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PERSONALITY AND CULTURE IN
EASTERN EUROPEAN POLITICS

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Personality and Culture in Eastern European Politics

by

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A POLICY SCIENCES BOOK

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I

INTRODUCTION

THROUGHOUT MANY CENTURIES, the area between the Baltic and the Mediterranean has remained the center of an unending struggle between the Eastern and the Western world, and a crossroads of conflicting cultures, religions, and political and economic systems. Such a situation has made Eastern Europe a particularly important "laboratory" for the study of intercultural, interpersonal and power relationships. Eastern Europe has been also a standing challenge to social scientists to find ways to stabilize a "problem-area" whose upheavals, convulsions and warfare have often spread far beyond its borders, and have twice in the recent past inflamed the whole world.

Soon after its conquest by the Roman legions, in the first century A.D., this part of Europe became the battlefield of a conflict between Hellenization and Romanization. Then, when the Roman Empire was divided into its eastern and western parts, in the fourth century A.D., Eastern Europe became a contested region between Byzantium and Rome. Then, when the Christian Church split into two branches, the Eastern and the Western, this area became the heart of the strife between Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Christianity. That struggle took on a political, as well as cultural, aspect that lasted many centuries and is not yet ended.

After the fall of Constantinople, in the fifteenth century, and even before that event, Mohammedanism and Christianity fought a battle for the control of Eastern Europe that lasted until the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the twentieth century. With the rise of modern nationalism in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Pan-Slavism entered this arena and engaged with Pan-Germanism in a contest that only sharpened the age-old antagonisms. In the present day, the clash between Soviet totalitarian socialism and Western liberalism is nothing but a new form of an old

struggle that has ravaged Eastern Europe for two thousand years.

In the course of this millennial strife, any ascending group in the urban centers undertook to spread its ideology, its culture, and its political control to the surrounding country, to the farming folk in the valleys and the herdsmen in the prairies and mountains. The mosaic of ethnic groups and nations which have been formed in this way inherit from the past a host of conflicting claims, outlooks and aspirations. It is this social heritage that is primarily responsible for the internal strife, disorders, conspiracies and revolutions, as well as for the international tensions and warfare, which have characterized the centuries of social and political development in this part of the world. As a result of this trend of events, many states and empires have been formed and dissolved, a situation affecting the course of history not only in this area but in the rest of the world as well. The same process of political and social change is still taking place in our own days, as is manifested in the rapid sovietization of this part of Europe and in its clash with the Western world.

Since the economic techniques of the countries of Eastern Europe are still predominantly agricultural and pastoral, and since between sixty and eighty per cent of its population still lives in small rural communities, rural strata play an important role, not only in the economic development of these countries, but in their cultural and political growth as well. It is for this reason that the interrelations of the three basic structural elements of the countries of Eastern Europe—the herdsmen, the peasantry and the urban strata—appear to be of primary importance in the understanding of the events in that part of the world. The actions and motivations of these three main cultural agents are studied in the following pages through the analysis of cultures, social structures, dominant personality types, religious and political ideologies, external pressures, and the rise and collapse of political elites and states. Moreover, since this is a study of society as an historical and cultural continuum in the process of change, both historical records and ethnological field studies are used as sources of material.

Detailed field studies have been conducted on the culture, personality development and political role of the sheepraisers and warriors in the Dinaric mountains, which are located

between the Morava River and the Adriatic Sea. In the same manner, studies have been made of the culture, personality development and political role of the Zadruga plowmen in the valleys and plains between the Drava and Sava rivers. Both historical sources and comparative ethnological studies indicate that these two societies, the Dinaric and the Zadruga, well represent the two main types of migrations that flooded Eastern Europe from the first centuries of the Christian era up to the end of the Middle Ages.

The Zadruga culture is closely related to the culture which existed among the Slav farming folk in the marshy plains of Polesie at the beginning of the Christian era, and which was spread by these soil cultivators throughout Eastern Europe. The Dinaric culture, on the other hand, is fundamentally identical with the culture and social organization of the Ural-Altaic sheepraisers and horsebreeders who invaded Europe in a series of waves of conquest in the course of the Middle Ages. These two contrasting types of culture and social organization have preserved themselves until today, in a greater or lesser degree, among the peasants and the herdsmen in the rural areas throughout Eastern Europe.

In the study of urban strata, and of the formation and dissolution of political elites and dominant classes, as well as in the study of political ideologies, conclusions and generalizations were reached on the basis of a comparative analysis of the historico-political development of a number of nations in Eastern Europe, from Poland to Greece. Special attention was given to the study of the effects of personality and culture on power in the Balkans, since the interrelations between men of arms and men of the soil, and the resulting processes of social change, can today be observed in their original form in this area where the five hundred years of Ottoman rule have extended the Middle Ages to our own times.

In the light of our analysis of the interplay of politics, personality and culture, what is to be said about the strategy of peace and freedom in Eastern Europe? No doubt, the most important result of this inquiry is to identify some of the principal insecurity-producing factors whose control is essential to the reduction of political conflict. Failure to cope successfully with the basic factors will keep alive a vortex of discord which has complicated European and

world politics for many centuries. It is not enough to prescribe the compulsory unification of Eastern Europe by the Soviet-centered or the America-centered world. Attempts on either side to impose a fixed framework by force imperils the precarious peace now prevailing, not only by running the risk of World War III, but by adopting an internal program which keeps intact many of the factors which have so long fostered violence and despotism in Eastern Europe.

Among the internal factors which sustain destructive forms of human relationship are the power-seeking personalities whose accentuation of power reflects, and in turn perpetuates, the values and many of the ideologies and techniques of Dinaric society. Insecurity of life and property, despotic local and state organization, exposure to hostile and arbitrary family environments, and to a family discipline constantly alternating between the extremes of harshness and of indulgence, favor the development of a malevolent, deceitful and disorderly view of the universe, and an emotionally unbalanced, violent, rebellious and power-seeking personality, together with tense interpersonal and cultural relationships, and extreme political instability. This herdsman-brigand-warrior-police ideal furnished a program for the conquerors of urban centers and of the surrounding peasantry. The contrasting type of personality formation accentuated the humanistic values of Zadruga society. The wide diffusion of political power, personal freedom and economic security, combined with exposure to happy family life and a mild, but reasonable, just and firm family discipline, favored an optimistic, peaceful, just and well-ordered conception of the world, an emotionally well-balanced, non-violent and power-indifferent personality, and smooth and harmonious interpersonal and intellectual relations.

Some of the power-seeking personalities who seized control of local urban areas learned to consolidate their rule by propagating a religious, nationalistic or party ideology. The outcome has been a patchwork of ideological patterns throughout Eastern Europe, since some patterns were encouraged by the great aggregations of power or cultural influence marginal to the region. A further source of past and present ideologies has been the tension between peasant, herdsman and urbanite. No sooner has an official system of doctrine been imposed from an urban center than recurring

accumulations of discontent lead to the revival of old faiths, or heighten receptivity to new and ideologically differentiating links with fancied or real liberators and protectors.

A further complication is the tendency to meet seemingly invincible power by withdrawing entirely from the world of politics, often taking up religious and supernatural rites and dogmas which legitimize passivity. Strong tendencies toward political quietism, as well as toward political unrest, create difficulties for ruling élites. As a means of stimulating a sense of solidarity and of consolidating the shifting sands of internal support, the rulers encourage "border incidents" and war scares, and connive at plot and counterplot calculated to sustain continual pressure toward political integration around the standards of the ruling minority. Where the Partisans have operated in recent years, the disinclination of peasants and urbanites to fight has manifested itself in many ways. Among the Catholics, in particular, there is much evidence of religious piety, and of superstitious belief in miraculous liberation from current oppressors. But there is also a tendency toward open revolt in the form of guerrilla activities or subversive movements whenever the ruling clique appears open to attack. Hence, the compensatory militancy and recklessness of the Partisan chiefs.

Our analysis reveals where the policy of "containing" Russia is peculiarly vulnerable. We heartily endorse the assumption that the forcible expansion of the Soviet Union needs to be held in check while we work to strengthen the enduring bases of peaceful cooperation and freedom. But apart from constant and deliberate incitement from Moscow, provocations are also spontaneously (i.e., locally) generated in many of the border zones between the United States and the Russia-centered regions. Some of the local trigger-happy puppets are inclined to assume a crusading zeal that may surpass the intentions of their masters, get out of control, and endanger and indeed upset the peace.

Only by profound structural and ideological transformations can the turbulence of Eastern Europe be brought to an end. So far as economic institutions are concerned, enough alterations have been made in the traditional structure of Zadruga society to generate deep feelings of insecurity, and to jeopardize the humanistic outlook once overwhelmingly characteristic of peasant culture and per-

sonality. The generous, peaceable, democratic elements are being undermined by the power-seekers, and indeed are in danger of being more or less completely transmuted into those grasping, imperious types whom H. G. Wells castigated in his autobiography as the "rats."

The attempt to impose unity and order by consolidating a chain of garrison-prison states holds little hope of security and peace, and no hope of freedom. The states dominated by warriors and policemen give full rein to the traditional ideals of Dinaric culture, and their condition presages an era of acute conflict as compulsory measures are invented and adapted to the problems of Eastern Europe. Any attempt to introduce forcible collectivization on the Russian plan will intensify the existing antagonisms throughout the "green belt," and lead to years of tragedy. Given present-day technology, it is not feasible to transform the whole of Eastern Europe into a maze of factory towns and garden suburbs. Efforts in this direction, instigated by the planning center at Moscow, and accompanied by forced labor and low wages, would increase rather than relieve existing insecurities.

The "cockpit of Europe" is in need of an all-inclusive framework of order in which there can be brought into existence peaceful (and piecemeal) transformations that will accelerate development toward increasing internal security and human decency. Let us postulate, for instance, that after critical years of chronic fear of war, America-centered and Russia-centered states begin once more to cooperate with one another, and that this cooperation takes the form of more trade, investment, travel, study and migration. Such a development would signify that the most influential elements in both state-aggregates are convinced that they have more to gain by such cooperation than by isolation and war. This can occur only as the rulers and the public in both camps come to believe themselves secure internally. On its side, the American world must adopt the measures necessary to the maintenance of high levels of productive employment. The Russians, in turn, will need to give up the expectation that "capitalism" will inevitably crash down upon them from internal crises of mass unemployment, and they will have to take measures toward increasing internal security by raising the standard of living and the level of personal

freedom and human dignity. With more internal and external security, greater freedom in the form of political democratization and decentralization can be permitted, and social institutions can be allowed to evolve with little regard for the stringencies of central power.

The favorable adjustment of the problems of Eastern Europe depends, therefore, upon a general settlement which will tilt the global equilibrium toward peace and freedom, and away from war and despotism. In the meanwhile, it is crucially important to recognize the factors which are local to Eastern Europe, and which must be skillfully evaluated and controlled if realization of a general settlement is not to be rendered impossible. The menacing factors are deeply imbedded in the structure of personality and culture throughout the entire Eastern zone. In the long run, our aim is to remodel these destructive patterns of life in harmony with the aspirations of all who stand for an organization of the world community in which there shall be universal safety, abundance, and decency.

II

THE POWER-SEEKER IN DINARIC SOCIETY

Family Organization—Parent-child and Sibling Relations—Emotional Instability—Violence—Deceit and Distrust—Blood Vengeance—Bandits and Heroes—Position of Women—Marriage—Sworn Brotherhood and God-Parenthood—Beliefs and Hallucinations—Social Differentiation—Tribal Background

Family Organization

THE BASIC economic and social institution of the Dinaric sheepraisers is the *kuća* (the house), a joint household which may consist of a number of married brothers and cousins and all their descendants. The *kuća* is ruled by the *starješina* (head elder), the oldest male of the *kuća*, known also as *domaćin* (the home-man). If this family group numbers about twenty or more people, it is known as *velika kuća* (the great house). Most Dinaric *kućas*, however, consist only of two grandparents, their unmarried children, and the families of their married sons, and it may have up to ten or more members. There are also households composed of only one biological family, that is, a single couple and their unmarried offspring, known as *inokosna kuća* (the single house).

In the eastern part of the Dinaric area, the *kućas* are located high in the mountain valleys upon isolated open spaces surrounded by thick forests. As a rule, the nearest *kuća* is a mile or more away, often on the other side of the mountain. There is practically no contact with neighbors, and each Dinaric household must depend, to a great extent, upon itself for its livelihood and protection. Since there is little agriculture in this part of the Dinaric area,¹ the family is dependent upon nearby crossroad market places for many of the necessities of life. Here they may exchange

¹ They sow some rye and oats, seldom maize or wheat.

smoked meats, cheese, candles, fats and handmade wooden implements for food, clothing, kitchen utensils, and farm implements.²

In the western part of the Dinaric area, in the hinterland of the Adriatic Sea, which is characterized by rugged limestone *karst*, the settlements tend to be located lower in the mountain valleys, where one finds hollow-like meadows. On these narrow meadows it is possible to cultivate the land on a small scale; potatoes and maize are the chief crops. The few small plains interspersed within this rugged terrain are almost worthless for agriculture, because for a large part of the year they are inundated by floods. As there are no forests here to help regulate the rainfall, the region suffers from an alternation of floods and droughts. Both pastoral and horticultural economy is limited, and people often suffer from hunger.³

Each *kuća* makes its living chiefly from herds and land collectively owned by its members. This common property, together with agricultural implements, is known as the *očevina* (the father's heritage) and can not be alienated. Selling the *očevina* is considered a grave offense against community mores.⁴ In addition to the collective property, each member of the *kuća* can own private pieces of land, small herds of livestock, or other personal property.

The *starješina* governs the *kuća* as an absolute ruler until his death. He can be removed from power only under exceptional circumstances, such as physical or mental disability, or obvious or notorious misrule. Even in such instances, however, it is expected that he himself will turn over the control of family affairs to the next oldest male member.⁵

After the *starješina*'s death, his position and power are inherited by the next oldest member, although sometimes the semblance of an election is observed. If so, the election is more symbolic than real, because everyone is conscious of the right of the oldest member of the household to inherit the position of *starješina*. Often the dying *starješina* desig-

² Cvijić, J., "Studies in Yugoslav Psychology," *Slavonic Review* (1931), pp. 58-59.

³ Cvijić, J., *Balkansko Poluostrvo* (Beograd, 1922), pp. 92-104.

⁴ Bogišić, B., *Gradja u Odgovorima iz Slavenskog Juga* (Zagreb, 1874), p. 25.

⁵ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 54.

nates as his successor the one who has the right to that position on the basis of seniority.

If the late starješina had overlooked nominating his successor, all the members of the kuća get together, immediately after his burial, and the oldest man opens the meeting in this manner: "My brothers and my children, we have lost the head of our kuća. It is now our duty to keep up his fame and his face before the world. If we do not know how, it will be our own shame and we shall have a black face. Let us therefore discuss in a brotherly way whom we are going to nominate here this morning to take his place." Then the second oldest is expected to speak, approximately in this way: "It is not necessary to have any deliberation here because we do not want to impose a new law on the old land. This kuća is yours and it is for you; you govern and direct us with the help of God. Here am I, the first to recognize you as starješina of the kuća, and I kiss your hand." He arises and wants to kiss the hand of his senior, but the new starješina does not allow a man over eighteen years of age to kiss his hand, but he kisses the men on their faces. He allows the women and children to kiss his hand and he kisses them on the forehead.⁶

The other adult members of the kuća are only councillors to the starješina. He is expected to ask their advice, but the final decision rests with him. If he makes a proposal, any other kuća member would seldom if ever dare to object or to make a counter-proposal. If he plans to buy some property, or if he wants to build a hut, a house, or a barn, he usually explains his proposal to the adult males, and then asks: "What would you say; shall we, or shall we not?" It is very seldom that anyone would disagree with him, or question the wisdom of his plans. The usual answer is: "The way you want it," or, "If you see that this is better, do according to your wishes."⁷

The starješina is expected to be harsh and crafty, but fair in the distribution of food to the kuća members:

When the starješina is harsh, but just (it does not pay him to be good), everything is in order and goes like a thread. This justice of his can be seen when he does not hide anything that belongs to the kuća; when he does not drink and eat except

⁶ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁷ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 79.

with other kuća members; when he does not give more to his own wife and children; when he tells his brothers what he sold of the kuća property; how much money he received and what he intends to do with it. His justice can be seen when he is at the table and divides the meat according to years, and not according to someone's mustache; when he does not take more for himself than for someone else, or more for his own wife than for another's wife. If he distributes the wine equally by glasses, he is a just starješina, even if he is despotic. But what is most important for a starješina is that he arises early from his bed and that he knows how to talk among people and how to outwit others in deals.⁸

The main means of coercion employed by the starješina against the male adult members is verbal reproach before the members of the kuća, and before neighbors and strangers. Public censure is considered the greatest of punishments.⁹ For younger males, disapproval usually consists of depriving them of new clothes; and for women and children, slapping and flogging are often used as a means of training and discipline.

It appears that, in the conditions of economic scarcity and political insecurity in the Dinaric society, the starješina of a velika kuća was able to retain the responsibilities and the privileges acquired by the father and the elders in all patriarchal societies. Even today, in the kućas of the Bosnian Dinarics, only the starješina is called Father. All other biological fathers in the same kuća are addressed by their children by their first names.

In the kuća, the paternal status and age are the most decisive sources of power, influence, and rank, and this is manifested in all interpersonal family relations:

The youth who has not yet undergone the military examination and has not yet grown his mustache is not recognized, whether his ideas are good or bad. He is not supposed to meddle in the affairs of the kuća, even if everything is burning with fire . . . It is only when he begins to be known as a father that his voice in the family is taken seriously, like that of the other men. But even then his word is not quite accepted before he grows a beard and after he has attained the age of

⁸ Ardalić, V., "Bukovica," *Zbornik za Narodni Život i Običaje* (Zagreb, 1899), p. 207.

⁹ Ardalić, V., *op cit.*, p. 207.

thirty or over, because there are those who even until that time indulge in immature pranks.¹⁰

The concentration of power in the hands of the elders is rationalized in the Dinaric society as a moral and natural order in the interest of the community's prosperity. This attitude is evidenced in many Dinaric popular sayings which support gerontocracy: "Where the elder is not obeyed, God does not help"; "The fire is brighter out of old wood"; "As long as there are elders, the kuća will not be corrupted"; "The elder is recognized even among the pigs"; "The younger is there to obey, and the older to command."¹¹

The chief occupation of the kuća men is herding. Their technique of stockbreeding is seminomadic. In the summer months, they move their oxen, sheep and goats high into the mountains, sometimes above the belt of forests, where they keep wooden sheds for sheep and cattle. In the autumn, they move their herds down again into the warmer regions. Most of the work in the house, in the fields, and around the livestock is done by the women. The men are often idle: "Some of the men simply go to the mountains for their amusement and do practically nothing. The rest spend nearly half the year in the fresh mountain air of the high pasture lands above the village . . . either living in their huts or beside them. Their work is very slight and simple."

An order according to seniority is maintained in the tasks connected with herding. The oldest member next to the starješina takes care of the oxen, and is known as *volar*. Next in order of seniority is *čoban*, who takes care of the sheep and goats. The *janjčar* (the lamb man) and *krmar* (the pig man) follow. The youngest is the *tučar* (the turkey man). *Konjušar* (the horse man) can be anybody in the kuća, except when there is a cart to be driven. In this case, the *kočijaš* (the cart man) is "the one who is not a drunkard and who has a feeling for horses."¹²

A new kuća is organized when an old kuća is split into two or more parts. This often results from dissatisfaction with the domineering tendencies of the starješina, or from the desire of another member of the kuća to gain power by

¹⁰ Ardalić, V., *op cit.*, pp. 165-166.

¹¹ Ardalić, V., "Obitelj u Bukovici," *Zbornik* (Zagreb, 1906), p. 165.

¹² Cvijić, J., "Studies in Yugoslav Psychology," *op cit.*, p. 64.

¹³ Ardalić, V., *op cit.*, p. 193.

organizing a separate kuća of his own. The urge to gain power is especially marked among those who do not possess any private property, and who live in the common household with no feeling of power whatsoever.¹⁴ The only possibility of satisfying this wish for power is to get a part of the common possessions, depart from the old kuća, and establish one's own home with the power concentrated in one's own hands. This intention sometimes provokes opposition on the part of those who do not want to see the očevina divided and broken into a number of small parcels. But if the starješina in the Dinaric kuća tends to be too autocratic, the kuća as a rule will split after his death.

Conflicts are frequent in Dinaric households. There is a meager existence, and always the necessity of submissiveness to the elders, but, at the same time, there is a strongly developed desire for self-maximation and an equally keen resentment of accepting dictation from others. Violent clashes often result from these tensions. The need for remaining together, however, occasionally forces the members of the same kuća to settle their mutual rivalries and hatreds, to forget insults, and to bury personal grievances. This reconciliation occurs especially at great religious festivals or other ceremonial events, where there is an abundance of food, drink, song, and play, and when everybody is expected to discipline himself temporarily and to be on friendly terms with others. In this way, peace and fighting consequently alternate:

This squabble cannot last long because holidays and feasts are coming at which all kuća members should be gay. At Christmas time, even those who have been quarreling must make peace. That is, they embrace three times before the dinner. Then they kiss each other and say together: "Lord's peace, Christ is born; truly He is born." As soon as they kiss each other and say these words, the dispute is over and peace is reestablished for a time. In this way, they fight and make peace from Christmas again to Christmas.¹⁵

It is in such a family atmosphere that many Dinaric children are born and reared. A further account of Dinaric family relations may provide clues to the effect of such a

¹⁴ Ardalić, V., *op cit.*, p. 193.

¹⁵ Ardalić, V., *op cit.*, p. 208.

family environment on the personality development of both young and adult members.

Parent-Child and Sibling Relations

The birth of a son is received with particular approval and joy in a kuća, since it is the men in this society who hold exclusive power and are regarded with admiration and hope. They say *Muška glava kućni odžak glasi* (a man's head brings fame to the kuća's hearth). It is also the men who keep the blood line of a kuća unbroken. Both in Montenegro and in the Bay of Kotor, the people believe it to be a real tragedy if a man dies without having left a male child. They say that his kuća is "uprooted," and that such an "extirpated" kuća is nothing but "God's curse."

The preference for male children is especially manifest in the regions in which the tribal organization is still alive, and where all clansmen join in celebrating the birth of a new warrior. In Montenegro, for instance, as soon as a male child is born, his father "runs out from the house and shoots his gun. When his clansmen in the village learn that a male child is born, all shoot their guns and rejoice that they have gained one more gun."¹ The Montenegrins say that "when a boy is born even the tiles of the roof rejoice."² When asked how many children he has, the Montenegrin is likely to give the number of his sons, utterly ignoring his daughters.

The mother takes complete care of both male and female children for the first few years after they are born. The father is not supposed to talk or smile at his child, or even look at him before he walks or talks. According to Jovičević, some men will talk to the child if they are not seen or heard by other people in the kuća, but not many will do so in front of the family members, and especially not before outsiders.³ After the children start to walk and talk, the father takes increasing care of the males, but seldom if ever pays any attention to the females.

¹ Georgevitch, T., *Nash Narodni Zivot* (Beograd, 1930), Vol. 12, p. 132.

² Jovičević, A., "Crna Gora" *Zbornik* (1910), p. 50. Jovičević was an informant and collector of folk material for the Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb. He was a Montenegrin, and a teacher in his native region.

³ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, pp. 292 and 201.

The father has the power of life and death over his son, and is regarded as a God by his son. "*Bog na nebu a otac na zemlji sinu*" (Father is to his son on the earth the same as God is in heaven), Dinarics say.⁴ The father has the right to do anything he pleases with his son, even if the son is guilty of no offense: "If a hundred sons were to complain against the evil of their father, even if wrong were done to them, nobody would agree with them, but all would tell them they were wrong."⁵ As long as the father is alive, all his sons are under his power "even if they are getting gray."

The contradiction between the Dinaric adoration of the male children and the despotic attitude of the father toward his sons is manifested in the parent-child relationship, in a constant oscillation between overindulgence in affection and overstrictness in punishment on the part of the parent. In many instances, it is also reflected in an ambivalent attitude of love and hatred, submissiveness and defiance on the part of a male child toward his father:

There are parents who strike their children on the head with the fist, or pull their ears and hair, who slap them on the face, or beat them on the back . . . Other parents shout at the child so that the poor child must keep still. They kill his freedom so much that he may remain forever dumb, frightened, and dizzy . . . Some always keep a stick and show it often to the children in order to make them quiet so that they will not cry, shout, and be restless. When the father scolds and beats the child, the child runs to the mother and she calls him endearing names, caresses him, and hugs him. Presumably she even scolds the father who has clubbed the child. The same happens if the mother beats the child. The child runs to the father, and the father quiets him; often the father shouts and pretends to scold his wife and to beat her before the child. The wife, in order to quiet the child, pretends to wail and to weep because of the mock flogging. Now the child becomes quiet because his father has avenged him. In this way the children are terribly spoiled, and they run from the father to the mother, or from the mother to the father. The children very easily learn to dislike either the father or the mother, but more usually the father.⁶

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 292.

⁶ Jovičević, A., *op. cit.*, p. 51.

But there are also parents who do not punish their children, at all, even for great offenses. Some of them even encourage children to misbehave, and some of them overindulge their children so that they do not obey anyone. Jovičević says that often these children grow to be "no-good."

According to Bogišić, the only sons and male children in families where there are many daughters are especially pampered by all kuća members. "Everybody must bow to the will of such a child; woe to the sisters of a *pogjevoječar* (male child in a family where there have been only daughters) and woe to those families where there is an only son."⁷

In Dinaric society, from earliest times to the present, sharp father-son clashes were a regular occurrence, and patricides and infanticides were common. As recently as World War II, for instance, in the Dinaric families, fathers and sons often found themselves in opposite camps. Thus, a son of the famous Chetnik guerrilla leader, General Mikhailovich, fought with the Partisans, the rival guerrillas; and in Montenegro there were a number of instances in which sons who fought with the Partisans executed their own fathers who were made prisoners while fighting with the Chetniks. In the past, many civil wars were fought in Dinaric states as a result of father-son rivalries among the ruling families.

Parent-child relations in Dinaric society may also be manifested in the "conflict of generations" in which the entire younger generation, both men and women, tend to adopt a philosophy of life completely contrary to that shared by their parents. This kind of "reaction formation" was noticed in Serbia before and during World War II. At that time, an unusually large number of young men and women of outstanding conservative and well-to-do families were prominent in the radical movements. A daughter of an outstanding leader of a Serbian conservative political party, for instance, became a very influential personal secretary and mistress of Marshal Tito at the same time that her father was the Foreign Minister of King Peter while the King waged a guerrilla war of extermination against the Marshal. An equally good example is that of a daughter of the Chetnik

⁷ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 289. Bogišić was an authority on Slav common law. For reference to his material see Tomašić, D., "Personality Development in the Zadruga Society," *Psychiatry* (1942), Vol. 5, footnote p. 236.

guerrilla leader, General Mikhailovich. She had joined the Partisans, the rival guerrilla movement, and, as a Partisan youth leader at a public rally in Belgrade, publicly accused her father of treason: "She concluded her fiery speech with the following words: 'Bring to trial all traitors of the Serbian people!' The youths responded to their comrade: 'Down with Drazha Mikhailovich!'"⁸ General Mikhailovich was subsequently caught by the Partisans, brought to trial, accused of treason, and executed.

The strained relations between parent and child do not remain unnoticed by the Dinaric bards. Father-son antagonism and hatred appear too frequently in Dinaric culture to be overlooked by those who express their impressions of their own society, in folk poetry.⁹ Such father-son conflicts are, for example, well illustrated in a ballad about Prince Marko¹⁰ and his father, King Vukashin. In this narrative, in a dispute between his father and his uncle over the throne, Marko passes judgment against his own father. This unfilial gesture provokes the rage of King Vukashin, who then attempts to slay his treacherous son:

When King Vukashin heard this,
The King sprang to his feet from the ground
And drew his golden dagger
For to slay his son, Marko.
Marko fled from before his father,
For it had ill become him, brother,
To fight with his own father,
Marko fled around the white church,
Round the white church of Samodreza

⁸ *Politika*, Beograd, November 29, 1944.

⁹ The composing and singing of popular ballads have always been a well-developed institution among the Dinarics. Ballads are often chanted by professional bards to the accompaniment of a primitive one-stringed instrument, known as the *gusla*. Some people, especially the blind and the disabled, make their living by playing *guslas* and chanting ballads. Most herders' homes, and every tavern in the herding regions, have *guslas*; and one of the favorite ways of the herdsmen of spending their abundant leisure time is to play the *gusla* or listen to those who chant heroic songs to its music. The authors of the ballads are usually unknown, and every bard feels free to add new lines or change parts of an old ballad. New ballads are constantly being added to the old collections, and even today actual happenings are described and popularized in the form of epic narratives.

¹⁰ Prince Marko is an historic figure. He was the son of the Serbian King Vukashin, who lived in the fourteenth century. Prince Marko, known to the Dinarics as Kraljevič Marko, is the most popular of all Dinaric heroes.

Marko fled and the King pursued after him
 Until thrice they made a circle
 Round the white church of Samodreza.

Marko fled into the white church;
 Behind, the door closed.
 The King rushed upon the church door,
 He smote the wood with his dagger
 And lo, blood dripped from the wood,
 And the King repented him
 And spake these words:
 "Woe is me, by the one God,
 I have slain my son Marko!" ¹¹

That clashes between Marko and his father were frequent is indicated by other lines from this representative ballad, in which King Vukashin complains about his son:

"Since myself have a wayward son,
 Mine own son, Kraljevic Marko;
 He goeth whither he listeth, asking leave of none,
 And ever at his down-sitting he drinketh wine out of measure
 And ever he stirreth up brawl and conflict."

Parent-child conflicts often result from mother-child relationships, and these are frequently depicted in the Dinaric ballads. But while these heroic narratives almost invariably refer to the "meanness" of the father, they show an ambivalent attitude toward the mother. Often she is presented in a very noble light, but sometimes the ballads picture her also as a cruel, jealous, spiteful and revengeful creature. In one such epic, Marko kills his own wife, at the instigation of his mother, but then repents and expresses the wish: "May a black cuckoo cut out the eyes of my mother." ¹²

While the violence of father toward son may result in the slaying of the son, and *vice versa*, the hostility of mother toward son is often expressed in the invocation of curses, which is an effective means of threat and intimidation in Dinaric society. Malediction by the mother was in earlier times accompanied by the exposure of her breasts:

"Accurst to thee my caressing!
 Accurst be to thee thy mother's feed!"

¹¹ Low, D. H., *The Ballads of Marko Kraljevic* (Cambridge, 1928), p. 10.

¹² Banović, St., "Prilozi za istraživanje Hrvatskih ili Srpskih Narodnih Pjesama" *Zbornik* (1924), Vol. 25.

And she drew forth her breasts from her bosom:
"May in thy wounds thy mother's milk burst out!
May the milk from these nipples be leprous to thee!"¹³

A male child is disciplined not only by his grandfather and his father but by his older brothers, since in this society years mean higher rank, which in the family implies disciplinary privileges over those of lower rank. It is for this reason that strong hostility, sharp conflict and rivalry often develop among brothers of Dinaric kućas, a situation which explains why many Dinaric kućas split soon after the death of the father. However, this deeply rooted sibling antagonism, which may have become engraved on the personality of a Dinaric man in early childhood, is not likely to die out even after the kuća is split and each brother has organized a kuća of his own. In fact, sibling antagonism has sometimes caused new clans to be originated, and has been at the root of clan feuds that lasted for many generations. Even today, the sibling rivalry of the Dinaric warriors often drives them into opposing war camps. In World War II blood brothers often found themselves in opposite guerrilla bands and showed no mercy if one was made prisoner by another.

How strong such sibling hostility could be, is illustrated in a letter recently published by a Communist-Partisan paper in the United States (*Narodni Glasnik* of Pittsburgh). In this letter, an immigrant Dinaric who had identified himself with the cause of the Partisans, having learned that his own brother was killed by the Partisans while fighting on the side of the Ustašas, a rival political movement, offered publicly the sum of twenty-five dollars to the Partisan who had killed his brother.

In the past, rivalry between brothers and cousins among ruling Dinaric dynasties often provoked bloody civil wars. Neighboring powers never failed to take advantage of sibling antagonism and father-son conflict in Dinaric dynasties, using them to further their own interests in the Balkans.

Emotional Instability

It is probable that family organization, particularly the father-son and sibling relations, is closely connected with the

¹³ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 196.

remarkable lack of emotional balance which is noticed by all students and observers of Dinaric society. Cvijić, a well-known student, claims that perhaps the most characteristic feature of many Dinaric districts is the large number of men who act hastily without any deliberation.¹ The Dinarics themselves say that "a man freezes if he thinks too long"; that he "who hesitates makes no progress."² Cvijić observes that, if one studies the history of outstanding personalities in these regions, he finds in "every single one an alternation of a very active period with one in which they were completely passive and exhausted."³ He notes contrasting "excellence and feebleness," especially among the leaders.

Observing the Dinarics, Cvijić also remarks that they have "too good an opinion of themselves," and Miss Durham, an English anthropologist, reports that they are great boasters."⁴ Cvijić says that the habit of flattery and adulation is strongly entrenched, and that the ambition and pride of some of these people are "quite boundless." There are persons with "overbearing conceit," and extreme self-confidence which has "no limits."⁵ According to the same writer, many of these people are incapable of realizing that some difficulties are insurmountable, and that compromises must often be made. They are entirely obsessed by the desire to win a place of their own in the world, and to in full gain what they want. They show a "ceaseless concern with their own importance and reputation," and are likely to exaggerate their successes and to develop from this exaggeration unjustified personal and national claims.⁶ Accordingly, they are likely to overestimate their own strength and size, and to minimize the help they receive from others; they often claim for themselves the achievements of other people.

According to Cvijić, there is a lack of proportion in suffering as well as in pleasure. Both hope and despair are excessive and, when the turn of events is against these people,

¹ Cvijić, J., "Studies in Yugoslav Psychology," *Slavonic Review* (1930), Vol. 9, p. 383. Cvijić was born in Serbia, of a family of Dinaric immigrants. He studied at the University of Vienna, and later became Professor of Anthropogeography at the University of Belgrade.

² *Ibid.*, p. 383-384.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

⁴ Durham, M. E., *Some Trial Origins Laws and Customs of the Balkans* (London 1928), p. 175.

⁵ Cvijić, J., *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 72 and 378.

they are easily assailed by an "indefinite hesitation of spirit which gradually becomes frenzied."⁷ They are ready to shed tears and inclined to go to extremes in their sorrow, as well as to lose self-control completely and kill an offender in anger. Kara George, the founder of modern Serbia, a man of Dinaric origin, killed some of his closest associates in moments of rage; then, when he realized what he had done, he wept bitterly and blamed others for his deed. A similar behavior has been noticed among many other leaders in that society.

Miss Durham was startled by the excess in the expressions of grief which she witnessed in Montenegro, such as in burial ceremonies:

When we were within a hundred yards of the house, the death wail was raised—a terrible rhythmical chant that echoed over the mountains. Some of the men did not even know the name of the deceased and had to ask for it before crying. . . The cry is made on a quick breath, which soon becomes a shattering sob—a convulsion of the diaphragm. The mourners arrived in a frenzy. . . The younger daughter, a very beautiful woman, had ripped her face from forehead to chin with her nails; streaming with blood and sodden with tears, she was an appalling sight. The three women, locked together, swayed slightly as they ceaselessly sang the praises of the dead boy . . . Then the men hurled themselves in. I knew most of them well, but I was something like terrified. Had I not dashed into the corner, they would have trampled me underfoot, I think, without seeing me. Yelling the death wail, they danced furiously in front of the "trpez," beating their breasts and their temples with their closed fists, thus accompanying the wail with a barbaric drumming. Tears streamed from their eyes and soaked their clothes. They leaped almost a yard from the ground. They almost fought each other in their struggles to throw themselves on the dummy and kiss it . . . It was a maniacal howling orgy of grief, stopped suddenly by Pope [priest] Gjuro, who was head of the ceremony, crying: "Brethren, you have wailed enough. Make place for others." They reeled from the hut, exhausted . . . Many of the mourners had never seen the lad, but their red waistcoats were dark and soaked with tears, and, as they sat in the inn, they quarrelled as to which had cried the best.⁸

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

⁸ Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*, p. 218-19.

The Dinarics like to see themselves as great martyrs, as well as great heroes. In their ballads and in their school textbooks they present themselves as people who have been unjustly persecuted by their enemies, and who have greatly suffered to save the world, but without being rewarded for it. In that respect, they tend to identify themselves with Christ, and talk in terms of "crucifixion" and "resurrection." This ability to glory in martyrdom, for instance, enabled the Dinaric Serbs in the past to convert great national tragedies into a psychological force that has worked in the direction of a national renaissance. Many self-sacrificing and resolute leaders and many gallant warriors have risen after a period of demoralization and despair.

Thus, after the Serbians had been defeated by the Turks in the Battle of Kosovo, in 1389, they never ceased for a number of centuries to emphasize their sufferings, the martyrdom to which they were exposed as a result of the defeat, and their sacrifices for Christendom. They developed a cult of Kossovo, as shown by the sanctification of the heroes of the battle, and by the numerous ballads⁹ sung up to the present time:

There resteth to Serbia a glory,
A glory that shall not grow old;
There remaineth to Serbia a story,
A tale to be chanted and told!
They are gone to their graves grim and gory,
The beautiful, brave, and bold;
But out of the darkness and desolation
Of the mourning heart of a widow'd nation,
Their memory waketh an exaltation!
Yea, so long as a babe shall be born,
Or there resteth a man in the land—
So long as a blade of corn
Shall be reapt by a human hand—
So long as the grass shall grow
On the mighty plain of Kossovo—
So long, so long, even so,
Shall the glory of those remain
Who this day in battle were slain.¹⁰

⁹ Some significant ballads of the Kosovo cycle have been translated into English by Lytton, E. R. B. L. cf. Meredith Owen, *Serbski Pesme* (London 1917). See also Noyes and Bacon, *Heroic Ballads of Serbia* (Boston, 1913).

¹⁰ Meredith Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

In this way, the spirit of independence was kept alive among all the Serbs during five centuries of Turkish overlordship. The common tradition united the nation in wars for independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In the same manner, today, while under Communist rule and Soviet control, the Serbs in emigration repeatedly speak of the battle of Kossovo and of the heroes of Kossovo, in order to arouse national consciousness and to keep national aspirations alive.¹¹

The lack of emotional balance may explain why the Dinaric warriors are more successful and efficient as guerrilla fighters than as regular army soldiers. As soldiers of a regular army, they are exceedingly brave in a successful offensive, but are likely to become panicky and cowardly, and to flee, when faced with what appears to be a superior force. In guerrilla warfare, however, the fighters are organized into small bands which are able to disperse quickly and escape to safety when faced by the enemy. Then they regroup themselves in their hideouts and again ambush the enemy or attack him from the rear. In these hit-and-run tactics they can never be encircled, and they are always on the offensive and always have an advantage over their enemy regardless of his numerical strength. This is why the German and Italian armies in World War II, like the Ottoman armies in the past, did not find it difficult to defeat the regular armies composed of the Dinarics, but in order to smash their guerrilla resistance, had to resort to like methods and to organize counter-guerrilla formations.

The Dinaric fighters are often extremely spiteful. Out of spite they do things which are completely irrational, and which often turn against the spiteful person himself. The Dinarics themselves say of such a person: "Out of spite he was born, out of spite he will die." They frequently move from one camp or one faction to that of their former enemies, according to their changing moods or the changing fortunes of war. Thus, there is a remarkable frequency of sudden disloyalty to a heretofore much worshipped leader. "Traitors" and "renegades" are common. Coup d'états, palace revolutions, and assassination of rulers are often initiated by people from among the most intimate entourage

¹¹ *Amerikanski Srbobran*, May 5—May 30, 1945.

of the rulers. In the course of World War II, moving from one guerrilla camp into that of its rivals was a regular occurrence. Even after a long war of extermination fought between the Chetniks and the Partisans, a great many Chetniks joined the Partisans as soon as that guerrilla faction was in the ascendancy when the British, who had formerly supported the Chetniks switched their help to the Partisans, and when the Soviets officially declared themselves in favor of the Partisans. General Mikhailovich, the famous Chetnik guerrilla leader, in his trial in Belgrade, pointed to such events as the major cause of his defeat. It is reported that Mikhailovich was caught by the Partisans as a result of the treachery of one of his closest associates. This is undoubtedly an expression of the same trait of instability in emotional attachments, and of sudden relapses from one extreme to another, which are so characteristic of the Dinaric mountain folk. There can be no doubt that, when the power of the Partisan rulers of Yugoslavia begins to show signs of weakness, the Dinaric fighters will not fail to flock in great numbers into the opposite camp, whatever that camp may happen to be.

Cvijić, himself a Dinaric Serb, believes that the unbalanced temperament of the Dinaric man developed because of alternating periods of hardship and idleness, which were determined by the climate and by the geophysical conditions of the Dinaric regions.¹² According to him, geographical conditions are among the most constant, and therefore most determining, influences which shape the character of men and the psychology of nations. It seems, however, that the Dinaric social and family structure (with its characteristic internal interpersonal relations) is sufficient to explain the ambivalent drives and the emotional instability of the Dinaric people. The Dinaric child is born and reared in an atmosphere of rivalry and antagonism, where a strong drive to exert power over others comes into sharp conflict with the necessity of submissiveness. He is exposed to extremes of overstrictness and overindulgence, and is both sternly disciplined and greatly spoiled. It is not difficult to imagine how the child in such a family may have a desire to identify himself with the omnipotent and godlike *starješina* and father,

¹² Cf. Cvijić's theories in Tomašić, D., "Sociology in Yugoslavia," *The American Journal of Sociology* (1941), Vol. 44, pp. 53-69.

or with his elder brother, and how he may oscillate between extremes of malice and overaffection in relation to his parents, siblings and other kuća members. At the same time, deep feelings of insecurity in such a family environment create a strong need for self-assertion, with the resultant overcompensation in boastfulness and illusions of grandeur. Conditions of insecurity in the family environment are only strengthened by the general conditions of insecurity in which the Dinaric society was placed.

Popular opinion in the Dinaric regions is inclined to explain the emotional instability of the Dinaric man in a manner that harmonized with our own. In the ballads concerning Marko and other Dinaric heroes, impulsiveness, spite and lack of a sense of proportion are marked traits. The unbalanced temper of the heroes is strongly stressed in much of the oral poetry; Marko is an extreme case of emotional instability. From his childhood on, he was subjected to hard handling and great admiration from his closest kin. His father, the King, "cursed him," and at the same time, his uncle, the Czar, "blessed him":

Then the King was very wroth with Marko
And in wrath he cursed him;
"Son Marko, may God slay thee,
Mayest thou have neither grave nor posterity,
And may thy soul not leave thee
Until thou has served the Turkish Sultan."
The King cursed him, the Tsar blessed him:
"Marko, my godfather, may God be thy stay!
May the sword be sharp in the battle!
May no knight be found to put thee to the worse.
Be thy name renown everywhere
Whilst sun and moon endure!"
And so they spake curse and blessing,
And so also it came to pass.¹³

The geographic location of the Dinarics, an area which for centuries has been contested by churches and empires, has doubtless contributed to the anxieties of the people and to their feeling of world importance. Shifting fortunes at this crossroads of world power have probably perpetuated such patterns of behavior as moods of depression and despair, alternating with elation and exuberance.

¹³ Low, D. H., *op. cit.*

Further analysis of interpersonal and interpolitical relations in Dinaric society may throw added light on why the Dinaric man acts as he does.

Violence

Lacking a well-established and accepted central authority in the past, the Dinarics have had no impartial protection against aggressive conduct. Everyone has been compelled to rely on self-help and to apply personal sanctions in the event of threat or injury. The principle of self-reliance was so generally accepted that it was endorsed by some written laws, such as that of Vladika (Bishop) Peter I of Montenegro, of 1796, which states:

A man who strikes another with his hand, foot or chibuk, shall pay him a fine of fifty sequins. If the man struck, at once kills his aggressor, he shall not be punished. Nor shall a man be punished for killing a thief caught in the act.¹

In such circumstances, the Dinarics came to identify physical force with right and law. Numerous popular sayings testify to such a conception of justice and security: "He who has force has justice"; "Force is stronger than a kind word"; "Not even the mountains could resist force"; "There is no reasoning against force."²

The Dinaric ballads are known for their reverence of force and their glorification of violence. Marko has much coerciveness in his character, and the epics concerning his exploits show how much one can achieve by this trait. The ballads especially delight in describing the physical force he employs to intimidate his adversaries. He is able to terrify even his own protector, the Turkish Sultan, whom Marko sometimes calls "Father":

And when it wearied Marko of the servants,
He donned his wolf-cloak of hide reversed,
He took his heavy mace and went
And entered into the Sultan's tent.
So fierce within him was Marko's anger
That, booted as he was, he sate him down on the carpet
And looked sideways at the Sultan,
And tears of blood stood in his eyes.

¹ Durham, M. E., *op cit.*, p. 79.

² Škarpa, V. J., *Hrvatske Narodne Poslovice* (Šibenik, 1909), pp. 324-326.

Now when the Sultan was ware of Marko,
That he had with him his heavy mace,
The Sultan went backwards and Marko followed after,
Until he drove him even to the wall.
Right so the Sultan put hand in pocket
And drew forth an hundred ducats,
And gave them to Kraljevic Marko,
"Go Marko," quoth he, "drink thy fill of wine.
What hath so sorely angered thee?"³

The lack of safety and the emphasis on physical strength led so often to violence that the Dinaric men went about heavily armed, and never laid aside their weapons. The carrying of arms, however, tended to increase rather than to prevent violent clashes. This was especially true in places where crowds convened, such as at the bazaars or in front of churches. Even today, such gatherings often end in physical clashes and homicide.

Such traditions, combined with the lack of emotional balance often led to bloodthirstiness, brutality and other excesses. Cvijić says that the Dinarics "can hate with a consuming passion and a violence that reaches a white heat"; that one can find in the Dinaric regions "excessively fierce, wild and narrow-minded men who are goaded beyond endurance by the smallest insult, and who are so hot-blooded that they immediately convert their feelings into actions which often end in crime."⁴

Extreme hatred against enemies is sometimes manifested by torture and mutilation of the defeated. Some of these people find sadistic pleasure in such inhuman acts, since both their historical documents and their ballads give detailed accounts of various methods of tormenting their adversaries and of the atrocities committed against them.⁵ Their oral poems often tell of living persons being bound to horses which are then driven in opposite directions to tear the victims apart. They describe in detail the mutilation of living and dead, the flaying of living people, executions by slow burning, and forceful feeding of victims with human flesh. Some of these tortures had been common in Byzantium and in the Ottoman Empire. They were adopted by the early

³ Low, D. H., *op. cit.*, p. 150.

⁴ Cvijić, J., *op. cit.*, p. 383-384.

⁵ Compare Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*, p. 178.

Dinaric codifications, such as the Code of Czar Dushan.⁶ Banović, who compared Dinaric ballads with historical documents, believes that the atrocities described in these epics often corresponded to the actual events.⁷ The investigations conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace brought forth numerous evidences of "savage atrocities," "wholesale crimes," and "sensational cruelties" that took place in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. Not only the common soldiers, but also the officers and the civil population participated in some of these acts.⁸

Recently, in the course of World War II, various guerrilla factions in the Dinaric area—the Chetniks, the Partisans, and the Ustašas—mutually accused one another of indiscriminate mass killings and gruesome barbarities committed on their victims, dead and living alike. While many of these claims are undoubtedly products of the imagination, and sometimes purposely fabricated stories to be used as a means of propaganda, it is certain that many cases of useless sacrifice of human lives, large-scale massacres of adversaries, torturing, maiming and killing of prisoners, and other similar practices are still found in this area, especially in times of social upheaval and war.

Extreme antagonism and hostility against rivals and enemies is indicated, in the ballads, by the desire to drink the blood of one's adversary. In the following narrative, Kraljević has been made prisoner by Djemo, the mountaineer, who, tired after fighting, became thirsty and asked for a drink. Kraljević suggested animal blood, but Djemo preferred human blood:

"Knights of worship speak not in this wise, Djemo,
But rather they slay horse or falcon,
And stay their thirst with blood from the throat."
Djemo the Mountaineer made answer:
"Nor horse not yet falcon will I slay,

⁶ See Novakovitch, *Zakonik Stefana Dushana* (Belgrade, 1898).

⁷ Banović, St., *op. cit.* Banović, born in a kuća of Dinaric Catholics in Biokovo region, was a schoolteacher in his native region, and became informant and collector of folk material for the Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb, Croatia.

