australian Aborigines* (1913);

The Father in Primitive Psychology (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1927).

Mead, Margaret, *Coming of Age in Samoa.* New York: William Morrow and Company, 1928. Also, *Growing Up in New Guinea.* New York: William Morrow and Company, 1930.

Two fascinating pictures of family relations and the rearing of children in societies greatly different from our own. The author stresses the relevance of the educational practices of these peoples for our own family education. These two books, together with a third (*Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*) are brought together in a single volume: *From the South Seas*, 1939.

Schapera, Isaac, *Married Life in an African Tribe.* London: Faber and Faber, 1940.

This study of the Bakgatla of the Bechuanaland Protectorate includes data for 439 families on family size, births, infant mortality, and measures used to control fertility.

Stern, Bernhard J., *The Family: Past and Present.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938.

This source book contains, in Part I, judiciously selected readings on preliterate family life.

Westermarck, E. A., *The History of Human Marriage*, 3 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921.

The classic study of marriage among preliterates, with special emphasis on origins. Valuable in showing monogamy on the lowest cultural levels, but faulty in regarding it as the only normal pattern for all societies.

Whiting, J. W. M., *Becoming a Kwoma.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.

One of the most detailed and exacting descriptions of the process of socialization of the child in a primitive society.

Chapter 3

BACKGROUNDS OF THE MODERN AMERICAN FAMILY

THE PRECEDING CHAPTER on preliterate peoples sketches the broad outlines of the evolution of the family from the early hunting level through the development of horticulture. We now carry the narrative forward to the period in which we find all the literate peoples of the Old World living in settled communities practicing intensive agriculture based on the plow and on draft animals. Some preliterate, and even some early literate peoples like the Incas of Peru, learned to domesticate large animals, but never used them in farming because they lacked the plow. Although intensive agriculture and civilization are possible without the plow, this invention represented an important step forward, for it literally tied big domestic animals closely to farming and helped establish farm life more securely.

We first find the plow culture in Egypt and Babylonia, in China, and in India. The same culture existed among the Hebrews, later among the Greeks and Romans, and still later among the Germanic tribes who established it in England and throughout Europe. The system grew through the centuries, reached its peak in the Middle Ages, and remained dominant in the West until fairly recent times. In the East it still flourishes. Plow culture was thus part of the intimate experience of our forbears for several thousand years, and it is familiar to us now. The family organization seems to have been well adapted to farming from its beginning, and long experience with this economy served to make the family's adjustment to it increasingly efficient. The picture, then, is of a type of economy with the family as its nucleus existing through the centuries and remaining the dominant pattern in our civilization until about two hundred years

ago. So powerful and prolonged an association between the family and the plow culture could not but have important effects, some of which have outlasted the association itself. So closely was the family tied in with this economy that it is generally referred to as *the household economy*.

THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY

The household economy system as we find it in different places varies somewhat in detail because of local cultural and historic factors, yet in essentials it is strikingly similar everywhere; hence the consequences for family life are remarkably uniform. Although the Egyptians, Chinese, and Hebrews permitted polygyny while the Greeks and Romans did not, although the Egyptians traced descent through females, the Chinese through males, and the Teutons utilized both lines, these and other variations may be charged to causes similar to those which account for the variations in the family organization of hunting peoples. Notwithstanding such variations, we can, so to speak, factor out certain patterns of family organization which are common to plow cultures.

In plow cultures, the families either live in villages and go out to work their farms which are located a short distance away, or, less frequently, they follow the practice better known in the United States and live on the farm itself in the open country. Our acquaintance with farming makes the household economy familiar to us, but it must be remembered that in some cases nowadays farms are highly specialized and grow only a single crop, such as cotton, berries, or wheat, which is exchanged for money with which to buy the things needed, that farmers now sell from 80 to 85 per cent of the goods they produce,[1] and that most of the articles they consume are not produced by them but are bought with money. If a farm family produces more than half of the goods it consumes, it is classified as a self-sufficing unit. But even by this liberal standard, only about one twelfth of all farms in the United States today are rated as self-sufficient.[2]

[1] *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1938 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 616.

[2] William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, *Sociology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940), p. 530.

In contrast, the early organization of farming in the household economy was largely self-sufficing. The producers were the consumers of their own products, buying from other producers only a few things such as metal wares, weapons, gunpowder, silks, glass, and other luxuries. For a family to supply all or most of its needs, production must be highly diversified. The list of economic activities carried on by the early farm families is indeed an imposing one. In addition to the manifold activities of farming and the care of cattle, sheep, and goats, there were such things to do as dairying, preserving food, cooking, serving food, housekeeping, basket- and pottery-making, tanning of leather, shoemaking, furniture-making, sewing, spinning and weaving, fire-making, soap manufacture, lighting, and drug-production. This list could be greatly extended. It is clear that the early farm family is an imposing economic institution.

In order to get the proper picture of the household economy, we must note that the abundant economic life was so carried on in most of the households, and that economic functions were little specialized beyond the division of labor by age and sex. What any one woman could do, all or nearly all the other women could also do. In general, the same could be said for men. Such specialization as did exist, however, was along masculine lines. Specialization was furthered by the discoveries of the use of the metals: copper, tin, bronze, gold, and iron. The uneven distribution of these metals in nature meant that they could not be worked by all families; hence specialists arose, such as the tinsmith.

In the larger towns and cities considerable specialization in the handicrafts occurred, and various industries were organized into crafts or guilds. For example, by the fifth century in Greece, tanning, shoemaking, hat manufacture, pottery-making, metal work, milling, and even baking were organized as separate trades. In interpreting these developments, however, we must bear in mind that the larger communities were few in number until recent times, and included only a small fraction of the total population, so that the great bulk of the families continued to be self-supporting. Where specialized trades developed in cities and towns, the work was largely carried on in private homes by the master craftsman and a few apprentices who generally lived in the house and were treated as members of the family. Factories were scarce or unknown, and the home was still the center of production.

The outlines of the household economy were, as has been said, remarkably uniform in all the ancient civilizations based on the plow and the handicrafts. The differences encountered are chiefly those of differences in the raw materials supplied by nature and in the instruments used in working the materials. The instruments improved as new inventions were made through the years, so that the quantity of goods increased greatly, but the fundamental processes of hand manufacture remained unchanged until the eighteenth century in the West. The labors of Penelope in the *Odyssey* are not unlike the duties of an English countrywoman of the seventeenth century. The Greeks and Hebrews with their vineyards mashed grapes for wine in press pits, while the Englishwoman steeped grain in water to make malt from which ale and beer were concocted. The beverage is different, but the process is still one of home-brewing. The Greek woman used a distaff and hand spindle, and two thousand years later the Englishwoman used a spinning wheel, but the operation was still a handicraft process carried on at home.

CORRELATES OF THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY

Patriarchal Rule

We have now to see that certain very important consequences grow from the organization of the family around agricultural and handicraft production. One is the great authority developed by the elder males, and the accompanying relatively low status assigned to women and children. This power of the male does not derive solely from the prevailing economy, for masculine leadership rests on the biological fact that the male is the physically dominant sex. However, as the biological factor remains more or less constant, it does not account for the variations in degree of control to be found on the different levels of material culture. As we have seen, on the more primitive level of hoe culture the authority of the women is generally higher than it is either in the preceding hunting culture or the subsequent plow culture. Women do not have less to do in the plow than in the hoe economy, but their work seems to be less important because man's work becomes more important. An old saying associated with plow culture has it that man's work runs from sun to sun, but woman's work is never done. In considering the effect of

woman's work upon her social status, we should consider the fact that in farming economy she is dependent for a living upon the family. She works very hard, but that work is expected of her, and she has little bargaining power because no other jobs are open to her. It is the factor of choice that contributes so greatly to woman's favorable status today; choice of marriage or a job beyond the control of her family.

We must note, too, in accounting for masculine rule, that wealth accumulates in plow cultures to a point appreciably above the level found in hoe cultures, and wealth tends to buttress the authority of the male. If the agricultural-handicraft family is regarded as a vital business undertaking, it is not difficult to see how such an important economic organization would need a strong head. Religion, too, builds up the authority of the elder males by assigning monopolistic rights to males in religious ceremonials. In the ancient religions, males were designated as responsible for offering up sacrifices to the ancestors and fulfilling the other duties of ancestor worship. This religious sanction reinforced the already existing preference for sons on economic grounds, and helped to establish the practice of tracing kinship exclusively through males. When the male became of great importance in the plow economy, he seldom went to live in his bride's home, but instead either she came to live with his family or the couple established an independent household.

The marked emphasis on the equality of the sexes in our day makes it difficult for us to envision the magnitude of the power wielded by the elder males in antiquity. No more extreme expression of masculine authority has ever appeared among civilized peoples than existed in Rome up to the close of the Punic Wars (153–146 B.C.). The Roman household was dominated by the *paterfamilias*, usually the eldest male, who had *potestas* (power) over its members. In him resided virtually all economic rights, all religious rights, all legal rights pertaining to the family. He had complete control over the property and earnings of all the members of the family. As chief priest, he officiated at the ceremonies of ancestor worship, and his place might not be filled by another. He could sell his children, banish them, even kill them if he chose. His children remained under his control during his lifetime, even after their marriage, which might be arranged or dissolved without their consent.

Other early civilizations were likewise patriarchal, although none

allowed the father quite so much power as did the Roman culture. In the earliest period, the Hebrew father like the Roman father held the power of life or death over his children, as is evidenced by Abraham's attempt to make a burnt offering of his son, Isaac. The Hebrew father could sell his daughter as a slave to a fellow countryman. Over his wife he had the power of life and death if she committed adultery. The Greek patriarch's control over the life of the members of his family, however, was largely restricted to the time of the birth of children. His was the power to determine whether a newborn child should live or be exposed.[1]

The ancient Romans, Greeks, and Hebrews seem remote to us, but what we must realize is that their culture is in our heritage, and that the patriarchal organization of the family has continued throughout the long history of our western civilization until comparatively recent times. The period from the end of the fourth to the beginning of the sixth century saw hordes of our Germanic ancestors swarming into western Europe, establishing themselves in what had been the empire of the Caesars. The culture changed, but the family remained patriarchal. The German father could sell his wife if she proved obstinate; he had power of unrestricted chastisement over her; he could marry off his children without their consent, or send them to the monastery against their will. This patriarchal rule, which existed during the early Middle Ages, continued into the later Middle Ages under feudalism, when powerful farmers exacted payment from neighboring weaker farmers and with this tribute supported soldiers to protect the whole group against aggression. Since feudalism emphasized military service, for which women did not qualify, patriarchal rule was intensified. So the patriarchal pattern was sustained and continued, century by century, until, at the dawn of our own separate history on the continent of North America, we find the patriarchal tradition established among the colonists, as we shall shortly see. Is it surprising that the power of the father should have been maintained for this long stretch of several thousand years? Hardly, for the basic economic organization throughout the entire period remained the farm culture of the plow and the handicrafts.

The critical reader may have wondered if the picture of the patriarchal family given above is altogether realistic. Did the Roman

[1] W. Goodsell, *A History of Marriage and the Family* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), chaps. II, III, IV.

father actually have the power to punish his wife and children capitally? It is important to realize that there may be considerable discrepancy between the legal code and actual custom. The paterfamilias was hardly his own master. For instance, before carrying out a death sentence upon his wife, he was required to summon the male members of both sides of the house for common counsel, and it must be assumed that their combined judgment counted for something. Then, too, a distinction must be noted between familial and extra-familial jurisdiction. In private law the position of a Roman citizen's son was much like that of a slave, but in public law the son was free from the *potestas* and might accept and acquit public responsibilities without his father's consent. Patriarchal rule, then, even in Rome, was probably not so rigorous as the legal code would suggest. The Roman father under the law had the power to punish capitally, but the fact that the population was not decimated is evidence that the power was not widely exercised.[1]

The patriarchal rule, then, is subject to certain limitations and shows considerable variation from place to place and from time to time. It is sometimes formidable, as with the Greeks and Teutons; sometimes even more formidable, as with the Romans and Hebrews. By the time of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the American colonies, however, the power of husband and father had appreciably abated. And yet anyone interested in obtaining insight into the highly significant phenomenon of the changing relationships of the sexes in the last one hundred years would do well to note the patriarchal organization of the family in the agricultural-handicraft economy and the great modifications occasioned in family organization by the new technologies of the machine age.

Since the problem under discussion is one of the division of power and authority, an analogy of the family with the state may be helpful. We are familiar through recent history with the phenomenon of the totalitarian state, controlled by a political dictator who rules with an iron hand. This example affords us some basis for understanding what may be called the totalitarian family system, wherein virtually every household has its dictator. Of course, political dic-

[1] "If one half of the human species, the maternal half, women, in addition to many natural weaknesses, had been from the first the victim of malicious imposition and persecution at the hands of the other and stronger half, men, humanity would not have survived." Otis T. Mason, "Woman's Share in Primitive Culture," *American Antiquarian*, January, 1889.

tators differ greatly in the scope of the power they wield. They have their advisers, and they keep their ears to the ground so that in actual practice their authority is not without limit. And in somewhat the same way, the domestic dictator is not a completely free agent, but must reckon with the curbs imposed by custom as well as by the wishes and personalities of the other members of the household. But these variations and qualifications notwithstanding, a great difference remains between dictatorially and democratically controlled families, precisely as between totalitarian and democratic states.

Frequency of Marriages

We have next to see how the economic opportunities open to women affect their chances of marriage. Ten per cent of females nowadays are still single at the age of forty-five. The figure is about the same for males. In our time, then, the high status of women is associated with the relatively high percentage of unmarried women, and the correlation is no mere coincidence. If women have an alternative to marriage in well-paying jobs, they may marry more nearly on their own terms, which means that many will not marry. For women who are looking toward a career, precious years are consumed in preparation, precious because a woman's chances of marriage fall away rapidly with the passing years.

In agricultural society, and in the more elementary hunting and hoe cultures, the single woman is rare. The reasons for this are doubtless many, but the central ones are tied in with the economic situation. Where few, if any, jobs exist for women outside the home, women are dependent upon marriage for economic support if they are not to remain indefinitely under the parental roof or be looked after by relatives. The pressure on daughters to wed is, therefore, tremendous in farming cultures. Families move heaven and earth to get a daughter married if the years slip by and bids for her hand are not numerous The device of the dowry comes into play as an added incentive to suitors. In many farming cultures it is regarded as extremely bad practice for a younger sister to wed if an older sister still remains unmarried, for this would only emphasize and aggravate the latter's plight. It will be recalled that Jacob labored seven years for Rachel, only to be given her older sister, Leah, instead; but being a man of purpose he labored another seven years for Rachel.

Another factor promoting marriage in farming societies is the early age at which the young people marry, especially the girls. It is obvious that the younger the girls may marry, the greater the chances that they will marry, and the larger will be the proportion actually married. In agricultural society girls commonly marry by the time they are sixteen, or not long after puberty. Since girls mature earlier than boys, it is customary for boys to be somewhat older at marriage, but they usually marry under twenty in farming cultures. Under Talmudic law, Hebrew girls were permitted to marry when they had completed their twelfth or thirteenth year. Our own common law is not much different when the parents consent to the marriage.

It is not difficult to see why youth in a farming-handicraft economy would usually marry at an earlier age than modern youth, because the demands made upon the former are simpler and more readily met. Nearly every boy knows that he will grow up to be a farmer or a craftsman, and every girl knows that she will be a homemaker. We have an instructive illustration in the report of a research study [1] of conditions in an isolated farming community in the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia which had seldom been visited by outsiders in the more than one hundred years of its existence. When the girls in Colvin Hollow were asked by the investigators what they expected to be when they grew up, they invariably answered: "Wimmin."

Where conditions are much the same from year to year, the young know what will be expected of them as adults. Hence, they can make careful preparation for their future responsibilities, achieve the necessary skills, and at an early age be in a position to marry. In a complex society like ours, the constant state of change makes the process of preparation difficult and uncertain, for the work that the young people of any generation are prepared to do may be rendered useless by new inventions or changed social conditions.

Observation of farming cultures reveals that one important effect of early marriage for girls is to shorten the period of marriageability. If it is customary to marry young, the emphasis in choosing a mate is on youth, and somewhat older females are not regarded as desirable. A girl in her early twenties becomes an object of great concern to her family, while one in her late twenties is almost certain to be considered an old maid.

[1] Mandel Sherman and Thomas R. Henry, *Hollow Folk* (New York: The Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1933).

Size of Family

Early marriage helps to make for large families which are characteristic of the farm economy, but it is not likely that we should find either early marriage or large families if children were not well adapted to farm life. Even young children can do useful work on a farm and relieve adults for essential chores. A large family thus becomes a feasible way for a farmer to acquire a labor force, which in turn makes it possible for him to work more land. If the size of family determined the size of farm, obviously there never could be any great inequality in the distribution of holdings. But there are other possible arrangements for farm expansion which have been extensively employed, such as slavery, serfdom, tenancy, and sharecropping, or even the hiring of farm laborers for pay. Lacking these devices or in conjunction with them, the farm family may undertake to increase its labor force by stretching its size. It may expand vertically by adding children who in due course produce children of their own, forming what is known in ancient law as the five generation kindred: grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren. Or it may expand laterally by keeping the sons at home and bringing in their wives, as well as various relatives. It is not difficult to understand why the commandment, "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth," was spoken to an agricultural people.

The need for labor on farms is nearly always great, but it was much greater in earlier times when land was harder to work and farm implements were more rudimentary than now. Nearly everyone knows that farming, even in the present day, is hardly a life of conspicuous leisure, but strenuous as farming still is, it was considerably more taxing in the days before rural electrification, telephones, automobiles, tractors, and modern agricultural implements. Crude farming tools persisted with little change for about two thousand years, beginning with the dawn of history and extending throughout the Middle Ages and beyond to the close of our own colonial period. The colonial farmer still had to cope with the cumbersome plow with its wooden mould-board and with the wooden-toothed harrow and rake. Two persons were required to work a plow, one to direct its course and the other to follow with a spade and turn the soil that the inefficient plow merely broke. Grain was cut with a sickle, grass with a scythe, and threshing was done by flail or by horse's hoofs.

Economic Considerations in the Choice of a Mate

Since the family in the agricultural handicraft economy was a significant business enterprise, in which a man's wife was his business partner, it is not surprising that in looking for a wife a man sought a woman who was industrious and thrifty, a good manager and a capable housekeeper, while a woman sought a husband who was a good provider. A classic description of the traits of a good wife in an agricultural handicraft economy such as existed in Biblical times is given to us in the Book of Proverbs.[1]

> Who can find a virtuous woman? for her price is far above rubies. . . .
> She seeketh wool, and flax, and worketh willingly with her hands.
> She is like the merchants' ships; she bringeth her food from afar.
> She riseth also while it is yet night, and giveth meat to her household, and a portion to her maidens.
> She considereth a field, and buyeth it: with the fruit of her hands she planteth a vineyard.
> She girdeth her loins with strength, and strengtheneth her arms.
> She perceiveth that her merchandise is good: her candle goeth not out by night.
> She layeth her hands to the spindle, and her hands hold the distaff.
> She stretcheth out her hand to the poor; yea, she reacheth forth her hands to the needy.
> She is not afraid of the snow for her household: for all her household are clothed with scarlet.
> She maketh herself coverings of tapestry; her clothing is silk and purple.
> Her husband is known in the gates, when he sitteth among the elders of the land.
> She maketh fine linen, and selleth it; and delivereth girdles unto the merchant.
> Strength and honor are her clothing; and she shall rejoice in time to come.
> She openeth her mouth with wisdom; and in her tongue is the law of kindness.
> She looketh well to the ways of her household, and eateth not the bread of idleness.
> Her children arise up, and call her blessed; her husband also, and he praiseth her. . . .

[1] Prov. XXXI, 10–28.

These sentiments were reputedly voiced by King Solomon ten centuries before Christ, but they were still applicable twenty-eight centuries later, and were extremely popular with the American colonists.

In our day when we find the pulp magazines and the movies making so much of romance as a factor in mating, we may be surprised to learn of earlier societies emphasizing the capabilities of the prospective partners and assigning a subordinate rôle to affection. Love was thought to be desirable, but hardly important enough to be the sole basis for marriage. It was assumed that if the partners were virtuous and capable, the partnership would prosper, and affection would develop as a result of successful teamwork. Love was not, however, ruled out as a condition of choice. If a marriage partner was chosen by the parents and proved unacceptable to their daughter, she might veto the selection and her wishes would generally be respected.

The Family as a Determinant of Social Status

The family everywhere accords individuals their initial social status. The problem, then, is to determine to what degree in different types of economy the family fixes a member's status during his lifetime, especially after he has reached maturity. Where, as in the household economy, the family is the chief agency in society for discharging the economic functions, and where the family becomes attached to so stable a form of property as land, it is not difficult to see how the family would be highly influential in fixing the social status of its members. The family name becomes important for business and for property arrangements, and wealth is associated with the family rather than with the individual. The reputation of the family may be so great that a member is identified in the community as, say, a Fairfax or a Baltimore, rather than as an individual in his or her own right. Since the communities are small, the family names are generally well known to everyone.

When families are marked by appreciable differences in social status, we say that a class society exists. Agricultural society with its slow rate of social change appears to be especially favorable to the formation of a stratified social structure. It is no accident that an extreme instance of class society in the East should have developed in the vast agricultural country of India, or that the class system of feudalism should have existed during the agricultural heyday of the Middle

Ages in the West. Agriculture changed very little in its material basis during a stretch of about two thousand years in the West, and still remains relatively unchanged in the East. A comparatively static material culture means that the chances of developing new sources of wealth, and, therefore, a new influential social class, are greatly restricted, especially since wealth is in land which is limited in amount. The rate of change being slow, "the cake of custom" supporting the class system has a chance to harden, further supporting the class system. The formation of social classes is, then, fostered in agricultural society because conditions remain relatively unchanged over a long period of time. Time and a stable economy are the bases of social classes. An important family is an old family, and the oldest of all are the "First Families." Those who have just come into wealth do not rate at the top, but are dubbed "*les nouveaux riches*," a term of opprobrium.

The Home as the Central Social Unit

To round out the picture of the family in the household economy, some consideration should also be given to the prominence of the home as a unit for fellowship, recreation, and sociability. The family is generally a medium for companionship in all cultures, especially where the various families are scattered on separate farms and are more or less isolated from other families. Under such circumstances, the members of a family necessarily depend upon one another for association, conversation, and recreation because few other facilities are available to them. Families which live in towns are better off socially because there are shops, inns, the town commons, the meeting house, the church, and perhaps even the schoolhouse which provide for sociability, although specialized clubs for recreational purposes or for artistic and scientific encouragement may be lacking.

The hunger for the company of others sometimes becomes very sharp in farming communities, a fact which may help to explain the extreme hospitality of isolated groups. One wonders if the famed hospitality of the plantation owner in the South in the colonial period may not have derived from such a condition. There are accounts of Virginia gentlemen waiting on horseback along well-traveled roads with the intention of intercepting travelers and inviting them to come home as guests.[1] The plantation, of course, shared conditions com-

[1] W. E. Woodward, *The Way Our People Lived* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1944), p. 79.

mon to all farming communities, which tend to limit sociability to the home. For one thing, farming is an occupation which by its very nature ties the farmer to the soil and limits greatly his opportunities for travel, particularly if he has livestock to care for. In earlier times an additional bar to a widening of one's range of contacts was the poorly developed system of transportation and communication. Nowadays the state governments in America spend more money on roads than they do on any other single function, but the paved highway is a very recent development in man's history. Throughout the Middle Ages a wagon traveling on the rough roads could not make as many miles in a day as an automobile covers in half an hour. Correspondence was difficult, for letters were expensive to send and were often written in duplicate or triplicate to protect against loss in transit. Travel was scarcely inviting because danger lurked in the form of enemies and wild beasts. Even visiting neighbors of an evening in a village loses some of its attraction when there are no street lights, when one has to find one's way around in the dark or carry a torch of pine firewood, and when curfew sounds at nine.

THE COLONIAL AMERICAN FAMILY

In preceding paragraphs we have considered in general terms how the family was organized in the household economy. A general description, drawing upon the common elements in many situations, serves a useful purpose but suffers from the weakness of failing to provide the details which lend color and distinction to a considered culture. It, therefore, seems desirable to supplement the general account with a detailed description of family organization in a particular household economy. For this purpose we choose the American colonial family, since it furnishes us with a basis for comparison with the modern American family which developed from it. Such a picture of the colonial family will do much, later, to sharpen our understanding of the revolutionary changes in family life which have occurred in the last century.

The colonies were, however, not a single integrated society, but a dozen or so separate cultures differing in nationality, religion, and somewhat in economic organization. The problem of singling out one specific culture area for discussion, therefore, remains, and will be

met by the selection of the English-speaking colonies, specifically those of New England. The New England colonists were predominantly English. There were a few Scotch and Irish in New Hampshire, and some settlements of Huguenots in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, but otherwise the white population of New England was almost entirely English. In the middle colonies, there were settlements of Dutch in the Hudson Valley and adjacent regions; Germans and Welsh Quakers in Pennsylvania; and Swedes on the Delaware; and in the South again the English. More important, however, is the fact that English law and custom finally came to prevail over the country generally. It is appropriate, therefore, for us to give special attention to family life in New England, since the economic basis of the several ethnic groups was more alike than different and family life in each of the colonies bore certain striking resemblances to family life in all the others. The picture in New England is not very different from what it was elsewhere.[1]

Colonial Backgrounds

Although there were separate farms in New England, most of the population lived in tiny hamlets of a few score persons or families, or in small villages, about which lay the land they tilled. The people are to be visualized, therefore, as living in widely scattered, sparsely settled communities. In the middle colonies the solitary farm was the unit of organization, while south of the Delaware River the large plantation became a unit of settlement, although even in the South most of the farmers had small holdings which they worked with the help of their families. The picture, then, is one of families living alone or in small clusters. It is difficult for the student accustomed to the teeming city of our time to realize how tiny by comparison were even the biggest places in the colonies at the turn of the eighteenth century. Charleston, the only town south of the Delaware, contained but two hundred and fifty families in 1700; while Philadelphia listed seven hundred. New York was a metropolis of about five thousand persons and it was the only community in the New York colony bigger than a hamlet. Boston topped all other communities on the continent for size, with a population of probably not more than seven thousand.

[1] "On the whole, the New York family does not appear basally different from that of New England." A. W. Calhoun, *A Social History of the American Family* (The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1917), vol. I, p. 183.

The town communities of colonial times were small because the bulk of the population was devoted to working the soil which was abundant in the new country, and because the homesteads were far apart. It is thought that in this period of our history perhaps four in every five persons farmed for a living, the other one in five being occupied in trade, manufacturing, commerce, or service. These figures should be compared with those of the present time, when only one in five persons works on a farm. From the Chesapeake Bay southward, the climate, soil, and broad coastal plain were well adapted to the production of staples in demand in England, especially tobacco. In the middle colonies grain crops predominated and were produced in sufficient volume for export, but in New England the narrow coastal plain and rocky soil forced the farmer in quest of a living to produce diversified crops, with no thought of an exportable surplus. For export staples the New Englanders turned to fish, timber, ships, and rum. But exportable surplus or no, everywhere in the colonies agriculture was the mainstay of existence.

In the towns there were specialists who plied various trades and professions, but specialization could not be carried very far except in the largest communities which were so few they could be counted on the fingers of one hand. In the smaller towns, the village blacksmith produced his own nails as well as his horseshoes, and perhaps even his own tools. Writing as a separate profession was practically nonexistent, writers usually being lawyers, clergymen, merchants, or practitioners of some other calling. Paul Revere made false teeth among other things when he was not occupied with his trade of silversmith. There were, then, in the towns craftsmen who manufactured goods directly for the consumer, but they provided for the needs of only a small fraction of the population, because of the relative isolation of the towns and because of the prices charged for the merchandise, which were beyond the means of the masses. Another reason, doubtless, was that the farmers were themselves capable of supplying their needs for many manufactured goods. There was, however, a class of itinerant craftsmen who moved from place to place, generally using the farmer's raw material. This was possible, of course, only where the producer's goods were light and portable, as in the case of the itinerant shoemaker. The great bulk of the handicrafts were produced, then, in the homes and shops of farmers, with some assistance from itinerant artisans and from the shops of the craftsmen in the towns.

The town shops were usually an adjunct to the home, the shop and the home being housed in the same dwelling; the shop at the front of the house and the living quarters of the family at the rear and above the shop. For a labor force, the master craftsman might have one or more apprentices — boys in their teens whose families had arranged for them to learn a trade in this way. They usually served for a period of years during which time they were housed, fed, clothed, and perhaps given a little spending money, but no regular wages. It will be recalled that Benjamin Franklin, the son of a Boston candle-maker, fled to Philadelphia to escape from his apprenticeship to his brother, who was a printer. Other sources of labor were indentured servants, who served for a period of from three to seven years to work off the costs of their passage to the country, and slaves.

The household, we see, then, whether farm or town, was an exceedingly important unit in production. On the farm it accounted for all of the farmer's products, both of the field and of the shop. In the towns it accounted also for most of the production, where goods were produced mainly in small shops and power-driven mills located near the home of the owner-worker or actually adjacent to it. Virtually every home, however, had its spinning wheel and loom for the making of cloth, its carpenter's bench and its fireside forge for the making and repairing of household furniture, kitchen utensils, and farm implements. There were a few bigger plants, owned by more than one family, which might be called factories. Such were the woolen mills, tanneries, flour mills, and establishments for processing food, distilleries, packing houses, fisheries, lumber mills, shipyards, and iron works. However, these were relatively few in number, and do not bulk large in the total picture when compared to the volume of household manufactures.[1]

From what has been said, it is evident that economic self-sufficiency is the principal key to the understanding of the colonial family. But a general statement of this sort is not very satisfactory for conveying the idea of the great scope and variety of domestic pursuits, which can be appreciated fully only when seen in detail. When we read that the colonists made their own clothes, table and bed linen, that carding, spinning, and weaving were common household tasks, the simple statement of fact does not do justice to the complexity of the work in-

[1] R. M. Tryon, *Household Manufactures in the United States*, 1640–1860 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1917).

volved. Flax culture, for example, was an elaborate art requiring much time and effort. The flax was planted in May, and as soon as the plants were three or four inches high they were weeded by barefooted young women and children. Near the end of June or July, the flax was ripe and it was then pulled up by the roots and laid out to dry in the sun for a day or two, being turned several times. A coarse wooden or iron wire comb called a ripple comb was fastened to a plank and the stalks of flax were drawn through it to break off the seed bolls, which were used for seed for the next crop. The stalks were then tied in bundles at the seed end, and spread out fanwise to dry. Next, the bundles of stalks were piled solidly on top of each other, covered with boards and heavy stones, and set in running water to rot the leaves. In four or five days the bundles were taken up and the rotted leaves removed. The stalks were again dried and tied in bundles, after which they were put into a flax-brake, an implement of heavy wood used to beat the flax to separate the fibers from the hard woody center, called the "hexe." The fibers were next gone over with a singling block and knife (a heavy wooden log and knife) to remove any remaining particles of bark. The clean fibers were once more made into bundles and swingled, or beaten, again, the refuse from this being used for spinning and weaving coarse bagging. To make the fibers soft, the bundles were then pounded in a wooden trough.

After this, the flax was wetted and drawn through hackle teeth to comb out the short fibers and lay the longer fibers into continuous threads, the process being repeated several times, each time with finer hackle teeth. The fibers were then sorted according to fineness, and the flax was ready for spinning.

The flax was wrapped around the spindle, and the spinner spun the fiber into a long thread by working the treadle. The thread was then wound off on a reel which counted the strands in order that the knots and skeins would be equal in number. These skeins were bleached by being placed for four days in warm water which was frequently changed, and washed until they were completely clean. Then they were bleached with ashes and hot water, and laid in clear water for a week. After this came seething, rinsing, beating, washing, drying, and winding on bobbins for the looms. A comparable procedure existed for wool.

This was only one of the exceedingly numerous and complicated household arts in colonial times. Another was candle-making, parti-

cipated in every autumn by the entire household in anticipation of the winter need. Two huge kettles half-filled with boiling water and melted tallow, which had already been scalded and twice skimmed, were hung in the open fireplace. In a cooler place, small sticks called "candle rods" were placed across two long poles. About six or eight straightened candle wicks were attached to each candle rod, and then each rod was dipped in the melted tallow and hung up to cool and harden. This was repeated so that the candles steadily grew until the right size was obtained. Two hundred candles could be made in a day if the workers were good and the room fairly cool so that the tallow hardened quickly.[1]

One further illustration of the multifarious household arts: The home was an apothecary's shop where various herbs and roots were converted into familiar medicines. A standard poultice was a paste of pepper, mustard, and the bark of the elder tree, used in treating what was called "throat distemper," now known as diphtheria. Every housewife was expected to know how to compound this preparation, and others like pokeberry plaster, palsy drops, and snail water, for doctors were scarce and druggists even scarcer. A standard household remedy was Venice treacle, consisting of the crushed bodies of snakes mixed with twenty different herbs and boiled with white wine, to which was added a small quantity of opium. It is easy to see that herb-gardens were an important feature of seventeenth and eighteenth century American homes, and that scientific medicine was slow in developing.

The above descriptions give us some idea of what is involved in the way of sweat and toil when a household is self-sustaining. Add the further fact that the tools at the disposal of the worker were often crude and ill-adapted to the task, and one gains an even clearer notion of the arduous effort required. The same arduous effort was required in farming as in the handicrafts. Plows were not plentiful in the colonies and such plows as were available were heavy and awkward, requiring from four to six oxen to scratch three inches deep over an acre a day.[2] In some cases the ground was broken by hand after the trees had been girdled and the roots grubbed up.

[1] Alice Morse Earle, *Home Life in Colonial Days* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1898), pp. 101–02.

[2] Lyman Carrier, *The Beginnings of American Agriculture* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1923).

High Birth and Death Rates

The difficulties of supplying the needs of the family under such conditions meant that the demand for labor was great. The supply of cheap labor was very small, since there was little incentive for anyone to work as a farmhand at small wages when land could be had for little more than the asking. The large families of colonial times are understandable under these conditions of a tight labor market and an urgent need for extra hands.

The great size of the colonial family has been emphasized by historians, who frequently base their reports on accounts which have come down to us in the diaries of the period, like those of Cotton Mather and Judge Sewall. In the following, for example, the famous colonial divine tells about an acquaintance, Mr. Sherman:

> He was twice married. By his first wife, . . . he had six children. But his next wife was a young gentlewoman whom he chose from under the guardianship of Edward Hopkins, Esq., the excellent governor of Connecticut. By [her] . . . Mr. Sherman had no less than twenty children added unto the number of six which he had before. One woman [in New England] has had not less than twenty-two children. . . . Another woman has had no less than twenty-three children by one husband. . . . A third was mother to seven and twenty children; and she that was mother to Sir William Phips, the late governor of New England, had no less than twenty-five children besides him. . . . Now unto the catalog of such "fruitful vines by the side of the house" is this gentlewoman Mrs. Sherman to be enumerated.[1]

Care must be taken in the interpretation of such data lest it be thought that families of twenty to twenty-five were common, if not typical. Although actually they were very rare, the fact that they should have existed at all is significant. Diaries tend to emphasize the singular and sensational, and, therefore, are often not good sources of information if one is interested in forming an impression of what was the average or typical situation. Fortunately some more inclusive data of the period are available to us. A record of 153 married graduates of Harvard College for the years 1658 to 1690 shows they had 808 children, or an average of 5.21 children per family.[2] Some of

[1] Cotton Mather, *Diary* (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, Series 7, VII–VIII, 1911–12).

[2] T. J. Wertenbaker, *The First Americans* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927). Two centuries later (1872–79) Harvard graduates averaged 3.09 children per family, a decrease of two fifths in number of children born.

these men had very large families, although none was quite as large as those described in the quotation from Cotton Mather. One had 20 children; one, 15; three, 14; three, 13; two, 12; seven, 11; four, 10; and fourteen, 9. These thirty-five fathers of large families averaged nearly eleven children apiece, whereas the rest averaged fewer than four children per family. A number of general estimates of population are available for the thirteen colonies as a whole, and a number of local censuses taken before the Federal Census of 1790,[1] but the figures are not always reliable.[2]

It will be noted that the large families referred to are those of college graduates; that is, the privileged group of ministers and magistrates. Does this mean that the birth rate of the poor was even higher, as it is at the present time? And if so, was the differential in the birth rate of the rich and the poor as great then as now? There is evidence [3] showing that by the nineteenth century, before the spread of modern contraceptive knowledge, the lower economic classes were having appreciably larger families than the middle and upper classes, but what the situation was in earlier times is not clear.

The high birth rates of colonial times were coupled with high death rates. Probably about one in every four infants died during the first year of life, compared to about one in twenty-five today. The records which have come down to us based on diaries present extreme cases.[4] Cotton Mather had sixteen children and outlived all but one, Samuel II. Nine died in infancy: Abigail I, William, Mary, Joseph, Mehitabel, Samuel I, Nathaniel, Eleazer, and Martha. Another, Jerusha, died of measles at the age of two years, seven months. The others died in their twenties: Elizabeth at twenty-two; Hannah at twenty-

[1] E. B. Greene and V. D. Harrington, *American Population Before the Federal Census of 1790* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932).

[2] A further weakness in the data for our purposes is that they are seldom calculated in terms of the family unit. Felt gives five and one half as the average size of family in New England in 1675, but this is the number living and not the number of children born per family. Joseph B. Felt, *Statistics of Population in Massachusetts* (Boston: American Statistical Association Collections, 1897), I, 121–216.

[3] A. J. Jaffe, "Differential Fertility in the White Population in Early America," *Journal of Heredity*, 31:407–11, September, 1940.

[4] As a further illustration Mrs. Alice Earle, who has written extensively about the colonial period, tells how heavily the hand of death was laid upon her own forbears: "There lies open before me an old leather-bound Bible with the record of my great-grandfather's family. He had sixteen children. When the first child was a year and a half old, the second child was born. The baby was but four days old when the older child died. Five times did that mother's heart bear a similar cruel loss when she had a baby in her arms; therefore when she had been nine years married, she had one living child. . . ." Alice Morse Earle, *Child Life in Colonial Days* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1899), p. 5.

four; Increase at twenty-five; Katherine and Abigail II at twenty-seven. Judge Sewall survived all but three of his flock of fourteen. Of the 808 children of Harvard graduates mentioned in the preceding paragraph, 162 died before reaching maturity. The high frequency with which children came into the world doubtless had something to do with the speed with which they left it, since women, exhausted by frequent childbearing, were rendered unfit for the responsibilities of parenthood. The problem was greatly aggravated by the lack of scientific medicine and sanitary engineering, and the tendency to ascribe disease to diabolical rather than natural causes.

Marriage

An important factor in the birth rate is the number of years of exposure to marriage. Those who marry late or are separated from their spouses are likely to have fewer children than those who marry early and stay married. In our day, marriage for most women is delayed until the early twenties or later; and in the case of bereavement it is customary for a widow to wait at least a year before remarrying, if she remarries at all. In colonial New England things were different. Strong social pressure was brought to bear that all should marry, marry young, and stay married. The feeling against bachelors was especially strong, and they were treated somewhat after the manner in which we now handle criminals on parole; that is, they were required to report to a magistrate from time to time and give an account of their doings. Even their housing was carefully supervised. They were forbidden to reside alone or in households not certified by the local authorities. New Haven in 1656 had the following ordinance:

> That no single person of either sex do henceforward board, diet, sojourn or be permitted so to do, or to have lodging; or house room within any of the plantations of this jurisdiction, but either in some allowed relation, or in some approved family licensed thereunto, by the court or by a magistrate.

To discourage celibacy, the unmarried were taxed in some communities, while in others they were offered free land and various other inducements to marry. These measures seem to resemble somewhat those taken by totalitarian states, past and present, for the common purpose of increasing the population.

No exact figures regarding the age at marriage in colonial New England are available, but the evidence points to very early marriage, especially for females. One finds unmarried women of twenty-five referred to in the literature as "ancient maids." Some idea of the age at marriage for males in the towns may be gained from the fact that they generally began their apprenticeship at the age of fourteen and served seven years without pay, so presumably marriage did not as a rule occur before the early twenties. On the farms, where there were no such obstacles to self-support, marriage could take place earlier. The acute shortage of women in the early colonial period and the decided advantages of marriage in frontier society were important factors in encouraging early marriage and speedy remarriage in cases of bereavement. We read that the first marriage to occur in Plymouth Colony united Edward Winslow who had been a widower only seven weeks and Susanna White, only twelve weeks a widow.

Family and Status

In the courtship customs of the times we see instruments for maintaining the rôle of the family as a status-fixing institution. Before courting a young woman, a man was required by Puritan law to obtain her parents' formal permission, otherwise he might be subject to fine or imprisonment for the offense of "inveigling." This practice left the family in position to arrange a suitable marriage (that is, one between individuals of the same social class) and to avert a mésalliance, since in a small community a relationship begun surreptitiously could be continued without parental knowledge only with the greatest difficulty. The family exercised further control through the marriage settlement, it being the custom for the bride to bring a dowry to her husband and perhaps for the groom to make some provision for his bride. The groom's parents might build the couple a cottage to live in, while the bride's family supplied the furnishings plus a certain amount in cash. The emphasis placed on material considerations in mating was very great, and haggling over the terms of the settlement was frequent. There were many reasons why economic factors were stressed so heavily, but for our purposes it may be noted only that this type of financial bargaining was a device for keeping control within the family.

When the family is in a strong position to influence the choice of a mate, considerable freedom can be permitted in courtship itself, since

if the privileges are abused the family knows who is responsible and can hold him to account. Certain practices of the time, however, represented adjustments to circumstances, particularly to the lack of fuel, light, and space among the poor, who were numerous. This is probably the explanation for "bundling," a much publicized and misunderstood colonial custom of permitting the lovers, fully clothed, to carry on their wooing in bed, usually separated by a board. Evidently the purpose of this custom was to conserve firewood and candles where these objects were scarce and precious. The practice led to a certain amount of immorality, and was decried by the leading clergymen of the time. As the standard of living improved, it finally was abandoned. Later on in some localities, the desire of lovers for a measure of privacy led to the use of "courting sticks," through which the two lovers whispered to each other with the rest of the family present. These were hollow sticks about one inch in diameter and six or eight feet long, fitted with mouth and ear piece. Elsewhere courtship outside the home was carried on by promenading on the village green or common, by riding, visiting, attending a lecture or a dance, and, with the faster set, visiting a tavern.

In early colonial days there was a formal ceremony of betrothal called a pre-contract at which a sermon was preached whose text was chosen by the bride. In all colonies except New Hampshire a law required that wedding banns be published three times in the meeting house before the marriage. There being in New England a distrust of ecclesiastical services which persisted until the close of the seventeenth century, a justice of the peace or a magistrate officiated. The wedding itself would be accompanied by dancing, perhaps by the firing of guns and by drinking, and sometimes the sport of stealing the bride was indulged in. If the bride was married "in her shift on the king's highway," a custom held that her creditors could no longer collect their debts from her.[1]

Patriarchal Rule

Colonial America was a man's world, as was England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. When a woman married, she lost her separate legal status and became, as it were, a ward of her husband, as the following classic statement by the great jurist, Blackstone, reveals.

[1] Alice Morse Earle, *Customs and Fashions in Old New England* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1893), pp. 36–82.

> By marriage the husband and the wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of her husband. . . . Upon this principle of a union of person in husband and wife depend almost all the legal rights, duties and disabilities that either of them acquire by the marriage. . . . For this reason a man cannot grant anything to his wife, or enter into covenant with her; for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence, and to covenant with her would only be to covenant with himself; and therefore it is also generally true that all compacts made between husband and wife when single are voided by the inter-marriage.[1]

At the time of marriage, all of a woman's property, both real and personal, came under the control of her husband. Even her clothes and objects of personal adornment were legally his. During his lifetime he was free to dispose of these things if he chose, with but one exception; in the case of real estate possessed by his wife before marriage, or received by gift or inheritance after marriage, the right of disposal was denied. But the husband, nevertheless, had control over such real estate and was the recipient of all the income and other benefits accruing from it, so long as his wife lived; if a child was born to them, the father was allowed to enjoy these benefits as long as he lived. Furthermore, the father was regarded as the sole guardian of his children.

In the homes of the common people chairs were scarce; so the mother and children sat on stools or on the settle, which was a bench with high back and sides. But every Puritan home had one chair reserved for the father, and no one else would think of using it, even in his absence. With its high back it was a sort of domestic throne, a symbol of his authority.

The records that have come down to us of the discipline of children show it to have been harsh. A number of colonies in New England prescribed the death penalty for children defiant of parental rule, and although there is no evidence that the law was ever invoked, it is significant as revealing the great authority of the elders. In Connecticut the law read:

> If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son of sufficient years and understanding, viz; sixteen years of age, which will not obey the voice

[1] Sir William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (21st ed., London, 1862), Book I, ch. XV, p. 441.

> of his father or the voice of his mother, and that when they have chastised him will not hearken unto them, then may his father and mother, being his natural parents, lay hold on him and bring him to the magistrates assembled in court, and testify unto them that their son is stubborn and rebellious . . . such a son shall be put to death.[1]

The influence of the Old Testament is apparent here. So, too, the Biblical notion prevailed that play was the agent of the devil — a sort of idleness making for sin. Children were kept busy at work. Although theirs was not a life entirely without play,[2] much of their time was taken up with the duties of the farm: cutting wood, caring for the animals, picking berries, spooling yarn, setting card teeth, and so on. This represented the practical phase of their education. In addition they were given careful religious instruction, in large doses. Soon after birth, Puritan children were taken to church to be baptized, no matter what the weather. Sometimes the ice had to be broken in the christening bowl, and there were numerous deaths due to exposure. The theology of the time, based as it was upon such ideas as the sinfulness of human nature and the torture of lost souls in hell, was not disposed to make children cheerful. They spent a great deal of time in studying the Bible, in learning the catechism, in listening to frightful sermons. The effect of such instruction upon a highly suggestible child — his own daughter Betty — is recorded by Judge Sewall in his *Diary*. It is unlikely that her reaction was typical, but the illustration is interesting because it shows the kind of religious teaching to which children were exposed.

> She was first wounded by my reading a sermon of Mr. Norton's; text, "Ye shall seek me and shall not find me." And those words in the sermon, "Ye shall seek me and die in your sins," ran in her mind and terrified her greatly. And staying at home she read out of Mr. Cotton Mather, "Why has Satan filled thy heart," which increased her fear. Her mother asked her whether she prayed. She answered "yes," but feared her prayers were not heard because her sins were not pardoned. (Two weeks later) Betty comes in as soon as I was up and tells me the disquiet she had when wak'd. Told me she was afraid she should go to

[1] Trumbull, *Blue Laws True and False*, 1876, 69–70; cited by W. Goodsell, *A History of Marriage and the Family* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 367.

[2] In the early period, children were allowed few amusements; for instance, swimming and football were forbidden, and even marbles were not sold until 1771. All this changed in the late eighteenth century to a love of amusement, when parties and dancing came into vogue.

> hell; was like Spira not elected. Ask'd what I should pray for, she said that God would pardon her sin and give her a new heart.[1]

Judge Sewall prayed as directed. In his *Diary* he adds: "Hope God heard."

The saying that has come down to us that the child should be seen but not heard describes fairly well his status in colonial New England. A book of table etiquette popular at the time begins its code of good conduct for children as follows:

> Never sit down at the table till asked, and after the blessing. Ask for nothing; tarry till it be offered thee. Speak not. Sing not, hum not, wriggle not. . . . When any speak to thee, stand up . . . etc.[2]

Children in colonial times were expected to eat their meals in complete silence, as fast as possible, and leave the table as speedily as possible. In many households they were not allowed to sit at the table, but stood by the side of the table or at a side table, running over to the regular table for additional helpings. In some families they stood behind their parents or other adults, and the food was handed back to them.

The Pattern of Colonial Institutions

Our review of the colonial family, though brief, shows it to have been a powerful institution, performing a great variety of important functions. The home was factory and market-place, schoolhouse, playground, chapel, hospital, and courtroom, all combined in one. The family was a giant in the earth in those days.

Two other institutions were also highly influential in seventeenth and eighteenth century America: the church and the local community. In the colonies there was no single established church, but the church was highly influential, nevertheless. The tie between church and government was particularly close in Massachusetts, sometimes called the Bible Commonwealth. Although the clergy held no civil offices, church membership was at first a prerequisite for the franchise. The town meeting was a congregational meeting which among other things levied taxes to pay the minister's salary. The influence of the church over moral conduct was seen in the harsh penal code which

[1] Reprinted by permission of the publishers, The Arthur H. Clark Company, from A. W. Calhoun, *Social History of the American Family*, vol. I, pp. 108–109.

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 112–13.

decreed death for a dozen or so offenses including "the smiting or cursing of parents by their children." Since there were but few doctors to treat illness, and since scientific medicine was little developed, the clergy also ministered to bodily ills, as it was thought that sickness was generally the result of sin and the work of the devil. Education, especially higher education, was sponsored by the church, the early colleges like Harvard and Yale having been founded for the training of young men for the ministry.

The government of colonial times was a government of small units, the villages and the towns. Political ties between the colonies were weak, but there were social and economic ties out of which a larger political solidarity was later to develop. Local government, however, was strong, as the legislation over personal habits suggests,[1] but such government did not render many services for the people. In 1644 the Massachusetts General Court ordered every community of fifty or more persons to establish a school, but the statute was ill enforced and education was far from being the function of the local government that it now is. Many of the services that are now rendered by local governments, like road-building and fire-fighting, were functions of the whole community. The whole male population could be mobilized to work on the highways or to repair the church building.

To sum up: Life in colonial times was organized by the family, the church, and the local community. There were small governmental units rendering relatively few services. Industry was largely within the home, and economic organization apart from the family was little developed. Such was the institutional pattern in the United States one hundred and fifty years ago. Today it is vastly different. The family is not the tower of strength it used to be, and neither is the church so powerful as formerly. The new stalwarts in the institutional lists are business and the state. The change in leadership has been dramatic, revolutionary. How it came to pass and what it signifies, the next chapter tells.

[1] It was illegal, for example, for a man to wear his hair long like a woman, to be idle, to use the Lord's name in vain. Commoners were not allowed by law to use silver ornaments or otherwise dress like freemen. In the early period, wages were established by law.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is meant by the phrase, "the household economy"?
2. How do you account for the fact that the status of woman was low in such a highly developed civilization as that of the ancient Greeks?
3. Do you agree with those students of society who hold that the condition of modern family life spells the collapse of our civilization, as is said to have been the case in ancient Rome? Why?
4. How does the type of economy affect the chances of marriage for women?
5. What traits are admired in a wife in an agricultural society? Why?
6. How does the family function as a determinant of social status in an agricultural society? In an industrial society?
7. Why do we pay special attention to the economic functions of the colonial family?
8. What, from our present standpoint, is unusual about the high birth rates of colonial times?
9. What purposes, if any, were served by "courting sticks" in colonial times?
10. Do you think the illustrations regarding discipline and religious education in colonial times given in the chapter were typical of the common folk or merely special cases?
11. What was the pattern of social institutions in colonial New England and how has it been altered?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. A comparative study of the household economy of ancient Greece and mediaeval England.
2. Patriarchal rule in theory and practice in ancient Rome.
3. Social inducements to marriage in colonial New England.
4. Family organization in colonial New Amsterdam.
5. The influence of Puritan theology on family organization.
6. The single woman in early agricultural society.

SELECTED READINGS

Calhoun, A. W., *A Social History of the American Family*, vol. I. Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1917.

The definitive history of the colonial American family. Because of lack of data, some of the generalizations like that regarding size of family are probably of questionable validity.

Earle, Alice Morse, *Home Life in Colonial Days*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1898.

This book and others by the same author (*Customs and Fashions in Old New England*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1893; *Child Life in Colonial Days*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1899) give us the most detailed accounts available regarding the material culture and customs of the colonial New England family. Other aspects of the family situation, such as the psycho-social and demographic, are not covered.

Goodsell, W., *A History of Marriage and the Family*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

Supersedes the author's earlier book, *A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution*. The definitive account of the history of the European-American family system. Well written.

Howard, G. E., *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*, 3 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1904.

A scholarly work.

Stern, Bernhard J., *The Family: Past and Present*. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938.

Part 2 consists of readings on family life in the ancient Mediterranean world, which is in our own historical tradition. Part 3 traces the European family through to the time of the Renaissance, while Part 5 sketches the impact of the commercial and industrial revolutions in England, and Part 6 treats the early American background.

Part Two

MODERN AMERICAN FAMILY AND CULTURE

IN PART One we developed a general conception of the family as a social institution, and showed something of its cultural foundations. We are now ready in Part Two to consider in detail our modern American family system, in which we have special interest. The chapters of Part Two are accordingly devoted to an analysis of contemporary family organization in the United States. Chapter 4 presents a comprehensive general view of present-day family life. This is followed by a series of chapters (5–8) which consider the American family from a number of points of view. Family life in the United States is not uniform as to type, but is, instead, highly differentiated because of differences in income, social class, occupation, location, race, and culture. These factors are important causes of variations in family life, and failure to take them into account can lead only to an oversimplified, unrealistic view of the American family. Finally, it seems desirable to conclude this section with a discussion (Chapter 9) of the interrelations of the family and the other major social institutions. We shall consider how the type of social order in the United States affects the family as compared with other types of social orders in other lands.

Chapter 4

MODERN AMERICAN FAMILY

A General View

The family today seems to be in considerable distress. The number of homes split by divorce or separation is very great. In 1940, one man was separated or divorced from his wife for about every thirteen married men living with their spouses; the ratio was slightly higher, about one to twelve, for women, so that altogether there was approximately one divorced or separated person to every six married couples.[1] Also families without children are numerous. In the large cities, approximately every other family is without a child living at home, and about a fifth of all married women who reach the age of forty-five have never borne a child. This situation is a source of anxiety to many persons, for the home is the place where the personal and social virtues are nurtured. The kind of citizen one becomes depends in no small measure upon the kind of mother, father, and home life one has. What happens to so important an institution as the family is of great moment to society.

The situation was very different two hundred years ago. The picture of the colonial family given in the preceding chapter shows it to have been a strong, stable institution. Why the drastic change?

It will be recalled that the principal key to the strength of the colonial family was its organization around farming and the handicrafts, making it economically self-sufficient. There was some development of the factory system, but it was greatly limited by the necessity of manufacturing by hand and by the lack of adequate transportation facilities. For power, it was necessary to depend upon human beings, domesticated animals, wind and water.

[1] William F. Ogburn, "Marital Separations," *American Journal of Sociology*, 49:316–23, January, 1944.

Beginning in the last half of the eighteenth century, all this was greatly changed. The settlement of new lands had given a marked impetus to commerce; and the new markets, created faster than goods could be manufactured by hand under the guild system of organization, provided inventors with a strong incentive to find improved methods of production. Besides, material culture after decades of slow, unspectacular growth had become ripe for far-reaching developments. The hand looms, the distaff, and the wheel, used for spinning yarn and weaving coarse fabrics, gave way to the spinning jenny, the water frame, and the mule, using steam power. In 1767, James Hargreave's spinning jenny made possible the operation of eight spindles at the same time by the turning of a wheel, and in 1785, thanks to James Watt, the low-pressure steam engine was introduced as a practicable source of motive power. The improvements in textile manufacturing, which came first, were gradually extended to all branches of industry. At first the changes were gradual and spotty, so that the Fourth Federal Census (1820) could report that two thirds of all textiles and 96 per cent of woolens were still products of household industry. But by 1860 power-driven machinery was established in the basic industries.

The coming of steam power gave a great push to production, as did also the perfection of steel tools. The far-reaching changes produced by this combination of inventions amply justifies the use of the phrase "industrial revolution" which came first to England and then was duplicated all over Europe and in America. Only rarely, as in the creation of bronze, had such momentous inventions been made in man's long history. Steam power and steel brought in a new social order. Society has changed more in the last two hundred years than in the preceding two thousand, and differs more from the Puritan culture than the Puritan differed from the Greeks or the ancient Hebrews.

Steam was ill-adapted to home use, as were also the large steel tools; so new houses called factories were constructed. These factories needed more workers than could be supplied by a single family; hence workers were drawn from many homes. In the household economy, the producers of goods were the owners of the goods. As operations expanded and more capital was required, the owners turned their profits back into the business. Sometimes a few neighbors would form a partnership or a joint-stock company, supplying the needed capital. But as the factories grew in size and the cost of the new intri-



FIGURE 6. ECONOMIC PRODUCTION LEAVES THE HOME

The departure of economic production from the family has led to the growth of cities, the proliferation of complex economic institutions and a socialistic trend in government. From Casner, Garner, Gabriel, *The Rise of American Democracy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company). Courtesy of Pictograph Corporation.

cate producers' goods became greater than could be met by the simple pooling of local resources, a new financing device — the corporation — was invented. Capital was obtained by selling stock to any number of subscribers, who were responsible only up to the value of the shares they held. Stockholders could also raise capital by issuing bonds which were mortgages on the equipment. Because capital played such a large part in financing the new economy, it was called *capitalism.* If the stockholders were numerous, they would choose directors who, in turn, chose a manager to run the business. Thus, the owners were not close to the workers and might be indifferent to their welfare. The managers hired workers on an individual, not a family, basis. The managers were primarily interested in production, and ordinarily had no great concern about what went on in the worker's family.

The change was revolutionary. The home ceased to be the seat of production, and the members of the family ceased to be partners in production. Nor did they generally co-operate in the production of wages. On the lower economic levels, however, wives and even young children sometimes joined the men in earning a living, but the difficulties in doing so were great and the family life often suffered. It was not so easy for a wife and mother to combine work in a factory with her household responsibilities as it had been when production was in the home and could be fitted into the domestic schedule. The hours of work in the new factories were often long and the conditions of work very bad, so that women and children had little incentive to find a place in industry unless the family was poor. In the new economy, then, the family ceased to be a co-operative unit in economic production, even of wages, and the burden of family support fell chiefly on the male head of the household, who earned an income which was shared by all the members of the family.

In 1940, one wife in every seven was in the labor force. A decade earlier, the ratio was one to nine, and earlier still, at the turn of the century, the proportion was one to sixteen or seventeen. The proportion has thus increased. If one is interested in the social changes occurring in our society and in the shape of things to come, one's attention will center on the marked increase in the number of women who combine marriage and a job. If, however, one is interested in observing the dominant characteristics of our present-day family pattern, one will note that the great majority of wives are homemakers but not breadwinners.

In 1940, the Census Bureau classified families according to the number of gainful workers in them. Families with only one employed member constituted 58.8 per cent of all families, those with two paid workers comprised 21.7 per cent, those with three gainfully employed made up 6.7 per cent, and those with four or more at work for pay were 3 per cent of all families.[1] Thus, we see that in three fifths of American families the burden of family support rests on one pair of shoulders.



FIGURE 7. THE INCREASE IN WORKING WIVES, 1890–1940

The population of married women in the labor force has trebled in the last half-century, and the trend is still upward. The reader will note that the figures in the chart above do not necessarily represent working mothers. Will woman's place be in the home fifty years hence?

In families with only one provider, who assumes the responsibility of family support? If we consider so-called "normal" families — that is, families with husband and wife present — the wife was the sole breadwinner in only one family in one hundred in 1940; children and other relatives were sole breadwinners in only five cases in one hundred; while the husband was the sole provider in about fifty out of every one hundred families.[2] The rôle of the husband as breadwinner is thus pretty sharply defined in our culture.

In the earlier household economy, the members of the family daily worked together at home to produce their livelihood; now under the capitalist system of factory production the earning of a living is not a

[1] *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940: Population and Housing: Families — General Characteristics* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), Table 13.

[2] Computed from data in Table 10, p. 52, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940: Population — Families: Employment Status.*

family affair and does not occur at home. Under the earlier system of production, families were bound together firmly by their economic co-operation and interdependence; under present conditions, the members of the family who do not work for pay generally look to the family breadwinner or breadwinners for support, but the breadwinners look to their jobs and not to their families. The change means that many of the highly important economic ties that formerly bound all the members of the family together have been cut, putting a strain on some of the remaining bonds and in some cases snapping them, so that the family remains a much less highly integrated unit than it used to be.

Economic Functions of the Modern Urban Family

The transfer of economic functions from the urban family to outside agencies has gone quite far in the past century and has left chiefly cooking, the care of the house, laundering, and some sewing in the urban family. Even portions of the latter functions have been transferred, as for instance the baking of bread to the bakery, cooking of lunches to restaurants and soda fountains, some washing of clothes to outside laundries, and much sewing to various types of factories.

The transfer process is not yet completed. Men's functions were the first to leave the household as farming was given up, but women's more varied household duties have been transferred more slowly. The transfer continues, however, and there is no sign of a halt in the process. During the decennium, 1919–1929, the per capita canning of vegetables, soups, and fruit increased 79 per cent, and the number of workers in cleaning and dyeing establishments mounted 220 per cent, while the population expanded only 16 per cent and the number of families only 23 per cent.[1] A sample of one thousand families studied in 1930 showed that nine out of ten city families and two thirds of the farm families used baker's bread only. During the next decennium, 1929–1939, the per capita production of canned vegetables increased 9.1 per cent, and canned fruit 44.4 per cent. This may mean that less fruit is canned at home or that more fruit is consumed, or both, but in any case the proportion of home-canned fruit to all canned fruit was apparently less in 1939 than in 1929, and this may be regarded as a relative loss of a productive function for the family.

[1] *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933), vol. I, pp. 665, 666, 668.

In the same period, the number of eating places increased about 27 per cent, as did the number of persons employed in such places, while the population grew only 8 per cent. During the decade, the increase in the number of employees in cleaning and dyeing plants, while not so phenomenal as in the preceding period, still was appreciable — about 40 per cent. However, from 1929 to 1939 the number of wage-earners in power laundries increased less than 5 per cent, which was less than the increase in population.[1] The 1930 study referred to above had shown that only one family in thirty-three among urban families had reported using outside laundering exclusively, while about one third of these city families reported using home laundries only. With more than ten million families owning electric washing machines and with twenty million electric irons in homes, the function of laundering clothes at home appears to have been retained during the past decade, and it may be that other economic functions utilizing electricity are similarly resisting transfer.[2] In general, however, it seems that the family function of economic production continues to be curtailed.

The transfer of economic functions from the family to industry means that the grandeur that was once the family's is now the grandeur of business enterprise. The loss of so powerful a function as economic production naturally entails the loss of influence and prestige. In the modern urban family the economic functions have probably reached a new all-time low; lower even than in the early hunting cultures, when, although men and not women were the hunters, the women and children co-operated in obtaining the food supply and in the production of the handicrafts. The evolutionary story of the family appears to be that of an institution beginning with important economic functions in the early hunting cultures, then adding greatly to these functions in the plow cultures and achieving great stature as an institution, only to be toppled from its eminence by the recent revolution in technology.

[1] Meyer F. Nimkoff, "The Family: Recent Social Changes," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 47:867–68, May, 1942.

[2] The baking of bread has been transferred from the home to a much greater extent than the laundering of clothes, and doubtless electricity is a factor, since the electric washing machine expedites the process of washing, while electricity does little to improve upon gas in cooking and baking. Electricity has actually restored certain economic functions to the home which had been transferred, such as the manufacture of ice in refrigerators. However, in accounting for the persistence of laundering in the home, factors besides electricity, such as the greater cost and greater wear and tear of commercial laundering, need to be taken into account.

The growth of the massive modern economic organization is then a result of the economic decline of the family. But industry has done more than take over what were once the functions of the family. It has expanded these functions far beyond their earlier dimensions, and it has added numerous functions which the family never exercised. The modern economic organization is a tremendously complex system consisting of dozens of varieties of farming, numerous types of factories, mills, mines, railroads, telephone, and telegraph, a vast system of distribution through stores, wholesale and retail, and agencies of credit and money, like banks and investment trusts. The new economy has elaborated the production of goods far beyond the total produced by the family in the household economy. The census of manufactures for 1929 showed an output for the United States of $58,100,000,000, about three hundred times the value of annual products a century before when the factory system was scarcely under way.[1]

The new economic organization has functions affecting the family besides the primary ones of production. Industry provides the members of families with some education, chiefly of a technical and vocational nature. It also performs protective functions through its varied social services, such as medical and welfare services. Most important of all, perhaps, as regards its auxiliary functions, industry performs important recreational functions. Indeed, these services are so extensive and so specialized that they have been organized as separate industries, collectively called commercialized recreation. So great is the prestige of professional entertainers that they are among the best-known persons in the country and the most highly paid.

The Redistribution of Population

Steam and steel produced factories, and factories caused cities to multiply. Workers left the farms and villages to work the new machines, starting a movement away from the land, until today less than one quarter of the population lives on farms, as compared with more than one half a century ago, and an even larger proportion at the time of the formation of the republic. Another reason for the diminishing rural population is the increasing efficiency of agricultural production because of better tools and machines and better knowledge of fertilizers and of plant and animal breeding, as a result of which fewer farmers are needed to feed the city dwellers.

[1] Robert R. Doane, *The Measurement of American Wealth* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1933.)

In 1790, only 3 per cent of the population lived in places of 8000 persons or more, but by 1940 the percentage had grown to around 50. It was not until 1820 that the United States had a city of 100,000 inhabitants, representing about 1 per cent of the total population of that time, while today almost a third of the population (30 per cent) lives in sixty-three cities of over 100,000. This drastic redistribution of population indicates that the modern family is increasingly an urban institution. The last decade or so has seen a slowing-up of the growth of large cities and a tendency toward decentralization in areas adjacent to the big cities, a development made possible by cheap electricity and by our highly effective transportation and communication systems. The urban aggregates in the future may, therefore, not continue to grow at such a rapid rate as in the past; they may lose population, but there is no indication that the diffusion of urban patterns of behavior has been halted.

The Great Growth of Governmental Services

The forces that were responsible for the growth of cities also operated to strengthen the larger communities of the states and the nation.



FIGURE 8. CHANGES IN URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION, 1860–1940

The figure at the left, which gives the population in millions, shows that at the time of the Civil War the rural population was about four times as great as the urban, but that about 1920 the urban population pulled ahead. The figure at the right shows that the rate of urban growth has been upward. The slowing-up of urban growth may be the result of the depression years of the nineteen-thirties, and in large cities it may be the result of the fact that the boundary line of a large city is political and does not include all of the economic city. Does decentralization mean the return of handicrafts to the home? From Philip M. Hauser, "Population: Recent Social Changes," *American Journal of Sociology*, 47:827, May, 1942.

With improvements in transportation and communication, the mobility of the population increased; the ties to the local community weakened and those to the larger areas became stronger. The improved transportation and communication enabled the governments of the larger areas to organize more efficiently and to extend their influence greatly.

In the pre-industrial era, government was largely that of small places, rendering, as was shown in the preceding chapter, relatively few services. In the larger communities, governments took on many new functions and expanded greatly their services to the people. The governments, for example, undertook to furnish more police protection. There had sometimes in earlier times been a constable or other police officer in the smaller communities, but the family shared the police function and kept a musket handy. Today most homes have no



FIGURE 9. HOW GOVERNMENT SERVES THE FAMILY

The sketch suggests a few of the numerous services that government renders the family. The growth of the social-service state is at the expense of the authority of the family, which formerly controlled a larger percentage of the economic and correlated functions.

firearms and the average husband is more helpless against a burglar than a husband in colonial times was against hostile Indians or wild beasts. It is true that the need for policing is greater in the city than in the small village, but whatever the reasons for the change, the function of policing, which was once a prerogative of the family, is now a function of government, representing a gain for the latter and a loss for the former. In the same way, other functions formerly rendered by the family have been transferred to government: education, health, insurance, relief, jobs for the unemployed, recreation, and many others.

Recreational Functions

In a farm economy there are few outside recreational agencies, and the family furnishes its own entertainment in the form of games, reading aloud, and playing musical instruments, as well as in activities like corn huskings, taffy pulls, and sewing bees, which combine work and play. As transportation facilities are poorly developed, recreation is sought at home, and the family participates as a group. The pressure of work, however, leaves little time for leisure, and the standard of living is not such as to permit many toys and other play materials for the children.

The higher standard of living and the increased leisure resulting from factory production have led, however, to an amazing development of recreational agencies outside the home. There are clubs of all kinds, athletic, bridge, fraternal, hobby; there are motion-picture houses, theaters, football stadia, baseball parks, playgrounds, bowling alleys, skating rinks, shooting galleries, dance halls, night clubs, tennis courts, golf links, swimming pools, race tracks, boxing and wrestling rings, and so on in great profusion. The proliferation of recreational outlets and their availability on a commercial basis encourage individualization in recreational interests as one of the dominant characteristics of the present-day play pattern. This means that each member of the family may have his own separate leisure-time activities which are not shared by the other members. Father may spend his Saturday afternoon fishing, mother may spend hers playing bridge, while sister enjoys a sorority tea dance, and kid brother watches the Indians bite the dust at the special Saturday afternoon show at the neighborhood theater.

New recreational functions of the family

The marked individualization of recreational interests in the modern family is real and important, but it should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the great growth of play facilities has also increased the possibilities of common recreation for the family as a whole, such as going to the movies or taking a week-end drive together. The changing forms of recreation sometimes deceive the observer who, finding a decline in the old types of play, concludes that there is less joint family recreation than formerly. There is probably less reading aloud at home, less playing of games, less group singing, because some of these old forms are better adapted to rural conditions. Reading aloud by one member of the family meant that the others could continue with their tasks of quilting or crocheting, and much of this work was done during the evenings before bedtime. Reading aloud is not so well adapted to modern conditions of living, with many books, public libraries, inexpensive newspapers, and the radio. On the other hand, city families that have lived or worked in congested areas all week are likely to take their recreation together by means of a drive into the countryside during the week end or by going to the movies. In our industrial economy, where people live in one place and work in another, the only time that members of the family have together is their leisure time. As a consequence, whether a husband and wife find their relationship satisfying depends more directly upon how they use their leisure time than used to be the case when they worked side by side throughout the day. The education of women, which has proceeded apace until it is nearly equal to that of men, has become more and more like that of men, at least in respect to their recreational interests. This similarity encourages companionship between the sexes. It is, therefore, not clear that there has been any loss in recreational functions of the family unless these are viewed only in relation to the prodigious growth of personalized recreation outside the home.

The increased importance of the recreational functions of the modern family can be noted especially in reference to the young children. In a farm economy no special provision has to be made for the play needs of the young. The farmyard is their playground. Toys are few, and often household objects like clothespins and brooms are put to recreational purposes. Pets are part of the equipment of the farm and require no special care. Things are different, however, in an urban economy where space is at a premium. Much concern is often given

to finding a place to live which will be suitable for the children and yet not too inconvenient of access from one's work place. Pets are expensive, they must have special attention, and they are sometimes not welcomed by neighbors. The commercialization of toys has meant that a vast assortment is available, and doubtless parents spend considerable time in the selection and purchase of playthings for their children. The responsibility of caring for the play needs of children would thus appear to be greater in the modern urban family than in the earlier agricultural family.

No discussion of the recreational functions of the modern family is adequate without some attention to the influence which electricity is having upon these functions. Unlike steam power, which was ill-adapted to the home and led to the transfer of many activities out of the home, electricity is well suited to the home, since it can be transported over long distances at small cost and can be made available in small units. Electricity furnishes many comforts which may make the home a veritable fairyland. Air-conditioning machines are available that provide artificial climate indoors the year round. Quartz lamps give the benefits of sunshine. Electric refrigerators and electric mixers make hospitality easier. A highly varied entertainment is provided by the radio and will be even further enriched by television. Electricity, however, also makes out-of-the-home places, such as motion-picture theaters and restaurants, more attractive, so that the home probably continues to lose influence as a recreational center, despite a definite gain in variety and ease of entertainment.

Educational Functions of the Family

The formal education of children, including vocational and physical education, is now largely centered in the schools, established and run by government. The absence of one or both parents from the home while at work in industry fostered the development of schools for the children, as did also the great growth of culture with its demands for specialization, demands which the parents were no longer able to meet. Gradually the schools have enlarged their responsibilities, and they now perform a variety of functions besides the purely educational one. It is quite generally recognized that the schools play an important child-caring function, relieving parents of responsibility for looking after their children for a large portion of the day. The schools pro-



FIGURE 10. THE SCHOOL TAKES OVER FAMILY FUNCTIONS

About one half of all the days of the year, children of school age in the United States are out of the home and in school. The school not only educates but may feed, discipline, protect, and amuse the child, and is therefore a part-time institutional home for children.

vide protective and recreational services [1] for the children, and to a degree relieve families of responsibility for these activities. Where the school has a cafeteria or furnishes milk, it also helps the family with its economic responsibilities.

The trend is toward the increase, rather than the decrease, of these supplementary functions of the school. In many ways we find the school extending the range of its activities and taking the child out of the home for longer periods,[2] freeing the parents increasingly of direct responsibility for the supervision of their offspring. More and more children are attending school, and they remain there longer. There does not, however, seem to be any appreciable trend in the United States to get children into school at an earlier age, despite the invention of the kindergarten and the nursery school. At least the figures show that in 1910, 17 per cent of all five-year-olds were in school, and in 1940 the proportion was still about the same, 18 per cent. These figures may represent something of a lag, but there is

[1] *Planning Schools for Tomorrow: The Schools and Recreation Services* (Washington, D.C.: United States Office of Education, Leaflet 73, 1945).

[2] C. H. Judd, "Education," *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933), pp. 325–81.

a general feeling that very young children should be cared for by their families and should not be entrusted to others.[1] On the other hand, of children between the ages of five and seventeen years, 59 per cent attended school in 1900 and 82.5 per cent in 1940. This means that an increasingly large number of families have been relieved of the responsibility for the formal education of their children. It is possible, of course, that some of these families never assumed this responsibility, so that, strictly speaking, its assumption by the school would not represent a loss to the family. But if we try to assess the relative influence of the institutions of a community, the increase in functions of the school means a relative loss of influence by the family, whether it previously exercised the function or not.

In 1900, the average term of the school year in the United States was 144 days; by 1940, it was 175 days, or an increase of about 25 per cent. On the average, then, children of school age are now out of the home about one half of all the days of the year. Whether the school year will be even further extended is a debated question. Some school authorities favor keeping the children in school during the summer months, to help solve the vexing problem of urban recreation, but the proposal has not had much support, presumably for economic reasons. Summer camps have developed as a partial solution to this problem, and it is likely that this movement will grow. The development of agencies for the care and schooling of children during the summer months means a further reduction in the educational functions of the family.

New educational functions

In considering the changing functions of the family, it is important to note that new times occasion the development of new functions as well as the loss of old ones. For instance, more urban than rural parents are members of the Parent-Teacher Association, serve on school committees, and show interest in the schools in other ways, such as visiting them from time to time. In a sample study [2] nearly three

[1] Even during World War II, in the face of an acute shortage of manpower in industry, when women in large numbers were taking the places of men, governmental officials took the attitude that mothers of small children could serve their country best by remaining at home and caring for their children.

[2] J. Roy Leevy, "Contrasts in Urban and Rural Family Life," *American Sociological Review*, 5:948–53, December, 1940: a study of 1000 rural white and 1000 urban white families in Illinois, representing a wide range of occupations. The urban communities ranged in size from 14,000 to 63,000 population; the rural, from 250 to 2400.

fifths of the urban women were members of the Parent-Teacher Association, as compared to one third of the rural women; for the men, the proportions were about one sixth and one sixteenth, respectively. In the small rural community, where the parents know the teacher, there is perhaps less need for membership in the Parent-Teacher Association than there is in the city, where the teacher is seldom a resident of the neighborhood in which she teaches. But whether this is so or not, the greater participation of urban parents in the Parent-Teacher Association and other school responsibilities represents the addition of a new educational function for the family.

In formal education, the family has transferred to the school many of the functions it formerly exercised, such as teaching children the three "r's." While in many homes the children still get some help in these rudiments from parents or brothers and sisters, the family previously had the whole responsibility for such instruction. At present, however, parents have additional educational responsibilities which they did not have before; they help their children with homework in a great variety of subjects now taught in the school which formerly were not taught by parents. They often choose schools and courses of study for their children, supervise the selection of radio programs, and occasionally act as intermediaries when conflict flares between child and teacher. These and other responsibilities represent new educational functions.

The point just made is highly important, because it suggests that the family is not losing all its institutional functions, as is sometimes believed. In its economic activities of production, it is true that the family has been experiencing an absolute as well as a relative decrease in functions, and this may be true of certain other functions, such as the religious and status-giving. However, in functions like the educational and the recreational, the loss in the old is partly offset by the gain in the new functions. This shifting suggests that the family is not drying up for want of things to do, and that it is not in danger of becoming a vestigial institution performing no essential functions. On the contrary, child-rearing, with its educational and recreational problems, is probably more difficult today than at any time in the past. The family still performs important educational functions, some of which are new functions, and so far as informal training goes, the family still retains its commanding rôle. Since the family has the child during his formative years, it lays the foundation of his attitudes, manners, and morals, as is shown in Chapter 11.

PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS

Governments and social institutions have also extended enormously the protective services which they offer members of families, and have thereby relieved the latter of much of the necessity for furnishing such care. In protective functions, the problem is similar to that of economic production. The economic functions have, of course, been shifted largely to industry, while the protective functions have been transferred to the state or to social institutions. In both

FIGURE 11. HOME OWNERSHIP UNDER THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM

Evidence of the transfer of economic and protective functions from the family to the state: the percentage of all privately financed new homes financed by Federal Housing Administration insured loans. The sharp reduction in the monthly cost of purchasing a home under the Federal Housing Administration plan, resulting from the low maximum interest rate and long-term amortization, was a strong influence behind the large gains in new home construction in the years shortly before the war. In 1940, about 42 per cent of all privately financed new single-family homes were financed by Federal Housing Administration insured loans. The total number of such homes increased from 53,552 built in 1937 to 171,440 in 1940. *Seventh Annual Report of the Federal Housing Administration* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941). Data used in figure, covering all types of family dwellings, supplied by Federal Housing Administration.

cases, however, the change probably represents an absolute decrease in the functions remaining in the family. While we can make no quantitative estimate as to how the modern family compares with the family of earlier times in the exercise of the protective function, we are warranted in surmising from such evidence as the increase in hospitals, clinics, doctors, nurses, policemen, firemen, and court officials that the family does not have as much responsibility for the protection of its members as formerly. In the earlier agricultural society, doctors were inaccessible or nonexistent, especially in the remote regions. Families made their own medicines, ministered to the sick, and when death came buried their own dead. In certain sections of Arizona today, there are to be found some families of Navaho Indians who behave in a similar manner, although mission and governmental hospitals are open to them. They prefer to use their own medicine men and their own remedies. Most of the Indians, however, use the facilities provided for them, and so shift to philanthropic and governmental agencies a large share of the responsibility formerly exercised by the family.

In later chapters,[1] we shall consider at length some of the agencies, public and private, which help to protect the family. Here it is sufficient to point out how extensive such protective services have become. Maternity centers and hospitals now relieve the family of considerable responsibility in connection with the birth of babies and the subsequent care of mother and child. The government helps to educate parents in the proper care of their children, and through pure food and drug laws and sanitary engineering helps to protect them against contagion. The government maintains employment bureaus to help members of families get jobs, and if no jobs are available, the government furnishes work or money relief, as well as compensation for unemployment. If the members of the family become too old to work, the state provides a pension or assistance. And finally, when death comes, if the family is too poor to pay the costs of burial, the government will take care of them. In the past such services have been rendered chiefly to the poor, but more and more the trend has been to serve the masses, irrespective of need. Plans for these protective services have become so extensive that they are designated "the-cradle-to-the-grave" programs of social security. Indeed, the community goes even beyond helping the family to protect itself, and protects members

[1] Chapter 9, also Chapter 19

of the family against one another. The Roman father had the power of life and death over his children, but the modern father may feel the interfering hand of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children if he acts too harshly toward his young. In a single year, the Society in a large city like Boston handles thousands of cases involving abuse of children by their parents.

When the comparison is made with times past, the family is seen to have suffered a loss of protective functions, but this loss should not blind us to the fact that the family still remains the most important protective agency for its members, especially during childhood. Most children rely upon their parents for protection and care, and when help comes from the outside it is generally procured through the parents. If the child is ill, the parents may use a doctor instead of trying to handle the case alone, but they still have the responsibility of choosing a doctor, of summoning him, of filling his prescription. The modern family is thus the middleman of community service to the child.

We have seen in preceding paragraphs how the government has taken over numerous functions of education and protection formerly exercised by the family. The government also has supplanted the family as the guardian of industry. Government now regulates industries the products of which are essential to most consumers or to many other industries, such as railroads, banks, electric light, gas and water companies. Government also exercises control over industry in the protection of workers from accident, in sanitation, in the work of women and children, and sometimes in wages and hours of work. In the household economy, such control of industry was vested in the family. It seems correct to say, therefore, that many of the functions of regulation and control of industry have been shifted from the family to the state.

To sum up: Governments in recent times, especially in the twentieth century, have been extending their functions into a great variety of fields. Since many of these functions were originally performed by the family, the collectivist trend of government is in part a result of the decline of the family. With the change in functions has gone a change in loyalties. When the family was all-powerful and provided for all or nearly all of the needs of its members, the devotion to the family was great, as is well exemplified by the old Chinese family, with its virtues of filial piety and ancestor worship. Now that members of

families look more and more to government for support, education, and protection, the feeling of loyalty to the state is greatly increased and in some places amounts almost to worship. The power that was once the family's has become the power of the state.

Religious Functions

We have considered in preceding paragraphs the great transfer of economic, educational, recreational, and protective functions from the family to industry and government during the last few centuries. Some consideration needs also to be given to the religious functions. Two hundred years ago, in colonial America, the church was a powerful institution, with great influence upon government, education, art, morals, and medicine, as the previous chapter showed. The church was closely tied in with family life. The family went to church in a body twice on Sunday, grace was said at table, family prayers were offered, the children were taught the catechism by their parents, and frequently religious books were read aloud to the assembled family. Religion was an integrating force, emphasizing the responsibilities of parents and children to each other. In the earlier farming societies, the home was a church, the father of old was a kind of high priest, and where the idea was highly developed, as in the Far East, family religion prevailed and was organized around ancestor worship. Today ancestors are scarcely remembered, let alone worshiped.

About two fifths of all American families today are without church affiliation and an indeterminate number lack the integrating religious functions of the family in the household economy. The religious function of the modern family, then, is very different from that of the other functions already considered. In the economic functions of production, the family's loss has been industry's gain. Likewise the schools and commercialized recreation have benefited by the family's relative loss of educational and play activities. In religious functions, however, we find an absolute decrease in influence in both the home and the church. The educational functions which were transferred from the home to the school have been expanded, but the religious functions of the family have been in large part lost and are not being performed by any institution. Of course there are still a great many homes where religious functions are prominent, but if the comparison is with the family of the past, a marked decrease in religious functions is noted.

Reproductive Function

The modern family has so far been described in terms of its economic, protective, educational, recreational, and religious functions. These are not the central or definitive functions of the family, and the transference of such functions to other organizations is not crucial to the family's survival, however much the family's stature as a social institution may be affected. What is indispensable to the family is the reproductive function, for without it the family would obviously cease to exist. The reproductive function, however, is not unaffected by the other functions, especially the economic ones, the marked decline of which have been accompanied by a reduction in family size. Indeed, the small size of the modern urban family is a striking symbol of the reduced stature of the family as a social institution.

Under capitalism, the decrease in the reproductive function of the family has been great, and since this activity is not transferable, the change represents a considerable net loss of function. The data show a decline in the fertility of the native white population since the middle of the nineteenth century, coincident with the industrialization of American society. Consider the change that has occurred in the typical family.[1] The first census, taken a hundred and fifty years ago in 1790, showed the five-member family to be the most common type. A hundred years later, in 1890, the predominating type was a family of four members. By 1900, there were more three-member families than any other kind, and by 1930, two-member families were most common.[2]

Another way to observe the change in the birth rate is to consider the mean or average size of family. In 1790, the average number of persons per family in the United States was 5.7; in 1890, it was 4.9; in 1930, 4.1; in 1940, 3.8. There has thus been a loss of two persons per family in the last hundred and fifty years, the loss being most rapid during the last decade. The trend toward smaller families is expected to continue in the future, until a point of relative stability is reached.

[1] Paul C. Glick, "Family Trends in the United States," *American Sociological Review*, VII: 505–16, August, 1942.

[2] These figures do not reveal the number of children ever born to these families, only the number of persons living together at the time of the census. Some families are smaller because the children have grown up and established families of their own, or have moved away from the parental household. The 1940 Census reported the number of occupied dwellings in the United States and these have been used as an approximation to the number of families in the United States in 1940. The average size of family has been computed by dividing the total population by the number of occupied dwelling units.

It is thought that by 1980 the average size of family will be 3.1 persons.[1] If the reduction should be somewhat greater, the average size of American family will have been cut in half in about eight generations.



FIGURE 12. THE CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION

Proportion of American women in three age groups and at three epochs — past, present, and future. The average size of family in 1800 was about seven or eight children. The large proportion of children meant that women of childbearing ages were relatively scarce. Because of high mortality rates, there were relatively few aged persons. Since 1800 there has been a marked decline in the percentage of young people, while the percentage of oldsters has more than doubled. The larger percentage of women of childbearing ages is due to the higher birth rates of past generations and to past immigration. Fifty years hence, every third person in the United States will probably be fifty years old or over. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, October, 1940, p. 6.

The decline in the size of the family has resulted from changes in family habits induced by industrialization, notably the trend toward the establishment of independent households of parents and children. Fewer relatives and unrelated persons live with the family now than

[1] This estimate is based on forecasts of future population and families, assuming medium mortality, medium fertility, and no immigration. See *The Problems of a Changing Population* (National Resources Committee), p. 25.

formerly, and even more important, fewer children under twenty-one remain at home. In 1940, more than two fifths of the families reported no children under twenty-one living at home, as compared with an estimated one fifth of such childless homes a hundred and fifty years ago.

If families become smaller in the face of a growing population, it is obvious that the number of separate households will become greater. Since 1890, there has been an increase of 175 per cent in the number of families, while population has increased only 110 per cent. The increase in the number of separate households is important to many persons. To manufacturers, for instance, the trend is highly significant, for it means a bigger market for the goods they make. Smaller families mean that certain goods are shared by fewer persons, hence more goods must be provided. The newsboy has more addresses at which to leave the morning newspaper. In 1940, there were 34,362,000 occupied dwellings in the United States, compared to 29,905,000 in 1930, an increase of 16.6 per cent, or more than twice the gain in population, which was only 7.2 per cent.

Childless homes

Doubtless one reason for such a phenomenal increase is the increased longevity of parents. A much larger proportion of parents now survive beyond the period of the empty nest, thanks to modern medicine and sanitary engineering. The expectancy of life for males at the time of the Civil War was only thirty-nine years; at the turn of the present century it was only forty-seven years; by 1940 it was about sixty-two years.[1] There has been little change in the interval after marriage at which the first child is born; hence this is not a factor limiting the number of offspring. However, fewer children are born, so that the last child arrives while the mother is still rather young. It used to be that the family of a typical couple would continue to increase until the end of the wife's childbearing period, about the age of forty or forty-five, which meant that in their old age the couple would still have some children at home. At present, a typical couple marry in their early twenties and have two or three children before the wife is thirty. By the time the parents reach fifty, the children have grown up and departed, leaving the parents to live out the remaining twenty years or so of their lives alone.

[1] For females the 1940 figure, based on 1939 mortality, was around sixty-six years.



FIGURE 13. RECENT TRENDS IN AMERICAN REPRODUCTIVITY (UNITED STATES EXPANDING BIRTH REGISTRATION AREA, 1920–1940)

These charts show why the rise in the birth rate since 1933 is probably temporary. (They indicate principally a fluctuation in the marriage rate.) The left-hand panel shows that most of the births are concentrated among women from twenty to twenty-nine years of age, while the right-hand panel shows that the increase consists mainly of first and second births. Births of fourth and higher orders have continued to decline; so the trend is still toward the small family. The gain in births is due to the increase in marriages reflecting improved economic conditions due to the war and post-war boom. From Louis I. Dublin, "The Trend of the Birth Rate Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," *Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine*, August, 1943, p. 567.

Family limitation

Things were different when we were a nation of farmers, for children are well suited to a farm economy. On the farm they have plenty of space in which to romp, the cost of maintaining them is

not great, and they are useful workers even when still quite young. In contrast, an industrial economy of intricate machines does not readily utilize the labor of children. Compulsory school attendance laws keep them out of much gainful employment until adolescence. Instead of the playground of the spacious farm, there are the crowded city streets with their dangers to life and limb. Since the urban child does not work but must be supported, he is an economic liability. It has been estimated by one agency [1] that the cost of bearing and rearing a child from birth to age eighteen averages somewhat more than $7700 for a family in the $2500 a year income class. The cost of rearing a single child in the city is thus about equal to the total family income for three years. This figure does not include the cost of schooling which must be borne by the taxpayer, whether he has children to educate or not. Nor does it include the interest which might have been earned on the money expended.

Since children in an urban economy are economically unprofitable, they must be wanted for other reasons if they are to be produced in appreciable numbers, unless they come accidentally, which happens with decreasing frequency in an age of artificial contraception. As children are often wanted for their own sake, as is evident from the large number that are born, the problem is to account for the reduction in the birth rate, which is not fully explained by economic factors alone. It should be recognized that the care of children is a heavy responsibility which many adults do not want to assume. Children

TABLE 1. THE COST OF BRINGING UP A CHILD

The cost of raising a child in *American families* which have *an average income* of $2500 a year. Expenditures *from birth up to age eighteen on the basis of the price level in 1935–36.*

1. Cost of being born		$ 300.00
2. Food		2,271.88
3. Clothing and shelter		3,357.33
Clothing	$ 709.53	
Shelter	2,647.80	
4. Education (incidental costs only)		82.50
5. Medical care		296.84
6. Transportation and recreation (auto and movies)		1,126.80
7. Sundries (personal care, publications, insurance, etc.)		326.52
Total		$7,761.87 *

* This figure does not include interest which might have been earned on the money expended. At the rate of 2.5 per cent a year, compounded annually, the interest would yield around $2000 for the eighteen-year period. If this item is included, the total cost is close to $10,000.

[1] The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, July, September, October, and November, 1947.



FIGURE 14. EVIDENCE OF THE FALLING BIRTH RATE

The decreasing birth rate is, after a time lag, reflected in the school attendance of young children, especially in the big cities where the net reproduction rates are lowest. For the country as a whole, there were 4,302,823 first-graders in 1920; in 1940, only 3,018,463, about three fourths as many. From National Resources Planning Board, *Human Conservation: The Story of Our Wasted Resources.*

in an urban environment require a great deal of time and attention, and may interfere with the life-plans of their parents. In a sense the problem is economic, because couples might have more babies if they had more income, since they could then shift the burden of physical care to paid help. But this line of reasoning should not be carried too far, since those with the highest incomes do not at present have enough babies to keep up their numbers. Moreover, the birth rate has fallen steadily while the standard of living has been rising. It is not realistic, therefore, to assume that a further increase in family income will necessarily result in a higher birth rate.

Contraceptives and the birth rate

A highly interesting and socially significant question concerns the relation of contraceptives to the falling birth rate. The decline in the birth rate has been notable in western nations since about the middle of the last century. This period has also seen the introduction and diffusion of improved artificial means of birth control. Prior

to the nineteenth century, the desire to control conception and some knowledge of control were universal social phenomena,[1] but the desire was not so widespread as now, and the knowledge of methods was relatively undeveloped and undiffused. Is, then, the small modern family a result of the invention and spread of contraceptives? This question was raised by a commission [2] appointed to investigate the causes of the declining natality in Sweden, where the net reproduction rate had been cut in half in two generations [3] — to a point where it was about 25 per cent short of the number needed to keep the population stationary. The commission found that the drastic decline in births occasioned by the new urban industrial economy had been accomplished by deliberate birth control, largely without contraceptives. Inquiry showed that modern chemical and mechanical devices were not widely utilized and, therefore, played only a minor rôle. What was new in the Swedish situation was not birth control *per se*, but the greater use, both extensively and intensively, of an old familiar folkway method. Approved modern contraceptives may possess certain advantages from a psychological as well as a hygienic standpoint, but the decline of the birth rate in Sweden without benefit of the new methods testifies to the relative effectiveness of the old methods. Confirming evidence as to their effectiveness is supplied also by the records of birth-control clinics in the United States.[4] The important elements in the situation affecting the birth rate in recent decades are, then, (1) a strong demand for a smaller family induced by the changed rôle of children in the new industrial order; and (2) workable means, however simple, of satisfying that demand. Modern contraceptives when available may be highly preferred, for reasons of greater effectiveness, but the new methods in themselves do not appear to be a major factor in the reduction of the birth rate in recent times.

The changing sex morals

Another important question concerns the relation of the new economic order and the invention of contraceptives to sexual morality.

[1] Norman E. Himes, *Medical History of Contraception* (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1936).

[2] The Swedish Population Commission, *Report on the Sex Question* (translated and edited by Virginia Clay Hamilton. Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1940).

[3] In the eighteen-eighties, the net reproduction rate in Sweden was about 1500; it first fell below 1000 in 1925; by 1933, it was 702. The Swedish Population Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[4] See Chapter 16.

Is the moral code respecting sexual behavior changing, and if so, why? It is extremely difficult to consider these questions scientifically, because relevant and reliable data are scant, especially regarding trends. The reports on illegitimacy [1] make it obvious that sex relations are not always confined to marriage, but the data have not been altogether satisfactory because many conceptions which occur outside of wedlock are covered up by the subsequent marriage of the couple before the birth of the child; and more important still, only a relatively small number of extra-marital affairs eventuate in pregnancy.



FIGURE 15. THE TREND IN NET REPRODUCTION RATES, 1800 TO THE PRESENT

In the early days of our Republic the fertility and mortality of our population were such that a hundred new-born girls would have had nearly five hundred granddaughters, if conditions had remained unchanged. By 1933 the birth rate had fallen so far that, even with greatly improved mortality, a hundred new-born girls would just hold their own in regard to replacements. By 1936 our net reproductive capacity fell below the maintenance level. The net reproduction rate is a better index to population change than the rate of natural increase or decrease, since the latter may show a gain simply because of a surplus of women of childbearing ages, as is true today. The situation is more acute in France than in the United States and even more acute in England. On the other hand, Russia and Japan are high in reproductivity. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, November, 1938, p. 9.

[1] For fuller treatment, see Chapter 16.

Some highly interesting and novel data have become available to us through the Population Act which went into force in England and Wales in July, 1938, and which required those who register a birth to give the date of the marriage. If we take the number of maternities reported as occurring within the first eight months of marriage, plus the number of illegitimate maternities for the same period, we have the total number of maternities reported during the period which represent extra-marital conceptions. These numbers, together with certain others, are set forth in Table 2.[1] Inspection of the table shows that the number of women reported as bearing children, extra-maritally conceived, during the years 1939–43, averaged about 80,000, which represents about one third of all first maternities, and about one eighth of all maternities. If it is assumed that all these cases represent socially disapproved sex behavior, the figures are somewhat misleading because in some rural areas of England and Wales the ancient custom still survives of proving fertility before marriage. Conceptions occurring under these conditions are deliberate, and not a transgression of the local moral code. We do not know how many such cases are involved, but the number is thought to be small.

Most of the women represented in the table of extra-marital maternities probably did not wish to conceive, but were ignorant of contraceptive methods or careless in the use of them. These women are, moreover, not the only ones engaging in extra-marital relations. We must also take note of those who had their pregnancies terminated by abortion, spontaneous or induced. The number of such cases is unknown, but a conservative estimate by the British Medical Association in the nineteen-thirties put the number at about 150,000 annually, or approximately one abortion to five births. If we apply this ratio to extra-marital conceptions, the earlier figure of 80,000 rises to nearly 100,000. In addition, we must include the greater number who engage in extra-marital affairs without becoming pregnant. No definite information exists as to the size of this group. Mace, who put together the data shown in the table, asked a number of persons for estimates as to the probable ratio of the number of extra-marital affairs avoiding pregnancy to the number resulting in conception. The lowest estimate given was four to one, while eight

[1] David R. Mace, *The Outlook for Marriage*, p. 4. Reprinted from *The Christian News-Letter* by the Marriage Guidance Council, 78 Duke Street, London, W. 1.

TABLE 2. MATERNITIES OF VARIOUS TYPES, ENGLAND AND WALES, 1938–1943*

	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943
Maternities up to eight months after marriage...	54,926	57,895	55,612	41,645	39,213	36,433
Illegitimate maternities....	25,348	26,924	26,871	32,179	37,597	44,881
Total maternities representing conceptions outside marriage.....	80,274	84,819	82,483	73,824	76,810	81,314
Total first maternities.....	247,386	254,815	255,439	247,342	284,198	294,571
Total of all maternities....	619,928	636,060	622,376	592,813	665,838	697,267
Estimated unmarried women of ages 15–49....	4,938,000	4,921,300	4,696,000	4,550,200	4,440,300	4,383,000

* From David R. Mace, *The Outlook for Marriage*, p. 4. Figures are available only for the second half of 1938, hence these have been doubled to make them correspond with the figures for the full years which follow.

to one was the average of the estimates. On the basis of the former, the total number of women engaging in extra-marital relations in England and Wales each year, 1939–43, would amount to about half a million; on the latter basis, about a million. The bottom row of the table shows that the average estimated number of unmarried women (single, widowed, or divorced) in England and Wales who were between fifteen and forty-nine years of age in 1938–43 was about 4,500,000. If the guesses referred to in the preceding sentence are true, then at least one in six unmarried women of childbearing age in England and Wales in the years in question was unchaste.

Mace recognizes that the "estimates" are really guesses and purely hypothetical, but he believes that whatever the estimate, the trend toward sexual immorality is unmistakable. As his data cover only a six-year time-span, they do not disclose any significant changes. There are, however, other data, notably those of Terman,[1] which do show a trend toward greater sexual indulgence before marriage, although the sample used is not representative of American women generally.

If there have been changes in sex morals in recent decades, does this mean that our morals have deteriorated? The complaint fre-

[1] See Chapter 12.

quently heard that modern youth is heading for moral ruin is not new. It is an old recurring belief, common to all times of rapid change. Some years ago, archeologists uncovered some tablets belonging to the time of Hammurabi, and discovered on deciphering them that they expressed concern about the morals of the young. What, they asked, is our youth coming to? The "Golden Age" of morality, it appears, lies always in the past, because our memory is selective and retains only what is pleasant and virtuous, while the shameful vices of our childhood are quickly repressed and forgotten. It is possible that the modern industrial era may have produced a deterioration of sexual morality, but the fact is yet to be established. The greater freedom of discussion which characterizes modern times gives the impression of greater immorality, when the fact of the matter may be that we only talk about it more.

When we turn from an appraisal of recent changes in extra-marital sex behavior to a description of the changes themselves, we find ourselves on surer ground. Whether one believes that morals have deteriorated depends on his values; hence is a subjective judgment. An accurate description of actual social changes, however, is an objective phenomenon. Nearly everyone acknowledges that significant changes have occurred in sex morality in modern times with the weakening of the traditional double standard, and the substitution in its stead of the single standard for both sexes. The double standard sanctioned one code of sex behavior for men, another for women, the code for men permitting considerable sexual freedom and that for women requiring strict chastity before marriage and fidelity thereafter. The religious institutions have been strongly opposed to the double standard, and have espoused the single standard of premarital continence and marital fidelity for men as well as women, but the mores of the group have taken an ambivalent position, tolerating departures from these standards on the part of men. The rationale of the double standard is highly complex and not clearly defined, but an important idea underlying it is the idea that the sex drive is stronger in men and harder to contain, while women are thought to be sexually passive. Since the male had the more active rôle in mating, it was thought that extra-marital sex experience provided valuable training for marriage and was a proof of virility. Faulty knowledge regarding sex hygiene resulted in coitus being discouraged throughout pregnancy, and since pregnancies were numerous, the

long periods of abstinence invited infidelity. If men were to be sexually free, and women not, then there must be two classes of women — the women of good reputation who were to become the wives and mothers and the women with whom the men could consort, namely, the prostitutes.

The double standard originated in the upper classes in the cities and then spread to the middle, and, to a minor degree, to the lower classes. In the rural economy of the pre-industrial era in Europe, the code governing sex relations was quite different. There we find the widespread peasant custom of betrothal which permitted the couple to come together freely, with the understanding that if pregnancy occurred marriage would follow. Children were highly desired because useful in the farm economy; hence pregnancy was valued as a test of fertility. Youth was not an obstacle if the couple was sexually mature, because early marriage was possible. Life in small, intimate communities meant that the father of a child was generally known and could be held accountable. In the city, things were very different. Here children were not so highly valued for their economic contribution, which might be small or nonexistent. Early marriage was not so common because of the difficulties of finding work and the educational preparation required for the new occupations. The city was a community of strangers; hence it was more difficult to determine paternity in extra-marital conceptions. The double standard was a social invention for the protection of the great mass of the upper-class and middle-class urban women.

In recent decades there have been considerable changes in the double standard effected by the new, improved status of women. The greater economic opportunities open to them afford them more freedom in affectional matters. They enjoy more nearly equal opportunities with men in education, politics, and other fields. If there is to be a single standard in these areas, why, some ask, should there not also be a single standard of sexual morality? The single standard might be either one of strict pre-marital continence for both sexes, or one of sexual freedom for both; that is to say, the modern man might adopt the traditional standard of the upper-class woman, or the modern woman might adopt the traditional standard of the man. Mohammed found it was easier to go to the mountain than to have the mountain come to him, and modern women likewise have found it easier to adopt the practices of the men. At least many

observers have noted an increase in recent decades in the number of couples having pre-marital sex intercourse. Most of these are said to be engaged couples, or couples with a serious interest in each other from the standpoint of matrimony. The relationships are stable, affectionate, and responsible. What we have here apparently is an attempt to reconstruct in the urban environment the type of betrothal experience formerly so common in the rural community, with the important difference that pregnancy is shunned, not sought. Great reliance is, therefore, placed on contraceptives.

In describing the new morality, care should be taken not to exaggerate the trend, for though the double standard has been modified, it has not been abolished. The effort of women to obtain sexual freedom before marriage in the urban environment is beset by many difficulties.[1] That is why the double standard developed in the first place. The new urban social order promotes socially responsible, though unsanctioned, pre-marital sexual relations, but it also encourages casual, promiscuous, irresponsible relations. These differ from the old prostitution in that they involve no financial consideration, yet they are not unlike prostitution in their demoralizing effects. Sexual experience has, of course, different implications for male and female in any social order whatsoever. In a simple rural society these differences may be minimized so as to afford women sexual freedom equal or nearly equal to that of men, but in a complex urban industrial society, the differences are not so readily controlled.

Social Psychological Functions

Our review of changes in family organization in recent decades shows a loss of certain traditional functions, centering around the transfer of economic production from the home to the factory. However, in the educational and recreational functions, absolute gains may be noted, in spite of the great growth of these functions outside the home. The gains in these activities show that the trends are not all on the debit side of the family ledger, for while losing time-honored responsibilities the family is gaining new ones. These new functions relate chiefly to the personal or human side of family experience, with the emphasis on companionship between husband and wife and between parents and children.

How, it may be asked, has the family been strengthened in its

[1] For further discussion, see Chapter 12.



FIGURE 16. ECONOMIC COHESION OF THE COLONIAL FAMILY

All the members of this colonial family, even the young children, are engaged in economic production. Before the Industrial Revolution, work activities centered in the home and served to bind the family closely together. Under the modern system of factory production, the earning of a living is not a family affair and does not occur at home. The loss of economic and correlated traditional functions means that the family has fewer ties to bind it together and depends for its integration chiefly on affection and companionship.

affectional functions when the shared activity of the group has decreased? This is a good question because it highlights the importance of joint activities for companionship. Companions are persons who share many important functions and who have a great deal in common. If the members of the colonial family performed more functions as a group than do the members of the modern family, why was not companionship more highly developed in former times? The answer appears to be that the common activity of the colonial family was largely economic, and economic activity does not often conduce to fellowship, because the emphasis is not on human values. For instance, where economic values are dominant, a man marries a

woman who is a good worker rather than one whose personality he admires. Her ability to cook, sew, and run a household is more important than her ability to engage in interesting conversation. Not infrequently, the economic demands of life in earlier times taxed the worker's time and energy and left little opportunity for leisure. However, as machines replaced men in production, more goods were produced, wealth increased, and more leisure was available for the cultivation of the mental and emotional life. The average working day in industry has been cut from eleven hours in 1840 to eight hours in 1940, while the number of work days has been cut from six to five. With more leisure, the sciences develop rapidly, especially the sciences of man, which afford new insights into human behavior by isolating the factors responsible for happiness or unhappiness. Accordingly, we now have more time in which to cultivate human relationships, and improved resources of knowledge and income with which to do so.

New family rôles

With about one in every three women of working age (eighteen to sixty-four years) actually in the labor force in the United States in 1940, women are less dependent upon marriage for security than they are in a farming society where there are few jobs available, except as housekeepers. The greater economic independence of women has been attended by improvement in their educational opportunities, which nearly equal those of men, and give the sexes a common ground for companionship. The Greeks kept their wives uneducated, then sought the company of other women (the *hetairai*) for intellectual companionship, but the modern American husband more and more seeks companionship with his wife. A hundred and fifty years ago, when a woman married, all her personal property became her husband's, and he was free to dispose of it as he wished. Real property which was the wife's before her marriage he could not sell, but he had the right to manage it and enjoy the income it provided. A wife could not sue alone or execute a deed without her husband's approval. The father was the sole legal guardian of the children. Today in nearly all the states mothers are co-guardians of their children. Women vote, serve on juries, hold public office, even perform military duties. Under the old system, the family was the unit and the man was the head of the family. He was the master and his

wife and children were his subordinates. Under the new system, the members of the family tend to be more nearly equal in their rights before the law and to enjoy a basis for democratic fellowship. The improvement in the status of women and the new rôles which they play tend to make them more nearly the equals of men and more capable of effective companionship.

The relations between parents and children are also changed, since smaller families mean that children are more often the result of choice and less often the result of chance. Wanted children are more apt to be loved. With fewer children and more leisure, parents are able to be more companionable with each child.

Modern divorce

The weakening of the economic ties in marriage and the strengthening of the affectional bonds have been attended by an increase in divorce, which is interpreted by some as an indication that the affectional functions are not functioning well. The affectional bonds are effective in forming marriages, but they are more volatile than the economic bonds. In an agrarian economy, divorce is serious because a man loses a helpmeet when he loses his wife and it is difficult for a man to manage a farm without a housekeeper. For the woman divorce is equally serious, since there are open to her few means of support other than marriage. The topic of divorce is treated at length in a separate chapter; [1] hence need not be discussed here, except to point out that the marked increase in the divorce rate in recent decades need not mean that the family is suffering a decline in its affectional functions comparable to the loss of economic functions. The latter have been transferred to industry, but there is no evidence of any large-scale transfer of the affectional functions to other institutions. The higher rates of divorce reflect the greater ease of separation, and are not proof that there is more marital unhappiness, any more than the increase in the number of hospitals is proof that as a people we are deteriorating physically. Since marriages are less often held together by restraint, necessity, or tradition, marital happiness may in fact be more common now than in the past.

A more convincing indication, perhaps, of losses on the affectional front is the large number of persons who do not enter into conventional family relationships. The percentage of the population which

[1] Chapter 18.

marries is probably less now than in earlier times. The proportion of the population that is married has not decreased in recent decades, but this is in part explained by the drop in the birth rate. With fewer children in the population, the age group among which marriages occur constitutes a larger proportion of the total population. But if we consider the proportion of marriages among persons of marriageable age, the situation is different. About 10 per cent of each sex at age forty-five is unmarried; the figure is higher for males and lower for females, as the last two columns of Table 4 indicate. This is a large proportion, and doubtless exceeds the number of unmarried in colonial times. Among the more important reasons for not marrying, we should have to mention the attractiveness of single life in an economy which provides restaurants, hotels, laundries, and tailors for men, as well as jobs for women. Doubtless other important reasons are the unequal ratio of the sexes in certain regions, and the difficulty of making satisfactory contacts among strangers in an urban environment. The education and work of many persons segregate them and prevent them from meeting persons who would be suitable mates. Another factor is the social code in certain quarters which does not permit women to retain their jobs after marriage. The impersonal city life also means greater tolerance of unconventional conduct. A survey [1] of persons living in furnished rooms in the lower north side of Chicago showed that a large percentage (about a fourth of the total number) had established extra-legal liaisons. Whether from choice or necessity, a large number of persons in our modern urban communities lack normal family life.

The modern family as a loosely integrated unit

The various functions of the family — the economic, protective, reproductive, religious, educational, recreational, status-fixing, and social-psychological — may be visualized as so many ties binding the family together. The several ties are probably of unequal tensile strength and binding power. We know that the frequent exercise of the reproductive function is associated with family stability; at least, numerous offspring and a low rate of divorce generally go to-

[1] Harvey Zorbaugh, "Roomers," *The Survey*, 56:461–63, July 15, 1926. By means of a house-to-house canvass, the investigator found that 52 per cent of the roomers were single men, 10 per cent single women, and the rest — 38 per cent — couples. Three fifths of the latter were not legally married. The difficulty of getting valid data in this kind of study must, however, be recognized.

TABLE 3. CHANCES OF MARRIAGE FOR SINGLE PERSONS AS COMPUTED BY LIFE TABLE METHODS*

(Based on data for period 1920–39)

Age	Per Cent Who Marry Within Year †		Per Cent Who Ever Marry ‡		Per Cent of Population Single, 1940	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
15 years	0.1	1.0	92.2	93.5	99.8	98.8
16 years	0.3	2.4	92.4	93.5	99.7	96.1
17 years	0.9	4.5	92.5	93.5	99.3	91.0
18 years	1.9	8.5	92.6	93.3	97.9	82.3
19 years	4.2	12.0	92.7	92.9	94.6	73.0
20 years	6.7	15.5	92.6	92.1	89.1	62.8
21 years	9.4	18.2	92.3	90.8	81.0	54.4
22 years	12.5	20.8	91.8	89.0	72.8	46.2
23 years	15.3	21.3	90.9	86.3	62.9	38.7
24 years	15.9	20.9	89.6	82.8	54.3	32.9
25 years	17.0	18.9	88.0	78.5	46.9	28.6
26 years	17.3	16.0	85.9	73.7	40.8	25.1
27 years	17.3	13.3	83.4	68.9	35.0	22.0
28 years	17.1	11.7	80.3	64.4	30.6	20.1
29 years	16.8	10.7	76.6	59.9	26.2	17.7
30 years	15.9	9.6	72.3	55.3	25.2	17.9
31 years	13.1	8.5	67.5	50.8	21.0	14.7
32 years	11.7	7.7	63.0	46.4	20.9	14.7
33 years	10.5	6.8	58.5	42.1	18.6	13.0
34 years	9.3	5.9	54.1	38.0	17.2	12.6
35 years	8.2	4.9	49.7	34.3		
36 years	7.2	4.4	45.6	31.0		
37 years	6.3	3.9	41.6	27.9	15.3	11.2
38 years	5.5	3.5	38.1	25.2		
39 years	4.9	3.0	34.8	22.6		
40 years	4.5	2.7	31.7	20.2	§12.6	§9.5
45 years	2.5	1.5	19.1	11.3	§11.2	§8.6
50 years	1.5	0.8	11.1	6.1	§11.0	§8.7
55 years	0.9	0.4	6.2	3.2	§10.8	§8.7
60 years	0.5	0.2	3.3	1.6	§10.5	§9.3
65 years and over	–	–	1.9	0.8	9.8	9.3

* Bureau of the Census, *Population — Special Reports*, Series P–45, number 10, November 21, 1945.

† Per cent of persons single at beginning of year of age who marry during the year. This figure indicates the chance of marriage within one year from attaining the specified age.

‡ Per cent of persons single at beginning of year of age who marry in that year and all later years. This figure indicates the total chance of marriage for persons who have attained the specified age.

§ Per cent single in age group 40–44, 45–49, etc.: data for single years not available.

gether. We also know that the functions of economic production are highly important for family solidarity, as is shown by the fact that the divorce rate of farmers is appreciably lower than that of factory workers. But even if we were to ignore the differences in binding power of the several functions and consider that they are equal, we should still have to observe that in the earlier household economy the functions of the family were numerous and now they are few. A few ties are not so binding as many.

Many persons are greatly disturbed by the loose integration of the modern urban family which makes it unstable and vulnerable to disorganization. Some writers [1] who admire the stable family of the household economy advocate that the modern family turn its back on the city, return to the country, and resume its former functions of production leading to economic self-sufficiency. Are such proposals realistic? It does not seem probable that the family can take over the vast productive activities of modern industry. The availability of electricity in the home does make possible the retention by the family of some functions of production for its own sake rather than for the general market. It is also possible that some domestic handicrafts might be retained as useful recreations or hobbies for the members of the family. Instead of trying to turn back the clock of time, however, by restoring production to the family, it would seem more promising to try to integrate the family by strengthening the existing social psychological functions of achieving happiness in marriage and rearing wholesome children. These are the functions that young people today lay great store by. They do not look upon the family chiefly as an economic and social institution, but as a medium for providing happiness in marriage and for rearing children. A very large and important part of this book (Chapters 10 to 16) is given over to the presentation of the findings of science regarding the factors involved in marital and parental adjustment. These functions are receiving a great deal of study, and it is quite likely that discoveries will be made which will contribute greatly to human happiness. In the past, students of the family have focused their interest chiefly on the economic and social functions, and have neglected the vital problems of personality and human relations.

[1] Ralph Borsodi, *Flight from the City* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1933); *This Ugly Civilization* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1933).

Increasing Differentiation of Modern Family Life

In times past, societies have been generally characterized by a single predominating pattern of family organization. At the present time in the United States, there are many different types of family organization, and the differentiation of types is expected to continue in our rapidly changing, heterogeneous culture. In colonial times, the family was patriarchal. There may have been some variation from type, but if so it was slight and relatively insignificant. Today in our cities, paternal, maternal, bohemian, equalitarian, and filiocentric families have been delineated.[1] During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the principal domicile was the homestead, a large, single-family house standing on an ample plot of land. Although there were other types of houses, these were relatively few, and in some regions the homestead was the only kind of domicile to be found. Nowadays, the single-family detached dwelling is still the main type of residence, but about one fifth of the total number of families live in buildings that house two or more families.[2] There are duplexes, apartment houses, flats, furnished rooms, auto camps, and hotels. There is a predominating pattern, but, since the trend is in the direction of variety, a false picture is painted if the situation is sketched only in terms of the dominant pattern. For this reason, subsequent chapters of this section develop the significant variations which are to be found in the modern American family.

Rural-urban differences

The reasons for the marked differentiation of family patterns are many, but principal among them is the fact of rapid and extensive social change. Where conditions are relatively stable from generation to generation, the habits of a people become fixed. Experimentation ceases or slows down, and certain forms are selected as perhaps best adapted to the prevailing conditions. Since the conditions are fairly uniform, the same form will be widely used and exceptions will be rare. The single-family dwelling, the large homestead, is well adapted to a farm economy where there is plenty of space and material with which to build a big house, and where there is abundant labor. Where farms are worked by individual families,

[1] Ernest Mowrer, *The Family* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 96.

[2] Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census — 1940 — Housing*, vol. II, *General Characteristics*. Part 1: United States Summary, Table 3, p. 9.

it is fitting that families live separately in order to be near their place of work, especially since means of transportation are poorly developed. All this is changed by the introduction of machines using steam power, resulting in factories and cities. Under the new conditions, workers wish to be near their places of employment. They crowd into the area in great numbers, and space is at a premium. Land is expensive, and so houses are built on top of houses, and we have apartments occupied by many families, not just by one family as on the farm. The new conditions of urban industrial life bring new adjustments in family life which coexist with the older patterns of the rural economy. Thus, there are two main patterns existing side by side in our society, the farming and the industrial, with combinations of the two in varying degrees. As a consequence, we have extensive variation in family organization depending upon the type and the size of the community, so that any discussion of the American family which is limited to a general over-all picture is certain to be incomplete, and possibly misleading. Urban-rural differences in family organization are considered in Chapter 5.

Regional differences

Besides industrialization, a factor in the American scene making for differentiation of institutional life is the unequal resources of the various regions of the country, coupled with the western movement. Family life in the South is different in certain respects from family life in the West, because of differences in the standard of living in the two regions as well as in the composition of the population. The South is poor compared to the West and has many more children to rear. This means that the families in California can give their children more of the good things of life and the community can provide a better education. To lump all American families into a single pile is to obscure important regional differences and to give an unrealistic picture of our domestic scene.

Socio-economic differences

The differentiation does not stop here. There are not just farm families and city families, for within each class there are marked differences occasioned by occupation and income. Although they live on the land, the families of sharecroppers and itinerant farm laborers are more like those of city families on relief than they are like those

of owners of big farms. It is generally recognized that occupation affects family organization and that the family life of railroaders is different in some respects from, let us say, that of bank clerks. The census now lists several thousand occupations, and the trend is toward further division of labor and specialization. Because occupation and income so greatly affect family life, a separate chapter, Chapter 6, is devoted to the interrelationship of these factors.



FIGURE 17. FAMILIES WITH HOT AND COLD WATER IN HOME, BY PERCENTAGES

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN HOUSING COMFORT

The figure gives the percentage of families having hot and cold running water in both kitchen and bath, selected income classes, seven farm analysis units in thirteen states, 1935–36. California farms in the $2500 to $3000 income class are much more comfortable than farms of the same income class in other regions. Region rather than income seems to be the determining factor, but the per capita income of the region should also be considered. From *Family Housing and Facilities*, p. 43.

Racial, ethnic, and religious differences

A further factor making for variety of family life in America is the marked heterogeneity of the population, racially and ethnically. Of the approximately one hundred and thirty millions of persons in the United States, about one tenth are not white. We find numerous

ethnic groups — Germans, Poles, Swedes, Finns, Russians, Italians, Mexicans, and many others — each with its distinctive family patterns. There are also millions of Catholics and Jews in the United States, to mention only the largest groups in the non-Protestant religious minority. Together, these groups make up a large part of our American population and contribute no little to the differentiation of American family life. For example, it is interesting to learn that the average income of American families was about $1200 a year in 1935–36, but this average obscures the great disparity between the average income of white families and that of Negro families. Likewise, divorce is a common feature of American family life, but not for the Catholics, or the Mormons, or the Amish. It must be obvious that any discussion which leaves these numerous minority groups out of account gives an incomplete and distorted view of the American family scene. For this reason, two chapters in this section of the American family (Chapters 7 and 8) are devoted to a consideration of family organization in relation to racial, ethnic, and religious variations.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why is there at present marked differentiation of family patterns in the United States?
2. Why are the changes in technology due to steam and steel called a revolution (the Industrial Revolution)?
3. How are technological changes related to the redistribution of population since 1790?
4. Why does the city family more often do its own laundering than bake its own bread?
5. What is the significance of the transfer of economic functions from the family to industry?
6. How do you explain the continued increase in the number of married women in the labor force?
7. In view of the marked growth of schools generally, why has not the nursery school had a wider adoption?
8. How are the educational functions of the family affected by summer camps for children?
9. "New times occasion the development of new functions as well as the loss of old ones." How does this apply to the educational functions of the family? The recreational?

10. How do the recreational and affectional functions of the modern urban family compare in importance with those of the family in times past? Why?
11. What are some of the effects of electricity on family life?
12. How are changes in the religious functions of the modern family different from changes in other functions?
13. Why has there been such a marked growth of protective services by government in behalf of families?
14. Is the reproductive function transferable? Why?
15. What are the principal reasons for the decrease in the size of the family?
16. Why is the modern family a loosely integrated unit?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. Trends in occupations for women in the United States, 1900 to the present.
2. Patterns of recreation of the urban American family.
3. The functions of the National Congress of Parents and Teachers.
4. New governmental protective functions in behalf of the family.
5. The rôle of the spinster in modern society.
6. The changing sex morality.

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The data are for the nineteen-thirties.

Ogburn, William F., "The Family and Its Functions," in *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, vol. I. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933.

An outstanding analysis of the modern functions of the family, based on research.

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A symposium of great worth, to which is devoted the entire issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 160, March, 1932. See also the more recent symposia in the *American Sociological Review*, October, 1937, and the *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1946.

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Good material to illustrate regional variations in American family life. Part III presents case studies of the Ozark Highlanders.

Chapter 5

MODERN AMERICAN FAMILY: URBAN AND RURAL

WE CAN SHARPEN OUR UNDERSTANDING of what has been happening to the family in modern times by contrasting the present urban situation with the rural. The urban pattern embodies everything that is recent and spectacular and revolutionary in the evolution of the family. The rural pattern is old, extending back several thousand years, a survival of the plow culture of Abraham's time. Even as recently as two hundred years ago, family habits in the towns of colonial America were not greatly different from those in the country, and were not the subject of special comment. Then came the great changes initiated by the Industrial Revolution, which magnified towns into cities as workers were drawn off the farms into the factories. The revolution affected principally the handicrafts and had less influence upon farming, for the steam engine was too large and unwieldy for use on the farm, and the farmer could not readily regulate his production with a view to profit as did the factory owners under capitalism. The new conditions widened the gap between town and country, and social life, family life included, became very different in cities from what it was on the farms.

In contrasting rural and urban family organization as we do below, our reference is to general farming and to big city communities, but this should not blind us to the fact that in reality there are a great variety of types of rural and urban communities.[1] The separate farms so characteristic of America, loosely tied together into the so-called

[1] Descriptions of girls in families in six different rural occupations (mountain farm family, soft-coal mine, cotton farm, tobacco farm, potato farm, and fishing community family) are given in Nora Miller, *The Girl in the Rural Family* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1935).

open-country community, are different from the hamlets, and both of these in turn are in many respects unlike the small villages. Moreover, there are many types of farms, ranging all the way from the self-sufficing farm (which sells less than fifty per cent of what it produces) to the far-flung corporation farms using power machinery, but fruit ranchers, dairymen, truck farmers, part-time farmers, and a variety of others are all lumped in the same farm category. Similarly, there are not just urban communities, but small and large towns, and cities of different sizes and types, such as trading, transportation, mining, and governmental centers. It is necessary to keep in mind that each of these sub-types differs somewhat from the others in family organization, even though limitations of space require that in this discussion we consider mainly the more general rural-urban differences. Unless otherwise indicated, the comparisons will be understood to be those between general farming and big city families, which present the greatest contrast.

Economic Organization

Underlying many of the differences between farm and city family organization is the basic difference in economic organization. The farm family is a unit of economic production as well as consumption, while the city family is not a unit of production in any important sense. Farmers produce in and about the home much of what they consume. The value of home-produced food, at most income levels among farmers, is fifty per cent or more of the total food expenditure; it is only six per cent for rural non-farm families; whereas for urban families it is so small as to be negligible from a practical standpoint.[1] This means that the farm family is a kind of business partnership with all the members working together in a common enterprise. Farming is still largely a family occupation, with the farmer highly dependent upon his wife and children for his labor force. In 1940, 83 per cent of the farms used nothing but family labor, while only 4.5 per cent of the farms used hired labor exclusively. The great importance of family labor in farming is indicated by the practice of shortening the school year in rural areas, so that the children can help in the fields in the spring and autumn when their help is especially needed. City schools do not adjust so readily to the labor needs of urban industry. The reasons for the difference are many, but one is

[1] National Resources Committee, *Family Expenditures in the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 9.

that in the country the need is an urgent family need, production and family welfare being inseparable. Industry hires all the workers it needs, but the small farmer cannot do so profitably.

The great variety of family production on the farms was detailed in preceding chapters discussing farm life of earlier times. Compared to production in the past, production in the farm family at present is not great or diversified, a smaller percentage of modern farms being self-sufficing. But there were almost two million farms in 1940 on which the farm products used by the household were the major source of income. Compared to production in the urban family, that in the farm family is still impressive. In fact, the difference in production between the two at the present time would seem to be greater than the difference between the farm and town family of the past, or between the farm of the past and the farm of the present. The most extreme contrast at present is between the childless city family living in a residential hotel and the self-sufficing farm family still found in isolated places.[1]

City families do not co-operate in production, but work away from home for wages, with which they buy the food and other goods that are required. Even on the side of consumption the farm family is more complete, for the members take more of their meals together, and use a larger portion of the total income for collective or family needs; while the city family tends to be more individualistic, with the members spending a larger proportion of the total income on personal satisfactions.

Marital Status

A great many consequences stem from this difference in economic organization. Because of it, marriage is more important on farms than in cities. At least there is a larger proportion of married persons on farms, and this advantage in favor of the farms has increased in recent decades. In 1940, on farms there were 667 married women per 1000 white population fifteen years old and over, but in urban places the number was only 562. In 1940, 326 out of every 1000 white women fifteen years of age and over on farms were either single or widowed, whereas the number was much greater, 396, in all urban places.[2]

[1] This contrast is presented in Chapter 8.

[2] Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census, 1940, Population: General Characteristics* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), Table 16.



FIGURE 18. MARITAL STATUS OF WHITE WOMEN ON FARMS AND IN URBAN AREAS, 1940

On farms, about one fifth more women are married, one third fewer widowed, and five sixths fewer divorced than in urban areas. The cities are places of refuge for many rural widows and divorcees.



Each male figure equals 50 Males
Each female figure equals 50 Females

FIGURE 19. THE EXCESS OF UNMARRIED MEN (15–44 YEARS OLD) OVER UNMARRIED WOMEN IS GREATER ON FARMS THAN IN CITIES

Data per one hundred single females of the same ages, in urban and farm communities, United States, 1940. In urban areas the ratio of the sexes is not so greatly unbalanced (113 males to 100 females), but on farms there are more than three unmarried males to every unmarried female (322:100).

TABLE 4. MARITAL STATUS OF THE WHITE POPULATION, FIFTEEN YEARS OLD AND OVER, FOR THE UNITED STATES, BY URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, 1940*

Area	Males				Females			
	Single	Married	Widowed	Divorced	Single	Married	Widowed	Divorced
Total United States	33.1	61.4	4.2	1.3	26.2	61.1	11.0	1.7
Urban	32.5	61.9	4.1	1.5	27.8	56.2	11.8	4.2
Rural non-farm	31.2	63.0	4.5	1.3	22.7	64.9	11.0	1.4
Farm	36.5	58.3	4.4	0.8	24.4	66.7	8.2	0.7

* Adapted from Table 16, Bureau of the Census, *Population: General Characteristics* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943).

One reason for the greater number of married persons in the country is that marriage takes place earlier (as shown in Figure 20), and this has an important bearing on the probabilities of marriage, especially for women. The farm girl does not have much inducement to postpone marriage or to avoid it altogether, since there are no occupations in the country open to her except that of house servant. She is dependent for economic maintenance on marriage, or on her parents or relatives or other family support. From the farm woman's standpoint, marriage is a refuge, while from the standpoint of the farmer, it is a good investment, since he gets an invaluable worker for much less than he would otherwise have to pay for such services. Indeed, without the assistance of a housekeeper, a farmer finds the going difficult. From this we see that the farm couple is bound together by strong ties of economic interdependence, ties which are highly effective in holding them together.

Following along this line, it is interesting to compare the farm wife who works on the farm with the city wife who works outside the home. Both are economic contributors and therefore both might be expected to be more or less economically independent. Actually the city wife has much more independence and is much freer to separate from her family if she wishes. The economic activity of the farm wife seems to make her dependent upon her husband and to tie her closely into the family structure. The difference lies in the fact that the city wife is paid a separate income in money from an independent source, whereas the economic contribution of the farm wife is without monetary reward, as such, to the wife. This analysis helps to explain



FIGURE 20. COUNTRY GIRLS MARRY YOUNGER

The age at marriage is related to socio-economic status, but the age range is greater in the city than in the country. The length of the bar represents the most frequent (modal) age at marriage of women in urban and rural areas, by occupational status of husbands. The data are from the 1910 census relating to women under forty years of age at marriage who had been married five to ten years. The reference is to unbroken unions in which the husbands and wives were native-born of native parentage. From National Resources Committee, *Problems of a Changing Population* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 143.

why marriage means more to the farmer's wife than to the city worker's, and why the rural family is more stable.

Ratio of the Sexes

Another reason for the greater number of married women on farms than in cities is that in general there are more men than women in farming areas, while the reverse is true of urban regions in the United States. When the proportion of the sexes is expressed in terms of the number of men to one hundred women, it is called the sex ratio.

In 1940 for the United States as a whole this ratio was 101.1, but for farms it was 112.1, and for urban areas, 95.8, a difference of about 16. For the age groups, fourteen to forty-four years old, wherein most marriages occur, the difference was 14, the ratios for farm and urban areas being 108 and 94 respectively. Even more striking, there were more than twice as many single white men as single women, twenty to thirty years of age, on farms in 1940. An excess of men increases greatly the probability of marriage for women, while an excess of women has less noticeable influence upon the marriage rate of men. Men are less dependent on the supply of women, and are more likely to marry irrespective of the sex ratio.[1] Why this should be so is not clear, but it is consistent with the fact that men have more freedom in taking the initiative in courtship and the fact that perhaps men are also less particular in their choices. In any case, women are much more dependent than men upon a favorable sex ratio, and the considerable surplus of men in farming regions creates an enviable situation for farm women, if marriage is the objective. As to why there should be an excess of males on farms, the answer appears to be that the scarcity of jobs for women in rural regions induces them to migrate to the towns and cities where opportunities for employment exist. The larger communities are also places of refuge for the widowed and divorced, as well as for the maladjusted, the eccentric, and the highly individualistic.

Size of Family

It is generally recognized that the farms are the granaries of the nation, and if it were not for the farms the urban population would be without food.[2] Not so clearly understood, however, is the fact that the farms are also the replenishers of the population, and if it were not for the supply of persons which the farms provide in the form of migrants, the cities would dwindle in size and die out. For the cities do not reproduce sufficiently to maintain their populations, but instead have a negative net reproduction rate, or one insufficient for replacement needs, while the farms have a positive net reproduction rate, or one more than enough to take care of the replacement need. The net

[1] E. R. Groves and W. F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928), chap. XIII: "Sex and Marriage."

[2] "The average American farmer, after taking care of the needs of his own help and family, now provides food and fibers for fifteen other persons in the United States and one abroad." See Ogburn and Nimkoff, *Sociology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946), pp. 452–53.

reproduction rate table (Table 5) shows the number of daughters that would be born to the survivors of a group of one hundred female infants during the course of their lifetime if present birth and death rates remain unchanged. A rate of one hundred means that the group would remain stationary, since the survivors of the original group of one hundred would give birth to one hundred daughters. A rate higher than one hundred means an increase in population in the next generation, while a rate under one hundred would lead us to expect a decline in population in the next generation, assuming a continuance of the existing birth and death rates. As Table 5 indicates, both the rural-farm and the rural-non-farm areas had positive net reproduction rates in 1940, the former being 36 per cent above present replacement needs, the latter 16 per cent. Urban areas, though, showed a potential rate of decrease in the next generation of 24 per cent. It will be noted that the net reproduction rates of all three types of community have fallen markedly since 1930, so that for the nation as a whole the rate in 1940 was 4 per cent under replacement needs. But this negative situation is due entirely to the cities, which are almost a quarter short of their maintenance quotas. This is an average figure, with the

TABLE 5. NET REPRODUCTION RATES BY COLOR AND URBAN, RURAL-NON-FARM, AND RURAL-FARM RESIDENCE, UNITED STATES: 1930 AND 1940

(1940 data are estimates based on a 5 per cent cross-section of the 1940 census returns. Figures for white population in 1930 have been revised to include Mexicans.)*

Color and Census Year	Total	Urban	Rural-Non-Farm	Rural-Farm
All classes				
1940	96	76	116	136
1930	111	88	132	159
White				
1940	95	76	116	132
1930	111	90	133	159
Non-white				
1940	107	76	115	154
1930	110	75	119	156

* *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940*, release of February 21, 1941. The net reproduction rates in this release were computed by the so-called "indirect method" from the age structure of the population in 1940 and in 1930. The number of births was estimated from the number of children under five years of age. Since these children were the survivors of births in 1935 to 1939 and 1925 to 1929, respectively, the reproduction rates do not strictly apply to the census dates.

smaller cities having a higher rate and the larger cities a lower one.

When we examine the population picture a little more closely, we see that there are appreciably more childless families and fewer large families in urban areas than on farms. Table 6, which gives the distribution of types of families in big cities and on farms in 1940, shows that 44.9 per cent of the big city families had no children living at home, as compared with 31.7 per cent of the farm families. On the other hand, families with three or more children comprised 30.5 per cent of all farm families and only 13 per cent of the big city families. The largest families, consisting of husband, wife, and four children or more, were three and a half times as numerous on farms as in the big cities.

Causes of the differential fertility

Why don't urban white-collar workers have as many children as do farmers? There is no evidence that any genetic factor is involved and there is little probability that such a factor is operative. Among the social factors which help to explain the difference, mention has already been made of the later marriage age of the urban population. A delay in marriage affects greatly the number of offspring, since it

TABLE 6. TYPES OF FAMILIES IN CITIES OVER 1,000,000 POPULATION AND ON FARMS, 1940*

Type of Family	Cities over 1,000,000	Farms
Husband and wife only	320	254
Husband, wife and 1 child	207	181
Husband, wife and 2 children	152	154
Husband, wife and 3 children	64	104
Husband, wife and 4 children or more	50	175
Husband only	37	29
Husband and 1 child	10	12
Husband and 2 children	4	7
Husband and 3 children or more	3	10
Wife only	92	34
Wife and 1 child	31	14
Wife and 2 children	17	10
Wife and 3 children or more	13	16
Total of all types	1000	1000

* Calculated from United States Census, *Population, Families, Size of Family and Age of Head.* Taken from Ogburn-Nimkoff, *Sociology*, p. 526.

shortens the reproductive period in women. Moreover, the disposition to have children is greater among the younger wives. Still, if the age differential between rural and urban marriages were the only factor involved, the birth rate should be much the same for the city women who marry early and for the country women. This is not the case. Indeed, as Figure 22 shows, the maximum differences in fertility occur among the wives that marry early. The probable explanation is that the wives of the business and professional classes are more apt to limit the size of the families through the use of contraceptive practices. There is some suggestion, however, that the wives of business and professional men who marry at the age of twenty-five or later are more fertile than wives of laborers marrying at these ages. This difference, in turn, is influenced by the fact that, from the economic standpoint, children are more of an asset in the country, more of a liability in the city. There are many useful things that a child can do on the farm, but in the city it is difficult to find profitable work for children, and there are the added deterrents of school attendance and child-labor laws. Besides, to rear a child on the good earth and in the



FIGURE 21. NET REPRODUCTION RATES, UNITED STATES, 1935–40

If we depended wholly on our cities for our population, we should decline by one fourth in a generation. The cities draw population from the villages and farms, which exceed their quota of births. The South is the only region maintaining its numbers via the birth rate. Taken from Louis I. Dublin, "The Trend of the Birth Rate Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," *Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine*, 19:569, August, 1943.

wide open spaces is easier than in a crowded apartment or city streets. Moreover, the environment of the country is more favorable to the child's physical welfare. To all these reasons must be added another, that modern contraception and its supporting facilities are more readily available in the urban areas.[1]



FIGURE 22. HOW THE AGE OF MARRIAGE AFFECTS FERTILITY, IRRESPECTIVE OF OCCUPATION

Number of children born per hundred wives under forty-five years of age, by age of wife at marriage, for each urban and rural occupational class. The number of births decreases sharply with postponement of marriage. Why should wives of skilled workers marrying after twenty-five have fewer babies than wives of business and professional men of the same marriage-age class? Data from 1910 Census; unbroken unions in which the husbands and wives were native whites of native parentage. Rates calculated on the assumption of a standard duration-of-marriage distribution for each age-at-marriage group. From *Problems of a Changing Population* (National Resources Committee: Washington, D.C., 1938), p. 144.

[1] The idea has been advanced that the desire for contraception may be more important than the availability of modern techniques. Urban-rural differential fertility was studied in a number of non-European countries as of the present time and in a number of European nations and in the United States during the early nineteenth century, where modern methods were not available. With only a single exception, the rural fertility rate greatly exceeded the urban. A. J. Jaffe, "Urbanization and Fertility," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 48:48–60, July, 1942.

Recreational Functions

So far we have shown that the farm family in comparison with the urban family represents more extensive organization, in respect to both the reproductive and economic functions. Now we have to ask whether the farm family is more complete in the exercise of the other institutional functions as well. Does it have more recreational, religious, protective, and educational functions?

As for play, it is common knowledge that the farm family has less leisure time, hence less time for play than the city family which benefits from social legislation limiting hours of work. It may be that the farmer with his varied activities has less need for recreation than does the city dweller who works at more limited and monotonous tasks. For the latter, recreation often serves the purpose of providing exercise, fresh air, and sunshine which the farmer obtains regularly as a matter of course. Be this as it may, recreation taken by the farm family is more likely to be taken by the family as a whole,[1] and is more likely to be creative or self-provided than in the case of the city family. Reading aloud, playing games together, singing, and other home-centered play are forms of recreation more common among rural than urban families. If farmers live in villages, the community life of small groups of families furnishes many recreative stimuli. Visiting of friends and relatives is an important recreational outlet where commercialized facilities are limited.

City families, on the other hand, engage in more individualistic recreation, such as bridge parties and commercialized recreation like movies and sporting events, which are passive forms of play and cost money. The average city family spends about four times as much on motion pictures, as well as on sports and games, as does the average farm family, and about two and a half times as much for other paid admissions, such as those to plays, dances, and circuses.[2] The general distinctions drawn above are supported by a study of several thousand families of white, American-born junior high-school students over the country as a whole, which showed the following percentages of rural and city families engaging in various play activities:

[1] It is reported that among Northern rural folk, at least, if husbands participate socially, wives usually do, and if husbands and wives participate, children usually do, so that participation is chiefly a family trait. W. A. Anderson, "The Family and Individual Social Participation," *American Sociological Review*, 8:420, August, 1943.

[2] See *Family Expenditures in the United States*, Table 92, p. 31.

TABLE 7. PLAY ACTIVITIES OF RURAL AND URBAN FAMILIES[1]

Type of Activity	Per Cent	
	Rural	Urban
Reading aloud at home	33	13
Playing games together at home	50	40
Singing, playing instruments at home	50	40
Going to motion pictures together	33	65

The rural environment is, as has already been suggested, a more favorable one for the young child, for the reason that the farm automatically provides him with plenty of space in which to play and exercise, a necessary condition for the healthy development of human infants as well as other animal young. In the city, space is at a premium, and although the great bulk of families provide outdoor play space for children, there is a good proportion — at least 10 per cent, it would seem — without this facility. A study of 908 Indianapolis families in four different sections of the city showed that 10 per cent had homes without yards, while in "Middletown," a community of 38,000 persons, 14 per cent of the homes lacked yards. The data do not tell us what proportion of these families had young children, and it is of course recognized that apartment buildings and other places which make no provision for children's play are generally occupied by single people and childless couples. Even so, the record of the city cannot measure up to that of the country, and the best the city can do is to approximate the natural advantage of the country by fencing off small private yards and larger public yards called playgrounds.

For adults, the principal difference between recreation in the country and in the city is probably that the rural family has less leisure time and has to furnish a larger portion of its own entertainment, while the city family has an army of commercial agencies catering to its pleasure. This does not necessarily mean that the urban family has less responsibility for the amusement of its older members, for urban parents may have to exercise considerable supervision over the recreation of their older children, even though they themselves do not provide it or share it. Such urban parents may have more recreational functions to discharge than rural families who have little leisure for play, or more limited selection of recreational outlets. In the city, the great proliferation of types of recreational activity means considerable individualization of play on the part of members of the family.

[1] E. W. Burgess, *The Adolescent in the Family*, White House Conference on Child Health and Protection (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934).

Father may have his golf, mother her bridge club, son his tennis, daughter her dancing group. In the larger centers there are scores of different kinds of commercialized pleasure to suit every taste, whether it be for concerts, plays, boxing, ice hockey, bicycling, taxi-dancing, roulette or target practice. Not only is there marked variety in recreational facilities, but the principal forms have expanded greatly in recent decades. While the rural population is not wholly without participation in these activities, they are primarily available to the urban population. During the interval, 1907–1930, urban population increased only by about 65 per cent, which is appreciably less than the gain in public and paid recreation.[1] The away-from-home movement of recreation in urban centers has thus considerably increased in recent decades.

Educational and Protective Functions

It is generally appreciated that a smaller proportion of rural than of urban children are to be found in the public schools, and that they also put in less time there. This comes about because in the country there is work which children can do, the schools are sometimes harder to get to, and the enforcement of compulsory attendance laws is more lax. The rural regions, moreover, are poorer, and cannot afford as effective schooling. Whatever the causes, the school comes less to the assistance of the rural family than it does to the urban, and a larger proportion of what the rural child knows he must learn from his parents. Urban parents have the function of helping their children with homework, a function which is probably exercised a good deal less by farm parents, but this is no doubt more than compensated for by the training in occupational skills which farm children receive.

In assessing the educational functions of farm and city families, it is important to note the heavy burden which farm families bear. The fact that families in the open country are bigger than those in the city means that farmers are educating more than their share of the nation's children, and this they must do on less than their share of the nation's income. The ratio of children of school age to the number of supporting adults in general increases significantly with a decrease in the size of the community. For every 1000 adults under sixty-five years in the

[1] As examples, municipal park acreage increased 238 per cent from 1907 to 1930; public playgrounds, 293 per cent from 1910 to 1930; golf courses, 207 per cent in the seven years, 1923 to 1930. J. F. Steiner, "Recreation and Leisure Time Activities," *Recent Social Trends*, pp. 915, 917, 926, 929.



FIGURE 23. EDUCATION FOR FARMING IS LARGELY A FAMILY AFFAIR

Farming is transmitted from fathers to sons to a much greater degree than are non-farming occupations. Few farmers are recruited from non-farming families. The vocational education of farm boys is largely at the hands of their parents, while non-farm boys are more likely to get their vocational training from sources outside the family. The data for the figure are based on Table 15 of W. A. Anderson, *The Transmission of Farming as an Occupation* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, October, 1941). The sample covers farming families of the father-generation of all high-school children in the rural areas of Cayuga-Delaware counties, and a second sample of 664 Cortland County farm families.

urban population in 1940, there were 508 children under twenty; in the villages, the number was 659; and on the farms it was 842. Table 8 shows that the several regions of the United States differ greatly in the task of rearing children. The Southeast states have the largest number of children to educate and the Pacific states the smallest number. In South Carolina there are less than two adults, twenty to sixty-four

years of age, for every child of elementary-school age, while in California the ratio is better than four to one. These facts should be taken into account in appraising the educational system of a region. California has a remarkable school system, and one reason for it is that it has relatively few children to educate. Another is the high per capita income of the state. Farm families have only a small part of the total national income — 7 per cent — but they have 23 per cent of the population and 29 per cent of all the children under twenty. As Figure 24 shows, the farms of the Far West are the only ones which do not have a percentage of children of school age greatly in excess of their share of the national income. The greatest disparity occurs in the farms of the Southeast, where are to be found 13 per cent of the nation's children of school age and only 2 per cent of the total national income. The burden of rearing and educating the children of our nation rests more heavily upon the farm family.

Likewise, the farm family has more responsibility for protecting its members, since it depends less upon medical and hospital service, police and fire protection, and other forms of assistance, which are more completely available in the larger centers of population. If the farm family is not so well protected as the urban, this is because the rural regions lack adequate facilities. For instance, whereas for the country as a whole in 1939 there was one practicing physician per 807 persons, the ratio was 1 to 1300 persons in certain predominantly rural states, and even as low as 1 to 3000 or more in certain rural counties. In the same year four fifths of all urban births occurred in hospitals

TABLE 8. THE TASK OF REARING CHILDREN, BY REGIONS

Region	Children under 20 per 1000 Adults under 65, 1940	Per Cent of U.S. Children	Per Cent of U.S. Income *
New England	523	6	8
Middle Atlantic	497	19	28
East North Central	534	19	22
West North Central	587	10	8
South Atlantic	721	16	10
East South Central	785	10	4
West South Central	706	11	6
Mountain	681	3	3
Pacific	444	6	10

* Income received by individuals by regions, 1940. *The Economic Almanac*, 1943-44, National Industrial Conference Board, p. 367.



Percentages based on U.S. Department of Commerce data. Total income from *Survey of Current Business*, August, 1945, p. 17; farm income, unpublished estimates.

FIGURE 24. TWO REASONS FOR THE HEAVY EDUCATIONAL BURDEN OF FARM FAMILIES

Regional percentages of child population (five to seventeen years inclusive) and of the nation's income, 1940. Non-farm communities have fewer children to educate and more money with which to educate them.

as against only one fifth of all rural births. One fifth of all the rural births of that year were home deliveries with no doctor in attendance, while only two urban mothers in one hundred were without the services of a physician at childbirth. The lack of social services in rural areas means that the rural resident must himself look after his family needs. In 1935–36, when the depression was taking a heavy toll, one in every six urban families was receiving some form of relief from government, but only a little more than half that proportion of farm families was on the relief rolls. The needy farm family is more likely to have a shelter over its head and a place to grow a little food, and may thus be somewhat better able to protect itself.