⁸ See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Nationalism and War in the East* (Oxford, 1915), pp. 280-282. Also Dotation Carnegie, *Enquête Dans les Balkans* (Paris, 1914), p. 133.

But I am minded to slay thee, Kraljevic,
For to stay my thirst with blood from thy throat." ⁹

Drinking the blood of one's enemy seems to have been actually practiced in some cases. Miss Wilson, who was in charge of war refugees in the Balkans, in 1915, quotes a refugee's description of a blood ceremony in which the blood of the enemy was drunk: "We met in a darkened room . . . Lots were drawn to determine who should go forth to assassinate. We broke the loaf in two and each ate a piece. Our wine was the blood of the Bulgars." ¹⁰

Often cruelties are committed merely because they are the established custom, and because certain kinds of atrocities against the enemy are expected of the warriors. In the past, the warrior in Montenegro who did not succeed in sending the head or the nose of an enemy lost his reputation. A man's fame and rank depended to a large extent upon the number of heads or noses that he had cut off. For this reason, the ballads which describe these atrocities are not always completely devoid of human sympathy. Sometimes they give an impression of mixed or ambivalent feelings towards the victim, and indicate an attitude of grief after the cruelties have been committed. This may be the result of instability in the emotional attitude toward the victim, or it may indicate a genuine feeling of regret that such a act of brutality had to be done because it was demanded by society. For instance, in the following song, which was popular among some Dinaric guerrillas in World War I, one detects traces of human sympathy despite the overlying bestiality:

I have grieved many a mother,
But one most of all!
I have slaughtered her son Jovan,
And I forced Jovan's father to roast him.
The father was roasting him and crying:
"Oh, Jovan, St. George Day's lamb!"
I forced Jovan's mother to eat him.
The mother was eating him and crying:
"Oh, Jovan, St. George Day's lamb!" ¹¹

⁹ Low, D. H., *op. cit.*, p. 136.

¹⁰ Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*, p. 161.

¹¹ Georgevich, T., *Nash Narodni Zivot* (Belgrade, 1922), Vol. I, p. 121.

Blood is often used as a symbol in the Dinaric society. In situations of great distress, the heroes of the ballads write letters in their own blood to plead for help, and when angry "tears of blood" stand in their eyes. Blood is stressed in many of the ceremonies, such as the custom of smearing the war standard with blood before undertaking a war exploit, sucking the blood from one another's fingers in the ceremony of "sworn brotherhood," and scratching one's face until it bleeds, as an expression of grief. In Bukovica, a woman who marries into the kuća before another often asserts her priority before a younger bride by saying, "I spilled my blood here before you did." The constantly present idea of blood and destructiveness is also reflected in many ballads, which sometimes draw a gory picture of the destruction and floods of blood in battle:

Up to the stirrups of the steed that day the red blood ran,
 Unto the silken girdle of many a fighting man;
 Horses and heroes swam, steed by steed, and hero hero by,
 And we flew up hungry and thirsty, the vultures of the sky;
 We fed on human flesh, drank our fill of human blood.¹²

Miss Durham interprets the Dinaric atrocities and Dinaric emphasis on blood as remnants of cannibalism.¹³ It seems, however, that, regardless of the historical origin of such practices, they would not be surviving today if they were not favored by the conditions in which a Dinaric warrior is born and reared. His unbalanced temper makes him likely to be as excessive in violence as he is boundless in all other expressions of self-assertion. At the same time, the traditional view of life and of the institutions of his society point to violence as a reasonable and feasible means of self-protection and self-aggrandizement.

Deceit and Distrust

"He who knows how will gain double." (*Tko umije njemu dvije*), Dinarics say when justifying unethical means employed to gain personally profitable ends. They rationalize such behavior by claiming that the whole universe is deceitful:

¹² Noyes, G. P. and Bacon, L., *Heroic Ballads of Serbia* (Boston 1913), pp. 130-131.

¹³ Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*, pp. 159-169.

The Sun himself breaketh faith,
And warmeth not the earth in winter as in summer.¹

According to Cvijić, cunning is regarded as "astuteness of high order," and many stories are told about clever persons who outwit everyone.² Successful duping of others is regarded as a sign of high intelligence and adroitness; in some regions, this type of behavior is very common and is known as *podvala* (undermining).

Ardalić reports that, in Bukovica, when a man seizes the property of others, whether in a legitimate or an illegitimate way, the people do not say that he has stolen, but that he "likes it for himself" (*Voli sebi*).³ This attitude justifies the seizure of public or private property by anyone who is shrewd enough and bold enough to take it. According to the view of life in the Bukovica regions, whoever is able to defraud the public institutions or the women is looked upon with approbation:

The people consider that it is not a sin to cheat the church, the state, and the tavern keeper, or not to pay a woman. They say that everyone gives to the church and the state. As for the tavern keeper, they say that he himself swindles others and makes false bills, and that if one does not pay a woman, no great damage will be done to her.⁴

They seem ready to swear falsely at any time, and to think nothing of it. In Montenegro, in the past, there was no provision in the state laws for the punishment of perjurers, and the people explain this omission by saying that it is for God to decide whether he wants to punish them or not.⁵ In Lika, a region in the northwestern part of the Dinaric area, they say, "If it is to the oath, then the cow will be mine"; and in Bukovica they say, "that when they commit perjury they pray to the Lord and ask him for his help in fighting the adversaries against whom they take the oath." "They would invoke the help of the devil himself, let alone God, in order

¹ Low, D. H., *op. cit.*, p. 105.

² Cvijić, J., *op. cit.*, p. 60.

³ Ardalić, V., "Bukovica," Vol. 15, p. 256. Ardalić was an informant, and a collector of folk material for the Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb, Croatia. He was born in a Dinaric Orthodox kuća, and lived all his life as a merchant in his native region, Bukovica.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 592.

to succeed in the matter for which they take the oath,"⁶ They would be willing "even to raise ten fingers, let alone three," when taking a false oath if that would help them to defeat their enemies.⁶ Immediately after taking a false oath, some men secretly spit upon the ground and then step upon the spittle. They believe that, if they follow this precaution, no evil consequence will befall them as a result of their having sworn falsely. The general belief is that everybody is false as long as he can get away with it.

The institution of professional begging is a recognized way of making one's living, and this type of earning is called *zaraditi na štapu* (earning with the cane). Often whole families leave their homes and go begging, telling pitiful stories of how they lost their homes and property because of fire. The professional beggars are very skillful in simulating blindness and deformity. As a rule, they do not beg in their own community, even though the source of their wealth is known. Arson is common, and insurance companies refuse to insure property in some localities, because too many people there have made a business of insuring their homes and then setting them on fire.

It is obvious that such habits of double dealing may also affect political and international relations. The history of the Dinaric society is marked by many instances of "stabbing in the back" and the breaking of pledges in international deals. Montenegrin rulers, for instance, often resorted to treacherous means in dealings with the neighboring Albanian tribes. It happened more than once that the Albanian tribal chiefs were led into a trap by the Montenegrins, who had guaranteed them personal safety and given *bessa*. The *bessa*, an Albanian tribal institution, consists of giving a pledge of peace and safety, which is then very scrupulously observed by all parties concerned. The Montenegrins, however, did not consider themselves bound by the *bessa*, and often Albanian tribal chiefs would be assassinated when they were visiting Montenegrins under the pledge of safety. In World War II, local deals made by the Mikhailovich Chetniks and by the Partisans with their enemies, the Italian and German local army commanders, had much the same background.

In Dinaric society, treachery also is approved if it is successful, especially if it is successful against the one who is

⁶ Ardalić, V., *op. cit.*, p. 256.

generally considered as enemy. Marko, for example, enters the service of the enemy of the Serb people, the Turkish Sultan, as a mercenary, but since he is successful at double-crossing the Turks, his cleverness is highly lauded in the folk epics. Thus, collaboration with the enemy and factional fights that may eventually help the enemy all are judged from the point of view of the final outcome. In the course of World War II, for instance, both the Chetniks and the Partisan guerrillas not only occasionally collaborated with the enemy, but often, while one of these two pro-Ally guerrilla factions was engaged in fighting the Axis, it was attacked by the other from the rear. Each then accused the other of intrigue with the Axis and betrayal of the Allies.

Treachery and violence are aspects of the same mental process of the Dinaric warrior. His traditions and his own experience teach him to identify self-aggrandizement with power, and power with violence. But if violence does not seem expedient to him at the moment, the socially recognized way to fight superior strength is to outwit his opponents by resorting to craftiness and deceit. Which one of these means of self-maximation he will choose to employ, will depend upon circumstances. In many cases, these two aspects of Dinaric aggressiveness can be found simultaneously or alternately manifested in the same situation. Cvijić, for instance, quotes a ballad in which Jovan of Kosovo often beguiled people by leading them to insult him, whereupon he would rob them and "cut them to pieces."⁷

The prevalence of perfidy, and its common use in interpersonal relations, may explain the lack of confidence of the Dinaric man. He suspects not only the enemy, but also the members of his own community, of the ever-present possibility of *podvala*. Consequently, an inclination to spy upon other people has developed, a trait which can be greatly misused in an autocratic society. Hence, it is not without significance that the leaders, and most of the agents of the notorious secret political police of Partisan Yugoslavia, known as OZNA, are of Dinaric background, and that a large percentage of them are Montenegrins.

The lack of trust sometimes reaches such proportions that one doubts the members of his own family. Family mistrust and suspicion is often noted by observers of ruling families,

⁷ Cvijić, J., *op. cit.*, p. 61.

and there is no reason to deny that this factor has contributed to the political instability of Dinaric states.

The Dinaric philosophy of life, as expressed in popular sayings, bears witness to deeply rooted feelings of suspicion: "He who does not trust will not be duped"; "It is better to believe your own eyes than other people's words"; "The time has come that man does not trust his own shirt"; "Woe to him who trusts a man."⁸ They say that "Everyone carries his own head in his bag" (*Glava mu u torbi*); that is, nobody's life is safe or secure. Under such conditions, one can not have confidence in anybody, not even in the Almighty. Consequently, the Dinarics picture God not as a just, merciful and benevolent being, but rather as an arbitrary and cruel old creature whom they sometimes refer to as "that old bloody slayer" (*stari krvnik*). Their feeling of helplessness against superior forces only increases in the face of such an unpredictable supernatural power, who can not be propitiated by human means.

Blood Vengeance

In his early childhood, the future warrior is trained to gain compensation for injuries through vengeful acts. As soon as he can carry arms, he is expected to avenge himself by killing the person who insults or injures him or any one of his kin. This social duty is institutionalized, and is known as *krvna osveta* (blood revenge). Early in his youth, the Dinaric man learns that by applying coercion and requital he may achieve his ends. In the regions where the blood feud is still in force, as he matures, he soon realizes that he himself may be marked for retaliation, not only as punishment for his own deeds, but also for any offense on the part of any one of his clansmen. So he often lives under constant strain, uneasiness and fear. The responsibility for deeds committed by his clansmen increases or decreases in degree, according to seniority and nearness in blood ties. The one most responsible is the eldest among the nearest blood relatives. Thus, the father is held to be the one most obligated to vindicate his son. Next to the father are the brothers, then cousins of the male line, according to the nearness of blood ties. In this

⁸ Škarpa, V. J., *op. cit.*

system of blood revenge, there is never a question of the "rightness" or "wrongness" of the act which provoked the feud. Any offense, no matter how justifiable, and no matter how unintentional, has to be requited.

In the past, this custom of vendetta necessarily led toward increasing acts of bloodshed, which in turn only intensified the conditions of insecurity. Such a circle of violence and counterviolence might increase a hundredfold when a whole clan identified itself with each one of its members and was ready to avenge him. Here is a classic example:

Four rams were missing from the herd of Pavle Vojinić. The Vojinić clansmen suspected Mirko and Novak of the Spasojević clan, and killed a Spasojević clansman (cousin of Mirko and Novak). The next autumn, Mirko and Novak Spasojević killed Pavle Vojinić, cut off his head, and escaped to Stubica on the border of Turkey and Montenegro. Prince Danilo . . . sent them word to meet him on St. George's Day, the day of his *Slava*,¹ when he promised them that he would make peace between them and the Vojinić clansmen . . . The messenger came back and announced that Novak and his father would come. Prince Danilo reported this to the Vojinić clansmen . . . Six Vojinić clansmen, headed by Peko, the son of the murdered Pavle, came to the Njeguški Valley, hid along the road, and waited. When the Spasojevićs came so near that the Vojinićs could count their teeth, they fired their guns, killed both of the Spasojevićs, then mutilated their bodies, cutting them into small pieces, and hung the parts of the bodies around over ash trees and hornbeam trees along the road. When Mirko heard about the death of his father and his brother, he lamented day and night and thought of ways of revenge . . . Autumn came, and that, was the best chance for him because he knew that Peko Vojinić would move with his herd to Lastva Mountain. He began spying on Peko's pen. With the sheep were Peko and his youngest brother, always on guard and afraid of Mirko. The third day after they moved to the mountains . . . Peko left and Spasoje remained with the sheep. When Peko was far away, Mirko took out his dagger, crossed himself, and said, "Oh, St. Vasilije, help me this morning if you ever think of me." He crept toward Spasoje, seized him by the neck, and forced him down. Spasoje thought it was Peko joking with him and said, "Go away, Peko, you have frightened me enough with Mirko." "It is not Peko," said Mirko, "and Peko will never again frighten you

¹ Celebration of patron saint's day.

with Mirko." He pulled out his dagger and with one blow cut off Spasoje's head.²

There are, however, two ways of avoiding vengeance. One of these is to have the clan publicly renounce responsibility for one of its members. The other consists in the "pacification" of the dead head or the wounds. This is an institution of blood-gold, a ceremony in which the culprit atones for the injury with gold and by personal humiliation. This is done according to the sentence passed by a people's court, composed of twenty-four judges nominated by the claimants:

They gave us the names of twenty-four men, and off went I over wood and rock to beg them to come, and luckily none refused. St. Sava's Day came. I killed two oxen and six sheep, took four rams and bought two barrels of wine. I gathered together my bratstvo (clan), my Kums (godfathers), and my pobratims (sworn brothers), and, God forgive me, they helped me with money and bread, and so I had all that was needed. And the men sat down and gave judgment thus: They held the head of Nikola Perovo as equivalent to that of my dead father. The head of Gjuro Trpkov they valued at 120 zecchins. One of their wounded was held equivalent to my wounds, and the other was valued as seven bloods (one "blood" was 10 zecchins, i.e., about 5 English pounds) and that woman's wound was reckoned as three bloods. And they decreed that I should bring six infants (in order that a man of the other bratstvo shall stand godfather to them and thus cement peace by spiritual relationship), and that I should hang the gun which fired the fatal shot round my neck and go on all fours for forty or fifty paces to the brother of the deceased Nikola Perovo. I hung the gun to my neck and began to crawl towards him, crying: "Take it, O Kum, in the name of God and St. John." I had not gone ten paces when all the people jumped up and took off their caps and cried out as I did. And by God, though I had killed his brother, my humiliation horrified him, and his face flamed when so many people held their caps in their hands. He ran up and took the gun from my neck. He took me by my pigtail and raised me to my feet, and, as he kissed me, the tears ran down his face, and he said, "Happy be our Kumstvo (Godfatherhood)." And when we had kissed, I too wept and said: "May our friends rejoice and our foes envy us." And all the people thanked him. Then our married women carried up the six infants, and he kissed each

² Pavičević, M., *Crnogorci u Pričama i Anegdotama* (Zagreb, 1923), Vol. 21, pp. 112-114.

of the six who were to be christened. Then all came to us and sat down to a full table . . .³

Blood revenge is an exclusively male duty, and not to avenge one's nearest kin means the complete loss of one's honor. A clansman who fails to avenge his relatives is not in a good position to take a stand against anyone, not even against the members of a weaker and less respectable clan, because anyone could say to him, "If you were worth anything, and if you had any honor at all, you would revenge your father (brother, cousin, sworn brother, etc.)." They would also tell him that he behaves "like a woman." His own mother would be ashamed of him and would often reproach him, "You had better take off your trousers and let me wear them, and you had better put on an apron!"⁴

Because of the tremendous importance of blood revenge as a means of protection and as a display of honor, self-respect, strength, and dominance, this institution has acquired a sacramental character among the people. "*Tko se osveti taj se i posveti*" (He who avenges himself, sanctifies himself), they say. According to the belief of the Montenegrins, the Christian credo itself, in its third point, expressly says, "The holy vengeance, the truth of God!"⁵

There are many popular sayings which express the vindictiveness of the Dinarics, and which indicate the extent to which revenge is considered necessary. They say: "It is easy to forget someone's good deeds, but not the bad ones"; "Blood can not fall asleep"; "Shoot with your gun him who throws a stone at you."⁶

The institution of blood feud in the Dinaric area helps strengthen the numerically stronger clans at the expense of the weaker ones. It is only the weak clans that accept the humiliation and the economic burden of the blood pacification ceremony. It is also only the weak clans that would publicly renounce responsibility for one of their members. In this way, the strong clans may not only terrorize the small ones, but they may always profit economically if they want to accept the blood-money.

In the past, some clans have been almost completely exter-

³ Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*

⁴ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 578.

⁵ This is a misinterpretation of the Old Slavonic words in which the Eastern Orthodox Serbs say their prayers.

⁶ Škarpa, V. J., *op. cit.*, p. 41.

minated through blood feuds; others have been forced to emigrate because they were unable to endure threats or to pay blood-gold. As a rule, when a member of a weak clan expected blood revenge, he would immediately flee to another district, across the borders, or to the mountains to join the *haiduks* (bandits).

In the practice of blood vengeance, trickery is sanctioned in the assassination of the offender. The favorite method of "taking blood" is to lie in ambush and fire, that is, to get the marked man into a trap and then fire at him from a safe place and distance, or actually stab him in the back.

The urge for dominance as institutionalized in *krvna osveta* is manifested not only in the desire to eliminate one's blood enemy by murder, but also in the great humiliation to which the adversary is subjected in the ceremony of blood pacification. The search of security is manifested in the extermination of the rival, or in the amount of gold paid and in the number of *kumstvos* (God fatherhoods) through which new friendly contacts are established.

The *krvna osveta* was inevitable under the conditions of insecurity and traditions of violence which existed in a society devoid of a feeling of unity and lacking a recognized central authority. In such circumstances, the drives toward self-aggrandizement and power recognized no bounds. Ardalić himself, analyzing the acts of revenge in his own community, says that the "man is not responsible because of his own will for the evil he does, but there must be something else that makes him do so, like an unjust judgment . . . And when the man sees that there is no justice which he should have, he gets it himself to the satisfaction of his heart."⁷

But even today, when the strengthening of the central authority makes it possible to treat the blood feud as a criminal offense, the Dinarics often seek revenge by destroying property, such as fruit trees, vineyards, and gardens, or by burning wheat fields and stables. These acts of vindictive violence imply less risk, because they are not punished as severely as murder, and because they can always be committed under the cover of night when the culprits can not be easily identified. At the same time, however, with the development of the state, the blood feud institution did not

⁷ Ardalić, V., *op. cit.*

completely disappear, but was transformed from clan level to national level and often took a political and national, instead of a personal, aspect.

By assuming a political aspect, the blood-feud idea came to play an especially important part in the life of the people, and even affected the international relations in southeastern Europe. Because of the strongly entrenched tradition of blood feuds with the growth of the state, political assassinations were widely condoned and eulogized as saintly national deeds. These assassinations were rationalized as a necessity to retaliate for defeat, humiliation or sufferings at the hands of a national enemy. An example of this was the murder of Sultan Murad by Milosh Obilich after Murad had defeated the army of the Serbian Prince Lazar, in 1389, in the battle of Kosovo. Milosh approached Murad feigning loyalty under vow, and then he slew him with a dagger he had hidden in his stocking. The ballads abound with praise and admiration for Milosh and his deed:

Milosh fell,
Pursued by myriads down the dell
Upon Sitnitsa's rusty brink,
Whose chilly waves will roll, I think,
So long as time itself doth roll,
Red with remorse that they roll o'er him.
Christ have mercy on his soul,
And blessed be the womb that bore him.
Not alone he fell. Before him
Twelve thousand Turkish soldiers fell,
Slaughter'd in the savage dell.
His right hand was wet and red
With the blood that he had shed,
And in that red right hand he had
(Shorn from the shoulder sharp) the head
Of the Turkish Tsar, Murad.⁸

The Serb Orthodox Church considers Milosh a saint. He is worshipped also in the school textbooks, where he is pictured as an example of exceptional heroism and self-sacrifice. According to Gibbons, this assassination "has been held up to posterity as the most saintly and heroic deed of national history."⁹

⁸ Meredith, Owen (Lytton), *op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁹ Gibbons, H. A., *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, 1916), pp. 117.

In the same way, the Serbs justify the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, in 1914, by Gavrilo Princip, a Dinaric youth. Archduke Ferdinand came to Bosnia with the intention of holding military maneuvers on the borders of Serbia, on June 28 (St. Vitus Day), the day when the Serbs commemorate their defeat by the Turks in the battle of Kosovo. The killing of the Archduke is defended as revenge for Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a region that was claimed by Serbia. They say that the slaying of the heir to the Austrian throne was a retaliation for the humiliation he inflicted on the Serbs because he had chosen St. Vitus Day, a day of grief for every Serb, for the display of his military power. Garvilo Princip is glorified as an outstanding national hero, comparable only to Milosh Obilich: "He (young Garvilo Princip) was not a criminal-terrorist . . . but a hero and avenger of Serb Kosovo. He killed Franz Ferdinand because this oppressor-conqueror came to the Serb land in order to ridicule the Serbs and the Serb Saint Vitus Day."¹⁰ After World War I, a monument was erected to Princip in Sarajevo, at the place of the assassination.

Among the events which led to the fall of Yugoslavia was the assassination of Croatian deputies in the midst of the Belgrade *Skupshтина* (Parliament), in 1926, by Punisha Ratichich, a member of the Vasoyevich tribe in the Dinaric area, and a Serb national representative. He justified his deed on the ground that he acted in defense of Serb national honor, which, according to him, was highly damaged by the speeches of Stjepan Radić and other Croatian leaders in the *Skupshтина*. A group of members of the Croatian Ustaša, a terrorist group of Dinaric background, retaliated against this act by conspiring to kill King Alexander Karageorgevich in 1934. They held the Serb King directly responsible for the death of the Croatian leaders.

As long as the social and political conditions in the Dinaric area are not radically changed, the blood-feud tradition will be used as a political instrument. Thus, the blood that flowed in the course of World War II, among rival Dinaric guerrilla factions, the Chetniks, the Ustašas, and the Partisans, is already aggravating internal relations in Yugo-

¹⁰ *Amerikanski Srbobran*, Pittsburgh, Pa., May 17, 1945.

slavia and may soon provoke grave international repercussions.

Bandits and Heroes

Villainy and valiancy are so intermingled in the Dinaric society that in Bukovica, for instance, some fathers show a certain amount of pride when their sons are "following the devil." The people of Bukovica say that such a boy is a "*junak*" (hero) and "daring." They claim that "a mischievous and cunning child will always develop into a worthy man, while one who is a coward and a fool as a child will always remain a fool." They compare a quiet, nonemotional, and passive person to an owl, the bird which symbolizes a dumb and unresponsive simpleton. Of a quiet child or a retired and reserved person, they say, "An owl he was, and an owl he will remain"; (*Ćuk bio, Ćuk osta*). They are convinced that from the behavior of a child one can safely judge what kind of man he will become, and they say, "From the trunk, one can see what kind of a tree will grow."¹ Accordingly, some parents openly encourage misbehavior among their children:

There are children who would bring to their mothers anything they had stolen. No mother would tell them, "Don't do it son," or something similar, but she would teach them how they could best accomplish their aim. There are children who search in the chests around the house as soon as they notice that a chest is open; they put in their hands and take out whatever they like. They unstitch silver jewelry from clothing, for instance, or take money which they find, or steal a piece of cloth. They only take a part of what they find; they would not take everything. They bring it all to their mother and she hides it away, especially if she has some quarrel with a sister-in-law or a brother-in-law, in which case she will do anything to get something of theirs. This thievery is done especially by girls between the ages of ten and fifteen, because they are at home more than the boys are. In case a *kuća* is divided, the children often steal in the neighborhood. They pull out onions, potatoes, or steal chickens. If a boy is inclined toward evil in his childhood, when he grows up he becomes quite a thief.²

¹ Ardalić, V., *op. cit.*, p. 21-23.

² Ardalić, V., *op. cit.*, p. 3.

The written laws of Montenegro deplored the training of children in thievery and the practice of teaching them to steal from other Montenegrins and from friendly neighboring states. At the same time, however, stealing from enemy states, such as the Ottoman Empire, was not prohibited, but rather encouraged by implication:

Knowing that most of the blood and evils spread throughout the land are caused by thieves, and that parents are most guilty, for they do not bring up their children fitly and in the fear of God, but teach them to rob others, we established today in this article that whosoever shall steal a horse or an ox or anything in Montenegro or the Brda or Primorja, or from our friends and neighbors in the Imperial and Royal States of Austria, he shall be expelled . . .³

In Bukovica, if one finds some old clothes belonging to a good friend, one is expected to return them to him. This is not so true, however, if one finds new clothes, and definitely not so if one finds money. For, in this region, they justify their stealing by claiming that "all the people are thieves." They say that people who do not take other people's property might not speak the truth, and might not do justice, and that these people too, are like thieves.⁴ Even the old heroes are known as thieves. It is said that, in the time when the Venetian Republic controlled Bukovica, these old heroes received lands from the Venetian Doge as a reward for their services to the republic in fighting the Turks. Not satisfied with the lands and meadows given them by the Doge, they seized fertile lands wherever they could and gave them to their "junior comrades and heroes."⁵

How well the institution of stealing is developed in Bukovica is shown by the numerous beliefs, rules and magic formulas which are devised for protecting the thief. The thievery is usually done at night, for it is believed that thieves have special powers at night. "They can see as well as in the daytime, the night gives them extra strength, and they are lighter at night and therefore able to cover more ground than in the daytime. The thief is cheerful at night. He says the night was born out of heaven, and the people say that the thief can see in the darkest night the same as

³ Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁴ Ardalić, V., *op. cit.*, p. 266.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 267.

in the daytime.”⁶ The starješina might notice or hear something and come out into the courtyard, but “he doesn’t see anyone, and he is well seen by the thief.”⁶ Therefore “either the devil or the Lord helps the thief.”⁶ The Bukovica thieves contend that “the night pushes them; that, in the daytime, even if they were allowed to, they could not climb into places into which they can climb at night when it is dark.”⁶ They claim to have double power at night, that they are “capable of lifting up a calf and taking it away at night, but in the daytime they could not do that even with a good ram.”⁶ At night, they have enough strength “to put two rams around their necks and run with them as if they were a pair of turkeys.”⁶ The thieves rationalize this feeling of security at night by saying that “whoever desires the night, she takes him for herself and gives him double power, and whoever hates or fears the night, she kills him.”⁶

Thieves often use magic to protect themselves. For instance, to be safe from dogs they make shoelaces from dog hide for their sandals, or place the sandals under a litter of puppies until the puppies open their eyes. Thus, the thieves have “the power to see at night the same as the dog does.”⁷

In some Dinaric regions, the act of theft is not considered wrong when it is successful, but is regarded as very shameful if the thief is caught in the act. The Montenegrins have a number of derisive proverbs about those who are unsuccessful in their attempts to steal: “Coming with full hope and going with empty hands”; “Where have you been? Nowhere. What have you been doing? Nothing . . .”; “He had a rabbit in his heart and a fox in his way.”⁸

Thieves, however, are not regarded highly, because thievery does not imply force and courage and is done without much risk. “The wolf grabs, he doesn’t steal,” “The hero does not steal, he grabs,” the Montenegrins say.⁹ It was therefore banditry which, in the past, was especially esteemed in the Dinaric society.

Banditry was institutionalized in the form of *haiduk* bands and *chetas*. The professional robber, or highway brigand, became known as a *chetnik* or *haiduk*. These outlaws

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

⁸ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 599.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 598.

were organized into bands of about five to fifteen or more, but, while the chetnik was always a member of a band, a haiduk might rob alone. In Montenegro, when a band was not strong enough to take things by force but had to resort to theft, it was scornfully called *lupežica* (a small band of thieves).

The haiduks gathered around an outlaw known for his courage and successful exploits. He was known as *arambaša*, or *chetovodja*, and he directed the band and led it in its plundering expeditions. The band was organized under iron discipline, and those not conforming to its rules were either expelled from the group or murdered. Booty was equally divided among all the members of the group, with the exception of the leader, who was entitled to a larger portion (*starješinstvo*).¹⁰

Dinaric brigandage was organized with the help of *jataks* (receivers), whose functions were to aid the bandits to attain their objective or to gain safety. Jataks were rewarded by the outlaws for their help, but a rather negative attitude toward jataks was maintained, because they gained without risking anything. For example, the Montenegrins say, "The jatak is worse than the thief," and "Whoever doesn't steal, but only hides what was stolen, eats for nothing."¹¹

Since the haiduks could thrive only with the help of jataks, they had to have such receivers and informants in every village. They often slept or rested in the houses of jataks, or spent the winter there until the weather again became favorable for looting. Saint George's Day, April 24, was known as the day of all the members of a haiduk band who had scattered to hibernate in safety.

In the past, the haiduks preferably attacked the merchants and people who owned larger herds of cattle and sheep. In the Ottoman days, many of these better-off people were of Moslem faith. The common Christians, antagonistic toward their Moslem rulers, although often cognizant of the identity of the highway robbers, were reluctant to denounce them to the authorities. The Dinarics admired the outlaws for their courage, but the people also feared the haiduks because they were known to be cruel and extremely revengeful against those who might betray them to the authorities.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 609-613.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 609-613.

These traditions and fears may explain why, in Montenegro, those who expose thieves and robbers are condemned by the people. Very seldom, if ever, would anyone in the Montenegrin regions report a robber or a thief, even if there were ten or twenty witnesses to the crime. A man who reports a thief or robber is derisively called a "spy." According to Bogišić, the people approve of disclosing the identity of a thief or a robber only if something has been stolen from a child or an orphan. In all other cases, they show admiration for those who refuse to betray the thieves and robbers to the authorities. The village of Brajice, on the Bay of Kotor, is especially admired in the surrounding territory for its discretion, and people note it is a good example and speak of "Strong faith like Brajice."¹²

Haiduks might take anything of value, but usually they took sheep, cattle, clothes, arms, or money. Things were seized by violence unless the victims consented to relinquish them without a fight. The haiduks were especially fond of exhibiting fine arms and clothes. They very often showed their generosity by giving away their possessions. The circumstances in which they lived prohibited their safely accumulating riches, but they showed great pride when praised for their generosity. Haiduk Veljko, a leader in the uprising against the Turks in 1815, was insatiable in quest for booty, and for the sake of a few piastres would hazard his life, says Ranke. Yet what he obtained he would immediately give away. "If I possess aught," he would say, "anyone may share it with me; but if I have nothing, woe be to him who has and does not freely share with me." He even quarreled with his wife because she refused to treat the members of his band as well as she treated him. "All of them," he said, "are my brothers." He greatly enjoyed being praised for his deeds, and such praise was sung to him at his table by ten singers. When the Russian officers asked him why he allowed people to call him Haiduk, a name that meant robber, he answered, "I should be ashamed if there were any greater robber than myself."¹³

Although the haiduks had the good will of the common people, they still lived in constant danger, and were exposed to great risks. The fears and anxieties which developed

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 639.

¹³ Ranke, L. von, *A History of Serbia* (London 1847), pp. 281-2.

under these conditions were manifested in many of their superstitions, such as the belief that it was very unlucky to meet a woman, or to see certain birds or animals. If they met one of these symbols of bad luck, especially a woman with a spindle, they would immediately return to their hiding places convinced that they would not have luck that day. On the other hand, it was considered lucky to meet a man bearing weapons. So far as quadrupeds were concerned, the sighting of a hare or a fox was the worst of omens; a wolf, or a snake, the best. "God help them if a crow or a cuckoo flew over them, because these bring great misfortune. On the contrary the dove is lucky, and so is any other bird except a black one." ¹⁴

Bogišić contends that the haiduks did not attack and abuse women. This claim may be connected with the idea that the women brought bad luck. The Dinaric ballads, however, tell of haiduks or plundering excursions taking advantage of Moslem women, and in certain instances historical evidence likewise proves the contrary of Bogišić's contention. Haiduk Veljko was known for his inclination to take advantage of women. When some other leaders of the uprising complained about such misbehavior, he exclaimed to his band: "When I came here, I thought I should be asked how many wounds I had received? How many brave companions I had lost? How many horses have been killed under me? But they asked how many girls I have kissed! Come! Let us depart!" ¹⁵

Both parts of the Dinaric area, the forested and the rocky, provide ideal terrain for outlawry and guerrilla warfare. The limited means of communication, the scattered settlements, the thick forests, and the almost inaccessible high rocks favor the ambush and the quick, successful getaway. But the natural environment, and even the economic circumstances of the area, are not enough to account for the development of banditry and of guerrilla activities. Similar regions elsewhere do not produce the same behavior complex. To explain what we find, we must look to the environment provided by the family for its members, together with certain other cultural and political factors.

Ballads frequently refer to haiduks as people without a

¹⁴ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 615.

¹⁵ Ranke, L. von., *op. cit.*, p. 250.

family or bonds of affection, as persons born of a "bad father and a worse mother," and not caring if they live or die. The haiduks are often described as individuals who carry all their possessions on their persons. Ballads may say that the gun is the true father and mother of the haiduk, and that he has no "faithful lover." All these allusions indicate a popular intuition that the roots of brigandage lie deep in family conflict and missing emotional attachments. But brigandage is also glamorized, and many youths are attracted by guerrilla adventures, roaming the mountains, fighting, collecting booty, and becoming celebrated in spoken poetry. Many young people flee to the mountains and engage in banditry to save their lives, or in order to avenge themselves in blood feuds. The truth is that banditry had its roots in the interpersonal relations of Dinaric society and find support in the economic and political conditions of the area.

In the earlier days, in many Dinaric regions, plundering was a legitimate way to earn a living for oneself and family. In tribal days, when tribes and clans were in continual warfare among themselves, almost every kuća in Montenegro and Herzegovina selected a man whose duty it was to aid the family income by guerrilla activities and piracy. There were some tribes in Montenegro who were especially skilled in looting, and who greatly increased their wealth thereby.

The international situation also favored banditry. Because of the division of the Roman Empire into East and West, and the split of Christianity into Greek Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, the Dinaric regions comprised, for centuries, a shifting borderline between two differing and conflicting worlds. The millennial struggle between empires, religions, and economic and political systems for the control of this territory has been waged since the coming of the warrior tribes into the Balkans from the Eurasian steppes and mountains, at the beginning of the Middle Ages, and has not ended yet. Therefore, large sections of the Dinaric area have remained a "no-man's-land" throughout the centuries, and the native populations have been encouraged from all sides to engage in banditry and warfare as a means of undermining the political regime across the borders. Any plundering expedition against the Moslem population, for instance, was rationalized as a patriotic fight "for the Holy Cross and golden liberty." Tribes who undertook such raids

soon became renowned for their bravery and heroism.¹⁶ Hence brigandage has been perpetuated as a recognized way both of making one's living and of achieving recognition and power.

It was these traditions and practices, supported by the fierceness of the Dinaric temper that made professional banditry and guerrilla activities flourish until the present times. According to Radić, a well-known Croatian ethnologist, a certain restlessness among the Orthodox in Herzegovina made most men eager to fight whenever the occasion arose. One of the Radić's local informants in that region claimed that "if someone asked the people whether they would prefer to attend a wedding party or go to battle, most of them would choose to fight."¹⁷ Cvijić, too, asserts that the Dinarics make war "simply for the joy of fighting." He says that the Montenegrins collect a force and say: "Where shall we go? Who knows a village that has not been plundered and burned in which we might find booty?" "If there is good plunder, let us plunder, and if not, let us cut off good heads." According to Cvijić, the shepherds in Montenegro do not care to raise sheep, but would rather wait for a border war. If there is none at the moment, they make one, and they find particular pleasure in bringing back a large quantity of booty.¹⁸

Banditry is eulogized in all Dinaric heroic poetry. According to these ballads, Prince Marko spent all his life in forcefully appropriating other people's earnings in preference to the alternative of laboring on the land:

With his mother, Yevrosima, his thirst did Marko slake
On the red wine. When they had drunk, to him his mother
spake:

"O thou, Prince Marko, prithee cease from the ravage and the
raid;

Never on earth is evil with a good deed repaid.

Weary is thy mother of washing from thy shirts the crimson
stain

But do thou now yoke ox to plow, and plow the hill and the
plain.

¹⁶ Jovičević, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

¹⁷ Radić, A., *Izvjješće. Zbornik* (1899), Vol. 4, p. 301. See concerning Radić in Tomašić, D., "Personality Development in the Zadruga Society," *Psychiatry* (1942), Vol. 5, p. 236.

¹⁸ Cvijić, J., *op. cit.*, p. 70.

Sow thou the white wheat, little son, that thou and I may sup."

Marko harkened to his mother, and he yoked the oxen up;
He plows not the hill, nor the valley; but he plows the tsar's
highway.

Some janissaries came thereby; three packs of gold had they:

"Plow not the Tzar his highway, Prince Marko," said they then.

"Ye Turks, mar not my plowing!" he answered them again.

"Plow not the Tzar his highway, Prince Marko," they said anew

"Ye Turks, mar not my plowing!" he answered thereunto.

But Marko was vexed; in anger he lifted ox and plow,

And the Turkish janissaries he slew at a blow,

And their three packs of treasure to his mother he bore away:

"Lo, mother, what my plowing hath won for thee today!"¹⁹

The admiration and open encouragement of piracy and mountain robbery when directed against the out-group, or the enemy, found its expression even in state laws. The Code Danilo, for instance, by prohibiting such practices "only in time of peace," encourages "chetas, brigandage, theft and all malversations" in time of war:

In time when we are at peace with the Turkish districts on our borders, chetas, brigandage, theft and all malversations are forbidden, and all loot shall be returned and the thief punished. But only in time of peace.²⁰

Since the underprivileged classes and peoples idealized the bandits and discovered in them those who "took from the rich and gave to the poor" and those who fought for "justice and national freedom," the outlaws became a rallying group in the days of national awakening at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Traders, priests and lay intelligentsia joined the haiduks and formed the first groups of guerrilla fighters with an ideological program. These groups of outlaws then organized regular armies and led popular uprisings and wars against the Turkish rule. The experience of haiduks as guerrilla fighters, their endurance in hardships, and their whole system of receivers and informants were a great asset in fighting the Turks.

It was this same system of guerrilla warfare, originally developed by the Dinaric haiduks, that was so successfully adopted in World War II, as the best way to fight the Ger-

¹⁹ Noyes, G. P. and Bacon, L., *op. cit.*, p. 172.

²⁰ Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*

man and Italian armies of occupation. In the course of that war, as in the days of uprisings against the Turks, the outlaws became army leaders and builders of the state.

The Position of Women

Alongside the glorification of masculine prowess is a positive contempt for women. In all Dinaric regions, women are held in very low esteem. In Montenegro, the birth of a girl is regarded as an extreme misfortune, and for that reason the Montenegrin never supports his female children. They say that at the birth of a girl "even the fire weeps."¹ In Stari Vlah,² if a man has only daughters, he has great difficulty in finding husbands for them, for the potential suitors are afraid that the girls from such a manless breed might not be able to give birth to male children. While male children are welcomed as potential fighters and heroes, Dinaric society looks upon female children as "*tudja kost*" (alien bone) and "*tudja sreća*" (alien fate),³ that is, something that will eventually belong to someone else and will therefore be of no value to the family or the clan.

The low value of women in contrast with that of men is manifested also in judicial procedure. On the Bay of Kotor, in earlier days, the oath of one man was equal to that of three women;⁴ and in the ceremony of blood pacification, as mentioned before, the wound of a man equals seven "bloods" and that of a woman only three "bloods."

The primary function of a woman is the bearing of male children; and, next to this, her main duty is to perform tasks of physical labor. Besides doing housework, weaving, cooking, spinning, and tending the babies, the women do most of the work in the fields and tend the livestock. Carrying wood from the forest to the village is also the exclusive work of women. One can often see men traveling empty-handed while the women carry heavy loads. One also sees men riding on horses and mules while their women carry heavy loads behind them.⁵ The women are expected to work constantly. If a woman is ever seen sitting down and resting from work,

¹ Georgevitch, T., *op. cit.*, p. 130.

² A region in the eastern part of the Dinaric area.

³ Georgevitch, T., *op. cit.*, p. 130.

⁴ Georgevitch, T., *Nash Narodni Zivot* (Belgrade, 1930), Vol. 4, p. 12.

⁵ Georgevitch, T., *op. cit.*, p. 14.

the men make derisive remarks about her, and say: "She is sitting as if she were a man."⁶

Pregnant women are not spared work even on the day of birth or immediately thereafter. It is not unusual for a woman to give birth to a child in the field or on the mountain while tilling the soil or cutting wood. Even then it is considered a disgrace for her to come home without a load of wood on her shoulders, as well as the child in her kerchief. When she arrives home, if it is a male child which has been born, the *suekrva* (mother-in-law) shouts loudly so that all the neighbors can hear, "*Rodi vučica vuka*" (the she-wolf gave birth to a wolf), and the child is named *Vuko* (little wolf).⁷

In Montenegro, the women never eat at the same table with the men. They eat only what is left after the men have eaten. They are expected to kiss the men's hands, to rise when they enter, and to step aside when the men pass by. When Miss Durham was in Montenegro, she was ranked as a man because of her English origin and her social position, and consequently the Montenegrin women refused to eat with her. Here is what she says:

When, after a good deal of discussion, it was decided to rank me as a man, and I ate at the male table, women often would refuse to eat with me, saying that it would be shameful . . . Krsto, . . . used to give himself great airs to the women in the houses we visited. He thrust out his hand for them humbly to kiss on arrival, and shouted his orders rudely to them. Any woman sitting by the roadside when a man passed at once arose and gave humble greetings. Krsto always was very lordly on these occasions.⁸

The superiority of men over women is manifested also in the brother-sister relations in the *kuća*. Male children, no matter how young, are always higher in rank than the female members of the family. Brothers consider themselves not only the protectors of their sisters, but also their superiors, and take over the authority of parents when these are absent.

Both the brothers and the parents consider it a great shame and calamity if a girl in the *kuća* becomes pregnant

⁶ Jovičević, A., *op. cit.*, p. 70.

⁷ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁸ Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*, p. 293.

before marriage. In such a case, the girl has to be hidden from her brothers or father, who might go so far as to kill her:

As soon as a girl's clansmen notice that she is pregnant, they feel as if they had lost their heads. In such a case, her brother or her own father may kill the girl in his rage, but her mother or sister-in-law usually takes her to the kuća of a friend in her mother's clan to watch her and to take care of her. Such a misfortune greatly affects not only the girl's kuća but also those of all her relatives, especially if she is from a good, honest, and well-known clan. They believe that the blood-line is broken by such shameful pregnancy. For a few days, the members of the girl's kuća do not eat and do not drink; no one says a word and all are as angry as if they had just buried a twenty-five-year-old youth. One forgets about work; one forgets about the kuća and property; one forgets about everything, and any other evil would be forgotten because of such a shameful act.⁹

According to Bogišić, "There is nothing worse than a *kopile* (bastard)." ¹⁰ At the mere mention of it, there is no person who will not frown or show some other sign of disapproval, for "a *kopile* is considered to be the ugliest, the most shameful, and the most sinful thing in the world!" ¹⁰ The people of Montenegro and Herzegovina believe that the village in which a *kopile* is buried will be exterminated and devastated. Therefore strangled bastards are always buried outside the village, in the forests and caves. The worst offense for a man is to be called "*kopile*." ¹⁰

Despite such ideas and beliefs, however, it appears that girls are often seduced before marriage. To cope with the shame and other difficulties connected with illegitimate pregnancy and illegitimate birth, the pregnant Dinaric girls resort to abortion. According to Bogišić, abortions in Montenegro and Herzegovina are provoked with the help of a few (ten to fifteen) juniperlike berry seeds, which the pregnant girl swallows. This, Bogišić believes, became a practice after the herdsmen in Montenegro and Herzegovina noticed that the swallowing of such seeds by the sheep resulted in abortion.¹¹

⁹ Jovičević, A., *op. cit.*, p. 65.

¹⁰ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 605.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 605.

Along with the inferior status of women, and the tendency of men to exploit them, there is also a tendency on the part of the men to take a protective attitude toward the female sex. For instance, it is considered one of the greatest sins to seduce a girl and not marry her. It is also inexcusable to kill a woman.¹² To criticize an unmarried girl is regarded as one of the greatest wrongs, and such an offense "can never be expiated,"¹³ they say.

Ballads, too, show an ambivalent attitude toward women. Sometimes they pay tribute to their fine qualities, to their self-sacrifice, to their beauty or modesty, and their love and loyalty. But the heroes of the Dinaric ballads are also likely to deal rudely with women, and to change suddenly from admiration to extreme hate. In this event, a woman may be killed and mutilated. In a ballad, Marko, struck by the beauty of Rosanda, asked her to marry him or one of his two sworn brothers. But when Rosanda not only refused, but also offended the wooers, Marko lost his self-control:

Marko raged and was wroth out of wit,
One step he made and a mighty spring,
And by the hand he seized the damsel,
He drew the sharp dagger from his girdle,
He cut off her right arm;
He cut off her arm at the shoulder,
And gave the right arm into her left hand,
And with the dagger he put out her eyes,
And wrapped them in a silken kerchief,
And thrust them into her bosom,
Then spoke Marko in this wise:
"Choose now, thou maid Rosanda,
Choose now which thou wilt,
Whether the Turkish minion,
Or Milos the mare's son,
Or Relja the bastard!"¹⁴

It appears that the position of women in the Dinaric society has affected the development of the woman's personality. According to Miss Durham, who studied the Eastern Orthodox population closely, and according to Bishop Palunko, who lived among the Roman Catholics of Herze-

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 591.

¹³ Georgevitch, T., *op. cit.*, p. 51-53.

¹⁴ Low, D. H., *op. cit.*, p. 10.

govina, the women in these regions appear to be rather mild and nonaggressive, as compared with the men. They do not show the same revengeful and pugnacious tendencies that the men do:

The girls and the married women are of a mild nature. I never heard of women nagging or wrangling among themselves; never do they quarrel with anyone. Be they sisters, brides, sisters-in-law, or mothers-in-law, they always address each other with the most pleasant words, such as "my sister," "my son," "my gold," "my heart," "my eyes," "my apple," "my rose," "my flower," "my turtle-dove," "my dawn," etc. And these words are accompanied by such phrases as: "mayst thou be lively," or "mayest thou be gay," "mayst thou dance in heaven," or, for instance: "Janjo, my gold, mayst thou be lively, hand me a glass of water." They would address the man in the same way: "my falcon," "my hero," "my knight," "mother's pride," "my lap," "my chicken," "my little bird," "my crown," etc. If it is necessary to reprimand someone, they would never insult, but they would accompany their reproaches with phrases like "mayst no evil fall upon you," "mayst thou never mourn after your eyes," "may the angels hold you," "may no snake bite you," etc.¹⁵

According to other sources, however, aggressiveness among women in Dinaric regions is not lacking, but it takes a different form than that of the Dinaric men. Some of the more common overt forms of female animosity are shown in their turning to black magic. Illicit premarital and extra-marital love affairs may also be a form of aggressiveness which compensates women for their maltreatment at the hands of parents, brothers, and husbands.

The ill will of Dinaric women may take the form of invoking malediction and exposing breasts. Banović who made an intensive study of his native region in the Biokovo mountain area of Dalmatia, says the women there pronounce curses more than men. A woman who is often heard imprecating against someone is known as a *samoklečina*, and it is believed that the evil she invokes may easily overtake one:

In our community those who pronounce malediction are mostly women, seldom men. A person who can easily enchant

¹⁵ Palunko, V., "Običaji u Popovu u Hercegovini," *Zbornik* (1907), Vol. 12, p. 266. "My son" is used among women as a complimentary expression, because of the implied masculine quality which is so highly appreciated in Dinaric society.

by invoking a curse is called *samoklečina*, or *samokletnik*; what they say will happen to you. The worst curses are those pronounced when somebody kneels on his bare knees "toward the sun from the East." The worst imprecations are those of parents, but a father's curse is heavier than that of a mother. A girl's curses are gravest when she is invoking evil against a youth who deceived her, or people who are trying to besmirch her name. My late aunt Bare, I am told, was quite a *samoklečina*. Once she cursed her son Mijo, invoking his death, and she found him dead when she came home from work . . .¹⁶

But many other forms of hostile behavior which are common to men in that society, such as warlike activities, banditry, blood feud and killing are tabooed for women. The women are tamed by men and are restricted to a few very limited forms of aggressiveness. This may be the reason why suicides are more common among women than among men.¹⁷ Also, neurasthenia and hysteria are very common among women, possibly for the same reason:

They often suffer from neurasthenia and hysteria. A curious form is not unknown among the women of Macedonia and Montenegro . . . It begins as a hiccough, and becomes more and more intense until it is a violent and fast-recurring spasm of the diaphragm. The hiccoughs become louder and louder till they are uninterrupted crowing like that of a hoarse rooster. So quick are they that the patient cannot breathe. Just as she appears to be in danger of choking, she suddenly pulls herself together, draws a long breath, gives a gasp or two, and recovers in a few minutes.¹⁸

It appears that the low social position of women in Dinaric society results from the domineering tendency of men. The low status of women enables males to satisfy their drives for self-assertion and for the exercise of power, drives which seem to dominate Dinaric men. At the same time, these relations make the women immune to many of those threats to which the men of that society are exposed. Being low in the scale of social values, and having accepted that position, the women are less concerned with their status than the men are with theirs. They also enjoy more safety,

¹⁶ Banović, "Vjerovanja," *Zbornik* (1918), Vol. 23, p. 205.

¹⁷ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 25.

¹⁸ Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*, p. 273.

because they do not engage in warlike activities and are protected from blood feuds and other dangers which the men can not avoid. Since, from early childhood, women are looked upon as worthless, they avoid the overindulgence in love (or outright spoiling and pampering) and overstrictness in disciplining to which male children are exposed. They do not lack aggressiveness, but owing to differences in training, function, status and security, women have developed different forms of aggressiveness than men and a type of personality of their own—a type having more in common with one found occasionally among men of the lower Dinaric classes than with the pattern characteristic of the upper and ruling strata.

This conclusion is supported by the fact that, in changed circumstances and in a new ideological environment, the personality of the Dinaric woman may change and show new and more intense forms of aggressiveness. In World War II, for instance, many Dinaric women, freed by the Communist ideology from traditional restrictions, became outstanding as guerrilla leaders and fighters.

In a similar way, the ideology of the Croatian peasant movement had freed Catholic Dinaric women from their social seclusion, and had made a number of them politically active. Before the spread of the Croatian peasant movement from Zadruga regions of upper Croatia into Dinaric areas, it was not considered quite proper for a woman even to go to school and learn how to read and write; and for her to appear at a political meeting or to address such a meeting was something unheard of and definitely shameful. With the advent of the Peasant movement, however, not only did the percentage of literate women sharply increase among the Dinaric Catholics, but a number of Catholic Dinaric women became prominent as party organizers, speakers, poets, and writers.

The parent-child antagonism, formerly noticed only in parent-son relations, seems to have manifested itself in these changed circumstances also in parent-daughter relations. Relieved, with the help of Communist ideology, of their traditional "repressions," the Dinaric women became free to express hostility against their parents. A daughter of General Mikhaïlovich, the Chetnik leader, for instance, joined the

Partisans, the rival guerrilla movement, and as previously mentioned, publicly accused her father of treachery.¹⁰

Marriage

That the main purpose of marriage in Dinaric society is to increase the number of fighters is symbolically demonstrated in Montenegro in the course of the marriage ceremony. The mother-in-law receives the bride at the doorway, holding a male child. A skin rug is spread at the doorway and weapons are hidden under it, for it is believed that by stepping on the weapons the bride is more likely to bear a warrior.¹ The bride then carries the child into the house and gives him a present.

Marriage is also a means of increasing contacts and friendly relations with outsiders. The strengthening of family and clan ties through marriage is reflected in the especially cordial relationship that is established between a man's family and his wife's relatives. The latter are called *prijatelji* (friends) and they are always treated in a particularly hospitable manner, unless conflicts and clashes develop between the two kućas. The need to seek security through marriage is particularly noticeable in the desire to marry a girl from an *oglašena kuća* (famous house), that is, "from a large, well-to-do family, in which there are plenty of *muške glave* [men's heads], and which belongs to a strong clan or tribe."² Most desirable are the kućas that are "known for their *junačko koljeno* [breed of heroes]."² The wooers, therefore, take good notice of the "appearance of the girl's mother."² "Heroes' breed, heroes begets,"² they say. It is also important that the bride be "robust, that is, tall and healthy, in order to perform heavier labors,"³ and in order that she may "bear strong and *gorostasan* [mountainlike] children."³ Strength more than beauty recommends a girl for an early marriage. "From a bad field, nothing but straw,"³ they say.

Customarily, a girl marries between the ages of sixteen and twenty, but may marry when older, even at twenty-five

¹⁰ *Politika*, *Op. Cit.*, Nov. 29, 1944.

¹ Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*, p. 208.

² Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 164.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

and thirty years of age. Sometimes, however, circumstances may dictate marriage for a girl at as early an age as ten.⁴ Such a marriage might be contracted to cement the ties of friendship between two men or two families; it might also result from keen competition over the girls of outstanding kućas. The need to improve one's status through marriage ties sometimes leads the Montenegrins to betroth even their infants. Medaković, a student of Montenegrin society, claims that sometimes the Montenegrin betroths his son and daughter while they are still in the cradle. He says that the Montenegrin "likes to make friends with outstanding ones, and this is why he tries to befriend them as soon as possible."⁵

The order in which the boys and girls of the kuća get married follows a strict principle of seniority. The whole family is greatly disgraced if a younger brother or a younger sister is married before an older one. Only in very exceptional cases, such as mental deficiency or deformity, may this rule be overlooked.⁶ The order of marriage in the Dinaric joint-family system follows logically from the principle of seniority, age differentiation, and sense of rank which so strongly permeate the family organization and the whole social structure.

Because of the circumstances which dictate the choice of a mate, age difference between the marriage partners is often completely disregarded. The bridegroom may already be a mature adult and the bride still a child, or vice versa. The marriage candidates usually have nothing to say about the time of marriage or the choice of a mate. All that is entirely in the hands of the heads of the respective kućas. Sometimes the marriage partners see each other for the first time in the church during the marriage ceremony. Sometimes a false bridegroom or a false bride is smuggled in and married instead of the one originally chosen. Such a situation is most likely to occur when a marriage tie is agreed upon between a strong and a weak kuća or clan. A strong kuća or a strong clan might want to take advantage of its strength by substituting a less desirable candidate for the original one, and

⁴ Georgevitch, T. *op. cit.*, p. 22. A female child becomes a *djevojka* (girl) as soon as her breasts start to grow. A male child becomes *mladić* (youth) when he is around sixteen years of age and begins to bear weapons.

⁵ Quoted by Georgevitch, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁶ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 134; Georgevitch, T., *op. cit.*, p. 39.

the weak kuća or clan would have to accept the substitution without protest because of the fear of reprisal and blood revenge.

Because of the exogamous practice, brides often have to be brought from other, sometimes distant, localities. In this case, the journey and the marriage festivities may take several days, because of the lack of good roads or rapid means of transportation. The farther the bride has to be brought, the more important and outstanding is the wedding, because of the greater expense and risk involved. Such a wedding party may be composed of forty, fifty, or even more wedding guests on the bridegroom's side and, as they pass, all the people along the road gather to see them.

Because of church influences, marriages are customarily celebrated only in certain months of the year. During these months, two wedding parties going in opposite directions may meet on the road. Since the roads, often only paths, are narrow, one wedding party has to make room for the other to pass. For one party to step aside, however, is an admission of inferiority, the last thing a Dinaric would ever be willing to admit. Therefore, it often happened in the past that when two wedding parties of equal strength, equally armed, met on the road, the inevitable outcome was an armed clash. Occasionally such a fight resulted in the almost complete extermination of both wedding parties. If two wedding parties meet on an open plain, custom demands that they engage in competitive games. In the past, rivalry and fighting often developed from such games, resulting in a number of wounded and dead on each side. There are many ballads which describe these wedding riots. The places where such encounters had occurred, and where the wedding guests were buried, are still called *svatovska groblja* (the wedding parties' graveyards):

Two wedding parties met each other, one from Zasad and the other from Mustač. Two wedding leaders came out with wine flasks and they treated each other according to wedding customs. After them, two standard bearers came out, and they started to dance on the meadow, and to fly their flags to show which one was the more skillful. It happened that the standard bearer from Zasad was better as a dancer and better in flying the flag. The standard bearer from Mustač was angered and humiliated because the two wedding parties and the two

brides looked on. So, out of spite, he hit with his flag-spear the flag of the Zasad's standard bearer. The other felt ashamed, took out the small gun from his girdle, and killed Mustač's standard bearer . . . A wedding party's power is stronger than that of the Czar and each wedding guest is to the other wedding guest more of a brother than if he had been born of the same mother. The wedding guests, being youthful and impetuous, full of food and drink, started against each other with guns and daggers until they all lay on one heap.⁷

In each locality there are, on the average, only two or three outstanding kučas with especially desirable mates. Since every family head is trying to form marriage ties only with the more famous and outstanding kučas, there are many young men of less well-known families who do not have sufficiently strong backing to be able to get the partners they desire. Another factor is that the regular wedding ceremonies are too expensive for less well-to-do families. Or in the border areas, between herdsmen and land cultivators, it is difficult to get a bride because of the high bride price, or because of the antagonistic attitude of the farming folk toward the sheepraisers. Under these conditions, a young Dinaric may resort to marriage by capture, in order to secure a desirable mate, or to avoid wedding expenses.

Marriage by capture is known as *otmica*, and it often results in violent and bloody clashes:

One goes to an *otmica* with weapons, the same as to war. Sometimes the *otmičari* (*otmica* men) lie in ambush for the girl when she is with the herd, or when she comes to the well to get water. They catch her and take her away. Sometimes they attack the girl's kuča (the same as *haiduks*), break into it, bind the girl's father and brothers until they find the girl, and take her away. Sometimes her brothers and relatives fight with the *otmičari* and much blood is shed. For this reason, it is not easy for the *otmičari* to attack a kuča in which they know there are many of the girl's relatives, and especially if the village is united. In such a case, the peasants, as soon as they hear the guns and the fighting, take their own guns and run to help. It is a disgrace for the whole village if a girl is captured from the village, but it is a still greater disgrace for the band of capturers if they come back without a girl. Once the *otmičari* get the girl into their hands, they will not give

⁷ Georgevitch, T., *op. cit.*, p. 106-116, quoting Vrčević.

her up, even if they all have to perish. If the girl hesitates and does not want to go, they pull her by the hair and beat her with a stick as one would beat an ox. The capturers do not dare to take the girl to the prospective bridegroom's kuća, because sometimes the peasants, together with the girl's relatives, go after them in pursuit. Instead, they take her into the forest, where the groom marries her in some hut (belonging to a forest guard or to a shepherd), or he marries her right in the midst of the forest. The priest must perform the ceremony, even if he does not want to, otherwise he will be beaten. When those who pursue the capturers come to their village, all the people of that village come out before the party of pursuers and start in a nice way to talk peace. If they succeed in making peace in this way, it is good. Sometimes the pursuers, if they do not find the capturers with the girl in the village, burn the houses and possessions of the one for whom the girl was captured, and of his relatives. But in the end, they make peace just the same.⁸

The influence of the Catholic Church in the Dinaric regions served to weaken the clan ties, and to eliminate ancient customs which were not in accordance with the teachings of Christianity. Bishop Palunko, who lived in Herzegovina as a Catholic parish priest at the end of the nineteenth century, gives a description of his effort to stop marriage by capture among his parishioners.⁹ According to him, Herzegovinian Catholics, unlike the Orthodox, did not resort to arms to defend their honor or to regain the girl, once she was captured.¹⁰

Among the Eastern Orthodox, the church ceremony may be performed immediately after the bride is stolen, but among the Roman Catholics, when the bride is captured by force, the church marriage is always performed some time later. In the meantime, the prospective bridegroom is expected to leave the house and come back only after he has received permission from the church authorities to marry the captured girl, who is asked for her consent. Among the Eastern Orthodox, the bride is sometimes brought to the bridegroom's home without being married, and the church ceremony is performed sometimes as late as a year or two after the capture. The bridegroom does not leave, and the

⁸ Vuk Karadžich, quoted in Georgevitch, T., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2.

⁹ Palunko, V., "Zenidba," *Zbornik* (1908), Vol. 13, p. 235.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

captured girl is recognized as his wife by the starješina. Among both Catholics and Orthodox, no discrimination is made against a captured wife.

In the past, marriage by capture often took place without the consent of the girl, but nowadays the capture is usually arranged. A girl may elope with a man when she is threatened with the possibility of being given in marriage to a man she does not like. In this case, marriage by capture functions as a safety valve in a society where the youth are often frustrated in their intentions by the absolute rule of their elders.

Until clan solidarity was broken, neither the Church nor the Civil Law was very effective in exterminating this custom. With the disintegration of the Dinaric clan system, however, the rise of the state, and the strengthening of Church authority, the practice is gradually weakening and nowadays occurs only sporadically.¹¹

The bride is expected to be a virgin. If she is not, the parents-in-law have the right to return the girl to her parents. Loss of virginity before marriage is considered to be a great disgrace to both families. The parents-in-law, however, are inclined to protect the girl, because they are the ones who chose her. If the bridegroom in Montenegro has any doubts concerning the virginity of his bride, he complains to his mother, but she tries to convince him that his doubts are without foundation.¹² In earlier days, in some parts of eastern Dinaric area, virginity had to be publicly demonstrated by exhibiting the bride's nightgown with traces of blood in the morning after the first night on which she had slept with the bridegroom. The failure to produce such evidences of virginity brought great disgrace to the bride's parents, and symbolic protests were made, which consisted of pouring wine and brandy into a glass which had no bottom. The purpose of these demonstrations was to bring strong pressure to bear upon the bride's parents to expiate the shame by bestowing gifts upon the bridegroom.

As soon as a bride comes to her bridegroom's house, she

¹¹ In certain circumstances, the stealing of wives was also common in the past. In Montenegro, for instance, if a man married a woman who had deserted a husband in another tribe or clan, it was the duty of the deserted husband and of his clansmen to avenge the disgrace by stealing any wife from the offending clan and marrying her to the deserted man.

¹² Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 261.

undergoes a severe training in discipline and adjustment to her new environment. In Konavlje,¹³ this training starts during the course of the marriage ceremonies and consists of the bride's having to bow deeply to all her new relatives while the wedding guests are singing a wedding song depicting the status of the bride:¹⁴

You are welcome, our bride,
May you bring us good news from all the *družina*,¹⁵
And the best one, to the bridegroom,
From you, maiden.
Oh, maiden, our sister,
Take short steps,
Bow frequently;
*Svekars*¹⁶ are seated by rank,
They look at you.
Oh, maiden, our sister,
Take short steps,
Bow frequently;
*Svekrvas*¹⁷ are seated by rank,
They look at you.
Oh, maiden, our sister,
Take short steps,
Bow frequently;
*Djevers*¹⁸ are seated by rank,
They look at you.
Oh, maiden, our sister,
Take short steps,
Bow frequently;
*Zavas*¹⁹ are seated by rank,
They look at you.
Oh, maiden, our sister,
Take short steps
Bow frequently.

In Herzegovina, the custom of bowing to the elders is combined with kissing the faces and the hands of married male relatives. In some localities, the young bride has to continue the custom of kissing the hands of all adult male

¹³ A region near Dubrovnik in Dalmatia.

¹⁴ Palunko, V., *op. cit.*, p. 259.

¹⁵ Collective of kuća members.

¹⁶ Fathers-in-law.

¹⁷ Mothers-in-law.

¹⁸ In this connection, brothers-in-law.

¹⁹ Sisters-in-law.

relatives from one to three years after she is brought to her husband's home, in other regions even longer:

The young bride bows to everyone. In certain localities this custom is continued for a long time, and in others a relatively shorter time, usually from one to three years. The bride never goes to any gathering, or to church, or on a trip, alone, but she is always accompanied by the djever. It is customary on holidays for the people to gather together in front of the church before the Mass. The men smoke and talk, and the women stand in small groups. When the young bride comes into the churchyard, she first approaches the man whom she knows best, bows to him and kisses him on the cheek. She inquires about his health and about the health of his family, and before she goes away from him, she bows again. Then she greets every other adult man; she bows very deeply and kisses each one on the cheek. In this way she goes around the whole group. When she is bowing and kissing them, the men are generally passive and neither speak nor move. They continue to smoke and talk to their neighbor as if she were not there. If there happens to be a stranger or Moslem who is unknown to her, she also bows to him, but kisses him only on the hand. If her own husband is there, she does not bow to him or kiss him; she ignores him as if he were not there. After she has visited all, she again goes to the side of the djever and stands by him. If somebody she knows comes to the church, she goes up to him, bows and kisses him. But as far as the women are concerned, there is no end of embracing and kissing with them. There is no communication with the young men, except when the youth is a relative or is from a friendly kuća of another village. Then she treats him the same as other adults. Generally speaking, wherever she goes, and whomever she meets, the young bride must bow to everyone.²⁰

Since the primary function of women is to bear warriors, their relations with their husbands are reduced almost exclusively to sexual intercourse: "Don't you know," says Vrčević, "that the women in relation to their husbands are nothing but slaves, and that the men get married for nothing else but to have offspring, the same as if they would buy a field to bear bread . . ." ²¹

²⁰ Palunko, V., *op. cit.*, p. 264.

²¹ Quoted by Georgevitch, *op. cit.* Vrčević was a native of the Bay of Kotor. He expressed his observations on the life of the Dinaric people in short stories.

In accord with this attitude toward marriage, any open sign of affection between husband and wife is strictly tabooed. When the husband comes home, the wife is expected to arise and serve him, but she is not supposed to inquire about either his health or his journey. If he is absent, no matter for how long, she is not expected ever to ask about him directly; she must learn about him indirectly, by listening secretly to other people's conversations, or from other women in the kuća who are friendly to her.

This principle of avoidance is manifested also in the husband's aloofness toward his wife. He is not to be seen talking to her except when giving orders, and she must follow them without questioning. He must avoid mentioning his wife before others, but, if he is forced by circumstances to talk about her, he has to apologize for it with the words, "*Da oprostiš*" (mayest thou excuse).

In order to show his strictness and to test his power and dominance, the husband is supposed to beat his wife periodically. In the past, he was privileged to chastise his wife not only when she was guilty, but even when she was completely innocent. The Dinarics are heard to say: "Beat your wife all the time; if you beat her when she is not guilty, it is to prevent her from doing wrong, and if you beat her when she is guilty, it is because she deserved it"; "He who does not beat his wife is not a man"; "Strike the woman and the horse if you want them to obey you"; "Strike the woman and the snake on the head." ²²

The need of self-assertion seems to be the main motive behind this attitude toward wives, and behind the wife-and-child-beating so prevalent in Dinaric society. This need is of special importance in a sharply stratified society, in which everyone's position in the social scale is constantly being threatened. By dominating one's wife and children, one at least feels he has the power and strength which are the main means of self-preservation in that society. The accumulated feeling of frustration to which Dinaric men are subjected, because of constant need of submission to those higher in rank, presses for release and compensation. Perhaps men have found wife-and-child-beating and domination of the family a very convenient channel of emotional discharge. Wife-beating and wife-hating, combined with child-beating, are socially approved and institutionalized; they have de-

veloped into a social duty, and so have become an expedient channel to externalize one's hostilities without much apparent harm to the society as a whole.

If the wife does not take the property to which she is entitled according to written laws of Western origin, she is always welcome to visit with her parents for a few days. This is often a temporary escape from an unbearable situation in the home of her husband. It is difficult for her to run away or to desert her husband entirely, because the Dinarics consider that "The good bride suffers in silence; it is only the bad one who complains to her clan."²²

Compensation for the sufferings from maltreatment at the hands of the husband sometimes may take the form of unfaithfulness, but woe to her if she is discovered:

If the man starts to notice anything out of the ordinary about his wife's actions, he becomes suspicious and watches her every step. If he catches her with another man, it is too bad for her and for that man if the husband has a heroic heart. The old custom was that the husband of such a wife killed the offending man and cut off the nose of his wife. A cut nose was the greatest disgrace that could be brought upon a woman. After he had cut her nose, the husband could also divorce her.²³

The Code Danilo, in Article 72, expressly legalized this custom: "Should a man find his wife unfaithful and catch her in the act, he may kill both parties . . ." ²⁴ When Miss Durham expressed the idea that the unfaithful husbands should be subjected to the same treatment, the Montenegrins answered that, if they were, there would be hardly any men left in Montenegro.²⁵

The Dinaric society does, however, provide the wife with a trusted friend and protector upon whom she can always rely for advice, help and affection. The person entrusted with such a function is the *djever* (groomsman). A peculiar relationship exists between the bride and the groomsman, which starts the day of the marriage ceremonies, when the groomsman sleeps with the bride:

²² Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 49 and 271.

²³ Jovičević, A., *op. cit.*, p. 43.

²⁴ Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*, p. 85.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

The first two or three nights after the young bride is brought to the house (and while there are still some wedding guests in the house), it is the *djever* who lies down with her. He is usually the bridegroom's brother or relative. The bride and the *djever* do not undress but sleep dressed. One or two nights after, the *zaova* (the sister of the bridegroom) or *jetrua* (the bridegroom's sister-in-law) sleeps with her. The *svekrva* (mother-in-law) marks the day on which she wants her son to lodge with the bride. That evening she sleeps with the bride until around two or three o'clock in the morning, when she notices that the *nevjesta* (daughter-in-law, bride) has fallen asleep. She gets up quietly and in the dark (because after everyone has gone to bed one cannot burn a candle), awakens her son, and sends him to the bride, blessing him and wishing that God may give him happiness and beautiful male offspring with her. He kisses his mother on the hand and lies down next to the bride. The days which are usually marked by the mother-in-law are Sunday evening, Thursday, "the good beginning," and Tuesday, "the benefactor."²⁰

Miss Durham believes that this custom is a remnant of an earlier practice of polyandry, when a few brothers shared the same wife. It is true that the groomsman in Montenegro is usually one of the bridegroom's brothers or cousins, but such is not always the case. Miss Durham herself records that an English journalist was chosen as the *djever* at a Montenegrin wedding. It would be difficult to explain the institution of polyandry in a society of warriors eager to increase the number of males. A polygynous family would correspond much better with such an ideal. Polyandry would be against the whole view of life, and particularly against the attitude of the Dinaric man toward marriage and the family. In fact, it seems that in the past Dinaric warriors were often polygynous in practice, and Georgevitch, a widely known Serbian ethnologist, quotes a number of such instances both among Dinaric leaders and the common people. Furthermore, it would be difficult to defend the view that the custom according to which the groomsman sleeps with the bride is a remnant of an earlier and different society from which the Dinaric society had evolved. Institutions which do not have a definite function, and which are not supported by circumstances tend to disappear in any society, unless a new func-

²⁰ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 250.

tion is found for them; and in the latter case, the institution entirely changes its character and meaning.

The djever has some other functions which support the view that his sleeping in the same bed with the bride the night of her marriage is probably symbolic of his closeness to the bride as her most trusted friend. Obviously, she cannot expect any open love, sympathy or support from her husband. When the bride goes to the church or to the market place, as a rule, the djever accompanies her. When she stands in front of the church, or in any other place where there are strangers, she is supposed to remain next to him and he puts his arm around her shoulders. In Montenegro, the djever is expected to manifest his affection openly for the bride and to kiss and caress her, even if he does not like to do so publicly. He can even caress the bride's breasts if he wishes. Nobody can reproach him for such behavior, but someone might remark jokingly, "There were djevers in the old days, too, but they did not squeeze like that." He is apt to laugh and answer, "She is mine down to the girdle and his below the girdle." He may also say, "Caressing is left to us by God," or "It is a long way from caressing to loving."²⁷

The custom of sleeping with the bride for the first few nights might have been originally a form of sex hospitality, especially if an outstanding personality was the djever. In a Dinaric ballad, the Doge of Venice, who was chosen to be the djever of the bride of Marko, attempted to make love to her. When she objected, fearing the punishment of God, the Doge boasted:

"Already I have loved nine,
Nine goddaughters by baptism,
And twenty-four by marriage;
Not once has the earth opened,
Nor the heavens broken above us,
Sit thee down that we may caress each other."²⁸

The custom of sex hospitality seems to have been widespread in the past, and was noticed by a number of students of Dinaric society.

In the earlier days there were two ways in which the marriage could be dissolved, divorce and wife-selling. Jireček, a

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

²⁸ Low, D. H., *op. cit.*, p. 66.

well-known historian, reported that the custom of wife-selling existed in Herzegovina in the fifteenth century.²⁹ A law in the *Military Frontier*, dated as late as the eighteenth century, expressly prohibited wife-selling: "Whoever induces his wife to run away to Turkey, and then sells her there or forsakes her to the Turks, will lose his life."³⁰

In Montenegro divorces are rather frequent, despite the fact that they may promote blood revenge. Among the most important grounds for divorce are sterility and lack of male children. Such grounds for divorce are to be expected in a society of warriors, since in such cases the marriage fails in its primary function.

All aspects of Dinaric marriage indicate how this institution was shaped in accordance with the Dinaric view of life and with the urge for security and dominance, the two basic drives on which that society was built. When these ideas and needs changed, because of the influences of a new economic, political, and moral order, introduced through the ascendancy of church and state, the Dinaric marriage institution underwent some modification which brought it closer to the marriage institution of the European Christian world.

But even today, marriage in the Dinaric area, like the whole family organization, shows many traces of its earlier aspects. These traits, of course, are more noticeable in those regions where pastoral economy has not yet been completely superseded by the economy of intensive agriculture and intensive stockbreeding, and where urban centers are not yet well developed or European urban influence not yet sufficiently felt. But even in the midst of the Dinaric urban centers, beneath a Westernized appearance, the basic Dinaric family and marriage relations often have remained unchanged.

Sworn Brotherhood and God-Parenthood

The institution of sworn brotherhood is known as *pobratimstvo* in the Dinaric society. In a ceremony, according to this custom, two men who are not of the same kuća or clan

²⁹ Quoted by Georgevitch, op. cit., p. 69-70. Georgevitch was a well-known Serbian ethnologist. In his main work, *Nash Narodni Zhivot (Our People's Life)*, he classified South Slav folk material according to subject matter.

³⁰ Georgevitch, T., *Nash Narodni Zhivot* (Belgrade 1930), Vol. 1, p. 105.

promise each other love, loyalty and help. The mutual obligations between the two pobratims are more binding and more lasting than those which exist between blood brothers.

Pobratims help each other in wars, and also in certain cases with the work at home. In Montenegro, they fight side by side, and until very recently it was the duty of the one who remained alive to cut off and carry away the head of the other if he was slain, to prevent the dead pobratim from falling into the hands of the enemy. Even if one pobratim were only wounded on the field of battle, so that he could not be carried, it was the duty of his sworn brother to cut off his head.¹

In Montenegro, a church ceremony or a blood ceremony is performed before two men become pobratims. The pact brothers are then supposed to help each other at all times, especially in illness or danger. They are together most of the time; they go together to the *kolo* dance, to the church, and to meetings and other gatherings:

The pobratims cannot live without each other; they are faithful to each other; they will tell each other everything that they see, hear, or do, what they think, what they desire, and everything that is in their hearts. They have faith in each other, and one will not denounce or betray the other while his head is on his shoulders. They entrust their secret deeds, their secret desires and thoughts, to each other; together they do many things which no one would do before his born brother or any of his other relatives. Bad pobratims together do many bad things which sometimes become publicly known, but they do not hide this; they boast about it as if they were going to be praised . . . It happens even today that youths become pobratims; they do that in the church before the holy altar, where the priest reads certain prayers to them, gives them wine to drink, and they kiss each other three times before the cross . . . and there are pobratims who suck blood from each other's finger.²

Among the most important duties of a pobratim is the obligation to avenge the other if he is killed or wounded, a practice which considerably increases the feeling of security of each sworn brother. The desire for protection is the basis of *pobratimstvo od nevolje*, that is, "brotherhood

¹ Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*, p. 174.

² Jovičević, A., "Crna Gora," *Zbornik*, Vol. II, p. 63.

of misfortune." In this type of pact brotherhood, a man or woman in dire need calls on another for help in the name of God and St. John. The person so called becomes a sworn brother, and is bound to give help to the one in need as to his own brother.³ Sworn sisterhood, an institution similar to sworn brotherhood, is practiced among the girls and married women and is known as *posestrimstvo*.

Pobratimstvo and posestrimstvo may take on some homosexual aspects. Homosexuality is to be expected in a society in which the relations between men and women are placed in sharp contrast, in which men from their early childhood are almost exclusively in the company of men, and women in the company of women, each group rather secluded from the other. Men are trained to look down upon women as inferior, and are taught to regard all affectionate relationships with them as unheroic. In these circumstances, men and women are inclined to seek companionship and affection among their own sex. That homosexual relations sometimes exist between the pobratims is evidenced by the observations of the Orthodox priests in Montenegro:

My old friend, Pope Gjuro of Njegushi, spoke in the strongest terms against this ceremony, which he said the Church should never have permitted. He described it as "the marriage of two men and against all nature"; and intimated clearly, as did others, that it had been used as a cloak for vice.⁴

Another institution in the Dinaric society whose function is to increase security by strengthening the interpersonal ties of loyalty and affection is known as *kumstvo*. Kumstvo is a form of God-parenthood or spiritual kinship, according to which the *kum* owes protection and help to his spiritual child. Both families, that of the *kum* and that of the child, enter into closer interpersonal relations, and are expected to offer mutual aid in case of need. There are three occasions upon which *kumstvo* is established: at baptism, at marriage, and at the ceremony in which the first cutting of a boy's hair is celebrated. The first two can be formed only between Christians. The third party may also be used to strengthen the ties between Christians and Moslems. According to Bogišić, the *kumstvo* of baptism extends its duties to all the

³ Durham, M. E., *op. cit.*, p. 157.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

relatives of the two sides, up to the seventh degree, and includes the duty of blood revenge. The other two kumstvos are binding only upon the two main persons taking part in the ceremony.⁵

It is obvious that both kumstvo and pobratimstvo are used by the Dinaric warriors to compensate for the deficiencies of in-group relations. In Dinaric society, the system of security and protection is based on person-to-person loyalties within one's kuća and clan. At the same time, however, the frequent intra-family and intra-clan rivalries and suspicions make it imperative to look for support, affection and loyalty outside of the primary group. This is achieved through a fictitious kinship, which, by extending one's primary group, enhances his chances of survival in an insecure world. It is for this reason that the ties of kumstvo and of pobratimstvo are considered to be so sacred that to kill one's own kum or one's own pobratim, or to have sex relations with one's own *kuma* (female spiritual child, or spiritual mother) are among the very few sins which could never be expiated.⁶

While pobratimstvo seems to be disappearing, kumstvo remains to the present time a very important institution among the Orthodox. It is significant that, with the strengthening of the power of the state, the institution of kumstvo was transferred from the tribal to the state level, where it flourishes in the form of nepotism among the ruling classes. But nepotism often develops into political corruption, which provokes envy and antagonism among the underprivileged. In this way, the tendency toward factionalism and political instability is intensified.

Beliefs and Hallucinations

The needs of people are reflected, although sometimes in very indirect fashion, in their dreams and in popular beliefs about omens and mysterious forces. Dinaric culture includes many significant signs of the stresses and strains involved in human adjustments to the values of Dinaric life. Dinaric people consider dreams of darkness, flight and blood as evil omens. They believe that the cuckoo, because of his wailing song, and the church, cross, bier, and priests, possibly be-

⁵ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, pp. 376 and 389.

⁶ Georgevitch, T., *Nash Narodni Zivot*, (Belgrade 1930), Vol. 7, p. 153.

cause of their connections with burial ceremonies, when seen in the dreams foretell grief and death. They regard their dreams as significant in predicting the future; and there are many people in the Dinaric regions who are known for their ability to interpret dreams and to foresee coming events. Many ballads presage an impending disaster by telling a dream about it.¹

This feeling of insecurity, as reflected in dreams, is manifested also in the belief in witches, vicious ghosts, and other unfriendly beings believed in as possessing supernatural powers and causing disease and death. The Dinaric term for witch is *vještica*. As a rule, only married women are accused of being *vješticas*, although sometimes married men are also suspected of practicing witchcraft. It is told that the *vješticas* eat the hearts of babies or suck their blood, and sometimes even destroy their own children in this manner. It is believed that they can harm cattle and other livestock, and that they especially like to eat the heart of a young ox or a young horse. Sometimes it is thought that they quench their thirst with milk, instead of blood, and that, by means of their supernatural powers they drink all the milk from whole herds of sheep or cows, even though they may get no closer than a distant hill. *Vješticas* are commonly charged with the power of invoking hail, destroying vineyards, and spoiling the wine in the cellar. They are frequently blamed, also, for quarrels and tense relations between husband and wife.

Various charms and spells are presumed to give protection against the numerous *vješticas*, whom many inhabitants profess to have seen coming out of chimneys and flying, en masse, over the villages at times of carnival. In Bukovica, according to Ardalić, *vješticas* are "allowed to do anything that pleases them."² Ardalić claims to have seen *vješticas*, himself:

At the carnival, after supper, they go to the hill to see *vješticas* fly. I did not believe them, but last year I was asked to go and see them. I went. We sat on a hill and waited. Suddenly a light appeared; a blue light as big as a hen was visible in the middle of Varivoda about four or five kilometers away

¹ Compare Noyes, G. P. and Bacon, L., *Heroic Ballads of Serbia*, *op. cit.*, and Low, D. H., *The Ballad of Marko Kraljević*, *op. cit.*

² Ardalić, V., "Vjerovanja," *Zbornik*, Vol. 22, p. 310.

from us. It was flying toward our village and it disappeared in some house. From there, a short time later, three lights came up and flew toward other houses. Finally two of them fell on our cistern, one next to the other, so that the whole cistern was lighted. A short time later they flew very slowly over the ground, and upside down and one above the other; and then they flew toward the village. One of them turned toward one kuća and the other toward another kuća; exactly toward those households about which there was a rumor that they had vješticas. This is what I saw with my own eyes.²

The belief that vješticas cause the death of infants is closely related to the high mortality rate among children, which actually is due to an insufficient and unbalanced diet, and contagious diseases, some of which are endemic in the area. The mortality rate for livestock is also high, because of the primitive techniques of stockbreeding. Primitive techniques of cultivation, the absence of insecticides, and frequent hailstorms expose crops to many hazards. Wine often sours because of the lack of proper utensils, or because of improper cleaning of the vats. Through ignorance of the natural causes of all these misfortunes, the people believe that they are caused by supernatural powers. They blame the vješticas, and show a strong hostility against the women who are suspected of practicing witchcraft.

Bogišić reports that in Montenegro, in earlier times, vješticas were stoned to death after the epidemics had caused a great mortality among children or livestock. It was felt that the vješticas had to be exterminated from the society. They were discovered through trials, such as the one described in the following document. It made no difference whose wife or mother was identified as a vještica; if she could not withstand the trial, she was declared guilty:

In order to find out how many vješticas there are, and who the real vješticas are, and in order to punish them because they ate a child, this is what they do with the poor women: All the village assembles, everybody who bears a gun, and the starješina of the village says approximately this: "You see, my brothers, how our remnants are being exterminated by soulless witches. May God judge them! Tomorrow morning every one of you, the same as I shall do, will bring his wife and mother to the cistern (or river, or lake) to throw her into the water, in order to see who are the vješticas among them and

to stone them to death or to make them swear that they will never again do evil. Shall we do it, brothers?" All unanimously answer, "We will, and what else could we do?" Tomorrow morning each one brings his own wife or mother and binds her under the armpits with a rope, and throws her into the water completely dressed. The one who sinks down is quickly pulled out, for she is not a vještica. The one who does not sink, but remains sprawled out on the water is a vještica.³

If a vještica confesses to the priest, she ceases to be a vještica. The people believe that the priests can easily tell who are the real vješticas, for they are able to recognize them at a certain point in the course of the mass or liturgy. The Dinarics are, however, inclined to doubt the sincerity of their priests. The Orthodox say that their priests would rather the vješticas did not confess because, to keep the priests from disclosing their nature, the vješticas bribe them with gifts or various kinds of agricultural produce and food.

Fear and distrust of the members of one's own community is manifested also in the belief in *mora*. Moras are unmarried women who supposedly attack young people at night. They press hard against them, and squeeze the breasts and nipples of the youth. Moras are presumed to attack only those young men whom they particularly like, and only those women whom they particularly dislike. It is important to note, in this connection, that the "beautiful and fat" ⁴ young men are especially exposed to the attack of moras.

The hazards of life to which the healthy and well-fed young people of Dinaric society are especially exposed find expression also in the *urok*, and the "evil eye." ⁴ The *urok* is the intentional harm done to someone as a result of spoken words; the "evil eye" ⁴ does the harm by the mere power of a look. According to Miličević, a student of Dinaric folklore, *uroks* and "evil eyes" ⁴ are especially harmful to "beautiful and handsome" ⁴ people and to a "good and a fat" ⁴ ox, horse, or ram. "The more beautiful and the more youthful they are," says Miličević, "the more they suffer from *uroks* and evil eyes." ⁴ Such ideas may indicate that the general lack of protection causes the one who is more prosperous to be especially fearful lest he arouse the jealousy and

³ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, pp. 640-641.

⁴ Quoted by Georgevitch, R., *Nash Narodni Zhivot* (Belgrade 1930), Vol. 3, p. 36.

hostility of witches and other people who possess evil powers.

The Dinaric Orthodox tend to look for sources of their distress primarily in deliberate actions and wicked intentions of the members of their own community. The Catholics, on the contrary, find the main causation of their evils in the supernatural world. The difference between the two groups is best illustrated by their contrasting beliefs in *vukodlaks* (werewolves)—those ghosts of evil people who return after death to work harm on the community.

Among the Catholics, any mean person is a potential *vukodlak*, while an Orthodox will become a *vukodlak* only if he has stolen a plowshare, and even then he will come to this world just to draw the plowshare behind him for a short while. The Catholics, but not the Orthodox, have therefore developed elaborate measures of protection against the *vukodlaks*. To protect themselves, they pay for masses, wear talismen, and carry pruning knives and canes made of the wood of the black thorn tree, especially when they travel at night. The approved method of protecting a Catholic community against the potential injury of a *vukodlak* is to pierce the dead body with a stick from a thorn tree, or to sever the veins just below his knees with a pruning knife.⁵ Fear of *vukodlaks* among some Catholics is so widespread that they seldom stay outdoors between twilight and dawn.

Among Catholics, rationalization of the cause of distress emanating from the supernatural world may also take the form of the *nagaz*, the fate which overtakes him who steps on an object belonging to the other world, or particularly to the world of the devil. The result of the *nagaz* is sickness or death.⁶

The devil, too, is considered a far greater menace among the Catholics than among the Orthodox. They believe he can do harm in various ways, from assuming the form of a donkey to "beclouding" the mind of his victim in such a manner that he takes bad for good and good for bad. The devil is recognized by the Catholics also in a being called the *vodac*. The *vodac* induces a man to do any evil.⁷

Although the Orthodox do not believe that Orthodox persons can come back to this world as ghosts, save in one

⁵ Ardalić, V., "Bukovica," *op. cit.*, p. 148.

⁶ Banović, St., *Vjeronjanja, Zbornik* (1918), Vol. 23, p. 198.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

exceptional case, they do think that some of the Orthodox have the power to see those Catholics who have come back as *vukodlaks*. According to Ardalić, this power comes only to those Orthodox who have not been fully baptized, and arises during the baptismal ceremony if the priest forgets to say the necessary words, says the wrong words, makes faulty gestures, or forgets some parts of the ceremony. Ardalić, who was himself an Orthodox, says that it happened at his own baptism because the priests who baptized him were intoxicated and did not utter the proper words. As a result, Ardalić claims that he too met *vukodlaks*.⁸

There is a difference in the degree of religious discipline between the Catholics and the Orthodox. Some students of Dinaric society insist that this situation accounts for the different ways in which the two groups express their fears and hostilities. Cvijić claims that Dinaric Catholics are "weak" and tame when compared to Dinaric Orthodox, and he ascribes this contrast in behavior to confession, an institution which is lacking, on the whole, among the Orthodox, but is strictly practiced by all the Catholics. Bogišić, Jovičević and other writers explain that the absence of formal education among Orthodox clergy results in a corresponding lack of authority and obedience. In Montenegro, for instance, the Orthodox priests in the past often did not even know how to read or write, and they often took part in guerrilla activities, together with their flock. Under such conditions, little opportunity was left for religious training.⁹

The relations between the Catholic clergy and their parishioners are placed on a different basis. Antun Radić commented on the strict authority and subordination that existed between Franciscan friars and Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Radić, who was rather critical of the Catholic Church and some of its practices, said that such relations of authority and subordination were "justified" in Dinaric regions.¹⁰ The implication was that, since the political authorities had not succeeded in fully establishing themselves in that area, the aggressiveness of the people and their inclination toward lawlessness needed supervision and disci-

⁸ Ardalić, V., "Bukovica," *op. cit.*, p. 305.

⁹ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, pp. 91 and 641.

¹⁰ Radić, A., *op. cit.*, p. 305.

pline, which in Catholic communities were provided by the Church.

It is true that the influence of the Catholic Church in the Dinaric regions was instrumental in weakening the clan ties, and in eliminating ancient customs not in accordance with the teachings of Christianity. When Bishop Palunko undertook to stop marriage by capture among his Herzegovinian parishioners, and to introduce Western ways of behavior into the Dinaric family, they said to him, "Father, ask blood from under our neck, and we will give it to you willingly, but do not take away this marriage custom of ours! However, if that is how it should be, then we are ready to obey you."¹¹ Palunko furthermore states that, if he ever objected to certain habits, they would never repeat them in his presence. But he does admit that not all Catholic clergy were equally successful in their efforts and that some customs which he thought he had eradicated were revived after his departure.

The variance between the Catholics and the Orthodox feeling of security may also account for some of their differences in behavior. The Catholics of the Dinaric regions represent, on the whole, a more settled population. They tend to substitute agriculture for herding more than the Orthodox do. Catholicism has always had a closer relationship with Western cultural and economic systems. It had always had a more educated clergy, with higher economic standards and cultural demands. The Catholic Church spread first among the agriculturists, and, when Catholicism began to spread among the Dinaric herdsmen, the Catholic Church made a definite effort to induce its fold to "settle down" and to engage in agriculture. Increased productivity evoked an increased sense of security, bolstered, in part, by the Western cultural influences which were introduced into the Catholic family and community through the ideological efforts of the Church.

There are further significant differences between the Catholics and the Orthodox. Being increasingly engaged in agricultural occupations, the Catholics tended to settle in the river valleys and plains and to organize densely populated villages. The Orthodox stuck to the mountains and lived in villages of a scattered type. Since the latter settled

¹¹ Palunko, V., *op. cit.*, p. 235.

primarily in the eastern parts of the Dinaric area, they were farther from the center of political stabilization and more exposed to political change. The Catholics, therefore, being economically and politically more stabilized than the Orthodox, and more disciplined by church and state, effected certain changes in their interpersonal relations, and were able to internalize their aggressiveness and "project" it into the supernatural world of evil in a higher degree than the Orthodox.

The fears and anxieties of the Dinarics are reflected in their dreams of blood and death, in their beliefs in harmful beings and persons. Their longings and hopes are manifested in ballads, dreams and hallucinations about gold and hidden treasures, in visions of beneficent spirits, and in beliefs in their gold-producing qualities.

The heroes of the ballads make a great display of weapons mounted with gold and silver, and encrusted with precious stones. They eat at "golden tables," drink from "golden beakers," and sleep on pillows "woven in threads of purest gold." Their apparel is often minutely described as consisting entirely of gold, silver and jewels, silk and velvet, whose value is equal to that of a number of the "Tsar's towns," and higher than many acres of land.

To find a hidden treasure left by some past civilization or to come upon a cache of gold plunder is the hope of every Dinaric herdsman. Lucky the man whose dream may lead him to the spot where a buried treasure lies! In fact, many Dinarics dream about gold, and dig in the earth where they dreamed it is hidden. They tell numerous stories about old ruins and caves where the gold might be found if only a chart existed. Unfortunately most of these maps, they say, are "in the hands of the Greeks." There are people who make a business of selling "ancient letters" which are supposed to indicate where the hidden riches lie. Archeological museums in the Dinaric regions are often molested by these gold-hunters, who insist upon obtaining permission to excavate old ruins.

A knowledge of certain herbs and ceremonies is felt to be necessary to protect oneself against the devils or other supernatural beings who watch over buried fortune. Some Dinarics believe that an infant has to be killed and his blood sprinkled over the hoard to chase away evil spirits. Without

such knowledge and ceremonies, one would not only be unable to take possession of the concealed deposit, but would also be exposed to untold dangers. This is why the Dinarics often "see" and even "touch" the secreted treasure trove, but are not able to take it away:

There was a cave near the village Bruvno, known as Kubat cave. That cave was found once accidentally by a shepherd. When he entered the cave, he saw a few rows of barrels full of golden and silver coins. A row of golden and another of silver ones. There were also gold and silver coins lying in heaps next to the barrels. After the shepherd gazed at the coins to his satisfaction, he decided to take a few pieces with him. But from out of the corner a voice was heard: "Leave the money, you won't get out alive." Now the shepherd got near a heap of gold, stepped over it and started to grab with his hand. Again something shouted as before. He heard the voice but he did not see anyone in the cave. He started to go out with the money he had seized, but the voice continued to shout louder and louder. The shepherd became frightened and threw away the money, but the voice still shouted: "Leave the money." The shepherd was surprised that it was shouting, despite the fact that he threw the money away. Then the idea came to him that perhaps a piece of gold was left on his body. Indeed, that was what it was. A coin was caught under his shoe laces. He took out the coin and threw it on the heap and then only was he able to get away. When the shepherd came home he told what had happened and reported it to the sheriff's office. Immediately twelve men went to see the cave. Among them was the Catholic Priest Murgić, the Eastern Orthodox Priest Kovačević, the Captain Filipović from Lovinac, and the mason Jure Šolić from Lovinac. They entered the cave and found everything as the shepherd had recounted. They too decided to take the money with them, but they could not do so because, as soon as they would grab some coins, something would start to thunder from the corner and shout, "Leave the money, or you won't get out of the door. Bring the keys of the earth, and the money will be yours and I will be redeemed because I am the ghost who was condemned and I must watch these coins." Captain Filipović was enraged and he drew out his sabre in the direction of the place from which the voice was issuing. But the ghost told him: "Put back the sabre into the scabbard. You won't carry it for long anyway." And indeed Filipović died the same year in Lovinac; all the others died in the same year except

Jure Šolić and the Priest Kovačević. This happened in the year 1838.¹²

Associated with these wishful dreams and visions of hidden riches is a widespread belief in supernatural beings called *vilas*. Vilas, fairy-like beings that live in the hills and in the woods, further the good fortunes of those who win their favor. They appear in the form of young women, very beautiful, except for hooved feet which they try to hide, and which one is supposed not to notice, in order to avoid their anger. The Dinarics often contend that they hear the vilas singing and see them dancing. They believe that vilas talk to the people and that they are willing to help them, except when irritated. Vilas possess the human qualities of sympathy, as well as envy and cruelty.

The fondness for vilas is manifested not only in open regret that they are not seen more often, but also in the frequency with which hills and valleys in the Dinaric regions are named after them, and in the many stories and ballads in which they are represented as sources of potential wealth and security:

Without a good reason, vilas will not do any wrong to anyone but they will help those whom they like or those who are their friends. If somebody helps vilas, it will not be in vain for him. A long time ago, a small boy by the name of Kraljević was coming home from Brda through Prosik and he was carrying milk in a small leather container. When he came to Prosik he met two beautiful girls. They asked him what he was carrying. The boy told them that he was carrying milk home. "Would you give us a little?" they asked him. The boy gave them some, and the girls blew into his container and put something into his bag. But they also asked him not to peek into the bag before he arrived home. When the boy came near the first village houses, the devil wouldn't give him any peace and he peeked into the bag and saw dry leaves. He emptied the bag in the middle of the road. When he came home, he told everything to his people who immediately rushed to open the bag—where from a slanting angle a gold coin came out. They rushed to the place where the boy had emptied the bag of leaves, hoping to find what he emptied, and they didn't find even a leaf. There you are! If there was luck and the boy listened to vilas, if he had not peeked into the bag before he came home, contrary to the wishes of the

¹² Biljan, M., "Snaga Nekih Trava," *Zbornik* (1907), Vol. 12, pp. 154-156.

vilas, he would have brought half of his bag in gold coins and he would have become a respectable man.¹³

The Orthodox claim to see vilas more often than the Catholics. According to the Catholics of Biokovo mountain, the vilas were condemned by a Pope to live apart from human beings, locked in rocks from which they could not escape. Now they appear very seldom, and only to certain people. The vilas now fear the sound of church bells. However, it is predicted that, when their term of condemnation is over, they will again be able to travel as freely as before.