Religious Functions

It is sometimes said that the farmer, because of his occupation, is closer to nature and therefore to God than the urban dweller, who is more impressed by the artificial wonders which surround him, and which man himself has created.[1] However this may be, it is true that the church receives fuller support from the rural elements in our population than from the urban. Even as regards financial support of the church, the rural family acquits itself a bit better. Farm families had 17.2 per cent of the aggregate income in 1935–36 and gave 17 per cent of all church money, while urban families with 66 per cent of the total income accounted for only 61.2 per cent of the total contributions.[2] The best financial support of the churches comes from village families which, with 16.8 per cent of the aggregate national income for these years, contributed 21.8 per cent of all the church money.

More important than money support is that which the family gives the religious program, and here the gap between the rural and urban family is even greater. One survey showed that in American villages, about two thirds of the adults are members of the church, while in large cities of 300,000 or more, it is estimated that 59 per cent are

[1] Because various factors like modern communication and transportation bring urban and rural populations closer together, it is probable that psycho-social differences between these groups are diminishing. A recent study, using the Minnesota Scale for the Survey of Opinions which tests attitudes toward the family, legal institutions, and our economic system, reports that rurality as measured by size of home community appears to be unrelated to the traits tested. (William H. Sewell and Eleanor E. Amend, "The Influence of Size of Home Community on Attitudes and Personality Traits," *American Sociological Review*, VIII: 180–84, April, 1943.) The whole question of attitudinal differences between rural and urban persons is highly complex and in need of further investigation. In the absence of such research, broad generalizations regarding rural-urban differences in personality traits do not appear to be warranted.

[2] *Family Expenditures in the United States*, Table 94, p. 31.

members.[1] The larger cities also have fewer ministers. An average town of fifty thousand population in the United States has sixty-eight preachers, but a city of a million or more inhabitants has proportionally only half as many.[2] What of religious practices? How extensively are these carried on in rural and in urban communities? The White House Conference study referred to above included a number of questions on religious practices. Its report shows the following percentages of American-born junior high-school students engaging in the specified type of religious activity during the month preceding the time of making the report: attendance at church with family (rural youth, 85 per cent; city youth, 40 per cent); family Bible reading (rural youth, 22 per cent; city youth, 10 per cent); saying grace at meals (rural youth, 38 per cent, and city youth, 30 per cent).[3] It will be observed that except for attendance at church with family in rural areas, no item of traditional religious observance commands majority support. Family prayer, another traditional element, was reported by only 12.5 per cent of the children, both rural and urban. All the religious practices of the past thus show a falling-off, but the reduction is much greater in the urban than in the rural regions. While the reasons for this difference are numerous, we may point out that in small communities group pressure operates more effectively to bring individuals into line with established institutional practices, and there are fewer other social and recreational organizations with which the church has to compete.

Marital Adjustment

The farm family is, we have seen, more extensive than the urban family, both in size and in the scope of its functions. But what of its solidarity? Is the rural family also a happier family? Are country spouses better adjusted to each other than city husbands and wives? The answer appears to be in the affirmative, if we may judge from the findings of a comprehensive study of the factors associated with marital success and failure of 526 couples.[4] This study reports that it is a distinct advantage to have been reared in the country, on the theory

[1] H. Paul Douglass and Edmund De S. Brunner, *The Protestant Church as a Social Institution* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935), pp. 39 and 41.

[2] William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, *Sociology*, p. 540.

[3] Cited in *Recent Social Trends*, vol. I, p. 674.

[4] Ernest W. Burgess and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939).

that such upbringing commonly develops certain viewpoints, standards, and habits which are favorable to social adjustment. Table 57 shows that there were 50 per cent more cases of good marital adjustment among the wives with a rural upbringing than among those with a city background, and an even larger proportion of good adjustments among those husbands who were reared in the country. The results are shown graphically in Figure 25. Only a small proportion of these country-bred couples were living in the country at the time of their marriage, which raises the question as to whether they may not represent a selected group. There is some evidence[1] to suggest that persons who migrate from the country to the cities are more intelligent (as measured by intelligence tests) than those who do not migrate. Another study[2] of over seven thousand marriages reported that the sample of 376 couples living on farms represented the lowest percentage of the "very happily married" among eleven groups of communities classified as to size of population. In view of this finding, Burgess and Cottrell conclude that a rural background is more favorable than an urban for marital happiness for those who migrate to the city.[3] One wonders, however, if the category "very happily married," with its highly ecstatic, romantic emphasis, may not be more characteristic of urban psychology than of rural. On the farm,



FIGURE 25. RURAL UPBRINGING FAVORS MARITAL HAPPINESS

The proportions of good, fair, and poor marital adjustments made by 526 husbands and wives with backgrounds of rural and urban residence. What in rural and urban upbringing accounts for these differences in marital adjustment? From Burgess and Cottrell, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, Chart 4, p. 85.

[1] N. P. Gist and C. D. Clark, "Intelligence as a Selective Factor in Rural-Urban Migration," *American Journal of Sociology*, 44:36–58, July, 1938. This finding has been corroborated by other data from the same area. See Mapheus Smith, "Some Relationships Between Intelligence and Geographical Mobility," *American Sociological Review*, 8:657–65, December, 1943.

[2] Richard O. Lang, *The Rating of Happiness in Marriage*, unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1932.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

where effective division of labor is emphasized, romantic expression may be more temperate and moderate.

Whether happier or not, marriages in the country are more likely to remain intact. The probabilities of divorce are appreciably greater for urbanites than for farm folk. In 1940, three fifths of the white population fifteen years old and over were in urban places, but about three quarters of the divorced were in these places, whereas the rural-farm population, with one fifth of the population, had only one tenth of the divorces. Again, of the population fifteen years old and over, 1.23 per cent was divorced for the nation as a whole. For the urban population the figure was 1.45, for the rural-non-farm, 1.16, and for the farm, only .68. The cities, it should be noted, are places to which considerable numbers of rural persons migrate, including divorced females who find refuge and employment in the larger centers. If, however, the number of divorces granted, rather than the percentage divorced, is used as the index, the result is much the same. When, for instance, the divorce rate for a city like New York is compared to the rate for the state, the proportion of divorces contributed by the city is greater than its share of the total population.

The reasons that there are fewer divorces in the country are doubtless many. The lower income of farmers deserves some mention, since it undoubtedly affects the ability to buy a divorce. More important probably is the phenomenon of social pressure, which operates more stringently and relentlessly in small groups of familiars than in the larger aggregates of strangers. An associated phenomenon is the greater persistence in the smaller places of traditional religious restraints and sanctions which, supported by the great social pressure, keep discordant couples together when they might otherwise separate. A basic factor is the great economic importance of marriage on farms. Where husband and wife work together as partners in business, the disruption of the relationship becomes a particularly serious matter, since the economic as well as the affectional organization is greatly disturbed by the change.

To sum up: A review of preceding paragraphs shows that rural youth marry in greater numbers, produce and rear more children, live longer, and get fewer divorces than urban youth. From the biological viewpoint, the rural family represents the fuller, more adequate adjustment. The farm family gets its strength primarily from its organization for economic production, which in turn greatly enhances its edu-

cational, religious, protective, and other functions. Whether, all told, the rural family is better off or worse off than the urban family is, of course, an exceedingly difficult matter to judge, as it involves many considerations besides the biological factors and the volume of functions mentioned above. One's judgment rests ultimately on one's values which are subjective and personal, and hence not readily appraised by science. But the brittleness of the urban family and its failure to reproduce sufficiently to maintain its numbers have been disturbing to many persons interested in the public welfare.

Standard of Living

If the rural family possesses the virtues indicated, why, it may be asked, have young people been flocking from the farm to the city?



FIGURE 26. INCOME VARIES DIRECTLY WITH SIZE OF COMMUNITY

The discs show the average income of non-relief families in six types of community, 1935–36. Note the progressive rise in income with increasing size of community. Farm income includes the occupancy value of the farm dwelling, value of farm-furnished food for household use, and the value of fuel and other farm-furnished products used by the household. It may be questioned, though, whether money income measures psychic income. What values does the farm family enjoy which are not measured in terms of dollars? Adapted from National Resources Committee, *Consumer Incomes in the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938), Chart 14, p. 24.

The answer is that they are motivated, not by domestic considerations, but by the lure of the income,[1] conveniences, and excitement which the larger communities provide.

In terms of money, at least, the standard of living of the rural family is lower than that of the city family. The average income (mean) per farm family for 1935–36 was $1215, as against $1409 for the average village family, and $1855 for the average urban family. The aver-



FIGURE 27. FARM FAMILY INCOME, 1935–1936, IN PRE-WAR DEPRESSION YEARS

Adapted from United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Home Economics, *The Outlook for Farm Family Living, 1941* (Washington, D.C.: October, 1940).

age urban family thus had about 50 per cent more income than the average family on the farm. But this does not entirely represent the difference. Since the rural families were larger than the urban, the per capita difference in income was even greater, $270 as opposed to $496, with the village figure in between, $362.[2] If the comparison is

[1] The pull from ahead may be accompanied by a push from behind, due to the lack of opportunity in the country. Because of the farm credit and tenure system in Wisconsin, for example, farms are available for only about one half of the farm boys born on farms when they reach their majority.

[2] *Family Expenditures in the United States*, Table 86, p. 29.

between farm and metropolis, the contrast is even greater, for the mean income of families living in communities of a million and a half population and over was $2704, or considerably more than twice what it was for farms. The median incomes, which run from $965 for farms to $1730 for the largest cities, show less range, since these figures are less affected by the very high incomes of the families with the biggest incomes, but even this range is appreciable.



FIGURE 28. URBAN FAMILY INCOME, 1935–1936, IN PRE-WAR DEPRESSION YEARS

Data from National Resources Committee, *Family Expenditures in the United States*, June, 1941, Table 362, p. 120.

There is a progressive rise in income level with increasing urbanization. This is shown graphically in Figure 26, which gives the average incomes of non-relief families in six types of community, and in Figures 27 and 28, which give the number of farm and urban families receiving certain incomes. These materials show the income superiority of the larger communities, but do not tell us anything about the disadvantages of living in such places; the greater danger to life and

property through crime, the higher death rate, the noise, confusion, and congestion, as well as the intense loneliness felt by many persons who live in the midst of strangers.

Expenditures

City families, we have seen, have about 50 per cent more income than rural families. How is it used? The biggest item in the budget is food. Urban and farm families spend on the average about the same amount for food, if the money value of home-produced food is included in the food costs of the farm family. Since the farm family has less income, this means that it devotes a larger share of its total income for food than does the city family. For farm families the outlay for food is almost two fifths of the total income, while for city families it is only a little over one quarter of the total income. Presumably food is such a big item in the budget of farm families because farm folk work hard and have lusty appetites, but the ready availability of food is probably a factor too. Village families have to buy nearly all the food they consume, and their total average expenditure for this item is appreciably below that of farm families, about one fifth less, despite the fact that their cash outlay for food is almost twice as large.

When a large share of the total income is devoted to food, as with farm families, less remains for other things. Consequently, we find that farmers spend smaller proportions of their total income for most of the other items that make up the family budget: housing, household operation, recreation, personal care, tobacco. Farm families spend about the same proportion of their income as city families for furnishings, clothing, medical care, and education. A larger share of farm income goes to two items: automobiles and savings. The farmer probably has less inducement to spend and more to save, but whatever the explanation, he and his family saved 11.4 per cent of their income as against 9.5 per cent for the urban family in 1935–36. The relatively greater expenditures of farm families for automobiles may be because they do not have other means of transportation which are available to urban residents.

Since urban families have on the average more income than rural families, the urban families spend appreciably more dollars for every item of the budget, except, as has been pointed out, food. This means that the urban families get a great many more of the things that money

can buy.[1] Compared to the average farm family, the average urban family spends about two and a half times as much for housing; twice as much for household operation; not quite twice as much for furnishings; about 50 per cent more for clothing; a third more for automobiles; about 50 per cent more for medical care; two and a half times as much for recreation; twice as much for tobacco; 50 per cent more for education (which is largely provided by the state); 150 per cent more for reading. The initial income advantage of the city family is so great that it can enjoy all these things and still give away one and one third times more money as gifts to individuals outside the family. And besides all this, the savings of the city family exceed by 25 per cent those of the farm family.

Housing

Farm families occupy almost without exception single-family dwellings or homesteads, whereas in urban areas about one fourth of the dwellings are not of this type, as Table 9 reveals. It will be noted that the great majority of all dwellings in America are of the one-family type, in urban areas as well as rural, but the urban proportion is naturally lower. In cities, where the land is at a premium, families must spread upward instead of outward. As a rule, the bigger the city the larger the percentage of the families that live in apartments. Between villages and small cities there is not much difference in the proportion of families living in single-family dwellings, which was close to nine out of ten for white families studied in certain cities and villages in the North Central and the Pacific regions, and in the villages of the Plains and Mountain regions. As Table 10 shows, however, there are regional differences. In New England,

TABLE 9. TYPES OF RESIDENTIAL STRUCTURE, FOR THE UNITED STATES, BY TYPE OF COMMUNITY, 1940*

	Rural-Farm	Urban
One-family dwellings	98.2	74.7
Two-family dwellings	1.3	14.9
Three-family dwellings or more	0.5	10.4

*Bureau of the Census, *Housing. Sixteenth Census*, vol. II: *General Characteristics*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943). Adapted from Table 3.

[1] Money expenditures do not always give an accurate picture of value received. For instance, farm families spend less than urban families for clothing, but it is thought by many that careful buying, remodeling, mending, and better care of clothes make the farm dollar go farther.

twenty-six village families in every one hundred reside in two-family homes or apartments, while in Pacific Coast villages the number of families so housed is only two in one hundred, and even in the small cities of this region, only ten in one hundred.

Since there are more two-family houses and apartment houses in the larger centers, and since apartments seldom are owned by the occupants (and at least one of the two occupants of a duplex is usually a renter), we may say that in general the bigger the community, the larger the percentage of renters. This is borne out by a sample survey of housing in five regions of the United States in 1935–36, which reported that 40 per cent of the families in the small cities were home owners, and 46 per cent of the families in villages.[1] The proportion of farm families owning their homes is larger than that of urban families — 50.9 per cent, according to a sample taken in 1934.[2]

When the family owns its home, the tie to it is strong, there is somewhat less incentive to seek out-of-the-home pleasures, and there is, of course, a greater obstacle to changing one's address. The importance of home ownership lies partly in its relation to mobility. Un-

TABLE 10. FREQUENCY OF TYPE OF HOUSING IN VILLAGES AND SMALL CITIES IN FIVE REGIONS*

Analysis unit:	Percentage of Families Occupying †		
	1-Family House	2-Family House	Apartment
Small city:			
North Central	88.2	7.4	3.3
Plains and Mountain	77.6	11.3	10.3
Pacific	88.4	3.6	6.5
Southeast	79.0	14.7	5.1
Village:			
New England	71.5	23.1	3.3
Middle Atlantic and North Central	88.3	8.4	.6
Plains and Mountain	87.3	5.5	4.8
Pacific	96.0	1.5	.8
Southeast	85.9	9.9	2.3

* The study covered families living in 20 small cities, 140 villages, and 64 counties of 12 farm sections. U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Family Housing and Facilities: Five Regions* (Washington, D.C., 1940), Miscellaneous Publication 399, p. 2.

† These percentages do not add to 100, since a few families had living arrangements, such as dwelling units in business buildings, not included in these classifications.

[1] United States Department of Agriculture, *op. cit.*, p. 2, Table 1.

[2] This was an 8.6 per cent sample, covering 595,855 farm homes. U.S. Department of Agriculture, *The Farm-Housing Survey* (Washington, D.C.: March, 1939), Miscellaneous Publication 323.

like farm families, urban families spend more time away from home and change their residences more frequently, the average big city family making a move about every two or three years. This has its effect on neighborliness. If a family changes residence frequently, as urban families that rent are likely to, the chances of getting well acquainted with neighbors are not so good as they would be under conditions of fixed residence. The density of population is, of course, a factor also, since it is easier to get acquainted with a few other families than it is with a great many. City families living next door to each other in a multi-family dwelling may not even know each other's name, and are merely *neigh-dwellers*, not neighbors.[1] Those who rent, moreover, are less likely to feel any responsibility for the upkeep of the home. There is evidence that with the purchase of a home, "expenditures on the household and its family as a unit are increased or are not materially decreased; expenditures for individualist satisfactions are decreased."[2]

Housing facilities

Because they are relatively poor, farm families lack many of the so-called modern conveniences. In 1940 more than four fifths of the farmhouses of the country were without running water.[3] If a modern home is regarded as one having electric lights, running hot and cold water, and indoor flush toilet, then few farmhouses are modern, for fewer than one tenth have all three of these facilities.[4] In recent years there has been an appreciable gain in the number of farms having electricity, thanks largely to the Rural Electrification Administration, but as of January 1, 1943, six out of every ten farms in the United States were without electricity,[5] and were still using kerosene lamps.

The lack of modern facilities in farm homes is only partly the result of their relatively greater poverty. Another factor is the density of population, which in the cities makes possible improvements and social services not available to farmers living on separate places in the

[1] Term proposed by Bessie A. McClenahan, *The Changing Urban Neighborhood* (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Studies, Social Science Series, number 1, 1929).

[2] Niles Carpenter, "Attitude Patterns in the Home-Buying Family," *Social Forces*, 11:76–81, October, 1932.

[3] Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census, 1940: Housing — Special Reports*, Series H–44, number 4, December 29, 1944.

[4] Bureau of Home Economics, *The Outlook for Farm Family Living, 1941* (Washington, D.C.: October, 1940), p. 15.

[5] *Report of the Administrator of the Rural Electrification Administration*, 1943.

open country. The urban family has the advantage of the good things that numbers permit, while the farm family has not. In the same way the larger cities can have certain benefits, such as symphony concerts and operas, which are not possible with the more limited resources of the smaller cities. A farm family, if it is to have a water and sewage system, must install its own plant, while an urban family needs only to hook up to the municipal services. It is one thing for a city family to ask the electric light company to run a wire into the house from the pole at the corner, at no cost to the family, and it is quite another thing for the farm family to have to pay for bringing electric current from a power line that may be some miles away. The same income in the city, then, will bring more in the way of facilities and conveniences than it will in the country. Poor urban families, therefore, enjoy, on the whole, more comforts than do farm families equally poor, while the possession of a decent income gives a farm family no assurance of modern conveniences. These facts are illustrated graphically in Figure 29 which shows the proportion of two income groups ($500 to $999 and $2500 to $2999) in small cities and on farms enjoying certain conveniences. The figure shows that the city families fare better in respect to all housing facilities, not even excepting living space, which might be expected to be provided more generously in farm than in urban dwellings. A distinction, however, must be made between number of rooms and amount of living space, which is measured by the number of persons per room. Even the homes of the farm poor in this sample have more rooms, on the average, than the homes of the urbanites with substantial income, though they may have more persons in each room. On the other hand, except for living space, the farmers with a comfortable income ($2500 to $2999) do not enjoy any advantage in living facilities over urban families with only a $500 to $999 income.

The farm family might be expected to have an advantage in living space, but this advantage is not effective, for many farm families close off a portion of the house, at least during the colder months. The number of available rooms must also be seen in terms of the size of the family to be accommodated, which is larger on the farm and results in more serious room-crowding than is found in urban areas.[1] Also

[1] The incidence of room-crowding is measured by the proportion of dwelling units housing more than 1½ persons per room. The percentage of such dwellings in rural-farm areas was 16.1, compared to 5.7 for all urban places. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census, 1940, Housing — Special Reports*, Series H-44, number 5, December 30, 1944.



FIGURE 29. COMPARATIVE FACILITIES IN LIVING QUARTERS FOR TWO INCOME GROUPS: ON FARMS AND IN SMALL CITIES

The poor families in these cities have more facilities than the poor families on farms. Data are for seven North Central small cities and selected counties in Pennsylvania-Ohio farm section, 1935–36. From Bureau of Home Economics, *The Outlook for Family Living, 1941* (Washington, D.C.: October, 1940), p. 16.

noteworthy is the fact that the lower income group in the small cities is not much below the higher income group in the proportion enjoying running water, a sink with drain, and electricity. Indeed, 95 per cent of the low income families in these cities had electricity in their homes. Type of heating and availability of hot water are more dependent upon income. The poorer urban families benefit from the ready availability of facilities and services resulting from the collectivist program of modern city government.

Our analysis has shown that the urban family enjoys certain material advantages over the rural, but also that the urban family is less stable and less well adjusted. Are these two situations related? Are the difficulties of the urban family a result of its material superiority? Or is the reverse true: Will the greater wealth of cities prove to be a factor facilitating adjustment?

We may find it helpful to view this confusing situation from the perspective of social change; that is, from the long-time point of view. The city is the strangest and most artificial environment man has ever lived in. The great masses of stone and steel and concrete, the paved streets, the tall buildings and the factory smoke that hide the sun, the relative lack of green, growing things, sometimes make the city seem like a cold and dead place to the visitor fresh from the country. It would be strange, indeed, if such a radically new environment did not bring problems of adjustment.

The family seems to have been well adapted to farming from the beginning, but the early adjustments of the family to the new city environment have manifestly not been good. However, our experience with urban civilization has been very brief. In the United States it has not lasted for even a single century, which is a short time compared to the many thousands of years man has lived on the land. For so short an experience, city organization has been remarkably successful in moderating the initial difficulties of adjustment. The structure of houses and the planning of the streets may seem to show that the city is still not a good place for children, but urban programs of public health and the extensive urban social services have been developed to the point where the death rate of infants in the cities is less than that in the rural areas for the country as a whole, and the differences in the complete urban-rural death rates are less than the variations within the cities themselves. The situation with reference to urban adjustment should, therefore, not be viewed as fixed and unchangeable. It is conceivable that the conditions affecting family life in the cities may improve. Indeed, given time and the ample resources at the disposal of urban agencies, it is possible that the improvements will result in an even better adjustment for the urban family than the rural family has known. In any case the city environment is too new and changing to permit of our holding fixed opinions concerning its influence upon family life.

Another possibility is that the urban and farming communities as we now know them will not exist several hundred years hence. The

city was the product of the factory and the railroad using steam. Now the automobile and electricity are stretching the city into the metropolitan area, which may be better adapted to the family. Farming is changing, too, under the impact of the new technology and the influences flowing from the new urban patterns. With the tractor, the gasoline engine, and electricity, the Industrial Revolution is coming to the farm. Commercial farming varies greatly from the self-sufficing type of the old plow culture, and approaches more and more the type of production found in the towns, villages, and cities. The two types of community, the rural and the urban, are thus tending to become more and more alike, although they will not necessarily ever be exactly the same. For the present and for the near future, important differences remain, as this chapter has shown.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Does the country afford a more suitable environment for family life than the city? Why?
2. How are differences in the economic organization of farm and city families related to differences in: (*a*) proportions married; (*b*) ratio of the sexes; (*c*) size of family?
3. How does the recreation of farm families differ from that of urban families? Which is the fuller expression of the recreational function?
4. How would you account for the fact that farm families are more closely related to the church than urban families?
5. What factors account for the relative lack of modern facilities in farm homes?
6. How does home ownership affect family life?
7. Why is a rural upbringing associated with good marital adjustment?
8. How do you account for the difference in the urban-rural divorce rate?
9. In most regards, the social characteristics of villages are more like those of cities than those of farms. Why so?
10. What types of rural communities are there? Urban communities? Which are the more recent?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. Family organization in six contemporary rural communities. See United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Eco-

nomics, *Culture of a Contemporary Rural Community, Rural Life Studies:* 1. *El Cerrito, New Mexico*, by Olen Leonard and C. P. Loomis; 2. *Sublette, Kansas*, by Earl H. Bell; 3. *Landaff, New Hampshire*, by Kenneth MacLeish and Kimball Young; 4. *The Old Amish of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania*, by Walter M. Kollmorgen; 5. *Irwin, Iowa*, by Edward O. Moe and Carl C. Taylor; 6. *Harmony, Georgia*, by Waller Wynne.

2. Girls in families in six different rural occupations. Nora Miller, *The Girl in the Rural Family* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1935).
3. Causes of the differential urban-rural fertility.
4. Functional housing for urban families. See Svend Riemer, "A Research Note on Sociological Home-Planning," *American Journal of Sociology*, 46:865–72, 1941.

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Beers, Howard W., "A Portrait of the Farm Family in Central New York State," *American Sociological Review*, 2:591–600, 1937.

The farm family in process of change.

Leevy, J. Roy, "Contrasts in Urban and Rural Family Life," *American Sociological Review*, 5:948–53, 1940.

A study of 1000 rural and 1000 urban white families in Illinois.

Mowrer, E. R., *The Family, Its Organization and Disorganization.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932.

Contains a careful description of "family areas" in the city of Chicago, showing the differentiation of family types under varying conditions of income and ecology.

Sorokin, P., and C. C. Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology.* New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929.

Abundant objective data on the differences between rural and urban communities.

Stern, Bernhard J., *The Family: Past and Present.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938.

Part 9 contains a careful selection of readings on the farm family.

Thomas, W. I., and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America.* Boston: Badger, 1918.

A monumental study of the processes involved in the transition from peasant to industrial life.

Chapter 6

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING FAMILY LIFE

FAMILY ORGANIZATION on farms differs significantly from family life in cities, as the preceding chapter has shown. But size and type of community are not the only factors affecting family life. There are rich and poor farmers, and all the gradations in between. There are farm owners, farm laborers, sharecroppers. In the towns and cities there are professional persons, owners of large and small business, clerks, servants, skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers. Although unskilled workers live in the city and farm laborers in the country, they are more nearly alike in many aspects of their family life than are the unskilled laborers and the professional persons who live in the city, or the farm laborers and the large ranch owners who reside in the country. The discussion of family life according to type and size of community brings out some important differences, but it also obscures differences due to occupation and income. There are no more important determinants of family life than these two factors of work and money, as we shall see in this chapter.

OUR NATIONAL INCOME AND ITS FAMILY DISTRIBUTION

Every year the government makes an estimate of our national income and of the number of families in the United States, but the only recent data that we have which are based on a large-scale field study are for the depression years 1935–36, when several federal agencies collaborated in an investigation of the income from all sources of a

representative sample of 300,000 American families.[1] The total national income for that year was $60,000,000,000, but all of this did not go to families, since eight out of every one hundred persons then living were single individuals who did not regularly share their incomes with others, and one additional person in every one hundred was a resident in some institution — the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Army or the Navy, a prison or a public hospital. This left ninety-one persons out of every one hundred who were members of families, or a total of 116,000,000 persons separated into 29,500,000 families. All together they had a total family income of $48,000,000,000.

But these 29,500,000 families did not share the $48,000,000,000 evenly. If that had been the case, each family would have received



FIGURE 30. THE UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME

Share of the aggregate family income received by each tenth of the families of the United States, 1935–36. The chart may be read either by length of bars or by symbols. Each figure symbol represents 1 per cent of all families or 294,000 families. Each dollar symbol represents 1 per cent of aggregate income of all families or $476,792,380. The richest tenth of our families received 18 times as much money as the poorest tenth. National Resources Committee, *Consumer Incomes in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), Chart 11, p. 19.

[1] National Resources Committee, *Consumer Incomes in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938). The inquiries on income made at the 1940 Census do not provide statistics on total family income, but are limited to data on family wage or salary income in 1939. Such data are of limited usefulness for our purpose, because they exclude groups whose income is largely derived from other sources, such as owners of businesses and farmers. Most farmers receive little or none of their income in the form of money wages or salaries.

TABLE 11. DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES, BY INCOME LEVEL, 1935–36*

Income Level	Families		
	Number	Per Cent at Each Level	Cumulative Per Cent
Under $250	1,162,890	3.95	3.95
$250–$500	3,015,394	10.26	14.21
$500–$750	3,799,215	12.92	27.13
$750–$1,000	4,277,048	14.55	41.68
$1,000–$1,250	3,582,444	13.20	54.88
$1,250–$1,500	2,865,472	9.75	64.63
$1,500–$1,750	2,343,358	7.97	72.60
$1,750–$2,000	1,897,037	6.45	79.05
$2,000–$2,250	1,420,883	4.83	83.88
$2,250–$2,500	1,043,977	3.55	87.43
$2,500–$3,000	1,314,199	4.47	91.90
$3,000–$3,500	743,559	2.53	94.43
$3,500–$4,000	438,428	1.49	95.92
$4,000–$4,500	249,948	.85	96.77
$4,500–$5,000	152,647	.52	97.29
$5,000–$7,500	322,950	1.10	98.39
$7,500–$10,000	187,060	.64	99.03
$10,000–$15,000	131,821	.45	99.48
$15,000–$20,000	58,487	.20	99.68
$20,000–$25,000	34,208	.12	99.80
$25,000–$30,000	22,233	.08	99.88
$30,000–$40,000	15,561	.05	99.93
$40,000–$50,000	6,603	.02	99.95
$50,000–$100,000	10,571	.04	99.99
$100,000–$250,000	3,336	.01	100.00
$250,000–$500,000	699	†	....
$500,000–$1,000,000	197	†	....
$1,000,000 and over	75	†	....
All levels	29,400,300	100.00	....

* *Consumer Incomes in the United States*, p. 18.
† Less than 0.005 per cent.

$1622 for the year or a weekly income of $31. An average of this kind means little, because it takes only one very big income to offset a great many very small ones. A better average figure is the median, or income of the middle family, which in 1935 was $1160 for the year or $22 a week. This means that half of American families received more than $22 a week, and half received less.

Even this figure does not show how much more or how much less some families received than others. The range of incomes was very great, indeed. At the short end were 4,500,000 families who were wholly or partly dependent upon public relief in these depression years; fifteen out of every one hundred families. At the top were seventy-five families with incomes for the year averaging $2,000,000. If we divide all of the American families into ten groups, as is done in Figure 30, we see that the richest tenth of America's families had eighteen times as much income as the poorest tenth. The poorest tenth received less than $410 a year income, only 2 per cent of the total family income of the country, while the richest 10 per cent received 36 per cent of all the income. Again, if we divide the total family income into tenths, we find that the bottom tenth of the total family income supported forty times as many families as the top tenth.

An examination of the data on the differences of family income by occupational groups brings out the important fact that these differences are more pronounced than those for the types of community which were presented in the preceding chapter. Wage-earning families (comprising skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers) made up almost two fifths of American families in 1935–36, and received a little over a quarter of the total income. These families and those of farmers are at the end of the economic procession. Next come the families of clerical workers, who received just a trifle more than their numerical share, since they constituted 14.5 per cent of the families and received 15.5 per cent of the aggregate income. Up ahead are the families of independent business men, a miscellaneous category including small shopkeepers and large entrepreneurs. As a group they got about 50 per cent more income than their numbers would warrant. Next in line are the salaried professional and salaried business men, while leading the procession are the families of independent professional men, including physicians, lawyers, accountants, architects, and other professional persons engaged in private practice. One in seventy-five families belonged to this group which received better than one twentieth of the income, or almost four times their proportionate share.

Adequacy of American Family Income

Is the income of the families of American wage-earners adequate? This is, of course, an exceedingly important question, but one difficult



FIGURE 31. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASS

Families of wage-earners are most numerous and have the second lowest average (median) income. Half of the families in each occupational group had incomes greater than these sums each week; half had less. Adapted from *Consumers' Guide*, September, 1938, pp. 40–41.

to answer, since any test of adequacy presupposes a standard of some kind, and this standard rests on values which are ultimately subjective. The wages of American laborers are low if the comparison is made with the income of American professional men, but not if the comparison is made with, say, the income of wage-earners in Mexico, or India, or Arabia. In some lands the amount of money that comes to the hands of workers is meager and may be nearly nothing, and their real income is little better. For instance, it is said that in rural China peasant families do not know what it means to go to bed without being hungry. Compared to workers in most other lands,[1] American wage-earners are not very poorly off.

Suppose, however, the standard we adopt is the amount of income needed to maintain a family in health and decency: then is the income of American wage-earners enough? This question has greatly concerned social workers, who are much interested in the discrepancy between costs of living and the income of the poor, especially those on relief, since the problem here is to try to make up, at least in part, the difference between these two sets of items. It has been necessary, therefore, for social workers to set up standard budgets for practical purposes. Two such standards were worked out by the Works Progress Administration in 1935 as a basis for measuring intercity differences in costs of living[2] — a maintenance budget and an emergency budget. The maintenance budget was designed to keep a family of an unskilled manual worker, consisting of four persons, the worker, his wife, a son of thirteen, and a daughter of eight, in good physical and psychological condition. It provided for living in a four- or five-room house, kept in at least a fair state of repair, with water and sewer connections and with the exclusive use of an indoor bath and toilet. Facilities included ice, electricity, gas, a small radio, but no automobile. There was allowance for a daily newspaper, movies once a week, and a few other simple recreational activities. An adequate diet of minimum cost was provided. The man was to wear overalls at work, but the cost of the rest of the family clothing

[1] It has been estimated by one authority that 81 per cent of the earth's inhabitants have a real income per breadwinner of less than $10 per week, and 53 per cent a real income of less than $4 per week. Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1940), pp. 2–3.

[2] Margaret Loomis Stecker, *Intercity Differences in Costs of Living in March, 1935, 59 Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Works Progress Administration, Division of Social Research Monograph XII, 1937).

was calculated with some regard for social as well as material needs. The budget also allowed for medical care, furniture, furnishings, household equipment, carfare, taxes, and numerous incidental expenses, but there was no allowance for household assistance. This standard, it will be seen, is a modest one, somewhat above the bare minimum needed for subsistence, yet certainly below the so-called "American standard of living" to which there has been so much reference by politicians and others in recent years, and which has been said to include a car for every family.

On the basis of these items, the average cost of maintenance-level-of-living for a wage-earner family of four was estimated to lie approximately somewhere between $1250 and $1280, depending upon the region, except for the South Central region, where the average was about $1185. What proportion of American families had incomes of such amounts? A little less than half in three regions (New England, North Central region, and the Mountain and Plains region), just a little over half on the Pacific Coast, and less than a third in the South Central region. Income distribution does not give an entirely accurate picture of family living, since families may in any year spend more than they earn by drawing on their savings, by borrowing, or by running into debt. Even so, probably about two fifths of American families in 1935 spent less than the amount that social workers said was necessary for the maintenance level of living. This figure, it should be noted, is considerably higher than the much publicized estimate that "one third of our nation is ill-housed, ill-clothed, and ill-fed."

These figures tell us what proportion of all families fall short of meeting the standard set up by the Works Progress Administration, but tell us nothing of how far short some families actually fall. About two fifths of American wage-earners received less than $1000 a year income in 1935–36, a proportion which held also for families generally, since the higher incomes of business and professional families were offset by the incomes of farm families, which are lowest. One out of every ten wage-earner families in 1935–36 earned less than $10 a week, and one in every thirty-three less than $5. When we say that one family in thirty-three earned less than $5 weekly, the number may not seem to be a large proportion, but it means 703,765 families, embracing probably more than 2,250,000 persons. Five dollars a week for a family of four means eighteen cents per person per day, but many families with earnings of less than $10 a week had more than four

members. There were 83,225 families with five or six members and 43,932 with seven or more members, the latter averaging less than ten cents per person per day.[1] Since ten cents was the average income per person, the members of some of these 40,000 families had even less than ten cents apiece a day on which to live.

Who are these low-income families? Although urban centers have their very poor too, the farm tenants, sharecroppers, farm wage hands, and migrant farmers of all types probably rank lower than any others. Sharecroppers[2] arose after the Civil War, in an attempt to solve the problem created by an upper class who had only land and a lower class who had only labor. A sharecropper furnishes labor in cultivating a farm for the owner, who supplies stock and implements and who receives in return a share of the crop produced, usually one half or less. The tenant farmer supplies his own team and plow, and so generally turns over a smaller share of his yield to the owner. The landlord may supply seed and fertilizer and he may extend a small credit at the neighborhood store or at a commissary owned by the landlord. The amount of this debt is supposed to be repaid when the crop is sold. If the crop is poor or the price low, the farmer remains in debt, in which case he may remain on the land to work off the debt or move on. A wage hand lives on the farm and agrees to work for a definite length of time at a set wage. In 1934, tenants of the Southern plantation had an average net income of $309 per family; the average sharecropper family income was $312; and the average family income of wage hands was only $180 per family. Operators netted around $2600.[3]

Of all these disadvantaged farm groups, the farm laborers' lot is the worst. They have only seasonal work and are unemployed from 40 to 60 per cent of the year. The hired man on the farm used to be regarded as one of the family, but now, with mechanized agriculture, farms are often large and the workers are more like those in industry — employed for particular jobs and with no special feeling of obligation on the employer's part for the workers' general welfare. Under the impact of technological change there has developed a class of itinerant

[1] Computed from Table 8B, *Consumer Incomes in the United States*, p. 97.

[2] It has been said that the most typical scene in the South is a cotton field with a solitary man — a sharecropper — plowing in it. The chances are two to one that he is white. Arthur F. Raper and Ira De A. Reid, *Sharecroppers All* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 145.

[3] Rupert B. Vance, *Farmers Without Land* (New York: Public Affairs Committee, 1940), p. 21.

farm laborers. They are to be found in largest numbers on the Pacific Coast where they follow the crops as they ripen, from early berries in the South to Canadian wheat in the North. Migratory workers are found increasingly in the South and Southwest on truck, berry, and fruit farms. Table 12 records one of several efforts to measure the socio-economic status of various farm groups.

FAMILY ORGANIZATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

Preceding paragraphs have shown how unevenly income is distributed among American families. We have next to see how family structure and function are affected by variations in income; that is, what difference it makes whether a family has much income or little. For purposes of comparison we shall consider chiefly the very rich and the very poor because the rôle of the income factor can be dramatized most effectively by presenting these extremes, but we do not lose sight of the fact that most American families are neither very rich nor very poor, but are distributed along a continuum between these extremes. It is not easy to specify the income that marks off the very poor or the very rich, and no rigorous limits will be imposed. In general, however, when we refer to the very poor in subsequent paragraphs, we shall mean those families with incomes under $500 for the year 1935–36. One family in seven had a total income for the year of less than this amount. Our conception of a very rich family will be one with an income of at least $100,000 for the year. Such families are very rare — only one in ten thousand. In our discussion it will not be possible to adhere rigidly to these categories, because many of the data in which we are interested, like birth and death rates, are broken down according to income for the lower-income groups and for incomes up to, say, $3000, but are not given for very large incomes. The birth rates and other characteristics can thus be given with exactness for very poor families but not for the rich.

A further difficulty concerns the relation of income to social status. Families with small incomes are often referred to as lower-class families and those with big incomes as upper-class families. The concept of social class is a useful one, but it poses some special problems because of the difficulty of exact definition. It is generally agreed that income is an important component of social class status, that the lower classes have the least wealth and the upper class the most

TABLE 12. FARM FAMILY SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS SCALE*

(SHORT FORM)

Score	*Scale Items*				
.....	1. Construction of house:				
	Brick, stucco, etc., or painted frame				Unpainted frame or other
	Score: (5)				(3)
.....	2. Room-person ratio:				
	Number of rooms .....÷ Number of persons.....=				
	Ratio: Below 1.00		1.00–1.99		2.00 and up
	Score: (3)		(5)		(7)
.....	3. Lighting facilities:				
	Electric		Gas, mantle, or pressure		Oil lamps, other or none
	Score: (8)		(6)		(3)
.....	4. Water piped into house?	Y (8)		N (4)	
.....	5. Power washer?	Y (6)		N (3)	
.....	6. Refrigerator:				
	Mechanical		Ice		Other or none
	Score: (8)		(6)		(3)
.....	7. Radio?	Y (6)		N (3)	
.....	8. Telephone?	Y (6)		N (3)	
.....	9. Automobile? (Other than truck)	Y (5)		N (2)	
.....	10. Family takes daily newspaper?	Y (6)		N (3)	
.....	11. Wife's education:				
	Grades completed: 0–7	8	9–11	12	13 and up
	Score: (2)	(4)	(6)	(7)	(8)
.....	12. Husband's education:				
	Grades completed 0–7	8	9–11	12	13 and up
	Score: (3)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
.....	13. Husband attends church or Sunday school?				
	(¼ of meetings)			Y (5)	N (2)
.....	14. Wife attends church or Sunday school?				
	(¼ of meetings)			Y (5)	N (2)

..... Scale Score

* William H. Sewell, "A Short Form of the Farm Family Socio-Economic Status Scale," *Rural Sociology*, vol. 8, No. 2, June, 1943.

MEAN SCORES ON THE SHORT SCALE FOR VARIOUS TENURE GROUPS IN THREE SAMPLES

Tenure Status	Oklahoma		Louisiana		Kansas	
	Mean	S.E.	Mean	S.E.	Mean	S.E.
Owner	61.4	0.5	61.5	0.5	71.8	0.7
Tenant	54.9	0.5	53.7	0.7	65.8	0.9
Cropper	...	..	50.9	0.8	...	..
Laborer	50.0	1.0	47.1	1.1	60.4	1.7

wealth, but there is not much agreement as to how much income is needed to put a family in the upper class or to keep it out of the lower. The idea of class goes beyond the money factor to include the phenomenon of prestige, so that upper-class families are those which are looked up to by all the other families while the lower-class families are those looked down on by all the rest. Position in the upper class is generally obtained, not alone by having more money than other families, but by having had it for a number of generations, so that the time element, which permits the cultivation of the social graces, is important. Income is highly correlated with social class, but there are exceptions, as when a distinguished old family loses its wealth but retains its prestige. Although these comments indicate some of the difficulties that lie in the way of exact definition of the concept of social class compared to the precision with which income can be stated, still the idea of class is a valid one and can be usefully employed if rigorous measurement is not demanded. In the following discussion we shall use the terms "the poor" and the "lower class" interchangeably, and similarly the terms "the very rich" and "the upper class."

Consumption Expenditures

The most obvious significance of differences in family incomes is that they affect standards of living, determining how many or how few of the necessities and comforts of life the members of a given family will enjoy. If a family has a large income, it has money with which to buy the goods and services it wants. Some of the goods are essentials, like food, shelter, and clothing; others are luxuries, like tobacco, automobiles, magazines, travel, musical instruments, and a college education. If a family has a big income, it can have the necessities and the luxuries too. A family with a small income may have barely enough for the essentials. The smaller the income, the larger the percentage that has to go for food, shelter, and clothing, which leaves a smaller percentage for the luxuries. The larger the income, the smaller the share of the available total that must be devoted to the basic necessities, and the larger the margin for the good things of life. For instance, the poorest families in the United States, families with incomes under $500, spend about two thirds of their income for food alone. If costs of shelter and clothing are added, the income of these families is exceeded by 15 per cent. For these essentials alone (food,



FIGURE 32. WHAT THE POOR AND RICH CAN BUY

Total expenditures of the upper and lower thirds of the consuming units of the United States in 1935–36, by type of expenditure. Each figure symbol represents 10 per cent of all families and single individuals. Each bag symbol represents 10 per cent of total expenditure on specified category of consumption. From National Resources Committee, *Consumer Expenditures in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 9.

shelter, and clothing) these poor families actually paid out 15 per cent more money than they earned during the depression years 1935–36. They were able to do this by drawing on savings, by borrowing, or by running into debt. Their net expenditures exceeded their net income by more than 15 per cent, since they did not limit themselves to expenditures for these essentials only, but bought other goods and services. Total expenditures for this income class (under $500) were, indeed, on the average about 50 per cent greater than income.

Rich families, on the other hand, those with incomes of $20,000 and over, spent only about one twentieth of their income for food.[1] The rich, then, have the great bulk of their income left for the extra things of life, while the poor have only a small fraction, or nothing, left for these things. Of course, even this small margin that the poor can devote to the movies, toys, toilet articles, train travel, and newspapers is available because the expenditures for food, housing, and clothing are kept down below what is required for adequate protection. Those with incomes under $500 a year average about $200 annually for food. As income rises, the actual dollar expenditure for food rises also, families with incomes of $20,000 spending over $2000 for food. The proportion devoted to food and other current consumption needs decreases, however, because food is not a highly elastic item. We can increase somewhat the quantity of food we consume, and there are broader limits to the quality of food, but the amount is not great compared with, let us say, the number of vacation trips that people may take or the number of books they can buy. Some years ago this special rôle that food costs have in the budget was noted and described by an economist named Engel; hence the generalization that the proportion of income devoted to physiological needs shrinks with increasing income has come to be known as Engel's Law.

It is revealing to compare consumption expenditures of the lowest and the highest income classes for which we have data, namely, families with incomes under $500 and those with incomes of $20,000 or more. The latter spend eleven times as much money for food as the former, twenty times as much for housing, sixty times as much for clothing, over one hundred times as much for transportation by automobile, one hundred and fifty times as much for recreation, and two hundred and fifty times as much for education. It will be noted that

[1] National Resources Planning Board, *Family Expenditures in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), Tables 107–10.

the differential increases as we move from the necessities to the luxuries. Despite appreciably greater expenditures for these and other items, and despite an additional cut of approximately one seventh of the total income for taxes and contributions, the high-income families saved a bit more than 50 per cent of their income for the year. These families were able to make heavy expenditures for goods and services and taxes and yet save a little more than half of what they received because the amount received was so great, averaging 134 times as much as that for the lowest-income group. The latter, it will be recalled, finished the depression years 1935–36 with an average indebted-



FIGURE 33. HOW SAVINGS VARY ACCORDING TO INCOME

Expenditure for food, clothing, and savings by income class, 1941. Savings rise sharply with increasing income, for incomes over $3000. The poorest families have negative savings, while those in the highest income class save more than a fourth of their income. Food expenses alone take about three fifths of the total income where the family has an annual income under $500, as compared with about one eighth where the income is $14,000. From Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, *Family Spending and Saving in Wartime*, Bulletin 822 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 36.



FIGURE 34. PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES WITH A NET SURPLUS OR DEFICIT, BY INCOME CLASS, IN THE DEPRESSION YEARS OF THE 1930's

The data are for certain small cities of the North Central area, 1935–36, but the pattern for the nation as a whole is essentially the same. Note that the proportion of families with an annual surplus increases greatly with relatively small rises in income. From *Family Income and Expenditures: Five Regions* — Part 2, *Family Expenditures* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, Publication no. 396, 1940), p. 6.

ness of about 50 per cent of the average income. The value of a surplus is, of course, that it adds to the family's net worth. The next year such a family has its regular earnings and, in addition, the accumulated savings yield interest and dividends which boost the income still higher. In this way the margin of difference in net worth between the low-income and high-income groups may increase from year to year, unless progressive income taxes and other means are effective in redistributing wealth.

Economic Organization

Where, as with the very poor, daily activities are closely organized around the struggle for existence, the family is economically a highly important unit, with all the members of the family except very young children making a contribution. The mother cooks, cleans, washes,

irons, sews and mends, besides caring for the children. Where the father is present, he is normally the principal if not the sole breadwinner, but the mother, and even the children, may work outside the home too. The lower classes have the biggest percentages of working wives, since the smaller the husband's income, the greater the need for the wife to work. Where the husband had an income of $500 or less in 1939, about one wife in four was in the labor force in large cities, but only one wife in eighteen was employed where the husband's income was $3000 and over.[1] The older children help with the household tasks and with the care of the younger children, and they may or may not work for pay. In a representative sample of Maryland youth, it was found that if the father is an unskilled laborer the chances of a youth's going to work before he is sixteen years old are better than one in three; they increase to about one in two if the father is a farm laborer, but they are less than one in twenty if the father is a professional man.[2]

How a lower-class family is organized economically is described by the mother of a family of seven in a Southern mill town, as follows:

> . . . I get up at four to start breakfast for the children. When you got five young 'uns it takes a while to dress 'em. The oldest is nine and she helps a lot. The others are seven, five, four, and three. What do we have for breakfast? Well, we usually have bread and butter and syrup. No, we don't get any sweet milk. We get a gallon of buttermilk every day from Mrs. Rochester for twenty-five cents. The children like it; they don't take much to sweet milk. They ain't used to it.
>
> After I've got the children dressed and fed I take 'em to the mill nursery, that is three of 'em. Two go to school, but after school they go to the nursery until I get home from the mill. The mill don't charge anythin' to keep the children there. I couldn't afford it anyway. We have breakfast about five, and I spend the rest of the time from five to seven gettin' the children ready and cleanin' up the house. That's about the only time I get to clean up. Ruby washes the dishes. Ruby is nine.
>
> My husband and I go to the mill at seven. He's a stripper in the cardin' room . . .

[1] Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940. Population — The Labor Force — Employment and Family Characteristics of Women* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), Table 23.

[2] Howard M. Bell, *Youth Tell Their Story* (a study of the conditions and attitudes of young people in Maryland between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four) (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1938), p. 58 ff.

I work in the weavin' room. . . . I work from seven to six with an hour for dinner. I run up and down the alleys all day. No, they ain't no chance to sit down, except once in a long time when my work's caught up, but that's almost never.

At noon I run home and get dinner for the seven of us. The children come home from school and the nursery. We have more to eat at noon. We have beans and baked sweets and bread and butter, and sometimes fat-back [fat bacon] and sometimes pie, if I get time to bake it. Of course I make my own bread. . . .

After dinner I wash the dishes and run back to the mill. We don't have any sink, but there's a faucet with runnin' water on the back porch and a regular toilet there, too. You can see we have electric lights, but we don't have any heatin' stove. I cook with an oil stove and we have these two fireplaces.

When the whistle blows at six I come home and get supper. Then I put the children to bed. . . .

When supper is over I have a chance to make the children's clothes. Yes, I make 'em all, and all my own clothes, too. I never buy a dress at a store; I haven't no sewin' machine but I borrow the use of one. On Saturday night I wash the children in a big wash-tub and heat the water on the oil stove. Then I do the week's ironin'. . . .

I always make a coat last seven or eight years. My husband gets a suit every two years but he ain't had one for the last six years. He got an overcoat about four years ago. Things have been pretty hard. I like the movies but I haven't been to one in about six years now. Not since the children was young.

I press my husband's clothes. He half-soles the children's shoes and all our shoes. See those! Those soles on my shoes came from the dime store and cost twenty-five cents for the pair. He puts 'em on with tacks. I make a dress for myself about every six or seven months out of cloth I buy in town. . . .

Usually I get to bed between ten and eleven at night.[1]

In the upper class, the economic organization of the family is very different. This class has the smallest percentage of wives who are earners. Often the men themselves are not earners either, in which case there is no worker at all in the family, inheritance having supplied the resources. If each member of the family has his or her own separate income, adequately provided, then there is no dependence upon family support such as is found in the lower and middle classes,

[1] Adapted from Paul Blanshard, "How to Live on Forty-Six Cents a Day," *The Nation*, 128:580-81, May 15, 1929. With permission.

and no strong economic ties bind the members together. What this difference in economic organization means is strikingly revealed when death removes the head of the household. On the lower economic levels, the loss of the breadwinner represents a great economic catastrophe, heightening the already existing insecurity, but the loss of father or mother in a wealthy family, personal tragedy though it be, may mean that the children come into an inheritance which leaves them financially more secure than before.

As for domestic duties, the upper-class wife may supervise her household servants, but she does none of the housework herself, since physical labor is characteristically regarded by the upper class as menial and degrading.[1] She not only does not do the physical work of the household, but is relieved in large measure of the actual physical care of her own person. She has a maid to dress and groom her and to look after her clothes. The husband likewise has his valet and the children their nurse. The children do not help with household tasks or enter the labor market.

Social Status

Despite the democratic shibboleth that "all men are born free and equal," it is apparent that children at birth come into possession of the social position already held by their parents. With these positions go privileges and opportunities, or the lack of them. Social classes are tremendously important because they influence one's "life-chances" and determine one's share of the good things of life. Some of the differential advantages of upper-class status have already been indicated, and others relating to family organization will be considered in later paragraphs. Here we wish to call attention to the highly important function of the family as a status-fixing agency, and to point out especially the automatic operation of this function. Since the child does not choose his parents, he must accept and adjust to whatever family situation he finds. The family transmits to the child not only its name and its milieu, but a tradition and a set of influences that mold his behavior and his destiny for better or for worse. Theoretically it might be possible to assign a status to each child at birth on the basis of personal considerations, but this would be exceedingly difficult to do, and highly disturbing so far as the organization of the family and the community are concerned. Society is primarily interested in the

[1] Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: The Viking Press, 1943).

orderly performance of social rôles rather than in the identity of the individuals who play the parts.[1] The transmission of social status through the family makes for the easy maintenance of the social structure, but it entails a social loss where the opportunities of individuals do not square with their capabilities.

The importance of the family name and tradition is strikingly illustrated on the positive side by the history of the Adams family of Massachusetts,[2] which for two hundred years has been distinguished for its record of public service. The record begins with John Adams (1735–1826), the second President of the United States, whose son, John Quincy Adams (1767–1848), became this country's sixth President. His son, in turn, Charles Francis Adams (1807–96), served brilliantly as our Minister to England. Then the latter's third son, Henry Adams (1838–1918), became a celebrated historian of his country. And the son of the latter, Charles Francis Adams (1866–), by serving as Secretary of the Navy in the Hoover administration, carried forward the family's unbroken record for public service. The family name becomes so important in such instances that members of the family are regarded by others, and come to regard themselves, as bearers of a lofty tradition or status rather than as individuals with interests and destinies of their own. The emotional appeal of the family name is greatly reinforced by objective symbols like a distinctive seal or coat of arms and a carefully recorded genealogy.

But a family tradition can be as powerful on the negative side as on the positive. This is illustrated by the following account of five generations of a parasitic family. The record starts some seventy years ago with a drunkard, Thomas Jed, who in his early twenties took up residence in a small Southern town of about four thousand population. Shortly thereafter he married into a family of low economic and social status and to this marriage eight children were born, six surviving. Because of his drinking, Thomas Jed was unable to support his family, which had therefore to be assisted by his wife's family. All the children married in early adulthood. One girl remained in town, two boys and one girl moved to the city about fifty miles distant, where they were joined by their parents, and the remaining two girls went

[1] Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936), chap. VIII.

[2] A. D. H. Smith, "Families Conspicuous in American History," *Current History*, 33:677–80, February, 1931.

to other sections of the South. Within a few years all the girls had acquired children, had lost their husbands through death or desertion, and had rejoined their parents and brother in the city. All became public charges. They were dropped by the social agencies, however, when they made no effort to re-establish independence, but resorted instead to double-dealing. Thomas Jed became an ordinary street beggar, his wife a house-to-house beggar, one widow "developed into probably the most successful residence beggar in the city," another became an habitual church beggar, and so on. Even the children were apprenticed and used as decoys, an anemic-looking child being carried as "a sample of the half-dozen sick children at home." This child finally grew up and married at nineteen and then her baby was used for the same purpose.[1]

Social status and inherited mental ability

Some readers may react to the account of the Jed family with the observation that whatever a man sows, that shall he also reap; that the plight of Thomas Jed and his family was his own drunken fault. It may be noted that the Jed family is not so much a lower-class family as one that is declassed, functioning outside the conventional bounds of the community, but the question remains: Do the poor have the status they deserve? Is the distribution of opportunities just? There are those who argue that our capitalist economy rewards individuals according to their abilities.[2] We may note again in this connection that the range of incomes is very great. In 1935–36, there were seventy-five families in the United States with an average annual income per family of $2,000,000. At the other extreme, there were more than a million families that had an average income of less than $250 for the year. The range from $250 to $2,000,000 is very great. The range in mental abilities, from idiot to genius, is also great. Do the variations in ability determine the variations in income? The distribution of nearly all biological phenomena like height and weight, and presumably intelligence as well, approximates the normal probability curve which resembles a bell. The distribution of income, as we see from Figure 30, is more like a right-angled triangle, greatly skewed in the direction of low incomes. If inherited abilities determined the distri-

[1] H. W. Gilmore, "Five Generations of a Begging Family," *American Journal of Sociology*, 37:768–74, March, 1932.

[2] John Bates Clark, *The Distribution of Wealth* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1902).

bution of income, the curves for the two sets of phenomena would be alike. They differ because cultural or institutional factors, like the laws of inheritance, property rights, and the phenomena of power and prestige play a big part in determining social status. It is not suggested that the laws of heredity have nothing to do with success and status, but only that social factors are also highly important.

Size of Family

Family income and social status are very unevenly distributed and so are children. If we consider the number of children under eighteen years of age living at home in the United States in 1940, we find nearly one half of them in the one seventh of American families with three or more children; and the other half in the one third of American families having one or two children. That leaves about half of all homes with no children under eighteen. These data do not tell us how many children have been born to the families, for many of them had children who grew up and left home, but the data are useful for showing how dependent children are distributed at a given time. One half of our families, then, have no children under eighteen at home while one in seven has three or more to support.

Families with high incomes obviously are better able to support children than families with low incomes; so theoretically we should expect income and size of family to be positively correlated, but actually the opposite is the case. Low incomes and high birth rates go together, as do high incomes and low birth rates. The average total income of the childless families mentioned in the preceding paragraph was higher than that of the families with children, and the larger the family, the smaller was the average total income. Where the family consisted of a married couple only, and the head was under thirty-five years of age, the median wage or salary income per family was $1320, but where there were three children in addition to father and mother, the average income was much less, $1010.[1] The disparity is even greater if we consider the family income on a per capita basis, since childless families divide their income into two parts, while families of three or more children must divide theirs into five or more parts. On a per capita basis, the former averages more than three times as much as the latter, which means that the family with just two members can

[1] Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census, 1940, Population — Special Reports*, Series P–44, number 19; *Per Capita Income in Wage-Earner Families, by Size of Family*, 1939. Released September 8, 1944.

maintain three times as high a standard of living as the family of five, or it can put the difference into savings. These measures are only approximations because they ignore the differences in per capita living costs for small and large families, but the variations in the income of families of different sizes are so great that an approximate measure is adequate for our purposes.

It is clear from the foregoing that the size of family of the poor intensifies their poverty. It may not be correct to say that they are poor because they are big, but they would be less poor if they were smaller. It may also be noted that the economic handicap of a large family is greatest where the head is young. In families with a young head, let us say thirty-five years old, the husband is generally the only breadwinner, since his children are too young to work and the mother is likely to stay home to look after them. In families with an older head, perhaps forty-five years old, either the children are old enough to be supplementary earners or they have left home, resulting in an improved economic situation for the family.

Fertility and socio-economic status

Our discussion so far has concerned the number of dependent children living in homes of varying socio-economic status. It may be objected that this is not an altogether satisfactory index and that it would be better to consider instead the total number of children ever born to mothers of different income and occupational groups. For such an analysis of differential fertility according to socio-economic status, we turn first to a study based on the 1910 Census.[1] In 1910, the largest families were found to be those of farm laborers, who have the smallest average income. Their rate of 299 children born per one hundred wives was more than double the rate for wives of professional and business men, whose income is highest. In the cities, the poorest group, the wives of unskilled laborers, exceeded the fertility of the least fertile group, the professional families, by 73 per cent. As the size of a community increases, there is a decrease in the fertility of all occupational groups, but the relative differences between the socio-economic classes remain fairly constant.

Since 1910 there have been some important changes in the fertility

[1] The study is based on the analysis of data concerning the fertility of 100,000 married women under forty-five years of age, representing unbroken unions, both spouses being native-white persons of native parentage.

rates, including substantial declines in the general birth rate, which were reported in Chapter 4. A further change is indicated by the report that the birth rate for native-white wives of professional men was higher than that for wives of business men.[1] Aside from this, however, the picture was the usual one of inverse association of fertility and socio-economic status. When the fertility rates were examined according to income, it was found that "the birth rate for all native-white wives in families earning $5000 and more was no lower than that for wives reporting family earnings of $3000 to $4999 or $2000 to $2999." [2] This was true only for the native-white women, not for the foreign-born or Negro women.

The figures just cited are for married women, among whom there appears to have occurred some slight change in relative fertility, according to economic class, in the upper-income ranges. This is important, for it may be a token of things to come, portending further departure from the traditional inverse relation between fertility and socio-economic status. If, however, we are interested in knowing the relative fertility of socio-economic classes as a whole, we must include in our calculations both unmarried and married women. The proportions married may be different for the several economic classes, which would, of course, affect the fertility rate. When the analysis [3] is not restricted to married women, but includes the total female population of childbearing ages, the traditional inverse relation between income class and fertility is clearly manifested. On this inclusive basis, the general fertility rate for the $2000 to $2999 income class was about a third higher than the rate for the highest income class, $3000 and over, while the group on relief had a general fertility rate more than three times as great as the top income group. The same sharp inverse relation is found between general fertility and amount of schooling. Women with less than seventh-grade formal education reported a birth rate over twice as high as women who had been to college. If the comparison is confined to married women, the college-educated do not fare so badly, since they are only a little less fertile than the

[1] Clyde V. Kiser, "Birth Rates and Socio-Economic Attributes in 1935," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 17:9, April, 1939.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[3] Based on a consideration of approximately 632,000 families and about 2,250,000 persons, embracing 596,474 females 15 to 44 years of age, of whom 336,226 were reported to be married. Bernard D. Karpinos and Clyde V. Kiser, "The Differential Fertility and Potential Rates of Growth of Various Income and Educational Classes of Urban Populations in the United States," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 17:367–90, October, 1939.

high-school group. The poorer showing of the total college group of women is due, then, mostly to postponement of marriage and to the smaller proportion married.

Data from the National Health Survey (1935) show that only the very poorest urban white women in the nation, those from families with incomes under one thousand dollars and those with less than a seventh-grade education, are reproducing sufficiently to keep up their numbers. All the other urban groups are said to have net reproduction rates too low for permanent renewal of their ranks. This situation is a matter of great concern to many people, who fear that if the trend continues, the poor and the poorly educated will truly "inherit the earth."

Fertility and quality of the population

Are these fears well founded? It is interesting to note that back of these fears are certain notions regarding the inherent quality of the lower and upper social classes. It is assumed by many that the classes with small incomes are genetically inferior; hence there is concern lest this inferiority be multiplied while the excellences and virtues of the upper classes are diminished or even lost. If, however, it can be shown that these views of the hereditary inferiority of the lower-income groups are of questionable accuracy, the fears to which they give rise may seem unwarranted. This, of course, would in no wise detract from the desirability of having our children reared in largest numbers by those best able to give them a satisfactory upbringing.

The fact that these families with many children have low incomes is used as an argument to prove their genetic inferiority, but this is merely arguing in a circle; it is not proof. It must be shown independently of income that these families are inherently deficient, because, as was indicated earlier in the chapter, the low income may be due to environmental factors, like lack of opportunity. There are fewer opportunities for high incomes than for low ones because of the very nature of our economic organization, just as in the army there are far fewer chances for commissions than for places in the ranks because of the nature of the military organization. A position in the upper-income brackets may be due to innate ability, but it is also certainly due to training and opportunity. It is known, for instance, that the children of fathers who practice the professions have a much better chance of going to college than the children of wage-earners. This means that some of the upper-class youth go to college whether they

are capable or not, while many capable lower-class youth are denied the chance.[1] There is thus a certain amount of transmission of opportunity by the upper classes which is independent of ability. True, the upper classes get higher scores on I.Q. tests, but again the scores reflect opportunity to learn the kind of material upon which the tests are based. If we could provide all the economic groups with equally attractive opportunities for learning and advancement, then and only then would we be in a position to judge the relative inherent mental capacity of each group. When, as in Russia, a violent revolution occurs and the upper classes are liquidated, there is a temporary period of confusion and social disorganization, but after a time members of the lower classes arise to meet the needs. Is there any evidence today that Russia has fewer or less effective leaders in the professions, in business, and in government than she had under the aristocracy of the czars? The genetic inferiority of the masses may be a reality, but it has yet to be proved.

Fertility and social change

The anxiety over the future population of our country rests on the further assumption that the existing type of differential fertility is a permanent thing. Will the poor continue to outbreed the middle and upper classes in the future as they have in the recent past? The situation is certainly not static, as is shown by the partial modification of the marital fecundity rates of the two highest-income classes during the past two or three decades. Recent studies of graduates of Harvard, Princeton, and Yale likewise report that the most successful men show a larger proportion married than the least successful and a greater average number of children per married man.[2] Affecting the relative birth rates by economic classes in the past has been the uneven diffusion of artificial contraception, which has been more favorable in the case of the classes with high incomes. If, however, contraception is democratized and spread more uniformly throughout the population, changes in the birth rates of the lower-income classes, especially

[1] It may be estimated that perhaps as large a proportion as 50 per cent of all high-school graduates eventually capable of college training fail to continue their schooling for want of sufficient financial resources. A study of 3767 Iowa high-school graduates (1934) showed that 40 per cent in the highest half of the total distribution of scholastic ability continued their formal education, and approximately 60 per cent in the highest decile. Richard W. Barker, *The Educational and Vocational Careers of High-School Graduates Immediately Following Graduation in Relation to Their Scholastic Abilities* (Master's thesis, University of Iowa Libraries, August, 1937).

[2] Frederick Osborn, *Preface to Eugenics* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), p. 132.

in urban areas, may be expected. This is to be inferred, perhaps, from existing studies which show that the birth rate among the foreign-born has fallen, between 1920 and 1930, more than the birth rate of the native whites; [1] also that the decline in births of Catholics in recent years has been greater than that of Protestants in the same area.[2] In the last chapter, too, it was seen that the birth rate between 1930 and 1940 fell further on the farms than in the villages or cities, even though the result was still to leave the farms in the lead. The wider and more equitable diffusion of contraception should then be a factor in diminishing the differences between the economic classes in fertility.

However, in accounting for fertility differentials, factors other than contraception may be involved, as may be implied from certain evidence [3] suggesting that the lower-income classes were more prolific than the upper as far back as 1800, before the invention and introduction of modern contraception. Theoretically, as has been said, those with the most income might be expected to have the largest families, since they can afford to do so. Actually there are a number of obstacles. The later age of marriage generally required because of preparation for a professional or business career greatly limits the number of offspring, as does the ambition for an ever higher standard of living. Income which might be used to rear a number of children is used by the adults for their further pleasure. What happens to the birth rates of the various economic classes in the future will depend, then, on the social forces which play upon these groups. There is no inherent fertility difference; the birth rate is not significantly different for the upper or for the lower economic classes when contraception is not used.[4]

Families on relief

It is well known that families receiving public assistance are larger than economically independent families, and that the difference in size is appreciable. The average number of persons per family on re-

[1] Frank Lorimer and Frederick Osborn, *Dynamics of Population* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 48.

[2] Samuel Stouffer, "Trends in the Fertility of Catholics and Non-Catholics," *American Journal of Sociology*, 41:143–66, September, 1935.

[3] A. Jaffe, "Fertility Differentials in the White Population in Early America," *Journal of Heredity*, 31:407–11, 1940.

[4] Raymond Pearl, *Natural History of Population* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 390.

lief in 1935–36 was 4.5, as against 3.8 for non-relief families.[1] An interesting question is whether the granting of relief is itself responsible for this condition. A good many people appear to think so and to decry what they believe is the multiplication of paupers at public expense. Indeed, there is some feeling that the availability of relief actually increases the number of babies born beyond what the number would be if no relief were forthcoming. It is difficult to secure evidence which is conclusive on this question, but there are some data [2]



FIGURE 35. STABILITY OF THE HOME IN RELATION TO RELIEF

About a third of the white relief families were broken by death of one or both of the parents, as against less than a quarter of the non-relief families. The unbroken home is more of an economic asset to society than the broken home.

which suggest that relief grants do not aggravate the problem. These data, showing the average number of children per relief and non-relief family, by age, reveal some interesting things. For infants under two years of age the number is 0.1 for all income groups, relief as well as non-relief. There is then no difference in the number of very young children in the two groups. The difference appears in the number of children between two and fifteen years of age. The figure for boys is 0.9 and for girls 0.8 per family on relief, as opposed to 0.5 children of each sex per non-relief family. It appears from these figures that there may be some relation between the number of dependent children and relief grants. A family is classified as being on relief if it receives any amount of public assistance, however small, during the year. These relief families, then, include some which received very little assistance and others which were on the rolls the year round. In all

[1] Relief families contain more relatives and other adult dependents as well as more children. For a comparison of 341 relief and 447 non-relief households see Theodore B. Manny and Harry G. Clowes, *A Comparative Study of Certain Relief and Non-Relief Households in Selected Areas of Rural Maryland* (College Park, Maryland: University of Maryland, 1939).

[2] *Family Expenditures in the United States*, Table 336, p. 108.

probability the poorest relief families had the most children. These families had probably been on relief long enough for the impact of that situation on family size to be felt. But since there was no difference between relief and non-relief families in the number of children under age two per family, it might be argued that the receipt of relief actually served to diminish the fertility of those on relief. These observations, however, are based on data for relief families as a whole, and may not apply to certain special groups in the population.[1]

Protective Functions

Even if they had fewer offspring than the rich, the poor would not be in as good a position to protect their children against the hazards of life. Since the families with the lowest incomes have the most members, it is not surprising that they contribute a highly disproportionate share of the social problems relating to the protection of women and children. One such problem is the mortality of mothers due to childbirth. Figures are lacking on maternity deaths by family income, but if such figures were available they would be likely to show a high rate for the low-income classes. The mothers of the lower class not only have many babies, but they bear them in rapid succession, and without adequate medical care. A study of mothers of the tenant-farmer class in the South,[2] where the mean number of children borne per married mother is 6.4, reports that it is customary for these women to continue their work at home and in the fields "right on up to the last," when they are delivered by a midwife at home without benefit of anesthetics. In the cities, hospitalization and the attendance of a physician are more frequent for lower-class expectant mothers, but not as common as for women of the middle and upper classes.

Variations in family income also greatly affect the chances for the survival of the offspring. If we examine the number of deaths of infants under one year old in the United States, we find that a fourth of the total is contributed by families with incomes under $450, comprising a tenth of all families. More than nine tenths of all the infant deaths occur in the 30 per cent of our families with incomes under

[1] Paul Popenoe and E. M. Williams, "Fecundity of Families Dependent on Public Charity," *American Journal of Sociology*, 40:214–20, September, 1934. This study has special reference to the Mexicans of Southern California.

[2] Margaret Jarman Hagood, *Mothers of the South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939).

$800. The infant mortality rates (number of deaths per thousand live births) for seven cities studied by the Children's Bureau show a decrease, as family income increases, as follows: [1]

TABLE 13. INFANT MORTALITY AND INCOME

Under $450	167
$450–$549	106
$550–$649	117
$650–$849	108
$850–$1049	83
$1050–$1249	64
$1250 and over	59

A high death rate of mothers affects the life-chances of the infants of the lower classes, as does also the relatively high percentage of mothers of these classes who have jobs. It is known that the death rate of infants is much higher when the mothers work for pay than when the mothers remain at home with their babies. But even if all the mothers of the lowest-income class were spared and remained at home with their infants, the widespread ignorance regarding the rules of nutrition and health and the low purchasing power of this class would still be translated into high rates of malnutrition and illness, resulting in high mortality rates.

Despite the greater elimination of the weaker babies of the lower class, those that survive grow up into sicklier adults than do members of the upper classes. The number of heads of families unable to seek work because of chronic illness was found in 1935–36 to be one in twenty for relief families, one in thirty-three for families with incomes under one thousand dollars, and only one in two hundred and fifty among the higher-income groups. A comparison of the families on relief with those having an income of $3000 or more showed that the reliefers had 57 per cent more disabling illness lasting a week or more, and that the average case of chronic illness lasted 63 per cent longer, which indicates that reliefers get sick oftener and stay sick longer.[2]

Social maladjustment

Poverty breeds social as well as physical ill health. Field studies of lower-class family life of both whites and Negroes in the South

[1] Robert M. Woodbury, "Infant Mortality in the United States," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 188:102–04, November, 1936.

[2] *The National Health Survey, 1935–36*, Bulletin number 2, *Illness and Medical Care in Relation to Economic Status* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938).



FIGURE 36. AS INCOMES FALL, DEATHS OF BABIES RISE

More than nine tenths of all the infant deaths occur in the poorest 30 per cent of our families. One way to save the lives of infants is to increase family income. Data from Woodbury (see text).



FIGURE 37. MEDICAL EXPENDITURES OF POOR FAMILIES

Percentage of families in the income class $250–$599 having medical care expenditures within specified ranges, Middle Atlantic and North Central village analysis unit, 1935–36. Note the unequal distribution of medical care. One in twenty of these poor families spent around one third of their total income for medical care (including doctors' bills, medicines, dental care, eyeglasses, etc.) while one in six spent nothing. Since probably less than 4 per cent received free medical care, there appears to be a good deal of gross medical neglect in the group. If the income is raised $200–$300 a year, the proportion of families without medical expenditures drops to one in twenty. Based on Table 3, *Family Expenditures for Medical Care: Five Regions* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Publication no. 402, 1941).

report that extra-marital unions are common for both partners; that desertions and separations are frequent; that fighting, even shooting, cutting, and gambling, are "accepted classways." The child reared in this kind of environment absorbs its atmosphere and tends to duplicate the behavior patterns of his elders. There is thus a transmission from one generation to the next of family habits having to do with sex, aggression, and status-striving which differ from the patterns followed by the middle and upper classes. In these classes the child's manner of eating and dressing, his choice of playmates, and the time, place, and nature of his play, are closely supervised. He is likely to have educational and occupational ambitions which motivate him in his studies. He is taught to avoid aggressive behavior, at least in the form of fighting, and to inhibit his sex impulses. He is cautioned against frequenting poolrooms, gambling houses, and beer parlors where the youth of the lower classes fraternize.[1]

These and other differences exist in the family situations of children of the lower, middle, and upper classes, with important consequences for personality and behavior. For instance, a boy's chances of joining a predatory gang and becoming a juvenile delinquent are in direct ratio to the economic status of his family, the poorest families furnishing the greatest number of delinquents. Chances of becoming a Boy Scout and presumably a law-abiding citizen decrease as his family status falls; at least, the poorer the boys the fewer the Scouts among them.[2] This suggests that one effective way to raise the moral tone of families is to improve their economic standing.

Income and Family Adjustment

There is considerable interest in knowing how income is related to marital adjustment. Some students of the subject believe that extremes of income are associated with family instability; that the very poor and the very rich have relatively more domestic discord than have the middle classes. Discord is readily fostered in the families of the poor by ignorance as well as by frustration which leads to aggression. The fact that there is a relatively large percentage of working wives in the lower class means that they are less dependent on their husbands for support, and consequently the economic ties that bind

[1] See Allison Davis, "American Status Systems and the Socialization of the Child," *American Sociological Review*, 6:345, June, 1941.

[2] Raymond V. Bowers, "Ecological Patterning in Rochester, New York," *American Sociological Review*, 4:180–89, April, 1939.



FIGURE 38. RELATION OF FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS TO THE AMOUNT OF SCHOOLING THEIR CHILDREN RECEIVED

Note that the chances of not continuing beyond the eighth grade are more than eleven times as great for youth in the farm-labor class as for those whose fathers are in the professions. In the light of these data, what is meant by equality of opportunity? The data are based on a representative sample of over 13,000 youth in Maryland, 1936. From Howard Bell, *Youth Tell Their Story* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1938), p. 59.

couples together are weakened. Children are generally a highly integrating force in the family and the poor have many children, but since a larger percentage of them are unwanted than on higher economic levels, they may more often be regarded as a burden. The children in turn may respond with a show of resentment at the lack of prestige and the limited opportunities afforded by the family. Research has shown that during a period of economic depression, where the income of families is drastically reduced, the father often suffers an appreciable loss of authority.[1] This observation concerns a change of family status from higher to lower rather than the maintenance of a status which is already low, but it may afford a clue as to the difficulties encountered by lower-class fathers in the exercise of their leadership, difficulties which are accentuated by the strong tradition of patriarchal rule. These conditions lay the basis for conflict between parents and children.

Among the upper classes, family ties are often very loose, particularly where the members are financially independent and are not bound to one another by economic need. Even where this is not the case, rich parents do not ordinarily assume direct responsibility for the physical care and education of their children, but instead delegate these responsibilities to paid help — nurses, governesses, and tutors. This arrangement often results in the parents being somewhat detached from their children. Where servants are retained for a long period of years or even for a lifetime, more than one generation of the family may have the same nurse or teacher. Such a person becomes an important part of the household and often has from the children a devotion which in the middle class would be directed toward the parents. When the children are old enough for school, they are sent to a private country day school and later to a private school away from home, further attenuating the family ties. The social schedule of the mother is a busy one and may be so full as to leave little time for the children.

The following account of upper-class family life, although fictional and therefore somewhat exaggerated, gives a glimpse into the morning life of the matron, Mrs. Manford. Her schedule runs as follows: 7:30 — mental uplift; 7:45 — breakfast; 8:00 — psychoanalysis; 8:15 — see cook; 8:30 — silent meditation; 8:45 — facial massage; 9:00 — man with Persian miniatures; 9:15 — correspondence; 9:30 — mani-

[1] Mirra Komarovsky, *The Unemployed Man and His Family* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1940).

cure; 9:45 — eurythmic exercises; 10:00 — hair wave; 10:15 — sit for bust; 10:30 — receive Mother's Day deputation; 11:00 — dancing lesson; 11:30 — birth-control committee; and so on. We are told that when Mrs. Manford's children want to see her, they have to take their turn along with the faith-healers, art dealers, social workers, and manicures.[1]

Turning to the objective data, the publications of the Census of 1940 show the number of separated married couples (that is, families with a "spouse absent"), according to the occupation of the spouse. These data refer to homes broken because of imprisonment, hospitalization, preparation for war, sailing the seas, residence in a foreign land, temporary employment away from home, and permanent separation, but they do not include homes broken by death or divorce. While the data are given by occupations rather than by income groups, certain inferences about the latter can be made. The data show that the rate of separations among laborers is fairly high, while the rate among owners and managers of business is low. Of the married male laborers (not divorced or widowed) in the labor force, 6 per cent were separated from their spouses in 1940, as compared with 2.4 per cent of proprietors, managers, and officials. It should be noted that these homes with "spouse absent" are truly broken homes, regardless of whether or not a permanent separation is intended. Husbands and wives are deprived of association with each other while the children lack the influence and companionship of the absent spouse. In some respects, families broken by separation are socially more significant than families broken by bereavement or divorce, for remarriage is possible in the latter, but not in the former.[2]

The data on separations are interesting, but they must be interpreted with care. In comparing the list of occupations according to separation rates with a list of occupations according to divorce rates worked out for an earlier period (1887–1906),[3] it was found that there were thirty-five occupations with about the same rating in both lists.[4] But there are exceptions: farm laborers had a low divorce rate, but a high separation rate. Separation with a view to desertion is less ex-

[1] Edith Wharton, *Twilight Sleep* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1927).

[2] William F. Ogburn, "Marital Separations," *American Journal of Sociology*, 49:316–23, January, 1944.

[3] The topic of divorce rates by economic classes is further developed in Chapter 18 on "Family Disorganization."

[4] William F. Ogburn, *op. cit.*

pensive than divorce, and so would presumably be used more often by the lower-income than the higher-income groups. In fact, it is definitely known that the type of family instability is related to social class, with desertion being resorted to more commonly by the lower- than by the middle- or upper-income groups. Mowrer has shown such class differences for Chicago.[1]

If the data show that the lower-income groups have a larger percentage of broken homes than the higher-income groups, does this mean that they have less domestic happiness? Desertion and divorce are certainly related to marital discontent, but dissatisfaction with one's spouse does not always lead to separation. It is possible that various social influences, such as considerations involving family and occupational prestige, may deter certain individuals from terminating an unhappy union, especially if there are opportunities to compensate in various ways for the unhappy relationship. Such considerations would presumably play a larger part in the lives of the higher- than the lower-income classes, and would help to reduce the number of overtly broken homes of the former. This is possibly one explanation for the findings of several studies [2] which report that no significant correlation exists between happiness in marriage and size of income. The findings, however, may be due to lack of a representative sample, since the groups investigated were largely recruited from the middle class. A few couples with fairly low incomes were included, but the number was small, and there were none at all with very low incomes. For husbands, it is claimed, moderate income at marriage gives better chances of marital success than either high or low income; for wives, on the other hand, a consistent relation is reported between size of income and probability of success in marriage.[3]

Positively correlated with marital adjustment are the following: the possession of savings; employment in an occupation characterized by stability and subject to social control; regularity of employment. Financial security and type of work appear to be more important than amount of income, as shown in Figure 39. Teachers make more good adjustments and fewer poor adjustments in marriage than do big busi-

[1] Ernest R. Mowrer, *The Family* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), pp. 96–99, 187–93.

[2] Lewis Terman *et al.*, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939). Ernest W. Burgess and Leonard Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938).

[3] Burgess and Cottrell, *op. cit.*, p. 153 ff.



FIGURE 39. MARITAL HAPPINESS OF HUSBANDS, BY OCCUPATIONS

This chart shows the specific occupations of 17,533 husbands and the happiness ratings given them by friends and acquaintances. From Richard O. Lang, *The Rating of Happiness in Marriage* (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1932). Reproduced as Chart 28, Burgess-Cottrell, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*. One theory emphasizes the direct relation of social control, and the inverse relation of mobility of occupation, to marital happiness, but the theory has shortcomings. For instance, salesmen are found in all four quartiles of the chart. Perhaps the ratings reflect other than occupational factors.

ness men with larger incomes. The culture patterns of teaching and the personality traits of teachers are favorable to marriage. The factors of culture and personality, then, are more significant for purposes of marital adjustment than income as such.

The Family and Social Mobility

The preceding analysis of variations in family organization according to socio-economic status has presented a cross-sectional view of our society, and like all views of cross-sections the picture is a static one, a still picture, presenting the situation as it exists at a particular time. Such a picture is in a sense incomplete, for it gives no indication of the dynamic character of our social structure. In all societies with social classes there is at least some mobility, both up and down the social scale. In cultures with a caste system, like India, social status is rather strictly determined by heredity and the amount of mobility is relatively small. In other countries, such as England, with an established aristocracy, the opportunities for change of status are greater than in India, but less than in the United States with its system of open classes.

We are interested here in the relation of the American family to social status and social mobility. We have already noted that the parents are responsible for fixing the child's initial status. In the same way the child is likely to share any gain or loss in position made by his family during his minority. However, there are ways in which the child can raise himself above the social level of his family and even help to raise the level of the family group. Since nearly all of these involve training of some sort leading to the cultivation of skills for which there is a strong social demand, education becomes the highway to opportunity and is so recognized in our culture. The importance of the educational process for the maintenance of status is recognized by the upper classes who place the names of their newborn infants on the waiting lists of the schools they wish them to attend, usually their own preparatory schools or colleges, a practice now copied by the middle classes. That the importance of schooling as a status-building device is also recognized by the lower-income groups is evidenced by the great sacrifices which parents of this class, especially the foreign-born, often make to keep their children in school. Some parents may wish to improve their own standing vicariously through their children so that the sacrifice is for a rather selfish pur-

pose, but often such an outcome is not foreseen. If the parents retain their lower-class habits while their children acquire the customs of some other class, the children may grow to feel ashamed of the ways of their parents.

Success achieved through education comes as a rule very slowly, for it takes time to acquire knowledge and to utilize it to advantage. A more rapid vehicle of social mobility is marriage, when it occurs between persons of different social class positions. Interclass marriages may cause sudden and drastic changes of position in either direction. They may raise the status of one partner and lower that of the other. That is why few things disturb upper-class parents so much as the prospect of a mésalliance involving one of their children.

Usually the problem does not arise, because the social classes live apart and go their separate ways, with the rich marrying the rich and the poor the poor. This is noteworthy because it highlights the significant fact that stratification is the rule of society and social mobility the exception. While it is evident that a great many persons in our society are able to better their social standing by such means as education, special talents, economic success, beauty, and marriage, and others for want of these suffer a loss of position, the great majority of individuals remain in the class into which they are born. Statistics on the occupations of fathers and sons show that for the most part the occupations of the sons are in the same economic class as those of the fathers.[1]

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How does the discussion of family life according to type and size of community obscure differences due to occupation and income?
2. Why is the distribution of family income so uneven?
3. Which occupational groups have the poorest incomes? The highest? Why?
4. What is an adequate family income? Is the standard proposed by the Works Progress Administration adequate?
5. Is a peasant class developing in the United States?
6. What is the social significance of Engel's Law?

[1] Percy E. Davidson and H. Dewey Anderson, *Occupational Mobility in an American Community* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1937).

7. "Some families make no expenditures whatever for medical services in certain years." Is this desirable?
8. Why do so few families practice tithing?
9. What is the relation between family income and community organization?
10. Why did the majority of moderate-income families in 1935–36 close the year with a deficit?
11. How do income and occupation affect family size?
12. Why do college women contribute less than their share of offspring?
13. Are low-income families genetically inferior?
14. Will the poor continue to outbreed the middle and upper classes in the future?
15. What effect do public assistance grants have on size of family?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. Proposed minimum standards of living for American families.
2. Occupational mobility and family life. (See W. Fred Cottrell, *The Railroader*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940.)
3. Family life of college professors. (See *The Professor's House*, by Willa Cather, and *The Bent Twig*, by Dorothy Canfield Fisher.)
4. An upper-class family. (*H. M. Pulham, Esq.*, by John Marquand.)
5. Families on relief.

SELECTED READINGS

Davis, W. Allison, and R. J. Havighurst, *Father of the Man*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947.

Practical implications of recent research into social class differences in child training.

Lynd, Robert and Helen, *Middletown*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929. Also, *Middletown in Transition*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937.

A widely acclaimed study of the social characteristics of a small, Midwestern city, generally, but erroneously, thought to be a "typical" American small city. The second title presents the same city

after ten years of boom and depression. Family traits of the business and the working class are contrasted.

Stern, Bernhard J., *The Family: Past and Present.* New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938.

Part 8 contains striking descriptions of family life in mill town, mine, and metropolis. Some of the readings are literary and impressionistic.

Warner, Lloyd, and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community*, vol. 1 of the *Yankee City Series.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.

The most exacting study available of the social structure of an American community. The class differences, including those relating to family life, are presented for an old New England city of about 30,000 population, but there is little information regarding family life itself.

Zimmerman, C. C., and M. E. Frampton, *Family and Society.* New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1935.

Part III contains an interesting series of cases of family life on different economic levels in the Ozark Highlands. The presentation and analysis follow the method of Le Play.

Zorbaugh, Harvey W., *The Gold Coast and the Slum.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929.

An able description and interpretation of various social classes in Chicago, from the standpoint of social attitudes and behavior.

Chapter 7

THE AMERICAN NEGRO FAMILY

In the United States we live amidst many different races, religious groups, and cultures: Negroes, Japanese, Chinese, Filipinos, Mexicans, Indians, Jews, "Pennsylvania Dutch," Amish, Quakers, Mormons, Irish Catholics, Italians, Poles, English, and many others. Our nation has been called a "melting pot" because these diverse elements have been fused into one people with common loyalties, traditions, and aspirations. But if this figure conveys the idea that the fusion is complete, that all the differentiating characteristics of the immigrants are completely melted down in the American pot, the analogy is false, because the pot is closed to some peoples and the melting down is only partly accomplished in the case of others. Indeed, there is widespread disposition to preserve cultural differences, at least in part, as an antidote to the trend in totalitarian countries where, from our viewpoint, cultural homogeneity is overemphasized. In the United States the process of assimilation has not precluded differentiation, as is shown by the number of religious bodies in our nation, totaling 256 in 1936, a net gain of forty-three denominations since the previous census of religion, taken a decade before.

The population of the United States is, of course, predominantly white, only 10.2 per cent being colored persons.[1] Of the latter, the great majority are Negroes, the other non-whites constituting a negligible proportion (0.4 per cent) of the total number. It would be desirable to give some attention to each of the minority races, in the interest of providing a comprehensive picture of family life in the United States, but limitations of space, as well as lack of data, make this impracticable. The Negroes, however, constitute a sizable

[1] As of 1940, the population of the United States, by race, was as follows: White, 118,214,870; Negro, 12,865,518; Indian, 333,969; Chinese, 77,504; Japanese, 126,947; Filipino, 45,563; Hindu, 2405; Korean, 1711; all other races, 788.

group — 12,865,518 persons in 1940, or 9.8 per cent of the total population — and considerable information exists concerning their institutions. It is feasible, therefore, to examine in some detail the family life of Negroes in the United States at the present time and to observe how it compares with that of white people. Such a review should help to give us a more realistic appreciation of family differences within our nation and of the problems that such differences bring.

Race and Family Organization

How does race affect family life? Race is a biological concept, referring to the inherited structural similarities and differences of large groups of people. Thus, the Negro tends to have a longer head, broader nose, thicker lips, longer limbs, and less body hair than the white man, although, when measurements of these traits are taken for the two races, the overlapping is considerable. Plainly these traits have nothing to do with family organization which is functional and, therefore, not biologically inherited. The family behavior of a people is a cultural, not a racial, phenomenon, and while some races have distinctive cultures, they are the result of geographic and social, and not of genetic factors. The Chinese are a different race from the Caucasians, and they also have a different culture with family patterns of their own, such as ancestor worship and the large-family system; but these patterns are not due to race, as may be seen from the fact that the Chinese of the second and third generation in the United States do not necessarily adopt them, but are rather more likely to take on the patterns of the American community in which they live. Moreover, ancestor worship is practiced by peoples of other races, and there are Mongolian peoples among whom the custom does not exist. It is important to keep in mind this distinction between race and culture, for the failure to do so often leads to the mistaken belief that certain types of family organization are necessarily linked to certain races.

While no direct relation exists between race and culture, race may affect family life indirectly through the medium of prejudice. If two races live side by side in a relationship of marked inequality, as the whites and the blacks do in the United States, with separate spheres of activity assigned to each and intermarriage tabooed by law or custom, the existing caste system becomes a significant factor affecting many aspects of social life, family life included. Where race prejudice and caste distinctions are less extensive or nonexistent, as in France

and Russia, the situation is very different, and there is little if any connection between race and family life. The social isolation [1] of the American Negro is, then, a key factor in the explanation of his family organization.

In the separation of the white and the black races in the United States, the fundamental rule is that there must be no association on the basis of equality, especially in relations of intimacy. The white Southern boy is not to say Ma'am to a Negress, nor to tip his hat to her, nor to give her the right of way on the sidewalk. Negroes in the South have separate seats assigned to them in streetcars and buses, separate coaches on the trains, and separate waiting rooms at railroad stations. Theaters, restaurants, hotels, and other commercial places furnish separate accommodations for Negroes or exclude them entirely. Whatever services are furnished for Negroes, such as schools, are generally inferior in cost and quality to those furnished for whites. More important in its influence upon family life is the occupational segregation, which results in the employment of Negroes in low-income jobs connected with agriculture and the unskilled and semi-skilled trades. Negroes comprise 10 per cent of the population and more than twice that proportion (22.6 per cent) of agricultural workers (1940), as a class the most poorly paid in the nation. On the other hand, Negroes constitute 2.8 per cent of all professional and semi-professional workers.

The fact that Negroes are not entirely limited to the low-income occupations, but are represented in a variety of levels of employment including the professions, means that the caste system in America is not exactly like that of some other cultures, such as India where occupational segregation is appreciably more rigid. In India and other caste societies that are largely agricultural, culture is less dynamic than in the United States, and custom is sufficient to maintain the traditional taboos. In the United States, the situation is less stable, custom alone is less effective in enforcing the taboos, and recourse must be had to legal restrictions and threats of violence. The master taboo is the prohibition of any intimacy between a Negro man and a white woman, but in the North, where no laws prevent, there are some intermarriages.[2] The attitudes of whites toward Negroes are at

[1] Charles S. Johnson, *Patterns of Negro Segregation* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943).

[2] For an excellent review of the subject of miscegenation and interesting new data on intermarriage, see Louis Wirth and Herbert Goldhamer, "The Hybrid and the Problem of Miscegenation," in Otto Klineberg (ed.), *Characteristics of the American Negro* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944).

present in a process of change, both in the South and in the North, and new racial accommodations are in the making. The situation is, then, highly dynamic and must be considered from the standpoint of social change. In the future, in all probability, Negro-white relationships will be different from what they now are, and Negro family organization will be affected accordingly.

Slavery and Family Life

Although the family organization of American Negroes is in large measure a consequence of their caste status, this factor alone does not offer a full explanation for some of the striking attributes of their family system. One of the major characteristics of the Negro family is its very loose integration, as will be shown later. This is in sharp contrast to the highly organized family life which exists among other minority colored races against whom caste restrictions are also directed. For example, the Chinese live a segregated life in America more complete than that of the Negroes, yet the solidarity of the



FIGURE 40. PROPORTION OF NEGROES OF DIFFERENT TYPES

Herskovits' estimates of the proportions of Negroes of mixed and unmixed blood in the United States, based on genealogical statements and anthropometric measurements, and having some support from other studies. The fact that only 22 per cent of Negroes in the United States are said to be unmixed is due to miscegenation and a little intermarriage. These data should probably be viewed critically, since it is difficult to obtain samples which are representative of American Negroes generally. Data from M. J. Herskovits, *The Anthropometry of the American Negro* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930).

Chinese family is notable. There is no reason why segregation, *per se*, should result in family disunity; on the contrary, opposition from outside is often an effective force in making for greater internal strength in the group that is being opposed. The effect of opposition upon the group seems to depend on the strength of its cultural tradition, including its family patterns. The Chinese in America recognize their connection with the great and hoary civilization of China which lays great emphasis on close family ties. The Negroes in America, on the contrary, do not regard themselves as representatives of the African tradition, which also emphasizes strong family ties. The experiences of slavery and the assimilation of Negroes into American culture have cut the bonds that once tied them to their homeland and its culture. The break has not been clean, and there are numerous survivals of Africanisms in the culture of American Negroes, but in general no conscious loyalty is felt to the great civilization of the dark continent.[1]

In Africa there is, of course, a good deal of variation from tribe to tribe, but the general pattern is one of a highly developed social organization. Polygyny exists, and the individual family is closely linked to the larger kinship groupings of the extended family and the sib (clan). Where there is more than one wife, each wife has her own hut in the compound of her husband and takes her turn living with him. In the joint family system which exists, more than one male generally occupies the household. The group may include the eldest male, his unmarried sons, his married sons, and their wives and offspring, and his brothers. They are tied to one another by strong bonds of mutual obligation. Thus, if one of the brothers should die, another brother takes over responsibility for the care and protection of his deceased brother's widow and children. The clan regulates marriage by prohibiting the union of clan members. The family in Africa is, then, a closely knit organization.

When the Negroes were brought to America as slaves, they were regarded primarily as property and only secondarily as human beings. The masters were chiefly interested in potential workers who would be economic assets; hence matings were arranged with a view to producing healthy offspring. Children were separated from their parents as one or the other were sold by their masters. The evidence is not clear as to exactly how much interference with the domestic arrangements of the slaves actually occurred, but the situation was evi-

[1] Melville J. Herskovits, *The Myth of the Negro Past* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941).

dently one to make for considerable irregularity of family organization.[1]

The maternal family

With social control over the conduct of Negroes shifted from the African mores to the individual slave master, with the Negro father sometimes living apart from his family, and with the economic support of the Negro family furnished by the white man, it is easy to see how the early Negro family in America would become organized mainly around the nucleus of the mother and her child or children rather than around the father, as in the case of the whites. In the households of the dominant group, the father, if present, was the recognized head and exercised considerable authority, more then than now. But in the Negro household the one to whom the group looked for leadership was generally not the father, even when he lived with his family, but the mother. She was the one who usually furnished the family with such solidarity and continuity as it possessed.

An interesting question is whether survivals of African customs may not also have played some part in defining the rôle of the Negro mother in the family. Under African polygyny, a man's wives lived with him in rotation, then returned to their separate huts where they lived with their children. When a woman conceived, she generally suspended her visits to her husband until after the child was weaned. An arrangement of this kind might be expected to result in closer ties between mother and children than between father and children. Polygyny itself tends to have this effect because the children of any one wife must share the father with the children of all the other wives, whereas each child's mother is exclusively his own. The arrangement whereby the several wives and their children occupy separate huts would probably help to strengthen still further the dependence of the children upon the mother. All of these agencies are, of course, special factors reinforcing and supplementing the greater reliance of the child upon his mother, which is in the natural order of things.

Emancipation and Migration

With emancipation came the migration of the Negroes to the cities, first to those of the South, then to those of the North. This migration

[1] E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

was steady, but in small volume until during and after the first World War, when it reached mass proportions with tens of thousands of Negroes pouring into such cities as New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Chicago. The process was repeated during World War II. One effect of such migration was, of course, to redistribute the Negro population, so that the percentage remaining in the South is smaller than before. An evidence of this is found in the number of counties in which Negroes constitute 50 per cent or more of the total population. Such counties, all in the South, fell in number from 286 in 1900 to 180 in 1940.[1] Despite the considerable migration, somewhat more than three fourths of all Negroes (77 per cent) are still to be found in the South, where they constitute less than a quarter of the total population (23.8 per cent in 1940). Nearly all of the remaining one quarter are in the North, where they comprise 3.7 per cent of the total population. The West has a very sparse Negro population. As of 1940, only 1 per cent of the nation's Negroes were in the West, where they were 1 per cent of the total population. In the South most of the Negro families still live in rural communities, while in the North they are largely concentrated in urban areas.

One of the principal effects of the redistribution of population has been the differentiation of the Negro population according to socio-economic status, especially in the towns and cities. The Negroes have developed their own caste system, a series of social classes resembling those of the whites but with some important differences, especially as regards the percentages of the population assigned to the several classes. The outstanding difference, perhaps, is the much larger percentage of blacks than whites who are in the lower classes. Because the income range of Negro families is relatively narrow, as will be shown below, the separation of the middle and upper Negro classes from the lower in terms of income is not so great as with the white man, and some upper-class Negroes have a standard of living which does not differ appreciably from that of some middle-class whites. The prerequisites to upper-class status in Negro circles also differ somewhat from those of white society. Johnson has listed as qualifications any combination of most of the following: a respected family background, a substantial amount of education, occupation achieved by special formal preparation, a comfortable income,

[1] Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census, 1940, Population — Special Reports*, Series P–45, number 3, March 29, 1945.

property, stable residence, and superior cultural standards.[1] These would seem to be more modest demands than are made by upper-class white society. For instance, the Negroes are scarcely in a position to lay as much emphasis on family background; too short a time has elapsed since emancipation to permit the building of an impressive family reputation.

Negro Family Income

Negro families, as has been said, because of the restrictions under which they live, are much more highly concentrated in the low-income classes than are white families. One indication of this is that the United States Government, in presenting figures on incomes of



FIGURE 41. AVERAGE INCOMES OF WHITE AND NEGRO FAMILIES

The reference is to non-relief families in three types of American communities, 1935–36. In the South, the average Negro family income is about one third that of the white families; in the North it is less than one half. Negroes are barred from better paid occupations and receive less pay than whites for the same work. Many of the characteristics of the Negro family are a result of poverty and segregation.

[1] Charles Johnson, *Growing Up in the Black Belt* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941), p. 73.

white families in its study, *Consumer Incomes in the United States* (their distribution in 1935–36), gives the amounts for white families up to $10,000 and over; but in presenting the incomes for Negro families gives income levels only up to $4000 for urban Negroes and $2000 for Southern rural Negroes, because of the small number of Negro families with incomes exceeding these amounts. Another indication of Negro poverty is the number of families receiving public assistance during the economic depression of the nineteen-thirties. In May, 1935, when there were about 18,000,000 persons wholly or partly dependent on public relief for subsistence, which was nearly one seventh of the total population, 3,000,000 of these were Negroes, representing one quarter of the Negro population of the country.[1]

The great disparity in white and Negro family income is shown in more detail in the tables below. In interpreting these data we should keep in mind that all families receiving relief in any amount have been excluded from the study of consumer incomes made by our federal government in 1935–36. Had relief families been included, a much larger proportion of low-income Negro families would have been reported. Table 14 shows that in both urban and rural Southern communities the average income of non-relief Negro families in 1935–36 was approximately one third that of non-relief white families. Even

TABLE 14. AVERAGE INCOMES OF WHITE AND NEGRO FAMILIES (NON-RELIEF)* IN SOUTHERN RURAL COMMUNITIES AND CITIES AND IN NORTH CENTRAL CITIES,† 1935–36‡

Region and Type of Community	Average Income per Family			
	Median		Mean	
	White	Negro	White	Negro
Southern rural communities	$1,100	$ 480	$1,535	$ 566
Southern cities of 2,500 population and over	1,570	525	2,019	635
North Central cities of 100,000 population and over	1,720	1,095	2,616	1,227

* Excludes all families receiving any direct or work relief (however little) at any time during year.

† *For location of communities included in sample, see chart 10.*

‡ *Consumer Incomes in the United States*, p. 28.

[1] *On Relief, May, 1935.* (Prepared by the Graphic Unit of the Research Section, Federal Emergency Relief Administration, October, 1935.)



FIGURE 42. INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF WHITE AND NEGRO FAMILIES

Here we see one reason for Negro migration to cities and to the North. The data are for non-relief families in three types of American community, 1935–36. If relief families were included, the situation of Northern Negroes would be less favorable. (From *Consumer Incomes in the United States*, p. 29.)

in the North Central cities of 100,000 population and over, the average income for Negroes was less than half that for whites. The table shows that the same general relationship holds when middle incomes of the two groups are compared, but in the Southern rural and Northern urban areas the disparity is somewhat less than it is for average income. Even so, we see that one half of the Southern rural Negro families had less than $480 for the year as against a median income of $1100 for white families. The middle incomes differ less than the average incomes because of the negligible proportion of Negro families with big incomes.

TABLE 15.* PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF WHITE AND NEGRO FAMILIES (NON-RELIEF)† IN SOUTHERN RURAL COMMUNITIES AND CITIES AND NORTH CENTRAL CITIES, BY INCOME LEVEL, 1935–36

Income Level	Families Living in —					
	Southern Rural Communities		Southern Cities of 2500 Population and Over		North Central Cities of 100,000 Population and Over	
	White	Negro	White	Negro	White	Negro
Under $250	0.9	12.0	1.6	16.2	1.6	1.9
$250–$500	9.6	41.1	4.4	31.1	2.7	4.7
$500–$750	17.7	26.1	9.5	25.4	5.1	13.5
$750–$1,000	16.6	11.6	10.8	13.9	8.5	22.2
$1,000–$1,250	12.9	4.4	11.7	6.3	11.2	20.1
$1,250–$1,500	10.2	2.5	9.5	2.9	11.2	12.8
$1,500–$1,750	7.7	1.2	9.1	2.1	10.8	8.5
$1,750–$2,000	5.1	0.6	8.5	0.8	9.9	6.0
$2,000–$2,250	4.1	0.2	6.7	0.7	7.7	3.9
$2,250–$2,500	2.9	0.2	5.7	0.6	5.9	2.5
$2,500–$3,000	4.0	0.1	7.5	0.4	8.4	1.7
$3,000–$3,500	2.4	‡	4.8	0.2	4.9	1.1
$3,500–$4,000	1.5	‡	3.4	0.1	2.9	0.4
$4,000–$4,500	0.9	‡	2.0	0.1	1.7	0.2
$4,500–$5,000	0.7	‡	1.2	‡	1.0	0.1
$5,000–$7,500	1.5	‡	2.3	0.1	2.1	0.2
$7,500–$10,000	0.6	‡	0.5	‡	1.5	0.2
$10,000 and over	0.7	‡	0.8	‡	2.9	‡
All levels	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.	100.

* *Consumer Incomes in the United States*, p. 28.

† Excludes all families receiving any direct or work relief (however little) at any time during year.

‡ Less than 0.05 per cent.

The concentration of Negro families in the low-income groups is shown in Table 15 and graphically in Figure 42. More than nine out of every ten in the rural South had incomes under $1000, while less than one half of the white families had similar incomes. Migration to Southern cities does not seem to have helped the Negro family very much, as far as income goes, for it will be observed that the situation

in the city is very similar to that in the country, with only a little less than nine out of ten Negro families having incomes under $1000 for the year. The white families in the Southern cities did much better, only a quarter of them having incomes under that amount. When we turn to North Central cities we see that the Negro fared better, with most families falling in the $500 to $1500 income classes, although the exclusion of relief families from this study probably distorts the comparison with the white families of this region, since the incidence of relief among Northern Negroes was very great. Even so, the economic advantage to the Negro family of residence in the North is great,[1] which is doubtless a cardinal reason why Negroes have migrated in such large numbers to Northern cities in the last three decades.

The Plantation Family

The biggest single group of Negro families, the poorest economically, and those showing the closest resemblance to the slave families of the past are those of the Southern plantation. Less than one in five are owners, the others being tenants or sharecroppers. A survey of 916 such families in the cotton belt [2] furnishes us with a description of their living conditions and patterns of family organization. About two thirds of these families were able to furnish data regarding income which seemed reliable, and from these it was estimated that the median annual family income was $452. The typical shelter is a box house of rough lumber, with a median living space of 3.12 rooms occupied by a median family of 6.03 persons. Most of the houses have never been painted, or have not been painted in the last twenty years. Most have a leaky roof, a broken porch, broken front steps, and a broken floor. A majority of the families get their water from an open well, use a kerosene lamp for lighting, and a fireplace for cooking. Nearly one fifth have no water on the place. The open privy prevails, but one tenth have no toilet on the premises. As for recrea-

[1] In New York City, among wage-earners and clerical workers, the proportion of Negro families having certain housing facilities was greater than in the case of white families. This was true for hot running water, janitor service, and central heat, a condition which reflects the general restriction of Negro wage-earners in New York City to apartment districts, 95 per cent of the Negroes being so housed. Faith M. Williams and Alice G. Hannson, *Money Disbursements of Wage-Earners and Clerical Workers, 1934–36, Summary Volume* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Labor Bulletin number 638, 1941), pp. 102–03.

[2] Charles S. Johnson, *Growing Up in the Black Belt* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941).

tion and education, a little over one fourth of the families had a victrola, one sixth a radio, one third had no books of any kind, and one quarter took a daily paper.

Economic household

The datum on the median number of persons per dwelling place given in the preceding paragraph indicates that the families of the Southern plantation are generally large. A large family is virtually a necessity in cotton sharecropping, for many hands are needed to work the crop. Children are economic assets. They can begin to chop cotton when they are about ten years old, and within a year or two the boys after school can help with the plowing. There are, of course, other farm tasks that can be done by the children at an even earlier age. When a plantation girl is ready for marriage, she looks for a husband who will be a good worker. Frequently the girls marry older men, and a widower with children is regarded as a choice prize.

The emphasis on labor supply in the plantation economy means that the Negro family is not so often organized exclusively around the simple biological unit of parents and children as in the typical American family, but is rather often a more complex household including perhaps grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, adopted children, relatives, and boarders. In the thinking of these people, household is synonymous with family except for boarders. This emphasis on kinship has an economic basis in the need for farm labor, but in addition the organization around kin serves an important protective function, for in an environment of alien and unfriendly whites the Negro families must place greater reliance upon their relatives for assistance in time of trouble. An evidence of this, perhaps, is that more Negroes contribute to the support of relatives and their contributions are larger than in the case of white families of comparable income.[1] In seeking an explanation for the special emphasis on kinship, it is interesting to speculate on what part, if any, survivals of African tradition may play. The family in Africa, it will be recalled, is generally of the extended type, resembling somewhat the plantation household, and is tied in with the kinship system of the clan.

[1] Dorothy S. Brady, Day Monroe, Elizabeth Phelps, and Edith Dyer Rainboth, *Family Income and Expenditures: Five Regions*, Part 2, *Family Expenditures*, Publication number 396 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 1940).

Irregular family organization

These households of low-income Negro families are not only large, but often irregular in composition and organization, from the standpoint of the white culture. Of the 916 plantation families referred to, one half were natural families made up of two parents and their children, while the other half were of various types: mother or father with children; grandparents and children; three or more generations in a household; the natural family with other persons, related and unrelated.[1] One of the more irregular families described is that of Sadie Randolph, a girl in a sharecropper family.[2] The head of the house is David Freeman, who, though not married to Sadie's mother, is accepted by the girl as her stepfather. The mother is present. There is also a ten-year-old boy, David Freeman's son by another woman at the time he was living with his first wife. This boy's mother gave him to his father's first wife because she had other children and the wife had none. An uncle and aunt also live in the home. The uncle is Sadie's father's brother and the aunt is Sadie's mother's sister. A family of this type creates some special problems of adjustment, especially for the children.

An earlier study of a different sample of plantation families yielded the information regarding marital status shown in Table 16. It will be noted that about three fifths of the families are irregular or broken unions. Of special interest is the fact that single or unattached persons are very few, less than 2 per cent, whereas about 10 per cent of all

TABLE 16. MARITAL STATUS OF ADULTS IN 612 FAMILIES OF THE SOUTHERN PLANTATION *

Marital Status	
Single, living alone	8
Unknown	4
Married, times unknown	1
Both married once	231
Husband married once, wife more than once	4
Husband married more than once, wife once	75
Both married more than once	71
Married but separated	52
Widowed	105
Divorced	2
Unmarried couples living together	24
Unmarried mother with children living without father	12

* Charles Johnson, *Shadow of the Plantation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 72.

[1] Charles S. Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 6 ff.

persons in the United States reach the age of forty-five without marrying. Also noteworthy is the large number of Negroes who have been married more than once. In this tendency to remarry after separation, divorce, or bereavement, the Negroes surpass the whites. In this plantation sample more than one quarter of the husbands and wives had been married before.

In these data showing the greater fragility of Negro marriage, we have evidence of the incomplete assimilation of the race to American standards. In large numbers the Negroes are governed in their domestic experience by sentiment and expediency rather than by a moral code grounded in the mores. They live together as long as they care for each other or are dependent upon each other, but with little feeling of lasting obligation. This kind of family is a natural family in contradistinction to the cultural family of groups with a highly elaborated tradition. In our society, the mores exercise a compulsive force on unhappily married couples to stay together for the sake of the children, or, if not, to make provision for their care, but among these simple Negroes there is no such constraining code. This is seen, for instance, in the general lack of resentment on the part of mother and children toward the deserting parent, even though this desertion means that the mother must shoulder the entire responsibility for the support of the family. The children seldom make inquiries as to why the father has gone and are given no explanation. There is an unemotional acceptance of desertion, and in the case of a remarriage, likewise, seldom is any resentment shown toward the step-parent. If friction does occur, it is generally based on personal dislike and not on distrust of the step-parent as a person supplanting the child's true parent. As a result, one does not find as much tension among these Negroes as one would expect to find among white people in a similar situation.

Marriage

A large majority of the Negro families of the rural South are established via common-law marriage,[1] an agreement between a man and a woman to become husband and wife without benefit of ecclesiastical or civil ceremony, the agreement being provable by the conduct of the parties. Such marriages are legal in the plantation states. One explanation of why the license and wedding are dispensed with is that

[1] Hortense Powdermaker, *After Freedom* (New York: The Viking Press, 1939), p. 149.

the expense may not seem warranted to a people with very low incomes. Those who look for evidences of African culture in the behavior of lower-class American Negroes think they detect such an instance of survival here. In Africa, marriage does not require the approval of state or church, but only the consent of the families involved. This interpretation, however, has been questioned on the grounds that common-law marriages are merely personal adjustments based on natural tendencies and do not require a theory of culture diffusion for their explanation.[1] Whatever the explanation, a licensed marriage in the lower class is rare.

Next to common-law marriage, probably the most common type of union among the folk-Negroes is the casual alliance or temporary association, not regarded as marriage. To comprehend this situation, it should be noted that for these people sex is not an acute problem. The boys and girls of this class grow up with a naturalistic attitude toward sex, since privacy in such matters is scarcely possible in the small, crowded cabins. Important, too, is the fact that the low-income Negro, lacking many of the opportunities for self-expression and recreation open to the white person, finds in his instincts a ready source of satisfaction. It has been noted that economic striving may absorb a great deal of the energy of the lower-class white man, but the relative lack of the competitive stimulus in the life of the Negro causes him to turn his attention to other things.[2] The inability to support a family is not thought to be sufficient grounds for continence, and there may be beliefs regarding the harmful effects of continence. If a girl conceives and pregnancy results, the illegitimate child is accepted by her mother and her people. If the mother must work, a relative may be found to take over the responsibility of the child's care. The unmarried mother suffers no loss of status, nor are her chances of marriage lessened. The father of the child, even when known, is not prosecuted, and generally not even pressed to assume responsibility for mother and child.

Because of the circumstances and attitudes described, illegitimacy is widely prevalent among Negroes, the rate being from five to ten times that for white people in certain regions. Precise data on illegitimacy are not available, but information on the number of Negro children

[1] See M. J. Herskovits, "The Negro in Bahia, Brazil: A Problem in Method," *American Sociological Review*, 8:394–402, August, 1943, and the rejoinder by E. Franklin Frazier.

[2] Harlan Gilmore and Logan Wilson, "Negro Socio-Economic Status in a Southern City," *Sociology and Social Research*, XXIX:361–73, May–June, 1945.

born out of wedlock in rural communities gives the figures as between 10 and 20 per cent.[1] The unmarried mother and her offspring generally live with her parents, but in 1930 about sixty thousand Negro families were reported with a woman head who was single, and of these about one in three had children, as compared with about one in eleven native white single women heads of similar families. These data are of questionable accuracy, however, since there is no check upon unmarried mothers who falsely report themselves as widowed or divorced, in order to avoid social censure. It is difficult to know which group, the Negro or the white unmarried mothers, is more incorrectly reported, but it seems reasonable to suppose that the latter would have more incentive to practice deception.

Fertility

It is quite generally believed that Negro women are more fertile than white women. In one sense this is true. Negro women who become mothers bear more children, on the average, than white women. In a group of one thousand married mothers, fifteen to seventy-four years old, the number of children ever born was reported as 3688 for non-white mothers as compared with 3125 for white mothers in 1940.[2] The question of Negro fertility, however, must be approached with caution, since the proportion of unreported births is not known. That Negro births exceed white births is clear, but we cannot say by exactly how much. If, as seems likely, the Negro births are underenumerated more largely than the white, then the differential fertility in favor of the Negroes would be greater than the recorded figures indicate.

There is, however, another sense in which the non-white mothers are less fertile than the white. The non-whites have more childless families. This fact is not so well known. Among women ever married, fifteen to seventy-four years old, who reported on the number of children ever born, 25.6 per cent of the non-white women were childless, as compared with 19.7 per cent of the white women. These figures are for the nation as a whole, but there are more childless non-white married women on the farms as well as in the villages and cities, although the differential increases as one goes from the smaller to the

[1] E. Franklin Frazier, "Analysis of Statistics on Negro Illegitimacy in the United States," *Social Forces*, XI:249–57, December, 1932.

[2] Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census, 1940, Women Classified by Number of Children Ever Born: 1940* (*Population — Special Reports*, Series P–44, number 2, February 10, 1944).



FIGURE 43. MORTALITY OF WHITE INFANTS, UNITED STATES 1938–40

The lowest rate for white infants (34.6) is in Oregon. Only one state with a large Mexican population has a rate above 80. For Negroes (see Fig. 44) there are eight such states.

larger places. Some of the childlessness is, of course, voluntary, but since it is evident that the non-whites, especially the farm women, do not make greater use of contraceptive practices than the whites, the percentage of childlessness due to involuntary causes must be greater among Negroes. Such causes are probably largely related to health factors, especially venereal infection which is a potent cause of sterility. There is no evidence that any differential genetic factor is involved, and it is highly improbable that such a factor is operative.

Although more children are born to Negro mothers, fewer of them reach maturity. In 1927, one tenth of all Negro children died during the first year of life. The number of infant deaths per one thousand live births is known as the infant mortality rate. This rate has fallen greatly for both whites and Negroes during the past decade, but relatively the two sets of rates have not changed very much. In 1940, the infant mortality rate for white babies was 43, and for Negro babies,



FIGURE 44. MORTALITY OF NEGRO INFANTS, UNITED STATES 1938–40

The shaded portions of the map show the Negro infant mortality rate in each of the twenty-seven states having 2500 or more Negro live births, 1938–40. New York, a Northern state, has an infant mortality rate for Negroes about 16 per cent higher than Arkansas, a Southern state. The difference may be even greater, since Arkansas reports a smaller percentage of births than New York, and since deaths are better reported than births. United States Department of Labor, Children's Bureau. Based on data from the United States Bureau of the Census.

73.[1] The maternal mortality rate is also much higher for Negro women. For reasons such as these, the proportion of the population that is Negro has decreased in recent decades, despite the greater fertility of the Negro mother.

Age of marriage

The greater fertility of Negro females is associated with the earlier age at which they marry. The estimated median age at first marriage for this group is from one to two years less than for white females. The figures for the Southern white and non-white populations are 21.1 and 19.7 respectively, for 1940.[2] A median age at marriage of

[1] J. Yerushalmy, "The 1940 Record of Maternal and Infant Mortality in the United States," *The Child* (Monthly Bulletin of the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Labor) 6:204, February, 1942.

[2] Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census, 1940, Age at First Marriage (Population — Special Reports*, Series P-45, number 7, May 28, 1945).

19.7 years for Southern Negro females means that 50 per cent married under that age. Some married under fourteen. The number is not great, but the proportion of such child-brides is better than two to one in favor of the Negroes. These data concern reported or legal marriages. If data on informal unions were available, they would no doubt widen the gap between the average ages of the two races at marriage.

The earlier age at which Negro females marry has an important effect in increasing the percentage of females who marry. Postponement of marriage for women lessens greatly the chances for matrimony. There are factors other than age which influence the probability of marriage, but whatever the factors, Negroes are a "more married" people than whites. The chances that a woman will reach the age of forty-five without ever having married are more than twice as great for whites as Negroes. There are one in eleven such white women in the United States, compared to one in twenty-three Negro women. The larger percentage of Negro married women becomes, in turn, an important additional factor making for the greater number of Negro births.

FIGURE 45. MATERNAL DEATHS DUE TO CHILDBIRTH

The number of white and Negro mothers who died during or after childbirth in the United States Expanding Birth-Registration Area, 1930–40. Although rates for both races have moved downward, the rate for Negro mothers is still twice that for white mothers. The high death rate of Negro mothers contributes to the death rate of infants.

Educational functions

Children must be educated, and our inquiry turns next to the question how the Negro family compares with the white in its educational responsibilities. There is little direct comparative information available on this subject, but certain inferences may perhaps be made from the evidence on the general educational situation of Negroes and whites. We know that a smaller percentage of Negro children are in the schools. The difference is not great for the lower grades, but becomes more pronounced as one moves up the educational ladder. The reasons why fewer Negro children go to school or remain there are doubtless many, but prominent causes are the unfavorable opportunities presented to them and their extreme poverty. In most places Negroes receive only a small fraction of their proportionate share of school funds, which means relatively unattractive facilities, poorly trained teachers, and a short school term. The greater poverty of Negroes means that the pressure to leave school for a job is very great, and a large proportion of Negroes think that child labor is none of the government's business.[1]

Negro children drop out of school earlier than whites. May this be taken as evidence of lack of capacity for schooling? The answer to this question is that there may be an acquired difference in educational ability, but that no proof has yet been offered of any genetic difference in mental ability between Negroes and whites. Negro school-children have on the average lower I.Q.'s, but this fact can be accounted for entirely in terms of their more limited opportunities. At least it has been shown that a definite improvement in the I.Q. scores of Negro children occurs when they attend good schools, and the amount of improvement is proportionate to the number of years spent in such schools. These studies have been carried out in New York City, where educational opportunities for Negroes are good. Lest it be thought that the better Negroes are the ones who migrate to the North, it should be stated that there is no evidence of selective migration, at least so far as I.Q. is concerned, since studies show that the previous school record of the migrants is not superior to that of the non-migrants.[2]

[1] Howard M. Bell, *Youth Tell Their Story* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1938), p. 25.

[2] Otto Klineberg, *Race Differences* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935), *Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935).

With fewer Negro children in the schools, the responsibility for their education might conceivably rest more heavily upon the home. That this is actually so is, however, very unlikely, in view of the limited schooling of Negro parents as revealed in the 1940 Census. Two thirds of Southern farm Negro heads of families, male as well as female, have completed less than five years of grade school. This is just twice the fraction for the Southern rural population generally. Less than one in ten of these Negro heads is a grade-school graduate, and only one in 170 is a high-school graduate. The children, then, are probably unable to fall back on their parents for much assistance with schooling. Rather, the limited background of their parents would seem to be a factor discouraging interest in school work.

Even if Negro mothers were as well prepared to give help as are white mothers, they would still not have as much leisure to do so because of the greater percentage of Negro mothers who work outside the home for pay. What this means to the Negro school-child was shown by a study in Chicago of the schools which had the largest enrollment of Negroes. This study found that a third of the pupils were left to themselves "either all the time or part of the time," because both parents were working, and a little less than a third did not eat their breakfasts or lunches or both at home. In a mixed school the principal found that 90 per cent of the white mothers were housekeepers, but only 58 per cent of the Negro mothers.[1]

Religious functions

As in the case of education, there is little comprehensive information available regarding religious activities in the Negro home, and inferences on this subject must be drawn from what we know about the Negro church. Except for its disapproval of certain forms of recreation, particularly card-playing, dancing, and baseball, the church is not greatly concerned with the habits and moral practices of the group.[2] Instead, the church serves mainly as a source of comfort to a troubled people by providing intense emotional religious experience and by emphasizing the expected blessings of the future life. Much has been made of the excitement of Negro services in the rural South, with their noise-producing sermons, their shouting congrega-

[1] T. J. Woofter, *Negro Problems in Cities* (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1928), p. 193.

[2] John Van Deusen, *The Black Man in White America* (Washington, D.C.: Associated Publishers, 1938).

tions, and their connections with superstition, but it may be noted that these characteristics are not racial, since they appear in the religious services of the rural white population of comparable low incomes and limited education.

Since religious services do not seem to have much meaning for young children, regardless of whether or not the services are highly emotional, or whether the children are white or black, parents must frequently use considerable persuasion to get their children to attend. At adolescence, when the emotional life of youth is quickened, a change in attitude toward the church is often noted. This is a period of numerous conversions and intense religious participation by youth. In the case of Negro adolescents, the change has been especially noted, and it is thought to be associated with the increased awareness of the meaning of color differences which occurs at this time of life.

The family, the local community, and the church are the three chief organizing agencies in the life of rural Negroes. This is true for rural whites also, but in the case of Negroes the church is relatively much more important, for the reason that it is to a much greater extent the principal source of organized social and recreational activity, and in some places very nearly the only such source. Race prejudice and low income prevent the Negro from participating freely in other social and recreational organizations. The motion picture, which appeals so greatly to the white population, is sometimes not available to the Southern Negroes, and even when it is cost and distance from town combine to prevent most of them from attending. Radios in homes are very scarce. Only about a quarter of the plantation homes have books or a daily newspaper. Libraries are not open to the rural Negro. The existing organized places of entertainment, such as taverns, dance halls, and "honky-tonks," may be vicious. The lack of organized recreational facilities means that the rural Negro is thrown back more upon his own resources. Since these are often limited to a few activities like swimming and boxing, there is considerable idleness, and loafing becomes a principal form of recreational activity. Almost twice as many Negro youth as white list loafing as a principal leisure-time activity.[1]

In this situation of limited social and recreational facilities, the Negro church looms large as an approved medium of sociability and entertainment. The church is the place to meet one's friends of both

[1] Howard M. Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

sexes. For young people, its value here is less seasonal than that of the school. Debating societies, tea parties, guilds, clubs, class meetings, and many other activities constitute a rich offering of social activities. Notable occasions in the rural South during the summer months are the frequent ice-cream socials, fish-fries, and picnics sponsored by the church, while in winter there are the candy-pulls and the chicken-throwings. The Negro church thus provides a larger number of functions and a fuller expression than the white church. One evidence of this is the greater proportion of Negroes than of whites reporting Sunday-School attendance. There is some criticism of the illiterate rural preacher by the young people who have opportunities for more education, but the appeal of the church with its message of salvation and its social and recreational services is still very great.

A review of the discussion of preceding paragraphs shows the families of Negro farm workers, comprising the largest single group of Negroes in the United States, to have certain attributes: little home ownership, few household facilities, many children, little medical care, high death rates, little schooling, and much domestic irregularity and instability. The discerning reader will have noted that this list, taken as a whole, reads much like the list of family attributes of the low-income groups of the white population described in the preceding chapter. Since these Negroes are farmers, their family characteristics resemble those of low-income white farmers: the tenants, farm laborers, and sharecroppers. The most important single key to the understanding of the Negro family of the rural South is, then, the factor of income, more limited than that of any other group of comparable or nearly comparable size in the nation.

An associated phenomenon is the prominent economic rôle of the Negro woman which accounts in large measure for her position of special importance in the family. It is, of course, characteristic of farm women, white as well as Negro, to be economic contributors, usually as unpaid family laborers working under the informal direction of the male head. A larger percentage of the Negro women, however, are heads of families and as such have more economic power. When we turn to farm women who work for pay, we again find a much larger proportion of Negro women than white. There are in the South more than twice as many such Negro farm laborers as white with husband present.

In the towns and cities the percentage of Negro women in the labor

force is also greater. In big cities of the South in 1940, the chances that a married woman with husband present would be in the labor force were slightly more than one in five for the general population, but for the comparable group of Negro women the chances were twice as great, or two in five. Women not living with their husbands (the separated, widowed, or divorced) would, of course, be expected to be more often employed. Yet the percentage of such white women in the labor force is not greater than the proportion of Negro women with husband present. On the other hand, if a Negro woman is separated from her husband, the chances that she will work are better than two in three.[1]

The Negro women are employed in such large numbers because of the low earnings of their husbands and because they work largely as domestic servants and farm laborers. In the South they have a virtual monopoly of jobs in domestic service.[2] In other kinds of work the opportunities for older women are decidedly not good, but in these two fields the opportunities are comparatively favorable. The effect of the Negro woman's economic position is to strengthen her influence in the home; hence the maternal family is even more common in the city than in the country.

The Urban Negro Family

In the country, the family of the Negro farm laborer, tenant, or cropper is, as we have seen, distinctly lower-class. A somewhat higher status is achieved by the family of the small farm owner, generally regarded as middle-class. Since Negroes can usually afford only a small farm, there are relatively few owners in the plantation states; only 12.4 per cent, for example, in Mississippi, compared to 61.6 per cent in Virginia. The typical house of the Negro farm-owner family shows certain evidences of the higher economic status of its occupants: it averages five rooms, is in good repair, is fenced in, has green blinds at the windows, and a stove for cooking instead of a fireplace. In the towns and cities, where the economic opportunities open to Negroes are more varied than in the country, these two classes, the lower and middle, are duplicated and a third or upper class is added.

[1] Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census, 1940, Population — The Labor Force: Employment and Family Characteristics of Women* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), Table 8, pp. 26–27.

[2] Of women engaged in domestic and personal service in one Southern town, 97 per cent were Negresses. John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), p. 96.

Net reproduction rate

Under the impact of the new urban environment, the Negro family undergoes certain marked changes. One of these is a reduction in fertility. On the farms the Negroes are maintaining their numbers and, in fact, greatly surpass the whites with a net reproduction rate [1] of 206 compared to 157 for white farm women for the period 1935–40. In the rural villages, the Negroes hold a small advantage for the period in true rate of increase. For the nation as a whole during these years, the non-white population was reproducing about 11 per cent in excess of replacement needs, while the white population was about 4 per cent short of its requirements for a stable population. It is significant, however, that the non-white net reproduction rates fall behind those of whites in the cities, where the fertility of Negro women is 30 per cent short of replacement needs compared to a shortage of 27 per cent for white women. The decrease for non-whites is greatest in the urban areas of the South.

The Negro family, then, does not differ from the white family in the difficulty it finds in maintaining its numbers under conditions of city life. The reasons are largely the same for both races: the availability of contraceptive knowledge, the economic liability of children in the face of compulsory school attendance and child-labor laws, and the higher standards of living. The Negroes are affected less by these factors than are the whites, so that the Negro birth rate is higher, but this is offset by the higher death rate. For example, the maternal mortality rate (the number of deaths of mothers per 10,000 live births) is more than twice as high for Negro as for white women (78 and 32 respectively, in 1940). A more inclusive datum is that Negro females on the average have a life expectancy about thirteen years shorter than do white females.[2]

[1] The net reproduction rate is a measure of the extent to which a group is maintaining its numbers. This index takes into account, not only the present birth and death rates, but also the age distribution of the population, which is changing rapidly in the United States. It shows the average number of daughters that would be born per one hundred females starting life together if present birth and death rates at different age levels remain unchanged. A rate of 100 means that each generation will just replace itself, and in the long run the population will be stationary. If the rate exceeds 100, each generation will be successively larger and the population will grow; if the rate is less than 100, each generation will be smaller and the population will decline.

[2] Bureau of the Census, *United States Abridged Life Tables, 1939 (Urban and Rural, by Regions, Color, and Sex)*, June 23, 1943. The average duration of life in years, based on 1939 mortality, was 66.7 for white females and 54.3 for non-white females.

Urban adjustments

The small size of the urban Negro family shows that the Negro responds to the conditions of the urban environment in ways similar to the white man. Whatever sexual pattern the Negro brings to the city appears to be flexible enough to include the practice of family limitation. Likewise, urban Negroes are tending to resemble the white majority in their relationship to the church. The Negro is generally pictured by whites as being easily swayed by appeals to the emotional and the supernatural in matters of religion, and as being a staunch church member. This is a stereotype based on experience with the Southern rural Negro, but what of the urban Negro? There are data which suggest that the religious interest of Negroes as a whole is not significantly greater than that of whites, at least as measured by church membership. The proportion of persons reported as church members is not significantly different for the two races.[1] The data are not given by type of community, but if, as is generally believed, the church has a particularly strong place in the lives of the rural Negro, it would seem that the proportion of church members among urban Negroes is less than among urban whites. Another point of resemblance to the whites is in the difference in religious interest between the sexes of the two races: white women are more religious than white men; Negro women are more religious than Negro men.[2]

In the rural South, the desertion of the woman by the man, it will be recalled, is a common and casual occurrence. This pattern of family dissolution is carried over into the city environment, as the evidence regarding the disproportionate share of desertions among urban Negroes shows. In Chicago in 1921, for instance, Negroes constituted 4 per cent of the population, but contributed 15.6 per cent of the reported desertions. No other racial or ethnic group had such a large ratio of desertions to population.[3] Likewise, in New York City in 1916–17, Negroes comprised 5.6 per cent of all the families under the care of the Charity Organization Society, but they furnished 11.2

[1] Bureau of the Census, *Religious Bodies, 1936*, vol. I, pp. 17, 73. Negroes contributed 10.1 per cent of the total church membership in 1936. In 1940 they constituted 9.8 per cent of the population of the United States. The Negroes do have relatively more ministers than whites, and relatively more churches. A total of 199,302 churches is reported in this census, and of these about a fifth (38,303) were Negro congregations. Ministers are the only professional group who are relatively more numerous among Negroes than whites.

[2] In 1936, there were 78.5 males per 100 females in the churches as a whole, while for Negro churches the ratio was 60.5 per 100.

[3] Ernest R. Mowrer, *The Family* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 164.

per cent of the desertion cases.[1] While desertion is the outstanding ground for seeking a divorce among Negroes as among whites, the reason is far more commonly alleged by the Negroes.

These data seem to suggest that the Negro has difficulty in assimilating the practice of legal divorce. It may be noted that many of the urban Negroes are migrants from the rural South, where the legal nature and implications of divorce frequently are not understood by the simple folk who look upon divorce as a personal matter. Since they seldom recognize the necessity of having a minister or justice of the peace unite a couple in marriage, they would scarcely see why outside permission should be needed for a divorce. That the concept of



FIGURE 46. PROPORTION OF ALL FAMILIES THAT ARE BROKEN

Data for Negro and native white families, United States, 1930. Despite the greater concentration of Negroes in rural-farm areas where broken families are fewest, nearly one in three Negro families was broken in 1930, compared to one in five native-white families. For non-farm families the discrepancy is even greater. A broken family is here defined as one where the spouse is absent (may or may not be permanently broken), widowed, or divorced, or where there is only a single family head. Data from Richard Sterner and Associates, *The Negro's Share*, p. 50.

[1] Joanna C. Colcord, *Broken Homes: A Study of Family Desertions* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1919).

formal divorce is alien to the folk Negroes is shown by the fact that some of them think that merely crossing the Mason and Dixon line means divorce. Still others believe they can legally divorce themselves by writing out and signing a statement of divorce, which they call "giving a scrip," a notion probably derived from their reading of the Old Testament where a similar practice is described as having existed among the ancient Hebrews. Many folk Negroes feel that a formal divorce is needed only if one of the pair objects to the separation.

For reasons like these, the divorce rate of Negroes in the rural South is below that of Southern whites. But there are important changes in the making. The number of divorces among rural Negroes is increasing rapidly,[1] and in the cities, Negroes are seeking divorces more frequently than do whites.[2] These developments suggest that the low income of the Negro and the cost of divorce are not the only factors in the higher rates of desertion among Negroes. The data perhaps also indicate that the Negro is adopting the white man's pattern of legal divorce.

Middle and upper classes

Our discussion has shown that the Negro takes on some additional domestic behavior patterns from the dominant white culture when he moves from the rural South to urban communities. In the bigger centers, the economic opportunities open to Negroes are more varied than in the smaller places and lead to greater differentiation as to income. As a result, social classes develop, with important consequences for family life.

Frazier has studied these class differences in Chicago, correlating them with location. As the Negro population of Chicago has grown and as the Black Belt has expanded, a corridor has been pushed through white districts for a distance of more than seven miles, extending from the slum areas near the center of the city to the outskirts near the suburbs. The distribution of Negro families in this belt is not altogether a matter of chance, but represents selection and segregation along occupational lines. The low-income Negroes live in the slum areas nearest the center of town; the middle-income classes generally occupy the residential sections; and the high-income groups

[1] Walter F. Willcox, *The Divorce Problem: A Study in Statistics* (New York: 1937).

[2] Ernest R. Groves and William F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928), p. 372.

tend to live in the southern end of the community. Frazier divided the Negro community into a number of zones, and found that home ownership is nonexistent in the central zone. As one moves out toward the last zone, the rate of home ownership increases progressively, and for the last zone it is 30 per cent.[1] In the innermost zone, which lacks home ownership, the occupants are largely unskilled workers, and only 5.8 per cent of the employed men are of the professional or white-collar class, while in the outermost zone more than a third are professional or white-collar workers. The low-income areas are marked by high percentages of unmarried males, women heads of families, illiteracy, arrests of husbands for non-support, desertion and charity cases, illegitimacy, and juvenile delinquency. The high-income areas show just the opposite: a high percentage of marriage, few broken homes, families with male head, almost universal literacy, almost no illegitimacy and delinquency.

As the Negro approaches the white man in income, he also approaches him in his cultural standards and family behavior. The aspiration of the Negro for the white man's status is naturally great, and this sometimes leads him, unconsciously as well as consciously, to show a marked preference for the white man's standards. One indication of this is the tendency of middle- and upper-class men to make a selection of wives having light or fair skin. In a sample of upper-class Chicago Negro women, less than one in twenty was dark.[2] The acute status-hunger and status-striving is also evident in the expenditures of certain groups of the higher-income classes, showing a desire to enhance their status by "conspicuous consumption." Deprived of social equality with whites, they strive to emulate them in the insignia or earmarks of economic status. A Negro researcher once pointed to a number of cars of Negro and white physicians parked in front of Freedman's Hospital in Washington, D.C., and claimed he could tell which ones belonged to Negroes, merely by noting the more expensive ones.[3] Such behavior is characteristic of all socially ambitious segments of minority groups that have high incomes without commensurate social acceptance and is not limited to the Negroes,

[1] E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 127.

[2] W. Lloyd Warner, Buford H. Junker, and Walter A. Adams, *Color and Human Nature* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941).

[3] E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 430.

but it does exist among them and constitutes overcompensation for social inferiority. In family life this tendency toward overcompensation shows itself in the maintenance of especially high standards of sexual and moral conduct. It is conjectured that in the towns and cities the small group of upper-class Negroes shows more family stability than upper-class whites. The explanation given is that these Negroes are overcompensating for the bad reputation of lower-class Negroes, and they, therefore, take extreme positions against marital laxness.[1] In one community in the Deep South, not a single member of this upper class of Negroes had had a divorce or separation.[2] Their code, it seems, attaches such stigma to divorce as to require that a marriage be continued, even if unsatisfactory.

Before concluding this chapter, it seems desirable to consider what direct effect the prejudice and hostility of the dominant white group has upon Negro family life in the United States. As we have seen, the effect is largely indirect, through low income and social isolation. But there are also direct effects in terms of tensions created within the Negro family by the fear and hatred of white people. The Negro knows, especially in the South, that if he offends a white person there may be unpleasant and even dangerous consequences. Richard Wright [3] records several episodes in his own life when he and members of his family were in terror of being hurt or killed, and describes one incident in which a relative with whom he was living was murdered at his place of business, exactly how or why the family never knew. They did not dare even try to recover the body, but packed hurriedly and fled. Wright described several experiences of hasty packing, abandoning possessions that could not be immediately taken, and fleeing into the night to avoid the wrath of white people. Such experiences obviously produce tensions within the family, but it should be noted that they probably also are a powerful influence in fortifying family morale. It is known that opposition from outside the group frequently has the effect of strengthening the group internally.

Episodes such as these are relatively rare because conflicts with whites are avoided as much as possible. The children are taught how to get along with white people, and are sometimes punished for failing

[1] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), vol. II, p. 933.

[2] Hortense Powdermaker, *After Freedom: A Cultural Study in the Deep South* (New York: The Viking Press, 1939), pp. 149–50.

[3] *Black Boy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945).

to do so even if the fault is not theirs. The problem is handled somewhat differently by the various classes, but the children of all classes are taught to avoid contact with white people as much as possible. Where avoidance is not possible, a policy of subservience to whites is generally followed. The Negro children are taught to act as if the white person were always right, not to talk back or argue, and to ignore insults. The lower-class Negroes play up to the white man's feeling of superiority and may even believe in it themselves. They may exploit the whites by deliberately flattering them and even by "playing the monkey," thereby hoping to gain money or favors. Such conduct is disapproved by members of the Negro middle and upper classes, who regard it as debasing. Children in these classes are taught to ignore the insults of white men with the rationalization that they are superior to the offending whites and that it would be cheapening to retaliate.[1]

In conclusion, the family life of the Negro in the United States may be viewed in the light of social change. The period since emancipation has been brief, a matter of only two or three generations, so that many Negroes now living are the children of slaves. Even in so short an interval the changes in the cultural and economic status of the Negro have been vast. Three quarters of a century ago more than four fifths of the Negroes were illiterate; today the proportion is less than one sixth.[2] The economic situation has been greatly improved and has led to the formation of distinct social classes. The change in Negro family patterns is in the direction of greater approximation to the prevailing standards of the dominant white culture. A legal marriage in the Southern rural group is rare, but a common-law marriage in the upper class is even rarer. In the rural South it is reported [3] that the trend of Negro youth is toward stricter sex standards and more stable family life. Sexual irregularities are still common, but they are not so common nor regarded with as much complacency as in past generations. Girls in lower-class families are reacting against common-law marriage, large families, hard work, and being the economic

[1] E. F. Frazier, *Negro Youth at the Crossways* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1940). Allison Davis and John Dollard, *Children of Bondage* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1940).

[2] As of 1930. No study of illiteracy has been made since the 1930 Census. The question was changed in the 1940 Census to the "highest grade of school completed."

[3] Charles S. Johnson, *Growing Up in the Black Belt* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941), chap. VIII. See also Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, and Mary R. Gardner, *Deep South* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 123.

mainstay of the family. While there has been a tightening of the family standards of the Negro, a general loosening of sexual and moral standards seems to have occurred in the white population in recent decades. As a result, the two races tend to approach each other in family behavior and to become more nearly alike.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Are racial and cultural homogeneity desirable in a nation, or should differences be preserved?
2. What is a race? How does race affect family life?
3. What aspects of Negro family life in the United States, if any, can be traced to survivals from Africa?
4. What significance for Negro family life do you attach to the fact that such a large percentage of Negro women are employed?
5. How do the consumption patterns of Negroes differ from those of whites, and why?
6. What differences in family organization exist among Negroes depending upon whether they are (*a*) rural or urban; (*b*) Southern or Northern; (*c*) middle-class or lower-class; (*d*) black or mulatto?
7. Why is the economic factor of such importance for an understanding of Negro family life? How is the economic factor tied in with the factor of race prejudice?
8. What is the rôle of the Negro church in relation to family life in the South?
9. How does Negro family life compare with that of whites, as regards stability?
10. What is the effect upon Negro family life of the migration northward?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. A comparative study of racial intermarriage in the United States and Brazil.
2. The Negro family in Africa.
3. Upper-class "Black Puritan" families.

4. Personality development of Negro youth. (See reference to *Children of Bondage* in the Selected Readings. Also E. Franklin Frazier, *Negro Youth at the Crossways* (1940), for case studies of personality development in the Middle states, and W. Lloyd Warner, Buford H. Junker and Walter A. Adams, *Color and Human Nature*, for a discussion of personality development in a Northern city.)
5. The hybrid and the problem of miscegenation. (See volume edited by Otto Klineberg, *The Characteristics of the American Negro*; especially the section by Louis Wirth and Herbert Goldhamer.)

SELECTED READINGS

Davis, Allison, and John Dollard, *Children of Bondage*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1940.

Case studies of personality development of Negro youth in the urban South.

Dollard, John, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937.

An able interpretation, mainly from the psychoanalytic point of view. Stresses the differential advantages associated with various class statuses.

DuBois, W. E., *The Negro American Family*. Atlanta: The Atlanta University Press, 1908.

An early study.

Frazier, E. Franklin, *The Negro Family in Chicago*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932.

The adjustment of the Negro to the urban environment. A scholarly work.

Frazier, E. Franklin, *The Negro Family in the United States*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939.

A social history of the Negro, from his enslavement and subsequent emancipation to his recent migration northward. A significant work.

Johnson, Charles S., "The Present Status and Trends of the Negro Family." *Social Forces*, 16:247–57, 1937.

Johnson, Charles S., *Shadow of the Plantation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

A careful, objective study of six hundred peasant families in Macon County, Georgia.

Myrdal, Gunnar, *An American Dilemma*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944.

The most comprehensive and searching book in print on the Negro problem in American democracy. A two-volume synthesis and interpretation of a study sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation. Other volumes published in this series (Harpers) are: M. J. Herskovits, *The Myth of the Negro Past*, 1941; C. S. Johnson, *Patterns of Negro Segregation*, 1943; Richard Sterner, *The Negro's Share*, 1943; Otto Klineberg, ed., *The Characteristics of the American Negro*, 1944.

Chapter 8

ETHNIC VARIATIONS IN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE

THE PRECEDING CHAPTER on the Negro family showed that skin color, hair texture, and other racial traits have no direct bearing on family life, however great may be the indirect influence of the prejudiced evaluation of these traits by the dominant whites. Race is a matter of inherited structure, and human family life is a matter of learned behavior which stems from culture. Culturally, the Negro in the United States is an American. He speaks the English language, follows the Christian religion, and is in general the product of American tradition. Such survivals of African culture as are still discernible are slight.

For other groups in the United States, however, cultural differences are outstanding and contribute greatly to distinctive patterns of family organization. The number of separate ethnic groups is in fact considerable, and all together they form an appreciable part of our total population. The Mexicans, for instance, loom very large in the life of our Southwestern states where they number several hundred thousand. Among the distinctive aspects of their family organization we note the employment of families as a unit, especially in agriculture; the high birth and death rates; the extreme poverty and dependence on public relief; and the strong emotional and affectional content of their personal relationships. Their family patterns are described more fully in a later section. In the Southwest too — particularly in Southern California — and elsewhere in the United States there are sizable colonies of members of Eastern Orthodox churches, Greek and Russian.[1] The members of all the Eastern Orthodox churches in

[1] In Los Angeles County are the Molokans, an Orthodox Russian sect, who have been described in an excellent sociological study by Pauline V. Young, *Pilgrims of Russiantown* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932).

the United States number in excess of three hundred thousand — an appreciable group. An even larger group, with distinctive family patterns, is the Latter-Day Saints, or Mormons, totaling around three quarters of a million, with the largest concentration in the Mountain and Pacific states. Although polygamy has been legally abolished and its practice almost completely discontinued, other distinctive family practices continue among the Mormons, such as "celestial marriage," which is thought to be marriage for eternity, not just ordinary marriage until death. Mormon family life achieves an exceptionally high degree of solidarity. At least the divorce rate of this people is very low. Among those who marry under the sacred vows of the Temple, the divorce rate is perhaps the lowest of all groups of comparable size in the nation. Another minority group, even larger still, are the Jews, who number around 4,500,000 in communities where there are synagogues. That the Jews have a distinctive family pattern is well known, especially as it is manifested in their great emphasis upon the sanctity of the home, mutual aid among their own kind, and their thirst for education. The bases of these and other patterns will be considered more fully in a later section. Add to these minorities the great aggregates of Irish, Italians, Poles, and other European nationals to be found in our country, and it is not difficult to see what an erroneous impression is given when, in describing American family life, we ignore these separate and distinctive religious and ethnic groups and speak of the American family in general terms only.