The "gold-producing" qualities are ascribed to another superhuman being known as the *matić*. The *matić* develops from an abortive fetus, and seems to frequent the Catholics more than the Orthodox. Those who know how to keep a *matić* secretly at home are thought to be blessed with good luck. According to Banović, "It can easily be noticed when the *matić* comes to a person's home, because that man prospers in his business and increases his property; in a short time he acquires a fortune. My own father acquired considerable wealth in his youth, and all the village said that it was a *matić* who brought him the riches, but he swears that he never heard or saw any *matić*."¹⁴ Since the Catholics, on the whole, are more prosperous than the Orthodox, it is not surprising to find that the *matić* is believed to favor them especially.

Other dreams and hallucinations which reflect the drive for power and the wish for security are those in which the Dinarics see the great heroes of the past leading them toward victory over their enemies. Cvijić states that the Montenegrins often dream of Milosh Obilitch, the Avenger of Kosovo. He also says that in wars "many Dinaric Serbs see a shining warrior on a white horse who leads them to victory and then vanishes suddenly."¹⁵

The wish for security is also manifested in the strong Dinaric longing for a cheerful life, devoid of worries, plentiful in food and drink, and full of abundant leisure, a yearning which is often expressed in ballads:

And wine there was out of measure,
And the sofa was garnished with all knightly cheer,

¹³ Banović, St., *op. cit.*, p. 198.

¹⁴ Banović, St., *op. cit.*, pp. 197-198.

¹⁵ Cvijić, J., *op. cit.*, p. 386.

And the fine meats of every sort.
They drank wine, yea, and so they tarried,
From Sunday again to Sunday.¹⁶

The contrast between "blood" and "gold" in the dreams, beliefs, hallucinations, and ballads may reveal the basic nature of the Dinaric emotional life—a strongly developed feeling of insecurity of emotional attachment, of life and status, and an equally powerful urge to overcome it by controlling means which bring affection, distinction, power and dominance, a pattern around which the main Dinaric institutions have been built.

Social Differentiation

On all occasions, the Dinarics exhibit their wealth and social position by wearing expensive clothing and precious jewelry, and by carrying fine weapons. Those who have the means build large stone houses and *kulas* (castles), and spend lavishly at marriage, Christmas and other festivals and ceremonies. Prospective brides appear at bazaars and other public gatherings to parade their riches in the form of gold and silver coins sewed all over their dresses. At the present time, because of the lack of precious metals, they parade their wealth by decorating themselves with paper money of large denominations. This outward appearance of distinction is often demonstrated for a time, even when its property basis is gone, because in this way it is possible to maintain at least the pretense of a much coveted higher status. When asked whether they would prefer better food or better clothing, the answer, from both youths and adults almost invariably is that they prefer clothes. They remark, "No one knows what is in me, but everyone can see what is on me." As a matter of fact, the urge to spend beyond one's means for the sake of appearance often ruins Dinaric families economically.

Family status based on family possessions and wealth is of great importance. A person of a well-to-do and reputable kuća is known as a *koljenović* (of a good line), or a *gazda* (a wealthy man). A man from a poor and insignificant kuća is called a *nikogović* (of nobody) or a *fukara* (outcast, bum).

¹⁶ Low, D. H., *op. cit.*, p. 10.

The heroes of most ballads are princes and other aristocrats, and the ballads themselves often stress the importance of good family lines. A heroic deed in itself is usually not enough to raise one's social status if the hero is not of a well-to-do kuća. "They have a very great respect for good birth and nobility, as well as for heroism, and heroism is regarded as really worthless if a man is not well-born,"¹ says Cvijić. He also asserts that in Dinaric society the leaders are practically always chosen from "well-born men."¹

The prestige of an old family depends upon its ability to maintain its economic status. If an old and renowned family becomes economically impoverished, it loses its prestige and influence. While it is a great honor to be the starješina of a well-to-do kuća, it is a disgrace to be addressed as, or even to admit being, starješina of a poor kuća: "It is better to be a servant to a good husbandman than to be a starješina in poverty," is a popular Dinaric saying. As a rule, one is addressed as starješina only if he is head of a prosperous kuća.²

Since property is the basis of prestige and power, there is an inclination to accumulate riches by any available means. When Montenegro was in a continual state of warfare with the Turkish Pashas, the number of livestock or other booty taken in the raids along the borders could easily raise both the economic status and the fame of the raiders. Wealth, banditry, heroism and power were interconnected. After the ascendancy of the state and increased control by a central authority, many Dinaric sheepraisers showed a tendency to engage in trade as a means of achieving riches directly, and authority and power indirectly. When formal education was introduced, they showed a remarkable eagerness to school themselves if they had an opportunity, since anyone with some education was sure to rise to a position in the civil service, because of the general lack of literate and educated people. Office was sought, as a means of acquiring not only power, but riches as well; and the gaining of wealth while in power became an accepted practice.

Class distinctions are so pronounced that there is a marked difference in behavior between the higher and lower classes. The youths of the privileged classes are expected to be arrogant. They dress better and, where the law permits it,

¹ Cvijić, J., *op. cit.*, p. 69.

² Ardalić, V., *op. cit.*, Vol. 5, pp. 3 and 18.

wear more distinguished weapons than youths of lower classes. The upper-class youths openly boast about their property, and behave as if they were afraid of no one. They engage in all sorts of outlawry and mischief, and are not ashamed to be imprisoned for the harm they do. In fact, going to prison brings them more prestige:

It is an easy life for a youth in a *velika kuća*. He is proud of himself and is haughty. He chooses and wears the most showy clothes. When the law does not prohibit it, he wears weapons like a *haiduk*. He is rough, and does not even allow anyone to look at him, all because he belongs to a *velika kuća*. Whenever he boasts about his property, it does not matter that he would get only a small part of it if it were to be divided among the *kuća* members; he does not think of that when he is boasting. Even if there were a hundred members in his *kuća*, he would never say, "We have," but instead he always says, "*I have* so many oxen; *I have* so many rams," as if they all belonged to him alone. Who is in the inn but him? Who is in the *kolo* dance among the girls but him? . . . In almost every *velika kuća*, the youths are brusque, and they steal things when they have a chance, because from such *kućas* the youths are doubly free and they are afraid of no one. They start brawls and fights with other people and are not afraid to go to prison. The girls do not mind if such a youth gets into mischief and is put into prison, because they think of him as a hero. This is how the girls would express themselves: "Anybody who is worth anything is in prison or in the army, and only he who is a dumbbell stays at home."³

Ardalić says that the well-to-do *kućas* seize for themselves as much community land as possible, while "a poor man does not do that; he cannot, and he must not, do the same as the others."⁴

The underprivileged status of people born in a small and poor *kuća* or clan manifests itself in their lack of influence and prestige in the community. Such people are unprotected and completely intimidated by the powerful. They do not dare to champion any idea or proposal that they have. They lack courage, especially in their relations with outstanding people and well-to-do families in the community. The worst position seems to be that of a man who lives in a separate

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

kuća of his own, consisting of himself, his wife, and small children. Such a man is not esteemed and is not recognized as much in the community. He is called a *samac* (the solitary one):

The poor *samac* does not have the right to say a word. He is not like a person from the *velika kuća*. No one pays any attention to him if he says anything, even if what he says has some value . . . These *samacs* seldom interfere in anything because they know that they are not allowed to, and they do not have as much time as do those who have a number of brothers. The *samac* is afraid of everyone, and everyone assails him if he says anything. A person from a *velika kuća* in relation to a *samac* behaves as if he had two hearts. This is why a *samac* can be insulted in any way in front of a church or in a *moba*,⁵ if one is angry with him. The *samac* must be a quiet, peaceful man. He must be so to his own shame, because he cannot have leisure time and he cannot be mischievous like a member of the *velika kuća* where there are as many people as in a *moba*. Not even the girls desire to marry such a *mirnjak*,⁶ because they say that anybody can attack him, that he has no backing, and that he is not presumptuous or arrogant like those from *velika kuća*.⁷

There is no doubt that such conditions of social inequality provoke envy and antagonism among the poor and underprivileged. But they were held in stalemate, in the past, because any potential hostility was counterbalanced by admiration for the powerful, and intimidation by the ruling group. The subjected classes were politically inactive, and unable to exert influence in changing the political regimes. Although there were changes in rulers, these changes were instigated by conspiracies of small groups in the upper strata, through palace revolutions and military *coups d'états*. The ascending group was interested only in taking the place of those whom they overthrew, not in effecting any radical social alterations, so that Dinaric society did not change fundamentally for a number of centuries.

Only very recently, some social movements, such as the peasant movement and the communist movement, have undertaken to activate the politically dormant low-income

⁵ Group engaged in collective work in field or village.

⁶ A quiet, peaceful man.

⁷ Ardalić, V., *op. cit.*, p. 1.

strata by promising them advancement in their economic and social conditions. The ideologies of these two movements worked in the direction of freeing and mobilizing the aggressiveness of low-income Dinaric strata in the same way as they activated the Dinaric women, politically and militarily.

The Communists, whose ideology was more radical, were especially successful among the Dinaric Orthodox, while the peasant movement infiltrated the Catholic Dinaric communities. This mobilization of the aggressiveness of the lower strata of the Dinarics brought about some radical changes in local Dinaric communities, where the formerly subjected classes took power into their hands with the backing of the Communist Party. It seems, however, that the ascending group took advantage of the new position to enrich itself, while the overthrown strata did not give up the fight to recover their lost position. The final result of this social upheaval, and of the reaction to it, is not yet clear. In the meantime, the prolonged struggle is taking the lives of thousands, destroying property, and impoverishing all strata of the population.

In addition to classes which are sharply separated by distinctions of wealth and differences in mental make-up, one finds caste-like relations, that is, relations marked by a minimum of contact and great social distance. The most widespread relations of this type are developed along religious and cultural lines.

Religious differences are responsible for caste-like groupings of the Dinaric people into *Hrišćani* (Eastern Orthodox), *Latini* (Roman Catholics), and *Turci* (Moslems). All these people speak the same language, though in different modes, and often live in the same local community. Religious influences have caused them to develop certain differences in dress, food, type of houses, and other cultural patterns.

The Eastern Orthodox, largely herdsmen, are least affected by outside influences and by written laws. They hold the Catholics in contempt, since they believe that the Catholics do not conduct themselves like heroes, that they are too "civilized" and not enough "nativelike":

The worst *kronici* (slayers) of the Montenegrins are the Moslems, because, as you know, these two peoples incessantly

butcher each other, and there will be peace between dogs and cats before there will be peace between the Moslems and the Montenegrins. The Latin (Catholic) customs, however, look even more worthless to the Montenegrins than the Moslem customs, because there is a lack of heroism among the Latins. Even if they have Christ's faith, they cross themselves in a different way, and they do not have the true Serb customs. They do not live the way the common people live and think, but they behave differently and they are striving toward civilization.⁸

While differences of religion and culture among Dinarics form the strongest social barriers, still another caste-like distinction is drawn on the basis of occupation. In the past, merchants and blacksmiths in Montenegro ranked lowest in the social scale. In fact, all non-warriors, regardless of occupation, were considered inferior; and even today the military, especially the officers and the gendarmes, are regarded as the highest class by the common people. Today the sharpest occupational caste distinctions exist between the townspeople on the one hand, and the peasants and herders on the other. The process of urbanization began in those parts of the Dinaric area which came very early under Western cultural and economic influences. Small urban centers arose as a result of commerce and industry, and the urbanites in these regions seized all administrative and political control during the period of the formation of the civil state. They grew to model their dress, manners and habits after those of the urban people in Western European communities. They developed a high standard of living, and were in a position to exploit the rural folk. As readily as they assumed the power from former feudal nobility, they also adopted the nobles' contemptuous and superior manner toward all country people.

The formation of towns took a somewhat different trend in those parts of the Dinaric area which were a part of the Ottoman Empire. Most of the towns there originated as Turkish garrison posts, and as crossroad market places, where Dinaric traders settled together with the Greek and Roumanian (Wallachian) merchants. Since there is little Western influence in these small towns, the traders even now wear peasant dress and do not differ noticeably in be-

⁸ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 644.

havior from the rural folk in surrounding areas. In the past, this similarity in appearance and custom helped the traders to control the peasants and herders in their communities, economically and politically. They bought landed property in the villages and practiced usury, thus increasing the economic differentiation and political dependency in these regions.

The disdain and contempt of these caste-like groups for each other is often expressed in popular sayings. The Roman Catholics scornfully call the Eastern Orthodox *Vlasi* (Wallachians) and picture them as false and untrustworthy: "*Ni u moru mire, ni u Vlahu vire*" (there is no measure in the ocean, nor is there faith in a Vlah);⁹ "Put a Vlah at the table and another one under the table; what the one under the table intends to do to you, so does the one sitting at the table."⁹ The same type of distrust is shown by the Orthodox towards Moslems and Catholics: "One who has faith in an Osmanli leans with a cane on the water"; "The Turks and the venomous snakes do not have any faith";⁹ "The Latins are old deceivers."⁹ The rural folk say about the urbanites: "*Mrka kapa zla prilika*" (Black cap, bad sign).

It appears, therefore, that inter-caste relations, like family and clan relations and class distinctions, reflect the character and mentality of Dinaric man. Because of his suspiciousness and lack of confidence, he is strongly inclined to doubt everyone, especially the people who differ from him in appearance or actions. As a means of protection against them, and as a means of self-glorification, he tends to over-emphasize the values of his own status and culture and to underestimate or belittle the status and culture of others. Because of his urge to dominate, he is inclined to abuse those whom he considers to be below him. The result of such an attitude is a lack of contact and increasing conflict and misunderstanding between different Dinaric groups and strata.

Although the three religious groups are often settled in the same village, they do not intermarry and, as a rule, do not intermingle socially. They identify each person with his social group mainly on the basis of his dress, his mode of speaking, and the phrases he uses in greeting. Very often

⁹ Georgevitch, T., *op. cit.*, pp. 138-45.

they identify one another on the basis of physical appearance, bearing and manners. The Orthodox, on the whole, tend to be darker in complexion than the Catholics and the Moslems. The Moslems are still lighter in complexion than the Catholics. The Moslems and the Catholics feel a closer affinity and both claim that the Orthodox can easily be recognized because of their "gloomy" expression and "haughty" bearing.

In the past, the increasing cultural differentiation among these groups led them to identify themselves with different political symbols and to organize separate states. The Catholics of the Dinaric area identified themselves with Croatian nationalism, since Croatian statehood was originally sponsored by the Vatican. The Orthodox recognized themselves as Serbs, because of the identification of the Serb Orthodox Church with the state of Serbia. The Slav-speaking Moslems in the past confused their religion with Turkish nationality, since it was the Moslem Turks who ruled most of the Dinaric lands for a number of centuries. Greek-speaking, Albanian-speaking and Romanian-speaking Dinarics identified themselves with the respective national and ethnic groups.

When Yugoslavia was organized as a unitary and highly centralized Dinaric state the intrinsic instability of the Dinaric society was actually intensified, so sharp are these differences in identification, and so conflicting are Croatian and Serb demands and aspirations. These conflicting identifications, demands and aspirations in Yugoslavia took the form of an internecine war of extermination among various groups of Dinarics during World War II. Many Dinaric Catholics identified themselves with the Axis-supported independent State of Croatia and with its Ustaša movement, while the Orthodox joined, first, the Chetniks and later the Partisan guerrillas. The Moslem Dinarics first identified themselves with the Croatian state but later, with the ascendancy of the Partisans to power, a number of Moslems joined their ranks. The conflicting identifications of these groups and factional strife within each group greatly contribute to the instability of the contemporary Partisan state.

Tribal Background

The origin of Dinaric society is historically related to a tribal organization which was introduced into the Balkans at the beginning of the Middle Ages. The basic units of this social system were the *kuća*, the *rod* or *bratstvo* (clan), and the *pleme* (tribe). The *bratstvo* was composed of a group of *kućas*, which were related among themselves through the male line of descent, known as *debela krv* (thick blood). The female line, *tanka krv* (thin blood), did not establish blood relationship.

The blood relationship of all members of a *bratstvo*, although sometimes fictitious, was emphasized in the common name of the *bratstvo*, which was believed to be the name of its first male founder. Each *bratsvenik* (clan brother) was designated by a personal name, and by the name of his father, his *kuća*, and his *bratstvo*. To these he added the name of his tribe when he had dealings with members of other tribes.

The *bratstvo* possessed common pasture grounds, forests, wells, mills and other property, and its main function was to protect these collective possessions, as well as the life, honor, and private property of each one of its members. For this purpose, solidarity among the members of a *bratstvo*, as well as loyalty to each *bratsvenik* and to the *bratstvo* as a whole, was emphasized and was especially manifested in the institution of blood feud.

The inner organization of the *bratstvo* was developed on the principles of stratification, hierarchy and dominance. The *glavarstvo* (headmanship), that is, the leadership and power within the *bratstvo*, was hereditary and belonged to the *glavar* (headman), who was usually the eldest member of the most outstanding *kuća* of the *bratstvo*. Since the prestige of a *kuća* depended greatly upon its economic status, it sometimes happened that a *kuća* which had traditionally furnished the *bratstvo* with its *glavar* lost its wealth and had to give way to a *nouveau riche* *kuća*, which thus acquired the *glavarstvo*.

This transfer of power, however, seldom took place, because the *glavar* of the *bratstvo* had the right, in intraclan disputes, to collect tributes and to impose fines, which he

retained for himself and his kuća. He was also the commander-in-chief of the bratstvo in war exploits and, when the war booty was divided, he always received more than the rest, sometimes double. His share was known as the *starješinstvo* (the right of the headelder). The glavar's kuća, being richer in number of sheep, goats and oxen, could better utilize the bratstvo's common pasture lands, forests and water reserves. The same was also true of all other well-to-do kućas in the bratstvo, and this condition was an incentive for their support of the existing social organization and property relations.

The power and the glavar in the bratstvo corresponded to the power of the starješina in the kuća. He represented the absolute power, was the lawgiver, executive, judge, and military leader. The heads of other kućas in the bratstvo were his advisers, but, in theory, he did not need their concurrence to reach a decision. In practice, however, the glavar would take notice of the opinion of the heads of more outstanding kućas in the bratstvo. After the glavar had reached a decision, he would present it to the heads of all the kućas, in the bratstvo, who would almost invariably accept the decision. Seldom, if ever, would they dare to oppose the glavar's will.¹

The size of the bratstvos varied greatly. There were bratstvos of only thirty to fifty members, and others of seven to eight hundred people. The strength and influence of a bratstvo was judged mainly according to the number of its *puškas*. (*Puška* meant gun, but was also the symbol for male.)²

A unit, composed of several bratstvos which settled in a contiguous territory, possessing common pasture lands or other common territory, was known as the pleme, and was also designated by a common name. The pleme tended to be a territorial rather than a blood unit. Often a strong bratstvo succeeded in controlling the weaker bratstvos of the same pleme, and thus acquired the hereditary leadership of the whole pleme. If there were a few equally strong bratstvos in the pleme, the tribe was under the joint control of all these. The influence of a bratstvo in the affairs of the pleme depended entirely upon its physical strength. A

¹ Bogišić, B., *Gradja u Odgovorima Iz Slavenskog Juga* (Zagreb 1874), p. 523.

² *Ibid.*, p. 512.

bratstvo of two hundred puškas, for instance, was considered strong, and had a leading voice in tribal affairs, but a bratstvo of twenty or thirty puškas had very little to say.³

The bratstvo was an exogamous unit; marriage between its members was strictly taboo. The pleme was not exogamous; members belonging to different bratstvos of the same pleme intermarried, because members of the pleme, if they were not of one bratstvo did not consider themselves related by blood. The existence of blood relationships within the bratstvo, but not in the pleme, may explain why loyalty to the bratstvo preceded allegiance to the pleme. If a conflict between these loyalties developed, it was the integrity of the pleme that usually suffered.

A hindrance to the unification of a pleme was the rivalry among its bratstvos for the control of the pleme. Only when one bratstvo far outdistanced the others in the number of puškas and wealth, was it able to impose itself upon the whole pleme and to control it undisputedly. Otherwise the unity of the pleme was manifested only in times of common danger, such as an attack on the pleme's common pasture lands or other possessions. When there was no external threat, a pleme was often internally disrupted by internecine warfare and blood feuds among its bratstvos.

When a pleme was united, its leader was known as *vojvoda* (war leader). The power of the vojvoda depended upon the degree of integration of his pleme. If the pleme was strongly unified, the vojvoda's power was theoretically unlimited in both civil and military affairs, and corresponded to that of the glavari in a bratstvo, or to that of the starješina in a kuća. That is, he was the lawgiver, chief executive, commander-in-chief and chief justice of the pleme. His duty was to settle the disputes between various bratstvos of his pleme, to collect tribute, and to preside at the *skupština* (meeting) of all the bratstvos of his pleme. The glavars of the bratstvos in a well-integrated pleme were only councillors and advisers to the vojvoda, and theoretically he did not need their consent to make a decision, but in practice that depended upon vojvoda's appraisal of the strength of the various bratstvos in his pleme. When a pleme was not unified, the vojvoda was elected only in times of

³ Lopičić, S. L., "Bilješke iz Običajnog Prava u Staroj Crnoj Gori," *Zbornik* (1919), Vol. 24, pp. 273-294.

war. In peacetime, all the common affairs of such a pleme were decided jointly by the glavars of a few of the strongest and most influential bratstvos.

Despite the tendency toward autocracy and oligarchy, there was nevertheless a marked attempt on the part of the leaders in the pleme to win popular support and unanimity by means of persuasion and appeals to "unity":

The votes are not counted, but wherever the most outstanding ones who have influence turn, there the others turn also, even if they are not of the same opinion. But if some do not want to consent, even if there are only one or two dissenters, the rest would try to persuade them: "Go, by God, you too should consent so that disunion is not created. You see that it is better in this way; you are opposing in vain when all others want it." And so, those who think differently at the end agree.⁴

However, if there were some who insisted on dissenting, the leaders would resort to violence in order to reach "unity." In the pleme Kuchi, according to the accounts of its own vojvoda, Marko Miljanov, those who disagree were punished. After a decision was reached, a ceremony of stone-throwing was performed as a warning of what might happen to those who might voice a different opinion, and curses and threats were uttered against those who might disobey the decisions reached at a skupshtina. A "unanimous" decision of a skupshtina was known as *amin* (amen); and anyone who dared to break the amin was liable to persecution by all others:

Among the Kuchi, a unanimous agreement is symbolized by both the amin and a heap of stones. The custom existed until recently. I know that the Kuchi, when they have the skupshtina make such amins, throw stones on a heap and say: "May God grant that all evil shall fall on whoever violates this amin. May his soul carry to the other world this heap of stones." Every possible curse is uttered so that the one who violates this particular amin may expect all kinds of punishment from God. However, offenders are punished by the people who do not wait for the Lord to punish them.⁵

It may be that this pretense of unanimity was necessary to strengthen the bonds of loyalty to the leader. At the same

⁴ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 533.

⁵ Miljanov, Marko, *Pleme Kuchi* (Belgrade 1904), p. 18.

time, the conditions of external threat and internal strife made it expedient for the leading kućas to concentrate and to retain exclusive power, and then to command the unswerving obedience of their subjects on the basis of personal loyalty and physical force.

The origin of this pattern of power might be traced also to the time when small bands of warriors and clans of pastoral nomads who conquered the Dinaric regions in the early Middle Ages forced their rule upon the democratic society of soil cultivators. When autocratic warriors imposed their dominance upon a democratic society, they might have allowed certain semblance of popular will as a concession to the former order, and as a means of winning the allegiance of subjugated groups.

It has already been indicated that there were two types of migrations in the Balkan and Danubian regions until the seventh century A.D. The earlier was a mass movement of Slav farming folk, whose origin can be traced to the Pripet marshland in the triangle between Kiev, Mogilev and Brest-litovsk.⁶ The latter was a migration of sheepraisers and horsebreeders, whose culture was of Altaian origin.⁷ The Dinaric social organization and the personality of the Dinaric warrior still closely resemble their Altaian prototypes. Accordingly, the Dinaric heroic poetry, in its conception of the hero and of his character, is almost identical with the narrative epic of the Tartars, the Altaian herdsmen of western Asia.⁸

That these warlike tribesmen had imposed themselves upon the peaceful society of soil cultivators who had previously immigrated into the Balkans is evidenced by both historical and ethnological sources. This trend of events is for instance reflected in folk tales, such as the legend on the origin of the pleme Kuchi, which relates that the pleme was founded by a shepherd after he had slaughtered a plowman and had taken his oxen.⁹

⁶ Peisker, J., "The Expansion of Slavs," *Cambridge Medieval History* (1926), Vol. 2, p. 420. The culture of these Slav soil cultivators is discussed in Tomašić, D., "Personality Development in the Zadruga Society," *Psychiatry* (1942), Vol. 5, pp. 229-261.

⁷ Peisker, T., "The Asiatic Background," *Cambridge Medieval History* (1924), Vol. 1, pp. 333-352.

⁸ Chadwick, H. M., *The Growth of Literature* (Cambridge 1940), Vol. 3, pp. 74-75.

⁹ Miljanov, Marko, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-15.


But quite apart from the question of its origin, it is certain that the Dinaric tribal system itself bred conditions of instability in emotional attachments, and insecurity of life, status and property. In this manner, it greatly contributed to its own self-perpetuation. It was mainly under the impact of external influences, such as Christianity, the Western feudal system, and the growth of nationalism, that the Dinaric tribal organization gradually disintegrated. It is preserved nowadays only in some isolated regions of Montenegro and Sandžak.

With the disintegration of the Dinaric tribal system, however, the Dinaric culture did not disappear. The struggle of the great Powers to control the Balkans, and the lack of economic advancement, perpetuated Dinaric culture and made possible the transfer of Dinaric traits from the tribal level to the state level. Hence, the state organization which developed from the Dinaric tribal system retained some of the basic traits of the culture from which it sprang, such as the concentration of power, personal rule, reliance on violence and deceit, factionalism and instability.


The spread of Dinaric culture, in common with the spread of other sheepraising cultures elsewhere in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, was enhanced by the great mobility of herdsmen and warriors (see Map 1, page 105.) Not only were these mountaineers accustomed to migrate, because of their nomadic or seminomadic pastoral economy, but they often left home because of family clashes, blood feuds, and hunger. They moved into agricultural areas and took to farming, or they settled in crossroad market places as traders, or immigrated to cities as professional soldiers, businessmen, or industrial workers. In each case, they showed a strong tendency to seek political power and to climb rapidly up the social ladder. Their sons, who acquired higher education and became members of the learned professions, the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, showed the same tendency as their fathers and grandfathers; many became outstanding army leaders and statesmen, thus transferring the traits of herdsmen and warriors to both mediæval and modern states throughout Eastern Europe.

It takes a long time, in a society of warriors, for personal ties to be replaced with institutional loyalties, and for common interests and ideals to take precedence over the vested

interests of leaders. Since most Eastern European states have been essentially warrior states, this process has never been wholly completed; hence, those states have been doomed to fail. The warrior's lack of integration with the nation, his cultural conflicts, clashing loyalties and ungovernable temper were manifested in the never-ending round of intense



TRENDS OF MIGRATION OF
BALKAN SHEEPHERDERS
after XVIIIC



political strife, factionalism and warfare which perpetually undermined the stability of all Eastern Europe. This is true of medieval Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, of Montenegro, of modern Serbia, of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as well as of Partisan Yugoslavia. It is also true of medieval and modern Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, as well as of medieval and modern Poland. Moreover, all new Eastern European state formations which are organized along the same lines, will undoubtedly share the fate of their predecessors.

III

POWER-SEEKING AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN EASTERN EUROPE

The Origin of States in Eastern Europe—Political Structure of Eastern European States—Social Structure of Eastern European States—Dissolution of States in Eastern Europe.

The Origin of States

STRONG DRIVES toward self-maximation, reliance on violence and craftiness, and extreme hostility and factionalism were the outstanding traits of the warriors of Ural-Altaic origin when they invaded Eastern Europe in the first part of the Middle Ages. The Byzantine Emperor, Mauricius, who observed these tribes at the close of the sixth century, while they lived across the Danube, and before they invaded his Empire, wrote that they "are treacherous to the end, and unreliable in agreements, and will give in more because of fear than because of gifts." Mauricius also claimed that they "have many chiefs who do not live in harmony . . . disagree among themselves and cannot get along; even when they do get together, soon some of them break the agreements, because they are blood enemies to each other and no one wants to give in to another."¹

Soon after these nomadic horsebreeders and sheepraisers invaded Eastern Europe, they settled in the mountain areas which were located in the vicinity of important commercial routes that linked the East with Western Europe. Such a location gave them an opportunity for sudden raids and quick retreats, in their plundering expeditions against the caravans crossing the mountain passes of the Balkans and the Carpathians, and against the galleys sailing along the coasts of the eastern Mediterranean. Already, even in those days, these

¹Quoted in Knezović, O., *Hrvatska Povijest* (Zagreb, 1922), p. 23. See also T. Peisker, "The Asiatic Background," *Cambridge Medieval History*, I (1924), 33-52.

warriors practised the guerrilla tactics for which they became renowned in later ages and in our own times.

The Croatian tribes, for instance, settled in the Dinaric Alps, in the immediate hinterland of the eastern Adriatic coast, along which ran the main maritime road between Venice and the Levant. Taking advantage of the geographic conditions of the eastern Adriatic coast, with its numerous islands, narrow harbors and deep river valleys, dominated by steep mountains, these tribes soon became known as dreaded pirates who preyed on Venetian boats, not unlike the Illyrian pirates who, centuries before, had harassed the Roman galleys in the same territory.

A similar strategic position was acquired in the Balkans by the Serb tribes, which, in the second part of the seventh century, had settled on a high plateau in the eastern part of the Dinaric area not far from the Morava-Vardar valleys, and not too distant from some of the main continental roads which had been built earlier by the Romans, and through which a great deal of trade flowed between Byzantium and Western Europe. Employing guerrilla tactics, Serb tribesmen could raid the traders on the roads and the agricultural population in the river valleys, and then quickly and safely retreat to their mountain abodes.

In a similar manner the Bulgarians, a Turanian tribe akin to the Huns and Avars, crossed the Danube in the eighth century and settled in the Balkan mountains that traverse the agricultural area of the eastern Balkan Peninsula and divide it into two parts: the northern, which slopes toward the Danube, and the southern, which extends toward the Bosphorus and the Aegean Sea. Such a strategic position, dominating important food-producing areas and lines of communication between the Danubian basin and the Eastern Mediterranean, enabled these Turco-Mongol warriors to fight successfully against Byzantium. Likewise the Magyars, a tribe of Finno-Ugrian origin, pushed forward from Asia to the Carpathians by the end of the ninth century, and conquered the Slav agriculturists settled in the Danube river basin of the Hungarian plains. Apparently the warriors of Ural-Altaic origin were also instrumental in the formation of Poland in the tenth century by imposing their rule over the Slav agriculturists in the basin of Bug and San

ivers, and in the strategically located territory between the Carpathian Mountains and the Baltic Sea.

However, this location of herdsmen-warriors, which was strategically very favorable for their predatory activities, was not sufficient for the unification of these tribes with the agricultural population in the river basins and valleys and for the organization of a supreme authority in the form of a state. Though the Ural-Altaic tribal system already possessed some of the basic elements of state organization, such as tribal territory and a tribal authority, the internal organization of these tribes was based primarily on blood and personal ties, not on territorial and institutional loyalties. As a result of such internal relations, the clans of the same tribe were in perpetual warfare among themselves, except when they joined their forces around a forceful and successful chieftain, or when it was imperative to combat a common enemy. Even within each clan there was a perpetual struggle among leading families, and among the members of the same family, for leadership and control. This was true of all the area between the Baltic and the Aegean, where a variety of tribes of Ural-Altaic origin had settled. The unceasing internal struggle for power prevented the establishment of a lasting central authority among these tribes, as well as the extension of such an authority over surrounding agricultural populations. Thus, as long as a radical change in this tribal structure was not effected, a lasting state organization was not possible.

A change in the internal structure of these tribes came as a result of rivalries of Churches and of Empires in this area, a situation which favored the consolidation of a number of independent political units. The Byzantine emperors, for instance, at first took advantage of the intrinsic factionalism of Ural-Altaic warriors by playing one chief or one faction against another, in order to prevent their unity. The Emperor Mauricius wrote: ". . . since they do not live in harmony, it is not inopportune to win over some of them by promises and gifts, especially those who border the Empire, and then attack the others so that they do not unite in a common hatred against us and form a state."²

But when the territory of the Byzantine Empire was finally invaded by the Avars who possessed superior military

² Knezović, O., *op. cit.*, p. 23.

powers, the Byzantine emperors undertook to undermine the Avar power in the Balkans by encouraging various tribes subjected to the overlordship of the Avars to rebel against their masters, and to emancipate themselves from Avar domination by forming independent political communities. This is how, with the fall of the Avar power by the middle of the seventh century, a number of independent and semi-independent states and principalities arose in the Balkans. Deteriorating internal conditions in the Byzantine Empire in the centuries following, and the struggle of the Byzantines, the Franks, and the Church of Rome over the control of Eastern Europe, further favored the formation and expansion of independent political communities in this territory. Each of these great powers, while struggling with the others, endeavored to win local tribal chiefs over to its side by helping them to strengthen themselves and to expand their power over the neighboring clans and tribes. Once strengthened locally, however, these tribal chiefs, driven by their urge toward self-maximation, would court at the same time two or more great powers which were struggling for the control of this area. They were always ready to betray one in favor of the other whenever a better opportunity for increased personal power and territorial aggrandizement arose. In this manner, the local chieftains were redoubling their bargaining power and extending their personal rule in the direction of complete independence.

Both the Byzantine Emperors and the Popes of Rome, while struggling for supremacy in eastern Europe, endeavored to Christianize the Ural-Altaic warriors, and then to employ church organizations among these people as a means of political control. The Church performed two important functions in this respect: It was an instrument in the transfer of loyalties from a clan level to a state level, and it also became a unifying factor between the herdsmen in the mountains and the soil cultivators in the valleys and plains. For instance, after the Bulgars invaded the Balkans, one of the *Khans* (Chieftains), Boris I, adopted Christianity (864) and the Church that he established in his territory adopted the Slavic language for the church liturgy. The use of the Slavic language in the Church was an important agent in the assimilation of the Bulgar warriors, who spoke a Turanian language, with the Slavic-speaking agriculturists

whom they subjugated. Among other peoples of Eastern Europe, the Church was of equal importance as a unifying political and cultural agent, and it has remained so until the present time.

In Poland, for instance, the unification of the tribes in the territory between the Baltic and the Carpathian Mountains was effected only after Roman Catholicism was spread in this area by missionary monks, and after an independent Polish Catholic Church was organized in the beginning of the eleventh century. In the midst of the strong factionalism and centrifugal particularism of the Polish military caste, manifested in the tendency of every little prince to have his own separate court and to develop his own empire, the Church was the only stable and unifying element. Its frequent synods represented the whole of Poland, and kept alive the idea of national solidarity. By the beginning of the eleventh century, the Church at Gniezno was a metropolitan see, with jurisdiction over the bishoprics at Cracow, Breslau and Kilberg. At the same time, the orders of Cistercians, Dominicans and Franciscans were very active as colonists, pioneers and church builders. The Roman Church was very anxious to unify and strengthen this frontier territory between Western Christianity and Eastern Orthodoxy in the north of Europe. In Bohemia and Moravia, on the other hand, where warriors of the Ural-Altaic origin founded a number of states in the course of the Middle Ages, they were unable to consolidate their power, because of the lack of sufficient support by the Church of Rome, and because of the failure to organize a national church of their own.³

There was a difference between the Roman and Byzantine Churches in their role as instruments of state formation and control. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, a number of weak states and principalities arose on its territory. This situation gave the Roman Popes an opportunity not only to emancipate themselves from lay rulers, but also to claim the supremacy of the Church over the lay authorities. On the other hand, the Eastern Roman Empire, which

³ There were two attempts to organize a national Bohemian Church. One occurred in the ninth century, when Eastern Christianity was adopted; and the other, in the fifteenth century, took the form of the Hussite Movement. Concerning Moravia and Bohemia, see Thomson, S. H., *Czechoslovakia in European History* (Princeton, 1941). Concerning Poland, see Buell, R. L., *Poland* (New York, 1939).

survived many centuries after the fall of the Western Empire, retained its centralistic and despotic organization according to which all institutions, including the Church, were subjected to the final will of the Emperor. Thus, in Byzantium, the Church became a political tool in the hands of the Emperor, while in the West the local rulers were used to further the interests of the Church.

Once the Church in the East became "national," in the sense that it supported the interests of its sponsor, each local ruler, endeavoring to emancipate himself from Byzantium, sought to establish a church of his own and to fill its hierarchy with his relatives and tribesmen. This is how separate Bulgarian, Serb and Rumanian Orthodox Churches originated in the Balkans.

Each one of these national Churches in the East, closely related to the ruling dynasty by political interests and ties of blood, endeavored to strengthen its authority by the practice of sanctification of the rulers, thus vesting them with a supernatural power. This practice was of great help in the struggle of the ruling dynasty against many pretenders to the throne and the hostile tribesmen in the mountains. Thus the Eastern Church, which at first served as a unifying force in the Byzantine Empire, soon became one of the main agents in its disintegration.

In other parts of Eastern Europe, such as Poland, Croatia, Moravia, and Hungary, where the influence of the Roman Church finally prevailed, the Church, following its ideology of a supranational and universal Church, and its claim of supremacy over the lay authorities, remained always sufficiently detached from the local rulers, and was able to influence their policies in accordance with the exclusive interests of the Vatican. In this manner, the Popes of Rome not only were able to sponsor the organization of principalities and kingdoms, but also were often in the position to hasten their downfall, if such a policy suited the interests of Rome. The Popes, for instance, encouraged the formation of the Croatian Kingdom, in the ninth century, in order to emancipate the eastern Adriatic from the rule of Byzantium, but already, by the end of the eleventh century and the beginning of the twelfth century, they helped Hungary, a new and stronger Catholic power, to overrun Croatia. In the same manner, the Popes showed more interest in the political

independence of Poland and of Austria, which became frontier territories against Orthodoxy and Islam, than in that of Moravia and Bohemia, which were surrounded by other Catholic Empires.

The personality traits of herdsmen-warriors of Ural-Altaic origin and the rivalries of Churches and empires, both of which characterized the formation of the eastern European states in the Middle Ages, has marked also the foundation of these states in the modern age and in our own days. The state of Montenegro, for instance, developed its independence in the course of the nineteenth century as a result of power-seeking drives of Montenegrin tribal chiefs, whose self-seeking was favored by the efforts of Turkey, Russia, Venice and Austria to undermine one another's influence in this area. It was in the course of this struggle of the great Powers for control of Montenegro that the *kuća* (house) Petrovich of the Niegushi tribe of Montenegro gained Russian support in acquiring the right to name the bishops of the Eastern Orthodox monastery of Cetinje, which was located on the territory of the Niegushi tribe. The Russian support came after Nikolas Petrovich, the Bishop of Cetinje, had staged a massacre of the Moslems of Montenegro, one Christmas Eve early in the eighteenth century. Peter the Great, of Russia, at once enlisted Bishop Nikolas as an ally "to conquer the Turk and glorify the Slav faith and name."⁴ As religious heads of the Cetinje monastery, the Petroviches were able to unify a number of Montenegrin tribes under their leadership and to play off one great Power against another. They obtained material and moral support from Russia and Austria, Venice and Turkey, according to the circumstances. When accepting funds from Christian powers to fight the Turks, they used them to bribe the local tribal chiefs, to strengthen their own power in Montenegro. Thus, by cunning and power politics, and with the help of a national church, the Petroviches finally achieved complete independence, which was internationally recognized at the Berlin Congress in 1878.

Joseph Kermopotitch, an envoy sent by Austria in 1788 to win over Montenegro to the Austrian side, gives his impression of the culture and personality of Montenegrins in those days. Kermopotitch's impressions of Montenegrins in the

⁴Quoted by M. E. Durham, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

eighteenth century are strikingly similar to those written by the Emperor Mauricius twelve centuries earlier concerning the Ural-Altaic warriors across the Danube. Kermipotich states:

The people live by raiding cattle . . . from border lands. They are led on these raids by their priests. They are divided into rival families, between whom blood feuds rage. There is no sort of unity. During our stay some were with us, others sought our destruction. Some fought the Turks; some were in alliance with them. They have a bishop, serdars, guvernador and voyvodas. But these are mere names. People obey only so long as they gain by so doing. . . .⁵

Greece, Serbia, Rumania and Bulgaria, not unlike Montenegro, also were reestablished as independent states in the course of the nineteenth century as a result of the Austrian-Russian-Turkish struggle for the control of the Balkans, the activities of the Balkan mountain outlaws, the craftiness of their leaders, and the ideological foundations laid by the Eastern Orthodox Churches. When, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, a civil war broke out in the Ottoman Empire between the two classes of Moslem rulers, the landed nobility of the Spahis and the military class of the Janissaries, the Spahis turned to the outlaws in the mountains and armed them to fight the Janissaries. These bandit warriors first fought the Janissaries but then turned against the Spahis, and plundered and massacred all Turks, indiscriminately. It was in this way that the Serbian haiduks gathered around themselves a considerable force of men which was felt to be sufficiently strong to start a war of liberation against the Turks, in 1804. Getting help from both Russia and Austria, and playing off Russia against Austria, and Turkey against Russia, these rebels with the help of the Eastern Orthodox clergy finally engineered independence for Serbia.⁶

In the beginning of the twentieth century Albania, and later Poland, achieved their independence in a similar way. Unlike the other Balkan countries, Albania was handicapped in achieving independence, because the majority of

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

⁶ Concerning the formation of modern Serbia, see von Ranke, Leopold, *A History of Serbia* (London, 1853), and Temperley, H. W., *History of Serbia* (London, 1919), Chap. VIII ff.

the Albanians accepted Islam, the religion which served as a unifying agent in the Ottoman Empire. However, in spite of the identity of their religion with that of their Turkish overlords, the Albanian tribal chieftains, as ambitious and power-seeking as those of Montenegro, a number of times revolted against the Turkish rule, from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century. But it was only when the power of the Ottoman Empire greatly weakened in the Balkans, as a result of the Balkan wars, and when the tribes of the northern Albanian mountains around Kosovo led a successful uprising, that Turkey granted autonomy to Albania, in 1912. Then, when Austria and Italy became worried lest a Russian-supported Serbia and Montenegro might annex Albania, they backed an Albanian tribal chieftain, Ismail Kemal Vlora, to proclaim Albanian independence, in 1912. Likewise, Poland reestablished its independence after World War I, as a result of the fall of Czarist Russia and the breakdown of the Central Powers, all of which controlled parts of the Polish territory. By clever politics, first siding with the Central Powers against Russia, and then fighting with the Allies against the Central Powers, the Polish military, supported by the clergy and the nationalist intelligentsia, finally succeeded in establishing an independent Polish Republic, in 1918.

In like manner, an Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed by the Croatian Ustašas in the course of World War II. This group of Croatian outlaws and terrorists, originating in the Dinaric mountains, and supported by a part of the clergy and nationalist intelligentsia, took advantage of the struggle for power in the Balkans between the German-Italian Axis and the Western Allies, and, taking the side of the Axis, established themselves in power in Croatia as soon as Yugoslavia was overrun by the invading German and Italian armies.

The formation of Partisan states in Eastern Europe, at the end of World War II, followed a strikingly similar pattern. At the end of that war, power-seeking guerrilla chieftains and Communist Party leaders, supported by dissatisfied national minorities, took advantage of the struggle for power in Eastern Europe, between the Soviet Union and the British Empire, and imposed themselves on these countries with the help of the Red Army.

Thus, a general review of the formation of states in Eastern Europe, from the Middle Ages up to the present day, seems to support the theory according to which the origin of these states can be found in the personality traits of the predatory herdsmen and the military whose power-seeking traits have remained basically unchanged throughout centuries. Driven by a powerful urge toward self-maximation, these warriors were always ready to take advantage of the rivalries of the great Powers by gaining and expanding local political control. Once in a position of power and control, they used first religious and later nationalistic ideologies to unify and assimilate their subjects and to consolidate their rule.

Such a theory not only explains the formation of the states of Eastern Europe, from the early Middle Ages up to the most recent times, but it also explains the failure of some ethnic groups in Eastern Europe, such as the Slovenes and the Macedonians, to form in the past a state of their own. The Slovenes, as their name indicates, are a part of that great multitude of Slav farming folk who had settled in central and southeastern Europe in the course of the first centuries A.D. But, unlike Hungary, Poland, Moravia, Croatia, Serbia and Bulgaria, the Slovene regions were never permanently settled by Ural-Altaic herdsmen-warriors, who could have provided the power-seeking element which was so instrumental in the organization of states in Eastern Europe. Besides, the territory on which the Slovenes settled soon came under the permanent control of the Franks, and it lacked that element of contest between neighboring powers which was so helpful in the expansion of the rule of the local tribal chiefs and mountain outlaws in other regions of Eastern Europe. The Catholic Church, too, to which the Slovenes adhered, was in this case like that of Croatia and Moravia, an obstacle, not a help, in developing an ideology of Slovene nationalism. The Vatican considered that the survival of the Austrian Empire, to which these countries belonged, was in the interest of Roman Catholicism.

As for Macedonia, its mountainous regions were settled early in the Middle Ages by herdsmen-warriors of Ural-Altaic background, but these tribes were too weak to defend themselves against the expansionistic drives of the Bulgarians and the Serbs, and they fell alternately under the con-

trol of these two neighboring nations and alternately identified themselves with each one of them. It is only in the most recent times that some Macedonian outlaws and nationalistic intelligentsia, organized as a terroristic organization known as IMRO (International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), have advanced claims for an independent statehood. The Macedonian intelligentsia and outlaws were encouraged in their political ambitions by the increasing rivalry, in recent decades, of their neighbors and of the great Powers for the control of Macedonia's territory. Such prospects have especially brightened since the expansion of the Soviet power toward the Aegean Sea and Salonica.

The theory advanced here can be helpful also in appraising the future possibilities in Eastern Europe. So long as the social structure which supports the perpetuation of the herdsmen-warriors and the rise of the military in Eastern Europe is fundamentally unchanged, and so long as the rivalries of the great Powers and of the churches persist in the same intensity in this area, the disintegration of the old and the formation of the new states may be expected with a high degree of certainty in a not too distant future.⁷

Political Structure of the Eastern European States

The drive of the herdsmen-warriors of Ural-Altaic origin toward self-maximation, found to be one of the basic agents of state formation in Eastern Europe, is also directly related to the autocratic character of these states. Among the Balkan sheepraizers, for instance, the head of the family is likened to God and has the right of life and death over his wife and sons. On the clan and tribal level, the urge toward limitless power is manifested in autocratic tendencies of clan and tribal chiefs, and on a general community level this same impulse for boundless self-assertion is manifested in the subjection of women and of lower-income classes, and in a sharp social stratification. Finally, this tendency toward infinite self-centeredness is expressed in treachery, in extreme factionalism, and in reliance on force and cunning as the main means in achieving one's personal aims.⁸ It is only to be expected, therefore, that the same compulsions,

⁷ Compare with Chs. V and VI.

⁸ See Ch. II.

tendencies and practices will be manifested on the state level of the social organization of these people.

Indeed, it seems that on a higher level of political organization such urges and practices are even more manifested, and less restrained, than on lower levels. On the lower levels of social organization, such as the extended family, local group, clan or tribe, the autocratic tendencies of the chiefs are checked by the threat of internal split and fission of these units, which would automatically reduce the power of the head man. On the state level, on the other hand, any tendency toward partition or separation may be prevented by organized military force. This possibility gives a far greater assurance of power to the rulers, whose tendency toward self-aggrandizement can be checked only by external force or pressure. Thus we find that most states in Eastern Europe, from medieval times up to the present day, were and are ruled by despotic and oligarchic governments. These states have shown even sharper stratification than the communities on the lower levels of the political and social organization of these people. Such a sharply stratified system of state organization is especially noticeable in those eastern states which adopted Eastern Orthodoxy and were in the past particularly influenced by Byzantine civilization, and by the Byzantine or Byzantine-Ottoman system of administration, as compared to those states in Eastern Europe which adopted Western Christianity and grew within the Western cultural, economic and political orbit.

The Roman Popes, by emphasizing the supranational and universal character of the Roman Church, and by claiming superiority over the lay authority, were often able to control also the internal policies of local rulers and to limit their power. Medieval Croatia, for instance, had moved from the Roman to the Byzantine orbit, and vice versa. Thus, while the rulers of the medieval Croatian state were within the sphere of influence of the Roman Church, they were greatly limited in their freedom of action, not only in their international policies but in their internal affairs as well. At such times, the Latin clergy, as adviser at the courts of the Croatian medieval rulers, *de facto* ruled Croatia.

For instance, this limitation of the freedom of action of the eastern rulers by the power of the Popes was manifested in the vow which the Croatian King Zvonimir (1079-1089)

made to Pope Gregory VII, and in which Zvonimir pledged his "unconditional obedience in everything that is ordered or will be ordered in this Kingdom, either by the Apostolic See or by its legates." In this same vow, King Zvonimir concretely pledged to "nurture justice," to see that the clergy live a "clean and decent life," to give "protection to the poor, to widows and orphans," not to allow divorces, and to "oppose the selling of human slaves."⁹ It is obvious that the Roman Church, which was at the height of its international power in those days, could effectively control a small kingdom in its immediate neighborhood, limit the despotic tendencies of its rulers, and exert a strong influence in the direction of westernization and humanization.

Likewise, the autocratic power of Hungarian rulers was limited soon after Hungary became a kingdom under the aegis of Pope Sylvester II, in 1001. As a result of Western influences introduced into Hungary by the Catholic Church, legislation was enacted which protected private property and personal liberty, eliminated the more cruel practices in trials and punishments, and made the king responsible for his unconstitutional conduct.

In Poland, too, the Roman Church exerted a significant influence which favored the development of personal freedoms and of corporate and municipal autonomies. It was on the basis of these internal "checks and balances," and on the basis of constitutional guarantees of personal and corporate freedoms, that the development of trade and industry was fostered and that all great movements of the West, such as the Renaissance and Humanism, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, and, finally, the ideas of the French and American Revolutions made headway in this area and became the basis for the struggle in these eastern Catholic countries for human rights and democratic liberties.

On the other hand, the Eastern Orthodox Patriarchs, who identified themselves with the political powers which sponsored their Church autonomies, and who were used as political tools in the hands of their protectors, were not in a position to exert a restraining influence on the power of these lay rulers. The Eastern Orthodox Churches not only supported the existing monarchical-autocratic principle in Byzantium, and in the states in the East formed within the

⁹ Knezović, O., *op. cit.*, pp. 86-88.

Byzantine orbit, but in a number of cases even vested the lay rulers with divine power through the practice of sanctification. It was in this manner that these national Orthodox Churches became important instruments in the development and perpetuation of despotic power by the monarchs and a strong obstacle to any political, economic or cultural changes that might have endangered the vested interests of the lay rulers and of the national Church.

This unrestricted character of the power of the Orthodox rulers in Eastern Europe found expression in the written laws of their states. A good example of such laws is the Code of Czar Stephan Dushan, who ruled in the first part of the fourteenth century, and who called himself "Czar and autocrat of Serbs, Greeks and Bulgars." The purpose of Dushan's Code of Laws was to establish a feudal military despotism in the territory which he ruled. The aim of the Code was also to strengthen and stabilize the autocratic power of the Czar. It was in view of this tendency that the Code of Dushan prescribed ruthless measures directed toward the elimination of all remnants of the influence of the Roman Church, and ordered forceful conversion to Orthodoxy of all Dushan's subjects and clergy who had previously accepted the Latin rites. Expulsion, branding on the cheeks, selling into slavery, cutting off of the hands, and pulling out of the tongue were some of the measures directed against the heretics.¹⁰

At the same time, however, while strengthening the cause of Orthodoxy against Roman Catholicism, Czar Dushan completely subjected the Orthodox Church to his imperial rule.¹¹ In his relation to the landed military aristocracy and their serfs, the Czar reserved for himself unlimited power and the supreme right not only to the military service but also to a part of the land produce.¹² The nobility, when they functioned as army commanders, had in relation to their soldiers the same unlimited power as the Czar. In such a case, the common soldier did not have the right of appeal to the Czar.¹³ Not only branding, and maiming, and tearing out of the tongue, but also slitting of the nose, cutting off

¹⁰ *Zakonik Stefana Dushana*, (Beograd, 1898), Ed. by Novakovich, Art. 6-21.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Art. 25.

¹² *Ibid.*, Art. 190-198.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Art. 129.

the ears, blinding by gouging out the eyes, burning to death by fire, and hanging were among the measures adopted by the Code to support the autocratic rule and caste relations in Dushan's Czardom.¹⁴ This Code of Laws was adopted in the fourteenth century, at the time when the Catholic states in the neighborhood of Serbia, such as Hungary and Croatia, already had not only state constitutions which limited the power of the ruler, but also literature, art, philosophy, science and institutions of higher learning, all of which reflected the ideas of the Renaissance and the trend of Humanism.

The written laws, however, only partly reveal the actual relations in the Orthodox states, since these laws also reflect some moderating influences of other codifications of laws and of ideas of those times. The actual relations between the rulers and their subjects in the Orthodox states went to even greater excesses than the written laws of these states would indicate. According to the historian Jorga, in the thirteenth century in Roumania, it was the sheepraisers of the mountains who formed the first political communities, under the rule of their Voivodes, and with the help of the priests and merchants:¹⁵

Here the head of the political life is the *prince* . . . He has a city in which he habitually resides—but he covers the whole country every year, especially during the spring and summer, stopping at various places for the personal administration of justice . . . All laws emanate from him. He makes gifts—he confiscates the estates of traitors. Contracts, to be valid, must be submitted for his ratification. He has the power of life and death and he uses it liberally . . . The revenues from the customs and the salt-pits, and the taxes paid by foreigners, go right to him . . . His direct intervention is necessary in every act of public life, which he, so to say, sums up in his own person. . . .¹⁶

A typical case of a Balkan shepherd and brigand who rose to summits of uncontrolled power is that of Ali Pasha of Jannina, who ruled Albania and Greece at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. According to the historian Finlay:

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Art. 54-54, 69, 166, 201 and others.

¹⁵ Jorga, N., *A History of Rumania* (London, 1925), p. 6.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-132.

Ali Pasha . . . was brave and active, restless in mind and body, and utterly destitute of all moral and religious feeling . . . As he grew older and rose in power, he became . . . habitually false; and, regarding cunning as a proof of capacity, his conversation with strangers was usually intended to mislead the listeners. During his long and brilliant career, his personal interests or passions were the sole guides of his conduct . . . he rose gradually from the position of a petty chieftain to the rank of a powerful prince; yet his moral and political vision never seems to have been enlarged, for at his greatest elevation selfishness obscured his intellect, and avarice neutralized his political sagacity. Ali ascribed his success solely to his own ability, and his self-conceit persuaded him that his own talents were an infallible resource in every emergency. . . . He thought that he could deceive all men and that nobody could deceive him. . . . his conduct was full of contradictions. At times he acted with excessive audacity; at times with extreme timidity. By turns he was mild and cruel, tolerant and tyrannical, but his avarice never slept, and to gratify it, there was no crime which he was not constantly ready to perpetrate. The boasting ability of Ali was displayed in subduing the Albanians, cheating the Ottoman Government, and ruling the Greeks. The cruelty of Ali excited horror in civilized Europe, but it exerted admiration from his subjects.¹⁷

Kara George, a Dinaric herder and outlaw (*haiduk*), and the leader of a Serb uprising against the Turks in the beginning of the nineteenth century, laid the first foundations of modern Serbia, and the political institutions which he instituted during his rule in Serbia (1804-1812) well reflect the background and mentality of a Balkan herdsman and bandit. According to the historian Leopold von Ranke, Kara George was impulsive, violent, despotic and crafty. When he was proposed as chief of the Serb rebellion against the Turks, he himself warned the Serbian chiefs that his impetuosity rendered him unfit for the office, that he would not wait to consult, but would be inclined to kill at once anybody who dared oppose him. His record bore out his words. He murdered his own stepfather in a moment of rage, and once assaulted his own mother by forcing a hive of bees on her head. He ordered that his only brother be hanged at the door of the house, and he forbade his mother to mourn outwardly for the death of her son. He would not even pause

¹⁷ Finlay, *A History of Greece*, VI (Oxford 1877), pp. 58-60.

to tell his *momak* (personal guard) to beat an offender, but he himself would kill him, even if the offender happened to be one of his close friends and associates.¹⁸ It is said that he killed a hundred and twenty people in this way.

As soon as Kara George had been elected leader of the uprising against the Turks, he manifested the tendency to perpetuate himself in power and to concentrate the power exclusively in his own hands. But the other chieftains, too, most of whom were also former mountain bandits, were as much interested in increasing and concentrating the power in their own hands. There was, however, sharp rivalry between the *voivodas*, the chieftains who commanded smaller districts, and the *gospodars*, the chieftains who controlled larger territories and were more independent. Kara George commanded one of the largest districts, Shumadia, and the town of Belgrade with its renowned fortress. He was attended by the greatest number of personal guards, and enjoyed the largest share of military glory. By taking advantage of the antagonisms between the *gospodars* and the *voivodas*, and by playing off one group against the other, Kara George constantly increased his personal power and, when necessary, would intimidate his adversaries with a display of arms. Employing this combination of craftiness and violence, Kara George finally crushed the power of the *gospodars*, appointed the *voivodas* himself, and succeeded in controlling the entire administration according to his own views. The whole authority was concentrated in his hands, and all men with power in the country were dependent upon him for tenure.¹⁹

Not dissimilar were the personality and the rule of Milosh Obrenovich, who, with the help of the Turks, murdered Kara George and became the ruler of autonomous Serbia. According to von Ranke, Milosh was as violent and despotic as Kara George, but more crafty. Born of a family of Dinaric herdsmen, Milosh, when he came into power, considered himself not only the chief of Serbia's administration, but also its sole lawgiver, its commander-in-chief, and its supreme justice. In autumn, 1835, his official newspaper proclaimed that in Serbia Prince Milosh was the only Mas-

¹⁸ Leopold von Ranke, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

ter, and that no one except him had any claim to power.²⁰

The traditions of patriarchal rule of the Balkan mountaineers and the Turkish example of Oriental despotism favored Milosh's autocracy. His authority was both like that of the starješina (elder) of a Dinaric kuća and like that of a Turkish pasha; but, even more than the Turkish pashas, he took personal advantage of his unlimited power.

He exercised the power of life and death over his subjects, and spared none who appeared to him to be his rival. The more dangerous ones he killed, contenting himself with cutting out the tongues of his less formidable opponents. "Am I not the master, and shall I not be at liberty to do what I please?" he would say.²¹

In Montenegro, as late as the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, at a time when many of the ideas of the French Revolution had been adopted and put into practice in most of Europe, the methods of rule of Montenegrin tyrants did not differ from the most ruthless practices known to barbarian societies. These methods were manifested in a policy of systematic extermination of all those who might not completely conform to the orders of the rulers. Peter I, who ruled Montenegro in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and who himself was an Orthodox bishop and was later sanctified by the Church, is said to have assassinated eighty-three chiefs of Montenegrin clans and tribes who dared to show some opposition to his rule.²² Bishop Peter II, who succeeded him, was not less murderous, and both were not only matched but surpassed in such methods of rule by Prince Danilo, the first lay ruler of Montenegro. One of Danilo's brothers and a military leader, Voivoda Mirko, in subjugating recalcitrant tribes, would exterminate all tribesmen who did not succeed in fleeing or hiding themselves:

Not even children in the cradle were spared, regardless of whether they were male or female, because every soldier tried to kill them before another in order to get a medal or a cross and to leave the other without honor. In this way, even the old men and the sick who could not get up because of old age or infirmity were slaughtered; their heads were cut off and

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

²² Miljanov, M., *Pleme Kuchi* (Beograd, 1904), pp. 301-313.

brought to a place where they were exhibited so that their number would not be forgotten.²³

This same system of personal rule and terrorism is found basically unchanged in a number of eastern European states of our own day, where it is supported not only by practices inherited from the past of these countries, but also by the power-seeking tendencies of the new ruling classes, the military and the intelligentsia, a large part of whom is still being recruited from among the herdsmen and the mountain folk.

King Alexander, of Yugoslavia, for instance, ascending the throne after World War I, ruled his country in a manner which was very much like that of his two great grandfathers, Kara George of Serbia and Danilo of Montenegro. Before he ascended the throne, Alexander had shown great impatience in waiting for the death of his father, King Peter of Serbia, and with the help of an army faction known as the "White Hand," he became the ruling Regent and deprived his father of all power. Before that, Alexander had successfully plotted against his own brother, Prince George, who was the legal heir to the throne of Serbia. With the help of an army faction, Alexander succeeded in depriving Prince George of his right to ascend the throne. Already, as Regent of Serbia, Alexander sought to restrict the power and the influence of all outstanding army and political leaders. Either by ruse or by assassination, he eliminated from the army and from the political scene, one by one, all those who he suspected might oppose his personal rule. When he became King of Yugoslavia, he proceeded to rule in the same manner. First, he gradually eliminated from power the important leaders of all political parties, using methods of trickery and assassination; then, free of restraint, he resorted to a *coup d'état* with the help of a military faction, abolished the existing constitution, disbanded the Parliament, and proclaimed a personal dictatorship.²⁴

In the same manner, in the Greece of our day, the tendency toward oligarchic and autocratic rule has often been manifested. In 1922, for instance, a group of Greek army officers forced the King to abdicate, formed a military government, and arbitrarily executed a number of former min-

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 301.

²⁴ Pribichevitch, S., *La Dictature du Roi Alexandre* (Paris, 1938).

isters. Following the same example, in 1925, General Pangalos, a military adventurer, staged a *coup d' état* with twenty-eight supporters and made himself master of Athens. He "hanged officials for peculation, in virtue of an *ex post facto* law, and had himself elected President of the Republic by means of a popular election at which he was the only candidate."²⁵ The Pangalos regime was overthrown, again by a military *coup d' état*, and, after a few years of both disguised and undisguised autocracy of various military and lay leaders, and of a king who was brought into Greece on the basis of a fake election, General Metaxas obtained special powers from this King and, on that basis, established his personal dictatorship. Parliament was suppressed, the political parties were abolished, and strict censorship was instituted by royal decrees. Metaxas then proclaimed himself prime minister for life, and proceeded to rule by his personal decrees. His police spied out all alleged opponents, who were then imprisoned, beaten, tormented and interned.²⁶

In Bulgaria, after the peasant leader Stambuliski was overthrown in a military *coup d' état*, in 1923, the army dictatorship was accompanied by terror, bomb plots, murders and mass executions of political opponents. Finally, in 1933, the Constitution was suspended and Parliament and the political parties were dissolved or suppressed by terror. In 1935, King Boris overthrew the ruling military junta, with the help of another military faction. Former military leaders were given the death sentence, and the King himself assumed the dictatorship.

Fundamentally, the same political development took place in modern Rumania, where by 1938 the King drew up a new Constitution which was "accepted by a plebiscite with open verbal voting." According to this Constitution, the King alone could initiate legislation, and he alone had the right of veto with respect to all acts of Parliament. The government was appointed by the King, and was responsible only to him. All political parties were disbanded, and some of the opponents of the regime were arrested and shot to death without trial.

Even in Poland, where western influences always exerted

²⁵ Robinson, V., "Greece," in *Hitler's Route to Bagdad* (London, 1939), p. 224.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

a moderating effect on those stemming from the East, the internal conditions after World War I favored the ascendancy of a military oligarchy and its arbitrary rule. In 1926, Marshal Pilsudski, taking advantage of the internal disturbances caused by economic and social differences of the post-war years of this newly formed state, seized power by a *coup d' état*. In the following years, Poland was ruled dictatorially by "the Colonel's group." Opposition leaders were imprisoned and tortured. In 1935, Marshal Pilsudski was succeeded by Marshal Smigly-Rydz as military dictator. He dissolved Parliament and decreed a new constitution, which allowed only officially approved candidates to stand for election. One of the Colonels was appointed as the head of the government party.

After World War II, when most of the countries in Eastern Europe were occupied by the Red army, the autocratic and tyrannical practices inherited from the past, and supported by the self-maximizing tendencies of the mountain folk and of the local military and intelligentsia, were only accentuated. In some cases, these practices were legalized in the form of new laws and constitutions.

It was in the course of this occupation that the Communist-oriented factions of the intelligentsia and the mountain guerrillas, together with the Soviet-oriented military, established autocratic power with the help of the Red Army. In Yugoslavia, for instance, the Partisan guerrillas, protected by the Soviet Union, resorted to a one-party system and police government. They proceeded to rule that country in a manner closely resembling the methods of medieval rulers of Serbia and of Petrovich's dynasty in Montenegro. Concentration camps, slave labor, forced unemployment, execution sentences passed by Communist-packed "people's courts," and outright murder without trial are being widely used as means to crush all active opposition, and to eliminate those who are even suspected as potential opponents of the regime. The present dictator of that country, Marshal Tito, himself declared in a speech: ". . . we will arrest everyone who resists the present state of affairs. . . . We will have no pity toward them. . . . they will have to disappear from the face of this earth. . . ." ²⁷

The present Constitution of Partisan Yugoslavia itself

²⁷ *New York Times*, November 11, 1946.

bears witness to the extreme concentration of power and to the military and police character of this state. Thus, the Constitution openly declares that it is the duty of the army not only to defend the borders and the independence of the state, but to protect "the freedom of the people" as well.²⁸ That is, the army is constitutionally recognized as the political instrument of those who hold power, and the rulers have assured for themselves the constitutional right to call upon the army to support them whenever their power is threatened, and whenever they choose to characterize the opposition to their regime as a threat to the "freedom of the people."

Likewise, the unusually powerful position given to the Public Prosecutor by this Constitution is a good example of how the police and prison character of the Partisan regime is legalized. The Public Prosecutor, who is really chosen by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, but who is formally "elected" by the National Assembly, is above all law and all court decisions, since it is stated in the Constitution that "all public prosecutors are independent of all other organs of state authority and are subordinate only to the next higher public prosecutor, from whom they receive orders and direction." The Public Prosecutor also has the right to interfere in court decisions, and in the decisions of other state organs.²⁹ In other words, by controlling the army and the police, the Communist rulers of Yugoslavia secured for themselves the right to interpret law arbitrarily, to abolish court decisions, and to use police, as well as military force, in order to perpetuate themselves in power.

Not unlike their Ural-Altaic predecessors and the bandit-heroes of the Ural-Altaic and Balkan ballads, the Partisan-Communist rulers of Eastern European countries also take personal advantage of their political power. They appropriate for their own use other people's property, live in luxurious palaces, are surrounded by many servants and courtiers, indulge in publicly displaying their wealth, position and

²⁸ Article 134 of the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

²⁹ "Yugoslavia's New Constitution," *News of Yugoslavia*, February 1946, p. 9, Yugoslav Embassy, Washington, D. C. See also Articles 126 and 127 of the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

medals and are fond of bestowing favors upon their admirers and rare jewels upon their mistresses.

Thus driven by a powerful urge to self-maximation and power, the tendency of herdsmen warriors and of the military in Eastern Europe was always to seize power by cunning and violence and to retain it in an unlimited form by all the means at their disposal, unless checked in their drives and practices by restraining outside influences. Moreover, so long as a new system of recruitment of political élites does not take place in this area, or so long as the rulers are not restrained by outside influences, the tyrannical character of those states, under one disguise or another, will remain unchanged.

Social Structure of the Eastern European States

The domineering guerrillas and military who imposed themselves as the autocratic rulers of the states they formed not only kept the power concentrated exclusively in their own hands, but showed no restraint in seeking territorial aggrandizement whenever an opportunity arose. They were encouraged in this policy by the great Powers, which were fighting for spheres of interest, and which employed the local chiefs and rulers to promote their own aims in Eastern Europe. As a result of such power politics on a crossroads of cultures, religions and political and economic systems, the states in Eastern Europe necessarily had incorporated peoples and strata that sharply differed in their views of life, in their aspirations, and in their concept of the state and its functions. At the same time, the autocratic tendencies and vested interests of the ruling classes were not conducive to political and social changes which would tend to develop territorial and institutional loyalties and tie various elements of their countries into an integrated unit.

Medieval Croatian rulers, for instance, sought to control the eastern Adriatic coast, with its well-developed and prosperous commercial cities built in the days of the Roman Empire and settled by Roman and Romanized native elements. In Dalmatia, the urban centers, together with the islands, sought protection of Byzantium against the plundering expeditions and piracy of the Croatian tribes, and in this

manner they tended to orient themselves toward Byzantium, not only in political but also in religious matters. But the Popes of Rome, who were at that time already struggling with the Byzantine emperors for the control of the Balkans, considered the Dalmatian cities to be within the direct sphere of influence of the Church of Rome. Such a situation on the Eastern Adriatic coast brought the Croatian tribal chiefs and the Roman Popes toward a closer understanding and a common policy with regard to the Adriatic. The Croatian tribal chiefs were interested in extending their power over the Dalmatian cities and islands, and the Popes, who endeavored to expand their own influence across the Adriatic Sea at the expense of Byzantium, encouraged Croatian territorial ambitions and Croatian political emancipation from Byzantium. However, the incorporation of Dalmatian cities within the Croatian Kingdom brought into the Kingdom conflicting Byzantine and Western political, religious and economic influences, which were soon manifested in a sharp internal struggle in Croatia over the system of land tenure, over the Church language and ritual, and over the boundaries and privileges of the Slav and Latin Bishoprics.

Both the tribesmen in the mountains and the peasants in the valleys and along the coast opposed the establishment of the feudal system, which was supported by the Latin clergy, the city absentee landowners, feudal magnates, and dynasts and courtiers. They reacted to these disturbing innovations by assassinating the princes, the landlords and the priests. At the same time, the increasing influence of the Latin clergy upon cultural and political life in Croatia soon brought them into open conflict with the Croatian native clergy, who felt themselves threatened by the Latins. The Croatian native clergy, recruited mainly from among Croatian mountaineers, and influenced by the Byzantine Church, insisted upon the use of the native Slav language and other Byzantine traditions in the Church. Close to the people in all their ideas and ways of living, they opposed both feudalization and Romanization. Thus a struggle developed between the Latin clergy and the Croatian native clergy over the rites, the tithes, and the control of the bishoprics and the extent of their territories, all of which greatly hampered the

process of Croatia's internal unification and political stabilization.³⁰

Similar internal conflicts brought about through territorial expansion characterized medieval Serbia, and were especially manifested in the Czardom of Dushan. Taking advantage of the distressing conditions within the Byzantine Empire of his days, Stephen Dushan incorporated into his kingdom a part of the southern Balkan peninsula, together with a part of the Balkan regions which were formerly controlled by Rome, and in 1345 he called himself "Lord of almost the whole Kingdom of Rome." Then, having conceived a plan of conquering Constantinople, he attempted to carry it out. As a part of this ambitious scheme, he elevated one of his councillors to the position of "Patriarch of the Serbs and the Greeks," and the new Patriarch then crowned Dushan at a Church Council in Skoplje, in 1346, as the "Czar and autocrat of the Serbs, the Greeks, and the Bulgarians."

Dushan's achievements represented the climax of a policy of conquest and expansion carried out by the Nemanja dynasty in the course of their two hundred years' rule in the Balkans. However, in spite of his successes in international politics, Dushan was hampered in consolidating his realm internally, because of his inability to assimilate the conquered peoples culturally, to unify them economically, and to win over their allegiance to the state and its institutions.

Thus, in spite of Dushan's attempt to develop agriculture, mining, commerce, arts and letters, and a well organized mercenary army, his empire remained essentially on the level of the Dinaric tribal society from which it originated.³¹ Conquered peoples could not be assimilated in the course of Dushan's short rule, nor could the cultural level of the Dinaric ruling strata be elevated to that of some of their subjected groups, such as the Byzantines, coastal Romans and western Slavs. The rule of Dinaric herdsmen was looked upon as raw and brutal, and was borne very unwillingly by the peasants of the plow and by those of the subjugated people who were more urbanized and more civilized than their rulers. It was because of these conditions that Dushan

³⁰ Concerning internal conditions of Croatia in those days, see Sisić, F., *Pregled Povijesti Hrvatskoga Naroda* (Zagreb 1916), pp. 1-72.

³¹ Concerning the Dinaric tribal system, see Ch. II.

failed to develop institutional ties and loyalties to bind his subjects into one community of interests, ideals and aspirations. The Serb Orthodox Church alone, which was forced upon all Dushan's subjects as a means of unity, in spite of its unswerving and unconditional loyalty to the state and its rulers, was not sufficient to develop a will to live together among peoples whose cultural orientations and economic interests so sharply conflicted. The Code of Laws enacted by Dushan was directed, after the Byzantine pattern, toward strengthening the central power of the state and its military and administrative effectiveness, and at the same time it was an attempt to emulate the Western type of feudalism. Not only were these two systems contradictory, but laws and other formal institutions imposed by force were not sufficient in themselves to transform a basically tribal society into a civilized and economically advanced empire, despite provisions which for their ruthlessness surpassed all similar codifications of those times.³² •

When Serbia emerged again as an independent state, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, through the activities of the mountain guerrillas and outlaws, it showed the same traits of external expansion and lack of internal unity as the Czardom of Dushan before it. Before the Balkan Wars in 1913, Serbia's territory was double the size it had been at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But, while it expanded territorially so rapidly in the course of a century, its internal situation became increasingly unstable.

The Dinaric mountaineers, as leaders of rebellions against the Turks, imposed their rule over the peasants of Serbia and concentrated the power in their own hands. They perpetuated themselves in power as dynasts, courtiers, army leaders, police and bureaucrats. At the same time, however, the urbanization of the country and its economic life were retarded because of the emphasis on militarism as a major state policy, and because the Byzantine-Ottoman practices of autocratic bureaucracy were adopted by the new rulers. These practices hampered all initiative and free development in trade and industry, and absorbed most of the country's resources for the maintenance of the army, the bureaucrats and the police. Not only did the peasants have

³² Concerning the early history of Serbia, see C. Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben* (Gotha, 1911).

to support all these governmental classes, but they soon came under the economic and political control of village merchants and usurers, most of whom emigrated from the mountains into peasant villages in the valleys. Because of difficulties in an economy which was changing from a system of self-sufficiency and barter to a system of market economy, the peasants became economically indebted to this village merchant class, and were thus prevented by them from organizing politically and from developing an independent political movement of their own.³³

These internal contradictions and conflicts were greatly intensified after Serbia incorporated Macedonia, at the end of the Balkan wars, in 1913, and when Serbia extended its rule over Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Voivodina, upper Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slovenia, in the form of Yugoslavia, in 1918, at the end of World War I. The territory then controlled by Serbia was ten times as large as its original territory at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This unparalleled expansion in such comparatively short time placed Serbia's military in control of territories and peoples that had been subjected for ages to divergent cultural, religious, political and economic influences. But, since the Serbian ruling classes followed Ural-Altaic and Byzantine traditions of limitless power, they insisted on a centralistic organization of the state and rigid concentration of all power in their own hands. They refused to share the political power with the representatives of provinces and peoples that were newly incorporated within the kingdom. Clashes therefore necessarily developed over all issues and policies, heightening, instead of weakening, the divergencies and conflicts that were brought in by such mentally, culturally, religiously and technologically heterogeneous elements of the new state.

In the Yugoslav Kingdom, which incorporated all these different groups, the Serbs of Serbia not only were in numerical minority but were also less advanced industrially, less urbanized, and less Westernized than the major part of the state which they now dominated. The Serbian ruling classes lacked sufficient prestige and experience to rule populations which were accustomed to other administrative standards. These sections of Yugoslavia's population strongly

³³ Concerning the internal conditions of modern Serbia, see Jovanovich, S., *Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovicha* (Beograd, 1931).

resented the Serbian hegemony, and refused to be subdued by people whom they considered backward and crude. The situation in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the twentieth century was a repetition of the situation that existed in the Czardom of Dushan in the fourteenth century.

The main opposition to the autocratic rule of the Serbian military centered in Croatia, a section of Yugoslavia which not only grew within the Western political orbit but which had a long tradition of political independence and constitutional rights of its own. Thus, when Croatia was deprived of the political autonomy which it had enjoyed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, instead, became subjected to the rule of a military class whose concepts of state organization and of human rights completely differed from those to which the Croats had become accustomed through their contacts with the Western world, all Croatian classes, regardless of political orientation, strongly reacted against the new state of affairs. Moreover, the strength of the Croatian opposition encouraged the dissatisfied elements in other parts of the kingdom, such as Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia, whose traditions and aspirations differed from those of Serbia. It was these divergencies in views among the peoples of Yugoslavia, coupled with increasing economic difficulties, that caused friction and disturbance and that prevented internal unification and consolidation of the Kingdom.³⁴

The formation of the social structures of other states in Eastern Europe was not unlike those already discussed. All these states have been founded and ruled by the military and the intelligentsia, one of whose primary interests was in the expansion of their personal power and of territorial control. Thus, all these states have included within their boundaries peoples of different origin, mentality, and economic and administrative standards. All of them also have included large peasant populations whose low standard of living was directly related to the policy of militarism, nationalism and expansion pursued by the ruling classes.

Albania, for instance, came into existence as an independent state in the twentieth century, as a result of the political expansion of the tribes of warriors of the northern Albanian

³⁴ Tomašić, D., "Croatia in European Politics," *Journal of Central European Affairs* (April, 1942), pp. 63-85.

mountain areas.³⁵ In the course of this expansion, Albania came to include Moslem, Greek-Orthodox and Catholic populations and also became divided, along economic lines, between the more primitive herdsmen of the north (the Ghegs) and the more advanced agricultural folk of the south (the Tosks). At the same time, the Gheg warriors of the northern mountains, who assumed political control of Albania, were themselves split into numerous hostile tribes, clans and factions. After World War I, it was Ahmedbeg Zogu, Chief of the Mati tribe, who, with the help of Italy, subjected the other tribes, assumed control of Albania, and proclaimed himself king. King Zogu, however, was never able to consolidate his power, because of the hostility of a number of tribes in the northern mountains, as well as of those in the south.

Likewise, Bulgaria was never completely unified and consolidated, in either medieval or modern times. Bulgaria was first formed by the Bulgars, a Turanian tribe of nomadic herdsmen and warriors who ruled as *Boyars* (landed military nobility) over agricultural Slavic folk. Then, under the Turkish rule, its internal divisions only increased. There were the Greek merchants, the Saxon miners, and the inhabitants of the "warrior villages," who received self-government and exemption from taxation in return for military service. There were also the outlaws in the mountains, who maintained themselves by guerrilla warfare and banditry, then the Turkish military and feudal nobility, the Christian serfs, and the Moslem free peasants. All these groups formed separate bodies, with little contact, especially since the Christian Church, the original unifying agent, was limited in its activity under the Turkish rule, while the Turkish masters did not know how to use their own religion as a unifying force. Instead, they frowned upon Islamization, which brought the liberation of former serfs and therefore considerable loss in the amount of feudal tributes.

The autocratic and bureaucratic practices of both the Turanian and the Turkish rulers of Bulgaria did not foster internal unification. As a result, the modern Bulgaria, too, has inherited a lack of internal unity and is still divided between the mountaineers and plainsmen, the city dwellers

³⁵ Concerning the tribal structure of Albania, see E. Durham, *Some Tribal Origins, Laws and Customs of the Balkans* (London, 1928).

and the rural people, the northern Bulgarians and the Macedonians, the Turks and the Greeks, the Eastern Orthodox and the Moslems, the military and the laymen, and the many factions of the army and the intelligentsia—conditions which do not favor internal political stability.

Even more than in Bulgaria and Albania, internal cultural and social divisions prevented consolidation of Rumania and Greece. Besides having its mountain folk and the people of the lowlands, its Boyars and its bourgeoisie, Rumania is also divided culturally between its Transylvanians, who were accustomed to Hungarian administrative standards, and the old Rumanians, whose administrative practices stem from the Byzantine-Ottoman world. Moreover, the pre-war Rumania was settled by large national minorities, such as the Magyars, Germans, Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgars, and Jews. It is obvious that such internal differences would contribute to internal tensions and delay political unification and stability.

And Greece, besides the same internal divisions along cultural, ethnic and social lines that one finds in all eastern European countries, is also split along geographic lines to a much greater extent than any other state in this area. The mountainous districts, the Peninsula and the islands present three main divisions in Greece, not only in a geographic sense, but often in a social and political sense as well. In addition, even within each of these three main divisions, there are many cultural and ethnic differences. There are large groups of Albanians, Turks, Wallachians and Slavs dispersed throughout the Greek territory. There are strong Mediterranean cultural influences on the islands and along the coast, but also important are "Balkan" cultural influences in the interior, manifested particularly in the culture of the herdsmen and in the Byzantine-Ottoman heritage. In Greece, as well as in all other Balkan countries, the gradual addition of territories as a result of the gradual retreat of the Turks meant also added difficulties in the process of internal unification. This lack of unification explains to a large extent the present difficulties of Greece, as manifested in the large-scale guerrilla warfare which at present ravages that country.

Farther north we find similar developments. In Poland, for instance, the military who founded the Polish state of

1918, driven by their urges toward self-maximation and territorial expansion, had incorporated into their new state districts and provinces inhabited by populations foreign in culture, religion, practices, feelings and aspirations. Out of a population of thirty-four millions, eleven millions (or about one-third) were peoples who did not identify themselves with the Polish majority, such as the Ukrainians, the Bielorussians, the Germans and the Lithuanians. Moreover, the emphasis on military preparedness and police control brought the ruling military into open conflict with the peasantry. Thus both cultural and social conflicts and great internal tensions and disturbances characterized the life of the new state.

Of the states formed in Eastern Europe after World War II, the most complicated structure from the point of view of internal divisions is that of the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia. This state has inherited the contradictory and heterogeneous structure of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the Partisan guerrillas who imposed themselves on the new state, as autocratic rulers recognized the cultural divergencies of the various peoples and regions of Yugoslavia. They divided the state into six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and into the autonomous province Vojvodina, and an autonomous territory Kosovo-Metohija. The people in each one of these states, provinces and territories have a different history, mentality, culture and social structure, and the principle that each one should be allowed to develop along its own autochthonous lines is sociologically correct. However, following Ural-Altraic, Byzantine-Ottoman, and Soviet traditions and practices of rule, a Partisan military and police autocracy permeated the whole structure of this new state and, as a result, the autonomy given to various historical and ethnic groups is in name only.

Regional and state autonomies are compatible with a system of representative democracy, not with a system of bureaucratic regimentation and totalitarian militarism. Thus the "autonomous" republics and other "autonomous" regions in Partisan Yugoslavia function only as the organs of the central government; they are so strictly subjected to the control and the orders of this central authority in all their activities that their autonomy becomes illusory. The

central government has the right to establish the extent of the autonomy and of the territory of the republics, and is also empowered to extend or limit these autonomies and territories at will.³⁶

The structure of Partisan Yugoslavia remains, therefore, basically the same as the structure of its predecessors, medieval and modern Serbia, and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, except for an emphasized centralization and governmentalization in all fields of public activities. Because of the increased internal tensions in such a system, the ruling minority must rely on military and police forces for its support. In order to maintain themselves in power, the ruling clique is also forced to set various nationalities, ethnic groups, religions and classes of the country one against another, a policy that in its own turn increases divisions and sharpens the internal conflicts.³⁷

It is such lack of internal integration that prevented the consolidation of the military in Eastern Europe. The internal divisions only strengthened the traditional factionalism of the warriors, and the states that they built became renowned for internal disturbances and tensions.

Dissolution of States in Eastern Europe

The emotional instability of the Ural-Altaic warriors and their drives toward extreme self-maximation and unlimited power, coupled with internal divisions and with the struggle of the great Powers for the control of Eastern Europe, were the conditions responsible not only for the formation of states, but for their disintegration and downfall as well. Not only had the extreme power-seeking of these people laid foundations for the building of the state and determined its pattern of tyrannical rule, but it had also prevented the development of feelings of loyalty among the subjected peoples, and had even thwarted the political unification of the ruling group itself. Owing to their sudden and shifting fluctuations in emotional attachments, their relentless self-seeking and rivalry, and their utter lack of ability to com-

³⁶ Articles 9, 12, 44 and 72 of the Constitution of The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

³⁷ Tomašić, D., "Nationality Problems and Partisan Yugoslavia," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, VI (1946), pp. 112-125.

promise, these military, even when members of the same ruling clan, clique, or family, were always ready to form factions, to conspire, and to rely on foreign help in a ceaseless struggle for self-assertion, ascendancy and power.³⁸ Such circumstances provoked endless civil and foreign wars and brought about, in the past history of this part of Europe, the downfall of most states. A review of the changes in the political configuration of Eastern Europe, from medieval days to present times, will illustrate this point.

In medieval Croatia, for instance, after the relations between the Roman Church and the Byzantine Empire became strained, each time the ruling faction orientated itself toward Byzantium it was overthrown in favor of a pro-Frankish or pro-Roman faction of the tribal chiefs, nobility and clergy. But as soon as the power of Byzantium would again grow in the Balkans, the followers of the dethroned dynasty, with the help of Byzantium, would organize a series of conspiracies to overthrow the ruling dynasty. Then again, as soon as the Byzantine influence would weaken, the pro-Byzantine dynasts would be assassinated and the pro-Roman aspirants enthroned, backed by the Latin clergy and the pro-Latin nobility. Such a situation finally brought about the downfall of the Croatian medieval kingdom and its incorporation into the kingdom of Hungary.

By the end of the eleventh century, as a result of increasing internal tensions and conflicts, a civil war broke out in Croatia between, on the one hand, the Dalmatian cities, the Croatian feudal nobility, and the Latin clergy and, on the other hand, an anti-Latin party led by the native Croat clergy and backed by the peasants and Dinaric tribesmen. The anti-Latin party, supported by Byzantium, elected Slavić, a tribal chieftain, as King of Croatia. But the Latin party and the feudal nobility, backed by Pope Gregory VII, invited the Normans from southern Italy to invade Croatia. As a result of this invasion, the anti-Latin party was defeated and King Slavić was dethroned. Then the Latin party and the feudal nobility enthroned Zvonimir as King of Croatia. Zvonimir recognized the Pope as his overlord.

Zvonimir had the support of the Latin clergy and of the city people, but he lacked that of the Croatian tribesmen, the peasants, and the native Croatian clergy. Thus, when

³⁸ See Ch. II.

in 1079 Zvonimir consented to undertake a crusade which the Pope urged, and called a meeting of the Croatian tribesmen in the Dinaric mountains to win them for his crusade, he was assassinated.

Soon after the death of King Zvonimir, the internal situation of the Kingdom rapidly deteriorated. Conflicts and rivalries were intensified. The cleavage between the tribal system and the feudal system, between the Croat clergy and the Latin clergy, and between Eastern and Western influences deepened; internecine warfare and chaos developed: ". . . among the magnates of the Kingdom a quarrel was born and when they split into rival groups, because of lust for power, and because of the claims over the possession of lands . . . there was no end of daily persecutions, attacks, and slaughters among them."³⁹

In such circumstances, Zvonimir's successor, Stjepan, II, was assassinated, and the feudal and Latin factions invited the Hungarians to invade Croatia, in order to help the feudals and the Latins to regain power, while the anti-Latin and anti-feudal factions, backed by Byzantium, enthroned Peter, a descendant of King Slavić, as King of Croatia. However, with the backing of the Pope, the Hungarian army invaded Croatia, defeating and killing King Peter, a trend of events that finally brought about the incorporation of Croatia within the Kingdom of Hungary (1102).⁴⁰

No less bloody and violent was the history of medieval Serbia. The founder of the Serbian dynasty, Nemanja, came into power in the beginning of the thirteenth century, after his three brothers were defeated and one of them assassinated in the course of a fratricidal war. Then, after Nemanja's death, his own sons, Stephan and Vukan, engaged among themselves in a bloody strife which ended in the victory of Stephan. Vukan was backed by Rome and Stephan by Byzantium. After Stephan's death, Stephan's sons, Vladislav, Radoslav and Urosh, fought a civil war in which conflicting Byzantine and Roman influences were felt. In the course of this war, Radoslav was dethroned by Vladislav, and Vladislav was in turn dethroned by Urosh I, who established himself as ruler of Serbia. But even before Urosh I died, he was attacked by his own son, Dragutin, who, too

³⁹ Thomas Archidiaconus, *Historia Salonitana*, Ed. Amst. C. XXVII.

⁴⁰ Šišić, F., *Pregled Povijesti Hrvatskaya Naroda*, Zagreb, 1916, pp. 39-65.

impatient to wait for the death of his father, overthrew him and imposed himself as an autocrat. Dragutin, however, did not rule undisturbed, because his younger brother Milutin (Stephen Urosh II) forced him out of power.

Then another civil war broke out, this time between Milutin and his own son, Stephen Urosh III. In due time, Milutin defeated his son with the help of the monks and lay clergy, who loaned him funds to hire mercenaries. To avenge himself for the unfilial rebellion of his son, he ordered that Urosh be blinded and exiled. The blinding, however, was only partially successful and so Stephen Urosh III, after the death of his father, engaged in a fratricidal war with his brother Constantin and his cousin Vladislav (the son of the dethroned Dragutin), for the succession to the throne of Serbia. Constantin was captured, nailed to a cross, and sawn asunder, while Vladislav fled to Hungary where he died in exile. Soon after Stephen Urosh took power, however, disputes arose between himself and his son, Stephen Dushan. Claiming that his father cherished designs against his life, Stephen Dushan rebelled. Because of the military prowess which Stephen had demonstrated in a previous battle, most of the army rallied around his standard. The old king was easily captured and imprisoned, and his son Stephen Dushan was then crowned King by the Archbishop of Serbia. Within five weeks from the date of Stephen Dushan's coronation, his captive father was strangled at the orders of his son.⁴¹

The final collapse of the Nemanja Empire began after Dushan's death, when Symeon, the younger brother of Dushan, arose as pretender to the throne against Dushan's son and successor, King Urosh IV. The two other voivodas, Vukashin and Ugljesha, Dushan's governors in Macedonia, following the example of Symeon, arose against Dushan's son. Vukashin began to reign in Macedonia, assuming the title of King.⁴² When Urosh IV died, in the meantime, under very mysterious circumstances, other chieftains imitated Vukashin and Ugljesha, using the general confusion after Urosh's death to their own advantage. Greeks to the

⁴¹ Miller, W., "The Balkan States," *Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. IV, pp. 536-37.

⁴² Vukashin was the father of Marko Kraljevic, the famous hero of Serbian epic poetry.

south and Albanians to the west raised the flag of rebellion under the leadership of Dushan's former officials. Each one of these officials strove for independence and tried to unite as large a territory as possible under his own rule.⁴³

In the midst of this development, the Turks invaded the Continent. They were met and resisted by some kings and princes, together with their loyal clansmen and tribesmen, such as King Vukashin and Prince Lazar and their armies. But others, such as Vukashin's own son, Marko, and Vuk Brankovich joined the Turks and betrayed their kinsmen. The farming folk, too, welcomed the Turks as liberators from the unbearable conditions to which they were subjected in the system of Serbia's military despotism. In such circumstances, the Turks did not have difficulty in conquering Serbia. In the battle of Kosovo, in 1389, Prince Lazar and his army fought the last battle against the invaders. His defeat put an end to Serbia's national independence for the next five hundred years.

Similar circumstances in Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Rumania enabled the Turks to conquer the Balkans in the course of the fourteenth and the fifteenth century. Thus the rivalry among tribal chieftains in Albania made it difficult to unify the Albanian tribes for any long period. Instead, taking advantage of intertribal strife, and often invited by opposing factions, the Byzantines, the Serbs, the Normans, the Venetians and the Turks, one after another, conquered and ruled Albania.

In the same manner, internal dissensions between various pretenders to the throne of Byzantium and lack of internal unity made it possible for Bulgarians, South Italian Normans, Venetians, Latin and French crusaders, Serbs, and finally the Turks to invade and conquer Greece.⁴⁴ Likewise, after the expansion of the Bulgarian power over Serb and Greek territories in the tenth century, the internal factionalism enabled the Russians and the Byzantines to invade Bulgaria and put an end to its independence. For more than a century and a half, all Bulgarian territories remained subject to the Byzantine Emperor. But by the end of the twelfth century Bulgaria reestablished its statehood as a

⁴³ See Haumant, E., *La Formation de la Yougoslavie* (Paris, 1930), pp. 64-71; also Südland, L., *Südslavische Frage* (Vienna, 1918), pp. 108-113.

⁴⁴ See Finlay, G., *A History of Greece*, *op. cit.*, IV, V, VI.

result of a general insurrection in northern Bulgaria, under Ivan Asen, who assumed the title of Czar. This new independence, however, was short-lived because the Turks, taking advantage of internal dissensions between the peasants and the tyrannical Boyars, and among the Boyar nobility themselves, invaded Bulgaria. By 1382 they seized Sofia, meeting with almost no resistance.

Farther north, in Poland, the factionalism and the autocratic tendencies of the military came to a climax in the "liberum veto" practice. The self-seeking drives of the Polish military aristocracy were rationalized by the idea of the absolute political equality of every Polish noble, with the result that every law introduced into the Polish Diet had to be adopted unanimously. Therefore, any deputy, by his individual veto, could prevent any action proposed by the rest. In such circumstances, the foreign powers struggling for the control of Poland could easily play one faction of the Polish nobility, or one single Polish aristocrat, against the others. These practices finally brought about the downfall of Poland, because the neighboring powers—Austria, Prussia and Russia—as a means to bring their rivalries over Poland to an end, conceived the idea of dividing Poland among themselves, a trend of events that brought about a number of partitions of Poland between these powers. In the course of these partitions, in 1795, Poland lost her independence and ceased to exist as a state.

Like conditions brought about the downfall of states in the twentieth century. In Montenegro, for instance, after its independence was recognized by the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the clans and tribal chiefs proceeded to fight border wars and blood feuds among themselves. Some backed Petrovich's dynasty, others opposed it. All were thinking in terms of personal gain and personal power, not in terms of common national interest. Assassinations of chieftains were a daily occurrence. The Orthodox Church, which could have served as an agent of Montenegrin unity, failed to do so for two reasons. Its clergymen were uneducated and lacked economic resources. They did not distinguish themselves from others, and often took part, together with their fold, in border raids, guerrilla warfare and blood feuds. They did not command sufficient prestige and permanent authority, nor were they united among

themselves. Moreover, the Orthodox Church in Montenegro was Serb, not Montenegrin, by tradition. Therefore, so far as it promoted the ideas of nationalism, it was in the form of a Serb, not a Montenegrin, national ideology.

It was this lack of internal political unity and lack of ideological integration around separate Montenegrin national symbols that brought about the downfall of Montenegro at the end of World War I, when the anti-Petrovich factions in Montenegro allied themselves with the Serbian military and helped them to occupy Montenegro, dethrone Petrovich's dynasty, and exterminate by assassination all pro-Petrovich chieftains who did not succeed in fleeing to the mountains or to foreign lands. The Serbian military then extended the rule of Serbia over the whole of Montenegro.

Serbia itself, however, did not escape the fate of Montenegro. The unprecedented expansion of this state after World War I resulted in the incorporation—under the rule of Serbia, in the form of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia—of many different peoples, cultures, traditions and creeds. This trend of events was, however, the beginning of the end of Serbia's power and independence. The internal conditions in Yugoslavia became too complex to be solved merely by resorting to autocratic methods and violence. The oppressed peoples reacted to Serbian military despotism by developing extremist underground movements with both Communist and fascist leanings. There were even some Serb factions which allied themselves with these movements, in the hope of gaining power.

Threatened by this increasing challenge to their rule, the Serbian dynasts and the military, rather than compromise, began to look for foreign help. In the existing political circumstances, they believed that their interests could be best safeguarded if they should orientate themselves toward the Nazis. They therefore secretly agreed to the infiltration and eventual annexation of Austria by the Nazis in exchange for Germany's support of King Alexander's plans for the domination of the Balkans. As a reaction to this policy, Musolini gave his support to the Ustašas, a Croatian political faction of Dinaric origin, which demanded an independent Croatia at any cost. Together with the Macedonian revolutionaries,

the Ustašas seem to have been implicated in the assassination of King Alexander in 1934, in Marseilles.

The assassination of Alexander meant a certain change in the internal policy of the country, but not in the international orientation of Serbia's ruling military. Alexander's successor, Regent Prince Paul, who ruled in the name of Alexander's son, King Peter II, sought an agreement with Hitler, allegedly to get Germany's support in his scheme to dethrone the boy King Peter II and to proclaim himself king. For the same purpose Prince Paul sought an agreement with the Croatian Peasant Party.