Since the number of minority groups in the United States is too large and their family organization too varied to permit an inclusive survey in this chapter, it seems desirable to limit the discussion to a few groups for which rather adequate source materials are available and which can give us some idea of the rich diversity in family life existing in America. For such analysis we consider first the Amish people, an unusually homogeneous and distinctive group.

RURAL FAMILY VARIATION: THE AMISH

Amish religion, unlike that of most Protestant denominations, is highly integrated with everyday life, affecting economic organization, family life, education, recreation, even dress and speech. Since the Amish believe that the cardinal virtue is obedience to the will of

God, they follow literally certain teachings of the Bible, particularly the New Testament, as interpreted by the church leaders. One important rule of Scripture to which they subscribe is, "Be not conformed to the world." (Rom. 12:2.) In the eyes of the Amish, this means the renunciation of modern inventions and innovations, for they are worldly and, therefore, evil. Tabooed are such things as automobiles, radios, telephones, electric lights, central heating, bathrooms, even curtains, carpets, and pictures, so that the houses seem quite bare. Another teaching to which they adhere is, "Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers." (II Cor. 6:14.) This is given as the reason for not taking out fire and life insurance, and for not sending the children to consolidated schools. This teaching also underlies their refusal to take oath, bear arms, or participate in civic duties, since they believe the state is unchristian. In support of their pacifism and conscientious objection they cite additional passages from Scripture; for example, "Thou shalt not kill," and, "If a man hate his brother, he is a murderer." (I John 3:15.)

Historical background

The Amish are a division of the Mennonites, a group of Protestant Christians who organized themselves in Switzerland in 1525 and spread to Germany and Holland. The Mennonites are lineal and spiritual descendants of the Anabaptists, who in turn formed a radical wing of the Zwinglian movement in the early days of the Swiss Reformation. The Mennonites believed in a free church which was to be voluntary, somewhat like a social club. They were a group of faithful men and women who were "form of the spirit" and who were initiated into membership by baptism upon confession of faith.[1] Some of their religious doctrines are now old in Protestant churches, but they were completely new when Meno Simon gave them to his people. He believed that religion was an individual matter, and that neither an elaborate ecclesiastical machinery of salvation nor a political organization could take the place of a living faith as a means of access to a loving Father. The Mennonites rejected infant baptism and baptized only upon confession of faith. They believed in absolute religious toleration. They held the doctrine of non-resistance, believing that only love and good will could successfully combat such

[1] C. Henry Smith, *The Mennonite Immigration to Pennsylvania in the Eighteenth Century* (Norristown, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania German Society, 1929), pp. 14–25.

evils as spring from human passion and hatred. They had a strong sense of other-worldliness. They interpreted the Scriptures literally. They stressed the need of living a pure life.

A division occurred among the Mennonites in 1620, after a controversy over the practice of "shunning" a member who broke rules of the church. Jacob Amen, a Mennonite minister of conservative views, believed that if someone fell under church censure the members should socially and economically ostracize him as well as refuse to take communion with him. The Mennonites merely denied communion to such a person. The Amish still practice "avoidance" as taught by Jacob Amen. They also follow the practice of foot-washing, and proscribe the use of buttons and the trimming of the beard. The followers of Amen became the Amish Mennonites.

In 1865, this group again divided into the Conservative and the Old Order or Home Amish Mennonites. The Old Order protested against the new forms of worship that were being introduced and against the growing similarity between the Mennonites and the Amish. In the seventeenth century, Mennonites of all types emigrated from Germany, Switzerland, and Holland to Russia and the United States to escape persecution. They were attracted to Pennsylvania by William Penn's promise of religious freedom, and the first settlement was made in Germantown, Pennsylvania, in 1683. From here the Amish have spread throughout the United States and Canada, numbering perhaps between 25,000 and 40,000 in these two countries. The largest groups live in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Iowa, Kansas, the Dakotas, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, and even a few colonies in Oregon. Recently, because of difficulties with Pennsylvania laws, they have also migrated to southern Maryland.

Dress

The Amish were farmers and settled in farming communities. Because they avoided people not sharing their faith, they remained in the small communities in which they first settled and then retained their own peculiar customs. This is shown conspicuously by their dress. The men wear ankle-length, cuffless trousers buttoned down both sides. They use white muslin shirts for both work and dress, plain black suspenders, dark-colored high vests, and collarless coats, fastened with hooks and eyes. They wear their hair long in a Dutch bob, kept trimmed by some member of the family. For headgear they

wear broad-brimmed shallow-crowned black felt hats. The men shave until they marry; then they let their beards grow.

The women wear a small white lawn cap, or prayer cap, over a knot of hair at the back of the head, and this is covered by a black bonnet. The dress is ankle length, gathered at the waist, close-fitting, long-sleeved. The Amish woman also wears a large black shawl and a matching knee-length apron. Her stockings are black cotton and her shoes are high-laced and flat-heeled. Amish women may and do indulge in bright colors in their dresses, although dark colors are preferred. As the cut of the dress always remains the same, the Amish woman does not need to worry about changing styles, but may continue to wear her dresses until they are worn out. The boys dress like their fathers, the girls like their mothers, except for the prayer cap which may be worn only by church members.

The Amish, it will be noted, have much in common with other Plain Peoples, such as the Dunkards, the Dukobors, and the Mennonites from whom they are derived. These Mennonite groups, collectively, are quite numerous with over one hundred thousand members reported in 1936. With some modifications, therefore, the following account of Amish [1] family organization is applicable to the great body of Mennonites.

Courtship

The age of marriage for the Amish is early by comparison with that of the American population in general. Amish girls usually marry when they are about seventeen or eighteen years old, the boys when they are twenty or twenty-one. The young people are free to make their own choice of a mate, subject to parental consent and the realization that their elders expect them to marry someone within the church, since otherwise special problems arise. The only general taboo is against marriage with someone outside the church. Such marriage leads to excommunication, which means that membership in the church is taken away from the offender, and no Amish may eat, drink, or work with such a one, or accept anything from him. In sup-

[1] The description given in this chapter concerns the Old Order or Home Amish, the more conservative branch of the faith. How conservative the Home Amish are may be judged from the fact that the other, somewhat more liberal, group is called the Conservative Amish. They follow the same Articles of Faith but have no church fellowship with each other. The Conservatives use churches as places of worship instead of homes, permit the use of certain modern conveniences, and make certain concessions in the matter of dress.

port of this code the Amish cite the Scripture: "With such, do not eat."

The mothers teach the girls that it is natural and right that they should marry young and be good wives and mothers. They object to birth-control methods, and think it a social advantage to have large families. In this society a large family is not a burden because the children all help economically on the farm. So the girls are taught to admire the mothers of many children and hope to become one.

The Amish attitude toward sex is surprisingly liberal. A person whom we of other conventions might consider had bad sex habits is seldom regarded as any worse, in the Amish home, than one with any other fault. In any case the Amish do not emphasize it as an outstanding moral wrong, as we do. Chastity is expected until marriage and extra-marital relations are frowned upon, but those who stray from these customs do not become moral outcasts.

The fathers teach the boys as the mothers teach their daughters. A common belief among boys is that their wives will be their property, and the girls seem to expect this attitude and do not rebel against it.

There has been much discussion of the practice of "bundling" among the Amish. Bundling occurs, but the practice is rare and in no way general. As the Amish are without electricity and sometimes without furnaces, the reason for bundling would still exist. The question usually discussed is whether bundling is a sign of a low moral code or not. Opinions differ. It may be noted that in every society or group, rules are broken by some while most follow the established rules of conduct. If Amish customs of courtship include bundling, is it a sign that their morals are lower than those in our culture where young people can stay out half the night in automobiles? At least bundling keeps the young folks at home.

It is a common but erroneous belief among the Pennsylvania neighbors of the Amish that when they have a marriageable daughter, they announce this fact publicly by painting the front farm gate blue; to the contrary, the Amish cover courtship with a cloak of great secrecy. Amish youth try to hide their wooing even from their friends and family. The whole courting is extremely surreptitious, and not until the young couple have plighted their troth to each other and the banns are published in the church do they appear in public together. A young Amishman who is interested in a particular girl may walk home with her after a party, but he does not escort her there. She is

taken by her brother or by someone other than the young man whom she favors. His wooing is carried on by stealth. He must wait until his family has gone to bed before he steals away to the home of his beloved. There he must ascertain that her family has also retired; whereupon he tosses a few grains of corn against the girl's window to announce his presence. His identification established, he is invited into the kitchen, where by the light of tallow candles the courtship is carried on until midnight. The Amish themselves sometimes refer to the practice as "sneaking over." If questioned or teased about their love affairs, the young people pretend to indifference or ignorance. There is virtually no discussion of these personal matters with outsiders. It is highly interesting that in this society, as in so many primitive societies, the right of young people both to self-determination in their choice of mate and to privacy in their courtship is accorded by the group, which in general regulates very highly the conduct of its members.

Marriage

When the couple feel that they are economically in a position to marry, the boy goes secretly to a minister of the sect, who agrees to intercede with the girl's parents.[1] If they give their consent, the banns are published two weeks before the wedding, which occurs after the harvest. The wedding itself is usually a big, all-day affair held at the home of the bride. She is not gowned in white satin, but wears the approved Amish garb — black apron, black bonnet, and long dark dress. The bride and groom are taken into the minister's room for instructions in the duties of married life, and then the actual ceremony is performed. It is much like that used by other Protestant denominations, except that it is spoken in German, and the parents of the bride and groom are not present. An Amish woman does not receive a wedding ring, because jewelry is an evidence of "pride." After the ceremony, there is feasting and singing, lasting until the small hours of the morning. As the guests are leaving, they snatch up the bridegroom and toss him over the fence, after which the couple is considered officially married.

Both bride and groom receive dowries. The groom's family contributes a farm and home, livestock, and poultry. The family of the

[1] Joseph W. Yoder, *Rosanna of the Amish* (Huntingdon, Pennsylvania: Yoder Publishing Company, 1940).

bride supplies the simple furniture with which the home is furnished, the linen, home-canned goods, and kitchen utensils. Friends give useful wedding gifts, such as clocks, saws, and hatchets. Thus the newly-weds begin married life well provided.

At the wedding, which is the most important social event in Amish experience, as many as one hundred to three hundred guests may be invited, since the Amish live in self-contained little communities and are surrounded by relatives and friends. Later the newly-weds pay visits to all the guests, and it is at this time that they receive their wedding presents. Since they may spend several weeks visiting, staying a night or several nights here and there as the honored guests of their hosts, the trip is virtually a honeymoon.[1]

Housing

The Amish people are exceptionally good farmers, and take great delight in working their fields which are usually extensive. On the place is a huge barn with a wooden floor, sometimes used for dancing or for church services, and a large stable. The houses are of plain wood with big cool cellars and enormous kitchens. The living-rooms, or parlors, are seldom used except for special company. The partitions on the lower floor of the house are all movable, so that the main floor may be made into one large room. This is done so that there will be room for everyone when it is time to have "preaching" in the home. The Amish have no churches, but they take turns in having services. When the house is built, wooden benches are made to be used during "preaching." Amish women are superlative housekeepers and are noted for keeping their homes immaculately clean. The absence of carpets, curtains, pictures, and other decorations would seem to simplify the problem of housekeeping.

The building of a home and of farm units is a collective enterprise in which neighbors participate, on the theory that if they lend a helping hand they themselves will be helped when they are in need. The homogeneity of the group and their relative isolation from outsiders helps to promote this policy of mutual aid, for the Amish disdain help proffered by unbelievers. They are also loath to receive any assistance from governmental agencies, such as pensions, money for crop reduction, or even funds for school purposes. Many of the

[1] Walter M. Kollmorgen, *Culture of a Contemporary Rural Community*. Rural Life Studies: 4 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics).

Amish, for instance, conformed to the request of the federal government during the nineteen-thirties for reduction of certain crops, but refused to accept the customary payments made by the government in return. They also prefer to send their children to schools which they themselves provide, and when the state officials in Pennsylvania ordered they must attend new consolidated schools built by the Public Works Administration, the Amish protested. When certain groups of Amish had already planned to migrate from Pennsylvania to Maryland because a shortage of land made it difficult for fathers to provide their sons with a farm as a marriage gift, the difficulty with civil authorities served as an additional push from behind, and the move was made. To help establish the migrants, large groups of Amish and their families traveled south and collaborated in putting up the new houses and barns. As many as seventy-five or one hundred Amish men would work together in the construction without any blueprints and apparently without supervision, yet dovetailing their efforts perfectly and putting up a house in two days. The women banded together in preparing the meals which were served communally.

Division of Labor

The structure of the Amish family is definitely patriarchal. In the more liberal homes the wives may be consulted when family problems arise, but the authority of the husband is regarded as final in domestic matters. The place of the woman in the home is fixed as her husband's helper, but not quite his equal.

The husband's duties are to care for the livestock, plan and plant the fields, reap the harvest, and make repairs about the farm. As soon as the sons are about five years old they begin to help their father. The wife's duties are to care for the children, cook and clean, prepare produce for market, make all the clothes for the family, and can, dry, and preserve food. Women also help with the harvest if the work is particularly heavy, but almost never are they called upon to do the more disagreeable jobs involved in farming. Little girls are taught to help their mothers and seem to delight in doing so. A Home Amish woman never undertakes to prepare for a profession. She may do housework for pay, however, in which case she is not looked upon as a servant but as one of the family.

Economic Functions

From the above it will be seen that the Amish family retains a great many economic functions concerned with production. In this respect it is like the usual rural American family, except that it retains a larger measure of the economic functions of the farm economy of the past and that it has taken on fewer of the functions and practices of the urban family than has the typical American farm family.

The farm is the Amish man's kingdom, and, although his implements are not as modern as those of some other farmers, his thriftiness and hard work have made Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, where there is a large Amish group, the "garden spot of America." Tobacco is the main money crop in this particular area, but vegetables and fruits are also grown for the markets as well as for the family's own needs.

The Lancaster markets are widely known, and it is the "Plain People" that make them famous. Market for them is a family project. The night before market day the mothers and daughters stay up late and work hard, baking cookies, cleaning chickens, scrubbing vegetables, and doing many other things. Sometimes the men and boys help. Early the next morning they pack their wares in their wagons and go to Lancaster. Each family has a stall in the large market room. Sometimes only the man brings the goods to market, but usually the entire family helps. At market one marvels at the list of food available. You see counters of scrubbed vegetables, homemade butter and apple butter, chow-chow, horseradish, jellies, homemade bread and rolls, cookies, cakes, pies, fish, meats, candies, homemade cheese, walnut meats, dried corn, eggs, hooked rugs, potted plants, and flowers.[1] Such an array calls for a prodigious amount of work.

Besides being just a farmer as we think of him usually, the Amish man is a butcher, a curer of leather, a manufacturer of harness, a horseshoer, a shoemaker, and a blacksmith. You might think that he was "Jack of all trades and master of none," but this is not true. He is first and foremost a farmer and an excellent one.[2]

Religious Functions

As indicated, religion plays the central rôle in the life of the Amish. Children are taken to "preaching" from the time they are infants,

[1] Ann Hark, *Hex Marks the Spot* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1938), pp. 114–28.

[2] John Umble, "The Social and Religious Life of the Amish Mennonites of Union County, Pennsylvania," *The Mennonite Quarterly Review*, April, 1933, pp. 94–95.

although they do not join the church until they are about twelve years old. There is no meeting house or church, services being conducted in the members' homes. The Sunday morning service is unusually long, lasting three or more hours, from eight-thirty or nine until noon or later. It is followed by dinner in the same house served in shifts to all the congregation, so that families do not start back for home until late in the afternoon. Here the social and recreational rôles of the church are clearly manifested. The pattern is, of course, traditionally rural, but it is carried further by the Amish than by country folk generally. The children may sleep throughout the service, but they create no disturbance. A child who proves himself a nuisance is punished, and besides he misses the refreshments. These are introduced midway through the service, when the hostess enters with platters of half-moon pie for all the children. One wonders if church-going might not be more popular in our time if this Amish custom were copied by other denominations.

It is a big job for the housewife when it is her turn to have the church service. She cleans for weeks beforehand, and on Sunday the people arrive from far and near in carriages. No automobiles are allowed and even fancy carriages are avoided. The people gather in the "parlor" or barn, wherever the benches have been placed. Men sit on one side of the room, women on the other. They sing songs while the ministers meet in another room and plan the day's service. When the ministers return, one of them reads an entire chapter in the Bible which is followed by silent prayer. The sermon is long and unprepared. It is followed by an audible prayer. After that the other ministers may talk. This is followed by testimonies from the congregation, which may be as long as an ordinary sermon. After announcements and a hymn, lunch is served. The men then smoke and chat while the women clean up and wash the dishes. A supper is also served for those who stay that long, and in the evening there is a "singing" for the young people.

Ministers are not trained, they are chosen from the congregation by lot. Each church has at least two ministers and a bishop. When the time comes to select a new minister, nominations are made by the members of the church. As many Bibles as there are candidates are placed on a table. Each candidate selects a Bible. In one is a slip of paper reading, "And they gave forth their lots, and the lot fell upon Matthias; and he was numbered with the eleven apostles." (Acts 1:

26–28.) The man who receives this Bible becomes the minister. His is an unenvied job, for he receives no pay, must quote the Scriptures verbatim, must conduct all services in German, and still run his farm.

The church governs behavior through its sanction of the virtues, sobriety, industry, and piety. A member of the church may be excommunicated for committing a crime. When this happens he is cut off from the church, his friends, and his family for the period of seven weeks. No one may have any contact with him until he is again received into the church. Thus the church, through its power to regulate behavior, has enormous influence over the Amish.

Education

The education of the Amish is given in the home, the school, and the church. They want it closely allied with religious learning and so refuse to enter new and modern schools. Recently a group bought an old discarded one-room schoolhouse, and are sending their children there to a private teacher rather than to the new consolidated PWA school with modern equipment.

The Amish want their schools run on the order given by Christopher Dock in early colonial days. The routine of these schools is much like that of our Sunday Schools with the addition of lessons in spelling and sums.[1] The Amish believe that eight years of school are enough; hence the formal education of an Old Order or Home Amish child is limited to grade school. Further learning, they feel, may lead to worldliness and perhaps to discontent with the church. Since their forefathers lived righteously without benefit of much formal education, they think that they, too, do not need it. Besides, much is taught in the advanced grades in modern schools that is not considered right. If an Amishman continues his education, he may be excommunicated for life.

Recreation

The play of the Amish is like that of other rural groups, in that much of it is useful, and there is an emphasis on group and family fun rather than on individual activity. Where there are no separate recreational institutions, play activities are tied in very closely with economic and religious functions. A distinctive aspect of Amish play

[1] Martin G. Brumbaugh, *The Life and Works of Christopher Dock* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1908), pp. 105–12.

is its rigid avoidance of all forms of commercialized recreation, excepting one or two like the circus, although even at the circus the Amishman is supposed to see only the animals and not the main show. Movies, dancing, and cards are frowned upon. The Amish get together and have a good social time while accomplishing necessary work. Examples of such practical play are chestnut parties and corn huskings, which permit much visiting and laughing by the young people, and there is always the eager hope of finding a red ear of corn, since this entitles the boy to kiss his partner. The corn husking or other activity continues by moonlight until rather late — ten o'clock — when the group has supper and then adjourns to the barn for the party games, like "Bingo," "Six-Handed Reel," "O-Hi-O," "Twin Sisters" — all with much singing. The party does not break up until early morning.

Singing is in much favor, perhaps because it is a part of the church activity. A regular occasion of recreation is the Sunday night singing, which provides an opportunity to learn the hymns of the church and do a little visiting or courting on the side. Since no musical instruments are tolerated by the Amish, the singing is *a capella*. The Amish have also various competitive sports, such as ball and wrestling. In the former, one side takes up positions at corners and then tries to hit one of the two opposition players who stand in the middle and try to dodge the ball when it is thrown at them. These active, simple games are in interesting contrast to our commercialized sports with their emphasis on watching rather than participating.

It may be observed further that when a culture provides few entertainments, people look to one another for recreation, and visiting is often highly developed. This is true among the Amish. The fortnightly church services provide good opportunity for visiting, since the church-goers may arrive before nine o'clock in the morning and remain until after dinner has been served. On the Sundays without church services, there is even more time for visiting. Near kinsmen feel an obligation to visit each other as often as possible. Parents and grandparents visit their children and grandchildren several times a year, and since families are large most people are usually behind the visiting schedule. Winter is the time for lengthy visits, sometimes to distant places, where there are likely to be relatives and friends.

Visiting children and grandchildren is encouraged among the Amish as an activity after retirement, or when a farmer and his wife are too

old to carry on the regular work of the farm. When not visiting, the old farmer and his wife (Grossdawdy and Grossmutter) remain on the farm which is being worked by one or more of their children. The old folks live in an addition to the main house or in a separate unit, and do as much work as they are able, thus remaining happily occupied. They are contented to have daily association with their children and yet to enjoy the privacy of separate quarters. Observers are agreed in reporting that the old people seem happy in this arrangement.

The Amish family, then, is a highly integrated unit with many bonds — religious, economic, recreational, and protective — tying the members firmly together. In its economic functions it resembles our rural American family, except that these functions are more numerous and varied for the Amish. The religious functions are clearly more prominent in the Amish family than in American farm families generally, since every Amish home is a part-time church and every Amishman is a potential minister. Because the Amish may not be doctors or lawyers, they must either depend for protection upon outsiders or rest on their own resources. When things are really serious they utilize modern services and equipment, but their religion leads them to shun these outside aids as much as possible. Some powwowing is done to cure sickness, and there is resort to simple home remedies. These methods may not be so effective as the more scientific approaches, but they represent a higher degree of exercise of the protective function by the Amish family than by the rural family in general. In their personal relationships between husband and wife and parents and children, the Amish are a quiet, sober people who are undemonstrative in their affection. They never kiss their children in public and rarely in private. The description of their courtship practices shows, however, that affection between mates exists and is emphasized by the culture, although they are discouraged from wearing their hearts on their sleeves. For them the choice of a mate is a more serious matter than for us, since divorce is not permitted and separation is possible for adultery only.[1]

The foregoing description of the Amish shows how closely their life is organized around the three institutions of family, church, and local community, with governmental and economic organization clearly subordinate. In our larger society the situation is reversed, for the

[1] Although no statistics are available, informants in one Amish community (Lancaster County) could not recall that any separation had ever taken place. Cf. W. M. Kollmorgen, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

family and church have been losing functions to business and government which have thereby increased their stature and influence. The great rôle of the family and the church in Amish society is reminiscent of mediaeval times when these two institutions were dominant and exercised extensive economic and governmental functions. The Amish thus represent a group that has remained relatively unchanged over a long period of time while the world about them has changed greatly. Indeed, the description of the Amish is a striking study in arrested social change. It is as though the evolution of the family had been frozen in Germany and Switzerland two or three hundred years ago. The Amish are like an archeological find, or like the paleological recoveries from the La Brea pits in Los Angeles, except that the Amish are in our midst, are still part of our present American scene, and are well adjusted economically. These "Plain People" illustrate perfectly what a rich and powerful institution the family was in olden times, before the advent of the modern technological age. For this reason they are much more significant sociologically than their small numbers would suggest.

The account of the Amish is intended to highlight the variation which exists in contemporary American family organization. The example is especially interesting because it pertains to rural society, where we expect to find less variation than in urban society. It has been observed by sociologists that the occupation of farming is a great leveler of men, and that rural communities in widely different cultures show essentially similar basic characteristics, such as high marriage and birth rates and low crime rates. Other general traits of American farm families were observed in an earlier chapter devoted to the subject.[1] But the description of the Amish has shown that, however much rural family organization may be alike the country over, it is far from being undifferentiated. On the contrary, there are significant variations in American rural family organization due to differences in other aspects of the local rural community. In the case of the Amish, the important differential is religion which has stemmed the tide of social change, but differences along other lines, such as location, government, type of economic activity, and the ratio of the sexes, may also affect rural family organization. This is true because the social organization of a community is a bundle of interrelated activities, and a change in any one aspect brings changes in varying degree to all the

[1] Chapter 5.

other interconnected parts. In the mountain hollows of Tennessee and elsewhere the farm family retains many of the old patterns, because geographical isolation has removed the community from the main currents of social change. Geography does for the mountaineer family what religion does for the Amish.

URBAN FAMILY VARIATION

In American cities, family differences are more pronounced than in rural communities. The differences are partly due to the impressive variety of ethnic groups found in certain cities, especially the larger ones. They have their Little Sicily, Ghetto, Chinatown, Russiantown, Little Armenia, and numerous other nationality groups. Another factor is the relatively rapid rate of urban social change. The city itself is the product of change, especially in inventions pertaining to manufacturing, transportation, and communication. The constant developments in technology mean that the city is a seat of continuing change, which has the effect of creating further cultural differences within the ethnic groups.

The limited area of the city leads to competition for advantageous position on the part of the various occupational, income, racial, and religious groups, as well as the various enterprises and institutions, and results in the distribution of persons and establishments according to a definite pattern. The innermost circle of highest land values is the main business district. This is in a process of expansion, and encroaches on the surrounding residential section which is neglected because of its transitional status and so becomes an area of minimal choice, the area of tenements and rooming-houses, of the slums, of vice, and of the underworld. The next zone is that of apartment houses; the outermost zone is the area of single-family dwellings (mainly bungalows, with big yards) found at the border of the city.

Investigation [1] has disclosed that these urban areas are correlated with types of family organization. In or near the central zone is the *non-family area* of Chinatown, Hobohemia, and the hotels catering to transients. This is largely an area of single males. The surrounding area of tenements and ethnic colonies is characterized by the *paternal family*, where the authority of the husband is great. There is a strong sentiment in these immigrant and working classes that woman's place

[1] Ernest R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927).

is in the home looking after the children. This is not a stronghold of feminism. In the third zone, of the middle and professional classes, the viewpoint is different. They believe that families should be small and that the wife should have outside interests. Since they emphasize companionship of husband and wife and an equal division of authority, the type of family they form has been called the *equalitarian.* In the suburbs we find the *maternal* type, where, in the absence of the commuting father from early morning until late afternoon, the mother takes over the major responsibility for making family decisions and for maintaining community contacts. Finally, spread across the other areas and following the lines of transportation is the *emancipated* family of the rooming-house, kitchenette apartment, and residential hotel. These are the childless families in which the interests of both the husband and wife lie outside the home and where a relatively high percentage of the wives are in the labor market.

When these different types of family are examined, they are found to vary widely in type and degree of instability. The paternal families may have high rates of desertion, but the highest rates of disorganization exist in the equalitarian and emancipated families of the rooming-house and apartment-house areas where the rentals are high. For one such district the rate is higher than in Reno.

The preceding analysis developed a threefold classification of urban families (paternal, maternal, and equalitarian) based on the division of authority between husband and wife, with a fourth type (the emancipated) where the problem of authority apparently does not enter. If one is interested in a more detailed analysis, even greater differentiation of types may be shown to exist. For instance, there are several degrees of paternal rule, not just one. The characteristic Italian immigrant family in the city is a big, closely knit group under the strict rule of the father. The patriarchal pattern of the old country is retained in a highly developed form. The rule of the father is even more rigorous among the Italians than among either the Irish or the Jews. The families of the latter are large and closely knit, too, but the dominance of the male is often only nominal, with the wife and mother in actual control. Not so with the Italian women, who are discouraged from having interests apart from the home, and who do not go to work unless it is thought to be necessary to eke out a livelihood for the family.

The lives of Italian children are closely regulated by their immi-

grant parents, especially by the father. The girls are carefully chaperoned and are discouraged from having casual dates. Potential mates are chosen by the parents and an effort is made to have the courtship limited to these choices. Of twenty-two young Italian married women questioned in an immigrant quarter of New York City, nineteen had never been out alone with any man except the one they married. Two had not even gone out with their future husbands before they were engaged. There is a general feeling among these Italian young people that absolute obedience to parents is right and proper. When a group was questioned on this matter, only 8 per cent dissented from this view.[1]

Of the family heads just considered, the Italian father is the most powerful patriarch, then probably the Irish and the Jewish in the order indicated. If an investigation were undertaken, it might be possible to work out a rank order for paternal families, according to the degree of authority of the father, for all the urban ethnic groups. In all probability the Chinese father would top such a list.

The Latin Quarter

The various urban family groups described in preceding paragraphs differ, as we have seen, in degree of organization and stability. The paternal families are the most highly organized and the maternal families the most stable. At the other extreme are the emancipated families which are the most loosely organized and most unstable of all. The emancipated families do not all behave exactly alike, but show some variation, just as do the paternal families. Some of the emancipated wives have no children, no housekeeping responsibilities, and a minimum of other economic functions, but they are legally married and have a secure and stable companionship with their husbands. A different pattern is the one that prevails in the Latin Quarter of big cities, where the family as an institution is virtually lacking. If one is interested in knowing the full range of variation in family organization, one will not ignore this extreme "bohemian" pattern.

The Bohemian Culture Pattern

Probably every big city attracts a considerable number of people who desire to repudiate the social standards of the communities in

[1] Caroline F. Ware, *Greenwich Village, 1920–1930* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935), p. 193.

which they have been reared. Civilization always has its malcontents, those more or less poorly adjusted to the demands of the prevailing culture whether it be because of a weakness in the culture or in the individuals, or both. They protest against the common conventions of bourgeois society which they hold to be hollow, unnatural, and stifling to originality. These rebels find the small community, with its close personal relationships and moral censorship of conduct, inhospitable to their ideas and their conduct. The big city, however, vouchsafes them anonymity and offers them a suitable refuge. The large size of the population makes it possible for such persons to find others of the same persuasion, and by banding together in a segregated area they are able to organize their unconventionality. Such communities are Greenwich Village in New York City, and Towertown [1] in Chicago. A conventional person in these places would seem as odd as an unconventional person in a small village. The surrounding areas in the city generally show the Latin Quarter a certain amount of tolerance or even support. Like Chinatown, they are places that attract tourists and so are a business asset to the larger community.

Since the bohemians are in rebellion against the prevailing standards of our society, they exalt artistic, literary, or other intellectual pursuits, and disdain wealth and social class distinctions based on money. They disavow institutional obligations, especially those of church and family, the two mainstays of conventional morality. They avoid the customary and convenient contacts with family, neighbors, and members of the same economic or social class, and instead form individual ties with friends in different parts of the city on the basis of common interests and tastes. The bohemians have, however, quite varied motivation and background. The early group in Greenwich Village included some eminently capable persons with a genuine interest in social reform, like Edna St. Vincent Millay, Theodore Dreiser, Sinclair Lewis, and H. L. Mencken. These early residents did pioneer work in such fields as free verse, the Little Theater movement, and radical periodical literature. The group was poor and lived in reduced circumstances, frequently co-operatively. They criticized each other's work, and, although highly individualistic, formed a very close group. Later comers were more likely to be of just ordinary caliber. There were some who knew little of any phase of art,

[1] Harvey Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

but who desired self-expression and decided to paint or write for a while. Their dominating passion to be different sometimes led to strange behavior. Novels were written with no punctuation marks or with many of the words turned upside down. There were clubs in which the members who met for luncheon started the meal with dessert and worked backwards to the soup.[1] The Latin Quarter is doubtless characterized by a high percentage of emotionally unstable men and women, who would probably be regarded as personality problems in the communities from which they came.

Family behavior

Bohemians may be viewed as a group to whom the institution of the family means little or nothing. They see in marriage only the loss of freedom and self-expression. This is especially true of the woman who objects to giving up her name and independence. It is generally thought that the women of the group are exploited by the men, and it may be so, but the women are said to be the more ardent supporters of the pattern. This is not surprising, since the principal adjustments in marriage are generally made by the woman who may regard them as burdens. Frequently two names appear on a mailbox, such as Mary Jones and John Smith, showing that they are living together unmarried. Such a liaison is usually very casual, established perhaps because the parties thereto agree on politics or because they both like the same poet. It usually ends in the same casual way: one person starts to talk about getting married and that bores the other; or one meets someone he likes better; or the couple do not seem to share the same interests any longer. There is a tacit understanding that the relationship may be terminated at any time at the will of either. Occasionally, however, these unions last for years and may even pass into marriage. While the couple lives together, the woman works and pays her own expenses, and if necessary may help to support the man. If there are household tasks, it is thought that the man should share them, but household tasks are obnoxious to this group, and the kitchen in particular is felt to be a symbol of tyranny; hence eating out is popular. Indeed, in such liaisons the couple may largely go their separate ways, and sometimes even have separate establish-

[1] Thomas F. Healey, "Bohemian Captivity," *The Forum*, May, 1934. Also Maurice Zotolow, "Our Lost Seacoast of Bohemia," *New York Times Magazine*, October 8, 1939.

ments. The affectional pattern is definitely experimental and casual.[1]

The bohemian behavior pattern is regarded by some as the feminist position carried to its extreme. If women are to have equal rights with men, economically, legally, and politically, then why not sexually too? Equality in sexual behavior for bohemian women apparently means obtaining the privileges of the double standard for themselves rather than trying to establish the single standard for both sexes. But the consequences of equality are not quite the same for both sexes. Obviously the women bear the children and the men do not. This fact alone means that the woman bears the greater responsibility in a casual affair. Experimentation is also more costly to the woman, since her chances of marriage decline sharply with the advancing years. Another consideration is that as children some of these bohemians may have been reared in a conventional environment and may be less emancipated in their attitudes than they or others think. A man may live with a girl illegally, for example, and then hold her in contempt. Such attitudes sometimes crop out in conversation with other men when no women are present.

The Amish and the bohemians

Our purpose here, however, is not to weigh the merits of the bohemian pattern, but to present it for consideration as an example of extreme variation in contemporary American family organization. Earlier in the chapter the family organization of the Amish was described. These two accounts, of the Amish and of the bohemians, present a striking study in contrast. The story of the Amish family reads like a page out of a history of the past and illustrates what a rich and powerful institution the family was in olden times. The Amish with their rural heritage show the great strength of the family when deeply rooted in the soil. The bohemians, on the other hand, illustrate the disruption that may overtake the family in the city. In a previous chapter,[2] the maladaptation of the family to the city environment was shown. The bohemian culture carries the urban disorganization to its extreme. In the bohemian community the family is bankrupt and has nearly been liquidated as a social institution.

[1] Groups outside the Latin Quarter may have the pattern of affectional relationships just described, or certain elements of it. The rooming-house areas contain many couples living together temporarily without benefit of clergy. They have somewhat the same arrangement as the bohemians, perhaps without the supporting philosophy and without other components of the bohemian pattern.

[2] Chapter 5.

The Mexican Family

Having sketched two extremes of the family scene in the United States, it may be helpful next to fill in the picture somewhat by including a few additional illustrations of intermediate variations. For this purpose we turn first to the Mexicans, who comprise a fairly large minority group with distinctive family patterns, and numbering over a million in 1940.

The Mexican population of the United States, like that of Mexico, is largely rural, hence bears certain resemblances to other rural peoples in family organization. Family income is low, the birth rate is high, the ratio of men to women is high, especially in the Mexican-born group, there is a high marriage percentage, and the family is a co-operative unit in economic production.

Certain of these characteristics are more pronounced in the Mexican family than in rural families generally. For instance, the family income is lower and the death rate higher. In these respects the Mexicans are like another rural group, the Negro, and for much the same reason, discrimination resulting from race prejudice. The Mexicans face the same problems of segregation and limited educational and vocational opportunities as the Negro, although perhaps not to quite the same degree. The racial classification of the Mexicans is not so definite. In 1940, the Census listed the Mexicans with the foreign white stock, but in previous years they were classified as non-white. The Mexicans comprise a white population of Spanish descent, mestizos (mixed bloods), and Indians. The majority in the United States are probably of lower-class origin. In Mexico, especially before the recent revolution, class lines were tightly drawn between a small upper class of Spanish landowners and the great mass of the people but little removed from serfdom. The half-naked peon is still a familiar sight in the country. In the city most poor families live in large courts called "neighborhoods," where each family has its room, a griddle, a metate for grinding corn, a huge water pot, brightly painted wooden bowls, a square tin oil can, assorted pottery, hammocks or straw mats, a little shrine with tinsel and candles, "two dogs, three hens, four babies, a broom of rushes, and somewhere, flowers." [1] The effect of the Mexican class structure is carried over, perhaps, in the peon's ready adaptation to low-income living stand-

[1] Stuart Chase, *Mexico: A Study of Two Americas* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931).

ards in the United States and in the relative lack of ambition with which he is commonly charged.

The social isolation of the Mexicans means that they must place greater reliance on relationships with their own kind. Security is furnished in part by the extended family and by numerous associations. Of a group of Mexicans studied in Los Angeles, 75 per cent belonged to one or more formal organizations made up of Mexicans alone. Michigan, with a total Mexican population of six thousand, had more than twenty Mexican societies.[1] The parallel to the social organization of American Negroes is evident.

The Mexican family bears certain resemblances, then, to the rural family in general and to the Negro family in particular. But there are differences too. One stems from the fact that a relatively large group of Mexicans are employed as migratory agricultural laborers. They are located largely in the Southwest and West, where they follow the crops from one region to another for seasonal harvesting. June may be the month for berries and July for peaches; September for grapes, and October for walnuts. In December they move on to cotton, and from January to March they may do general farming. In between crops they may drift back to the city to find unskilled work or to remain jobless. Mobility is so common among Mexican laborers that migratory schools with tents and traveling teachers have been set up in an attempt to follow the Mexican child with schooling. Conditions are not favorable for family life and rearing children. Frequent moving tends to de-group the members of the family, so that they have difficulty in keeping friends or in maintaining institutional contacts.

Work is a family enterprise for the great mass of the agricultural laborers. Individual wages are small, but working as a family increases the total income. In the cotton, the beet, or the fruit crops the whole family is employed, and wages are paid, not individually to the various members, but "by the family." Co-operative productive endeavor is, of course, characteristic of farm families generally and is an integrating influence, but the farm family workers are seldom paid.

Religion, culture, and family life

The Mexicans are set apart from most rural folk by their adherence to Roman Catholicism, which is largely an urban institution in the

[1] M. Gamio, *Mexican Immigration to the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

United States. This combination of heritages, rural and religious, works powerfully to stabilize family life, somewhat as in the case of the Amish. Certain teachings of the Church relating to the family, especially those on birth control and divorce, better adapted to rural than urban conditions, get strong support from the rural Mexican population.

In Mexican homes one will find an altar, religious pictures upon the walls, crucifixes, a "treasure corner" containing objects of religious import, and various other symbols of religious faith. The Mexican child wears about his neck a gold chain from which hangs a medal of Jesus or Mary. At home he hears the saying of prayers by members of his family. When he begins to talk, his parents teach him the "Our Father" and "Hail Mary," and when he is older he has a rosary like his mother's by which he can count his prayers. His mother teaches him to trace the sign of the cross. Later he is taken to church, and at about the age of seven he makes his first communion and his obligation to hear Mass begins. These rich religious symbols tie the home closely to the Church, and the strength of the Church is in a measure imparted to the family.

The relation of the Church to the status of women makes an interesting subject for inquiry, but only brief comment is possible here. Since only a man may become a priest and only a male may assist at Mass, the Church recognizes that the man is head of the family. The Church, however, accords woman an important position through the Sisterhoods, through the respect shown for the mother of Christ, and in other ways. Male children are not considered more satisfactory than female children as in the case of some religions. However, emphasis on childbearing and child care as the basic duties of women tends to restrict the entrance of women into the labor market and limits their opportunities for economic independence, probably not without effect on their status. Compared to American women generally, Mexican women appear to occupy an inferior position. According to Mexican custom, a married woman may not engage in any profession or business without the consent of her husband. Although a woman attains her legal majority at the age of twenty-one, she may not leave the parental home without her father's consent until she is thirty, if she is unmarried.

While Catholicism is an important factor affecting family life, it must be remembered that cultural factors may also be important, for

Catholics of the various nationalities (Irish, Italian, Polish, English, Greek, Russian, and Mexican) differ widely, so that Catholic family life is not everywhere identical. For instance, the Mexicans have a reputation for being demonstrative in their intimate relationships, while English Catholics are thought to be more reserved, perhaps like our New Englanders. Mexicans are an expressive people and their intimate behavior abounds in embraces, kisses, and compliments, publicly bestowed. There may be many reasons, but doubtless of primary importance is the lack of a Puritan tradition with its emphasis on the repression of the emotions. Latin tradition, on the contrary, takes an uninhibited and realistic attitude toward the emotional life, as is shown by the custom of permitting well-behaved male inmates of Mexican prisons to enjoy conjugal visits. In keeping with this tradition, one finds the double standard much more pronounced among Latins than among other peoples. Infidelity in husbands, especially of the upper class, is something which no one bothers even to pray about. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that wives and daughters in strict Catholic families are closely chaperoned and are kept quite secluded.

Mexican family and social change

A difficulty with the understanding of the Mexican family in the United States is that studies of Mexican family life are devoted almost entirely to the family in Mexico. While the Mexican family in the United States still bears many resemblances to the family in the home country, the new urban industrial culture of the United States is responsible for many modifications. An illustration is the changing loyalty to the Church, with important consequences for family behavior. Handman [1] records that among three hundred and fifty Mexican families visited in Dallas, Texas, fifty were Protestant. San Antonio has half a dozen Protestant Mexican churches. Where there is not a change of membership, there is often some change in religious behavior. The shift in church allegiance is an illustration of the changes that are occurring in many aspects of the Mexican culture under the impact of the new environment. The changes, however, are not made uniformly by all members of a given family. The younger members, especially the American-born, readily adopt the

[1] M. S. Handman, "The Mexican Immigrant in Texas," *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly*, VII:33–41, June, 1926.

customs of the new land while the older members retain a larger number of the old customs. The Mexican boy, especially, tends to become individualistic in his wants, and home life no longer satisfies him so completely as it would in Mexico. The girls at adolescence frequently revolt against the close supervision of their relations with young men, and elopements are common. The youth of both sexes are troubled by the old customs of their parents, even such slight survivals as the shawl worn by the mother instead of a hat. Such differences of culture in a particular family often become sources of friction and create problems of adjustment in the Mexican-American family. In this respect the Mexican family may serve as an example of a problem that is common, to a greater or lesser degree, in nearly all immigrant groups.

The Orthodox Jewish Family

Having treated the family organization of the dominant Protestant group in previous chapters, and that of the Mexican Catholics in preceding paragraphs, it is appropriate now to consider briefly the novel family patterns of the third major religious group in the United States. The Jews, numbering about five millions or less than 4 per cent of the total population, are the most highly urbanized ethnic group in the nation, with more than half of their number in just two cities, New York and Chicago. This urban concentration has an important effect on occupation and income, which in turn influence certain aspects of family organization. The Jews are mostly in trade and manufacturing, where they constitute a much bigger percentage than non-Jews. As a result the average incomes of Jewish families are probably somewhat higher than the general average, although there are many poor Jews, as the big budgets of Jewish charities and the pool of unemployed Jews indicate.[1] The relatively favorable income of Jews probably has the usual effects of advancing the age at marriage and limiting the size of family. It doubtless also helps to support the passion for education for which Jews are noted. Although comprising less than one twenty-fifth of the population, they form one quarter of all dental, law, and pharmacy students, as well as one sixth of all commerce and medical students; and the proportions would probably be higher were it not for quotas set by some professional schools.

[1] Of all gainful workers in New York City unemployed in 1937, 11 per cent were Jews. About 30 per cent of the population is Jewish.

Urban location is itself a factor, since the schools are mostly located in cities, but there are other urban groups with a smaller percentage in the institutions of higher learning, and income alone seems hardly sufficient to account for the difference. Observation, moreover, shows that a large proportion of Jewish families with low incomes make sacrifices to give their children the benefits of education. The love of learning is a matter of tradition. For more than a thousand years the Jews have been without a homeland, and the responsibility of individual families for the conservation of Hebrew tradition has been correspondingly greater than in the case of other peoples. A Jewish home without at least a literate father is a rarity, for a man must know how to read the Holy Works if his religious obligation is to be fulfilled.

Religious tradition is bound up with the home and family life appreciably closer for the Jews than for Christians, whether Protestant or Catholic. The Jewish home may be viewed as a partner of the synagogue in the celebration of religious holidays. The Sabbath, which runs from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday, means special preparations for the Orthodox Jewish family. Enough food is bought and cooked beforehand so that no cooking will be necessary on the Sabbath. The house gets a special weekly cleaning, and the table is set with the best linen, silver or brass candlesticks, the engraved silver *kiddush* cup, and the two braided loaves of bread (*hallah*). The mother lights the Sabbath candles and says a short prayer, praising God and asking His blessing upon the home. Then the members of the family turn to one another with the greeting: "Good Sabbath!" In Orthodox homes, the family attends services at the synagogue Saturday morning, and in the afternoon the father and older sons go again for a short period. If any part of the pattern is omitted, it is likely to be the visit to the synagogue and not the ceremony at home

In the Jewish homes there are family prayers and prayers for the departed, as well as religious customs connected with the dietary. The latter are quite numerous and show how close is the connection between religion and the everyday life of the Jewish family. The Orthodox Jew is permitted to eat only "kosher" food, or food that is "fit." With regard to animal food, the law holds that "whatsoever parteth the hoof, and is wholly cloven-footed, and cheweth the cud, amongst the beasts, that may ye eat." (Lev. 11:3.) Pork may not be eaten because the hoof of the hog is not cloven, and the animal is therefore

deemed to be ritualistically unclean. All meat except that of fish must be cleaned of blood before it is eaten. Fish are allowed, provided they have scales and fins. Snails, lobsters, crabs, "and every swarming thing that swarmeth upon the earth is a detestable thing; it shall not be eaten." (Lev. 11:41.) A further rule prohibits both meat and milk products from being served at the same meal, nor may the same dishes be used for both. Accordingly, the observing Jewish family has two separate sets of dishes for meat and milk products. For this purpose, however, the flesh of fish is not considered meat.

Religious ceremonies and the celebration of High Holy Days are also carried out at home as well as at the synagogue. According to Jewish tradition, the circumcision of all males has been enjoined by God upon the people of Israel ever since the time of Abraham. When the infant is eight days old, an official of the synagogue performs the operation, not at the synagogue but at the home of the child. The



FIGURE 47. HOW RELIGION OF PARENTS IS RELATED TO HIGH-SCHOOL GRADUATION OF YOUTH

The percentage of youth in each religious group who graduated from high school. Based on a representative sample of more than 13,000 youth in the state of Maryland in 1936. Rather marked variation in the schooling of youth of different religious backgrounds suggests that group tradition as well as income is a factor. It is not to be implied that the study measured only the religious factor. Taken from Howard M. Bell, *Youth Tell Their Story*, p. 195.

High Holy Days begin with the Jewish New Year (*Rosh Hashanah*) in the fall of the year and conclude in the early spring with Passover, the festival of freedom, commemorating the release from bondage in Egypt. The purification rites associated with Passover include a thorough housecleaning and the outfitting of all the members of the family with new clothes. Any ordinary bread remaining is discarded, and only specially prepared unleavened bread is eaten during Passover week. Special dishes and silver, used at no other time, are brought out for this occasion. The climax of the period is the family dinner on Passover Eve, called the *Seder*, or order of service, when the father as a sort of high priest leads his family through a long recital of the four stages of the redemption of Israel.

Some aspects of Jewish church doctrine, like Protestant doctrine, do not contribute to family solidarity. Such are the validation of civil marriage, contraception, and divorce. But the numerous distinctive customs and religious practices in the Jewish home, reinforced by the defenses which Jews erect against the hostility of non-Jews, are sufficient to produce marked family solidarity. Inquiry [1] in a small Southern city confirms the general impression regarding the unusual solidarity of the Jewish family. For instance, it is reported that Jews in this community have daily contacts with their blood relatives about twice as often as non-Jews.

Social change

Despite its retention of distinctive cultural traits, the Jewish family has not remained unchanged in the United States. The pressure of the dominant culture, with its high status value, brings modifications. The Jews feel the weight of prejudice sometimes even more than the Negroes in the North, perhaps because of the greater competition which they offer, but it is much easier for Jews to escape restrictive measures, since they are not set apart by different skin color, and since sometimes they have no differentiable physical traits. Cultural differences like those of language and religion are easy to change. Consequently, we find in the United States at the present time not just one Jewish cultural pattern, but several. The Orthodox Jews follow most closely the customs of mediaeval times. They still use marriage brokers and hold that divorces granted by the state are not valid unless sup-

[1] Stanley R. Bray, *Jewish Family Solidarity: Myth or Fact?* (Vicksburg, Mississippi: Nogales Press, 1940).

PLATE 6. SOME OF BRIGHAM YOUNG'S WIVES

Polygamy was legally abolished in Utah in 1890, but the Mormons retain other distinctive family patterns. Mormon family life is highly stable. From M. R. WERNER, BRIGHAM YOUNG. *(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1925.)*

Black Star

PLATE 7. THE LARGE CHINESE FAMILY

A Chinese household (consisting of the parents, their married sons and the latter's wives and children, their unmarried children, relatives, and servant) formally greets one of its members on his return from a trip. The large-family system has more stability and continuity than does our small conjugal unit, but it is not so well adapted to a highly mobile, industrial economy.

plemented by a divorce according to Jewish religious law. So-called Conservative Jews are not so strict in their observance of the ancient laws, and have modified many of the customs of the Orthodox group. The most modern group, however, are the Reform Jews, who have adapted their ways to western culture. In their places of worship, which they call temples, the men remove their hats and families sit together. They may have services on Sunday as well as Saturday, there is organ and choir music, and the sermon is delivered in English. It is highly probable that the Reform group does not show as much family solidarity as the more Orthodox population. And the Orthodox group in turn is probably less cohesive than the Jewish families in the ghetto of Presburg on the Danube in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Additional evidence of social change in Jewish family life is the intermarriage of Jew and Gentile. The increased rate in modern times despite a rigorous religious ban shows the strength of the secular trend and the weakened hold of the synagogue and family upon the younger generation. Orthodox Jewish parents bitterly oppose mixed marriages, and Orthodox parents of a son who has wed a Gentile say prayers for him as if he were dead. No rabbi, even the most liberal in Reform Jewry, is permitted to officiate at a mixed marriage unless the non-Jewish bride or bridegroom has previously accepted Judaism.[1] Yet the rate of intermarriage has risen sharply in modern times; that is, since the emancipating forces set loose in the nineteenth century. In Germany, only half a decade before Hitler (1926–27), it is said that about a fifth of all Jews married Gentiles. In Trieste, Italy, for the same period the percentage of mixed marriages is reported as 56.[2] There are no statistics for the United States as a whole, but the rates are thought to be higher in the Southern and Western states than in the Eastern. Where there are large concentrations of Jews, intermarriages are relatively few. In New York City,[3] in 1920, less than 2 per cent of Jews married outside the faith. But the rate for second generation Jews was seven times that of the first generation.

[1] David De Sola Pool, *Intermarriage* (New York: Jewish Welfare Board).

[2] Maurice Fischberg, *The Jews* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911); also U. Z. Engelman, "Intermarriage Among Jews in Germany," *Sociology and Social Research*, 20:34–39, September, 1935.

[3] Julius Drachsler, *Intermarriage in New York City* (Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Columbia University, vol. XIV, number 213, January 1, 1921).

Summary

In this chapter and in the three preceding chapters we have considered the significant variations in the organization of contrasting examples of the American family. These variations, we have seen, are related principally to two sets of causes, the occupational and income factors, on the one hand, and the ethnic or cultural factors, on the other. The occupation of farming produces a type of family organization which is significantly different from the type associated with urban occupations. If further research were undertaken, additional differentiation could probably be shown according to types of farming and other occupations. Closely associated with occupation is income, but since there is often considerable variation in income within a given occupation, the income factor has been considered separately in its relation to the family and has been shown to be a cause of extensive variation in family behavior. In the second category of causes, those pertaining to ethnic differences, we have seen that the United States is a land of diverse cultures and that these are reflected in distinctive family patterns.

Emphasis has been laid throughout on the importance of social change. The city with its varied occupations is itself a result of technological change, and now these changes are coming to the farm. The result of rapid and continuing changes in technology is to create new occupations and modify old ones, increasing the number of pursuits and thereby furthering the differentiation of the family. The prospect for the future is, then, one of increasing diversification of family patterns. The changes in technology are accompanied by changes in customs and in religious beliefs and practices. There are now more types of Jews and Christians than formerly and more varieties of Jewish and Christian family life. The multiplication of ideologies and customs is, then, also a cause of further differentiation in family patterns. Actually, during the last few centuries the differences in religious beliefs, although more varied, have become less powerful in their influence on family organization, while the influences of the technological changes, centering in occupation and income, have been relatively greater. This change is associated with the trend toward increased secularization, as well as the progressive assimilation of minority groups by the dominant culture. We have seen that, as Negroes change their occupations and increase their incomes, African survivals become less and less discernible, and the Negro family pat-

terns become increasingly like those of whites. Likewise, with the passing of time the Jews, Mexicans, and other populations in the United States become less distinct as ethnic groups. From the long-time point of view it would seem that the purely ethnic factors may be expected to play a relatively less important rôle, and the technological factors an increasingly effective part in shaping the family in the future.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What are the major distinguishing characteristics of the Mennonite faith and how do they affect family behavior?
2. Why are Amish styles in dress economical? What else in Amish culture encourages thrift?
3. Is it easier or harder for the Amish to maintain their family practices today than a hundred years ago?
4. What is the significance of Amish culture, from the standpoint of the dominant modern patterns?
5. Is "bundling" an evidence of a low moral code?
6. How does the Amish honeymoon differ from the traditional American type? Is it possible to say which is more desirable?
7. How is the principle of reciprocity used as a medium of exchange?
8. How is the type of family organization in the modern city related to its ecology?
9. What is the significance of the bohemian family pattern?
10. How are the family attitudes of residents of the Latin Quarter to be accounted for?
11. What resemblances are there between Mexican and Negro family life? What differences?
12. What are the salient traits of Jewish family organization in the United States? How have recent social changes resulted in the differentiation of family patterns?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. Family organization of the Mormons, past and present. (See Selected Readings for suggested sources of information.)

2. The ecology of urban family patterns.
3. Chinese family life in the United States.
4. Review Floyd Dell's *Love in Greenwich Village* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1926).
5. Report on Milton L. Barron, *People Who Intermarry: Intermarriage in a New England Industrial Community* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1946).

SELECTED READINGS

Anderson, E. L., *We Americans: A Study of Cleavage in an American City*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937.

An objective study of class, ethnic, and religious distinctions in Burlington, Vermont, a city of about 25,000. Good source material, attractively presented.

Kollmorgen, Walter M., *Culture of a Contemporary Rural Community*. Washington, D.C.: Rural Life Studies: 4. United States Department of Agricultural Economics, September, 1942.

A study of the Old Order Amish community of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, regarded as "probably the most stable community life of America." Page 58 ff. for discussion of the family.

For consideration of the Mormon family, past and present, the following studies are recommended:

Nelson Lowry, *Some Social and Economic Features of American Fork, Utah* (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Studies, number 4, 1933). (A study of a community of about 3000 population, within thirty-five miles of Salt Lake City.) See also *Studies*, numbers 1–3 in the same series. Nels Anderson, "The Mormon Family," *American Sociological Review*, 2:603, October, 1937. Roy A. West, "The Mormon Village Family," *Sociology and Social Research*, 23:357, March, 1939. Harris, F. S. and N. I. Butt, *Fruits of Mormonism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925). (Statistics on marriage and divorce, chastity, births, mental disorders, education, etc.) Good general popular accounts are Linn, W. A., *The Story of the Mormons* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923); and Werner, M. R., *Brigham Young* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1925). The mental conflicts produced by polygamy are analyzed by Hulett, J. E., Jr., *The Social and Social Psychological Aspects of the Mormon Polygamous Family* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1938–39). Portions of this study have been published: "Social Rôle and Personal Security in Mormon Polygamy," *American Journal of Sociology*, 45:542–53, January, 1940;

"The Social Rôle of the Mormon Polygamous Male," *American Sociological Review*, 8:279–87, June, 1943.

Saunders, Lyle, *Spanish-Speaking Americans and Mexican-Americans in the United States*. New York: Bureau for Intercultural Education, 1944.
A selected bibliography.

Chapter 9

THE FAMILY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

IN RECENT YEARS, the Soviet Union has decorated with Motherhood Medals thousands of Russian women who have reared five or more of their own children. There are a half-dozen different types of medals, awarded according to the number of children: a Mother Medal, First Class and Second Class; the Order of the Glory of Motherhood, First, Second, and Third Class; and the highest honor of all, the title of Mother Heroine, conferred on mothers who have borne and reared ten children.[1] In the United States, mothers of large families are not so honored, nor do they receive state allowances of money at the birth of the third and each subsequent child as do Russian mothers. These are only a few of the differences in governmental policy affecting the family in the two countries. What is responsible for these variations? Is it because the two nations differ in their political, economic, and religious organization? The United States is a democratic nation with private capitalism, while the Soviet Union is a totalitarian, communist state. The church plays a different rôle in the two countries. Are these differences in social organization responsible for the differences in family programs? How does the social order affect family life?

In this chapter we shall consider how the family is related to the three major institutions in society, namely, the governmental, the economic, and the religious. Preceding chapters undertook such analysis for specific groups in our population, in an effort to show the basis

[1] The awards were instituted on July 8, 1944, and come into effect when the last child born reaches the age of one year, if the preceding children of the same mother are living or have been lost in action. "Edict of the Supreme Soviet of USSR on the Increase of State Aid for Mothers and Children," *Information Bulletin*, 4:1–5, July 25, 1944 (Washington, D.C.: The Embassy of the U.S.S.R.).

of the extensive variation in our family organization. What has so far been lacking, however, is some discussion of the interrelation of the family and other institutions in our culture as compared to the pattern of interrelationships in other societies. Such a comparative analysis can serve a useful purpose in rounding out our understanding of family organization in the United States.

Before turning to this task, a brief comment regarding the interrelations of institutions in general may be made for purposes of orientation. Although the institutions of religion, government, business, and the family are to be found in all highly developed societies, each society has its own distinctive configuration of institutions. Thus, both the United States and England are Christian nations, but the diversification of sects and denominations is greater in the United States which has no established church, while England has the dominant established Church of England. This means that the church is more closely connected with the state in England than in the United States, and because of this connection the English Church is also more closely linked to the family. The church influence is seen, for instance, in the limitation of grounds for divorce which are much more highly restricted in England than generally in the United States. Turning to the governmental realm, the United States and England are both political democracies, but the principle of states' rights, found in the former nation but not in the latter, makes the two political patterns different and has important bearings on family practices. As an example, the British policy respecting divorce is uniform throughout the nation, but American practice varies widely in the different states. The English economic organization, embracing nationalization of certain basic industries, is also unlike the American system of modified free enterprise, and has different influences on family life. These are only a few of the outstanding differences between the two systems. Actually the differences are much too complicated and numerous to be adequately described in a few sentences or paragraphs. The economic, political, and religious institutions are of course related not only to the family but to one another in a variety of ways, producing a highly intricate pattern of interrelationships.

The Family and the Church

In the United States the religious organization is predominantly Christian, comprising a large Protestant majority divided among more

than two hundred denominations, and an influential Catholic minority. The situation here may be contrasted with that of non-Christian nations on the one hand and Christian nations with a large Catholic majority on the other. Christianity upholds certain family patterns, notably monogamy, whereas some non-Christian religions sanction forms of multiple marriage. The Koran states that a good Mohammedan may have several wives, and there is nothing in Buddhism to prevent polyandry or polygyny. But religious ideology is not the only factor underlying the monogamous mores, for some non-Christian nations have moved in the direction of monogamy also. Mustapha Kemal, the dictator of Mohammedan Turkey, decreed the abolition of polygamy as one of the drastic reforms calculated to westernize his people. It may be noted that the trend toward monogamy is associated with increasing industrialization. A system of multiple wives seems to be better adapted to farming, where the need for family labor may be great, than to the factory economy where workers are employed on an individual, not a family, basis, and where household tasks are more limited. The near equality in numbers of the sexes is also a strong force making for monogamy. For these reasons, monogamy as a compulsory system might in time have become widely diffused without benefit of religious influence, although Christian doctrine steadfastly upholding the monogamous principle has given strong support to the other social forces working in the same direction.

Christianity, through its teachings respecting the integrity of the individual personality, has also been a force for democracy in the relations between the sexes. Theory has not always been translated into practice, however. The status of women throughout the Christian era has not always been as high as it is at present, and in some Christian countries of South America the status of women is even now much lower than in the United States. Historically, a high status for women has been associated more closely with urbanization and industrialization than with theology.

The impact of the Protestant viewpoint in the United States is seen in the concept of marriage as a civil concern and in the sanction of divorce. At the time of the Reformation, the Catholic Church had already ruled that only such marriages were to be considered valid as had been celebrated by the clergy. In turning against the established church, Martin Luther turned also against marriage by the clergy.

"Know," he wrote, "that marriage is something extrinsic as any other worldly affair. In regard to matters of marriage and divorce, let them be subject to worldly rule." Luther upheld the right of the clergy to marry, and lent reality to his words by wedding an escaped nun. The view of marriage as a civil affair prevailed from the first among the colonists of New England, who sometimes ran ministers out of town for presuming to officiate at weddings. Although marriage by clerics is now recognized, the state regulates marriage by requiring the officiating clergyman to make a written report and by permitting various governmental officials to perform the marriage service.

Our brief review of the interrelationship of the church and the family in the United States shows that the tie-in is rather weak. The church, through its teachings, has been an influence for monogamy and a high status for women, but these phenomena are highly correlated with urbanization and industrialization in non-Christian as well as Christian cultures, so that the influence of the church is somewhat obscured. By sanctioning civil marriage and divorce the church has recognized the authority of the state, and has relinquished control over the family such as is possessed by the Catholic Church. The marked diversification of religious bodies in the United States, representing divergent views of moral behavior, appears to be an important factor in reducing church influence on the family below the level of influence found in cultures where the population is more uniform in their religious beliefs. However, for the past few hundred years the church has been losing functions to the state in all industrialized nations, so that the trend in the United States is not something apart from the world-wide trend, although it may be more pronounced here than elsewhere.

The Family and the Government

Governmentally, the United States is a political democracy, and so it is appropriate to inquire how democracy compares with other political systems in its effect on family life. Democracy is difficult to define in a few words, but may be viewed as a system of government where the citizens choose their leaders in free elections and where, by implication, therefore, any citizen may choose to become a candidate. In other systems of government, sovereignty rests, not with a body of citizens, but with a more restricted group, whether it be a monopolistic political party, a body of aristocrats, a king, or a dictator.

It is generally assumed that there is a close relation between political democracy and family life. A president of the United States once defined democracy as a government of the people, by the people, and for the people; but a democracy may do little for the people concerning their family problems because the government is poor or indifferent or motivated by the theory of *laissez-faire*. Democracy is a type of political structure, and institutional structure does not determine function. A particular type of structure may function differently at different times or places, while different types of structure may carry out similar functions. Democratic governments show a wide range of variation in the services they render the family, and are sometimes surpassed in this function by governments that are not democratic. Democratic Australia and New Zealand provide medical care for all the people on much the same basis as education is provided in the United States, but dictatorial Soviet Russia does the same. Australia and New Zealand have a far more elaborate system of social security legislation than has the United States, where these laws are more recent. In the United States wages paid to married men and to fathers with children are not different from those paid to single men doing the same work with equal skill, but in democratic France the government requires employers to pay higher wages to married men than single men and an extra bonus to those with children.[1] But family allowances which may be financed and distributed in a variety of ways are not a monopoly of democratic governments. Fascist Spain and Argentina and dictatorial Soviet Russia (1935) are among the countries granting allowances. In fact, the idea of social insurance and allied services was first developed by monarchical Germany in the eighteen-eighties.

The reader has noted that certain services in behalf of the family are less extensive in the United States than in other democracies. We do not have as comprehensive a program for family welfare for the nation as a whole as do Australia and New Zealand, for example. One reason for this is the heterogeneity of our population, and especially the presence of large, highly organized minority groups which are able to make their influence felt on certain issues like birth control and child

[1] These allowances or subsidies are paid by the employers directly to the wives and mothers. Industries are grouped according to type and make regular contributions of money into a common fund, according to the number of workers employed. This serves as a safeguard against a particular employer hiring only single men. Since the employer must pay into the industry's fund a fixed amount per employee regardless of whether the worker is married or not, he has no incentive to discriminate against married men.

labor, circumventing the will of the majority. Another reason is the system of dual sovereignty, or the doctrine of states' rights, which limits uniform action by the nation as a whole. As an example, most of the states have been moving toward a minimum age for marriage of eighteen years for boys and sixteen for girls, but as of January, 1942, ten states still authorized the issuance of licenses to girls who are fourteen years old, and four states had no statutes fixing minimum ages, establishing, it may be assumed, the common-law marriage age, namely, fourteen for boys and twelve for girls, in these states. In like manner, the social security program is complicated by the existence of two sets of programs, state and federal, which are sometimes separate, sometimes co-operative. For instance, general assistance and pensions for the blind are supplied by the separate states, in old-age assistance (not pensions) and aid to dependent children the federal government participates with the states on a matching basis, while in still other programs, like WPA employment, only federal funds are involved. The federal Social Security Act provides aid to widows and dependent children under eighteen years in their own homes and allots funds to the states based on 50 per cent of monthly payments of $18 for one child and $12 for each other child in the family. Some states are more liberal in the amount of aid that may be granted to a family; hence the federal funds constitute much less than 50 per cent of the total expenditures for such aid. In August, 1941, the federal contribution for this form of assistance in fifteen states varied from 29 to 45 per cent of the total expenditures.[1] Between 1930 and 1940, twenty-six states had minimum wage laws for women and twenty-two states had none.

Democracy and the status of women

A democratic shibboleth holds that all men are born free and equal, and the motto of democratic France is, "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" Does this democratic emphasis on equality mean that women have the same standing as men in business, politics, and the family? Women in the United States have very nearly the same rights

[1] In the writer's own state of Pennsylvania, for example, the maximum aid to a mother and one dependent child is $30.40 per month; two dependent children, $39.75; three dependent children, $46.70. It should be mentioned also that in all the states there are residence, age, citizenship, and other eligibility requirements, as well as financial need and ability of relatives to help, which limit the availability of this assistance. The same restrictions apply for other types of assistance.

as men before the law. They may buy and sell property, execute wills, vote, serve on juries, and hold public office. Mothers and fathers are recognized as co-guardians of their children. Yet there is nothing to prevent many business firms and school boards from discharging women when they marry, and few employers pay women as much money as men for doing the same work. Democratic Sweden protects married women in the right to work by making it illegal for any employer to dismiss a woman either because of marriage or because of childbirth. Russia, under one-party rule, does the same.

In considering the bearing of political democracy on the status of women, it is well to remember that democracy is an elastic concept and that it is, moreover, only one of a number of factors affecting the relations of the sexes. Democracy does not necessarily mean that all the adult citizens, male and female, have the right to vote. The growth of the democratic principle has been halting and gradual. In ancient Athens, the free citizens were only a small minority of the adult population, and in the early years of our own Republic there were many qualifications for the franchise which greatly limited the number of voters. Women in the United States did not win the franchise until after the first World War, and certain groups of adult citizens are still barred from voting by the poll tax and other means. The tenets of democracy constitute an unremitting force for equality, and over the long pull have resulted in an extension of the franchise to the poor as well as the rich, the Negroes as well as the whites, and the women as well as the men. But political democracy is only one factor among many influences determining the status of women. The influence of economic factors is particularly outstanding. Woman suffrage and other rights did not exist in our democracy when the economy was primarily agricultural and there were few paid jobs available to women.

We may observe, moreover, that democracy in the state does not guarantee democracy in the home. In many households in the United States the principles of democratic government are not demonstrated in day-to-day family behavior. This is true, of course, in other political democracies as well. Sweden possesses a notable democracy, but the traditions of family life are strongly patriarchal, and the men rule in the home like dictators. An observer of family life in England reports that "the British husband is still 'waited upon' by his wife, gives her little help in her traditional household duties, and has a

more exclusive control of money." [1] There are thus spheres of democracy (political, economic, religious, and domestic), and the existence of democracy in one sphere gives no assurance that it will be found in another, even though the democratic principle, once it is established in a segment of the culture, probably tends to produce a strain toward consistency in the culture as a whole.

The Family and the Economic Order

The number of functions which the democratic government performs for the family is lower in the United States than in Australia and New Zealand, and lower in the latter two countries than in Russia. Apparently political democracy is not the principal factor responsible for the volume of family services. Democracies may do few things or many things for the family. In like manner, political democracies may perform few or many functions of economic production and may, therefore, be tied in with a variety of economic systems. The United States has a modified form of private capitalism in which industry is largely financed by private funds for private profit. There are some exceptions to free enterprise in periods of crisis and to free enterprise in certain fields, like the hydro-electric, where the government enters directly into production and competes with private industry. Nor is enterprise entirely free of governmental regulation, for there is control over banks and credit institutions, and profits are curbed by social legislation which puts a floor on wages and a ceiling on hours, as well as taxes on individual and corporate income. It is difficult in a few sentences to characterize accurately an elaborate economic system, but if we are interested in comparing our economy with other types, we will not err in minimizing the limitations to the free enterprise system and in stressing the fact that industry in the United States operates independently of government, except for a certain amount of aid, supervision, and control. In socialistic Australia and New Zealand, a number of basic industries have been nationalized and brought under government ownership and operation, while in communist Russia the union of state and industry is virtually complete in manufacturing, transportation, distribution, and farming, although some private production does remain. The Russian state also controls foreign trade, banking and credit, and prices. Here, then, are a number of different economic systems, representing various

[1] Joseph K. Folsom, "British Family Welfare," *Marriage and Family Living*, 7:25, May, 1945.

degrees of governmental dictation. How do these systems affect family life?

Family organization in the free enterprise system

The type of economic organization of the United States is commonly called "the free enterprise system" because ideally the system calls for a minimum of interference by government. The system has been highly revered by the classical economists, who regard it as self-regulating. The driving force that sets the system in motion is the profit motive, which causes producers to compete with one another for available markets. Competition keeps down the costs of production and gives the consumer the benefit of low prices. Competition for workers tends to raise wages and enlarges the market for goods. The volume of goods is kept in balance by the law of supply and demand. If too many goods are produced, the producer loses because he must sell his goods at less than cost.

The account given is, of course, somewhat idealized and in practice there are departures from the theory. Income becomes very unequally distributed under the free enterprise system, and the efforts to lessen the inequalities lead to minimum-wage laws and progressive income taxes which are interferences with the free enterprise system. Changes in the ratio of purchasing power to production also lead to economic crises which recently have become very severe, resulting in large-scale unemployment. At such times the state has interfered with the free workings of the economic system to help stricken industry and to aid the unemployed. Another trend is that toward monopoly. Competitors tend to kill one another off by undercutting prices, after which the few remaining producers may get together and set a price that will give a profit and eliminate further competition. This, in turn, prompts government to take action to smash the monopolies and to restore competition. In a number of ways, then, the actual working of the system departs from the classical theory.

When we consider national policies respecting the family in the United States, we find the same combination of governing concepts as in the politico-economic realm, namely, *laissez-faire* plus some aid and protection, with the former predominating. Industry is to be as autonomous as possible and the family also. When a couple marries, they themselves decide according to their viewpoints and needs whether just the husband shall earn the living or both shall go to

work. The government will not encourage the wife to work, except in wartime, and many industries and organizations may discourage her from doing so. If she becomes an expectant mother, she and her husband carry the entire cost of childbearing. Unless the family is needy, the government or private philanthropy will not defray the cost and provide the services needed. It is a family responsibility. If the woman about to become a mother is employed, she may receive a leave of absence before and after childbirth, probably without pay, or she may have to give up her work. Employers do not like such interruptions because they interfere with production and lessen profits. After childbirth, if the mother wishes to resume her work she must make provision for someone to look after the baby, generally at home. There are relatively few employers who provide facilities for the care of infants during the mother's working hours. For the mother to interrupt her work at regular intervals of three or four hours every day to breast-feed her infant does not make for efficient production for profits. Moreover, it is felt that the proper place for the mother is at home with her young child, and mothers of preschool children are therefore discouraged from seeking employment. Later, when the child goes to school, the state furnishes the instruction, but the food, clothing, and medical care are supplied by the parents, except for those on relief. The state comes to the succor of the needy family only after a careful investigation, and since the granting of relief is exceptional, some embarrassment attaches to its receipt.

The responsibility for rearing the child in the United States is largely a family responsibility, and the child as a result generally develops his principal loyalties toward his parents who have done so much for him. The child's dependence upon his family for economic support is not as great in our modern industrial economy as it formerly was under agriculture, but child-labor laws limit the child's opportunities for employment. Where industry furnishes jobs there is little feeling of loyalty to the economic organization, one reason being that the corporation is often large and impersonal, and another that the job is not provided primarily as a service to the worker, but as a source of profit to the employer.

In our culture the child is supposed eventually to become emancipated from parental support and protection. He is expected to leave the parental roof and establish an independent household, where the process of rearing a family is repeated. The close family ties, however,

sometimes make the transition difficult, and adolescence in our culture is frequently felt to be a time of great emotional stress. The adolescent may wish to be emancipated from parental authority, but he is often tied to his parents by bonds of affection as well as by an actual continuing need for parental support and protection. The parents, who have exercised authority for so long a period of years and who have become closely attached to their children, are loath to relinquish control and find it difficult to cut the emotional ties binding them to their children. The price we pay for close family ties in our culture is, then, often adolescent rebellion, or, on the part of the less assertive child, a continuing emotional dependence and immaturity.

Family services in a collectivist economy

In the socialist states, like Australia, New Zealand, and England, we see a swing away from production for private profit to production for community consumption in a number of basic industries, while the great mass of production remains under private ownership. The state may operate its industries at a profit, but the profit is used to provide services for the people and may or may not be used to provide additional capital for expanded operations. Since the ideology is one of doing more things for the population, the socialist states generally render a greater number of services to the family than do the free enterprise states. The most complete identification of industry and the state occurs under communism, as in Russia, and here the idea of having the state render services to the family is most fully developed.

If a woman is about to become a mother and is employed at a wage or salary, or is the wife of such a worker, the Soviet Union provides entirely free of charge medical care during pregnancy, confinement at a maternity hospital, several months' leave of absence from her work at regular wages, continued medical care, the right when medically fit to resume her employment if she wishes, with an opportunity to suckle her child every three or four hours, a grant of money for the infant's clothing, with an additional monthly sum for food during the first year, and the provision of a crèche at the mother's place of employment, where, between the ages of two months and five years, the child may be safely cared for during the mother's working day.[1] These benefits are provided, not just to the needy, but to all mothers

[1] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), II, 818 ff.

where the system is in full operation. What is new in the plan is not the maternity hospital or the crèche or any other similar detail, but the application of these services on such a vast, comprehensive basis in a country where there are more than six million births annually. The system is supported by the commissariat of health of each autonomous republic, by social insurance, which is financed by a tax on payrolls, but without any individual contributions by the workers.

These services are largely developed in the cities and are less widespread in rural areas, where, however, they are being constantly extended. In the cities, nearly all the confinements of mothers now take place in hospitals. In the rural districts, where the great majority of the births occur, it was stated in 1933 that about 20 per cent took place in institutions, but even this figure is twice that for London in the same year.[1]

When a mother attends a prenatal clinic in the city, she receives a card which entitles her to (*a*) the right of precedence in public vehicles and a sheltered place in them; (*b*) service in shops without waiting; (*c*) an extra food allotment; (*d*) lighter work at her place of employment; and (*e*) a leave of absence of two or three months without loss of pay. But probably nothing reveals the attitude of the government toward the employment of women better than the crèches where infants from two months old may be cared for. There is a veritable network of these of many different kinds. The larger factories have crèches attached to them, as do also many of the offices and establishments employing as many as a few score women. For the smaller plants there are district nurseries, while many of the clubs and organizations of working women supply evening crèches. The larger railroad stations have facilities for relieving mothers of the care of their young children while shopping or on business in the city. In the rural districts there are summer nurseries for mothers engaged in the harvest in all state farms, many of the collective farms, and all of the communes. "In the new Russia," we read, "it is impossible to imagine any industrial establishment, any undertaking, any kolkhos, any tractor station, any collective undertaking, without such a crèche." [2]

The crèche was a service upon which Lenin especially insisted as a

[1] Sir Arthur Newsholme and D. A. Kingsbury, *Red Medicine* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1933), pp. 175, 178, 179.

[2] Fannina Halle, *Woman in Soviet Russia* (New York: The Viking Press, 1933), p. 161.

means of relieving women of the constant burdens of child care, so as to release their energies for other work and service to the state. To understand properly this viewpoint, it is necessary to consider the teachings of communism on the status of women. The doctrine of economic equality which is central in communism is interpreted to apply to women as well as men, the more so because woman's status was extremely low in tsarist Russia. The changes under communism, therefore, marked an even greater revolution in the affairs of women than of men. It was felt that political and legal equality for women were not enough; that emancipation necessitated freeing them from the burdens of housekeeping, child-bearing, and child-rearing. This was not taken to mean that woman should be discharged from her peculiar function of child-bearing, but only that the drudgery and pecuniary burdens of domestic responsibilities be lightened by state services. "A victory for socialism," Lenin is reported to have said, "is impossible until the whole half of toiling mankind, the working woman, enjoys equal rights with men, and until she is no longer kept a slave by her household and family." [1] In interpreting this declaration, we should note that the position of woman in Russia before 1917 was quite different from that in the United States and in parts of Europe. The civil code of the tsars was reflected in the rule that "a woman is bound to obey her husband in all things, and in no wise to be insubordinate to his authority." Such subordination is not rare in agricultural societies, but in the new industrial nations of Europe and America the position of women has for nearly a century been improving little by little. What made the Russian plan seem revolutionary was that it aimed to accomplish nothing less than complete equality for women, including economic equality, not gradually but at once.

The Russian plan of complete equality of women in economic affairs provides that all occupations shall be open to them at equal rates of pay. They are eligible on an equal footing with men for membership in trade unions. In the United States, less than 5 per cent of the doctors are women, but in Russia two thirds of all doctors are women.[2] The first woman in the world to become a locomotive engineer was a Russian. Women police direct traffic in the cities.

[1] Quoted by Clara Zetkin, *Reminiscences of Lenin* (London: Modern Books, 1929), p. 57.

[2] World War II created a shortage of physicians in the United States, but did not greatly affect the proportion of women in medicine, which has hovered about the 5 per cent mark for the past forty years. (Women's Bureau, *Women Physicians*, Bulletin 203, number 7, 1945.)

Many of the services for the family which are rendered by the Russian state are not new. The transfer of functions from the home to the state is a trend which has been evident in all industrial countries during the past century. What is distinctive about the Russian situation is the great scope of the services, marking an acceleration of the trend. The Russian leaders appear to have understood quite well the implications of these changes. "We are," said Lenin, "establishing communal kitchens and public eating houses, laundries, and repairing shops, infant asylums, kindergartens, children's homes, educational institutes of all kinds. In short, we are seriously carrying out the demand of our program for the transference of the economic and educational functions of the separate household to society. These changes," he added, "will mean freedom for the woman from the old household drudgery and dependence on man, and enable her to exercise to the full her talents and her inclinations."

In Russia, then, the transfer of functions from the family to the state has been carried farther than in other nations. Of prime significance in these developments is the transfer of loyalty and authority from the family to the state. The services to women and children outlined above are only a special part of an astonishing list of health and security benefits which the government provides. When the state furnishes members of families with jobs, affords compensation for illness, supplies vocational training and re-training, if needed, makes available free medical, dental, and surgical care, as well as free hospitalization, provides rest and recreation centers where families may spend their holidays and vacations — in short, when the state is the source of a long list of protective benefits from birth to death for very nearly the whole wage-earning population, it is not surprising that the public regard for the authority of the state should increase and that the sense of obligation to the family should decline. The family may benefit by the service it receives, but at the price of a loss of authority.

Devotion to the state which takes the form of nationalism has many of the characteristics of religious devotion; hence it displaces, to a degree, the church as well as the family in the hearts of the public. Indeed, since the Russian revolutionists looked upon the established church as the enemy of the state, they closed the places of worship, turned many of them into museums, and purged the calendar of holy days. The communists tried to redirect toward Marx and Lenin and the other heroes of the revolution the reverence that had been felt for

the saints of the church. Visitors from all over the vast Russian domain make pilgrimages to the Red Square at Moscow where the body of Lenin is preserved. The official hostility toward the church has lately been greatly moderated, but the effects of the earlier onslaught have not been entirely neutralized, so that the church is not the powerful institution that it was. In somewhat the same way, although less vigorously, the home was attacked as a place of narrow loyalties that prevented the development of the larger devotion to the community which the communists espoused. In the early phase of the revolution the reaction against the family was quite severe.[1] There was extreme talk of baby farms where the children would be reared by professionally trained persons employed by the state and not by the parents, although the plan was never given much official support. Marriage and divorce were for a time framed in very casual legal terms. Lately the swing of the pendulum has been the other way, and the national policy governing divorce and other family matters has stiffened; but the family has not regained the prestige and autonomy it formerly possessed, and the state remains a sort of beloved highly influential foster parent. Although loyalty to the state is especially strong among those who spent a large share of their tender years in the youth organizations for the children of party members (the Cubs, Pioneers, and Comsomol), the masses also appear to have great faith in the economic state which, they believe, belongs to them and is consecrated to their welfare.

The family and the changing social order

A great difficulty in describing the social system of Russia, as well as that of many another nation, is that the description may be quickly invalidated by rapid social changes. Under Bolshevik rule the state regulation of marriage, divorce, and family relations was, for a time, very lax. In 1920, only civil marriages had legal authority. Abortions, even of the first pregnancy, were legalized and performed by the state. Divorce was procurable at the will of either party. The process was a very simple matter, consisting only of the notification of the defendant by postcard that the action had been granted. All this has been drastically changed by preparations for war, increased industrialization, and the stabilization of internal affairs. In 1936,

[1] George M. Day, "Family in Soviet Russia: A Study in Folkways versus Stateways," *Social Forces*, 16:556–61, May, 1938.

abortions were made a penal offense, and divorces were taxed and penalized.[1] Common-law marriage is discouraged although still legal, but the right of a mother to appeal to the court for the purpose of establishing fatherhood and claiming alimony for the upkeep of a child from a man to whom she is not legally married has been abolished.[2] These new provisions are apparently designed to support and strengthen the conventional family, and hardly give any basis for believing that the family under communism is an expendable institution. In fact, the family regulations cited above for the Soviet Union are not very different from comparable family laws in the United States.

Education in Russia has also undergone changes in recent years which greatly concern the family. Under the earlier Soviet plans, education was outlined for the masses. The state paid one third of the costs and the local community paid the rest, and free education was open to everyone up to the age of seventeen. Elementary education was compulsory and private schools were prohibited. All education was antagonistic to religion, and communism was taught in its stead. But in 1940 free secondary education and all free higher education were abolished. Students in the eighth, ninth, and tenth grades were required to pay a tuition of two hundred rubles yearly in towns and one hundred and fifty rubles in villages. Since the average monthly wage in Russia in 1940–41 was probably around two hundred rubles a month,[3] the opportunities for education for children of the lower-income groups and from large families must have been quite limited. For children attending high schools and colleges the tuition was set at four hundred rubles in cities and three hundred rubles in towns.

A further highly significant change in the educational field was the abandonment of coeducation by the Soviets in the fall of 1943, not only in the secondary, but in the elementary grades. The explanation given was that, although sex equality is still an undisputed principle in Russia, the war had shown the desirability of differentiating the occupational rôles of men and women. Since the man must become a soldier, it was said, a boy must be trained for service in the Red Army while he is still at school, and to this end must receive special physical and military training. Girls, on the other hand, will become mothers

[1] A petition for the dissolution of a marriage is to be accompanied by a sum of 100 rubles and, as of 1944, an additional sum ranging from 500 to 2000 rubles is assessed against one or both parties when the divorce is granted.

[2] B. D. Wolfe, "Silent Soviet Revolution," *Harper's Monthly*, 183:14, June, 1941.

[3] A ruble in 1940–41 was worth about nineteen cents.

and will care for children, and so must have special knowledge of human anatomy, psychology, hygiene, and domestic science. Another reason given for the change in policy was that girls, because they mature earlier than boys, have different interests from boys of the same age groups, and that this difference makes joint instruction inadvisable.

Do these educational changes portend further developments which will lower the status of women in Russia and diminish their occupational opportunities? Russia has been widely heralded as a country where the principle of sexual equality in occupations has achieved its fullest expression. The principle is sometimes described as a logical and almost inevitable consequence of communist ideology as developed by Marx and Lenin. But ideology and practice are not always consistent, and the occupational opportunities of women in Russia must be seen, not alone in terms of the ideology of the culture, but also in relation to local conditions, especially local economic factors. When the Soviet Union came into being, it was confronted with the tremendous task of converting a nation which was mainly agricultural and mediaeval into a modern industrial nation. The need for labor was extraordinary. Surrounded by enemies, the Soviet States had to draw heavily on their manpower for military purposes, rendering the labor problem even more pressing. This was no time to argue about the rights of women. The need for workers, especially professional people and experts of various kinds, was acute. Before the revolution, Russia had fewer than 20,000 physicians, about one tenth the number in the United States, relative to population. Since Russia aimed to increase the number to 140,000 by 1940, the doors of the medical schools were thrown wide open to women. These special circumstances help to make intelligible the high percentage of Russian physicians who are women, and suggest that, although the communist ideology was a supporting factor, expediency was a more important consideration. When the full complement of doctors is reached, will the medical schools continue to admit such a large proportion of women? When the Russian economy is stabilized after full industrialization and a return to a more peaceful basis, will women retain their economic opportunities? Certain recent changes in Russia, the abolition of coeducation included, have been disturbing to many admirers of the Russian experiment. The explanation for the educational changes given by the Russian authorities seems to these persons some-

what like the statements about the nature and destiny of women made by anti-feminists generally, and in particular by Nazi leaders during the nineteen-thirties.

For all that has been said, the changes in Soviet policy, while socially significant, do not spell the abandonment of the vast system of economic security any more than the introduction of differential wage scales, piece rates, and special bonuses means that the Russian economy is no longer communistic. The state still supports a tremendous program of public services, and the state still owns the basic means of production. But the changes do indicate that Russia, having swung to the extreme left after the Revolution, is now moving somewhat to the right. At the same time the trend is to the left in nearly all the other major nations. England, voting in its first socialist government in 1945, symbolizes the change. In the United States the economy still remains that of free enterprise, but the modifications have become increasingly numerous as evidenced by the expansion of the social security program. The trend in government is nearly everywhere toward greater collectivism, entailing the transfer of economic and protective functions from industry and the family to the state. If this trend continues, we may expect an increase in state social services for the family in the United States in the future and a corresponding decrease in the provision of such services by the family itself.

The Family and the Military Order

The foregoing analysis of the interrelations of the family and the political order is incomplete without some consideration of the influence of the military function of the state. War has been a highly important factor in the experience of many nations, absorbing a large share of the energies and wealth of the people. It would, therefore, be surprising if war and preparation for war did not have important implications for the family. This question of the impact of the military order on family life has special significance for us because war has become in recent years an increasingly important function of the government of the United States.

The United States, with abundant natural resources and an advanced technology for converting them into instruments of war, is an important military power. But the United States also has a large population, and it would not be militarily strong if it had not. Man-

power is only one factor in military strength, but it is an essential element. Hence, if a state has military ambitions, its motives in sponsoring an increase of population are quite understandable. Germany in the past has been such a state, and its population policies make instructive reading. Through its population policies a state may bring strong influences to bear upon the family.

Devices for increasing the population

To increase the population the war state employs a number of methods, including marriage loans to qualified couples, subsidies to large families, the reduction of their tax burdens, and special favors, such as free or low rent and education for the children. The system of marriage loans was started in Germany in 1933 with loans of up to one thousand marks to responsible healthy couples. The bride must have worked six months in the preceding two years, but could not work after her marriage until the loan was repaid unless her husband earned less than one hundred and twenty-five marks per month. No interest was required for the loans, and repayment was to be made at the rate of 1 per cent a month. The birth of each child reduced the original loan by 25 per cent. In 1934, loyalty to the state was also required for a loan. The funds were secured by taxing unmarried persons earning seventy-five marks per month. Up to 1937, 700,000 loans had been granted.[1]

Subsidies were given to large families, at the rate of ten marks a month for the fifth child and later children under sixteen, if the father earned under one hundred and eighty-five marks per month.

In 1937, Italy also provided for marriage loans in a similar manner, with a sum of 1000 to 3000 lire given men and women not over twenty-six years old whose combined income did not exceed 12,000 lire per annum.[2] The first repayment of 1 per cent without interest was due six months after marriage unless the wife was pregnant in the fifth month, in which case the first payment was due eighteen months after marriage. The birth of a child, alive and normal, cancelled 10 per cent of the loan. The birth of a second child cancelled 20 per cent of the loan, and the birth of a third, 30 per cent. The birth of the fourth child cancelled the remainder of the loan.

[1] Clifford Kirkpatrick, *Nazi Germany: Its Women and Family Life* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1938), p. 131.

[2] "Family Loans in Italy," *Monthly Labor Review*, 46:57, January, 1938.

The campaign for larger families also included a lowering of the amount of required schooling, the provision of housing facilities, stricter laws against abortion, and a disapproving attitude on birth control with a reduction in birth-control clinics.

That the National Socialist aim was the birth of many children for the war service of the state rather than for the strengthening of family sentiments is shown by the sponsorship of illegitimate births by certain high governmental officials. Their attitude seems to have been that healthy illegitimate babies were better than none at all. Thus, Heinrich Himmler, chief of the secret police of the Reich, is reported to have said on December 23, 1939: "Beyond the limits of bourgeois laws and customs which ordinarily are probably necessary, it can become an exalted task even outside of wedlock for German women and girls of good blood to become — not frivolously but imbued with deepest moral concern — mothers of children begotten by soldiers moving to the front without knowing whether they will return or die for the Fatherland." [1] Himmler promised that special sponsors would be appointed by him for all children of good blood born in or out of wedlock whose fathers fell in the war. There was opposition to his proposal, especially from the church. Nor did it find favor in the eyes of the masses of the people if the decrease in the incidence of illegitimacy in Germany after 1932 may be so interpreted.[2] But coming from such a high governmental source the approval of illegitimacy, of a selected type, may have been a factor in lifting the rate above what it would otherwise have been.

The idea of increasing the number of believers in National Socialism was also carried over in the practice of depopulating countries not so believing. Thus, young men in Poland and Czechoslovakia were taken for compulsory labor service to Germany and kept from contact with girls either of their own nationality or of German nationality.

Governmental policies versus social trends

Here, then, are a number of programs sponsored by the totalitarian states in the interests of promoting the birth rate. These programs

[1] *The New York Times*, December 24, 1939.

[2] The rates of illegitimate births per 1000 of all births for the Old Reich are as follows: 1932, 11.6; 1933, 10.7; 1934, 8.6; 1935, 8.0; 1936, 7.8; 1937, 7.7; 1938, 7.4. There has thus been a steady decline in the rate. Data for 1932–35 from Clifford Kirkpatrick, *Nazi Germany: Its Women and Family Life*, p. 204. Data for 1936–38 from Frank H. Hankins, in "Comment" on Conrad and Irene B. Taeuber, "German Fertility Trends, 1933–39," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI, number 2, September, 1940.

entail a tremendous amount of effort, organization, propaganda, and expense. It is pertinent to ask whether they have been successful. While the evidence does not warrant a conclusive answer, the results are certainly not very striking. The crude birth rate in Germany increased from 14.7 per 1000 population in 1933 to 19.7 in 1938. The increases were general for all birth orders and all durations of marriage. It has been estimated that about one third of the increase of legitimate births in the Old Reich during this period was due to the increase in the number of marriages, with the remaining two thirds of the increase attributed to an actual increase in fertility. The German marriage rates for the nineteen-thirties show that the increase largely occurred during the first year or two of the Nazi régime, and so may have been in part the result of the initial marriage loans which hastened marriages that would have occurred sooner or later in any event. It is highly questionable whether in the long run marriage loans have any great effect on the rate of marriage, although if they lead couples to marry at an earlier age they do serve to increase the birth rate, since younger mates generally have the larger families. It is also thought that the fertility of marriages with loans was higher than that of marriages without loans, but the poorer economic classes tend to have more children, so it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the loans. Divorce decreased in Germany under National Socialist rule, but this fact is not regarded as contributing much to the increase in births. Illegitimacy, as we have seen, likewise diminished, and hence is not an important factor in this connection. The most probable positive factors responsible for the increased birth rate are the decrease in abortions[1] and the temporary prosperity of the masses brought about by enormous state outlays for war and the fruits of extensive conquest. With the coming of the Nazis and their vast expenditures in preparation for war the business cycle swung upward, and this brought an increase in marriages and a higher birth rate. Economic prosperity nearly always has this effect.

We conclude that the birth rate increased under the National Socialist program, but how much of the increase is to be attributed to the program and how much to other factors is not clear. Without benefit of marriage loans and subsidies the birth rate increased surprisingly in the late nineteen-thirties and early nineteen-forties in the United

[1] P. K. Whelpton, "Why the Large Rise in the German Birthrate?" *American Journal of Sociology*, 41:299–313, November, 1935.

States when the government spending in preparation for war brought economic prosperity to the nation. And while the Nazi policies were efficacious in Austria, they appear not to have worked in Italy. At least the birth rate in Italy fell during the nineteen-thirties, despite a program of loans and subsidies similar to that of Germany.

The experience of the war states shows that governmental policies affecting the family are successful only if they are supported by the prevailing social trends. If the dictates of government go counter to these deep-rooted social forces, they fail. The experience with the birth rate is a case in point. The National Socialist Party wished to encourage parenthood and so it provided marriage loans, but compulsory military and labor service made early marriage difficult. Even if the Nazis did succeed in raising the birth rate temporarily by patriotic appeals, by small payments of money, and by public recognition of mothers of many children, it is not likely that the gain would be retained for long by people who wanted an ever higher standard of living. The money which the state grants for each additional child is, of course, of some help, but the amount is scarcely adequate, nor can it be, for the state is unable to bear the major part of the cost of rearing the children.

Still another Nazi policy which ran counter to the times is that which had to do with the status of women. In Nazi Germany, the ideal woman was one who was a good wife and mother, who did not enter masculine work, and who raised her children to love the Fatherland. This ideal was carried out by Germany through its Mother Service Department established in 1934 to educate women over eighteen years of age for the duties and responsibilities of motherhood. Attendance at meetings was voluntary except for those who were to become wives of SS. men, an élite organization of warriors. Women were thus expected to make housekeeping a career rather than to enter employment. Later this idea was somewhat revised to mean that women should enter only "womanly occupations." Military, political, and judicial professions were closed to women, but they could enter other professions, although there were many restrictions connected with them. Women lawyers were not allowed to have judgeships, and in 1936 women court officials were dismissed. Women teachers were also dismissed, even in girls' schools. Attempts were made to exclude women from medicine and politics. The extent to which these attempts were successful in politics can be seen by the

fact that when the Reichstag was dissolved in 1932, there were thirty-eight women members. After November, 1933, there was not a single woman member in this body. It is clear that the status of women in Germany was greatly affected by the ideals of the Nazi state.



FIGURE 48. DO SUBSIDIES HELP THE BIRTH RATE?

Number of births per 1000 population, United States and Germany, 1914–42. Nazi Germany's effort to stimulate the birth rate was tremendous, but the results were not very striking. The birth rate in the United States rose even higher without benefit of loans and subsidies. From *Fortune Magazine*, March, 1943.

It is true that patriarchal traditions were strong in Germany, but here, as in other highly industrialized nations, the trend had been for women to leave the home for other work. With small families, modern conveniences, and virtually no economic production in the home, many women felt they did not have enough to do at home. Others felt that they must work in order to make both ends meet or to have a higher standard of living. Added to these general considerations was the establishment of a war economy by the militaristic Nazis, which greatly increased the demand for the labor of women. Thus, despite official pronouncements about the place of women being in the home, women in Germany remained in industry to a large extent. The actual number increased from 1933 to 1936, although the relative number decreased. More than a third of these women workers (36.8 per cent) were married. In the United States, with a population

twice as large as that of Germany, only a little more than a quarter of the women workers (28.9 per cent) were married.[1] This means that the government which militated against the employment of married women actually had a larger percentage at work than the state which took no official action on the matter. Had the state been more severe and outlawed all jobs for married women, of course woman's place would have had to be at home. But the state could not do this because as the war progressed it felt the need for increased production with a decreased manpower.

Returning to the matter of the birth rate in Germany, it must further be noted that while the rate did increase during the nineteen-thirties under National Socialism, at the close of the decade it was still considerably below that desired to maintain the increment of males nineteen to twenty years of age at not less than the increment of 1930.[2] The achievements of the German policies show that for a five-year period, 1934–38, the total real increase in fertility exceeded the total births of 1933, and equaled those of 1934. The births in the first three quarters of 1939 showed increases over the corresponding quarters of 1938, and preliminary figures seem to indicate that the number of births rose also during 1940.[3] When viewed over a longer period of time, however, the birth rate in Germany has declined, as it has in all the other principal nations. In Germany it dropped .27 per cent between 1913 and 1938.[4]

These population policies designed to increase the birth rate, although carried to their fullest development by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, are not confined to states with just one type of political ideology, but are a function of war states generally. The opening paragraph of this chapter referred to the recent introduction of subsidies for babies in Russia. Democratic Sweden, to encourage young people to marry early, furnishes loans up to one thousand kronor, the amount to be repaid in five years.[5] Seventy-five kronor are paid to every

[1] Clifford Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

[2] Conrad and Irene B. Taeuber, "German Fertility Trends, 1933–39," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI, number 2, September, 1940.

[3] The report for the first three quarters of 1940 showed a total of 1,131,300 births. The total for the corresponding period of 1939 was 1,097,800. Data supplied by Frank H. Hankins in a letter dated February 12, 1941.

[4] The rates of decline between 1913 and 1938 for certain other nations are: Great Britain, .36 per cent; Italy, .36; United States, .28; France, .19; and Japan, .12. League of Nations, *Yearbook*, 1938–39.

[5] Harriet Dahllof, "Both Doing Well," *The American Swedish Monthly*, 35:8, May, 1941.

woman at childbirth whose income is not over three thousand kronor, which includes 90 per cent of the mothers.[1] The Swedish government, as does Soviet Russia, sponsors housing on terms favorable to families with many children.

Preparation for war is not the only reason for wanting a bigger population. Pride in numbers is probably a quite general phenomenon in every nation, and a decline in population brings an unfavorable public reaction. Although it is by no means clear that a stationary population, or even a slight reduction in population, is altogether undesirable from an economic standpoint in a modern industrial society — it may indeed be a good thing — nations facing a decrease in numbers tend to view the situation with alarm.

Sweden affords a good example of a non-military state greatly concerned about her falling population. Like other modern industrialized nations, Sweden experienced a decline in population for a number of decades, but her decline was more acute than that of other nations. Her net reproduction rate, in fact, has been one of the lowest among the nations, fully a quarter or more below replacement needs. The true situation was obscured by the increase in marriages and births during the nineteen-thirties, but these increases were due to a temporary abnormal age distribution which provided an unusual number of persons of marriageable ages, and hence an increased marriage rate. An additional factor was the increased economic prosperity of the nation during this period, with Sweden practically spared the secondary depression of 1937–38. But the real potentialities for population increase in Sweden are fewer than ever before, so that a further drop of 25 per cent is anticipated unless conditions should radically change.[2]

That the Swedish people have been disturbed about this decline is evidenced by the widespread debates of 1934 on population policy, by the appointment of a Royal Commission on Swedish Population Problems in 1935, and by the enactment in 1937 and subsequent years of large reforms to improve the economic situations of families with children. Sweden, a nation which has enjoyed peace for more than one hundred years, probably has no military ambitions. One reason

[1] A. Hojer, "Some Aspects of Swedish Social Welfare," *Public Health and Medical Care* (Swedish Royal Commission: New York World's Fair, 1939), p. 31.

[2] Gunnar Myrdal, *Population: A Problem for Democracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), p. 178. See also "Population Problems and Policies in Sweden," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 197:200–15, May, 1938.

is the utter futility of such ambition on the part of a nation with a population of only six million, when her neighbors, Germany and Russia, have eighty million and one hundred and seventy million inhabitants respectively (1945). But an interest in population for war purposes may be present, even so. A number of smaller powers may bind together with a big power, and so numbers are also important to small nations from a military standpoint. Even if such a policy were unrealistic, it might still exist. State policies, like those of individuals, are not always motivated by reasons that are reasonable.

Be this as it may, the Swedish system of family welfare bears many resemblances to that of Russia and Nazi Germany, although naturally each nation shows some distinctive characteristics. A distinguishing mark of the Swedish policy is democratization of birth control and the legalization of abortions. Abortions are now illegal in Russia, and in the last years of the Nazi régime the code provided the death penalty for the abortionist "in cases in which it was shown that the vitality of the German people has been impaired by repeated abortion." But in Sweden, because the state believed that no children should be born unless wanted, a law was put through in 1939 which made abortions legal on humanitarian, biological, social, and medical grounds.[1]

The Swedish leaders say they are interested in quality as well as quantity, and they do not desire to maintain the population by having the poorer elements, through ignorance, bear very large families which they cannot support or educate properly. The rate of illegitimacy in Sweden has been very high, about one seventh of all births, but the leaders regard such illegitimate births as undesirable, since they represent unwanted children. Since the view has been adopted that in a democracy only such children should be born as are wanted and as can properly be cared for, voluntary parenthood, with state sponsorship of contraceptive hygiene, has been accepted by the government as the basis for the new population policy. This meant the repeal of the existing laws prohibiting the dissemination of contraceptive information and the establishment, instead, of clinics throughout the land at which such information may be obtained. This service, supported by taxation, is rendered without cost to those applying for it. To make the program more comprehensive and effective, a cur-

[1] Alva Myrdal, "A Programme for Family Security in Sweden," *International Labour Review*, 30:723–63, June, 1939.

riculum of sex education has been introduced into the schools, starting with the elementary grades.

In Russia, birth control is legal (1945), but the state does not sponsor the program as does Sweden. Russia can afford to sanction contraception, at least for the present, since she has the highest birth rate of all the nations in Europe, and unlike the nations of northwest Europe enjoys a highly favorable net reproduction rate. Yet Russia is campaigning for even bigger families. Her losses in World War II were heavy, and she has vast areas to be settled. It is also possible that she is anticipating the effects of increased industrialization which in other nations have led to a declining birth rate.

The reader naturally has a special interest in the population policy of the United States. Will the United States follow the example of other powers and encourage bigger families in the future? We already have the rudiments of a special national program of family welfare, although it is not so comprehensive or so highly integrated as are those in other nations. The federal income tax discriminates in favor of married couples with children, with further exemptions for additional dependents. The Social Security Act includes benefits for needy families. The maternal and child-health provisions make possible prenatal clinics and nursing services, especially in rural areas, while the child-welfare sections allow needy dependent children to receive financial aid in their own homes. The Cellar Act, passed in July, 1937, provides that no person shall be discriminated against in connection with the federal civil service, because of his or her marital status. Local governments provide public housing for low-income families, and financial assistance is furnished to prospective home owners by the Federal Housing Administration. These and other programs reveal a quickening of the public interest in family welfare and may be the forerunners of a more systematic program in the future. The United States is still a comparatively young, prosperous country where optimism regarding the future is high and where the actual population increase from year to year obscures the undercover decrease in the birth rate. It is true that the population of the United States has been increasing, but for some time now — the recent war years excepted — the birth rate has been declining and the growth of population has been slackening. If this trend continues, the population must shortly become stationary, then decline. The United States has important military commitments in many parts of the world, and its national



PLATE 8. SOCIAL HOUSING IN SCANDINAVIA

Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland lead the way in social housing for the lower and medium income groups. By social housing is meant those forms of housing in the construction of which the profit motive is not present or is not prominent. In the cities are to be found municipal apartments for the lowest income groups, "self-help" housing for workers, co-operative houses and industrial housing for workers in factories. Upper: Skilled mechanics employed by the city erect the pre-fabricated walls of a "self-help" house. Lower: New apartment buildings of "The Tenants' Savings and Building Society," the largest co-operative housing society in Sweden. This type represents the latest development in Swedish apartment house planning. From JOHN GRAHAM, JR., HOUSING IN SCANDINAVIA. *(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1940.)*

Sovfoto

European

PLATE 9. WOMEN'S WORK IN THE U.S.S.R.

Upper: In Russia the range of occupations open to women is wider than in other western countries, and they receive the same pay as men. Are these temporary phenomena, associated with intensive, rapid industrialization and an acute shortage of male labor?

Sovfoto

PLATE 10. MEDALS FOR MOTHERS

Lower: Mikhail Kalinin, late Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Presidium, awards "Mother Heroine" medals to Russian women who have borne ten or more babies. Other nations use other methods to stimulate births. Whether such measures greatly affect the cycle of population growth and decline is an unanswered question.

policies are increasingly dominated by military considerations. It would, therefore, not be surprising if in the future the United States also sponsored a higher birth rate and offered bonuses for babies.

To sum up: Western history during the last two hundred years or so records the progressive transfer of functions from the family and the church to state and industry. In Russia, under communism, this trend has been carried to its furthest development, with the family and church both subordinate to the state which has absorbed industry. Russia represents an extreme pattern, but the trend in industrial nations generally is in the direction of an increase in the economic power of the state. The state renders an impressive number of services for the family for which the family itself previously assumed responsibility. The state, because of its broad tax base and great economic strength, is able, when it represents the whole population, to furnish a greater variety of services and a greater average volume of services per family than the separate families are able to provide for themselves under other economic systems. As a result, some of the loyalty previously shown to the family and the church is transferred to the state.

While the growth of the collectivist state reduces the economic, protective, educational, and recreational functions of the family, thereby diminishing its autonomy and lessening its integration, the effect of the prevailing economy is less conspicuous with regard to other aspects of family organization. Thus, the family is monogamous under various types of collectivism as well as in free enterprise systems. The size of family is nearly everywhere small in industrial nations regardless of type of economy. Divorce policy seems to bear no relation to the economic philosophy of the state. Even the status of women seems more closely related to industrial opportunities than to type of political organization. It would be very difficult to say how the affectional bonds between family members compare in intensity in societies with varying degrees of interrelationship of state and industry. If such differences in family affection exist, they are not conspicuous.

The reason many aspects of family organization are not highly correlated with the type of politico-economic system is, of course, that many other factors enter in to determine the shape of family organization in a complex modern society. Some of the more important are the state of development of inventions, the standard of living, and the cultural tradition. The influence of these factors has been considered in previous chapters. In general, it appears that the technological

factors, operating through inventions, are the primary determinants of family organization. Since, however, the modern state tends to incorporate within itself the economic organization, the state becomes, indirectly through its control of the technology and directly through its social services, a powerful source of influences bearing upon the family.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why are governmental services for the family increasing in all modern industrial nations? Is this a good thing?
2. How are the church and the family interrelated in the United States?
3. What bearing does political democracy have on the status of women?
4. Where is the tie-up of government and the family closer, in totalitarian states or in democracies? Why?
5. Is loyalty to the family detrimental to loyalty to the state?
6. Why did the German birth rate rise during the nineteen-thirties, but not the Italian, although both countries resorted to loans and subsidies? In the long run, do marriage loans have any great effect on the marriage rate?
7. How does family organization in a free enterprise system differ from that in a communist economy?
8. How did the Swedish population policy during the nineteen-thirties differ from the German?
9. What is the Swedish national policy with respect to the employment of married women? Do you approve?
10. How is a co-operative organized and how does it function? Do co operatives have any special significance for family life?
11. How does the status of women in Sweden compare with that in Russia?
12. Why does not the United States have an explicit national population policy?
13. Does political democracy necessitate economic and social democracy? Democracy in the home?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. A comparative study of pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary family patterns in Russia.

2. Governmental subsidies for large families.
3. The interrelationships of church and family in England.
4. Family welfare legislation in Australia.
5. Co-operative housing in Scandinavia.
6. Recent changes in Russia in the laws governing family life.
7. A national population policy for the United States.

SELECTED READINGS

Kingsbury, Susan M., and Mildred Fairchild, *Factory, Family and Woman in the Soviet Union.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935.

The best single source of information on the status of women in Soviet Russia in the early nineteen-thirties. For an earlier account, see Elaine Elnett, *Historic Origin and Social Development of Family Life in Russia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1926). For a good brief account of recent developments, see Rose Maurer, "Recent Trends in the Soviet Family," *American Sociological Review*, 9:242–49, June, 1944. This issue of the *Review* is devoted to "Recent Social Trends in the Soviet Union" and furnishes valuable background material.

Kirkpatrick, Clifford, *Nazi Germany: Its Women and Family Life.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1938.

The best single interpretation of family life in Nazi Germany.

Myrdal, F. Alva, *Nation and Family.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941.

The Swedish experiment in democratic family and population policy ably set forth by one who had a hand in the shaping of the policy.

Myrdal, Gunnar, *Population: A Problem for Democracy.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940.

The other half of the famed team of population experts points to an impending ideological crisis in Western civilization over the declining birth rate and proposes methods of meeting the crisis.

"The Rôle and Function of the Family in a Democracy," *Living*, II, number 1, February, 1940.

This magazine, now called *Marriage and Family Living*, is the official quarterly publication of the National Conference on Family Relations.

Part Three

MARRIAGE AND PERSONALITY

PREVIOUS CHAPTERS have dealt with the more formal, objective, institutional aspects of the family, such as the economic, ethnic, ecological, and ethnological. These considerations are interesting in themselves and are necessary for an adequate understanding of family organization, but they also have considerable bearing on the happiness and social adjustment of the individuals who make up the family. For instance, in discussing the differences between rural and urban families, we are interested in knowing how rural and urban life affect the behavior of persons reared in the two contrasting environments. Likewise, we are interested in variations in economic and political conditions of family life because such variations affect the attitudes and habits of the members of families.

In Part Three this interest in the human side of the family becomes the central consideration. The purpose of the discussion is to focus rather sharply on the factor of personality, because this is crucial in marital adjustment. It seems highly desirable to deal with personality in the making, for if personality is to be controlled in the interests of happiness there must be understanding of how personality develops. Because there is much misconception of the function of heredity, Chapter 10 undertakes to clarify what heredity does and does not contribute. Chapter 11 continues the discussion of personality development with reference to the more variable, and, therefore, more significant, contributions of the group and culture, noting especially the strategic rôle of one's experiences in the parental family. Since this chapter analyzes the factors that shape personality, it may be regarded as a discussion of some of the principal dangers, as well as desiderata, in parent-child relationships. In due course the child matures and the period of adolescence brings heightened interest in the opposite sex

and in the process of forming a new family. These experiences of courting and choosing a mate are highly important, and hence are dealt with in separate discussions (Chapters 12 and 13). A further chapter (14) is devoted to the interesting question of the possibility of predicting marital happiness, a question to which science makes a promising answer. Following the central discussion of marital adjustment itself in Chapter 15, there is a final chapter (16) on the having of children, the event which continues the cycle of the generations.

Chapter 10

HEREDITY AND PERSONALITY

WHAT DOES THE FAMILY contribute to the child's personality? [1] This question is difficult to answer because the family's contribution is both indirect and direct; that is, biological as well as social. Even if a child loses his parents at birth and is reared by others, his personality is influenced by the unique endowment received from his forbears. Although handed down directly from parents to offspring, the biological contribution of the family to personality is largely indirect, because the hereditary factors do not by themselves determine personality traits. These depend directly on our experiences, especially those of the early years of life which center in the family.

THE MECHANISM of HEREDITY

Part of the contribution of the parents, then, is the transmission of life through the germ plasm. The contribution is instantaneous and final, for once a human egg has been fertilized, it contains all the hereditary structures it will ever have, though in some cases it may take years for the structures to mature fully. The fertilized egg contains forty-eight chromosomes, half contributed by each parent. Within the chromosomes are gelatinous substances, resembling beads strung together, which are, or contain, the genes. The genes are the determiners of inheritance, and a single chromosome contains scores to hundreds of them.

When a child is born, we look to see which parent he most closely resembles. He may resemble either parent, neither parent, or both

[1] By personality we mean the pattern of a person's thoughts, feelings, and actions — that is, his psychological behavior as distinguished from his physiological behavior, although many interconnections exist between these two fields. Habits, opinions, and attitudes constitute the core of personality. The terms "human personality" and "human nature" are used interchangeably.

parents. A father is often surprised when his son does not resemble him and may even be disturbed if there is no resemblance to either parent. In so far as this attitude is not just sentiment, it may betray ignorance of the principles of heredity. Members of a particular family are likely to resemble each other more than do an equal number of individuals chosen at random, but there is still room for considerable variation because of the recombination of the parental genes in the offspring.[1] Each parent gives the offspring genes which, though similar in general function, may differ in character and may result in different traits. If both parents had exactly the same genes, the children would all be carbon copies of their parents. Actually, children are never replicas of their parents and generally differ markedly from



FIGURE 49. HUMAN CHROMOSOMES

A microscopic view of the twenty-four different pairs that are responsible for all our hereditary traits. Each parent gives one of the two genes from each of his pairs to the child. Redrawn from A. Scheinfeld, *You and Heredity* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1939).

[1] Dominant mutational changes are only very infrequently a source of changes in man over short periods of time, although it is probable that the great variety of human genes is at least partly the result of mutations that have occurred during the tens of thousands of years of man's evolution. For discussion of mutation, see Thomas Hunt Morgan, *The Scientific Basis of Evolution* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1935).

them. This shows that human parents are invariably mixed or hybrid, and that there are no pure human family lines.

How the principles of inheritance work out in practice can be illustrated by a few specific structures such as the color of the eyes and of the skin. If a male with pure blue eyes marries a female who also has pure blue eyes, all the children will have pure blue eyes. If the parents both have pure brown eyes, the offspring will have pure brown eyes. Should a male with pure brown eyes, determined by the gene *GG*, mate with a female carrying gene *gg* for pure blue eyes, the offspring will have mixed brown eyes (*Gg*). These will look like the father's eyes, despite the fact that they are the result of a combination of the genes for brown and the genes for blue eyes. However, if two hybrid individuals mate, both of whom have mixed brown eyes (*Gg*), the offspring will have brown eyes and blue eyes in the proportions *GG*, *Gg*, *Gg*, and *gg*; that is, one pure brown-eyed offspring, two mixed brown-eyed, and one pure blue-eyed. The determiners for blue eyes were not lost in the second generation. They reappeared in the third. The brown color is more vigorous than the blue and appears more frequently.

On the basis of similar evidence on inheritance in sweet peas, Abbott Gregor Mendel nearly one hundred years ago posited three laws of inheritance: (1) The inherited factors are passed along unaltered from generation to generation. (2) The genes are paired, but are not necessarily of equal potency. When the genes differ in their effects, one may dominate the other. The controlling gene is called the *dominant*, the subordinate gene the *recessive*. (3) The genes for each trait are segregated in the new individual and remain apart from other genes. Mendel's epochal findings were ignored during his lifetime and were not rediscovered until the turn of the century. Since then, many experimenters, notably Thomas Hunt Morgan and his co-workers, have proved that while the mechanism of heredity is not so simple as Mendel thought, his principles were essentially correct.

In eye color, a number of genes are involved, but a single key one is decisive. The genes for black or brown eyes are dominant over those for blue or the other shades. Blue eyes are recessive to light-brown, green, or gray, but it is not known with certainty what happens when green meets gray. Wide eyes dominate narrow ones and long lashes prevail over short. Hair color is determined by the genes producing melanin, or hair pigment. A heavy deposit of melanin means black



FIGURE 50. PURE AND MIXED FAMILY LINES IN EYE COLOR

When pure blue-eyed or brown-eyed persons mate, all children have the same color eyes as their parents. When a blue-eyed person marries a brown-eyed person, the children have a mixture of brown and blue genes, even though their eyes are brown. If such hybrids intermarry, their offspring will have brown and blue eyes in the ratio of three to one.

hair, lesser deposits dark brown, light brown, or blond. Red hair is due to a supplementary gene which produces red pigment, but it may be obscured by a very active melanin gene, so that not all those who have the gene for red hair actually have red hair. With few exceptions, light hair is recessive to darker hair. In a similar manner the genes for certain types of nose, ears, mouth, teeth, head, and hair dominate over other types of these structures.

The paired genes are not always unequal in effect. If a Negro mates with a white person, all the children are mulattoes. Neither the genes for black skin or those for white skin are dominant; hence the two combine to produce the new skin color, brown. The blending, however, occurs only in the effects produced, not in the genes themselves, as noted by the third Mendelian principle stated above. When two mulattoes mate, since both have genes for white and black skin

which recombine at random, they may produce children of various shades, ranging from the darkest black of any Negro grandparent to the fairest skin of any white grandparent, although the chances favor the mulatto shade.

Suppose a white person mates with a mulatto. Is it possible for this couple to have a black child? A generation ago, C. B. Davenport, studying Negro-white crosses, laid down the rule that the child can never be darker than the darker parent. This fact is of considerable importance, presumably, for light mulattoes. Similarly, if a black person mates with a person who is part white, the children cannot be lighter than the lighter parent. There are some extremely rare possibilities that the multiple factors (perhaps five or six) responsible for skin color may recombine in such a way as to violate Davenport's rule, but for practical purposes they may be ignored. Infrequent exceptions may also result from accidents of maturation, just as on rare occasions two blue-eyed parents have a child without blue eyes.

Ignorance of the Mendelian principles sometimes leads to fantastic notions regarding inheritance. Thus, it is a recurring superstition that if two white persons marry, one having a remote Negro ancestor, they can have a Negro child. A black child is possible only if *both* parents have color genes for black skin. It is possible that very light mulattoes may pass as white, for there are many shades of white skin, ranging from the fairest Nordic to the swarthiest Mediterranean. Two mulattoes may, of course, have a black child. But if two white parents have a Negro child it may be asserted that both have Negro ancestry or that the actual father of the child is a Negro.

The genes for any trait exist in pairs. Those for pure brown eyes are alike, as the symbol *GG* indicates. The genes for mixed brown eyes (*Gg*) differ. The fact that the two members of a pair of genes may differ is of great significance. When the fertilized egg develops through cell division and cell differentiation, each cell of the body receives a complete repertoire of the paired genes, with the single exception of the germ cells which contain only one gene of each pair. When the male and female germ cells unite, each contributes one member of all the pairs of genes needed by the individual.

The existence of pair-differences in genes largely accounts for the great variation in the physical structure of human beings. If a person has two pairs of unlike genes, he produces four types of germ cells. Suppose a man has genes for mixed brown eyes (*Gg*) and is of blood

group *AB*. When sperms are formed, each will have one gene from each pair. The following combinations are possible and will occur in equal numbers: *GA*, *GB*, *gA*, and *gB*. If an individual has three pairs of unlike genes, he will produce eight kinds of germ cells; if four pairs, sixteen kinds, and so on. The number of types of germ cells increases very rapidly with relatively small increase in the number of unlike pairs of genes. A convenient formula for the number of possible kinds of germ cells is 2^n, where n equals the number of unlike pairs of genes. If n were two hundred, the total would be greater than the number of electrons in the universe. Since our genes are numbered in the thousands, it is little wonder that no two children are alike in their inheritance, except identical twins.



FIGURE 51. HOW INFERIOR PARENTS MAY PRODUCE SUPERIOR OFFSPRING

Fortunately, nearly all inherited defects are recessive, which means that both parents must have the same deficiency in their genes if it is to appear in their offspring. In the diagram, the father (*P*) has both genes defective (white) in the second pair shown; the mother (*M*), both defective in the fourth pair; the defects appear then in each, not merely in their chromosomes. The offspring (*F*), receiving one set of genes (*p* and *m*) from each parent, has no pair in which both genes are defective (white); it is therefore not defective. Each parent supplies a normal gene for the pair that is defective in the other parent. The danger of marriage between closely related couples is that the gene defects, if any, are more likely to lie in the same pairs of chromosomes than in the case of unrelated couples. From H. S. Hennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature*, p. 15.

Structure and Function

The great power of the microscopic hereditary substances is truly awe-inspiring, and the precision of the processes by which they work is marvelous to contemplate, but unless we are careful we may be led into making erroneous and even fantastic claims for heredity. For instance, it is alleged by some writers that the following are inherited: altruism, the worship of God, gregariousness, parental love.

Is there an inherited love of children on the part of parents? We may answer this question by observing that structures of various kinds are inherited, but not functions. This is an important idea for students of the family, and it seems to be hard to grasp. Heredity is a biological phenomenon, and only physical structures are inherited. A structure is living matter, and has the capacity to react and grow. Some structures, like those involved in the "batting of an eye," act very simply and are not affected much by varied environments. The eye reflexes work about the same whether one lives in Europe, Africa, or China. Other structures, like the apparatus of speech, are more complicated and are subject to considerable modification by learning. The apparatus of speech is inherited: the voice box, the vocal cords, the nervous mechanism, and all the rest; that is, the capacity to make sounds is inherited. But the use of this inherited mechanism to speak Chinese, French, or Bantu is learned. The vocal apparatus of a deaf mute may be perfect, but he cannot speak because he has never heard language spoken. The inherited vocal apparatus does not determine linguistic behavior.

Parental love, like speech, is learned behavior. It is actually not just one type of behavior, but the combination of a variety of acts, like fondling the child, worrying about it, taking it to the doctor, and getting it ready for school in the morning.[1] What physical structures could possibly determine such complex and diversified behavior? Only for nursing the infant is a predisposing physiological basis evident. After birth, a close relationship is established between child and mother because the baby, if it is to survive, must be fed and its body temperature must not be allowed to vary greatly. The mother undertakes to supply these needs, and for the feeding process a definite physiological foundation is discernible in the mammary glands which following childbirth become distended, causing distress until relieved. It has become fashionable, however, for mothers not to breast-feed their offspring, even when capable of doing so, but to relieve the tensions of the mammary glands by artificial means. A mother who feeds her baby by bottle may love the baby, but the inherited maternal structure is not responsible for the new type of feeding. And what is the rôle of the inherited structure when mothers turn on their children and destroy them? Infanticide is a widespread

[1] L. L. Bernard, *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1924).

occurrence among preliterate peoples, who resort to the practice in lieu of birth control as a means of adjusting population to resources. By arguing that the mothers love their children and are loath to part with them,[1] infanticide may be reconciled with the belief in a maternal instinct, but even so it is apparent that the inherited maternal structures do not determine the type of maternal behavior.

Human Versus Animal Heredity

In evaluating heredity's contribution to the child, a major point is that human behavior is not so closely correlated with physical structure as is the behavior of the lower animals. A female rat will at a certain stage during the period of gestation undertake to build a nest and make other anticipatory adjustment, whereas no such behavior occurs when the rat is not impregnated. Immediately after parturition interest in the offspring is at its height and is then stronger than interest in food, water, or sex.[2] When the period of lactation has passed, the white rat shows little interest in her young, indicating a close connection between the maternal behavior and the glandular condition. This is indicated, too, by the fact that if certain hormones of the anterior pituitary are implanted in male rats, they behave like females; that is, they build nests, lick their young, and go through the motions of feeding, although there are no evident changes in their mammary glands.[3]

In rats, birds, and other lower animals, we find then a nest-building instinct which is an advantage in survival, since the animals do not have to depend upon one another for the knowledge of how to build a nest. Man has no such specific inherited capacity, and its lack may in the beginning of man's existence have been something of a handicap. Even some human beings with a rudimentary culture are able to provide the child with little protection against the elements. The Australian aborigines have only a lean-to for shelter, and the Onas of

[1] There appear to be few, if any, accounts in the ethnological literature which show remorse or distress on the part of mothers, and in some places, for instance Australia and New Hebrides, mothers do away with their offspring on the grounds of mere inconvenience. N. Miller, *The Child in Primitive Society* (New York: Brentano's, 1928). For numerous illustrations of infanticide and the harsh methods often employed, see W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1906).

[2] C. J. Warden *et al.*, *Animal Motivation*, 1931. Strength of drive was measured by willingness to take punishment (an electric shock) in order to obtain food, water, sex satisfaction, or retrieve young when separated from them.

[3] M. McQueen-Williams, "Maternal Behavior in Male Rats," *Science*, 82:67–68, 1935.

South America go practically naked despite the cold climate, and, lacking adequate shelter, try to keep warm before an open fire. But man early began to learn to protect himself, first by living in caves, later by building houses. He learned to make a more durable and livable "nest" for himself than the birds can build, whether it be the igloo to keep out the bitter cold or the adobe mud house to keep out the burning sun.

The extensive possibilities which human beings possess are the result of nervous and glandular structures which are only partially complete at birth. The more rigid behavior of animals, like the pecking ability of the chick, represents a fuller integration of the nervous system. Unlike the chick, the human infant does not have the capacity to seek out his food, but because of this lack later develops a more varied set of eating habits. The prolonged period of growth of the human organism, and particularly of the nervous and glandular structures, is then the basis of man's great capacity for learning. Human heredity presents highly flexible and malleable material for culture to mold. Man's great gift of heredity is not a list of skills already provided or patterns of adjustment already formed, but an almost unlimited capacity to learn. Though the difference in learning capacity between man and other animals may be only a matter of degree, this difference is substantial and of the greatest significance.

Nervous and glandular systems

The inherited structures most influential in mental and emotional behavior are the nervous and glandular systems. The nervous system, like a telephone switchboard, is a mechanism for receiving and responding to stimuli, both internal and external. Impulses of light, color, sound, heat, cold, and pain are received by the eyes, ears, and skin. Various internal stimuli are also received, especially from the stomach and the sex and excretory organs. The desire for food can be created by the contraction of the muscles of the walls of the stomach, which happens periodically, as well as by the sight of tempting food. The impulses are transmitted from the receptors along afferent nerves to the appropriate center in the spinal cord or brain, where the impulses are redirected to the muscles or glands to produce the required response.

In the same way the glands of internal secretion have the power to produce behavior in response to stimuli originating within the glands

as well as from the outside. The glands are interrelated and work in concert, although each also has its specialized functions. They achieve their effect by pouring chemical substances called hormones directly into the blood stream. These produce reactions similar to those produced by other stimuli through the nervous system. For instance, thyroxin, the hormone of the thyroid glands on either side of the larynx, steps up the rate of breathing and vitalizes behavior. A hormone of the four parathyroids, located in pairs near each thyroid, contributes to the clotting property of the blood. An inherited deficiency of this hormone underlies hemophilia, in which the lack of clotting quality of the blood is so great that even slight injuries may result in death through uncontrollable bleeding. Parathyroid deficiency is also associated with nervous instability; an excess of the hormone is believed to be a factor in eidetic, or photographic memory, whereby a single glance at a page may be sufficient to enable one to repeat from memory what he has seen. The pituitary gland, located at the base of the brain, has a number of known functions. One of its hormones regulates bodily height, while another stimulates sex development, as do the hormones of the gonads. Adrenin, the hormone of the adrenals, located near the tip of the kidneys, increases the blood sugar from the liver, and by supplying fresh energy helps the body to meet physical emergencies. The functions of the pineal gland, located in the head, are not well understood. Those of the thymus gland, in the chest astride the windpipe in the region of the heart, are probably associated with sexual development during the first few years of life, after which the gland shrivels up and is absorbed.

The conditioned response

In the simplest behavior, such as the blinking of the eye or the jerking of the knee, the impulse is transmitted by the receptor along a single afferent nerve to the spinal column, then switched along an efferent nerve to the appropriate muscle which produces the blink of the eye, the knee jerk, or other response. Such a simple direct reaction is called a reflex, and is the smallest unit of behavior.

Very little behavior, however, is as simple as this. More complicated action is possible because, as has been stated, the nervous system is like a switchboard which theoretically makes possible the linking of several "stations" at the same time. A child touches a hot radiator, and the stimulus is transmitted to his brain and is felt by him as

pain. One such experience may be sufficient to teach the child that he must be careful of hot radiators. But his learning does not stop here. When he touches the radiator his mother may say, "Hot, don't touch." He comes to associate the word "hot" with the sensation of pain, and learns to withdraw his hand from any object if he is warned that it is hot. This association of a new or substitute stimulus (*B*) for an original or appropriate stimulus (*A*) so that *B* succeeds in producing the same response as *A*, is known as the conditioned response. The mechanism of the conditioned response was first demonstrated in detail by the Russian physiologist, Pavlov, in his well-known experiments with dogs. Dogs normally salivate at the sight of food, but Pavlov showed that if a bell is rung when the food is presented, after a number of trials the ringing of the bell is itself sufficient to produce a flow of saliva. That is, the salivary reflex becomes conditioned to the sound of the bell as well as to the sight of food. Pavlov also found



FIGURE 52. LOCATION OF THE DUCTLESS GLANDS

Overlooked by early physiologists, the glands of internal secretion are small and located in well-protected portions of the body. Their influence on structure and behavior seems out of all proportion to their small size. This is especially true of the pituitary, popularly called the dictator of the system. From J. F. Dashiell, *Fundamentals of General Psychology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company), p. 214.

that unless the food is reintroduced after a number of trials, the ringing of the bell alone ultimately fails to produce the flow of saliva. Reinforcement by the original stimulus is necessary if forgetting is not to occur. These are only a few of the more elementary considerations governing the process of conditioning, which is highly complicated and not yet fully understood. But enough is known to show that the mechanism of the conditioned response plays an exceedingly important part in the learning process. Indeed, with the help of memory and language, it is probably the most important single key to human learning.

Heredity furnishes us with the capacity to learn — a nervous system capable of conditioned responses — but what we learn depends on experience. Before the mechanism of the conditioned response was understood, it was customary to explain much human behavior in terms of instincts (inborn tendencies to action), whereas actually the behavior was learned. Long lists of "instincts" were compiled, in which appeared such behavior as gregariousness, imitation, acquisitiveness, and maternal love. But there is, for instance, no evidence of an inherited tendency in man to enjoy the company of his fellows. The child is dependent upon its mother for food and protection, and if she supplies these, the child becomes attached to her through the mechanism of the conditioned response. If the same satisfactions are acceptably furnished by some person other than the child's mother, let us say a nurse, the child's affection is for the nurse, not the mother. There is no instinct of filial affection or natural love of the child for parent, as was formerly thought; the affection, if any, results from experience. If a child's early experiences with adults, strangers as well as familiars, are not happy ones, he will be inclined to shy away from people altogether and to become self-centered and introverted. Fondness for people and a desire to be in their company are traits which most people show only because they have found satisfaction in such relationships.

Effect of Physical Structure on Personality

Heredity produces variations in bodily structure, but what have these to do with personality, which is the major concern of this chapter? It is difficult to see what connection there is between white skin or black skin, short stature or tall stature, brown eyes or blue eyes, and the opinions that one holds, the way one feels, the habits

one acquires. It is popularly thought that men who have short stature are in general more touchy, more easily offended, more aggressive than those of tall stature. If so, the personality traits are not a direct result of the physical trait of short stature, but are due to the inferiority feelings engendered in short men who find themselves in competition with tall men, where society favors tallness. Even kings may not escape the social pressure; witness the high heels introduced by Louis XIV of France in order to compensate for his lack of height. Tall stature is probably valued in most societies, since it represents an advantage in economic and social competition, but a short person would probably feel less inferior among people like the African Negrillos, whose males average a height of about four feet six inches, than among the Lake Chad Negroes, who average six feet one inch.

An example of the special problems of the short male in our society is the difficulty he may have in his intimate association with women. In our culture and in many others the approved pattern is for the man to be taller than his mate, and he may be ridiculed if he is not. A tall man has the widest range of choice in mating, since he can choose from among women of short, medium, or tall stature. The man of medium height has less choice, since he is more or less limited to women of short or medium height; but the short man is restricted to very short women, unless he is willing to risk being the butt of social amusement. A comparable problem exists for the tall woman. Abnormal stature is something of a handicap, and it may lead to resentment and rebelliousness. If so, the traits of personality engendered by being short are of purely social origin, reflecting the prevailing values of the group.

One way to note the independence of physical and personality traits is to observe that physical traits are relatively fixed and constant, whereas personality traits are subject to great change. The personality traits of Negroes underwent considerable change when they made the transition from slavery to freedom, and from farm to urban life. Personality may be greatly affected by the vicissitudes of life, such as bereavement, illness, or financial disaster, without any great change in the physical structure of the individual involved. We all know what happens to a man's personality when he falls in love. Personality is not constant even within the individual, but varies with different situations, so that, for instance, a person may be brave on the playing field or in battle, but shrink from marriage. Rip Van Winkle was

not afraid of the vastnesses of the mountains, but trembled before the tongue of his termagant wife. A man may have the personality trait of honesty in dealing with his wife and children and in handling the accounts of his Sunday-School class, yet embezzle the funds entrusted to him by investors. Structure is relatively fixed and does not vary much with changes in the external conditions, but personality is a function of particular situations; hence it is highly dynamic.



FIGURE 53. HOW THE SOCIAL SITUATION AFFECTS PERSONALITY

The dials show the radical changes in scores on social behavior made by two preschool children after they were moved into new groups which gave them increased security. This illustrates the point that behavior is in part a function of particular social situations. Thus, a person who is unsuccessful in one marriage may be successful in another, and a student's class behavior may not be indicative of his behavior toward his mother. From Lois B. Murphy, *Social Behavior and Child Personality*, p. 244.

The discussion thus far has been concerned with the general relationship of physical structure to personality. But some structures have more to do with personality than others. A man's disposition, convictions, habits, and ideals may not be closely related to the color of his eyes, but are these traits unaffected by other types of physical structure, perhaps his endocrine glands and his brain? It is obvious that the glands of internal secretion and the brain do play a part in influencing personality. A person with a hyperactive thyroid gland, for instance, is likely to be nervous and easily agitated. A child who is feeble-minded develops a different kind of personality from one of average intelligence, and both will be different in some respects from a child who is a genius. These examples are sufficient to show that some structures are more closely allied to personality than others, and it is to these that we will now give special attention.

Of especial significance are certain types of structural malformations. The list of those which have an hereditary component is extensive, and there is no purpose in presenting it here. Examples are deformed ears or teeth, blotched face, scaly skin (ichthyosis), and the more extreme physical defects such as those seen in circus sideshows. Some of these conditions unfit a person for normal social adjustments, such as finding employment or getting married, but again it must be noted that the influence of the defect upon personality is indirect, through the negative attitude of the group toward the defect. The effect would be different if the group opinion were favorable, as in the case of medicine men in primitive society, who may be epileptic, but whose behavior is valued by the group which erroneously interprets the seizures as religiously inspired. In our society an epileptic lives under a cloud of public pity, if not avoidance, which is certainly no help to his spirits.

There are also a number of structural defects that lead to malfunctioning of the organs affected, such as rheumatic heart disease, diabetes, hemophilia, color blindness, pattern baldness. About 10 per cent of the cases of blindness and deafness are thought to be inherited. Of the heart diseases, the rheumatic type is the only one for which there is clear evidence of hereditary influence, although the disease may be due to other factors also. It is thought that diabetes is generally due to inherited inability of the pancreas to produce insulin. Pattern baldness and hemophilia (failure of the blood to clot normally) are sex-linked inheritances due to glandular deficiencies.

The effect of these defective structures on personality is sometimes partly direct through lowered vitality or limited activity, and partly indirect through their relation to adjustments to the group.

Although the list of structural defects thought to be inherited is a long one, over the years it has progressively shortened. At one time syphilis and tuberculosis were thought to be inherited, but this idea had to be abandoned when it was proved that both are germ diseases. A child may be born with syphilis, but this is because he contracts it from his mother, sometimes as early as the fourth or fifth month in embryo. The germ of syphilis is one of the few capable of being carried by the blood stream of the expectant mother directly to her unborn child; hence it is sometimes congenitally acquired. Tuberculosis may be contracted only after birth by contact with the tubercle bacillus. Feeblemindedness was once regarded as entirely due to bad heredity, but it is now recognized that possibly half of the cases involve constitutional or experiential factors. An extreme type of feeblemindedness, Mongolian idiocy, is now thought by some to be caused by constitutional defects in the mother's womb. At one time all mental disorders were believed to be inherited, but it seems that only a few types are definitely inherited, like Huntington's chorea (a degeneration of a part of the nervous system leading to convulsive twitchings and other involuntary motions). In some cases of schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis there may be an inherited weakness of the nervous system which makes the individual particularly vulnerable to strain. But in accounting for mental disorders the emphasis has shifted notably in recent years to an environmental interpretation. Night-blindness, formerly called an hereditary defect, has recently been linked to vitamin A deficiency, challenging its hereditary basis.

Are acquired characteristics inherited?

Earlier, when the mechanism of biological heredity was not so well understood, it was believed that characteristics acquired by an individual during his lifetime are transmitted to his offspring. The Lamarckian theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics was shattered by the work of Weismann, who showed that the germ cells are well insulated against bodily influences and are unaffected by the ordinary experiences of the individual. It is for this reason that a man who loses an arm or leg in an accident can become the father of a fully limbed child. Similarly, drunkenness in the parents cannot possibly

affect the child's heredity, although it may affect his development in embryo if the mother drinks to the point where it affects her health or nutrition. Drinking parents produce an environment which will affect the child after he is born, but this is not biological heredity.

If impairments of the body are not transmitted by heredity, neither are improvements in body or mind of the parents. The parents may both be brilliant scholars, but the hereditary mental endowment of their children is exactly the same as if neither parent had had a single day of schooling. There is no gain in literacy, in morality, or in any other virtue which must not be won anew in every generation through education. There are two mechanisms of transmission, the one biological via the germ plasm, the other social via learning. These processes are different and much harm can result from failure to distinguish between them.

The right to parenthood

The problem of what is inherited and what is not is of real concern to many persons who wonder if, in view of possible biological defects in their family line, they have the right to parenthood. For instance, is it permissible to marry if there is a family history of cancer or insanity? Persons with such problems wish to know whether the defects are inheritable. The discussion of the preceding paragraphs shows that no general answer can be given covering all defects, but that the answer depends on the type and distribution of the defect present and the seriousness of the defect. It is suggested by family counselors that the wise course of action, when in doubt about the wisdom of having children, is to consult a specialist in human genetics. Experience shows, however, that this approach usually proves disappointing because the specialists are unable to give a definite answer. There is no way to analyze the genes of the couple. The most that can be done is to inspect closely the two family lines in search of supposedly inherited defects. Procreation may be discouraged if the same defect plays a prominent part in both family histories, for then both parties may carry recessive genes for the defect. If propagation is inadvisable, a sterile marriage may still be permissible. The decision not to have children remains a matter of personal conscience, since the laws of our country do not limit the right of married couples to have offspring.

The Drives and the Emotions

Resuming our inventory of the inherited structures with reference to their possible contribution to personality, we turn next to the drives and the emotions. Man has a few drives which prompt him to action, and these are related chiefly to organic needs, like those for food, water, sex, rest, elimination, and exercise. The drives are irresistible in the sense that they are internally motivated and operate, in a measure, apart from our volition. External stimuli may bring an organic drive into play or reinforce it, as when the sight of attractive food whets the appetite, but the drive will operate at certain intervals even if no external stimulus is present.

The drives create tensions which make for uneasiness until they are released. The tensions themselves are organically determined, but experience determines how they will be managed. For example, the sensation of hunger recurs at rather regular intervals because of internal nervous and muscular changes in the wall of the stomach, but the type of food that is taken to relieve the tension depends on social factors which are learned. The child in an American family eats beef, lamb, and pork; the Eskimo child eats the meat of the seal and the walrus; the Filipino child likes the flesh of the dog; the Maori may ease their hunger pangs on the flesh of human beings. We in America find some of these food preferences abhorrent without recognizing that our tastes just as often seem incredible to others. Our consumption of beef is shocking to the Hindu who regards the cow as an object of sacred adoration. Examples of this sort could be multiplied without end to show that, though the drives are inherited, the way they are gratified and the goals toward which they are directed are determined by experience.

Eating habits, because they are the earliest habits established by the child, are among the most important not only for health but for personality. The early feeding experiences, whether by breast or bottle, may have undesirable effects if frequently interrupted or if terminated too quickly. Investigation has shown that the average child requires about two hours of satisfactory sucking experience each day.[1] If he gets less, he may become fretful and develop nervous reactions. He may show little interest in food. Later on, he may have further difficulties as new food flavors and textures are introduced and as par-

[1] M. A. Ribble, "Disorganizing Factors in Infant Personality," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 98:459–63, July, 1941 — May, 1942.

ents force certain foods on him because of their presumed nutritive value. The parents may resort to coaxing, wheedling, and entertaining the child in order to get him to eat. Mealtimes may become dramatic occasions with the child in the leading rôle. If entertainment becomes the conditional stimulus, the child may not eat unless entertained. The coaxing may bring resistance and a refusal to eat, resulting in partial starvation and in an antagonistic attitude toward the parents. Even if one could have exact knowledge of the inherited hunger drives of a group of newborn infants, it would hardly be possible to predict their food preferences and attitudes toward eating at, for example, the age of five or ten.

In assessing the contribution which heredity makes to the drives, the factor of intensity needs to be taken into consideration. Individuals differ in the strength of certain of their organic drives, and it is possible that some part of this variation must be charged to inheritance. Genetic differences probably underlie differences in the intensity of the sex drive in human beings, although health and experience play a part. Favorable experience tends to vitalize a drive, unfavorable to inhibit it. Sexual vigor is in part a glandular matter, and the relative vitality of the glands may be affected by hereditary endowment. Likewise, individuals differ in their appetites, and it would seem that again an hereditary component is operative, but other factors also are present, such as the type of work one does and the presence or absence of fatigue and worry, which are not inherited. The intensity of the drives is an important part of personality, involving a number of one's habits and affecting one's adjustments to others, especially in marriage.

Another question concerns the rôle of heredity in determining our emotions or intense feeling states. We not only do things, but we have certain feelings about the things we do. Action and feeling are interrelated to form two aspects of the same thing. We speak of the feeling of hunger and of the sexual emotion, but it is not easy to know with what emotional endowment heredity supplies the child. Some emotional states are clearly dependent upon a certain amount of maturity and experience. For example, if we perform well some highly important action, such as courtship, we are buoyed up by an emotion called elation, but if the effort meets with failure the feeling may be one of dejection. But are elation and dejection inherited emotions? Do infants experience these emotions?

One of the ways to find out what heredity contributes to the child is to observe his behavior as soon after birth as possible, before the outside environment has much chance to affect it. This procedure is not entirely satisfactory because the newborn child has already had nine months of environmental influence in the mother's womb. Since the physical condition affects the emotional life, it is possible that the mother contributes indirectly to the child's emotional condition during its interuterine existence. If so, this would constitute a prenatal environmental influence, not an hereditary one. The mother makes no direct contribution to the child's emotional condition during the prenatal period. Inasmuch as no connection exists between the mother's nervous system and the child's, the thoughts and feelings of the mother cannot be directly transmitted to the child in embryo. Notions about maternal impressions (that the mood and experiences of the mother directly affect the growing embryo) belong in the realm of superstition. If an expectant mother listens regularly to good music, it will do her no harm, but it will not influence one whit the capacity for music which her child inherits. Nor will the happy mood of the



FIGURE 54. THE MYTH OF "MATERNAL IMPRESSIONS"

The sketch of factors in the uterus within the mother's body shows the prenatal connection between mother and child. Note that there is no nerve connection between mother and embryo. The only psychological effect is indirect, through the influence of the mother's feelings upon her physical condition, which affects the embryo. Direct psychological influence by the mother is possible only after the child's birth. After Scheinfeld. *You and Heredity*, p. 34.

mother find its way directly to the child, although it will help indirectly through its beneficial effect upon the mother's health.

The question of the nature of the emotional inheritance has been studied by modern psychologists and physiologists without decisive results. The earlier experiments performed by John Watson led him to believe that the child was born with at least three specific emotions, those of fear, anger, and affection.[1] According to Watson, the very young children in his experiments showed a fear response to loud, sudden noises, and to sudden loss of support. An emotional reaction called anger was produced by restraining the child in the free movement of his body, as by preventing him from moving his head or by pinning his arms to his sides. An affectionate response resulted from stimulation of the erogenous zones, from feeding, and from general bodily comfort. Watson also tested his infants in a wide variety of other situations, with negative results. For instance, no fear responses were registered toward the dark, snakes, furry animals, or menacing expressions on the countenance of the experimenter. Later experiments by Sherman and others have raised some doubts about the specificity of the child's emotional inheritance, and there is some question as to whether fear, for instance, can be distinguished in the infant's behavior. Sherman had motion pictures made of the stimulation and responses of children in the Watson manner, then had the film cut so that the responses were separated from the conditions that caused them. A number of trained psychologists were asked to identify the emotions, but were unable to do so. This has led some observers to believe that the infant does not possess any sharply differentiated emotions, but only a general capacity of reacting emotionally in a favorable or unfavorable way. The specific emotions, it is thought, come later as the result of maturation and learning.