By agreeing to establish a separate Croatian province, in which the Croats were guaranteed autonomy in their internal affairs, Prince Paul partially consolidated his power internally and thought that he could proceed undisturbed with his personal plans. Perhaps to get Axis backing for his ambition to establish himself on the throne, he agreed that Yugoslavia should sign the Axis Pact. In return for this signing of the Pact, Germany promised to support Prince Paul against internal opposition. Also, to strengthen the pro-German faction, Hitler promised Yugoslavia an outlet on the Aegean Sea at the expense of Greece, and territory in northern Albania, including the city of Scutary.⁴⁵

But any tendency toward federalism, and especially any potential ascendancy of the Croats within Yugoslavia, was strongly resented by many Serb political leaders, and particularly by army circles. On this question the army and the lay political leaders split into two factions. One, led by General Neditch, contended that the concessions to the Croats were a temporary expedient during the war, that the victory of Germany over the Allies was inevitable, and that Serbia would then secure a dominant position in the Balkans with the help of the Germans, and would be able again to dominate Croatia.

The opposing faction of the military, led by people from the immediate entourage of the boy King Peter II, became increasingly impatient over the growing influence of Croatia. They also suspected that Prince Paul's plans were to seize the throne from King Peter. It was mainly this faction of Serbia's military that aroused nationalistic opinion in Serbia against Prince Paul's government, on the grounds of his

⁴⁵ Mirkowitch, N., *Foreign Affairs* (1941), p. 137.

pro-Croat policies. Thus they were preparing Serbia's public opinion for a *coup d'état* in favor of King Peter II. The signing of the Axis Pact came as an excellent opportunity for this faction of army officers to overthrow Prince Paul's government by force. They effected a *coup d'état* in March 1941, and placed in power King Peter II, a few days before he had reached the age required by the Constitution for his ascending the throne. Since their main purpose was to seize power, not to fight Germany, the ruling junta was ready to make arrangements with the Nazis. They promised Hitler and Mussolini that they would adhere to the agreement signed between the Axis Powers and the government of Prince Paul. The new rulers even designated their representatives who were to be sent to Rome and Berlin for parleys.⁴⁶

Hitler, however, lost faith in Serbia's military and decided to solve the Yugoslav question in another way. In April of that year he invaded Yugoslavia. Weakened by bitter factionalism, unprepared militarily, and lacking a unifying ideology, Yugoslavia could offer no resistance to an invading army. Moreover, as had happened in the past of all other Eastern European states, there were factions, both in Serbia and in Croatia, which went over to the side of the invaders in order to gain power. This action meant the end of Yugoslavia. On its ruins, and with the help of the Axis, the Ustašas organized the Independent State of Croatia, while in Serbia, which was reduced to its pre-Balkan-wars size, the power remained in the hands of an Axis-dominated military faction led by General Neditch, and supported by a pro-German fascist-like movement known as Zbor, and by a pro-German faction of Chetnik Guerrillas led by Kosta Pečanatz. The remainder of the Yugoslav territory was partitioned among the Germans, Italians, Hungarians, and Bulgarians.

The two new states, Ustaša Croatia and General Neditch's Serbia, did not survive World War II, because of the same extreme power-seeking and extreme political factionalism that have ruined all the eastern European states in the past. The Ustašas terrorists, who established their rule in a separate Croatian state, with the help of the Axis powers, made the mistake of all eastern European military in expanding

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

their rule to territories and peoples whom they were unable to assimilate, and whose loyalty they could not command. Thus the Independent State of Croatia, ruled by Catholic Ustašas, expanded to include the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a territory located in the heart of the Dinaric mountains, and in which forty per cent of the inhabitants were of the Eastern Orthodox faith.

These Orthodox mountaineers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, together with the Orthodox mountaineers in Dalmatia and upper Croatia, composed an element numerically too strong and too warlike to be easily assimilated or controlled. By tradition, they were inimical to the new Catholic state. It was this element of the Orthodox mountaineers in Ustaša Croatia that provided most guerrilla fighters, and that perpetuated most acts of sabotage in the new state. It did not matter under whose command they operated, so long as they got help in arms and funds to undermine the rule of their traditional enemies, the Catholic Croatians. They were therefore employed by the pro-Ally Chetnik faction led by General Mikhailovich, but they also served the purpose of the Italian army, which occupied the western parts of Croatia, and which was interested in undermining the new Croatian state in order to subdue it completely to Italian political and economic control. Thus the Italians trained and financed a number of Serb guerrillas in Croatia, organized as Chetnik units, to fight the Croatian authorities.

Later, when Communist-dominated Partisan activities were organized in Croatia, after the attack of Germany on the Soviet Union, many Serb Orthodox mountaineers in these regions joined the Partisans, but some others remained in the service of Italy or under the command of General Mikhailovich and fought against the Partisans. At the same time, a number of Croat Catholic mountaineers from the area occupied by the Italian army, and exposed to Italian and Chetnik persecution, joined the Partisans.

In this manner a free-for-all fight among all factions of the Dinaric mountaineers—the Chetniks, the Partisans, and the Ustašas, the Orthodox, the Catholics, and the Moslems, the Croats and the Serbs—developed in the mountainous regions of the new Croatian state. In the course of this war of extermination, hundreds of thousands of lives were lost and entire regions were completely devastated. But all this

sacrifice in lives and property was inspired primarily by the desire of each Dinaric faction to gain strategic advantages that would insure its ascendancy to power at the end of the war.

It was as a result of this factional struggle for power, which developed in the territory of Croatia and spread also to Montenegro and Serbia, that all these states formed in the course of World War II were greatly weakened internally. They were therefore unable to prevent the Partisans from destroying them and organizing a new state, in which the Partisan guerrillas established themselves in power with the help of the Red Army and of the factions that expected to gain power, in case of a Partisan victory.

Likewise in Albania it was the internal tribal rivalries manifested in the rival guerrilla movements that favored the trend of events which finally placed that country under the rule of General Hoxha, a Soviet puppet. In Rumania the German puppet, General Antonescu, who was brought to power by the Nazis, was sentenced to death and replaced by the Russian puppet, Goza, while the pro-Western leaders and factions were suppressed. In the same manner, in Bulgaria, leaders of the pro-German factions were brought to power with the help of the Nazis. Later they were sentenced to death, interned or exiled, when the pro-Russian and Communist-led factions established themselves in power with the help of the Red Army. The new ruling military also imprisoned, banished or annihilated all pro-Western leaders.

In Poland, which was partitioned in 1939 between Germany and Russia, as a result of a Nazi-Soviet pact of friendship, two opposing factions of the military and of the intelligentsia developed after World War II. One oriented toward Russia, the other toward the West. Similar developments took place in Czechoslovakia and Hungary at the end of that war, with the result that all these countries became easy prey to Soviet aggression. Of all the states between the Baltic, and the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, it was only Greece that, so far, escaped sovietization, but only because of the presence of the British army and owing to the active intervention of the United States.

This trend of events in the states of Eastern Europe in our day seems to demonstrate that the fundamental conditions and agents which, in the past, determined the internal in-

stability of these states and their sudden downfalls are still at work. These states will therefore continue to fail in consolidating themselves internally, and will remain easy prey to aggressors, or will undergo violent internal convulsions and split into their composite parts as soon as the ruling cliques lose the support of their foreign protectors. It is only if a fundamental change in the structure of Eastern Europe takes place that the states in this area will be able to escape such a fate. In order to investigate the possibilities of such basic structural changes in this part of the world, we turn now to a consideration of the Zadruga culture, the other major pattern of Eastern European society which has endured from the earliest days of Slavic migration in pre-Christian and early Christian times. Through the centuries, personality formation in Zadruga society has remained constant, and, in relation to power, provides an extraordinary contrast to Dinaric power-seeking.

IV

POWER INDIFFERENCE IN ZADRUGA SOCIETY

Zadruga Self-Sufficiency—Property Relations—Social Control—Division of Labor—The Training of Children—Beliefs and Hallucinations—Disintegration of the Zadruga—Rural-Urban Conflict

Zadruga Self-Sufficiency

THE ZADRUGA is economically, as well as emotionally, a self-sustaining community, consisting of a group of families averaging, altogether, from twenty to forty members.¹ They occupy a large common house (*družinska hiža*), a number of individual dwellings (*komoras*), and other buildings placed close together, and cultivate in common a number of arable fields,² fruit orchards,³ vegetable gardens,⁴ vineyards and patches of industrial plants.⁵ They possess forests, streams and meadows, herds of cattle, hogs, goats, sheep, horses and flocks of poultry. As a common household is also maintained, meals are served in the *hiža* to all Zadruga members at the same time.

The Zadruga is both a social and an economic unit. Its core consists of an extended kinship group, but it often includes a number of adopted and unrelated members and families. Being organized primarily around fixed and inalienable possessions, not around family ties, a Zadruga may exist for an indefinite number of generations. Unlike the *kuća* and the *bratstvo* in Dinaric society, which are strictly exogamous, members of the same Zadruga often intermarry.

¹ Some Zadrugas had, in the past, up to one hundred members, but some numbered twenty or less. Earlier Zadrugas were numerically stronger, but, with the decrease of self-sufficiency, the number of Zadruga members also fell.

² Wheat, maize, corn, rye, oats, barley and spelt.

³ Many varieties of plums, apples, pears and peaches.

⁴ Potatoes, cabbage, turnips, beans, peas and tomatoes.

⁵ Mainly flax and hemp.

In the past, the Zadruga organization and technique of production provided for most of the living necessities of its members. It depended upon trade for only a very limited number of commodities,⁶ such as salt and the iron for tools and implements. Food, medicaments,⁷ shelter and clothes⁸ were consumed and produced within the Zadruga; the same was true of utensils and furniture. With an increasing urban influence and the introduction of money economy, the degree of self-sufficiency decreased, but even today the Zadrugas produce most of their food, clothing and housing material.

The natural environment in Zadruga regions, that is, the quality of soil, the supply of wood, and the climate, is such as to facilitate production of most of the goods required. In the past, when communications and trade were not developed, the maintenance of security in this society depended exclusively upon a self-sustaining economy. This existence, however, could not be achieved without the possession of enough land on which to raise cattle and cultivate food and industrial plants for the fulfillment of Zadruga needs.⁹ Because large tracts of arable land, forests and pasture grounds are indispensable for maintaining self-sufficiency, Zadruga peasants value land very highly.

For this reason, they relentlessly fought subjugation to the feudal system for centuries, rising up against landlords, burning their estates, and killing bishops and seigniors.¹⁰ Even after the introduction of liberal and individualistic laws, peasants still strongly disapproved of anyone's selling

⁶ Because the feudal system was established very late in Croatia, it remained in its earliest phase and did not develop trade and means of communication. The nearness of the Turkish border and constant harassing by the Turks hampered the economic development of Croatia.

⁷ Medicaments were prepared from herbs, roots and seeds.

⁸ Clothes were made of linen and wool. Parts of clothes, primarily woolen parts and embroideries, were colored with dyes prepared from pieces of various herbs and barks.

⁹ Approximately 150 to 200 acres are needed per Zadruga of 30 to 40 members. Rožić speaks of a Zadruga in Prigorje which dissolved in 1900. It numbered 24 people. They owned 140 acres of land, 8 oxen, 6 cows, 2 horses, 55 hogs and a flock of 100 poultry. Rožić, V., "Prigorje," *Zbornik*, Vol. 11, p. 221.) According to Mosely, the Varžić Zadruga, 1938, when he visited it, numbered 26 people. They possessed 138.24 acres of land, 4 pairs of horses and 2 foals, 82 head of cattle, 111 head of swine, 60 geese, and 100 chickens (Mosely, P., "Adaptation for Survival: The Varžić Zadruga," *The Slavonic and East European Review* (1942-1943), pp. 152-155).

¹⁰ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, p. 221.

parts of his land. Even now they say of such a person: "By God, he is selling his land! And how is he going to live? He is not a good *gospodar*. He is going to spend his money and he won't have his land; and how are his children going to live? Those who sell their land are not husbandmen." A peasant who loses his land (or who can not maintain himself on his land) loses his prestige in the village.

In order to maintain self-sufficiency, a considerable amount of manpower is needed. It is necessary to plow and to hoe, to manufacture linen and woollen goods, to prepare food and to build dwellings, to herd and to raise livestock. This end is achieved in the Zadruga society by tying together a few families on a common piece of property, by early marriage and a high birth rate, and, if necessary, by the adoption of bridegrooms, bachelors, even a whole small Zadruga, into a larger one.

Production is intensified by the emphasis on labor, combined with singing and a general spirit of gaiety. Collective work is often followed by a feast, which is again a time for drinking and merry-making. Sometimes a few Zadrugas may unite to help one another make the work more efficient and the occasion merrier.¹¹ It is for these occasions that thousands of songs are created, all of which emphasize the beauty of nature, productive labor, and the joy of life:

A long field along green groves,
On it groweth snowy wheat;
It was reaped by a graceful maiden,
With a golden sickle, white hands;
What she reaped she gave to the horses;
"Eat, drink, my brother's horses,
A long journey you have tomorrow;
Across three plains, wide plains,
Across three groves, green groves,
Across three bridges, steely bridges,
Through three villages, merry ones." ¹²

The need for an emotional outlet and the development of a sense of personal well-being is also met by the Zadruga through the medium of elaborate burial, marriage and birth

¹¹ Kotarski, T., "Lobor," *Zbornik*, Vol. 12, pp. 44-224. Prigorje and Lobor are the names of the regions whose life and customs are described in the references given in footnotes 9 and 11.

ceremonials, religious festivals, dances, and rituals connected with the seasons. In the past, an ox was killed for the marriage ceremonies and an abundance of poultry, wine and cakes prepared. Marriage ceremonials, including wooing and religious ceremonies, lasted about eight days, part of them being performed at the house of the bride and part at the house of the bridegroom.¹² When the wedding-guests came to the Zadruga of the bride, they sang:

Flowers cover my field,
Oh, flowers cover my field,
Where my lover is passing by;
He is coming to me, his darling,
Riding on his sorrel horse.
Hitch the horse to my rose,
Let the rose scent it.

While only Zadruga members and their friends, relatives and neighbors take part in the marriage, birth and burial ceremonies, a whole region, including many Zadrugas, may attend the religious festivals and seasonal rituals. In most of these ceremonies, singing and merrymaking prevail.

The difference in social organization and traditions between the Zadruga and Dinaric societies account for their differences in artistic expression and standards of living. Epic poetry and heroic ballads, for example, are unknown among the Zadruga folk, who are fond of lyric and love poetry, drinking songs, ritual and ceremonial verses. The *gusla* is unknown. Instead, the Zadruga people play the *tamburica*, a banjo-like, four-stringed instrument of varied size and shape. Unlike the prevailing uniformity of clothing among the Dinarics, and their tendency to exhibit weapons, the Zadruga folk show a remarkable variety in their dress and do not wear weapons. The clothing of both men and women is colorful and gay; their linen costumes are decorated with lace and embroidered with white, red, blue and green designs, both geometric and naturalistic. The Zadruga peasant folk, who are well able to provide themselves with most of the necessities of life, have also a higher standard of living than the Dinaric herders. These differences in living standards are manifested in housing facilities, in clothing, in food consumption, and in the degree of cleanliness.

¹² Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, pp. 29-74, and Kotarski, V., *op. cit.*, pp. 193-216.

Property Relations in the Zadruga

Collective property in the Zadruga consists of land, live-stock, farm equipment, and buildings—everything necessary to secure a living for all members. This property belongs to the Zadruga community as a whole, and individual members have only the right to share in the produce; they have no claim on any specific part of the collective possessions.

Since Zadruga economy is organized on the principle of production for its own consumption, trade was formerly not important. In the past, if the Zadruga needed some goods which it could not manufacture itself, as a rule it traded only the cattle or hogs to obtain them. If there was a food surplus, it was divided among the members. Surplus wine was sold and the income divided. In each case every Zadruga member received an equal portion.

Besides a common husbandry, the Zadruga also keeps a common household to provide meals and recreation for all members. All *družina*—the collective of Zadruga members—gather together in the *družinska hiža* (communal house) for meals. Food is so plentiful that there is no discrimination between Zadruga members at meals. Men sit, but women stand, around the common table while eating, and turn their heads each time they take a bite.¹ In some Zadrugas, the gospodar cuts the bread and meat in equal parts. All children eat together at a separate table, assisted by their mothers. When there is no work, most of the Zadruga members mingle, providing their own recreation in which young and old participate. If someone can play the tamburica, the fiddle or the bagpipe, there are dancing and singing. Members from a neighboring družina may join in the gaiety.

This community organization of household and living led many earlier observers to identify the Zadruga with the family. In the following pages, it will be shown that the Zadruga, unlike the kuća, is not only a family and an economic unit, but also a territorial and a political institution.

The Zadruga's družinska hiža is utilized not only for community eating, meetings and gatherings, but also as a joint workshop and dormitory in the wintertime. Compared with the rather crowded living quarters in a Dinaric kuća, where

¹ This may be related to some old food taboo, but there is not sufficient material available to explain it.

all kuća members often sleep in one room, the quarters of a Zadruga are rather spacious. Each couple has one or two beds in the dormitory, and there are also common sleeping arrangements for children, over a big tile stove or elsewhere. Besides this, each family in the Zadruga has a separate one-room dwelling called *komora*. In each *komora* there are one or more beds, a table, chairs, and chests for linen and clothes. The *komora* serves both as a sleeping room and as a reception room in which to entertain guests and friends. It is a shelter for those who want more privacy. It serves also as a good escape in case of personal conflicts within the Zadruga: in his *komora* each member can remain aloof from others as long as he wants, or he can entertain his own friends there privately. A *komora* is used especially by a young couple during the first few years of married life:

Oh, on the hill there's a little
hut, little hut;

Oh, in the little hut there's a
little bed, little bed;

Oh, on the little bed there are
darlings two, darlings two.

Such a degree of privacy in the Zadruga is quite in contrast to Dinaric society, where lack of privacy due to inadequacy of housing facilities makes it difficult to escape unbearable situations. Crowded home conditions add to existing frustrations and antagonisms, and only increase the existing tensions within the Dinaric family. It is the family clashes that cause the split-up of the Dinaric kućas. While many Zadrugas remain together for an indefinite number of generations, seldom does a kuća remain together for more than two or three generations.

The principle of equality in the sharing of Zadruga property and income is utilized also when a Zadruga is dissolved. Before the infiltration of the capitalistic system, if there were too many people in one common household, a number might leave the old Zadruga and form a new one. Under the pressure of the policies of economic liberalism and changing techniques of production, many Zadrugas disintegrate. In each case, the land is divided in equal shares among the biological families of which the Zadruga is composed, irrespective of blood lines and degrees of blood relationship. Families

represented by a widow, widower or orphans are treated the same as others. In some Zadruga regions, crops and livestock are divided *per capita*, that is, an equal share to each member irrespective of family ties; in some other regions members above sixteen years of age get their full share of the crops and livestock, and members under sixteen get half shares.² Not so in the Dinaric kuća, which is a strictly family institution where, therefore, the common property is always divided *per stirpes*, that is, according to families and blood lines.

Though the Zadruga provides all necessary food for feasts in connection with birth and marriage ceremonies, it does not provide dowries for brides, nor marriage gifts for the bridegroom to present to his parents-in-law. If there are such expenditures, they come from individual property, not from the collective property of the zadruga. For after a girl marries, she loses all her claims on Zadruga property; it is considered that her security is provided for by the Zadruga into which she married.

Each Zadruga member may possess personal property, called the *osebunjak*. Originally, the *osebunjak* consisted exclusively of a vineyard, and it was only later that private property could include also a wheat field, hayfield, or other land.³ The *osebunjak* is bought, or inherited, or brought as a dowry, and each Zadruga family, as a rule, has an *osebunjak*. Every *osebunjak*, if it consists of a vineyard, has a cabin with a table, some chairs, wine and brandy, necessary utensils, dishes and glasses. On Sundays and holidays, most of the older men go to their own *osebunjaks*, where they spend the afternoon and evening resting or entertaining some *kum*, that is, friend or neighbor:

Oh, how nice it gleams
In our kum's cabin!
Oh, my kum, oh, my kum,
Let's go there!
We shall drink wine,
We shall say a word or two,
My kum, my kum,
Let's go there.

² Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 25.

³ Kotarski, T., *op. cit.*, p. 224.

The osebunjak, like the komora, provided an escape in the event of personal conflicts within the Zadruga.

Work on the osebunjak is begun by each owner after he has done his share in laboring for the common Zadruga property. Managed as if it were the common property of each biological family, irrespective of whether it was brought by the wife as dowry, or bought, or inherited by the husband, it is always left by inheritance to the offspring. This practice is commonly understood, so that no special will or testament is necessary upon the death of the owner. Any income from the osebunjak may be used for more linen or clothes for the family, gifts on the occasions of betrothal and marriage, or any other individual purposes. Owing to the system of inheritance of the osebunjak, according to which it is inherited in equal parts by all the children, this property can seldom if ever accumulate to the point where it is larger than the collective Zadruga property.

Though, in the Dinaric society, the private property of individual kuća members is allowed, the institution of the osebunjak has never reached the size and importance that it had in the Zadruga. The reason lies in the differences between the two systems, and in their techniques of production. For, in the pastoral economy of Dinaric society, the main stress is laid on ownership of herds and not so much on land; and it is well known that the private holding of herds is very unstable, especially in a technically non-advanced and politically insecure society.

It appears that the whole system of property relations in the Zadruga community, unlike that in the Dinaric society, aims at an equal sharing of income, safety and privacy. Equality in such relations is the basis upon which security in the Zadruga is maintained. This principle is of fundamental importance for the development of self-respect and of mutual respect among all members. The feeling of safety is manifested in the practice which allows any member to leave the Zadruga and return later at will. On his return, he enjoys the same privileges as the rest, no matter how many years he has been absent. Such a system is obviously directed toward the elimination of economic and emotional frustration. Though the institution of the osebunjak might have introduced a certain differentiation in the distribution of income, such a trend did not have a noticeable effect on the

Zadruga system until after the reorganization of the Zadruga economy, in compliance with the needs of a competitive market.

Social Control in Zadruga Society

As has been shown, social control in the Dinaric kuća is concentrated in the hands of the starješina, or father. The control of Zadruga affairs and Zadruga relations, however, is vested in the hands of the *družina*, that is, the Zadruga rank and file—all zadruga members, male and female, who are fully able to work.¹ It is true that these entrust the running of Zadruga affairs to two elected managers, a man and a woman, known as the *gospodar* and *gospodinja*. But no decision of any importance may be reached by these representatives without consultation with, and approval by, the *družina*, and both the *gospodar* and *gospodinja* may be replaced at any time, if necessary. There is, however, a tendency in the Zadruga to have a stable management, and the *družina* are not inclined to make any changes if the *gospodar* and *gospodinja* are satisfactory. Nevertheless, it is a custom in many Zadrugas each year, a couple of weeks before the New Year, for the *gospodar* and *gospodinja* to offer their resignation to the *družina*. On New Year's Eve, the *družina* decide whether or not the management of the Zadruga affairs should be left in the hands of the same persons:

Every year, fourteen days before the New Year, at supper, the *gospodar* must say to the *družina*: "I was the *gospodar* this year; now the time has come for you to choose another *gospodar*. You have fourteen days' time to talk over whom you intend to have as *gospodar* in my place." Together with the *gospodar*, the *gospodinja* also resigns. If the *družina* are not satisfied with the *gospodar* or *gospodinja*, they consult together whom they should have as a new *gospodar* as *gospodinja*. On New Year's Eve, at supper time, the *gospodar* must ask the *družina*: "The time has come when we should know who is going to be the *gospodar* for us in the coming year; did you decide who your choice is?" Of course, even before that, the *gospodar* could hear whether the *družina* still wanted him or not. If all were satisfied with him, the one who is the oldest and wisest says: "And why should we choose another; you

¹ When they are about twelve years of age, children are gradually trained in all daily tasks.

were a good and provident gospodar to us; we were all pleased with you; you should stay on.”²

Any time during the year, moreover, the gospodar and gospodinja are expected to resign of their own free will if the družina are not satisfied with them.

In spite of the fact that these officers carry prestige and authority, there is an almost complete lack of competition for the positions of gospodar and of gospodinja. Unlike the case in Dinaric society, where there is a marked struggle for power and a tendency to hold it, Zadruga members seldom show interest in being selected as the gospodar or gospodinja, or in their reelection to these offices. More often they are reluctant to accept such a position. There are a few factors which contribute to an explanation of this situation. The prestige of a successful Zadruga is shared by every Zadruga member; the authority of the gospodar and the gospodinja is very limited; there is no economic gain in being a Zadruga representative, but merely more work with more responsibility.

Being the gospodar may mean the disregard of personal interests for the common good; it may mean that the gospodar does not have as much time as the rest to work on his osebnjak. It is not easy to get up first in the morning and to make sure that everybody is attending to his work, to work with others and more than others, to see that all Zadruga members are provided for, to deal with outside people and authorities, to be strict and to report to družina about everybody and every event, and to be exposed to constant criticism if anything goes wrong. However, the gospodar does have as his reward the general respect and liking of the družina. Both his prestige and that of the Zadruga grow in the community, if he is successful in his management. In some cases, both gospodar and his Zadruga may even become widely known.

The ideal gospodar is expected to be “strong, healthy, provident, industrious, wise and intelligent.”³ It is preferable that he be married, but that is not absolutely necessary. He is usually selected from among the older Zadruga members, but sometimes he may be a young man in his thirties.

Despite the prestige and authority that a good gospodar

² Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, pp. 276-277.

³ *Ibid.*

enjoys in his Zadruga, and in the community at large, it is never possible for him to concentrate the power exclusively in his own hands. He can serve many years as a gospodar, but let him become pretentious or arbitrary toward the družina, and he will be quickly reminded of the limitations of his powers: "You won't be gospodar for me very long now; only let this year pass by!" However, the gospodar may threaten the družina with his resignation if things do not go according to his plan: "Manage the zadruga yourself," he may say, in such a case, hanging up the keys, and "while he is angry" it is his assistant who replaces him.⁴

The position of the gospodinja in a Zadruga is as full of responsibility as that of the gospodar. If the gospodar is married, it is very probable that his wife may be elected as the gospodinja, but such is not always the case. The gospodinja, who is chosen by the female part of the družina, is expected to exhibit the same wise statesmanship as a good gospodar. Often, if the gospodar is an old man, the Zadruga may prefer to have a younger woman as gospodinja. The gospodinja manages all affairs pertaining exclusively to Zadruga women, but she especially oversees the house, cooking, poultry, milking of the cows, and the gardening. It is a difficult position, and she is exposed to even more criticism than the gospodar. Women, more often than men, decline to accept the office. Gospodinas in successful Zadrugas, and those who hold the position for a long period, enjoy great prestige in the Zadruga and in the whole region. A widow could be the gospodinja, also an "old maid," but never a young girl. That would be a "shame" for the Zadruga.

Zadruga customs favor early marriages aimed at providing the manpower of which the manifold Zadruga economy is always in need. This is also an expedient which solves the sexual problem in the Zadruga, which is often composed of a number of young men and women of marriageable years, unrelated by blood. It is for these reasons that in the Zadruga, when a boy reaches eighteen years of age, he is expected to get married and is known as a *ženitnjak* (to be married); when a girl is fifteen years old, she is known as a *zamuškinja* (to go to a man) and will soon have to get a mate.

⁴ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, pp. 276-277. In some Zadrugas, the gospodar is allowed to choose his own assistant; in others, it is the družina's privilege.

If she is over nineteen, and not yet married, she is considered an "old maid."

As a rule, marriage is decided upon by the parents but, if there is a need for manpower, the *družina* might persuade the parents that their boy or girl should have a mate. If there are few *ženitnjaks* in the *Zadruga*, the older ones marry first. There is no principle of seniority in the case of girls. A girl may be allowed to show her preference in the choice of a mate, especially if she belongs to a successful and widely known *Zadruga*. If she says to one of her closer relatives that any prospective *ženitnjak* "is a good boy," that is enough to start the procedure of *snuhoki* (wooing):⁵

On that mount there's a tree,
Slim and tall,
And a girl is sitting under it,
I am next to her.
Asked she:
"Will you marry me?"⁶

There is no difficulty in the choosing of mates. The *Zadruga* provides for the needs of everyone, and the question of dowry is not important. Cases of *Zadruga* endogamy are not rare, because many girls prefer to marry within their own *Zadruga*. Also parents who have only girls like at least one of them to marry within their own *Zadruga*. Young batchelors who are accepted into the *Zadruga* as members or as servants often marry *Zadruga* girls.

The principles of social control in the *Zadruga* are extended also to the village and to the *općina* (commune). Originally, every *Zadruga* was a *selo* (village). Later, as the population grew and *Zadrugas* became settled closer to one another, a few *Zadrugas* composed a *selo*, and a few *selos* an *općina*. These *selos* and *općinas* have a common administration elected by the people. Inasmuch as the feudal and civil authorities do not interfere with this self-government, the *Zadruga* principles of social control are applied to village and *općina* affairs, and they are governed in the same way, even at present.

Anything relating to these affairs is discussed and decided at a common gathering called the *dekončak*. Anybody can

⁵ Kotarski, T., *op. cit.*, pp. 44-224.

⁶ Kuhač, F., *Južno-Slavjenske Narodne Pepievke* (Zagreb, 1878), p. 120.

take part in a dekončak, adults and youths alike. As a rule, the dekončaks are attended only by males. However, although youths are always present, they do not have as much courage to talk as married adults:

The village guard goes from house to house . . . : "Come to the selo around three o'clock in the afternoon. We shall talk over whom to choose as village forester (or anything else of common interest); come, come, so that there are more of us." When the time comes, they start to gather, and the first to come immediately asks one another: "Whom shall we have?" "This one and that one," everybody answers. "What do you think of Jankić?" "Whom else would you want? Nobody would watch the grove as well as he would!" In case they are not all for one . . . some shout: "Let's have this one," and again the other: "Let's have that one!" and it may happen that they quarrel. If there is an older man among them whom all respect, and whom all consider wise, he quiets them down: "By God's five wounds, don't be like children! If he doesn't do as we want, then we shall elect another one; we might try this one for one year." . . . If it happens that they quarrel very much, then they leave and they get together again only after they have come to a common understanding and agreement. In case they do not consider the matter important, they do not discuss it again.⁷

So it would seem that the principles on which social control in Zadruga society is based are expressed in a tendency to achieve stability and efficiency in the community, and to prevent the concentration of power and influence in the hands of one or of a few. Unlike Dinaric society, the Zadruga system of social organization discourages the accumulation of family property; also family control and political power are very limited. Nor is Zadruga society in favor of strengthening ties of kinship within the community, since that practice might disturb the foundations on which the Zadruga system is built. Zadrugas accentuate the common goal, namely, the well-being of all, and frown upon those who show any inclination to improve their personal affairs at the expense of the common interest. Indeed, the Zadruga folk consider that these are the ways by which the rank and file may retain the control of community affairs, and by which the highest possible degree of safety and of personal

⁷ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*

satisfaction can be guaranteed to each member. Toward this end, the internal relations of the Zadruga are organized; toward this goal, also, the training of children and the development of their personalities are directed.

Division of Labor in Zadruga Society

Unlike the Dinaric society of herdsmen and warriors, where the work is unequally divided at the expense of the women, in the Zadruga society of soil cultivators there is a fair distribution of work according to sex, age and ability. While, in the Dinaric society, a part of the kuća's income is provided through trade or plunder, the Zadruga people have to rely on their own labor to produce and provide for most of their needs. But in order to produce all or most of the necessities of life for Zadruga members, a well organized and cooperative system of labor is essential. The principles of Zadruga organization of labor have developed on this basis. One places emphasis on a division of labor according to age, sex and ability. The other is a tendency to avoid any overspecialization. There are certain tasks performed exclusively by women, others only by men, but most of the work is done jointly by both sexes. Every adult man and woman in the Zadruga is well-informed about every important kind of work, but for the sake of expediency and efficiency the labor is divided.

It is the task of the men to take care of the plowing, mowing, woodcutting, carpentry, and special work in the vineyards and orchards. The cultivation of vegetables, cooking, cleaning, embroidery, and lace work are assigned to women. Women spin, weave, hoe and reap. They help the men in the wheat and hay fields, vineyards and orchards. Men help the women in the preparation of industrial plants, in hoeing, reaping, and sometimes in weaving.¹ Children and unmarried girls are usually engaged in herding. Aged people perform minor tasks about the house or in the fields.² Nobody, however, insists that children and the aged work.

¹ In some Zadrugas only men do the weaving.

² Tomašić, D., *Društveni Razvitak Hrvata* (Zagreb, 1937), p. 22. According to some writers, Zadruga people are divided into five age groups corresponding to the degree of responsibility and to the intensity of labor: children—to 12 years of age; herdsmen—to 16; attendants—to 20; men and women—to 50 or 60; old people—over 50 and 60.

There is a still further division of labor in the Zadruga. Work in the fields, in the woods, in the stables, and in the house is so diversified that each group of tasks needs special attention and coordination. It is for this purpose that the Zadruga has one or more men and women specifically in charge of oxen, of horses, of weaving, and of herding. This does not mean, however, that it is customary for certain persons to be assigned to only one kind of labor, with no variation. The trend is toward versatility. The specific group of activities which a Zadruga member directs, and the duration of this particular task, depend primarily upon his experience, then upon personal inclination, availability of labor, expediency and other circumstances.

Although Zadruga people have to be acquainted with many skills, there are as a rule no people who practice a particular craft exclusively. There are always some Zadruga members who are thoroughly trained in some special trade, but that is not their only occupation. Each adult man and woman, according to abilities and talent, has knowledge of all the arts, such as medicine, midwifery, music, carpentry, weaving and embroidery. If some people excel in these techniques, their services are at the disposal of the Zadruga when necessary. Otherwise they work at the common tasks along with everybody else.³

³ There are some differences from Zadruga to Zadruga in matters of the division of labor. Zadrugas also show variations in other forms of organization and interpersonal relations. What is presented here is rather a cross-section based on the studies of Zadruga life by Rožić, Kotarski, Bogišić, and Mosely, and on personal observations of Zadruga life by the author of this study. Rožić himself was born in a Zadruga. Later he became a parish priest in his native village. His accounts in *Zbornik* are of great value, especially respecting the more intimate and subjective aspects of Zadruga life. Kotarski was also a parish priest in the parish whose Zadruga life he described, but he was not a native of that region. His description has the objective values of an intelligent outsider. Bogišić was an internationally known jurist, and specialist on Slav common law. He collected his material with the help of educated people, particularly priests and teachers who lived in the villages, on the basis of his own questionnaire. Rožić and Kotarski described Zadruga life with the help of questionnaire and the instructions of Antun Radić, an ethnologist and sociologist. His method was highly up-to-date and differed considerably from that of Bogišić; for, whereas Bogišić collected material indiscriminately on each of his questions from all regions, Radić insisted on a detailed description of the *whole* life in each separate region which formed a unit by itself. Bogišić's material is the oldest, about the middle of the nineteenth century, and Kotarski's material is more recent, from the beginning of the twentieth century. Mosely is an American, and a well-known student of Slavic history and customs. He employs the methods developed by the

The possession of any unusual skill is highly thought of, but does not bring in any special income; it carries with it a certain amount of prestige. Although such highly gifted people are sometimes employed by a Zadruga other than their own, they are not as a rule personally rewarded. Their work is done on the basis of exchange labor, for it is considered that any special talent should be at the disposal of the entire community. Furthermore, the possession of skill in a certain craft does not increase one's chances of being selected as *gospodar* or *gospodinja*. At the same time, all the Zadruga members share, to a certain extent, in the prestige of any member who is a renowned artisan.

Unlike the situation in Dinaric society, with its definite stratification of labor, in Zadruga society there is a marked tendency not to put differential value on any kind of work. All labor is equally necessary for the final Zadruga output and for its sustenance. Therefore, there is no competition for a particular type of work, nor is there any reluctance on the part of any Zadruga member to accept the work at hand. No kind of toil is considered inferior to another. As a child grows up, he is initiated by the adults into all the tasks which must be done. If he shows some special ability, he may occasionally be mildly praised and encouraged to develop it. But even if he does not show any particular inclination, he is considered just as good as anybody else.

The organization of labor in the Zadruga indicates a tendency so to distribute social values that everybody shares equally in the benefits of Zadruga life. None of these values—economic security, personal happiness, participation in Zadruga life, dignity and self-respect—is affected by the division of work in the Zadruga community. This is mainly because the principle of the equality of toil is so thoroughly applied. No matter what kind of work one does in a Zadruga, he is equally respected. Perhaps this point can be best demonstrated by the social position of the servants in Zadruga society.

American social scientists and is interested in the cultural interpretation of history. His narrative is very recent—he personally observed and collected material on Zadruga life as late as 1938. His observations have the unbiased value of a detached foreign scholar. The chronological distribution of the material available on Zadruga life gives a splendid opportunity to observe the structural and psychological changes in this society which will be discussed in the following pages.

Originally there were no servants at all. If there was any lack of labor, the Zadruga coped with this difficulty by getting new brides, by accepting the bridegrooms into the Zadruga, or by incorporating a new member. This newly incorporated member was known as a *skupnik* (collective member). Both bridegrooms and skupniks entered the Zadruga with rights equal to those of the rest. Such a new member might even become gospodar, but only after he had spent a few years as a member of the Zadruga.

By the second part of the nineteenth century, when Zadruga began to split up more rapidly and the number of members decreased, servants were introduced. Now they have no rights to Zadruga property, but they work the same as the others and eat with the družina. They participate in discussion at the common meals. Often they are finally married to Zadruga girls, thus acquiring full rights as Zadruga members. In such cases, they also accept the common Zadruga name.⁴

In Zadruga society there is a tendency to value labor very highly, and to value all the people equally because they contribute equally to the sustenance of the community. People who live without laboring are looked down upon. This point of view is in contrast with conditions in Dinaric society, where the tendency is to place a low value on ordinary labor, and to think highly of people who can afford to live by the labor of others, either by commanding their services or by forcefully appropriating other people's property. Even today, in many Dinaric regions, some starješinas of well-to-do kućas do not work in the fields themselves, but spend most of the time at home, in the village tavern, or in the near-by town. This freedom gives them an excellent opportunity to engage in political activities.

For that reason, and because of the high prestige they enjoy in their communities, the starješinas of well-to-do kućas in Dinaric regions are often local political leaders. They usually look strong, well-fed, and well-dressed, all important symbols of deference among the Dinarics. In Zadruga regions, the gospodar of a well-to-do Zadruga is expected to work with the others, and little if any time is left to him for

⁴ All Zadruga people go under one family name, although they may not be related. This is a further reason why earlier writers tended to identify the Zadruga with the family.

political activities. It is usually another Zadruga member, not the gospodar, who engages in political activities. When the Zadrugas disintegrate and individual economies become established, it is usually middle-class peasants who turn to politics, rather than the well-to-do, because the latter have neither the time nor the willingness to undertake the responsibilities inherent in political work. This difference in classes from which political leaders are drawn from among Dinarijs and Zadruga folk had important political and social repercussions in the two societies.

The Training of Children in the Zadruga

Children are born into a Zadruga under happy circumstances. Since they are not considered a burden but an asset because of the need for manpower, everyone shows them much affection, and each married couple desires several. Birth control is not practiced. No matter how many children are born, they are always received with equal pleasure and tenderness. "That's why God created me, to bear children," the women say. One who can not have children is called a "jalovka" (the sterile one) and she is reproached for her sterility. When a jalovka quarrels with another woman, the latter never fails to tell her: "If you were worth anything, you would not be a jalovka."¹

It is considered that there is enough food and room for everybody no matter how many children are born: "Nobody here has as yet died of hunger; neither will my children." Moreover, children are expected to be a help and comfort to their parents in their old age: "And who would feed me and bring me wood when I am old and weak; who would close my eyes when I am dying?"²—all of which goes to explain why children are so welcome in Zadruga society.

Elaborate preparations are made, even before a child is conceived and born. It is considered very important that a man is sober when he approaches his wife; otherwise the child may be a drunkard. Husband and wife must be gay so that the child, too, may be gay. A husband must think of his wife if he wants the child to be like him. He must kiss his wife if he wants the child to be carefree. Everybody in the

¹ Kotarski, *op. cit.*

² Rožić, V., *op. cit.*

community is considerate of a pregnant woman. They offer her food and anything else she might desire, otherwise they themselves might get a *jačmenac*.³

The pregnant woman herself has to be pleasant to everybody. She must not reproach other people, lest her child have the same fault: "What you see on other people's calves, expect to find on your own child." Intercourse during and immediately after pregnancy is not prohibited, but the pregnant woman is expected to observe many food taboos and to perform certain homeopathic magic. She is not supposed to eat hare, squirrel, veal, snails, mushrooms, or bread made with yeast; she certainly should not eat plums and peaches if she does not want twins.⁴ When pregnant, a woman may not steal anything, lest the child be a thief. She should not blow on the fire, otherwise the child may be asthmatic; she must talk, otherwise the child may be born mute; she should not hear thunder or stories about ghosts, otherwise the child may be timid; she ought not to look at a dead body, or the child may be pale, and so on.⁵ Observance of these practices will ensure the proper appearance and good behavior of the child according to the standards of Zadruga society.

The moment the child is born, the midwife says, "He is going to be a good man. He is going to have everything." If it is a girl, a spindle and a needle are put into her hands; if a boy, an ax is brought, or sometimes a book. All this ritual is believed to help children develop into wise adults, satisfied with their respective functions in society. A woman in confinement lies in bed for a few days and is visited only by female relatives, friends, and neighbors who bring food, drink or other gifts. There is no special feast on the occasion of baptism, which is performed in the church the same day the child is born, but three weeks after childbirth there is a feast called *babinje*. This is attended only by women, all of whom bring food and drink. They eat, drink and gossip far into the night, and some women, after *babinje*, go home with more drink than they can stand.

Unlike the Dinaric *kuća*, where the birth of a girl is looked upon as a misfortune, the Zadruga wants both boys and girls in the family. Either sex is equally welcome. In the

³ An excrescence on the eye—sty.

⁴ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, Vol. 13, p. 38.

⁵ Kotarski, T., *op. cit.*, Vol. 21, p. 200.

course of the child's first year, the mother spends most of her time looking after it. She does everything to avoid or alleviate all frustrating experiences to which the child may be exposed. She watches it carefully, rocking it in the cradle, caressing it, singing and talking to it. There are many lullabies and children's songs in Zadruga society, all of which express the tenderness and affection with which children are reared:

Grow, grow, little rose,
While you are rosy:
Run away, run away, little girl,
While you are pure.
I was running, I was running,
I can't any more;
I was hiding, I was hiding,
I can't any more.
You provide the cradle, brave man,
And I'll get the little dress.
The little cradle is ready,
Made of linden wood.
The little robe is ready,
Made of fine linen.
Rock-a-bye, rock-a-bye, my little son,
What a rogue your father was,
He slipped away my little crown.

Children are dealt with gently when they are taught how to sit, how to walk, how to eat, and so on. They are induced to do all this by the adults' singing, smiling, and making a general display of approval.

While she is nursing, the mother is spared working. She nurses her child with great joy, and is unhappy if she is unable to feed the infant with her own milk. If such bad luck occurs, she takes the child to a nursing relative or any other nursing woman in the Zadruga or in the neighborhood. Since there is no feeding schedule, the baby is nursed when it cries or when the mother believes it necessary. For three months the child is fed only mother's milk. After that, the mother gradually feeds it cow's milk and cereal. Later the baby is given food which the adults eat, but it is first thoroughly masticated by the mother. Simultaneously the child also suckles. The suckling period lasts practically until another child is born, sometimes for two or three years. The

mothers in the Zadruga try to wean their children in a gentle and gradual manner. Only if the child is stubborn does the mother resort to wetting her nipples with the juice of bitter herbs.

For the first three months a child is swaddled. After that, both boys and girls dress alike, in shirts. If pants are used, they are open in the back. In both cases, excreting is not interfered with, because it can easily be accomplished without the help of the elders; it does not necessitate the soiling of clothes and frequent changing and cleaning. It eliminates much work for the nursing mother, and prevents the unnecessary whipping often resorted to in some other societies as a means of training children in sphincter control. It is possible that this situation in connection with other circumstances may affect the mother-child relationship, and that it may be of some significance in the formation of the child's personality.

A child of four or five years, if a boy, is dressed exactly like an adult man; if a girl, she is clothed like an adult woman. Since the imitation of adults' ways of behavior is so visibly expressed, this fact among others may explain why children in Zadruga society look rather serious. From this time until about twelve years of age, both *dečeci* (little boys) and *dečlice* (little girls)⁶ spend most of their time playing together, performing minor tasks, watching the adults at work, and listening to them talk. Children's play in Zadruga society is, as a rule, organized so that at least five, ten or even more children of both sexes play together in games that emphasize swiftness, intelligence and shrewdness. As a rule, these games do not incite much competitiveness, and there is little reliance on sheer luck.

Children under twelve years are not asked to work if they are unwilling. They may be given the task of herding hogs, goats and sheep, watching the poultry, or some other necessary but simple work if they wish to do it. If a child refuses to perform even such simple tasks, there is no punishment. The gospodinja might say, "The little devils, they would just eat but not listen." A more aggressive adult might call them such names as *ti*, *terdokornjak* (thou, the

⁶ While in the cradle, the infant is called *dete*. After that, both male and female children are called *čorje*.

stubborn one) if the offender is a boy; if a girl, *ti, nesramnica* (thou, the shameless one).

Seldom does anyone dare to whip or inflict punishment on a child other than his own. Not even the *gospodar* and *gospodinja* have this privilege, for it would be considered a great offense against the parents. Punishing another's child not only is a cause of great friction among the members of the *družina*, but calls for retaliation. If anyone has a complaint against a child, it is considered proper to appeal to the parents, who punish or spare the child as they will. If a child behaves as is expected, the reward is mild public approval. The child is petted, spoken to on equal terms by the elders, and generally treated with respect. The child is also addressed with such warm names as *dušica* (my little soul) or *serčece* (my little heart).

When a boy reaches the age of twelve, he becomes a *dečke* (boy); at the same age, a little girl is a *dekle* (girl). Both *dečke* and *dekle* have more new clothes and try to look very smart. They are gradually introduced to the work and the affairs of the *Zadruga* as helpers and apprentices, until they are married. As soon as they start to work seriously, they form a part of the *družina*. Boys now sit with the adult men around the common table, and girls stand with the rest of the adult *Zadruga* women. Whenever the *Zadruga* affairs are discussed and proposals are made, they are allowed to take an active part in the *dekončak*, if they have something of real importance to say; otherwise they are expected to remain quiet. Their rôle is rather to listen and learn. But they are not discouraged from taking part in the discussions, since people of *Zadruga* culture believe that one should weigh carefully even the words of children, and not be reluctant to accept a child's proposal worthy of consideration.

Children in the *Zadruga* do not own any personal property; everything belongs to their parents. But they are very early instructed in the knowledge of what is common *Zadruga* property, and are expected to take more care of communal possessions than of things belonging to their parents. Any damage done by children to *Zadruga* goods may cause friction and tension within the *Zadruga*.

¹ A Dinaric child is faced very early in his life with distinctions in rank. The *Zadruga* child, on the contrary, is early conditioned to the fact of his equality with all other *Zadruga*

members. This recognition contributes to the development of thoughtfulness among Zadruga children, and implies that the child must treat everybody with consideration and equal respect, regardless of sex. This lack of sharp stratification is manifested, also, in the equal training of Zadruga boys and girls, and in equal sharing of knowledge. Not even such matters as sex and magic are kept secret from the children. A knowledge of life and death comes equally to everyone from the open handing down of Zadruga tradition by the družina.

In contrast with the Dinaric alternation between submissiveness and rebellion, the respect for authority, so long as it is kept within proper limits, is instilled into Zadruga children very early. For example, there is always protection against the *gospodar* and *gospodinja* if they exceed their authority, since their power is only delegated, not absolute. To encroach upon the rights of children is to encroach upon the rights of their parents, with whom the ultimate control of the Zadruga rests. In the main, however, a child is expected to be respectful to the *gospodar* and the *gospodinja* and to obey them.

While in Dinaric society much emphasis is placed on individual performance and rivalry, in the Zadruga competition is neither encouraged among children, nor is any great commendation bestowed upon personal achievements. "Much praise brings quick corruption," they say. Their accomplishments are appreciated but not eulogized. As everyone is expected to take part in the common enterprise, in accordance with his age, sex, and ability, public approval or disapproval is the only final judgment of each person's behavior. Aggressiveness among children is not encouraged, and fighting among them is not tolerated because it might disturb the relations of the Zadruga members, especially mothers.