Whatever interpretation one follows, it is clear that the emotions are not fixed and determined once and for all by heredity, but instead depend for their expression upon experience. Heredity provides the general capacity to respond emotionally, and there may be also some inherited variation in emotional potential, but the types of situations that produce an emotional response depend upon learning. The child's experiences will determine whether he comes to fear many things or few things, whether he shows much anger or little anger,

[1] John Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1919).

whether he is affectionate toward many persons or toward few. These developments occur through the mechanism of the conditioned response. At birth the infant has no fear of the dark, which is scarcely surprising in view of his previous experience with total and continuous blackout in the mother's womb. But the child may learn to be afraid of the dark in a number of different ways: through hurting himself in the dark, through being taken by surprise in the dark, through suggestions made by others regarding the dangers that lurk in the dark, and so on. That this fear is not innate is clear from the fact that many children do not have it. Fear is a response to potential danger, real or imagined. If the child has not learned to regard a particular situation as dangerous, he will not be afraid of it.

As with fear, so also with anger and affection, the capacity to respond emotionally may be inborn, but the stimuli that produce the emotional response depend on learning. Anger is a response to denial or restriction of some sort. If crossed, a child may develop temper tantrums as a device for gaining attention or getting his way if parents yield to the child's wishes in order to have peace at any price. If a child is completely ignored when he reacts angrily in order to achieve his end, so that the anger accomplishes nothing, not even the disturbance of his parents, he has little incentive to repeat the performance. On the other hand, the development of an affectionate disposition by the child depends on satisfying relationships with others. Affection is a response which the child makes to those who fondle him, play with him, sympathize with him, and cater to his needs. The greater the number of satisfying human relationships, the greater will be the probability that the child will develop fondness for people. This point is developed further in the next chapter, which discusses in detail the processes by which the child's personality is developed through learning.

Mental Capacity

Still another factor in personality is mental ability. Direct effects of intelligence upon personality are manifested as degrees of alertness. We say of one child that he is quick to respond, of another that he is slow. Intelligence has also certain indirect, less definite effects upon personality. For instance, intelligence plays a part in the choice of an occupation, which in turn may lead to the formation of distinctive interests and habits.

As to the existence of variations in intelligence there is no dispute, for observation shows some children to be very bright, some very dull, with the rest falling in between. Scores on I.Q. tests follow the normal probability curve, with a few feebleminded at the lower end of the curve, a few gifted persons at the upper end, and the great mass in between. If a number of biological traits are measured, such as height and weight, in which an hereditary component is present, the measurements likewise take the form of a bell-shaped curve. That the scores for I.Q. take this form is, however, no proof that the abilities measured are inherited, for the test is constructed to give this kind of curve. It is now generally conceded that the I.Q. tests do not measure native ability alone, but rather native ability as developed by learning and experience. No device exists for measuring the potentialities for learning inherent in the genes.

That much of intelligence is due to heredity is, however, clear from the fact that differences in mentality appear so early in life, especially in the feebleminded. Where environmental causes are not known to have been responsible for the defect, the rôle of heredity is clear. The mechanism responsible for such heredity is, however, quite obscure. It is thought, but it has not been proved, that hereditary feeblemindedness is a recessive trait and that it occurs only when two persons mate, each of whom carries the recessive trait. If so, an entirely normal person marrying a feebleminded person would have only children of normal intelligence. Should these normal persons, carrying the defective genes as recessives, marry others like themselves, they would produce feebleminded offspring. Recessive traits do not show outwardly; so there is no way of telling who the carriers are unless one happens to have detailed knowledge of a particular genealogy, which is unlikely. It is estimated that perhaps ten million persons in the United States have recessive traits for feeblemindedness. We do not know exactly how much feeblemindedness is of hereditary origin and how much of environmental origin, but the two types may be about equal in number.[1]

Since mentality is important for personality, we wish to know how much of a person's mental ability may be charged to heredity and how much to the family and other environmental influences. The most promising approach to the problem has been through the study of

[1] A. J. Rosanoff, L. M. Handy, and I. R. Plesset, "The Etiology of Mental Deficiency with Special Reference to Its Occurrence in Twins," *Psychological Monographs*, 48, number 216, 1937.

identical twins reared apart.[1] Identical twins share a common heredity because they result from the splitting of a single fertilized egg; fraternal twins represent the simultaneous fertilization and development of two separate eggs. Fraternal twins are, therefore, as different genetically as brothers and sisters born at different times, and may be of different sex, whereas identical twins are perforce of the same sex. Since the hereditary factor is constant in the case of identical twins, any differences that exist between them must be charged to environment. In ten pairs of identical twins studied, who were reared apart, the average intrapair difference in I.Q. was 7.7 points, compared to 5.3 points for those reared together.[2] The difference between the two scores is not significant, but it would be a mistake to conclude that environmental factors are unimportant in intelligence. The fact that twins are reared apart does not necessarily mean that the environments in which they are placed are very different. In one of the cases a more significant difference of 17.7 points was noted between Mary and her identical twin sister Mabel. Mary had grown up in a city family and had finished high school, while Mabel was brought up in a farm family and had only six weeks of high school. Mary's I.Q. was 106.2; Mabel's, 88.5. Since the range, 90–110, represents average mentality, Mary had a high average rating, while Mabel's score put her in the category of the dull. The I.Q. tests, it should be noted, are based on urban culture more than rural culture, on schooling more than on farming. It is quite possible that Mabel made as intelligent an adjustment to her farming experiences as Mary made to her urban situation. Also in interpreting these scores it should be kept in mind that an individual's I.Q. score may vary by five or six points on retesting, and in extreme situations the variation may be as high as fifteen or twenty points.[3]

An additional approach to the problem has been the observation of children placed in foster homes, where stimulating environments have caused improvements of from ten to thirty points. The younger the child when placed, the greater the possibilities of improvement. It has also been noted that the best gains generally occur among those children who obtain a favorable score when first placed in the foster

[1] R. S. Woodworth, *Heredity and Environment: A Critical Survey of Recently Published Material on Twins and Foster Children* (New York: Social Science Research Council, Bulletin number 47, 1941).

[2] H. H. Newman, F. N. Freeman, and K. J. Holzinger, *Twins: A Study of Heredity and Environment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937).

[3] Gladys C. Schwesinger, *Heredity and Environment* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933).

home. This suggests that they possessed potentialities which were brought out by the better environment.

An attempt has been made to reverse the situation, by holding the environment constant and noting the effect of the stable environment upon children of differing hereditary endowment. If environment is important in its effect on mentality, then it is thought there should be less variability in test-intelligence among children in a uniform environment, such as an orphanage, than among children in the general population. Studies show that this is not true. But before we conclude that the environment is unimportant for test-intelligence, we should consider whether the environmental factor is really held constant in an orphanage. Is it ever possible to hold the environment constant — that is, to provide two or more individuals with exactly the same experiences? The Dionne quintuplets may throw some light on this question. The Dionnes are exceptional, not only because they have identical heredity, but also because an attempt has been made to give them an identical environment. They have lived together during early childhood, sharing the same quarters, enjoying the same facilities, following the same program and schedule, and, what is most important, dealing with the same persons. They have been shielded from the general public and have lived a restricted life, which probably has had the effect of making their environment more uniform than that of an orphanage. Yet the Dionne quintuplets seem not to have had an identical environment, and their experiences have varied considerably. Indirect proof of this statement is found in the personalities of the children, which differ greatly. When tested, Emilie was observed to be the most mature of the five, the one least given to anger and fear reactions, while Annette and Marie were the least mature.[1] These differences in personality, and many others which were noted, must have resulted from differences in experience, since the five sisters have identical heredity. In the matter of intelligence, the quintuplets differ only slightly, suggesting that small differences in experience have greater significance for personality than for intelligence. This is in keeping with the probability that there is a structural basis for differences in intelligence, but not necessarily for differences in personality.

Another point worth noting is that the intelligence of the Dionnes is not great, despite the unusual opportunities the girls have enjoyed.

[1] William E. Blatz, *The Five Sisters* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1938).

They have had the best equipment that money could buy, have been instructed by the latest methods of progressive education, yet they have only average intelligence. Nor have their I.Q.'s risen much over the years. This suggests that if the child has average, or below average, inherited ability, not much improvement is possible through training, at least with present methods, and the more deficient the child, the less we can do for him. But a child may be deficient mentally because of limited opportunity, even if his native capacity is good. Heredity fixes the limits of the learning capacity, but experience determines whether the limits will be reached. Probably the only sure way to determine whether the limits have been reached, except where the deficiency is obvious and extreme, is to provide the child with a highly stimulating environment. We shall be in a better position to assess the relative contribution of heredity and environment to intelligence when identical twins are not only separated at birth, but are placed in widely differing environments, such as would be represented by an isolated mountaineer family at one extreme and the home of a brilliant professional man and his wife at the other. Meantime, such evidence as we have suggests that heredity ordinarily plays the principal rôle in intelligence, although a favorable environment is necessary for its full realization.

Special Talents

In completing this survey of the contribution of heredity to personality, we may note the part played by special abilities, like those for music, mathematics, drawing, mechanics, and athletics. It has long been observed that some persons are especially proficient in one or another of these activities while others are notoriously deficient, and it is thought that inherited factors underlie these differences, since they are not correlated with general intelligence or training.

Let us use musical ability as an illustration. Musical aptitude has been shown to consist of a number of components: pitch, time, intensity, consonance (harmony), rhythm, and tonal memory. These components are independent units and are not necessarily correlated; that is, a person may have perfect pitch but a poor sense of rhythm, or vice versa. Also musical capacity is not highly correlated with I.Q. There have been a number of musicians who were feebleminded and who achieved considerable technical proficiency, but never good musicianship. It is thought that each of the components has a constitu-

PLATE 11. HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT IN IDENTICAL TWINS

Common heredity in each of these six pairs of identical twins is responsible for their great similarity in appearance. But what is responsible for the similarity in dress? Identical structures do not produce identical functions. Two identical twins with identical vocal chords may speak different languages. Similarly, one identical twin may learn certain gestures, the other not. From S. J. HOLMES, HUMAN GENETICS AND ITS SOCIAL IMPORT. *(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936.)*



PLATE 12. PERSONALITY AND THE LEARNING PROCESS

Personality traits like fearlessness and motor skills develop out of experience and cannot be understood except in the light of that experience. One of a pair of twin brothers, Johnny, was given intensive motor training; the other, Jimmy, was not. The bottom pictures show Johnny getting off a 63½-inch stool at twenty-one months. In the picture at the left, Jimmy refuses to climb off a lower stool. Since the family has the child during his earliest years, it has the best opportunity to build up useful habits of personality. From MYRTLE B. McGRAW, GROWTH: A STUDY OF JOHNNY AND JIMMY. (*New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1935.*)

tional basis; for instance, the sense of pitch is thought to depend on ear and brain structures, and the sense of rhythm on muscular co-ordination.

In the case of music there are reasons for believing that the capacity is inherited. Retesting of persons on the Seashore Musical Aptitude Tests shows that the scores do not materially improve, even when the subjects receive musical training. Particularly impressive is the fact that musical talent usually becomes evident at an early age. In a group of thirty-six highly talented contemporary instrumentalists, investigation showed that the average age at which talent was first expressed was under five years old, and the average age at début was thirteen years old.[1] A Julliard group of the same size showed talent by the age of six. In singing, an environmental factor should be noted, because the individual must wait until his voice has "set" after puberty before its quality can be dependably judged. Great achievement in music is, then, correlated with a very creditable start at an age when most children are still playing in sandboxes.

Investigation of the background of great artists also shows that where both parents are musical a larger percentage of the offspring are musical than where only one of the parents is musical, and the percentage is smallest where neither parent is musical. These facts permit of an environmental as well as a genetic interpretation. More favorable to the hereditary viewpoint are cases of musical geniuses arising from non-musical homes. The number of such is considerable, and includes Toscanini, Rubinstein, Schnabel, and Iturbi, none of whose parents was musical. In the case of Toscanini, there is no musical talent discernible anywhere in his background.

Heredity may furnish the unusual gift, but training is necessary for its cultivation and expression. This means that the atmosphere of the group must stimulate the talent if it is to flourish. A great talent for music means nothing in a culture which is deficient in music and does not greatly appreciate it. Likewise a great gift for numbers would be wasted in an Eskimo, since the culture makes little use of mathematics. That "many a flower is born to blush unseen" is suggested by the great number of accidental "finds" despite the widespread opportunities for musical training. Martinelli was discovered at the age of nineteen while he was in the service of the Italian army. Singing in the barracks, he was overheard by an officer with musical training

[1] Amram Scheinfeld, *You and Heredity* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1939), p. 237.

who at once recognized the remarkable possibilities of the voice. There are many such cases, and they force the question as to how many more there must be which are not discovered and developed.

Recognition of the talent is only half the problem, of which the other half is its cultivation. Here again environment factors may be favorable or unfavorable, like income, health, and the attitude of parents and friends. A child with a great gift for music had to abandon plans as a concert violinist because of asthma, which he did not inherit. Another child with perfect pitch and a generally superior musical capacity fought every suggestion of a musical education made by his father, who was himself a good musician, because the boy had acquired from his playmates the idea that music was "sissy stuff." For a successful career in music, many more factors besides innate talent may operate — for instance, good health, favorable attitudes, proper instruction, and positive habits of application, all of which have environmental rather than genetic implications.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why is it difficult to determine what the family contributes to human personality?
2. Why is it that children in the same family do not have the same heredity, although they have the same parents?
3. Is parental love inherited?
4. What is the difference between biological and social transmission, and what is the significance of the difference?
5. What are resemblances, and differences, between human and animal heredity?
6. Are personality traits directly dependent upon physical traits?
7. What is the significance of the observation that "personality is a function of particular situations"?
8. What has been happening to the list of traits thought to be hereditary? What does this mean?
9. Are acquired characteristics inherited?
10. If an expectant mother listens to good music, what benefits if any accrue to the unborn child?
11. How account for the widespread and deep-rooted inclination to attribute human behavior and personality to biological inheritance?

12. What is the most promising approach to the study of the relative contribution of heredity and environment to intelligence and personality?
13. Is it permissible for two persons to marry if they both have a family history of cancer? Epilepsy?
14. What is the relation of intelligence and personality?
15. What are special capacities and how are they related to personality?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. The mechanism of heredity.
2. Heredity and epilepsy.
3. Hereditary factors in cancer.
4. The marriage of the feebleminded.
5. Superstitions regarding maternal impressions.

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Chapter 11

THE FAMILY AS THE NURSERY OF HUMAN NATURE

DURING THE UTERINE PERIOD, the child is influenced by only one person, the mother, and her influence is wholly physiological. The cutting of the umbilical cord does not end this dependence upon the mother if she nurses her child, but at birth a new type of experience begins, namely, social psychological experience. If the child's mother happens to be an undernourished and nervous person, the child will, as a result of undernourishment, probably be born with a poor structure, perhaps with deficient calcium for bones and teeth,[1] but the mother's nervous condition, as has been said, will not directly have had any influence on the child, since there are no nerves linking the mother and the embryo.

After birth the situation changes radically. Now the nervous mother comes into direct contact with her baby, and the baby at once feels the effects of the mother's nervousness in everything the mother does. A nervous mother is more likely to find the nursing experience painful or irksome than a mother who is not nervous. The feeding periods are apt to be shorter, more abrupt, less satisfying. In many ways the nervous mother overstimulates her baby: in handling it, in bathing it, in dressing it, in fondling it, in talking to it. Later she may speak sharply to the child, may frequently lose her temper, may easily be annoyed by the child's actions, may constantly reprimand

[1] Bertha S. Burke, M.A.; Virginia A. Beal, B.S.; Samuel B. Kirkwood, M.D., and Harold C. Stuart, M.D.: "Nutrition Studies During Pregnancy," *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology*, 46:38–52, July, 1943. In 216 cases studied, every stillborn infant, every infant who died within a few days of birth (with the exception of one), the majority of infants with marked congenital defects, all premature, and all "functionally immature" infants were born to mothers whose diets during pregnancy were very inadequate.

the child for trifling misconduct, may show chronic anxiety for the child's welfare, and so on. For the child there is no protection against these stimuli as there was before birth. If an invisible statistician could follow the child about, keeping a record of these daily experiences, the total number recorded would be very impressive, and it would then be easy for us to see why a child so stimulated becomes hypersensitive.

Birth starts the learning process going. Children may do some learning before birth, but the amount is probably insignificant because of the restricted nature of the stimuli in the environment of the womb. After birth the world that opens up to the child is very different. It is rich in stimuli, and they are highly diversified. There are people to respond to: mother, father, sisters, brothers, relatives, friends, neighbors, strangers. Also there are things almost too numerous to mention: diapers, safety pins, soap, talcum powder, olive oil, shoes and socks, shoelaces, dresses, crib, sheets, blanket, rattle, hot-water bottle, dolls, beads, blocks, songs, words, pictures, and so on. The child learns to recognize and use these tools. He also learns various practices, customs, and traditions, like being fed and bathed at regular intervals, playing games, celebrating birthdays, saying prayers, listening to lullabies and bedtime stories. These are the child's introduction to the vast social heritage that has been these tens of thousands of years in the making, with which the child becomes progressively familiar as he grows older and by which his personality is molded.

The Influences of Group and Culture

The environment that begins to shape the child's personality at birth consists, then, of other people and of social culture. The two are inextricably intertwined, for the cultural heritage reaches the child largely through the medium of other persons despite the fact that culture is increasingly stored in objective forms. Likewise the persons who influence the child are themselves in large part the product of cultural heritage. Whether or not parents are companionable with their children, whether they are loving and friendly, may depend on the way the culture of which they are a part defines the rôle of the parent. In most places the mother is closer to the little child than is the father, a condition which may have its roots in the greater physical dependence of the infant upon its mother, yet there are cultures, like

that of the Manus of New Guinea,[1] where the father has the closer relationship with the children. In still other societies neither parent develops much companionship with the children, so that they have much the same feeling for their parents as they do for other adults in the community. The type of relationship of parents and children is fairly general in a society and is established by the culture of that society. In the United States we have no homogeneous culture, and no single pattern of parent-child relationship is as conspicuous as it is, let us say, among the Manus people, although there is a fairly general feeling that mothers ought to look after their children, especially when they are little. Other patterns are permitted, however, in different groups, such as the assignment of children to governesses by the rich and the placement of little children in day nurseries and nursery schools by working mothers. Although the culture dictates more or less what the relationship of mother and child shall be, especially during the child's infancy, the relationship between mother and child is not wholly determined by tradition. Factors of a more personal and local character also play their part, such as whether or not the child is planned for and wanted, whether the parents desire a boy or a girl, whether the pregnancy causes much discomfort, whether the child is or is not healthy. These special considerations concern chiefly the few individuals involved, in contrast to the more general influence of cultural factors. It may be argued by some that the considerations just mentioned are not personal, but really cultural in origin; that, for instance, the preference of parents for a male child in our society comes from the fact that in our culture males have more privileges than females, and the fact that it is perhaps easier to rear a boy than a girl. If the preference for male births is cultural, how then shall we account for expectant parents who hope greatly that their baby will be a girl? The answer may be found in the personal experiences of the parents, but hardly in the prevailing culture patterns. So it is with much of our interaction with others. The types of personality we develop depend in part on special, personal factors as well as on the more general, traditional pressures of the culture, although in practice it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish between the two.

[1] Margaret Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea* (New York: W. Morrow and Company, 1930). An even more striking case is furnished by Marquesan culture, where the women subordinate the parental functions to the sexual and marital functions, hence give little attention to their children. Abram Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), chap. V.

Special Importance of the Early Years

One of the great discoveries made by the psychoanalysts has to do with the significance of the early years of life for personality. Previously it had been thought that not much of any consequence for adult life happened during the first five or six years. As the very early experiences are hard to recall, especially those of the first two or three years, it was assumed that the experiences could not be of much importance. The overemphasis on heredity also obscured the rôle of early experiences. For these reasons and others, the average person glosses over his early childhood experiences as if they counted for little, and dwells largely on the occurrences of later childhood and adulthood. It is much nearer the truth to say that the earlier experiences are the more important, for they set the direction in which the person is to go. As the twig is bent, so is the tree inclined. The early experiences are important because they come first and build up mental sets that condition all later learning. This principle was grasped by the Jesuit priest who said if he could have charge of the child's education for the first five years of life he did not care who handled it thereafter.

The hypothesis that experiences of the first few years influence later learning has been tested in an unusual experiment of early childhood memory. Beginning when his son was fifteen months old and could understand only a few words of English, Burtt [1] read to him every day for three months approximately sixty lines of iambic hexameter taken from Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* in the original Greek. At the age of eighteen months, these lines were replaced by sixty other lines of the same length, which were read daily for three more months, and the process repeated for each three-month interval until the boy was three years old. Then the reading was discontinued and nothing was said about the material until the boy was eight and one half years of age. At this age he learned by a modified prompting method various portions from *Oedipus Tyrannus* which had not been read to him, and others which had. The material which he had heard as a baby required about 30 per cent fewer repetitions for memorization than the new material which was as nearly comparable in every respect as possible. If the hearing of meaningless words in infancy leaves an enduring and measurable impression, what is likely to be the effect of early intense emotional experiences on the personality development of a

[1] H. E. Burtt, "An Experimental Study of Early Childhood Memory," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 40:287–95, 1932.

child? We have no experimental data to answer this question, but the evidence of clinical studies is abundant and convincing.

When we say that the fundamental patterns of personality are laid down during the early years of life, we do not mean that nothing can be done later on to modify these patterns, but as a rule patterns once established tend to persist because it is easier to do nothing about them. The tenacity of these first patterns is very great, even when they are undesirable and do not help the individual to make satisfactory adjustments. Thus, the persistence of self-seeking tendencies when laid down early is impressive. The case is recorded [1] of a girl who in early childhood developed a narcissistic lack of feeling for others. Her desires were catered to by an hysterical, disagreeable mother and a henpecked father, upon whom she made great demands, responding with tantrums if her wishes were denied. She was "vain, jealous, and spiteful," and her characteristic attitude toward other people was that they must be either her slaves or her enemies. At the age of twenty-two, she found a husband and sought perpetual flattery from him. She insisted that he live with her parents and that he model his behavior after her father's. The marriage was a struggle from the start and ended in divorce. Later she married again, this time a widower with an attractive daughter. She at once set to work trying to make the girl feel uncomfortable. She selected unattractive clothes for her, made disparaging remarks about the girl's deceased mother, and as a permanent offset to the girl adopted a male child. The highly egotistical tendencies of this woman remained with her through the years and brought unhappiness to her and to others. The abnormal intensity of her self-regard magnifies the trait and makes it easy for us to see the persistence of early childhood behavior. Normal patterns of behavior also show much the same persistence.

Strategic Rôle of Family Experience

If the early years of life are of such importance for personality development, it follows that the family occupies a commanding position in the field, since the child's earliest and most profound experiences are with his family.[2] Some psychiatrists, like Karen Horney, believe that

[1] Paul C. Squires, "A Case of Female Narcissism," *The Psychoanalytic Review*, XXVI:461–69, October, 1939.

[2] The great variability of family situations is indicated in an analysis by James H. S. Bossard and Eleanor S. Boll, *Family Situations: An Introduction to the Study of Child Behavior* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943). This study differentiates 52 types of family situations, each of which is illustrated by a concise case study.

the common denominator in neuroticism is a lack of genuine affection in early childhood.[1] Criminologists likewise believe that the roots of delinquency are to be sought in the emotional rejection of children by their parents. Healy and Bronner [2] studied many pairs of twins where only one of the pair was delinquent. Why, it was asked, did the one become delinquent and the other not? Analysis of the cases according to these investigators showed that in every instance the delinquent had suffered serious frustration in his family experience, whereas the non-delinquent brothers and sisters had not. These studies make out a strong case for the strategic rôle of early family experience in the formation of personality.

Ideas, especially moral ideas, play an important part in personality, and the influence of the family in developing such ideas in children is great, very much greater, in fact, than the influence of the school and the church combined. This observation is supported by a report [3] of the sources from which children derive their ethical concepts. A large number of children were tested as to their ideas of right and wrong, and the results were correlated with the scores of the children's associates, as follows:

Child and his parents	.545
Child and his friends	.353
Child and his club leaders	.137
Child and his day-school teachers	.028
Child and his Sunday-School teachers	.002

The figures show that there is no agreement of any importance between the moral judgments of these children and those of their club leaders, school teachers, or Sunday-School teachers, indicating that these persons did not influence the child's moral thinking in a positive way, at least in so far as the ideas tested were concerned. The connection between the ideas of right and wrong of the children and those of their chums is more significant, but we have no way of telling whether the children got their ideas from their chums or selected as chums those who happened to agree with them. There can be no doubt of the causal factor in the influence of parents, since children do not choose their parents or parents their children. As would be ex-

[1] Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1937).

[2] William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, *New Light on Delinquency* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936).

[3] H. Hartshorne and M. A. May, "Testing the Knowledge of Right and Wrong," *Religious Education*, 21:539–54, October, 1926.

pected, the children's moral concepts are more closely allied to the mother's than to the father's, probably because of the more intimate relationship usually enjoyed by the mother.

The Continuity of Personality Development

Our discussion has shown that personality develops out of experience, especially the early experiences of life centering in the family. One child runs home every time he gets into trouble and weeps on his mother's shoulder. He does this over and over again, and so develops the habit of running away from difficult situations, the habit of pitying himself, and the habit of leaning on others for sympathy. He develops these habits because his mother is always ready to receive him and baby him, and never finds him at fault. Such a child will continue to run to his mother when life crosses him. Another child gets a hearing when he comes home with his tale of woe, but he gets no sympathy. He tells his mother about a boy who has been bullying him on the bus en route to school. Her response is to buy him a pair of boxing gloves and a punching bag, and to see that he uses them. This boy is learning to face his troubles and master them or go down fighting. Later in life he will stand on his own.

When an example like this is presented, it is easy to see how personality traits are built up, but we often lose sight of the important implication that personality has a history, and that unless we know this history we do not know the person and cannot properly understand his behavior.[1] Any given act of behavior is to be thought of as the end-act of a series, to be understood only in terms of the antecedent acts. How, for instance, shall we explain Mr. A's reaction to unemployment? He lost his job in the depression of the nineteen-thirties, and instead of looking for a new one he sat around the house all day while his wife and children taunted him. Perhaps Mr. A.'s experience in early life was like that of the boy described above, who always retreated from difficulty and sought his mother's protection. Or possibly he was allowed to form lazy habits as a youth. Mr. A.'s wife finally left him. In interpreting her action we might be tempted to say that the economic depression was responsible for breaking up this home. But studies [2] have shown that the effect of unemployment in

[1] John Dollard, *Criteria for the Life History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935).

[2] Robert C. Angell, *The Family Encounters the Depression* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936); Ruth Shonle Cavan and K. H. Ranck, *The Family and the Depression* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938); Mirra Komarovsky, *The Unemployed Man and His Family* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1940).

many cases is to solidify the family, not to shatter it. Where the family collapses because of limited income, the lack of income is only the immediate stimulus, the spark that touches off the powder. This is not to say that the home might not have been preserved if the crisis had not occurred. But the crisis was not the only cause or even the principal cause. The basic causes are to be sought in the personality traits of the individuals involved, principally in their characteristic reactions to difficult situations and in their attitudes toward each other.

Affectional Development

One of the clearest instances of the continuous nature of personality development is to be found in the affectional life, where development is closely correlated with the maturation of the body.[1] A boy must grow up emotionally as well as physically before he can fall in love with a girl and be successful in marriage. Some youths are women-haters; other prefer the company of men; still others are deeply in love with themselves. These variations are some of the casualties of the process of growing up, and they show that the course of emotional maturity presents many hazards which are not always surmounted. Students of the family need to learn to recognize the symptoms of affectional immaturity, because nothing is more important for normal marital happiness than the ability to give and receive love.

The infant starts life with an interest in himself, in his own body, and has no interest in other persons or things except in so far as they contribute to his own bodily comfort and satisfaction. When infants under one month old are observed, it is noted that they make no selective response to adults, but react to their environment in an undifferentiated manner. During the first two weeks of life, the reactions of the infants to noises, like those made by striking a plate with a spoon or rattling paper, are more frequent and positive than reactions to the human voice. During the third week, the human and non-human stimuli run neck and neck in attention-getting value, but during the fourth week the human voice pulls out in front in the competition.[2] The human voice wins because the infants learn to associate it with

[1] J. C. Flügel, *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family* (London: The International Psychoanalytic Press, 1929).

[2] H. Hetzer and B. Tudor-Hart, "Die frühsten reaktionen auf die Menschliche Stimme," *Soziologische und Psychologische Studien Über Das Erste Lebensjahr*, 1927, pp. 107–24.

deep-seated satisfactions, like the provision of food, warmth, and affection.

Very early, then, the child becomes conscious of the importance of other persons and bids for their favor. Usually the first person he discovers is his mother, who becomes his first love if she is good to him. Otherwise he is thrown back on himself, and his emotional development is blocked. Little children enjoy certain bodily pleasures associated with the sexual and excretory organs, but their interest here is normally supplemented by the development of the larger interest in persons, especially the mother. In due course the father and other members of the family are added to the circle of persons to whom the infant makes an affectionate response. Later there are playmates of both sexes; then still later, during the gang age, intimate association is largely limited to children of the same sex. Throughout, the widening of the child's social horizon means the loosening of the bonds that tie him to his former associates. In this way the child matures until during adolescence, when his sexual structure is fully developed, he shows interest in members of the opposite sex, finally selects one, and marries her.



FIGURE 55. STEPS IN AFFECTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Generalized schema of stages (with approximate ages) in emotional development of the boy in our culture. (1) Early infancy with its autoerotic, narcissistic interest; (2) interest in mother; (3) the latency period, with physical aspects of the affectional interest inhibited; (4) the gang age; (5) the period of first, shy acceptance and then active seeking of a mate.

The normal development of the affectional and sexual aspects of personality is beset by dangers. At any stage in the upward climb from self-love to normal adult heterosexuality, the child faces the possibility of having his emotional development either arrested or pushed back to a lower level. Fixation of affection may occur early in life, if the child becomes so strongly attached to his mother that he cannot develop any deep affection for others. This may happen if the mother makes unusual demands for affection.[1] The danger is great when the mother is herself unhappily married and seeks, quite unwittingly as a rule, to compensate for her unhappiness by monopolizing her child's affection and by making him a partisan to her cause.

According to Freud, every child develops a compelling affection for the parent of the opposite sex during early childhood. Usually this phase is temporary and is succeeded, say the psychoanalysts, by a "latency period," during which the child represses his affectional longing for the parent. The boy's Oedipus complex, or fixation on the mother, is repressed as he learns the cultural proscriptions against sexual intimacy between parent and child, and the repressed impulses find socially acceptable expression (sublimation) as the boy becomes more closely identified with his father and does not regard him as a rival. The Oedipal interest in the mother becomes diluted into tender affection, and the child, though he still has a warm spot in his heart for his mother, is now able to show affection to others as well. The girl is presumed by the Freudians to resolve her Electra complex, or fixation on the father, in similar manner. Many psychiatrists and psychologists, however, question whether the Oedipus and Electra complexes are universal as the Freudians believe,[2] and regard it as more probable that these complexes occur only occasionally and represent abnormal development. In any case there exists the possibility of the short-circuiting of the emotional development by too early fixation upon the parent. A person with such an infantile fixation may never marry

[1] See Mary Buell Sayles, *The Problem Child at Home* (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1928), for the case of Irek. When he was eleven, his mother discovered that he had been smoking and told him that if he continued she would die. He did not smoke again. At sixteen he was still sleeping in the same room with his mother.

[2] Robert R. Sears, *Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts* (New York: Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 51, 1943). Researchers find that, contrary to the Freudian theory, there is little or no difference between the sexes in amount of attachment to each parent, with both sons and daughters generally preferring the mother. R. M. Stogdill, "Survey of Experiments of Children's Attitudes Toward Parents: 1894–1936," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 51:293–303, 1937. See also Meyer F. Nimkoff, "The Child's Preference for Mother or Father," *The American Sociological Review*, VII:517–24, August, 1942.

because he is not able to tear himself away from the greatly beloved parent. Or if a mate is chosen, the choice is often on the basis of resemblances to the parent. The marriage of a young man to a much older woman is generally to be explained as the transference of parental fixation.

The emotional life may be arrested on the parental level, or on the subsequent level of association with other children of the same sex. There is a gang age through which children pass in cultures like ours which emphasizes the segregation of the youth according to sex. A danger of this period concerns the development of the same-sex attachments which may become pronounced if long persisted in. The problem of such conduct is recognized wherever there is enforced segregation of the sexes for long periods, as in prisons. Sometimes the habit is the result of being reared with practically no contact with members of the same sex, so that the attraction is away from the members of the opposite sex, who are familiar, and toward the less familiar members of one's own sex.

Just as there is danger that the emotional development of the individual may be arrested short of complete maturity, so a serious disappointment in love may push a person back to an earlier, more childish level. Such regression may occur to a child who tries to wean himself from dependence upon his mother by making approaches to other children, only to be rejected by them. A child who cannot compete to advantage with other children, especially if he is a newcomer to the group, runs special danger of being rebuffed. If he is a timid child, he may turn to his parents for the assurance and affection he wants. If his parents reject him, he is thrown back upon himself. Regression to infantile habits is seen in other situations, as in the case of the child who resumes thumb-sucking or nail-biting when confronted with a vexing problem. The stronger the earlier habits of dependence, the greater the likelihood of returning to them in time of stress. Indeed, research studies suggest that a habit must first be fixated if it is to become a point to which there may be regression from later habits.[1] A young man who develops strong habits of the single life, then falls in love with a girl only to have his love unrequited, may easily slip back to the earlier level and live out the rest of his life as a misogynist. Men's clubs in the large cities are apt to include such women-haters For the man whose affectional development has been normal a disap-

[1] R. R. Sears, *op. cit.*, chap. V.

pointment in love may be painful, but it is not likely to keep him from trying again.

Identification and Family Life

The affectionate response which the child makes to his mother and father enables him, as he grows older, to stretch his ego to envelop these persons. This process, called identification, enables him to put himself sympathetically in their places. His mother and father are highly important parts of his environment which he appropriates and makes his own. He feels sad if his parents are hurt because their hurt is psychologically like a hurt to himself. In the same way he may become identified emotionally with his brothers and sisters, as well as with persons outside the family. Identification is important because the child learns by appropriating the behavior of these persons. Thus, he borrows, largely by unconscious imitation, the vocabulary, gestures, facial expressions, food preferences and aversions, and other behavior of the persons with whom he is identified, patterning his behavior after theirs. His parents serve as models to be copied. In some cases even the choice of an occupation is made in order to carry out a parental wish, either expressed or implied. It is believed that an influence of this kind was an important factor in determining the nature of Darwin's scientific work.[1]

The emotional dependence of the child upon his family may be so great as to make it difficult, if not impossible, for him to establish a normal affectional relationship with a member of the opposite sex in adulthood. The problem of adult heterosexual adjustment may also be great where the child's identification with his mother is negative. Such a reaction, based on hatred, develops when the child is rejected by his mother. In such a case the child's aim is usually to follow a course of action directly opposed to the mother's wishes as a means of gaining revenge. He may retaliate by spiting his mother, by doing the things of which she does not approve. Where the hatred of the mother is extreme, the child may respond to her every suggestion in a contrary manner, a type of behavior sometimes referred to as negativism. The significance for later life of parental rejection and the resulting negativistic reaction of the child lies in the fact that the child finds great difficulty in learning to love other adults of the same sex as

[1] E. J. Kempf, "Charles Darwin: The Affective Sources of his Inspiration and Anxiety Neurosis," *The Psychoanalytic Review*, V:151.

the rejecting parent. The child's negative identification with his mother becomes an obstacle to a positive identification with a sweetheart whom he may wish to make his wife. We have a suggestion of this in observations which have been made of foster children. Although the homes were carefully chosen from the standpoint of the child's needs, an investigation [1] revealed that, despite the affection shown the child by his foster parents, placement was often a failure because the child's hatred of his own mother was transferred to the foster mother. As a defense against further hurt, the rejected child develops a strong resistance against those who have any authority over him, and he becomes more or less "unapproachable." Later on, such a person may have difficulty in making satisfactory adjustments to the woman he marries. In a mature relationship between husband and wife, the sensual and tender feelings exist as concomitants, and the identification of the two is such that the successful realization of the aspirations of one partner is a source of gratification to the other. A person with a childhood history of parental rejection has difficulty in mustering such tender feeling toward an adult woman and in establishing positive identification with her.

Ambivalence in Family Life

It is quite obvious that children may hate their parents as well as love them, but in the popular view these two attitudes are not commonly regarded as coexisting. We recognize that a child may love his mother and hate his father, perhaps because he regards his father as a rival for his mother's affection, or because his father administers the discipline while his mother is lenient with him. Not so generally understood is the fact that the child's attitude toward his mother is nearly always a combination of love and hatred. The mother may be highly companionable with her child who may respond with affection, but the mother may insist on an early hour for retiring, earlier perhaps than that of the child's playmates, and the child may think this unfair. A number of such restrictions are part of normal parental supervision; consequently ambivalence is a common phenomenon. Ambivalence patterns, however, show considerable variation in the relative strength of the two components (love and hatred), depending on the ratio of satisfactions to frustrations in the parent-child relationship.

[1] George E. Gardner, "Ambivalence as a Factor in Home Placement Failure," *The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, XII:135–39, January, 1942.

Lovers who cherish each other, especially newly-weds, are sometimes greatly disturbed when they discover that they also bear malice toward each other. They believe with the Scriptures that "a friend loveth at all times" (Proverbs, 17:17) and so are ashamed of their hostile feeling. The popular idea seems to be that you either love someone or you hate him, and if you hate him you do not love him. Of course, in a sense this is true, since the two emotions are not felt simultaneously, but they may be felt alternately, sometimes in rather rapid succession. Couples who have been married for some time, and who have made good adjustments, learn to avoid the chronic situations that produce hostility. For instance, certain topics upon which there is disagreement are never discussed, although such taboos may be themselves a source of annoyance. Married couples would probably be helped also by a realistic appreciation of the normality of ambivalence. A show of hostility is particularly disturbing when it comes from a loved one, but the venting of hostile feeling, far from betokening a lack of affection is sometimes a true earnest of it. Where there is no regard for another person, indifference to his behavior is possible, but not when there is love. What matters, then, is that there shall be true affection between parent and child and husband and wife, and that the tender feelings shall dwarf the hostile ones.

Social Rôles in the Family

We have seen that the child regards his father and mother as observers of his conduct, as persons who are constantly passing judgment on him. If they are good to him, he covets their esteem and shuns their censure. Praise and blame are the powerful instruments which shape his personality. The child's desire to win praise and avoid blame causes him to regulate his behavior according to what he thinks his parents want him to do, so long as he is positively identified with them. If he is rejected by his parents, his identification takes a negative turn, and his object then is to displease them. Partly because of differences in the child's attitudes toward the members of his family, and partly because of variations in the behavior they expect of him, the child's conduct within the family circle is not wholly consistent. Within the confines of his home a child may play many rôles. For example, he may play the part of constant protector to his mother, humiliating critic to his father, faithful lackey to an older brother, and chronic tease and tormenter to a younger sister. These descrip-

tions are, of course, highly simplified. In actuality the behavior patterns are complicated and may consist of a variety of rôles in relation to each member and not just one as indicated above. The persistence of childhood behavior patterns has already been noted. Later on, a husband or a wife may attempt to re-enact all or some combination of the rôles formerly played in the parental family. The success of the marriage will depend on how congruous the two sets of behavior patterns are.[1]

To the family group the child adds in due course school groups and play groups, and later on, occupational and other groups. In the urban community particularly the different groups to which an individual belongs may be many. All these groups make different demands on the individual and result in the development of specialized rôles.

This conception of the segmental nature of personality has some highly important implications for students of the family, and especially for young people confronted with the problem of a wise choice of mate. The fact that a person plays many different rôles indicates that our knowledge of him is fragmentary and incomplete so long as we know him in only one or two. A young man may be brilliant in the classroom and charming at a tea dance, but these attributes give no assurance as to other more important aspects of his personality. Studies of marital happiness show that a highly important correlate is the kind of relationship that a person has with his parents. The chances of happiness in marriage are greater if the relationship with one's parents has been pleasant and free of chronic conflict. It is helpful, therefore, to know something about the family rôles of the person one contemplates marrying. This should be no particular problem in a small rural community where all the families know one another well, but even here the more intimate relationships of parents and children may be screened from public view. In an urban community, made up of thousands of persons living under conditions of high mobility, however, it is not so easy to have information about the family rôles of the persons we know. Their families may live in other communities some distance removed. To marry without knowledge of the family behavior background is to assume an added risk.

[1] Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., "Rôles and Marital Adjustment," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 27:108–09, May, 1933.

Unconscious Behavior

It is easy to see that we may be unaware of important phases of another's personality, but not so obvious is the fact that portions of our own behavior may not be known to us. We often act from motives which we perceive but dimly, if at all. This is partly due to the fact that motives are built up early in life and become automatic parts of our being, operating outside the range of the forefront of consciousness. Then there are actions and motives of which we are ashamed, which we banish from the mind into that area which the psychoanalysts call the unconscious. Here are stored the ideas which we wish to forget for one reason or another. But it is one thing to repress an idea and another to keep it repressed. These submerged and forgotten impulses find expression in devious ways. They arise at night, when the censorship of the mind is relaxed, to plague us in dreams which seem grotesque; they crop out in so-called slips of speech; they manifest themselves in our prejudices.

These repressed impulses in our unconscious, these ideas which we have and of which we are not aware, may lead us into unreasonable actions and make it difficult for us to get along with others. One of the tricks that the mind plays is to blame others for faults which are our own, faults which we have but which we have not admitted to ourselves, seeking instead to banish them from consciousness because they are painful. As an illustration, Menninger [1] mentions the frequent complaint of certain women that their neighbors do not come to see them or call upon them, which they interpret as meaning that the neighbors do not like them, when the true explanation usually lies in the fact that the neighbors do not call upon such a woman because she does not call upon them. A more serious illustration, provided by Frink,[2] is of a young woman college student who charged that certain of her professors exercised hypnotic influence over her, putting erotic fantasies into her mind. She became so disturbed and enraged over these developments that she had to leave school. Actually the attacks began when she felt herself becoming attracted to one of the professors. She talked about how able and attractive he was, without intimating that she was falling in love with him. Then she began to feel that he was falling in love with her and exercising strange powers

[1] Karl A. Menninger, *The Human Mind* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1937), p. 282.

[2] H. W. Frink, *Morbid Fears and Compulsions* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Company, 1921).

over her. In this case the girl could not admit her love interest in her teachers because of feelings of guilt which had developed as a result of earlier experiences, and which accompanied the love impulse. Her accusations were then only externalizations of her own feelings, and her anger against the teachers represented pathological resistance to her own desires.

This unconscious tendency to foist our own shortcomings upon others, a process called projection, is very widespread.[1] It is plainly an undesirable tendency, and, while it may soothe the subject's ego, it is a source of much annoyance to others. The opposite tendency, that of blaming oneself where others are at fault, is of course also bad, especially for the subject. The desirable course of action is to accept responsibility for the consequences of one's actions, and, if the consequences are unattractive, to try to do something about them rather than to concentrate on blaming anyone, even oneself.

Rationalization

Another device by which the ego protects itself against unpleasant realities is rationalization, a form of self-deceit. It is the practice of justifying one's actions by means of good reasons instead of the true ones. For example, a student has an examination for which he should prepare. He decides to give the evening to study and is about to begin when his cronies stop by and invite him to join them in going to the movies. If the student doesn't like to study and greatly enjoys the movies and the company of the boys, he will be sorely tempted to go. Yet duty bids him stay. He may then tell himself that he hasn't been to the movies in a long time, that he is getting stale and needs a rest, that the course is a dull one and not worth studying for, that he can get up an hour earlier in the morning and do his studying then. In short, he may try to convince himself by spurious arguments that he really ought to go to the movies, when the truth of the matter is that he really ought to study, but he wants more to have some fun.

Rationalization is a normal and common phenomenon, and is not particularly dangerous unless carried so far that fact and fantasy are altogether confused. There are situations where it can have serious consequences, like rationalizing anti-social conduct. For instance, it

[1] The concept of projection is supported by high correlations between self-criticism and "ideas of reference"; that is, there is a close relationship between false ideas that other people are behaving critically toward a subject and his own tendency toward self-criticism. R. R. Sears, "Experimental Studies of Projection: II, Ideas of Reference," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 8:389.

appears that a not inconsiderable number of young persons have premarital sexual relations which they skillfully rationalize. Such relations, they argue, are necessary in order to determine compatibility. Such relations, they say, are justified in a society which causes undue postponement of marriage beyond the age at which young people are ready for marriage. Such relations, they declare, are a private matter and none of society's business. Such relations, they add, are moral if there is love, and they are immoral if there is no love, even though the pair be married. These are all very interesting reasons; they are good reasons; but it is doubtful if they are valid reasons. In any case they are not the real reasons for the behavior which are probably desire, lack of inhibition, ignorance, or disregard for the welfare of the other person. For in our culture the group frowns on such behavior and penalizes those who are guilty of it, especially if pregnancy results and the facts become public. We no longer brand an unmarried mother with a scarlet letter, but we still look upon her with pity if not with scorn. There are times when rationalization helps to protect the ego against shock or attack, but if one is heading for a fall rationalization may just grease the skids.

These devious subterfuges to which the ego resorts to protect itself show that human behavior cannot always be taken at its face value. Everything a person does means something, but it may not mean what it purports to mean. The student of personality and the family ought, therefore, to acquire some skill in spotting symbolic behavior; that is, behavior that means one thing, if taken at its face value, but which actually means something very different. It is like the sign x in algebra — a symbol for some other value. For instance, a woman who felt that she was losing her hold on her husband developed a chronic ailment that kept him at her side a great deal of the time. The doctors were unable to diagnose the difficulty, yet she seemed incapacitated. The neighbors were all sympathetic, thinking it a pity for her to be bedridden, and they blamed the doctor for incompetence. The neighbors judged only by surface symptoms. The woman complained of being ill and acted as if she were ill; therefore she must be ill. It never occurred to them that the "illness" was induced by psychological factors revolving around the woman's fear of losing her husband. Indeed, the woman herself may not have been fully aware of her subterfuge. By becoming incapacitated she appealed to his sympathy and his conscience, so that had he wanted to leave her he would have

found it difficult to do so. It may be noted that illness is not regarded as reprehensible in our culture; hence it can be resorted to with impunity. Students of family relationships need to learn to recognize such conversion symptoms. They should also be alert to evidences of repression, mental conflict, dissociation, displacement, projection, rationalization, and other psychological mechanisms which often have their origin in early family experiences. Only so can students avoid superficial interpretations of family behavior.

Divergent Experiences of Children in the Same Family

Although family experiences, especially those of the early years, are of primary importance for personality, these experiences are not the same for all the children. One reason is the differential treatment of children by their parents, which may be so great as to produce an emotional disturbance in the child who is not favored. This is shown by a study of non-identical twin brothers, six years old, one of whom was a delinquent.[1] The delinquent twin had twice run away from home, had been picked up by the police several times, had made a serious attempt to set the house on fire, was truant from school, had repeatedly stolen considerable amounts from his teachers and parents, as well as from a neighbor's apartment, a hospital, and a gasoline station. His parents complained of his disobedience, impudence, and temper tantrums. The non-delinquent brother, on the other hand, was described as an even-tempered, obedient, thoroughly well-behaved "model child." Health was apparently not a distinguishing factor, since the physical condition of the twins was found to be equally good. A difference in intelligence was noted, as measured by I.Q. tests. The non-delinquent scored 95, the delinquent 82, but it was felt that the latter would have done considerably better if his attention could have been held. The family lived in crowded quarters, but was under no great financial stress. The parents, however, were incompatible and quarreled often, the mother charging the high-tempered father with whipping too severely, and the father accusing her of being dull, incompetent, and too lenient. The outstanding factor noted by the investigators was the attitude of the father toward the delinquent. He said he detested the boy, and gave as his reason that the infant had shown a stubborn lack of response to him. "I can't bear to have him touch me," said the father. "I would rather have a

[1] Healy and Bronner, *op. cit.*, Case A, chap. VII, pp. 95–98.

snake around me than have him." From the mother it was learned that the father always repulsed the boy when he attempted to climb on his knee, whereas the other twin was welcomed. The delinquent boy testified that he deeply felt the deprivation of his father's love as well as other forms of discrimination, and the investigators interpreted the boy's delinquencies as attempts to escape from unpleasant situations, to obtain revenge, and to get substitutive satisfactions.

It will be noted in this account that the father referred to a "stubborn lack of response" which the delinquent showed toward him even as an infant, and it is possible that some inherited or constitutional factor may be involved here. On the other hand, this is the report of a man who shows a violent dislike of his son, and he may be referring to the effect rather than the cause, which may have been his own marked partiality for the other twin. Why a parent sometimes prefers one child to another is not entirely clear, but differences in intelligence, competence, and general attractiveness of the children may be factors.[1]

While there is no gainsaying the fact that influences besides those originating in the family affect personality, it is important again to note that children brought up in the same family never have identical experiences. Children who belong to the same family have the same parents and occupy the same home, but this is not entirely true from a psychological standpoint. When the first child is born, he has a clear field, but when a second child arrives, a problem of filial adjustment is created. For instance, if the older child has begun to take piano lessons, the younger one is likely to study some other instrument, because most parents prefer to have some variety in the musical activity of the home. The first child is probably less likely to have to wear "handed-down" clothes than is the younger one. On the other hand, the younger one may enjoy certain advantages. He probably

[1] Where partiality is shown, usually the parent is conscious of his or her behavior, but there are a surprising number of cases where the parent is unaware of the partiality. A mother of two daughters, age three and six, sought assistance in correcting undesirable behavior which the older daughter was showing. She was sullen, defiant, and unco-operative. When given a dress for her birthday, she cut it to bits with a pair of scissors. Investigation showed that the mother was slighting the older girl, who resented the discrimination and was resorting to unapproved behavior in order to get revenge. When given this explanation, the mother strongly denied its validity and claimed she had equal affection for her two girls. However, it was noted that in addressing the older girl the mother simply called her by her given name while in speaking to the younger one the mother used terms of endearment, and the tone of voice was different. The mother also did many little things for the younger daughter which were not done for the older, like taking time to examine and praise things made or work done.

stands a better chance of going to college because the family has more time to accumulate savings and because the older child may help with expenses. Some doctors call the firstborn the "tension child" because the parents are inexperienced and overanxious, and parents learn not to repeat certain mistakes with their second child. These influences are, of course, highly variable, and the examples given are cited not so much to show infallible sequences as to indicate the inescapable differences that exist in the family circle.

The way in which an older child influences a younger one is strikingly brought out in the following account of two daughters of the Jones family, Nellie and Mary.[1] As soon as Nellie, the firstborn, was old enough to learn, she was given instruction in needlework and baking by her mother, whose skill in these fields had won blue ribbons at county fairs. Nellie proved to be an apt pupil, and her needlework and culinary efforts were placed before women of the neighborhood, before friends and relatives, and highly praised. When her mother entertained her club, Nellie would join the women and sew, and her handiwork would be passed around and admired. By the time Mary could toddle, Nellie was seven years old. Mary, too, tried to excel in baking and sewing. On baking day she was given a chance to make little cakes, and she learned to make dresses for her dolls. Her work was as good as Nellie's handiwork. One day Mary brought out a little blue dress she had made for her doll and showed it to her maternal aunt, who examined it and observed: "Well, Mary, I am afraid you will never be able to sew like Nellie. You are like me. I could never learn to sew." Mary's father, noting her disappointment, tried to console her: "What if you can't sew and bake, you can be daddy's outdoor girl and help him. How would you like a horse to ride?" Mary put her doll aside and seldom played with it again. She followed her father about the farm and rebelled when her mother asked her to do housework. As her father had suggested, she took to riding, and by the time she was ten she took prizes for riding at the county fair. Each day she added some new accomplishment in the out-of-doors and became known as a tom-boy. She excelled her brother at target practice with a .22 rifle. Now she was daddy's outdoor girl,

[1] Adapted from L. G. Brown, "The Development of Diverse Patterns of Behavior Among Children in the Same Family," *The Family*, 9:35–39, April, 1928. For further treatment of this topic, see B. Weill, *Behavior of Young Children of the Same Family* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928).

the champion shot of the Jones family, not just Nellie's younger sister.[1]

The Only Child

Brothers and sisters have strong influence upon one another's personality which is different from the effects exerted by their parents. From both types of relationship children gain perspective on themselves and training in social adjustment; in dealing with their parents they learn response to authority, and in dealing with one another they learn to compete with equals. This difference in influence enables us to see why, unless some rectifying influences are exerted, the only child develops certain handicaps of social and emotional adjustment. A number of studies show the greater difficulty of only children in achieving satisfactory adjustments in marriage, and there is supposed to be relatively more neuroticism and unhappiness among such children. There is some evidence to suggest that they are more often successful in the economic struggle than their numbers would warrant, perhaps because they have the advantage of better training, since they do not have to share the family funds with brothers and sisters. However, the evidence on the position of the only child is not conclusive, and a recent comprehensive review of the literature reports that in most traits only slight differences are indicated between children who have siblings and those who do not.[2] It is possible, therefore, that the dangers of being an only child have been exaggerated. Perhaps the popular stress laid on this problem has made parents more mindful of the dangers, and has led them to take appropriate precautions. Also, the increase in the number of families with but a single child means that the situation is much less uncommon than it used to be, and that only children, therefore, are probably less sensitive about their status, which would be a favorable factor in adjustment.

Criteria of a Good Family Environment

In the light of the above findings can we say more definitely what are the outstanding characteristics of a good family environment from

[1] The above account is interesting in showing that, to gain distinction as a person, Mary had to develop interests different from those of her sister. There is another side of the picture which is not given, namely, the effect of Mary's popularity upon Nellie, which is also interesting to speculate upon.

[2] W. Paul Carter, *The Only Child and Other Birth Orders* (doctoral dissertation, Chicago: University of Chicago Libraries, 1937). Studies in progress suggest that only children at Bucknell University do not differ significantly in emotional, social, and health adjustment from a control group of non-only children. The groups were matched for age, sex, education of parents, occupation of parents, and I.Q.

the standpoint of personality? If we assume that a good home is one which produces an adjusted child, then an approach can be made toward answering the question by comparing the home background of adjusted and non-adjusted children. A number of investigations have shown that an important factor in a child's adjustment is the marital adjustment of the parents and the happiness of the home background. One study [1] of thirty-three couples, each of whom had a child in a nursery school, showed that twenty-two of the couples were poorly mated. The poorly mated couples had twenty children who were badly adjusted and two children who were well adjusted, whereas the eleven couples who were well mated had ten children who were well adjusted and only one who was poorly adjusted.[2] Later on, when the children who come from happy homes marry, they stand a much better chance of duplicating the success of their parents than do the children who come from unhappy homes.[3]

A happy home gives a child a secure base from which to operate, but his adjustment is affected by the attitudes of his parents toward him as well as their attitudes toward each other. This is suggested by a study [4] of the incidence of adverse parental attitudes in twenty-five series of cases, comprising over one thousand children seeking assistance at child-guidance clinics. Between 80 and 93 per cent of the parents of these children were considered by the clinic staffs to have definitely adverse attitudes toward their children. In a second series of fifty cases of children described as unusually well adjusted, only one fourth had parents whose filial attitudes were judged to be unsatisfactory.[5] The unsatisfactory parental attitudes concern the show of

[1] Dorothy W. Baruch, "A Study of Reported Tensions in Interparental Relationships as Coexistent with Behavior Adjustments in Young Children," *Journal of Experimental Education*, 6:187–204, December, 1937.

[2] It would be interesting to know more about the children who came from unhappy homes and were well adjusted, and those who came from happy homes and were poorly adjusted, but little information concerning these cases is given. However, such cases show that the family setting is not the only factor in adjustment. It is usually the most important factor, but a complete analysis would have to take into account the child's heredity, health history, and conditioning by influences outside the home, such as school and play groups.

[3] Lewis A. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938).

[4] Helen L. Witmer, "The Influence of Parental Attitudes on the Social Adjustment of the Individual," *American Sociological Review*, 2:756–63, October, 1937. A study made by a group of students of the Smith College School of Social Work under the guidance of clinical workers.

[5] Again it would be interesting to know why the children of the latter group of parents escaped unharmed. Also the question occurs as to whether the unfavorable attitude of the parents may not be a result as well as a cause of the difficulties of the children.

affection. For normal development a child needs a great deal of love to give him self-confidence, but he needs gradually to be weaned from his parents as he gains in self-confidence. If the psychological weaning comes too early, or is too abrupt, or if the child is rejected by his parents, the effects are likely to be harmful. Rejection is bad, but so too is the other extreme of overprotection. Large doses of parental love, unwisely administered, give us the "spoiled child," and sometimes, when the protection is removed, the psychotic child. Miller [1] cites the case of a boy of fourteen, a large overgrown fellow, who was the only child of a widow. Having reared him with the conviction that he was superior to everyone else, she was persuaded greatly against her wishes to send him to a boarding school to be educated. He stepped out from under the protecting arm of his mother into the clenched fists of his schoolmates, who took a hearty dislike to him because of his supercilious air. He became the butt of the whole school, and even the smallest boys found they could safely pick on him. In spite of his size he was useless on the baseball or football field, and in spite of his age he was in the lowest grade. During his first term at the school a document was found among his papers which read in part as follows:

> I have been expecting for many years to become the most wonderful man on this earth — in fact, you cannot say upon this earth exactly, as I should be immortal.
>
> I shall have magic lifts which will run between heaven and earth.
>
> Heaven will be my native land, and I shall be sort of let into heaven by the back door, so to speak; that is to say, I shall not be like an ordinary human being, but if God will give me all these things, I will pay him back.

In this sad case we see fantasy let loose by a doting and overprotecting mother resulting in complete flight from reality. Investigation has shown that such overprotective mothers, in a proportion larger than would occur by chance, were underprotected and unloved in their own childhood, so that the overprotection represents overcompensation for their feelings of inferiority.[2]

[1] H. Crichton Miller, *The New Psychology and the Parent* (New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1928), pp. 42 ff.

[2] Elizabeth Hough, "Some Factors in the Etiology of Maternal Overprotection," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 2:188–208, March, 1932; Patricia Foley, "Early Responsibility and Affection Hunger as Selective Criteria in Maternal Overprotection," *ibid.*, 2:209–23, March, 1932.

As a rule, the love of parents for their children is kept within bounds by the necessity of administering discipline. The child needs affection in order to develop self-confidence, but he also needs discipline if he is to show the proper regard for others, since no one lives entirely unto himself. As in the case of affection, the desirable course in the matter of discipline appears to be the golden mean. No discipline at all makes tyrants, while undue control produces rebels,[1] particularly where the control is not offset by affectionate regard for the child's welfare. Children whose discipline at home was steady, firm, and moderate have been reported as making good adjustments in marriage more often than those whose discipline was either lax or harsh.[2] It has also been reported that extensive criticism by parents is associated with poor adjustments in children.[3]

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why does more learning occur after birth than before?
2. What is meant by "the group factor"? by "culture"? Are they separable?
3. Why are praise and blame such powerful tools in fashioning personality?
4. Why do some children strive to please their parents, and others not?
5. How do we learn by "taking the rôle of the other"?
6. How can parents draw the line between proper doses of affection and overprotection in child guidance?
7. How do narcissistic tendencies established in early life affect marital adjustment?
8. What implications for students of the family are involved in the concept of the segmental nature of personality?
9. Why is it important for the student of the family to understand that behavior is often unconscious and symbolic?
10. What are the implications of the statement that personality has a history?
11. How does it happen that sometimes one twin becomes delinquent and the other not?

[1] John Dollard *et al.*, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939).
[2] Terman, *op. cit.*
[3] Ernest W. Burgess, *The Adolescent in the Family*, White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, III A (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1934), p. 274. Criteria of a good family environment reported by this investigation are: little parental criticism; absence of nervousness in both parents; frequent confidences between parents and children; some physical expression of affection; and common family activities.

12. Are the problems of only children usually magnified?
13. What are the criteria of a good family environment?
14. What kinds of discipline are there and which is most desirable?
15. In what respects are the early years of life more important than later years? Are later years more important for certain purposes?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. Case studies of the influence on marriage adjustment of desirable and undesirable personality traits established in early life.
2. Lack of affection in early childhood as a factor in neuroticism.
3. Survey of objective studies of psychoanalytic concepts. (See reference to Sears' study in *Selected Readings*.)
4. Causes of divergent behavior of children in the same family.
5. James H. S. Bossard, "The Law of Family Interaction," *American Journal of Sociology*, 50:292–94, January, 1945.
6. New light on the personality adjustment of only children.
7. The child's preference for mother or father.

SELECTED READINGS

Cooley, Charles H., *Human Nature and the Social Order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922.

An early account of the group forces affecting personality, but one that is still good. The book also contains the exposition of the author's well-known ideas on the origin of the conception of self.

Flügel, J. C., *A Psychoanalytic Study of the Family*. London: Wolff, 1926.

A classic statement of the rôle of the family in personality development, from the psychoanalytic point of view.

Freud, Sigmund, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, translated by G. S. Hall. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1922; *Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, translated by A. A. Brill. New York: Modern Library, 1938.

These two books by the master himself represent the basic ideas of psychoanalysis and the later revisions and additions, but with a scarcity of illustration.

Hart, Bernard, *The Psychology of Insanity*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1925.

A classic on the factors involved in mental disorders. The emphasis is on mental conflicts.

Healy, William, *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1917.

An early book, with evidence on the connection between repressed worries and misbehavior.

Horney, Karen, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1937.

Valuable for tying psychoanalysis in with sociology. The inferiority feelings are related to the competitive structure of our society, and mental conflicts to cultural cleavages and contradictions.

Kardiner, Abram, *The Individual and His Society*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

This book advances our understanding of the interrelationships of personality and social institutions, including the family.

Mead, Margaret, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*. New York: W. W. Morrow Company, 1935.

In this very readable book, three widely differing cultures are described. It is shown how the children grow up with differing personalities in these different neighboring cultures.

Murphy, Gardner, and Lois B. Murphy, "The Influence of Social Situations upon the Behavior of Children," *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Carl Murchison, editor. Worcester, Massachusetts: Clark University Press, 1935.

Experimental work showing the influence of specific social situations on behavior; necessarily presents a fragmentary picture of the whole of group influences shaping personality.

Murphy, Gardner, Lois B. Murphy, and Theodore M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937.

Part II of this work presents interesting and important experimental research on the process of socialization.

Sears, Robert R., *Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts*. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1942.

Extremely valuable in helping to separate the wheat from the chaff in psychoanalytic theory. Objective research appears to substantiate the theory of the latency period, the importance of the early years of childhood for later affectional behavior, the reality of projection, and fixation as a precondition to regression.

Stern, Bernhard J., *The Family: Past and Present*. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938.

Part 13 contains some carefully selected readings on the family milieu in relation to personality development.

Thomas, W. I., *The Unadjusted Girl.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1923.

An able exposition of the development of personality in terms of the celebrated "four wishes."

Waller, W., *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation.* New York: The Cordon Company, 1938.

Traces the influence of the family upon personality, first in childhood, then in adolescence and courtship, next in married life, and finally in the disorganization of the family, as by death or divorce. The most comprehensive development of the human nature approach to the family.

Brown Brothers

EMMA WEDGWOOD



Brown Brothers

CHARLES DARWIN

PLATE 13. IS IT SAFE FOR COUSINS TO MARRY?

If they represent good stock and are free of the same recessive defects, cousins may produce superior offspring. The marriage of Charles Darwin and his first cousin produced four distinguished sons. Three of them are pictured below. Many states prohibit the marriage of first cousins, and Oklahoma makes the marriage of second cousins illegal; but the laws are not based on scientific knowledge. The danger of mating between closely related pairs is that gene defects, if present, are more likely to exist for the same traits than where the mates are unrelated.



Keystone

LEONARD

Major in Royal Engineers and afterwards well-known economist and eugenist

Keystone

SIR GEORGE HOWARD

Professor of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy at Cambridge



Brown Brothers

SIR FRANCIS

Distinguished Botanist, and his father's editor and biographer

ELIZABETH BROWNING

ROBERT BROWNING

MARIE CURIE



PIERRE CURIE

PLATE 14. TWO EMINENTLY SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGES

When asked to name an "ideal" marriage, most college students mention the Brownings. They also give a high rating to the marriage of the Curies. Students choose these two couples perhaps because both members achieved eminence in their professions as well as happiness in their marriages. Pictures from Keystone.

Chapter 12

COURTSHIP

In the natural world, courtship is a common phenomenon. The cricket chirps a special tune to attract his mate; certain varieties of insects do elaborate dances; the peacock struts about displaying his gorgeous feathers; the bower bird builds an attractive nest for the female.[1] Darwin's review [2] of animal courtship shows that among the appeals used in winning a mate are beauty, strength, and skills like dancing, which would seem to be not unlike those employed by human beings. Courtship has as its function the preparation of the individuals for mating. Mating is not immediate, but is preceded by a period of selection and preparation. With non-human animals, this period is relatively brief, while in the case of man it is often rather long, permitting more careful selection and extensive preparation.

Courtship and Culture

Among the subhuman primates, to whose conduct we look for possible suggestions as to man's inherited nature, mating behavior is not uniform. The female baboon will accept any interested male if she is ready to mate, but not so the female chimpanzee, who may be quite selective. Attempts to mate normal, healthy, mature chimpanzees sometimes fail because of lack of attraction, either one-sided or mutual. We do not know how to account for these differences, but one factor may be that the male baboons are always appreciably larger and stronger than the females, whereas the male and female chimpanzee do not ordinarily differ greatly in size at puberty, although

[1] The bower birds of Australia build bowers on the ground, decorated with feathers, shells, bones, leaves, etc. These are apparently for the sole purpose of courtship, since they are not used later as nests for the young. Both sexes assist in building the bower, but the male does most of the work.

[2] Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1927), second edition, revised.

thereafter the male becomes the bigger and heavier of the two. Either sex may initiate the mating process.

Evidence suggests that love-making preliminary to mating is brief or nonexistent among the simians.[1] It presumably occurs only when the two animals are not equally ready to mate and is, therefore, of short duration. Motivation in selection is relatively simple, nor is mating long delayed once selection has occurred. With human beings, things are far different. A man may seek a wife who has money and social position and who resembles his mother. The woman he woos may be twice his own age. Social factors may interpose a considerable period of delay between the beginning of courtship and its conclusion. Two biologically mature college students who are in love with each other may postpone marriage for years, perhaps because the boy wants first to complete his graduate study and to set himself up in a profession. The courtship of human beings is conditioned by a variety of cultural considerations. The motives in selection, the manner of selection, the number selected, the duration of the selective process, and the conduct of the courtship period are all affected by the terms of the prevailing culture.

Cultural variability in methods of securing a mate

The highly variable nature of human courtship may be illustrated by reference to the approved ways of obtaining a mate in different places. Mates may be secured by capture, abduction, combat, exchange, service, gifts, purchase, persuasion, infant betrothal, and by arrangements made by parents, tribesmen, or go-between. Capture, never the usual method of obtaining mates in any society, is rare, occurring during war when the women are taken as trophies of victory and usually held as concubines, not sharing the status of true wives. Wholesale capture has occurred among some preliterates and some early warring peoples, such as the Germans of old and the Hebrews in the wars of Canaan. Abduction as a method of obtaining a mate is not to be confused with seduction in our society. Certain cultures insist that a man who wants a particular woman as a wife must first kidnap her, then hide her for a time from her kinsmen who try to "rescue" her. The whole affair has something of the sham about it, since the abduction is socially sanctioned, but sometimes the woman's relatives put up a good fight and there are casualties. Kidnapping is perhaps a

[1] Robert M. Yerkes, *Chimpanzees* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), p. 65.

variety of the method of combat and resembles somewhat the simian practice of fighting it out for the female. Eskimo suitors for the hand of a girl may settle their claims by means of a wrestling match, which is reminiscent of the fighting of duels on the continent of Europe in recent modern times. Occasionally nowadays we read of a double marriage between brother and sister and sister and brother, and think the coincidence odd, but in a number of preliterate cultures, like that of the South Australian aborigines, this method of exchange is the established practice; that is, a father will give his daughter in marriage to a member of a family, provided the same family can reciprocate by furnishing a wife for his son. As a rule, the winning of a mate calls for some contribution on the part of one or both of the parties, or of their respective families. The usual arrangement is for the prospective bride and groom to exchange gifts as tokens of their interest in each other. These gifts are not often of great value, although what may seem rather inconsequential to us may be greatly prized in a society where material goods are scarce. In some places the contribution may take the form of labor, as when a suitor comes to the house of the girl he wants and works for a time as a servant, doing menial tasks and sleeping in the open or in the barn. We are told that Jacob sought Rachel's hand in this manner and served seven years in her father's house. The tables may sometimes be turned and the girl may be required to prove herself, serving under the supervision of her prospective mother-in-law.

In some places, the approved method of getting a wife is by purchase. The Kaffirs of South Africa used to buy their wives until the Christian missionaries intervened. A wife was worth so many oxen, which were precious in a society with a limited accumulation of goods. The purchase price provides a method of differentiating among brides of differing worth and is a matter of a great deal of pride. The wife is not property and cannot be sold, except in rare cases where the culture has become disorganized.[1] The popularity of marriage by purchase is attested to by its widespread existence in the past. The ancient Semites called a wife *Me'orassa*, meaning "she who

[1] Such cases are more likely to occur in modern than in preliterate societies, which are much less disturbed by radical social change. Thus, there is some evidence that wives were offered up for sale at public auction in England in isolated sections during the last century. "The London *Times* during April, 1932, published a series of letters giving evidence of cases within the last century where a man put a rope round his wife's neck and offered her for sale in a public place." G. E. Newsom, *The New Morality* (London: Nicholson, 1932), p. 40.

has been paid for." In the time of the Hebrew kings, the usual price for a wife was about fifty shekels. The prophet Hosea tells us that he paid that sum for one of his wives, "half in cash, the rest in kind." We find similar practices among the ancient Celts, Slavs, Tatars, Mongols, Vedic Indians, and early Greeks. In pre-Christian days among Europeans, marriage by purchase was the prevailing method of concluding a marriage, and survivals of the practice are still to be found in the south of Spain among the peasants. The reverse of the bride price is the dowry paid by the bride's family to the groom or his family, a custom still practiced on the continent of Europe.

Wife purchase and the other methods of obtaining a mate described above may seem strange to the reader who lives in a society where romantic love is generally regarded as the only legitimate basis for choice. Courtship customs, however, like most social phenomena, are obviously not the result of abstract reasoning or logical analysis concerning the behavioral possibilities open to mankind, but are part and parcel of the prevailing type of social organization. If our type of family organization were different, our courtship practices might be different also. Preceding chapters have shown that the major types of family organization may be dichotomized into (*a*) the modern family, based on companionship between mates and the rearing of children; and (*b*) all other families, which are traditional families; that is, families having a host of economic and other regulatory functions. We may think of courtship customs as being related to these two types of family. Where property, social status, economic production, and regulation of behavior are major family functions, affection takes a somewhat subsidiary place. And conversely, where the family has relatively few economic and other institutional functions and is less important in determining the social status of its members, romantic love assumes greater significance as a basis for marriage. The situation must be seen as a relative one, for love is not ruled out by the institutional arrangements of primitive society. Despite the prescriptions of the traditional family, surprisingly often some preference, some liking, is expressed for a particular person, and if there is hearty dislike for the one that has been chosen by the family, the institutional dictates may be overthrown.

The practice of offering some kind of compensation for a mate may still seem to the reader to be highly reprehensible, even though the absence of such a practice in our culture is probably due less to moral

than to economic and other factors. But it is worth noting that the system of compensation has certain merits, while our system has certain weaknesses. When a man has invested a number of years of life in service to his wife's family, or when he has paid for her, he will not take her so lightly as he may when she comes to him without any cost whatever. When the investment is considerable, divorce entails a serious financial loss and is something to guard against. So it does also if the girl brings a dowry, which may have to be returned if the marriage is not successful. The absence of such economic ties between mates in our time shifts the emphasis to love and companionship, but affection is often quite volatile. The status of woman in marriage is affected by many factors, of which only one is the bride price. In France it is common to bring a dowry to marriage, but the status of women is higher in the United States, without benefit of dowry. If it is argued that a dowry actually lowers the status of the woman, on the grounds that she cannot get a husband without paying him something, then it cannot also be argued that a purchase price lowers her status, for in this case she cannot be had for nothing, and a high price paid for her means she has an exalted position in the group.

Most readers of this discussion will probably have a feeling of condescension toward these other cultures and their different courtship customs. This will not be due to the proved superiority of our own customs, but only to the prejudices that people naturally form in favor of their own way of doing things, a phenomenon which the sociologist calls *ethnocentrism*. If we do something in a certain way, we feel that way must be the best. But a little observation will show that many of our customs, or those of any group, cannot be defended in this way.[1] Is a high-heeled shoe the best kind of shoe to wear? Are cosmetics good for the skin and curling irons for the hair? Is smoking good for the health? The same sort of questions may be asked about some of our courtship customs. If we permit a girl to become a homemaker without ever having cooked a meal or sewed a stitch, is this desirable? Nearly all primitive peoples would doubt it. They have tests which they require their young people to pass as a condition to marriage. The initiation rites of preliterates are often very severe for both boys and girls. These tests determine whether the youths may assume adult responsibilities, including marriage, or must con-

[1] Robert H. Lowie, *Are We Civilized?* Human Culture in Perspective. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929).



FIGURE 56. THE MOST POPULAR MONTH FOR MARRIAGE

Culture rather than biology governs the time of mating. June is not the wedding month in most countries. The seasonal distribution of marriages seems to depend mainly upon occupations, religious customs, and climate. In countries like Norway, the return of the fishing fleets leads to an increase in marriages in December. Among agricultural peoples, fall marriages are preferred. In Greek Orthodox nations, like Bulgaria, the custom is to marry in February before Lent. The Swiss prefer the time of the joyous spring festival in May. Data from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, September, 1938.

tinue in the rôles of children. The initiation rites call for the display of unusual physical courage, such as the ability to bear pain without wincing, on the theory that a boy who cannot suffer torture without breaking down will not make a good warrior or hunter. These tests are appropriate to the hunting life which is full of hazards to life and limb; they would not be fitting in a nation which has anesthetics and a police force. Other tests are, therefore, now desirable, since we expect the husband to support his family and the wife to make a home, but we do not insist, for instance, that our young women shall pass a comprehensive examination in home economics before being allowed to marry.

Courtship and personality

One reason our society sets up no vocational prerequisites to marriage, although it does for medicine and law, is the great growth of the canning industry, the delicatessen store, restaurants, laundries, cleaning and dyeing establishments. These make it less imperative than formerly that a bride know how to cook and mend, although few families rely completely on these outside agencies. There is, moreover, a general realization that what matters most in our time is the personal adjustment of husband and wife; that is, the happiness they get out of living together. Before the modern service agencies were developed, a man had to marry or remain with his father and mother in order to get the comforts of a home. To get a livelihood, a girl had to do the same thing, since there were few jobs for her outside the home. Nowadays girls, except those on the farm, have many kinds of jobs open to them and do not have to marry for economic reasons.

Granted that people now marry for happiness, what evidences have we of any general societal concern with setting up personality qualifications for marriage? Such action would be dangerous, for too many might fail to pass the test. The initiation tests of primitive peoples are possible because there are few failures. The kind of life lived by preliterate boys and girls is calculated to develop in them the physical



FIGURE 57. PREPARATION FOR HOME-MAKING

Percentages of girls enrolled in home economics courses in schools reporting that offered instruction in home economics, 1938–39, United States. The rate decreased progressively above the junior-high level. About one half of the girls and only 1 per cent of the boys enrolled in high-school home economics courses in 1938–39. It is interesting to speculate on why there is not more interest in practical preparation for running a home. Data from *Home Economics in Public High Schools* (United States Office of Education, Vocational Division Bulletin no. 213, Home Economics Education Series no. 24, 1941), p. 39.

fortitude for which the tests call. Marriage is an experience which society cannot afford to deny to too many of its members. The personality factors are the most important in marriage today, but they are also the most difficult to develop satisfactorily, especially in a complex and rapidly changing society like ours. Society dare not say that only those who get a favorable score on the Bernreuter Personality Inventory may marry, that neurotics may not, or even that neurotics may not marry non-neurotics. Nor is it feasible for our government to demand that a man must be able to support a wife before he may marry. In a rapidly changing economy even those with highly developed skills may suddenly find themselves unemployed.

If we marry mostly for happiness, and if happiness depends on personal adjustments, then courtship provides an excellent opportunity for gaining insight into the personality of one's prospective mate. In the next chapter we shall give thought to the question of the wise choice of a marriage partner. Here our concern is to understand the nature of courtship, its meaning, and the opportunities it affords.

Although courtship can serve as a sort of testing ground for personality, the highly artificial and segmental nature of modern life makes this difficult. In the country, where life is still fairly simple and more like that of times past, the boy sees the girl in her home; he has a chance to observe how skillful she is in the kitchen, how she gets along with her mother and father; he knows all her friends, and he knows what the neighbors think of her. The smaller the community, the more complete will be the acquaintance between them. But in the big city, a man who courts a girl sees her in very few situations and under highly favorable conditions, and he probably knows much less about the girl he courts. If he meets her parents, the meeting may be casual and uninformative. He doesn't have a chance to see from daily observation how she lives at home and what her relationship is to her parents. His knowledge is even scantier if her family lives elsewhere, and she has come to the city for work. The young man probably does not visit her place of employment to discover how efficiently she does her work and how favorably her employer regards her. He may know some of her friends or none, but he is not likely to know them all. He comes to call on her several times a week. She has ample opportunity to make herself presentable. He doesn't know what she looks like when she isn't all dressed up. Perhaps he takes her to the movies or to a dance; almost always the occasion is a pleasant one. He doesn't

know how she behaves when she's sick, or disappointed, or not doing the things she wants to do. He may know as little about her after months of courtship of this kind as a theater-goer knows about the true character of an actor whom he has seen play *Hamlet* a dozen or more times. All the theater-goer sees is the mask worn by the actor, and all the lover sees is the mask worn by another actor who knows how to act well, too. It is small wonder, then, that people sometimes find after marriage that they have played the fool and married virtual strangers.

If courtship is to be a time of discovery, it is important that the two persons come to know each other as completely as possible, as completely as they would if they lived on adjoining farms. How to accomplish this in the city is a problem, but one suggestion is that they see each other in as many different situations as possible, since some trait of personality previously unrecognized may be revealed in a new situation. The most revealing experiences are generally those for which no preparation has been made, namely, the critical experiences. How he or she behaves when taken by surprise; when things go wrong; when she loses her job; when she fails in an important assignment; when she receives undeserved public ridicule; when a dearly beloved friend dies — these situations, and others like them, often reveal traits of personality that previously were not evident. The great difficulty of knowing a person when contact with that person is limited to familiar surroundings and situations doubtless underlies the time-honored suggestion that no man should marry a woman until he has seen how she behaves on a camping trip in unfamiliar country.

Is love blind?

There is a great deal of irrationality in the relationship of lovers. Each is blinded by love to the imperfections of the other. The young man falls in love and strives to possess completely his beloved. For one reason or another he cannot have her immediately; so must repress his desire. The accumulated emotion finds indirect expression in his love-making, in the many courtesies he shows her, in his daydreams, in a process which the psychoanalysts call sublimation. Part of the sublimation takes the form of idealization, and he imagines his beloved as he would like her to be. All her freckles fade away and only her big blue eyes remain. George Bernard Shaw points up this idealization in his definition of love as "a gross exaggeration of the differ-

ence between one person and all the rest." [1] The beloved one is perfect, for anything less than a perfect choice reflects on the intelligence of the chooser. In real life, especially in modern times among young people who are frank and realistic, the idealization is not always complete, but even a partial idealization means that there will be a number of blind spots.

Some argue that since love is blind we waste our time in talking about intelligent courtship, but the only alternative would be not to discuss the problem on the ground that the information presented will be ignored. This alternative is not attractive. We post warning signs: "Stop! Look! Listen!" — in the hope that some will see them in time. If students are conscious of the mechanism of idealization, they may not be entirely victimized by it. The tyranny of the emotional life is partly due to the unconscious manner in which it operates.

Courtship as a confessional

The usual behavior in courtship is for the two lovers to hide their defects, but sometimes we find persons who feel impelled to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth. These overconscientious individuals usually suffer from a compulsion based on acute feelings of guilt. They are very much ashamed of something they have done, and they atone by confessing their sins.

Confession may be good for the soul, but it is dangerous in courtship if carried too far. The recital of one's past mistakes generally leaves the listener wondering how many more there are which aren't being told. Moreover, events are not always seen in proper proportion. The thing being confessed, though actually a minor matter, may loom large in the mind of the hearer, who wonders why it should be told if there isn't more to it than appears on the surface. It is generally agreed by marriage counselors that confidence is undermined by indiscriminate confession. So far as the relationship of lovers is concerned, their present attitudes and habits are what matter, not those they formerly had. It is not possible to set down precisely the things that ought to be divulged and those that ought not, because allowance must be made for individual differences in standards and tastes. But good sense should dictate the desirability of divulging those things which might have important bearing on the welfare of the relationship.

[1] Freud refers to the phenomenon as "the overestimation of the sexual object."

What is love?

In the United States, it is taken for granted that one should marry for love. It is the only respectable motive for marriage in our culture. But what is this force we so greatly venerate?

The supply of love seems to be very great. At least, nearly everyone who marries says he is in love, and usually believes it. The number of persons is small who say with Laetitia in George Meredith's *The Egoist*, "I could not marry without love and I do not know what love is."

Love is a sentiment characterized by devotion to another's welfare. This is implied by the phrase "to care for someone," which literally means to take care of someone. The focus of love is the beloved one's needs and aspirations, not one's own. Love is a species of altruism, and the opposite of love is self-interest.

As a response, love must have a stimulus, and the stimulus is the person who is loved. If we have happy times with the loved person, our affection for him grows, just as the child's love for his mother develops because she is good to him. Love is an internal drive, but it depends on external stimuli for its expression and reinforcement. Love is not spontaneously generated and sustained, nor can it be turned on or off at will like a faucet. It is a response to a favorable situation, and a person capable of love will show affection if the situation is favorable. Love may be long-suffering, as the Scriptures point out, but there are usually limits to self-sacrifice. This brings us to the highly important conclusion that the natural attraction between lovers must be buttressed by congeniality, if their affection for each other is to endure.

The marked emphasis on romantic love in American culture is seen in modern popular music. This emphasis on romance is not found in other cultures which stress practical values. The elements of the romantic complex are somewhat as follows: (*a*) romantic love is the only valid basis for marriage; (*b*) love is a mysterious attraction of two people for each other; (*c*) one stumbles into love when the right person comes along; (*d*) there is a "one and only" right person for everybody; (*e*) finding this person insures lasting happiness. Any number of popular songs, chosen at random, may be cited as illustrations of the romantic complex: "It Had to Be You," "Night and Day," "Star Dust," "Till the Real Thing Comes Along."

Love and congeniality reinforce each other, and it is fortunate if a relationship starts out with both. The dominating rôle of congenial-

ity in promoting affection has long been recognized by mankind and most societies make it the basis of selection. If a choice had to be made between the two, it would probably be wiser and safer, as a rule, to marry someone who was highly congenial, on the theory that love would follow, than to marry an uncongenial person with whom one was deeply in love. Nowhere is romantic love glorified as it is in the United States.[1] The theme, "Marriage for love at any cost," lends itself to dramatic treatment and has not been overlooked by Hollywood and the pulp magazines. In most cultures, however, the emphasis in mating is on the suitability of the pair for marriage in general and for each other in particular. On this account the choice is often made for the young people by their parents, by relatives, or by professional go-betweens. The youth have the veto power, but do not, as a rule, initiate the relationship. Our own policy of self-determination for youth in the choice of a mate is probably advantageous, but only if the choice is wise.

Parental rôles in courtship

Although parents in our culture no longer select mates, they still play important rôles in the courtship of their children. The influence is usually unobtrusive, but as a result it is sometimes all the more effective. Investigation [2] confirms common observation that both parents are usually more concerned about their daughter's courtship than their son's, with the mother taking the more active interest. Particularly noteworthy are two classes of parents who stubbornly try to dominate the choice of a mate. One group consists of parents who are reluctant to give up the child whose dependence they are enjoying. These parents are emotionally immature, perhaps unhappily married or divorced, and they dread the prospect of the empty nest. The other group is made up of socially ambitious parents who want their children to make a "good" marriage. Their ambitions reflect the emphasis on "getting ahead" which is dominant in our culture. They are disturbed to see their children about to make a marriage which does not improve their social and economic position, however desirable it may be from other points of view. If the parents have not been successful themselves, their wishes for their children may represent vicarious compensation.

[1] For further treatment, see Chapter 20.

[2] Alan Bates, "Parental Rôles in Courtship," *Social Forces*, 20:483, May, 1942.

Love and the Learning Process

Some parents seem to hold the idyllic belief that courtship and love-making on the part of their children are natural phenomena controlled by instinct, and that they, the parents, need, therefore, give no attention to these matters. The idea that the floodgates of love-making are automatically opened at the onset of puberty, and that the adolescent youth is certain some time thereafter to be successfully launched upon the sea of matrimony is, of course, a fantasy. We know from observation that sometimes the floodgates are kept tightly closed, and the libido does all kinds of queer things to a highly introverted person. There are a great many people who go through life never really knowing how to make love or practice courtship. And they are most unhappy about it. Clearly, the ability to love another person and the ability to carry on a successful courtship are not gifts of heredity, but have to be learned.

Even mating behavior has to be learned if it is to be efficient. Several years ago the owners of a circus brought together two huge gorillas, male and female, that had been raised separately in isolation. The vast audience of the pulp readers got terribly excited. Nothing happened; even the gorillas have to learn to mate. Observations [1] of chimpanzees in captivity show that the sexually mature but inexperienced young male may behave ineffectively in the mating situation, especially if he is reared too much in isolation or deprived of normal companionship during his preadolescent years. It may be necessary for young anthropoid males to live in a group where rivalry for females prevails if the necessary skills and assertiveness for breeding purposes are to develop. In a chimpanzee colony in nature, imitation is the instrument of learning, but among human beings language may be sufficient.[2]

In connection with the relationship of family behavior to the learning process, we may observe also, in passing, that child care has to be learned by the mother. When the female chimpanzee bears her first infant, she may act as if at a loss what to do. The inexperienced mother, isolated from other chimpanzees, sometimes seems to be

[1] H. C. Bingham, "Sex Development in Apes," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 5, number 1, 1928.

[2] The literature on human mating is very extensive. A good practical discussion is A. Stone and H. Stone, *A Marriage Manual* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935). A comprehensive analysis of the relations of men and women from many standpoints is Amram Scheinfeld, *Women and Men* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943).

afraid of her firstborn. When the infant has emerged from her body, she may stand off from it and regard it uneasily, instead of placing it on her abdomen or breast, letting it cling to her and grooming it, as the experienced mother does. Eventually, curiosity prompts her to poke at her infant with her fingers or a stick, but she at first makes no effort to nurse or clean it. Observations such as these have been made in the laboratory.[1] In nature, chimpanzees live in bands and a young mother would presumably have the example and assistance of more experienced members. But it is of considerable importance that mating and maternal behavior have to be learned, and that the inherited biological structures of themselves do not guarantee satisfactory performance.

A Negro spiritual points out that "evybody talkin' 'bout heab'n ain't goin' dar," and we may likewise observe that everybody talking about love doesn't really know how to practice it. A person may be so self-centered, so narcissistic, as to be incapable of responding to the warmth of another. Or a person may be too devoted to mother or father, or to a member of the same sex, to be capable of normal affectional response to a mate. How normal heterosexual love develops was traced briefly in the preceding chapter, in which it was stated that, although considerable variation exists in children's affectional attachments because of differences in learning-situations, nevertheless a characteristic pattern of development can be traced in our American culture. The child begins life by showing an affectional interest in himself; that is, his initial orientation is narcissistic, since he derives pleasure from the sight and feel of his own body. In due course, he successfully transfers affection from himself to his mother, unless the transfer is blocked by the mother's encouragement of exhibitionistic behavior on the part of the child, in which case the child grows up a narcissistic or self-centered person. There are a good many men and women who are so wrapped up in themselves that they cannot give or receive affection. They want to reinforce their narcissism by having not love but admiration and praise, particularly as they do not want to give love — that is, devotion to another's welfare. Clearly, a narcissistic person is an outstanding risk as a marriage partner.

Normally the child moderates his self-love by a transfer of affection to his parents and the other members of his household. Through feeding, bathing, and other gratifications of the child's wants, self-

[1] Robert M. Yerkes, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

love is partly displaced by affectional attachment to the persons involved. This change occurs through the medium of the conditioned response. There is, it is thought, a physical element in the child's attachment to the parent of the opposite sex. For a time this interest is allowed to express itself, but during later childhood, at about the ages of six to eight, the child represses the physical aspects of the sexual impulse as he becomes aware of the sexual taboo of our culture. The sexual interest is only temporarily repressed and reasserts itself at puberty or earlier; hence the interval is known as the latency period. The evidence shows that the latency period is not present in all cultures, since in some places sexual interest begins at a very early age and continues without a break throughout childhood.[1] In our culture, however, there is evidence that the latency period is common, and that from the ages of six to twelve children exhibit shyness in the presence of the opposite sex. The love interest is present, as indicated by games like "Post Office," but the expressions and contacts are formalized.[2] Observation of a group of boys and girls enrolled in a club for a period of years [3] showed that the boys, at age six, would characteristically play in a group of girls, and even at age eight would not differentiate work according to sex. But between the ages of nine and eleven a gradual development of sex consciousness and sensitivity was observed, leading first to avoidance and rejection of the opposite sex, then to shy acceptance, and later to active seeking. At the age of twelve, the boys would touch the girls only in games or other conventionalized situations, but by the time they were fourteen or so they would try to improve their appearance in order to attract the opposite sex. Indeed, the inhibitions of the early prepubescent and adolescent period seem to give added force to the intensity of the love interest in later adolescence. The desire to be accepted and loved by the opposite sex often leads to exaggerated emphasis on personal appearance, especially on the part of girls, who look upon dull hair, unsmooth complexion, or glasses as major disfigurements, so that they become sources of anxiety which diminish only with progressively successful heterosexual experience. Failure to make a good adjustment leads to

[1] B. Malinowski, *The Sexual Life of Savages in Northwestern Melanesia* (New York: Liveright, 1929).

[2] S. Bell, "A Preliminary Study of the Emotion of Love Between the Sexes," *American Journal of Psychology*, 13:325–54, 1902. Cited in Sears, *op. cit.*

[3] E. H. Campbell, "The Social-Sex Development of Children," *Genetic Psychology Monograph* 21, number 4, 1939. A report based on the observation for a period of three years of a group of 46 boys and 39 girls enrolled in clubs at the Merrill-Palmer School, Detroit.

much anguish, and this in turn may lead to evasive and regressive behavior.[1]

The quickened physical impulses of puberty impel adolescents to show active interest in the opposite sex, but they often do not know how to behave toward each other because of their previous separation and inexperience. They may feel ill at ease in each other's presence, even strange and embarrassed. The sexual taboos of our culture and the resulting conspiracy of silence on the part of parents and teachers mean that many of our young people get their earliest sex information from unsatisfactory sources, and come to adolescence with a sense of guilt regarding sexual matters. The repression of the sexual interest and the lack of proper learning create a chasm between the sexes which even the finished examples of love-making on the silver screen cannot help to bridge, for these unfortunate young people cannot copy behavior for which they have no basis in their own habits. The boy may be abrupt and even rude in his love-making, while the girl may be either too passive or too eager. They simply do not know how to overcome resistances and establish rapport. They make awkward lovers because they have never learned how to make love.

In times past, lovers were supposed to be gallant, especially the males, and there was a certain tradition and set of manners to be learned. During the Middle Ages under feudalism, the courtly knights developed a special body of usages, including an appropriate set of attitudes toward women. History refers to this period as the Age of Chivalry. The knights were polite and attentive to the ladies, and valiant in their protection of them. Gallantry and courtesy were emphasized and carried to florid extremes. Courtship developed into an art, and there was a punctilious etiquette to be learned. The knights fought tournaments for the favor of the fair ladies whose ribbons they wore in the lists. The women, for their part, mastered a corresponding code, calculated to make them attractive to men. They cultivated a certain bodily fragility to appeal to the virility of the males. They emphasized modesty and femininity, but were not entirely passive. They learned to dress attractively and to defer to men in conversation. Certain of these habits were perhaps more appropri-

[1] Peter Blos, *The Adolescent Personality* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1941); and C. Zachry, *Emotion and Conduct in Adolescence* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1941). These are reports on the study of adolescents made by a committee of the Progressive Education Association. More than six hundred histories were collected, and an intensive analysis made of a smaller number. The study by Blos gives a few cases at considerable length.

ate to mediaeval than to modern times, but despite the recent changes in the relationship of the sexes, there is still room for them in courtship. The forms of love-making may be different, but the need for romance is probably as great as ever.

Culture and Adolescence

Whether or not the youth have learned how to practice courtship, certain striking physiological changes associated with sexual maturity occur at puberty and heighten the interest taken in the opposite sex. The contrast between the preadolescent and adolescent behavior is sometimes quite striking, and is often a matter of concern to parents, who view with alarm the child's preoccupation with love and his demand for greater independence from parental control. We used to think that rebellion against the authority of the parents was a natural phenomenon; that is, a normal concomitant of adolescence; but recent ethnological field studies have shown us that the storm and stress of adolescence is a product of the policy of sexual repression which has long characterized Western civilization. Boys are not segregated from girls, but physical intimacy between them is strictly tabooed. At the same time strong bonds are forged between the child and his family, and his dependence upon his parents is great. Adolescence brings change and rebellion. The pressure of the sexual tensions is great and threatens to break through the old restraints. In Samoa, where the culture defines the child's rôles differently, there is, according to reports, no such period of strain at adolescence.[1] Indeed, adolescence is scarcely differentiable from the period preceding, except for the fact that the girls at this time are freed from further responsibility of the care of their younger sisters and brothers. Almost as soon as a girl is able to toddle, she is saddled with the responsibility for the next younger member of the family. The children thus look after one another, and the parents are free to carry on their work. The little children also do a good deal of wandering about the island, visiting relatives here and there, so that they develop considerable independence. The sexual life is free. Even the small children play at sex, and later they form liaisons of varying degrees of intensity and permanence. Under the circumstances, adolescence is not a time of crisis, and the transition to marriage is an easy one.

For the Samoan boy and girl, adolescence is a period singularly free

[1] Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1928).

of care and responsibility. They have less work to do than before, and they do not have to worry about a career or about marriage, since these things take care of themselves. Things are different for youth in our culture. Adolescence is a time of added economic responsibility in many cases. It is a time when the boy must begin to think about his life-work. Competition with his fellows becomes more keen, not less. And there is the problem of the management of the sexual tensions and of marriage.

Weaning

It will be observed from the foregoing that the problem of adolescents in our culture may be generalized as one of making a more or less abrupt transition from dependent to independent rôles. As children they take orders; as adults they give them. The obverse of taking orders we call impertinence, which according to our standards is intolerable. There are societies, however, which do not make such a strong qualitative difference between children and adults. The virtues they exalt in grown men they encourage also in little boys. For instance, if courage is valued highly, it is fostered as a trait in the boys even to the point of permitting them to flout or even to strike their fathers. Instead of resenting such behavior, the father will relish it, for it is evidence that his child "will be a man." [1] In such a society the child does not have the problem of unlearning habits of docility and dependency when he reaches maturity.

In still other societies, the child learns habits of subordination to his elders which he retains as long as they live. This is true of the Chinese and others who are organized on the basis of the extended family or the clan. Chinese sons, even after marriage, remain subordinate to their elder brothers, their father, and their father's father. Independence comes — if it comes at all — only when the older males have died, and, therefore, it usually occurs relatively late in a son's life, after he has fully matured and has had ample opportunity to learn, by long observation of his elders, the appropriate behavior of a family head. The daughters are taught to subordinate themselves to their elders and to their brothers, regardless of age. When a girl marries, she moves to her father-in-law's house, where she is subservient to her sisters-in-law. The children in these extended families,

[1] Ruth Benedict, "Transmitting Our Democratic Heritage in the Schools," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1943.

therefore, have no radical readjustments to make when they marry, so far as their relations to their parents are concerned. In short, there is little or no adolescent problem of weaning where habits of either independence or dependence are developed in early life and maintained in adulthood. The difficulty arises where one set of habits is enjoined in childhood, and another and different set is sanctioned in maturity.

The foregoing discussion reveals that the problem of psychological weaning is peculiarly a phenomenon of our conjugal type of family organization. An important phase of the adolescent's achievement of maturity in our society has to do with his emancipation from the parental family. We expect him to set up a household of his own, which is difficult if he is tied to his parents. Weaning is especially important in our type of family structure (the conjugal family), more important presumably than it is in most preliterate societies where the family is organized around the blood tie of parent and children.[1] The conjugal family makes weaning urgent, yet may also make it difficult to achieve, especially where the family is small, since habits of dependency are probably easier to develop in a small group than in a large one. But this does not mean that weaning is usually unsuccessful in our society. There is some evidence [2] that dependence is characteristic of the relation of the child to his parents in our culture, and that overdependence is not. In most cases the adolescent's wish for freedom is not offset by his wish for protection, and if there is strong parental resistance to emancipation the child is likely to rebel.

Adjustment to peers

Weaning from the parental family has its counterpart in the child's adjustment to his own age group. Nothing matters more in his development than the child's relations with his peers, for investigation has shown the central importance of group acceptance for normal mental health. Specifically, investigation shows a close relation between schizophrenia and the inability of subjects to engage in the intimate,

[1] See Chapter 2 for discussion of the conjugal and consanguineous systems.

[2] Meltzer obtained twenty responses (ten on each parent) by asking children to tell the first thing that came to mind when the words "father" and "mother" were mentioned. The sample consisted of one hundred and fifty children chosen to represent a cross-section of the population. The age-range was eight to sixteen years and I.Q. spread was 62 to 160. About 60 per cent of the responses showed dependence, being about the same for mother and father; 2 per cent, overdependence. H. Meltzer, "Children's Attitudes to Parents," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 5:244-65, July, 1935.

informal life of their peers either in childhood or adolescence.[1] Marked inability to establish rapport with others leads to rejection by the group, and the resulting isolation is bad for mental health. How certain traits of personality isolate a person from the group is interestingly brought out in an intensive study of the characteristics of the least popular and the most popular girls in a state institution. The method used was to have each girl indicate the persons with whom she would choose to live, play, work, or study; and the persons with whom she would choose not to engage in such activities. A person could be chosen on one basis and rejected on another. The girls were classified as "under-chosen," "over-chosen," and "average-chosen." [2] Although differentiated as individuals, the "isolates" showed common behavioral characteristics, such as quarrelsomeness, irritability, nagging, whining, nervousness, aggressiveness, and tendencies to interfere with the activities of the group. The "over-chosen" were co-operative, even in disposition, willing to do more than their share of the work, solicitous toward new girls, and good listeners. They were able to add to their own happiness without subtracting from the welfare of the others.

A youth feels that if he is not to be rejected by his peers he must share their interests and values. This choice may, of course, bring him into conflict with his elders if their values are different. In general, adolescent rebellion is directed against the parent who exercises the control, whether it be the parent of the same or the opposite sex. Boys do not react more often against their fathers than girls against their mothers, as is sometimes thought. Studies [3] show that there is no significant difference between the sexes in their feeling for their parents, both sexes preferring the mother. There is some evidence [4] that in our culture girls are more critical of their parents than are boys, but this critical attitude is directed to both parents. One reason

[1] N. J. Demerath, "Adolescent Status Demands and the Student Experiences of Twenty Schizophrenics," *American Sociological Review*, 8:513–18, October, 1943.

[2] "Under-chosen" is defined as placing 1 S.D. below the mean of the test population; "over-chosen," 1 S.D. above. Total number: 450 persons at the New York State Training School for Girls. Helen Hall Jennings, *Leadership and Isolation: A Study of Personality in Inter-Personal Relations* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1943).

[3] Lewis M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938). Terman's subjects rated, on a 5-point scale, attachments to and conflicts with parents.

[4] L. H. Stott, "Adolescents' Dislikes Regarding Parental Behavior, and Their Significance," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 57:393–414, 1940. The subjects were nearly one thousand adolescents from farms, small towns, and a large city. Each child was asked to state what there was to criticize in his parents.

for this is probably that girls are subject to greater control, and another is that they are perhaps more vocal.

One reason for parent-child conflict at adolescence is the cleavage between inexperienced youth and their experienced elders. The older people have learned from experience, perhaps by having their fingers burned, and earnestly want to spare their children the pain of learning the hard way. Another factor, perhaps even more important, that tends to separate the generations is rapid social change, which has the effect of creating two different worlds for youth and for their elders, so that they seem sometimes not to talk the same language and scarcely to understand each other. When conditions are changing rapidly, as they now are, new customs and practices develop which are followed by the young, while the elders are clinging to more conventional ways. For example, there is more unrestricted dating nowadays among young adolescents than formerly,[1] but parents may not approve of having their fourteen-year-old daughter go to the movies alone with a boy friend, even if it is done by others. This may lead to friction. In a changing culture the interests of the generations may be different. Adolescents generally band together in support of such interests as the movies, swing music, dancing, pulp magazines, and sports, and frown on "highbrow" activities which their parents support, such as good books and classical music. They also tend to cultivate personality traits which they think other adolescents would like them to have; for example, physical attractiveness, social ease in heterosexual relations, aggressiveness, efficiency, in the case of boys fearlessness in physical combat, and in the case of girls being attractive and a "good sport." [2]

The mores of courtship

Young people in our culture are much concerned about the matter of their pre-marital sex adjustment. The problem in which they are interested is complicated, but revolves around the question of whether it is right to have pre-marital sex relations. The question is nearly always posed on an ethical level, and it is assumed that affection exists

[1] R. S. and H. M. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929), pp. 111, 138, 283. See also by the same authors *Middletown in Transition* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937).

[2] These are trait evaluations of fifteen-year-olds. Those of twelve-year-olds differ markedly. C. Tyron, *Evaluations of Adolescent Personality by Adolescents* (Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, IV, number 4, 1939).



FIGURE 58. SEX DIFFERENCES IN ADOLESCENTS' CHOICES OF ACTIVITIES

The top panels show the decline of interest in playing ball and the spurt of interest in parties for both sexes in early adolescence. Girls' interest in parties is greater at all ages. The bottom panels show a declining interest in reading on the part of both sexes, but with differences in the relative values assigned to movies and dancing. Adapted from Harold E. Jones, *Development in Adolescence* (New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1943), p. 98.

between the persons involved. Promiscuous relations are almost universally condemned by young people. But, they ask, if two persons love each other and are unable to marry in normal season because of limited income or preparation for a career, what ought their emotional adjustment to be?

The standards of right and wrong, as students of the social sciences recognize, are fixed by the mores of the group. Our mores disapprove of pre-marital sex relations. This statement may be received with some skepticism by those who point to evidences of increasing sexual freedom before marriage. The evidence on this question is not very good and that supplied by extremists, whether conservative or radical, is untrustworthy. According to a recent study [1] of college students,

[1] D. D. Bromley and F. H. Britten, *Youth and Sex: a Study of 1300 College Students* (New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1938).

one half of the boys and one quarter of the girls reported having had pre-marital relations. The study has its defects, since we do not know that the colleges visited constituted a representative sample of American colleges; and, more important, we do not know that the responses were reliable. It is hardly to be doubted, nevertheless, that an increase in the amount of pre-marital sex behavior has occurred in recent years. Such an increase would be in keeping with recent social changes, such as the growth of cities, the loss of functions by the family, the greater employment of women, the increased secularization, and the invention and diffusion of the automobile and of contraceptives. In an extensive investigation, Terman compared the pre-marital sex experience of four married groups: the first, born before 1890; the second, between 1890 and 1899; the third, between 1900 and 1909; and the last group in 1910 or later. The trend was toward a progressive increase in the amount of pre-marital sex experience.[1] In interpreting this conclusion, it should be noted that striking social changes occurred around the turn of the century, and the immediate impact of these new conditions was very great. It may be that further experience with them will bring a more conservative adjustment. It is interesting that in a recent nation-wide survey [2] of young women between the ages of twenty and thirty-five, two thirds expressed the opinion that women should have stricter morals than they have now, and only about one quarter thought the present code should stay as it is.[3]

Since the mores make conduct right or wrong, we are interested in knowing whether there has been any change in public attitude toward pre-marital sex relations. The increase in the practice is not, *per se*, evidence of increased public approval; the crime rate has also increased in the last three or four decades, but we still think crime is bad. Unfortunately, there are no comparable data on the sex question which show the nature of the long-time trend. Studies of recent changes indicate that "present attitudes among the population at large are less different from those of a generation ago than many scarehead writers

[1] Louis M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938), pp. 320–24.

[2] The Fortune Survey, *Fortune Magazine*, August, 1943.

[3] Women tend to show a greater conservatism in moral judgments than men, reflecting the double standard of sex morality of our culture. Arthur Hosking Jones, "Sex, Educational and Religious Influences on Moral Judgments Relative to the Family," *American Sociological Review*, 8:405, August, 1943.

would have us believe." [1] In one large and representative survey, only a fifth of the adults believed it was "all right" for both parties to a marriage to have had previous sex experience.[2] While there has been a general trend toward greater tolerance of previously disapproved behavior in the field of sex and marriage, the trend has not been uniform with respect to all types of behavior. Tolerance of divorce and birth control is much greater, for instance, than tolerance of pre-marital sex relations.

Social change and courtship

There have always been individuals who do not conform to the standards of the group, even where the standards were clearly understood and strongly sanctioned by the general population. In our own society at present, however, part of the difficulty arises from the confusion which exists regarding the nature of the standards themselves. This confusion has resulted from the uneven changes in our thinking and in our standards brought about by our rapidly changing technology and by the transition from a rural to an urban society.

In the rural society of the past, many of our present courtship problems did not exist. In the modern city one of the serious problems of young people is the great difficulty of meeting persons who might make suitable mates. The young people of former times had no such difficulty. They grew up together in the same small community and knew each other well. There were few strangers in such groups, and those few did not remain strangers long, although they might be received at first with some suspicion unless they were vouched for by some member of the group. The formal introduction became part of our tradition as a safeguard against exploitation by undesirable strangers. If a stranger came to town without introductions to the young women, it was no great loss to them, because they had plenty of boy friends and protectors.

In the big city, things are different. There nearly everybody is a stranger. The problem of getting acquainted is great. Introductions are infrequent, since they depend on having common friends who provide the introductions. "Pick-ups" and blind dates, though they are dangerous and may lead to exploitation, bring speedier results. Many

[1] Theodore Newcomb, "Recent Changes in Attitudes Toward Sex and Marriage," *American Sociological Review*, 2:661, October., 1937.

[2] *Fortune Magazine, Quarterly Survey*, April, 1937.

young people, especially young women who have gone to the city to work and are not living with their parents, often find themselves very much alone, and they do not like it.

In the country the courtship was carried on under the chaperonage of the group. The couple would meet in the girl's home, or they would go to church together, or participate in the functions of other organizations. They were quite generally under public protection and observation. The expenses of courtship were paid by the man, but since there was little commercialized recreation, the outlay was, as a rule, not great. Because of the surveillance of the group and the prospects of early marriage, the problem of pre-marital sex adjustment was not acute. The boys married early because they had jobs waiting for them as farmers. If they married early, they could have a large family, which would give them many unpaid workers for the farm.

Our present urban, industrial situation changes the picture for youth. The automobile takes young people away from the watchful eyes of neighbors and substitutes private morality for public codes. The city is filled with agencies like the movies, dance halls, and night



FIGURE 59. ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN PROPOSING MARRIAGE

In Hopi society, the girl usually proposes and announces the betrothal by combing her fiancé's hair in public. Above are the attitudes of five hundred college students toward according women in the United States the same right to propose. The women students are more conservative than the men and probably more subtle. These data are unrealistic, but the trend seems to be toward greater independence for girls, as in blind dating and in sharing the expenses of courtship. Since courtship practices are in a state of change, there is much confusion regarding what is proper. Data from W. S. Bernard, "Student Attitudes on Marriage," *American Sociological Review*, 3:357, 1938.

clubs that provide recreation for money. Courtship is expensive. Many youths have no jobs and others must spend long years in preparation for their life-work. Many girls may have jobs, and may earn more money than the boys. Should he pay all the bills, or should she share the costs of courtship? Is a youth justified in courting a girl under these circumstances? If not, what are the young women to do? These questions show how difficult are the problems of courtship in a rapidly changing industrial society.

Many changes in material culture come rapidly, but only slowly do we learn to make adequate adjustments to them. The time interval between the two is called a social lag, and it is these lags that give us so many of our social problems, marital as well as others. Given time, mankind undertakes to remove the lag and effect satisfactory adjustments to the changed conditions. If the changes produced by inventions were all as revolutionary and far-reaching as those produced by steam power and steel tools, the adjustment might well be hopeless, and we might despair of ever being able to catch up. Fortunately, basic changes such as those which gave us our cities are rare, most changes being in the nature of improvements on major inventions. This gives us time to become accustomed to the new conditions and to make advantageous adjustments to them.

In the case of courtship and marriage, there is evidence that such adjustments are in the offing in the urban environment. Various agencies are helping with the problem of providing contacts for young men and women who find themselves isolated in the big city. The YMCA and the YWCA in a number of places plan joint programs, such as dances, hikes, and swimming parties. In a few cases where new YMCA and YWCA buildings have been built, they have been placed near each other, to facilitate joint programs. New agencies, such as hobby clubs, dance clubs, and get-acquainted clubs, have been organized, and probably many more will be. If the solution is to be satisfactory, the problem cannot be left to the young people themselves to work out on an individual basis, for courtship functions best when it is socialized or institutionalized. Young people of the old rural society enjoyed the protective environment of home, school, church, and local fellowship groups; adequate adjustment in the modern urban community would seem to call for some satisfactory equivalent.



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Religion: Protestant ☒ Catholic ☐ Jewish ☐
J. C. P.

Education: Elementary ☐ High ☐ Bus. ☐ Voc. ☐
College Wellcliffe Degree
E. H. C.

References: 1. Dr. A. D. Borden
76 Main Street
2. Mrs. Grace Dorr
17 Marley Road

Person
Age 19 Hgt. 5 ft 7 in. Wgt. 123
Complexion Fair
Hair Blonde Eyes. Blue

Interests

Arts	Sports
☐ Music	☒ Hiking
☒ Dancing	☐ Swimming
☒ Dramatics	☐ Tennis
☐ Writing	☐ Bowling
☐ Painting	☒ Skiing
☐ Photography	☐ Skating
	☐ Riding

* * *

☐ Chess ☐ Bridge
S. Q. a ☑ b ☐ c ☐ d ☐

"I understand that the responsibility of *INTRODUCTION is limited solely to the introduction of approved subscribers."

Reg. No..... Pd..... Date..... Signed.....

FIGURE 60. INTRODUCTION SERVICES

Professional matchmaking, an old institution in many cultures, does not seem to be consistent with ideas regarding romance and self-determination in our culture. However, the complexity and mobility of modern city life makes it difficult for many persons to have adequate social contacts and has led to the establishment of introduction services of many kinds. Shown above are an advertisement and an application card of two non-profit introduction services. (Card reproduced by courtesy of *Introduction, Inc.*)

Courtship as a Social Process

Courtship is the kind of process [1] which the social psychologist calls *summatory*, for it consists of a series of events which build up to a climax, marriage. There is an almost irresistible forward motion in this kind of process, and the farther along it carries one, the more involved it becomes. The practical significance of this phenomenon is that in courtship there can be no standing still, no marking time. With each passing day and with each new experience, the pair become either more attached to each other or less. That is the reason that those who have once been lovers can seldom be "just friends" in the way they were friends originally. Such an altered feeling, however, doesn't mean that they can't be civil in their treatment of each other. Hollywood has, in fact, developed a code, presumably in the interests of good sportsmanship, which includes dates between ex-partners in marriage. In such cases all we see is the outward behavior, which may not afford a valid clue to the inner feelings of the persons involved. There may never have been any genuine emotional attachment between the couple, or there may have been a distinct difference in the feeling of the two for each other, the one caring, the other not. Be this as it may, in true courtship there must be either a progressive emotional involvement or a falling out. A couple whose courtship drags on year after year may seem to be standing still, but this is only because we see the outer form of the relationship and not the inner substance. A static courtship usually reflects a pathological personality.

In courtship and in marriage the two lovers rarely become equally involved; that is to say, the man loves the woman more than she loves him, or vice versa. Lovers suspect something of the sort, as may be seen from the constant reassurances which they seek in affection. "Do you really love me?" asks the girl, wanting the man to say that he loves her as much as she does him, which is generally not the case.[2] At least investigation has proved what has long been suspected — that the wife usually makes the principal adjustment in marriage,[3] because she usually has a greater stake in the outcome. For

[1] Adapted from Willard Waller, *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1938), chap. XI.

[2] This question is also a common one among narcissistic females who want to reinforce their egotism by having not love but admiration and praise.

[3] Ernest W. Burgess and Leonard Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1939), p. 349.

her, marriage is her whole existence; for her husband it is a thing apart. This is the general rule, but there are many cases where the reverse is true. In either event, if the involvement is not mutual, or equally great on the part of both, it is probable that the terms of the association will be dictated by the person who has the least interest in the continuance of the relationship. This introduces the possibility of exploitation.

Quite the opposite situation may develop. A man may be attracted to a woman and start to "date" her. His feeling for her may not grow, but she may become greatly attached to him. He may want to discontinue the relationship, but if the courtship has continued for some time, he may feel sorry for her or feel honor bound to marry her. Up to the age of forty-five, a woman's chances of marriage decrease with age more sharply than a man's, but this is hardly a good argument for requiring a man to marry a woman he doesn't want as a wife. Until recently, an engagement was a pledge to marry, and was so interpreted by the courts. Of late, there has been a tendency to outlaw breach-of-promise suits,[1] on the ground that times have changed and that women are no longer dependent on marriage for a livelihood. It is unfortunate if the relationship has been allowed to drag on unduly, or if a promise of marriage has been made, but a bad marriage is worse than a broken engagement.

As a matter of fact, most "love affairs" do not lead to the altar. Only about one in six or seven eventuates in marriage.[2] Each love affair may be serious and the participants may believe it is "the real thing," but it may be terminated by (*a*) external circumstances, such as spatial separation, death, marriage to another person, or interference of a third person; or (*b*) internal weakness, such as dissatisfactions and quarrels. In the Hamilton sample, about one quarter of the love affairs ended because of the former and about one half because of the latter. When people who are in love do not marry, the reasons may be that they are not congenial, or that they are not quite ready for

[1] As of January 1, 1943, breach-of-promise actions had been abolished in ten states: Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Information supplied by Professor C. G. Vernier, Stanford University School of Law, in letter to writer, April 3, 1944.

[2] G. V. Hamilton, *A Research in Marriage* (New York: A. and C. Boni, 1929), chap. 10. Hamilton's group is probably highly selected and, therefore, not representative of the general population. His analysis is based on 1358 love affairs experienced by 200 persons (100 men and 100 women). The love affairs included those from earliest childhood to those in marriage and those after marriage. The number of love affairs was nearly the same for the two sexes.

marriage because they are too young or too insecure economically. But every love affair is genuine at least in the sense that it is an experience which results in some kind of learning, whether for good or ill, affecting subsequent experience.

Courtship versus dating

Sometimes two persons meet, one of whom is ready for marriage and the other not. They may go together and enjoy each other a great deal and become enamored of each other, but their goals are different. The young man wants only a good time, because he isn't ready for marriage, whereas the girl has a more serious purpose. On the basis of this difference in motive, Waller [1] has distinguished between courtship and dating, and the distinction is important because of its practical implications. The aim in dating is merely to have a good time, but the aim of true courtship is marriage. The problem is particularly prominent on the college campus, for many of the young men feel they must delay all thought of marriage until they have established themselves in their life-work. Faced with the prospect of several years of professional study and perhaps of several additional years in getting established, they may not be willing to marry on graduation from college, whereas the girls in whom they are interested may be quite willing. If the girl waits, she faces the possibility that this particular courtship may be broken off and her prospects for marriage reduced. This situation has led some students of the family to suggest that college women date young men who have already established themselves in business or the professions. It is suggested that instead of limiting dances to undergraduate fraternity men, sororities extend invitations to the members of the nearest Junior Chamber of Commerce.[2]

Factors in involvement [3]

Like all processes, courtship has a beginning, a middle, and an end. The relationship develops through a sequence of steps. Every courtship may not pass through all these stages, nor may the content be the same in every case. If a great many cases are observed, however, it is possible to abstract the factors which are characteristic and so

[1] Willard Waller, *op. cit.*, p. 235.
[2] Paul Popenoe, "Mate Selection," *American Sociological Review*, 2:735–43, 1937.
[3] After Waller, *op. cit.*

arrive at what is known among sociologists as the *ideal-typical* pattern. The courtship process starts, typically, with some sort of coquetry. By this term we understand some subtle suggestion to proceed, like a meaningful glance or a smile, which one gives the other. This invitation to further acquaintanceship is, of course, based on a favorable first impression or set of impressions which the individuals make on each other. Next the man tells the woman what she likes to hear; that she is beautiful and a person of exquisite virtues. In the present-day vernacular, we say he "hands her a line," which may or may not be deliberate in intention on his part. Flattery, even if not believed, is often relished. For a time the relationship remains on the level of "light love," which serves as a protective device against too great an involvement, lest the love be unrequited. Each holds back a bit to make sure that the other is in the running and not lagging too much, but finally this phase is concluded by "falling in love." Frequent association results in the development of common tastes and complementary tastes. These shared interests and the physical intimacies of courtship intensify the feeling of identification which exists between the pair. For instance, they go to a concert together and are greatly stirred at hearing Wagner's "To the Evening Star" from Tannhäuser. If later one of them should hear this song when alone, it will seem strange and not altogether pleasant, because it has become their song. As the fixation on each other becomes greater, fantasy plays an ever greater rôle. Each puts his best foot forward. Separations serve to intensify the fantasies, for then the lovers are completely removed from reality and their imaginations have completely unhampered movement. All is not bliss, however. There are lovers' quarrels, due sometimes to real issues and sometimes to the accumulated tensions which result from the repressions that courtship imposes. These quarrels determine whether the relationship is to be broken off or continued. They serve the purpose of defining behavior and leadership; that is, they determine what course the relationship will take, what shall and shall not be done, and who is to have the final control. The affair continues, with the couple building up an exclusive world of their own. They live in "private worlds," have a language of their own, gestures which they alone understand. The mutual identification is very great; each keeps a record of daily experiences to share with the other.



FIGURE 61. THE ADVANTAGE OF A LONG ENGAGEMENT

Duration of engagement and marital adjustment of 468 couples. As the length of engagement increases, the proportion of couples with poor adjustment decreases and the proportion with good adjustment increases. A long period of acquaintance before marriage (five years or more) also seems favorable to marital adjustment, in which case the actual engagement period can probably be safely abbreviated.

Courtship as a portent of the future

The experiences of courtship may be viewed from the standpoint of the bearing they have on adjustment in marriage. Preliminary studies [1] show that, in general, couples having good adjustments in marriage also enjoyed good adjustments during courtship. On the other hand, unsatisfactory courtships tend to culminate in unsatisfactory marriages. Coming events cast their shadows before them. If a couple quarrels a great deal during courtship without settling any of their problems, they will probably meet the same problems after marriage with the same futile quarreling. Or, if, in order to save the union or to get peace, one always yields to the other, the winner will expect new victories after marriage. It may be that one is willing to yield to the other and that no great strain is put upon the relationship. But if one yields grudgingly, then after marriage there may be reprisals. It is thus possible to carry over into marriage all sorts of antagonisms which were temporarily subdued or concealed in the interests of getting married. To carry into marriage the unfinished business of courtship is a risky matter.

[1] Ernest W. Burgess and Paul Wallin, *The Adjustment of Engaged Couples*. Unpublished studies.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Under what conditions does courtship exist among animals?
2. How does human courtship differ from animal courtship?
3. Is the payment of a bride-price an evidence of woman's low status?
4. What tests would be fitting prerequisites to marriage in our culture?
5. How does the segmental nature of modern life affect the functions of courtship?
6. Are there any safeguards against the tendency, when in love, to overestimate the sexual object?
7. How much of one's past is it desirable to disclose in courtship?
8. What is love? What is the contribution of psychoanalysis on this question?
9. Why are parents, as a rule, more concerned about their daughters' love affairs than their sons'?
10. What changes, if any, have occurred in recent years in our culture as regards the mores of love and courtship?
11. What can be done in our cities to facilitate the courtships of young people?
12. Are unequal rates of involvement in courtship the exception or the rule?
13. Is the distinction between courtship and dating a valid one?
14. How do the experiences of courtship influence later adjustment in marriage?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. An inventory of theories regarding the nature of love.
2. Tests for differentiating between infatuation and love.
3. Adolescent adjustment to parents in conjugal and consanguineous family systems.
4. Changing courtship customs.
5. "Get-acquainted" clubs and matrimonial agencies.
6. The "dating and rating" complex on a given college campus.

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Chapter 13

THE CHOICE OF A MATE

"MARRIAGE brings numerous cares, which are amply compensated by the more numerous delights which are their companions. But to have the delights as well as the cares, the choice of partners must be fortunate." [1] Nearly everyone agrees with Cobbett in recognizing the crucial importance of a proper choice of mate for happiness in marriage, although a good choice does not produce happiness unless it is accompanied by a good adjustment afterward. The problem must be seen in proper perspective. It is easy to rationalize a poor marital adjustment with the statement: "I married the wrong person." To blame the choice of mate is probably less damaging to one's ego than to acknowledge mistakes in adjustment. But the importance of postmarital adjustments can be exaggerated too, as it is by writers who say that, if one is adaptable, the choice of a particular partner makes little difference, that virtually any normal mate will do. This view ignores the fact that each of us finds it easier to get along with some persons than with others.

MOTIVES IN SELECTION

Readers of this chapter probably would like to know what factors determine the choice of a mate, and how the choices work out in terms of marital happiness. What prompts Jane to marry John rather than Tom or Harry or some other person? Are her motives desirable, from the standpoint of happiness?

There are in mating perhaps a few general motives, like the desires for sex expression, for children, for domesticity, for companionship, and for social status. Concerning the last of these factors, for instance, we observe that the group encourages marriage by putting a

[1] William Cobbett, *Advice to a Lover* (New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1938).

premium on the marital status. We marry to get the benefits of the secure social position that marriage provides, whether it be an increase in pay, deferment in the draft during wartime, or greater respect and influence in the community. These generalized motives help to explain why people marry, but they do not tell us why they marry specific persons.

Motives in sexual selection, like those in most types of complicated social behavior, are likely to be highly varied and complex, partly unwitting, and often inconsistent, affected as they are by a wide variety of factors like health, age, race, religion, education, occupation, locality, family position, and marital status. A sickly man may want a robust wife who can look after him, which may help to explain why many an invalid marries his nurse. On the other hand, when Elizabeth Barrett protested Robert Browning's offer of marriage with the remark that she was an invalid, his reply is supposed to have been: "My strength demands your weakness." A bright youth may unconsciously prefer an older woman as a wife, because all his life he has found that he gets along better with older persons who seem more intelligent and more interesting to him than those of his own age. A member of a minority group may want a wife who enhances his social status.[1] An ambitious professional man may look for a collaborator in his wife. One who has been exploited may seek someone else to exploit. So do motives vary.

The conception of an ideal mate

Although motives in mating are numerous, they are not entirely miscellaneous and permit of some classification. Some motives, moreover, are more common than others and more influential in determining happiness or unhappiness. One such motive concerning which there has been a considerable amount of investigation is the individual's conception of an ideal mate. Most of us have in the back of our minds a picture of the person we should like to marry. A girl may picture her Prince Charming as tall, dark, handsome, athletic, a good dancer, a smooth conversationalist, well-mannered, intelligent,

[1] This is supposed to be the explanation for the reported tendency of Negro men to prefer mulattoes as wives. W. Lloyd Warner *et al.*, *Color and Human Nature* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941). It is probably true also that most persons, regardless of race, would like by their marriage to improve their social status as well as to compensate for any inferiority or inadequacy they feel. Most men who are neither handsome nor rich would probably like to marry women who are beautiful and wealthy.

gay and humorous, romantic, and prosperous. As a rule, we are aware of our standards, but rather vague regarding the details of appearance and personality. The ideal may be patterned after a single person or it may be a combination of traits of two or more persons. Our ideals may be based on observation of our friends, of our parents, or even of characters in history or fiction. There are probably a good many boys and girls whose ideals of beauty and conduct are formulated in part by movie heroes and heroines.

There is, of course, considerable individual variation in the content of the ideal, and yet certain components are characteristic of our society. Binderat asked a group of men at New York University whether they preferred to marry for health, beauty, or wealth. Three times as many mentioned health and beauty as wealth. The typical American boy and girl stress health, appearance, and personality but not money. In a group of 642 university students, more than nine tenths of the boys and four fifths of the girls said they would be willing to marry a person of lower economic rank than their own.[1] There are, as would be expected, some differences in values according to sex. The girls prefer husbands who are somewhat older and taller than themselves. Boys make a great deal more of good looks, a great deal less of intelligence and education. They attach somewhat less significance to differences in religious faith and to differences in economic position. There is little difference between the sexes in the importance attached to attractive personality, which both sexes rate highly as a selective factor. Women in the educated part of the population rank ambition and ability in business or profession very high, in contrast to the high ranking which the men give sex purity, sex attraction, and personal appearance.[2]

In the foregoing summary one notes the conspicuous lack of emphasis by men on the culinary and domestic virtues of the women they wish to marry. These virtues are apparently not regarded as crucial in a culture having delicatessen stores, restaurants, canned food, and tailor and cleaning shops. Instead, attractive personality is appropriately stressed, since the loss of economic and other institutional functions by the modern family leaves companionship between mates and the rearing of children as the principal domestic functions. A sur-

[1] Ray E. Baber, "Some Mate Selection Standards of College Students and Their Parents," *Journal of Social Hygiene*, 22:115–25, March, 1936.

[2] Wayne N. Neely, "Family Attitudes of Denominational College and University Students," *American Sociological Review*, 5:512–22, August, 1940.

vey of the marriage selection standards of our forbears at the founding of the nation would probably show a greater emphasis on the domestic virtues.

Exactly how the mating ideals function in selection is not clear, but there is evidence that they operate in part as limiting factors. Dating may be more or less restricted to persons who do not depart too greatly from the ideal. Others are not seriously considered. Race, religion, education, and socio-economic status are among the more important qualifying factors. The standards may also serve as measuring rods, enabling one to choose from among the contenders the person who most closely approximates one's ideals. Investigation [1] of a college group showed that approximately two thirds believed that the ideal was of some importance in picking a mate; and about three fourths reported a very close resemblance between the personality of the mate and the personality ideal.

There does not seem to be much doubt that most persons have a more or less conscious ideal at the time they meet and choose a mate and that the ideal has some bearing on the choice. A more difficult question has to do with the relation of ideals to adjustment. Does marriage according to ideals promote happiness? This problem has not been studied quantitatively, but the answer from clinical records is that much depends upon the nature of the ideals. Since most persons have ideals which govern them in the choice of a mate, it is probably safe to assume that the ideals generally serve a useful function in bringing together persons who are congenial. But ideals may make for poor adjustment too, if the ideals are unrealistic or highly rigid and inflexible. Exacting ideals sometimes discourage marriage because no one may be available who qualifies. Such exalted ideals are particularly hard on those whose own personalities fall far short of their own exalted standards.

In marriage, disillusionment often results where the person chosen as a mate does not live up to the other's ideals. The true personality may have been hidden during courtship and discovered too late, after marriage. The possibilities for unreality in the courtship situation were discussed in the preceding chapter in which it was shown that idealization of one's beloved may blind one to his or her imperfections. Such love is not a response to a true evaluation of the beloved

[1] Anselm L. Strauss, *A Study of Three Psychological Factors Affecting Choice of Mate in a College Metropolitan Population* (doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago Libraries, March, 1945).

one, but is in part a projection of self-feeling. Especially in the big cities, the difficulty of getting well acquainted means that courtship is often carried on between comparative strangers, and this encourages the development of images of the beloved which are based in large measure on the imagination, untested by real experience. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that marriage brings disillusionment.

There is, then, danger of unhappiness if the ideal is not closely related to the real personality of the loved one. This may happen if a person falls in love, so to speak, with his ideal and projects it onto his beloved one. The ideal in such a case may be composed of elements from his own unconscious and bear no resemblance to the object of his love. Or these idealized elements may be the result of a previous love affair, in which case the old love affair is projected onto the new relationship. The real lover is perhaps dead or absent or remote; hence the terms Phantom Lover and Ghostly Lover which have been used to describe the phenomenon.[1] The devotion is to the ideal, the Ghostly Lover, rather than to an actual person with whom one has a face-to-face relationship. The Ghostly Lover may, of course, be built entirely out of imagination and may have no relation to any person with whom one has had a real relationship. This situation is dramatically portrayed by Barrie in his play *Mary Rose*, when Mary Rose is lured away from her husband and child by strange music (her own fantasies) to the Island-That-Wants-To-Be-Visited. The world of fantasy can be made more alluring, more perfect, than the real world, and it provides a refuge to which one can easily retreat when in difficulty. The more often one yields to its charms, the more difficult it becomes to resist.

Ideals always represent some measure of departure from reality, and in extreme cases of fantasy the separation may be so great as to be pathological. Hero-worship of Rudolph Valentino led thousands of women at his death to flock to his bier, and a number still make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb. This is a worship based on fantasy, since these women had no personal relationship with the great lover of the screen. A woman who has such a fantasy may marry a man who loves her, while her devotion goes to the Ghostly Lover. She may try to get her husband to conform to the imaginary ideals which promise untold bliss, but the effort will be in vain and may lead to

[1] M. Esther Harding, *The Way of All Women* (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1939), chap. II.

disaster because the ideals exist only in her unconscious. If her relationship to her husband were real and satisfactory, her principal point of reference would be a real person, her mate, with standards and values of his own, and not some fantastic ideal apart from him.

Parent-image and marital choice

Another common motive in mate selection, according to psychoanalysts, is the unconscious wish for a modified parent-substitute; that is, a person who possesses the virtues and characteristics admired in one's mother or father, if the relationship with the parent has been pleasant. If the relationship has been unsatisfactory, the choice is of a person with opposite traits; for example, "the boy who has disliked his mother . . . will pick a wife as different from her as possible." [1] The theory, then, is that the person tends to choose a mate who resembles or differs from his parents in just those important physical or psychological traits which he liked or disliked in his parents.[2] This theory appears to be a special case of the general theory previously presented, that a mate may be chosen according to an ideal. In this instance the ideal is one's mother or father.

There have been a number of attempts to substantiate the theory of "modified parent-substitutes" by objective methods of investigation, but the problem is a difficult one to handle by statistical techniques, and the efforts to date have not been satisfactory. Kirkpatrick reasoned that if the Freudian theory were sound and the mother-image were carried over from childhood, men born of young mothers would be more inclined to marry women younger than themselves than would men born of older mothers. Investigation of 768 cases failed to substantiate the hypothesis,[3] but Kirkpatrick acknowledges that his test may not be adequate. A somewhat different approach to the hypothesis was made by Mangus, who asked whether the typical young

[1] John Levy and Ruth Monroe, *The Happy Family* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1938), p. 23.

[2] "Peculiarities of the human love-life, as well as the compulsiveness of being in love itself, can surely be understood through a reference to childhood or as an effective remnant of the same." Sigmund Freud, *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* (New York: The Modern Library, 1938), p. 619.

[3] As a subsidiary hypothesis it was assumed that sibling position might be associated with the average age of marriage, on the ground, for instance, that an only child or a firstborn child might be expected to have a closer emotional relationship with the mother, and this would lead to a postponement of marriage. But the data showed no significant relationship between sibling position and mean age of marriage. Clifford Kirkpatrick, "A Statistical Investigation of the Psychoanalytic Theory of Mate Selection," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 32:427–30, October, 1937.

woman's conception of an ideal husband is more closely associated with the idea of her father than with any other intimate male person. Six hundred young women of upper rank in college completed a test consisting of four sets of paired comparisons, each set containing eighty pairs of human attributes of an attitudinal or behavioral nature. The girls used these sets as bases for recording their judgments of father, of most intimate relative, of most intimate companion, and of ideal husband, underscoring the attribute in each pair which they considered most characteristic of the person being rated. Analysis of the data showed that in respect to personality, the ideal mate resembles the most intimate male companion more closely than the father or other most intimate blood relative,[1] but the study does not touch on the relation of such ideals to the personality of the actual mate.

According to psychoanalysts, the mate usually bears little or no physical resemblance to the parent, because this would mean a complete transference of the child's attitudes toward the parent, including subordination to the parent, and this would be abhorrent, since the child has been trying to free himself from parental control. Sometimes, however, the dependency is great, as in the case of the so-called "clinging-vine" type of wife. An objective study [2] confirms the point that the physical resemblances between mate or fiancé(e) and parent is not marked. The resemblance in behavior is greater, with about one third of the fiancé(e)s resembling the parents closely in personality. This study reports that parent-images definitely influence marital choice, but not according to the Oedipus and Electra theories which hold that a person in early childhood builds up an affectional response to the parent of the opposite sex. If this were true, we might expect a much greater proportion of men's fiancées to resemble the men's mothers than the women's fiancés to resemble the women's mothers. The analysis of the data does not show this sort of sex difference. In fact, the actual or potential mates resemble the parent of the same sex about as often as the parent of the opposite sex. The basis of the mate-image is not an automatic, instinctive affectional response to the parent of the opposite sex, but the conditioning of the affectional responses in early childhood. The influence of the parents upon the choice of mate is discernible in many cases, but this is

[1] Arthur H. Mangus, "Relationships Between the Young Woman's Conception of Her Intimate Male Associates and of Her Ideal Husband," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 7:403–20, 1936.

[2] Anselm L. Strauss, *op. cit.*

probably because the parents usually have the earliest and closest affectional ties with the child. A woman who had a satisfying relationship with both parents married a man who resembled her father physically and her mother temperamentally. Another woman who enjoyed the companionship of her brother and her father chose a mate who showed certain qualities of both. The mate may in certain respects be like a much-beloved foster parent or grandparent if the early conditioning of the affectional life was around this person.

How does a choice of mate resembling one's mother or father work out? Is this a satisfactory basis for marriage? A psychiatrist [1] studying one hundred marriages reported that about one sixth of the men married women who resembled their mothers physically, and of these men, nine out of ten were happy. Of the men marrying women who were physically unlike the mother, only one third were happy. Where there was resemblance to the mothers in disposition, the correlation with marital happiness was only slightly positive. This study seems to show the desirability of selecting a parent-substitute as a mate, but the findings are inconclusive because the sample was a small one for the many factors involved.

If one has an unresolved parental fixation, it may be wise to marry someone who resembles the much-admired parent, but this is hardly an argument for developing parental fixations. It would be better not to have such a complex, or if one develops, to resolve it before marriage so that early childhood affectional patterns are not complete dictators of behavior. The field of choice in mating is obviously greatly limited if one is satisfied only by a parent-substitute. Moreover, no two persons are alike in their personalities. If a man marries a woman who resembles his mother in appearance and expects her also to behave like his mother, he will be greatly disappointed. We have here a clear case of the general problem of the fantastic ideal, which was considered in an earlier paragraph. If the husband is truly devoted to his wife, he will undertake to discover and foster her own needs and interests instead of trying to force her to play the rôle of another person. A parental fixation is evidence that true devotion to one's partner does not exist, and is a sign of emotional immaturity. To re-educate oneself emotionally, it is necessary to face and acknowledge the complex courageously and to review in a searching manner one's early affectional experiences. By lifting them out of the unconscious

[1] G. V. Hamilton, *A Research in Marriage* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1929).

it may be possible to divest the early affectional impulses of their compulsive power. In this way one may master one's emotions instead of being mastered by them.

Personality needs and marital choice

It is a matter of common observation that individuals differ greatly in the type of satisfactions required for happiness. Miss A may feel the need to dominate other people, whereas Miss B may feel unhappy unless she is dominated by someone. Miss C, an intellectual type, likes to spend her evenings quietly at home; while Miss D, a social body, is restless at home and likes to spend her evenings attending movies or dancing or visiting friends. When each of these persons marries, will she seek a mate who will satisfy her needs? A psychological theory of mate selection, supplementing the two already discussed, is that selection occurs on the basis of need; that is, that "we fall in love with those whom we need to complete ourselves emotionally." [1] Investigation [2] of a small sample of engaged couples disclosed that in a little under one fifth of the cases the personality needs were extremely well met by the fiancé(e)s, while they were badly filled in a little over one quarter of the cases.

Is marriage to fulfill one's special needs a good basis for marriage? Certainly it would be risky to marry someone who did not meet one's basic needs. Adjustment in marriage is facilitated if the couple has congenial tastes. Should the husband be intellectual and want to round out his day of work with an evening of leisurely reading at home, while his wife who is more sociable wants him to dress for dinner and play host to her friends, or go out for entertainment, the couple may find adjustment more difficult than if they shared similar interests.

The danger, however, in marrying to satisfy a special personal need is that absorption with one's own needs may blind one to the needs of one's mate. If a narcissistic male greatly feels the need of praise and marries a woman who praises him a great deal, and hence satisfies his need, is this desirable? A happy marriage is one in which the basic needs of both members are satisfied. If the wife wants a husband whom she can praise and praising him gives her satisfaction, there

[1] Oliver Ohmans, "The Psychology of Attraction," in Helen Jordan (ed.), *You and Marriage* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1942).
[2] Anselm L. Strauss, *op. cit.*

does not seem to be any good reason why she should not marry an egocentric husband. The satisfaction in such a marriage is mutual, if not quite normal. The danger in such a marriage is that the satisfaction will not long be mutual. Human needs are quite numerous and are not limited to just one, however dominant it may be. The husband, being narcissistic, is unlikely to promote his wife's interests, and she may weary of giving praise and getting nothing in return.

A husband who loves his wife promotes her interests, whether or not they represent his interests. For example, the wife may be an active church member and the husband not, yet he will support her church activities because they mean a great deal to her. He is not helping to meet her need merely because in doing so he will be satisfying a counterpart of the same need for himself. His main point of reference is his wife's need, not his own. In a happy marriage, one's needs are satisfied, but they are not satisfied because one married in order to satisfy them. They are satisfied because one is married to a person capable of true affection. When one marries to satisfy a need, the point of reference is oneself; whereas in a marriage governed by affection, the point of reference is the welfare of the loved one.

Selection and the Range of Contacts

Discussions of preferences and motives in the choice of a mate are somewhat predicated on the assumption that the individual is unhampered in his choice of a mate. How much choice does one really have? It is rather naïve to think that, armed with certain standards, one goes about seeking someone who measures up to those standards, like Diogenes searching for an honest man. A moment's reflection will cause one to see that the choice of a mate is rather rigorously limited to the group of persons of the opposite sex of marriageable age. Theoretically there are many tens of millions of such persons in the world, but some of them live in Hindustan, in Yucatan, in Iran, in Africa, and in other regions to which the average person does not have access. The average young man who is twenty-five years old and who is looking for a mate must choose a wife from among the women he knows, and the average young man in the United States knows perhaps two hundred marriageable young women. No study has ever been made of this matter of availability, and the figure cited may be too large or too small by a hundred or so, but the number is certainly relatively small in any case, so that the margin of choice is

FIGURE 62. MARRIAGE RATE OF COLLEGE WOMEN

The marriage rate of college men is a little better than that of men generally, but college women have a much higher percentage of spinsterhood than their non-college sisters. Is college selective of non-marrying types of women or is college the cause of the low marriage rate? Data on college marriages from F. Lawrence Babcock, *The U.S. College Graduate* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), Table 2, p. 62. Data on the general population from the *Sixteenth Census of the United States*, 1940, vol. IV, part I, Table 6.

not so great as discussions of standards sometimes imply. Nor are all these persons of one's acquaintance (of the opposite sex, of marriageable age) actually eligible mates. Differences in race, religion, economic status, education, family background, age, health, and other factors are limiting considerations. When the margin of choice is viewed realistically, it is seen to be small and in some cases it is zero. One study [1] reports that the average number of proposals of marriage for a group of 208 women was only three per woman. The greatest single number for any one of these women was fourteen. This was not a sufficiently large or representative group to allow us to generalize about the situation in the nation at large or even in socio-economic

[1] Paul Popenoe, *Modern Marriage* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 2d ed., 1940), pp. 161–62.

groups represented by these women, but it helps perhaps to show how restricted the choice of a mate actually is. The choice is, of course, somewhat greater than these figures suggest, since some courtships are cut off before they reach the proposal stage.

The margin of choice in mating is then limited by the range of one's contacts. In our culture this range depends on one's own efforts and those of one's family and friends. The coeducational college campus provides one of the best means available for extending the range of one's contacts with potential mates. In some other cultures the highly limited nature of personal contacts is recognized, and provision is made for a go-between or matchmaker,[1] who brings suitable persons together. The nearest thing to this in our culture is the matrimonial agency, which does not, however, have general public support.

The Sex Ratio and the Probabilities of Marriage

Communities differ greatly in the proportion of men to women, and this affects the probabilities of marriage. When the proportion is expressed in terms of the number of males per one hundred females, it is called the sex ratio. The percentage of men who are married increases steadily as the ratio of women to men increases. Likewise the percentage of married women increases as the ratio of men to women increases, and it increases much more than does the marriage rate for men under comparable conditions; that is, a favorable sex ratio is more advantageous to women than to men. If, for example, there are one hundred women to every 72.5 men in a city, about 63 per cent of the men are married and 49 per cent of the women. If the situation is reversed and there are one hundred men to every 72.5 women, then about 56 per cent of the men are married and 66.5 per cent of the women. Obviously the maximum amount of marriage does not exist where the sexes are badly out of balance, as is the case with the Orientals in the United States, because immigration brought many more men than women. Neither does the maximum amount of marriage occur when the sexes in a city are nearly in balance, because of the greater dependence of women upon a favorable sex ratio. The maximum incidence of marriage in cities exists when there are somewhere between 120 and 140 men for every 100 women.[2]

[1] In Japan a go-between (*nakado*) is held responsible for the success of the marriage and is often paid accordingly. A. K. Faust, "Marriage and the Family in Japan," *Social Forces*, 18:89, October, 1939.

[2] Ernest R. Groves and William F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928), chap. 13.

The actual distribution of marriageable men and women is highly uneven, and this affects greatly the prospects of marriage in various places. The accompanying map shows by states the ratio of males to females, fifteen years old and over, single, in the native white population, in 1940.[1] Inspection of the map reveals that there is a surplus of single men in forty-seven of the forty-eight states. Theoretically, men seeking wives would find the greatest range of choice in the New England and Middle Atlantic states, while the women would do better in the West. Actually these data are somewhat unrealistic because, for a few individuals, the choice of mate is not limited to the state of residence, while for the great majority the choice is restricted to a much smaller area than the state or even the city. But when there is a large sex ratio in a state, there is also more likely to be a large sex ratio in a city of that state.



FIGURE 63. DISTRIBUTION OF MARRIAGEABLE PERSONS, BY STATES

Number of males per hundred females, fifteen years old and over, single, native white population, 1940. In some of the mountain states the discrepancy is pronounced, there being more than twice as many single males as females in Nevada; while in Massachusetts there were more single women than men.

[1] Since 1940, the sex ratios have, of course, been changed somewhat as a result of World War II. For discussion of the effect of war on the sex ratio, see Chapter 17.



FIGURE 64. THE DISTANCE BETWEEN RESIDENCES OF APPLICANTS FOR MARRIAGE LICENSES

The percentage of 5000 Philadelphia couples living within a specified number of blocks of each other. For those with high incomes, choice is not so greatly limited to neighborhood. Data from J. H. S. Bossard.[1]

Selection and Social Class

The ratio of the sexes in a region or local community has a great deal to do with determining the total number of married persons. But the population is not as a rule distributed evenly, so that the probabilities of marriage will be different for individuals in different parts of the same community. It would be helpful, then, if we had data on the sex ratio by smaller units — local neighborhoods, for example — for studies show that propinquity plays an important part in the choice of a mate. An examination of five thousand marriage licenses in Philadelphia revealed that 17 per cent of the couples lived within one block of each other, 34 per cent within five blocks, and 52 per cent within one mile. In only 17 per cent of the cases did one of the parties not live in Philadelphia.[1] If superficially interpreted, these data might seem to mean that propinquity, *per se*, is a primary factor in selection when actually the spatial or ecological factor is quite secondary. The

[1] James H. S. Bossard, "Residential Propinquity as a Factor in Marriage Selection," *American Journal of Sociology*, 38:219–24, September, 1932. In Philadelphia more marriages were contracted between persons living within five blocks of each other in 1931 than in 1885, 1905, or 1915. Other trends within the city were not consistent, and there was practically no change in the percentage choosing mates outside the city. (Ray H. Abrams, "Residential Propinquity as a Factor in Marriage Selection: Fifty-Year Trends in Philadelphia," *American Sociological Review*, 8:288, June, 1943.) The same general situation was found to be true in New Haven; that is, about one half of all married couples had lived within eighteen blocks of each other before marriage. M. R. Davie and R. J. Reeves, "Propinquity of Residence Before Marriage," *American Journal of Sociology*, 44:510–25, 1939.

primary factor is the tendency of persons of the same race, religion, ethnic background, and socio-economic status to segregate in the same or similar areas. As we say, birds of a feather flock together. As individuals rise in the economic and social scale, they are less bound by the factor of locality. This is brought out by a study of 538 marriages in Allentown in 1930 which showed that the higher the economic status of the couples, the greater was the tendency to marry someone who lived outside the city. The reason for this is, of course, that people who have money can travel and extend the range of their contacts. Age was also shown to be a factor in the residential propinquity of marriage partners, with those under twenty-one years of age having the smallest proportion of marriage partners from outside the local limits.[1] An economic factor is involved, since young people have had less time in which to earn and save money. They have also had fewer years in which to make contacts.

Probably the most important single consideration affecting marital selection is social class status operating within the framework of race, religion, and ethnic background. The rich tend to marry the rich and the poor the poor, but rich white women do not marry wealthy Negro men. Intermarriage of white with colored races is forbidden by law in a number of states and is frowned upon in all. For the most part, likewise, Catholics marry Catholics and Jews marry Jews. Within these broad categories, selection tends to take place on the basis of socio-economic status. Occupational groups of the same socio-economic status intermarry to the extent that we can speak of *class endogamy*, although the tendency is more marked in some groups than in others. An extensive study of Philadelphia marriages in 1913–16 found that men and women in the same occupation intermarried more often than could be explained by mere chance. This was true in practically all occupations and in most the greater-than-chance excess was considerable.[2] Another study, however, reported that the family background of the subjects was more important than their occupations. The occupations of husbands and wives at marriage showed a correlation of only .28, whereas the correlation between the man's occupation and that of his bride's father was higher, .43.[3] Compari-

[1] D. Harris, "Age and Occupational Factors in the Residential Propinquity of Marriage Partners," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 6:257–61, 1935.

[2] D. M. Marvin, "Occupational Propinquity as a Factor in Marriage Selection," *American Statistical Association*, 16:131–50, 1918–19.

[3] Paul Popenoe, "Assortative Mating for Occupational Level," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 8:270–74, May, 1937.

sons of husbands and wives in terms of occupation are not entirely satisfactory, because there is no occupational group of women comparable either to business men or to skilled men. Another approach made in a study [1] of 795 couples who were residents of New Haven, revealed that nearly three fourths of the couples were residents of the same area or the same type of area, type of area being defined in terms of similar nativity, religion, occupation, and income. An even more extensive study [2] attacked the problem more directly by noting the degree of similarity or dissimilarity in the occupations of marriage partners. The classification of occupations presents some problems, since economic groups do not always constitute distinct social classes. Socio-economic status varies widely, for instance, within white-collar and skilled worker groups. For this reason and others, there is more social mobility via marriage on the part of the middle groups — that is, white-collar and skilled workers. But wide disparities in the status of marriage partners are highly infrequent. In this investigation it was found that the proportion of professional men marrying professional and white-collar women averaged 71 per cent for three time-periods. The proportion of professional men marrying semi-skilled women was only 9 per cent. At the other extreme, only 8 per cent of the unskilled men married professional and white-collar women, while 65 per cent of unskilled male workers married semi-skilled women workers. We conclude that while in our open-class society there are a considerable number of interclass marriages, most unions occur between persons who are not greatly different in social status.

Assortative Mating

Intraclass or endogamous marriage reflects the basic tendency of persons to select mates who are somewhat similar to themselves in a variety of traits, both physical and psychological. In general blue-eyed men marry blue-eyed women, and tall men mate with tall women. It may be, as some think, that gentlemen prefer blondes, but usually men do not marry blondes unless the men are blonds. So it is, too, with psychological traits, like tastes and attitudes; similars unite more often than not. This tendency to select, consciously or uncon-

[1] M. R. Davie and R. J. Reeves, "Propinquity of Residence Before Marriage," *American Journal of Sociology*, 44:510–17, January, 1939.

[2] Thomas C. Hunt, "Occupational Status and Marriage Selection," *American Sociological Review*, 5:495–504, August, 1940. This study covered 2034 marriages recorded in the town of Norwood, Massachusetts, in three periods, 1923–28, 1930–32, and 1933–37.

sciously, a mate who has traits similar to one's own is called assortative mating. It is observed among animals and is thus a natural phenomenon, but in the case of man many of the traits selected are social [1] rather than physical, and selection even with respect to physical traits is determined by social rather than biological considerations. Friends are also chosen on the basis of likeness rather than difference.[2]

There is hardly a trait that can be mentioned in respect to which some degree of assortative mating does not occur. Positive correlations have been found for age, height, weight, eye color, color of hair, general health, physical defects, and a variety of other physical traits.[3] Boas even found a small tendency for mates to have the same shape of head. Why do these tendencies occur? It is hardly to be expected that blue-eyed men deliberately seek out blue-eyed females, or even that they do so unconsciously. The reason seems to be that marriage partners, as has been stated, are usually of the same race, religion, and socio-economic status. If Jews marry Jews, and Jews are mainly brown-eyed and dark-haired, then there will naturally be a general matching of eye color and hair color. The homogamy in physical traits is largely incidental to the racial and socio-economic endogamy. Likewise intelligence, as measured by the I.Q. tests, is a function of education, and the amount of schooling is tied up with economic position.

Since individuals tend to select partners from the same social class, they choose as a rule persons of the same general educational level. This is brought out in Table 17, which shows for each specified educational category of husbands the per cent distribution of their wives according to amount of schooling. The lower tier in the table gives the inverse relation. The diagonal figures in bold-faced type pertain to husbands and wives with the same amount of schooling. The reader will observe that the bold-faced figure in every instance, except one, is higher than the other figures in the same row or column. For example, among husbands whose schooling stopped after seven or

[1] E. W. Burgess and Paul Wallin, "Homogamy in Social Characteristics," *American Journal of Sociology*, 2:109–24, 1943. Data secured from one thousand engaged couples living in the Chicago metropolitan area showed homogamy for forty-five social characteristics.

[2] Helen M. Richardson, "Studies of Mental Resemblance Between Husbands and Wives and Between Friends," *Psychological Bulletin*, 36:104–20, 1939.

[3] For data on assortative mating, see J. Arthur Harris, "Assortative Mating in Man," *Popular Science Monthly*, 80:476–97, May, 1912; B. Schiller, "A Quantitative Analysis of Marriage Selection in a Small Group," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 3:287–319, August, 1932; W. C. McKain, Jr., and C. A. Anderson, "Assortative Mating," *Sociology and Social Research*, 21:411–18, June, 1937.

TABLE 17. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF WIVES * AND HUSBANDS ACCORDING TO EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, UNITED STATES, 1940 †

Maximum Years of School Completed by Husband	Maximum Years of School Completed by Wife						
	Total	Grade School			High School		College
		Under 5 ‡	5–6	7–8	1–3	4	1 or more
	Per Cent Distribution of Wives for Husbands of Specified Schooling (Read horizontal lines)						
Total	100.0	4.2	7.0	31.3	23.0	23.3	11.2
Grade school: under 5 ‡	100.0	33.2	22.3	30.0	9.5	3.8	1.2
5–6	100.0	8.6	27.2	41.8	15.2	5.7	1.5
7–8	100.0	2.2	6.5	52.0	22.5	13.1	3.7
High school: 1–3	100.0	1.0	2.7	23.2	40.9	25.3	6.9
4	100.0	.5	1.0	12.1	21.4	51.6	13.4
College: 1 or more	100.0	.4	.4	6.2	11.2	34.7	47.1
	Per Cent Distribution of Husbands for Wives of Specified Schooling (Read vertical columns)						
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Grade school: under 5 ‡	7.3	57.4	23.4	7.0	3.1	1.2	.8
5–6	8.6	17.3	33.4	11.5	5.7	2.1	1.1
7–8	34.9	17.6	32.4	57.9	34.2	19.6	11.6
High school: 1–3	20.0	4.5	7.7	14.8	35.6	21.7	12.4
4	16.3	2.1	2.3	6.3	15.1	36.1	19.5
College: 1 or more	12.9	1.1	.8	2.5	6.3	19.3	54.6

* Native white women of ages 15 to 49 married once and living with husband.

† From *The Statistical Bulletin* (Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, September, 1945), p. 4.

‡ Includes cases where schooling was not reported.

Source: Computed from data in *Population, Differential Fertility*, 1940 and 1910, *Women by Number of Children Under 5 Years Old* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1945, Table 30).

eight years of grade school, 52 per cent had wives with the same amount of schooling, and barely 4 per cent had wives with a college background. On the other hand, among husbands with some college training, 47 per cent married women who had also attended college, while only 6 per cent had wives who did not go beyond the seventh or eighth grade. Among women, the same tendency to marry someone with an equal amount of schooling may be noted.

While the homogamy of marriage partners is largely the indirect result of racial, religious, and social-class selection, the selective process is more direct and specific as regards a few traits, like stature. The general tendency is for the tall to marry the tall and the short the short. Since men are bigger than women, the tall men will be some inches taller than their wives, but wide discrepancies are the exception. When questioned, girls express a preference for mates who are several inches taller than themselves, and the preference has something of the force of a convention in our culture. The idea does not appear to be a natural one, for in a state of nature the females would look to the biggest males for protection, and the smaller males would have few if any mates. The influence of nature is not absent in our convention, for the marriage of a tall man and a small woman is more acceptable than the marriage of a tall woman and a short man.

The fundamental rule, then, is that similars mate and not opposites. The principal exception to the rule is that the opposite sexes marry, and that, moreover, there is a marked tendency for a mate to be selected on the basis of degree of femininity or masculinity comparable to one's own.[1] A further exception is that those with red hair seldom intermarry. The reasons are not clear, but one may be that red hair is relatively rare [2] and there is less likelihood of red-headed men and women having contacts with one another than with others. Another and perhaps more important reason is that red-haired boys and girls are often teased when they are small and become sensitive about red hair, so that they do not regard it as an asset in another person. There is the rather general notion that opposites in temperament attract, but this is a popular idea not confirmed by science. The evidence on this question is not trustworthy,[3] because valid temperamental types have not yet been isolated, nor adequate instruments devised for their measurement.

As to why assortative mating is the rule, one reason is that similar individuals are more likely to meet than dissimilars, because of the segregation of racial and social types which occurs in our competitive society. Another reason is that it is easier to get along with someone

[1] Lewis M. Terman and Catherine Cox Miles, *Sex and Personality* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937).

[2] Only one person in forty in the United States is classified as red-haired. James V. Neel in the *Journal of Heredity*, March, 1943.

[3] Schiller reported no definite correlation for assortative mating on the basis of temperament and Richardson records only a slight correlation.

who talks the same language, observes the same customs, follows the same habits, and shares the same tastes. We feel comfortable in the presence of persons who look like us, think as we do, and act as we do. Even the miserable are less miserable in one another's company.

From the above, it appears that assortative mating is favorable to marital adjustment. This is true if the matching process is in terms of fundamental psychological factors like interests, values, and needs. On the other hand, if the emphasis in selection is merely on the formal, outward signs of socio-economic status — amount of income, education, and similar factors — assortative mating may bring together persons who are incompatible. Two young people are more likely to have congenial tastes if both are from wealthy homes or from poor homes than if one comes from a wealthy family and the other from a family with little money. But the children of a given economic class are not all alike in their tastes and interests, nor are all persons alike who hold college degrees. Is it desirable for a college graduate to marry a person who has not gone to college? We know that a college degree is sometimes a substitute for an education, and that an education may be obtained outside college walls. A non-college person may be better read and better mannered than one who has been to college. In general, persons who have been reared in a common environment are more likely to share common tastes and interests than those reared in dissimilar environments, but variations are so great as to make it risky to judge a person superficially by the socio-economic labels he wears. This is particularly true in our modern urban industrial society with the strong leveling tendencies resulting from public education and other social services.

Assortative mating of defective types

There is evidence that assortative mating is particularly strong in the case of certain types of defectives. Persons who are hard of hearing furnish a good illustration. In one large sample, as Table 18 shows, nearly three quarters of the marriages were cases in which both partners were deaf. The reason for this is the bond of sympathy and fellowship that grows out of the common affliction; the two are able to communicate with each other with ease and freedom, and their interests and sympathies outside the home are apt to be the same. It is interesting to note that where both members of the union are deaf, the proportion of divorces and separations is less than half what it is when

TABLE 18. ASSORTATIVE MATING FOR DEAFNESS *

Marriages of Deaf	No. of Marriages	Divorces		Separations		Divorces and Separations	
		No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent
Both partners deaf	3242	33	1.0	51	1.6	84	2.6
One partner deaf, the other hearing	894	25	2.8	33	3.7	58	6.5
One partner deaf, the other unreported	335	7	2.1	7	2.1	14	4.2
Totals	4471	65	1.5	91	2.0	156	3.5

* J. Arthur Harris, "Assortative Mating in Man," *Popular Science Monthly*, 80:476–492, May, 1912.

only one of the two is deaf. In this pronounced tendency toward assortative mating, the deaf are not alone, for the tendency is known to be fairly general among socially isolated types. Studies [1] of matrimonial clubs show that they are frequented by a preponderance of misfits of various kinds, the socially awkward, the intensely shy, the unusually short, the pockmarked, and so on. Persons with pronounced neurotic and psychopathic traits are likely to marry others who are similarly maladjusted,[2] and they usually know that they are doing so. At least neurotic mates are generally able to judge correctly whether or not their mates have neurotic traits.[3]

There is also some evidence that divorced persons are marrying each other in greater numbers, but the percentage of single men and widowers who marry divorced women has also increased, as the stigma attaching to divorce has lessened. [4] In general we may say that there is assortative mating for marital status, with the single marrying the single, and the widowed and divorced marrying the widowed and divorced. As may be seen by Table 19, based on data for New York State exclusive of New York City, 1932–34, the chances are better than

[1] Rose Braunstein, quoted in Willard Waller, *The Family*, pp. 294–97.

[2] Havelock Ellis, *Psychology of Sex* (New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1935), p. 286.

[3] M. Schooley, "Personality Resemblances Among Married Couples," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 31:340–47, 1936.

[4] J. H. van Zanten and T. van den Brink, "Population Phenomena in Amsterdam," *Population* (London), 2:3–39, December, 1937.

TABLE 19. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF BRIDES AND GROOMS ACCORDING TO PREVIOUS CONJUGAL STATUS, NEW YORK STATE, EXCLUSIVE OF NEW YORK CITY, 1932–34 *

Previous Conjugal Status of Bride	Previous Conjugal Status of Groom				Previous Conjugal Status of Groom	Previous Conjugal Status of Bride			
	Single	Widowed	Divorced	Divorced and Widowed †		Single	Widowed	Divorced	Divorced and Widowed †
Total.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	Total.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Single.....	93.9	45.5	63.7	37.6	Single.....	93.2	39.8	61.0	37.5
Widowed....	2.9	42.2	13.4	33.6	Widowed....	4.0	51.1	19.5	37.8
Divorced....	3.1	11.4	22.0	23.7	Divorced....	2.7	8.0	18.4	19.1
Divorced and widowed †	.1	.9	.9	5.1	Divorced and widowed †	.1	1.1	1.1	5.6

* *Statistical Bulletin*, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, December, 1936, vol. 17, number 12.

† Items in this line and in this column relate to persons who have been both widowed and divorced.

nine out of ten that a bachelor who marries will take as his wife a woman who has not previously been married, and vice versa. Single men prefer divorcées slightly as compared to widows, while the reverse is true for single women, but, as has been stated, the chances are less than one in ten that a single person of either sex will marry someone who has been married before.

When we turn to those who have been married once before, we note that the tendency toward assortative mating is much less than in the case of the single. The chances are only a little less than fifty per cent that widowed males will marry females who are single, while divorced males choose single women in three cases out of five. This tendency for the widowed and divorced men to marry spinsters is stronger, naturally, than the comparable tendency of widowed and divorced women to marry bachelors. Yet two out of five widows marry single men and three out of five female divorcées marry single men.

If persons have been married more than once, and venture still again, they show a distinctly stronger tendency to mate with persons who have been previously married than do those who have been married but once. Table 20 shows that the much-married tend to mate with the much-married. The explanation probably lies less in preference than in necessity. The widowed and divorced, especially those

TABLE 20. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF BRIDES AND GROOMS, CONSIDERING ONLY THOSE WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY WIDOWED OR DIVORCED, ACCORDING TO PREVIOUS CONJUGAL STATUS, NEW YORK STATE, EXCLUSIVE OF NEW YORK CITY, 1932–34*

Previous Conjugal Status of Bride	Previous Conjugal Status of Groom				Previous Conjugal Status of Groom	Previous Conjugal Status of Bride			
	Widowed		Divorced			Widowed		Divorced	
	Once	Twice or More	Once	Twice or More		Once	Twice or More	Once	Twice or More
Total.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	Total.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Single.....	46.7	28.6	64.3	42.0	Single.....	41.3	20.0	61.4	45.3
Widowed once...	37.5	46.4	12.5	15.9	Widowed once...	45.6	54.9	18.1	28.0
Twice or more.	3.4	14.0	.8	.7	Twice or more.	4.0	16.2	1.1	2.7
Divorced once...	11.1	9.4	21.1	33.8	Divorced once...	7.8	6.9	17.6	12.6
Twice or more.	.4	.5	.4	6.9	Twice or more.	.3	.1	.8	6.7
Divorced and widowed †	.9	1.1	.9	.7	Divorced and widowed † ...	1.0	1.9	1.0	4.7

* *Statistical Bulletin*, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, December, 1936, vol. 17, number 12.

† Items in this line relate to persons who have been both widowed and divorced.

who have been married more than once, are older on the average than are the single folk, and therefore have a smaller proportion of single persons and a larger proportion of the widowed and divorced to choose from than do those who marry for the first time.

The special case of intelligence

The tendency of people to marry those who are more like themselves than the average in almost every measurable characteristic has been noted. In general the highest degree of resemblance has been reported for intelligence, but the findings are not consistent. In six recent investigations [1] employing different methods in different parts of the

[1] R. R. Willoughby, "Family Similarities in Mental Test Abilities," *Genetic Psychology Monograph*, 2:235–75, 1927 — studied 90 California couples by a battery of items taken from well-known tests, the average coefficient being plus .44; H. E. Jones, "A First Study of Parent-Child Resemblances," *Twenty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, 1928, Part I, 61–72 — this study, using the Army Alpha test, covered 105 Vermont marriages, with a coefficient of plus .598; B. S. Burks, "The Relative Influence of Nature and Nurture upon Mental Development," *ibid.*, 219–321 — two California groups, one of 174 marriages, with a coefficient of .42, the other of 100 marriages, with a coefficient of .55; F. N. Freeman, K. J. Holzinger and B. C. Mitchell, "The Influence of the Environment on the Intelligence, School Achievement and Conduct of Foster Children," *ibid.*, 103–217 — one hundred and fifty Chicago marriages with a correlation of .49; M. Schooley, *op. cit.*, a correlation of .556 for 80 couples; M. C. Outhit, "A Study of the Resemblances of Parents and Children in General Intelligence," *Archives of Psychology*, number 149, 1933 — the highest correlation, .74, but only fifty couples studied.

country, correlations for intelligence of mates were obtained ranging from plus .42 to plus .74. The correlations were not high except for the .74 correlation which was secured on a small sample of only fifty couples. If assortative mating for intelligence were pronounced in all groups, it might be difficult to reconcile this fact with the observed tendency of men to "marry down" by selecting wives who have less schooling and lower I.Q.'s than themselves. In a patriarchal society like ours, where men are supposed to supply leadership, men generally avoid marriage with women who make them feel intellectually inferior. The practice of "marrying down" is, however, largely a phenomenon of the upper levels of intelligence and education, since here the sensitivity to social status is most pronounced, and the college woman is more likely to challenge the intellectual superiority of her husband than the woman in domestic service. In any case the tendency to "marry down" has been observed principally in the group of professional and business men. In a study [1] of 433 marriages between University of Kansas graduates, the correlation for intelligence was only plus .193 ± .032, which is markedly lower than for the other recently published studies of less selected groups mentioned above.

Here we have highlighted the problem of certain very bright college girls who do not marry. Since it is less fitting for a woman than a man to "marry down," some very bright girls are left without suitable mates. Sometimes these girls compensate for unattractive appearance and personality by studying hard, getting good grades, and cultivating intellectuality. When six hundred women students at the University of California were classified by three judges into four groups (beautiful, good-looking, plain, and homely) and their grade-point averages were obtained, it was found that the scholastic averages diminished as the rating for beauty increased; the proportion of women rated as beautiful or good-looking decreased with years spent in college, and as beauty decreased, the per cent married also decreased.[2] In interpreting these findings, we should bear in mind that the ratings for beauty are subjective and do not have the validity of the objective grade-point averages. Nor are grades always true indicators of intelligence. Good looks may be correlated with intelligence, but the bright coeds who are good-looking have less incentive

[1] Mapheus Smith, "Similarities of Marriage Partners in Intelligence," *American Sociological Review*, 6:697–701, October, 1941.

[2] S. J. Holmes and C. E. Hatch, "Personal Appearance as Related to Scholastic Records and Marriage Selection in College Women," *Human Biology*, 10:65–76, 1938.

to work for honor grades, since they can get recognition on the basis of their looks alone. A bright girl may be popular with the boys, especially if she makes allowance for the male ego in our culture and defers to the boys instead of openly competing with them.

In considering the similarity of marriage partners in intelligence, the question arises as to whether the similarity may in part be charged to the marriage itself. Even if marriage does not add anything to the general mental capacity, married couples share a great many interests and activities and so come into possession of a common body of knowledge which could affect their test scores. Married persons are probably more likely to know or not to know the same things than are unrelated persons, and this would tend to make their scores on I.Q. tests more alike. Whether this is so could be determined if the I.Q. of married persons were taken before their marriage and even before their engagement, as well as at certain intervals of marriage. This problem has been investigated somewhat, with negative results; that is, there is no evidence that the mental resemblance between husbands and wives increases with duration of marriage.[1]

Legal Requirements

So far we have considered the psychological factors, both conscious and unconscious, which underlie the choice of a mate, and the social conditions which also influence the actual choices. The selection of a mate is subject to a number of limitations, the chief of which are the race, religion, and social-class status of the persons concerned. But there are additional limitations, specifically those that the law imposes, which still further restrict one's freedom.

The laws governing marriage vary quite widely in the different states and are sometimes in actual conflict, although there is a basis of consensus and agreement on fundamentals. The reason for this is the concept of states' rights which goes back one hundred and fifty years to a time when the different sections of the country represented special interests, and the people did not travel very much. Under modern conditions of high mobility and greater cultural uniformity, the continuance of the old ideology constitutes a decided lag, and many feel there is urgent need for uniform legislation, especially in so common an experience as marriage. In the discussion that follows,

[1] Helen M. Richardson, "Studies of Mental Resemblance Between Husbands and Wives, and Between Friends," *Psychological Bulletin*, 36:104-20, 1939.

TABLE 21. MARRIAGE LAWS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1945 *

State	Minimum Marriage Age Specified in Law		Common Law Marriages Are Valid	Prohibit Marriage of Those with Transmissible Disease in Infectious Stage	Physical Examination and Blood Test for Male and Female			Waiting Period	
	Male	Female			Date of Enactment	[a]	Scope of Laboratory Test	Before Issuance of License	After Issuance of License
Alabama	17	14	★	.....	[b]	15 da.	[g]	.....	.....
Arizona	18	16	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Arkansas	18	16	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
California	18	16	.....	.....	1939	30 da.	[c]	3 da.	.....
Colorado	18	18	★	.....	1939	30 da.	[c]	.....	.....
Connecticut	16	16	.....	.....	1935	40 da.	[c]	5 da.	.....
Delaware	18	16	.....	★	.....	.....	.....	.....	★ [k]
Florida	18	16	★	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Georgia	17	14	★	.....	.....	.....	.....	5 da.	.....
Idaho	14 [d]	12 [d]	★	.....	1943	30 da.	[c]	.....	.....
Illinois	18	16	.....	.....	1939	15 da.	[g]	.....	.....
Indiana	18	16	★	.....	1939	30 da.	[c]	.....	.....
Iowa	16	14	★	.....	1941	20 da.	[c]	.....	.....
Kansas	18	16	★	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kentucky	16	14	.....	.....	1940	15 da.	[c]	.....	.....
Louisiana	18	16	.....	.....	[i]	.....	.....	.....	.....
Maine	16	16	★	★	1941	[c]	.....	5 da.	.....
Maryland	18	16	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2 da.	.....
Massachusetts	18	16	.....	.....	1943	30 da.	[c]	5 da.	.....
Michigan	18	16	★	.....	1939	30 da.	[g]	5 da.	.....
Minnesota	18	16	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	5 da.	.....
Mississippi	14 [d]	12 [d]	★	.....	.....	.....	.....	5 da.	.....
Missouri	15	15	.....	.....	1943	15 da.	[c]	.....	.....
Montana	18	16	★	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

* Information furnished by the Women's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor. Reproduced from *The Book of the States*, 1945–1946 (Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 1945), p. 343. With permission.

[a] Time allowed between date of examination and issuance of license.
[b] In 1919 law adopted applying to male only; laboratory test authorized but not required.
[c] Syphilis. [d] Common-law marriage age. [e] Syphilis and other venereal diseases.
[f] Amended in 1939. [g] Venereal diseases. [h] Syphilis and gonorrhea.
[i] In 1924 law adopted applying to male only; laboratory test authorized but not required.
[j] In 1929 law adopted applying to male only; no provision as to laboratory test.
[k] 24 hrs., residents; 96 hrs., nonresidents.

TABLE 21. MARRIAGE LAWS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1945* — *continued*

State	Minimum Marriage Age Specified in Law		Common Law Marriages Are Valid	Prohibit Marriage of Those with Transmissible Disease in Infectious Stage	Physical Examination and Blood Test for Male and Female			Waiting Period	
	Male	Female			Date of Enactment	[a]	Scope of Laboratory Test	Before Issuance of License	After Issuance of License
Nebraska	18	16	.....	★	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Nevada	18	16	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
New Hampshire	14	13	.....	.....	1937	30 da.	[c]	5 da.	.....
New Jersey	14 [d]	12 [d]	.....	.....	1938	30 da.	[c]	2 da.	★
New Mexico	18	16	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
New York	16	14	.....	.....	1938 [f]	30 da.	[c]	3 da.	★
North Carolina	16	16	.....	.....	1941	30 da.	[c]	.....	.....
North Dakota	18	15	.....	.....	1939	30 da.	[c]	.....	.....
Ohio	18	16	★	.....	1941	30 da.	[c]	5 da.	.....
Oklahoma	18	15	★	★	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oregon	18	15	.....	.....	1937	10 da.	[h]	3 da.	.....
Pennsylvania	16	16	★	.....	1939	30 da.	[c]	3 da.	.....
Rhode Island	18	16	★	.....	1938	40 da.	[c]	.....	★
South Carolina	18	14	★	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
South Dakota	18	15	★	.....	1939	20 da.	[c]	.....	.....
Tennessee	16	16	★	.....	1939	30 da.	[g]	3 da.	.....
Texas	16	14	★	...	[j]	.....	.....	.....	.....
Utah	16	14	....	★	1941	.....	[e]	.....	.....
Vermont	18	16	.....	★	1941	30 da.	.....	.....	★
Virginia	18	16	.....	.....	1940	30 da.	[c]	.....	.....
Washington	14 [d]	12 [d]	.....	★	.....	.....	.....	3 da.	.....
West Virginia	18	16	.....	.....	1939	30 da.	[c]	3 da.	.....
Wisconsin	18	15	.....	.....	1939	15 da.	[c]	5 da.	.....
Wyoming	18	16	★	.....	1943	30 da.	[k]	.....	.....

* Information furnished by the Women's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor. Reproduced from *The Book of the States*, 1945–1946 (Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 1945), p. 343. With permission.

[a] Time allowed between date of examination and issuance of license.

[b] In 1919 law adopted applying to male only; laborarory test authorized but not required.

[c] Syphilis [d] Common-law marriage age. [e] Syphilis and other venereal diseases.

[f] Amended in 1939. [g] Venereal diseases. [h] Syphilis and gonorrhea.

[i] In 1914 law adopted applying to male only; laboratory test authorized but not required.

[j] In 1929 law adopted applying to male only; no provision as to laboratory test.

[k] 24 hrs., residents; 96 hrs. nonresidents.

the material will be limited mainly to a brief presentation of the general legal prerequisites to marriage. The laws of the different states vary greatly in detail and are subject to change, so that it is not feasible to present them here, except in outline form, as in Table 21. If the reader has need for more detailed information, he can secure it from the proper local authorities or from the secretary of state of the state in which he lives.

The control which the state exercises has mainly to do with the relationship of the contracting parties, and their mental and physical condition. Certain degrees of kinship and affinity are recognized as constituting a bar to a valid marriage. Consanguineous marriages are tabooed, but the prohibited degree of relationship is variously defined. All the states forbid the marriage of parent and child, brother and sister, grandparent and grandchild, uncle and niece, and aunt and nephew. In most states the marriage of first cousins is also illegal, but in about a third of the jurisdictions it is permitted. In one state, the marriage of fifth cousins is forbidden. It will be seen that there is considerable confusion regarding the advisability of cousins marrying each other, both in the law and in the public mind. From a biological standpoint there is little objection to such marriage if the stock is good. The danger lies in the possibility that cousins are more likely to have the same defective genes than are unrelated persons, and even if the defects are recessive, the presence of the same defect in both parents brings out the defect in the offspring. But by the same token, if the stock is good, the offspring will be superior, because they get double doses of the good genes. This is the principle followed with conspicuous success among animal breeders. There is thus no valid biological reason why cousins should not marry if they are fit and of good stock. Before marrying, cousins should probably take more than average precaution to make certain that their lineage is untainted.

As for the marriage of persons between whom there is an affinal, as contrasted with a blood, relationship, the laws are about equally divided between those that do and those that do not restrict such marriages. The principal taboo is directed against the marriage of stepparents and stepchildren. The objections to such marriages are not, of course, biological, but psychological and represent an effort to avoid moral confusion. If a son should marry his stepmother after she had divorced his father, the father would find himself in the position

FIGURE 65. THE PRE-MARITAL EXAMINATION

A comprehensive pre-marital examination includes, besides a physical examination and a blood test, counseling with regard to attitudes that may interfere with marital adjustment and an inquiry into family background.

of being father-in-law to the woman who had previously been his wife. More than half the states also taboo interracial marriages.

Condition of the contracting parties

A second category of restrictions is based on the principle that mutual consent is needed for a valid marriage. Should someone be married who is unable to give consent, or who gives consent under duress, the marriage may be annulled. All the jurisdictions have laws which say that the insane may not legally marry because they cannot give "intelligent consent," and certain jurisdictions extend the ban to the feebleminded and the epileptic. Even when the marriage of the feebleminded is not prohibited, it may usually be easily annulled. In Iowa, rosters of feebleminded residents are kept to whom a marriage license may not be issued, and in Nebraska the law reads that a license may be issued only if one of the partners is sterilized, but the law is not strictly enforced.

"Intelligent consent" to marriage may be given only by persons of marriageable age. The age at which a person is marriageable varies, depending upon whether parental approval is or is not secured. If the parents approve the marriage, the age is lower. In a few states the common law is still followed, under which girls of twelve and boys of fourteen may marry if they have the consent of their parents. However, the more general standard age at present is sixteen for girls and eighteen for boys, with parental consent. Without such consent the most common legal age at which marriage is permitted is eighteen for females and twenty-one for males.

As to the physical condition of the contracting parties, the law shows little concern. The only diseases which are ruled against are tuberculosis and venereal disease, and only a few states prohibit the marriage of the acutely tubercular. As for syphilis, gonorrhea, and the other social diseases, a few states like Wisconsin early passed so-called "eugenic marriage laws," but they were poorly drawn and poorly enforced. In recent years there has been a quickening of the public realization of the seriousness of these diseases, from which it is estimated that more than ten million Americans now suffer. Most syphilis is acquired pre-maritally by men through promiscuous sex intercourse, while most women acquire the disease post-maritally from their husbands. The new conception of syphilis as a public health, rather than a moral, problem has resulted in more aggressive



FIGURE 66. STATE LAWS PROTECTING MARRIAGE FROM SYPHILIS

As of January 1, 1944. Growing public interest in the control of venereal diseases has led to an increase in the number of states requiring a blood test for syphilis as a prerequisite to marriage. Desirable as this is, a more inclusive pre-marital conference is recommended, including a thorough health examination; an investigation into heredity; and guidance on attitudes and habits that interfere with good adjustment. Obviously, it is not feasible at present to make such a comprehensive pre-marital examination mandatory through law. American Social Hygiene Association, Inc.

action against the disease, and within the past decade has led a majority of the states to enact legislation making a serological examination for venereal disease a prerequisite to marriage. Under the stricter type of law a marriage license is not issued without a doctor's affidavit that the parties are free of infection, after the blood has been examined at a government laboratory, or by one approved by the state. The blood test is not infallible, but it does catch many thousands of infections. In many cases the persons have no idea that they are infected. Most of the states now also have laws requiring blood tests of all expectant mothers as a precaution against congenital syphilis.[1]

Advance notice of intention to wed

An old custom, when a couple wished to marry, consisted in "publishing the banns," which meant usually that a notice was posted in a public place on a number of successive Sundays calling the attention of the community to the fact that John Doe and Mary Roe planned to be married. If anyone had any good reason why these two persons should not marry, he had ample time in which to learn of the proposed marriage and to bring his reasons to the attention of the community. This custom was better adapted to the small rural community where people knew one another well than it was to the impersonal cities which sprang up in the nineteenth century, and as a result the custom was allowed to lapse. It is now being revived in a modified form, and the trend of legislation is to require a delay of from three to five days between the application for and the issuance of the marriage license. The purpose of the law is to prevent hasty, fraudulent, and ill-considered marriages, and this purpose appears to have been achieved in a measure; at least there is evidence that where the law calls for a waiting period, thousands of persons who apply for marriage licenses do not return for them.[2]

It will be noted that the state imposes only a few restrictions upon those desiring to wed. Probably most writers on the subject feel that there ought to be more restrictions, that marriage should be made more difficult. Marriage is likened to a house with a big front door which makes entrance easy, and a smaller door at the rear which

[1] A. E. Bowden and G. Gould, *Summary of State Legislation Requiring Pre-Marital and Prenatal Examinations for Venereal Diseases* (New York: The American Social Hygiene Association, 1944).

[2] Paul Popenoe and R. H. Johnson, *Applied Eugenics*, rev. ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 183.



FIGURE 67. MINIMUM LEGAL AGE FOR MARRIAGE WITHOUT PARENTAL CONSENT

Data as of January 1, 1943.

makes exits (divorces) difficult. Would it not be better, ask some, to reverse or at least to equalize the two situations by making marriage more difficult? It costs approximately two dollars to buy a marriage license and fifty dollars to buy a divorce. Should the cost of marriage be increased to keep out the thriftless and impecunious? A marriage license may be had without delay, or after a waiting period of from three to five days. This makes possible marriages between persons who scarcely know each other. Divorces take much longer. Should couples be required to wait a month or a year after getting a license to wed? The legal prerequisites to marriage can be increased and marriage be made more difficult, but there are practical limits to curbs on marriage. For example, there are tens of thousands of persons who marry despite disabling allergies and other physical disorders which handicap them in their domestic rôles, but the state denies marriage only to persons with an acute or communicable venereal infection. Should the same policy be applied to other diseases? The wish to raise the level of marriage is understandable, but is it realistic to try

to accomplish this purpose quickly by drastic legal action, when the medical means for making individuals physically sound are not fully developed or generally available? One must consider what the moral consequences would be if the number of persons denied the right to marry were greatly increased.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How does the type of social order in the United States influence the general motives in mate selection?
2. How valid are the psychoanalytic theories regarding the choice of a mate?
3. Does marriage according to ideals promote happiness?
4. How many potential mates does the average college male undergraduate have among his acquaintances?
5. Is marrying to satisfy a personality need a good basis for marriage?
6. Why do certain communities and regions of the United States have unbalanced sex ratios?
7. What is "class endogamy"? Is the phenomenon becoming more or less widespread?
8. What is assortative mating? Does it hold for all traits?
9. Why do defective and rejected types tend to intermarry?
10. Why do we say that assortative mating for intelligence constitutes a special case?
11. Would it be desirable to have uniform marriage legislation in the United States?
12. Why are pre-marital examination laws largely limited to venereal disease? Should other diseases be included?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. Cultural variation in conceptions of the ideal mate.
2. Psychoanalytic theories of mate selection.
3. Social factors influencing the sex ratio.
4. The measurement of "masculinity" and "femininity." Lewis M. Terman and Catherine Cox Miles, *Sex and Personality* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937).

5. Marriage as a family affair in Japan. For the autobiography of a girl betrothed at thirteen, see Etsu Inagaki Sugimoto, *A Daughter of the Samurai* (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1925).

SELECTED READINGS

Adams, Clifford R., and Vance O. Packard, *How to Pick a Mate.* New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1946.

A popular presentation based on scientific knowledge. A special feature is the use of psychological tests which the reader can give himself.

Bossard, James H. S., *Marriage and the Child.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940.

This book brings together some of the writer's research contributions on marriage selection.

Folsom, J. K., "Finding a Mate in Modern Society," *Reader's Digest*, 33:56–58, July, 1938.

A good brief summary of pertinent data.

Hart, Hornell, and Ella Hart, *Personality and the Family*, rev. ed. New York: D. C. Heath and Company.

Useful material and viewpoints on the problem of mate selection.

Popenoe, Paul, *Modern Marriage*, 2d. ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940.

Brings together, in very readable form, a considerable body of data on mating.

Reed, Ruth, *The Single Woman.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942.

Considers the personal adjustment of the one woman in every nine who does not marry. Based on interviews with three hundred such women. Sound and constructive. For material on emotional problems of celibacy, a good book is Laura Hutton, *The Single Woman and Her Emotional Problems* (Baltimore: William Wood, 1935).

Waller, W., *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation.* New York: The Cordon Company, 1938.

Chapter 14

PREDICTION OF MARITAL HAPPINESS

CONSIDER TWO PERSONS, John and Mary, who are in love with each other and about to be married. John, thirty years old, is a college graduate now employed as a high-school teacher in a small city where Mary has lived all her life. John was brought up on a farm as one of a large family of German-Americans. He belongs to the Lutheran Church and is regular in attendance. His mother has always been close to him, but not his father, who is quite stern and strict as a disciplinarian. Mary, twenty years old, is a high-school graduate, employed as a stenographer. She attends the Baptist Church somewhat irregularly. She is an only child who has had very happy relationships with her parents, who are of Welsh ancestry. John is quiet, reserved, and studious, while Mary is highly vivacious, with pronounced social interests, but decidedly not intellectually inclined.

On the basis of such information about John and Mary, can we say whether their marriage will succeed or fail? If we are personally acquainted with the couple, we will probably have our opinion, but it may be biased and inconsistent with the opinions of others. Can dispassionate and disinterested science make a valid appraisal of a couple's marital chances? All persons are not equally good material for marriage, just as all persons are not equally capable of becoming good farmers or teachers or engineers. Can we say what constitutes good marriage material? What kind of person is a good bet and what kind a poor bet as a marriage partner? This intriguing problem has recently engaged the attention of a dozen or so different researchers, whose studies are of primary importance for an understanding of the factors involved in marital adjustment.

The basic procedure in all these studies is rather uniform. Briefly stated, it consists, first, in trying to evaluate a number of marriages in

terms of their degree of adjustment or maladjustment; and second, in ascertaining what factors in these marriages are associated with the observed marital success or failure.

The Rating of Marriages

In rating marriages according to degree of adjustment, a number of different methods have been used. One method [1] is simply to ask married couples to evaluate their own marriages on, say, a five-point scale, which permits them to check whether they regard their marriage as very happy, happy, average, unhappy, or very unhappy. To encourage an honest response, no signature or identification of any kind is required. Another method [2] is to secure the judgments of close friends and relatives. There may be objection that these are merely reported opinions and not evidences of actual adjustment or maladjustment; hence a more objective, factual, indirect approach has also been used. A number of such tests have been devised, the most successful one to date being that developed by Burgess and Cottrell.[3] It seeks answers to four types of situations indicative of degree of marital accord.

1. Degree of adjustment in such matters as handling finances and dealing with in-laws, and in attitudes toward friends and toward recreation. For instance, a married couple is asked to check whether they "always agree," "almost always agree," "occasionally disagree," "frequently disagree," "almost always disagree," or "always disagree" in handling family finances, in caring for the baby, in table manners, and so on.

2. Number of common interests and joint activities. For instance, in his leisure time does the husband (the wife) prefer to be "on the go" or to stay at home?

3. Demonstrations of affection and mutual confidences. A typical question: "Do you confide in your spouse in everything? In most things? Occasionally? Almost never?"

4. Dissatisfaction with the marriage. "Do you ever wish you had

[1] Katherine B. Davis, *Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-Two Hundred Women* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1929).

[2] Richard O. Lang, *The Rating of Happiness in Marriage* (unpublished master's thesis, University of Chicago Libraries, 1932).

[3] Ernest W. Burgess and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939). The subjects of this study were 526 couples, members for the most part of the white-collar and professional classes; urban, native-white residents of Illinois; well educated; predominantly Protestant; married from one to six years.

not married? Frequently? Occasionally? Rarely? Never?" "If you had your life to live over, would you marry the same person?" The individual is also invited to list the things that are wrong with his marriage, and the adjustment is scored in terms of the number of complaints listed.

The ratings by close friends and relatives are probably more trustworthy than self-ratings, which are apt to be a little more favorable to the individual. However, when many cases are involved, the differences are not great, the two methods giving results which correlate to the extent of .9. Nor do the more exact and indirect approaches change the general picture. It is a point of considerable interest that the rating of marital happiness is much the same whether it be based on anonymous self-ratings, on the ratings of close friends or relatives, or on a more elaborate, indirect method. The special value of the last-named is that it permits an appraisal in terms of finer degrees of adjustment and maladjustment. By taking the items used in the questionnaire and weighting the different responses according to their degree of association with marital happiness (as revealed by the subjects' own appraisals), an index of marital adjustment is secured. But the general similarity in the results despite the use of different indices of marital success indicates that the findings of the various studies are generally comparable.

Correlates of Happy Marriages

After the marriages have been rated according to happiness, we may try to ascertain from the background information supplied by the subjects the factors that are associated with marital happiness. Of the factors that have been investigated we shall consider in this chapter only those which are of pre-marital origin, leaving for the next chapter the consideration of post-marital factors. Such a list of pre-marital factors related to marital happiness appears in the table on pages 436–440. It will be noted that of the fifty-five different items listed, twenty-two are reported by two or more studies, while thirty-three are supplied by only a single study. This is due in only a few instances to conflicting findings, and results mainly from the unfortunate circumstance that the various studies differ considerably in the background items investigated.

TABLE 22. PRE-MARITAL FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO SUCCESS IN MARRIAGE *

Pre-Marital Items	Studies by Bernard, Davis, Hamilton, Hart, Kirkpatrick, Popenoe, and Schroeder	Terman's Study (792 Couples)	Study by Burgess and Cottrell (526 Couples)
Acquaintance, length of	.....	H, three years or more W, one year or more	Two or more years
Age of marriage.....	H, 24 and over ..... W, 20 and over (Hart)	H, 22 and over ..... W, 20 and over	H, 22 to 30 W, 22 and over
Age difference.....	H, 0 to 10 years older W, 0 to 5 years younger (Bernard)	.....	H, older by one to three years or same age as wife
Attachment to father	.....	Good deal or very close	H, close W, close
Attachment to mother	.....	Good deal or very close	H, close W, close
Attachment to parents, degrees of preference	W, absence of greater intimacy with one parent (Kirkpatrick)	W, absence of markedly greater attachment	.....
Attachment to siblings	.....	.....	H, none W, none or younger brother
Babies, learned origin of	.....	W, 6 to 16 years	.....
Brother or brothers ...	W has (Hamilton) ..	.....	.....
Church attendance	Three times a month (Schroeder)	.....	H, two or more times a month W, four times a month
Conflict with father...	.....	None or very little...	H, little or none W, little or none

* E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939), pp. 357–59.

TABLE 22. PRE-MARITAL FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO SUCCESS IN MARRIAGE — *continued*

Pre-Marital Items	Studies by Bernard, Davis, Hamilton, Hart, Kirkpatrick, Popenoe, and Schroeder	Terman's Study (792 Couples)	Study by Burgess and Cottrell (526 Couples)
Conflict with mother	.....	H, none ..... W, none or very little	H, little or none
Courtship, length of	.....	.....	Three or more years
Discipline in home	.....	Firm but not harsh	.....
Education	W, beyond high school (Davis) Spouses have equal education (Hamilton) Beyond high school (Schroeder)	Beyond high school	H, college graduate or professional W, college, post-graduate, or professional
Employment, length of	.....	.....	W, employed seven or more years
Employment, regularity	.....	.....	Regularly
Employment, type	.....	.....	W, same as or similar to what she wants
Engagement, length of	Did not elope ..... (Popenoe)	H, six months or longer W, three months or longer	Nine months and more
Family background level	.....	.....	Superior level
Family background, similarity	.....	.....	Similar
Friends, men	.....	.....	H, several or many W, does not lack
Friends, women	H, excess or deficiency (Kirkpatrick)	.....	H, several or many W, many
Happiness in childhood	.....	Above average	.....

TABLE 22. PRE-MARITAL FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO SUCCESS IN MARRIAGE — *continued*

Pre-Marital Items	Studies by Bernard, Davis, Hamilton, Hart, Kirkpatrick, Popenoe, and Schroeder	Terman's Study (792 Couples)	Study by Burgess and Cottrell (526 Couples)
Health	W, healthy (Davis)		H, healthy
Height-weight deviation			W, 15 or more pounds underweight
H physically resembles W's father		W, none, some, or close	
Income			H, moderate W, moderate
Married by	Minister or priest (Schroeder)		Minister, priest or rabbi
Married where			At church or parsonage
Meeting place, first		Other than "pickup" or a place of private or public recreation	
Membership in organizations			H, two or more W, three or more
Menstruation, age at first		W, not before 12 years	
Mental ability, relative		W, husband not inferior H, husband not much superior	
Mother's (H's) attractiveness as rated by H		H, average or above	
Occupation			H, certain occupations W, teaching

TABLE 22. PRE-MARITAL FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO SUCCESS IN MARRIAGE — *continued*

Pre-Marital Items	*Studies by* Bernard, Davis, Hamilton, Hart, Kirkpatrick, Popenoe, and Schroeder	Terman's Study (792 Couples)	Study by Burgess and Cottrell (526 Couples)
Order of birth	.....	W, not only child....	H, not only child; if only and youngest, do not marry only and youngest
Parents' approval of marriage	.....	....	Approved by both
Parents' marital happiness	Rated happy (Popenoe, Schroeder)	W, about average or happier Rated (happy) H, rated decidedly happier than average	Rated happy
Parents' marital status	Not divorced or separated (Schroeder)	....	.....
Petting (or spooning)	W, none (Davis)....	W, never	.....
Punishment in childhood	....	None, rare, or occasional	.....
Rearing, urban or rural	Country and small town (Schroeder)	.....	Reared in country
Religious home training	.....	H, considerable.....	.....
Residence, neighborhood	.....	.....	H, in suburbs W, small town or city suburb
Savings	.....	.....	H has
Sex — response of parents to child's early curiosity	.....	Frank	.....
Sex, attitude toward..	.....	H, indifference or interest and pleasant anticipation	.....

TABLE 22. PRE-MARITAL FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO SUCCESS IN MARRIAGE — *continued*

Pre-Marital Items	Studies by Bernard, Davis, Hamilton, Hart, Kirkpatrick, Popenoe, and Schroeder	Terman's Study (792 Couples)	Study by Burgess and Cottrell (526 Couples)
Sex information, source of	.....	Parents or teachers...	.....
Sex, desire to be of opposite	.....	W, never desired.....	.....
Sex instruction	W, some (Davis) from mother or books (Schroeder)	H, more than very inadequate W, not entirely lacking	.....
Sex shock	.....	W, none from 10 to 15 years	.....
Sexual intercourse....	W, none (Davis) W, none (Hamilton)	None, or with future spouse only	.....
Sunday-school attendance	Beyond 18 years (Schroeder)	.....	Beyond 18 years
Wife physically resembles H's mother	H, wife resembles (Hamilton)	H, some or none.....	.....

Similarity of cultural background

One of the important findings [1] is that similarity of cultural background favors marital adjustment, while dissimilarity, if pronounced, disposes toward maladjustment. It is fortunate, therefore, that most choices are made on the basis of similarity of social and cultural milieu, as the preceding chapter brought out. The importance we attach to common and complementary interests as a basis for marital happiness is indicated by our frequent use of the phrase "the common life" when referring to marriage. Persons from different cultural levels who marry have more difficulty in understanding each other or in sympathizing with each other because they talk different languages. They attach different meanings to things, react differently to the same

[1] Ernest W. Burgess and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., *op. cit.*, chap. VI.

symbols, and hence have difficulty in achieving a "unity of communicating personalities." [1]

Cultural similarity is more favorable to marital adjustment than cultural difference, but we must not conclude from this that similarity of background has equal value on all cultural levels. The literate, for instance, are more likely to achieve happiness in marriage than the illiterate. Divorces are much less common among college graduates than in the married population generally. In the Burgess-Cottrell study, a decline in the percentage of poorly adjusted marriages and an increase in the percentage of well-adjusted marriages was associated with an increase in the level of cultural background, as measured by such items as the occupation of the father, education, religion, economic and social status. Economic and social status (amount of income and position in the community), however, were found to be less important than education, religious activity, and occupation. Differences in religious practices influenced marital adjustment, while likenesses or differences in religious affiliations did not. These findings emphasize the importance of the distinction to be made between structure and function or form and substance. What matters most is what the family is and does, not what label it wears.

A related finding is that the husband's background is usually more important for marital happiness than the wife's. This is indicated by the fact that the individual items in the husbands' family backgrounds correlated higher with adjustment score than did the same items in the backgrounds of the wives. A possible reason for this difference is that the wife generally makes the major adjustment in marriage, which means that she may deviate more from the ways of her parents than does her husband from his.

Happy home background

Of all the factors which have been studied in relation to marital happiness none stands out more than this one of a happy home background.[2] It rates as the four-star factor. Some of the evidences of

[1] Harvey J. Locke, "Tentative Knowledge About Marriage and Family Relations," *Marriage and Family Living*, III:74, November, 1941.

[2] Reported by Burgess and Cottrell, *op. cit.*, chap. VII; Lewis M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938), chap. IX; Clarence W. Schroeder, *Divorce in a City of 100,000 Population* (doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago Libraries, 1938); Paul Popenoe and B. Wicks, "Marital Happiness in Two Generations," *Mental Hygiene*, 21:218–23, 1937; Clifford Kirkpatrick, "Factors in Marital Adjustment," *American Journal of Sociology*, 43:270–83, 1937. Further reference to these studies appears in the bibliography at the close of the chapter.

such a background are: the marital happiness of the parents; close attachment of children to parents, especially on the part of sons, with no marked preference being shown for either parent; little or no conflict with parents; a happy childhood spent at home; firm but not harsh discipline; and the absence of frequent and severe childhood punishment. These findings of statistical investigations support the earlier findings of case studies in emphasizing the primary importance for personality development of the early years of life, which are spent in the family circle. Attitudes toward people, toward the opposite sex, toward marriage and family life are built up unconsciously during the formative years and persist in later life, greatly affecting the type of adjustment that one makes. We say that nothing succeeds like success, and so it seems true also that nothing succeeds like early happiness. Happiness begets happiness. It appears that those who are brought up in a happy home come to expect happiness and act in ways which produce it; they have the habits that make for happiness.

If, instead of dealing separately with the family backgrounds of husband and wife, we combine the happiness appraisals, as is done in Figure 68, we get some striking results. Note the consistent pattern in the figure with the marked differences between the extremes. Where both sets of parents are very happily married, almost three out of four couples have a good marital adjustment, and only one couple



FIGURE 68. MARITAL ADJUSTMENT IN RELATION TO HAPPINESS OF PARENTS' MARRIAGE (COMBINED RATINGS)

If both sets of parents are very happily married, the offspring have from two to three times as good a chance of being happily married as when both sets of parents are rated as average, unhappy, or very unhappy. From Burgess and Cottrell, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, p. 101, Chart 10.

in eight is poorly adjusted. But when both sets of parents get a rating of average, unhappy, or very unhappy, the ratio of happy marriages among their children is only one in four, and of poor marriages two in five.

Great care must be exercised in weighing the significance of the foregoing cultural and social factors for marital happiness. There is little doubt that family backgrounds generally work for or against marital happiness. The observed differences are too great to be accounted for by chance fluctuations. But the point to note here is that these background factors are not invariable in their effects. About one third of the marriages where the husband had a low cultural background score were rated as well adjusted, and not a few happy marriages were made by persons who came from unhappy homes. Exactly how influential is each of these two sets of factors, the cultural and the social? In determining the influence of any one factor, cultural background, for example, it is important to rule out the other factors which may be involved, such as the economic and the psychological. For instance, a group of marriages may show a positive correlation between churchgoing and marital adjustment, but this may be because of economic or educational or psychological factors. The churchgoers may be better educated than those who do not attend church, and the higher level of education may influence marital adjustment. To measure the impact of any one factor, like church attendance, it is necessary to control the other factors by keeping them constant. This can be done statistically by the method of partial correlation. Such an analysis, holding the other factors constant, showed that the combined cultural factors were correlated with marital adjustment to the extent of +.14; and the social factors to the extent of +.18. These correlations are extremely low, and indicate that all the social factors combined account for about 3 per cent, and the cultural factors for about 2 per cent, of the variation in marital adjustment. Each of these composite factors exerts only a slight influence on marital happiness. Unfortunately, the method of partial correlation has not been applied to the specific component background factors, like church membership, amount of education, or type of childhood discipline. If this were done, the small correlations obtained when the other factors are not controlled might completely melt away. The reader should keep these limitations of the statistics in mind as additional background factors are reviewed in subsequent paragraphs.

Birth order

When we acknowledge the importance of family influences upon the personality of the growing child, we include the influences of brothers and sisters as well as parents. Hence, there is interest in inquiring what effect, if any, size of family, birth order, and the relationships of siblings have on marital adjustment. The relationships of siblings have not been investigated as satisfactorily by statistical methods as have the other two factors mentioned. The results of investigation show that the chances of a good adjustment in marriage are greater if one has brothers and sisters than if one is an only child, and this is especially true in the case of the husband. A very large proportion of only children (about one half of all such husbands and more than a third of such wives) makes poor marriages. In combination, the intermarriages of only children make the poorest showing,[1] while the best showing is made by the intermarriage of oldest children. The reasons usually given in explanation of this condition are familiar, and have to do with the presumed lack of adaptability of only children as compared with other children. Much has been made of this, but it is not inevitable, as is shown by the fact that the correlation of order of birth and marital happiness is much less than perfect. An only child need not be spoiled or overprotected if parents are alert to the problem, and many are.

Rural upbringing

It is interesting to inquire if any general relationship exists between marital adjustment and the type of community in which one is reared. The city is still a comparative stranger to man, for it is only within recent years that the majority of the population of the United States has been found in urban centers. On the other hand, mankind has had tens of thousands of years of experience in adapting itself to village and other types of rural life. It would not be surprising, therefore, to find that man's adjustment to his rural environment surpasses his adjustment to the city, from a biological point of view. At least the marriage and birth rates are higher in the country, while the death rate is lower, as are also the rates of divorce, crime, insanity, and suicide, all indications of poor adjustment. In the Burgess-Cottrell study, the advantage of a rural upbringing is emphasized by the finding that two thirds of the couples with a rural background had good

[1] Burgess-Cottrell, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

marital adjustments and only about one in ten had poor adjustments, whereas about one third of the couples reared in the city had poor adjustments and only two fifths had good adjustments.[1] As to why a rural upbringing should be advantageous to marriage, we are not entirely sure, but the benefits of a country existence include a more natural and familiar attitude regarding sex, better general health, and the development of habits of industry and dependability through work responsibilities which come early in life. All these factors associated with country life are favorable to adjustment in marriage.

It must be pointed out that the couples with a rural background in the Burgess-Cottrell study represented a selected group, since they had left the country and migrated to the city and were living in an urban environment at the time of the study. Strictly speaking, the study shows only that a rural background for those migrating to the city is more favorable to marital adjustment than a childhood spent in the city. But what about those who remain on the farm? This group is not considered by the Burgess-Cottrell study, the subjects for which came mostly from Chicago and its suburbs. In another investigation,[2] however, a sample of 376 farm couples showed the lowest percentage reported as "very happy" among eleven groups classified according to size of community. Some question may be raised, however, regarding the fairness of a comparison of farm and city groups in terms of the concept of marital happiness. The goal of marital happiness is prominently set forth by a culture like ours in which the romantic fantasies are conspicuous, but the romantic complex is more appropriate to urban than to rural life. On the farm, husband and wife are business partners, while in the city, in the absence of such close economic ties, the idea of companionship is emphasized. Where companionship and sexual love are emphasized, as in our American urban culture, it is quite understandable that common interests should be stressed for husbands and wives, as well as demonstrations of affection, the sharing of confidences, and the sundry other criteria used by the researchers in constructing an index of marital happiness. But one may question the applicability of such criteria to farm marriages where economic factors predominate and the pattern is patriarchal, not equalitarian.

[1] *Ibid.*, see Table 57, p. 376. The same general finding is reported by Schroeder.

[2] Richard O. Lang, *The Rating of Happiness in Marriage* (master's thesis, University of Chicago, 1932).

Social participation

It appears to be a favorable sign, as far as probabilities of marital adjustment are concerned, if one has definite and varied social interests and is a good mixer. Thus, fairly regular attendance at church (two or more times a month for the husband, four times a month for the wife) is favorable to marital adjustment, as is attendance at Sunday School through adolescence. Definite interest in a number of civic organizations, in a job, and in people are also favorable omens. It seems that women who work before marriage are more likely to be happily married than those who do not work, unless there is a serious discrepancy between the kinds of work the wives wished to do and the kind they actually did. Likewise having friends is a good sign. Those who have many friends have a better chance for adjustment than those who have only a few friends. Sometimes those that have only a very few friends say that these are more intimate, but this is often only a rationalization.

It appears also to be advantageous to be married in a church, parsonage, or at home by a minister, priest, or rabbi, following a long period of acquaintanceship and courtship. Elopement is an unfavorable factor,[1] as is acquaintanceship made through a "pickup" or at a place of public or private recreation. Marriages which bear the approval of the parents are likely to turn out better than those without such



FIGURE 69. OUTCOME OF ELOPEMENTS

Based on 738 cases of educated white Americans. Elopements caused by (*a*) pregnancy and (*b*) parental objection had low rates of happiness, 33 and 45 per cent respectively, while those caused by (*c*) desire to avoid publicity and (*d*) desire to avoid expense showed 60 and 63 per cent successful. The taboo against secret weddings stems from the fact that marriage entails a change in one's legal and social status; hence the need for publicity. Data from Paul Popenoe, "A Study of 738 Elopements," *American Sociological Review*, 3:47, February, 1938.

[1] Paul Popenoe, "A Study of 738 Elopements," *American Sociological Review*, 3:47–48, February, 1938.

blessing. This is a reminder of the importance of pleasant home associations between parent and child. It is likely, too, that the approval of parents is a good sign because the parents are apt to place prudential considerations above romantic ones, and, as we have seen, congeniality of cultural background is a prime factor in marital adjustment.

Religious background

It has been suggested that regular attendance at church and Sunday School are favorable to marital adjustment, and that, therefore, the religious background is important in the choice of a mate. It will be noted that the emphasis here is on actual participation in church activities, as contrasted with mere membership. As is so often the case, it is helpful to distinguish between form and substance, between what one says and what one does. Between religious preference and marital success, no definite association has been noted except for those who report no church connection. The latter rank lower than the average in proportion of good adjustments. It is commonly assumed that Catholic and Jewish marriages show greater solidarity than Protestant marriages, but there seems to be some question as to whether, on the average, they are any happier.[1] Likewise, only slight differences appear between mixed and unmixed marriages (in religion) in their chances for happiness. This does not mean, however, that the usual admonition against mixed marriages (Jew-Gentile, Protestant-Catholic) is unsound, especially where real differences exist. Young people hesitate to marry if they have marked differences in religious convictions; hence, there are relatively few such marriages. Those who do marry may be only moderate in their faith, and so may be able to make adjustments in this area more readily than others who have more pronounced convictions. Clinical studies support the belief that the most successful mixed marriages are made by so-called emancipated individuals.[2] Denominational ties do not, of course, give much indication of a person's actual faith. Whether a person is a Catholic, Protestant, or Jew probably does not matter so much as whether, let us say, he is a modernist or a fundamentalist.

Schooling

How does amount of schooling affect marital happiness? The evidence on this question is not entirely consistent. Burgess and Cottrell

[1] Clifford Kirkpatrick, "Factors in Marital Adjustment," *American Journal of Sociology*, 43:270–83, 1937.

[2] Cf. Felix Adler, *Marriage Incompatibility* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1930).



FIGURE 70. FREQUENCY OF CATHOLIC-PROTESTANT MARRIAGE

These data for 702 children, only a small sample, in one large parish on the Atlantic seaboard where both parents were Catholic suggest that such intermarriage is probably not uncommon in areas of mixed population. Where only one of the parents was a Catholic, the proportion of mixed marriages was about 50 per cent greater. The association of children of different faiths in the public schools and neighborhood is thought to be an important reason for the high percentages of intermarriage. Data from Gerald J. Schnepp, *Leakage from a Catholic Parish* (doctoral dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1943).

report that with a few slight exceptions increased chances of success in marriage go with a rising level of education,[1] but other studies [2] report only a negligible correlation. There appears to be a slightly greater degree of happiness among wives whose husbands are most highly educated.[3] The discrepancy between the studies may be more apparent than real and may be due to the probability that mental ability, not amount of schooling, is the important variable affecting marital happiness. The data show a higher correlation of mental ability and happiness. Amount of schooling is tied up with economic factors as well as with mental ability, and it is doubtless more realistic to emphasize the latter as the more important factor in adaptability.

Another question in which there is considerable interest is whether or not it is desirable for persons of unequal education to marry. Studies show that, on the average, differences in formal education are of no real consequence so far as the happiness of husbands is con-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 122. Also Davis reports more happiness among college than non-college women.
[2] Terman, Bernard, Kirkpatrick.
[3] Terman, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

terned, but wives whose husbands are markedly inferior to them in degree of education show low happiness scores.[1] This suggests that for a woman to marry a man with less education is a greater risk than the other way around. The differences are chiefly important in so far as they reflect differences in I.Q., although the prestige value of considerable formal education is probably also a factor. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that the media of modern communication are highly proliferated, and provide many ways of getting knowledge other than by going to school.

Economic factors

In our materialistic society, money is usually rated as very important and success in life is generally measured by the size of one's income. Therefore, many may be surprised to learn that within the limits of the samples studied there is no correlation between size of income and marital happiness. On the average, there is no difference in amount of marital happiness among the well-to-do, the average, and the poor. In none of the investigations was the sample representative of our general population in point of income, which may have affected the finding somewhat. Thus, only about a fourth of the couples in the Terman study had incomes under $1500 a year, while for our nation as a whole the proportion was over one half. In the Burgess-Cottrell study the poorer classes were better represented with about a third of the subjects reporting income under $1200, but many of these were persons who reported no income because they were students, or were otherwise dependent upon their parents for support. Still the range of income in these studies was not inconsiderable, ranging in the Terman study from less than $1000 to $5000 and over, with the latter group representing 6 per cent of all cases. These incomes seem to cover satisfactorily the middle and upper middle classes, and the findings suggest that within these limits, at any rate, marital happiness is not related to amount of income. These findings do not really surprise us because we generally recognize that happiness depends more on emotional than upon economic factors, given a reasonable amount of physical security.[2] Increased income does not always bring increased happiness, because the additional income promotes new desires and creates new problems of management.

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 191.

[2] Investigations of happiness in relation to income have yielded negative findings among the unmarried as well. See Goodwin B. Watson, "Happiness Among Adult Students of Education," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 21:79–109, 1930.

More important for marital happiness than amount of income is the character of one's occupation. What seems to matter is whether it provides for regularity of work and income, and whether it is characterized by a high degree of social control and by little mobility; that is, marriages stand a better than average chance of success when the husband is engaged in an occupation over which the community exercises a good deal of control, and in which he has to answer to the group for his behavior. This is brought out in Figure 39, which shows the happiness ratings of husbands in a considerable number of occupations. It will be noted that the proportion of happy marriages is very high among school teachers. Intelligence and favorable personality factors are not to be ignored in accounting for this, but it is thought that important additional reasons are the social supervision to which teachers are subject, the regularity of their work, and their relative lack of mobility. The first and last factors are related, since it is difficult to exercise control over individuals whose work takes them from place to place. Unskilled laborers and traveling salesmen are probably the most mobile groups in our population, and they have the lowest ratings in marital happiness.

Stable, socialized personality

A number of different background factors have been shown to have some bearing upon one's chances for marital happiness. Emphasis has been laid upon the importance of a happy home life in childhood, participation in the activities of many groups, the possession of many friends, and employment in occupations characterized by regularity of work, public chaperonage, and relative immobility These factors are easily identified, and hence are useful in the investigation of the conditions underlying marital happiness. But the discerning reader has probably noticed that back of these separate and seemingly discrete factors are certain common elements which relate to personality itself. A happy home background is important for what it does to one's personality; participation in the activities of many groups is evidence that one has certain traits of personality, as are many other background factors which have been mentioned as being favorable. After all, people are happy or unhappy because of what they are, and they are what they are because of what has happened to them. We must, therefore, look to the personality itself for the chief clues to adjustment in marriage.

When we examine the various background items that are favorable to marital adjustment, we note that they are such as to suggest the stable, socialized personality type. The type of person who goes to church regularly, who affiliates with social organizations through a sense of community feeling or civic responsibility, who does not marry in opposition to the wishes of his parents, who has many friends, and who has regular work, is likely to be the conventional and stable sort of person. The unstable and unconventional person is more apt to defy his parents, to disparage the church, to ridicule the civic activities of the "respectable" as being mere worthless gestures. When we interpret these background factors in terms of their personality components, they take on added significance. From this standpoint we understand better why it is that the reception of sex instruction from parents or teachers is favorably associated with marriage adjustment. Frank attitudes of parents toward the child's early curiosity regarding sex, and the absence of petting and of pre-marital sexual intercourse, are favorable factors because they promote stable, conventional personalities. A child who understands sex and appreciates its proper rôle in life is stabilized in regard to this important phase of experience, whereas one who lacks such knowledge and attitude develops some sort of unfavorable reaction, whether it be impulsive, morbid, or repressive. So, too, it is the headstrong and the irresponsible who are more likely than others to indulge in pre-marital sexual intercourse, in the face of general social disapproval.

In the Burgess-Cottrell study, as well as in most of the others, the personality factors which favor marital adjustment are suggested by the external background factors. A study by Terman,[1] however, directly attacks the problem of the relation of personality traits to marital happiness. Terman's subjects filled in a schedule covering items of background, but in addition furnished responses to sixty-seven items from a modified Bernreuter Personality Inventory [2] and fifty items from the Strong Vocational Interest Blank. The Bernreuter test is said to be capable of revealing a number of personality characteristics, such as whether the subject is nervous or steady, intro-

[1] Lewis M. Terman *et al.*, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938). An investigation of 792 married couples predominantly professional and white-collar classes, urban, native-white residents of California; well-educated; Protestant; mean length of marriage, 11.4 years.

[2] If all the items are used, a low or negligible correlation is obtained between total score and marital happiness, but it is reported that more than a quarter of the items discriminate in some degree between the happily and the unhappily married.

vertive or extrovertive, ascendant or submissive. The Bernreuter, like other similar personality tests, asks such questions as whether the person daydreams frequently, often feels miserable without apparent cause, is much affected by the praise or blame of others, takes the lead to enliven a dull party, lacks self-confidence, and so on.

On the basis of such responses, Terman differentiates the personalities of the unhappily and the happily married as follows.[1] (The comparison is, of course, a relative one.) Unhappy wives are nervous, oversensitive, contentious, unfriendly, restless, unsystematic, wasteful, and unconventional. They show nervousness, for instance, in worry over possible misfortune, in alternating between happiness and sadness without apparent cause, in being easily excited and irritated, and in being bothered by misdirected thoughts. Their acute feelings of inferiority they show in their lack of self-confidence, in getting rattled easily, in being over-apologetic for mistakes made, in rewriting letters before mailing them, in being easily hurt by criticism, and in being suspicious of those in positions of control. They try to escape from their own feelings of inadequacy by "flight into reality"; that is, by a restless drive toward participation in community affairs with a view not to service but to self-glorification. The happily married women, on the contrary, are more often than not serene, self-confident, kindly, friendly, benevolent, co-operative, charitable, attentive to detail, regular in their work habits, thrifty, methodical, and conservative. The happily married women generally support the *status quo* in religion, politics, and morals. They approve of Bible study, think religious instruction necessary, and believe in sexual purity both before and after marriage. By contrast, more of the unhappily married women dislike Bible study, think religious education unnecessary, and show less concern about sex purity.

The personality traits for the husbands are basically the same as for the wives, but there are differences in the way the fundamental traits are expressed, because of differences in the rôles played by the two sexes in our society. The unhappily married men give neurotic responses like those of the unhappily married wives, but whereas the nervous women rush into activity of an exhibitionistic sort, the nervous men withdraw from social activity and seek refuge in fantasy. The unhappy wives are more likely to reveal their rebelliousness in romantic questing, while the unhappy men are more likely to show

[1] *Op. cit.*, chap. 7.

theirs in a negative form by being antagonistic toward women. This difference may result from the fact that the sex tensions of unhappily married women are apt to be stronger than those of the men.

Happily married men show signs of an even emotional disposition, a co-operative spirit, and a lack of self-consciousness. They do not get rattled easily or become discouraged when blamed. They tend to treat others courteously, tolerantly, and benevolently, instead of being domineering or defensive in their reactions, as are the unhappy husbands. The happily married men get along well with their superiors and carry out orders without objection. They tend to treat women as equals; they are conservative in their attitudes and methodical in their habits.

The personality traits of the happily married and the unhappily married have been stated in some detail, but an over-all view indicates that the many detailed differences are expressions of a basic conflict between the individual and the group. The unhappy persons are not well adjusted to others and they are, therefore, emotionally disturbed. Because they do not know how to get along with others, they lack self-confidence and pay too much attention to themselves. In general, the unhappily married are egocentric and the happily married alterocentric.

The responses of the happily married show that they have personality traits which distinguish them as a group from the unhappily married, but are the responses causes or effects? Is, for instance, the nervousness of the unhappy husband the reason for his unhappiness, or is his unhappy marriage the reason for his nervousness? Certainly an unhappy marriage, if bad enough, can make one grouchy, suspicious, touchy, and otherwise nervous. The question of priority is important and could probably be solved if responses to the questionnaires could be obtained from individuals before they began the relationship that ultimately results in marriage.

The personality responses in the Terman study were weighted according to the degree of association with the marital adjustment index, and the resulting personality scores of the husbands correlated +.47, and those of the wives +.46, with their index of marital adjustment. This is not a high correlation, and one wonders why a higher correlation was not obtained for these personality items when personality factors are at the heart of marital adjustment. While it is possible that the essential personality factors have not yet been isolated,

it is possible also that a higher correlation would have been obtained had the personality traits been taken in combination rather than separately for husband and wife. A given trait in the husband has meaning only in relation to the corresponding trait in the wife, and what matters is the pattern formed by the interrelationships of their traits. A comparison may clarify this point. An only child is, as a rule, a poorer risk as a marriage partner than is a youngest child, but if only children are wedded to oldest children the marriages generally turn out better than marriages where both partners are youngest children. The largest proportion of poor marriages result where both partners are only children. This example shows that the delineation and evaluation of the traits of husbands and wives separately is not enough. What we need to know is the value of certain traits in the husband in relation to corresponding traits in the wife. Knowledge of the value of combinations of traits in relation to other combinations would be even more useful.

A word of caution is also in order about personality tests of the paper-and-pencil variety, such as have been used in the study of marital adjustment. These tests, which are still rather new, are subject to limitations which cause some social psychologists to question their validity.[1] A primary weakness of the tests is the tendency to regard personality traits as fixed, and hence to generalize regarding them on the inadequate basis of an individual's reported verbal responses in a relatively few situations. Actually, personality is a function of almost countless particular situations which vary greatly and often result in diverse and even inconsistent responses. Take, for example, the personality trait of self-confidence which is thought to be positively associated with marital happiness. The personality inventory may ask: Do you lack self-confidence? An answer in the affirmative counts against you. But how is one to answer such a general query? A man may lack confidence in his dealings with some persons and not with others. He may lack confidence in his relations with a particular person in some situations and not in others; on some occasions and not on others. Whether one lacks confidence or not is a function of particular situations involving many factors. If a person is tested in a wide variety of situations, it may be possible to generalize as to his possession or lack of self-confidence, but even so the generalization covers only the situations tested and may give us no sure basis for pre-

[1] Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1940), p. 440.

dicting whether or not the individual will show self-confidence in a new situation.

The Prediction of Marital Adjustment

Those looking toward marriage are nearly always confident that happiness lies ahead. Such confidence may be a good thing, but it is not always warranted, as the statistics of divorce and marital maladjustment indicate. Confidence is a virtue in itself, but it may be misplaced, and sometimes it represents merely ignorance of consequences. A realistic view sometimes prompts one to drop a contemplated course of action because the odds are heavily against success. If there were some way of knowing how strongly the odds were for or against success, more intelligent decisions could be made. Business firms like employees who are self-confident, but they also want them to be capable; so many companies use aptitude tests to sift out candidates who, presumably, are not fit for the work. The armed forces similarly put candidates for the air corps through a series of aptitude screens. Can we do the same for marriage? Can we tell in advance whether a prospective marriage is likely to stand or fall?

A promising beginning has been made in this direction by Burgess and Cottrell, in the test which appears at the close of the chapter. This instrument was devised in the following manner: All the background items were correlated with the marital adjustment score, and those showing a significant relationship were selected for the prediction schedule. It will be noted that there are twenty-one such items in the prospective husband's background, seventeen items in the prospective wife's background, and three items in common. The several parts of each item, representing the various possible answers, were then given values corresponding to the frequency with which they occurred in the group with very high adjustment scores. The background factor of education may be used to illustrate the procedure followed. The data showed that in general the higher the educational level at the time of marriage, the greater are the probabilities of good adjustments in marriage and the smaller the probabilities of poor adjustments. About one half of the men who were college-trained had very good adjustments; whereas the proportion was one third for those with less education. Those with graduate work generally surpassed those with college training. For wives, the discrepancy was even greater, so that the wife's education makes more difference than

the husband's in affecting the chances for a high marital adjustment score. In assigning weights to the different educational levels, graduate students receive the greatest number of points, college students the next largest number, and so on. Since the wife's educational standing at marriage matters more than the husband's, she receives a greater number of points for the same educational achievement. As a rule, the answer which is given by the group with the highest proportion of "very high" adjustment scores receives the greatest number of score points, whether it be 20, 30, or 40, and the other answers are scaled down to 0, which score is given to the characteristic which describes the smallest proportion of the very high adjustment scores.

Limitations of the prediction scale

The discerning reader may have wondered whether the techniques mentioned are not faulty, since the factors on which the prediction is based were assessed after the couples had been married. May not the marital happiness or unhappiness have affected their responses to the items assumed to be predictive? For example, it is claimed that happily wedded couples, more than others, are likely to have happily married parents. But if a woman is unhappily married, she may unconsciously allow her disappointment to color her judgment concerning the marriage of her parents. Undoubtedly a better procedure would be first to secure responses from an unmarried group on a number of items thought to affect marital adjustment, and then follow the group through a number of years of marriage to see which factors are correlated with success. This is now being done. Kelly has secured a large number of measures of engaged and newly married couples and has made a follow-up of the marriage, securing a marital happiness score for each couple at the end of each year of married life. The study is still in progress at this writing, but a preliminary report on fifty-two couples who were followed for two years shows that the prediction scores based on the Terman personality and background items yielded a correlation of about +.5 with marital happiness at the end of the second year of marriage.[1] This is about the same correlation as was reported by Terman and by Burgess and Cottrell, who studied only married subjects. The results of Kelly's investigation would, therefore, seem to substantiate the validity of the prediction schedule. In

[1] E. L. Kelly, "Concerning the Validity of Terman's Weights for Predicting Marital Happiness," *Psychological Bulletin*, 36:202–03, 1939.

a somewhat similar manner, Burgess and Wallin are studying one thousand engaged couples, whose marriages are to be followed for three years in an effort to discover which factors are useful as indicators of marital adjustment.[1]

The prediction schedule is an interesting device and can be used to advantage, but it offers only a very crude index of the probabilities for success or failure in marriage and must be used with great caution. It is to be noted that predictions based on this scale can be made with much more confidence where large groups are involved rather than a single couple. Since, however, the reader may wish to use the test to rate himself, it is essential that the weaknesses and limitations, acknowledged by the authors themselves, be recognized. Inspection of the scale will show that there are a number of inconsistencies in the scoring, as when more points are given to a husband with a grade-school education than to one with a high-school education. The inventors of the test have chosen to retain these inconsistencies rather than violate empirical procedure, but the inconsistencies, although few, remain and are unexplained.

It may also be pointed out that the coefficient of correlation between the prediction scores and the adjustment scores comes only to about +.5, which accounts only for a fourth of the variations in marital adjustment.[2] In other words, whatever may be the factors responsible for success in marriage, this study misses three fourths of them. The authors believe the correlation is not higher because the test does not take personality factors into account, but it will be recalled that the personality factors tested by Terman did not increase the validity of the score. Personality factors are in all probability crucial for marital adjustment, but it seems that we have not been able so far to devise an instrument for isolating the essential interacting dynamisms. To show the limitations of the prediction schedule, Burgess and Cottrell give in some detail a case of a fairly well-adjusted couple with a low prediction score, and a couple with a high prediction score and a poor adjustment. The explanation given is that the personality factors in these cases are not consistent with the back-

[1] *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment* (New York: Social Science Research Council, Bulletin number 48, 1941), p. 44.

[2] It is thought that the happiness of a marriage may be predicted just about as effectively from such a scale as college success can be predicted from a three-hour test of scholastic aptitude or from four years of high-school marks. See Lewis M. Terman and Winifred B. Johnson, "Methodology and Results of Recent Studies in Marital Adjustment," *American Sociological Review*, 4:322, January, 1939.

ground factors. The background schedule, for example, may show that the subject, a girl, an only child, comes from a broken home, was reared in the city, worked only irregularly before marriage, and was married by a justice of the peace — factors which contribute to a low prediction score. But such a girl, perhaps because of her very difficulties, may have acquired insight into her own problems and her own personality, and by virtue of this fact, plus a strong determination to do well, she may find happiness in marriage. Let us remember that when we say an only child is a poor marital risk, we are talking about only children as a group, not about some particular child. Nearly a third of the only children get a rating of "very happy" in their marriages even when they are married to other only children. The reader must, therefore, be exceedingly careful in his use of the prediction test. It can be useful in furnishing clues, but it may be dangerous if used as the sole basis in the choice of a mate. The predictive value of the test is very great for those at the extremes and less for those in between. We must also bear in mind that all prediction is in terms of probabilities, not certainties. A person's prediction score shows at most the "risk group" to which he belongs.

While the field of marital prediction is changing rapidly, and further improvements in prediction instruments may be expected in the future, accuracy in prediction can be increased by a combination of statistical and of case study methods rather than by the use of either method alone. The experience of the life insurance companies furnishes an instructive analogy. If the intensive study of the individual case were not important, life insurance companies would not go to the considerable expense of supplementing their actuarial tables by careful medical examinations.[1]

The Age Factor in Marriage

The reader would probably like most of all to know what is the best age for marriage and what relationship ought to exist between the ages of husband and wife, from the standpoint of marital happiness. The question of the best age for marriage naturally raises the question: best for what? Both sexes are biologically ready for marriage at puberty, which is about fourteen to sixteen years of age, and the female is generally able to bear a child perhaps a year or two later.

[1] See discussion by S. A. Stouffer in P. Horst and others, *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment* (New York: Social Science Research Council, Bulletin number 48, 1941).



FIGURE 71. GIRLS' CHANCES OF MARRIAGE

Probabilities of marriage at various ages. At fifteen, a girl's chances that she will marry sooner or later are nine in ten, while at forty-five her chances of not marrying are nine in ten. Up to the age of twenty-two, the girl has a better chance of marrying than the boy. After twenty-two, the man's chances are better, until the age of forty-five, when the chances are the same for both sexes. Data from *Science News Letter*, 41:376, June 13, 1942.

The best age for bearing the first child is said by gynecologists to be in the late teens and early twenties, although the difficulty of childbirth for women at later ages, especially under conditions of modern obstetrical science, has probably been exaggerated. Moreover, on the psychological side, the impulses associated with marriage and parenthood attain strength fairly early in life.

There is, however, fairly general agreement that most boys and girls in their late teens are not sufficiently mature socially to assume the responsibilities of a home and family in our highly complex industrial society. A distinction may then be advantageously drawn between the biological age for marriage and the cultural. Just when we become wise enough to handle the problems that beset a marriage in our intricate civilization, it would be difficult to say. If this measure of wisdom should not come until quite late in life, it would hardly be practicable to postpone marriage accordingly, and we should have to reconcile ourselves to the necessity of learning by living. But apart from considerations of maturity of judgment there is an economic side to marriage and parenthood, involving support of mate and children, and the material demands may necessitate postponement of marriage. Certain occupational plans, too, entail considerable educational preparation and discourage early marriage.

The data on average age at first marriage in the United States show that it is not true, as is commonly thought, that the age for marriage is being steadily advanced. Actually the opposite is the case, for the trend in recent decades has been toward earlier marriage, at least for men. The median age at first marriage, for all men who ever marry, based on censuses from 1890 to 1940, dropped from 26.1 to 24.3 years.[1] For women, the decline is less marked; the median age at first marriage being 22.0 years in 1890 and 21.3 years in 1930. By 1940, the median rose to 21.6, probably because of the large number of couples who had to defer marriage during the hard times of the nineteen-thirties. Another indication of the trend toward earlier marriage in recent decades is the change in the proportion of young persons who are married. In 1890, 18.5 per cent of all persons between fifteen and twenty-four years of age were married; in 1920, the percentage of such persons married had jumped nearly one third, to 23.8 per cent; [2] and in 1940 the number was 23 per cent. The number of marriages in the United States (1940) with the bride under sixteen years of age was in excess of sixteen thousand.

If there has not been a trend toward general postponement of marriage, how has this come to be the common conception? The answer is that the comparison, conceptually, is often made, not between today and recent decades, but between this and earlier centuries. Although we lack specific information on the age at marriage in earlier times, say at the founding of our Republic, there does not seem to be much question that marriage, especially for females, occurred much earlier when society was mainly organized on an agricultural basis. Even today girls marry at an earlier age in farming communities than in the cities, although the age at marriage for farm girls has probably risen also during the centuries. Earlier farming societies were appreciably less complex and heterogeneous than modern agricultural communities which have felt the impact of the dominant urban culture.

One reason perhaps for the belief that the recent trend has been away from early marriage is that most of the writing on this question is done by the group with higher education, and this group has actually experienced a delay. The delay is occasioned by the increased amount of preparation required for the professions and for business,

[1] Bureau of the Census, *Age at First Marriage (Population — Special Reports*, Series P–45, number 7), May 28, 1945.

[2] Ernest R. Groves and William F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928), p. 219.





FIGURES 72, 73. AGES OF BRIDES AND GROOMS

The average young bride chooses a mate several years older than herself, but if she defers marriage to a later age, she is likely to get a husband about her own age. On the other hand, the average young groom takes a bride somewhat younger than himself and the age difference increases the older the groom. Graphs adapted from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, May, 1937, p. 6.

as well as by an increase in the standard of living. Whereas the average age at marriage for women who have been to college is 21.6 years, it is twenty-six years for those who have been graduated from college, and twenty-nine years for those with a sufficiently distinguished career to receive listing in *Who's Who*.[1]

The postponement of marriage has more serious implications for women than for men, for the older men tend to choose wives much younger than themselves, thus leaving the older women with limited chances for marriage. The average man of twenty-five marries a woman of twenty-two, but the average man of thirty-five marries, not a woman of thirty-two, but one of twenty-seven or twenty-eight. About one tenth of all men marry women of their own age; another tenth marry women who are older, although in nine out of ten of these cases the difference is less than six years; and the remaining four fifths marry women who are younger than themselves, with a difference of more than six years in a third of these cases.[2]

Age at marriage and marital happiness

Some of the earlier studies [3] conveyed the impression that early marriage was especially hazardous, but later studies make a more cautious appraisal of the importance of the age factor for marital happiness. Only a slight tendency to lesser happiness is reported for women who marry under twenty and for men under twenty-two.[4] Those who marry in their teens are more apt to be headstrong and unstable than those who marry later, so that immaturity rather than age is probably the crucial factor. In the present state of our knowledge, we can say that there is some additional risk in an early marriage, but no exact statement can be made regarding the best age for marriage.[5]

[1] Paul Popenoe, *Modern Marriage* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940), p. 12.

[2] James H. S. Bossard, "Age Factor in Marriage: A Philadelphia Study," *American Journal of Sociology*, 38:536–47, January, 1933. See also O. D. Duncan, "Factor of Age in Marriage," *American Journal of Sociology*, 39:469–82, January, 1934.

[3] Hornell Hart and W. Shields, "Happiness in Relation to Age at Marriage," *Journal of Social Hygiene*, 12:403–07, 1926. According to this study, the chances of unhappiness are much greater where the groom is under twenty-four and the bride under nineteen than where they are somewhat older. The ideal ages for marriage are given as twenty-nine and twenty-four, respectively. For further comment see reference to this study in the Bibliography at the close of the chapter.

[4] Terman, *op. cit.*, p. 181. In the Burgess-Cottrell study, the age period nineteen to twenty-one is reported as the danger period (p. 117).

[5] An analysis of 560 divorces showed the correlation between age at marriage and duration of marriage to be practically zero. C. Kirkpatrick, "Factors in Marital Adjustment," *American Journal of Sociology*, 43:270–83, 1937.

Age difference and marital happiness

According to the popular notion, the husband should be older than his wife, but not much older. Investigation of the age differences of married couples in relation to marital happiness does not, however, substantiate this notion. In the Burgess-Cottrell sample, the largest proportion of good adjustments was made where the wife was older than the husband, and the next best record was made by marriages where the husband was eight or more years older than the wife. These marriages also tended more to extremes of adjustment, for they also had larger proportions of poor adjustments.[1] In the Terman study, it was found that in general the happiest couples were those in which the husband was from three to five years older than the wife, but the happiest husbands were those who were twelve or more years older than their wives, while the happiest group of wives had husbands from four to ten years younger than themselves.[2] A big age difference probably suggests a selective factor. There are a few persons who want much older mates, perhaps because of attitudes of dependency. Such persons are happy when they get the maternal or paternal protection they want, but this does not mean that all of us would be happy under the same circumstances. It is, therefore, doubtful whether the age factor, within the normal range, is in itself important for marital happiness.[3]

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why do the three methods of rating marital happiness referred to in the text give nearly the same results?
2. Do the various researchers fail to include any important factors in their investigations of the pre-marital correlates of marital adjustment?
3. Is marital happiness more common on the higher educational and cultural levels, or is the definition of happiness such as to favor the higher levels?

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 162. [2] Terman, *op. cit.*, p. 183 ff.

[3] In the Terman study, the husbands and wives checked a list of faults which they found with their marriages. When these were arranged in order of seriousness, the complaint that the spouse was older ranked thirty-two in a list of thirty-five, alike for husband and wife, and the complaint that the spouse was younger was in last place in both lists. These couples do not, in their statements at least, attach much importance to age differences. Terman, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

4. Why is the couple's childhood experience in their parental home of such importance for their own married life?
5. Why is it, in general, an advantage to be reared in the country, from the standpoint of marital adjustment?
6. Which is better, a long or a short engagement?
7. Why do marriages performed by a minister usually turn out better than marriages performed by a justice of the peace?
8. How does religious background affect marital happiness?
9. Why do the studies fail to find any correlation between size of income and marital happiness?
10. What are the earmarks of a stable, socialized personality?
11. How does the Terman study differ in method and findings from the one by Burgess and Cottrell?
12. How are the personality traits of unhappily married women expressed in particular situations?
13. Are aptitude tests for marriage a good thing? Will they come into wider use as they are perfected?
14. What are the limitations of the prediction scale?
15. What is the best age for marriage?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. Limitations of existing scales for the prediction of marital adjustment.
2. A critical analysis of criteria of marital success.
3. Prediction by the use of personal documents. Ernest W. Burgess and Paul Wallin, "Predicting Adjustment in Marriage from Adjustment in Engagement," *American Journal of Sociology*, 49:324–30, 1944; Theodore R. Sarbin, "A Contribution to the Study of Actuarial and Statistical Methods of Prediction," *American Journal of Sociology*, 48:593–603, 1943; Leonard S. Cottrell, "The Case-Study Method in Prediction," *Sociometry*, 4:367–68, 1941; also the following bulletins of the Social Science Research Council: number 48, *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment*, by Paul Horst; number 49, *The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological Science*, by Gordon W. Allport; and number 53, *The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology, and Sociology*, by Louis Gottshalk, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Robert Angell.

SELECTED READINGS

Burgess, Ernest W., and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939.

A highly important, original, scientific study of factors that predispose marriage to success or failure.

Hart, Hornell, and W. Shields, "Happiness in Relation to Age at Marriage," *Journal of Social Hygiene*, 12:403–07, 1926.

Valuable as an early, pioneering study in prediction of marital happiness. It overestimates the importance of the age factor, possibly because of the unrepresentative nature of the sample used, namely, couples married in Philadelphia from 1905–1922 and cases appearing before the Philadelphia Domestic Relations Court in May–June, 1924. Cases coming before this court probably represent considerable selection.

Horst, P., and others, *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment*. New York: Social Science Research Council, Bulletin number 48, 1941.

A comprehensive, critical study of attempts to predict personal adjustment with special emphasis on the problems of methodology.

Kelly, E. Lowell, "Concerning the Validity of Terman's Weights for Predicting Marital Happiness," *Psychological Bulletin*, 36:202–03, 1939.

Undertakes to test the validity of Terman's prediction scores by comparing them with the scores of marital happiness of couples after several years of marriage.

Terman, Lewis M., and Winifred B. Johnson, "Methodology and Results of Recent Studies in Marital Adjustment," *American Sociological Review*, 4:322, January, 1939.

The discussion is concerned principally with Terman's continuing researches on the subject.

Terman, L. M., *et al.*, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938.

A valuable supplement to the Burgess-Cottrell study cited above. Solid, scientific. Uses, with slight adaptations, the Burgess-Cottrell criteria of marital happiness.

I. THE MARRIAGE PREDICTION SCHEDULE[1]

Please read carefully before and after filling out schedule.

This schedule is prepared for persons who are seriously considering marriage. Although designed for couples who are engaged or who have a private understanding to be married, it can also be filled out by other persons who would like to know their probability of success in marriage.

The value of the findings of the schedule depends upon your frankness in answering the questions.

The following points should be kept in mind in filling out the schedule:

1. Be sure to answer every question.
2. Do not leave a blank to mean a "no" answer.
3. The word "fiancé(e)" will be used to refer to the person to whom you are engaged.
4. Do not confer with your fiancé(e) on any of these questions.

Part One

	1	2	3
1. What is your present state of health: poor health [*a* chronic ... *b* temporary ...]; *c* average health ...; *d* healthy ...; *e* very healthy	...	...	...
2. How would you rate the physical appearance of your fiancé(e)? (check): *u* very good looking ...; *v* good looking ...; *x* fairly good looking ...; *y* plain looking ...; *z* very plain looking. ...	...	...	...
3. Your present marital status: *u* single ...; *v* widowed ...; *x* separated ...; *y* divorced....	...	...	...
4. Check total number of years of schooling completed at present time.			
a Grades			
1... 2... 3... 4... 5... 6... 7... 8...;			
b High School *c* College			
1... 2... 3... 4...; 1... 2... 3... 4...;			
d Graduate of college (check): .....; *e* Number of years beyond college in graduate work or professional training. ..... Training for what profession ..... for none in particular (check)	...	...	...
5. Present occupation ..... Work record (check): *u* regularly employed ...; *v* worked only during vacations or/and only part time while in			

[1] Reproduced by permission of Ernest W. Burgess and The American Book Company. From E. W. Burgess and H. J. Locke, *The Family* (New York: American Book Company, 1945), Appendix C.

	1	2	3
school ...; *w* none because in school or at home ....; *x* always employed but continually changing jobs ...; *y* irregularly employed ...; other	...	...	...
6. Are you a church member? yes ...; no .... Your activity in church (check): *a* never attend ...; *b* attend less than once a month ...; *c* once or twice per month ...; *d* three times a month ...; *e* four times a month ...; other activity in church (state what it is)	...	...	...
7. Did you ever attend Sunday School or other religious school for children and young people? .... At what age did you stop attending such a school? *a* never attended ...; *b* before 10 years old ...; *c* 11–18 years ...; *d* 19 and over ...; *e* still attending	...	...	...
8. How many organizations do you belong to or attend regularly, such as church club, athletic club, social club, luncheon club (like the Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions), fraternal order, college fraternity, college sorority, civic organization, music society, patriotic organization, Y.W.C.A., Y.M.C.A., Y.M.H.A., C.Y.O.? (check): *a* none ...; *b* one ...; *c* two ...; *d* three or more	...	...	...
9. In leisure time activities (check): *u* We both prefer to stay at home ...; *x* We both prefer to be "on the go" ...; *y* I prefer to be on the go and my fiancé(e) to stay at home ...; *z* I prefer to stay at home and my fiancé(e) to be on the go	...	...	...
10. Check what you consider to have been the economic status of your parents during your adolescence: *u* well-to-do ...; *v* wealthy ...; *w* comfortable ...; *x* meager ...; *z* poor	...	...	...
11. Check what you consider to be the social status of your parents in their own community: *j* one of the leading families ...; *k* upper class ...; *l* upper-middle class ...; *m* middle class ...; *n* lower-middle class ...; *o* lower class	...	...	...
12. Marital status of your parents (check): *l* married (both living) ...; *m* separated ...; *n* divorced ...; *t* both dead ...; one dead (specify which one) .... If parent is dead give your age when the death occurred .... If parents are divorced or separated give your age at time of divorce or separation	...	...	...
13. Your appraisal of the happiness of your parents' marriage			

	1	2	3
(check): *i* very happy ...; *k* happy ...; *l* average ...; *m* unhappy ...; *n* very unhappy	...	...	...
14. Check your attitudes toward your parents on the following scales: (1) Your attitude toward your father when you were a child: *j* very strong attachment ...; *k* considerable attachment ...; *m* mild attachment ...; *n* mild hostility ...; *o* considerable hostility ...; *p* very strong hostility	...	...	...
(2) Your present attitude toward your father: *j* very strong attachment ...; *k* considerable attachment ...; *m* mild attachment ...; *n* mild hostility ...; *o* considerable hostility ...; *p* very strong hostility	...	...	...
(3) Your present attitude toward your mother: *j* very strong attachment ...; *k* considerable attachment ...; *m* mild attachment ...; *n* mild hostility ...; *o* considerable hostility ...; *p* very strong hostility	...	...	...
(4) Your attitude toward your mother when you were a child: *j* very strong attachment ...; *k* considerable attachment ...; *m* mild attachment ...; *n* mild hostility ...; *o* considerable hostility ...; *p* very strong hostility	...	...	...
15. Rate the marital happiness of your parents. Write *M* for mother's rating; *F* for father's: *i* extraordinarily happy ...; *k* decidedly happy ...; *m* happy ...; *n* somewhat happy ...; *o* average ...; *p* somewhat unhappy ...; *q* unhappy ...; *r* decidedly unhappy ...; *s* extremely unhappy	...	...	...
16. Outside of your family and kin how many separated and divorced people do you know personally? (check): *j* none ...; *k* one ...; *m* two ...; *n* three ...; *o* four ...; *p* five ...; *q* six ...; *r* seven or more	...	...	...
17. With how many of the opposite sex, other than your fiancé(e) have you gone steadily? (check): *v* none ...; *w* one ...; *t* two ...; *l* three or more	...	...	...
18. Defining friends as something more than mere acquaintances but not necessarily always boon companions, give an estimate of the number of your men friends before going steadily with your fiancé(e) (check): *a* none ...; *b* few ...; *c* several ...; *d* many .... In round numbers about how many?	...	...	...
19. Estimate the number of your women friends before going steadily with your fiancé(e) (check): *a* none ...; *b* few ...;			

	1	2	3
c several ...; *d* many .... In round numbers how many?			
20. How many of your present men and women friends are also friends of your fiancé(e)? (check): *u* all ...; *v* most of them ...; *x* a few ...; *y* none	...	...	...
21. Have you ever been engaged before (or had any previous informal understanding that you were to be married)? (check): *u* never ...; *w* once ...; *x* twice ...; *y* three or more times	...	...	...
T	...	...	...

Part Two

	1	2	3
1. Do you plan to be married (check): *u* at church ...; *v* at home ...; *x* elsewhere (specify)	...	...	...
2. By whom do you plan to be married? *v* minister ...; *x* other person (specify)	...	...	...
3. Where do you plan to live after marriage? (check): *j* private house ...; *k* small apartment building ...; *l* large apartment building ...; *m* apartment hotel ...; *n* hotel ...; *o* rooming house	...	...	...
4. *j* Have you bought a home? .... *k* Are you planning to buy a home? .... *m* Will you rent a home?	...	...	...
5. Population of city or town where you plan to live (check): *i* open country ...; *j* 2,500 and under ...; *k* 2,500 to 10,000 ...; *l* 10,000 to 50,000 ...; *m* 50,000 to 100,000 ...; *n* 100,000 to 500,000 ...; *o* over 500,000 ...; *u* suburb	...	...	...
6. After marriage do you plan to live (check): *j* in own home ...; *n* with your parents ...; *o* parents-in-law ...; *p* relatives (specify) .....; *q* relatives-in-law (specify) .....; *r* other persons (specify)	...	...	...
7. Check your attitude toward having children: *v* desire children very much ...; *x* mildly desire them ...; *y* mild objection to them ...; *z* object very much to having them....	...	...	...
8. How many children would you like to have? *u* four or more ...; *v* three ...; *w* two ...; *x* one ...; *y* none	...	...	...
9. Check what you think your fiancé(e)'s attitude is toward having children: *v* desires children very much ...; *x* mildly desires them ...; *y* mild objection to them ...; *z* objects very much to having them	...	...	...
10. Do you think your fiancé(e) is spending a disproportionate amount of present income on (check): *a* clothes (or other			

	1	2	3
personal ornamentation) ...; *b* recreation ...; hobbies (specify) ...; *c* food ...; rent ...; *d* education ...; *e* do not think so			
11. What is the attitude of your closest friend or friends to your fiancé(e)? (check): *v* approve highly ...; *w* approve with qualification ...; *x* are resigned ...; *y* disapprove mildly ...; *z* disapprove seriously	...	...	...
12. Do you smoke? (check): *u* not at all ...; *w* rarely ...; *x* occasionally ...; *y* often	...	...	...
13. Do you drink? (check): *u* not at all ...; *w* rarely ...; *x* occasionally ...; *y* often	...	...	...
14. *u* Do both your father and mother approve your marriage ...; *y* do both disapprove ...; *z* does one disapprove: your father ...; your mother	...	...	...
15. What is your attitude (check) toward your future father-in-law: *k* like him very much ...; *l* like him considerably ...; *m* like him mildly ...; *n* mild dislike ...; *o* considerable dislike ...; *p* very strong dislike ...; mother-in-law: *k* like her very much ...; *l* like her considerably ...; *m* like her mildly ...; *n* mild dislike ...; *o* considerable dislike ...; *p* very strong dislike	...	...	...
16. Was your first information about sex: *v* wholesome ...; *x* unwholesome .... Where did you get your first information about sex? *j* from parent ...; *k* from wholesome reading ...; *m* brother ...; sister ...; other relatives ...; *l* other adult ...; teacher ...; *n* other children ...; *o* from pernicious reading ...; other (specify) ..... Do you consider your present knowledge of sex adequate for marriage? *v* yes ...; *x* no ...; doubtful	...	...	...
17. How long have you been keeping company with your fiancé(e)? (check): *a* less than 3 months ...; *b* 3 to 6 months ...; *c* 6 to 11 months ...; *d* 12 to 17 months ...; *e* 18 to 23 months ...; *f* 24 to 35 months ...; *g* 36 months or more ..... Enter here exact number of months	...	...	...
18. How many months will elapse between your engagement (or time at which you both had a definite understanding that you were to be married) and the date selected for your marriage? (check): *a* less than 3 months ...; *b* 3 to 6 months ...; *c* 6 to 11 months ...; *d* 12 to 17 months ...; *e* 18 to 23 months ...; *f* 24 to 35 months ...; *g* 36 months or more....	...	...	...

T

Part Three

	1	2	3
1. Do you and your fiancé(e) engage in interests and activities together? (check): *v* all of them ...; *w* most of them ...; *x* some of them ...; *y* a few of them ...; *z* none of them	...	...	...
2. Is there any interest vital to you in which your fiancé(e) does not engage? (check): *v* no ...; *z* yes (specify):	...	...	...
3. Do you confide in your fiancé(e)? (check): *i* about everything ...; *k* about most things ...; *m* about some things ...; *n* about a few things ...; *o* about nothing	...	...	...
4. Does your fiancé(e) confide in you (check): *i* about everything ...; *k* about most things ...; *m* about some things ...; *n* about a few things ...; *o* about nothing	...	...	...
5. Check the frequency of demonstrations of affection you show your fiancé(e) (kissing, embracing, etc.): *i* occupies practically all of the time you are alone together ...; *j* very frequent ...; *m* occasional ...; *n* rare ...; *o* almost never	...	...	...
6. Who generally takes the initiative in the demonstration of affection? (check): *u* mutual ...; *m* you ...; *x* your fiancé(e)	...	...	...
7. Are you satisfied with the amount of demonstration of affection? (check): *j* yes ...; no ...; *p* desire less ...; *q* desire more .... Is your fiancé(e) satisfied with the amount of demonstration of affection? (check): *j* yes ...; no ...; *p* desires less ...; *q* desires more	...	...	...
8. State the present approximate agreement or disagreement with your fiancé(e) on the following items. Please place a check in the proper column opposite every item.			

Check one column for each item below	Always agree *j*	Almost always agree *k*	Occasionally disagree *l*	Frequently disagree *m*	Almost always disagree *n*	Always disagree *o*	Never discussed *t*			
Money matters								...	...	...
Matters of recreation								...	...	...
Religious matters							•			

Check one column for each item below	Always agree *j*	Almost always agree *k*	Occasionally disagree *l*	Frequently disagree *m*	Almost always disagree *n*	Always disagree *o*	Never discussed *t*	1	2	3
Demonstrations of affection										
Friends										
Table manners										
Matters of conventionality										
Philosophy of life										
Ways of dealing with your families										
Arrangements for your marriage										
Dates with one another										

9. When disagreements arise between you and your fiancé(e) they usually result in (check): *v* agreement by mutual give and take ...; *y* you giving in ...; *z* your fiancé(e) giving in ....
10. Do you ever wish you had not become engaged? (check): *u* never ...; *x* once ...; *y* occasionally ...; *z* frequently ....
11. Have you ever contemplated breaking your engagement? (check): *u* never ...; *x* once ...; *y* occasionally ...; *z* frequently ....
12. Has your steady relationship with your fiancé(e) ever been broken off temporarily? (check): *v* never ...; *x* once ...; *y* twice ...; *z* three or more times ....
13. How confident are you that your marriage will be a happy one? (check): *v* very confident ...; *w* confident ...; *x* a little uncertain ...; *y* extremely uncertain ....

T

Part Four

Compare the following personality traits of yourself, your fiancé(e), your father, and your mother. Write *F* for father, *M* for mother, *S* for fiancé(e), and *Y* for yourself. If either of your parents is dead, rate as remembered. Be sure to rate your father, your mother, your fiancé(e), and yourself on each trait.

	Very much so	Considerably	Somewhat	A little	Not at all	1	2	3
Takes responsibility willingly	*u*	*v*	*w*	*x*	*z*			
Dominating	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
Irritable	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
Punctual	*u*	*v*	*w*	*x*	*z*			
Moody	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
Angers easily	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
Ambitious	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
Jealous	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
Sympathetic	*u*	*v*	*w*	*x*	*z*			
Easygoing	*u*	*v*	*w*	*x*	*z*			
Selfish	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
Stubborn	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
Sense of duty	*u*	*v*	*w*	*x*	*z*			
Sense of humor	*u*	*v*	*w*	*x*	*z*			
Easily hurt	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
Self-confident	*u*	*v*	*w*	*x*	*z*			
Nervous	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
Likes belonging to organizations	*u*	*v*	*w*	*x*	*z*			
Impractical	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
Easily depressed	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
Easily excited	*a*	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*			
						T		
Part I ....., Part II ....., Part III ....., Part IV....., Total								

II. SCORING THE MARRIAGE PREDICTION SCHEDULE

The three narrow columns at the right-hand side of each page of the Marriage Prediction Schedule are reserved for scoring the replies to the questions. The score values assigned are arbitrary in the sense that usually each gradation in reply differs by one point. For example, the following question is scored as follows: Do you and your fiancé(e) engage in outside interests together? (check): *v* all of them, +1; *w* most of them, 0; *x* some of them, −1; *y* few of them, −2; *z* none of them, −2. Although arbitrary

the score values are in general conformity with the findings of the studies in this field, particularly those of E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*; L. M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness*; and E. W. Burgess and Paul Wallin, *A Study of 1000 Engaged Couples* (in progress).

The letters in italics before each subdivision of the question provide the code for scoring the replies. The code value of each letter is as follows:

a ..... −2	*j* ..... +2	*s* ..... −3
b ..... −1	*k* ..... +1	*t* 0
c 0	*l* 0	*u* ..... +2
d ..... +1	*m* ..... −1	*v* ..... +1
e ..... +2	*n* ..... −2	*w* 0
f ..... +2	*o* ..... −3	*x* ..... −1
g ..... +2	*p* ..... −3	*y* ..... −2
h ..... +2	*q* ..... −3	*z* ..... −2
i ..... +3	*r* ..... −3	

The following is the procedure for scoring the replies to the questions:

1. For each question enter in column 1 at the right-hand side of each page the letter in italics which precedes the answer which is checked for the given item.
2. Enter in column 2 all the plus scores and in column 3 all the minus scores corresponding to the appropriate code value for each letter as indicated above.
3. Add the scores in columns 2 and 3, entering them for each part; then transfer them to the appropriate place as indicated on the last page of the Marriage Prediction Schedule.

High scores, those above 60, are favorable for marital adjustment, as indicated by research findings that approximately 75 per cent of persons with these scores in the engagement period are well adjusted in their marriages. Low scores, or those below 20, are much less favorable for happiness in marriage, as shown by the probability that only 25 per cent of persons with these scores will be well adjusted in married life. Intermediate scores, those between 60 and 20, should be regarded at present as nonpredictive since the chances of persons with these scores for marital success may tentatively be considered as about even.

The prediction score of a person and his corresponding matrimonial risk group assignment should be interpreted with extreme caution. The following points should be kept in mind:

1. The prediction does not apply directly to the individual. It states the statistical probabilities of marital success for a group of persons of which the individual is one. If he belongs to the lower risk group,

in which 75 per cent of the marriages turn out unhappily, there is no way of telling by this statistical prediction whether he falls in the 25 per cent of the marriages with varying degrees of happiness or in the 75 per cent of unhappy unions.

2. The prediction is an individual's general matrimonial risk irrespective of the particular person to whom he is engaged. The individual's specific matrimonial risk for marriage to a given person is much more valuable but also more complicated and therefore not suited for self-scoring.
3. In the majority of cases the specific matrimonial risk of a couple may be roughly estimated from the two general matrimonial risk groups to which the two persons are assigned. An average of the two scores will generally be close to what may be expected from a specific matrimonial risk group assignment worked out by combining the answers to each question given by the two members of the couple.
4. With the above reservations in mind, a low prediction score should not be taken as indicating lack of suitability for marriage. It should, however, be helpful to the person in stimulating him to secure adequate preparation for marriage, to be more careful in the selection of a marriage partner, and to give attention to the solving of any difficulties in the relation before rather than after marriage.

Chapter 15

MARITAL ADJUSTMENT

THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE of this chapter is to consider the factors in marriage which predispose to adjustment or maladjustment. The preceding chapter dealt with the pre-marital factors and emphasized especially the importance of the candidates' emotional and social development. It was shown that the happily married are generally more stable, optimistic, outgoing, co-operative, and benevolent than the unhappily married. On the basis of his data, Terman develops the theory of temperamental predisposition to happiness or unhappiness.[1] In brief, the theory holds that one gets out of marriage what one brings to it in the way of temperament. According to Terman, some persons because of their unfavorable disposition are incapable of happiness in any marriage; others may find happiness only under highly favorable conditions; while still others are so blessed in temperament as to be shielded from acute unhappiness even in a poor match.

Are there certain types of persons, as Terman believes, incapable of happiness in any marriage whatever because they have serious emotional defects? Emily B. is reported to be such a person.[2] She was a pretty girl, but had to compete with a sister who had the kind of beauty "which launched a thousand ships." This sister married at the age of nineteen and went to California to live. Until then, Emily didn't have a chance with the boys she knew. She made light of it herself, and when she brought a new boy friend to the house, joked about leading lambs to the slaughter. Emily disavowed having any serious thought of matrimony for herself and declared her intention of devoting her life to nursing, and to taking care of her parents. But three months after her sister's marriage, Emily suddenly married a new doctor at the hospital. He was fifteen years her senior and was

[1] Lewis M. Terman *et al*., *op. cit.*, chap. VI.

[2] John Levy and Ruth Monroe, *The Happy Family* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1938), p. 69.

carried away by her prettiness. But he was a very busy man, and Emily soon found herself alone a great deal of the time. She started going out again with her own set, which was younger than her husband's. Her friends began pairing her with Harry S., one of the few eligible bachelors in town, and one evening on the way home after a dinner dance at the country club, Harry discovered how much he loved Emily. In a few weeks Emily discovered that her marriage to the doctor was a ghastly mistake and that Harry was the man intended for her. She divorced the doctor and married Harry, only to find that while her new husband was more romantic than her old one, he was not nearly so good a provider. She complained about his meager and spasmodic income, and he objected to the unadorned stew she served night after night. In due course they parted, with Emily telling friends she had sacrificed everything for Harry, only to have him turn out to be a "selfish brute." Thereafter, the course of Emily's love life ran unsmoothly through affairs with Stanley, Harold, Malcolm, and Maurice.

The reader has probably already surmised that the fault was not with Emily's suitors, but with Emily. She had ample reason to dislike her exquisitely beautiful sister who gave her such one-sided competition, but Emily was a gentle, well-bred girl who adored her sister. Instead of hating her, she hated herself, and despite her own prettiness and charm thought herself inferior and unworthy. Her abject self-feeling was only partly conscious, and, accordingly, it was intense and compulsive. What Emily needed was continual reassurance, praise, and affection. Even a brief lapse in the attention shown her by a lover would be quickly interpreted as lack of genuine regard for her. She could suffer no let-down or "neglect." During the honeymoon and for a brief time thereafter she was exquisitely happy, but when life settled down to a normal level and she no longer received unintermittent attention, she was miserable. Had she had normal self-confidence, instead of being troubled by the gnawing sense of personal inferiority, she would have interpreted her first husband's attention to his medical practice as devotion to his work, with which she sympathized, and not as neglect. Many doctors, obviously, are married to women who understand the special claims that the practice of medicine makes on a man's time. Emily's difficulty with Harry was that she felt his low income as a threat to her ego, since without the ample funds that her first husband had provided, she could not dress or show

herself off to such good advantage. So it went in her succeeding affairs with men. Her self-concern, rooted in her acute sense of inadequacy, was too strong to enable her to identify herself with another person's welfare. So Emily's personality was a barrier to happy marriage. Whether she was foreordained to unhappiness in any marriage whatever, or whether it might have been possible for her to find a husband with whom she could live successfully without any modification on her part, is a moot question. But it is clear that, at best, she would have to have highly special, favorable conditions in order to achieve marital happiness.

Terman does not argue that his theory of emotional predisposition to happiness or unhappiness is new, or that it is true in every instance, but he believes it holds in a large proportion of cases. In other words, while Terman stresses the importance of the adequacy or inadequacy of the individual personality, he admits that it is not the only major factor affecting marital happiness. There are those who do poorly in a first marriage and well in a second. It would be possible to reconcile this situation with the Terman theory by saying that some change in personality may occur between the first and second marriage, but such an explanation would hardly be valid in every case. Something more than the stability or instability of the individual personality is involved, namely, the compatibility of the two personalities whether stable or not. It is not often that husband and wife operate independently of each other in their content or discontent. The data show a high relationship between the happiness scores of mates; if one is unhappy, the other is likely to be unhappy too. Moreover, a couple may be happy for a time, then unhappy, because of some change in their circumstances, such as sudden fame or failure. This indicates that the social situation in which the couple find themselves must be considered too. In accounting for marital happiness or unhappiness, therefore, we must reckon not only with (1) the degree of emotional maturity of the two persons, but also with (2) their compatibility, and (3) their social situation. Three closely interrelated factors are involved, not just one.

Incompatibility

Marriage is a relationship, not a condition or trait of personality, and what matters is the congeniality of the mates rather than the traits they possess. Failure to recognize the interactional character of

marriage leads to serious errors of judgment, such as the ascription of absolute value to certain physical and personality traits, values which they do not possess in marriage. Thus, good health is a desirable condition, and few if any would argue against it. There is evidence to show that in general it is associated with marital happiness; that is, the healthy couples are usually happier than the sickly ones. But there are many exceptions. Sometimes these are due to other values in the relationship which counterbalance the negative factor of poor health, but it is a point of the first importance to recognize that ill-health in marriage is not always a negative factor. Illness in the wife may be responsible for stimulating an even greater affectionate response in a husband who loves his wife. Her illness may appeal to his masculine pride as an opportunity for a show of solicitude and protection. Ill-health is a more or less objective condition, relating to the functioning of the organism, but its meaning depends on the attitude taken toward it. It is highly important, then, to see the personalities of husband and wife, not as separate entities with traits which have fixed value, but as phenomena which take their meaning from the attitudes shown toward them.

Neurotic personality is not favorable to marital adjustment, especially if the mating is with another neurotic. Confirming evidence is supplied by Winch[1] in his study of engaged couples. Using certain items of the Thurstone Personality Inventory, he was able to classify his subjects as neurotic or non-neurotic. In general he found that the most favorable situation for the adjustment of the young man in engagement was where both partners were not neurotic; it was somewhat less favorable where only the young woman was neurotic; even less favorable where only the man was neurotic; and least favorable where both were neurotic. Hence the necessity of considering personality traits in combination.

To illustrate this interaction theory of marital adjustment, which stresses compatibility, two cases are herewith presented. The first concerns Barbara H. and Jack G. who were in their early twenties when they married. They had grown up in the same community and had known each other since childhood. Barbara's father, a wealthy broker, and Jack's, an equally prosperous merchant, were old family friends. They belonged to the same clubs, and often spent a portion of the summer touring or sailing together. These close ties, main-

[1] Robert F. Winch, cited in Burgess, E. W., and Locke, H. J., *The Family* (New York: American Book Company, 1945), p. 465.

tained over a period of more than three decades, were finally broken by the death of Jack's father, and some months afterward Barbara's father became seriously ill. One day he called her to his bedside and said he had one special wish for her, and that was to see her married to Jack. Barbara was devoted to her father and eager to please him, and especially so now that he was critically ill, but his request took her by surprise, and she protested that she was not sure how Jack felt about her, or how she felt about Jack. They had grown up together, almost like brother and sister, and although Jack had spoken of his affection at various times, she had never thought him serious, perhaps because of her own lack of response. Barbara, a beautiful and intelligent girl, especially gifted in art and music, was not averse to marriage, though she planned to continue her music professionally. Her father revealed that he had always hoped she would marry Jack, and that he would feel better if he knew that she had someone to care for her and her mother after he was gone; no one could make her a better husband than Jack, whom they had known all their lives. Forthwith Jack pressed his suit anew and Barbara consented. They were married at her father's bedside, and a few days later he passed away.

Barbara's misgivings about the marriage were soon confirmed. Jack was as kind a husband as Barbara could wish for, except that he was prosaic, unimaginative, and lacking in understanding of her needs. For example, he would bring her bottles of exotic perfume which she abhorred and did not use. She would chide him gently about this, and she would think that now he understood, but the bottles of perfume continued to accumulate. His insensitivity of her tastes extended to other personal matters, but what troubled her more was his almost complete indifference to her aesthetic interests. He was tone deaf and one composition sounded like another to him, so that attending symphony concerts was an ordeal to him. Art in any other form also was practically meaningless to him. He did have strong interests of his own, but these were strictly along business lines. He was punctilious in keeping regular hours at his office and quite often used his evenings for business purposes. Barbara, who had no particular interest in business affairs, did not see why Jack should expect her to hold herself in readiness to entertain his business associates whom she found boring. These intrusions, moreover, meant frequent interference with her musical evenings. Whenever Barbara discussed the matter with Jack, he would first express surprise at her objection,

then disappointment. Didn't she care whether or not he succeeded in his business? Didn't she love him enough to help him with his business? Barbara, in turn, would wonder whether Jack didn't love her enough really to care about her music. Didn't it mean anything to him when it meant so much to her?

The foregoing description of Barbara's and Jack's marriage is, of course, greatly oversimplified. Only one aspect of a highly complex relationship has been sketchily presented, although enough has been given perhaps to indicate that the marriage was intolerably dull and frustrating to both. There was nothing seriously the matter with Barbara or Jack as persons, in the sense that either one possessed personality traits which a psychiatrist would regard as abnormal. Neither was a particularly selfish person. Both were regarded by their acquaintances as attractive, and they did not lack friends. The difficulty lay in the fact that Barbara and Jack were unsuited to each other in terms of their basic needs. Following their separation and divorce, both found happiness in a second marriage. Barbara married an attorney whose avocation was art and who had a warm, expressive personality, while Jack married a little mouse of a girl who hardly ever spoke out in a group, and was contented with her life of domesticity. It is possible, of course, that Jack and Barbara might have saved their marriage had they taken their troubles to a counselor, but a satisfactory readjustment probably would have required a thoroughgoing transformation of interests on the part of one or both.

One way, then, to illustrate the interaction theory of marital adjustment is to show, as above, that two persons who are generally well adjusted socially and emotionally may be poorly adjusted to each other as marriage partners, because of a conflict in basic behavior patterns. Another way is to show that a happy marriage is possible between two persons, one or both of whom may be socially maladjusted and lacking in emotional integration. Sam and Sarah are such a couple. They have had ten years of marriage in which to prove their devotion to each other and to their two daughters. Sam was thirty-five when he first met Sarah, and she was thirty-one. Neither had had a previous love affair; in fact, neither had had any normal heterosexual relationships, and were almost completely isolated socially. Sam, at the age of twenty, had come to New York as an immigrant from Armenia, and had worked hard to establish himself in the strange, new land. Although of an age when most men have completed their

schooling, he had a great longing for the education of which his impoverished farm life in the old country had deprived him, and he determined to go to school. He worked hard to learn the new language, and a year later was admitted provisionally to high school. He was given room and board by a kindly elderly couple in exchange for small duties about the house, but he had to work after school, frequently until late at night, in order to earn enough for his clothing and other needs. Because of his age, he had little or no social life with his schoolmates, and almost his only social contacts were with the elderly couple, whom he adored. Sam had a good mind, indefatigable zeal, and a rugged constitution, and he was able to complete the high-school course in about three years. He was then twenty-five, but he determined that he would try to go to college, for a life of manual labor such as he had so far known did not appeal to him, while the intellectual life held great attraction. He applied to a near-by state university and was admitted. He could not carry a full program of courses because he had to work afternoons and evenings to earn his way, but he stayed at his studies the year round, and was able to earn his A.B. degree by the time he was thirty. This strenuous schedule gave him little time for social life, and lack of money remained a chronic handicap. He felt highly sensitive about his poor clothes, and his foreign accent and mannerisms helped to isolate him from others. On getting his bachelor's degree, he applied for a position as a teacher in the public schools, without success. When his small funds gave out, he obtained a position as an interviewer for the county relief agency, but the salary was very low and the work disagreeable. He was living alone at this time in a furnished room in a poor section of the city, too shamed by his economic situation to keep up his contacts with his few college friends. Craving fellowship, one evening after work he went to a meeting of a "lonely hearts" club whose advertisement he had seen in the daily paper and there, in a small dancing class, he met Sarah. Sarah, too, had come to the club in search of companionship. She was a teacher of a small school in a rural part of the state and had come to New York City for the summer, ostensibly to attend summer school. She was kind and considerate, but plain in appearance and excessively shy, especially with men. She had never had a boy friend, perhaps not even a single date. She did not know how to dance, so had gone to the club and there she met Sam. They saw each other nearly every evening after that. Sarah was touched by

Sam's story of struggle as he unfolded it to her, and she told him she felt that life had not been fair to him. Sam found himself greatly drawn to her, and in due course told her he would like to marry her, but was embarrassed because his small salary could not support them both. They discussed various expedients. If she married, her school board would probably ask her to resign. She would talk to her county superintendent and see. To her surprise, the superintendent inquired how she would like to have Sam considered for her position. She lived on a near-by farm with her father and mother and an older unmarried sister, and the work of the farm was beginning to be too heavy for her father. Sam could help on the farm after school hours. Sam was given the school position, and shortly afterward they were married. They have lived happily together on the farm with her family ever since.

Had Sam and Sarah taken a standard test for personality adjustment at the time of their marriage, they would probably have obtained low scores. Such scores would ordinarily be interpreted as signifying that Sam and Sarah were not promising candidates for marriage. While this is in general a correct interpretation, it should be noted that it is expressed in terms of probability, which is more meaningful where large numbers of cases are involved than in a concrete instance. Sam and Sarah would probably have fewer chances of achieving a happy marriage if they had chosen a mate at random than would a well-adjusted person, but the fact is that Sam and Sarah were able to make a highly specialized selection, and were well suited to each other.

It must be remembered that each of the two individuals entering into the marriage relationship has certain traits of personality which may be objectively measured; and in addition, each has certain opinions regarding himself and his future mate which may or may not correspond to objective fact. A study [1] of engaged couples showed that these couples believe they are much more alike than they actually are or than they are judged to resemble each other by their acquaintances. It is, therefore, conceivable that the actual relative amounts of intelligence or the actual relative positions of the husband and wife on a personality trait continuum are not as important in determining compatibility as the belief of the husband and wife regarding their

[1] E. L. Kelly, unpublished.

relative positions on these scales. Kelly [1] undertook to test this hypothesis on a sample of seventy-six couples who on the average had been married 10.6 years. These couples filled out, anonymously, printed schedules which included items for determining an index of marital compatibility, and also a graphic personality rating covering thirty-six personality traits like self-control, jealousy, generosity, sincerity, and selfishness. On the personality rating scale, the husband was asked to rate both his own and his wife's personality, and the wife was asked to do the same for herself and her husband. It was found that in general a high compatibility index for husbands is associated with (1) a tendency for the husband to rate his wife higher than he rates himself or than she rates herself; and (2) a tendency for the wife to rate her husband higher than he rates himself or than she rates herself. Comparable findings are reported for the wife. High compatibility indices are also associated with high self-ratings for both sexes. In short, a high degree of marital compatibility seems to be attended by a declaration of the superiority of one's partner. The typical husband or wife who considers himself very happily married tends to rate himself above average, but to rate his mate still higher than himself.

Is matching desirable?

Some students of marriage believe that the problem of mating would be solved if we matched people for age, intelligence, social background, temperament, and the like. The idea of matching traits is an improvement over the definition and evaluation of the traits of the individual because the former recognizes the interactional nature of marriage. But matching is not quite the answer, for what matters is not likeness or difference in traits, but compatibility of wishes. In some traits, like education, similars are more apt to be congenial than dissimilars, but that there are exceptions was shown in the preceding chapter. In other traits the reverse may be true and opposites may, on the average, make better adjustments. This appears to be true for masculinity and femininity, the latter being defined in our culture in terms of a lack of aggressiveness. For a sample of 1479 marriages rated for happiness according to the femininity of the wife, it was

[1] E. L. Kelly, "Marital Compatibility as Related to Personality Traits of Husbands and Wives as Rated by Self and Spouse," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 13:193–98, August, 1941. The seventy-six cases represent returns from nearly five hundred sets of blanks sent out to a random mailing list, based on the telephone directory of five Connecticut cities.

reported that the chances of a happy marriage were seven out of ten where the wife was either highly feminine or average, as against five out of ten where the wife was rated as of low femininity.[1] For most traits, similarity is probably more favorable to marital happiness than dissimilarity,[2] but these statements concern averages, and in any individual case we should have to take the attitudes of the two persons into account in order to make an accurate prediction. Although the wives with high femininity fared better as a group than those with low femininity, 50 per cent of the latter were thought to be happily married, which seems to indicate that certain types of males found them acceptable. Unfortunately, the personality traits of the husbands are not given.

A congenial married couple have many common and complementary attitudes. Where differences occur, toleration may be practiced, but it is doubtful if a happy marriage can be built merely on a broad basis of tolerated differences. It is more likely that some differences will be tolerated if there is enough else in the relationship on which the couple agree, or at least on which their interests do not clash. But interests and attitudes are innumerable, and all are not of equal importance for marital happiness. In general, the more important interests relate to such matters as children, employment of the wife outside the home for pay, religious beliefs, sex, and friends. An important consideration is the status of the partners in marriage. Who is to be the boss? A survey [3] of 2596 marriages in the educated part of the population showed that where the woman was thought to be the head of the household, 47 per cent of the marriages were rated happy;

[1] Paul Popenoe, *Modern Marriage*, rev. ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940), p. 261. The difference between the high and average was slight and not significant, but the difference between the low and average has a critical ratio of 4.4, which shows that the difference is significant. Of the group with rated high femininity 17 per cent were rated unhappy, as against 14 per cent for the group with average femininity and 31 per cent for the group with low femininity. The proportions of wives assigned to each of the three types was about a third, one half, and one sixth, respectively. The general conclusion of this study is supported by a more extensive investigation by Lewis M. Terman and Catherine Cox Miles, *Sex and Personality* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937). A weakness of the results is that they are based on appraisals of married women and it is possible that unhappiness tends to make women more aggressive. It has been shown, for instance, that unhappiness in marriage tends to make women more aggressive socially, while unhappy men tend to withdraw from social contact. The results might be more valid if the femininity ratings were obtained before marriage.

[2] This would seem to follow from the finding of the Burgess-Cottrell study that similarity of cultural background is favorable to marital happiness. Such similarity would encompass a great variety of traits.

[3] Paul Popenoe, "Can the Family Have Two Heads?" *Sociology and Social Research*, 18:12–17, 1933.

where the man was believed to be the head, the proportion of happy marriages came to 61 per cent; but the highest proportion of happy marriages, 87 per cent, occurred where there seemed to be joint control on a so-called fifty-fifty basis. It is to be noted that this study is limited to the better-educated groups living in the United States in the twentieth century. They include a large proportion of college graduates, among whom the idea of copartnership in the management of the home has recently become increasingly strong. But the distribution of the happiness scores also shows that no one pattern is acceptable to all, or at least that a variety of types of adjustment are in existence and acceptable to some individuals. The patriarchal tradition has a venerable history in our culture and appears to have the respect of a goodly number of wives who are content to have their husbands rule. It is interesting that the proportion of happy marriages with a woman head is about the same as the proportion of happy marriages of women with low femininity, although the two studies were made on different groups at different times.

To summarize: We find that partners who give evidence of marital felicity or of marital infelicity have a great variety of characteristics; both groups have members who married young and members who married late; both groups have members who are in good health, in fair health, and in poor health; and so on for all, or nearly all, the traits that can be mentioned. Some traits are more favorable to marital happiness than others, but few, if any, are indispensable. The reason is that the traits of the individual do not matter so much as whether the individuals find each other congenial, and congeniality is a matter of taste. *De gustibus non est disputandum.*

Tensions

In the interpretation of marital discord, therefore, emphasis should be placed on the conflict of attitudes and wishes resulting in tensions which are disagreeable and from which individuals seek to escape. It may be observed, parenthetically, that not all tensions are unpleasant. Only those resulting from conflict are so; tensions attendant upon anticipation of pleasure may be highly gratifying. Negative tensions, which tend to disrupt the marriage, have in the preceding discussion been referred back to two sources: personality defects or personality differences which take the form of clashes of will. There is still a third possible source of difficulty to be considered, namely, the social

situation in which the married couple find themselves. It is known that a couple may be well adjusted for a time, then become maladjusted because of some change of circumstance; or the exact opposite may occur. Personality cannot be separated from the social situation, since personality is the result in part of past and present experience, and in turn exerts selective and modifying influences on experience. There is not a personality situation and a social situation; actually the two are one, or, possibly, two phases or aspects of the same thing.[1] The social situation is important, from a practical standpoint, for its effect in stabilizing or unstabilizing personality. Social situations differ, some being more important in their consequences for personality than others. For example, in its effect on the stability of a marriage, having a baby is in general more important for a woman than having a job. The divorce rate of families with babies is one nineteenth that of marriages without them, and where women work for pay the divorce rate is higher than where they do not.

The Social Situation

In succeeding paragraphs we shall consider some of the factors in the marital situation which affect marital adjustment. First, however, it is desirable to make a few preliminary observations regarding such factors. The materials which are to be presented are statistical findings which are based on many cases and which show general tendencies. These studies help us to see which factors are in general more important than others, but they do not tell us how important any particular factor is in a particular case. Moreover, these general studies deal with certain factors only and may leave out of account conditions which have considerable significance for adjustment in particular cases. The number of things that may irk people is very great and approaches infinity, although the principal annoyances may be more readily enumerated. Psychiatrists cite cases to show how slight may be the cause that underlies a profound maladjustment between mates. Perhaps a wife who has not hitherto done so suddenly decides to dress her hair so that her ears are exposed, and this causes tension in the husband, who is annoyed every time he looks at her. The resistance to exposed ears may go back many years to the hus-

[1] This may be what Faris has in mind when he refers to personality as "the subjective aspect of culture." Ellsworth Faris, *The Nature of Human Nature* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937).

band's experience with a childhood girl friend who wore her hair the same way, and with whom he had a highly humiliating experience. As the experience was painful, he quickly forgot it, but his wife's new coiffure touches off the old resentment which he unconsciously projects upon her. He is irritated, but does not know why. She becomes objectionable to him in other ways, tension accumulates, and the marriage is headed for disaster.[1]

In interpreting this case, it might be argued that the cause of the difficulty really lay in the personality of the husband, not in the situation, and this is the attitude which the psychiatrist is likely to take. If the husband could be better adjusted to his past experience, he would be able to take his present experience in stride. But it may also be argued that the problem would never have arisen if the wife had not presented the wrong stimulus; that is, if the social situation had been different. Sometimes it is easier to change the situation than the personality. In any case, it is to be noted that there are variations in social situations and variations in personalities, and both are important. Some persons can "take" more than others because they have better organized personalities. The personality factors are important, but if the situation gets bad enough, it is questionable whether any personality can "take" it. There are limits to which personalities can be stretched. If this discussion is valid, it is an overstatement to say that the difference between successful and unsuccessful families is in the manner of meeting problems rather than in the kind of problems they are required to meet.[2] While it is well to emphasize the importance of the resources that people bring to marriage, the importance of favorable environment can be underestimated. For example, unemployment is generally regarded as an unfortunate situation and, as we shall see, the unsuccessful in marriage more often than the successful have to reckon with this problem. Research has shown that protracted unemployment weakens the solidarity of some families and strengthens that of others.[3] The solidarity of the family is not a fixed or constant trait, but varies with the social situation.

[1] For a comparable case, see Carl Ramus, *Marriage and Efficiency* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1922).

[2] Ernest R. Groves, "Are Successful Families Different?" *Social Forces*, 8:536, June, 1930.

[3] Robert Cooley Angell, *The Family Encounters the Depression* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936); Ruth Shonle Cavan and Katherine Howland Ranck, *The Family and the Depression* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938); Mirra Komarovsky, *The Unemployed Man and His Family* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1940).

The marital situation

It is thought by many that the probabilities of success in marriage are affected adversely by such factors as residence in an apartment, living with relatives or in-laws, the absence of children, and irregularity of employment. Whether or not this bill of indictment is true in every particular — a matter which we shall shortly investigate — it is interesting because it shows a general appreciation of the fact that some conditions are more favorable to marriage than others. Not so well appreciated, however, is the fact that marriage itself is something of a strain upon the original nature of man. Marriage is good for man, as shown by the evidence that married people generally live longer, enjoy better health, and get into less trouble than single people. Even so, marriage, as the culturally organized relationship of a male and a female, places certain strains upon human nature that either are lacking or are less pronounced in the unmarried state. Marriage ordinarily means a degree of intimacy between two persons which is greater than that between friends; marriage is the more intense relationship, with more of the personality laid open to view. In point of time, as well, marriage is an outreaching experience, a twenty-four-hour-a-day, fifty-two-week-a-year relationship. If ten-



FIGURE 74. MARRIED PEOPLE LIVE LONGER

Death rates for males at age forty, New York State, exclusive of New York City, 1929–31. The death rate in the essentially productive ages of life is about twice as great for single and widowed as for married men. For females the differential is similar but much smaller. Married life is conducive to physical and emotional health because it generally entails an ordered existence, companionship, and a marked sense of responsibility for others. The favorable mortality of the married is, however, thought by some writers to be the result of selection. The widowhood data do not rule out this possibility, since the weak may marry the weak. Data from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, February, 1937, p. 7.

sions develop, it is more difficult to get away from one's spouse than from a friend or acquaintance without doing damage to the relationship. Marriage also makes many demands upon the individual which cannot well be shifted. Because it is such an intense, such a protracted, such an exacting experience, marriage itself is frequently a source of tensions.[1] Besides, it is often a dumping ground for extra-familial troubles. The irritation resulting from a tiff with the boss, a financial loss on the stock exchange, a flat tire, or a poor golf score is likely to find its final resting place across the family threshold. In view of these considerations, one wonders if we have a right to expect as good an adjustment of men and women in marriage as in other personal relationships, or whether as good an adjustment is actually made, as a rule. It would be interesting to test by actual research the suggestion that the marital adjustment tends to be a bit inferior to other adjustments. An investigation [2] of 152 married couples showed that they had more neurotic tendencies than a college group of the same social and intellectual level, but neurotic traits are difficult to measure, and in this particular study the age factor was not held constant. From a practical standpoint it might be helpful if there were more general recognition of the special demands which marriage makes upon human nature, and if allowance were made for this fact.

Place of residence

When young people marry, they often spend considerable time selecting a place in which to live. There is thus a good deal of interest in knowing whether type of residence is related to marital happiness. Investigation shows that it is; that residence in single houses and suburban neighborhoods is more favorable to marital adjustment than residence in areas characterized by apartments, and that the poorest showing of all is made by those who live in rooming-house, two-flat, and hotel areas.[3] At first thought it would seem that place of residence is only a surface factor and that underneath is the true factor responsible for the family's location, namely, their income. But income is not related to marital happiness, at least within the

[1] M. F. Nimkoff, "The Relation of Parental Dominance to Parent-Child Conflict," *Social Forces*, 9:559–63, June, 1931.

[2] R. R. Willoughby, "Neuroticism in Marriage," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 5:3–36, November, 1934; 5:467–99, November, 1935; 6:397–436, February, 1936. A further study of 1400 subjects showed that spouses have substantial but not high accuracy in predicting each other's responses. R. R. Willoughby, "Spousal Estimation of Emotionality," *Human Biology*, 10:417–25, 1938.

[3] Burgess and Cottrell, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

limits of the Terman and Burgess-Cottrell samples, as was shown in the previous chapter. Besides, the rentals in certain apartment and hotel areas may not be lower than those of single-family dwellings in the suburbs. The reasons for the average difference in marital happiness are usually sought in the characteristics of the types of families that occupy the different kinds of residence. It is thought that families occupying single-family dwellings are apt to be more stable than the others, and that this difference in stability is reflected in the data on marital adjustment. This view is supported by the finding that frequent change of residence is associated with poor adjustment, and that those living in multiple-family dwellings are known to move more often than those in single-family dwellings. In a city like Chicago the average family moves once every two years, which indicates that for many families the rate of change is much greater. A thought that may occur to the reader is that the apartment and hotel dwellers have fewer children, and that the greater instability of these families is associated with the relative absence of children, since it is known that divorce is more common among the childless than among couples with children. In interpreting the data on the relation of residence to marital happiness, it is, therefore, well to emphasize the possibility that selection may be a factor.

Home ownership

One of the questions that newly-weds debate a good deal is whether or not it is desirable to own their own home. Of course, many factors are involved, such as the type of community, the size of the couple's income, the nature of their occupations, their skill at making household repairs, as well as the more personal consideration of whether they want home ownership or not. As to the comparative costs of owning and renting a home, some evidence has been presented which indicates that on the average the two come to about the same,[1] although there is a good deal of variation in different communities, depending on local rentals and building costs. An argument for home ownership, perhaps, is the better showing that home owners make in marital adjustment as compared with renters. The size of the home in terms of number of rooms does not seem to matter, nor does the amount of rent paid per room.[2] This is consistent with the finding of

[1] Norman Himes, *Your Marriage* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940), chap. 12. John P. Dean, *Home Ownership: Is It Sound?* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945).

[2] Burgess and Cottrell, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

the unimportance of the income factor. In determining a cause-and-effect relationship, however, it is likely that those who are stable and well socialized become home owners rather than the reverse, but home ownership in itself probably tends to further a family's socialization. At least there is added inducement to participate in civic affairs when a family pays property taxes and has a special practical interest in what happens to the neighborhood. This theory is supported by an investigation of the habits of home owners which shows that they tend to spend less money for personal needs and more for collective or family needs than do non-owners, whose expenditures are more selfish.[1]

Residence with relatives and in-laws

One of the most urgent precautions that newly-weds are advised to take is against becoming dependent upon their in-laws and relatives. According to our folklore, this is supposed to be a major hazard to marital happiness. It is thought that frequent visits from in-laws are bad enough, but that living with them or being supported by them is worse. Why this belief should be so popular is not entirely clear, but it seems to be consistent with the present economic organization of the family in independent households. In a rural society it is not uncommon for married sons to remain at home with their brides and continue to work with the father in cultivating the family acres. More land can be added to cultivation if necessary. Indeed a larger family means a larger force and the possibility of more wealth for the family; hence there is a strong incentive to keep sons at home and encourage the birth of many children, who can be useful on the farm. The homestead is usually large, so that the new family can be accommodated, or if necessary an addition can be built to the house, since there is plenty of land. In preliterate societies also it is common for the newly-weds to take up residence with the parents of either the groom or the bride even though taboos may surround such residence. Frequently, there are taboos against association between son-in-law and mother-in-law. They may not speak to each other, and in passing they must lower their eyes to avoid looking at each other. The primitives say that these are evidences of respect, not hostility or distrust, but the pattern is not fully understood by ethnologists. Lowie [2] has

[1] Niles Carpenter, "Attitude Patterns in the Home-Buying Family," *Social Forces*, 11:76–81, October, 1932.

[2] Robert Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 96.

shown mother-in-law avoidance to be a function of matrilocal residence, but there are striking exceptions like the Hopi, so that matrilocal residence is not the sole cause, although perhaps one of the main determinants. Underlying the practice may be the Oedipus complex, but if this is so it is difficult to understand why the comparable prohibition between daughter-in-law and father-in-law is less widespread. Be this as it may, in our own urban, industrial society, it is not so convenient for married children, with their mates and offspring, to remain at home. Space is limited and expensive, and sons do not generally work with their fathers. Incomes are earned separately, jobs may be at a considerable distance from home, and there is much mobility, which encourages the establishment of independent households. Still, there is a good deal of living together, especially in critical times like wars and economic depressions.

In view of the widespread in-law bugaboo, the negative findings of research on this question are particularly interesting. They show that there is no significant difference in amount of marital happiness between those who live with relatives or in-laws, and those who do not. The advantage is on the side of those who do not, but it is only slight and is not significant. Nor does it seem to make much difference how often one sees one's in-laws. At least no clear-cut differences are noted in amount of marital happiness according to frequency of seeing in-laws.[1] How shall we account for this refutation of a deeply rooted popular belief? For one thing, it is possible that a certain amount of selection exists in the sample studied. Perhaps those who suspect that they will have difficulty with their in-laws avoid them, so that the group actually living with their in-laws represents a group capable of making good adjustments. Another possibility is that those who are handicapped by living with relatives are offset in the statistical averages by those who are helped by doing so. We must not overlook the possibility that in-laws and relatives are sometimes angels of mercy, and it is conceivable, therefore, that some couples would be less happy were it not for the help given by other members of the family. The greatest proportion of poor adjustments is registered by those who say they never see their in-laws. We cannot be certain of the reasons for this, but the situation suggests the possibility of estrangement in a good many cases. It will be recalled that failure to obtain parental approval of one's marriage does not augur well

[1] Burgess and Cottrell, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

for the success of the marriage. It may also be true that those who have difficulty in adjusting to their relatives and in-laws are socially deficient, and have difficulty in getting along with others generally. Be this as it may, the evidence from research suggests that, contrary to popular belief, the danger of in-laws may in general be grossly exaggerated.[1]

Children

Another common belief is that children add to the happiness of a marriage and that, conversely, the lack of children is detrimental to marital adjustment. This idea derives, perhaps, from the fact that parenthood is the natural purpose of marriage, and infertility represents a negation of the reason for which mating occurs in the natural world. This argument is dulled somewhat by the fact that marriage for human beings is a cultural phenomenon, not a purely natural one, and many couples have other reasons for mating, a prominent one being the desire for companionship. They may not wish to have children at all or they may plan to have children only if they are certain that their mates are companionable, a plan which can be carried out because of the knowledge of contraception. Doubtless many couples in our culture want to see if they are compatible before having a child, although compatibility is dynamic and may be won today and lost tomorrow. We say "in our culture" advisedly, because marriage for companionship, if not an exclusive feature of our society, is certainly unique in the emphasis it receives in the United States. There are cultures, however, where couples first see whether they can have offspring and then take each other in marriage. In these cultures, the production of children is thought to be a more important function of a marriage than the companionship of husband and wife.

This brings us to a highly important question: Does the birth of a child tend to increase marital compatibility or to decrease it? If children are a favorable factor, there may be some danger in waiting to see how the relationship turns out without them. Investigation of this problem has not been entirely satisfactory, but it has yielded results which challenge the popular notion about the beneficent effect of children so far as marital happiness is concerned. Several studies,[2] including the one by Terman, have reported almost zero correlation

[1] See Chapter 20 for further discussion of the in-law problem.

[2] Hamilton, Bernard, and Terman. See bibliography of preceding chapter for full reference.

between marital happiness and the presence or absence of children. In another research, it was found that having no child or only one child was more favorable on the average than having two or more children.[1] As between those that had no child and those that had one child, there was not much difference. These findings need careful interpretation. There is a possibility that the effect of children varies with the number of years married, being less important during the early years and more important in the later years. The first few years of marriage may be sustained by the euphoria of honeymoon psychology; the couple is young, eager, happy with plans for the future, and the absence of children may not be felt. Later, if routine replaces romance and the prospects of worldly success either dwindle or pall, the absence of children may be felt more keenly. A zero correlation, moreover, does not necessarily mean that children have no effect on marital adjustment. It may be that the effects balance each other. Some couples may be made happier by the coming of a child, while others are made less happy. These effects would be very real in particular cases, but they would tend to cancel each other in a measurement of averages. Still another consideration to be noted is that the chances of divorce are much greater for childless couples than for those with children, since something like three fifths of all divorces are granted to the former. This has been known for some time, but it has not been clear whether the divorces are caused by the absence of children or whether children hold parents together who would otherwise get divorces. The studies reporting near zero correlation between children and marital happiness would seem to indicate that in general the children are not a primary factor. The implication seems to be that the unhappily married are much less likely to have children than are the others, and it is the unhappiness, not the absence of the children, which is chiefly responsible for the divorce. The Terman subjects had been married for a varying period of years and represented varying degrees of happiness, but none of them were divorced. In other words, the group was a selected sample. Since those without children are more likely than others to get a divorce and are more likely to get it during the early years of marriage, the childless couples in the sample may represent a more highly selected group than do the couples with children; that is, selected for happiness and for stability of personality. In a less selective sample, the

[1] Burgess and Cottrell, *op. cit.*, p. 413.