A child relies for guidance in his behavior not so much upon the adults as upon other Zadruga children. Since all the children, although they belong to different families, eat, sleep, and play together, it is only natural that every child is much concerned with the approval or disapproval of his playmates. This explains why, in play, the emphasis is on the group performance rather than on personal prominence, and why children speak always in terms of "we" and not of

"you" and "I." Since the children take over the task of moulding one another into worthy members of Zadruga society, it is not necessary for adults to assume the role of strict disciplinarians. This is why both parents in Zadruga songs are always mentioned with great tenderness, quite unlike the parent-child antagonism of the Dinaric ballads. It is only the gospodinja whom the songs sometimes present in an unfavorable light:

A long field—a bad gospodinja!
"Dear mother, I want to dine."
"Thy companions dined long ago?"
"They dined, they called me."
I said I dined
But instead, grieved, I refused."

The gospodinja has more to do with the children in the Zadruga than the gospodar, and even more than the parents themselves, because she is always at home when the parents and the gospodar are in the fields. Although she is not expected to chastise the children, she can scold them and they must obey. For these reasons, Zadruga children often resent her, and their attitude is made plain in some of the folk songs.

Because the children are trained gently and considerately, they are free from many frustrations and resentments and comply easily with group rules. It is not necessary to employ force or to invoke supernatural powers to discipline them. Fear and force do not play the important part in training Zadruga children that they play in the Dinaric child training. The gradual and painless methods of training, the absence of domineering parents and of domineering types among the children themselves, the benevolent attitude of adults, and the general atmosphere of warmth and friendliness, all serve to protect the child from exposure to traumatic experiences. Weaning from both the mother's breast and from family ties not only comes about gently but is compensated by a fuller and more exciting life with many playmates. The same is true with reference to initiation into work and adulthood. This is done tactfully by an understanding družina, so that the loss of carefree childhood is replaced by increased self-respect and the gratifying experience of full social participation in adult Zadruga life. In

these circumstances, the child has an opportunity to express himself and to develop his personality without being thwarted by the social environment. With little compulsion, the child absorbs the knowledge, attitudes and behavior of Zadruga society.

Interpersonal Relations in the Zadruga

While the whole structure of Dinaric society emphasizes conflict, in Zadruga society the necessity of avoiding it is stressed in all interpersonal relations. "*De ne družina besna, ne ni hiža tesna*" (where the družina is not impetuous, the hiža is never overcrowded) is an old saying in Zadruga society. The members are very much aware of the fact that a successful life is entirely dependent upon the avoidance of conflict among the družina. Hence, the people are always ready to make certain sacrifices: "If your wicked neighbor will not move, then move yourself." Almost anything is justified for the sake of peace; one might even be forced to act against one's own principles: "Sometimes one must light candles to the devil also." And when a quarrel does start, it is finally brought to an end and forgotten by the participants, who say to each other: "*Reč je veter*"—words are like wind.

The need to avoid conflict is stressed in the most important occasions in life; it is equally emphasized at birth, marriage and death. Even before the mother gives birth to the child, she is expected to perform certain homeopathic magic so that the child may not, for example, be irritable and reckless. When a newly born child is brought home after being baptized, the godmother must lay the child on the floor, and his mother must then raise him up, a performance believed necessary to ensure that the child will develop into a "completely peaceful man."

The bride and the bridegroom are also expected to observe certain practices which will enable them to live harmoniously. When the bride enters the Zadruga for the first time, all women come out from the hiža. This is to prevent the new bride from being "stronger" than the others, which would arouse envy and jealousy within the Zadruga. On the day of her arrival, the young bride sprinkles water over the hiža so that she will be liked by the družina.

In songs lamenting the death of a beloved one, emphasis is laid on the fact that the deceased was "provident, good, wise, and quiet"; that he never took advantage of anybody, "big or small," not even of a "tiny little ant." Those who remain express anxiety that they might have done something to cause distress to the departed while he was alive:

Woe to me, woe to me—
 My beautiful little head,
 Good and wise,
 Wise and peaceful,
 Who never took advantage of anybody,
 Big or small,
 Not even of a tiny little ant!
 Woe to me—woe to me!
 I did everything for my little gospodar,
 And I served him the best I could,
 If only I did not offend you
 In something,
 My little head!
 Oh, my little soul—my sustainer,
 Oh, my little rose—my sustainer.
 My little heart!
 My beautiful blue eyes [or dark],
 Don't you want to look at me!
 My sustainer—my little soul, my little head,
 Shrewd and wise,
 Who knew everybody,
 Far and wide,
 Who was early rising and late retiring.
 Whence ever he came from,
 He brought gifts to little children.
 Good-by my little soul,
 Good-by companion dear!¹

Quite opposite to Dinaric worship of physical force is the dislike of violence among Zadruga people: "Come closer to where people are drinking; get away from where people are fighting," the Zadruga folk say, and they consider a verbal offense much less of an evil than physical force: "Let him call me a black pot as long as he does not throw it at my head," they say. According to their philosophy of life, physical violence has no lasting effects, because "If good words do not improve a person, clubbing will not help either";

¹ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*

"All force is temporary"; and "One does not pray to God with force."²

In Zadruga society it is firmly believed that violence and all kinds of conflict can be easily avoided if a sense of proportion prevails throughout all personal relationships. Aggressive, overtalkative, and boastful people are frowned upon. Of such a person one says, "If you stop up his mouth, his behind will speak." When these rules are observed by Zadruga members, "peace and harmony" prevail; it is easy to attain unanimity in all vital problems; there is "order" and a total lack of exploitation. In such an atmosphere, to do as others do is not difficult: "As all do, so shall I." Unanimity in Zadruga society is achieved by means of persuasion and compromise. Among the Dinarics, the same result is sought through threat and violence.

Everybody in the Zadruga is conscious of the fact that his very existence depends upon cooperation and collaboration: "Wood leans upon wood, and man against man." Members feel much stronger when united: "The village is stronger than the wolf." Thus the ideal man in their society is one who does not deviate from the community pattern, who is modest and satisfied with little, who "stretches himself only as far as the length of the blanket will allow," who is unprovocative and flexible, who is such that "you could twine him around your finger," and who would "give you his very soul."

Person-to-person relationships in specific situations are also guided by the same type of personal consideration. Take the example of the use of the personal pronoun. All younger people "respectfully" address all those who are five or more years older; that is, they use the second person plural—*vi* (you), instead of the second person singular—*ti* (thou),—a more intimate, but also less respectful mode of address. Children speak "respectfully" to their parents, younger brothers and sisters to their married brothers and sisters, the wife to her husband.

All these rules of conduct are applied not only within the Zadruga itself, but also in the relation of the Zadruga with other Zadrugas and with other people in the region. Harmonious and affectionate relations with neighbors, with *kum*

² Lukanec, P., "Poslovice i fraze Podravini," *Zbornik*, Vol. 31, pp. 135-200. Most of the proverbs in this chapter are quoted from this work.

and *kuma* (godfather and godmother), and with other friends are very desirable. One always bears in mind that the time is certain to come when he will need the help of another, and a sense of mutual dependence is very highly developed: "The day is never so long that the night may not come."

Old people are highly respected. Young men and younger adults restrain themselves voluntarily in the presence of the old people. Children never ridicule them. Cases of illness are cared for by the immediate families. In the event that there are no close relatives living, another Zadruga member may step in.

Relations within the family do not come under the surveillance of the Zadruga. The husband-wife relationship, for instance, is the concern of the married couple alone. If they quarrel, no one interferes. "If the bed does not make peace between them, nobody else will." When they do finally make peace, their friends jokingly remark: "Blessed be that night which made peace between us!" The parent-child relationship is likewise a private family affair. A very affectionate relationship exists between children and parents, made possible by the limited authority exercised by parents. Their role is more that of protector than disciplinarian. Both boys and girls address the father as *oček* or *očiček* (daddy, little daddy) and the mother as *muma* or *mumica* (mama, little mama). The boys sometimes venture to say *oča* (father), but only if the father is not present.

The division of functions between the family and the Zadruga is so organized that many conflicts which are usually generated within the family circle in other societies are transferred to the community in Zadruga society. As a result, family relationships remain undisturbed. There is less occasion for parent-children conflict, few occasions for jealousy or envy between family members, and little or no struggle for dominance among them. All is transferred to the Zadruga, where conflicts take a less intense form, owing to the numerous possibilities of "escape." Thus the family within a Zadruga remains an affectionate and well-integrated unit.

Economic problems are not the concern of individual families, but of the *gospodar*, *gospodinja* and *družina*, as a whole. So also the problem of education, training and disciplining of children is the task of the whole Zadruga, and

not an exclusive family prerogative. The function of the family is therefore limited to reproduction, and to the fostering of an affectionate and intimate relationship between parents and children, between the children themselves, and especially between brother and sister.

Numerous songs from the Zadruga indicate the warm feeling and the particularly tender relationship which exists between brother and sister. Some of these songs are particularly interesting because they disclose some incestuous inclinations. Symbolic to a high degree, they frequently indicate also a feeling of guilt:

A horny hart was grazing,
While grazing, praying God:
Give me, oh Lord, golden horns,
That the black mountain
I may overturn:
That I may see down to Karlovec.
Below Karlovec they dance the kolo;
Within the kolo a fire burns;
Next to the fire are a brother and sister:
"My little sister, how beautiful thou art!
If we were not what we are,
Thou wouldst be my lover."

I have a brother, and I have a lover,
For the brother, my black eyes I gave,
For the lover, my golden ring I gave.
I'm going to that burning fire,
Good-by, my father, good-by, my mother.

On the meadow the little green grass
Is well felled:
It was felled by a brave lad and a maiden,
The brave one with scythe and the maiden with a sickle.
The brave lad mows and the maiden carries a drinking cup,
"Come, my little sister, do be mine!"
"No, my little brother, that would be a sin!
The same mother bore us,
The same blood flows in us,
The same cradle rocked us."

This feeling of guilt, often symbolized as "burning fire," is suggestive of the Christian teachings of eternal fire as a punishment for the sinners.

In the Zadruga, children mostly lead a life apart from the družina. All children stay together most of the time, and play, eat and sleep among themselves. Their contacts with their parents are not as frequent as those in other family systems, and they are provided with affection and care by all the družina, as well as by their parents. These conditions, therefore, do not favor the development of an "Oedipus complex." As a matter of fact, any hostility of children is not directed against their own parents, but rather against the gospodinja and gospodar, because these and not the parents represent authority to them and are their chief disciplinarians. Though chastising children is the exclusive privilege of the parents, they more often protect children than punish them.

It is extremely interesting to consider how these parent-child and brother-sister relations have influenced the equalitarian social system of Zadruga society; and to contrast the Dinaric authoritarianism and hierarchical structure with its all too frequent conflict between parent and son.

The Zadruga system of social organization is not based upon blood ties, but rather upon a mutual interest in common property and a realization of mutual dependency. For this reason, "friends" are highly valued. A friend (*prijatelj*) may be a person who has offered one assistance or prompt aid in time of trouble. A friend may be a *kum* (godfather), a *kuma* (godmother), or even a neighbor. Zadruga people are fond of saying that "A good neighbor is a closer relative than a distant brother" or that "One neighbor always needs another." Friends are treated with great respect at all times, and especially on the occasion of a visit when hospitality in the form of food and wine is extended to them. "Stick to the old wine and to the old friend" is a favorite proverb.³

The infrequency of interpersonal conflicts among the Zadruga peasants, as compared with their high frequency among the Dinaric shepherders, is doubtless related to the emotional, economic and political security which prevails in Zadruga society, rooted in its social and psychological structure, which contrasts with the unbalanced and insecure relationships of Dinaric society. The Zadruga is able to provide its members with most of the necessities. Also, each Zadruga household is self-governed and democratically organized;

³ Kotarski, T., *op. cit.*

and it is protected against arbitrariness and mistreatment by internal and external authorities. Since the Zadruga thrives on its own land and on work, the attitude toward the problem of security is that everybody is safe as long as he is willing to work: "While a man has two healthy hands he does not have to fear hunger." They also say that "Every bird gets enough food with its own beak."

Of course, security is also related to the existing wants and can be more easily achieved if people are satisfied with little and do not develop desires above the existing level of living. "If you can possibly do without something, don't crave it," the Zadruga folk say. They believe that the accumulation of too many goods brings new desires and consequent unhappiness: "One who has ten daughters is more satisfied than one who has ten oxen." This freedom from anxiety and personal frustration generates an optimistic attitude toward life which Zadruga people retain even under less favorable conditions. Their general attitude is that: "It's never so bad that it couldn't be worse" and that there "never came night that didn't bring dawn."⁴

According to the Zadruga ideal, life-as-it-is is accepted and enjoyed with the idea that one should get the most from today: "Everything will still be here when we are gone." Popular drinking songs well express this philosophy of life:

There is nothing better
Than a fruitful vineyard!
Come, my dear, do drink, do indulge in pleasure,
It won't be long, we'll be gone!
Why do I toil, but to drink,
Why do I suffer, but to feast,
Today or tomorrow we'll be dead,
The wine will remain, we'll be gone.

Good little wine, come to me,
The time will come when I will not be!
In the black earth I'll be rotting,
Thee, little wine, I'll not be drinking!
As many drops, so many summers
May God give us to live on earth.⁵

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*

Another very popular song says that "as yet no Zagorec ⁶ sold a drop of wine because it was always drunk at home by a gay družina."

Such a view of life helps one to be friendly with others, but at the same time to expect the same consideration from them: "Each one is going to return the toast to you in the way in which you toast him"; "Never ask from the other fellow what you are not ready to give him."

Because it is thought that women disturb happy relationships more often than men, they are more often blamed for Zadruga troubles. In fact, when dissolution of the Zadrugas began, peasants said almost unanimously that the women were the cause of the breakdown. A quarrelsome and unadjusted woman is sarcastically called *baba*. There can be nothing worse! "If the devil can't do it, the baba will"; "The baba is worse than the devil"; she is "three days older than the devil"; "All the village bitches couldn't outbark her."⁷

This attitude toward women can not be due to their inferior social status, because, as it was pointed out, women in Zadruga society have rather a high social position. Indeed, their status is manifested by the independence of the gospodinja, by the division of labor favorable to women, by the equal participation in Zadruga affairs, and sometimes by the privilege of choosing a mate. The importance of the role played by women in Zadruga society is clearly expressed in the sayings: "The house does not rest on the ground but on the woman"; "The woman holds three corners of the home."

However, woman's social position in Zadruga society is fast being affected by European-feudal, Western-urban, and Christian influences, all of which give to the man a higher place in the home and in society. The irritability of Zadruga women may be associated with this decline in their influence. The attitude toward "babas" may be but a reaction of men, newly affected by urban ideas, against the "domineering" tendencies of women. It is also possible that such an attitude developed as a result of the behavior of those women who married into the Zadruga from outside, and who could not very easily adjust themselves to the new

⁶ Man from Zagorje, the part of Croatia where Zadruga life in the past was especially well developed.

⁷ Lukanec, P., *op. cit.*, pp. 135-200.

environment. There is some support for this view in present popular expressions: "Everything is fine while you have your flies in the hiža; as soon as an alien fly comes in, all of them immediately are buzzing in a different way," or "While she is at home with her mother she is quieter than a sheep, but when she gets a man, she spreads out a tongue a meter long." This may have been the reason why Zadruga folk reached the conclusion that it is best "to get married from near-by, and to get kums from afar."⁸

Since Zadruga life is so satisfactory and pleasant, aside from occasional difficulties, there is a remarkable lack of emigration from Zadruga regions. Even temporary leave from the community, such as call for military duty, is considered a great misfortune. When the Zadrugas finally do break down to form separate "individual" families, many people talk about Zadruga days as if something very dear to them were lost forever.⁹ Zadruga members are free to leave the Zadruga whenever they wish, and may return, at will, without jeopardizing their rights as members. But even so, unlike the strongly migratory Dinarics, relatively few people leave Zadrugas permanently. Some may go to near-by towns to learn a special trade, but many of these return to the village to live. Both the reluctance of the people to leave the community and their dislike of fighting and military training are expressed in many folk songs arising in these regions:

Wine, red wine!
Who is going to drink you, oh wine,
When I have to go to fight?
Wine, wine, red wine!
Who is going to mow you, oh grass,
When I have to bear a gun?
Grass, grass, green grass!
Rose, scarlet rose!
Who is going to pick you, oh rose,
When I have to march?
Rose, rose, scarlet rose!
Darling, dear darling,
Who is going to love you, dear,
When I have to serve the czar?
Darling, darling, dear darling!

⁸ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*

⁹ Kotarski, T., *op. cit.*, Vol. 21, p. 57; also Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, Vol. 12, pp. 213-214.

The band was playing
And my darling was crying,
Don't cry, dear darling,
Don't afflict your heart!
Plenty of weeping there's going to be
When I leave for the battlefield
And do not return.
When you hear, my soul,
How I died,
Do not spare grief,
But come to my grave.
Kneel there,
And say:
Thou, oh green grass,
Be kind and gay to him
As I was
When I was his.¹⁰

Departure from the Zadruga is always painful. Mothers and wives are very much distressed when men are called to military duty: "Some cry and carry on as if their men were already dead." Letters to those in the service and their replies indicate the concern of men about affairs at home, and how anxious the women are that their men come home. In one such letter, for instance, a wife begs her husband not to be promoted to the rank of corporal, for fear lest such a promotion might postpone his homecoming. Such sentiments are quite contrary to the attitude of Dinarics, in whose society war and fighting are the source of wealth and glory, and where war is considered the only effort worthy of a man. Zadruga people on the other hand, are so well integrated in the peaceful ways of their culture that they feel it a great shock when they are forced to leave their community to engage in a new occupation or to adjust themselves to a new way of life. This process of readjustment is so distressing and painful to them that it is often represented in the folk songs as equivalent to death.

A certain ambivalence exists in Zadruga society, so far as human relationships are concerned. There is a tendency to identify oneself exclusively with the narrow local group. But there is also a certain feeling of being a part of humanity as a whole, and a strong belief that it does not make

¹⁰ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*

much difference to what particular community within humanity one may belong. Therefore, little emphasis is laid on local historical traditions, or on one's line of descent, as is the case with Dinarics. At the same time, knowledge of other peoples may be very limited, but there is on the whole no ill feeling or open hostility toward other groups or cultures. For example, Zadruga ploughmen feel neither superior nor inferior to others, but respect the right of each group to its own particular way of life. Those who speak like Zadruga people are called *naši* (our people), but the Dinarics who speak a different dialect are called *Vlasi* (Wallachians). This discrimination is also evident in the reproach, "that is how the Wallachians eat." Zadruga people believe that many Dinarics are thieves and robbers, but they are reluctant to express themselves openly on the point. But these are just some of the few instances in which Zadruga people indicate a mild antagonism toward another culture.

In accordance with this attitude, the people believe wars between states and nations to be the result of the personal disputes and ambitions of kings, and not the fault of the people of the nations or states concerned. "Enemy" people, they say, should be treated with a respect befitting the dignity of human beings.

The only negative attitude really shown toward people outside of the Zadruga is a hostility toward kings, feudal lords and priests. Age-old experience with feudal classes, who dispossessed farming folk of their lands and then imposed on them a new order and a new "justice," taught these peasants to distrust the upper classes. And in the past, priests received their share of this antagonism, because they were employed by the feudal lords and therefore belonged to the feudal classes. In the past, also, the Church was the biggest landlord, and in the famous uprising of Croatian peasants under Matija Gubec, in 1573, it was a bishop who sentenced Gubec and his aides to death. This identification of the clergy with the feudal classes impressed the Croatian peasants so much that political catholicism was unable to make any headway whatever in the villages of upper Croatia.

This distrust of kings and feudal lords is expressed in many folk songs. Here are two examples which show the deep rooted suspicion of these classes:

The king was playing with a little girl
 From the eve until the dawn,
 When he played long enough,
 She was weeping, dear one.
 There we see, there we see,
 Cross-bearers, cross-bearers!
 O, my dears, my cross-bearers!
 For whom do you bear the cross?
 For a little girl who died from grief.

Sing to me, oh merry bird,
 In the woods, on the pine fringes.
 The bird was heard by the king's little sister:
 "Come to me, oh merry little bird,
 You will sing at the dinner for the kings!"
 "I won't, my faith, king's little sister,
 Your grooms are clever smarties,
 My plumes they would strip away,
 Their bonnets to adorn.
 It is better to sleep with plumes on stones
 Than to lie as a plucked one on white bedding." ¹¹

In earlier times, the antagonism towards priests was also expressed in various ways. Such antagonism was manifested, for instance, in the belief that all priests were sorcerers who could bring a shower of hail upon the peasants.¹² This belief is particularly significant because, in Zadruga culture, fear of sorcery and other supernatural forces was not well developed.

The cruelest punishment suffered by a Zadruga member is expulsion, either temporary or permanent. In the days when military service was not compulsory for everyone, the gospodar threatened recalcitrant members with draft into the army. The družina might also decide that a restless or peace-disturbing member should be sent as an apprentice or manual worker to a near-by town. Both these measures were considered very severe because of the strange and unfriendly world which existed in the urban areas, as contrasted with the secure and warm environment provided by the Zadruga. If a permanent expulsion is considered necessary, the expelled Zadruga member may start a new Zadruga of his own in the same village, but this event would be remembered

¹¹ Kuhač, I., *op. cit.*, p. 120.

¹² Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, Vol. 13, pp. 97-98.

and condemned by everybody for a few generations. However, permanent expulsion is rare in the Zadruga society. In some villages, peasants can not remember whether it has ever occurred or not.¹³

Such sanctions are applied against those who cause a permanent disruption of the peaceful relations and harmony of Zadruga life.¹⁴ For occasional damage to common property, or any other occasional misbehavior, there is neither punishment nor any means of forcing a member to repair the damage if he does not wish to do so: "If there is damage, let the whole community pay it" is a popular saying.¹⁵ If the damage is small, "everybody thinks to himself: that might happen to me too; why, then, should I make a big fuss over it?" In the case of serious damage, Zadruga members openly show their disapproval, but that is all: "If he wants and if he can, he repairs the damage; if not—not." Of course, no member of the Zadruga is allowed to appropriate anything from the common property, and the gospodar is overzealous in his care of property, lest the družina think he is getting some personal benefit from it.¹⁶

In a society in which interpersonal relations are so well adjusted, the external sanction, the means of external coercion against those who deviate from the established rules of behavior, need not necessarily be well developed. That is why binding forces in the Zadruga society are of an internal rather than an external nature. Being talked about as a "bad gospodar," as "inconsiderate," "a bad neighbor," or "wasteful," or "boastful," is much stronger condemnation against deviating behavior than any other coercive measures in the form of fines or physical punishment. Even when external punishment is applied, its power is more in the shame, the loss of respect in the community which these measures provoke, than in the physical deprivations they entail.

The worst crimes known to Zadruga society are the following: starting a fire on peasants' property, homicide, a physical attack upon one's parents, burglary, theft, and changing the borders of peasants' lands. However, it is not

¹³ Bogišić, B., *op. cit.*, p. 329.

¹⁴ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, p. 285.

¹⁵ Lukanec, P., *op. cit.*, Vol. 31, pp. 135-200.

¹⁶ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, Vol. 13, p. 227.

considered a crime to put fire to the property of a usurer, or to take wood from the estate of a seignior.

Unlike the Dinaric system of blood feud, the Zadruga society judges an offense on the grounds of its motivation and of the status of the person against whom it was committed. Unintentional injury is not punished. Intentional injury or even murder is condoned against one whose activities or behavior may be considered dangerous to the community. Homicide, however, is an extremely rare event in Zadruga society; in some regions only one or two homicides have happened in the course of over one hundred years. Damage to property and theft are more usual offenses. There is a remarkable lack of crimes of lust, abortions and divorces in the Zadruga culture.¹⁷ The negative attitude toward intentional abortion and toward extra-marital sexual relations is expressed in the belief that abortive children take the form of beast-like ghosts and that unfaithful mates might be haunted by their spouses after these are dead.

Beliefs and Hallucinations in Zadruga Society

Interpersonal relations in Zadruga society are reflected in its belief in the supernatural world and in its attitude toward death.

People held in general dislike may be accused of sorcery. Babas with "nasty and shrinky" faces are thus suspect, but they can not do much damage except to spoil the milk in the cows, and to cause sexual impotence or an attack of lice. It is comparatively easy, moreover, to defend oneself against such witches when meeting them at night, gathered around the fire: merely to smoke tobacco makes one immune. Priests and students in priests' seminaries are often suspected of sorcery; but there, again, sorcerers are able to do damage only to those who mistreat them. It is the same with the spirits of the dead, who may return in the form of a vukodlak to revenge themselves upon those who have injured them during their life in this world.¹ While, in Dinaric society, the vukodlak is an expression of aggressiveness and fear, among Zadruga people it seems to be primarily a manifesta-

¹⁷ Rožić, *op. cit.*, Vol. 12, pp. 270-272.

¹ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, Vol. 13, pp. 97-98.

tion of guilt. The same "projection" of guilt may be noticed in the case of some other supernatural beings, who, in the form of devils and half-beasts, may make nuisances of themselves; but they bother only those who misbehave.²

The Christian conception of God was imposed upon Zadruga peasants by the teachings of Catholicism, but the peasants modified it by making an anthropomorphic God for themselves. In their folk tales one may find a certain mistrust of God, but this feeling has never developed into the fear or pure hatred of God found in Dinaric society. True, Zadruga distrust of priests may have been transferred to God, whom the priests represent. At the same time, however, Saint Peter is represented in Zadruga folk stories with great sympathy, and as a real friend of the people.³ Above all, however, there is a strong belief that justice is omnipresent and must finally prevail on earth, as well as in heaven, and that God himself is subject to it: "Justice is stronger than God," the peasants say.⁴ One may speculate whether such a concept of the limitation of God's powers may be a reflection of the limitation of the powers of the *gospodar* in a Zadruga, the same as the Dinaric concept of God as an arbitrary "old slayer" may reflect the despotic powers of *starješina* in a Dinaric *kuća*.

In the same way, the Zadruga belief in *vilas*, its idea of heaven, and its attitude toward death may be a manifestation of the deeply rooted feelings of security in that society. There are many people in Zadruga society who claim to have seen *vilas*. Contrary to the moodiness of the Dinaric *vilas*, those in Zadruga society are always good, helpful, kind and beautiful:

My father often told us how he saw *vilas* when he was with the oxen in the pasture; he told us that a *vila* was as white as snow—and beautiful—beautiful, and that she had long hair which hung down onto her shoulders. Also my uncle Mikula says that he saw *vilas*; he says he was in the pasture with the oxen and the oxen lay down, and he and Uncle Joška (who is dead) fell asleep next to the oxen. Then an ox bellowed and they awoke and saw two *vilas*, white as snow, with long hair.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 13, p. 99.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 13, pp. 106-107.

⁴ Kotarski, T., *op. cit.*, Vol. 20, p. 59.

They saw the vilas caressing the oxen, saying: "The cattle are resting, and the spahis are sleeping."⁵

There are also people in Zadruga society who claim to have seen heaven:

I often heard from my late father how he saw heaven open. Once at night he came out from the hiža and saw heaven open and then close immediately. He said heaven was beautiful and nothing in the world could be as beautiful. Before he died—it was near the hour of four o'clock in the morning—he asked to be taken out in the front of the hiža. He looked towards heaven and at once slipped into death. People said that the heavens opened to him, otherwise he wouldn't have died in that way.⁶

The Zadruga idea of heaven is a place where people never work or suffer, but where they spend their time in gaiety. There is plenty of pastime there, and people even dance. All those who are from one family come together and remain with one another constantly without worries. As a result of the teachings of the Church, people have come to have ideas on purgatory and hell, but they never elaborate upon these concepts as much as they do on the idea of heaven.

Remarkably lacking in Zadruga culture is a fear of death. Old people who are too weak to be useful think it only natural and necessary that they should die. They even make all necessary preparations, give instructions as to how they shall be dressed, and sometimes urge that their coffins be made before they die. They show considerable concern about the ceremonies to be held, and sometimes even ask assurance from the družina to that effect. Death is always natural in Zadruga society; suicide is never practiced, and is thought to be "strange" and "unheard of." When a person dies, all relatives, friends and neighbors come to console the nearest mourning relatives. They eulogize the dead; they always say he was a "good gospodar" who "never offended anybody," and did "not even as much harm as there is black under a nail; let heavenly light guide him, he was really an honest man, he never spoke a gruff word to anyone."⁷

Visions, ideas of heaven and of supernatural beings, the attitude toward death, and the lack of suicide may appear to

⁵ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Kotarski, T., *op. cit.*

be very closely connected with the type of interpersonal relations which exist in the Zadruga society. The infrequency of conflicts and the lack of intense fear and anxiety in the Zadruga culture may explain these phenomena. Mild hallucinations, relatively harmless sorcery, benevolent spirits, an aversion toward suicide, lack of fear of death, and belief in the supreme rule of justice are likely to be found in a secure, and well-adjusted society. For the same reason cases of psychotics are very rare in the Zadruga society—or, at least, they are so mild that they are able to adjust themselves to life in the community. They are never a threat to the Zadruga and, as a rule, there is no need for institutionalizing them.

Disintegration of the Zadrugas

Two main factors affected the security of Zadruga society and brought about profound changes in its culture. One was a reorganization of production to satisfy the needs of the market. The other was the state taxation policy. Both introduced money economy, with the result that there was less and less security in the households. These changes came about as a consequence of a breakdown of the feudal system, by the second part of the nineteenth century, and the formation of an urban class which lifted the power from the hands of the nobility and reorganized the state in favor of itself.

In order to obtain sufficient cash to meet the demands of taxation officers, who threatened them with sale of their property, the Zadrugas were compelled to reorganize their economy according to the needs of the market. They were forced to specialize in certain products which had a high market value. At the same time, they had to cease producing some goods needed for their own consumption and start buying them on the market. For example, certain Zadrugas had to specialize in cattle raising, poultry production, or in wine, but they were forced to buy in the town or village store a part of the food and clothes which formerly they themselves were able to produce.

In addition, as a result of a division of feudal property among the former seigniors and their serfs, a division which was favorable to the seigniors, many Zadrugas remained short of land. Parts of the feudal estates not under cultiva-

tion remained in the possession of the nobles, and were not available to the peasants who formerly had used them as pasture and as a source of wood. These two new elements—a lack of sufficient land and the organization of production for the needs of the market instead of for home consumption—were the origin of conflict within many Zadrugas, and at length caused their disintegration. At once, many Zadrugas began to divide their common property and parcel themselves into small family properties. The state laws tried to prevent this trend, but the Zadrugas violated the law by secret divisions. Formally, they kept together; *de facto*, they lived apart, every Zadruga being broken into a few families, each with its own separate economy.

These small families, of course, were unable to retain a high degree of self-sufficiency; and many of them were not able to produce enough for sale at the market to pay taxes, nor to buy in sufficient quantity those goods which they could no longer produce. The price of industrial products was very high, in comparison with the price of the agricultural products, particularly when the quality of the industrial products had to be taken into account. Textiles, for example, produced in factories had to be cheap to come within the reach of the peasants' ability to buy. Cheapness meant low quality, especially when compared with peasant homespun.

This situation was mainly responsible for a lower standard of living among the peasantry of Croatia after the breakdown of the feudal system. Peasants were forced to sell more and to consume less. The old economic stability and the feeling of security achieved by the Zadruga organization were completely shaken. Not only was economic security undermined, but emotional security also suffered greatly. Community labor, feasting and festivals, marriage celebrations—all the old rituals and ceremonials which served to give personal satisfaction and provided for emotional outlets—had to be greatly reduced because of the expense involved. These ceremonies now had to be counted in terms of money, because they fell on the shoulders of families and came no longer from communal Zadruga property.

Marriage could not take place at an early age, as was formerly the custom in the Zadruga system. It was often postponed for both boys and girls, because of lack of sufficient

land and dowry. A boy from a family that owned a small amount of land and a girl without a dowry had difficulty in finding mates. Because the dowry was appreciated only if it consisted of pieces of land, the need for a dowry meant an increased parceling out of land owned by families. Such a situation forced many people from these regions to emigrate. They went to near-by towns as craftsmen or industrial laborers, and to America as factory workers and miners. Emigration became especially rapid when vineyards suffered an attack of phylloxera in the beginning of this century, with an almost complete destruction of some of those peasant economies which tended to specialize in producing wine.

Under these new and distressing conditions, in many Zadrugas the attitude of the *gospodar* and *gospodinja* toward the members changed perceptibly. According to tradition the *gospodar* was only the "first among equals"; the power and the ultimate decision in all affairs rested in the hands of the *družina*. But now, in many Zadrugas, owing to urbanizing influences, the *gospodar* and, to a lesser extent, the *gospodinja* began to display a tendency to concentrate the power in their own hands. The *gospodar*, particularly, tried to behave differently from the *družina* by imitating the townspeople in his speech and manner, and by abstaining from participation in manual labor. Some *gospodars* and *gospodinjas* derived personal profit at the expense of the Zadruga by secretly selling Zadruga products or by retaining a part of the common income for themselves. In some instances, both *gospodar* and *gospodinja* made a distinction between their own children and other children in the distribution of food, a matter which became very important with the increasing scarcity of food after the Zadrugas began to produce primarily for the market.

In some cases, to retain their power, the *gospodar* and the *gospodinja* resorted to bribing some of the *družina*. After food and wine became scarce, the *gospodar* and the *gospodinja*, who controlled the storage place and the distribution and cooking of food, could easily bribe a member of the *družina* by inviting him to their *komora* and treating him with food and wine. In some cases, the *gospodar* even inflicted punishment on recalcitrant Zadruga members by refusing to give them food, while he, in turn, was reluctant

to account to the *družina* for money income and expenditures.

All these changes provoked dissatisfaction, tension and conflict within the *Zadrugas* in which they took place. The common welfare was no longer the goal of these *Zadrugas*. Everybody now tried to get as much personal benefit from the property as he could, and stealing from this common *Zadruga* property became widespread. All *Zadruga* members began to care more for their own private property and for their own *osebunjaks* than for the general interests. They did the common work as quickly as they could, to have more time for themselves, or to work at a near-by factory, or on an estate where they received wages. Everyone sought personal gain and money. *Zadruga* discipline broke down, and, instead of the common feasts and gaiety which had formerly prevailed, many members gave way to their disillusionment and dissatisfaction by indulging in drinking and lasciviousness in the near-by inns. Accusations, recriminations and broils were growing in such *Zadrugas*, and it was obvious that in these circumstances a common life could no longer exist. The women, especially, became very persuasive in encouraging their husbands to break with the *Zadruga*: "See, even if I have to work harder, at least we shall know why we toil; let us separate, we can save more." . . . "We are going to separate; at least we shall know what is ours and what we shall be able to leave to our children. The feudal obligations have ceased. We, too, want to be free."¹

The division of common *Zadruga* property among members meant a heavy burden on the peasants. Not only did they have to pay taxes, and expenses for lawyers and engineers, but there were implements and utensils which could not be divided. The member to whom these pieces of property were adjudged had to pay for them in money to the rest of the members. As a rule, this adjudication meant incurring debts in order to provide necessary cash. Besides, the new small private peasant holdings necessitated having new implements and utensils, which had formerly been owned collectively and used when working both common property and on the personal property of the members. New implements and utensils meant an additional investment and additional debts, or it meant the mortgaging of the

¹ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, p. 56.

newly established private peasant economies. The actual distribution of property was accompanied by heartbreaking experiences. "It could be heard far away when the dividing was going on in a Zadruga. There was shouting, villification, cursing; it was something that was very painful to everybody."² It was a part of their very life from which these people were being separated.

The disintegration of the Zadruga assumed especially large proportions in regions with a high birth rate, and in hilly regions with a scarcity of good land. But in the plains, such as those of Slavonia and Posavina,³ where there was an abundance of land and where the members resorted to the practice of birth control to prevent a lowering of their standard of living, the Zadrugas have survived until the present day.

Individual families who broke the Zadruga ties had to cope with many difficulties. For families with a small amount of property and insufficient manual laborers, the separation meant considerable hardship and responsibility for all family members, the wife and small children included. No longer could there be any division of labor, any special protection for women, children, and the aged. All of them had to work hard, in order to manage their private economy; their responsibility was increased.

This new life meant not only additional labor in connection with their own property, but also agricultural labor on the land of absentee owners or more prosperous farmers, to obtain the cash so badly needed for taxes and necessities no longer produced under such a restricted economy. A lowering of the standard of living and a growing dissatisfaction was the result. Very soon people regretted having broken from the Zadruga. "If only there had not been that unfortunate division," they would say; "the devil himself invented the partition. While we lived in the Zadruga we had four big oxen, a number of cows and horses, plenty of bread and all the gifts of God, and now there are as many gospodars as there are men, as many gospodinjas as there are women. If I am in the field, there is nobody to cook for me; if I am herding the cows, there is nobody to work for

² *Ibid.*, p. 57.

³ The plains around the Sava River.

me. Our hižas are vacant, stables and chests are empty. On all sides there is hunger.”⁴

Departure of the families from Zadruga life meant not only that they lost economic security but that they were deprived of many emotional outlets as well. They were forced either to suppress their desires, or to discover new outlets and gratifications. Some people found compensation for their frustration in drinking, ribaldry, pre-marital and extra-marital sexual affairs. This loose conduct, of course, provoked intense family and neighborhood tension and conflicts which were sometimes manifested in the form of wife-beating, desertions of the husband by the wife, and strained relations with the neighborhood where the opportunity for liaisons was the greatest. Kotarski enumerates the “causes” of the family conflicts after the breakdown of Zadruga life, as follows:

Great poverty; there is no bread and there is no money to buy it. Children want to eat, parents are hungry; if the wife says something, the husband gets angry and they quarrel. If the husband is a drunkard, his wife often looks for him in the tavern, where she may even strike him, and then when he comes home drunk, there is fighting and quarreling. The greatest cause of quarrels over a long period of time is the “mixing” of the husband with another woman . . . the wife every day reproaching his unfaithfulness; on the other hand, if the husband hears that his wife goes out alone with another man, that she is drinking with him in the tavern, her back gets blue . . . He does not say anything about this fault of his wife until she offends him in something.⁵

Such conflicts do not happen in a Zadruga household where responsibility is a matter for all the members; it is equally shared by everybody and thus easier to bear. In a separated family, on the other hand, responsibility falls heavily on two persons—the husband and the wife. In addition, the responsibility of the family is increased because of the added problems with which the peasant’s small income has to cope. A number of people can not stand the stress and strain of their new independence, and give way to drinking, fighting and “low” behavior.

Because of these family conflicts the sons in some families

⁴ Kotarski, T., *op. cit.*, Vol. 21, p. 57.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

showed a tendency to leave their fathers' homes as soon as they married. Knowing the established pattern of community life, and the legal property rights of the father in relation to family property, one might expect that a married son would stay with his father until the latter died. And so it happened in a majority of cases. But in many cases a married son wanted to establish his own independent economy. Such action usually was preceded by family quarrels between the parents and their son and daughter-in-law. In order to maintain peace, the old father might decide to give a part of the family property to his son to manage by himself. This process, however, only increased the parcelling out of land and added to already existing difficulties.

The necessity of postponing the age of marriage because of economic difficulties increased the number of illegitimate children and of liaisons between boys and married women, especially with *jalovkas*.

Another trait which former Zadruga people developed after the breakdown of Zadruga ties was the habit of undertaking lawsuits and counter lawsuits, even in petty matters. Not only did many lawsuits result from conflicts over boundaries and divisions of immobile property, but there were also suits involving petty offenses expressed by words, gestures, etc. The peculiar aspect of these suits was that the parties involved were not much concerned about the economic benefits or the material cost of the taxes, fees and other expenses implied in legal procedure. On the contrary, they were primarily interested in the pleasure of winning the suit and seeing *pravica* (justice) done. For example, two peasants sued each other for a turkey, whose estimated value was less than one dollar, while the expenses involved in the legal procedure came to more than fifty dollars.⁶ Peasants even spent a considerable amount of money for lawyers and court fees only because one had cursed the other.

As a result of the new distressing conditions and the breaking down of old mores, crime was now more prevalent than before, although it was still rather infrequent. The records reveal about three cases of homicide in the course of thirty years, in an estimated population of ten thousand. Some prostitution was known, but it was also rather rare. There were a few cases of fraud. Crime usually took the

⁶ Tomašić, D., *op. cit.*, p. 42.

form of theft, a very understandable fact in view of the considerable impoverishment which followed the breakdown of the Zadrugas. Usury also flourished. Mendicancy greatly increased, and there were even cases of suicide, formerly completely lacking.

The disintegration of the Zadruga system brought about a certain economic and social differentiation in former Zadruga regions. Not all the Zadrugas broke down immediately, but the change was a gradual disintegrating process which lasted almost a hundred years, and which even now still is not complete. In each region, therefore, some people were living in Zadrugas, and some were not. Those who did live in Zadrugas were much more prosperous, and enjoyed a higher social status, than the others. These people maintained the old customs, traditions, beliefs and morals; usually it was only those from impoverished families, broken away from the Zadruga, who showed signs of deviation from the old traditions. This fact even further affected the process of differentiation. Those who kept the old customs enjoyed the greater deference. The Zadruga with a high social status was called *prezvanejša hiža* (the very esteemed house), and the family with low economic and social status was called *sirocka hiža* (the poor house).

Merchants began to increase in number in former Zadruga regions. In days gone by, there had been almost no need for them, since most necessities were produced by the Zadrugas themselves. But now, when the peasant economy tended to become specialized and production was limited to one or a few products, many necessities had to be bought. It was mainly the tavern keepers, who had always sold salt, petroleum, iron, and a few other products which peasants in Zadruga regions did not produce themselves, who became merchants. After the system of production changed, however, innkeepers started selling many other things which peasants had stopped producing for themselves. New products for which the peasant had no particular use were also introduced, stimulating the creation of new needs. The merchants sold their wares, both for money and in exchange, for the peasants' products. In the latter case, the exploitation of the peasants was keenly developed. It is important to note that merchants, in such circumstances, did business more with the poor peasants than with the well-to-do. Poor

peasants, no longer self-sufficient, were forced to buy many of their necessities, while the more prosperous peasants, who still lived in their Zadrugas, were able to retain a considerable degree of self-sufficiency, despite the necessity of producing for the market.

Following the gradual loss of their self-sufficiency, some peasants specialized as artisans. They were carpenters, boot-makers, blacksmiths, butchers, potters, weavers, flaskmakers and shovelmakers.⁷ Formerly, almost every Zadruga member knew something about all these crafts. Now there were not enough laborers in each individual family for all these skills; therefore, some peasants specialized in craftsmanship and sold their services to the rest in return for money or for products, but preferably for money. These peasant-artisans remained peasants. They dressed like peasants and they also worked in the fields, in addition to carrying on their trade. Merchants, on the contrary, gave up peasant dress, did not work in the fields, and endeavored to imitate the townspeople in manners, ideas and dress.

Rural-Urban Conflict

When the old system of Zadruga economy began to disintegrate, the urban leaders of Croatia failed to pay sufficient attention to the need of intensifying farming and of increasing the cash income of the peasantry. The new urban ruling group in Croatia consisted of priests, bureaucrats, lawyers and other intelligentsia, together with the remnants of former nobility. The intelligentsia favored the liberal ideas of the time, and were interested in developing commerce, industry, communications and schools, according to the patterns of the Western world. They were educated at Western universities and they demanded, for themselves and for the cities in which they lived, a standard of life which would be equivalent to that in the Western and economically more prosperous countries. Had they resorted to improving the technique of farming, a larger cash income for the peasants would have resulted, and the increased purchasing power of the peasants would have served as an economically sound basis for the development of industry and commerce. Instead, the new rulers resorted to protective tariff barriers

⁷ Kotarski, T., *op. cit.*, Vol. 21, p. 70, and Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, Vol. 12, p. 248.

and to increased taxation; and peasants, who at that time composed the overwhelming majority of the population, had to bear the brunt of the burden.

Left to their technologically backward system of production, and exposed to heavy taxes and fees, the peasants soon realized that freedom from feudalism meant only increased worries and disrupted homes. Instead of being controlled and exploited by the nobility, they became the prey of tax collectors, priests and lawyers "whose pockets have no bottom."

In the days of feudalism, peasants lived in Zadrugas and formed a society and a culture completely different from that of the seigniors. Both serfs and those peasants who were free of feudal ties lived within Zadruga households, and, except for greater freedom from land ties and feudal obligations, the life and culture of these free peasants did not differ from those of the serfs. Thus there were two worlds: the world of the seigniors and the world of the peasants. After centuries of bloodshed and struggle, these two worlds adjusted to each other through a kind of symbiosis, and each lived its own life. There was no possibility for a peasant, even when free, to rise to the status of a seignior, the only exception being priests who became prelates; but these were the unusual cases. There was no possibility, either, for the seigniors to become peasants; impoverished nobles settled in towns and engaged in the learned professions.

When the feudal system broke down, and when money income furnished a means of raising one's social prestige, it appeared as though the separation between the two worlds would disappear. In reality, however, a separation remained, but now it was between village and city. Instead of the seigniors' world, there was now the world of the city people, but the peasants' world remained as far away from the urban world as it was formerly removed from the world of the nobility. True, the peasants could now raise their social status if they progressed economically, but only a very few had a chance to try.

Unlike the feudal masters, who, though different in culture, lived in close personal contact with the peasants, the new rulers came to the villages only to collect fees and taxes, or to mortgage and sell peasant property. They not only were different from the peasants in dress, manners, income,

and general living conditions, but they also looked down upon the peasants and considered them stupid and dirty. To the peasants, on the other hand, the sight of city people boded no good. To them all urbanites were alike; all of them were just *pokvarena gospoda* (rotten gentry).

Gospoda originally included the seigniors and priests but, after the downfall of the feudal system, the word gospoda was applied to the officials and professionals who personified the new civil state in their capacities as lawyers, tax collectors, judges and bureaucrats. The peasants were inclined to blame the gospoda for all troubles arising out of the difficulties of adjustment to a new economic and political system, an adjustment which was necessary after the disintegration of the feudal system and of Zadruga society. It was these *črnohaljci* (blackcoats)¹ who were accused of bringing all the misery and trouble into the villages:

They can't stand the civil servants . . . If a few peasants are talking together and a civil servant happens by, they will not greet him. They pretend not to have seen him . . . The people can't stand the gospoda because they never come under a peasant's roof except for the purpose of mortgaging something. When a peasant sees someone in urban garb approaching his home, he will immediately hide, saying: "The devil sends him to me for evil!"²

There were some among the peasants who thought that it might be to their advantage to entertain the gospoda in their homes. They thought, also, that such behavior might increase their standing with the gospoda. The rest of the peasants had only contempt for such people. They would say among themselves: "Yes, he thinks the *Črnohaljci* will help him! He won't get very far by entertaining them!"³

In the minds of the peasants, there was nothing worse than the gospoda: "The gospoda are devils and devils are gospoda." The peasants expressed the belief that there were too many gospoda: "There are more dogs than the bitches can bear," was a popular saying. The gospoda were also considered to be of very low moral calibre. For example, it was

¹ The name "blackcoat" was derived from the contrast between the dress of the townspeople and that of the peasants. The peasants wore colorful folk costumes, but the gospoda were dressed in colorless or black suits.

² Kotarski, T., *op. cit.*, Vol. 21, p. 77.

³ Rožić, V., *op. cit.*, Vol. 12, p. 265.

said that they would do anything for money: "For a good sum of money, the gospoda would make a thief an honest man and an honest man a thief." The peasants believed that the gospoda were never satisfied with the amount of money they received: "The gospoda think that the poor peasants excrete their money—always give, give, give—never enough"; "one cannot even go to church without money"; "one can never go to the priest or to a lawyer without money"; "the only thing that one can still do for nothing is to weep." The gospoda were considered lazy gluttons and drunkards, dishonest in every move. Of course, they might be bribed, but bribery was very costly: "One goes to a woman during confinement with only a basket of gifts; to bribe the gospoda, one must come with a cartful." The peasants claimed that the gospoda took advantage of them, cheating them in every respect: "It is easy to hunt with the gospoda, but it is difficult to divide the game with them." The gospoda were considered irresponsible: "The gospoda can do anything they want and they don't keep their word."

So the peasants lost all faith in justice as practiced by the gospoda. "If a poor man steals a penny, he is hanged on the gallows; the gospoda may steal millions, but they are not punished." Court procedure was criticized: "In court the parties contest and the lawyers make decisions—the judges only listen." It was a common belief that "one who goes to court for justice will only lose his cow," and that "lawyers will even milk a dead cow."

Of course, such a situation, according to the peasants, affected the character of the people themselves: "If the gospoda were not dogs, the people would not be wolves," and "If an honest peasant holds an office with the gospoda he is bound to emerge dishonest."