FIGURE 75. DESIRE FOR CHILDREN, PRESENCE OF CHILDREN, AND MARITAL ADJUSTMENT

The presence or absence of children is not so important for marital happiness as is the attitude toward having them. Why should those who have no children, but want them, have the largest proportion of happy marriages? Perhaps the age factor plays a part in these data; the couples in line one of the chart may be younger and nearer the honeymoon.

presence or absence of children might be more highly correlated with marital happiness, as the statistics of divorce suggest.

Although the available researches leave some questions unanswered, they indicate that the presence or absence of children in marriage is not so important by itself as it is in relation to whether or not the couple wants children. As may be seen from Figure 75, the poorest adjustments on the average are made by the parents of unwanted children; the next poorest, by "companionate" couples who want no children and have none. It is interesting to note that as a rule those who have no children but want them have the largest proportion of good marriages and the smallest proportion of poor marriages. From this it seems reasonable to infer that the desire for children, especially if mutual, generally reflects the state of the marriage, and, therefore, serves as a valuable clue to marital happiness.[1] Not to want a child, except for eugenic reasons, is probably a highly unfavorable sign.

Economic factors

The preceding chapter disclosed that one's emotional balance, not cash balance, is what matters for marital happiness. On this subject

[1] There is supposed to be a relation between the desire for children and "genital fixation" or sexual desire and satisfaction, but evidence is lacking. If so, the sexual factor would be an underlying third factor.

the results of scientific investigation coincide with popular belief. An increase in income means a higher standard of living, but not necessarily a greater marital happiness, because marital happiness results from the mutual devotion of mates to one another's welfare; whereas money-making may be an expression of strong ego drives, with the emphasis on self, not others. In any case, the correlation between size of income and marital happiness is practically zero.[1] It is unfortunate, however, that no study has been made of marital adjustment in terms of the relation of actual income to amount of income desired. This would be somewhat comparable to the study of marital adjustment in terms of the relation of size of family to the number of children desired, which we saw to be more meaningful than a study merely in terms of the presence or absence of children. Happiness depends not only upon what one gets out of life, but upon its relation to what one wants. Some time ago, William James pointed out that self-esteem may be enhanced either by having less ambition or more success. Sometimes this does not work out as expected, and a goal is reached toward which one has long striven only to have it prove disappointing. It wasn't worth wanting, or its value was overrated. A certain amount of income is needed to keep body and soul together and to furnish some of the comforts of life, and less than this amount may impair efficiency and affect the possibilities of adjustment between mates. But given this minimum,[2] additional increments in income do not necessarily produce additional increments in marital happiness. On the contrary, increased income may promote unhappiness in some cases by stimulating a restless, chronic desire for further gain.

More important for marital happiness than the amount of family income is its stability, as reflected in regular employment and savings.[3] Marriages where the husband has long periods of unemployment tend to show a large percentage of poor adjustments, though in a few cases the crisis serves to strengthen the family ties. Frequent change of jobs is also unfavorable to marital adjustment. Economic insecurity and instability are thus indicated as bad for marriage. In some cases,

[1] Lewis M. Terman, *op. cit.*, p. 169. Jessie Bernard reports similar findings for 252 subjects.

[2] It is difficult to state a definite amount, because many factors enter in, such as the locality in which the family lives, the size of family, and the cultural differences in living standards. However, relief officials have had to prepare such family budgets as a practical administrative measure to help in determining amounts of aid to be granted. There is not perfect agreement in such budgets, but the variation is usually not great. See Chapter 6.

[3] Burgess and Cottrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 261 ff.

doubtless, the irregular employment and frequent change of job are merely reflections of the unstable personality of the worker, but in view of the widespread unemployment of the nineteen-thirties, when millions were unable to obtain work, it hardly seems reasonable to suppose that the economic difficulties of families generally can be explained in terms of pre-existing personality defects in the bread-winners.

Should married women work for pay?

One of the topics on which there is a good deal of lively debate is whether or not it is right for married women to have jobs. The problem is highly complex and involves a number of issues, such as the effect of the employment of married women on the employment of men, which cannot be gone into here. In this chapter we are interested in knowing what effect, if any, the employment of married women has upon the happiness of their marriages. Investigation of the question shows that the wife's attitude toward working after marriage is what matters, not the mere fact of working or not working. In general the lowest adjustment scores are made by those wives who want to work after marriage, but do not. It is interesting that wives who do not want to work, but do, have better than average adjustments in general. The largest proportion of good adjustments, however, is made by those who want to work and do, and those who do not want to work and do not. These findings seem to warrant the conclusion that employment or non-employment after marriage is significant for marital happiness chiefly in relation to the wife's attitude toward such work.

Investigation shows that the husband's attitude is also highly significant, suggesting once more the relative unimportance of individual traits or circumstances, as such, and the greater importance of the compatibility of attitudes on the part of mates respecting such traits and circumstances. Various studies suggest that professional women are in general more successful than non-professional women in combining marriage and a job, and that an important factor is the favorable attitude of the husband. In her study of several hundred situations, Pruette [1] found that husbands of little education tended to be least sympathetic toward having their wives at work outside the home, whereas husbands with more education were more liberal in

[1] L. Pruette, *Women and Leisure* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1924).

their attitude. Likewise, Collier [1] reports that of one hundred husbands of professional women, eighty-six were decidedly favorable and twenty-six of these were actually enthusiastic in attitude. The question of status may be important here, since practicing a profession is more likely to add to the family reputation than working in a factory or department store. In combining successfully a home and a job, it helps if the wife has good health, sound training for her work, and adequate assistance at home. In all these respects the professional woman usually has an advantage over the woman who is not highly trained.[2]

The Sex Factor

The distinctive thing about marriage is that it is the most intimate relationship between male and female. From this it is easy to infer, as many have, that sex adjustment is crucial for marital happiness. In the literature one finds statements to the effect that there are no unhappy marriages without sexual incompatibility, and conversely that all happy marriages are marked by sexual felicity. Neither statement is true. The clinical records furnish cases of unadjusted couples whose sexual adjustment was not a problem and whose sexual experience continued to be satisfactory to both, even up to the very granting of a divorce.[3] Conversely, there are couples whose sex adjustment remains unsatisfactory, but who are happy because there is enough else in their relationship that is satisfying. As a rule, the sex problem looms large because any difficulty in the adjustment of husband and wife is likely to show up first in their sex experience, since this is an area in which the earliest overt adjustments must be made. However, the existence of sexual incompatibility does not mean that the sex experience, in itself, is the cause of the difficulty. Medical men in particular often discuss the sex relationship as if it were a thing in itself, and fail to see that sex behavior is an expression of the total personality. The sex drive in men, unlike that in lower animals, is affected by culture and learning, so that its expression in marriage does not represent an organic drive pure and simple, but a drive that has been conditioned by social experience. Organic or constitutional defects account for only a tiny fraction of coital incompatibility. Nearly

[1] V. M. Collier, *Marriage and Careers* (Bureau of Vocational Information, Channel Bookshop, 1926).

[2] For further discussion of the economic problems of marriage, see Chapter 20.

[3] E. T. Krueger, "A Study of Marriage Incompatibility," *The Family*, 9:53–60, April, 1928.

all of it is due to some defect or some clash of personality, so that the sexual difficulty is usually a symptom of some more far-reaching problem. In short, sexual compatibility, while highly desirable, is neither purely biological nor crucial to marital happiness.

In the Terman study, the co-operating subjects answered a considerable number of detailed questions about their sex history; yet the highest correlation obtained between any combination of sex factors and marital happiness was +.5, which accounts for only one quarter of the variations in happiness. Clinical studies show that the sex factors have much in common with personality factors, an observation that is borne out, as well, by the statistical findings. It will be recalled from the preceding chapter that the personality items correlated +.5 with marital happiness. When the sex factors are added to the personality factors, the correlation is raised from +.5 to +.6. This slight increase is probably caused by the fact that the sex questionnaire is much more detailed and inclusive than the personality schedule, but even a correlation of +.6 leaves nearly two thirds of the variation in marital happiness unaccounted for.

There are some surprising findings regarding the sex factors that are, and are not, associated with marital happiness. Little or no association with marital happiness is indicated for reported and preferred frequency of coitus, reported duration of coitus, and contraceptive techniques. This suggests that undue emphasis has been laid on the importance of specific sex techniques which, while desirable in themselves, do not appear to affect the chances for marital happiness. On the other hand, two factors which are more highly correlated with marital happiness are the orgasm adequacy of the wife, and husband-wife similarity in strength of sex drive.

One third of the married women in the Terman sample were sexually inadequate,[1] but the reason is something of a mystery. Although it is generally thought that such inadequacy is a result of childhood conditioning, many factors which might be responsible do not show a high correlation with the inadequacy. This is true for conflict with one's parents, religious training, sources of sex information, sex shock under age ten, happiness during childhood, pre-marital disgust with sex, and fear of pregnancy. A further interesting observation is that as large a proportion of inadequates is to be found among the younger as the older wives, despite the fact that the younger wives have

[1] A "sexually inadequate" wife is one who reports that she seldom or never has an orgasm.

probably had the advantage of a more liberal sex education. Nor does high I.Q. help, for the proportion of inadequates is as high among gifted subjects as among the wives in the less highly selected sample.[1]

Failure to find causes in such conditioned responses leads Terman to wonder if the inadequacy may not be attributed to constitutional factors, especially since the orgasm inadequacy is correlated with neurasthenic tendencies. In view of the emphasis which clinical studies place on experiential factors, Terman's statistical findings are highly surprising. It is possible that clinicians may be guilty of explaining such maladjustments in preconceived or plausible terms, rather than in terms of actual causes. The evidence cited does not definitely prove this, however, because it is exceedingly difficult to reduce to simple statistical units the highly complicated behavior with which the clinician deals.

The correlation between the wife's classification as adequate or inadequate as to orgasm capacity and her own happiness score is only .3, a highly reliable correlation for a sample of this size, but one of insufficient magnitude to account for 10 per cent of the variation in the happiness scores. One fourth of the high happiness group were "sexually inadequate" wives, and of the low happiness group nearly half were "sexually adequate."

Although sex is a function of the total personality and not solely a biological function, and although it is generally not the major determinant of marital happiness, it is nevertheless a highly important factor and contributes substantially to marital happiness or unhappiness. The second sex factor — the similarity in the strength of sex drive in the husband-wife relationship — must be viewed in proper perspective. Terman reports that coitus is almost as frequent among the unhappily married as among the happily married. At first thought this finding might seem to suggest that the erotic relation does not contribute materially to marital adjustment. But perhaps in some unhappy marriages sex relations represent the one type of communion which is mutually satisfying; and sex may be used in the hope of revitalizing the marriage. If the unhappy couples referred to above

[1] Lewis M. Terman, *A Partial Report on Marital Adjustments in a Group of Gifted Subjects*, paper read at the meetings of the American Sociological Society, December, 1940. This report is part of an extensive follow-up of the gifted subjects whom Terman located and studied in 1922. They number about fourteen hundred, aged twenty-two to thirty-seven years, more than half of them married. They all had I.Q.'s which placed them well in the top 1 per cent of the school population. The marital adjustments of the intellectually gifted subjects closely resemble those of the relatively normal group, with the gifted subjects making slightly better adjustments.

had not continued with coitus, but had abandoned it or greatly reduced it, their total marital adjustment might have been poorer. It may be noted that these unhappy couples were still living together, despite their unhappiness. In many cases of separation, however, clinicians report that the sexual contacts drop to zero before the actual divorce.

These findings may suggest that marital stability is furthered by not permitting extraneous issues to interfere unduly with the regular satisfaction of the sexual appetite. A quarrel over money, or in-laws, or other matters is likely to be reflected in sexual coolness on the part of the couple toward each other unless precautions are taken to prevent it. The coolness may develop into frigidity and lead to sex tensions. Where habits of sex expression are more or less regularized, as they usually are in marriage, interruption of the sex life tends to result in tensions. Sex is undoubtedly an appetite somewhat resembling hunger, and inhibition of it leads to strain.

A minimum desideratum, then, may be to keep the amatory relationship alive, while an optimum goal is to have it contribute to the satisfaction of both parties. An obstacle to such fulfillment is, of course, ignorance regarding sex physiology, psychology, and technique. Although sex ignorance, as the Terman data show, is not generally a major factor in unhappiness, doubtless it is a major factor in certain cases. Ignorance regarding sex is still abysmal despite the enormous literature of the subject. There are still persons who do not know the father's rôle in reproduction. Inaccurate sex knowledge is particularly dangerous when it results in unwholesome attitudes toward sex, such as that sex desire is indecent, or that sex experience is something to fear or to worry about or to feel guilty about. These unhealthful attitudes, generally the result of early conditioning, are thought by clinicians to underlie most sexual maladjustment in marriage. Organic causes are very seldom found,[1] and undesirable attitudes may yield to psychiatric treatment.

Many women fail to achieve a physical and emotional climax in coitus, while few men have such difficulty. Does this mean that the sexes are unequal in sex drive, with the female more passive and the male more active? This established belief has lately been called into question, but the evidence is not clear. Females show a greater fre-

[1] Robert L. Dickinson and Lura Beam, *A Thousand Marriages* (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1931), p. 447.

quency at the extremes of sexual desire; that is, there are more frigid women than impotent men, and for obvious physiological reasons, sexually active females are more capable of repeated coitus than males. But is the greater passivity of females a biological or a culturally acquired trait? Mead reports [1] that there are societies where the women are as vigorous sexually as the men, and still other cultures where the women are even more vigorous than the men. The concept of the sexual passivity of the female is not so popular in our society now as it was a century or two ago when the status of women was different. In earlier times, women held a subordinate position which fitted in well with the theory that they were created mainly to serve men. The evidence from the anthropoids, however, shows that the female is not passive, but may take the initiative in mating behavior.[2] Modern culture still fosters the idea that there is a more active interest in sex on the part of males, but there is, even so, a good deal of variation, and some females are sexually more aggressive than some males. In a particular marriage, these differences in strength of sex drive are highly important and call for adjustment in the interest of marital happiness.

An objective for marriage is, then, mutual satisfaction in the erotic sphere, rather than an arrangement which is agreeable only to one member, usually the husband. Mutual satisfaction does not, however, necessarily mean similar satisfaction, or satisfaction in an identical manner or to an identical degree. Since orgasm adequacy is associated with marital happiness and is beneficial in itself, the achievement of orgasm is a desirable goal for the wife, where the result is possible. But it is not clear that orgasm is indicated or possible for all women, because of either constitutional or attitudinal factors, or both. Sympathetic co-operation by husband and wife, and considerable experimentation, and even psychiatric assistance, may be needed in order to determine whether orgasm is possible. If not, acquiescence to the inevitable will result in a better marital adjustment than worry or rebellion. If two persons are in love with each other and feel secure in their relationship, they can work out a mutually satisfactory sex adjustment, and they will cheerfully accept whatever sexual adjustment they can achieve.

[1] Margaret Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies* (New York: W. W. Morrow and Company, 1935).

[2] Robert Yerkes, *Chimpanzees*, p. 64.

The idea of mutual satisfaction in sexual relations is, of course, only a special case of the general principle that mutual devotion on the part of the couple to each other's welfare characterizes affection. Since no two individuals are exactly alike, their differences are certain in greater or less degree to be reflected in their sexual patterns as well as in other behavior. The effective regularization of the sex life does not, therefore, necessarily require that it be thoroughly conventionalized or standardized. The "Ideal Type" of adjustment described in the manuals of marriage guidance does not fit real marriages exactly, and in some cases it may be wide of the mark so far as the needs of a particular couple are concerned. The techniques, the frequency, and the duration of coitus are matters for individual adjustment; and no practice is to be considered undesirable from a psychiatric standpoint [1] which contributes to the strengthening of the marriage, however unorthodox it may be from the standpoint of the established folkways.[2]

A review of our discussion to this point shows that traits of personality and types of background are not so important for marital happiness as the attitudes of husband and wife toward each other's traits, circumstances, and sex urgencies, and toward their own. Some of the more favorable combinations have been indicated, such as the intermarriage of persons who have happy temperaments and amiable dispositions; of persons who want jobs and get them; of persons who want children. But there are big gaps in our knowledge, and many of the factors responsible for marital happiness have not yet been identified. The problem is complicated by the fact that in marriage it is necessary to please only one other person, some of whose wishes are certain to be unique. Thus, a wife with a slight masochistic tendency may not be happy unless her husband punishes her from time to time, while the husband will not be happy about doing this unless he has, say, a sadistic streak. A study of marriage compatibility or incompatibility, therefore, suggests the importance of the *gestalt*, or total configuration of the wishes of the married pair in relation to the objective situation. A weakness in one mate may harmonize with a similar or complementary weakness in the other, as in the example given above. Or a weakness may be compensated for by unusual strength in some other direction. Again, a weakness in one

[1] John Levy and Ruth Monroe, *The Happy Family*, chap. IV.
[2] The problem of sexual adjustment in marriage is further examined in Chapter 20.

partner may be absorbed by a working philosophy or a rationalization. A given factor does not have much meaning in itself, but takes on significance only in relation to all the other factors in the situation. No single factor is indispensable. There are many different kinds of individuals making many different types of marital adjustment which are satisfactory to the couples involved, if not to anyone else.

CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION

DISILLUSIONMENT

Adjustment is, of course, a relative term. In discussing the causes of marital discord, we generally find it expedient to consider cases where the difficulty is deep-seated or far gone, because these conditions are the serious ones. Also by looking at abnormal cases, normal people can see their own defects as through a magnifying glass, for the differences are largely differences in degree. The point is that all marriages have their problems of adjustment, although some are more pronounced and serious than others. Individual differences make some measure of frustration inevitable. Young people in love do not like to believe this. They turn their eyes from the truth quite unwittingly, because they are in love and are, therefore, perfectionists. During courtship they are on their best behavior and succeed reasonably well in putting their best foot forward, because they can come and go, and the separation affords opportunity to relax from their exertions and pretensions. They are blind to each other's defects because they are in love, and they are under the romantic illusion that true love is without blemish. Love distorts the conception of reality, as does all emotion. The euphoric state of mind induced by love is carried into the honeymoon, during which each strives to please the other and to blot out annoyances. Nevertheless, even then conflicts sometimes occur, promoted by the oversensitiveness of the couple, for the strain is great. Although they may be successfully anaesthetized against reality during this period, the effects begin to wear off as the honeymoon wanes and as they become more mindful of weaknesses in each other's armor. A certain amount of readjustment and sometimes disappointment is thus inevitable in the early weeks and months of marriage. Where extensive illusions have been built up and are shattered, extreme disillusionment results. Such a high degree of dis-

appointment, however, is hardly as common as the writers in the pulp magazines would have us believe. Disappointment in the early period of marriage is a variable matter. In some cases of very happy marriage, the disillusionment is slight, and possibly a few couples may escape it altogether. Newly-weds may be better prepared to bear the disillusionment if they understand beforehand that it is an almost inevitable phase of the early readjustment to reality.

Types of Conflict

Conflict, if not disillusionment, is universal experience.[1] It is the inescapable consequence of interaction, since no two individuals are exactly alike in their interests and wishes. Marriages vary considerably, however, in the number, type, and severity of their conflicts. Some writers distinguish between overt and covert conflict, and regard the latter as the more dangerous type.[2] Concealed conflict is thought to be bad because there is no airing of grievances. One member dominates, and the other submits outwardly, though inwardly seething with discontent. There is no safety valve in such a marriage for the release of accumulated tensions as there is when overt conflict occurs. It is possible, of course, for both members to repress their grievances. Covert conflict tends to be of the chronic variety. In some cases the aggrieved member comes to feel that there is little hope of remedying the situation, and accommodates himself by avoiding the issue in order to keep peace in a marriage which is otherwise attractive.[3] One may learn to live with chronic conflicts as with chronic ills. From this it follows that the type of conflict is not so important for marital adjustment as the cause and scope of the conflict. Conflict is dangerous if it dominates the whole relationship, so that one member comes to think of the other as an obstacle to happiness or achievement. The situation is, however, highly relative, since people differ in the amount and type of annoyance they will tolerate.

Some writers distinguish between destructive and constructive quarrels, and the distinction is valid, though of doubtful utility from the standpoint of control, since one must wait until after the quarrel to see what the result has been. It is true that some quarrels clear the

[1] Willard Waller, *The Family* (New York: Cordon Press, 1938), p. 313.

[2] E. R. Groves and W. F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928), pp. 79, 85, 87.

[3] See the description of "habituated conflict" in Joseph K. Folsom, *The Family and Democratic Society* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1943), p. 446.

atmosphere and leave the couple with a better understanding of each other than they had before. This is what is meant by a constructive quarrel, and obviously it is preferable to the destructive type; but there is still another method of settling differences which is better than either, namely, discussion. Conflict establishes conflict patterns which are easily touched off. A quarrel means anger, and anger means striking out at the source of irritation. There is always the danger in anger that one will do or say something which will later be regretted. Anger causes wounds that heal badly and leave scars. Anger is thus offensive, in both senses of the word. Discussion is a better method of settling differences, but it is a more difficult method for those whose emotions flare into quarrels and block the rational processes. Quarreling in marriage is related to early childhood patterns of temper reaction to deprivation. Still, one can learn to keep one's emotions in check, or to control, more or less, their expression.

The symptomatic nature of grievances

Serious limitation on the value of discussion as a means of adjusting marital differences is the unconscious nature of much serious conflict. How can a husband be expected to discuss his difficulties intelligently with his wife when he doesn't know what they are, or when he has repressed the conflicts so that he doesn't admit them to consciousness? Of course, not all difficulties are repressed or misunderstood, but many of them are, especially the deep-seated ones with roots running back to early childhood. To ask a person what is wrong with his marriage is somewhat like asking him to make a self-diagnosis of an illness. He may not know what is the matter, and he is likely to report symptoms rather than causes. Or being ashamed of the truth, he tends to give rationalizations or excuses which from a factual standpoint are nearly worthless. This is shown by Terman, who had his married subjects check the things in their marriage which had interfered with their happiness. On the basis of these replies, the grievances were listed in order of reported seriousness, as shown in Figure 76. Inspection of the list shows that some of the complaints are superficial, or represent effects of maladjustment rather than actual causes. The importance of others is overemphasized. For instance, insufficient income is listed as the fourteenth most serious grievance for husbands and the fifteenth for wives, yet it will be recalled that no meaningful relation was found between amount of income and



FIGURE 76. SEX DIFFERENCES IN THE SERIOUSNESS OF 35 GRIEVANCES

Relative differences are suggested in strength of values of husbands and wives. However, their significance is limited by the fact that the spouses were given no opportunity to mention additional grievances not on the list, an unavoidable limitation in this study. Even more important, as Terman recognizes, these responses do not describe the real problems but are only symptomatic of them. Taken from Lewis M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938), p. 105.

marital happiness of this group. The same general observation may be made concerning the rôle of in-laws, which is mentioned even more often than income. The explanation is probably that money and in-laws are acceptable excuses for marital incompatibility in our culture, and they are, therefore, handy pegs on which to hang the blame, although they are in no sense valid causes. The most popular excuses, as distinguished from real reasons, given by unhappy wives for their unhappy marriages are that their husbands are profane, older, insufficiently educated, conceited, late at meals, addicted to

tobacco, vulgar, and talkative.[1] The superficiality of such "reasons" or "complaints" may be shown by an examination of the first one mentioned — profanity. Swearing is not a highly esteemed habit in our culture, but it is not disruptive of marriage if other factors are favorable. Of the happy wives who mentioned this trait in their husbands, only one in thirty-five complained of it, whereas it bothered three fifths of the unhappy wives. Of course, profanity in itself may constitute a major problem in a marriage where the wife is exceptionally strait-laced, but as a rule it is felt to be a problem only because other things are troublesome. Even in the case of the strait-laced wife, the profanity is likely to be a secondary cause of conflict. Since she married someone who was profane, she probably knew before she married him that he had the habit and was willing to take him as he was, for the sake of other values. If these values do not materialize, then the profanity becomes highly obnoxious. It is also possible that she thought she could reform him and failed, in which case the control-pattern would be the true cause of the maladjustment, and the swearing would be only a stimulus touching off the fuse.

The grievances which appear in Figure 76 do not exhaust the serious faults which these couples find with their marriages. The subjects were presented with a check list of common faults and asked to check those that applied to their own marriage. Had other items been included in the list, they would in all probability have been checked too. It would have been particularly interesting, despite the unreliability of the responses, if the subjects had been asked to check their own faults as well as those of their mates. A common characteristic of human nature is projection, or the shunting of one's own repressed weaknesses onto others. We profess to see in others faults which we do not admit in ourselves. Thus, some of the complaints that are made about the spouse reveal conditions that exist in the complainant.

Even minor conflicts may have an adverse effect upon marital adjustment. Some years ago a popular magazine published two anonymous articles,[2] in which a husband and wife enumerated the sources of annoyance in their marriage. The husband listed the following as the things he wished his wife wouldn't do: Use my hair-

[1] Lewis M. Terman, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

[2] "Things I Wish My Wife Wouldn't Do" and "Things I Wish My Husband Wouldn't Do" in the *American Magazine*, July and August, 1925.

brushes and leave hair in them; back-seat driving; love for semi-darkness, dimly lighted rooms; straightening up my desk; telephone me at the office for trivial reasons; wear kimono and mules; call me pet names in public; always ask me to run little errands. In turn the wife enumerated the following as the things she wished her husband wouldn't do: Think with mannerisms: twist lock of hair, scratch chin, etc.; leave safety razor blades around; make me ask for money for each separate expenditure ("What do you need this money for?"); retire behind a newspaper; wash after food is on the table; flick ashes on the rug; eat noisily; comment whenever guests arrive, "Now at last we get a square meal," and make remarks about the special dishes, silverware, etc. More important grievances are not mentioned or mentionable, and serious grievances often operate on the unconscious level, but even so, adjustment in marriage can probably be facilitated by conscious attention to visible sources of annoyance.

A serious danger of conflict is that it will become progressive until finally nearly everything about the spouse is felt to be bad, and the marriage seems to contain little that is worth while. Just as a forest fire is apt to be devastating unless choked off in its early stages, so anger, when kindled, tends to carry to the "logical extreme," which is the elimination of the obstacle. A minor maladjustment can thus be magnified until it seems that the marriage is utterly futile. The tendency to exaggerate, however, works in the opposite direction as well. The "generosity factor," or "halo effect," shows itself in the tendency of happily married couples to maximize each other's virtues and minimize each other's vices, which has the effect of further promoting the happiness of the marriage. There is thus a cumulative effect in either direction. Nothing succeeds like success, and nothing fails like failure.

The solution of conflicts

The disorganizing effect of conflict and the tragic consequences of disorganization are doubtless responsible for the abundant advice available on the subject of marital adjustment. Most of it counsels perfection and so is not particularly helpful, but some of it provides useful suggestions of procedure. Most people in trouble know that something ought to be done. They want to be told not only what to do but, in detail, how to do it. A particularly interesting effort to

furnish such techniques of adjustment has been made by the Harts.[1] They offer the following seven suggestions:

1. Eliminate needless annoyances.
2. Discuss problems frankly, but do not debate endlessly.
3. Be just, but do not demand justice.
4. Formulate plans jointly.
5. Invent solutions that will enlarge areas of agreement.
6. Surrender non-essentials.
7. Be a good sport.

Dominating these suggestions is the idea of keeping uppermost in mind the welfare of the family as a unit. Proposed solutions of family problems must meet the test of whether they contribute to the good of the whole. Some measure of personal autonomy is essential, but it must not be carried to the point where self-interest dominates over group-interest. By way of illustration, take the first suggestion, that needless irritants and annoyances be eliminated. Practically everyone has "pet peeves" — things that rub him the wrong way. We are advised to discover these reactions in our mates and to avoid doing the things which irritate them. On the positive side, we can try to provide satisfiers — stimuli that are particularly pleasing. But what happens if only one of the couple eliminates annoyances, while the other makes no effort to do likewise? There are such marriages, where all the yielding is on one side, and one exploits the other. Such relationships sometimes work because there are those who like to be servants, if not slaves. As a rule, in our culture the wife is still the one who makes the major adjustments in marriage, but nowadays women are not willing to be as subordinate and self-sacrificing as they were several generations ago. The chances for a happy marriage are, therefore, better if there is a willingness on both sides to make whatever adjustments are needed. The "ideal" situation would probably exist where each spouse tended to make one hundred per cent adjustment to the needs of the other, without expecting any readjustment whatever in return. According to this formula, while one was trying to eliminate needless irritants, the other would try to stop being annoyed by them.

If husband and wife are at cross-purposes, one or both must yield if

[1] Hornell and Ella Hart, *Personality and the Family*, rev. ed. (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1941), pp. 329–35.

their marriage is to function smoothly. The morale of the relationship is generally best sustained not by having one bulldoze the other into accepting his wish, but by trying to arrive at a "meeting of minds." Compromise is a healthy solution of conflict, because each gives up something in order to save the union. Debate or endless argument weakens marriage, because debate has victory over one's adversary as its object, whereas discussion aims at discovering the truth and at working out "creative accommodations."

These suggestions have merit, but their utility is seriously limited by the fact that usually the causes of serious marital conflict operate on the unconscious level and are not known to the couple, or that they are too complicated for self-analysis. Such rules as the above are more useful for well-balanced couples who have only minor adjustments to make, or for exceptional individuals who have considerable insight into their own personalities.[1] They can make happier a marriage which is already happy, or, at least, keep it from being less happy. But it is doubtful whether such suggestions are of much use to those who need them most.

Studies of serious marital discord [2] have shown that as a rule the causes are of unconscious origin and are deep-seated, so that the subjects are not aware of the forces that motivate them. They are aware of certain differences, but these manifest differences are often only symbolic of underlying conflicts. Husband and wife may argue about money, about going to the movies, about their in-laws, as if these were the things that disturbed them, when actually the arguments reflect a fundamental struggle for power. Since human wishes are innumerable, the chances of disagreement are great. The serious differences are not generally concerned with small matters, for back of the manifold wishes of human beings are a few basic ones, like the wishes for power, affection, security, and excitement.[3] The serious conflicts are those which involve the frustration of one or more of these fundamental wishes, of which individuals may not be immediately aware.

There is still another obstacle that frequently stands in the way of

[1] The possibilities of self-analysis, especially in cases of neurosis, are not thought to be good. See Karen Horney, *Self-Analysis* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1942).

[2] Harriet Mowrer, *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord* (New York: American Book Company, 1935).

[3] W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1923). Thomas's "four wishes" are well known and have been highly useful in the interpretation of behavior, although their universality has been called into question because the organic bases are not clear for certain of the wishes.

solving one's problems, namely, the way one reacts to difficulty. Habits established early in life tend to persist and are carried over into marriage. A person who has not learned to face trouble squarely before marriage will usually avoid coming to grips with his marriage problems. There are various rational ways of dealing with conflicts, and various non-rational ways. If a person has become accustomed to using non-rational ways, he will not be helped much by a list of suggestions based on the use of reason. Non-rational reactions to conflict include repression, compartmentalization, and efforts at escape. In repression, an effort is made to push the unpleasant conflict out of mind. For instance, a man may resent the fact that his wife is neither companionable nor attractive to him emotionally, yet he may not want to divorce her because divorce is distasteful to him. Besides, his marriage does offer him some important satisfactions, for his wife looks after him in a motherly sort of way. The husband may try to repress his conflict. This means is unsatisfactory in the long run, because the unpleasant feelings are hard to keep repressed and tend to find devious ways of emerging from the unconscious to vex the spirit. The husband may try to avoid the vexation by a rather thoroughgoing dissociation or compartmentalization. He may continue to live with his wife in a conventional marriage, and at the same time have an unconventional relationship with a mistress who gives him the response he wants. By playing dual rôles and keeping each in a separate compartment of his mind, so to speak, conflict may be avoided, although there is always danger that exposure or some other development will jeopardize the success of this type of solution. A third possibility is that the dissatisfied husband will resort to some method of escape. Heavy drinking provides a refuge from annoying feelings of inferiority, but the practice is socially objectionable, and the respite is only temporary. Daydreaming is more popular, partly because it is less reprehensible and more economical. In the case of women, illness is a common escape, because they can generally pass it off as a natural condition. Waller has described the use of clubs, vacations, and parties as additional means of escape from unsatisfactory marriages.

Where a couple lack insight into their difficulty, or lack forthrightness in dealing with it, or both, the possibility remains that they may be helped by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other qualified marriage counselor. There is considerable unwillingness to seek such assistance, but the resistance is being gradually overcome, and the day may

not be far off when people will consult experts for their emotional problems as readily as they now consult physicians for their physical ills. There hardly seems to be any valid reason why one should feel more reticent about one's emotional ills than one's physical ills. Indeed, in a very large proportion of the cases which doctors are regularly called upon to treat, the difficulty is really of a psychosomatic or emotional nature. Public confidence in psychological counseling will probably grow as the body of scientific knowledge concerning human behavior continues to accumulate, and with it the possibilities of therapy. At present, the technique is to help couples solve their own problems by giving them an understanding of their difficulties and of the backgrounds out of which these difficulties arose. This is accomplished by means of the probing of the unconscious, as in psychoanalysis, when deep-seated personality defects are present, and by means of the consciously directed interview, when the problem is to clarify the situation responsible for the difficulty. Considerable success has been reported in effecting adjustments by these methods,[1] as shown by the following illustration.

Mrs. R. sought the assistance of a therapist[2] in regard to her marriage which had been unsatisfactory since the birth of the first of her two children. She was anxious to save her marriage, but pessimistic about her chances of succeeding because of her husband's excessive drinking and his resulting inability to support his family. Mrs. R. also reported an acute sex conflict associated with the progressive impotency of her husband. She had at first no understanding of the unconscious basis of her husband's problem, nor of the part played by her own reactions to his misconduct. She knew only that he was weak; that he deceived her in certain ways, especially in regard to money; that he drank to excess; that he repeatedly promised to reform and never did. To help her, it was necessary to give her some understanding of her husband's behavior. Inquiry showed he was an only child of parents in comfortable economic circumstances who overprotected him and helped him to build up habits of escape. In an

[1] See Harriet Mowrer, *op. cit.*, p. 273. Mrs. Mowrer counseled both husband and wife and utilized intensive follow-up treatment, consisting of frequent contacts with the couples over a period of at least two years. She reports effecting "complete adjustments" in thirty-two out of sixty-six couples who were separated at first contact, and "partial adjustments" in nineteen additional cases; only six cases of this series were lost where there was an intensive follow-up. She also reports effecting complete or partial adjustments in fifty-one out of fifty-four cases where there was no separation at first contact.

[2] Harriet R. Mowrer, *op. cit.*, chaps. VII and XIII.

interview, Mr. R. revealed that before his marriage he did not have to keep a job, as his parents, especially his mother, always provided for him. He was not on friendly terms with his father, who was quite critical of him. His economic history showed that after working in a cigar factory for eight years, he borrowed three hundred dollars from his mother to start a cigar store of his own which was unsuccessful. From this point on, his economic adjustment was less and less satisfactory. For the past seven years, Mr. R. had worked as a laundry driver, but was not able to hold a job for any length of time because of his drinking. He reported that the drinking began when he was in the cigar business, and gave him confidence to go out and solicit orders. With the help of the therapist who handled the case, Mr. R. was able to see the complex unconscious nature of his compulsion and the futility of attempting to deal with it merely by means of good resolves and auto-suggestion. He now saw his drinking as an unsatisfactory attempt to escape from his problems, especially his acute sense of inferiority, and to reinstate the more favorable rôles of his early childhood. He came to view the influence of his parents upon his evasive behavior as primary, and to regard his economic and sexual difficulties as secondary or derivative. However, the new insights obtained by Mr. R. would have been of little avail without a corresponding change in his wife, since her critical attitudes were contributing factors. She had to develop a new orientation with regard to his behavior. She had been troubled by his accusations of infidelity which she now came to understand as a typical projection of his own feeling of inadequacy; that is, if he could not satisfy her, "someone else" must be doing so. She came to see the influence of her critical attitude upon his inadequacy and was encouraged to adopt a more sympathetic attitude, since their sexual adjustment had been satisfactory during the early period of their marriage. Consideration was given to finding new work for Mr. R., inasmuch as his work as a laundry driver called for soliciting and this contributed to his feeling of inferiority. An effort was also made to modify Mr. R.'s position in the family by having the other members deal with him as head of the family. These modifications are reported to have resulted in a satisfactory readjustment of the marriage.

THE EXTENT OF MARITAL HAPPINESS

This chapter and the preceding one considered the factors affecting marital happiness, but thus far nothing has been said of the extent to which happiness actually exists in marriage. A number of studies have reported on the variation in happiness in the sample examined, and all but one show a concentration at the happy end of the scale. The one study which does not is Hamilton's investigation of two hundred married persons,[1] 45 per cent of whom are said to have been seriously maladjusted in their marriages. Fifty-seven persons testified that they were dissatisfied before the end of the first year of their marriage, and thirty-nine more were dissatisfied before the end of the second year. No date was specified by twenty-one additional persons who felt that their marriages were failures. The proportion of Hamilton's subjects who were unhappily married is so greatly out of line with the reports of other studies as to require some explanation. Since Hamilton was a psychiatrist, it is possible that a high proportion of the subjects were psychiatric cases. An alternate but less likely possibility is that the high proportion of maladjustment was uncovered by the more intensive type of analysis that Hamilton used.

All the other studies show that happiness in marriage is the usual experience for the samples studied, but unfortunately the samples are not representative of the population at large. Davis's report on 988 marriages, heavily weighted with college graduates and containing no separated or divorced couples, showed 88.4 per cent happy and 11.6 per cent unhappy.[2] Terman's sample of 792 couples gave the following percentages for "above the average in marital happiness," "about average," and "below average": 82.6; 12.9; and 4.5 for husbands; 85.2; 9.2; and 5.6 for wives, respectively.[3] Better than four out of five husbands and wives are rated as distinctly happy in their marriages. It will be noted also that the wives are more variable and tend more toward extreme satisfaction or dissatisfaction than do husbands, probably because the woman's stake in marriage is greater. The Terman study, like the Davis study, did not include any couples who

[1] G. V. Hamilton, *A Research in Marriage* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1929). Dr. Hamilton studied fifty-five couples and forty-five unrelated husbands and wives, or a total of two hundred subjects, using a controlled interview technique. Cards containing questions were presented to the subjects, and their replies were taken down verbatim.

[2] Katherine B. Davis, *Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-Two Hundred Women* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1929).

[3] Lewis M. Terman, *op. cit.*, p. 78

were separated or divorced, and the distributions of happiness scores in the two studies are fairly similar. The Burgess-Cottrell sample did include a number of broken marriages, which doubtless helps to explain why the proportion of the happily married is smaller, and the proportion of the unhappily married greater than in the other two studies. "Above average happiness" was recorded for 63.1 per cent of the marriages; "average happiness" for 14.4 per cent, and "below average happiness" for 22.5 per cent.[1] Three out of five of these marriages, then, were thought to be distinctly happy. Similar findings are reported for the largest of all the samples, namely, Lang's study of 8263 couples, which also included separated and divorced couples. In this study the percentages of "above average happiness," "average happiness," and "below average happiness" were 64.9; 19.2; and 15.8, respectively.[2] We see, then, that happiness in marriage, as measured by existing tests, is the usual experience of the better educated portion of the population. Until studies are made using representative samples, we shall remain in the dark concerning the situation for our population generally.

Why is there so much happiness?

The findings of these studies have been criticized because they do not follow the normal probability curve (which is shaped like a bell), to which most biological phenomena, such as height and weight, conform. Perhaps when a more typical sample is measured, the curve will not be skewed so greatly in the direction of happiness, but is it reasonable to expect a normal curve? We must not lose sight of the high degree of selection which occurs, both before and after marriage. About 10 per cent of the population never marries, and there is evidence to show that those who do marry are on the whole a sounder and healthier group.[3] After marriage, divorce and separations eliminate many of those who are least happy, especially if they have no children. For these reasons we should expect those who are married at any given time to show a high proportion of good adjustments. But there may be another important reason. Happiness is the sub-

[1] E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 32. The ratings were based on the reports given by either husband or wife.

[2] Richard O. Lang, *The Rating of Happiness in Marriage* (unpublished master's thesis, University of Chicago Libraries, 1932).

[3] Ernest R. Groves and William F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928), chaps. X, XXI.

jective side of adjustment, and adjustment — while partly a biological phenomenon — is subject to numerous cultural influences, like religion, economic organization, medicine, and recreation which help to provide such values as ideals, economic security, a high standard of living, good health, and leisure for large portions of the population. These cultural props may facilitate adjustment and make possible a greater measure of happiness, even though it is true that cultural changes also create problems of adjustment.

It is important to note, moreover, that the appraisal of happiness is based upon certain criteria of happiness, and if we change the criteria we change the appraisal. We say that a marriage is happier than average, but what is average? Is the average amount of happiness the same today as it was in colonial times? If culture affects adjustment, and, therefore, happiness, it is unlikely that the average unit of happiness today is the same as it was two hundred years ago. Indeed, it is claimed that there are some people who do not know the meaning of marital happiness. Marriage for them is the fulfillment of a drive and a social duty, not the achievement of personal satisfaction. To be sure, there seems to be little difficulty in appraising the degree of happiness of a given group of marriages at any one time. When questioned separately, husbands and wives are in fairly close agreement regarding the happiness of their marriages, and their judgments correspond closely to those of persons who are well acquainted with them. But it is evident that the judgments are related to the standard utilized. Lower the standard, and you increase the proportion of marriages considered happy. Raise the standard, and you decrease the proportion. This is illustrated by Terman's experience. He was troubled by the fact that the happiness scores for his 792 couples were bunched together at the upper end of the curve, and undertook to modify his measuring stick somewhat, in order to get a less highly skewed distribution. By adding new items [1] which could not be checked as true except by those who were supremely happy in their

[1] New items such as the following were added: "I feel certain that there is no one else in the world with whom I could be as happy as I am with my husband (wife)." "My husband's (wife's) personality is so completely satisfactory that I would not want to change it in the slightest degree." "My husband (wife) never does or says anything that either irritates or bores me in the slightest." These statements are to be checked as "completely true," "almost completely true," "questionable," or "untrue." The thought here is to include questions which can hardly be checked as "completely true" by any except those who are unqualifiedly enthusiastic about their marriages. Lewis M. Terman, *A Partial Report on Marital Adjustments in a Group of Gifted Subjects*. Also correspondence with the author.





FIGURE 77. DISTRIBUTIONS OF MARITAL HAPPINESS SCORES

Note that the skewness in the top graph is more extreme, although in both graphs the scores are bunched at the happy end of the scale. Is there a heavy concentration of marital happiness in the population? The scores shown depend upon the criteria of marital happiness used, and these are more exacting in the second case. The top curve is for 792 California couples reported upon in L. M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness*, p. 63. The bottom curve shows the composite husband-wife scores for 540 couples, one spouse in each marriage being a member of the California gifted group studied by Terman since 1922, with childhood I.Q. above 135. The spouses have an average I.Q. of 125. Graph and data supplied by Lewis M. Terman.

marriages, he did succeed in getting a more nearly normal distribution of scores. From the practical standpoint of administering the test, there is value in getting a scale that gives a wide distribution, but it should be noted that the distribution is a function of the criteria. At any given time a certain consensus of opinion may be reached concerning the criteria, but it is meaningless to talk about marital happiness except in terms of the criteria employed. The fact that several recent studies have used essentially the same test items suggests that such a consensus probably does exist at the present time.[1]

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How valid is Terman's theory of temperamental predisposition to happiness or unhappiness?
2. Are there personality types who are unfit for marriage? If so, should they be permitted to marry?
3. What, if anything, is gained by viewing marriage from the interactional point of view?
4. Is it true that the difference between successful and unsuccessful couples is in the resources they bring to marriage and not in the kind of problems they have to face?
5. How is marriage as a type of social relationship different from friendship?
6. Why is frequent change of residence generally associated with poor marital adjustment?
7. What are the advantages and disadvantages of home ownership?
8. Why is there such strong popular feeling that it is unwise for a married couple to live with their in-laws?
9. Do children add to the happiness of a marriage?
10. Should married women work for pay?
11. What part do the movies and the pulp magazines play in producing marital happiness and unhappiness?

[1] Waller (*op. cit.*, pp. 434–36) posits the following as criteria of marital adjustment: (1) canalization and fixation of libido on mate, so that each mate is the principal love object of the other; (2) effective machinery, conscious or unconscious, for settling disputes; (3) numerous joint activities, memories, sentiments, as the basis for companionship; (4) mutual satisfaction of sex and ego demands; (5) economic security; and (6) continued self-realization. It is interesting that most of these items are the same as those used by Burgess as the basis for constructing his test items used in the measurement of marital adjustment. There appears to be a high degree of consensus as to an operational definition of marital happiness.

12. Is some measure of disillusionment inevitable in marriage?
13. What is the difference between a symptom and a cause?
14. Is advice on how to get along in marriage realistic, in view of the unconscious basis of most serious marital conflict?
15. What are common undesirable ways of reacting to a difficult situation?
16. How can the public be persuaded to make greater use of qualified professional counselors in solving their marital and emotional problems?
17. Is marital happiness, like most biological phenomena, distributed according to the normal probability curve?
18. What are the evidences of marital happiness? Is happiness a proper subject for scientific investigation?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. Successful remarriage after divorce.
2. Personality as a function of social situations.
3. John P. Dean, *Home Ownership: Is It Sound?* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945).
4. Estimates of the incidence of marital happiness in the United States.
5. An analysis of the types of family problems submitted to Dorothy Dix.

SELECTED READINGS

Bosanquet, Helen, *The Family*. New York: Macmillan, 1915.
Interesting as one of the first studies of the family from the social psychological viewpoint. An able writer.

Davis, Katherine B., *Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-Two Hundred Women*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1929.
One of the first objective studies in the field. An able piece of work. The most extensive of all the questionnaire studies in number of cases and in geographic distribution, but three quarters of all the subjects had more than a high-school education. Husbands were not contacted.

Dell, Floyd, *Love in the Machine Age*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1930.
A penetrating analysis of the obstacles to marital happiness in our technological age.

Dickinson, Robert L., and Lura Beam, *A Thousand Marriages*. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Company, 1931.

Interesting case materials but poorly organized.

Hamilton, G. V., *A Research in Marriage*. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1929.

A searching study of two hundred marriages. The methodology of the controlled questionnaire makes this study interesting from the standpoint of research. The subjects were mainly from New York and probably included a large number of problem cases.

Levy, John, and Ruth Monroe, *The Happy Family*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1938.

Practical pointers by a psychiatrist and his educator wife. Suggestive rather than balanced and definitive.

Mowrer, Harriet R., *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*. New York: American Book Company, 1935.

Clinical analysis of domestic discord in terms of the social rôles of husband and wife. Extended case studies, including diagnosis and treatment.

I. MARRIAGE ADJUSTMENT FORM [1]

This form may be filled out by either the husband or the wife. Frank and sincere replies are of the highest importance if the findings are to be of value to the person filling it out or for research purposes.

The following points are to be kept in mind in filling out the schedule:

1. Be sure to answer all questions.
2. Do not leave any blanks, as is sometimes done, to signify a "no" reply.
3. The word spouse is used to refer to your husband or wife.
4. Do not confer with your spouse in answering these questions or show your answers to your spouse.

YOUR PRESENT MARITAL STATUS

1. Are you now (check): married ...; divorced ...; separated ...; widowed ....
2. If divorced or separated, how long have you been separated? ... months. N.B. If you are divorced or separated, answer the questions as of the time of your separation.

[1] Reproduced by permission of Ernest W. Burgess and the American Book Company. From E. W. Burgess and H. J. Locke, *The Family* (New York: American Book Company, 1945).

Part One

	1	2	3
1. Present occupation of husband (be as specific as possible) ..... If unemployed, check here ..... How satisfied are you, on the whole, with present occupation of husband? If unemployed, answer this question about his usual occupation (check): *j* extremely satisfied ...; *k* very satisfied ...; *m* satisfied ...; *n* somewhat satisfied ...; *o* somewhat dissatisfied ...; *p* dissatisfied ...; *q* very dissatisfied ...; *r* extremely dissatisfied			
2. To what extent were you in love with your spouse before marriage? (check): *u* "head over heels" ...; *v* very much so ...; *x* somewhat ...; *y* a little ...; *z* not at all	...	...	...
3. To what extent was your spouse in love with you before your marriage? (check): *u* "head over heels" ...; *v* very much so ...; *x* somewhat ...; *y* a little ...; *z* not at all	...	...	...
4. How much conflict (arguments, etc.) was there between you before your marriage? (check): *u* none at all ...; *v* a little ...; *x* some ...; *y* considerable ...; *z* very much	...	...	...
5. To what extent do you think you knew your spouse's faults and weak points before your marriage? (check): *u* not at all ...; *v* a little ...; *x* somewhat ...; *y* considerably ...; *z* very much so	...	...	...
6. To what extent do you think your spouse knew your faults and weak points before your marriage? (check): *u* not at all ...; *v* a little ...; *x* somewhat ...; *y* considerably ...; *z* very much so	...	...	...
7. What is your attitude to your father-in-law? (check): *k* like him very much ...; *l* considerably ...; *m* somewhat ...; *n* a little ...; *o* dislike him a little ...; *p* dislike him somewhat ...; *q* considerably ...; *r* very much ...; dead	...	...	...
8. What is your attitude to your mother-in-law? (check): *k* like her very much ...; *l* considerably ...; *m* somewhat ...; *n* a little ...; *o* dislike her a little ...; *p* dislike her somewhat ...; *q* considerably ...; *r* very much ...; dead	...	...	...
9. What is your attitude to having children? (check): *v* desire children very much ...; *u* a good deal ...; *w* somewhat ...; *x* a little ...; *z* not at all	...	...	...
10. If children have been born to you, what effect have they had on your happiness? (check): *i* added to it very much			

	1	2	3
...; *k* considerably ...; *m* somewhat ...; *n* a little ...; *o* have had no effect ...; *p* have decreased it a little ...; *q* somewhat ...; *r* considerably ...; *s* very much	...	...	...
11. In leisure-time activities (check): *u* we both prefer to stay at home ...; *x* we both prefer to be "on the go" ...; *y* I prefer to be on the go and my spouse to stay at home ...; *z* I prefer to stay at home and my spouse to be on the go	...	...	...
12. Do you and your spouse engage in outside interests together? (check): *u* all of them ...; *w* most of them ...; *x* some of them ...; *y* few of them ...; *z* none of them	...	...	...
13. Do you kiss your spouse (check): *u* every day ...; *v* almost every day ...; *w* quite frequently ...; *x* occasionally ...; *y* rarely ...; *z* almost never	...	...	...
14. Do you confide in your spouse (check): *u* about everything ...; *v* about most things ...; *x* about some things ...; *y* about a few things ...; *z* about nothing	...	...	...
15. Does your spouse confide in you (check): *u* about everything ...; *v* about most things ...; *x* about some things ...; *y* about a few things ...; *z* about nothing	...	...	...
16. Are you satisfied with the amount of demonstration of affection in your marriage? (check): *v* Yes .... No; *y* desire less ...; *z* desire more	...	...	...
17. Is your spouse satisfied with the amount of demonstration of affection? (check): *v* Yes .... No; *y* desires less ...; *z* desires more	...	...	...
18. How frequently do you "humor" your spouse? (check): *a* frequently ...; *b* occasionally ...; *c* rarely ...; *d* never	...	..	...
19. Has your spouse ever failed to tell you the truth? (check): *a* often ...; *b* a few times ...; *c* once ...; *d* never	...	...	...
20. If until now your marriage has been at all unhappy, how confident are you that it will work out all right in the future? (check): *m* very confident ...; *n* confident ...; *o* somewhat uncertain ...; *p* very uncertain ...; *t* marriage has not been at all unhappy	...	...	...
21. Everything considered, how happy has your marriage been for you? (check): *i* extraordinarily happy ...; *k* decidedly happy ...; *m* happy ...; *n* somewhat happy ...; *o* average ...; *p* somewhat unhappy ...; *q* unhappy ...; *r* decidedly unhappy ...; *s* extremely unhappy	...	...	...

	1	2	3
22. If your marriage is now at all unhappy, how long has it been so in months: *m* less than 3 ...; *n* 3 to 11 ...; *o* 12 or more			
23. Everything considered, how happy has your marriage been for your spouse? (check): *i* extraordinarily happy ...; *k* decidedly happy ...; *m* happy ...; *n* somewhat happy ...; *o* average ...; *p* somewhat unhappy ...; *q* unhappy ...; *r* decidedly unhappy ...; *s* extremely unhappy			
24. Indicate your approximate agreement or disagreement with your spouse on the following things. Do this for each item by putting a check in the column which shows extent of your agreement or disagreement.			

Check one column for each item below	Always agree j	Almost always agree k	Occasionally disagree l	Frequently disagree m	Almost always disagree n	Always disagree o			
Handling family finances									
Matters of recreation									
Religious matters									
Demonstration of affection									
Friends									
Table manners									
Matters of conventionality									
Philosophy of life									
Ways of dealing with your families									
Wife's working									
Intimate relations									
Caring for the baby									
Sharing of household tasks									
Politics									

25. When disagreements arise between you and your spouse they usually result in (check): *v* agreement by mutual give and take...; *y* you giving in...; *z* your spouse giving in....			

Part Two

In the following list, put a cross (X) through the 0 for the things that have occurred in your marriage but have not interfered with your happiness.

Put a cross (X) through the 1 for those things that have made your marriage less happy than it should have been.

Put a cross (X) through the 2 for the things that have done most to make your marriage unhappy.

Insufficient income	0	1	2	Spouse considerably older than I	0	1	2
Poor management of income	0	1	2	Spouse considerably younger than I	0	1	2
Lack of freedom due to marriage	0	1	2	Matters relating to in-laws	0	1	2
My spouse and I differ in							
education	0	1	2	choice of friends	0	1	2
intellectual interests	0	1	2	attitude toward drinking	0	1	2
religious beliefs	0	1	2	tastes in food	0	1	2
preferences for amusement and recreation	0	1	2	respect for conventions	0	1	2
My spouse							
is argumentative	0	1	2	is conceited	0	1	2
is not affectionate	0	1	2	is easily influenced by others	0	1	2
is narrow-minded	0	1	2	is jealous	0	1	2
is not faithful to me	0	1	2	is selfish and inconsiderate	0	1	2
complains too much	0	1	2	is too talkative	0	1	2
is lazy	0	1	2	smokes	0	1	2
is quick-tempered	0	1	2	drinks	0	1	2
criticizes me	0	1	2	swears	0	1	2
spoils the children	0	1	2				
is untruthful	0	1	2				
For the husband to fill out:							
My wife							
is slovenly in appearance	0	1	2	does not have meals ready on time	0	1	2
has had much poor health	0	1	2	interferes if I discipline children	0	1	2
is interested in other men	0	1	2	tries to improve me	0	1	2
is nervous or emotional	0	1	2	is a social climber	0	1	2
neglects the children	0	1	2	is too interested in clothes	0	1	2
is a poor housekeeper	0	1	2	is insincere	0	1	2
is not interested in my business	0	1	2				

is extravagant..... 0 1 2
lets her feelings be hurt too easily..... 0 1 2
is too interested in social affairs..... 0 1 2
has annoying habits and mannerisms..... 0 1 2
wants to visit or entertain a lot..... 0 1 2
gossips indiscreetly..... 0 1 2
nags me..... 0 1 2
interferes with my hobbies. 0 1 2
works outside the home... 0 1 2
is fussy about keeping house neat..... 0 1 2
is a poor cook..... 0 1 2
interferes with my business 0 1 2

For the wife to fill out:
My husband

pays attention to other women..... 0 1 2
is nervous or impatient.... 0 1 2
takes no interest in the children..... 0 1 2
is untidy..... 0 1 2
is always wrapped up in his business..... 0 1 2
gambles..... 0 1 2
is touchy..... 0 1 2
is not interested in the home..... 0 1 2
has vulgar habits..... 0 1 2
dislikes to go out with me evenings..... 0 1 2
is late to meals..... 0 1 2
is harsh with the children. 0 1 2
has poor table manners.... 0 1 2
lacks ambition..... 0 1 2
is tight with money..... 0 1 2
has no backbone..... 0 1 2
does not talk things over freely..... 0 1 2
is rude..... 0 1 2
is bored if I tell him of things that happen in my everyday life..... 0 1 2
is unsuccessful in his business..... 0 1 2
does not show his affection for me..... 0 1 2

Part Three

	1	2	3
1. Have you *ever* considered separating from your spouse? (check): *u* have never considered it ...; *v* not seriously ...; *x* somewhat seriously ...; *y* seriously			
2. How many serious quarrels or arguments have you had with your spouse in the past twelve months? (check): *a* 4 or more ...; *b* 3 ...; *c* 2 ...; *d* 1 ...; *e* 0	...	...	...
3. Indicate to what extent you are in love with your spouse by placing a check (√) in one square on the boxed line below which ranges from "extraordinarily in love" to "somewhat in love." If your feelings fluctuate between two points, indicate what they are by placing a check in each of the boxes.			

		1	2	3
Extraordinarily in love	A B C D E F G H I J			
Somewhat in love		...	...	...

Indicate by a cross (X) in the above the extent to which you think your spouse is in love with you. ... ...

4. How does your present love for your spouse compare with your love before marriage? (check): *i* is very much stronger ...; *k* considerably stronger ...; *l* somewhat stronger ...; *m* a little stronger ...; *n* the same ...; *o* a little weaker ...; *p* somewhat weaker ...; *q* considerably weaker ...; *r* very much weaker ....

5. If you had your life to live over, do you think you would (check): *u* marry the same person [certainly ...; *x* possibly ...;] *y* marry a different person ...; *z* not marry at all ....

6. If your spouse could do it over again, do you think your spouse would (check): *u* marry you [certainly ...; *x* possibly ...;] *y* marry a different person ...; *z* not marry at all ....

7. How satisfied, on the whole, are you with your marriage? (check): *i* entirely satisfied ...; *k* very much satisfied ...; *m* satisfied ...; *n* somewhat satisfied ...; *o* somewhat dissatisfied ...; *p* dissatisfied ...; *q* very much dissatisfied ...; *r* entirely dissatisfied ....

8. How satisfied, on the whole, is your spouse with your marriage? (check): *i* entirely satisfied ...; *k* very much satisfied ...; *m* satisfied ...; *n* somewhat satisfied ...; *o* somewhat dissatisfied ...; *p* dissatisfied ...; *q* very much dissatisfied ...; *r* entirely dissatisfied ....

9. Have you ever been ashamed of your spouse (check): *u* never ...; *x* once ...; *y* a few times ...; *z* often ....

10. Even if satisfied with your spouse, have you ever felt that you might have been at all happier if married to another type of person? (check): *u* never ...; *x* rarely ...; *y* occasionally ...; *z* frequently ....

11. Do you ever regret your marriage? (check): *u* never ...; *x* rarely ...; *y* occasionally ...; *z* frequently ....

12. Have you ever considered divorcing your spouse? (check): *u* never ...; *x* not seriously ...; *y* somewhat seriously ...; *z* seriously ....

T

Part I ....., Part II ....., Part III ....., Total .....

II. SCORING THE MARITAL ADJUSTMENT FORM

The three narrow columns at the right-hand side of each page of the Marital Adjustment Form are reserved for scoring the replies to the questions. The score values assigned are arbitrary in the sense that usually each gradation in reply differs by one point. For example, the following question is scored as follows: Do you and your spouse engage in outside interests together? (check): *j* all of them, +2; *k* most of them, +1; *l* some of them, 0; *m* few of them, −1; *n* none of them, −2. Although arbitrary, the score values are in general conformity with the findings of the studies in this field, particularly those of E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*; L. M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness*; and E. W. Burgess and Paul Wallin, *A Study of 1000 Engaged Couples* (in progress).

The letters in italics before each subdivision of the question provide the code for scoring the replies. The code value of each letter is as follows:

a ..... −2	*j* ..... +2	*s* ..... −3
b ..... −1	*k* ..... +1	*t* 0
c 0	*l* 0	*u* ..... +2
d ..... +1	*m* ..... −1	*v* ..... +1
e ..... +2	*n* ..... −2	*w* 0
f ..... +2	*o* ..... −3	*x* ..... −1
g ..... +2	*p* ..... −3	*y* ..... −2
h ..... +2	*q* ..... −3	*z* ..... −2
i ..... +3	*r* ..... −3	

III. PROCEDURE FOR SCORING

The following is the procedure for scoring the replies to the questions:

1. For each question enter in column 1 at the right-hand side of each page the letter in italics which precedes the answer which is checked for the given item.
2. Enter in column 2 all the plus scores and in column 3 all the minus scores corresponding to the appropriate code value for each letter as indicated above.
3. Add the scores in columns 2 and 3, entering them for each part; then transfer them to the appropriate place as indicated on the last page of the Marital Adjustment Form.
4. In scoring Part II of the Marriage Adjustment Form (pp. 526–27) add the numbers crossed out and enter them with a minus sign in the appropriate place on page 528.

In evaluating the total score secured on the Marriage Adjustment Form Table 23 is to be consulted.

TABLE 23. MARRIAGE ADJUSTMENT SCORES AS INDICATIVE OF ADJUSTMENT IN MARRIAGE

Marital Adjustment Scores	Adjustment in Marriage
70 to 89	Extremely well adjusted
50 to 69	Decidedly well adjusted
30 to 49	Fairly adjusted
10 to 29	Somewhat adjusted
9 to − 9	Indifferently adjusted
−10 to −29	Somewhat unadjusted
−30 to −49	Unadjusted
−50 to −69	Decidedly unadjusted
−70 to −89	Extremely unadjusted

Should any score be found above 89 or lower than −89, it should be considered as falling in the groups 70 to 89 or −70 to −89 respectively.

Chapter 16

PARENTS AND CHILDREN

In most cultures, including our own, marriage is the gateway to legitimate parenthood, but in some places the situation is reversed and parenthood is a prerequisite to marriage. Such is the case, for example, among the Aleut Indians and certain Tartar tribes of Central Asia, who do not regard the intimate relationship of male and female as binding unless a child is born. Such instances reveal society's primary interest in the successful exercise of the procreative function, and the interest is understandable since the production of children is necessary for the survival of the group. When the emphasis is on childbearing, the view may prevail that no marriage without offspring is justified, even if the pair are happy; and, conversely, that children justify a marriage, no matter if the mates are ill-adjusted to each other. This viewpoint appears to underlie the ancient practice of permitting divorce for barrenness. In more recent times a shift in emphasis has occurred from parenthood to marriage. Nowadays, in our culture, stress is laid on the happiness of the marital pair; infertility is no longer an admissible ground for divorce, and some couples deliberately choose not to have a child. The newer viewpoint seems to be that, while children are necessary for the maintenance of the group, a happy marriage is conducive to the normal development of the children.

It is commonly thought that children add to the happiness of marriage, but investigation shows that on the average marital happiness is not correlated with the presence or absence of children. This is taken to mean that while children add to the happiness of certain marriages, they detract from the happiness of others, and the two influences balance each other when large samples are involved. The low correlation probably does not mean that the influence of children

upon marriage is not great, but rather that the influence takes an opposite direction in different cases.

We are loath to admit that children can be a source of parental unhappiness, because our culture does not welcome such an admission. On the contrary, it seeks to create the illusion that children are always a joy and a comfort. This is one of the methods by which the culture exerts pressure upon women to induce them to bear and rear children, as Hollingworth [1] has effectively shown. There is frequent reference to the "maternal instinct" (which is largely a fiction), with the inference that women are constitutionally deficient and inferior unless they desire motherhood. Whistler's "Portrait of the Artist's Mother" is a symbol of what is desired of a woman. Art, law, and religion unite to exalt the mother. Innumerable jokes are heard about mothers-in-law, but motherhood is never the butt of merriment. The law makes itself felt by setting obstacles in the way of contraceptive practice, and by treating induced abortion as a criminal offense.

When sentiment is set aside, we see that childbearing involves great sacrifice for parents.[2] Sometimes in the natural world the sacrifice is complete, as in the case of certain species of animals that do not survive the birth of their young. With human beings the physical sacrifice is not so extreme, and it is even argued by some that motherhood is a healthful experience. The evidence offered in support of this position is that mothers live longer on the average than do women who fail to bear children, and mothers of large families are the longest-lived of all. If this is true, does it show that childbearing is healthful, or merely that the strongest women are able to bear the most children? Certainly motherhood is not a healthful experience for many women, if the maternal mortality and morbidity rates are valid signs.

The expectant mother supplies the child with calcium, phosphorus and other essential elements, even at the expense of her own supply, but her sacrifice does not cease with the birth of the child. The changes that a baby effects in the habits and convenience of parents are a matter of common knowledge and a source of widespread sym-

[1] Leta S. Hollingworth, "Social Devices for Impelling Women to Bear and Rear Children," *American Journal of Sociology*, 22:19–29, July, 1916.

[2] W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1940), chap. VII; especially p. 317. Also Ernest Jones, "Psychology and Childbirth," *The Lancet*, 1:695–96, June 6, 1942. In the latter a distinguished psychoanalyst reports the reactions of women to childbirth.



FIGURE 78. WHAT IS THE SAFEST AGE FOR CHILDBEARING?

Maternal mortality rate, 1937, by age of mother (United States). Apparently the safest time for bearing children is between twenty to twenty-four years of age, in which years nearly one third of all births occur. Very young mothers run a much greater risk; after the early twenties the risk increases with age. The very young may include a larger proportion of unmarried mothers and mothers of low-income classes, who are without adequate medical care, so that cultural factors rather than biological age may be responsible for the high death rate of the younger mothers. Chart from the Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor.

pathy. The interrupted sleep, endless washing of diapers, walking the floor to allay colic, talking in whispers, and walking on tiptoe, reduction in the amount of entertainment of friends and in the number of evenings out — these are only a few of the readjustments that are commonly made, all minor but in their aggregate comprising an appreciable body of frustrations. When asked to name the chief source of their fatigue, 97 per cent of a group of mothers replied "care of children," whereas only 38 per cent mentioned "care of house" and 7 per cent "preparation of food." [1] Another study showed that the

[1] Ruth Lindquist, *The Family in the Present Social Order* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1931), p. 35.

coming of the first child adds anywhere from 45 to 80 per cent to the household duties. The time per week spent in care of children under three years of age was fifteen and a half hours in farm homes and thirty hours in homes in large cities.[1] For a woman who has followed a profession or a career before marriage, motherhood usually means an interruption of the career, at least during the pre-school years. Where the child is wanted, the adjustment is willingly made, but even then there must sometimes be some conflict in the minds of those who are ambitious. This is particularly true in our highly competitive culture, which makes so much of worldly success, yet expects women to lessen their chances of achieving it by having children. The inconsistencies of our cultural pattern find their counterpart in the mental conflicts of many women.

Children call for sacrifices, but for most women the sacrifices are more than offset by the satisfactions. If this were not so, few women would bear children in this age of effective contraception. The point to be stressed is that happiness results from willing self-sacrifice to the needs of one's group, not from pursuing personal ends. Parents recognize this when they say that children are a lot of bother, but are worth it. The satisfactions that parents get from their children are too numerous to catalogue here, but an important one is the sense of satisfaction which comes from being needed. The love of mates is the love of equals, but the love of a little child is the love of a dependent. Children also afford excitement and a chance to relive the happy times of one's own childhood. There are fewer dull moments if children are about. Children also extend the range of one's interests, since parents become identified with the things that concern their children. In this way they take a greater interest in the schools and in the community generally, and are more highly socialized because of parenthood. Through one's children it is possible also to try to achieve the things in life which one has wanted but has not been able to get. Children are used by parents to satisfy their own thwarted ambitions.[2] Much of the so-called sacrifice of parents is motivated by this desire to improve their own status by means of the achievements of their children. This can be a dangerous tendency if it ignores the child's own wishes and potentialities. Parents who are frustrated in their own striving

[1] Hildegarde Kneeland, "Woman's Economic Contribution in the Home," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 143:33–40, 1929.

[2] Kimball Young, "Parent-Child Relationships: Projection of Ambition," *The Family*, 8:67, May, 1927.

for power or affection can almost always, if they are unscrupulous, tyrannize over their children or exploit them emotionally. Thus the effects of parents on children need to be considered as well as the effects of children on parents.

The effect of a child upon his parents depends upon the attitude of the parents toward the coming of the child and is likely to be favorable where the child is wanted. Observations of sterile marriages show that they sometimes become fertile after the adoption of a child.[1] It is thought that the sterility in such cases is partly due to an



FIGURE 79. THE "IDEAL" NUMBER OF CHILDREN

The number of children considered "ideal" by 11,707 Maryland youth. The median number of living children in the parental families was 4.7, while the "ideal" number mentioned by the youth was two less. Adapted from Bell, *Youth Tell Their Story*, p. 37.

[1] H. F. Perkins, "Adoption and Fertility," *Eugenical News*, 21:95–101, September–October, 1936.

overanxiousness for children which inhibits somewhat the functioning of the thyroid and other glands. When a child is adopted, the anxiety is allayed, the body is restored to normal functioning, and conception results. However, the evidence to support this theory is not good, since important variables are not controlled. Something more than the desire for children may be involved, or the birth of a child may have occurred even if adoption had not previously been resorted to.

Infertility and Infecundity

In all probability, nearly every young person in our culture who contemplates getting married would like to become a parent and counts parenthood as one of the main reasons for marriage. Studies [1] of student attitudes show a widespread desire for children among college undergraduates, with two or three children as the number most frequently desired.

Yet the incidence of childlessness in the United States is high and appears to be increasing. In 1940, about one in six or seven native-white women who were married and living with their husbands reported reaching the age of forty-five without ever having borne a child. These data are particularly meaningful because women forty-five years old and over have generally completed their families and passed beyond the fecund period. In 1940, the percentage of such childless women was 15.6, whereas in 1910 it was 9.3.[2] It will be noted that these figures are for unbroken unions; that is, marriages where the husband and wife are living together and where, therefore, there exists the maximum opportunity for producing offspring. But the amount of childlessness is not much greater for married women of the same age group reporting the husband absent; for this group the figure is 16.4 per cent.

The figures cited are averages for the population as a whole, but there are important differentials according to type of community, socio-economic status, education, and age at marriage. Nearly one

[1] Stuart Rice, "Undergraduate Attitudes Toward Marriage and Children," *Mental Hygiene*, 13:788–93, October, 1929; Howard M. Bell, *Youth Tell Their Story* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1938), pp. 36–37; Wayne C. Neely, "Family Attitudes of Denominational College and University Students, 1929 and 1936," *American Sociological Review*, 5:512–22, August, 1940. In a survey of University of Mississippi students, there was no relation between the number of children desired and the size of the family from which the students came. Gilbert A. Sanford, "Research Note on Desired Family Size," *Social Forces*, 22:87–88, October, 1943.

[2] Bureau of the Census, *Population-Differential Fertility, 1940 and 1910: Women by Number of Children Ever Born* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945). Computed from Tables 13 and 15.

in five urban native-white married women reaches the end of her fecund period without becoming a mother, and in large cities the proportion is somewhat higher; on farms the ratio is about half as great, or approximately one in ten. There is less childlessness among farm women because there is less contraceptive knowledge and practice among them, and they may also suffer from fewer constitutional disabilities that lead to involuntary infertility. Another reason is the younger age at which farm women generally marry. Fertility is more closely related to age than to any other demographic factor. When a woman (native white, married once, husband present) marries under eighteen years of age, the chances of her remaining permanently childless are about one in thirty, whereas her chances are one in ten if she married at twenty or twenty-one, and they are greater than one in five if she waits until she is twenty-seven to twenty-nine years old to be married. Girls who graduate from college usually postpone marriage until their middle or late twenties and for this reason among others lessen their chances of fertility. There is, in general, a positive relation between amount of education and probability of childlessness. Only 8.6 per cent of the women, married, forty-five years old and over, who did not complete a single year of school, were childless in 1940, while the figure for the corresponding group of women college graduates was 25.7 per cent.

Why is there so much permanent childlessness? Is it largely voluntary or involuntary? In a sample of 1223 women who came to a birth-control clinic for help, it was estimated that only about 6 per cent were voluntarily childless at the time.[1] In all probability the amount of voluntary childlessness would be even smaller after an additional period of years, because the average duration of marriage of these childless couples was less than five years and most of the wives were working away from home. These women, however, are not very useful for the purpose of indicating the relative proportions of voluntary and involuntary factors in childlessness, because they are likely to be more fertile than the average run of women. For our purposes, we need studies of representative samples of childless women, not highly selected groups. Studies of marriages of long duration would also be more meaningful, and best of all would be studies of completed families. Unfortunately the early studies were few in number, not care-

[1] Regine K. Stix and Frank W. Notestein, *Controlled Fertility* (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1940), p. 72.

fully controlled, and contradictory in their findings. Lorimer and Osborn,[1] analyzing sixty childless women of completed fertility, concluded that from two thirds to three fourths were involuntarily childless, whereas Popenoe [2] reports from his study of 862 histories of childless couples that about two thirds were voluntarily so. Neither sample was, however, representative of the general population.

A more carefully controlled study made by Kiser [3] concerns a group of 411 childless women in New York City who were white, under fifty years of age, and married ten years or more. Of the 291 who had never been pregnant, more than three fourths reported that they had never used contraception; about two thirds expressed disappointment in their childlessness; and 57 per cent indicated that they had sought medical treatment for their problem. Kiser concludes that most permanent childlessness is probably involuntary, and that however prevalent may be the practice of contraception for the purpose of spacing and postponing pregnancies, the practice does not account for the major share of permanent childlessness. The New York women married at a later age than the average in the same community, which would contribute to the proportion of involuntary childlessness among them, but Kiser does not believe this is a major factor, because marriages of women over forty were excluded from his sampling.

Kiser's findings are not greatly out of line with those of a more recent survey of the factors affecting fertility of 41,498 native-white couples in Indianapolis, which showed that 14.3 per cent of the couples married twelve to fourteen years were childless.[4] Preliminary figures based on hand counts of a part of the schedules showed that of the couples in the childless group, 64 per cent were reported to be involuntarily childless.[5] The actual percentage of involuntary childlessness is probably somewhat higher than the reports indicate, since some of the women who testify that they have regularly sought to prevent pregnancy may be sterile without knowing it, and would

[1] F. Lorimer and F. Osborn, *Dynamics of Population* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), pp. 257–58. The authors use the women included in the Davis series, Katherine B. Davis, *Factors in the Sex-Life of Twenty-Two Hundred Women* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1929).

[2] Paul Popenoe, "Motivation of Childless Marriages," *Journal of Heredity*, XVII: 469–72, December, 1936.

[3] Clyde V. Kiser, "Voluntary and Involuntary Aspects of Childlessness," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 80:525–39, February, 1939.

[4] Warren Thompson, *Population Problems* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1942), p. 202.

[5] It is believed that a ratio of this general magnitude holds for the total group. Correspondence with Milbank Memorial Fund, dated January 2, 1946.

not have conceived even if they had not resorted to contraception.

The most plausible explanation for the increase in childlessness in recent decades is probably that it reflects an increase in the mount of involuntary as well as voluntary infertility.[1] It is very doubtful if there has been any genetic or inherited reduction of the reproductive vigor of the human race, for the changes in fertility are of recent date, covering too short a time for a genetic change to have occurred. Nor is the age at marriage responsible, since this has not risen in the United States in recent decades. The most likely explanation for the increase in involuntary infertility, if real, is that its causes are environmental, consisting of debilitating influences associated with modern city life; for example, sedentary habits; soft, rich foods; and the nervous, hurried pace. Our experience with zoos shows that some animals do not breed well in captivity. Urban man may not live in captivity, but the city is the most artificial environment in which man has ever lived. For tens of thousands of years, first as a hunter and then as a farmer, man lived an active, vigorous physical life in the out-of-doors. It would be strange indeed if he were not ill-adapted to the new, artificial conditions. Man's experience with the new conditions has been very limited, however. Given time, man may learn to make a more satisfactory adjustment.

Childlessness is regarded by many as an important social problem because it is a highly influential factor affecting the size of the population, but we are here concerned with the more personal aspects of infertility. Couples wanting children are greatly disappointed if they have none, and in some cases feel frustrated and inferior. About half of the childless women in the New York study, it will be recalled, sought medical advice on their problem.

A diagnosis of sterility is made if no conception occurs within two years of normal sex relations without contraceptives. A woman either conceives or she does not, from which it is easy to draw the erroneous conclusion that fertility is an absolute condition, an all or none proposition, when as a matter of fact most conceptions occur in spite of imperfections in the conceptive mechanism.[2] This is not the place to consider the causes of sterility, which are within the province

[1] Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1942), chap. XIII.

[2] In only three out of every ten cases of childless couples coming to a distinguished gynecologist for treatment could a classification of complete or absolute sterility be made. Samuel R. Meaker, *Human Sterility* (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1934), p. 3.



FIGURE 80. EXAMINATION FOR STERILITY

A microscopic view of a defective seminal specimen containing a few normal spermatozoa. Fertility in the male is established by an examination of the number, movement, and form of the spermatozoa. In the above sample, the total number is reduced; only one in three is active; and there are deformed, immature, and degenerate types. The examination of the female is more difficult, but the male is a cause in from one third to one half of all cases of sterility and should be examined first. From William H. Cary, "Examination of Semen with Special Reference to Its Gynecological Aspects," *The American Journal of Obstetrics and Diseases of Women and Children*, vol. LXXIV, no. 4 (1916), Fig. 10, p. 17. Used with the permission of the author.

of the physician, except to say that in the typical case several factors are usually involved,[1] and a change in any one or all of them may be necessary to assure fertility. The most frequent causes are gonorrhea in men, and endocrine disturbances and puerperal infections in women, including those which follow from induced abortion. Sterility may result from the after-effects of infectious diseases, such as mumps and tuberculosis; or it may result from lead poisoning, overexposure to X-rays, and vaginal acidity. There may also be psychological causes,

[1] The average childless couple presents 3.2 factors which limit fertility. Samuel L. Siegler, *Fertility in Women* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1944).

as is suggested by the experience of some infertile women who upon adoption of a child become fertile. The resolution of a deep-seated mental conflict is also said to lead to the restoration of fertility in some cases,[1] but the evidence is not good.

Inherited causes probably account for only a small fraction of sterile marriages, but a highly significant recent discovery concerns genetic incompatibility, or the possibility that the blood cells in certain unions are lethal in their effect upon one another. The two types of incompatible blood have been identified as that possessing the Rh positive factor and that lacking the factor, hence called Rh negative.[2] When an Rh positive male mates with an Rh negative female and the female conceives, her baby in embryo may be threatened with death if its blood carries the Rh positive factor, because such blood is incompatible with the blood of the mother. The disease caused by Rh incompatibility, called erythroblastosis, is responsible for more infant deaths than any other inherited condition, and perhaps for more than all of them put together.[3] The disease may result in spontaneous abortion, in stillbirth, or in death shortly after birth. A woman who is Rh negative and mated to an Rh positive male may have one or two normal children, but after that her babies may die. The explanation is as follows: When the blood of the mother without the Rh factor mingles with even less than one cubic centimeter of the Rh positive blood of her baby, anti-bodies (the disease-fighting organisms in the Rh negative blood) are developed which set out to destroy the red corpuscles in the Rh positive blood just as if they were disease-causing bacteria. If the infant has received the Rh factor from his father [4] while his mother lacks it, enough of the baby's blood may pass through the placenta to stimulate the mother to produce the anti-bodies which, returning to the foetus, destroy it. The first baby may escape destruction because it takes time for the mother's blood to develop the anti-bodies, unless these have already been developed by a previous Rh positive blood transfusion.

[1] Kenneth Kelley, "Sterility in the Female with Special Reference to Psychic Factors," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 4:211–22, April, 1942.

[2] So-called because it was first observed in the rhesus monkey. Not all sub-human primates have the Rh factor; it is absent in chimpanzees.

[3] Science Service, News Release, August 27, 1945. The disease also kills more infants than syphilis.

[4] The Rh factor is a dominant trait, so a child with one parent who has only genes for the Rh factor and one parent who lacks such genes will always be Rh positive. About one half the Rh positive fathers, however, also carry Rh negative genes, in which case the child has a 50–50 chance of inheriting the Rh negative part. There is, of course, no danger if both parents are Rh positive or Rh negative, or if the mother is positive and the father negative.

Fifteen per cent of white men and women in the United States are Rh negative and 85 per cent Rh positive.[1] The chances that an Rh positive man will marry an Rh negative woman are about one in eleven, yet erythroblastosis occurs only once in four hundred births. The explanation is that the placenta must be defective for the disease to occur.

The discovery of the Rh factor is recent and methods of dealing with the problem are still imperfect. The lives of babies have been saved by Rh negative blood transfusions, but sometimes these offspring are born feebleminded. Studies in the United States show that a much larger percentage of feebleminded children are Rh positive with Rh negative mothers than would be expected on the basis of chance, indicating that the baby's brain may be damaged before birth. As a precaution, some doctors advise that couples determine their Rh factor before marriage (while having the Wassermann test required by many states), and that no blood transfusions be given to a young woman or a newborn baby unless consideration is given to the Rh factor, or unless plasma which lacks red cells is used.

In recent decades, great strides forward have been taken in the treatment of sterility, and doubtless many couples now infertile and wishing children could have them if they sought the assistance of a competent gynecologist.[2] This is the implication of a report that of every one hundred involuntary childless marriages at least one third would prove fruitful if the husband and wife co-operated in obtaining expert treatment and study of their problem.[3] The examination of the husband is as important as that of the wife, since he may contribute to the infertility in as many as half the cases.[4] Before medical science discovered the husband's part in sterility, it was generally assumed that the wife was always to blame, and this erroneous idea is still widespread. We can now look back upon past history and see with what gross injustice women have had to bear the whole burden of humiliation and censure for barrenness.

[1] Racial variations are indicated by the fact that 99 per cent of Chinese are Rh positive.

[2] A directory of sterility clinics in the United States and other information regarding treatment may be obtained from the Planned Parenthood Federation, 501 Madison Avenue, New York City.

[3] Dr. William H. Cary, Woman's Hospital, New York City, in a letter to the writer. If the grossly incurable cases are eliminated, cures may be effected in as many as one half the sterile unions. Robert L. Dickinson and William M. Cary, "Sterility," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 88:1–6, January 1, 1927.

[4] Robert S. Hotchkiss, *Fertility in Men* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1944).



FIGURE 81. DAY OF OVULATION — RHESUS MONKEY

The data for women are thought to be roughly the same. The first day of menstruation is counted day 1. Graph A, day of ovulation determined by palpation; graph B, day of ovulation checked by recovery of eggs or embryos; graph C, black, A and B combined; white, 108 cases previously reported in Hartman, *Time of Ovulation in Women*, p. 180. From Carl G. Hartman, *Pacific Coast Lectures*, p. 15. Reprinted from the *Western Journal of Surgery, Obstetrics and Gynecology*, February, March, April, 1944.

It is an old Biblical observation that the female sex-cycle is marked by periodic sterility and fertility, but only recently has the physiological basis of these changes been understood, thereby making possible the calculation of the fertile period. The date of ovulation has been

studied most satisfactorily in the rhesus monkey where the facts may be objectively ascertained by palpation of the ovaries and by recovery of eggs and embryos. The distribution of 316 ovulations by date of occurrence, shown graphically in Figure 81, indicates that they are concentrated on the twelfth and thirteenth days after the onset of the menses, one half of the ovulations occurring on these two days. The "normal" spread of the ovulation days was from day eight to day seventeen, only six cases occurring beyond the seventeenth day.

It is helpful to consider these data for the rhesus monkey in terms of probability of conception on different days in the menstrual cycle, as measured by the number of chances out of one thousand. These chances are set out in Table 24. It will be noted that there are five consecutive days before the first day of menstruation and seven days following, on which the chances of conception are zero out of one thousand, and other days on which the chances are only three, six, or nine in one thousand. To interpret these figures properly, some sense of probability is required. The chances of drawing the ace of spades out of a pack of cards are one in fifty-two, or approximately twenty in one thousand.

These figures relate to the date of ovulation. For conception to occur, the male sperm must, of course, unite with an ovum of the female, and normally not more than one ovum a month is released by the ovaries. As regards the chances of conception, allowance must be made for the life-span of the ovum and the sperm. The ovum, after its release, lives a very short time, probably not more than eight or ten hours, on the average. Some students give an outside estimate of twenty-four hours, but there is no exact figure. The sperm live longer, perhaps from twelve to twenty-four hours, although some gynecologists make a generous estimate of seventy-two hours. An allowance of three days before and after the period of ovulation may, therefore, be made for the viability of the sperm and the susceptibility of ova.

The data for ovulation in women are not so easily or accurately determined, but the reports from most wives are roughly like those for the rhesus monkeys, and practically all close students of the subject think that the findings from the monkeys are relevant.[1] The sexual physiology of the monkey shows remarkable resemblance to that of human beings in length of menstrual cycle as well as in periodic

[1] C. G. Hartman, *Time of Ovulation in Women: A Study on the Fertile Period in the Menstrual Cycle* (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1936).

TABLE 24. THE CHANCES OF CONCEPTION AT DIFFERENT DATES IN THE MENSTRUAL CYCLE *

Days after First Day of Menstruation	Chances out of 1000 (Based on 316 cases)
1	0
2	0
3	0
4	0
5	0
6	0
7	0
8	9
9	51
10	114
11	168
12	231
13	240
14	111
15	70
16	44
17	9
18	6
19	3
20	6
21	0
22	0
23	3
24	0
25	0
26	0
27	0
28	0

* These data are for the rhesus monkey, based on accompanying graph from Hartman. The irregularity at the end of the curve is due to the small number of cases involved. A larger sample would give a more symmetrical curve and a smoother set of probabilities.

changes in ovaries, vagina, and uterus. It is not yet certain whether ovulation may not occasionally occur at any time of the cycle, but the eighth to twentieth days after the first day of menstruation constitute for the vast majority of women the period during which ovulation generally occurs.

In the interest of fertility, there is considerable advantage in having more precise knowledge as to when ovulation occurs in a given individual. A sudden drop in the basal body temperature, followed by a sudden rise, generally signals the time of ovulation.[1] The body temperature is maintained at a relatively low level during the first or follicular phase of the menstrual cycle, drops suddenly to its lowest

[1] *Human Fertility*, 10:87, September, 1945.

point at the time of ovulation, and rises abruptly thereafter to remain at a higher level throughout the second or pregestational phase of the cycle.

Adoption

If a couple wishes a child and cannot have one of their own, it is possible for them to adopt one. This solution is actually used by a great many. It is estimated that adoptions in the United States average between sixteen thousand and seventeen thousand a year.[1] Not all of these foster parents are childless, for in some cases children are adopted as playmates for one's own children, especially in the case of only children. Some adoptions are made by relatives who wish to help meet a family necessity. Discussions of this subject usually mention that the demand for foster children exceeds the supply, and it is true that there are long waiting lists, especially at the better child-placing agencies. But it may be asked if the shortage of children for purposes of adoption is not occasioned by the excess of orphanages in the United States, and the unwillingness of these institutions to part with their charges, although it is generally conceded that a good private home is better for a child than a good institution.[2]

Adoption is part of our culture, but it cannot be said to be popular, because most people have some reservations about the advisability of the practice. In any case, most childless couples do not take advantage of it. The situation is far different in other societies, like that of the Eskimo, where adoption is much more common. If an Eskimo family has two daughters, they may give one to a neighboring family which does not have a daughter. It is recognized that a woman is handicapped in housekeeping if she does not have a daughter to help her, and the Eskimos believe in sharing. When a white visitor expressed some surprise that Eskimo mothers would be willing to part with their own children, the Eskimos replied that they could not understand how the white man could be so selfish in his attitude.

[1] *Social Work Yearbook* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1937), p. 23. There are no nation-wide figures on adoption. The estimate is based on the data for certain states.

[2] The oversupply of orphanages is due to the fact that people have left large sums of money to these agencies. It appears to be easier to raise money for orphan children than for any other philanthropic purpose, because of the sentimental factor involved. In some places, like the Philadelphia area, the sums of money available for the institutional care of orphans is so great that social agencies have called upon the courts in an effort to prevent still further pouring of money into this channel, but the courts have been reluctant to interfere, on the grounds that to do so would destroy the confidence of benefactors that their wishes would be respected after death.



FIGURE 82. LENGTH OF MARRIAGE OF ADOPTIVE PARENTS (AT TIME OF CHILD'S ADOPTION)

The median age of adoptive parents (34.9 years for mothers, 39.3 years for fathers) is older than that of true parents, a fact that may have important consequences for the child's personality and welfare. An average of ten years elapses between marriage and the adoption of the first child. Data based on study of 2414 illegitimate children adopted in Minnesota from 1918 to 1928. A. M. Fahey, "Some Characteristics of Adoptive Parents," *American Journal of Sociology*, 38:548–63, 1932–33.

The reluctance of most persons, even childless couples, to adopt a child in modern urban society is understandable. What with child labor and compulsory school attendance laws, the labor of children is not so useful or extensive as in hunting or farming cultures. Nor is the domestic need for the labor of young children so great where there are canned goods, restaurants, labor-saving household appliances, and domestic servants. Among preliterates, moreover, the few families that make up the small communities are well acquainted with one another, and so can have more confidence in adoption than modern big city families who are mostly strangers to one another. A char-

acteristic attitude toward the unfamiliar is suspicion, and in the case of children available for adoption, there is often a fear that they may turn out to be inferior. There may actually be some basis for this fear, for it seems to be true in general that children available for adoption in our culture have an hereditary basis somewhat poorer than the average in mental ability.[1] Some couples are, of course, sentimentally opposed to adoption of any child whatever, even one who is demonstrably superior, because he is not their own flesh and blood.

Some of the reservations regarding adoption which exist in our society, however, stem from ignorance about present methods of placement. While there is considerable variation in practice among child-placing agencies, some make an effort to match the child and the prospective foster parents, in intelligence, social background, race, religion, even physical appearance, so that in many cases it is not possible to tell by looking at an adopted child that he is not the parents' own child. It may be noted in passing, however, that children do not always resemble their own parents. The matching of foster parent and child is done after careful investigation of both parties by trained case workers. If the child to be adopted has any defects, these appear in the record. Although it is possible that there may be hidden or latent defects which may be disclosed later on, such defects are rare and in most instances can be detected fairly early, as in the case of feeblemindedness. While there are risks in adoption even under the best auspices, it is doubtful if they are as great as the risks which are taken by parents in producing children of their own. In many modern marriages, the couple know little about each other's genealogy. Under the circumstances the chances of getting a defective child are probably greater than when a child is supplied by an accredited agency. If the foster child is found to be defective or uncongenial, he may be returned within the probationary period, which usually ranges from six months to a year. The better agencies employ social workers who study the situation and protect the child as well as the prospective foster parents. A public placement agency in a city of 900,000 population made eighty unfavorable recommendations in reporting on 648 adoptive homes during a five-year period. In fifty-two of these eighty cases, the basic reason for the rejection was the

[1] Frank N. Freeman, *Individual Differences* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1934), p. 128.

unfitness of the adoptive parents for rearing a child.[1] By way of contrast, the free-lance placers, who are numerous, arrange for new parents without benefit of the advice of experts in child-placement, and in some cases "market" children for "profit."

If the child supplied by an accredited agency is taken young enough and has normal health and intelligence, his personality can largely be molded by the foster parents, since habits and attitudes are a matter of conditioning by environmental stimuli. This is probably one reason why the demand is greatest for young children. The child's I.Q. may likewise be influenced by his foster home environment, as shown by a study [2] of seventy-four foster children who were examined before and after placement in foster homes. The average age at time of placement was eight years, and the average period of residence in the foster home at time of re-examination was four years The average I.Q. at adoption was 95, and four years later the average I.Q. had risen to 102.5, with an average gain of ten points for those foster children reared in homes rated as "superior." Of special interest is the fact that the correlation between the I.Q.'s of the foster children and the own children was .34, compared to a correlation of .5 between the I.Q.'s of siblings reared together. In other words, these adopted children tended to resemble their foster brothers and sisters in test intelligence almost as much as did brothers and sisters who were reared together. There was no evidence in this study that the foster children were selected for intelligence.

There is always the risk that during the probationary period the foster parents may find the child unsuitable and feel compelled to return him to the agency, and sometimes this is a great shock to the child's ego. Even when the child and his foster parents are well satisfied with one another, the child's unusual domestic history may result in his developing feelings of insecurity. The child who grows up knowing that he is adopted will generally be disposed to accept the idea without the emotional disturbance which results in cases where the child first learns of the adoption in later life, but there is a special danger that the foster child will lack normal self-confidence, unless preventive measures are taken.

[1] Maud Morlock, "Babies on the Market," *Survey Midmonthly*, March, 1945. Reprinted for the Children's Bureau.

[2] F. N. Freeman, K. J. Holzinger, and B. C. Mitchell, "The Influence of Environment on the Intelligence, School Achievement, and Conduct of Foster-Children," *Twenty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, 1928, Part I, chap. 9, pp. 103–217.

Illegitimacy

Many of the children who are placed out for adoption are the offspring of unmarried mothers.[1] Illegitimacy would thus seem to have a useful social function in helping to supply the demand for children, although society does not regard this as sufficient justification for illegitimacy. Indeed, the attitude of the group toward unmarried mothers is generally unfavorable, if not repressive. In some societies, virginity before marriage is not highly esteemed, yet the birth of a child to an unmarried mother is frowned upon. There are not many places where childbirth apart from marriage is tolerated, unless the marriage follows. Illegitimacy is not tolerated because to do so would be to undermine the system of legal marriage and parenthood, which aims to assure every child a male adult to help take care of him. Mankind has learned from long experience that this is usually the best arrangement for the child, and for the mother as well.

From this it will be seen that the basic cause of illegitimacy is marriage, in the sense that illegitimacy would not exist except for various sexual proscriptions and prescriptions required by marriage.[2] Illegitimacy expresses a conflict between culture and the original nature of man. Only the married may bear children, but many single persons have difficulty in conforming to this sanction. The difficulty is accentuated by the postponement of marriage beyond puberty or early adolescence, as well as by the taboos against contraception and abortion.[3] If contraceptive information were democratically dissemi-

[1] A study made by the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Labor showed that about 60 per cent of the children who came before the courts for adoption were of illegitimate birth. Of children adopted by persons other than relatives, almost three fourths were of illegitimate birth. About 60 per cent of the adoptions are by non-relatives. Maud Morlock, "A Community's Responsibility for the Child Born Out of Wedlock," unnumbered, Children's Bureau Publication, p. 2. See also Agnes K. Hanna, "The Interrelationship Between Illegitimacy and Adoption," *Child Welfare League of America Bulletin*, vol. 16, number 7 (September, 1937).

[2] Kingsley Davis, "Illegitimacy and the Social Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, 45:215–33, September, 1939; also by the same author, "The Forms of Illegitimacy," *Social Forces*, 18:77–89, October, 1939.

[3] This view is supported by some interesting information concerning the Trobriand Islanders supplied by Malinowski. He reports that although the young people have pre-marital sex experience, pregnancies are comparatively rare. He estimates on the basis of their genealogies that only about one per cent of the births involve unmarried mothers, a rate appreciably lower than our own. Malinowski is unable to account for this, but is unequivocal in his belief that no contraception is practiced. He thinks abortions may have been resorted to, but is unable to furnish any data on this point. There is also the purely biological question as to whether random sex relations begun at an early age provide some sort of immunity. The answer is not clear, but it may be noted that the early sex life does not prevent conception later in marriage. It seems that Malinowski has overlooked the age factor. There is usually about a two-year gap between the onset of menstruation and the capacity to conceive, which means that early marriage, such

nated, with sterilization for those unable to assimilate the information and if abortion were permitted in case of accidents, illegitimacy would be rare or nonexistent. However, to introduce such changes would be to disturb profoundly the existing moral order and jeopardize the position of marriage.

The importance of cultural factors in illegitimacy is suggested by the rates for Negroes, which are especially high. Negroes contribute about eight times their proportionate share of illegitimacy.[1] It has been estimated that perhaps 15 per cent of all Negro births are illegitimate.[2] However, the causes are cultural rather than racial, for the high rates of Negro illegitimacy are not constant, as they would be if genetic factors were dominant. At the turn of the century the rate was much higher, and is estimated by Du Bois to have been about 25 per cent. In Maryland, in 1928, the rate was only a little lower, 20.7 per 100 live births, whereas in certain Northern towns the rate is very low, and in some cases it is zero. The high rates are chiefly in the South, where the simple rural folk society of Negroes does not define illegitimacy as a social problem.[3]

Numerous studies show that unmarried mothers of all races coming to the attention of social agencies are in general an inferior group, economically, mentally, and emotionally. In every one hundred cases of unmarried mothers on the records of a city agency dealing with this problem, thirty-seven had been domestic servants, thirteen had been waitresses, and fifteen were schoolgirls. The rest consisted chiefly of clerks, telephone operators, and factory workers.[4] Two samples of unmarried prospective mothers showed only about one fifth to be of normal intelligence.[5] It should be noted here that cases

as occurs among the Trobrianders, would tend to forestall illegitimacy which would otherwise result. Bronislaw Malinowski, *The Sexual Life of Savages* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929).

[1] The rates per one thousand total births in 1929 were 17.2 for white mothers, 140.5 for Negro mothers. The number of cases reported were 33,696 for Negroes, as against 30,465 for whites. *Births, Stillbirths, and Infant Mortality Statistics for the Birth Registration Area of the United States, 1929* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932), p. 13, Table P.

[2] E. F. Frazier, "Analysis of Statistics on Negro Illegitimacy in the United States," *Social Forces:* 11:249–57, December, 1932.

[3] For fuller discussion, see Chapter 7.

[4] C. Mathews, "Case Work with Unmarried Mothers," *The Family*, 13:185–90, October, 1932.

[5] The distribution of the intelligence quotients of 84 prospective unmarried mothers was as follows: 90–109 (normal), 19 per cent; 80–89 (dull), 26.2 per cent; 70–79 (borderline), 20 per cent; 50–69 (moron), 23 per cent; 25–49 (imbecile), 3 per cent. (W. E. McClure and B. Goldberg, "Intelligence of Unmarried Mothers," *Psychological Clinic*, 18:119–27, May, 1929.) Another study of 161 unmarried mothers yielded a median intelligence quotient of 76. Only 20 per cent were of normal intelligence. (W. E. McClure, "Intelligence of Unmarried Mothers," *Psychological Clinic*, 20:154–57, 1931.)

coming to the attention of social agencies are highly selected for economic status, since unmarried mothers of the middle and upper classes are much better able to look after themselves and hence are less likely to find their way to such agencies. Moreover, illegitimate pregnancies on the upper economic levels are more often taken care of by abortion or by subsequent marriage. During the war years of the early nineteen-forties, however, reports reaching the Children's Bureau in Washington, D.C., indicated that the unmarried mothers coming to the attention of social agencies and maternity homes were from a wider range of educational, economic, and social backgrounds than in earlier years and included a larger percentage of school teachers, secretaries, and office workers. The reports indicated that these new agency cases, like the old, were mostly young girls. The youth of unmarried mothers is indicated by Table 25, which gives the proportion of illegitimate births to one hundred total births for mothers of various ages. Forty-six per cent of the unmarried mothers reported to the Bureau of the Census in 1942 were from fifteen to nineteen years of age.

Illegitimate births involve fathers as well as mothers, but one would scarcely guess this from the paucity of available information regarding unmarried fathers. Such scant evidence as we have pictures them as resembling the mothers in respect to social characteristics. The unmarried father is generally young, but often a few years older than the mother. In a large proportion of the agency cases, he is an unskilled worker, frequently unemployed or irregularly employed. Small earnings make the support of the child difficult or impossible. Sometimes the father is willing to assume his responsibilities for the child, but usually he tries to avoid them.[1]

In connection with the establishment of paternity, several states[2] permit the court, on motion of the defendant, to order the mother, her child, and the defendant to submit to one or more blood-grouping tests to determine whether or not the defendant can be excluded as being the father of the child. Such tests, which are reliable to the

[1] Maud Morlock, *The Fathers of Children Born Out of Wedlock.* Mimeographed, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, March 1, 1939. Also *The Unmarried Father* (papers and discussion given at the session on unmarried parenthood of the National Conference of Social Work, Grand Rapids, Michigan, May 29 and 30, 1940. Processed. 63 pp.). Available from Youth Consultation Service, 456 High Street, Newark, New Jersey.

[2] New York, Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Ohio, as of January 1, 1940. Blood tests have been used in European courts since 1924 and are compulsory in Sweden.

TABLE 25. RATIO OF ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS TO 1000 TOTAL BIRTHS BY AGE OF MOTHER, 1929 *

10–14	649.4
15–19	120.8
20–24	29.9
25–29	11.7
30–34	7.6
35–39	8.3
40–44	7.4
45 and over	10.6

* Bureau of the Census, *Births, Stillbirths, and Infant Mortality Statistics*, 1929; adapted from Table Q, p. 15.

point of demonstration, cannot prove paternity, but they can prove that the accused is not the father of the child. Where the result of the test does not show non-paternity, it is inconclusive and is, therefore, not admissible as evidence. A review of 319 blood tests made in the State of New York shows that nearly 10 per cent resulted in proof of non-paternity.[1] These men were cleared of the charges, but one wonders in how many other cases, where the evidence is inconclusive, men are falsely accused, perhaps with disastrous results to their reputations. There is a serious problem of protecting women and children against exploitation by unscrupulous men, but the evidence just cited shows there is also not a little danger the other way around.

Illegitimacy and social policy

The social treatment of unmarried mothers in the United States has passed through several stages.[2] At first it was thought that the only suitable treatment was to punish the mother by ostracizing her socially, as dramatically described by Hawthorne in *The Scarlet Letter*. Rather than endure such plight, unmarried mothers tended to abandon their babies, and "foundling homes" were established to care for these waifs. Gradually the concept developed that the children ought not to suffer for the sins of their mothers, and about the year 1850, "maternity homes" were established where unmarried prospective

[1] Sidney B. Schatkin, "Paternity Proceedings in New York," *New York Law Journal*, January 9, 10, 11, and 12, 1940. For discussion of the legal and medical aspects see also Sidney B. Schatkin and Philip Levine, "Paternity Blood Tests," *New Jersey Law Journal*, October 5, 1939; and Clyde E. Keeler, *Blood Group Tests as Evidence of Non-Paternity in Illegitimacy Cases* (rev. ed.), Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 1939.

[2] A. M. Donahue, "Children Born Out of Wedlock," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 151:162–72, September, 1930.

mothers were given shelter and care until the child was born. Then, as a rule, the mother was separated from her child and released from the institution, while the child remained to be cared for by the agency. At present, illegitimacy is regarded as a problem in social case work,[1] with each case requiring individual diagnosis and treatment. The aim is not to punish, but to help effect as good an adjustment for the unmarried mother and her child as possible. It has been established that generally the interests of mother and child are best served if they are permitted to remain together, and that the exceptionally high death rate of illegitimate children is in no small measure due to their separation from their mothers. In addition, the policy at present is to hold the parents of an illegitimate child responsible for his maintenance and well-being. The opening statement of the "Uniform Illegitimacy Act" drafted in 1922 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws contains the keynote of modern remedial policy: "The parents of a child born out of wedlock and not legitimated owe the child necessary maintenance, education, and support."

But it is much easier to announce such a policy than to make it effective.[2] There is the double difficulty of establishing paternity and of holding the father responsible. A survey [3] of existing legislation on the question shows that while it varies greatly in the different states, it is on the whole not adapted to modern conditions. It generally calls for criminal procedure to determine paternity and to impose upon the father the duty of supporting his child, while experience has shown that a more effective method is to win over the father by a sympathetic and conciliatory approach. But the difficulty goes even further. Studying 565 cases in Boston, the Intercity Conference on Illegitimacy found that in 344 cases no legal action had been taken; in 192 cases paternity was determined beyond a reasonable doubt, but could not be legally established; and in 398 cases, although there was good evidence concerning the identity of the fathers, the mothers would not co-operate with the agencies in bringing pressure to bear

[1] Cf. Ruth F. Brenner, *Case Work Service for Unmarried Mothers* (New York: Family Welfare Association of America, 1941).

[2] By January 1, 1938, this act had been adopted with few changes by only five states (Iowa, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming) and in part by two others (New Mexico and New York).

[3] *Paternity Laws* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938). This is Chart number 16 of the Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor.

upon them. In view of these facts, the states now include unmarried mothers among those who are entitled to public aid under the mothers' assistance provisions of the Federal Social Security Act and amendments. This Act makes no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate births, eligibility for assistance being based solely on the child's needs.[1] The tendency is thus to lessen the handicaps which the fact of illegitimacy imposes upon the child, and at the same time to discourage unorthodox paternity by holding the father economically responsible for his child.

Although there is considerable interest in knowing whether or not illegitimacy has increased in the United States in recent decades, discussion of the question remains speculative and highly unsatisfactory owing to the absence of reliable data. In 1927 the illegitimacy rate was reported as 28 per one thousand total live births, and in 1940 the reported rate was 40.5,[2] but the number of illegitimate births may have been more largely underenumerated in the earlier period. Part of the increase may be attributed to more careful record-keeping in certain states and to more complete returns, although California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Wyoming did not require a statement regarding legitimacy of birth in 1940.[3]

Abortion

The illegitimacy rate, whatever its magnitude, would be appreciably higher if it were not for abortion. This is clear even though the extent of abortion cannot be definitely stated. Possibly a minimum of around seventy thousand pregnancies in unmarried women are terminated in this way every year in the United States, and the number may be higher. If this figure is valid, the number of abortions in unmarried women is about equal to the number of reported illegitimate births; or, to put it differently, about one half of all illegitimate pregnancies are prematurely interrupted. These figures are based upon an estimate, called conservative, that a minimum of 680,000 abortions occur annually in this country, and that nine tenths of the

[1] For a brief statement of policy and practices under the Social Security Act in granting aid to children born out of wedlock, see Geoffrey May, "Aid to Dependent Children," *Social Work Yearbook* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1941), p. 55.

[2] *Vital Statistics of the United States*, 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942).

[3] As of January 1, 1944, four additional states, Colorado, Connecticut, New Mexico, and New York, did not require reports of illegitimacy, making ten states in all.

abortions occur in married women.[1] However, estimates of abortion are very unreliable, because under our code abortion, which is not spontaneous or which is not induced by a physician for medical reasons, is a criminal offense, and hence such abortions are concealed.[2] Despite this difficulty, nearly all careful students agree that the rate is high and probably increasing. A Cincinnati study showed that the abortion index increased more rapidly between 1918 and 1932 than the birth index.

Physicians say that a birth is aborted when pregnancy is interrupted by any cause whatever, prior to seven lunar months (twenty-eight weeks) of gestation.[3] The destruction of the fertilized ovum by natural causes before the period of viability is called spontaneous abortion or miscarriage, while stillbirth refers to death shortly before or during delivery. Legal abortion covers operations performed by accredited physicians in the interests of the mothers' health. Illegal abortion refers to pregnancies interrupted by the mothers' own efforts or by those of a professional abortionist. It is estimated that stillbirths and spontaneous abortions occur in about 10 per cent of all pregnancies, while perhaps from 3 to 6 per cent are induced abortions.[4] Most of the latter, about three fifths, are thought to be illegal.[5]

Unlike illegitimacy, abortion is not a class problem, in the sense of being preponderant in a particular socio-economic group, although it occurs more frequently in the lower-income groups than in the higher.

[1] Frederick I. Taussig, *Abortion, Spontaneous and Induced* (St. Louis: The C. V. Mosby Company, 1936), p. 26.

[2] Other estimates of abortions in the United States give the minimum figure as a million, or even more. Willystine Goodsell, *Problems of the Family* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), p. 341, pp. 367–68. Rongy's estimate is 1,250,000 abortions per year, but no details are given as to how this figure was obtained (A. Rongy, *American Medicine*, 37:400, 1931). On the other hand, A. W. Meyer thinks a conservative number would be about 250,000 a year. ("Some Aspects of Abortion," *Contributions to Embryology* [Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1921], Publication number 275.) Professor East thinks the number is under 500,000 a year. (E. M. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads* [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923], pp. 262–63). East arrives at this figure by inference from conditions in Germany and England, where thorough study has shown the rate to be about three per thousand population. He thinks our rate is lower because of better economic conditions. However, a counterbalancing factor may be the wider use of contraceptives in Europe. The unreliability of figures on abortion has led Dr. Halbert L. Dunn, Chief, National Office of Vital Statistics (Federal Security Agency), to refer to them as "guesstimates."

[3] As defined in the International List of Causes of Death.

[4] Regine K. Stix and Dorothy G. Wiehl, "Abortion and the Public Health," *American Journal of Public Health*, 28:621–28, May, 1938.

[5] The figure is given as 63 per cent by Max Handman, "Abortion," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. I, p. 373. This estimate, however, is based on a single study made among Maine physicians, and may not give a true picture of the situation in general.

This seems to be indicated by several limited studies, despite the absence of large-scale data on which to base an apportionment of abortions among the several social classes. A canvass of 826 married women college graduates drew admissions from ninety-two, or one in every nine, that they had had one or more abortions performed.[1] As between wives of manual workers and wives of white-collar workers who were patients at a birth-control clinic, there was no significant difference in the proportion of pregnancies terminated by induced abortion. However, religion was a factor, as might be expected, with Catholic women having relatively fewer abortions than non-Catholic, although in respect to absolute numbers there was little difference between the two groups because the Catholic women were more fertile. Jewish women resorted to fewer illegal abortions than did Gentiles. More important, abortion was principally a function of the size of family. As shown in Figure 83, illegal abortions increased with the order of pregnancy, from a rate of 5 per cent of first pregnancies to over 50 per cent of all pregnancies after the fifth.[2] These figures indicate the lengths to which women will go when they are determined to control the size of their families.

Abortion and social policy

Abortion is a vexing problem, the solution to which is not clear. On the one hand, there are those who would make all abortions legal. They hold that, owing to ignorance or inadequacy of contraceptive knowledge, pregnancies result which may not be desired or desirable. The facts plainly show, they say, that a large number of women will interrupt their pregnancy by resorting either to quacks or to crude personal methods, thus endangering their health and even their lives. The number of deaths from abortion in the United States in 1940 has been estimated as between three thousand and four thousand, which accounts for about 30 to 35 per cent of maternal deaths from all causes.[3] Since 1815 deaths attributable to abortion were reported to

[1] K. B. Davis, "A Study of the Sex Life of the Normal Married Woman," *Journal of Social Hygiene*, 8:173–89, April, 1922; 9:1–26, January, 1923; 9:129–46, March, 1923.

[2] Regine K. Stix and Frank W. Notestein, *Controlled Fertility* (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1940), p. 83.

[3] Halbert L. Dunn, "Frequency of Abortion: Its Effect on Maternal Mortality Rates," *Vital Statistics — Special Reports*, 15:443, July 30, 1942. These figures were obtained as follows. In 1940 there were 2,336,604 cases of live births and 71,026 cases of stillbirths registered in the United States. Of these, 1,055,000 were urban confinements, and 1,353,000 rural. It is estimated that urban areas have an abortion ratio of one per 5.6 confinements and rural areas one per 9.4



FIGURE 83. HOW ILLEGAL ABORTIONS ARE RELATED TO SIZE OF FAMILY

Percentage of pregnancy terminations in live births, illegal abortions, and other pregnancy wastage, by order of pregnancy. These figures are for a group of women using the facilities of the Birth Control Clinical Research Bureau and are only for a sample from New York City. From Regine Stix and Frank W. Notestein, *Controlled Fertility*, p. 83.

the Census Bureau in 1940, it appears that only about one half of the deaths from abortions are reported as such. The chief causes of death are infection and hemorrhage. These dangers are always present, even when the operation is performed by a competent surgeon under good conditions, but are greatly increased by medical incompetence, lack of surgical cleanliness, and lack of post-operative care which generally attends the illegal abortions. To avoid such ill effects, it is advocated by some that the state legalize all abortions, and even undertake to perform them as a public service.

In this connection, the experience of the Soviet Union is illuminating. As part of the general social revolution, the Bolsheviks in 1920 legalized abortions and provided that they should be performed only by registered physicians, serving without pay and operating in hos-

confinements. This yields 188,393 urban abortions and 143,936 rural abortions, or a total of 332,329. Assuming a fatality rate of 1 per cent, the number of deaths resulting from abortion comes to about 3300. Taussig's estimate is much higher — 8800 — but the constants used by him would seem to be too high, for the reported deaths from all puerperal causes in 1940 was only 8876.

pitals. No abortion was to be performed if the pregnancy had existed for more than two and one half months, or if it was a first pregnancy, unless the life of the patient was endangered. Hospitalization was required for three days, followed by a mandatory recuperatory period of two weeks. The new law resulted at once in a demand for abortions that greatly overtaxed the existing hospital facilities, and resulted in a modification of the law in 1924, giving preference to women with one child but no means of support, and to women with several children and means of support. The facilities still were overtaxed; so a fee was charged, ranging from fifty cents to twenty dollars, depending upon the financial status of the family, and the funds so collected were used to build special hospitals or abortoria. Still the number of abortions increased and showed no signs of abating. In Leningrad in 1924 the rate was 21 per 100 births, but by 1928 the rate had leaped to 139, or two fifths more abortions than births. The rural rates were lower, about one half the urban rates. In 1936, the government of the Soviet Union reversed its stand and abolished legal abortion.

The reason given by the Russian authorities for the discontinuance of the program was that it had not proved to be in the interests of the



FIGURE 84. ABORTION PROBABILITIES AND DANGERS

Mainly a problem of married life, abortions are highly dangerous, especially when illegal, as they are in most cases. How to prevent such tragedies is still a pressing social problem. Figures adapted from material supplied by the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.

women; that experience and careful study had shown that chronic invalidism, sterility, and serious psychological shock were widespread consequences.[1] Not so much was said about the effect upon the birth rate, but this may have been a more important reason for the change in policy, since all the untoward physical and psychological results of abortion are even more pronounced where the practice is illegal. Sweden still legalizes abortion despite a falling birth rate. One reason perhaps is that Sweden with a small population cannot in any case expect to become a great military power, and so can concentrate on quality rather than quantity of population.

In Russia the legalization of abortion was an important factor in reducing the birth rate, but one reason may have been that modern contraception was not widely diffused and utilized. In Sweden, where contraceptive information is provided democratically as a public service, the demand for abortions has not proved to be as great as it was in Russia. In Sweden, contraception and, if necessary, abortion are said to be in the interests of the women.

Voluntary Parenthood

At the present time there is fairly general agreement in the United States that where medical and social conditions indicate the undesirability of childbirth, fertility should be controlled. Official leaders of both the Catholic and Protestant churches agree that the avoidance or postponement of childbirth is indicated by three primary conditions: (1) the desirability of spacing births in the interests of the mother's health; [2] (2) the desirability of avoiding pregnancy in certain women for physical reasons, such as chronic nephritis, organic heart disease, tuberculosis, syphilis, or genes for feeblemindedness; (3) the desirability of limiting family size where poverty makes it impossible to give adequate care to the existing family.[3] This statement is highly important, for it means that there is a measure of agreement on the principle of controlled fertility. Nevertheless, there are important differences of opinion between the Catholic and non-Catholic churches

[1] National Committee on Maternal Health, *The Abortion Problem* (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1944).

[2] There is general agreement that one pregnancy should not follow immediately upon another, but there is difference of opinion as to the proper interval between births.

[3] "When there is present a substantial reason — such as serious illness or serious poverty — so-called natural birth control — that is, abstinence or rhythmic intercourse — is morally justified." The Reverend Edgar Schmiedeler, O.S.B., Director, Family Life Bureau, National Catholic Welfare Conference.



FIGURE 85. DOES CHILD SPACING AFFECT THE STILLBIRTH RATE?

Stillbirth rates by age of mother for each order of birth and for births of all parties, births to all multiparae fifteen to forty-four years of age, United States, 1937–41. The numbers at the beginning of each rate line represent order of birth. Note that the curves are not parallel, indicating that for each order of birth the increase in the rate is relatively greater in the younger than in the older ages. Thus, for each parity there is an extra risk associated with brief intervals between births. Long intervals are also associated with higher stillbirth rates, while moderate intervals lead to the lowest rates. From J. Yerushalmy, "The Existence of an Optimum Interval between Births," *Human Fertility*, 10:110, December, 1945.

regarding the moral aspects of birth control, relating chiefly to (*a*) the methods employed, and (*b*) the ethics of restricting family size when there are no such limiting conditions as have just been enumerated. Many persons take the position that, although these circumstances make birth control imperative, no special conditions are required to justify the practice, and not wanting children is reason enough. This position is based on the view that sex intercourse in marriage, when an expression of affection, is desirable in itself and morally right. The more conservative groups in our population do not share this feeling. They believe that parenthood is the prime, if not the only, justification for sexual intercourse, and that in the absence of limiting conditions, married couples should have as many children as possible.

Where family limitation is indicated, the Catholic Church puts its stamp of approval on abstinence, banning the use of artificial means. The position of the Roman Catholic Church, stated authoritatively by

Pope Pius XI in his Encyclical on *Christian Marriage*, 1930, may be seen from the following passages to be based on moral grounds.

> When we consider the great excellence of chaste wedlock, venerable brethren, it appears all the more regrettable that particularly in our day we should witness this divine institution often scorned and on every side degraded.
>
> First consideration is due to the offspring, which many have the boldness to call the disagreeable burden of matrimony and which they say is to be carefully avoided by married people, not through virtuous continence (which Christian law permits in matrimony when both parents consent), but by frustrating the marriage act. Some justify this criminal abuse on the ground that they are weary of children and wish to gratify their desires without their consequent burden. Others say that they cannot, on the one hand, remain continent nor on the other can they have children because of the difficulties, whether on the part of the mother or on the part of family circumstances.
>
> But no reason however grave may be put forward by which anything intrinsically against nature may become conformable to nature and morally good. Since, therefore, the conjugal act is destined primarily by nature for the begetting of children, those who in exercising it deliberately frustrate its natural power and purpose, sin against nature and commit a deed which is shameful and intrinsically vicious. . . .

In the early part of this century, the position on birth control taken by the Protestant churches was more like that of the Catholic Church. But since that time, and especially in recent years, there has been a growing tendency for the Protestant bodies to regard the moral problem of birth control as centering in the possibility of abuse rather than use. In 1929, the House of Bishops of the Church of England, at the Lambeth Conference, sanctioned the use of contraceptives when in keeping with Christian principles, and similar action was taken in the United States by the Presbyterian General Assembly's Special Committee on Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage. In 1931, the most important Protestant pronouncement on contraception to date was made by the Committee on Marriage and the Home of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, representing twenty-five Protestant churches, which issued a majority report of approval signed by twenty-two members and opposed by three. In 1929, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, representing the Reformed Jews of America, likewise voiced its approval.[1]

[1] *Moral Aspects of Birth Control* (some recent pronouncements of religious bodies). New York: Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1938.

It is interesting to speculate on what the future will show, for there is increasing diffusion of contraceptive knowledge in the United States at the present time.[1] One possibility is that the Catholic Church may modify its position to one of greater conformity to the trend. However, if the birth rate should continue to fall, and the population of the United States should begin to decline, it is possible that a reaction against family limitation will set in, for it is unlikely that the prospect of a declining population will be received with equanimity by a nation accustomed to the slogan "bigger and better," especially if the population of rival military powers should continue to increase.[2] If this should come to pass, and the Catholic Church stands adamant in its position on artificial contraception, the present liberal attitude may change. It is not certain, however, that the population of the United States will decline,[3] or if a decline should come, that it will be unfavorably received. Sweden has for some years been conscious of a population decline,[4] yet it has not attempted to curb contraception. Indeed, the Swedish government has gone further than any other in democratizing contraceptive services on the theory that quality of population must not be sacrificed to quantity. As previously stated, Sweden's problem is not altogether like that of the United States, yet public opinion in both countries seems to favor the spread of contraceptive information among the masses. Polls in the United States taken over a period of years show an increasing majority of the population favoring birth control.[5]

[1] The growth of birth-control clinics and of the movement generally are considered in Chapter 19.

[2] On January 15, 1946, the Commission on Marriage and the Home of the Federal Council of Churches, representing twenty-five leading Protestant denominations, submitted to the executive committee a statement on "Religion and the Birth Rate," emphasizing that "people of good health, mental and physical, and of good principles should have their full quota of children."

[3] Harold F. Dorn, "Potential Rate of Increase of the Population of the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, 48:173–87, September, 1942.

[4] In recent years the net replacement rate has been only about 75 per cent per generation. Dorothy Swaine Thomas, *Social and Economic Aspects of Swedish Population Movements*, 1750–1933 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941).

[5] In a Gallup poll taken in 1936, 70 per cent of those questioned favored legalization of birth control. A representative sample of 100,000 voters in all the states was used. Two years later a survey undertaken by the *Ladies' Home Journal* reported 79 per cent of the women favorable to birth control. Catholic women were evenly divided, with 51 per cent favorable, as against 84 per cent of the Protestant women favorable and 89 per cent of all others. Henry F. Pringle, "What do the Women of America Think About Birth Control?" (*Ladies' Home Journal*, August, 1943), shows the highest peak of favorable opinion. To the question, "Do you believe that knowledge about birth control should or should not be made available to all married women?" 84.9 per cent of women between the ages of twenty and thirty-five answered "Yes." Of the Catholic women 69 per cent said "Yes." An objective test for the measurement of attitude toward birth control has been devised by L. L. Thurstone, and is available in two forms, which give comparable results. (University of Chicago Press.)

Prevalence and effectiveness of contraception

There is interest in knowing how widely contraception is practiced and with what success. While no census of the subject has been undertaken, nor any study based on a large representative sample of the whole population, there are several comprehensive investigations which offer highly suggestive results. Pearl's study of thirty thousand women [1] who came to hospitals to bear their children revealed that between 50 and 60 per cent of the white married couples practiced contraception more or less regularly, thereby reducing the pregnancy rate per woman per unit of time about 20 to 30 per cent below that which obtained in the group of women not practicing contraception.[2] Pearl believed that the rates would have been higher with a representative sample, for studies of marriages on the higher economic levels report a larger proportion of contraceptors, as well as more efficient use. A recent survey of thirty-five hundred women, mostly of the upper middle class, indicates that 83 per cent tried to control conception.[3] Of the 17 per cent of non-contraceptors, 9 per cent had no need of contraception because of involuntary sterility, pregnancy, separation from their husbands, and the like. Reasons were not secured from 4 per cent. A bare 1 per cent did not know any method, and only 3 per cent were opposed. It would seem, therefore, that contraception is not a minority practice.

The practice of contraception increases with an increase in the size of community and the economic status of the family. The practice is less common among those between thirty-five and forty-five years of age than among those under thirty-five, perhaps because of the greater

[1] The hospitals were located in cities east of the Mississippi and north of the southernmost states. The women represented largely the lower economic classes. Raymond Pearl, *The Natural History of Population* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939).

[2] Among the Negro married women practicing contraception, the pregnancy rate was higher than among those not practicing it. This suggests greater fertility as well as inadequate methods of control on the part of the former.

[3] This study, conducted by the Market Research Corporation of America, covered 2568 upper-middle-class married women under forty-five years of age, living in thirty cities of various sizes and in various parts of the country; 457 young single women from the same communities; and 515 rural married women throughout the United States. (John Winchell Riley and Matilda White, "The Use of Various Methods of Contraception," *American Sociological Review*, 5:890–904, December, 1940.) Of the sample studied by Davis, 77 per cent of the women college graduates admitted using contraceptives. (Katherine B. Davis, *Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-Two Hundred Women.*) Himes reports on twelve investigations. In two cases the percentage of use was very low, but in the other samples, the range was from 59 per cent to 93 per cent with an average of 89 per cent. (Norman E. Himes, *The Medical History of Contraception* [Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1936], p. 343.)

fertility of the younger years and the prevalence of more liberal attitudes in the younger people. Contraception is, of course, more common among Protestants and Jews than among Catholics, but Riley and White report that about two fifths of the latter used other means than abstinence, while only about a quarter did not practice any means of birth control. Of the women who came of their own volition to a private birth-control clinic in New York City, from 1931 to 1932, about one sixth were Catholic.[1] There is also some indication that the higher fertility of the Catholics is diminishing,[2] which suggests increasing resort to birth control.

Some data have already been presented concerning the effectiveness of contraception. The methods vary in effectiveness, and none is 100 per cent effective, but it is highly important to note that even the older, folkway methods may be fairly successful in preventing births. This is indicated by Pearl's data, already cited, and by Dickinson's report on 184 couples, less than one fourth of whom reported any failure in method and four fifths of whose pregnancies were deliberate.[3] These results are especially interesting in view of the fact that the most effective methods were used by only one in twenty-five couples, and the bulk of the patients represent the era before medical instruction in contraception was introduced. A study [4] of patients served by a large clinic likewise revealed that the non-clinical methods used by the patients before their contact with the clinic were fairly effective in reducing fertility.

The Catholic Church sanctions the rhythm system of birth control, or abstinence from sex relations during the period of the woman's ovulation. A group of 207 women supervised in the use of this method at a clinic reduced their pregnancy rate from ninety to eleven

[1] Regine K. Stix and Frank W. Notestein, *Controlled Fertility* (Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1940), p. 11.

[2] Holding constant the three factors of age, urbanism, and economic status, Stouffer found that the Catholic birth rate fell much faster than the non-Catholic during the nineteen-twenties and gave indication of soon overtaking the latter. (S. A. Stouffer, "Trends in the Fertility of Catholics and non-Catholics," *American Journal of Sociology*, 41:143–66, September, 1935.) This finding is corroborated by A. J. Jaffe, "Religious Differentials in the Net Reproduction Rate," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 34:335–42, June, 1939. The evidence reviewed in this study (for the period 1920 to 1935) showed that in general the Italians have a higher net production rate than other groups, but the Irish and Polish Catholic have rates about the same as those of comparable non-Catholic groups.

[3] Robert Latou Dickinson, *Medical Analysis of a Thousand Marriages*, American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois. Reprinted from *The Journal of the American Medical Association*, 97:529–35, August 22, 1931.

[4] Stix and Notestein, *op. cit.*

per one hundred woman-years of exposure, indicating that the method may be highly effective with normal women when the aim is to reduce the fertility of the group as a whole. However, 37 per cent of the group discontinued the practice because of dissatisfaction or lack of interest, and six pregnancies resulted from true failure of the method itself, which leads the investigators to doubt "whether the method is reliable enough for individual cases in which contraception is an essential safeguard of the patient's health." [1] While there are portions of every menstrual cycle when a woman cannot conceive, many women are too irregular in their period to use the method successfully. Of the 225 patients who applied to the clinic for treatment, twelve were rejected because of irregularity of periods.

Effects of contraception

The immediate effect of contraception is the limitation of births, which is desired by the users, but the question arises as to whether there are other, less obvious effects, especially upon health or happiness. The effect of the practice of contraception on sexual adjustment is, of course, entirely a matter of attitude toward the practice, but the practice may facilitate adjustment by removing the fear of undesired pregnancy. It is definitely established that approved contraception is not injurious to health, although there are certain unapproved mechanical and chemical methods in use which may lead to serious injury. Likewise, no evidence exists to show that approved contraception has ever caused sterility. This could happen only if the contraception were unwillingly practiced, where the conflict so engendered was great enough to disturb the glandular functioning or body chemistry. Sometimes a couple that have used contraceptives abandon the practice in order to have a child, and if no child comes they may blame the failure on the former practice, when actually the failure is due to sterility or relative infertility of long duration, so that even if contraceptives had never been used, no conception would have occurred. The experience of the clinics shows that when women who are of childbearing ages and in good health abandon the use of approved contraceptives, pregnancies usually follow, no matter how long the contraceptive regimen has been carried on.

[1] Stephen Fleck, Elizabeth F. Snedeker, and John Rock, "The Contraceptive Safe Period," *New England Journal of Medicine*, 223:1005–09, 1940.

Possible effect on the sex ratio

An interesting question concerns the possible influence of contraception in unbalancing the sex ratio. At conception the ratio of males to females is about 110 to 100, while at birth the ratio drops to 105, due to the less favorable mortality of male fetuses. However, study of a socially select group of 5466 completed families showed a sex ratio of 112 at birth.[1] Since this exceeds even the conception-average, it cannot be due entirely to more favorable prenatal environment, although this could account for part of it. Moreover, the ratio among last children was 117.4, which suggests greater desire for male births than for female births in our society, a desire which can be satisfied somewhat because of contraception. If a couple has a strong preference for a son and the first-born is a son, no further children may be born if a small family is desired. If the first-born is a daughter, the couple will be tempted to try again, in the hope of getting a son. Under these circumstances the birth of a son is more likely to terminate childbearing than the birth of a daughter. However, this course hinges on a marked preference for male births, which is not likely to be carried very far in a society conspicuous for its feminist movements.

Limitations of contraception

While modern contraception is highly efficacious, there are a number of conditions that limit its use and effectiveness. One of these is the cost, which is greater than necessary perhaps because of the lack of governmental sanction and control of the trade. This problem is linked to the legal obstacles to contraception, which prevent the knowledge from reaching large sections of our population which need it most. A second limitation is the lack of a perfect, or foolproof, contraceptive.[2] This awaits the development of a serum capable of providing temporary infertility, or some comparable method that would take the responsibility out of the hands of the individual. At present, no one method is suitable for all persons or possibly for the same person at all ages. In the absence of a foolproof or automatic method, responsibility for successful use falls upon the user and many persons are incapable of managing contraception effectively. It will be re-

[1] S. Winston, "Birth Control and Sex Ratio at Birth," *American Journal of Sociology*, 38:225–31, September, 1932.

[2] Sterilization is an exception, but this has the drawback of being permanent. A few cases are recorded where sterilized patients have had their fertility restored, but this cannot be guaranteed at the time of the operation.

called that the majority of unmarried mothers coming to the attention of social agencies are feebleminded, and it hardly seems reasonable to assume that they are equal to using effectively the techniques of family limitation. If parenthood is to be avoided in these cases, recourse must be had to sterilization [1] or institutionalization. But the feebleminded are not alone in their shortcomings in this connection, for effective contraception makes heavy demands on normal people as well. It is the experience of birth-control clinics that a significant proportion of their clients, sometimes as high as a third or even more, fail to carry out the clinical prescription or any portion of it because they find it easier not to do so. Opponents of contraception sometimes charge that the practice tends to weaken self-control, and this may be true if the comparison is with the practice of continence, but otherwise the evidence shows that contraception makes considerable demands on both intelligence and character.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What factors underlie the shift in emphasis in recent times from parenthood to marriage?
2. Why has the percentage of childless women increased since the turn of the century?
3. What are the principal causes of sterility?
4. Why do not most childless couples who have a deep love for children resort to adoption?
5. Are the risks involved in adopting a child as great as the risks involved in having a child of one's own?
6. What traits characterize unmarried mothers as a group?
7. Should the law distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate births?
8. Ought the courts to admit blood group tests as evidence of non-paternity in illegitimacy cases?
9. Why is illegitimacy a race and class problem, but not abortion?
10. Should abortions be legalized, as in Sweden?
11. Under what conditions, if any, is contraception justified?
12. If the population of the United States should decline, would a reaction against family limitation set in?
13. Why have the leading churches modified their stand on birth control since the turn of the century? What further changes may be anticipated?

[1] The place of sterilization in our culture is considered more fully in Chapter 19.

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. Social devices for promoting the birth rate. See references to (1) Hollingworth and (2) the Swedish Population Commission in *Selected Readings* for this chapter.
2. The diagnosis and treatment of human sterility.
3. The genetic basis of the Rh factor.
4. The operation of unaccredited child-placing agencies.
5. Blood group tests to establish non-paternity.
6. The abortion problem in the United States.
7. The optimum interval between births.

SELECTED READINGS

Himes, Norman, *The Medical History of Contraception.* Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1936.

The definitive work in the field.

Hollingworth, Leta S., "Social Devices for Impelling Women to Bear and Rear Children," *American Journal of Sociology*, 22:19–29, July, 1916.

Most of these devices are used in democracies as well as totalitarian states. An able statement of social forces used by the group to perpetuate itself.

Meaker, Samuel R., *Human Sterility.* Baltimore: William Wood and Company, 1934.

One of the most comprehensive reports on the nature, causes and treatment of sterility. Certain important developments in this field, especially in regard to endocrinology, have been too recent for inclusion in this book. More up to date are Samuel L. Siegeler, *Fertility in Women*, and Robert S. Hotchkiss, *Fertility in Men* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1944).

Stix, Regine K., and Frank W. Notestein, *Controlled Fertility.* Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1940.

The reproductive experience of women using planned parenthood clinics in New York City. Careful, scientific study.

Swedish Population Commission, *Report on the Sex Question.* (Translated and edited by Virginia Clay Hamilton.) Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1940.

A report on the causes of the declining birth rate, the ethical

principles involved in contraception, the efficacy of contraception, and sex education. Sets a high standard of realistic analysis.

Thomas, W. I., and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928.

Presents varieties of maladjustments among children and practical programs for the treatment of them, together with a searching analysis of contemporary points of view concerning maladjustment. Comprehensive, balanced, and rich in illustrative material.

Part Four

THE FAMILY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

RAPID SOCIAL CHANGE is the most striking characteristic of our time, and no comprehensive treatment of the modern family as a social institution can ignore it. Chapter 17 essays an analysis of the factors responsible for social change and their impact upon family life. Where change is rapid, and appropriate adjustments are not forthcoming, disorganization is inevitable, and may result in demoralization, divorce, even death, as shown in Chapter 18. The marked increase in the divorce rate and the decline of the birth rate are symptoms of the great stress which the modern family is experiencing under the impact of rapid social change and accompanying culture lags. But all living things react to strain in an effort to ease it, and man especially is highly adaptable. New means of adjustment (inventions) are continually being developed which, if useful, become part of the established institutional life. Inventions that are social in nature we popularly call reforms. Certain reforms, considered in Chapter 19, are concerned with effecting adjustments in the institutional aspects of the family. Other proposals, derived from the sciences of man, are concerned with the more personal adjustments of husbands and wives, and parents and children. To these social psychological considerations, the concluding chapter (20) of the book is devoted.

Chapter 17

THE CHANGING MODERN FAMILY

THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER is to show how and why the family changes, and why important changes often bring serious problems of adjustment. That the family does change and is not static has been shown in preceding chapters. Indeed, the changes in the family during the last century or two have been very great, and have left the family a less imposing, though not less important, institution than it used to be. The family was a giant when it produced goods and food for the markets as well as for its own use. Now it produces little or nothing, but instead sends its members out into industry to earn money with which to buy the goods produced outside the home. When the family ceased being a major organization for production, it began also to shed many of its other important functions — educational, recreational, religious, and protective — so that the home is less of a school, less of a playground, less of a church, less of a courthouse than it used to be. Although the home has added many new functions, the far greater gains of government, industry, the schools, and commercial recreation have overshadowed the gains made by the home. It may still be true that a man's home is his castle, but it is not so self-contained a castle as it used to be. All these changes and many others resulted from the break-up of the farming and handicraft economy following the expansion of factory production based on steam and steel. And now electricity and the fabulous developments in transportation and communication are bringing further changes.

Why the family changes

The family changes because all the social institutions are correlated in a social system, and a change in any one part has an impact on other correlated parts of the system. Thus, the family changes because of changes in industry, in government, in education. If the government

puts its long, strong, protecting arm about the shoulder of old people and gives them the security of pensions, then the family is greatly affected in that children are no longer entirely responsible for the support of their aged parents. When the schools serve hot lunches for the children, the functions of the home are likewise lightened. Sometimes the impacts are not so direct as in these examples but are derivative; that is, they are the results of other impacts. For instance, in World War II the drafting of youth of eighteen resulted in a movement to speed up the education process to enable the boys to complete their college course before induction. This meant an all-year-round educational program and the abolition of the usual summer vacation, which in turn deprived many parents of the companionship and assistance of their children during this period. The impact of the war on the family in this case was indirect, transmitted through changes in the schools. A single change in a social system may in this way initiate a series of changes which affect many aspects of organized life.

These examples indicate that what happens to the other institutions affects the family, and may indeed be of vital importance to it. The family cannot live unto itself or escape the consequences of changes in the rest of the social order. And since social change is inevitable, it must be expected that the family will change too. These remarks are by way of answering those who would like to keep the family as it is. Even if it could be proved that the *status quo* represents a state of perfection, which is seldom claimed, it would be necessary to recognize that the trend of events will produce a new and somewhat different *status quo* tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. The close interrelation of the family with other social institutions means also that improvement in family life cannot be achieved simply by reforming the family, since what happens to the family depends largely on what happens to the rest of society.

Family organization compared to other institutional organization

The word "largely" in the preceding sentence is used advisedly to suggest that the family pattern is determined principally by what happens to the other institutions, rather than by what the family does for itself; that is to say, the family is affected more by the impact of the influences exerted by changes in other institutions than it is by the changes which it initiates itself. That the family does produce changes is quite evident. If the family experiences changes and is part

of a system, the institutions correlated with the family are sure to feel some of the impact of the changes occurring in the family. Thus, the decrease in the birth rate in nearly all the modern nations in our time is not without its influence on business, education, and the church,[1] to mention only a few impacts. The family is mainly on the receiving end of social change, not because it lacks influence, but because its influence is not organized like that of industry, or the state, or the schools. These institutions have established groups whose function it is to promote changes either in their own or in other institutions. Thus, the government has numerous commissions to regulate the railroads, supervise the stock exchange, control the air waves, and so on, while Congress and the courts initiate changes affecting every part of the nation. In industry likewise there are committees to suggest changes, and there is organized research leading to new products and processes. Indeed, the life of trade is the new invention or the new model. The schools also have committees and individuals at work on new inventions and new models of curricula, teaching techniques, teaching materials, and other aspects of education. The family is different from all these other institutions because it is not formally organized to initiate changes in its own affairs or those of other groups, except on a very modest basis. It is difficult to think of any national organization of parents except the Parent-Teacher Association, and this is a loosely organized body for a single specific purpose. As to why the family should be so lacking in formal organization is not entirely clear, but the reasons would seem to be largely historical, based on fundamental differences existing between the family and other institutions. The family is basically a natural group, while other institutions are man-made, made indeed by groups of families and individuals for the promotion of their own welfare. These institutions — the government, church, school, and others — exist in part for the protection of the family, and for this reason the family has not organized to protect itself.[2] This may, however, represent

[1] A smaller population means a lessened demand for certain consumers' goods. The smaller juvenile population occasioned by the declining birth rate has occasioned the closing of hundreds of elementary schools in the big cities, and affected the demand for teachers. The church, because of the declining birth rate, has had to redefine its position on birth control and family matters.

[2] There are many governmental agencies directly concerned with family welfare, such as the Children's Bureau, the Women's Bureau. An example of church organization in behalf of the family is the Commission on Marriage and the Home of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, representing Protestant denominations. The Catholic and Jewish churches also have special commissions on the home.

something of a lag, and in the future there may be a more direct organized effort on the part of married persons to promote their domestic interests on a large scale. The formation of local study groups of parents and their organization on a regional basis [1] probably represent a beginning in this direction.

How a change in one part of a culture produces changes in other parts may be illustrated by reference to war, which is a major change in the part of culture called the state. That modern war exerts a tremendous influence upon every aspect of organized life is well known to the readers of this book for whom the impact of war has been a matter of personal experience. Industry is diverted from the production of consumer goods to the production of the instruments of war; unemployment dwindles; there is a rise in prices and wages producing a measure of inflation. The government, already strong, becomes totalitarian in its power over the other institutions. Prices are controlled. Food and other goods are rationed. Civil liberties are curtailed. The schools are restricted through the loss of students to the armed services, and the curriculum is modified so that practical subjects and the teaching of patriotism are stressed. The churches also support the war and in doing so modify their pacifistic teachings.

The impact of war upon the family

The effects of war on the family are initiated by the withdrawal of males of fighting age from civilian life into the armed services. In World War II these men were mostly single men, in their twenties and early thirties, so that the effect of their withdrawal was mostly on the formation of new families rather than on the disruption of existing families. The net effect is the loss of an indeterminate number of families that would have been founded except for the war. Typically the marriage rate rises during the early period of a war, declines during the war, increases during the early post-war years, then resumes a more or less normal course. The situation for the first World War and for certain comparable years of the second are shown in Table 26. The marriage rate rises at first because all the young men needed for the armed services are not taken at once and there is a rush to marry on the part of two groups, those who hope to escape induction in this way and those who, casting prudential considerations aside, wish to assure

[1] An example is the Child Study Association of America, serving largely the area of metropolitan New York. Only a tiny fraction of the parents of the region are represented, however.

TABLE 26. VARIATION IN THE MARRIAGE RATE IN THE TWO WORLD WARS *

	World War I		World War II	
	Year	Rate per 1,000	Year	Rate per 1,000
Pre-war year	1916	10.6	1939	10.5
Selective Service	1917 †	11.1	1940	11.9 ‡
Selective Service	....	....	1941	12.6
War years	1918	9.7	1942	13.1
			1943	11.8
			1944	10.9
			1945	12.3
First post-war year	1919	11.0	1946	...
Second post-war year	1920	12.0	1947	...
Third post-war year	1921	10.7	1948	...

* Adapted from Ernest W. Burgess, "The Effect of War on the American Family," *American Journal of Sociology*, 48:345, November, 1942.

† In 1917 the draft law was passed after war was declared in April.

‡ In 1940 the long discussion of the Selective Service Bill affected marriage rates as early as June, although the bill was not passed until September.

themselves of some married happiness with a loved one while they may. Of course, the motives for these hurried-up marriages are many and often baffling, but the two that have been mentioned are conspicuous. The decline in marriages during the war is caused by the postponement of marriage by many young people because of prudential reasons, and by the lack of opportunity to marry which exists for the young men while they are actively engaged in warfare. The gain in marriages after the war is due to the accumulated postponements of marriage during the war and to the special appeal of marriage to men who have long been separated from the opposite sex and the comforts of a home.

Despite the gain in marriages during the early years of the war and in the years just after it, war results in a net loss of marriages because of the casualties involved, and also because not all deferred or postponed marriages are completed. In the first World War casualties were not sufficiently heavy on the American side to have much effect on the marriage rate. In fact, there was a shortage of women in the United States both before and after the war of 1917–18.[1] In World

[1] William Fielding Ogburn, *American Society in Wartime* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), p. 12.

War II the total of American deaths in action or from battle wounds totaled close to 325,000, a toll more than six times as high as in World War I.[1] Heavy as American combat losses were, they are much less than those of Germany or Japan. Those of Germany were heavier than they were in the last war, which resulted in a deficiency of more than two million men in the twenty to forty age group. More exactly, the first post-war census taken in Germany in 1919 showed a surplus of 2,214,000 women between twenty and forty-nine years of age.[2] In France and in England and Wales the surplus of women of these ages was about 1,250,000 in 1921, which led to a plea for polygamy. While these figures do not reflect the impact of the war with complete accuracy, since European populations characteristically show a surplus of women, nevertheless they do suggest that millions of these women were destined to spinsterhood because of the lack of men. An imbalanced sex ratio like this is especially hard on the women, for, as has been shown elsewhere,[3] women are more dependent than men upon a favorable sex ratio, so far as marriage is concerned.



FIGURE 86. WHAT WAR DOES TO THE SEX RATIO

Number of women per one hundred men at adult ages most affected by war, at last pre-war and first post-war census, France (World War I). The situation was much the same in Germany. Losses in war are heaviest among men under thirty, either recently married or at the period of life when they would soon marry. As a result, millions of women are cut off from marriage. Data from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, February, 1930, p. 2.

[1] Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, 26:1–3, November, 1945.

[2] The League of Nations, *International Statistical Year Book, 1926–28*. This figure did not include some 400,000 prisoners of war who had not yet been repatriated, so that the net surplus of women was under two million.

[3] Chapter 13.

Nor do statistics on the number of men and women tell the whole story, since many of the men who return from war are incapacitated for normal family life.[1]

The course of the birth rate parallels that of the marriage rate. Since war results in a net deficit of marriages and separates the married soldier from his wife, war also causes a net loss of births. The early stages of preparation for war bring prosperity and hence may show an increase in the birth rate, but once the war is under way the birth rate drops if the war is not a short one. After the war there is an increase in marriages and births, but the deficiency due to war is not made up. It has been estimated, for example, that the deficit of births in France in the war of 1914–18 numbered 1,320,000.[2]

Other influences of war on the family may be briefly indicated. The divorce rate usually declines during wartime and rises to a new high point following the war. There is an increase in illicit sex behavior and in illegitimate births, as well as in child neglect and juvenile delinquency. The government counters by increasing its protective services for members of families, making available low-cost insurance, cash allowances for wives and dependents of service men, day nurseries for young children of working mothers, supplementing the established services of the social security program.

Short-term versus long-term changes

Here, then, are some prominent changes wrought in the family by war. Many more might be recounted, but the list would be of little value without some comment regarding the relative significance of the various changes. For it is of the first importance to note that the changes are not of equal significance. Some of the effects of war on the family are of a minor sort or are not lasting.

Does the heightened sense of neighborliness produced by civilian defense activities persist when the war is over? Does the sharing of automobiles continue, or the planting of gardens by city dwellers? Some of the changes are plainly ephemeral. On the other hand, some

[1] The number of soldiers living at the end of the first World War but totally incapable of self-support has been estimated at 629,244, and the number with limited capacity of self-support at more than 10,000,000. It is not known, however, what proportion of these men were married before returning, and what number married afterward despite their handicaps. E. L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1919), p. 274.

[2] William F. Ogburn, *American Society in Wartime* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), p. 9.

FIGURE 87. WHY WAR MARRIAGES ARE RELATIVELY UNSTABLE

These and other causes of divorce exist in peacetime too, but they are accentuated by war. Drawings by Gregory d'Alessio. Courtesy of *New York Times Magazine.*

changes tend to stick. Such appears to be the case so far as the economic and social position of women is concerned. As men are drawn out of industry and commerce by the armed services, their places are filled by women. Occupations formerly closed to women in the United States are now open to them, and during World War II the occupations open to women were extended even to include the armed



FIGURE 88. PROPORTION OF WOMEN WORKERS, 1880–1940

Today women constitute a larger percentage of the total labor force than fifty years ago. War opens up many new vocational opportunities for women and accelerates the long-time trend. Data from United States Census Bureau.

services, although not in the fighting branches. Many of these jobs filled by women are relinquished "when Johnny comes marching home," but the social and economic gains won by women are not completely lost. Indeed, there is an appreciable net gain.

Children are also employed in greater numbers during wartime, but when peace comes they are dismissed. The increase in child labor is definitely a temporary, wartime provision. If we look only at the wartime situation, we see both the increase in the employment of women and the increase in the employment of minors. How, then, are we to know that the one is a permanent phenomenon, the other a temporary one? It is not always easy to tell, but the employment of women has been continuing for decades to show a gain, while child labor has been steadily falling off, especially in urban areas of machine production. Children are not well adapted to working at machines, and there is besides the conviction that children belong in school, and compulsory attendance laws are enacted to this end. These laws are relaxed during wartime because of the emergency need for labor, but when peace comes and the emergency has passed, the old trend toward abolishing child labor is resumed. From what has been said it is plain

that to consider only the changes that occur during wartime, without reference to the long-time trends, is to get an unrealistic picture of what is actually going on. The more significant changes brought about by war are those which reinforce existing trends, especially important ones.

When, as in the case of women in the labor market, the trend has been under way for some time and has continued despite various setbacks, it is not difficult to define the movement as a long-time trend, and to note its relation to the war. But when the trends are less conspicuous, it is less easy to appraise the ultimate significance of a wartime change. For example, in 1942 a government standard was established for enriched flour, requiring certain minimum amounts of thiamin, niacin, iron, and riboflavin, and in 1943 this standard was made compulsory for all white bread, rolls, and buns. Later, further additions of the B vitamins and of iron were made to give enriched white bread a food value similar to that of whole-wheat bread. The American people have a preference for the less nutritious white bread and so the government comes to the aid of the people during wartime by requiring the enrichment of white bread. These are wartime measures, established in the interests of the consumers during a period of rationing and limited food supplies on the ground that it is in the national interest to keep the people strong for the sake of maximum efficiency in warfare. But it is also desirable to have a healthy nation in peacetime, and nutritious food is an important factor in health. Will these wartime standards be maintained after the war? It is not easy to say, because in the past our system of free enterprise has not encouraged the government to do very much in the way of protecting the consumer, and the government has followed the policy of "let the consumer beware." But there is a growing belief that the principal purpose of production is consumption, not profit, and that it is therefore the business of government to protect the consumer. An evidence of this is the Federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act which exercises control over labeling the definitely harmful ingredients of products that enter interstate commerce.

The effects of economic depression on family life

Prior to the war, the interest of government in the nutrition of the masses was given some impetus by the acute and prolonged depression of the nineteen-thirties. Here, in the economic depression, we have a



FIGURE 89. OCCUPATIONS OF WOMEN, 1940

Nearly four fifths of employed women are concentrated in the first five fields shown above. Better than one in four is a clerk, saleswoman or kindred worker, while one in six is a domestic-service worker. Even so, occupations are more numerous and diversified than before. Of the six hundred or more occupations listed by the Census, there are only two or three in which no women are employed. Adapted from graph supplied by the Women's Bureau, United States Department of Labor.

second example of how a change in one part of the social system produces changes in other parts. In this case a marked change in the economic aspect of our culture has important repercussions in nearly every other sphere. Indeed, the very close interrelation of the major institutions is suggested by the fact that economic depression is a factor in war, while war is even more a factor in depression.

Economic depression affects the family as war does, causing a decline in marriages, births, and divorces.[1] Illegitimacy increases, partly because of the decline in marriage. Curiously, the death rate falls, as does the rate of sickness, perhaps because people, having less to spend, stay home more, get more rest, eat more wisely. Unemploy-



FIGURE 90. THE MARRIAGE RATE AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

Fluctuations in marriage rates * and business failures † compared. The marriage rate can be used as an index of the business cycle. Young people are restrained from marrying in bad times, and there results an accumulation of marriageable men and women who wait to marry in good times. To facilitate comparison, the annual deviations from the long-time trends are expressed with the standard deviation as unit, and the bankruptcy curve is inverted. Note the irregular situation for the war year 1918. From Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, July, 1938, p. 2.

* For the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Rhode Island, and the city of New York.

† Sources: 1868 to 1886—Roger W. Babson, Business Barometers, opp. page 373; 1878 to 1935—*Dun's Review*, December, 1937, page 16.

[1] W. F. Ogburn and D. S. Thomas, "Influence of the Business Cycle on Certain Social Conditions," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 18:324–40, September, 1922.

ment is of course widespread, but is higher among men than among women, since the latter will work for less; higher too among married than among single women,[1] because public opinion assumes that married women have less need to work and that by taking jobs they help to create unemployment. Families on relief are more mobile than those not on relief.[2] Depressions are not to be desired, and they cause the family a great deal of trouble, but the crisis of unemployment can be an organizing as well as a disorganizing factor. Research [3] has shown that families with a record of adaptability to changing conditions hold together better under the impact of a drastic drop in income than do families that are not adaptable. Whether the family is highly integrated or not — that is, whether the family members share many or few activities — does not appear to matter very much. Economic depressions are probably not without influence on family attitudes, but these have not been carefully investigated. There is some indication, however, that the authority of the husband suffers if he remains unemployed for six months or longer.[4]

Like war, economic depression highlights the problem of the important difference between short-term and long-term changes. During periods of prolonged unemployment married people tend to take up residence with their parents or parents-in-law. This phenomenon is, however, only a temporary reversal of the long-standing trend toward separate establishments for newly-weds and away from control of the young married couple by the kinship group. When good times return, the trend toward separate residences is resumed.

During the depression of the thirties, millions of persons found themselves without employment and in need of immediate aid. The private agencies which had been organized to care for a much smaller population were unequal to the problem, and so government was obliged to step in and assume the major responsibility for relief. There had been some governmental organization for this purpose before the depression, but this was on a local basis and proved inadequate to the tremendous task that now existed. The federal govern-

[1] S. A. Stouffer and Paul Lazarsfeld, *Research Memorandum on the Family in the Depression* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937).

[2] R. S. Cavan and K. H. Ranck, *The Family and the Depression* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

[3] Robert C. Angell, *The Family Encounters the Depression* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936). Also unpublished studies of the Committee on Appraisal of the Social Science Research Council.

[4] Mirra Komarovsky, *The Unemployed Man and His Family* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1940).



FIGURE 91. NET REPRODUCTION RATES IN DEPRESSION AND PROSPERITY

In the hard times of the middle nineteen-thirties, the rate dropped below the maintenance level. Under the stimulus of war-induced prosperity, the rate reached a peak in 1943, but was short of that for 1920. The birth rate fluctuates with the business cycle, but the long-time trend has been downward. From Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, April, 1946, p. 2.

ment therefore came to the rescue of the states through the Social Security Act of 1935 and its subsequent amendments with an elaborate program including assistance grants for needy, dependent children, the needy blind, and needy old people. The depression may thus be said to have been an important factor in accelerating the trend in government toward protective services for the family, and the transfer of the protective function from the family to the state. The movement did not terminate when the depression ceased with the onset of World War II, because the trend had previously been in the direction of an increase of governmental functions in behalf of the family, and the depression merely accentuated the trend. Unless new and powerful counter-forces come into play, we may, therefore, anticipate the further growth of social insurance and allied services.

The Modus Operandi of Family Changes

The family, we have seen, responds to stimuli (social changes) from within and without, but certain of these changes are more important

and lasting than others because they conform to prevailing trends. Is there any way to tell which social changes will have abiding effects and which will not? Of course, if we know in what direction the family is moving, we can judge whether a given influence — such as war, or economic depression, or marked increase in immigration, or the invention of television — abets or hinders that trend, and so make an inference as to the significance of that particular impact. We know, for instance, that the divorce rate is increasing, and has increased since the Civil War, at the rate of about 3 per cent a year. Since the divorce rate declines in wartime yet increases to new high points after the war, we conclude that the influence of war in retarding divorces is not significant. If we focus attention on the decline in divorces during wartime, we may wrongly conclude that war is a factor diminishing divorce; whereas the truth of the matter is probably that war contributes to divorce by increasing the number of hasty and hurried-up marriages.[1]

War is a revolutionary change and we should, therefore, expect that the impact of such a change on the family would be very great. It would be natural to expect a greater impact to be exerted on the divorce rate by war than by, let us say, the devaluation of gold or the espousal of the "good-neighbor" policy in the United States. War exerts a greater influence because it is more closely integrated with the family than are these other phenomena and because it is a more powerful stimulus. So the introduction of a new form in music, like the music dramas of Richard Wagner, is much more important to the arts than it is to family organization. The invention of the tin can and the can-opener, on the other hand, are more important to the family than to the arts. The importance of social change for the family depends, then, partly on how closely the new conditions are integrated with family life and partly on the force of the impact which they exert. The problem of evaluating the importance of any innovation for family life thus becomes a problem of assessing the importance of innovations or changes and the degree of their interrelation with the family. This can be done only in general terms, as has been done above,

[1] C. Hall, "The Instability of Post-War Marriages," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 5:523–30, November, 1934. This study reports that marriages which occurred in 1919 and 1920, the post-war years, resulted in proportionately more divorces than for any other year for which figures are available. Researches by Burgess and Cottrell show that marriages based on short periods of acquaintanceship show more poor adjustments than do marriages with longer periods of acquaintanceship (two or more years).

since no method has yet been developed for measuring such impacts. Most readers would probably agree that the invention of the typewriter had a more direct and significant effect on the family than did, let us say, the invention of basketball. In the field of sports, basketball is perhaps as important as the typewriter is in industry. At least, basketball is a very popular sport, both in point of number of participants and spectators. But sports are not so closely tied in with the family as is the business world. The typewriter has played a highly important part in improving the economic and social position of women because it provides clean, light work suitable to women who also generally surpass men in finger dexterity.

Culture lag

The social institutions, the family included, have been shown to comprise a set of interrelated units in a social system which is undergoing change. A change in one part, moreover, exerts an influence on other correlated parts, the extent of the influence varying with the force of the impact and the degree of correlation existing between the two factors. Most social changes are of a minor or temporary nature, and the impact they exert is not of lasting or major significance. Furthermore, it may be assumed that prior to the occurrence of some new vital change, a state of balance or adjustment tends to exist between correlated institutions or parts of institutions. Thus, before the introduction of factory production a good adjustment had been worked out between the family and the economic institution which was based on farming and the handicrafts. Production of food and goods occurred in and about the home, there was consensus of opinion regarding division of labor between men and women, and the labor of children was utilized. The dilemma of marriage or a career for women did not exist, or existed in but slight degree, because there were few or no careers apart from marriage. The adjustment of the family to the farming economy was good because mankind had had several thousand years in which to experiment and to work out favorable solutions to problems. It is probably safe to assume that the adjustment to farming was not so good in the early days of transition from hunting as it was very much later, just before the advent of the Industrial Revolution.

The Industrial Revolution substituted steam power for the power of wind, water, and muscles, and substituted the factory for the home.



Monkmeyer

PLATE 15. TWO TYPES OF WEDDING CEREMONY

Marriage in church or parsonage, or at home by a minister, priest, or rabbi, is associated with marital success. Possibly a selective factor is at work; couples having religious weddings may more often possess traits making for happiness than couples resorting to civil ceremonies. Picture of the wedding in "The Little Church Around the Corner," New York City (at top), reproduced by permission from MARRIAGE IS A SERIOUS BUSINESS *by* RANDOLPH RAY. *Published by Whittlesey House. Copyrighted, 1944, by McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.*

Roberts

Galloway

PLATE 16. GROWING UP IN TWO ENVIRONMENTS

Rural upbringing favors marital happiness. Also, marriage and birth rates are higher in the country, while the divorce rate is lower. Causes probably include the opportunities for co-operative labor on farms, and for naturalistic sex education.

When the first factories were opened in America, the question arose as to who should work in them. The men trusted the soil and were suspicious of the new machines; so the women went to the textile mills as the first workers. They enjoyed the work greatly, the conditions were pleasant, the pay attractive.[1] When the men saw this, they too sought employment in the factories, and tended to displace the women. This was not easy to do because the women would work for less pay, and in certain operations they were more efficient, so that employers preferred them. Difficulties arose. The withdrawal of women from the farms made it difficult for the farmer to manage, for a farmer is handicapped without a wife or housekeeper. The economy was still largely agrarian despite the new industry, and the farmers resented the loss of woman-power on the farms. Nor did they welcome the competition in the factories. For the women the new situation meant new problems too. If they lived in dormitories at the mills, their normal contacts with men were interrupted and their plans for marriage and parenthood suffered. As factories multiplied and workers crowded about them, building cities, the workers lived in homes of their own not far from their work. But even under these circumstances the women were faced with the problem of adding the care of home and children to their daytime employment, and the problem was more acute than now because the hours of work were much longer and the conditions of work less attractive. It became popular to say that woman's place was in the home.

This example illustrates how problems are created by important social changes. When a change occurs in one part of culture, the effects are felt in the correlated parts, which are thereby impelled to make corresponding changes in order to maintain a proper adjustment to the new conditions. But the correlated parts of culture are sometimes slow in making the necessary adjustments to the new conditions and lag behind, creating strains in the social system. The situation is like that of the man who, when walking his dog, quickens his pace only to have the dog hold back and tug at the leash. If the strain is great enough the line will snap. The illustration is not a good one

[1] Charles Dickens toured New England, visited these mills, and wrote glowing accounts of what he saw. The early mills, in order to attract workers who were highly suspicious of the new machines, provided clean, attractive dormitories for the women, and it appears that the conditions of employment were better than they were later. The pay attracted more workers than there were jobs, which gave the employers a bargaining advantage and led to the lowering of standards.

because in this case the man will probably defer to the dog and slacken his pace, but important social changes cannot readily be stayed or turned back. As more and more women were employed in industry and the home suffered through neglect of husband and children, it was not feasible to solve the problem by abolishing the factories and shops and offices. They were here to stay.

The process of social adjustment

The difficulty of the family in adjusting to the new economic conditions illustrates the confusion, the lack of consensus, the disorganization that first attends a basic social change. In the early days of the factory, the machines in some centers were attacked by infuriated mobs who sought to destroy them. It was a futile gesture, but it symbolized the prevailing confusion. Some thought that women ought not to work for pay, and public opinion was mobilized to the end of barring them from employment, especially if they were married. Something of this feeling still persists. But as the impact of the factory was felt more fully, as families shrank in size, as living quarters became smaller, and as restaurants, laundries, cleaning and dyeing shops multiplied, married women found less to occupy them at home. It is to be noted that these changes were as much the cause as the result of married women working; possibly more so. The birth rate did not fall so much because mothers were at work, but rather because children were economically unprofitable in an urban economy. The smaller homes resulted less from the fact that the women worked and were away from home, and hence needed less space, than from the fact that families were smaller and land was at a premium in the city. If women remained at home, they had more time than ever to bake bread, but bakeries developed because of the economies that are effected by mass production.

In 1900, about 6 per cent of married women were gainfully employed; in 1930, the percentage was around 12, or double what it had been only thirty years before at the turn of the century; and by 1940 the percentage had risen to 13.8.[1] The second World War gave a great impetus to the employment of women, increasing the number by 36 per cent in the interval from December, 1941 (the week before the

[1] This figure refers only to married women, with husband present. If the married women with husband absent, the widowed, and the divorced are included, the percentage in the labor force in 1940 stands at 19.4.



FIGURE 92. MARITAL STATUS OF EMPLOYED WOMEN, 1940

Nearly one employed woman in three is married and living with her husband, while one in five is a widow, a divorcée, or a woman whose husband is absent. Thus, a bare majority of employed women are or have been married. Data from Women's Bureau, United States Department of Labor.

Pearl Harbor attack), to March, 1944.[1] As the proportion of married women in the labor market increases, the saying that woman's place is in the home is heard less frequently than before.

With more married women working outside the home, the trend has been to invent means of easing the adjustment between home and job. It is to be noted that the earlier reaction was to attempt to discourage women from jobs, but as this has come to be recognized as an unrealistic adjustment, the emphasis has changed to one of working out methods of preserving the values both of the home and the job; that is, combining the two in a creative accommodation. In industry the adjustment consists in providing special safeguards for the health of women in working conditions, in hours of employment, and in minimum wages. Newer developments include welfare services with time off for expectant mothers for a period of weeks both before and after childbirth, and the provision of day nurseries for the care of the children when the mothers return to work. Until recently, nursery groups for preschool children were largely limited to the well-to-do who used the private nursery schools, and the poorest parents who used the centers established by WPA. Now there is a disposition to establish day nurseries for the children of working mothers of all classes. World War II stimulated this movement greatly, since many mothers of young children were drawn into war industries. There is still considerable feeling, however, that preschool children need their mothers, and that mothers of such children should not undertake full-time employment away from home. This is, in fact, the official posi-

[1] Frieda S. Miller, *Patterns of Women in Industry* (Washington: Women's Bureau, May 24, 1945).

tion of the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Labor,[1] which during the war tried to discourage mothers of preschool children from taking jobs in defense industries. Does this position, too, represent something of a lag? There are those who say that nursery groups are good for the child because of the socializing influence which children of the same age have on one another, an influence which is said to be lacking in one-child and two-child families, and even in larger families where the age interval between children is great.

To summarize: Family lags resulting from the failure of family organization to keep pace with correlated changes in other phases of culture are seen to be an important cause of family problems. In a rapidly changing society, the number of impacts on the family is great, increasingly great as the changes accelerate. If the family should show an increasing tendency to lag behind the accelerated rate of social change, the family would soon be hopelessly outdistanced without any chance of catching up. Such a condition would spell the collapse of the family organization, since it would have demonstrated its lack of adaptability to modern conditions. No such fate is in store for the family. While it shows many lags,[2] there is no evidence that these are increasing in number or importance. On the contrary, a new type of family is emerging which appears to be well adapted to the modern world, as succeeding paragraphs will undertake to show.

Adjustment of family problems consists in taking up the lag in family behavior to bring it into line with the changing general situation. Theoretically, the solution might be sought in cutting back the lead instead of taking up the lag, but in practice such an adjustment is seldom practicable. For instance, modern industry brought into existence the city with its slums and crowded areas, tenements, and apartment dwellings, which are by common consent regarded as less desirable environments for the rearing of children than the country with

[1] See Release CB 42–523: *Policies Regarding the Employment of Mothers of Young Children in Occupations Essential to the National Defense.* "In this time of crisis it is important to remember that mothers of young children can make no finer contribution to the strength of the nation and its vitality and effectiveness in the future than to assure their children the security of home, individual care, and affection. Except as a last resort, the nation should not recruit for industrial production the services of women with such home responsibilities." Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor.

[2] Chapin cites the continued legality of common-law marriage in many jurisdictions of the United States as an example of lag in family mores; also the persistence of the old, proprietary attitudes of parents toward their children. F. Stuart Chapin, *Cultural Change* (New York: The Century Company, 1928), chap. X: "The Cultural Lag in the Family."

its wide open spaces, sunshine, and fresh air. The family in the big city has its special problem, so far as the rearing of children is concerned, because of the lags in its adjustment to the new conditions. These lags can be corrected by city planning which makes provision for adequate housing, playgrounds, nurseries, tunnels under the main lines of traffic to afford safe passage, and other adjustments in the interests of safe and wholesome family life. These things are now being done, but slowly; the country still surpasses the city as a desirable environment for children.[1] This being so, why not move the family out of the city entirely and back to the farm or village? The idea is good but unworkable. There are those who advocate a return to the soil and the restoration of the handicrafts, at least on a partial basis.[2] Something along this line may happen, but if it does, it will be largely the result of new technological and industrial trends, not solely the result of what we want or what is best for our children. Electricity and modern communication and transportation are tending now to decentralize industry, especially lighter industry, and to scatter plants in the villages. It is thought that the atomic bomb will accentuate this trend.[3] The big cities have begun to slacken in their rate of growth, while the smaller cities near-by have added population. The distribution of population represents a series of responses to technological developments, and family adjustments are made accordingly. There is no turning back the clock of time.

Technological changes as the pace-setters

The family, we have seen, changes in response to other changes. Which changes come first? Which are the prime movers? When one is dealing with a social system composed of many parts, all of which are in motion, it is difficult to tell which part is mainly responsible for the motion. Since all the parts are in motion, every part exerts a direct impact on some of the other parts and an indirect impact on all the other parts, since the effects of changes are transmitted in a series from one part to another. A conspicuous source of change, however, is found in inventions and discoveries, and especially in technological developments. When we scan the long history of human culture and note the great turning points, we observe that momentous social

[1] For evidence, see Chapter 5.

[2] Ralph Borsodi, *Flight from the City* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1933).

[3] William F. Ogburn, "Sociology and the Atom," *American Journal of Sociology*, 51:267–75, January, 1946.

changes follow upon great inventions with revolutionary effects. Such was the case with the discovery of the planting of seeds which ushered in hoe culture and later in plow culture which supplemented hunting. The inventions of the steam engine and of steel gave us modern industry and transformed society anew. And now developments in electricity and electronics are further extending that transformation. The revolutionary development of nuclear fission has so far given us the atomic bomb. What this portends for society in general, and the family in particular, can at present only be speculated upon.

The reasons why technological changes occur with exceptional frequency, accumulating at an accelerating rate of increase like compound interest, while other phases of culture change less rapidly, are highly complex and need not concern us here.[1] We may note merely that material inventions are greatly desired, which is another way of saying that nearly everyone covets a higher standard of living; that is, more goods and more effective goods. The public appetite is whetted by a new model of automobile every year, but who would care to have his religion, or ethics, or family life changed annually? The reason for this is that the adaptive culture (folkways and mores) is designed to afford us stability, while the material culture gives us novelty and efficiency. Consequently the material culture can change radically without comparable changes occurring in the adaptive culture. A striking example was furnished by Japan which appropriated western technology, including battleships, airplanes, and guns, but eschewed our ideologies and social practices.[2] The family, religion, and other phases of the adaptive culture cannot escape some modification as the result of new technological developments, and the modification may indeed be great, but it will scarcely be as great or as striking as the changes in technology, assuming even that the adjustment is good and that no prominent lags exist. Society may in this instance be com-

[1] For fuller discussion see W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff, *Sociology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940), Part VII.

[2] Little affected by the new technology was the Japanese religion with its belief in the special divinity of the Emperor, direct descendant of the Sun God, and the social system of war lords and the obedient, impoverished masses. The Japanese social system probably contains an enormous accumulation of lags, for once the science that underlies technology is known and accepted, its influence begins to seep into surrounding fields, and the effect on superstition and supernaturalism is ultimately lethal. The process is a very slow one, however, as may be seen even in our own society where science is highly developed in many fields, yet many antiquated and unsuitable beliefs and practices continue.

pared to the movement of a watch, with the family represented by the big wheel and technology by the small one. The cogs of the large wheel and the small wheel are meshed and their movement is synchronized, but the large wheel makes fewer revolutions.

Uneven lags in the family

We have suggested that the family changes, but changes less than industry, medicine, and other institutions based on science. We have next to see that the changes in the family itself are very uneven. Changes in the material culture of the family, as might be expected, are most prominent, as the family appropriates part of the mechanical changes occurring in the society, while changes in family customs and traditions are less conspicuous. The economic functions of the family, especially those of production, have undergone the greatest transformation, while the functions of education, recreation, worship, and protection have been considerably modified as a consequence of the changes in the economic functions. All told, the changes in the ma-



FIGURE 93. INCREASE IN HOMES USING ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES, 1919–1939

An important factor in protecting the family's health, and in providing for the family's comfort and sociability, the refrigerator has had the most sensational rate of increase of the expensive appliances, topping electric toasters, percolators, or vacuum cleaners. Electric power, unlike steam power, is well adapted to the home and helps to strengthen the family in competition with outside institutions. Data for United States as of December 31 of each year, from *Electrical Merchandising*.

terial and economic functions of the family have been greater than the changes in the adaptive functions, but it is interesting to note that there are exceptions and that the changes in any given phase of culture are not even. For example, there has been considerable change in household appliances. A list of the objects to be found in a colonial New England kitchen is very different from the list of those found in a modern New England kitchen. When, however, we turn to the houses themselves, they look very much alike. Indeed, the single-family homestead of the Cape Cod type is still much in demand. The materials and design of houses show a pronounced conservatism and resistance to change which is probably greater than the lag, let us say, in the adaptive religious culture. It is not too much to say that the family since colonial times has changed less in its shelter than in its relation to the church. This is true despite the fact that it is easier to prove the superiority of modern materials of construction (the superiority of steel and plastics and glass brick over wood and plaster and ordinary brick) than it is to show the superiority of modern religious behavior to that of times past. The reasons for such marked conservatism in housing are many, but an important one is that our ideas of home are fashioned in early childhood and tend to persist, so that stereotypes are formed which are hard to change.

The economic functions have changed very greatly, yet in this sphere too the changes are uneven. An example is the relation of the sexes to the two functions of breadwinning and housekeeping. The growth of industry outside the home has drawn a great many married women into paid labor, and the proportion so employed has steadily increased. We can, therefore, say that there has been an appreciable and steady change in the economic function of breadwinning, and fewer husbands than ever before are the sole support of their families. If married women work outside the home, they have no more time for housekeeping than do their husbands who also work outside the home. But do the husbands share the responsibility for the care of the homes as the wives do the earning of the income? While some husbands are of some assistance in the home — and a few are very helpful — it is doubtful if the contribution of husbands generally is nearly as great as the situation requires. One of the commonest complaints of American wives is that their husbands "never help around the house." [1] Of course there are many rationalizations. It

[1] Based on a nation-wide poll conducted by the *Woman's Home Companion*. Reported January 17, 1946.



FIGURE 94. WHO DOES THE HOUSEWORK FOR EMPLOYED WOMEN?

An employed woman who does her own housework carries two jobs, three if she has a family. The resultant heavy tax on health and energy perhaps makes clear why most employed married women say they prefer not to have to work outside the home. In this study, for pre-war years, the nature of housework, as to whether full or part-time, is not clearly defined. Pictograph Corporation for *Should Married Women Work?* Public Affairs Pamphlets no. 49, 1940, p. 14.

is argued that there is less housekeeping, thanks to smaller quarters, and the work is easier because of modern facilities using electricity. It is said that women are naturally better suited than men to housework and cooking, although chefs in hotels are generally men. Be this as it may, it is conceivable that the adjustment of the wife and mother to the dual responsibility of home and job would be facilitated by a partnership in housekeeping on the part of her husband to match the wife's partnership in breadwinning.

Underlying Causes of Family Problems

Culture lag is one of the principal keys to human problems including those of the family, but it is not the only key. In the example given above, the relationship between husband and wife may be strained if the wife's rôle changes more rapidly than the husband's, so that the two are not dovetailed as they previously were. The lag in the hus-

band's rôle as homemaker is thus a cause of marital friction and subsequent divorce. But marital discord and divorce cannot be accounted for very satisfactorily in terms of the theory of culture lag. There is considerable marital strife in simple societies, where the cultural changes are not conspicuous; indeed, in some relatively stationary societies the divorce rate probably exceeds our own.[1] The reason for this is that the friction between mates is personal, and is, therefore, due to individual differences of temperament, tastes, and so on. There would be friction between mates even if man were an animal without culture, just as there is friction between other animals. The fact that man has a culture complicates the picture, because the culture may help to facilitate adjustments or maladjustments, depending on its teachings and the demands it makes. These remarks are by way of suggesting that there are three basic causes of family problems, and not just one: (1) culture conflict and culture lag, just discussed; (2) the conflict of man and his environment, which includes the conflict of man and nature, and man versus man; and (3) the conflict of man and culture.

The maladjustment of man and his environment

Part of the natural environment of man is other human beings, and part of the problems of family life arise from the clash of individuals due to differences existing between them. Most if not all of these differences nowadays have cultural implications, since human beings live in cultural groups, but culture in this situation merely reinforces an existing animal tendency in man. For instance, two children in a family may clash for possession of toys, clothes, candy, and other cultural objects, but basically the clash is the same as that of two dogs fighting for a bone. The culture can teach the children not to fight for the things they want, or even not to want them, but if it is natural to covet and try to possess some of the things that others have, then conflict is inevitable. Competition for objects that are scarce and are wanted is a natural phenomenon.[2]

The conflict of man and nature may be illustrated by illness, which represents a clash of the human organism and the germs of disease. Illness is a major problem of the family because it breaks up house-

[1] See Chapter 2.

[2] In making this point, it is not intended to suggest that co-operation, or mutual aid, is not also inherent in man. See Peter Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, for a definitive statement on the place of co-operation in the life of man and other animals.

holds through death while mates are still young and have minor dependents; because it is a leading cause of unemployment in normal times; because prolonged illness strains the financial resources of the family; because illness is not conducive to happiness. Nor are the germs of disease the only natural threats to man. The forces of nature are uncertain, and not always friendly. One year the flood waters rise and the next there is drought. A prolonged blizzard in the northern tundra keeps the hunters at home and spells famine and perhaps death to the whole settlement. Then there is the menace of other animals. Even today we, with our highly developed culture, are in a fight for survival with the termites. In simpler societies the danger of wild animals creates a problem of security for the family.

The conflict of man and culture

A third area of family problems is to be found in the maladjustment of culture and the original nature of man. The phenomenon of illegitimacy has been used to illustrate this type of problem,[1] for if there were no cultural organization of marriage, there would obviously be no such thing as illegitimacy, any more than there is a problem of illegitimacy among animals. Illegitimacy results from the fact that the imperious sex impulse, which is part of the native equipment of man, clashes with the proscriptions of our culture against childbirth outside of wedlock. So, too, sexual and other problems are created for many persons by the delay in marriage due to difficulties of achieving economic and social maturity in our highly complex culture.

Why do these maladjustments occur, if man himself is responsible for culture? Some of the difficulty is inevitable and is part of the price we pay for living in an organized society. Such is the case with illegitimacy, and no one argues that we should solve this problem by abolishing the discipline of marriage, which is essential to the development of a stable social order. Living in a group entails some restriction upon the self-assertive tendencies of man, and the necessary availability of energy for creative activities necessitates a measure of repression and sublimation of the instincts. But this explanation does not cover all the cases. Another reason why culture is sometimes ill-suited to man has to do with the unforeseen effects of new developments. An invention is made and the immediate uses to which it is to be put are understood. There is a demand for the invention, which

[1] Cf. Chapter 1.

means that people want what it will give them. They want the immediate result of invention, such as the automobile, but they do not want some of the effects, such as the high toll of life through automobile accidents. In the same way people wanted the machines that would give them more goods, but they did not foresee that the factories would bring slums, disease, and unemployment. Still a third reason why culture is sometimes ill-adapted to man is that inconsistent behavior patterns are brought into a given region by different groups, or develop as the result of diverse conditions, so that the culture lacks unity or integration. Such is the situation in the United States at the present time, where, for instance, Christianity teaches brotherly love and sharing with others, while the economic system of free enterprise disposes one to compete against one's fellow man and to rise above him if possible.[1] These culture conflicts are not without their influence upon family life. The drive to be successful in the competitive economic struggle in our culture leads many men to give less time and attention to their families than the latter need or desire, and as a result there is often bitterness and estrangement between mates or between fathers and children. If the mothers are ambitious, too, the children may be completely without parental companionship. On the other hand, the "family man" who does not enter earnestly into the competitive struggle of the workaday world may find his devotion to his family hampered by the feeling that others regard him as weak and unambitious. It is, of course, possible to work out an adjustment between the claims of these two rival systems by compartmentalizing one's mind, so that the right half does not know what the left half is thinking, but the adjustment would be easier if the cultural ideals were homogeneous and did not require the reconciliation of irreconcilables.

Culture change as the solution of family problems

In concluding this phase of the discussion, it is interesting to note that no matter what the underlying cause of family problems, the solution is sought in a cultural invention that will ease the point of strain. Whether the difficulty be caused by a conflict of man versus man, or man versus nature, or man versus culture, the adjustment is mediated through culture. The solution for illness (man versus na-

[1] For fuller discussion of the inconsistencies of our culture, and the problems that follow, see Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1937).

ture) lies in sanitary engineering, public health programs, and preventive medicine. The solution for war (man versus man) lies in new inventions for world government, world courts, and a world police force. The solution for illegitimacy (man versus culture) lies in education that will successfully discipline the emotions, in the sterilization of the feebleminded, in effective contraception. It is not necessary to change man's biological nature, to produce a superman, in order to solve our problems. If this were not so, the prospect would be unpleasant because man's biological nature is highly stable, with no important mutations noted in man in the last ten thousand years or so. Hence it is unlikely that any important changes in man's heredity are to be anticipated in the near future. Much the same may be said regarding nature. The geographic environment changes slowly, too, and no appreciable changes in climate, in rainfall, in the formation of the earth's surface, and in pestilence are to be expected soon. Culture, on the contrary, now changes greatly in relatively short periods of time, which means that man is learning to do things ever more quickly. In this acceleration of learning lies man's hope for the solution of his problems.

Future of the Family

The trend in the family since the start of the industrial era has been marked by the loss of the economic function of production, which in turn has resulted in the loss of other institutional functions, educational, recreational, religious, and protective. Remaining in the family are the functions of reproduction, child care, informal education, and the giving and receiving of affection. What have been lost to the family are certain historic functions, while what remain are certain natural and intrinsic functions. As a social institution, competing for power with other institutions, the family has suffered a loss of responsibilities, but as a personal institution, serving the psychological needs of its members, the family has probably experienced a net gain. If the family produces happiness, is that less important than the production of bread?

This revolutionary change from the institutional family to the affectional family, like many another major modern change, has not yet been completed, nor has it been effected without difficulty. A major social transition always entails a great deal of social disorganization as the old order gives way before the new order is fully de-

veloped. If we permit our attention to focus only on the middle scene, and do not look fore and aft, we see only the bewilderment and the confusion. The situation is much like that of the family that has broken up house and is loading its goods on a moving van. The family on the move will arrive at its new location and get settled again. It will take time, and meanwhile there is confusion. At present a large number of persons, perhaps a larger proportion than ever before, remain single, while there are reports of extensive satisfaction of sex and companionship needs on an unconventional basis. When the family settles down again, it will not be quite the same family as before, and in a world of rapid change it can never again expect to be as fixed as was the institutional, agricultural family. Some values will be different. For instance, it is possible that chastity will not be valued so highly by a society which emphasizes the equality of the sexes, but since the trend is toward a greater emphasis on companionship, the new sex code is not likely to condone promiscuity. The emphasis on affection and the availability of contraceptive knowledge may also lead to more sex freedom than formerly, but if new mores are developed they will prescribe what is proper, and the freedom will be an organized and orderly freedom, for society cannot function efficiently on any other basis.

In preceding paragraphs we say that an erroneous impression is gained if we consider only what happens during wartime and ignore the long-time trends. Much the same mistake is made by those who, seeing the present restlessness and revolt against traditional practices, are quick to interpret these conditions as signs that marriage is bankrupt and the family a dying institution.[1] In support of their position that the family is an outmoded institution, they argue that mankind has passed through two stages, the clan and the family, and is now entering upon a third, the individual.[2] Members of the earlier agricultural society were often organized on the basis of blood ties, which meant that the family was in certain respects subordinated to the clan. With the break-up of the clan or tribe, the individual *Grossefamilie* emerged as the controlling unit, and for centuries the family continued to control the behavior of the individual. An outstanding example that is usually cited of this type of

[1] V. F. Calverton, *The Bankruptcy of Marriage* (New York: Macaulay Company, 1928).

[2] F. C. Müller-Lyer, *Evolution of Modern Marriage* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930); also *The Family* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931).

family organization is the *patris potestas* of the early period of the Roman Empire, where the father had the power of life or death over his wife and children. But now, the argument runs, we have entered the stage of social evolution where the interests of the individual are dominant. "The home is no longer the goal; individual welfare and development are the goals." [1]

The foregoing statements, however, which are intended to show that the family is collapsing, can be used to support precisely the opposite view. The issue may be stated thus: Does the individual exist for the family, or the family exist for the individual? While there is a certain reciprocity of responsibility between the individual and the family, the institutional family emphasized the obligations of the individual to the group. One married, not primarily for happiness or development of personality, but because of one's duty to family, religion, and state. Is not the issue here much like that between the totalitarian and the democratic states, namely, whether the individual exists for the state or the state for the individual? The totalitarian family organization is as real as the totalitarian state. In the totalitarian family, the interests of the individual are subordinated to those of the head of the household or to the interests of maintaining the family tradition, while in the totalitarian state the loyalties of the individual are shifted from the family to the government.[2] But in either case the development of the personality of the individual in terms of his own needs and potentialities is a subordinate consideration.

Formerly, when the family was the chief unit of economic production, the last name or family name was emphasized, especially if the family was wealthy or powerful: a son or daughter was, say, a Stuart, a Hanover, or a Bourbon. What mattered most was the reputation of the family, and the members were largely bearers of a tradition. If several generations of the family had followed a particular calling, whether it be public affairs, business, medicine, or the ministry, a

[1] Ruth Reed, *The Modern Family* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), p. 25. Another writer reports: "One of the best social workers I know told me that she felt that among grown-up people there was no obligation toward other members of the family, even toward parents, that did not hold just as strongly toward anyone else who had come into the person's life. If the family relationship had resulted in a real and abiding affection, of course wonderful services would be rendered, even at great sacrifice, but they would be services rendered not on kinship but on affection." G. Vaile, "Our Interpretation of the True Place of Family Life," *The Family*, October, 1923, p. 153.

[2] See Chapter 9: "The Family and the Social Order."

son would be expected to follow that same calling, even though his own special talents and interests lay elsewhere. The professions tended to be associated with the aristocratic families and were a means of maintaining the rigid social class structure. Nowadays, with the family no longer the unit of economic production, and workers employed as individuals in their own right, the individual's first name is emphasized more, his family name less. Individual differences are stressed and careers are shaped more closely by individual aptitudes and interests and less by the family tradition. The close organization of the family has given way, in large measure, to individualization.

It is not to be denied that even in an open-class, democratic social order, the family has, and will continue to have, many vexing problems, one of the most serious of which is the problem of maintaining the population. It is obvious that if the population should decline over a sufficiently long period of time, the end result would be the suicide of the human race. At present the birth rate is declining and is insufficient to maintain the population at present levels in all the modern nations. How to stabilize or increase the birth rate in the face of the general desire for a higher standard of living and in the face of the availability of contraceptive knowledge is not clear, and it may not be possible. But neither is it clear that national advantage lies in maintaining the population at its present levels. The plight of Russia during the first World War because of her burden of a very large population suggests that the advantages in most but not necessarily in all countries may lie in the direction of a smaller population. A smaller population may mean less unemployment and, therefore, help to raise the standard of living, since modern inventions call for less labor in their use. A decrease in population, if rapid enough, depresses industry and wages, and is unpleasant while occurring, but the final result may be favorable if the population is stabilized.

Be this as it may, no adequate substitute has yet been found for marriage as a method of managing the sexual tensions and of providing companionship between the sexes, and no adequate substitute has been discovered for family care of young children. Nurseries may relieve parents of the responsibility for preschool children for a portion of the day, but if they take over the responsibility entirely the children may suffer, since personal care and affection are pos-

sible only in small groups and, what is perhaps even more important, often entail sacrifices and suffering which few persons are willing to endure except for the sake of their own flesh and blood. This observation is reflected in the saying, "only a mother could love him."

In this connection it is interesting to note that in Soviet Russia, in the early days of the Communist revolution, a direct assault was made on the family in order to divert the citizen's allegiance more fully to the state. Divorce was made procurable at the wish of either party if there were no dependent children. Abortions were legalized. But the results were not as desirable as had been expected, and in due course these actions were rescinded and some of the old supports were returned to the family. In the early days of the revolution a good Communist was taught not to think in terms of the family. Now that that lesson has been learned, it is being stressed that one cannot be a good Communist unless he is also a good family man.

The family, then, gives promise of enduring, probably as a small group concerned principally with the development of the personalities of its members, rather than as an institution based upon economic production and a host of correlated functions. Indeed, the small, loosely integrated family centered in the affectional functions seems particularly well adapted to a period of rapid social changes. Such a family makes the task of concentrating on the problems of human personality and human relations a definite one for reformers, and rests considerable hope in education and research.

A further change in the family may be anticipated in the direction of increased differentiation of types, representing diversified adjustments to varying conditions.[1] To delineate the family of the future in any detail is difficult because the shape of things to come will depend on future social changes, especially the great discoveries and inventions in material and non-material culture, and these cannot always be foreseen. Several major developments, however, are already in process of unfolding and may be observed. One centers around electricity, which, unlike steam, is friendly to the home, since it can be transmitted over long distances and sold in small units at low cost. Electricity may help the family indirectly by helping to decentralize industry, thus returning the family from the city to the village where the environment is more wholesome especially for young children.

[1] Ernest R. Mowrer, *The Family* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 96.

Electricity is also causing some economic enterprise to be returned or added to the home. An entire new home industry, the manufacture of ice in electric refrigerators, has arisen. Domestic consumption of electricity increased more than 100 per cent between 1919 and 1929 while the population grew only about 16 per cent. This indicates that electrical appliances in the home are increasing in great profusion. These appliances decrease the amount of hired help that is needed and increase the amount of ironing, sewing, and washing that is done in the home.[1] It is not to be anticipated, however, that electricity will restore home industry to its former stature, inasmuch as industry retains the economies resulting from mass production and from steady use of its machines. Many of the machines in the home are uneconomical because they are used only a very small portion of the time.



FIGURE 95. "A KITCHEN OF TOMORROW"

This kitchen, not yet available, makes extensive use of modern materials, especially glass. Appliances are built in and operated by electricity, although householders who want their toaster and waffle iron at the table may not think this an advantage. When not in use, the dining table is an attractive wall panel. Housing and household equipment have shown considerable resistance to change. The use of modern materials and appliances can make the home a place of greater comfort. Drawings created by the Department of Design, Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company.

[1] In a study of 764 housekeeping families of Mount Holyoke College students in 1929 it was found that since the introduction of electric appliances in the home, 40 per cent of the families increased the amount of ironing, 36 per cent the amount of washing, 17 per cent the amount of sewing, and 8 per cent the amount of baking. A. Hewes, "Electrical Appliances in the Home," *Social Forces*, 9:35–42, December, 1930.

It can hardly be doubted that electricity makes the home a very much more attractive place in which to live. Automatic stokers, regulated by thermostats, keep the house warm and the temperature even during the winter, while the air-conditioning unit keeps the house cool during the summer. Quartz lamps provide indoors the beneficial actinic rays. Television, now coming of age, makes a motion-picture theater of every home, even an improved motion-picture theater, for events are reproduced on the screen in the home immediately as they unfold in the wider world beyond. The home of the future should be an enriched center of sociability and entertainment.

Finally, a word about the contribution of social psychology to the family of the future. Young people nowadays think of the family as an institution for the provision of marital happiness and the rearing of children. These functions of the family are being investigated by the social sciences and will be more extensively studied. We already have findings which make it possible for the family to be a source of greater happiness to its members, and doubtless further study may be expected to yield additional knowledge which will be useful. In the past, students of the family spent their time studying the historical, the economic, and social functions of the family, and made little effort to solve in a scientific way the vital problems of personality. In the future the family should be a principal beneficiary of the increasingly active scientific study of human behavior.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why cannot the organization of the family in any society be thoroughly understood apart from the total institutional context?
2. Are "hurried-up" marriages in wartime generally desirable?
3. What is the effect of war on the status of woman?
4. Is it possible to tell which of the family reforms or changes initiated during wartime will be continued after the war?
5. In what respects is the effect of economic depression on the family similar to the effect of war? In what respects different?
6. In what ways, if any, does war benefit the family?
7. Why does the divorce rate decline during wartime?

8. Was the adjustment of the family to the farm economy before the advent of the machine age better than the adjustment of the family to the present urban industrial economy?
9. What can be done by society to improve the adjustment between home and job for gainfully employed married women?
10. How may the theory of culture lag be applied to the family?
11. Why do changes occur more rapidly as a rule in the material culture than in the adaptive culture?
12. Which of the theories of the causes of social problems expounded in the chapter is most helpful in explaining marital conflict?
13. Is a new type of family emerging in response to changing conditions? If so, what are its outlines?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. The impact of war on the family in the twentieth century. See *Selected Readings* for suggested bibliography.
2. A comparative study of the effects of World War I and World War II on the sex ratio.
3. The effect of economic depression on the family.
4. The instability of post-war marriages.
5. Contemporary culture lags in family organization in the United States.
6. New trends in family organization in the United States.

SELECTED READINGS

Chapin, F. Stuart, *Cultural Change*. New York: The Century Company, 1928.
Chapter 10 contains an illuminating discussion, with examples of culture lag in relation to family life, which has not kept pace with changes in modern industry.

Nimkoff, Meyer F., "The Family: Recent Social Changes," *American Journal of Sociology*, 47:867–68, May, 1942.
The period covered is the nineteen-thirties.

Ogburn, William F., *Social Change*. New York: Viking Press, 1922.
A great book because it has (1) directed the attention of sociologists to the dynamic aspects of social life and (2) furnished a key (culture lag) to many of our pressing social problems.

Ogburn, William F., "The Family and Its Functions," Chapter XIII in *Recent Social Trends in the United States.*

Concrete data on recent social changes, showing shifting functions.

Pidgeon, Mary Elizabeth, *Women in the Economy of the United States of America.* Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1937.

A report on the situation of women in the economy of the United States. Valuable in showing the great changes that have occurred in recent decades.

Sait, Una B., *New Horizons for the Family.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.

General and philosophical.

War and the family. For discussion of the effects of war upon the family, see Ray H. Abrams (ed.), *The American Family in World War II*, September, 1943, issue of *The Annals.* Contains articles by Bossard, Ogburn, Fairchild, Eliot, Mowrer, Waller, Sellin, Baker, and others, and is the most complete single source on the subject. Occasional articles of merit may also be found in the spring, 1942; autumn, 1942; winter, 1942; and summer, 1943, issues of *Marriage and Family Living*, the publication of the National Council on Family Relations. See also Willard Waller, *War and the Family* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1940). This chapter, published separately, and intended as an addition to the writer's *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation*, stresses the negative and unfavorable effects. A good popular discussion is the symposium edited by Sidonie Gruenberg, *The Family in a World at War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942).

Westermarck, E., *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilization.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936.

Foresight is not so keen as hindsight, as this book by the celebrated historian of marriage shows, but it is highly desirable to try to look ahead.

Chapter 18

FAMILY DISORGANIZATION

ON BEHOLDING THE RADIANT FACES of the great procession of brides and grooms, one would scarcely guess that about one in five marriages would come to grief and end in divorce. But unfortunately this is so. Nearly every couple begins marriage with high hopes for happiness, and failure is tragic. The problem is an especially serious one where there are young children. The home is the place where the civic virtues are first developed, and the kind of citizen one becomes is closely related to the kind of home life one has. The home is also highly in-

TABLE 27. DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES BY MARITAL STATUS OF FAMILY HEAD, UNITED STATES, 1940 *

Marital Status of Family Head	Per Cent Distribution					
	Of All Families			Of Broken Families		
	Total	Male Head	Female Head	Total	Male Head	Female Head
All families	100.0	84.7	15.3			
Natural families (husband and wife present)	75.8	75.8	---			
Family head single	6.4	3.8	2.6			
Broken families	17.8	5.1	12.7	100.0	28.9	71.1
Widowed	12.7	3.3	9.4	71.1	18.7	52.4
Divorced	1.6	.5	1.1	9.3	3.1	6.2
Separated	3.5	1.3	2.2	19.6	7.1	12.5

* *Statistical Bulletin* (New York: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company), July, 1944, p. 8. Bureau of the Census, *Population, Types of Families, 1940*. Washington, D.C., 1943.



FIGURE 96. BROKEN HOMES, BY TYPE AND SEX, UNITED STATES, 1940

For every hundred couples living together, there were forty-three homes with one spouse absent. It is estimated that around 1,500,000 couples in 1940 were separated by reasons other than divorce or bereavement. In about one fifth of these cases, the absent spouse was in prison or in an insane hospital. A small number (17,000) were in the armed forces, and another small group (23,000?) comprised spouses of immigrants still in the homeland. The remainder, four fifths of the total, were temporarily employed elsewhere or permanently separated. The evidence suggests that most marital separation is permanent. Data from W. F. Ogburn, "Marital Separations," *American Journal of Sociology*, 49:316–23, January, 1944.

fluential in determining the emotional stability or instability of the child, especially during the early years of life, thereby affecting greatly his chances for happiness in and out of marriage.

Divorce is not the only cause of broken homes. It is not even the leading cause. Homes broken by (*a*) marital separation and (*b*) death are much more common. For every family with a divorced head in 1940, there were about two families headed by persons separated (but not divorced) from their spouses, and about eight families with a widowed head. The percentages for the different types of homes, broken and unbroken, are shown in Table 27. The homes of the widowed make up the great bulk of the broken homes, almost three fourths of the total number, while the divorced comprise about a tenth and the separated about a fifth. All broken families in the

United States in 1940 totaled 6,262,000, or 17.8 per cent of the families of the nation.[1]

Widowhood

Death is responsible for nearly three out of four broken homes in the United States, yet some students of family disorganization do not give special consideration to bereavement on the ground that death is inevitable, whereas separation and divorce are not. The widowed person is comforted by a sympathetic public, while the divorcee's adjustment is hampered by the general feeling that marital separation means failure and is, therefore, more or less disgraceful. Bereavement probably serves as a rule to weld the rest of the members of the family into a more cohesive whole, whereas divorce usually splits the family into hostile camps. But bereavement is as truly a disorganizing experience as divorce, for it terminates the marital relationship and calls for radical readjustments in behavior.

The idea of disorganization

The concept of disorganization may be clarified at this point by a brief analysis. An organization is a configuration of various parts performing special functions which are synchronized. If the functions are disturbed, the system is disorganized. For example, a railroad is a structure consisting of interrelated parts (dispatchers, track crews, engineers, conductors, and the like), each with special functions which contribute to the common purpose of transporting men and goods. If these persons do not perform their customary functions because of a strike, a flood, or some other cause, and the trains fail to move according to schedule, the service is disorganized. The human body is likewise an organization of many interrelated parts with specialized functions. Failure of the lungs or the kidneys or any other major organs to perform their usual functions results in breakdown of health, and complete disorganization means death. Similarly, the family is an organization composed of interrelated members performing certain essential functions — reproductive, educational, recreational, religious, protective, and affectional. When these functions are disturbed and the unity of the group is impaired, we say that the family is disorganized.[2]

[1] Single persons, living alone or with dependents, are also classified as families by the Census, if they are household heads.

[2] Ernest Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, rev. ed., 1939).

It is to be noted that the definition of disorganization is objective, in terms of the functioning of the group, and is not a moral evaluation. A family of thieves may be highly organized with the members consecrated to the common cause of crime. The morale of such a family may be high. If society, which condemns stealing, should undertake to control the conduct of one or more of the members of such a family, the result might be to disorganize the family. As a matter of fact, our society is instrumental in disorganizing many such families when it sends to prison persons who are convicted of crimes, although they are the mainstays of their families. In such cases the maintenance of family solidarity is not thought to be as important as the maintenance of law and order.[1]

Since disorganization is impairment of function, it varies in degree from slight disturbance to complete loss. This is exemplified by disorganization of health, which may range from say a common cold to a fatal illness. Likewise in the family the functions may be only slightly disorganized, as when the furnace fire goes out on a cold winter day. If the maid should also leave, the disorganization would probably be increased somewhat, although this might be only temporary and might even finally result in increased family solidarity if the morale of the group is good. Divorce and widowhood, on the other hand, represent extreme disorganization, for they terminate the marital functions. Broken homes, however, are not the only disorganized homes. Many an unbroken home is disorganized by chronic discord among mates, or parents and children.

Sex differences in widowhood

The problems of widowhood, both as to degree and kind, are different for each sex. At every age level, as Table 28 shows, there are more than twice as many widows as widowers. In 1940, there were about 5,700,000 widows and 2,100,000 widowers fifteen years of age and over in the United States. The excess of widows is due to a combination of factors, namely, husbands are generally older than their wives and are likely to predecease them; women on the average live longer than men; and, most important of all, widowers have a higher rate of remarriage and tend to marry single young women.

In the great majority of cases, then, it is the wife who survives her

[1] It may be noted, however, that in some countries, like Mexico, prisoners are often not separated from their families.

TABLE 28. PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS FIFTEEN YEARS AND OVER WIDOWED, FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1940, BY SEX *

Age Group (Years)	Male	Female
15–19	...	0.1
20–24	0.1	0.6
25–29	0.4	1.3
30–34	0.7	2.5
35–44	1.7	6.0
45–54	4.2	13.3
55–64	9.3	26.9
65–74	20.0	49.3
75 and over	44.1	76.5

* *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population*, vol. IV, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), adapted from Table 5, p. 16.

husband and who carries on the family enterprise. She has an advantage over the widower, in that she is better able if she has the income, to keep the household going. The widower generally must hire a housekeeper or seek other assistance. More widowers than widows reside with relatives, and about three times as many live in lodging-houses. The widow, for her part, usually has a more serious problem of family support. Women who work before marriage generally retire from the labor force when they marry or shortly thereafter and devote themselves to housekeeping, while the husband assumes the rôle of breadwinner. The death of the breadwinner forces many widows to seek employment. Whereas married women with husband present constituted nearly two thirds of the total female population, eighteen to sixty-four years old, in 1940, they comprised less than one third of the corresponding labor force. Only 13.8 per cent (about one in seven) of the married women with husband present were in the labor force, as compared with 47 per cent of the widowed, divorced, or married with husband absent.[1] Where there are older children, the burden of support often falls on them. In the big cities, in homes broken by the death of the father, the children are the only ones gainfully employed in about one half the homes. Because the children in many broken homes are too young to work, our state and federal governments provide for cash payments to needy mothers of dependent children.

[1] Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Population, The Labor Force: Employment and Characteristics of Women* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 3.



FIGURE 97. CHANCES OF BECOMING AN ORPHAN

Percentage of all children in certain age groups who are orphans, United States, 1940. Only about one in forty children under five has lost one or both parents, but for the age group fifteen to seventeen, one in six is an orphan. Data from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, March, 1944, p. 5.

Since the problems of widowhood are especially acute where there are dependent children, we have special interest in knowing how numerous such children are. In 1940, there were altogether about 40,300,000 children under eighteen years of age in the United States. About 4,500,000, or one in nine, were in broken families, and 3,846,000 of these were orphans (about one in ten or eleven).[1] The chances of orphanhood increase rapidly as the child grows older, and at the ages of fifteen to seventeen, when children are asserting their independence from family control, the chances that a child will not have the steadying influence of both his father and his mother are better than one in six. Many writers think that one important factor in juvenile delinquency is the large number of broken homes with young children.

What the experience of bereavement may mean to a widower and his young daughter is brought out vividly in the following personal narrative:

> This is the story of two cases of bereavement in the family of a professional man. No attempt will be made to give a comprehensive account — merely enough to offer a glimpse of what these experiences meant to me.

[1] Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, March, 1944, p. 3.

At the age of twenty-five I was happily married to a woman whose previous life had been in some respects very different from my own, but who brought to me the things that I had missed in the past. We were alike chiefly in having been brought up in clergymen's families and (naturally) in not having much money. Our first year was badly broken by the War. . . .

We were both eager for children and looked forward with a happy anticipation to the coming of our first-born. She arrived a year later and fulfilled our fondest hopes. She was a healthy, happy baby. And then, a year and a half later, a second child was born. We were delighted with the thought that our first would not have to grow up alone, but would have a playmate almost her own age. But we were doomed to disappointment. The second baby was undernourished and partly paralyzed. For a long time, in fact so long as he lived, we knew not what day his life might be snuffed out. He cried "constantly," until both parents were worn out with worry and lack of rest. We took him to the best of medical men available, spending our time, our money, and our strength until it seemed we could do no more. After nine months of struggle, we accepted the inevitable. We realized that he would never grow up and that the strain of caring for him was more than we could bear. So we secured a nurse who kept him for a time and later placed him in a hospital school. He lived for six years, and in all that time there was not a week, in fact scarcely a day, when we did not half expect word that he had slipped away. We visited him, because he was our baby, but one could hardly say that these were happy visits. When at last he passed on, it gave almost a sense of relief, and yet there was a terrible longing for the lad that he might have been.

After we had been married about six years, my wife was found to have a tumor which it seemed necessary to remove. So she went to the hospital, confidently expecting to be back home in a couple of weeks. But on the operating table another tumor was discovered, whose removal was exceedingly difficult. Even so she seemed to be regaining strength when peritonitis set in and within ten days she was gone. The shock was something I cannot possibly describe. I could hardly eat; I had a constant feeling of nausea. Mentally I was full of self-accusation for not having taken the whole case more seriously and provided more adequately. (Nor for three days did I get her a special nurse, since the physician did not advise it.)

Fortunately I was able to sleep, and gradually my appetite returned. Within a week I forced myself back to my work. I devoted much time to my six-year-old girl.

Friends were thoughtful and quietly expressive of their sympathy. My mother spent a couple of weeks with us. But for weeks I went

about in a sort of daze. I was luckily able to secure a good housekeeper, who quietly fitted herself into our household, learned our ways, said little, but assumed responsibility and became very fond of the small girl. This woman was with us for over two years.

It should be said that the second child was still living at this time, and was an added cause of distress throughout. He died about a year after his mother.

Outwardly we seemed to have made a good adjustment, but the girl missed her mother, grieving secretly. At no time since her death has she been willing to mention her. Several times I have talked to her about her mother, but she would never bring up the subject of her own accord, nor would she ever say much when I opened the conversation. She clung to me and feared that I would leave her. Once when we were in a store together I went into a booth to try on some clothes; missing me she started for home crying as hard as she could. She did not want to go visiting or to have me go away. However, she has gradually changed in these respects, and seems now to be quite normal.

For myself, I was inexpressibly lonely. The housekeeper did her work admirably, but she was a woman of limited education and could not be a companion. I drifted into a correspondence with an old friend, visited her, and for a time was quite sure she was the one to fill the gap in my life. However, I cooled off and realized that she might provide only sympathy and companionship for a time. When I thought of the one who was gone and asked myself, "What would she think?" there was only one answer. I broke off, and decided that it was much better to "go it alone."

Still later a real affection developed between me and a woman five years my junior, who had lived with us when the small girl was about a year old. She was a charming person, who had gone through the experience of losing her father, and making a very happy adjustment to her stepfather and stepbrothers and sisters. We decided to get married, and have for over a year been living happily together.

The past is not wholly buried, but my daughter has a good mother and I have a lovely wife. Everything seems on a firmer footing than ever before. We are facing the future with hope and courage, knowing that there is plenty to do, accepting our daily problems as they arise.

I think the fact that the two women were fond of each other, and the fact that the girl and her stepmother are getting on so well, have contributed enormously to my own readjustment. When I look back I feel that I have been through hell, but for the most part I look forward and keep rather happily busy in the present.[1]

[1] Adapted from T. D. Eliot, "The Bereaved Family," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 160:184-90, March, 1932. Used by permission.

Young people who marry nowadays may expect a longer married life than their parents enjoyed. According to current mortality, the average couple at the time of marriage has a prospect of married life five years longer than would have been its share under the mortality of twenty years ago.[1] For example, a groom twenty-five years old and a bride of the same age have on the average thirty-seven years of married life before them. If a couple are both twenty years old at marriage, their joint expectation of life is as high as forty-one years. In most cases, the bride and groom are not of the same age, which naturally affects the length of their married life. What are the chances that a young couple will live to celebrate their silver wedding anniversary? If the bride is twenty-six years old or younger, and the groom is thirty-one, the chances are three in four. About one in ten such couples reach their golden wedding anniversary.

In most marriages, the prospect is that the wife will survive her husband. If they are both of the same age, the chances are three in five that she will do so. Since the wife is usually younger, the chances are generally greater. Widowhood is, therefore, the inevitable lot of the majority of married women, and for many women it is of long duration. The average woman who reaches sixty still has seventeen years of life before her. These facts place a responsibility on the husband to do what he can in advance to ease the burdens of widowhood for his mate. Many husbands recognize the financial problems that the sudden removal of the breadwinner brings and try to afford some protection for their families by means of accumulated savings, including life insurance. Even so, bereavement finds many a woman unprepared to handle her financial affairs, particularly where the husband has exercised exclusive management in money matters, leaving his wife without such experience.

Marital Separations

There are a considerable number of broken families in which either the husband or the wife does not reside at the family domicile, and in which the mate's absence is not accounted for by death or divorce. Such families are recorded by the census coders as "families with spouse absent," as contrasted with families in which both husband and wife are present, families in which the head has been divorced

[1] Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, "Length of Married Life Increases," *Statistical Bulletin*, February, 1944, p. 8.



FIGURE 98. CHANCES OF SURVIVING ONE'S MATE

Chances in one hundred that a married person will survive his or her mate. In most marriages the prospect is that the wife will survive her husband, because women marry at an earlier age and live to a riper old age. The problems of bereavement are serious and merit considerable forethought. Graph from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, February, 1944, p. 8.

(and has not remarried), and families in which the head is widowed. These separated families are highly significant socially, but they have not received much attention from sociologists, perhaps because the census data regarding them have only recently become available. Marital separation means that mates are deprived of normal marital association, affecting their health, security, and happiness. For the children, there is the loss of the daily love and counsel of one parent. The divorced and the widowed may remarry, but the separated may not.

In earlier times, separation when applied to marriage generally meant the departure from bed and board by one mate, with the intention of being divorced or remaining separated permanently. Migration was more difficult in earlier times. There were fewer jobs for women outside the domestic field. The running of the farm more or less required the co-operation of both husband and wife. There were few cities with services and commodities upon which separated per-

sons could depend, like hotels, eating places, processed foods, laundries, clothing stores, and hospitals. In a rural society, marital separation generally implied a long-continued separation. Has the picture changed, or does separation in modern times have the same meaning as before?

There were, in 1940, 1,500,000 to 1,600,000 "separated" couples who were neither divorced nor widowed; or one such couple to every eighteen or nineteen married couples living together. A portion of these separations appear to be more or less temporary. Included here are separations due to institutionalization, as in a prison or hospital for mental disorders. There were 300,000 such couples in 1940. Service in the armed forces separated 14,000 couples. This figure is as of April, 1940, at the time of the decennial census, six months before Selective Service, and one and one half years before the start of World War II. Another small group of 3000 couples were separated by the husband's service at sea. There were also perhaps 23,000 immigrants to the United States who had left their mates behind in a foreign country. If we total these four categories of marital separations due to institutionalization for crime and mental disorders, military service, seafaring, and immigration, we find that they account for only one fourth of the cases. There is no exact figure as to the number of couples who are separated by temporary employment in different localities, with the intention of rejoining each other at a later date, but analysis [1] of the data on separations suggests that this group constitutes only a small proportion of the total number.

Separated couples resemble divorced couples in number of children, employment of wives, nativity of the couples, place of residence, and type of occupation. Separations, like divorces, are especially prevalent among childless couples, working wives, non-whites, native whites of native parentage, urbanites, persons engaged in the service occupations, and the low-income groups of the laboring class. Separated couples show a special concentration among the young; whereas the percentage of divorced couples in the fifteen to nineteen age group is not particularly large. This may be accounted for by the fact that divorce takes time and couples are separated before seeking divorces. There is also a concentration of separations among the old, probably due to economic and health reasons rather than to sexual or

[1] William F. Ogburn, "Marital Separations," *American Journal of Sociology*, 49:316–23, January, 1944. The author has drawn heavily on this discussion.



Ford News Bureau



PLATE 17. CULTURE LAG IN HOUSING

Assembly line methods in the manufacture of automobiles have resulted in lower costs and increased distribution, while the survival of high-cost handicraft methods of home construction is reflected in a static trend in home ownership. *(See reverse side.)*



Automobile Manufacturers Association

PLATE 18. A NEW METHOD OF HOUSE CONSTRUCTION

The mobile device swings an outer mold into place over an inner mold, then backs off while workmen fill a 5-inch space between the two molds. The next day the inner mold is loosened and the vehicle, attaching itself to the outer mold, moves to a previously prepared concrete floor, where the house is laid. An objection to the method is uniformity of external appearance. From AUTOMOBILE FACTS, *April, 1946.*

personal maladjustment. The high rate of separations among the old may also reflect the factor of accumulation of cases with the passing years. We conclude that separated couples as a class have many of the characteristics of divorced couples, from which we may infer that probably the majority are permanently separated. If so, marital separation at present would presumably have much the same significance as in earlier times.

Desertion

A special type of marital separation is desertion, or the voluntary withdrawal of one marriage partner from the other without the latter's consent. It is distinguished from legal separation by the fact that it occurs without due process of law. Non-support generally accompanies desertion, but a husband who does not provide for his wife may be guilty of non-support, even if he remains at home.

Desertion is commonly called "the poor man's divorce." In a sense this is true, since desertion is largely confined to persons of the lower economic classes who can ill afford the expense of a divorce. But various studies have shown that desertion does not represent so sharp and final a break as divorce. Most deserters leave home more than once. In one study, 87 per cent of the total number were "repeaters," [1] while in another investigation it was found that 50 per cent of the deserters had returned after previous desertions.[2] Desertion in certain cases appears to be not so much the poor man's divorce as his "moral holiday."

Amount of desertion

In the nature of the case, there can be no valid data concerning the incidence of desertion in the United States. Estimates are also unreliable, since we do not know what proportion of the cases ever comes to the attention of public agencies. In 1928, the National Desertion Bureau sought to arrive at an estimate of the amount of desertion, through a canvass of urban social agencies likely to deal with the problem. On the basis of reports received from these agencies, it was estimated that there were about one hundred desertions per 100,000

[1] J. C. Colcord, *Broken Homes: A Study of Family Desertion and Its Social Treatment* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1919), pp. 7–8.

[2] E. F. O'Neill, "Report on a Study of One Hundred Cases of Desertion," *The Family*, 9:287–91, January, 1929.

urban population, or approximately 50,000 a year.[1] It is the general opinion of social workers that the rate of desertion has increased since that year, from the same causes that account for the rising tide of divorce.

Factors in desertion

The basic causes of desertion, like those of divorce, are of course to be found in marital discord. But there is one contributing cause in the case of desertion which is not present in connection with divorce. The person who initiates a petition for divorce is following the rules which society has laid down for those who wish to sever their family bonds. The rights of the family will be protected by the court. But the deserter is one who has no scruples about disregarding both the law and the rights and needs of his family. The question thus arises as to whether or not certain groups in our population are especially lacking in such scruples.

Most students of desertion believe that nationality is a factor in desertion, that persons of certain nationality desert more readily than others. The method followed is to compare the percentage of desertions contributed by a given group with the relative size of that group in the general population. When this was done in Chicago in 1921, it was found that Negroes constituted 4 per cent of the population, but contributed 15.6 per cent of the reported desertions; Poles made up 5 per cent of the population, and 9.7 per cent of the deserters; Russians comprised 3.8 per cent of the population and 5.4 per cent of the deserters; and Italians, 2.2 per cent of the total population, accounted for 3.5 per cent of the deserters. On the other hand, native-white persons were 66.3 per cent of the city population, but only 46 per cent of the contingent deserters. Negro, Slavic, and South European groups apparently contribute a disproportionate amount of desertion.[2] These are, of course, the low-income groups; so the true cause may be poverty.

It is thought by some students of the subject that differences of nationality, religion, and age of marriage partners are also factors making for desertion. In 28 per cent of the cases studied by Brandt, husband and wife were of different nationality, whereas in the same year only 8.5 per cent of all marriages in the United States were mixed mar-

[1] *Report of the Desertion Committee Compiled from the Questionnaires* (New York, 1928).
[2] E. R. Mowrer, *The Family* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 164.

riages, and less than 13 per cent were of this sort in New York City, where the desertion rate is highest. Furthermore, a difference between mates in the matter of religion was found in 19 per cent of the cases; in 27 per cent the difference in the ages of husband and wife was more than six years.[1] These three factors may help to explain the discord which developed between the husband and wife in these cases, but they hardly account for the fact of desertion itself. The most important thing about deserters is their possession of attitudes which permit them to abandon their familial responsibilities without due process of law. For the upbuilding of such attitudes we must look at the total social or cultural situation in which these individuals have their being. In a folk culture, like that of the rural Negroes of the South, desertion is not seriously condemned. Where groups are small and neighborly and farming affords a livelihood, the presence of the father is not so vital as it is in a complex urban technological society. In a simple society, divorce is usually a simple procedure. In our own society, divorce is a complicated and expensive process, and it is therefore not surprising that those who have come from simple folk societies should look to a simpler solution of their marital difficulties.

Divorce

Unlike desertion, divorce is a legal action terminating the marriage, usually carrying the right to remarry. This is true of absolute or unlimited divorce, although in at least one state — New York — the defendant in an action for divorce may remarry only after an interval of several years, and then only after the authorities are satisfied as to the "good behavior" of the defendant. In case of limited divorce or legal separation, remarriage is not permitted.

Annulment

Remarriage is permitted in case of annulment, a legal action that invalidates the marriage on the ground that it never legally existed and should not have occurred. The reasons for annulment are, therefore, the same as the reasons for which marriage is prohibited, the most important being (1) fraudulent representation — for example, concealment of insanity, impotency, or conviction of a felony; (2) bigamy; (3) non-age; (4) mental incapacity; (5) force or duress; (6) consanguinity or affinity; and (7) miscegenation. Of the annulments

[1] L. Brandt, *Family Desertion* (The Charity Organization Society of New York City, 1905).

granted, approximately nine tenths are for the first three reasons listed above.

Statistics of annulments for the United States were first collected in 1926 and annually thereafter until 1933, when the tabulation was discontinued. During this period annulments averaged about four thousand a year, a ratio of about one to forty-one divorces. Since the causes of annulment are present at marriage, the average duration of marriages ending in annulments is very short, one third being terminated within a year, and about four fifths within five years. An annulment accords a person his previous marital status, but it would be a mistake to think that it always restores the earlier *status quo* in other particulars, for the personal and property rights of the two parties and their offspring, if any, must be protected by the law, and these may have been affected by their illegal marriage. Accordingly, the law may provide for property settlements and alimony, as in divorce, where the need is established. Under the common law, the children of annulled marriages are illegitimate, but most of our jurisdictions have modified the common law, declaring that children of marriages annulled for certain specified reasons are legitimate. Otherwise the children are illegitimate, and are so in the ten states which do not provide special legislation on the subject.

The rising tide of divorce

Discussions of divorce usually emphasize the fact that the basic cause of broken homes is domestic discord, and the point is important, for it shows that the primary problem is marital unhappiness, and not the divorce in which it eventuates. As a rule, too much attention is given to the final surgical action and not enough to the underlying family crisis. It is well to keep this point in mind, for there are some disorganized homes which are not broken. These couples are unhappy, but they do not separate, because of various circumstances, such as religious scruples, a sense of responsibility toward the children, and considerations of occupation and social status. There is always the possibility that the alternative to an unhappy marriage may be even less attractive than the marriage itself. How numerous such cases are we have no way of knowing, for we have no data on the proportion of all unhappy homes that are eventually broken.[1]

[1] One difficulty is that we have no data on marital happiness for the population at large, all the studies now available having utilized selected samples. The most extensive sample, studied

What we do know is that the proportion of marriages ending in divorce has greatly increased during the last half-century. This is shown by the accompanying table (Table 29) which gives the number of divorces for certain years in relation to (1) the total population for those years, (2) the number of marriages in those years, and (3) the average number of marriages for the preceding ten years, including the year in question. All three sets of figures are included in the table because they are used by students of the family, but the third set is probably the most satisfactory. Where the divorce rate is given per thousand general population, the results for various years when compared may be misleading if there have been changes in the age composition of the population. At the present time, because of the low birth rate, the proportion of children in our population is decreasing and the proportion of adults is increasing. With a bigger proportion of adults in the population the proportion of married persons will increase, and this in itself will increase the number of divorces in the future. Actually, during the past fifty years or so there has not been much change in the proportion of persons in the United States who are of marriageable age; hence this method of computing the trend of the divorce rate gives a picture much like that yielded by the other methods. As for the second basis of computation (the number of divorces per hundred marriages), the weakness here is that the two sets of figures are not entirely comparable. The marriages of 1940, say, are truly events of that single year, but the divorces of 1940 represent marriages that were contracted for the most part in years prior to 1940, running back in some cases twenty or more years. To compare the marriages and divorces of any given year is, therefore, somewhat unrealistic. It is better to compare the divorces of a particular year with the marriages most likely to produce them. This method of computation is shown in the third column of Table 29, where the number of divorces for certain years are compared with the average number of marriages for the preceding ten years, including the year in question. This method is fairly satisfactory, since approximately two thirds of all divorces are granted to couples married less

by Lang, reported about 16 per cent "below average in marital happiness." This is virtually the same figure as the proportion of marriages that ended in divorce in 1930. Although these two sets of figures are not strictly comparable, they suggest that most unhappy marriages are eventually broken. The Lang data probably underestimate the amount of marital unhappiness in the general population, since the sample used was selected for education. Likewise, the divorce figures need to be supplemented by those for separations.

TABLE 29. DIVORCE RATE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1887–1940 *

(Number of divorces per 1000 total population; number per 100 marriages of the same year; and number per 100 marriages, average for preceding 10 years, including the year in question.)

Year	Number	Per 1000 Population	Per 100 Marriages	Per 100 Marriages Average for Preceding 10 Years
1887	27,919	0.47	5.5	---
1900	55,751	0.73	7.9	9.17
1910	83,045	0.90	8.8	9.97
1915	104,298	1.05	10.4	---
1916	114,000	1.13	10.6	11.7
1917	121,564	1.20	10.6	12.3
1918	116,254	1.12	11.6	11.5
1919	141,527	1.35	12.3	13.7
1920	170,505	1.60	13.4	16.0
1921	159,580	1.47	13.7	14.7
1922	148,815	1.35	13.1	13.5
1923	165,096	1.48	13.4	14.7
1924	170,952	1.51	14.4	15.0
1925	175,449	1.53	14.8	15.2
1926	180,853	1.55	15.0	15.5
1927	192,037	1.62	16.0	16.4
1928	195,939	1.63	16.6	16.5
1929	201,468	1.66	16.3	16.8
1930	191,591	1.56	17.0	16.2
1931	183,664	1.48	17.3	15.6
1932	160,338	1.28	16.3	14.1
1933	† 165,000	1.3	15.0	14.3
1934	204,000	1.6	15.7	17.6
1935	218,000	1.7	16.4	18.6
1936	236,000	1.8	17.2	19.8
1937	250,000	1.9	17.5	20.6
1938	‡ 244,000	1.9	18.5	19.9
1939	251,000	1.9	18.3	20.3
1940	264,000	2.0	16.9	20.6

* Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and Divorce, 1931* (Washington, D.C., 1932); *Marriage and Divorce, 1932* (1934); *Marriage and Divorce Statistics — United States, 1887–1937* (1940); *Estimated Number of Divorces by State: United States, 1937–1940* (1942).

† Estimates for 1933 to 1937 made by Samuel A. Stouffer and Lyle M. Spencer, "Recent Increases in Marriage and Divorce," *American Journal of Sociology*, 44:551–54.

‡ Estimates for 1938–40 made by the Bureau of the Census, *Vital Statistics — Special Reports*, vol. 15, p. 193, March 20, 1942.

than ten years, but even this method underestimates the probability of divorce for the marriages of any given year. For instance, in the year 1940 the divorce rate on this basis was 20.6, which means that there were 20.6 divorces per hundred marriages contracted during the pre-

ceding ten years. The probabilities are, then, that better than one in five marriages entered into between 1931 and 1940 ended in divorce, but since the trend of divorce is still upward, the one in five ratio probably underestimates the chances of divorce for marriages contracted in the most recent year of the series, 1940.

Inspection of Figure 99 shows that the trend of the divorce rate during the past half-century has been continuously upward, and the end of the upward course is not yet in sight. Although there have been some irregularities from year to year, principally because of economic depressions and wars, on the whole there has been an expansion of the divorce rate of nearly 4 per cent a year since 1896.



FIGURE 99. THE RISING TIDE OF DIVORCE

Ratio of divorces in each year to average annual marriages in preceding ten-year period. Until World War I, the increase in the divorce rate in the United States was fairly uniform. After the war, in 1919, the rate spurted phenomenally and maintained a high level during the nineteen-twenties. In the late nineteen-thirties a new sharp rise occurred, followed by another in the nineteen-forties. Adapted from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, October, 1943, p. 4, and January, 1936, p. 10. Sources: Estimates of divorces by the Bureau of the Census, 1911–1940; marriages, 1911–1944. Divorces, 1941–1944, questionnaire inquiry by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and State Reports (sixteen representative states).

Causes of the rise in divorce

How shall we account for the marked upswing in the divorce rate? Are relatively more persons unhappily wedded today than in 1887? Possibly so, but the evidence on this point is difficult to appraise. The increased individualization of personality which results from our present complex culture may make it more difficult for mates to achieve good adjustments than was the case in the simpler society of the last century. When young people live in small villages and towns and grow up together, they become well acquainted with one another and are, therefore, in a position to make a sensible choice of a mate. It has been shown [1] that a long period of acquaintance is favorable to happiness in marriage. In the modern urban communities young people probably choose mates on shorter acquaintance. In a farm economy, moreover, the mates are more likely to be congenial, since they share a common background and have many common interests and points of view. This contrasts with the situation in a modern urban society where the highly differentiated culture produces greatly individualized personalities with distinct interests and outlook which lessen the probability of congeniality in marriage. The rapidity of change of modern culture also tends to produce nervous individuals who have difficulty in making satisfactory social adjustments. Modern culture furnishes individuals with new resources for making adjustments, especially the insights into behavior provided by scientific knowledge, but it is doubtful if these gains as yet balance the problems of adjustment created by the new urban industrial society.

In accounting for the increase in divorce it is not necessary to assume that there is now more marital maladjustment than formerly, but simply that there is now less willingness to tolerate such maladjustment when it occurs; that is to say, the attitude toward divorce is now more favorable, or at least less unfavorable. In a large urban community, where one gains a sort of anonymity, social pressure is at a minimum. What your neighbors think about divorce is not important because they are not thinking about you, and so you need not consider them if your marriage is unsatisfactory and you want a divorce. In a small community a divorcee has daily to face neighbors who think that divorce is disgraceful because it is an admission of failure in life's most important personal undertaking. Nowadays, too, the standard of living is higher and there is more money with which

[1] See Chapter 12.

to buy divorces. An even more important economic factor is the ready availability of jobs for women, so that they do not have to remain in an unhappy marriage simply for the sake of economic security. The decline in the birth rate is doubtless also a factor, for many marriages are now childless, whereas children are highly important in preserving marriages. Ideological factors should be mentioned, too, especially those associated with the pleasure philosophy of our time, born of material science, which makes people less tolerant of inconvenience and discomfort. Where material culture is highly developed and provides innumerable creature comforts, one hears little of the duties of the individual and much of the rights of the individual to happiness and self-realization. A further consideration is the increasingly favorable public attitude toward divorce which doubtless helps to promote divorce. The increase in the number of divorces has itself affected public opinion because the greater the number of divorced persons in the population, the more likely we are to take them for granted.

The Distribution of Divorces

For the country as a whole, at least one fifth of all marriages now end in divorce. Does this mean that one out of every five readers of this book who marry will eventually come to grief in his or her domestic life? A moment's reflection suggests that this is not so, since most of the readers of this book will be college students, whose marriages are more successful than the generality of marriages. As a matter of fact, the distribution of divorces in the population is very uneven. The proportion for the whole married population is one in five, but for particular groups it may be one in ten, or one in fifty, or indeed no divorces whatever, while in others the proportion may be greater than one in five.[1] For instance, the writer is acquainted with one college faculty which does not have a single divorcee, though it has over one hundred members, and so would be entitled to twenty divorcees according to the national average. It is possible that there has been some selection, and that candidates for positions on this faculty have been rejected because of previous divorce, but this factor is not primary because many of the teachers are young and might still have sought divorces after their appointments. The reasons for the

[1] During the first six months of 1944, the clerk of Los Angeles County issued 16,578 marriage licenses and recorded 11,797 divorce and domestic relations actions filed, a rate of 71 per cent.



FIGURE 100. DIVORCES ARE LARGELY CHILDLESS

Percentage of marriages existing in 1930 in the United States ending in divorce in that year. The chances, in any one year of a marriage, that divorce will strike a family without children under twenty-one living at home are about seventeen times as great as for marriages with children. From W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff, *Sociology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940), p. 720.

unusual record are not all clear, but one reason is the tradition in this denominational college, located in a small town, that divorce is reprehensible. Additional factors are the personality and occupation of these men which make for marital stability. Whatever the reasons, this example shows that the distribution of divorces is very uneven in the population, with some groups having much more than their share, some much less.

Size of family

One of the most important considerations affecting the probability of divorce is the size of family. More than half of all divorces are granted to couples without children, and in an additional one fifth of the cases, only one child is involved, whereas only about one fifth of married couples are childless. It is not clear whether children contribute to marital happiness or just keep parents who want a divorce from seeking one. Reference was made in a previous chapter [1] to several researches which report a positive correlation between the desire for children and marital happiness, but none between marital happiness and the presence or absence of children. Those who do not have children and want them might be happier if they had a family, while those who do not want children and have them might be happier without them, but this is conjectural. All we know is that where

[1] Chapter 14.

there are children the chances of divorce are much less than where there are no children; indeed, the chances in the first instance are only one nineteenth as great as in the second. [1] Clearly children hold their parents together, but in what proportion of cases this pressure is a kind of duress, we do not know.

Religion

Some religions frown upon divorces, in which cases the religion is plainly a factor affecting the distribution of broken homes. The Roman Catholic Church forbids divorce and permits only separations which do not carry the right to remarry, and these are probably relatively infrequent, since there are many large families among Catholics. Less severe, the Episcopal Church permits divorce for adultery only, and sanctions remarriage only on the part of the so-called "innocent party" — the plaintiff in a successful action for divorce. These edicts of churches have the obvious effect of limiting divorces, but whether they do so by promoting marital happiness is doubtful. Terman's data [2] suggest, although they do not definitely prove, that either very much or very little religious training is less favorable to marital happiness than a moderate amount. This finding is in agreement with the conclusions of the Burgess-Cottrell study that brides and grooms reporting no church connection rank lower than the average in good adjustments.[3] Further evidence of the influence of religious ties in stabilizing marriages is provided by the data on the comparative success of religious and civil weddings.[4] Of 669 marriages which ended in divorce, two thirds (68 per cent) were performed by clergymen, and the remaining one third by justices of the peace and other civil officers. Since for the population as a whole nearly four fifths (79 per cent) of the marriages are celebrated by clergymen,[5] the religious marriages were underrepresented in the divorces studied. It would seem that those who have civil weddings are more likely than the others to wind up in the divorce court. In the sample under consideration, the broken civil marriages had a mean duration of 5.13 years as against 7.81 years for the religious unions.

[1] A. Cahen, *A Statistical Study of Divorce* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932).
[2] *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness*, p. 235.
[3] *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, p. 123.
[4] Paul Popenoe, "Success of Civil and Religious Marriages," *Eugenical News*, 23:70–71, 1938.
[5] Bureau of the Census, *Preliminary Marriage Statistics for 26 States: 1939, Vital Statistics—Special Reports*, vol. 15, number 8, p. 86, December 30, 1941.



FIGURE 101. RELIGION AND DIVORCE

The religious code is one of the strongest factors governing divorce. The rate of divorce of Catholics in this study is one third that of "non-Catholics" (a category containing some Jews, who are too few to be classed separately). Where one parent is Catholic and the other not (mixed), the divorce rate is appreciably greater, and it is highest for couples with no religious affiliations. Based on data supplied by 5490 secondary-school students of the public and parochial schools of Spokane. As the divorce rates are only for one city, for families with children in school, they are not comparable with the rates cited for the population generally, but are useful for showing differences in divorces according to religious affiliation. These data need to be supplemented by the data for annulments and separations. H. Ashley Weeks, "Differential Divorce Rates by Occupations," *Social Forces*, 21:334–37, March, 1943.

Duration of marriage

A third important factor affecting the likelihood of divorce is the number of years married. As Table 30 indicates, divorces are more likely to occur in the early years of marriage when couples are young, than in middle life or old age.[1] This is not surprising, since youth is the time for mating, and it is also the time during which the prospects for remarriage are greatest, especially for women, in case the first marriage proves unsatisfactory. It will be noted that more than one tenth of all the divorces in the United States occur within the first year of marriage, and approximately two thirds go to couples who have been married less than ten years. Since the average couple in the United States marry in their early twenties, at least four fifths of all divorces are granted to couples whose average age is under forty.

[1] This trend has been accelerated in recent decades. The average interval between marriage and divorce, which was about eight years during the latter part of the last century, is now nearer four.

TABLE 30. DIVORCES CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO DURATION OF MARRIAGE *

Number of Years Married	Per Cent Distribution 1932	1887–1906
Less than 1 year	3.9	2.1
" " 2 years	10.9	5.2
" " 3 "	19.2	12.0
" " 4 "	27.7	20.1
" " 5 "	35.7	28.3
" " 6 "	42.9	35.9
" " 7 "	49.4	42.9
" " 8 "	55.0	49.2
" " 9 "	60.2	54.8
" " 10 "	64.7	59.7
" " 15 "	81.3	77.7
" " 20 "	89.8	87.8
20 years and over	10.2	12.2

* Adapted from the Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and Divorce*, 1931, p. 27; 1932, p. 5.

What we have, apparently, is a relatively unstable family system in the early years of marriage and a more stable family in the forties. Among preliterates, the stability of the later years of marriage is impressive compared with the instability of the earlier years.[1] Is not, therefore, divorce largely a problem of the young marriage?

Most couples enter matrimony with great expectations of happiness and are extremely loath to admit failure when it occurs. A couple may give themselves time, hoping there may be a change for the better. This may be one explanation of the fact that the distribution of divorces is fairly even for those who have been married two, three, four, or five years. Compared to couples at the turn of the century, however, couples at the present time show much more impatience with marital unhappiness. At least Table 30 shows that of those getting a divorce, about twice as many modern couples dissolved their marriages within the first year or two.

How shall we account for the divorces of couples in later life? A possible explanation is that the happiness of marriage decreases with an increase in the number of years married. One study [2] reports an increase in the percentage of poor marital adjustments and a decrease in the percentage of good adjustments as the years of marriage slip by. This finding may seem discouraging, but it should be borne in mind that the standard of happiness is set very high during the first year of

[1] See Chapter 2.

[2] Burgess-Cottrell, *op. cit.*, p. 409. It is to be noted that the duration of these marriages was only six years.



FIGURE 102. DOES TIME CORRODE THE HAPPINESS OF MARRIAGES?

After the honeymoon, the happiness of marriage wanes until it reaches a low point six to eight years later, after which there is some improvement, especially in the later years. This could be due to selection, since most of the seriously maladjusted couples have probably been divorced during a period of twenty years, leaving behind the more happily adjusted. It is also possible that the criteria of marital happiness used in this study do not apply equally to the long-married and the briefly married. From Lewis M. Terman *et al.*, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938), p. 177.

marriage. By comparison with the poetic ecstasy of the early period the experiences of the later years may seem prosaic. Be that as it may, adjustment in marriage does not seem to improve very much after the first few years of marriage, as is shown in Figure 102. An implication of these findings is that human relationships do not carry themselves, do not improve simply because they have existed for a certain length of time. Habits which are hurtful to the relationship can develop as well as helpful ones. A marriage that has been happy for a time may turn unhappy because of some change of circumstance. This may help to explain why one divorce in ten is granted to a couple married at least twenty years. In some of these cases, the maladjustment is doubtless of long standing, with divorce postponed for the children's sake until they are grown up or for some other reason, but the collapse may also be due to new developments, whether they be changes in attitude, in circumstance, or in the functioning of the ductless glands. In short, adjustment in marriage is dynamic, and is not guaranteed for a lifetime because of a good start.

Region and community

Still another factor affecting the probability of divorce for any individual is his place of residence; that is, the section of the country in

TABLE 31. ESTIMATED NUMBER OF DIVORCES AND DIVORCE RATE PER 1000 POPULATION, UNITED STATES, BY REGIONS, 1940 *

Region	Number	Rate
United States	264,000	2.0
New England	9,715	1.2
Middle Atlantic	24,300	0.9
East North Central	53,853	2.0
West North Central	26,912	2.0
South Atlantic	32,630	1.8
East South Central	19,307	1.8
West South Central	45,831	3.5
Mountain	16,966	4.1
Pacific	34,019	3.5

* Bureau of the Census, *Estimated Number of Divorces by State: United States, 1937–1940, Vital Statistics — Special Reports*, vol. 15, number 18, p. 196, March 20, 1942. Adapted from Table 1.

which he lives and the type of community. For instance, if he lives in the mountain states of the West his chances of divorce are much greater than if he resides in the Middle Atlantic states, as can be seen from Table 31, which gives estimated divorce rates by regions, in 1940. His chances of divorce in 1940 in the mountain states, which had the highest rate of all the regions, were more than four times as great as in the Middle Atlantic states, with the lowest rate of all regions. In general the divorce rate increases as one moves west. • It will be noted that the regions with the highest rates are, as a rule, those of more recent settlement, where the rate of population growth is higher and the tradition more liberal than in the older states of the eastern seaboard.

The rate for the mountain states is greatly increased by the single state of Nevada which ranked the country with a rate of 47.1 per thousand population, due principally to Reno which furnishes nearly all of Nevada's divorces. Indeed, about one in every forty divorces in the United States is secured at Reno. Most of these, however, do not go to long-standing Nevadans, but to persons from other states, principally New York and New Jersey, who establish temporary residence in the state in order to take advantage of the lenient requirements.[1] The divorce rates of the various sections and of the various states reflect differences in stringency or leniency of divorce laws, although an additional factor may be differences in the proportion of the population that is married. Divorces are nonexistent in

[1] Of 5260 divorces granted in Reno in 1930, about 5000 went to out-of-state persons.

South Carolina because the state has no divorce law, only annulments being granted. The rate for New York is only 0.8, mainly because the state has but a single ground for divorce, namely, adultery.

Within the region the divorce rate varies also by type of community, being about twice as great in urban as in rural areas. One reason is the greater economic significance of marriage on farms, which makes divorce a more serious matter than in the city. A farmer is more greatly handicapped without a wife or housekeeper than is a city dweller who works in industry and has ready access to eating places, lodging-houses, tailor shops, and places of amusement. Divorce is more difficult for the rural wife, for she depends for economic support upon marriage, since there are few occupations in the country open to her except domestic service. For this reason, and because the group pressure is much less intense in the larger centers, farm and village women who obtain divorces migrate in large numbers to the town and city.

The variation in divorce rates continues within the city itself. This has been shown [1] for Chicago, where the divorce rate has tripled since 1887, whereas that of the ten most rural counties in the state of Illinois has barely doubled. In the city itself, certain localities are found that are totally devoid of divorce, and, at the other extreme, neighborhoods are spotted with a divorce rate of 68 per thousand population, the latter being true of certain rooming-house and apartment-house areas. In between these extremes range the other areas of the city with varying rates of disorganization. It is, of course, not known how many seek refuge there afterward. Persons wishing to escape scrutiny and censure because of divorce find a haven in certain parts of the city. Study [2] has shown that the divorced woman seeks social isolation in areas of mobility and poor housing where "come and go" relationships prevail, and cautiously avoids areas of light density and of religious prejudice.

Occupation

Type of residence has been shown to be associated with the frequency of divorce, but place of residence is itself determined by more

[1] Ernest R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 54, 117.

[2] J. H. S. Bossard, "Spatial Distribution of Divorced Women," *American Journal of Sociology*, 40:503–07, January, 1935. Bossard studied 404 census tracts in Philadelphia in 1930, involving 5644 divorced women, or a rate of 13.6 per 1000 married women. The areas of high mobility, dense population, and anonymity, represented by Negro and rooming-house districts, contained only 7 per cent of the total census tracts, but had 25 per cent of the divorced women. In 92 census areas no divorces whatever were reported.



FIGURE 103. OCCUPATIONS AND DIVORCE

The divorce rate increases progressively as economic status drops, with the skilled workers having a rate almost twice as high as the professional class. The unskilled have a lower rate than any group except the professional, but also have the highest separation and desertion rates. For source, and comment on the sample, see caption for Figure 101.

fundamental factors like occupation and socio-economic status. Divorced women are found in largest numbers in the poorest sections of town for a number of reasons, but one of the most important is low income. Divorced women have an especially difficult problem of supporting themselves and their children, and consequently drift into the areas of low rentals. Likewise farmers have an appreciably lower divorce rate than non-farmers, and the type of occupation is an important factor in accounting for the difference. In a previous chapter,[1] some findings were presented which raise a question as to whether variations in income above the subsistence level greatly affect the degree of marital happiness. The studies suggested that stability of income and of employment was in general more important than size

[1] Chapter 15.

of income. Occupational factors thus appear to outweigh in importance considerations of income *per se*.

Data on divorces by occupational groups are not available for the population as a whole except for certain years at the turn of the century.[1] These data, though not recent, are illuminating because they compare the occupational distribution of divorced husbands, 1887 to 1906, with the occupational distribution of males, 1900. The figures show that certain occupational groups had much more than their share of divorces, other groups much less. Doctors had twice their legitimate share of divorces, as did also journalists, hairdressers, barbers, restaurateurs, and saloonkeepers. Dentists had three times their share; and soldiers, sailors, and marines around ten times their quota. Among lawyers and college professors, the number of divorces was about what would be expected on the basis of their representation in the total occupational body. Clergymen, bankers, merchants, and government officials came off best, with less than their share of divorces. It is interesting to compare this list with the ranking of occupations according to marital happiness.[2] While there are some discrepancies, the two lists agree fairly well in showing the relationship between marital stability and certain occupational factors, notably the degree of mobility of the occupation [3] and the degree of social chaperonage to which it is subject. Occupations characterized by irregular work and hours, by absence from home overnight or longer, and by little or no group supervision of the morals of the

[1] Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and Divorce, 1887–1906*, Part I (Washington, D.C., 1909), pp. 42–47.

[2] See Chapter 15.

[3] Disorganization does not follow from mere movement, *per se*, but only from mobility that creates a new situation. As the saying goes, absence sometimes makes the heart grow fonder. For obvious reasons an extended absence in the first few months of marriage is not so likely to be disturbing as in a later period. In general, mobility is associated with instability of marriage. When Mowrer compared 1000 divorced cases appearing before the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in 1919 with a control group of 1000 non-divorced cases, he found (1) the mean number of years per address of the control group was 56 per cent greater than for the divorced group; (2) the mean years per community address of the control group was 62 per cent greater; (3) prior to separation, divorced families moved more often into areas of greater family disorganization than did the control group. Locke points out four different ways in which mobility may be associated with family disorganization: (1) If differences in the mobility of the several members of the family put the members in contact with different patterns of behavior, divergent behavior may develop, and incompatibility within the family may result; (2) the individual family may become disorganized as the result of moving to a strange community, because such moving tears the family from the social matrix of which it has been a part; (3) vertical mobility may individualize and separate the various members of a family; (4) separation in space of the family members because of differential mobility may be disorganizing. Harvey J. Locke, "Mobility and Family Disorganization," *American Sociological Review*, 5:489–94, August, 1940.

practitioners generally have more than their share of homes broken by divorce. Frequent contacts of a personal nature with members of the opposite sex in the course of employment appear also to be disruptive of marriage.[1]

Some may question whether the emphasis on occupational factors is justified. They may feel that the truly important considerations in human relations are personality factors and that the occupational context is quite secondary, on the ground that occupations exert a selective influence, with different occupations recruiting different kinds of people. While a certain amount of occupational selection on the basis of personality traits clearly exists, the idea must not be carried too far, for it implies freedom of choice of occupation, which is hardly the case in a class society. Most persons "inherit" their occupations, or occupational level, from their parents, and there is less choice than is generally supposed. Moreover, it is well to note that the practice of an occupation is not without effect upon one's habits and attitudes; hence the likeness in traits among the practitioners of an occupation is partly a result of the occupation itself.

Personal Effects of Divorce

The significance of divorces lies largely in what it does to people. The obvious thing is that it frees them from an undesired marriage, but less obvious is the fact that it does so at a cost. How great a cost depends upon a number of considerations, chiefly the depth of feeling that the mates have for each other and the availability of a satisfactory substitute for the old relationship. Where the mates have little or no affection for each other, the release from marriage is likely to be felt as a great relief, and this is especially apt to be the case where the marriage was begun without love. Such cases, however, are probably relatively scarce, especially in our culture with its romantic pattern which plays up the importance of love. Most young married couples in our culture, whether or not they are genuinely in love with each other, believe they are, and enter marriage with great hope of success and a deep sense of personal devotion. The feeling may not be genuine, or it may be dissipated by later disappointments, but even in these instances there is the memory of the former hope, so that divorce represents the painful shattering of a dream.

[1] M. F. Nimkoff, "Occupational Factors and Marriage," *American Journal of Sociology*, 49:48–54, November, 1943.

These remarks are intended to suggest that while the reactions to divorce are highly variable and in some cases involve no suffering at all, as a rule the experience is likely to be a painful one in a society like ours which values romantic love so highly. The hurt is lessened if there is a satisfactory substitute, like remarriage. Those who secure a divorce in order to remarry probably do not as a rule suffer much from the rupture, but most divorces — especially of women — are not followed by another marriage. These comments further suggest that the problem of adjustment to divorce may not be the same for the male and the female. Because of differences in degree of involvement and of differences in the availability of satisfactory substitutes, divorce is a more serious matter for women than for men.

Divorce is neither the beginning nor the end of the conflict process, but rather the termination of one phase of the process and the beginning of another. The situation is highly complex and varies greatly with different divorces, and can here be discussed only briefly in general terms.[1] Divorce does not always terminate the personal relationship, and the divorced may continue to have dealings with each other, as is shown by reconciliations.[2] These are probably rare, and in most instances the overtures made by one party, probably the one with the greater stake in the marriage and the least satisfactory substitutes, are rejected by the other who considers them as "pestering." The break is not clean, and months and years may elapse before the last threads that tie the pair are finally broken, all of which may delay the process of readjustment.

Effects upon the divorced

Meantime the divorced must adjust to friends and family and to the general public, with the feeling that these have an ambivalent attitude in which sympathy is mixed with reproach. The group may be sympathetic toward the divorced person, but it can never be so without reservation, for this would leave marriage without any moral underpinning. If marriage is important, indeed the most vital personal undertaking of all, then divorce represents a serious failure. It betrays either poor judgment in the selection of a mate or inability

[1] For fuller treatment of the effects of divorce see Willard Waller: *The Old Love and the New; Divorce and Readjustment* (New York: H. Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1930); also by the same author, *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation* (New York: The Dryden Press).

[2] Paul Popenoe, "Remarriage of Divorcees to Each Other," *American Sociological Review*, 3:695–99, October, 1938.

to make satisfactory adjustments. The fact that no one is altogether immune to the possibility of such personal failure mitigates only slightly the public censure, for the mechanism of projection comes into play with the divorcees serving as scapegoats. The divorcees themselves know best how keen are the barbs of public opinion, and the women especially try to change their addresses and to live among strangers, as has already been shown. With increasing divorce, the public attitude toward the divorcee has become more liberal and tolerant, but this trend has not been carried as far as is sometimes thought. There is still considerable public censure. At least divorcees are still sensitive about their marital status. This is true even in Hollywood where marriage is supposed to be taken so lightly that motion-picture stars are sometimes accused of resorting to divorce simply for purposes of publicity. When a trained investigator [1] supported by a large foundation recently sought information about the movie-makers, he found no type of information more difficult to secure than data regarding divorces.

Divorce means also a changed routine of living, affecting long-established habits of work, recreation, sex, and the like. For the woman, divorce frequently entails the shouldering of a new heavy economic burden, since alimony payments are awarded in only a very small percentage of cases (6 per cent), and the trend is to abolish such payments altogether.[2] Nearly three quarters of all divorced and widowed women are the sole supporters of their families. The interruption of the sexual regimen presents problems, especially if the divorced person finds it difficult to remarry. It has been estimated [3] that perhaps 25 to 35 per cent of the women remarry, 40 to 50 per cent of the men, but the data are not satisfactory. We do know that the chances of remarriage for the divorced are, age for age, not only greater than for the widowed, but even greater than the chances of marriage for the single.[4] A divorcée who is thirty years old has

[1] Leo Rosten, *Hollywood* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941).

[2] Alimony decrees now generally stipulate that payments shall cease upon remarriage, or that there shall be mandatory revision of payments upon remarriage. Alimony was more appropriate to a rural economy in which women were dependent upon marriage for a livelihood than it is in an urban industrial economy which offers women many types of paid work. In recent years there have been court decisions to the effect that husbands are also entitled to alimony under certain circumstances.

[3] Paul Popenoe, "Divorce and Remarriage from a Eugenic Point of View," *Social Forces*, 12:48–50, October, 1933.

[4] "The Chances of Remarriage for the Widowed and Divorced," *Statistical Bulletin* (New York: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company), 26:1–3, May, 1945.



FIGURE 104. CHANCES OF EVENTUAL MARRIAGE FOR SINGLE, WIDOWED, AND DIVORCED PERSONS, NEW ENGLAND, 1940

For both sexes the chances of marriage are greatest for those who have been married and divorced, next highest for the widowed, and poorest for the single. The prospect of marriage decreases sharply with advancing age. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, May, 1945, p. 2.

ninety-four chances in one hundred of remarrying, while a widow of the same age has sixty chances in one hundred, and a spinster of age thirty only forty-eight chances in one hundred. Another way to illustrate the advantageous position of the divorced as regards chances for remarriage is to observe that they are the same for the bachelor of thirty, the widower of forty, and the divorced male of forty-five, the chances in each case being about two in three. The chances of eventual marriage for single, widowed, or divorced persons, New England, 1940, are set forth in Figure 104.

How shall we account for the high remarriageability of divorced persons? Those who marry in the first instance may be regarded as having a favorable attitude toward marriage which many of the single lack. Failure in marriage apparently does not weaken this favorable attitude, perhaps because hope springs eternal in the human breast. The divorced may also be aided by the fact that most of them are childless, while the widow with dependent children may find them a handicap to remarriage.

Effect of divorce upon children

Although most divorced persons are childless, two fifths of all divorces involve children. There are in the United States today, it is estimated,[1] more than 1,500,000 children under eighteen whose homes have been broken by divorce. If the estimate is correct, 3.6 per cent of the children of these ages in the United States have divorced parents. Since children suffer most from the effects of divorce, the question arises as to whether unhappily married couples ought to stay together for the sake of the children. Some unhappy couples never separate, and some delay divorce until their children have grown up. This may help to account for the large number of divorces granted after twenty years of married life, which runs to about one tenth of all divorces. Some of these parents undoubtedly succeed in concealing their marital dissatisfaction from their children. It is not unusual for an adolescent child suddenly to become aware that all is not well at home. The parental relationship has not changed, but the child has matured, is more alert, has more insight. Something has been gained by the delay because the older child is less dependent upon his parents and the basic pattern of his personality is fixed. Whether it is desirable to keep an inharmonious family intact depends partly on the seriousness of the rift and partly on the skill of the parents in shielding the child from the ill effects. So far as the child is concerned, many social workers believe that a broken home is preferable to one racked by chronic discord, especially if the discord is not compensated for in any way. Social workers no longer take the view that a bad home is better than none. Indeed, they may petition the court for permission to remove a child from a bad home, even if the parents have no thought of separating.

Children vary in their reactions to divorce. Some may regard it as something of a lark, because they are the center of a contest with the parents vying to win the favor of the child by lavish gifts and entertainment. But even in such cases it is desirable to distinguish between the child's feeling about the divorce and its effect upon him, which is apt to be highly undesirable, whether he knows it or not. For most children the break between the parents is a seriously unsettling experience, especially if the child is fond of both parents. If his

[1] Kingsley Davis, "Children of Divorced Parents: A Sociological and Statistical Analysis," in the symposium, *Children of Divorced Parents*, published in the summer, 1944, issue of *Law and Contemporary Problems*.

parents seek to acquaint him with the details of their dispute in order to win his sympathy, they may tell him contradictory stories which confuse him and poison his mind. Divorce makes him feel insecure, if for no other reason than that his home is different from other children's. Insecurity is heightened if he is bandied about from pillar to post, living first a short time with one parent and then with the other. If the parent with whom he is living remarries, he has to make the difficult adjustment to a stepparent.

The social effects of broken homes have been extensively studied. Such studies show many types of undesirable social behavior in children — like ungovernability, running away from home, truancy, and stealing — to be linked to broken homes.[1] A review of a large number of such studies [2] shows about one half of approximately eighteen thousand juvenile delinquents coming from broken homes, mostly from those caused by death. About one tenth of the delinquent boys and better than one fifth of the delinquent girls were from homes broken by divorce or separation, which means that these groups contributed more than their share of delinquency. While a serious weakness of these studies is that they do not hold constant certain other factors which may contribute to delinquency, like the socio-economic status of the family, type of community, and ethnic background, there can hardly be any question that broken homes are an important factor in delinquency. There is additional testimony on this point during wartime when families are broken by fathers entering the military services and by mothers going to work in industry. During wartime the family security and protection of children is lessened and the delinquency rates rise sharply. Private warfare within the family in peacetime appears to have somewhat the same effect.

Before leaving this discussion of the ill-effects of divorce upon the child, we may note that the untoward consequences are partly a result of the small unit (conjugal) type of family organization of modern Western culture. Where the family is organized along consanguineous lines, and the young child lives in a large family group with adults other than his mother and father, the removal of one of his parents from the household does not constitute a major crisis for him, since he is still enveloped by the love and protection of the rest of the

[1] H. A. Weeks, "Male and Female Broken Home Rates, by Types of Delinquency," *American Sociological Review*, 5:601–09, August, 1940.

[2] M. C. Elmer, *Family Adjustment and Social Change* (New York: Long and Smith Company, 1932), pp. 173–99.



FIGURE 105. DO JUVENILE DELINQUENTS COME FROM BROKEN HOMES?

Delinquents and non-delinquents, by type of home. Many studies of the effect of broken homes on children are of limited value because they do not use a control group and they make no distinction between homes broken by death and those broken by divorce or separation. Cavan covered all cases of juvenile delinquency in Rockford, Illinois, from 1931 to 1937 inclusive, comprising 435 boys and 155 girls. These were compared with urban adolescents in general, as tabulated in a report of the White House Conference on Child Health and Protection. As the above figure shows, almost twice as many delinquent boys and three and a half times as many delinquent girls came from homes broken by dissension as did non-delinquents. By comparison the effect of the loss of one parent or both parents was not significant. The data, however, are for delinquents who get to court, and these come largely from the lower-income classes living in the deteriorated and crowded areas of the city. Hence poverty and ecology may be factors rather than broken homes. Data from Ruth Shonle Cavan, *The Family* (New York: Crowell, 1942), p. 340.

group. In our small family system, the child of divorce is generally placed in the custody of his mother, which means he is deprived of the daily love and counsel of his father. By way of contrast, in the large matrilineal family system, the masculine influence is supplied by an uncle or grandfather if the father is not present. If the organization is patrilineal and patrilocal, so that the mother is the one who withdraws from the household when divorce occurs, the situation is little more serious, since the household usually includes some of the husband's female relatives who will look after the child. In some patrilineal societies the child of a divorced couple remains with the mother and is returned to the father at a later date. But whatever the

kinship system, the child who is part of an extended family is likely to have, within the household, close affectional relationships with adults of both sexes who compensate for the missing parent.

What divorce means in the way of crisis and readjustment for the dependent child in our culture is brought out vividly in the following personal narrative.[1] In the final paragraph the writer seeks to avoid the reader's pity by remarking that it is necessary to remember that the child of divorced parents will one day grow up and be able to order his own life. While this is doubtless a commendable attitude for the writer to have, it scarcely erases the effects of years of unhappiness which he describes.

> My parents were divorced when I was four years old. Both remarried within four years, and until I was twenty-one my home alternated between them. I am now twenty-eight years old. I am impelled to write this account because it seems to me that much of the literature on divorce has been based on surmise and sentiment, and very little on fact.
>
> For about three years after the divorce I lived with my mother. Apparently I had skipped the "Mother, where is Daddy?" state, and took it for granted that one lived with one's mother and saw one's father every few months. He was a cold man, who took me upon his knee, said a few things which meant nothing to a child, and then went away. I had noticed that the fathers of other children lived with them, but I never missed my father. Since he was always rather impersonal, he created a tension when I saw him, and it was something of a relief when he kissed me and went away. When I was seven my mother explained that Daddy wanted me to stay with him for a while. I rebelled, cried, and even screamed, but I went with him to his home in a city about forty miles away. In his home I found a woman about the age of my mother, who seemed friendly, but who could not understand my homesickness. I spent two months there, rather miserably, and then was taken back again to my mother.
>
> I returned to find that my mother also had a companion, whom I was told to call Uncle. He was rather cold, but kind when occasion demanded, and my joy at being again with my mother almost obliterated the feeling of novelty at having a man in the house. Sometime during the following year my mother gave birth to a child, and when she had regained her strength she and my stepfather decided to move to a city about a thousand miles away. My father came to visit me and say

[1] "Divorce — and After," *The Nation*, 130:393–94, April 2, 1930. Used with permission.

goodby. As usual I was glad to see him go. We moved, and for two years I didn't see him, although occasionally I received a typewritten letter which inquired into the state of my health, and gave the state of his.

When I was ten I was informed that I was to live with my father "for a while." Again I rebelled, but again I went. I lived with him for two years. These years were quite miserable; he had had two children by his second wife, who resented my presence in the family; her treatment of me infuriated my father and there were many quarrels. I was anxious to be sent back to my mother, but my father apparently thought that I needed a man's care. At the end of the two years, however, he surrendered and sent me back. I traveled alone, and probably the happiest moment of my life came when I ran up the stairs of the depot and found my mother waiting for me. I continued to live with my mother until I was sixteen. My relations with her husband were not particularly pleasant, but compared to my experience with my father's wife, they were all right. When I was sixteen we moved back to the city from which we had originally come, and thereafter I saw my father about three or four times a year. When I was nineteen, having received the benefit of a high-school education, I went to work.

I have gone rather carefully into the causes of the divorce of my parents. My mother was eighteen when she married, and my father twenty-four. For a year they were happy. But my father, it seems, was inordinately jealous and suspicious. My mother was of a sunny nature, free and open. There were long quarrels. My father accused her of being too friendly with other men. Once she left him and returned to her relatives. She was induced to return to him, but within a month there were more quarrels. Shortly before they separated, he accused her of infidelity and struck her to the ground. She took me and left. At the present time my father is wealthy. My mother and her husband are poor. They have the bare necessities of life and little else. Since the divorce my mother's curve of fortune has gone steadily downwards with but few fluctuations. Poor health and poverty have conspired to make her life something of a ghastly joke. Recently I asked my mother if she ever regretted the divorce. "If I could know," she answered, "that your life had not been harmed during childhood, I would say that I have no regrets. For myself I have none. Obviously, I could not live with a man who thought I was unfaithful to him. It is only when I think of you that I have any doubts."

Probably more than the average son, I love my mother. Had she continued to live with my father, bearing his suspicions and his insults, I could not love her now; I could only pity her. My love is in great

part admiration for her courage and independence of mind. Before she married her second husband, my father, already on the road to wealth, begged her to return to him. She refused, and married a man earning eighteen dollars a week. I have truthfully told her that I should feel very bitter toward her today if she had lived a life of humiliation with a man she did not love, merely because of me.

I do not wish to fall, as others have done, into the error of generalizing about divorce, but let those who weep over the "child of divorce" remember that that child some day will grow up. If he loves his parents, and can keep from pitying himself, he will accept his childhood with a shrug of the shoulder and be thankful that his parents did not live together in misery in order to provide him with "a good home."

Are divorcees inferior?

That divorcees have a serious problem of adjustment is shown also by the data on pathology. Divorced persons are two to four times as likely to become insane, commit suicide, be convicted of crime, or be cared for as paupers as are married people of the same age. These findings are drawn from studies made in various countries, including our own.[1] It may be inferred from these data that the divorced's chances of living to a ripe old age are not as good as a married person's. Indeed the divorced's chances are scarcely more than half as good.[2] The higher death rate of divorced persons is probably a factor limiting the number of their offspring (most divorced persons, it will be recalled, are childless), but this can scarcely be the only reason for their high degree of infertility, since they have been married for an average period of ten years before divorce,[3] so have had ample time to bear children.

In general, divorced persons present a picture of biological and personal inferiority. Why so? Are their deficiencies the result of un-

[1] A study of suicide in Sweden, 1901–20, revealed that the rate for divorced men twenty years old and over was twice that of the widowed, three times that of the single, and four times that of the married. In general similar findings are reported for women. L. I. Dublin and Bessie Bunzel, *To Be or Not to Be: A Study of Suicide* (New York: Smith and Haas, 1933), pp. 131–32. A comparable study for Chicago, for the years 1919–21, showed the suicide rate for divorced men to be two times that of the widowed, 5.3 times that of the married, and 6.8 times that of the single. For women the corresponding figures were 3.3, 4.2, and 5.6 respectively. (Ruth S. Cavan, *Suicide* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928], p. 319.) For a comprehensive analysis of the relation of marital status to pathology, see Ernest R. Groves and William F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928).

[2] "Marriage and Long Life," *Statistical Bulletin* (New York: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company), 18:7–10, February, 1937.

[3] A. Cahen, *A Statistical Study of Divorce* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932).



FIGURE 106. MORTALITY, BY MARITAL STATUS

Age-specific death rates for each marital-sex class as percentages of death rates for the married of corresponding age and sex: United States, 1940. With the exception of married females twenty to twenty-four years old, married persons of both sexes and at each age have a lower death rate than do the corresponding single, widowed, and divorced persons. At the younger ages, the widowed have a less favorable mortality than the divorced, but at the older ages, the positions are reversed. The favorable mortality of the married is usually ascribed to (1) the selection, by marriage, of the healthier persons, and (2) the healthful nature of normal married life. Charts from Bureau of the Census, *Mortality by Marital Status* (Vital Statistics—Special Reports), vol. 23, no. 2, July 3, 1945.

happy marriages or are the unhappy marriages the result of long-standing personal deficiencies? Are they as a group constitutionally inferior? The only certain way to tell would be to have a good deal of exact information about the personality of divorced persons which was obtained before their marriages, but such data do not exist. In considering this problem we must bear in mind that some divorced remarry, perhaps between one third and one half, although the exact number is not known. At any given time, then, the married population includes persons who have been previously married and divorced. Many of these new marriages are successful. A small sample reports the chances as about fifty-fifty.[1] It appears that a selective process is constantly operative in marriage. Most people marry and most of these stay married. Many who are divorced remarry. Those who remain permanently in the ranks of the unmarried or the divorced would, according to this theory, be among the socially

[1] Paul Popenoe, *Modern Marriage* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940), rev. ed., p. 119.

inferior. It should be added that if this theory is true, it remains a generalization to which, of course, there are numerous exceptions.

But may not the sorry picture which the divorced present be due to the unhappiness of their marriages? It is commonly agreed that a happy marriage is a stabilizing experience. Perhaps married people live longer because they are better fed, receive better care, and live more orderly lives. The happily married person has a family to love and be loved by. He is less apt to commit a crime because he feels a sense of responsibility for the family reputation. These and other advantages accrue to the happy marriage, and conversely the unhappy marriage carried to the point of divorce is disorganizing in its effects. Before the relatively greater pathology of divorced persons is written off to marital unhappiness, however, it is well to note that widowed persons have also had their marital life disrupted, yet they do not show as much pathology as do the divorced. The comparison, however, may not be entirely fair, since there are marked differences in the two situations. The widowed are unhappy because of their bereavement, and not because of a failure in personal relationships. The widowed receive public sympathy, not censure. They are, moreover, in general considerably older, and have had a longer exposure to the stabilizing influence of married life.

Divorce Policy

So far in our discussion we have taken divorce for granted, almost as if it were a natural phenomenon, which it is not. The separation of mates is a natural phenomenon only among animals, who mate and remain mated until they have fulfilled their natural functions or until the male is dislodged from the relationship by some more aggressive male. In the animal world mates part without the necessity of obtaining permission from other animals. With man, however, the union of the sexes for purposes of procreation is everywhere subject to social control through the medium of marriage, and accordingly the group also retains the power to say under what conditions, if any, a marriage may be terminated. At the present time in the United States, divorce is under the control of the separate states which prescribe by law the conditions under which decrees may be granted. These laws are highly varied. Kentucky provides fifteen different allowable grounds for divorce, while New York permits divorce on a single ground only, adultery; and South Carolina with no divorce law what-

ever does not allow divorce. Residence requirements are equally varied. Alabama, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and North Dakota have residence requirements of from three to five years, while Nevada and Idaho make the requirement only six weeks.[1]

Control over divorce has not always rested in the state or in the separate states. In the past, in Western civilization, the power was vested elsewhere than in the civil government, usually in the hands of the economic head of the family. Among the Hebrews, the ancient Greeks, and the early Romans divorce was neither a civil nor a religious concern, but rather a prerogative of the husband. The Hebrew husband who wished to divorce his wife needed only to hand her a written statement reading, "Be thou divorced from me," and the divorce was accomplished. Among the Greeks the husband was required to declare the marriage null and void in the presence of witnesses; and the Roman patriarch pronounced the words of divorce before a council made up of the male relatives of both houses. These illustrations point up the great authority of the family in early agricultural times. The family was then a highly important unit of economic production, and the decision as to whether to disrupt so significant an economic enterprise rested with the head of the family. Today, in our industrial economy, the family no longer performs the important functions of economic production, and the function of regulating the conduct of its members has been shifted in part from the family to the state, so that the state determines whether or not divorce shall be permitted. As the economic position of women improved under the factory system, the husband lost his exclusive right to divorce, and divorce became available to both sexes on approximately equal terms.

During the late Middle Ages when the Catholic Church was sovereign, the sacramental character of marriage was reaffirmed, consequently divorce was not permitted. The Church has held to this posi-

[1] The United States Supreme Court, in a 6-to-2 decision handed down December 21, 1942, held that divorces granted in Nevada must be recognized as valid by all other states, even though their own statutes may be greatly different. The case upon which the Court passed concerned a North Carolina man and woman who were divorced from their respective spouses in Nevada, then married each other and returned to North Carolina, where they were arrested for bigamy. The decision of the High Court voided the arrest and declared the couple to be legally married. This decision of the Supreme Court reversed a previous decision on the same question, under which a number of states, notably New York, refused to recognize the legitimacy of a Nevada divorce for persons who were not *bona fide* residents of Nevada. The situation is still confused, especially if it can be proved that residence in Nevada was established solely to obtain the decree.

TABLE 32. DIVORCE LAWS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1945 *

State	Length of Residence Required Before Filing Suit	Grounds for Divorce: Adultery	Cruelty	Desertion	Alcoholism	Impotency	Felony Conviction	Neglect to Provide	Insanity	Pregnancy at Marriage	Bigamy	Separation	Imprisonment	Indignities	Drug Addict
Alabama	1 year	*	..	*	*	*	*	*	*[d]	*	..	..	..	..	*
Arizona	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	..	*	..	*[c]	..	*	..
Arkansas	90 days[d]	*	*	*	*	*	*	..	..	..	*	*[b]	..	*	..
California	1 year	*	*	*	*	..	*	*	*	..	..	..	..	..	..
Colorado	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*[c]	..	*	..	..	..	*
Connecticut	3 years	*	*	*	*	..	..	*	*[c]	..	..	..	*	..	..
Delaware	2 years[g]	*	*	*	*	..	..	*	*[a]	..	*	..	*[h]	..	..
Florida	90 days	*	*	*	*	*	..	..	..	..	*	..	..	*	..
Georgia	1 year	*	*[l]	*	*[l]	*	..	..	..	*	..	..	..	..	..
Idaho	6 weeks	*	*	*	*	..	*	*	*[m]	..	..	..	..	..	..
Illinois	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	*	..	..	..	*	..	..	..	..
Indiana	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*[c]	..	..	..	..	..	..
Iowa	1 year	*	*	*	*	..	*	..	..	*	..	..	..	..	..
Kansas	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*[c]	*	*	..	..	..	..
Kentucky	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	*	..	..	*	..	*[a]	..	..	..
Louisiana	1 year	*	*	..	*	..	..	..	..	..	..	*[h]	..	..	..
Maine	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	..	*	..	..	..	..	..	..	*
Maryland	1 year	*	..	*	..	*	..	..	*	..	*	*[c]	..	..	..
Massachusetts	5 years	*	*	*	*	*	..	*	..	..	..	..	*[e]	..	*
Michigan	1 year	*	..	*	*	*	..	..	..	..	..	*	*[b]	..	..
Minnesota	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	..	..	*[c]	..	..	*[h]	*	..	..
Mississippi	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	..	..	*[b]	*	*	..	*	..	*
Missouri	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	..	*	*	..	..	*	..
Montana	1 year	*	*	*	*	..	*	*	*[c]	..	..	..	..	..	..
Nebraska	2 years[r]	*	*	*	*	*	..	*	..	..	..	..	*[b]	..	..
Nevada	6 weeks	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*[b]	..	..	*[b]	..	..	..
New Hampshire	1 year[p]	*	*	*	*	*	..	*	..	..	..	..	*[w]	..	..
New Jersey	2 years	*	*	*	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
New Mexico	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	..	..	..	..	..
New York	(x)	*	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
North Carolina	6 months	*	..	..	..	*	..	..	..	*	..	*[h]	..	..	..
North Dakota	1 year	*	*	*	*	..	*	*	*[c]	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ohio	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	..	*	..	..	*	..	*	..	..
Oklahoma	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	..	*	*	..	..	..	..
Oregon	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	*	..	*[c]	..	..	..	..	..	..
Pennsylvania	1 year	*	*	*	..	*	*	..	..	..	*	..	..	*	..
Rhode Island	2 years	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	..	..	..	*[a]	..	..	*
South Carolina	No divorce	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
South Dakota	1 year	*	*	*	*	..	*	*	*[a]	..	..	..	..	..	..
Tennessee	2 years	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	..	*	*	..	..	*	..
Texas	1 year	*	*	*	..	..	*	..	*	..	..	*[a]	..	..	..
Utah	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*[a]	..	..	*[b]	..	..	..
Vermont	6 months	*	..	*	..	..	..	*	*[c]	..	..	..	*[b]	..	..
Virginia	1 year	*	..	*	..	*	*	..	..	*	..	..	*	..	..
Washington	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	..	*	*[a]	..	..	*[a]	*	*	..
West Virginia	2 years[r]	*	*	*	*	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	*	..	*
Wisconsin	2 years	*	*	*	*	*	..	*	..	..	..	*[a]	*[b]	..	..
Wyoming	60 days	*	*	*	*	*	..	*	*[c]	*	..	*[h]	*	*	..
Alaska	2 years	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*[b]	..	..	..	..	*	..
District of Columbia	2 years[i]	*	*[k]	*	..	..	*	..	..	..	..	*[a]	..	..	..
Hawaii	2 years	*	*	*	*	..	..	*	*[b]	..	..	..	*[f]	*	*
Puerto Rico	1 year	*	*	*	*	*	*	..	..	..	..	*[f]	..	..	*

[a] Ten years. [b] Three years. [c] Five years.
[d] Divorce suits may be filed after 60 days' residence, but an additional 30 days must elapse before a decree can be granted.
[e] Period can be shortened if approval of court is obtained.
[f] Seven years.
[g] One year's residence for divorce based on adultery or bigamy.
[h] Two years.
[i] Female under 16, male under 18.
[j] Residence of 1 year is required where the cause of divorce has occurred in the District.
[k] Legal separation for cruelty which can be enlarged into an absolute divorce after 2 years.
[l] A ground for divorce at discretion of jury.
[m] Six years.
[n] Joining a religious sect disbelieving in marriage.
[o] Unchaste behavior of wife after marriage.
[p] Absence of reconciliation for 1 year after judgment of separation, or public defamation.
[q] One divorced for adultery may not marry the paramour, but there are exceptions to this rule in Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. Special restrictions against remarriage exist in South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia.

* Information furnished by the Women's Bureau, United States Department of Labor. Reproduced from *The Book of the States*, 1945–46 (Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 1945), pp. 344–45, with permission.

TABLE 32. DIVORCE LAWS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1945

Fraudulent Contract	Felony Before Marriage	Violence	Absence	Infamous Crime	Loathsome Disease	Relationship Within Prohibited Degrees	Other Grounds	Period Before Parties May Remarry — Plaintiff	Period Before Parties May Remarry — Defendant
..	..	★	..	★	..	..	..	2 months if no appeal	2 months if no appeal
..	★	★	..	..	..	..	..	1 year	1 year
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	.	..	1 year	1 year
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6 months	6 months
★	..	..	★[f]	★	..	..	.	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	★	..	.	(t)	1 year	1 year
..	..	..	..	..	..	★	.	Immediately	Immediately
★	..	★[l]	..	..	..	★	(t)	Fixed by court	Fixed by court
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	.	6 months	6 months
..	..	★	..	..	★	..	..	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1 year[e]	1 year[e]
★	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6 months	6 months
★	..	★	..	..	★	..	(n o)	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	★	..	★	..	..	(p)	Man, 1 year; Wife, 22 mos.	Man, 14 mos.[q]; Wife, 2 yrs.[q]
..	..	★	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6 months	2 years
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately	Immediately[a]
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6 months	6 months
..	..	..	..	..	..	★	(r)	Immediately	Immediately
..	★	..	..	..	..	..	(s)	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6 months	6 months
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	★[b]	..	..	..	(u)	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3 months	3 months
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	(v)	Immediately	3 years — consent of court
..	..	..	..	★	..	..	..	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately[aa]	Immediately[aa]
★	..	..	★[b]	..	..	..	(s)	Immediately	Immediately
★	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6 months	6 months
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6 months	6 months
★	..	..	..	..	..	★	..	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	★	..	..	..	(a b)	6 months	6 months
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	.....	.....
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately	Immediately[c]
..	..	★	★[h]	★	..	..	(a a)	Immediately	Immediately[c]
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately; Cruelty, 1 yr.	Immediately; Cruelty, 1 yr.
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6 months	6 months
..	..	..	★[f]	..	..	..	(a e)	6 months	2 years[e]
..	..	..	..	★	..	..	(a d)	6 months	6 months[a]
★	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	60 days	60 days[a e]
..	..	★	..	..	..	..	..	1 year	1 year
..	★	..	..	..	..	..	(u)	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	Immediately	Immediately
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6 months	6 months
..	..	..	..	..	★	..	..	Immediately — 1 month	Immediately — 1 month
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	(a c)	Immediately[a f]	Immediately[a f]

[r] One year where the cause for divorce arose within the state.
[s] Court may restrain defendant from remarrying, up to 2 years in Michigan, up to 1 year in West Virginia.
[t] Insanity at time of marriage.
[u] Husband a vagrant.
[v] Three years on grounds of desertion. [w] One year.
[x] Parties must have married in the state or resided there when offense was committed. See N. Y. C. P. A., § 1147.
[y] The so-called Enoch Arden law provides for annulment of marriage upon showing that the other party has been absent for 5 successive years and that diligent search reveals no evidence that such other party is living.
[z] The procurement of a divorce, outside the state, by a husband or wife, by virtue of which the party who procured it is relieved from the obligations of the marriage while they remain binding upon the other party.
[a a] Attempt to corrupt sons or prostitute daughters; proposal of husband to prostitute wife.
[a b] Any other gross misbehavior or wickedness.
[a c] Refusal of wife to live with husband in the state and absenting herself 2 years.
[a d] Wife a prostitute.
[a e] Intolerable severity.
[a f] Man immediately; woman after 301 days.
[a g] In the court's discretion.

tion and does not countenance divorce. Legal separations are approved which do not carry the right to remarry. The Church itself does, however, grant a limited number of petitions for annulment, which permit of remarriage.[1]

In the United States, control of divorce has been reserved to the government, a policy which reaches back to the beginnings of the nation. The colonists in New England looked upon marriage as honorable rather than as sacred, and even went so far as to encourage civil rather than religious weddings. In certain colonies, ministers were forbidden to act as officiants at weddings, and it is recorded that in some places they were actually run out of town for doing so. At present most marriages are performed by clergymen rather than by civil officers, but the government remains in authority by requiring a license to wed and by requiring the clergyman to file a certificate of marriage with the county clerk. As regards divorce, the government alone has the power to grant decrees, usually through the courts. This policy of governmental control of divorce now seems well established. While the churches have rules governing their own members on this matter, rules which are more severe than the civil ones, the church rules are not recognized as valid by the state. Thus, the Protestant Episcopal Church in its canon on marriage holds that divorce may be granted only for the cause of adultery, and only the "innocent" party to the action may be remarried by the church. The laws of the land are more lenient and permit both parties to remarry, but if an Episcopalian who has been adjudged guilty of adultery remarries, he loses communicant status in the church.[2]

Should divorce be made more difficult?

The right to divorce for certain approved causes has become an established part of our culture, and there is no longer any serious question as to whether or not divorce should be permitted, although there are some minority groups which take a strong stand against the established policy. The question upon which there is a real difference of opinion with important practical implications is this: Should di-

[1] It is reported, for instance, that in 1927 there were fifty-three petitions for annulment before the Roman Rota, of which twenty-eight were granted. There are perhaps three hundred million Roman Catholics. Martin J. Scott, *Marriage* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1930), p. 142.

[2] One of the changes, made in the canon of marriage of the Protestant Episcopal Church in 1931, is: "Any person who has been married otherwise than as the Church allows may apply to the Bishop for restoration of communicant status. In case of favorable judgment, a minister of this Church may bless the parties to the marriage."

vorce be made more difficult? A number of groups answer in the affirmative, on the ground that if divorce were made more difficult marriage would not be entered into lightly and the marriage vows would be taken more solemnly. It is also thought that easy divorce discourages couples who have problems from working out solutions of those problems, since they can resort to the readier expedient of divorce. If the churches had their way, the divorce laws would probably be tightened. At least the church rules are far more strict, as we have seen in the case of the Protestant Episcopal canon. Other churches likewise allow divorce only for adultery, the Biblical ground, while still other churches admit one additional cause, desertion. Cruelty is not recognized as an allowable basis for divorce by any leading church, yet it is the most common ground upon which divorces are actually granted at the present time.

Those who object to making divorce difficult argue that to do so makes marriage a mouse-trap. They see no reason why provision should not be made for the humane correction of human mistakes. A fair proportion of divorced persons remarry, and there is evidence to show that a fair share of these second marriages are successful. Had these persons been unable to disengage themselves from their first unhappy marriages because of stringent divorce laws, many of them would have been deprived of the happiness which came to them in subsequent marriages.

How far ought we to go in liberalizing divorce? Just as some reformers would abolish divorce, so others would go to the opposite extreme and abolish all, or nearly all, restrictions on divorce. Writers like Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, Bertrand Russell, and Havelock Ellis believe that divorce is a personal matter, if there are no children. In their view, nothing should be necessary to make a divorce valid between childless couples other than their common desire to part company.[1] More careful students of divorce take issue with this policy, on the ground that it is not conducive to public welfare. Divorce is a personal matter, but even things personal have social significance, and society cannot permit its members to manage without supervision anything so vital as the marriage relationship, which lies at the heart of our ethical system. To permit individuals to dissolve their own marriages would provide opportunity for exploitation of the weak and

[1] Bertrand Russell, *Marriage and Morals* (New York: H. Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1929).



FIGURE 107. ALIMONY PAYMENTS IN SIX STATES

Percentage of divorce cases in which there was alimony, 1939. The great variation between states in laws governing divorce and in the filing of divorce records results in comparable statistics for only a few states. A survey in 1942 showed that only seventeen states have a central file of divorce records, and the information recorded in these states differs greatly. The chances of getting alimony, maintenance, or support order are about five times as great in Wisconsin as in Florida. Data from Bureau of the Census, *Vital Statistics — Special Reports*, vol. 17, no. 25, June 9, 1943.

ignorant, which it is the business of society to prevent. In this connection, it is interesting to note that even in Soviet Russia in the early days of the revolution, when divorce was made a very simple procedure, provision was made for public protection. At that time divorce was procurable at the will of either party, the other party being notified by government postcard of the completed action. This applied if there were no children. But even in these cases, the divorce was granted on the understanding that if either the husband or wife became economically dependent, the other would be liable to support

up to one third of his or her income. If there were children, a hearing took place within two weeks of the granting of the divorce, at which time the child's custody and support were considered. In a word, even this highly personalized and liberalized procedure remained under the control of the state, which imposed the conditions on which divorce could be granted.[1]

Effects of divorce laws on divorce rates

It is generally claimed by advocates of more rigorous divorce laws that moderate laws promote family disorganization, and that the easier it becomes to get a divorce, the greater is the number of broken homes. The argument is not a good one, because it concerns the number of divorces rather than the number of unhappy marriages. An increase in the divorce rate need not mean that more couples are unhappily married, but only that they need not remain that way. If divorce is made very difficult or impossible, unhappy couples may seek other means of escape. For instance, in South Carolina where divorce is prohibited, it has been necessary to enact special legislation covering the personal and property rights of extra-legal wives and children. The study of the effect of easier divorce laws on the number of divorces is not, therefore, particularly illuminating. If it could be shown that easing the divorce requirements makes for more marital unhappiness, that would be another matter.

Some writers [2] claim that there is no relation between the severity of the divorce laws and the incidence of divorce; or to be more exact, that the number of grounds for which divorce is granted has no effect on the divorce rate. Evidence is presented to show that certain states with liberal laws have a lower divorce rate than other states with more rigid requirements. Moreover, it is alleged that the divorce laws have steadily become more stringent in recent decades, excepting possibly the last, yet the divorce rate for the United States has mounted rather steadily during periods of varying types of legislation. It is alleged that the trend has been toward tightening of residence requirements, the inclusion of the interlocutory decree, and the addition of

[1] J. Holzberg, "Divorce in Russia and America," *The Nation*, 128:734–37, June 19, 1929. The condition described was temporary and the trend has since been toward a more rigorous divorce policy. See Chapter 9.

[2] J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1931), pp. 177–86. Alfred Cahen, *A Statistical Analysis of Divorce* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), p. 92.

restrictions on the "guilty party." The trend of divorce legislation in the United States since colonial times is, however, not clear. In the early period, the New England colonies were more liberal than the others because of religious views centering around the conception of marriage as secular. The period from 1800 to 1870 brought considerable liberalization in the laws of divorce, particularly in the addition of allowable causes and in the relaxation of restrictions on the right to remarry. Some of the states passed so-called "omnibus laws" which were fully as liberal as those of Nevada today, and there was some migration to those states for purposes of obtaining a divorce, as there is to Reno at present. After the Civil War a wave of reaction set in, and there was some tendency to make divorce requirements more strict, but the trend was not even, and certain states maintained easy requirements. "A detailed analysis and summary of divorce legislation from the Civil War to the present time shows that the number of changes has been many, but their importance slight, because the divorce laws of today are not substantially different from those of sixty-three years ago." [1]

Because the laws have changed only slightly, while the divorce rate has multiplied fivefold during this period, certain writers conclude that legal influences are negligible in their effect on the divorce rate. This conclusion is, however, hardly warranted. While it is true that divorces may increase despite a lack of change in the statutes, or even in the face of more rigorous statutes, it does not follow that an easing of the requirements would not further stimulate the divorce rate. Indeed, there is evidence to show that it does have such an effect. After the Revolution in France, incompatibility was approved as a ground for divorce in 1792 and six years later, in 1798, there were more divorces than marriages reported in Paris.[2] Again, in 1926 in the city of Leningrad the divorce rate was 3.43 per thousand population. The next year, after the new liberal Russian code had gone into effect, the

[1] A. Cahen, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

[2] André Maurois, "Divorce Should Not Be Too Easy," a chapter in the symposium, *Divorce* by Bertrand Russell *et al.* (New York: John Day Company), pp. 75–92. The irregular backing-and-filling trend of divorce legislation is illustrated by the experience of France. Before the Revolution, divorce was forbidden by the laws of the Roman Catholic Church. With the Revolution, restraints upon liberty were removed and even the request of one party only was sufficient for divorce, with results indicated above. The reaction set in, and under the Civil Code divorce was made more difficult; later, under Bourbon rule in 1816, divorce was altogether abolished, and was forbidden even for non-Catholics. Then, in the days of the third Republic, the Articles of the Civil Code were restored.



FIGURE 108. DIVORCE RATES IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

The United States is in undisputed first place among the nations, with a divorce rate fourteen times that of England and Wales. Liberal divorce codes and the heterogeneity of our population are probably major factors. Such a high rate constitutes a serious social problem. Data from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin*, January, 1938, p. 9.

rate jumped to 9.83, or nearly three times what it had been the year before. For Moscow the rates for the two years were 2.12 and 9.59 respectively.[1] A sudden and radical liberalization of the divorce laws, it appears, may greatly increase the number of divorces.

It should be noted that in the examples given above the change in legislation was only one phase of a general revolution in thought and social organization, so that the changed conditions, rather than the mere changes in law, were primarily responsible for the avalanche of divorces. Where conditions are more stable, the laws may be liberalized without such drastic effects. This is illustrated by the experience of the Scandinavian countries, which for about three decades have had liberal codes permitting divorce by mutual consent and without publicity. Since 1915, around three fourths of Swedish divorces have been granted for incompatibility, one of the most liberal grounds possible, yet the divorce rate in Sweden has been only a fraction of the rate in the United States. In 1935, it was 56 per thousand marriages as compared with 164 in the United States. The reasons for the low Swedish rate are to be found in various factors in the local situation, like the great number of small communities, the homogeneity of the population, and the highly developed social services available to the family, but the point to be noted is that if the social situation is favorable, a liberal divorce code need not greatly encourage divorce. Persons who are contented in their marriages do not resort to divorce simply because it is easy to get.



FIGURE 109. DOES A LIBERAL DIVORCE CODE PROMOTE DIVORCE?

The number of divorces per ten thousand general population, United States and Sweden, 1929. Sweden has a divorce code which is probably more liberal than ours, yet has only one fourth as many divorces as the United States.

[1] Frank H. Hankins, "Divorce," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), V:177–84.

Divorce Procedure

Although there is considerable disagreement on what our divorce policy should be, there is a fairly general recognition of certain glaring defects in our divorce procedure. Under existing divorce laws, the court is not supposed to entertain any suit which does not involve a real contest. Husband and wife must not both wish the divorce, for then there can be no adversary proceeding. In a number of cases, unquestionably, one of the two mates wants a divorce and is opposed by the other, but in most cases, when a petition for divorce is filed, both parties have agreed to the action. This probably explains why most divorce cases are uncontested. But the court pretends not to know that the action has been agreed upon by the two parties, for such prior agreement is *collusion*, a serious offense before the law. Actually, judges are quite mindful of the widespread collusion in divorce cases. Indeed, the great prevalence of collusion is an open secret.[1]

Since our courts pretend that an action for divorce is always a contest, they must look for evidence of guilt on the part of the defendant. The legal grounds for divorce are framed in such a way as to imply blame on the part of one party. Thus, the five chief allowable grounds for divorce in the United States at the present time are adultery, cruelty, desertion, drunkenness, and neglect to provide. These "causes" account for more than four fifths of all divorces, as the accompanying table indicates.

Table 33. Divorces Classified According to Cause and Party to Whom Granted, 1932 *

Cause	Per Cent to Husbands	Per Cent to Wives
Adultery	9.9	6.3
Cruelty	35.8	45.2
Desertion	42.2	22.8
Drunkenness	0.3	1.7
Neglect to provide	...	5.6
Combination of above five causes	3.9	9.3
Minor causes	6.7	8.1

* Adapted from the Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and Divorce*, 1932, Table 4.

The first three are permissible grounds in every state of the Union, except South Carolina, which has not permitted divorce since 1878, and New York, the only state with a single legal cause, adultery. Other

[1] Cf. "Divorce by Collusion," *Commonweal*, 17:340, January 25, 1933.

causes recognized by some states are vagrancy, conviction of crime, bigamy, fraudulent representation, misconduct, separation, and incompatibility.

It is obvious that in many cases, and perhaps in most, the legal grounds on which the divorce is being sought do not coincide with the actual reasons. It is, moreover, foolish to assume that one party is always guilty, the other innocent, of disorganizing the marriage. It takes two to make a quarrel although both may not be equally responsible. In most cases of marital unhappiness, the couple are simply not suited to each other or are unable to get along. There need be no special cruelty on one side, no financial neglect or desertion. Why force a contest and require one partner to bring charges against the other, especially when they are not true? Why not recognize incompatibility itself as a ground for divorce? Only New Mexico (1933) and Alaska (1935) do so. A larger number of jurisdictions [1] admit "living separate and apart" for a period of years, varying from two to ten, as a valid ground. This acknowledges the principle of mutual consent and does away with the concept of "the guilty party," but has the limitation of delaying action by requiring a long period of separation.

We have seen that in many cases, and perhaps in most, the legal grounds for divorce do not agree with the actual reasons for which the divorce is being sought. Under the circumstances if two persons wish a divorce, they can do one of two things. If another state provides grounds for divorce acceptable to them, they can establish residence and institute charges there. This is not feasible in most cases and contrary to general belief only about 3 per cent of all American divorces are migratory.[2] The other possibility is for them to base their case upon an allowable ground, though it be fictitious so far as their own marriage is concerned. In a word, the law fairly compels perjury, a serious offense. Who believes, for instance, that all persons who receive absolute divorces in the State of New York are actually guilty of adultery? Indeed, it is not surprising to learn that a flourishing business of providing professional corespondents for a fee has devel-

[1] Arizona, Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.

[2] A. Cahen, *op. cit.* However, migratory divorces may be concentrated in certain areas. About one fifth of divorces granted to New Yorkers are obtained outside New York and more than half of the couples married in Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, and Virginia in 1940 were out-of-state residents. Presumably most of them crossed the state line to avoid more rigorous legal restrictions on marriage in their own states.

oped in New York as a result of the law which holds that absolute divorce may be granted for adultery only.[1]

Fortunately, there is growing recognition of the inadequacy of present procedure in divorce trials, and in a number of progressive courts the highly formal, legal, unrealistic proceedings are being supplanted by methods more scientific. For example, in the Court of Domestic Relations at Dayton, Ohio, divorce is viewed as a social rather than as a legal problem. Each case is first handled by the "Reconciliation Department," which tries to repair the broken relationship. Failing this, the case comes before the court for action. Each case, in advance of its disposal by the judge, is studied by a social case worker in much the same spirit and with much the same scientific care that the doctor shows in dealing with a sick patient. The judge passes on the case only after the investigation, analysis, diagnosis, and recommendation of the "Reconciliation Department" are before him.[2] Given social workers adequately trained in dealing with problems of family adjustment, this method has much to recommend it, although the volume of cases coming before our divorce courts would appear to be a serious obstacle to "divorce by case work." Where divorce is indicated, it is felt that the interlocutory decree is advisable, since it gives the couple a period of time, usually a year, in which to reconsider the action before it becomes final. A rather large proportion of divorced persons, about one quarter of those interviewed, admit that they would like to remarry their former mate. The number who rewed is not known, but some do so,[3] and others would probably follow if circumstances permitted. This suggests that scientific counseling in divorce cases might effect many desirable reconciliations.[4]

Divorce in the future

It is not easy to describe the social effects of the increasing divorce rate and the probable course of divorce in the future. The increased divorce rate does not appear to have discouraged marriage, which has

[1] S. Ewing, "The Mockery of American Divorce," *Harper's Monthly*, 157:153–64, July, 1928.

[2] "Divorce by Case Work," *Survey*, 68:192, May 15, 1932.

[3] Paul Popenoe, "Remarriages of Divorcees to Each Other," *American Sociological Review*, 3:695–99, October, 1938.

[4] The purpose of case work is not solely to effect reconciliations, but to help persons make satisfactory adjustments. If the best interests of the persons are served by divorce, then the case worker is free to suggest divorce, just as the physician may deem it desirable to recommend that a patient change his occupation instead of trying to adjust to it.

been fairly constant. With divorce a neutral influence, the marriage rate depends mainly on the proportion of the population of marriageable age, which has not changed much in recent decades. Perhaps youth is not discouraged by divorce because it believes with Tennyson that "'Tis better to have loved and lost, than never to have loved at all." Most young people, though, take a more positive, optimistic view, and go to the altar with the firm faith that their own marriage is going to last. In any case there is little disheartenment because of divorce, and even the divorced seem to be remarrying in greater numbers. Indeed, a liberal divorce policy may encourage marriage by offering assurance that if the venture proves ill-advised, it will not be irremediable.

It is interesting to speculate on the probable future of divorce in relation to the general problem of a declining population, since divorce is a factor contributing to the decreasing birth rate. If considerable popular displeasure should develop over the declining population, then the reaction may include an attack upon easy divorce. A decreasing population would mean less manpower for military purposes, while the further extension of the Industrial Revolution to Russia, China, and India would give tremendously increased economic and military strength to nations with appreciably larger populations. A declining population may also affect profits adversely, for there would be fewer buyers in a contracting market, unless new inventions and other factors were able to provide the consumer with more income. As the slogan "bigger and better" suggests, the American public is psychologically conditioned to expect a continuous increase in population, which would make a declining population hard to accept.

The trend in recent decades in the direction of easier divorce has been furthered partly by liberal legislation,[1] mostly by more favorable public opinion. The basic causes of the trend are related to the changes in our social and economic systems, mainly the growing industrialization and urbanization, which have resulted in increased individualism and in diminished group control over personal behavior. A major consequence of the scientific revolution has been the weakening of traditional religious beliefs and their regulative power. Nor

[1] One of the most significant evidences of the more liberal attitude toward divorce in the English-speaking world was the change in England in 1937 when desertion, cruelty, and insanity were added to adultery as allowable grounds.

should the circular effect of divorce be overlooked. The greater the number of divorced persons, especially in high places, the greater the tolerance of divorce, so that the increase in divorce itself becomes a highly important factor in promoting divorce.

Will the policy of easy divorce be retained when the nation becomes aware of the impending population crisis? As a nation we are not yet aware of it, because the population still continues to increase, although at a lessening pace, so that the full implications of the situation are not recognized except by experts who do not have the ear of the nation. When the nation awakens to the true situation, will it turn against the present family pattern of few children and easy divorce, irrational though the reaction may be? The emotional and moral bases for such a reaction already exist in the conservative attitudes of many of our churches, but victory in the second World War and the attendant economic prosperity of the nation may serve to delay the day of reckoning.[1] For the near future, then, the analysis suggests an increasing tolerance of easy divorce and an increasing divorce rate.[2] The trend line of divorce, shown in Figure 99, has been steadily upward since 1890 and gives no indication of a downturn under present conditions.

Does the increasing divorce rate mean there are fewer happy marriages now than in the past? This need not be true, any more than the increase in the number of bed patients in hospitals means there is more sickness today than in times past. The growth in hospitals means that facilities for restoring health have increased, and likewise the growth of divorces may mean that one need not suffer so long in a sick marriage. There are no data to show an increase in marital unhappiness in the past half-century during which time the divorce rate has been rising steadily. A comparison of younger and older couples in a study of marital happiness showed no evidence of a falling-off in happiness in more recent times, but the data are limited.[3] From a purely theoretical standpoint the thesis that marital happiness has declined may be supported on the ground that modern culture tends to individualize and neuroticize personality, and so makes compati-

[1] In 1940, when the birth rate was high because of the business boom, the net reproduction rate in the United States was 1.024, or an increase of 24 per 1000 in a generation.

[2] A poll of student opinion revealed a belief in the probability of further increase in the divorce rate in the near future. N. Israeli, "Group Estimates of the Divorce Rate for the Years 1935–1973," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 4:102–15, February, 1933.

[3] Lewis M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness*, p. 177.

bility in marriage more difficult to achieve, but this trend is at least partly offset by the development of the psychological and social sciences, which give insight into the processes of adjustment. If there has been a decline in marital happiness, it could scarcely be as great as the increase in the divorce rate, which has more than doubled since the turn of the century. Does anyone believe there were two or three times as many happily married couples in 1896 as now? If so, the writers of that period were not greatly impressed, for no accounts of unusual domestic felicity have come down to us.

These comments bring into focus an important fallacy in popular thinking, namely, the confusion of marital infelicity and divorce. Because divorce occurs where there is unhappiness, some make the mistake of thinking that the denial of divorce would of itself make for happiness. If divorce is not the cause of the unhappiness, however much it may further contribute to it, then a realistic interest in promoting marital happiness would call for less concern with divorce as a legal instrument and more concern with the conditions that produce divorce. The testimony of a capable psychiatrist [1] is instructive on this point, and suggests that divorce may not be necessary or desirable in many cases. He tells how many couples have come to him on the verge of separation, usually after a long period of unhappiness; and how, instead of advising for or against divorce, he has tried to help them to understand the real basis of their difficulty. He reports that, after consultation, the couples without exception decided to stay married. This is a remarkable record, probably not matched by most counselors, but it shows what can be accomplished by a scientific approach to human problems.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How may family disorganization be defined objectively, in terms of institutional functioning?
2. How do the problems of widowhood differ for each sex?
3. Why are wives likely to survive their husbands?
4. Is the remarriage of widowed persons desirable?
5. Are marital separations usually temporary or permanent?

[1] J. Levy and R. Monroe, *The Happy Family* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1938), p. 84.

6. Of the various methods of computing the divorce rate, which one is most realistic?
7. Does happiness in marriage increase or decrease with an increase in the number of years married?
8. What are the problems of readjustment that face the divorced man? the divorced woman?
9. What changes, if any, have occurred in the public attitude toward divorcees in the past few decades?
10. Should alimony be abolished?
11. Ought unhappily married couples to remain together for the sake of the children?
12. Are divorcees as a group constitutionally inferior?
13. Would a uniform divorce law in the United States be a good thing?
14. Should divorce by mutual consent be permitted?
15. Should divorce be made more difficult?
16. Do liberal divorce laws tend to increase the divorce rate?
17. What would "divorce by social case work" be like?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. The burden of family support by divorced, separated, and widowed women in the United States.
2. A comparative study of bereavement customs.
3. Case studies of annulled marriages.
4. Migratory divorces.
5. The effect of divorce on children in the large family system.
6. Supreme Court decisions regarding the validity of out-of-state divorces.
7. The ethics of alimony.

SELECTED READINGS

Cahen, A., *Statistical Analysis of American Divorce.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1932.

A rich source of data, organized around important questions, such as the relation between size of family and divorce.

Davis, Kingsley, "Children of Divorced Parents: A Sociological and Statistical Analysis," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 10:700–720, summer, 1944.

One of twelve articles in a symposium on "Children of Divorced Parents," most of which treat the legal aspects. Shows that divorce as a problem is related to our small family system, and presents new data on the magnitude of the problem.

Eliot, T. D., "The Bereaved Family," *The Annals*, 160:184–90, March, 1932. Also by the same author: "The Adjustive Behavior of Bereaved Families," *Social Forces*, 8:543–49, 1929–30.

Despite the fact that there are twenty-six deaths every ten minutes in the United States, bereavement as a social phenomenon has been virtually neglected. These two articles open up a new field of research. See also Mortimer Spiegelman, "The Broken Family, Widowhood and Orphanhood," *The Annals*, 188:117–130, November, 1936. For interesting data on mortality, see Antonio Ciocco, "On the Mortality in Husbands and Wives," *Human Biology*, 12:508–31, December, 1940.

Elmer, M. C., *Family Adjustment and Social Change* (New York: Long and Smith Company, 1932), pp. 173–99.

A good review of the earlier studies on the social effects of broken homes. Most of these studies are deficient either because (1) no controls are set up or (2) broken homes are not differentiated as to type.

Groves, E. R., and Ogburn, W. F., *American Marriage and Family Relationships*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928.

Chapters 10, 20, 22, and 23 contain valuable data on disorganization.

Lichtenberger, James P., *Divorce: A Social Interpretation*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1931.

A standard work. The author's contention that divorce legislation is becoming more strict is open to question.

Mowrer, E. R., *Family Disorganization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, rev. ed., 1939.

A standard source of data on the ecology of family disorganization in the urban community.

Schroeder, Clarence W., *Divorce in a City of 100,000 Population*. Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago Libraries, 1938.

A statistical comparison of the background of married and divorced couples in Peoria, Illinois, matched for economic status.

Waller, W. W., *The Old Love and the New: Divorce and Readjustment*. New York: H. Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1930.

The best analysis of divorce and readjustment from the social psychological point of view.

Chapter 19

FAMILY REORGANIZATION

FAMILY LIFE TODAY is troubled, as the preceding chapters have shown. While the marriage rate holds steady, the divorce rate continues to soar with the peak of the rise not yet in sight. Many married couples, not divorced, live apart, and others are unhappy though living together. One fifth of the native-white married women were childless in 1940, and the number of babies born in that year was little more than sufficient to maintain the population. Juvenile delinquents abound and many other badly reared children are problems to themselves, if not to the community. These and other trends are disturbing to many people, and their concern is understandable because the home is the place where personal and social virtues are first developed.

The home, as the nursery of human nature, is a source of present despair, but it is also a source of hope for the future. At least there is general agreement that the family is our primary social institution, and that if we are to have a better civilization we must look to our homes to develop better citizens. Such a view has naturally led to the reform movements affecting the family.

While there is general agreement that the family needs help, there is much less agreement as to what changes are needed. For instance, there are those who advocate a uniform marriage and divorce law for the entire nation as a means of combating the progressive increase in divorce. Others look upon such a move as a threat to the legal standards of certain states, since a uniform law would scarcely be framed at the highest level. Disagreement also exists with regard to the desirability of sterilization of the unfit, the wider dissemination of contraceptive knowledge, subsidies for babies, and numerous other measures. Such disagreement is highly confusing to many persons who are prompted to ask: How can we tell what changes are desirable, and how can such changes be brought about?

PROGRESS AND SOCIAL VALUATION

The Subjectivity of Values

One reason people differ in what they think are desirable changes is that they have different values. One group thinks a federal marriage and divorce law would be a step forward, perhaps because they are collectivists and believe that increased centralization of governmental functions is a good thing; or they may believe in legal uniformity for the nation. Those who believe in states' rights regard such a move as a step backward, perhaps because they value local differences and experimentation more highly than uniformity, even if it means lower standards in some cases. So, too, some feel that the employment of women is a good thing, because, with the reduction in the size of the family and in household responsibilities, employment outside the home enhances woman's status and keeps her from being a parasite.[1] Others take the view that woman's place is in the home and that if she has less to do at home than before, she has opportunity for more fellowship with her husband and children. That the trend is for more women to enter the labor market is an objective fact, but how one evaluates the trend depends on one's standards, which are subjective and difficult for science to appraise.

Consensus

Values differ from culture to culture, and from time to time in the same culture, but at any given time in a particular culture there is consensus, or general agreement, on certain values and policies. Thus, at the present time the prevailing opinion in the United States is unfavorable to child labor and favorable to compulsory, free, public schooling for children. Earlier in our history the situation was practically reversed, for child labor was regarded as a virtue and public education was regarded with a dubious eye. Many other reversals of the same sort could be recounted. This suggests that consensus of opinion is inconstant and is subject to the same possibilities of irrationality and rationalization as individual opinion. When large numbers of persons agree on values, they lend authority to the decisions that are made, but there is no intrinsic merit in numbers, and consensus may be irrational, confused, or contradictory.[2]

[1] Olive Schreiner, *Woman and Leisure* (New York: F. A. Stokes Company, 1911).

[2] For an able analysis of contradictions in our culture, see Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1937).

In the light of the above, what we call progress is seen to be movement toward a goal thought desirable by the group at a particular time.[1] If the group thinks it desirable for young children to be in school rather than at work or at home, and if over the years an increasing percentage of children are enrolled in the schools, then we say progress has occurred.

Science and social progress

If consensus is subjective and subject to considerations of time and place, what is the relation of science to social progress? This is an interesting and very difficult question. The principal function of social science, it would seem, is not to determine values for the group, although it does have this function in some degree because science has its own value judgments, and the great respect in which they are held causes them to exert an influence upon social values. It appears, rather, that the principal rôles of science in relation to group values are as judge and promoter. As judge, science may undertake to determine whether or not certain values in a culture are consistent with other values, or whether certain proposed measures are consistent with established policy. If, for example, a movement is launched to prohibit the dissemination of contraceptive information, is that compatible with democracy? Science may also say whether proposals are realistic and realizable. Will a program of sterilization actually eliminate the unfit or appreciably reduce their number? Will subsidies for babies give us more population, and improve the quality? In the rôle of judge, science can frequently indicate the probable consequence of various courses of action, and thus help in social planning. Once a course of action is decided upon, science can promote that action by suggesting the best ways and means of realizing it. For example, if contraception is desired, science can evaluate the relative effectiveness of existing methods. Such, in brief, are some of the relations of science to programs of social action. They will be further exemplified in succeeding paragraphs, as various programs of family reform pass in review.

In considering an approach to family reorganization, one is faced with the practical problem that it is difficult to name any program of social welfare which does not in some way benefit the families of the

[1] For fuller discussion of the concept of progress and related topics, see W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff, *Sociology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940), chap. 28.

nation. In fact, years ago Devine expressed the conviction that the ultimate object of all social work was the conservation of the family.[1] However, certain institutions, as for example schools, libraries, and hospitals, serve the home only indirectly by serving individuals who happen to belong to families. On the other hand, there are agencies whose social work has the family unit as its primary object. In the following discussion of social effort in behalf of the family, we shall confine ourselves in the main to enterprises whose concern with the family is direct. We do this because of considerations of space, without losing sight of the fact that society is an integrated whole and that changes in one part of the social system may have consequences for other parts, including the family.

BIOLOGICAL ENDEAVOR

One major line of effort in behalf of the family is concerned with improving it biologically. This goal is approached in two principal ways, through heredity and through the environment. The aim of the first approach, *eugenics*, is to improve the inherent quality of the human organism by controlling its chemical determiners or genes. In contradistinction, the aim of the second approach, *euthenics*, is to improve the physical health of the human being after conception by controlling certain factors in his environment, such as food and the germs of disease.

Artificial Selection

The challenge of trying to improve the inherent quality of the human organism is presented by the successes we have achieved in plant and animal breeding. For example, by means of careful selection a milch cow has been produced which gives 42,000 pounds of milk a year, or about 21,000 quarts. Some ask, if we have been able to produce a super-cow, why not a super-man?

This idea intrigues the imagination, as is shown by the success of the comic strips and the romantic novels based on the idea, but there are great practical difficulties. In the case of plant and animal breeding, the goal is clearly specialization of one sort or another. In the example given above the aim is to get a cow that is a good milk pro-

[1] E. T. Devine, *The Family and Social Work* (New York: Association Press, 1912).

ducer. In the same way we produce a horse, the Flemish, for great pulling power, or another type, a thoroughbred, for great speed. In producing the Flemish we sacrifice speed; in producing the race-horse we sacrifice strength. If artificial selection were to be applied to human beings, for what traits should we breed? The militarists might argue for physical strength, the academicians for intelligence, and the preachers for a loving heart. One difficulty, then, with a practical eugenics program of a positive sort is the lack of group consensus regarding the traits to be cultivated.

If human virtues tended to form a positive cluster, the argument that eugenics cannot be applied to man because it would result in the development of specialized traits rather than in a balanced personality would lose its cogency. But it is not clear that intelligence, good health, and the social virtues are linked together in a positive manner. Criminals have less desirable social traits than non-criminals, but the two groups do not differ significantly in test-intelligence.[1] Traits such as honesty, co-operativeness, persistence, and inhibition give only low correlations with I.Q.[2] Attempts to uncover the relation of intelligence to emotional stability have yielded only negative results.[3] The findings suggest the independence of personality and intellectual traits, and one reason for this is that personality is much less dependent on genetic factors than is general intelligence.

Another and perhaps even more serious obstacle to the establishment of a national eugenics program is that it would call for rather rigorous control of the mating process, presumably by governmental agencies.[4] If good stock is to be selected and poor stock is to be rejected, some body of men must have the authority to decide what is good stock and what poor. In animal and plant breeding there is consensus regarding what is desired, hence, no governmental pressure is required; but the absence of consensus regarding the traits to be cultivated in man might mean that standards would have to be set up by

[1] Carl Murchison, *Criminal Intelligence* (Worcester, Massachusetts: Clark University, 1926).

[2] H. Hartshorne and M. May, *Studies in Deceit* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), Book I, p. 286; Book II, p. 220.

[3] L. L. Thurstone, "A Neurotic Inventory," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1:3–30, February, 1930.

[4] Some modern cultures, in times past, have had such controls. For instance, three or four centuries ago in Iceland, illiterate women were forbidden to marry. Nor could a man marry unless he could prove that he could support a wife or that she had other means of support. It is not known how much these laws accomplished, although Iceland today has the lowest rate of illiteracy. (Ellsworth Huntington, "A Thousand Years of Eugenics in Iceland," *Eugenical News*, March, 1943, p. 8.) Still, these bars to marriage were removed, which raises a question as to their effectiveness.

some governmental unit, at least until such time as the group developed a consensus of opinion. In democratic countries, such governmental action would probably be viewed as unwarranted intrusion in personal affairs and a negation of personal liberties. Indeed, such governmental action would be in direct contrast to the trend of our times, which has been to accord the individual an increasing measure of freedom in the choice of a mate. Young people in America have probably never been freer than they are today in selecting a marriage partner.

If it is argued that voluntary control is feasible (whatever may be said for compulsory, state control), and that young people may be taught to recognize the virtues of eugenic marriage, the difficulties are even so not entirely removed. For the youth of our times are disposed to mate for personal happiness and not for the betterment of the race. In a great many cases, possibly in most, the maximum welfare of the group may correspond to the maximum welfare of the individual, but there are certainly exceptions, such as the two partners in marriage who find great happiness without contributing offspring that have eugenic value to the group. Democracies tend to emphasize self-determination and respect for individual differences. It would seem, therefore, that a eugenics program, if it is to have any considerable success, must deny liberty in mating as in animal breeding. A voluntary eugenics program, coupled with a vigorous propaganda, would be the alternative, but this does not seem to offer much promise of success for the near future, although there is no denying what vigorous propaganda can accomplish. If a positive program were to be launched, it would require considerable time for its fulfillment, since there is at present widespread ignorance regarding the nature of family lines, and many generations of careful record-keeping would be required to furnish such information.

Negative eugenics

More consensus exists regarding the human traits that are to be weeded out, and even in the democracies a program of negative eugenics has been instituted. Sterilization of the feebleminded and insane in state institutions was permitted by the laws of twenty-eight states in the United States, as of January 1, 1944. The United States Supreme Court has given its stamp of approval to legislation of this kind, when the interests of the defective individual are protected by the law. In the test case, Buck *vs.* Bell, originating in Virginia, the



FIGURE 110. STATES WITH A STERILIZATION LAW IN 1944

Sterilization laws have been passed in thirty-two states and Puerto Rico. Because of technical deficiencies in the acts, four of these states (New Jersey, Nevada, New York, and Washington) repealed their laws. Map from Marion S. Olden, *Your Questions About Sterilization Answered* (Princeton, New Jersey: Birthright, Inc., 1944).

feebleminded plaintiff, besides being the daughter of a feebleminded mother, was herself the mother of a feebleminded, illegitimate child. Justice Holmes, in handing down the Court's decision, declared, "Three generations of imbeciles are enough."

All the states provide for the segregation of certain classes of feebleminded persons in state institutions, and when this confinement covers the whole period of the reproductive life of the individual the effect is the same as if the person had been sterilized, except that the taxpayer has had to bear the burden of supporting such persons when in many cases they might have been paroled back to a life of useful participation in the community. Frequently, even where sterilization is permitted by law, hostile public opinion limits very greatly the number of sterilizations actually performed. As of January 1, 1940, the number of operations performed by the states totaled only 33,000, and of this number, California [1] contributed 13,700, or about two

[1] The California law is mandatory, but the consent of the patient's kin is nearly always requested and seldom refused. For reports on the California experience, see E. S. Gosney and Paul Popenoe, *Twenty-Eight Years of Sterilization in California* (Pasadena, California: Human Betterment Foundation).

Table 34. Summary of Sterilization Laws of 28 States and Puerto Rico, 1944 *

States [1]	Legal Aspect of Sterilization Laws: Administ. Board: Heads of institutions [2]	Administ. Board: Existing state board of charities or control	Special	Hearing for parole or discharge	Notice to patient, parent or guardian	Provision for guardian, if none	Jury trial on demand	Appeal specified	Required report on completed operation	Officers and physicians protected	General Aspects of Application of Laws: Applies to: Institutions	Applies to: Population at large	Survey and continuous census required	Voluntary	Compulsory after hearing	Consent not mentioned	Application by: Officer	Application by: Parent or guardian	General Grounds for: Eugenic (heredity)	General Grounds for: Social [4]	General Grounds for: Interest of person and society to be considered	Classes Covered by the Laws: Feebleminded	Mental disease (unspecified)	Epilepsy	Nervous disease	Gross physical defect	General hereditary conditions	Habitual criminals	Sex delinquents — serious and perverts	Surgical Aspect of Various Laws: Physician protected	Therapeutic operations sp. excluded	Operation specified	Operation not specified	Castration: Not mentioned	Castration: Forbidden	Castration: Permitted
Alabama			X		X	X		X		X	X	X				X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X	[10]	X			X	
Arizona		X			X	X		X		X	X				X		X		X			X	X	X	X			X	X	X	V.S.			X	
California		X		X						X	[6]X	X		X	X		X		X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X			[9]X			X	
Connecticut			X								X					X	X		X			X	X	X				X	[8]X	X		V.S.		X		
Delaware		X			X				X		X	X				X	X					X	X	X	X					X			X	X		
Georgia			X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X			X		X		X			X	X	X		X	X			X			X		X	
Idaho			X		X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X			X	X	X	X			X	X		V.S.		X			
Indiana		X			X			X		X	X				X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X					X	X	X	V.S.			X		
Iowa			X		X			X			X		X		X		X		X			X	X	X				X	[7]X		V.S.		X			

* Compiled from data in the Social Security Board publication, Digest of State Laws Relating to Sterilization, 1944.

Kansas.....			×		×					×	×				×		×		×		×	×	×	×			×	×	×	×	×	V.S.C.	×			×
Maine.....			×		×			×		×	×	×		×	×		×	×	×		×	×	×							×		V.S.		×		
Michigan.....		×			×		×		×	×	×	×		×	×		×	×	×	×		×	×	×					×	×	×			×	×		
Minnesota.....			×		×	×			×	×	×			×	×		×					[8]×	×							×				×		
Mississippi.....	×				×	×		×		×	×				×		×		×		×	×	×	×						×	×	V.S.			×	
Montana [3].....			×		×			×		×	×			×	×		×		×		×	×	×	×						×			×	×		
Nebraska.....			×	×	×			×			×	×	×	×			×	×	×			[8]×	×											×	×		
New Hampshire			×		×	×		×	×	×	×				×	×	×		×		×	×	×	×						×	×	V.S.			×	
North Carolina.			×		×	×		×	×	×	×	×		×	×		×	×	×		×	×	×	×	×	×				×	×		×	×		
North Dakota..			×		×			×	×	×	×		×			×	×		×		×	×	×	×				×	×	×			×		×	
Oklahoma.....		×		×	×	×		×		×	×					×	×		×		×	×	×	×				×		×	×	V.S.			×	
Oregon.....			×		×		×	×	×		×	×	×	×	×		×		×	×		×	×	×				×	×					×	×		
South Carolina.		×			×	×		×		×	×				×		×		×			×	×	×						×	×			×		×	
South Dakota..			×		×	×		×		×	×	×	×	×	×		×	×				[8]×								×				×	×		
Utah.....	×				×	×		×	×		×				×		×		×			×	×	×					×		×	V.S.				×
Vermont.....			×								×	×		×		× [10st]	×	×	×		×	×	×									V.S.		×		
Virginia.....	×				×	×		×		×	×				×		×		×	×	×	×	×	×						×	×	V.S.			×	
West Virginia..		×			×	×		×		×	×				×		×		×		×	×	×	×						×	×	V.S.			×	
Wisconsin... ..		×			×				×		×					×	×				×	×	×				×						×	×		
Puerto Rico...			×		×	×		×	×	×	×	×		×	×		×	×	×		×	×	×	×	×	×	×		×	×	×			×		×	
Totals.....	3	9	17	4	26	14	3	21	11	20	29	13	6	12	21	9	29	8	25	5	15	29	28	21	3	3	2	10	9	20	14	14	15	15	11	2

* Prepared by Mabel G. Boyden, Ph.D., Birthright, Inc., Publication number 10. Used with permission.

[1] No laws include congenital blindness or deaf-mutism.

[2] Heads of institutions means either superintendent or board of trustees or both.

[3] Montana is the only state whose law defines all terms used.

[4] Social grounds does not include purely economic grounds.

[5] Population at large — specially committed to institution for operation alone.

[6] California: Applies to syphilitic disease, insanity of pregnancy, families already too large.

[7] Iowa: Includes syphilis.

[8] All feebleminded are wards of the state.

[9] Operation not specified: The term used is asexualization but description of operation used is distinctly vasectomy and salpingectomy.

[10] V.=Vasectomy; S.=Salpingectomy; C.=Castration.

fifths. This small number reflects the popular distrust of sterilization, based partly on ignorance of the facts, partly on fear. It is not commonly understood that medical sterilization does not unsex the patient, its function being solely to prevent conception. In fact, many a patient marries after he or she has been sterilized. In the case of the male, the operation — called vasectomy because the vas deferens are cut and tied, preventing the passage of the spermatic fluid — is a minor one involving only a local anesthetic, and from the standpoint of surgery is about as serious as a tonsillectomy. Sterilization of the female is a major operation, involving an abdominal incision and is comparable to an operation for appendicitis.

There is also a general reluctance to further the sterilization movement because of the fear that an extension may lead to unwarranted abuses. That these fears are not altogether unfounded is shown by the effort in some quarters to extend sterilization to criminals in state prisons, despite the fact that it has not been demonstrated that criminal behavior is biologically transmitted. Indeed, except for a small percentage of crimes, particularly those involving sex, it has been fairly well demonstrated that crime is a social rather than a biological product. Even the total extermination of the present prison population would not banish crime in the next generation, though it might diminish it somewhat, since criminals doubtless produce crime through their influence upon those with whom they associate. Sterilization would not prevent criminals from having influence upon other people's offspring, nor would it contribute much toward the improvement of those social situations which are the hotbeds of crime.

Some observers, noting the disposition of government to apply sterilization in situations where it is not warranted, view with alarm the investment of the state with such unusual power over the citizenry. The administration of government, they point out, is in the hands of a small group of men upon whose motives and intelligence we cannot always depend. Since abuse of power in government is not rare, there is no reason to think it may not also apply to sterilization. Bertrand Russell's speculation that the ruling party might some time decide to sterilize its political enemies, thus hoping to guarantee the perpetuity of its own power, is unquestionably extreme, but it contains the same warning that others give, and the treatment of certain conquered minorities by the Nazis in World War II scarcely makes the fear an

unreasonable one. From this it appears that eugenical sterilization must be employed with caution. Where medically indicated, sterilization may be desirable for the sake of the individual himself, since it protects him against the heavy responsibilities of parenthood which he is unable properly to acquit. This fact is usually evident to the patient's guardians, and experience shows that where the need for sterilization is clearly demonstrable, the consent of the guardians is almost always forthcoming.

Limitations of sterilization

Sterilization applied as a health and protective measure in the patient's interests is one thing; sterilization as a panacea for all our social ills is quite another. It is folly to think that sterilization can speedily eliminate the biological unfit from our midst. Consider first the feebleminded. It has been estimated that there are perhaps six million persons in the United States who may be so classed because they rate at least 30 per cent lower in general intelligence than the average run of persons. If all of these defectives were to be sterilized today, would feeblemindedness be wiped out for all time? No, because feeblemindedness is not always the result of biological inheritance, but may be because of a variety of social conditions, such as difficulties at childbirth and brain injuries from accidents and disease. It is not known what proportion of all cases of mental deficiency are of social rather than biological origin, but some students put the figure at about 50 per cent. Sterilization would not, of course, prevent the production of a new crop of feebleminded owing to social causes. Sterilization would accomplish little at first, even so far as the inherited cases are concerned, because mental deficiency is inherited as a recessive trait. If a feebleminded woman marries a normal man who comes from entirely normal stock, all of the children born of the union will have normal intelligence. The offspring will, however, carry genes for defective intelligence, and they may produce feebleminded offspring if they mate with others similarly endowed, since a double dose of recessive genes is required to produce the outward or visible trait. The difficulty, then, is that there is often no way of telling in advance of mating whether an individual has defective genes of the recessive type, and the magnitude of the problem is suggested by the estimate that there are in the United States perhaps ten million outwardly normal persons who carry such

defective genes. It has been estimated that if the proportion of feebleminded in the group is one per thousand, to cut that proportion to one per ten thousand would require between two to three thousand years, if it were done solely by preventing the propagation of feebleminded individuals.[1]

Mental disorders

As regards the problem of mental disorders, the case for sterilization is even weaker, because the rôle of experience in producing such disorders is more conspicuous. For a great many cases (approximately half of the total number) no physical basis for the mental disorder can be found with the instruments of diagnosis now available. These cases are, therefore, regarded as functional disorders, and it is assumed that the causes are social and cultural rather than physiological. Even when a constitutional basis is indicated, as in the case of certain glandular disorders, it should be remembered that the physical condition may be the result rather than the cause of the trouble since the glands may be affected by experience. In certain cases where a constitutional impairment is noted, the environment may still be responsible for the impairment, as when the disease germ of syphilis causes dementia paralytica, or an illness causes encephalitis, or an accident produces a brain tumor. In only a few conditions, like Huntington's Chorea and certain types of epilepsy, have organic states of an hereditary nature been established. Of course the great prevalence of so-called functional disorders does not rule out the possibility of an underlying hereditary factor, for the functional troubles may be caused by an inherited weakness of some sort which makes it difficult for some persons to stand up squarely against life's trials and tribulations. But this line of thought is purely conjectural, and there is rather more reason to suppose that the individual differences in ability to withstand stress are due to differences in social conditioning. Experiments with little children in the laboratory,[2] as well as in the larger sphere

[1] H. S. Jennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature*, p. 242.

[2] G. E. Chittenden, *An Experimental Study in Measuring and Modifying Assertive Behavior in Young Children* (Society for Research in Child Development, National Research Council, 1942). Nineteen dominative preschool children were divided at random into two sub-groups, a control group of nine children and an experimental group of ten. The children witnessed short "plays" in which dolls played the rôle of the children "in social situations similar to those in which the child himself frequently experienced difficulty." The doll's responses were analyzed by both the child and the adult, and both decided on the appropriateness of the responses. Among the results noted were: (1) a significant decrease in the dominative behavior of the experimental group and (2) "a trend toward a dependable increase in the co-operative behavior of these same children."

of society itself,[1] suggest how readily the personality can be molded into the desired pattern, if the effort is made early enough. We conclude, then, that in the case of those with mental disorders, as in the case of the feebleminded, sterilization is to be regarded mainly as a therapeutic measure benefiting the individual rather than as a solution for the problem of human abnormality.[2]

Birth Control

In the totalitarian countries of the nineteen-thirties and forties, the emphasis on sterilization was positive, while the attitude toward voluntary contraception for the masses was decidedly negative. These states sought by vigorous measures to prevent the reproduction of the unfit, while seeking by equally vigorous means, including sanctions against birth control, to encourage a high rate of reproduction for the rest of the population.

In the democratic, liberty-loving countries, on the other hand, the situation has been reversed, with sterilization played down and voluntary contraception played up. While the number of persons in state institutions in the United States who have been sterilized during recent years has averaged only around thirteen hundred persons annually, with no conspicuous yearly increase in rate to be noted, all indexes of the practice of contraception indicate a gain in public favor. Probably a majority of married couples, especially in urban centers, practice contraception, and a larger percentage approve of the practice.[3] Polls taken during the decade show an increasingly favorable public attitude toward contraception,[4] and the number of free clinics has grown apace, from 81 in 1930 to 783 in 1944.[5] The gains have not been even, however. During the decade there were some favorable federal-

[1] The indoctrinal successes of totalitarian cultures like Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Communist Russia are striking examples.

[2] In California, where upwards of fifteen thousand sterilizations have been performed since the law was introduced in 1909, one half of all the feebleminded who have been paroled have been sterilized, and one sixth of the new admissions to state hospitals for the insane. The latter have more sterilizations, however, presumably because their chances for recovery and parole are better. Of the persons sterilized in California, two thirds were committed as insane; one third as feebleminded. E. S. Gosney and Paul Popenoe, *Sterilization for Human Betterment* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929); also *Twenty-Eight Years of Sterilization in California* (Pasadena: Human Betterment Foundation).

[3] For fuller discussion of these and related points, see Chapter 16.

[4] *Public Opinion Quarterly*, II:390 (1938); *ibid.*, IV:349 (1940).

[5] *The Directory of Planned Parenthood Services* (Conception Control and Fertility Promotion) published by the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., 501 Madison Avenue, New York City.

court decisions permitting the use of the mails for the transportation of contraceptive materials and information, but there were also some unfavorable state-court decisions, principally in Massachusetts and Connecticut, where it was held that even physicians may not disseminate such information. On the other hand, physicians and pharmacists in Wisconsin, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Montana, and Oregon were, during the decade, exempted from the provisions of the law which limit the distribution of contraceptive information and materials.

One of the most interesting recent developments has been the provision of clinical birth-control services as part of the work of the state health departments for low-income groups in a number of states [1] and by individual county health departments in a number of other states.[2] The experience of South Carolina may serve to illustrate this type of development. In 1935, South Carolina had a higher maternal mortality rate than any other state in the Union, ninety-six deaths of mothers per ten thousand live births. In July of that year, a committee of the State Medical Association was formed to investigate the causes of this uncoveted record and to formulate plans for its improvement. A survey revealed that one fourth of the women who died had been chronically unfit for pregnancy by reason of pre-existing disease or disability, such as complicated pregnancies, improper diet, tuberculosis, heart disease, and severe anemia, yet these women — and many others — had not been protected against pregnancy. In 1938 the State Medical Association passed an enabling resolution permitting the State Board of Health to give contraceptive advice and material to underprivileged patients who, in the opinion of a licensed physician, needed it. No distinct birth-control clinics were set up, but the services were incorporated in the tuberculosis clinic, the well-baby clinic, or other activity of the county health office. In this way the pregnancy-spacing service was integrated with the general public health program, and was neither overemphasized nor neglected. Two years later, in 1940, the maternal mortality rate in South Carolina had been reduced to sixty-six deaths per ten thousand live births, a cut of 30 per cent in the 1935 rate.[3] It is not claimed that all of this decrease

[1] Seven states, as of January 1, 1946: Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Florida, Texas, and Mississippi.

[2] Outstanding is the Los Angeles County Health Department whose Mothers' Conference Service is offered to tuberculosis and venereal disease patients.

[3] Robert E. Seibels, "The Integration of Pregnancy Spacing into a State Maternal Welfare Program," *Southern Medicine and Surgery*, 102:230, May, 1940.



FIGURE III. GROWTH OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD CLINICS

In the period 1939 to 1944, clinical services increased by nearly two thirds. The trend is toward making such clinics a part of hospital and state and county public health services. From Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. With permission.

was due to the new contraceptive program, but undoubtedly the program played a big part.

Maternal and Infant Health

Birth control is frequently a problem of family health, but the latter is bigger than the issue of birth control, since many factors other than the desirability of having offspring may enter into the question of the mother's well-being and that of her children. The health problem is also bigger than the family, since many single persons are involved

and many community groups other than the individual family. Two health problems, however, are distinctly of a family nature, and these alone need concern us here, namely, maternal and infant mortality, which have long been the special concern of agencies of public health.

Until rather recently, local and state governments exercised exclusively the function of safeguarding the life and health of mothers and infants. The financial support of the programs was often uneven and inadequate in certain regions, and this eventually led to the view that the increasingly powerful and wealthy national government should share responsibility for the program. The first step was taken when, in 1921, Congress passed the Sheppard-Towner Act entrusting the Children's Bureau with the responsibility of distributing $1,240,000 annually to co-operating states as grants-in-aid for the provision of facilities for the care of maternity and infancy. When the Act expired in 1929, about three thousand prenatal and child-health centers had been established. The next big step forward was taken under the Social Security Act of 1935. Title V of this Act, as amended in 1939, made annual appropriations of $5,820,000 for maternal and child-health services and $3,870,000 for services for crippled children, while $1,510,000 was allotted for child-welfare services. More than one half of the 1229 prenatal clinics under state health departments in 1939 were a result of this law, as was the large expansion of public health nursing, especially in rural areas. These services and others contributed to the decline in infant and maternal mortality to the lowest points in our history. The infant mortality rate dropped to 40.4 per thousand live births in 1942, which was less than half what it was in 1915; and the maternal mortality rate, long steady, declined from 6.7 per thousand live births in 1930 to 3.8 in 1940. By 1942 the rate had dropped further to 2.6 which, translated into human terms, meant the saving of the lives of approximately forty-five hundred mothers in just the two years.

The lowering of the infant mortality rate in the United States is a source of gratification, but approximately one in every six deaths of white infants in our country is still unnecessary according to the experience of New Zealand, which has the lowest infant mortality in the world.[1] If we were as efficient as New Zealand in safeguarding

[1] Comparable data for the two countries are available for 1943. In that year the infant mortality rate in New Zealand was 31 per 1000 live births; in the white population of the United States it was 37.5.

babies we could save about 20,000 lives a year. Why we lag behind it is not easy to say and doubtless many factors enter in, but an analysis of the causes suggests that differences in medical facilities and practices probably play a big part.[1] While it is difficult to compare two nations so widely separated, still there is so much similarity between the customs and general characteristics of the two populations that it seems fair to use New Zealand as a reminder of how much still remains to be accomplished in the United States.

The increasing interest of the federal government in saving the lives of mothers and babies is noteworthy as an evidence of the will of the people to solve their health problems on a national basis. Health, like education, is a national resource. A nation cannot be strong if it has much illness, nor efficient if it has a great deal of illiteracy. The importance of having a well-educated citizenry was recognized relatively early, and a century ago a policy of compulsory education in free, tax-supported schools was adopted. The question arises as to whether the health of a nation is not as urgent as its education, and if so, whether medical care should not also be made available as a



FIGURE 112. THE UNEQUAL BURDEN OF MEDICAL COSTS

One tenth of the nation's families bore two fifths of the nation's bills for sickness in 1936. It is a serious matter when crushing medical, nursing, and hospital bills pile up and wages stop. The payment of moderate fees in advance insures somewhat against the costs of illness. Figure from William Trufant Foster, *Doctors, Dollars and Disease* (Public Affairs Pamphlet no. 10), p. 2. Courtesy of the Julius Rosenwald Fund.

[1] "An Object Lesson in Infant Mortality," *Statistical Bulletin* (New York: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company), October, 1938, p. 4.

governmental service supported by the taxes of the nation. A number of nations, including Sweden, Russia, Great Britain, New Zealand, and portions of Australia provide such service. In the United States also, despite the opposition of vested interests, the trend toward group medicine has been strong, but so far it has taken the direction of voluntary co-operation. In 1945, however, President Truman recommended a compulsory, tax-supported system to the Congress. Of course, group medicine has long been practiced in our country on a limited basis. Many public school systems provide periodic medical examinations for the pupils at public expense, and many colleges furnish medical and infirmary services on a group basis. Industries often have plans for protecting the health of the workers, as do fraternal organizations. The trend toward collective provision for medical care was given great impetus by the second World War because of the large percentage of men who were found to be physically unfit for military service and because of the health services introduced by certain leading industrialists.[1] It is difficult to predict what direction group medicine will take in the United States, whether voluntary or compulsory, or both, but the world trend seems to be toward a compulsory, tax-supported program.

ECONOMIC ENDEAVOR

Next to unemployment, illness is the chief cause of economic dependency of American families. This is noteworthy because it emphasizes the interrelationships of social institutions. The point was developed at some length in a previous chapter,[2] where it was shown that the kind of family life we have depends on the kind of economic, political, educational, and religious organizations we have. If the economic organization does not function smoothly, there is considerable unemployment, which in turn leads to fewer marriages, a lower birth rate, and other effects which may be undesirable. Insufficient income prevents families from utilizing the knowledge and facilities which are available for better living.[3] In brief, if we are to improve

[1] Outstanding is family care by doctors employed by Henry Kaiser in his shipyards and other enterprises. See "Kaiser's Challenge to Medicine," *New Republic*, 170:809, December 8, 1942.

[2] Chapter 17.

[3] L. K. Frank, *Human Conservation: The Story of Our Wasted Resources* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March, 1943).

the family we must give heed to the other institutions, especially the economic.

On its economic side, successful family life calls for an adequate income and its efficient use, but, as we saw in an earlier chapter,[1] these requisites are lacking in a large proportion of American families. The question of adequate income is a complicated one, for it involves, not only the size of one's income, but one's standard of living, which in turn depends for its meaning, at least in part, upon the standard of one's neighbors. Poor men nowadays may have more comforts than well-to-do men of Queen Elizabeth's time, who lacked radios, plumbing, central heating, even table forks. But the poor man feels poor because he compares himself with his neighbors and not with the men of Queen Elizabeth's time. The problem of poverty may thus be conceived as being either absolute or relative. Absolute poverty, or the lack of the essentials of life, namely, food, clothing, and shelter, depends largely on the quantity of production. In hunting cultures, where the means of production are little developed and the food supply is uncertain, absolute poverty frequently exists, though, when hunting is good, nobody starves because all the members of a hunting party share in the catch, whether they deliver the death blow or not. The superior hunter gets the choicest portions and the largest share and will have more to eat than the others, but he commonly shares his surplus by giving a feast. On the other hand, when famine strikes, everybody goes hungry. Such, for example, is the situation among the Eskimo.

Nowadays the problem of poverty in the United States is largely a relative one: the conveniences of life, like central heating, running water, and radios, are denied to many who do have food, clothing, and shelter. There are, of course, others — and at times they constitute a considerable number — who lack the very essentials of existence. But the point to be emphasized here is that, so far as the whole group is concerned, there is no absolute poverty, since our present economic organization is capable of producing enough for all and actually does produce such an abundance. This abundance is, however, very unevenly distributed, so that some have a very great deal and others have little or nothing.

In the very small communities, numbering roughly from ten to two hundred persons, which exist among the simple food-gatherers,

[1] Chapter 6.

the good-neighbor policy usually prevents gross economic injustices from arising. Something of the same policy may be seen even yet in country districts, where the villagers band together to help a needy neighbor. But as communities grow in size and as the number of goods expands, the good-neighbor policy breaks down, because the residents on the "right" side of the tracks do not know how "the other half" lives, and because, if all those on the "wrong" side of the track are poor, they cannot do much for one another. That is why in large, heterogeneous, highly developed societies, the government, which alone represents all the people, becomes the good neighbor, the protector of the weak against the strong, the great equalizer. Before government takes over, the old pattern of personal neighborliness and mutual aid is continued by private philanthropy and social work, and even yet a considerable amount of such private philanthropy exists. But as the burden becomes greater, it is too heavy for the voluntary agencies to bear, and the responsibility is shifted in increasing measure to government, which alone has the power to levy taxes.

General family relief

Students reading these lines will come mostly from middle-class families, and they are not likely to realize how widespread is the need for financial assistance on the part of American families generally. Some idea of the magnitude of the problem is suggested by the fact that in 1933–34, at the depth of the economic depression, somewhere between thirteen and fifteen million persons were unemployed in the United States, which was perhaps about one quarter of the total labor force. It is an acutely serious situation when one out of every four American workers is idle because he can find no work to do. Unemployment is demoralizing psychologically as well as ruinous financially, especially when it is long continued, as it was for great masses of the population before World War II. In 1940, nearly a decade after the beginning of the Great Depression, between eight and ten million persons were still unemployed.[1]

Since many unemployed persons are heads of households with children to support, the number of persons affected is very considerable. Some of these unemployed draw upon their savings to tide them over, but many have little or no savings. The number of persons who become wholly or partly dependent upon government aid is thus con-

[1] Federal Security Agency, *Second Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 67.



FIGURE 113. AVAILABILITY OF GENERAL RELIEF

The number of families and single individuals in the United States needing relief was estimated by the Social Security Board on the basis of the number receiving relief in the four or five states with the most liberal standards. The data are as of January, 1940. Pictograph Corporation, for *Jobs and Security for Tomorrow*, Public Affairs Pamphlets, no. 84, 1943, p. 6.

siderable, as may be seen in Figure 114, which shows that in the early part of 1934 nearly eight million households involving over twenty-seven million persons were dependent upon government aid, or about one in every five persons in the country. Some of the relief, furnished by the separate states, takes the form of outright grants for food, clothing, and shelter, while another type of assistance is payment for work on public projects (WPA), for which federal funds are available. There is also insurance against unemployment. Since general family relief is financed and administered by the states, there are marked variations in the size of the grants, and in some states a depleted treasury means that there is no money at all available for this purpose. In every state there are citizenship, residence, and other requirements which disqualify a considerable number of indigent people for public aid. Where aid is available, the amount is likely to be little and in many cases hardly enough to provide a healthful existence.[1]

[1] Pennsylvania, which presents one of the better programs, may be used as an illustration. In Pennsylvania in 1944, an "average" family of four persons dependent on General Assistance might receive a total maximum monthly allowance of $65.70. Actually they received much less, and frequently the amount was insufficient to maintain a healthful existence. "It is curious that among the almost innumerable criticisms . . . the one most truthful allegation is never made except by the families who depend on us. *We have never given adequate relief.*" Harry Hopkins, *Spending to Save* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1936), p. 99.



FIGURE 114. ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY IN THE NINETEEN-THIRTIES

Estimated net total number of households and persons receiving relief, works program employment, and emergency employment. When one in every five persons is economically dependent, it is clear that the economic organization is not functioning well. The family is greatly affected by the fluctuations of the business cycle. From T. J. Woofter, Jr., and T. E. Whiting, "Households and Persons Receiving Relief or Assistance," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 33:363–72, June, 1938, Chart I.

Aid to needy dependent children

General public relief such as has just been described helps to conserve the family, but it is not specifically a family measure. The government does, however, provide a type of protection which has the family as its locus, namely, aid to needy, dependent children. This is popularly referred to as Mothers' Aid or Mothers' Pensions, but it is available to children living with the father or with relatives as well as to those living with the mother, and is designed primarily to help the child and not the parent. The principle underlying the program is that the best place for a child is his own home, if it is a wholesome one, and that, therefore, it is undesirable to separate parent and child and to institutionalize the child, simply because the parent is unable



FIGURE 115. EXTENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, BY TYPES

Note the steady expansion of the permanent programs (aid to the aged, the blind, and dependent children). The growth of public assistance is an evidence of the transfer of the protective function from the family to the state. From T. J. Woofter, Jr., and T. E. Whiting, *op. cit.*, Chart II.

to support him. This point of view was promulgated in 1909 by the First White House Conference on the Dependent Child, called by President Theodore Roosevelt, and has since become the prevailing viewpoint. Since 1911, when Illinois and Missouri enacted the first mothers' aid laws in the United States, the movement has spread rapidly until all the states now have such laws, although a few jurisdictions do not yet have the approval of the Social Security Board, and, therefore, do not enjoy the support of federal funds provided by the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended in 1939. The number of children now cared for in their own homes under state-federal payments greatly exceeds the number in institutions and foster homes combined. The number was about 917,000 children in some 380,000 families in 1941. As in the case of general relief, the sums granted vary in the different states, ranging from an average of $10.57 per family in Texas to $62.58 per family in Massachusetts, with a national average of $34.34 per family as of October, 1942. It will be seen that the amount, by itself, is hardly sufficient to support a family, although it does serve as a helpful supplement to other family income.

The term "dependent child" is defined by the Social Security Act to mean a needy child under the age of sixteen years, or under the age of eighteen years if regularly attending school, who lacks parental care

or support by virtue of the death, continued absence from home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living in the home of a parent or relative. This means that the benefits may be available to a deserted or divorced wife with dependent children, to a wife whose husband is totally disabled, to a mother if the father is confined in a penitentiary or in an institution for the feebleminded or insane. It will be noted that there is nothing in the federal law to exclude unmarried mothers from the benefits of the act, and the intent of the federal authorities is to encourage the states to include them. The purpose is not, of course, to encourage irresponsible motherhood, but to protect the children who are the innocent victims.

Provisions for old age

Because the birth rate has been falling, children now constitute a smaller proportion of the total population and old people a larger proportion than formerly. This trend is expected to continue so that, by 1970, persons sixty-five years of age and over will comprise 10 per cent of the population, or two and one half times the percentage in 1890.[1] Old people are less able to care for themselves than formerly, because they are congregated in larger numbers in cities where they cannot grow their own food and where they are not wanted by industry using the assembly line which is better suited to nimble youth. Smaller families mean fewer children to support parents when they grow old. What to do? In some cultures the old people remove themselves by death when they find they no longer contribute to production, but our culture retains these inefficient elders because our culture is humanitarian as well as highly efficient in production, and this efficiency gives us an abundance, so that there is enough for all, children, youth, the middle-aged, and the old alike.

Developments like those just mentioned have led to plans for caring for old people which are in operation in all the states. Provision for the aged has, indeed, made more progress than that for dependent children, the outlay being about four times as great. The reasons for this difference are many, but an important one doubtless is that children don't vote. Assistance for the needy aged is to be distinguished from the old-age pension (or old-age and survivors' insurance) with which it is often confused. The old-age assistance payments are supplied by the states with matched grants from the federal government

[1] Data released by the Informational Service, Social Security Board, Washington, D.C.

to persons of a given age, usually sixty-five or over, who meet the requirements as to residence, citizenship, and financial need. At the end of the fiscal year 1945, slightly more than two million persons sixty-five and over in the United States were receiving old-age assistance payments averaging about thirty dollars a month. Old-age insurance, on the other hand, is not based on need, but rather on contributions made by the beneficiaries themselves during the years of employment.[1] In June, 1945, benefits in force under this system averaged about twenty-five dollars a month for a retired male worker who had reached age sixty-five. Benefits in force for specified family groups are shown in Figure 116.



FIGURE 116. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS' INSURANCE BENEFITS

Average monthly amount of benefits in force for specified family groups on the old-age and survivors' insurance rolls, June 30, 1945. The minimum benefit is $10 a month for a retired wage-earner and $15 for an aged couple. The maximum payable to a family is $85 a month, but only a few beneficiaries receive this amount. The majority have resources in addition to their benefits, but about one in ten has had to ask for supplemental public aid. Chart from Federal Security Agency, Section Five, Social Security Board, *Annual Report*, 1945, Chart 7, p. 36.

[1] Not all occupations are covered as yet by the federal insurance, and some acquire little protection because of mobility and other reasons, but progress has been made in improving the protection. Among other changes, provision has been made for survivors' benefits under certain conditions to widows, dependent children, or dependent parents, and for supplementary benefits to a qualified person whose wife is sixty-five or over or who has an unmarried dependent child under eighteen. This means that a child under eighteen, dependent on an insured individual at the time of his death, will receive a monthly benefit until the child marries, dies, is adopted, or reaches the age of eighteen. In addition, an insurance benefit is payable to the widow of an insured worker who has in her care a child thus entitled to benefits. Monthly old-age and survivors' insurance payments began in January, 1940, and by December, 1945, benefits were in force for almost 1,500,000 beneficiaries. *Social Security Bulletin*, vol. 9, number 2, February, 1946, p. 28.

Family endowment

As a rule, a single man and a married man with dependent children, both doing the same kind of work with equal efficiency, will in the United States receive the same pay, although the financial demands on both are not the same. Since children are necessary to the continuance of the state, the question arises as to whether this treatment of family men is fair, and, if not, whether some provision ought not to be made to help families that have to bear the cost of supporting dependents. This brings us to the matter of family endowment, or subsidies for children.

Although it has made practically no headway in the United States, family endowment is common in Europe and elsewhere. This is partly because of the lower real income of workers in other lands and partly from the desire of various governments to increase the population for militaristic purposes. The movement first developed on a large scale in France as a voluntary program instituted by certain public-spirited employers. Later, employers in a given industry organized themselves into a so-called "compensation fund," in order to equalize the burden and to remove the incentive which would otherwise exist to employ only unmarried men and married men without children. There were two hundred and thirty such separate "funds" in France in 1930. In addition, the government provided allowances for its public servants, and a number of private companies, though unaffiliated with a fund, granted subsidies to their workers with families. In January, 1932, a general system of compulsory family allowances was adopted by the French government, requiring every business employing more than a certain number of workers to join a "fund," just as soon as feasible.[1] The system was further unified and expanded by the *Family Code* of 1939 which provided allowances for the heads of families throughout the country, not only for wage-earning and salaried groups, but also for employers and for independent workers.[2]

[1] *Monthly Labor Review*, 34:796–98, April, 1932.

[2] The *Family Code* provides that from two thousand to three thousand francs be paid for a first-born legitimate child. One half of the amount is payable at birth and the rest after six months, provided the infant is alive, of French nationality and born within two years of the parents' marriage. Subsequent children under fourteen years of age (or seventeen if continuing education or apprenticed) are entitled to regular allowances. The rate for the second child is 10 per cent of the average salary of the locality in which the family resides, and 20 per cent for each subsequent child. Mary T. Waggaman, *Family Allowances in Various Countries* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1943), Bulletin number 754, p. 22.



FIGURE 117. AN ARGUMENT FOR FAMILY ENDOWMENT

Per capita income 1935–36, by size of family. Per capita income decreases sharply as the family increases in size. For the largest families the per capita income is less than one third that for the smallest. Do we owe children to posterity and should those without children be taxed to support those with large families? Chart from *Children in a Democracy* (General Report adopted by the White House Conference on Children in a Democracy, January 19, 1940, Washington, D.C.), p. 15.

Prior to World War II, family allowances in one form or another, exclusive of those for mobilized men, had been introduced into thirty-eight countries, which included nearly all of the countries of Europe and four in South America. Since then there have been notable additions to the list, including Canada (1944) and Great Britain (1945). The programs vary considerably as to eligibility and benefits. In Soviet Russia, for example, the 1944 law provides allowances beginning with the birth of the third child, whereas in England only the oldest child is excepted, and in Canada none are excluded and payments begin with the first child. There seems to be a difference of opinion, then, as to whether subsidies are needed to encourage married couples to start their families as well as to enlarge them. In Canada, payments vary according to the age of the child and the number of children in the family. The allowance begins at five dollars per month for each child under six and increases to eight dollars per month for children thirteen to fifteen years old, except that there is a reduction in the amount for the fifth child and each subsequent child. In England the initial law fixed the benefits at approximately one dollar a week for each eligible child. In Canada payments are made to parents regardless of the family's income, although income-tax deductions for a child are decreased by the amount of the family allowance received. In New Zealand, on the other hand, grants are made only to families with incomes below a specified amount.

In the United States there has been only occasional, non-governmental sponsorship of the family-endowment idea. A few business concerns, churches, and colleges have experimented with such grants, but the principal experiments have been those with teachers in the public-school systems. In the school year 1940–41, such schemes were in effect in seventy-five cities and towns.[1] The Salvation Army has a system of grants for its officers. These are only sporadic instances, and indicate the lag of the family-endowment movement in the United States. Although our income-tax exemptions in favor of married and familied persons imply recognition of the principle of family allowances, as does also federal-state aid to dependent children under the Social Security Act, the program of family allowances in the United States in the near future is not likely to advance beyond the stage of voluntary experiments, because of constitutional obstacles to its enforcement upon industry by the state, the relatively high

[1] National Education Association, *Report*, September, 1941.

standard of living of the masses, and the absence of an explicit national population policy. Still, the introduction of family allowances as a governmental function in so many different countries suggests a world-wide trend which may ultimately include the United States.

Limitations of family endowment

Since family endowment is sponsored by nations which are conscious of their small size or of their low birth rate as compared with that of their neighbors, one measure of the adequacy of the movement would appear to be its effectiveness in increasing the population. What has been accomplished thus far is not altogether clear. Certainly the program has not resulted in a net increase in population, for the figures for all the modern nations where the experiment has been tried for a considerable period of time show a down trend in the population for the period of the experiment. Germany was an exception in the nineteen-thirties, but it is by no means clear that the rise in the birth rate in that country during that decade is to be ascribed to the subsidies, since similar monetary rewards were provided in Italy and elsewhere without effect. It is hard to tell whether the birth rate might not have suffered an even more precipitous decline if subsidies had not been instituted, but clearly the subsidies did not succeed in producing a net increase in the birth rate. It is even possible that a program of family endowment, by calling attention to the economic liability of having children in our urban societies, may advertise this fact and thus serve as a further influence in the direction of family limitation.

The chief value of family endowment lies perhaps not in its financial aspects, but in its psychological effect. It is unlikely that allowances for children or any other economic rewards will induce any large number of couples to have offspring that they would not otherwise have, since the grants provided by government are sufficient to defray only a small part of the expenses of having and rearing children. Perhaps if government made childbearing profitable the appeal would be greater, but there are limits to the expenditures that governmental budgets can tolerate. The value of subsidies may lie partly in the encouragement they give to parents who desire more children and who are willing to lessen the chances of those already born, provided the chances are not lessened too much. Even more important, perhaps, the program of family endowment may help to promote population by

means of psychological incentives. If the national policy calls for more babies, then having babies becomes a patriotic duty, and the social pressure "to multiply and replenish the earth" becomes very great. Family endowment may be only one part of a total national program to make family life attractive. It is suggestive that the French "funds" referred to above took it upon themselves to serve the family in a variety of ways, providing free or low-cost facilities for maternal and infant hygiene, vacation centers for families, housekeeping courses, and other social services. If the design for family living worked out by the group is pleasing enough, it may be widely adopted.

A close student of the subject [1] points out that cash subsidies are likely to be absorbed in the family budget without special regard for the needs of the children. From a demographic standpoint, moreover, cash payments are likely to promote an increase in the number of children among the poorest families and among those who may have the least to offer in the way of heredity or social opportunities or both. Social services, on the other hand, contribute directly to the child's health, education, and well-being. "Cash," says Mrs. Myrdal, "favors quantity while kind favors quality."

Experience with family endowment to date reveals some of the difficulties which are encountered in the attempt to work out a satisfactory national population policy. One main problem centers around the question of the optimum population. How many people should a country have for its own best interests? The militarists clamor for a larger population, but the emphasis on numbers may be dangerous as well as futile: dangerous because, as Malthus showed, if numbers are increased beyond resources, misery results; futile because the population race between unfriendly nations is too uneven. Can Japan with 70,000,000 outdistance Russia with 180,000,000, or India with 300,000,000, or China with her 450,000,000? Numbers alone are not crucial; natural resources and efficient social organization are highly important also. But a nation like Russia with a large population has rich resources and an effective social organization, as the experiences of the second World War showed. Instead of engaging in a population race, it would seem to be the better part of wisdom for the smaller nations to try to get along with the bigger nations.

Public measures, like family relief, mothers' aid, old-age assistance,

[1] Alva Myrdal, *Nation and Family* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), pp. 133–53.

and subsidies for children, make evident the fact that there is appreciable general concern about fortifying the family on its economic side. Much has been done, but much still remains to be done. Our economic organization with its wizardry of mass production has made possible a higher standard of living for American families generally than has hitherto been known, but we have not yet conquered the evil of insecurity from unemployment. Irregular employment is definitely linked to family maladjustment. Persons interested in the welfare of the family are therefore interested in proposals for providing full employment. As to how this is to be accomplished, there are many different ideas, but nearly all serious students of the problem agree that government, the only agency that represents all the people, must take the initiative in stabilizing employment, largely through large-scale, carefully planned public-works projects.[1]

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ENDEAVOR

We turn finally to what is being done to help the family where it needs help most — on its personal side. While it is desirable for the members of families to enjoy good health and an adequate and stable income, it is even more important for them to live together happily. Health and economic security contribute to happiness, but happiness depends largely on the personality structure of the individual. Marital happiness depends on the synchronization of the two personalities involved, especially their capacity for fulfilling each other's wishes.

Unfortunately, family unhappiness is very widespread at present, although there is no proof that it is increasing or has increased in recent years. In about one marriage in every five, the friction is great enough to lead to divorce, but this ratio does not reveal the total amount of marital maladjustment, since one couple in eighteen or nineteen is separated but not divorced. Others stay together despite their displeasure because of children, or for some other reason. To the aforementioned, we must add the not inconsiderable number of parents and children who are at odds with one another. Plainly family maladjustment is very extensive, and consequently the need of mobilizing community resources to deal with the problem is great. Indeed, it is

[1] National Resources Planning Board, *After the War — Full Employment* (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office).

difficult to imagine anything more important than the effort to promote happiness among the members of families.

Most of the help available to discordant families is doubtless of an unorganized, unprofessional, and informal nature, like that furnished by doctors, ministers, teachers, and others who are called upon to help in individual cases of family maladjustment. Since such efforts are private, little authentic information is available regarding them, and even if such knowledge were to be had, it probably would not have much scientific value, since the techniques used are not standardized or transmissible. The discussion that follows is, therefore, limited to organized agencies which undertake this service professionally — family welfare societies, courts of domestic relations, and the recently established family consultation bureaus.

Family case work

At the present time most of the professional effort to eliminate discord from family life is probably supplied by family welfare agencies. The public agencies, numbering about four thousand, have been, perforce, relief-and-work-dispensing agencies, and have been little occupied with the problems of interpersonal relations. Formerly this was also true of the private family agencies when they had the field to themselves before the Great Depression of the nineteen-thirties and the advent of the Social Security program. Because the relief load was too great for the private agencies, public agencies were established, supported by tax money. These public agencies have largely taken over the functions of relief and health, leaving the private agencies freer than before to deal with the problems of personal adjustment.

How well have these agencies done? Studies [1] conducted in the nineteen-twenties did not give an encouraging answer. In reviewing 1573 cases which had come before Chicago social agencies, Mowrer discovered only 4 per cent which might be said to have been straightened out by the treatment received. Some of these adjustments were questionable, and in some of the apparently successful cases the adjustment was of very short duration with no certainty that it would last. This is a disappointing record, and yet, in weighing its significance, it should be noted that the family agencies work against great

[1] E. R. Mowrer and H. R. Mowrer, *Domestic Discord* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 105.

odds. Until the public agencies were established, the private agencies were few, numbering only several hundred. This meant that the case workers were obliged to carry such heavy loads that careful analysis and treatment were difficult, if not impossible. It will be recalled, too, that in the nineteen-twenties the family agencies were largely concerned with the work of health and relief, and the problems of personal adjustment were subordinated to financial and medical problems.

Courts of domestic relations

More recently, the growing social concern with problems of family maladjustment has led to the creation of another remedial agency, the court of domestic relations, first established in 1910 in Buffalo and in New York. Like the family welfare agencies, these courts are only a tiny fraction of the number required to handle the enormous volume of family cases, and their record is even less distinguished than that of the family agencies, so far as effecting readjustments is concerned. This conclusion follows from a review [1] of 936 court cases which revealed only 3.5 per cent of adjustments. A better showing is hardly to be expected, since once a case reaches the court there is little hope for a reconciliation, especially if it is attended by the usual publicity and the traditional formal procedures. Early sponsors of these special courts hoped they would prevent family collapse by means of thorough case work. Instead, these courts are generally like others in their attitude — that is, punitive — and for the most part devote their energies to getting deserters and non-supporters of families to meet their economic responsibilities. These courts as a group have been a source of disappointment to many who wished them well.[2]

Marriage and family-guidance clinics

The family welfare agencies and family courts may be viewed as social inventions that arose in response to the need for organizations capable of solving interpersonal family problems. Like all new inventions, these two had their defects, some of which have been indicated. An additional, continuing limitation of the welfare agency has been that it is associated in the public mind with economic dependency,

[1] Mowrer, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

[2] There are individual courts of which this generalization is presumably untrue. Such, for instance, may be the Court of Domestic Relations at Dayton, Ohio. An accounting of the work of this court in 1930 shows that, out of 101 cases, there were 20 adjustments (see E. R. Hixenbaugh, "Reconciliation of Marital Maladjustment," *Social Forces*, 10:30–36, December, 1931).

and even when offering personal services it has been identified largely, if not entirely, with the underprivileged. Clients come to the welfare agency because they are poor, and whatever personal problem they present is complicated by this ever-present fact of poverty, which makes the rendering of personal service difficult. For these reasons and others, it was felt that a new type of family agency was needed which would serve all classes of the community and which would develop highly specialized facilities for dealing with the psychological problems of marriage. In this way the marriage clinic came into being.[1]

The marriage-guidance clinic made its appearance in Europe in 1922, when the city of Vienna added to its Department of Health a bureau for the treatment of marriage problems. The idea spread quickly, and prior to the onset of World War II there were more than two hundred such clinics on the European continent, generally under governmental auspices.[2] In the United States the movement has been of more recent origin, the first clinics having been established in 1930. Since that time the growth of the movement, though halted by the war, has been rapid. So far, all the American clinics have been privately supported. A few are associated with large churches, several have been established as offshoots of existing family agencies, and a number are sponsored by institutions of higher learning.[3] The agency with the most extensive program at the present time is the American Institute of Family Relations at Los Angeles, which is privately organized as a non-profit corporation.

Although the marriage clinic gives every indication of becoming a permanent part of American organization of social work, it is still in a formative and experimental stage, as is shown by the continuing discussion [4] of the soundest basis for its establishment and by the high mortality rate of the clinics. During the decade, 1930–40, forty-seven centers were established, twenty-one discontinued.[5] Techniques for

[1] Meyer F. Nimkoff, "Pioneering in Family Social Work," *The Family*, 11:279–81, January, 1931.

[2] A. M. Durance-Wever, "Marriage-Advice Stations for Married and Engaged Couples," *The Family*, 11:85–87, May, 1930.

[3] A directory of marriage clinics as of November, 1940, appears in Appendix B, Norman E. Himes, *Your Marriage* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940).

[4] Ernest W. Burgess, "Marriage Counseling in a Changing Society," *Marriage and Family Living*, 5:8–10, February, 1943.

[5] Marie Carden, *Organization of Family Consultation Centers* (originally prepared as master's thesis, Boston University, 1941). Privately distributed.

FIGURE 118. THE SEX DISTRIBUTION OF TWO HUNDRED CLIENTS SEEKING PRE-MARITAL HELP FROM THE PHILADELPHIA MARRIAGE COUNSEL

More than three times as many women as men sought assistance. In only one fourth of the cases were both parties interviewed. All but 3 per cent had at least a high-school education; nearly 30 per cent had been to college. More than one fourth came for help one week or less before their marriage. Four fifths had only one interview, and there was no further contact with three fifths of the group. How to get counseling services to those who need them most is a vexing problem. Data from E. H. Mudd, C. H. Freeman, and E. K. Rose, "Pre-Marital Counseling in the Philadelphia Marriage Counsel," *Mental Hygiene*, 25:98–119, January, 1941.

helping those with unsatisfactory personalities or personal relations are still insufficiently developed, yet promising results are reported when cases are handled by competent workers not burdened with a heavy case load. Harriet Mowrer, treating twenty agency cases in the course of a year as an experiment, reported effecting adjustments in twelve of them.[2] This report of success is interesting because it suggests something of the magnitude of the problem confronting family counselors. In this experiment, it will be noted, only twenty cases were handled in a full year, although it is not stated that additional work was not done. But even if fifty or one hundred cases should represent the outside limit of the case load which a counselor can carry if there is to be careful analysis and treatment, we can form some idea of the army of counselors that would be needed if the service were to be as common as, let us say, medical service is at present. Of course it would not be realistic to expect the family counselor to make an exhaustive case study in every instance, because many cases do not require exhaustive analysis, just as in medicine. But even so, family counseling would plainly require many tens of thousands of trained workers, if the program were to become established as a common service. As the public consciousness of the need for psychological and social guidance quickens, we may confidently expect that this service will grow, although the prospect is that the growth will be slow.

[2] E. R. Mowrer and H. R. Mowrer, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

There are already more than seven hundred child-guidance clinics in the United States, some of which indirectly offer marriage guidance. There is also about the same number of birth-control clinics which in some degree render a marriage-guidance service. With a further decline in the economic, protective, and other institutional functions of the family, the social psychological functions will loom larger. It is therefore probable that in the future increasing attention will be paid to safeguarding these social psychological functions which contribute so largely to happiness.

THE PREVENTIVE APPROACH

There is a proverb that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. This is an extreme oversimplification so far as marital maladjustment is concerned, because in the realm of the emotions, ills are not so easy of self-correction as they are in the physical realm. Hostile germs are attacked by the anti-bodies of the blood, but the mind offers no natural defense to the encroachment of bad habits, wrong attitudes, and crippling emotions. Once established, faulty habits of adjustment in marriage are hard to eradicate, and if they are based on long-standing emotional defects they are frequently impossible to eliminate. It is therefore highly desirable in a comprehensive program of family betterment to emphasize the prevention of family failure, rather than the cure. This can be done partly through better marriage laws, but mainly through more adequate education for family life, starting at the cradle.

Legal safeguards for marriage

The conviction is widespread that it would be better if there were less concern with divorce legislation and more with laws regulating marriage. We make the dissolution of marriage an intricate, trying, and expensive procedure, but allow persons to enter into matrimony on the easiest terms imaginable. In almost half the states of the Union even a marriage license is not required. Common-law marriage was still recognized as valid by twenty-two states in 1940. Such marriage permits of exploitation, for without a record of the marriage there is often uncertainty as to the legal status of the wife and children. Fortunately, the present trend is to invalidate common-law marriage.

Traditional legal safeguards for marriage in recent years have included the raising of the legal age for marriage, the requiring of advance notice of intention to wed, and the requiring of medical certification. Social workers propose that the minimum legal age for marriage be set at eighteen for girls. Marriage in our complex modern society requires considerable mental and social maturity, yet eight states still permit the marriage of girls at the age of twelve.

Some persons marry too early, others marry too late. The demands of marriage in modern urban society are often heavy, and many young people find their emotional and occupational maturity delayed so that they are unable to marry until the late twenties. Is it desirable that there should be so great a gap between the biological and social ages for marriage? If not, there appears to be a need for a series of social and educational readjustments in our culture which would serve to accelerate maturity.[1]

Experience with the requirement for the filing of advance notice of intention to wed, now in effect in about half the states, has been favorable where the law is adequate. In some states, the license is granted first and a period of delay is supposed to follow before the ceremony may be performed. Under such vague restrictions, violations of the law are common. The more adequate type of statute requires (1) that three full days must intervene between the time of application for a license and its issuance, making a five-day period of delay in all; and (2) that both persons be present at the time the application is filed. Since in states having such a law, thousands of persons every year apply for licenses and never call for them, it would seem that the period of delay was a saving device in not a few instances.

The newest legal requirement for marriage is a certificate of premarital blood test, now operative in more than two thirds of the states [2] as a preventive to the spread of venereal disease. About the same number of states, although not always the same ones, require a seriological test of expectant mothers as a safeguard for the child. By virtue of such examinations, every year thousands of persons, who previously had not the slightest suspicion of the fact, discover that they are infected. The blood tests appear to have won public favor

[1] The new undergraduate program at the *University of Chicago, with its two-year* A.B. degree, apparently has this idea as one of its objectives. It would seem that acceleration of maturity, to be effective, must start much earlier, probably in early childhood.

[2] As of January 1, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Public Health Service, *Requirements of Pre-Marital Legislation*, Bulletin number 98, 1945).

and are likely to be even more widely adopted in the future. In some states where pre-marital blood tests are prescribed, the laws requiring advance notice of intention to wed have been repealed, since the blood test itself necessitates delay.

In concluding this section on legal safeguards for marriage, we may observe that, although effort put into strengthening the marriage laws is energy well expended, it is possible to put too much faith in the benefits of even good legislation. For one thing, laws are not effective unless they reflect public opinion and have the support of the masses. As an example, a number of states have sterilization laws which are themselves rendered sterile and ineffective by public indifference or antipathy. Another limitation of law is that it establishes minimum standards, not optimum ones. For example, statutes may dictate the minimum chronological age at which a person may marry, but it is not feasible to pass laws setting up mental and social age requirements as well, despite the fact that many a legal adult is a social infant. These remarks are simply by way of suggesting that in a preventive program of family welfare first place belongs to education and not to legislation.

EDUCATION FOR FAMILY LIFE

Education for marriage and family life does not have a very long history. The family, to be sure, has long been the object of scientific study, especially by ethnologists and historians, but practical courses on the family did not enter the curriculum until the second decade of the present century. The lack of any practical instruction in the schools in preparation for the responsibilities of family life led Herbert Spencer [1] to make the following classic observations:

> If by some strange chance, not a vestige of us descended to the remote future save a pile of our schoolbooks or some examination papers, we may imagine how puzzled an antiquarian of the period would be on finding in them no indication that the learners were ever likely to be parents. "This must have been the curriculum for their celibates," we may fancy him concluding. "I perceive here an elaborate preparation for many things — but I find no reference whatever to the bringing up of children. They could not have been so absurd as to omit all training for this gravest of responsibilities. Evidently, then, this was the school course of one of their monastic orders."

[1] "What Knowledge Is of Most Worth?" *Education* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1915), p. 40.

This can no longer be truthfully said of our curriculum. It is thought that probably one half of all liberal arts colleges now offer at least one course in marriage and the family, mainly in sociology and home economics departments.[1] When it is considered that the first practical college course on the family was probably offered in the nineteen-twenties, there would seem to be some basis for the belief that the course on the family has been one of the most rapidly growing courses in the curriculum in recent years. Investigation [2] shows that it has moved into third place in terms of the frequency with which it is given in sociology departments in the United States, being subordinate only to the basic courses in general sociology and social problems.[3] Even more significant, perhaps, has been the extension of such instruction downward into the public schools, even though the movement has been slow. Significant innovations in recent years are courses in home economics for boys, and the requirement for graduation from high school in the State of Washington of one year of home economics for all girls.[4]

Education for family life has not been confined to the schools, but has become part of general public education. Signs of this new popular interest in the family are numerous. *The Parents' Magazine*, founded in 1926 to help parents with the problems of rearing children from the crib to college, had a circulation in 1945 of more than seven hundred thousand subscribers, an increase since 1930 of more than 600 per cent. Books on marriage and the family come off the printing presses at an accelerated pace. The Library of Congress card catalogue, which lists nearly everything that is published in the United States, has about four hundred entries under the general head of "family." A check of the first hundred showed that sixty-four are dated since 1930, while thirty were issued from 1920 to 1930, or a ratio of better than two to one in favor of the more recent decade.[5]

[1] Cecil Haworth, "Education for Marriage Among American Colleges," *Bulletin of the Association of American Colleges*, November, 1935. See also Joseph K. Folsom, *Youth, Family, and Education* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941), pp. 120 ff.

[2] Raymond Kennedy and Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy, "Sociology in American Colleges," *American Sociological Review*, 7:666, October, 1942.

[3] It is reported, however, that the expansion of courses in marriage and family life has not kept pace with the general expansion of college enrollment. Elizabeth Barchfeld, *A Study of Instruction Concerning the Family in Colleges and Universities in 1935–36 and 1941–42.* (Unpublished master's thesis, Pennsylvania State College, 1942.)

[4] Doris S. Lewis, "Education for Family Life in Washington State," *Parent Education*, May, 1935.

[5] Meyer F. Nimkoff, "The Family: Recent Social Changes," *American Journal of Sociology*, 47:874, May, 1942.

Specialists in various fields of the family (sociologists, home economists, lawyers, economists, psychologists, social workers, and others) banded together in 1938 to form the National Conference on Family Relations for the purpose of presenting a united front in the campaign for family betterment, carried forward through national and regional conferences, proposals for legal reforms, and the publication of a quarterly magazine, *Marriage and Family Living*. A number of the departments of the federal government, notably the Children's Bureau and the Women's Bureau, are interested in education for family life, while the United States Office of Education has recently sponsored demonstration programs in family life education designed to show how a community may discover the needs of its families and mobilize its resources to meet them.[1]

What is a realistic education for family life?

Advocates of marriage education like to point out that those preparing for medicine, law, and teaching require special training. If this training is necessary for these careers, they add, why not also for the most important one of all, marriage? While something can be said for this position, marriage as a career can scarcely be regarded as co-ordinate with the professions of medicine, law, and teaching. For one thing, marriage is relatively unselected, with about nine tenths of all persons, forty-five years of age and over, married. What kind of standards can be set up for so large and heterogeneous a group? Education for the professions emphasizes the acquisition of information and skills, not personal qualities. We seek out the capable doctor, whether or not he be kindly or sympathetic. We do not have to live with him. But marriage is largely a matter of personal relations, although knowledge and skills pertaining to the non-personal relations have their place.

These remarks suggest that education for marriage, if it is to be realistic, must lay its emphasis principally on the development of wholesome, adequate, mature personalities, however great may be the need for information on budgeting, housing, sex, birth control, and the like. A realistic education for marriage concerns itself with the personalities of the students, with their qualities of mind, and even more, with their qualities of habit, emotion, and character.[2]

[1] *School Life* (Washington, D.C.: special reprint, Office of Education, 1941).

[2] Meyer F. Nimkoff, "Marriage and Family Education for College-Age Students," *Forecast*, 55:206, May, 1939.

College courses on the family serve young men and women, but education of the personality begins at birth. In fact, in so far as hereditary factors may play a part, the personality is partly fixed at conception — a consideration which prompted Oliver Wendell Holmes to observe that every child should choose his grandparents wisely. However, given normal endowment (physical, nervous, and mental), there is convincing evidence that the personality is largely shaped by social experience, especially by that of the early years of life centering in the home. Researches on marriage previously reviewed showed how important for one's marital happiness are the happiness of one's parents, the type of parental discipline, and other elements of early family experience. The most important education for family life is thus given at home before the child goes to school. The school can build on what the home has done, and when the home has not built well the school can perhaps render its greatest service by trying to rebuild the personality of the student through instruction and individual case work. We may, therefore, anticipate that the next step in education for family life will be toward a primary concern for the development of wholesome personality.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why do honest and intelligent men sometimes disagree on whether certain changes in the family constitute progress?
2. On what goals for family life is our nation as a whole united?
3. Which approach to improving man biologically is the more promising, the approach through heredity or the approach through changed environment?
4. Artificial selection has been used extensively with animals; why not with man?
5. Why does not the sterilization program have greater appeal in the United States?
6. Why is the idea of planned parenthood popular in a democracy?
7. Why has the development of clinical contraception as part of the work of the state health department occurred first in the South?
8. Should medical care be available to the people as a governmental service? On a free basis, supported by taxation? As health insurance, on a group basis?

9. Is it desirable for the state to help needy families?
10. Are marriage and family subsidies a good thing?
11. How large a population should the United States have for its own best interests?
12. What are the basic tenets of a sound national population policy?
13. Can the problem of providing regular employment be solved? What are some promising proposals?
14. Why does the government undertake to perform an increasing number of protective functions for the family, which previously were exercised by the family and the local community?
15. Are marriage clinics likely to prove more successful in effecting readjustments than the courts of domestic relations?
16. Is education for family life, as found in our schools, realistic? What are the elements of an effective program?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. Experience with sterilization in California. E. S. Gosney and Paul Popenoe, *Sterilization for Human Betterment* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929). *Twenty-Eight Years of Sterilization in California* (Pasadena: Human Betterment Foundation).
2. Clinical birth-control services as part of the work of state health departments for low-income groups in certain southern states.
3. A comparative study of trends in the infant mortality rate in various countries.
4. Mary T. Waggaman, *Family Allowances in Various Countries*, Bulletin number 754, Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, 1943.
5. Marriage counseling. See *Selected Readings* for references.
6. Legal safeguards for marriage.
7. Education for family life in the colleges of the United States.

SELECTED READINGS

Case, Clarence M., *Social Process and Human Progress*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931.

An able series of essays on the concepts and implications of social progress.

Douglas, Paul, *Wages and the Family*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925.

An able statement of the case for family endowment.

Folsom, J. K., *Youth, Family, and Education*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941.

A comprehensive and critical analysis of current programs of education for family life. Helpful supplementary volumes are *Education for Family Life*, sponsored by the American Association of School Administrators, 1941; and Goodykoontz, Coon, *et al.*, *Family Living and Our Schools*.

Holmes, Samuel J., *Human Genetics and Its Social Import*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936.

Most eugenists, before the rise of genetics, grossly overemphasized the biological factor in human affairs. Many still do. The author of this book is more familiar with human social problems than most biologists, yet he, too, may have overstated the case for eugenics. Another well-balanced book by a biologist is H. S. Jennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1930.

Marriage Counseling.

No systematic study of this significant branch of social work which is emerging as an independent organization is available at the time of writing, perhaps because the field is still insufficiently developed. The most comprehensive report is Marie Carden's *Organization of Family Consultation Centers* (master's thesis, Boston University, 1941). Some good discussions are the following: Ernest W. Burgess, "Marriage Counseling in a Changing Society," *Marriage and Family Living*, 5:8–10, winter, 1943; E. H. Mudd, C. H. Freeman, and E. K. Rose, "Pre-Marital Counseling in the Philadelphia Marriage Counsel," *Mental Hygiene*, 25:98–119, January, 1941; "Consecutive Cases in the Marriage Counsel of Philadelphia," *Mental Hygiene*, 21:198–217, April, 1937; R. Bridgman, "Guidance for Marriage and Family Life," *The Annals*, 160:144–64, March, 1932; Paul Popenoe, "A Family Consultation Service," *Journal of Social Hygiene*, 17:309–22.

Social Security.

The following three reports present the British and American blueprints for achieving freedom from want for the whole population: Sir William Beveridge, *Social Insurance and Allied Services* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942); National Resources Planning Board, *Security, Work and Relief Policies* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942); National Resources Planning

Board, *National Resources Development Report for 1943* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January, 1943). Both the American and British reports have been called "cradle-to-grave" plans because they guarantee medical care, food, clothing, and shelter to the whole population, irrespective of private means, from the prenatal period to burial.

United States Office of Education, *A Summary of Achievements to Date in Four Experimental Family Life Education Programs.* Miscellaneous Publications, number 2503. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940.

Significant because of federal participation in family life education.

Vernier, C. G., *American Family Laws*; 5 volumes and supplement. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1931–38.

The definitive study.

Chapter 20

THE HAPPY FAMILY

WHAT IS THE FAMILY still good for? This provocative question has been raised by various persons [1] concerned with assessing the dramatic institutional changes of the past two hundred years. In the agricultural economy of our great-grandparents, the functions of economic production were centered in the home and in the family farm. As a result, the family was a self-contained social unit responsible for the education, religious training, recreation, and protection of its members. When steam and steel revolutionized production by shifting it to the factory, the consequences for the family were drastic. The school, the playground, the movies, the courthouse, and the hospital are some of the visible signs that the family has sustained a great loss of institutional functions. The shift of the economic and recreational functions has been largely to industry, while the transfer of the educational and protective functions have been mainly to the state. These shifts of function have added enormously to the power and prestige of industry and the state, and have diminished greatly the authority of the family as a social institution. Preceding chapters have documented and detailed these momentous changes. Let us now in this final chapter try to assess the effects of these changes on the family as it exists in our culture today.

The great loss of institutional functions by the family has, however, not been without compensating gain in another direction. Although the family no longer assumes the primary responsibility for baking bread, teaching the three R's, holding daily prayer, and concocting home remedies, it still remains the most important instrument for affection and companionship between husband and wife and parents

[1] Edward Sapir, "What Is the Family Still Good For?" *American Mercury*, 19:145–51, February, 1930; William F. Ogburn, "The Changing Family," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 23:124–33, 1929.

and children. These personality functions have not been transferred to out-of-the-home agencies as have the institutional functions. When the Bolshevik Revolution shook the social order of Russia in 1917, some observers [1] predicted that legal marriage would be replaced by unregulated and unregistered unions, and that the offspring would be reared by the state in collective homes. No such thing happened. For a time in Russia marriage was very lax and either husband or wife could obtain a divorce simply by paying a fee of two dollars and by filing a request with the authorities, who would then in a routine manner notify the other partner by postcard of the action that had been taken. But divorce was more difficult to obtain if there were children, and at no time were children regarded as the property of the state and taken from their parents to be reared by the state. The excesses of the early period were temporary, and the more recent trends in Russia have been in the direction of strengthening the solidarity of the conventional family. In 1940 it was more difficult to obtain a divorce in Russia than in most of the states of the United States.

From the long-time point of view, a strong case can be made for the thesis that there has been an absolute gain in fellowship between husbands and wives, and parents and children, in the modern urban, industrial family as compared with the farm family of the past. The pictures that we have of family life in former times show the members preoccupied with economic pursuits, not with the cultivation of personal relationships. Economic considerations played a big part in the choice of a mate and sometimes the financial factor, in the form of bride price or dowry, was outstanding. At present, the remarkable advances in technology make possible more leisure and afford greater opportunity for cultivating personal relations. The economic and educational opportunities open to women are about equal to those of men, and have the effect of encouraging fellowship between the sexes. There are, of course, still some marriages of convenience in our day, and it is incorrect to believe that marriages in earlier times were generally devoid of affection, but a careful view of the long-time trends will show the shift in emphasis from impersonal to personal factors in the selection of a mate. The swing has, in fact, gone quite far and has, according to some critics,[2] resulted in overemphasis in our culture on

[1] V. F. Calverton, *The Bankruptcy of Marriage* (London: John Hamilton, 1939).
[2] Mabel Elliott and F. E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941).

love as a condition of marriage, to the exclusion of other important considerations. We are, they say, in the clutch of a "romantic complex."

Even if there had been no absolute gain in companionship since agricultural times, even indeed if there had been a loss, the affectional function of the family would be more important today than in earlier times. If the members of the agricultural family did not have much companionship, they at least participated in numerous joint activities which served to bind them securely together. They depended upon one another for a living, for knowledge, for protection, and for religious encouragement. But if the modern family lacks companionship, it may have little or nothing to hold it together, and it readily falls apart. The need in modern times for cultivating family affection is therefore urgent. Affection has in fact become the *sine qua non* of marital and family stability.

Affection is a powerful tie, but it is often ephemeral and short-lived. The evidence of family disorganization presented in preceding chapters shows that many marriages break up despite the fact that they were begun with a show of affection. Apparently love alone is often not enough. According to Saint Paul, all things are possible to them that have true love. "Love suffereth long, and is kind; love envieth not; love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not its own, is not easily provoked, taketh not account of evil, rejoiceth not in unrighteousness, but rejoiceth with the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. Love never faileth." [1] Not every married couple has such a steadfast love, capable of withstanding any assault and rising above any threat to the union. A couple may begin marriage with affection, but if they are beset by problems they cannot or do not solve, they may come to regard each other as obstacles to happiness, and their love may turn to bitter hate. It is, therefore, highly important to consider what pitfalls lie in the path of married couples, and how these dangers may be avoided. Because of limitations of space, we shall confine our attention to certain major problems of adjustment that are widespread, as indicated by the records of marriage counselors.[2] Although these inventories of marital difficulties are not in

[1] I Corinthians 13:4–8. Holy Bible, edited by American Revision Committee (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1901).

[2] Ernest R. Groves, *Conserving Marriage and the Family* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945). Robert G. Foster, *Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944). Emily H. Mudd, "Analysis of One Hundred Consecutive Cases," *Mental Hygiene*, April, 1937.

complete agreement, they do contain a common core. These problems have been discussed in previous chapters, but their significance for marital happiness is so great as to warrant further consideration of them here, even at the risk of some repetition.

Sex Adjustment

The earliest and most urgent problem of adjustment in marriage has to do with sex. This is not surprising, since the distinctive thing about marriage, the thing which sets it apart from ordinary friendship, is that it involves the most intimate relationship between a man and a woman. The two sexes are different, and the differences must be harmonized if the couple is to be happy. In other respects, such as education, family background, religious philosophy, and standard of living, the couple may be alike or nearly alike, so that little or no adjustment is required. In the lower animals the fact of sex differences seldom presents a problem of adjustment, for the two sexes are complementary, not antagonistic, in their functions, and more often than not the mating process is smoothly performed under the guidance of instinct. On the human level, however, sexual behavior is governed much less by internal biological forces and much more by external group and cultural forces which we consider under the head of the learning process. In some cultures, the learning process regarding sex is such as to facilitate adjustment,[1] and problems in this sphere are not conspicuous. In our culture, on the contrary, there is a great deal of faulty sex learning owing largely to our Puritan tradition which regards sex as a shameful, sinful, and embarrassing experience. These negative teachings have imposed a censorship on sex which has surrounded the subject with an aura of mystery. It is difficult to learn properly behavior that you can't talk about freely. In our culture, fear and embarrassment regarding sex create problems of adjustment in marriage. Sexual aversions may also have their origin in the excretory taboos because of the close topographical relation.[2] Another major cause of faulty sex attitudes is found in abnormal psycho-sexual development, represented by parental fixation, narcissism, and strong homosexual attachments.[3] Sex learning, like all learning, begins at birth, and the early learning is the most important. In choosing a

[1] See Chapter 1.
[2] G. E. Gardner, "A Factor in the Sex Education of Children," *Mental Hygiene*, 28:55–63, 1944.
[3] For fuller discussion, see Chapters 11 and 12.

mate, it is highly important to know about his or her affectional development.

Because many couples bring poor sex attitudes and habits to marriage, they may have to do considerable relearning in the interests of marital happiness. This takes time, but the patience and forbearance required may be rewarded with success. This is one of the implications of a recent study [1] of the length of time required after marriage for 409 couples to achieve adjustments in six areas, one of which was sex relations. The findings are presented graphically in Figure 119.



FIGURE 119. LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED AFTER MARRIAGE TO ACHIEVE ADJUSTMENTS

Married couples have greater difficulty in achieving a satisfactory sex adjustment at the start of marriage than in the other fields indicated. Doubtless the importance of the sexual adjustment for marital happiness is also greater. The 409 couples were highly selected for happiness. Had a random sample been used, the proportion with a good initial sex adjustment would have been much lower. Judson T. Landis, "Length of Time Required to Achieve Adjustment in Marriage," *American Sociological Review*, 11:666–77, December, 1946. By permission.

[1] Judson T. Landis, "Length of Time Required to Achieve Adjustment in Marriage," *American Sociological Review*, 11: 666–77, December, 1946.

One eighth of the couples did not make a good initial sex adjustment, but required from one to twelve months to do so, while an additional tenth took from one to twenty years. Generally the relearning is accomplished by the couple without outside assistance, but in cases where there is a serious impediment the couple may require the services of a medical or a psychiatric specialist.

Sex differences

Since adjustment is facilitated when couples understand each other and are at ease in each other's presence, a knowledge of sex differences may be helpful. The question as to whether male and female differ genetically in strength of sex drive is perhaps unanswerable, because they cannot be measured by the same standards.[1] Besides, the physical sex drive is modified by cultural influences so that genetic differences, if any, are obscured. In our culture, men generally have more sex drive, although there is considerable overlapping of the two groups, and some women have more sexual vigor than some men. Investigation [2] of American couples shows that where there is a discrepancy in the relation of actual frequency of coitus to preferred frequency, the discrepancy for husbands generally shows desire in excess of fulfillment, but the reverse is true for wives. What the situation would be if cultural influences were not operative, it is difficult to say. Among the simians, to whom we look for suggestions as to the original nature of men, either sex may take the initiative in the mating process.

However obscure may be the differences between men and women in strength of sex drive, there are clear-cut differences in sexual performance and expression. The sex act is impossible for the male if he is entirely without desire, but this is not true for the female, although under such conditions her satisfaction will generally be much less. This means that the male can force his attentions on the female, but not vice versa; rape is an exclusively male offense. This difference between the sexes is important and is the source of serious difficulty in many marriages, where the husband exploits his wife sexually without due regard to her own wishes and satisfaction. If equal satisfaction is the goal in marriage, or at least mutual satisfaction, as is expected

[1] A. Scheinfeld, *Women and Men* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), p. 232.

[2] Lewis M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938).

in the equalitarian marriages of today, attention by the husband to sex differences may be an important factor in marital happiness. There are cyclical variations in desire in the female, which are lacking or much less conspicuous in the male. These variations are associated with the menstrual cycle. In the apes, sexual interest is at its height at the time of ovulation, and the event is signaled by an outward physical sign, the swelling of the genitalia.[1] In human beings there is considerably more variation in the dates of heightened erotic interest. For many women the time of maximum response is during the days immediately preceding or following menstruation,[2] but it may occur at other times. This fact is not always known by husbands because there is no outward physical sign of maximum receptivity, as there is in the other primates.

From the standpoint of marital happiness, the point to be stressed is that satisfaction in coitus may be as great for the woman as the man. It may even be greater, for some women experience two or more orgasms in an act of coitus whereas a man can have only one. Some women do not achieve an orgasm because in their early training they were led to believe that coition is a concession to male passion, and that a good woman does not have erotic feelings. Many husbands are ignorant of the need of their partners for orgasms and regard coition as an opportunity only for male gratification. As pointed out earlier,[3] mutual satisfaction is the soundest basis for happy marriage and discrepancy in satisfaction disposes to unhappiness. It is not necessary that there should be complete mutual satisfaction in every act of coition, but only that this be the general objective. This objective may be departed from with safety only with the full consent, or, better still, insistence, of the person not being fully satisfied.

Marital infidelity

In our culture there is an acute intolerance of extra-marital affairs, and probably nothing more speedily jeopardizes the success of a marriage than the love triangle. Adultery is a ground for divorce in every jurisdiction where divorce is permitted, and in the State of New

[1] Robert M. Yerkes and James H. Elder, "Oestrus, Receptivity and Mating in Chimpanzee," *Comparative Psychology Monograph*, 13:1–39, 1936.

[2] R. A. McCance, M. C. Luff, and E. E. Widdowson, "Physical and Emotional Periodicity in Women," *Journal of Hygiene*, 37:571–714, 1937; K. B. Davis, "Periodicity of Sex Desire," *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology* 12:824–38, 1926.

[3] Chapter 15.

York it is the only ground for divorce. Such affairs are used by erotically vigorous persons as an outlet for their excessive sexual energy. These persons are emotionally mature and may be happily married.[1] The evidence from the infra-human primates suggests that there may be a natural basis for the wide variations in sexual vigor, although health and experience are also important factors. The apes are not one hundred per cent monogamous, but in a considerable percentage of the cases form a love triangle. A particularly dominant overlord may have half a dozen or so females. In our monogamous society, the teachings of culture may be highly effective in reshaping and redirecting the inherited biological nature of man, but there are failures, as the evidence of sex behavior shows.

Not all marital infidelity is of the type described above. Usually, unfaithfulness on the part of husband or wife is a sign that the marriage is unhappy. The offender tries, often blindly, to find in a new relationship the satisfaction that his marriage has denied him. This indicates that many times when a husband is unfaithful, his wife is partly responsible, and vice versa. Still other cases represent neuroticism and emotional insecurity,[2] with sexual motivation as a secondary factor. These affairs are promiscuous, episodic, and fragmentary, and do not provide lasting satisfaction because the individual has an inadequate personality which prevents him from relating himself wholeheartedly to someone else. Some marriage counselors [3] make a plea for more sympathetic understanding of infidelity instead of the righteous indignation and the quick termination of the marriage in order to save face. The cause may sometimes be corrected and the marriage saved. One may be cautioned against hasty divorce as against hasty marriage.

Marriage and Money

A second major area of domestic difficulty relates to the economic factor. This is not surprising, since husband and wife, together with their children, are partners in an important business enterprise. As in other businesses, there is in marriage the problem of an adequate

[1] C. Landis, A. T. Landis, and M. M. Bolles, *Sex in Development* (New York: Paul B. Hoeber, 1940).

[2] E. D. Wittkower and J. Cowan, "Some Psychological Aspects of Sexual Promiscuity," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 6:287–93, October, 1944.

[3] John Levy and Ruth Monroe, *The Happy Family* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1938); Ernest R. Groves, *Conserving Marriage and the Family* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945).

income. How much money is needed in order to be happily married? In our culture, most people behave as if the answer were: "At least 10 per cent more than you have, no matter what the amount," but the findings of research [1] show that, within limits, amount of income is not so important for marital happiness as regularity of income. This may not be true for extremely low incomes which are insufficient to provide for a minimum standard of comfort and decency, but the value for marital happiness of additional increments to income appears in our culture to be grossly exaggerated.

In former times, when the family was the source of employment for its members or the means by which employment was obtained, the parents had a large responsibility for inculcating habits of skill and diligence in their children. Now that jobs are largely supplied by industry and not by the family, and the schools play a large part in providing the requisite skills and habits, the responsibility of the parents is less. Even if the parents and the schools succeed in properly preparing youth, there may be no work, or only irregular work, for millions of persons because of the fluctuations of the business cycle. Today, the problem of economic security is less of a family problem than formerly, and more of a community problem.

Who shall earn the family income?

A question that causes difficulty in many homes is whether or not the wife should work for pay. If there is financial need because the husband's wages are inadequate, the question may answer itself. Many, if not most, wives who work outside the home say they are actuated by financial need, although it is often difficult to determine exactly what is meant by need. Other wives testify that they work to satisfy personality needs, to give expression to their education and training, to occupy leisure time resulting from lessened household responsibilities, or to avoid the monotony of housework. There are doubtless many other reasons why married women seek outside employment. The type of work done also varies greatly. Some women undertake volunteer work. Others find part-time jobs. These makeshift adjustments are said not to provide adequate satisfaction for women who want to play an active economic part in the community,[2]

[1] Chapter 15.

[2] Grace Loucks Elliott, "The Family — Covenant with Posterity," *Social Action*, VIII:22, February 15, 1942.



FIGURE 120. WHY MARRIED WOMEN WORK

The feeling against having married women work for pay, based on the belief that working women take jobs away from men, grows more acute during economic depressions. More than two thirds of married women who work are in domestic service or in low-paid manufacturing or clerical jobs, in which men do not seem to be particularly interested. This group works because their families need their help. Data from Public Affairs Pamphlet no. 49.

but evidence is lacking on which to form an unbiased judgment. In recent decades the percentage of married women employed outside the home has progressively increased.[1]

Is it desirable from the standpoint of marital happiness for the wife to work for pay? The evidence presented in an earlier chapter [2] was to the effect that working or not working is important only in relation to attitudes toward employment. Marital happiness is favored if the wife works, and if she and her husband both believe it is right for her to do so; or if they think she ought not to work, and she remains at home. From the standpoint of marital happiness, then, the decision as to whether the wife's place is in the home is the problem of the individual couple.

In the earlier farming culture, there was no issue as to the proper economic rôle for married women. Their place was in the home, though not exclusively so, for they helped with the farm work, and in the European system the dwelling-place was not on the farm, as it is in the United States, but was located in the village, some distance

[1] See Chapter 4. [2] Chapter 15.

away from the strips of land that were cultivated. Still, the distance from home was not great, and the mother at work on the farm could easily be summoned if she were needed at home. The children might be at hand in any case, because they could help with the farming too. So there was less incentive to postpone childbearing than there is at present when the wife has a job away from home. There was no economic competition between husband and wife because the family was the employer and no one received any pay. The situation at the present time is different because the husband and wife have separate work not furnished by the family, for which they receive money. The husband may be jealous of his wife if her success is greater than his; and even if it is not, he may resent the fact that she is not dependent upon him for economic support. Under farming, there was a single major economic pattern of adjustment for husbands and wives, with a minimum of variation, but now there is no established pattern for married couples to follow, and each married pair must work out their own adjustment. If this is to be successful, it must be in harmony with their joint wishes.

Who shall manage the money?

Another aspect of the economic adjustment of husband and wife relates to the control of the family income. Who shall manage the money? Under the patriarchal system of the past, it was customary for the husband to exercise exclusive control over family funds. If the wife needed money, she would ask for it and her husband would dole it out, if he approved the request; or she might receive a stipulated allowance at regular intervals to meet recurring household expenses. Under this system, many women had little or no practical experience in managing the family capital. The results were not serious so long as the husband lived, if he were a good manager; but at his death the situation often changed, and we have the not unfamiliar picture of the widow without financial experience dissipating her inheritance.

Nowadays many women have the experience of earning and managing money before marriage, and even when they are not employed after marriage, rebel at the idea of leaving all control over financial matters in the hands of their husbands. Such a wife may solve her problem by establishing a separate account for which she alone is responsible. This arrangement may not differ much from the allowance, unless it be in the amount of the funds involved and in the oppor-

tunity afforded for independent management and investment. Other arrangements, conspicuous in equalitarian households, relate to joint accounts, of which there are two main types. Husband and wife may manage their property as *joint tenants*, in which case the property is recorded as belonging to either husband or wife (Mr. John Doe *or* Mrs. Mary Smith Doe). Many couples have a joint checking account against which both may draw, and the bank honors either signature. An advantage of this arrangement is that husband and wife have the right of survivorship, and on the death of either party the property automatically reverts to the other and no inheritance taxes need be paid. A limitation of joint tenancy is that the holdings become the exclusive property of the spouse who takes possession, so that the arrangement is risky unless integrity and confidence exist on both sides. As a protection against possible abuse, some couples manage their property as tenants in common, in which case both signatures are required in a transaction. Under this system, the couple have their automobile, home, or other property registered in both names (for example, Mr. John Doe *and* Mrs. Mary Smith Doe). This is a more cumbersome arrangement than joint tenancy and is, therefore, not so common, especially for bank accounts, although it is often used in the case of real property.

The arrangements described above do not exhaust all the possibilities. Some husbands, though the number is small, turn over to their wives all responsibility for money and property management, perhaps because the husbands have no interest or skill in these matters. Some couples combine separate and joint accounts. There are, then, various ways of managing the family income. Can we say which method is best from the standpoint of marital happiness? No investigation has ever been undertaken on which to base a scientific answer, but common sense suggests that no one arrangement is desirable for all couples, and that any plan is satisfactory if it works well and is agreeable to both parties. A study [1] of the way that sixty-eight successful families of the upper business and professional classes managed their income showed that in one half of the cases husband and wife had a joint account, and that nearly all of the others had separate accounts. A few families combined the two plans. In three families, the husband had complete control of the family income and in one case, the wife.

[1] Chase Going Woodhouse, "Managing the Money in Successful Families," *Journal of Home Economics*, 23:1–8, January, 1931 The average income of these families was $6711.

How shall the income be expended?

Still another economic problem of the family has to do with the way the income is used. Examination of the financial situation of American families shows that a considerable percentage close the year with a deficit.[1] In some cases, this may be largely because of insufficient income. In others, the cause may be extraordinary expenses, such as are entailed by protracted illness. But often the reason for the deficit is faulty management. The family has no economic plan or an ineffectual one. The problem of spending the family income wisely and of balancing income and expenditures introduces the idea of budgeting.

Nearly everyone who counsels families on economic questions recommends the adoption of a budget, but the suggestion often meets with a cool reception. The term *budgeting* has an unpleasant sound to many ears. Why this should be so is not clear, but one possibility is that budgeting involves the careful keeping of financial records, and this in turn involves discipline, to which many persons react unfavorably. They may feel that the budget is a sort of policeman that watches carefully over their economic behavior, and limits and coerces them. Sometimes the feeling against policemen, budgets, timetables, and other symbols of authority is intense, especially in persons who were harshly disciplined as children. But even those who are not irked by discipline may regard the budget with misgivings because they have erroneous ideas regarding it.

A budget may evoke kindlier reactions if it is regarded as the economic basis of one's design for living. A family's budget is a mirror of its values. Once the family's pattern of expenditures is established, whether by plan or by accident, it becomes an accurate indication of the things the particular family lives by. From the way the family uses its income, we can generally tell what it holds dear and what it holds cheap. An examination of family expenditures in the United States shows that the average family spends not more than 1 per cent of its total income for reading matter, as compared with 2 per cent for tobacco. The average family also spends 2 per cent of its income for shampoos, permanent waves, cosmetics, toilet articles, and other items of personal care. The traditional idea of tithing is 10 per cent, but the average American family contributes only 1

[1] National Resources Planning Board, *Family Expenditures in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), Tables 107–10.

per cent of its income to the church. Ten per cent or more, however, goes to the maintenance of an automobile in the middle-class family.[1] Data like these tell us a great deal about the values of American families.

Whether a given family chooses to spend 1 per cent or 5 per cent on reading matter, or to contribute 1 per cent or 10 per cent to the church, is perhaps a matter for the particular family to decide. Each family is entitled to its own values, provided they are in harmony with the standards of the group, and provided also that the family can afford them. Many budget books indicate that a certain percentage of the income is to be allotted for food, clothing, shelter, and so on. It must be recognized that these are average amounts, and are intended as suggestions only, and allowance must be made for variations in individual tastes and needs. White-collar workers are likely to pay more for clothes and housing than wage-earners of the same income class. College professors spend a larger percentage for entertaining, books, and travel than businessmen who have the same income to spend. The purpose of the budget is not to enforce an artificial uniformity, but to make possible a pattern of expenditures suited to the needs, tastes, and means of the individual family. If expenditures for one category of consumption are greatly out of line, there can be no objection so long as this is what the family wants and can afford, provided this expenditure is compensated for elsewhere in the budget, and the budget is balanced.

A budget is, then, a plan for making the most of one's income according to one's light. Unless the family plans its expenditures, and checks the expenditures to make certain that they conform to the plan, it may not be using its income as it would like. A budget is not just a record of expenditures; not just an epitaph to dead money. Nor does operating a budget mean that it is necessary to keep a detailed record of expenditures daily, as is done in business. In many marriages, money matters are handled successfully without continuous recording of minor expenditures, because these couples have become habituated to a satisfactory pattern of spending. Once the pattern has been established, it operates automatically and no longer requires close attention. The purpose of the budget is to validate the family's economic program and to make certain it is the program the

[1] For these and other data, see National Resources Planning Board, *op. cit.* The percentages are for the year 1935–36.

family wants and can afford. A plan need only be made, and an inventory need only be taken, during the early period of the marriage, and at such times as some major change occurs in the family's economic fortunes, its circumstances, or its values.

The psychological aspects of economic problems

Preceding paragraphs have detailed a number of economic problems of family life. The discerning reader will have noted that the emphasis has been placed on economic behavior, or the psychological aspects of economic phenomena, rather than on the purely material aspects of the standard of living. From the standpoint of marital happiness, what matters is the attitude taken toward economic situations and not the situations *per se*. Studies described earlier [1] show that extended unemployment and loss of income do not always threaten the solidarity of the family, but on the contrary in some cases strengthen the family morale. The same objective economic situation elicits two different types of response, because different individuals have different attitudes toward the same values or because other factors in the situation are different. Likewise the problems of who and how the money shall be managed are not just problems in family economics, but problems in human relations. A wife may resent the fact that she has to ask her husband for money when she needs it, not because he does not respond, for his response may be generous, but needing to ask him makes her feel inferior.

In our culture there is considerable emphasis on economic values, and most wives want their husbands to be an economic success. It is a matter of pride to a woman if her husband is successful financially, for she is then the wife of a socially prominent man and she shares his status. A wife may be so ambitious socially that she goads her husband and drives him beyond his depth. He may have little economic drive or capacity and his wife's ambition makes him unhappy. On the other hand, the husband is sometimes the inordinately ambitious one who devotes himself so wholeheartedly to his work that he neglects his family. His wife wants affection and companionship, but he is too busy being successful to recognize her needs. Two sets of wishes, then, have to be reconciled in marriage: the wish for success or recognition and the wish for response or affection. The training of men in our culture is toward the pole of ambition, while the

[1] Chapter 17.

training of women is toward the pole of affection. But there are many exceptions and variations from type. Not uncommon is the good family man who lacks economic drive and the successful professional woman who minimizes her affectional needs. Marriage brings together two persons with definite mental sets regarding economic behavior. If the marriage is to be a happy one, these mental sets must be harmonized.

The In-Laws

The economic problems of marriage in our culture are complicated by the fact that newly-weds are expected to establish a separate residence. In the earlier farming society, this was not the case. When a man married, his wife came to live with him in his parents' home. The farmhouse was large, so there was plenty of space for another person, or an addition to the house could easily be made, for there was plenty of land. The son before his marriage had helped his father on the farm and the father's need for his son's help did not lessen with the years, but rather increased as the father grew older. If there was plenty of land in a frontier country, the son might add to his holdings; if the holdings were limited and the number of sons large, some of them might be obliged to seek their fortunes away from home. But continued residence with one's parents after marriage was not uncommon, and was not thought to present any special problems. At present, children do not regularly depend on their parents for jobs after marriage and the economic opportunities open to them are often not in the same community. Hence we have the custom of separate residences and the idea that married children should not be dependent upon their parents or in-laws for support or direction.

Compared to the family system of the past, modern family organization emphasizes more the conjugal relation of husband and wife and less the relation of parent and child.[1] This contrast is dramatically revealed in the story [2] of a European woman living in India with a Muslim family into which her daughter has married. The writer begins her fascinating story by saying that if anybody had suggested to her that she would accompany her own daughter on her honeymoon, she would have thought him crazy, but this is exactly what

[1] For fuller treatment of the contrast between conjugal and consanguineous family organization, see Chapters 1 and 2.

[2] Hilda Wernher, *My Indian Family* (New York: The John Day Company, 1945).

happened. To her Muslim son-in-law, it was unthinkable that his wife's mother should not be a member of his immediate family, because he was an orphan and wanted her to take his mother's place. The family organization of the Muslims is of the extended variety, with more than two generations living in the same household. When a man marries he expects to remain with his mother and father, and his wife goes to live with her husband's family. The author reports that she was treated with far more respect in the East than in the West because she was a mother. Her son-in-law did not try to avoid her, but was anxious never to leave her out of any discussion or decision. At first he was hurt because she did not kiss him, though she was demonstrative with her daughter. The Indians interpreted this as a sign that she did not like her son-in-law, which was not the case. When she realized this misunderstanding and made amends, he was happy, for, as he put it, he now had a mother. When he and his wife had their first quarrel, he placed the issue before his mother-in-law and abided by her judgment. Suddenly the daughter died, and upon the mother was laid the burden of comforting her son-in-law. She learned, when only a week had passed, that it was her responsibility to find him another wife. This shocked her, especially the suddenness with which the matter was proposed, until she remembered the rôle she was supposed to play, a rôle quite different from that of the mother-in-law in the West.

The problem of the mother-in-law is a problem of the small, independent type of family characteristic of our culture, and is related to the phenomenon of "the empty nest." After years of living with mother and father in the parental home, the son or daughter at marriage leaves to establish a home of his or her own. The parents, after exercising authority for so long, are reluctant in many instances to relinquish control. Even if they have no interest in maintaining authority over their children, they have a desire to help their loved ones in the new experience. The parents have encountered many of the problems facing their children. They have had their experiences and perhaps have had their fingers burned, and are anxious that their children should not have to learn in the same hard way. Hence they are inclined to proffer advice, even when it is not solicited. Nowadays families tend to be small, while the length of life has been extended. If a woman marries at twenty-two and has two or three children by the time she is thirty years old, the children may grow up

and be married by the time the mother is fifty or so, after which she has perhaps ten or more years of the empty nest. This is a difficult time for many women, particularly if they have devoted themselves exclusively to their families and have not cultivated outside interests. In our culture, the father generally has occupational and other out-of-the-home interests, which may help to account for the fact that the father-in-law is not so often a problem as the mother-in-law. When there is in-law trouble, the husband usually complains about his wife's mother, and this is followed in point of frequency by the wife's objection to interference by her husband's mother. If the mother is widowed, separated from her husband, or unhappily mated, the chances that her in-laws will have difficulty with her are increased.

Our type of independent family organization functions best when the newly-weds are self-reliant. Young people sense this as they mature and insist on a large measure of self-determination. The rebellion of adolescent youth is a protest against the efforts of parents to stay the process of psychological weaning. Unless the child is emotionally dependent upon his parents, he recoils from undue interference by them when he marries. If a married man is more devoted to his mother than to his wife, if he looks to his mother for decisions regarding his domestic problems, and if he plays his mother off against his wife, he is probably too emotionally dependent upon his mother to have an affectional life apart from her. His mother need not be at hand. She may live a thousand miles away and never set her foot in her son's home — she may in fact not even be alive; yet she remains a constant source of trouble because she has molded her son in such a way that he cannot adjust to his wife except in terms of his relationship to his mother. He may have chosen his wife in the first place because she resembles his mother in some particular. The resemblance is, however, likely to be slight and superficial. He cannot have a satisfactory relationship to his wife when he measures her by his mother, and does not treat his wife as a distinct person with habits and values and needs of her own.

The root of the in-law problem is not always to be found in abnormal ties existing between mother and son. The mother may have only a normal affection for her son and may scrupulously avoid interfering with his marriage, yet her daughter-in-law may accuse her of meddling because she herself is hypersensitive and insecure, perhaps even paranoiac, and unequal to the normal competition the mother

offers for her husband's affection. These observations emphasize the cardinal importance of psychological factors in the relations of the married couple and their parents. The in-law adjustment, like the problem of sexual adjustment and the problem of financial management, turns out to be a function of the total personality adjustment of husband and wife.

Emotional Maturity

Our discussion so far has emphasized the point that marital problems, particularized as sexual, economic, or in-law problems, are often really personality problems, or problems of interpersonal relations, and have a common psychological core. Failure to recognize this fact is responsible for the frequent tendency to confuse superficial symptoms of marital maladjustment with the underlying causes. Thus, many writers list as causes of domestic discord such behavior as: infidelity, desertion, cruelty, chronic alcoholism, hasty marriage, nagging, and quarreling. The lists of such causes are often quite lengthy and miscellaneous, but inspection of them reveals that they are nearly always expressions of a common factor, namely, inadequate personality. Maladjusted marriages are mainly produced by maladjusted persons, and generally the essence of their maladjustment is that they have not grown up emotionally. This is the verdict of the American Institute of Family Relations, which maintains an extensive clinical service in Los Angeles. Asked whether they could supply frequency tables of the problems presented by their clients, they sent the following reply:

> We can't be of much help in regard to lists of symptoms because all of our counselors long since gave up trying to tabulate them. We have always felt that the tabulations of complaints published in case-work reports and the like — drunkenness, adultery, cruelty, interfering relatives, etc. — are of little value. They represent just what the client happens to think of at the time, or what the counselor suggests to him. Emotional immaturity and mere ignorance are responsible for most of the difficulties.[1]

There is considerable evidence that college students generally recognize the cardinal importance of wholesome personality for happy marriage. One investigation [2] of the attitudes of university students re-

[1] Letter from Paul Popenoe, Director, dated January 14, 1946.

[2] Ray E. Baber, *Marriage and the Family* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939) p. 149.

garding mate selection reports that 98 per cent of the young men and 96 per cent of the young women testified that under no circumstances would they "marry a person of unattractive disposition and personality." A similar study of six hundred students at the University of Wisconsin confirms the high rating given character and personality as factors in mate selection, as shown in Figure 121. Since students regard these factors so highly, it is curious that they should so often ignore them when they come to make their own marital choices. The reasons are doubtless complex, but outstanding is the fact that the emotion of love, like all strong feeling, distorts reality. Another explanation may be that imperfections of personality are after all very common, and since most persons marry, the chances of marrying someone who is emotionally defective are hardly negligible. Then, too, we perhaps understand in a general way the importance of the emotional factors, but are not always familiar with the symptoms of inadequacy, especially the less obvious, more subtle signs.

We may be helped to an understanding of emotional maturity by comparing it with other orders of maturity. A person is physiologically mature when he has achieved full skeletal and dental development, generally around the age of twenty-four. Some persons take longer to mature physically, and some never achieve full development, but remain infantile in their physical structure. Likewise, some persons are mentally mature and adequate. They have sufficient mental ability to enable them to take care of themselves and to master skills which give them a livelihood. Other persons, the lower classes of the feebleminded, do not have sufficient mental capacity to look after themselves and remain a charge upon others. There are various types of maturity. Our concern here is with emotional development which is distinct from physical and mental development, although related in various ways. A man may be physically mature and strong, he may be mentally alert and competent, he may be highly successful in his vocation and even be a pillar of society, yet remain emotionally infantile. He cannot say with Saint Paul,[1] "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things."

While there is no generally accepted standard of emotional maturity comparable to that used to measure, say, physical maturity, nevertheless certain essential criteria or earmarks may be identified. These

[1] I Corinthians 13:11.



FIGURE 12.1. FACTORS IN MATE SELECTION

Average rating of eighteen factors in mate selection by men and women students. Of these six hundred University of Wisconsin students, the women students emphasize economic considerations more than the men, while the men make more of good cooking, good housekeeping, and good looks. Each sex emphasizes factors for which the other sex is mainly responsible. From Reuben Hill, "Campus Values in Mate Selection," *Journal of Home Economics*, 37:557, November, 1945.

relate to a series of developmental transitions from childhood to adulthood. The child begins life dependent, egocentric, irresponsible; maturity consists in his becoming fully independent, altruistic, and responsible.[1]

From dependence to independence

The infant is wholly dependent upon his mother for food, warmth, protection, and affection. Since, except for her ministrations or those of a substitute, the child could not survive, let alone prosper, it is not surprising that he should become greatly attached to so wonderful a ministering angel.

In due course the normal child in a normal home enlarges his circle of friends by becoming attached to his father, brothers and sisters, relatives, playmates, neighbors, teachers, club leaders, and others with whom he comes into contact, and as a consequence his relationship to his mother is not his only emotional tie. But conditions are sometimes not normal, and the child fails to enlarge his affectional horizon. He may have limited opportunity to make contacts outside his family because of extended illness or because of the character of the neighborhood, or, more important still, because of the abnormal emotional demands that his mother makes because her marriage is in crisis. In these situations the danger is that he will overlearn his lessons of dependence and develop a fixation on his mother, so that all his life her wishes dominate him and he has no will independent of hers. Levy [2] has studied more carefully than anyone else a group of overprotecting mothers. These mothers who used the services of the Institute for Child Guidance in New York City had reduced their non-maternal rôles (as wife, friend, club member, and so on) to a minimum and devoted themselves almost exclusively to their children. Evidences of overprotection include the following: a mother of a twelve-year-old still butters his bread, gives him his bath and dresses him. Another child in his teens sleeps with his mother and is her constant companion in his waking hours. He does not play with other children. Still another mother moves into a house within a block of the school her child attends, so that she can keep him under close surveillance. She watches him as he leaves the house and enters school; at noon she ob-

[1] H. Crichton Miller, *The New Psychology and the Teacher* (New York: Seltzer, 1924); Frankwood E. Williams, *Adolescence: Studies in Mental Hygiene* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1930), chap. I: "What is an Adult?"

[2] David M. Levy, *Maternal Overprotection* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943).

serves him as he leaves the schoolhouse and follows him with her eye until he reaches home. These children are said to be of two types: (*a*) the wanted child who has an unusual developmental history — for example, the sickly child and the long-awaited only child; and (*b*) the unwanted child who is the victim of the mother's unconscious hostility, which sometimes results in compensatory overprotection. Some of these children are indulged by their mothers; others are dominated. The indulged child develops into a tyrant, undisciplined as to obedience, speech, food, and possessions. The dominated child becomes excessively shy and submissive. Levy thinks the resulting personality type depends on the inherited temperamental tendencies of the child rather than on the behavior of the mother, which he claims, in so far as he is able to observe, is the same for both types.

What has all this to do with happiness in marriage? Levy conducted follow-up studies of his overprotected children and found that they made poor adjustments in adolescence and adulthood. The dominated children became parasitic adults. They had difficulty in keeping jobs and in supporting themselves. They expected to be looked after by others and thought they should be shown special consideration. Those who had been indulged as children developed into highly egocentric adults. They were unhappy when not in the limelight. They complained about not being understood by their mates and about not getting a square deal. They were touchy and quarrelsome, and did not make good marital partners.

From the standpoint of emotional development, overprotection has its hazards, but so does underprotection too, especially when it means rejection of the infant by his parents. Investigation [1] has shown that the infant needs a long and uninterrupted experience of mothering by one individual. According to Ribble, the mother's touch actually improves the infant's breathing and nutrition. This prompts Ribble to posit the existence of an additional organic craving, "stimulus hunger," which requires "stimulus feeding." Failure to obtain such mothering she believes results in "psychological abortion," producing anxiety as well as deficient metabolism in the infant. Thumb-sucking and nail-biting may be symptoms. The normal emotional development of the child is, we see, imperiled by too little love. The child who has been denied love may grow up suspicious of others, unable either to give or receive love normally; or he may overcompensate

[1] M. A. Ribble, *The Rights of Infants* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943).

and become highly demonstrative in affection, but overplay the outward show at the expense of genuine inner feeling. In either case he lacks emotional balance and self-assurance.

From irresponsibility to responsibility

Another characteristic of the immature person is undependability or unreliability. Children often show a great lack of social responsibility, whether it pertain to keeping a confidence, fulfilling a promise, or performing their daily tasks. A child's test of whether to do or not to do whatever is expected of him is whether the activity does or does not give him pleasure; and the best time to do anything is at his own convenience. An emotionally mature person, on the other hand, realizes that the daily routine of living includes unpleasant chores that have to be done and that he had better do his share as expeditiously and as graciously as possible. He is not happy to shift to someone else's shoulders burdens which are legitimately his own.

Children have a limited sense of responsibility, and we forgive them because they are young, but many adults never behave any differently and make ineffectual husbands and wives, fathers and mothers. Rip Van Winkle may be cited as a prototype of the irresponsible husband who excels at loafing and drinking and at neglecting his family and other social responsibilities. Rip's domestic difficulties reach a climax when while hunting for big game he shoots the family's only cow, and his wife orders him out of the house.

Childish behavior occurs where the child grows up in an environment which offers little or no opportunity for the acquisition of a mature ego-ideal. There are places where irresponsibility is quite general, and a child who grows up in such a community becomes a shiftless adult because shiftlessness is the established pattern. Erskine Caldwell in his novels depicting certain classes of sharecroppers leads us to believe that they are generally derelict in their duty, and have little incentive or ambition because they work and live under tremendous handicaps in an environment which offers little hope for economic improvement. Jeeter Lester is not an isolated specimen, but rather the symbol of the great body of forlorn sharecroppers who live on the eroded lands along "Tobacco Road."

It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that parasitic behavior is limited to the lower economic classes, or even perhaps that it is relatively more common on the lower than on the higher economic levels.

Caldwell has also given us, in *A House in the Uplands*, a stark picture of Grady Dunbar, a plantation owner (not a sharecropper) who gambles away the last of his estate at a roadhouse operated by a gangster, and returns home, drunk, to carry on with the quadroons in the old slave cabins on his place, ignoring and insulting his beautiful and devoted wife, Lucyanne. Excessive gambling, drinking, and idleness are perhaps in some respects less serious types of behavior for the rich than the poor, since the other members of the wealthy household may not be economically dependent upon the irresponsible head, but the effect on personal relations may be as great. In fact, the effect on happiness may be greater because of the higher social expectations and standards of the middle and upper classes. On the lowest economic levels, irresponsible family behavior is often taken for granted and does not have a disorganizing effect.[1] The effect of the irresponsible behavior is to produce a type of family that is, to a marked degree, loosely organized, but not necessarily disorganized.

Where the environment encourages the idea that effort will bring a higher standard of living and a higher social status to the low-income classes, as it does in the cities, the poor are often characterized by unusual ambition, thrift, and self-sacrifice for the sake of their families. Jane Addams [2] has out of her personal experience given us a vivid picture of the devotion of immigrant parents to their families on the East Side of Chicago:

> Every tenement house contains women who for years spend their hurried days in preparing food and clothing and pass their sleepless nights in tending and nursing their exigent children, with never one thought for their own comfort or pleasure or development save as these may be connected with the future of their families. We all know as a matter of course that every shop is crowded with workingmen who year after year spend all of their wages upon the education and nurture of their children, reserving for themselves but the shabbiest clothing and a crowded place at the family table.
>
> "Bad weather for you to be out in," you remark on a February evening, as you meet rheumatic Mr. S. hobbling home through the freezing sleet without an overcoat. "Yes, it is bad," he asserts: "but I've walked to work all this last year. We've sent the oldest boy back to high school, you know," and he moves on with no thought that he is doing other than fulfilling the ordinary lot of the ordinary man.

[1] In an earlier chapter (Chapter 7) it was shown that the widespread irresponsibility of the Negro male in the family of the southern plantation does not disrupt the family.

[2] Jane Addams, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909), pp. 31–32.

The intense self-sacrifice and devotion to duty of some of these immigrant parents possibly represent an unconscious attempt to satisfy the guilt feelings they have over their straitened circumstances, with resulting overcompensation. In so far as they behave compulsively, these parents are not fully mature, since they are not responsible for their behavior but are acting automatically in response to an irresistible urge which they do not recognize, let alone understand. But whatever the motivation, their behavior is *socially* responsible behavior because it is concerned with fulfilling the obligations of parenthood as our society defines such obligations.

Neglect of domestic and other duty is an obvious manifestation of irresponsibility. A less evident, but no less significant aspect is neglect of the truth, or, more exactly, the confusion of fact and fantasy. We see this most clearly where the confusion is extreme, as in the hallucinations and delusions of the insane, but mental and emotional differences are matters of degree only, not differences in kind, and the thinking of the normal person is also more or less colored by his beliefs and wishes. This is especially true of the young and the immature. Little children like to people their environment with fairies, and some even invent imaginary playmates. Many an adult carries a rabbit's foot for good luck, or wishes on a star, or uses a ouija board to foretell his future. Only when the fantasies so dominate behavior that normal social adjustment is difficult or impossible do we regard the person as psychopathic, but the unrealistic habits of thinking of normal persons may occasion no little difficulty, in and out of the family circle.

The writer once saw a painting that a college sophomore had produced in response to her psychology professor's suggestion that she express her feelings freely. The medium was the projective technique of finger painting. The sketch showed a girl and a boy strolling hand in hand up a flower-strewn path to a little white cottage at the top of a hill. Here is an adolescent's conception of marriage which has special cogency for our purposes because it is a typical adolescent romantic conception. Students of the family identify this student's picture as a symbol of the romantic complex, a widespread phenomenon of our time. Because of circumstances detailed at the beginning of this chapter, love has become the central cohesive factor in marriage in our society. Youth has probably always yearned for affection in marriage, but this desire becomes especially acute when the stabil-

ity of marriage so largely depends on love as it does at present. The repressive Puritan tradition regarding sex in which our youth are reared doubtless accentuates the adolescent's longing for romance. The conscious wish for love is strong, and the unconscious even more compulsive, but how does one get love, and what does one have when one has it? According to the immature mind, the experience of love comes spontaneously. Anyone who wishes to fall in love can do so. You must be careful, however, to fall in love with the right person who will reciprocate your love. He is waiting somewhere for you, and you have but to find him. Your love for each other is all that matters, for love conquers all: marked differences in age, religion, wealth, and education, poor health and heredity, the objections of parents — these considerations and others may be dismissed if you have true love, for love conquers all. Adolescents dote on love somewhat as little children dote on fairies, believing that all the perplexing difficulties of life may be dissipated by wafting the magic wand of love.

Such is the romantic myth, but what is the reality? Love has remarkable properties, but it does not emerge full-blown from the brow of Jove. It is not to be had just by wishing for it, or merely by uttering the magical formula: "I love you." The tyranny of words [1] is that they are often taken to be the very things they only symbolize. Affection is a habit, and like all habit has to be cultivated.[2] Some persons have their emotional development so twisted by their early experiences that they cannot relate themselves in a normal manner to an adult of the opposite sex. But even when affectional development is normal, love alone is scarcely a sufficient basis for enduring marriage. Like all habits, it must be reinforced, else it weakens and ultimately disappears. In a happy marriage, love is reinforced by mutual understanding, reassurance, and support.

Can the romantic attitudes of individuals be measured? It certainly would be highly desirable to be able to do so, and Gross [3] has made a preliminary attempt to construct a scale for this purpose. He has examined representative motion pictures, popular magazine and newspaper articles, popular songs, radio dramas, and the like, with a view to discovering a consistent body of material which could be used for

[1] Stuart Chase, *The Tyranny of Words* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938).

[2] This idea is developed more fully in Chapter 12.

[3] Llewellyn Gross, "A Belief Pattern Scale for Measuring Attitudes Toward Romanticism," *American Sociological Review*, IX:463-72, October, 1944.

test purposes. The test consists of eighty items, presumably evenly divided between statements of romantic belief and statements of fact, and has a reliability coefficient of .66, which is as high as that of many well-known personality tests. Is the test valid? Does it actually measure what it purports to measure? All personality traits are difficult to measure, especially traits like romantic attitudes which have large unconscious components. The only norms available at the time of writing are those for samples of trained psychologists who, as expected, gave realistic responses to the scale, high-school adolescents who gave romantic responses, and a group of college students who occupy an intermediate position. After the test has been further standardized, it would be interesting to use it to measure the relation of romanticism to marital adjustment.

From uninhibited self-expression to self-control

This section on emotional maturity as it relates to family adjustment will be concluded with a brief discussion of a third aspect of the problem, namely, the attainment of emotional control. Nearly everyone concedes the need of self-control for orderly, effective group life, family life included. Cannon [1] has shown that unchecked emotionality is injurious even to health. We recognize, moreover, that self-control is generally a function of maturity. The infant gives direct and immediate expression to his feelings by such behavior as screaming, kicking, demanding food, and voiding. He has no idea of containing himself and has an easy irritability. The process of socialization consists in his learning to manage his bodily tensions and emotions. Emotional and impulsive behavior is mediated by the subcortical regions, with the intellect subordinate or lacking. This is demonstrated by the ready emotional behavior of persons who are under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or subject to epileptic seizures where the individual "loses his head." Socialization, on the neurological side, involves the progressive use of the higher centers of the brain.

Examples of undisciplined emotional behavior on the part of married men and women, even the most distinguished, are not difficult to find. For instance, history has recorded the marriage of Abraham Lincoln as one made tragic by the jealous and shrewish conduct of his

[1] W. B. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 2d ed., 1934).

wife, Mary Todd.[1] She was sensitive about their difference in height, and never permitted a photograph to be taken of them as a couple. She often disparaged her husband's ability as a public speaker, and in the presence of others called his speeches the worst she had ever listened to in her life. Up till her time the established practice at the Inaugural Ball was for the President to lead the grand march with another woman on his arm, followed by his wife on the arm of another man. Mary Todd decreed that she must be the one to walk beside the President, and it was so ordered. After the receptions at the White House, she frequently berated the President for having talked to this woman or that. In the spring of 1864 she accompanied the President to City Point for a visit with General Grant's army and learned that since fighting was soon to begin, the wives of army officers had been ordered to the rear; that is, all the wives except the wife of General Griffin, who had, it was said, "a special permit from the President." On learning this, Mrs. Lincoln exploded and demanded to know if Mrs. Griffin had seen the President alone. The situation was smoothed over by General Meade, who explained it was the Secretary of War and not the President who had given permission to Mrs. Griffin. The next day it developed that the order retiring wives to the rear did not apply to the wife of General Ord as well, and, mounted on a horse, Mrs. Ord suddenly found herself riding alongside President Lincoln, with Mrs. Lincoln and Mrs. Grant riding in an ambulance just behind them. Mrs. Lincoln became furious, upbraided Mrs. Ord, and then Mrs. Grant when the latter tried to smooth things over. Insults and epithets were hurled at Mrs. Ord before a crowd of Army officers, reducing Mrs. Ord to tears; and that evening at a dinner given by President and Mrs. Lincoln to the General Staff, Mrs. Lincoln horrified the group by openly suggesting that General Ord was unfit for his command and ought to be relieved.

An irascible and jealous disposition lays a heavy strain on marriage and tries it sorely. For twenty-two years, Abraham Lincoln bore, with an expression of pain and sadness but with quiet dignity, his wife's repeated and often public attacks upon him. His unhappiness, of course, cannot be ascribed solely to his wife's irascibility. He had misgivings about marrying Mary Todd which at one point caused him to ask that their engagement be broken. Lincoln

[1] Carl Sandburg, *Mary Lincoln: Wife and Widow* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932).

was endowed with a melancholic temperament, and had doubts not only about marrying Mary Todd, but about whether he ought to marry at all. Lincoln's personality may have contributed to his marital difficulties, but it is clear that Mary Todd was a self-centered woman whose emotionally immature behavior kept her marriage in a turmoil.

Although emotional instability on the part of husband or wife, or both, is a negative factor, it must not be thought to make a happy marriage impossible. Lack of control is only one factor among many, and may be outweighed by a host of positive factors. An illustration is furnished by the marriage of Enrico Caruso, regarded by many music critics as one of the world's greatest tenors, who at the age of forty-five wed Dorothy Benjamin, twenty-one years old. Caruso had the impetuous temperament generally ascribed to artists. On one occasion, described by his wife,[1] old friends had taken them to dinner. The dining room was large, and Dorothy became a bit confused with all the adulation bestowed on her famous husband. He asked her to dance with him and in her confusion she refused, whereupon he asked their hostess. The host in turn invited Dorothy to dance and when she accepted, Caruso became furious, interrupted the dance, and returned home with her. At home there was a scene and Dorothy began to cry, whereupon Caruso repented to such an extent that he beat his head against a wall, hurting himself. Dorothy pleaded with him to stop, bathed his wound, and put him to bed. Despite this and other emotional upheavals, the marriage is described as a happy one. A reading of the account shows there were many favorable factors in the relationship. Caruso had an intensely affectionate nature and a great capacity for the enjoyment of living that offset his low boiling point. Dorothy was not volatile, although immature in other ways. And they richly satisfied each other's basic needs; his for affection and admiration, and hers for security, affection, and social recognition.

A promising instrument for measuring the control factor in emotional maturity is the Rorschach ink-blot test,[2] particularly the color cards. A so-called pure and undiluted color reaction, recorded as C, is the Rorschach test's indication of uninhibited feeling, an infantile response. The average healthy adult gives few pure C reactions, whereas schizophrenics who are "slaves to their feelings" generally record a relatively large number of C reactions. In the CF response,

[1] Dorothy Caruso, *Enrico Caruso* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945).
[2] Samuel J. Beck, *Rorschach's Test* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1945).

color still predominates, but is moderated somewhat by attention to form (F). This is said to be a less impulsive type of reaction than pure C, but still self-centered. A much higher developmental level is represented by FC, where color is subordinated to form. The latter type of response shows that the individual has a capacity for empathy, or fellow-feeling, and therefore masters his own feelings out of consideration for others. According to Beck, the capacity for empathy seems to be established at about mid-adolescence.

Personality Factors in Happy Marriages

Sometimes students complain that books on marriage and the family dwell too much on the unhappy and unsuccessful side of domestic experience, giving a pessimistic picture which is decidedly discouraging. A survey made in the nineteen-thirties reported that more space was given to divorce than to any other single topic in the teaching of family relations,[1] whereas young people are much more interested in promoting successful marriage than in preventing divorce. This may be a valid criticism, but the situation is understandable, for a disorganized family is more striking and newsworthy than a smoothly functioning one, and more readily commands our attention. Moreover, it is always easier to avoid error when we know what it is and what caused it. Mankind has a strong liking for the dramatic, and he also learns a great deal from it.

In this book, however, an effort has been made to accentuate the positive. The traits that make for unhappiness have been presented in conjunction with those making for happiness, and the contrast serves a useful purpose in sharpening our perception of the differential factors involved. A preceding chapter (Chapter 14) described in some detail the personality traits of happy and unhappy husbands and wives, as revealed by research. The present chapter has interpreted these traits in terms of the more general psychological categories of emotional maturity and stability.

A husband who is secure under his own skin is equipped to contribute to his wife's happiness. He can relate himself fully to her and be a source of strength. He does not make one-sided demands because of his own abnormal needs like a parasite sapping the strength of its host. A mature, stable person is in a position to add something to his mate's development.

[1] Paul Popenoe, "Trends in Teaching Family Relations," *Marriage and Family Living*, VIII:36, May, 1946.

Empathy

Husband and wife are constructively related to each other if each is able to place himself sympathetically and imaginatively in the rôle of the other and to understand how the other feels and thinks. Mature persons are likely to fall in love with someone congenial; that is, someone with whom they have a great deal in common. They do not marry to satisfy some abnormal psychological need; they are adequate themselves and so are likely to look for someone who is companionable. But even companionable husbands and wives may differ in some of their cherished aspirations, in which case happiness is enhanced if they can appreciate these differences. This may require considerable effort, and call for understanding as well as affection. The ability to put oneself in the place of another, and to imagine the feeling which another has, is called by the psychologist, *empathy*. T. V. Smith refers to it as "kinaesthetic appreciation."

Facilitation

For a husband to know how his wife thinks and feels, and why, is to bring tolerance to the relationship. If there is a difference of outlook on some question, say, religion, merely to emphasize the difference is to foster hostility. But the process of considering his wife's religious convictions sympathetically, of seeking to clarify them and to know precisely what they are, and especially to know how they were arrived at and what they mean, is likely to result in his having greater respect for them.

It is possible, of course, that greater familiarity with a particular set of values may lead to greater dislike of those values and to a feeling that one cannot honestly support them. But it is not reasonable to suppose that two persons who are emotionally mature, and who have enough affection for each other to get married, will be found very often not to have values and aspirations which they can support, even if they do not share them. In happy marriages, one is impressed by the way husband and wife not only understand each other, but help each other to realize themselves, especially in regard to the values they cherish most. In this way, husband and wife become a source of mutual support, allies who facilitate each other's development, not simply neutral observers who are indifferent to each other's welfare, or even enemies who set obstacles in each other's path.

A highly dramatic account of how a young woman identified her-

self with the career of a young man, and how she shared and sustained and promoted that career is given in *Immortal Wife*,[1] the story of Jessie Benton and her marriage to John C. Frémont.

There is a scene in the early part of the book in which Jessie's mother tries to dissuade her from marrying Frémont, in order to spare her the kind of stormy life of politics that the mother has known as the wife of a United States Senator. She confides that the public, controversial life in Washington has always been obnoxious to her, brought up as she was to delight in the quiet and tranquil life of the plantation. She tells Jessie she had a premonition that Thomas Benton's way of life could never be hers, and that was why she refused to marry him for six years. To him, politics was the breath of life; to her it was suffocation.

Jessie replies that she is like her father — ambitious, unafraid of conflict. She loves John Frémont and feels he will leave his mark on history, and she wants to be a part of that struggle and that contribution. They are married, and for fifty years she plans, works, shares, and suffers with him as a partner in his exploits, first as an explorer of the uncharted West and as a leader in the wresting of California from Mexico; then as the country's first candidate for the presidency on the Republican ticket; then as a general of the Army during the War Between the States; later as a man of wealth, and finally as a bankrupt failure. At the age of seventy, when he had made and lost a fortune, it was Jessie who proposed that he write his memoirs. It was she who went to New York and arranged with the publishers for a contract, wrote twenty articles about explorers and exploration to earn the money needed to move the family to Washington so that he could be near the archives his writing required; and it was she who worked daily from seven to six, with time out only for meals, taking down his words in longhand. And when this venture proved financially unsuccessful, it was Jessie who found a way for them to return to their home in California.

There is one incident that occurred rather early in John Frémont's hectic career that illustrates especially well Jessie Benton's rare devotion to her husband's interests. Shortly after his marriage, Frémont was sent by the government on an expedition to the South Pass, regarded by many as the most important mission since the expedition of Lewis and Clark. The success of this mission resulted in a

[1] Irving Stone, *Immortal Wife* (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1944).

second important assignment. He was on his way when the War Department discovered that he had taken a howitzer cannon along on a peaceful, scientific survey, and ordered him to relinquish his command and return at once to Washington. A copy of the letter reached Jessie at her home, and she realized that if the original should reach her husband before he started across the trail, he would have to obey the order and his career would be jeopardized. She determined, therefore, on her own initiative, to send a special messenger on horseback to her husband, urging him not to delay another day, but to trust her and start at once. He did so, and did not learn of the government order until his return, triumphant, as the popular hero of America.

Generosity

If one examines marriages characterized by conspicuously good adjustments, one is impressed, not only by the fact that mates support each other, but also by the way in which they do so. A trait which looms large in these marriages is generosity, expressed in the countless practical details of everyday living, and not just in money matters. By generosity we mean doing more than is required or expected of us. If, as the Scriptures say, a man compels you to walk with him one mile, and you go with him a second, that is generosity.

We usually think of money when we think of generosity, perhaps because so many of the values of our culture are expressed in material terms. A man who is generous with his money where his wife is concerned may urge her to add a complete ensemble of hat, shoes, gloves, and accessories when she is considering the purchase of a coat. But if she is not interested in clothes for herself, but is greatly concerned with, perhaps, the welfare of a mission school in China, then, if he spends his money on a new coat for her and brings it home as a surprise, and if this sort of behavior is characteristic, he may be a generous husband, but not an intelligent one, because he is not supporting his wife's interest which is to get funds for that mission school. His generosity would be more effective from the standpoint of his relations with his wife if he turned it to her missionary interests, even if he did not fully approve of them. A husband known to the writer is an agnostic in religion and his wife is an orthodox Baptist, active in the church. She was appointed to a committee assigned to raise money for new church pews. When he heard of the endeavor, he gave her a check for twice the quota which had been set for individual

donors. If that was his wife's interest, he wanted to support it, in full measure.

Generosity is a function of particular situations, and many a husband who is generous with his money is niggardly with other things, like time and praise. He may have more money than he knows what to do with, and it is an easy thing to write a check. His wife may not lack money or the things money can buy, but she may be lonely and crave his companionship. His work makes heavy demands upon him and does not afford him much leisure. But if he is concerned with his wife's needs, he will try to find more occasions when he can be with her. He may arrange to keep his evenings free of business affairs so that he can devote them to his family.

Generosity means sacrifice, sometimes very great sacrifice. O. Henry has written a story,[1] generally regarded as one of his best, around this theme of the sacrificial character of true devotion. The story concerns a young married couple of limited financial means. The Christmas season is approaching and Della resolves to give Jim a gold chain for his watch which is an heirloom and about the only thing of value he owns. She has no money, but she has a luxuriant head of hair which reaches below her waist. She sells her hair to a wigmaker and buys the watch chain, only to find that Jim has sold his watch in order to buy a pair of beautiful combs for her hair.

Generosity is a virtue in marriage, especially when practiced by both husband and wife. If one of the two is generous and the other not, the stage may be set for exploitation, the ungenerous one getting all that there is to get and giving little or nothing in return. Marriage involves two persons with equal claims to realization of their life purposes. But if the husband is dominant, his interests may have the exclusive right of way and his wife's interests may be ignored. She may consecrate herself to his purposes and he may not reciprocate. If his interests are also her interests, and she derives full satisfaction from supporting him, no damage is done. But if her husband's monopolistic demands mean that large and significant areas of her life are ignored, she may carry through life a deep sense of frustration and dissatisfaction. There are many marriages in which only one of the mates is satisfied with the relationship, or in which one member experiences appreciably more happiness than the other. In the happiest marriages, the happiness is mutual because the devotion is reciprocal

[1] *The Gift of the Magi*.

Success in marriage is the center of happiness for most people. The young person who recognizes the problems he faces, not only in selecting a mate, but in establishing a family which functions harmoniously throughout his lifetime, is fortunate indeed. This book has furnished information which may become the basis of insight. If it helps young people to achieve happiness in family life, it will have served its purpose.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is the family still good for? Describe the basic changes in the family during the past two centuries. Indicate whether you believe the family has gained or lost ground and why.
2. Is mutual affection a sufficient basis for enduring marriage? Is there more affection, or less, between married couples now than formerly?
3. How is it possible to have, before marriage, accurate and adequate knowledge about the affectional development of the person one is considering marrying?
4. How much money is needed in order to be happily married?
5. What arguments not presented in the text can you advance for or against the gainful employment of married women?
6. What is meant by the statement: "A family's budget is a mirror of its values"? Illustrate, using cases.
7. What emphases in our culture relating to economic values facilitate marital adjustment? Hamper adjustment?
8. How is the in-law problem a function of our type of family organization?
9. What distinction may be drawn between symptoms and causes of family problems? Illustrate.
10. How would you describe the emotionally mature person?
11. What are the elements of reality, and the elements of fantasy, in the romantic ideology of our time?
12. What is the significance of the observation that affection is a habit?
13. Why was the marriage of the Carusos happy and that of the Lincolns not, when both had the common factor of emotional immaturity in at least one member?
14. What is empathy; how is it developed; and what is its relation to marital adjustment?
15. How is generosity related to marital happiness?

TOPICS FOR REPORTS

1. The rôle of affection in the choice of a mate in colonial New England.
2. Psychological differences between the sexes.
3. Trends and problems in the employment of married women.
4. Types of family budgets.
5. The in-law taboo in primitive society.
6. Criteria of emotional maturity.
7. Gross's Scale for Measuring Attitudes Toward Romanticism.
8. The Rorschach ink-blot test as a measure of emotional control.

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