What was most serious was the fact that the gospoda themselves had no respect whatever for the peasants: "The gospoda care more for a hunting dog or a pheasant than for a poor man's cow." Peasants never found the gospoda willing to help them: "Even if the gospoda knew something which might help the peasants, they would not do it." To the gospoda "peasants are just trash." The gospoda were even more dangerous to the peasants because they were united: "The dogs know each other and they cling together," was the final verdict of the peasant. Since all evil

was laid at the door of the gospoda, the peasants thought their children should not be sent to schools of higher education: "It is better to kill a son than to send him to big schools. He will become one of the gospoda, and there is nothing worse than a 'corn-fed' gospoda!"

In its early period, that is, in the second part of the nineteenth century, the antagonism against the gospoda was principally a passive hatred and contempt. But by the beginning of the present century, with the increasing economic and political difficulties in Croatia, the peasants became more aggressive and more demonstrative in their attitude. They began to realize that to remain passive was to remain in slavery. "The gospoda are safe, so long as the poor man is a foolish man," but "If the wolves become angry, the dogs will pay with their skins."⁴ The scornful name for gospoda became *trbušaci* (the "big-bellies").

The peasants' attitude toward the seigniors of the feudal system was somewhat different. After a few centuries of struggle against the feudal nobility, and after a number of wars, a symbiosis developed between the two worlds and the peasants gradually adjusted themselves to a new situation. They were forced to give up certain property rights and political privileges, but they retained the possession of a part of their own lands, even if the latter were subject to the jurisdiction of their feudal masters. The peasants also preserved a considerable degree of autonomy and home rule in their local communities. By the time this order had been in effect for more than a century, there was a greater feeling of security and a strengthened belief in justice.

For this reason the peasants, though antagonistic toward the seigniors, never expressed themselves as violently against them as they did in the case of the gospoda; at least such was the case during the latter part of the feudal regime. Even when they lost a part of their land under the feudal system, the peasants retained certain political rights. Although they had to work for the seigniors and return to them a part of their products, they felt secure because they had to give only a part of what they had, and they knew the seigniors could not chase them from the land they possessed. However, when the civil state was organized, and many of the Zadrugas disintegrated, there were peasants who lost their property for

⁴ Lukanec, P., *op. cit.*, pp. 135, 211.

nonpayment of taxes. In such situations, of course, former feelings of security were completely shaken, and there developed a strong reaction against the gospoda, who were held responsible for the new state of affairs. It was the security of the gospoda that the peasants envied most. The peasants grumbled, "The first of the month bringing the monthly salary is never missing for the gospoda."

But the civil state introduced formal education into the villages, and enabled at least one group of peasants to take an active part in the political affairs of the country, through the establishment of the party system and voting.⁵ These were the channels through which the peasants became politically more aggressive; it was on these grounds that a peasant movement developed, which utilized the cultural background, ideas, and attitudes of the peasants as bases for political propaganda. Such a peasant movement could not fail to be instrumental in bridging the sharp gap between the town and the country.

In the regions in which the breakdown of the Zadrugas had occurred, a new type of peasant settlement developed. Instead of scattered Zadrugas, villages were formed, composed of groups of neighborhoods. Former Zadrugas were replaced with groups of separate households or neighborhoods occupied by families who formerly lived together, mostly relatives. A number of such neighborhoods formed the new village settlement, an enlarged selo.

This new selo became in itself a self-sufficient unit almost to the same degree as the former Zadruga. Labor was exchanged now within the village, and merchandized goods were acquired from the village merchants, mostly in exchange for peasant products. Services of artisans were also obtained, and paid for by labor or products. The use of money was limited. In fact, the village became but the duplication of the Zadruga on a new level.

Such a development was possible only because of a turn in the development of village structure in these regions. The economic development of the village here had not tended toward a sharper and sharper stratification, as many people had expected. Instead it took the opposite trend, the trend

⁵ In the beginning, the voting privilege was limited to wealthy peasants, to those who paid high state taxes. There were only a few such peasants in each village. The voting privilege gradually became universal.

towards equalization, mainly for the following reasons. Birth control was still lacking in some of these regions, partly because the attitude toward children remained the same, and partly because labor was needed even more than formerly. There was still insufficient emigration to relieve overpopulation, because Zadruga people were not yet psychologically prepared for mass migration, and because near-by industries were not sufficiently developed to attract large numbers of villagers. Both these circumstances, added to the custom of dowry and the distribution of land in equal parts among all children, tend toward increased parceling out of peasant properties. As a result, none of the peasant families in these regions own more than twenty acres.⁶

At the present time, in these regions, there is little economic differentiation in the villages, and an almost complete lack of social differentiation, so far as the peasants are concerned. Merchants, who are much better off than the peasants, are not considered by the peasants as belonging to the village; instead, they identify them with the *gospoda* and do not want them to meddle in village affairs. The peasants have the same attitude toward village priests, village teachers, and civil servants. Hence, the distribution of economic and social values among the peasants in the village tends towards an equalization which is similar to that of the Zadruga.

This lack of differentiation and the high degree of village self-sufficiency have enabled peasants in these regions to preserve a great deal of Zadruga culture, in both its material and its immaterial aspects, and in interpersonal relations. Despite the spread of literacy, to a great extent folk costumes, folk songs, peasant architecture, folk dances, and other folk customs are kept alive. Many other folkways resembling those of the old Zadrugas are still strong. Of course, in regions where birth control was more effectively introduced, and peasant properties remained sufficiently large, many Zadrugas are still to be found. These keep alive the memory of old days and old customs, when everybody living in the Zadruga was well fed, well clothed, satisfied and happy.

It was in these circumstances that a peasant movement was initiated by the beginning of the twentieth century. Its

⁶ Recently, in more populated Zadruga regions, about eighty per cent of the peasant families owned 5 acres or less per family.

ideology was formulated by Antun Radić and a few other Croatian intellectuals who themselves had a Zadruga background. The political philosophy they developed was based on the principles of economic security, political equality, and human dignity, all principles which prevail in the Zadruga society.

The political activation of the Zadruga peasants proceeded very slowly while Croatia was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The improving economic conditions in that Empire, at the beginning of the twentieth century, as a result of industrialization, made it possible to market peasant products at increased prices, to produce manufactured goods at a lower cost, and to ease the burden of taxes. It was not easy to activate peasants politically under such economically improved conditions. But when the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated as a result of World War I, Croatia, owing to the expansionist tendencies of the Serbian military, became a part of Yugoslavia. The policy of high protective tariffs in Yugoslavia and a limited market for agricultural products meant a smaller cash income and an increased cost of living. Limited commerce and the lack of industrialization meant also that an increasing share of direct and indirect taxation fell upon the peasants. It was under such conditions that the Croatian peasants were aroused, and organized politically into a powerful party that played an increasingly important part in the political life of that state. The conflict that developed in the Yugoslav Kingdom was essentially a struggle of the Zadruga peasantry against the Dinaric warriors who had imposed themselves upon Croatia as Serbian military.

At the end of World War II, the Dinaric warriors organized as Partisan guerrillas imposed themselves again upon the Zadruga peasantry, and established the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. This process of formation, both of the Yugoslav Kingdom and of the Partisan Republic, was the reenactment of a drama that has so often taken place in the course of two thousand years' history of Eastern Europe. In the past, the conflict between the views of life of the warriors and of the peasants, and the growing resistance of the peasants to the rule of the warriors, were manifested in the clash of political ideologies which only increased the

instability in that part of the world. The same irreconcilable political and social philosophies of these two strata can not fail to affect the ideologies in the Partisan states and the stability of these states in the near future, a trend of events that may be of some consequences in world politics.

V

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES AND THE STRUCTURE OF EASTERN EUROPEAN SOCIETY

*From Tribal to Imperial Ideologies—The Ideology of the Peasant
Movement—The Partisan Movement*

From Tribal to Imperial Ideologies

AT THE beginning of the Middle Ages, soon after the plowmen of old Slavic origin had settled the plains and valleys of central and southeastern Europe, the first waves of Ural-Altaic herdsmen invaded the same area. These nomadic warriors looked to predatory activities, cunning, and political power as the chief means of self-aggrandizement and security. Self-aggrandizement, admiration for the powerful, and identification with the strong, as long as they held power, were the leading drives in this society. These marauding and power-seeking graziers easily imposed themselves on the agricultural folk in the valleys and plains, whose system of diffused power and loose defense could not match the striking effectiveness of the concentrated power of the invading warriors.¹ However, their constant striving for power, and their practice of changing camps according to the fortunes of war, made the rule of these invaders personal and unstable. It was only when the Church christianized the tribal chiefs and elevated them to the position of princes, kings and emperors, and gave their personal rule an ideological orientation, that the power of the conquerors was stabilized.

By the time these horsebreeding and sheepraising nomads invaded central and southeastern Europe, Christianity had already become closely connected with the political power—either as its superior, as in the West, or as its loyal arm, as

¹ See Chs. II-IV.

in the East. The Church of Byzantium, by supporting the new rulers, became the most important instrument in the perpetuation of their rule. The Church of Rome, on the other hand, employed the new rulers to further its own interests. Both the Eastern and the Western Church worked unceasingly for the revival of these powers after their downfall. It was these expansionist drives and the interests of the clergy that gave rise to imperial ideologies which were later adopted by the lay intelligentsia. They still, today, represent a tremendously powerful force in mutual rivalries and conflicts in that part of the world.

Soon after the conquerors and the church had established common seats of power, increasing numbers of soil cultivators, skilled in a variety of crafts in which they were trained in their self-sufficient communities, moved to these centers. The newcomers also brought with them the ideas of personal, economic and political autonomy to which they were accustomed in their old villages. They stubbornly fought to retain these autonomies, and often allied themselves with the dynasts in a common struggle to limit or crush the power of the nobility and the clergy. Taking advantage of their strategic position in the struggle between the feudal classes, they often won support for their autonomies from the dynasts, who granted them charters of freedom in the hope that, if the burghers were strengthened, the nobility and the clergy would be enfeebled.

At the same time, however, increasing numbers of herdsmen were moving from the prairies and mountains into these urban centers, where they engaged in trade, military service, or police duties, the occupations to which they were accustomed or conditioned in their pastoral communities. Being mobile and self-seeking, these former predatory nomads looked for any opportunity to increase their personal power. They entered into the service of the clergy and of the nobility, as well as into that of the burghers. From their ranks, the clergy and political leaders of the burghers were largely recruited. From these ranks, too, and from the impoverished nobility the first lay intelligentsia developed in the course of the eighteenth century.

As long as the dynasts, the feudal magnates, and the clergy controlled the state, the merchant class, the lay intelligentsia, and the craftsmen fought for the abolishment of feudal

ties and the establishment of free national states ruled by governments of the people's choice and responsible to the people. But when the feudal system was abolished, by the middle of the nineteenth century, a new trend of events took place in Eastern Europe. The lay intelligentsia—as a result of their origin, traditions, upbringing and aspirations—looked toward personal gain and power, not toward community autonomies and equal rights of all citizens. They did employ slogans of freedom and equality in their struggle against the feudal classes, but, once in power, they fused their own desire^{*} for personal rule, cultural domination, political expansion, and economic gain with the old ideas of dynastic and church aggrandizement.

They developed an ideology of imperialistic nationalism which, in the name of the nation, justified the imperial demands for national power and expansion that were earlier claimed in the name of dynastic and church interests. This new situation called for large armies and a rising of the military, a trend of events that became characteristic of the countries of Eastern Europe after the end of feudalism.

Soon, however, the imperial dreams of the ascending military and intelligentsia clashed. The frontiers of the old empires, kingdoms and principalities—which were different at different times in history—overlapped, and each of the new states, dominated by the military and supported by the clergy and the lay intelligentsia, began to demand the re-establishment of its territory as defined at the time of its greatest grandeur and size in past history, in complete disregard of the claims of others or the ethnic changes that had taken place in the meantime. As a result, in the past as in the present, these states have allied themselves with opposing great Powers and have engaged in frequent wars as a means of realization of their conflicting dreams, rationalized as a “historical right” or as a “moral right” because they “saved the Western civilization,” or because they represent a “new and superior order.” They claimed to be the “bulwark against Pan-Slavism” or the “wall against Pan-Germanism” and to have “won” the first and second world wars. Each one considered itself “morally and intellectually superior” to the others, and justified its imperial demands on that basis.

The great Powers always took advantage of these national-

istic rivalries. They supported one local imperialism against another, thus fostering their own imperial interests in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union, for instance, is at present encouraging local imperialisms within its own orbit as much as the Nazi and Fascist rulers did before World War II. Thus, imperial dreams of the ruling military and intelligentsia still dominate strong Irredentas throughout Eastern Europe, irrespective of their present pro-Russian or pro-Western orientation and alignments. The aspirations of these strata favor warfare, treachery, large-scale massacres and bestialities, extermination of whole populations, mass expulsions of some minorities, and forceful assimilation of others. They are responsible for a number of contemporary political, economic and emotional issues in this part of Europe. These same drives will again usher in bloody conflicts in the not too distant future, unless a change in social structure takes place and other strata and ideologies achieve control. In the past, it was within the ranks of the peasants and of the industrial proletariat that the first reaction against the ideologies and policies of this imperialistic nationalism developed.

The Ideology of the Peasant Movement

The fighting effectiveness of the peasants in the feudal days was insufficient to overthrow the rule of the feudalists. But, in the course of the nineteenth century, when the rising intelligentsia and bourgeoisie formulated the demands for the abolishment of feudal ties and privileges, the peasants joined the revolt of the urban classes by refusing to pay tithes to the Church and tributes to the lay nobility. However, the formal abolition of the feudal system in Eastern Europe by the end of the nineteenth century did not bring a noticeable improvement in the economic and social position of the rural strata. These people had neither sufficient prestige nor adequate organization to take part in the affairs of the newly established civil states and influence the policies of their countries, in spite of the fact that about ninety per cent of the population in those days was composed of cultivators and herdsmen. It was the military, the intelligentsia, and the urban classes that, together with the clergy and the remnants of the nobility, took over the control of the

defeudalized society. But, since these countries were overwhelmingly inhabited by peasants, and not developed economically, the large armies, high-salaried bureaucracy, and highly paid learned professions were supported mainly by the peasantry by means of direct and indirect taxation, tithes, fees and similar burdens. The peasants also supplied the largest part of military contingents.

Because of a high rate of illiteracy, and because of their ignorance of the conditions of the commercial and financial markets, the peasants were often victims of village merchants and usurers and of small-town bankers, to whom they became heavily indebted and upon whom they became dependent, not only economically but politically as well. Thus, in spite of universal suffrage, parliaments in these peasant countries were composed not of peasants but of lawyers, remnants of feudal nobility, priests, journalists, industrial monopolists, village merchants, and professional politicians, most of whom knew little about peasant life and peasant needs. The laws they passed primarily benefited the urban, not the rural, population—a policy which sharpened the existing contrast between the two worlds in Eastern Europe. On the one hand, there developed the few urban centers, which monopolized all social and political power and all benefits of modern civilization; boasted a high standard of comfort, technology, and culture; and looked down on the peasants as rude and backward. On the other hand, there was the vast majority of the rural folk, whose level of living remained as low as that of the days of feudalism, or even lower. These people retained their old customs and institutions, and their old ways of thought and behavior, while the urbanites imitated the style of life of the Western urban world. The two strata wore different dress, had different manners, practiced different morals, and looked upon each other with suspicion. It was out of the contrast between these two worlds that drives, longings and attitudes were developed among the peasantry which expressed themselves in the form of a critical attitude toward urban civilization, in the idealization of the peasant culture, and in the demand for the establishment of a "Peasant State."

Anton Radić, as peasant leader, for instance, comparing his own peasant society with the city, claimed that the latter was standardized in culture, mechanized and dehumanized,

heartless and soulless. Radić believed that the main aspects of a culture, from the point of view of satisfactory living, were not material goods and services but "human relationships and art," reflected in how people behave toward one another and in what the people hope, fear, believe and think. This, he said, is the "culture of the heart and soul," and it is by this aspect of culture that we must judge the greatness and worth of each cultural entity and of each nation. It is only through this medium that the multiplication of material goods, technical progress, and the accumulation of knowledge gain in importance for all mankind. A new society based on the culture of the heart and soul will be achieved only if the peasants organize themselves into their own parties and break the political monopoly of the urban classes, so that the state will be governed "from below" and not "from above." When such "absolute and continuous people's sovereignty" is accomplished, politics will be conducted "according to each individual's free will and every man's own free judgment." No individual will be intrusted with a special authority, for "authority is good only when it consists of an ideal and when it is freely accepted." Every individual will then realize that "none of us is so great that he can do everything, and none is so small that he can do nothing." It is on such a basis, Radić said, that the life will become both good and beautiful for everyone.²

So formulated, political and social ideology embodies the rationalizations and aspirations of the sedentary plowmen in the valleys and plains, who seek security in production and mutual help, who resent the arbitrary and exploitative rule of the urban classes, crave peace and order, abhor militarism and autocracy, and exalt both personal responsibility and personal freedoms. The same ideology, however, could not have a strong appeal for the self-centered, aggressive mountain folk, who, seeking power, authority and prestige, move into the cities as professional soldiers, innkeepers and traders

² Anton Radić, *Sabrana Djela*, I-XVIII (Zagreb: Seljačka Sloga, 1936-39). Some of Radić's followers proposed the abolishment of the state as an institution of force that is imposed "from above," and the substitution of the "principle of function" for the "principle of power" as the basis for the organization of society. See Herceg, R., *Islaz iz Suvjetske Krize (Pangea)* (Zagreb: Seljačka Sloga, 1932); see also Tomašić, D., "The Ideology of the Croatian Peasant Movement and the Idea of World Peace," *World Peace* (Zagreb: Seljačka Sloga, 1940), 36-39.

and readily identify themselves with the ruling strata and their demands. The herdsmen, therefore, not only were never as antagonistic toward the urban classes as the peasants of the plow, but they also remained the main reservoir from which the urban classes were recruited. Though they, too, might show in their local communities a contemptuous attitude toward city folk, the herdsmen always kept close ties with the cities and looked toward urban occupations as the only way to improve their lot. Living below a subsistence level in the barren mountains, not being tied to the land, and conditioned by their seminomadic economy to self-help and migration, they seek an improvement in their position through individual actions and through opportunity wherever it is offered to them rather than through an organized mass movement or cooperative endeavor, as the farming folk do.

The peasants in the valleys, who are economically better off than the mountaineers, feel more directly the exploitation and the corruption of the ruling classes, but are also economically too tightly tied to their land, which needs many hands and constant care, to be able to move on and look for other opportunities as freely as the herders do. It was therefore the cultivators, whose mentality, tradition and techniques of production called for cooperative and collective action, who organized themselves into political parties whose professed aim was the overthrow of the rule of the urban minority and the establishment of a people's republic, organized according to the views and aspirations of the peasantry. Even in the peasant villages, however, the peasant ideology seems to appeal more to the middle peasant strata—that is, peasants who are not rich enough to identify themselves with the urbanites and not so poor that they become dependent upon the government or the absentee owners. Thus the peasant movement was most successful in the peasant regions that were without sharp differences in peasant land-ownership, where the middle peasants represent the overwhelming majority, as in the plains of Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland and Croatia. However, when in these countries the peasant parties did gain electoral majorities, they were not given a chance to organize "Peasant States," because the ruling classes effected *coups d'état*, disbanded the parties, and proclaimed military dictatorships. This was

the strategy of the pre-war autocratic regimes, as it has been that of the new Communist-Partisan dominated governments of the present day. This assertion is proved by the recent execution of the Bulgarian peasant leader, Petkov; the incarceration of the Rumanian peasant leader, Maniu; the exile of the Hungarian peasant leader, Nagy, the Croatian peasant leader, Maček, and the Polish peasant leader, Mikolajczyk; and the disbanding of the peasant opposition parties in these countries.

The Partisan Movement

By the end of the nineteenth century, with the beginning of industrialization and the growth of the urban proletariat, socialist ideology among the working classes in Eastern Europe was already sponsored by some of the intelligentsia. It was, however, only after World War I that this ideology in its radical and revolutionary aspects, as championed by the Communist parties, played a significant role in the countries of central and southeastern Europe. At this time, in many of these peasant countries, industrial labor comprised only about ten per cent of the population or less, but the influence of the Communist parties was out of proportion to the relative numerical weakness of the working class. The power of these parties was rooted, not in the strength of the proletariat, but in national and international conflicts that marked the birth of new states in the region after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the rise of the Bolsheviks in Russia.

It was in such circumstances that many former students who had never finished their studies and many lay intelligentsia and pseudo-intelligentsia who were unemployed—or who never achieved positions in accordance with their ambitions—looked toward the complete destruction of the existing social order and the building of a new society in which they could secure for themselves permanent positions of leadership. Totalitarian ideologies, both of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of racial superiority, appealed to them, and they frequently moved from one totalitarian camp into another. Middle schools (high schools) and universities, from Poland to Greece, became the most fertile grounds for both Fascist and Communist propaganda.

The disbanding of the political parties by the dictatorial regimes in this area favored the growth of communism. Not only was the missionary character of the peasant and other democratic ideologies—which relied on persuasion, deliberation and voting strength—not adapted to an underground life but, in dictatorial and totalitarian regimes, which relied on force and violence, opposition ideologies which favored the same methods of struggle had greater appeal. This was especially true of the more restless elements of the population, such as the urban and agricultural proletariat, the dissatisfied middle-class intelligentsia, students, the pseudo-intelligentsia, belligerent mountaineers, and nomadic sheep-raisers. Such was the situation when the countries of central and southeastern Europe found themselves occupied by the Nazi army.

When Germany declared war on the Soviet Union, in the summer of 1941, the Communist party's underground cells and the pro-Soviet intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia—who, from the time of the Soviet-Nazi pact of friendship, had been active in propagating nonresistance to the Nazis—took an increasingly active part in organizing an underground and a guerrilla movement against the forces of occupation. The "war of imperialist powers" became the "war of liberation." The Communists joined forces with all dissatisfied elements, all anti-Nazis, but their main strength was in joining hands with the nationalist intelligentsia of the oppressed minorities or dissatisfied nationalities, in a common struggle both against the forces of occupation, and against the reestablishment of former dictatorial regimes. They promised to all peoples and to all persons national independence, prosperity, security, prestige, influence, freedom and peace. It was out of these national, economic and emotional aspirations and promises, combined with the Communist plans for future political control, that the Partisan movement and its ideology arose and spread.

The pro-Communist intelligentsia and pseudo-intelligentsia, who took a leading part in organizing the Partisan political underground and the Partisan guerrillas, succeeded in retaining the Partisan movement under their control until the end of the war. Ambitious and power-seeking, these young people saw in the movement a means of achieving positions of leadership and high offices in the national states

of the Soviet type, which they were to build as soon as the enemy was defeated. These motives prompted them to betray to the common enemy other guerrilla factions or the armies of the Western Allies, if these were considered to be either serious contestants or a barrier in the coming struggle for political power after the war.

Because of its military character, the Partisan movement, like the pro-Ally guerrillas, became especially prominent in mountainous areas, where it had a strong appeal to herdsmen, whose warrior traditions and belligerent mentality favored military activities. Realizing, however, the significance of the peasants in the countries in which they composed the majority of the population, the Partisans undertook to win them over. These attempts were reflected especially in the official Partisan declarations. In the *Partisan Manifesto*, issued in February 1944, the "inviolability of private property" was emphasized and a solemn pledge was given against any "radical changes to be introduced in the social life and activities, with the exception of replacing the reactionary district administrations and gendarmes by elected people's institutions of a truly democratic character." The *Manifesto* also declared that the Partisans were fighting for "social and democratic rights" and were "opposed to every form of violence and lawlessness."³ In these three points the Partisans appealed to some of the main yearnings, antagonisms and aspirations of the peasantry—that is, the thirst for land, antibureaucratic and antimilitaristic sentiment, and the longing for peace and self-government.

These and some other points in the *Partisan Manifesto* were also aimed at the middle classes and the liberal intelligentsia of the dominant nationalities in Eastern Europe and the West, in order to weaken their opposition to the Communist-dominated Partisan movement. Thus the *Manifesto* declared itself in favor of the "full opportunity for initiative in industry and the economic field," and for "independence and truest democratic rights and liberties of all peoples."⁴

In the Slav countries, the Partisan ideology contained a strong appeal to Pan-Slavism. Just as in the nineteenth cen-

³ *Partisan Manifesto*, points 2, 3 and 4. The English text of this work was published by the United Committee of South Slavic Americans. (New York: United Committee of South Slavic Americans, 1944.)

⁴ *Ibid.*, points 1 and 2.

tury, when Pan-Slavism was used as a means of czarist Russian penetration into the Balkans, and also as a means of preventing Pan-German expansion into the same area, so, in the course of World War II, Pan-Slavism was officially indorsed by the Soviet leaders as a means of Soviet penetration into central and southeastern Europe.

Since the Partisan movement, from its very beginnings, was controlled by the Communist intelligentsia and pseudo-intelligentsia, its ideology, already in its early formulation, contained a number of Communist symbols, demands and aspirations, and also a reflection of some of the Soviet practices. In the course of the war, the Communist salute, in the form of a fist, was adopted by the Partisans, as was a red star, which was superimposed upon the national flags and was worn on the guerrilla caps. In the Partisan war songs there was already an indication of the possible expansion of Soviet power. These songs, for instance, told about the "sun of liberty that shines from the Baltic to China" and "from the Ural Mountains to the Adriatic" and that will eventually encompass "the whole world."⁵

Occasionally the Partisan war songs also referred to the slavery and sufferings of the working class, to its present chains, and to its bright future after the revolution, in the style of the earlier Socialist and Communist mythology and doctrines, but these symbols of the earlier industrial proletariat did not appear as prominently as the others. Significantly enough, none of the earlier or recent Socialist or Communist myths and claims figured in the *Manifesto*. This work, written by Communists, and broadcast in the course of the war over a Partisan radio station located in the Soviet Union, was deliberately intended to mislead all anti-Communist opposition in the West as to the future Communist plans.

The same strategy of deceit and misrepresentation was adopted by the Communists when drafting the constitutions in the countries in which they seized power with the help of the Red army. The constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, for instance, following closely the constitution of the Soviet Union, guarantees, as fundamental rights of all citizens, the right to work; the right to rest and

⁵ Naše Pjesme (Zagreb, 1945), reprinted as *Partizanske Pjesme* (Pittsburgh, 1946), pp. 27-28.

leisure; the right to maintenance in old age and in sickness or incapacity; the right to education; equal rights of men and women and of all citizens, irrespective of their nationality or race; freedom of conscience, of speech, of the press, of assembly; inviolability of the person; sanctity of the home; privacy of correspondence; secret and universal vote; and right of petition and of demonstration.⁶ But these constitutional pledges and promises, offered as an appeasement to the demands and aspirations of the middle classes, the peasants, and the liberal intelligentsia, were in conflict with the power-seeking drive of the Communist and Partisan leadership and with the plans of the Soviet Union. The local Partisan leaders, therefore, resorted to a number of ideological and administrative devices, and secured the backing of the Red army as a means of perpetuating the exclusive power for themselves.

In Yugoslavia, for instance, the old slogan, "For God, the King, and the Country," is replaced by the slogan, "For Tito and the Republic," and in the officially guided propaganda Tito is represented as an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving "Father of his People." In the personal letters of some of Tito's followers which are reaching America, the identification of Tito and God, the dependence of the people upon Tito, his love, wisdom, and leadership, are often stressed: "We thank God and our comrade Tito that we remained alive"; "we belong to Tito, Tito belongs to us."⁷ The deification of Tito is promulgated, and his image in the form of gigantic pictures and sculptures dominates all places of public gathering, and ornaments the homes of his worshipers.

Made secure by such ideological weapons, by powerful Soviet military support, and by economic assistance from the Soviet Union, the Partisan leaders have proceeded to governmentalize trade, industry and banking and to indoctrinate all cultural activities of the peoples whom they control. Unlike the warriors of feudal times, who left the urban strata a considerable degree of freedom, the warriors of our days have proceeded to regiment completely these centers of culture and sources of ideologies. As a result, in a greater or lesser degree, all Partisan countries from Poland to Yugo-

⁶ *Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia*, Articles 21-41; compare with Articles 118-40 of the *Constitution of the U.S.S.R.*

⁷ *Narodni Glasnik* (Pittsburgh, 1946), March 1, March 26, Feb. 20.

slavia tend to be organized in the style of military barracks and prisons. Parliamentary debates, public airing of grievances, free criticism of leading government functionaries, and any expression of public dissatisfaction are considered to be subversive. "We want action, not discussion," is now the leading slogan. Strict discipline, struggle against the "internal enemies," fight for the "fulfilment and overfulfilment" of the economic plans, and hatred of "capitalists and warmongers, international reactionaries and spies," are emphasized in the officially guided propaganda, especially among high-school and university students, the main reservoir from which the ruling Partisan classes are being recruited.

If, in the past, the structure of a society and its cultural and power relationships determined the formation and the content of ideologies, what kind of mentality and ideology can be expected to develop in the Partisan society, in which both the thought and the action of every person are being constantly drilled to the same rigid tune by an implacable iron hand? Could it be that in such a prison-and-barracks society the reaction of the subdued classes will be manifested in a mass prison stupor? ⁸ Faced with utter dependence upon political bosses, haunted by constant fear of spying and denunciation, and of loss of status and livelihood, lacking a varied and stimulating intellectual contact, denied all responsibility and initiative, craving freedom, hating restraint, but realizing at the same time the utter helplessness of the situation, how else can the intelligentsia, bureaucracy and labor react but by a philosophy of opportunism, by an escape attitude of fatalism and "nonresistance to the evil," or by a withdrawal from the world of reality and by projections into the world of fantasy or that of the dead?

A lifeless state of mind, a mass paralysis of energies, or a mass religious mania may easily develop in such circumstances—a hypothesis which the news from behind the "Iron Curtain" tends to confirm. It tells us of a dejected attitude of the masses, general sluggishness, lethargy, "war weariness"

⁸ See Victor Nelson, *Prison Days and Nights*. (Boston, 1933, pp. 219-42.) The term "prison-state" was used by H. D. Lasswell in "The Interrelations of World Organization and Society," *Yale Law Journal*, LV (1946), 888-908.

On the deadening and self-destructive effects of the totalitarian system upon human culture, see Bronislaw Malinowski, "An Anthropological Analysis of War," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI (1941), 543-49.

ness," dullness and indolence, and increasing absences from work because of imaginary illness, with the result of a lowering of efficiency and quality of production. But, in Catholic parts of Partisan-dominated areas, there is also news about the frequent appearance of miracle-making Madonnas and signs of the displeasure of the supernatural, such as the appearance of unexplained flames over the graves of the victims of the new regimes. There are also increasing cases of open rebellion against these regimes, in the form of guerrilla activities or mass flights across the border, especially in the mountainous regions.

Of all subdued classes in this new social structure, it is only the rural strata that still have a chance to readjust themselves to the new situation and, at least partially, to escape the fate of others. It is true that, in order to eliminate any future opposition on the part of the peasantry, the new Communist-dominated regimes in Eastern Europe are attempting to make the peasants economically and politically dependent upon the government, in the same way in which they succeeded in economically subduing the urban classes and the intelligentsia—that is, by a complete government control of economic and cultural production. Because of the lack of sufficient arable land, however, there is an urgent need for a high degree of intensification of farm production, and this is incompatible with collectivization of agriculture, which is better suited to an extensive system of soil cultivation. The peasantry of Eastern Europe, therefore, may be able to resist collectivization and retain a certain degree of economic self-sufficiency, independence and personal freedom, unless among the ruling classes the drive for self-perpetuation in power completely overshadows the economic need for efficiency, quality and output of production.

Equally successful in resisting collectivization will be the herdsmen, who by tradition and personal traits are opposed to any prolonged regimentation, and whose barren mountain regions and seminomadic pastoral economy are not suited to any degree of collectivization. These may be expected to join forces with any organized opposition that may eventually develop within the ruling class itself, as soon as the Soviet Union's prestige and control weaken in that part of the world. In such a case, it will again be the herdsmen who will be especially active in guerrilla activities and the

peasants in noncooperation. Such a trend of events will be exploited by the military in Eastern Europe, whose various factions always look for the first opportunity to seize power from their opponents, and who are always ready to ally themselves with foreign powers to achieve personal ends.

The ruling strata, on the other hand, are already resorting to the old device of reviving and stimulating the paralyzed energies of the masses, and of redirecting dissatisfaction and feuds within their own ranks by emphasizing the possibility of the external threats. They may even indulge in external aggressive adventures for the same purpose. The emphasis on military preparedness and extreme nationalism in these countries, and the news of border tensions and guerrilla warfare in the area where the Eastern and Western spheres of interest clash, indicate such a possibility. Incidentals like "Free Trieste" or a "Free Salonica," therefore, can not be lasting solutions for fundamental conflicts which are rooted in the structure of a totalitarian world.

VI

POWER AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN EASTERN EUROPE

I.

ESSENTIALLY a frontier territory at the crossroads of Eastern and Western social and political systems, a large part of Eastern Europe has remained for centuries a "no man's land." This has enabled a number of small local powers to develop and maintain a precarious independence between the two encroaching worlds. In this millennial struggle of states and empires for power and spheres of influence, natives on each side of every border have been recruited as mercenaries and encouraged not only to engage in warfare and police duties, but, in interwar periods, to plot rebellions and assassinations in order to undermine whatever authorities lie across the border. The bellicose and conspirative character of this area did not, however, result exclusively from the power politics of Eastern European states and world empires. It was also autochthonous, inasmuch as the mountainous regions of Eastern Europe have been inhabited by belligerent herdsmen whose origin can be traced to the great medieval invasions of Ural-Altaic warriors from the Asiatic mainland.¹ It is this society of predatory sheepraisers that has for ages bred outlaws and provided guerrilla warriors, military leaders and political terrorists in Eastern European countries. The unsettled international relations in this part of the world and the almost constant state of warfare favored the ascendancy of this turbulent element of mountaineers and the imposition of its rule upon the farming folk and city dwellers in the valleys and plains. From this clash of native cultures, in conjunction with diverging Western and Eastern influences, the proverbial friction and restlessness of Eastern Europe has resulted.

¹ Compare T. Peisker, "The Asiatic Background," *Cambridge Medieval History*, I (1924), 333-52.

In contrast to the economic self-sufficiency and equalitarian social relations of the plowmen in the lowlands, the economy of the mountain dwellers in Eastern Europe is a sharply stratified pastoral nomadism. Many still live in a patriarchal society and in a heroic age fundamentally like that introduced into these regions in the early Middle Ages by Ural-Altaic horsebreeding and sheepraising nomads, who subdued the peasants and established principalities and states in which originated Poland, Bohemia and Moravia, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Albania.²

The basic unit of this Ural-Altaic social system is the extended family, ruled autocratically by its oldest male member. In the same manner, the affairs of the large communities—clans, villages, and tribes—are in the hands of one or of a few well-to-do despots or oligarchs, who are often arbitrary in their dealings with social inferiors, and with those who are economically or numerically less strong. There is an intense struggle for self-assertion and power, and a deep urge to identify the self with the strong and powerful. Therefore, rivalry and hostility are paralleled by attachment and subservience to those in power—a situation which breeds both treachery and loyalty, feud and solidarity, factionalism and ethnocentrism, and a general feeling of insecurity of life and property, coupled with endless strife. "He who has no enemies is not a man," they say. These are the conditions which made these predatory herdsmen excel in violence, villainy and rebelliousness, as well as in deeds of self-denial and patriotism.³


Family quarrels, clan feuds, warfare and poverty often force the individuals to leave their grasslands and to settle in small crossroads market places or in city centers. Here the former sheepraisers become innkeepers, small traders, professional soldiers, political leaders and conspirators. With the development of industrialization, many mountain dwellers give up sheepraising to become industrial workers. Others settle down in their own communities, or move into valleys and plains to adopt the techniques and social institutions of farming folk (see Fig. I, page 105). Thus they tend to lose their warlike qualities.

In the days of Ottoman administration, for instance, the

² *Ibid.*

³ See Ch. II.

Balkan herdsmen had much opportunity to engage in brigandage and to wage guerrilla warfare against the Osmanlis as a means of gaining riches and local fame, and of revenging themselves against the arbitrariness of local Turkish autocrats. They were encouraged, and often hired as mercenaries, by the neighboring powers, such as Venice, Austria and Russia, who were interested in undermining Turkish rule in the Balkans. When the Ottoman Empire finally began to disintegrate, and the Turkish army gradually withdrew, native guerrillas



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and avengers placed themselves at the head of uprisings and political movements for national liberation. Thus, former outlaws and mercenaries became military leaders and statesmen. This is how the Balkan states, in the course of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, reestablished their national independence, with the help of Russia and of the Western powers, which were struggling for spheres of influence. But just as, earlier, the Osmanlis adopted many of the institutions and practices of the Byzantine Empire which they overthrew, so these new native rulers readily adopted the Byzantine-Ottoman system of administration left them as a legacy from the Turks.

The Byzantine-Ottoman system of administration differs, in its concept of the state and of the state's relation to the individual, from the system which prevails in the European West. In the West, after the downfall of the Roman Empire,

local autonomies grew, and the idea of natural law and human rights was developed, which limited the established authorities, Church and state alike, in the interest of the individual. Humanism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and economic and political revolutions emerged from these foundations—epitomizing a trend of events and of thought which finally brought about the secularization of the state and of representative government in the Western world, and the institution of universal suffrage.

In the European East, on the other hand, where the Roman Empire retained centralized administration centuries longer than the West, Roman patterns of imperial despotism and praetorianism were perpetuated. All social institutions, including the Church, as well as commerce and industry, were governmentalized. Autocratic regulation of political, spiritual and economic life meant forced conformity and police rule. Thus, the intellectual and economic development was retarded, personal safety remained precarious, and the increasing exigencies of the imperial court, of the military, and of the bureaucracy were met by ever-increasing taxation and by bribery.⁴ The Osmanlis, after conquering the Eastern Empire, fused their own institutions of theocracy and military autocracy with those of Byzantium, and proceeded to rule in much the same way until their downfall.

The Balkan mountain warriors took over dynastic despotism, praetorianism, police rule, and venal bureaucracy and carried them into the twentieth century when they replaced the Osmanlis in southeastern Europe. Moreover, following their own tribal traditions, the new Balkan military leaders split into numerous clanlike factions which constantly fought among themselves for power. There were, consequently, frequent changes on the thrones, and in the constitutions; and international intrigue and warfare flourished in the Balkans.

Traditionally bound to various great powers which helped them to regain national independence, the Balkan military factions also sought foreign support in their internal struggle for power; and, in this struggle for local ascendancy, they often provoked events which were beyond the intentions of

⁴ Charles Diehl, "The Government and Administration of the Byzantine Empire," *Cambridge Medieval History*, IV (1923), 726-41.

their great protectors. In Serbia, for instance, pro-Russian and pro-Austrian military and dynastic factions carried on a bitter feud for one hundred years. Frequent dynastic changes resulted, and Serbia engaged in a series of wars with Bulgaria and Turkey. The activities of one of its secret military organizations, known as the "Black Hand," brought about the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo, in 1914, an event which precipitated the outbreak of World War I.

Similarly, pro-Austrian *versus* pro-Russian alignments of the military took place in Bulgaria and brought that country into disastrous wars against Serbia in 1913, and against the Allies in 1914. In the course of World War II, a balance was reached between the pro-German and pro-Russian trends and, as a result, Bulgaria joined the Axis against the United States and England, but not against Russia. The struggle between pro-British and pro-German military factions plunged Greece into a series of internal convulsions and international conflicts that finally resulted in her siding with the Allies at the end of World War I, and in the disastrous Greek-Turkish war that followed. In like manner, pro-German *versus* pro-British alignments of the military and the dynasts took place in Rumanian politics, and resulted in the Rumanian declaration of war against the Central Powers in World War I, and in alignment first against the Allies and then with the Allies in World War II.

As long as the middle classes were undeveloped and the peasantry not yet politicized, the rule of the praetorians was unchallenged. However, with the withdrawal of the Ottoman rule, and the gaining of national independence, the Balkan peoples increased economic and cultural contacts with the Western world. As a result of the new commercial relations, there developed a middle class of traders and small industrialists, who sent their sons to Western universities. This intelligentsia, educated in the West, brought back a Western type of nationalism, but also Western ideals of political and cultural freedom, including the demand for human rights, constitutional liberties, and representative government. These young men sponsored liberal party platforms, organized labor unions and socialist movements, and aroused the heretofore politically dormant peasantry.

This process of Westernization was not easy, mainly be-

cause of traditions of military rule and of factionalism. Many lay political leaders came from families of mountaineers who migrated into urban centers to become professional soldiers and traders. Though some were trained at Western universities, their cultural heritage was still too strong to permit of basic changes of practice. Extremely ambitious, power-seeking and aggressive in their political behavior, they were not ready to compromise on issues. Instead of forming a unified political opposition to the soldiers and the police, they split into numerous parties and clanlike factions which greatly weakened their strength. The small political groups fought bitterly with one another, and were often ready to ally themselves with a rising military faction. In Serbia, for instance, both liberal and conservative parties, and in Greece both Republicans and Monarchists, sought the support of opposing military factions. Since, in most of the Balkan countries the Church identified itself with the rulers, in accordance with the Byzantine tradition, it could not exert a moderating influence but, instead, contributed the added strength of religious fanaticism to the struggle among parties and factions.

A similar development took place in the countries of Eastern Europe which did not succumb to the Ottoman rule. Though in these countries Western Christianity exerted a moderating influence on the feudal nobility, and later on the gentry and the intelligentsia, the traditional self-seeking and self-maximating tendencies of these people directed their main interests to seek positions of political power and control, thus preventing them from engaging their energies in industrial occupations. It was these conditions which led to the emphasis on militarism, and which retarded the economic development in these lands, a situation which in its own turn caused these ambitious men to seek political offices and military careers, and to shun industrial pursuits. The result was extreme power-seeking and factionalism. The neighboring great Powers took advantage of these circumstances and engaged among themselves in rivalrous contest over these countries by aligning themselves with this or that faction of the military and the intelligentsia in these countries.

Such conditions, for instance, brought about the partitions of Poland not only in the past, but in recent times as well.

Various factions of Polish nobility in the past, as well as various factions of its military and intelligentsia in our own day, wavered in their international orientations and often allied themselves with opposing great Powers. In World War I, for instance, some factions of the Polish military and the intelligentsia first sided with the Central Powers against Russia, and later on with the Allies against the Central Powers. Then again in between the two world wars, the Polish "Colonels" and some factions of the intelligentsia oscillated in their orientation between the Allies and Germany, first concluding a military alliance with France and later loosening their relations with that country and concluding a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany.

Also, in other states of Eastern Europe, formed on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the intelligentsia and the military ruled their countries primarily from the point of view of perpetuating themselves in power. It was mainly on that ground that they shaped their internal policies and their foreign orientations. These circumstances explain, for instance, the pro-Axis orientation of the landed magnates, gentry and military of Hungary and their unwillingness to defeudalize the country. The only hope for the expansion of the power of these Hungarian classes was in the revision of the treaties forced upon Hungary as a result of its defeat in World War I, and it was the Axis powers which demanded such revision. In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, the ruling Czech intelligentsia and military who gained power at the expense of Hungary were strongly against revision of treaties, and allied themselves with the Allies, who were for the preservation of the *status quo*. In their internal policies, the ruling Czech intelligentsia by various devices checked Slovak and Ruthenian factions of the clergy and the intelligentsia in their attempts to gain autonomies for these provinces. These dissatisfied Slovak and Ruthenian elements, therefore, were inclined to look towards Axis powers for help, a situation which internally weakened Czechoslovakia and finally brought about its partition and downfall before the beginning of World War II.

The net result of such political development in the countries of Eastern Europe before World War II was that the power remained concentrated in the hands of the dynasts, the military and the power-seeking intelligentsia. These rul-

ing factions allowed the other strata of the population, such as the peasantry, industrial labor and national minorities, to share in power only in a very limited degree. They were always ready, however, to resort to military *coup d'états* and to abolish even the existing shadows of representative government whenever their power was threatened by the growing strength of the peasant and workers' movements.

II

Peasant movements which favored economic and political reform that would limit the rule of the military drew their strength mainly from the farming folk in the river valleys and plains, whose culture can be traced to the migration of the Slavic soil cultivators into central and southeastern Europe in the early centuries of the Christian era.⁵ In contrast to the insecure economic and social conditions of stock-breeders in the mountains, the plowmen who settled the lowlands enjoyed an autarchic economy, an equalitarian family system, and a remarkable lack of sharp social differentiation. Since there is more personal and economic security and more social equality in this society, there is less incentive to struggle for status, less social mobility, and less instability in attachments and allegiances among the plainsmen than among the sheepraisers in the mountains.⁶ The peasants of this culture favor broad, all-inclusive actions and movements rather than small, clanlike parties and party factions. "A branch dries out if cut off from its tree," they say. Even in the remote past, when the peasants sporadically rose against their feudal lords, these rebellions were not limited to the conspiracies of small groups, but were always widely spread and included the overwhelming majority of the local peasants. Hence, when serfdom was abolished and the peasants gained political freedom, it was not difficult for a few intellectuals to develop party platforms which appealed to the broad layers of the peasantry and gained their solid support. In this way, peasant movements and peasant parties rapidly grew in Eastern Europe and soon surpassed

⁵ J. Peisker, "The Expansion of Slavs," *Cambridge Medieval History*, II (1926), 418-57.

⁶ See Ch. IV.

all urban parties, in terms of party discipline and voting strength.

The reasons for this remarkable activation of the peasantry were primarily economic and emotional, not political. Though the breakdown of the feudal regime, in the second part of the nineteenth century, and the introduction of economic liberalism and parliamentarism gave the peasants a certain degree of economic and political freedom, their standard of living remained very low, sometimes lower than in the days of feudalism. As a result of the introduction of the money economy and of the reorganization of production to meet the needs of the market, in combination with the limited supply of land left in the hands of the peasants, self-sufficient economies began to disintegrate. At the same time, the military, the business classes, and the nationalist intelligentsia, which took over the power from the feudal nobility, were strongly in favor of high tariff barriers and state-protected industries. This system of nationalist economy kept the prices of manufactured products very high,* in comparison with the prices of agricultural goods, while, at the same time, the high salaries of an overstaffed bureaucracy and the expenses of large armies and strong police forces meant an ever-increasing direct and indirect taxation. The peasants, whose cash incomes were very low, were compelled to live on an extremely low plane in order to meet the demands of tax collectors, and the fees of city doctors and lawyers, whose standard of living was at the level of the professional people in economically more advanced countries in the West.

The peasants, whose security was thus shattered, resented the economic inequality existing between the rural and urban strata. They demanded the expropriation of feudal estates and the abolition of all kinds of absentee ownership. "The land," they said, "belongs to those who cultivate it." The peasants claimed that "the city people are nothing but parasites." The urbanites, on the other hand, looked down on the peasants, while the landed aristocracy maintained that the expropriating and parceling out of large estates would have disastrous consequences for the national economy. It was mainly on the basis of this economic and emotional conflict between the urban and the rural strata that some of the intelligentsia aroused the peasants, organized them politi-

cally, and developed widespread peasant movements. The aim of these movements was to organize a state that would achieve social equality and harmonious relations between the city people and the country folk by raising the standard of living of the peasantry.⁷

After the end of World War I, in a number of Eastern European countries the peasant parties showed such popularity and voting strength that they threatened to overthrow the rule of the urban classes. It was in such circumstances that the dynasts and the military resorted to open dictatorship and political terrorism to save their privileged position. They were often supported in this action by urban parties, especially those which represented state-protected industries, landed aristocracy, and high financial and monopolistic interests. In Bulgaria, for instance, the Agrarian Party formed a government by the end of World War I, but in 1923 it had already been overthrown by the army in a *coup d'état*. Four urban parties merged to support the army in this action. Stambulisky, the peasant leader and thousands of his followers were assassinated. In Poland, in 1926, the military led by Marshal Pilsudski, overthrew in a *coup d'état* the government which was headed by the peasant leader Witos.

In Yugoslavia, the electoral victories and the growing strength and influence of the Croatian Peasant Party, under Stjepan Radić, so impressed the ruling military that they schemed the assassination of Radić and two other party leaders in the midst of a debate in the Belgrade Skupshtina (Parliament) in 1928. King Alexander, aided by the army and leading business circles, dissolved the Skupshtina, abolished the Constitution, and established a rigorous dictatorship. In Rumania, in 1928, the National Peasant Party, under the leadership of Juliu Maniu, on the basis of electoral victories, formed a government but was forced out of power because of its struggle with the urban parties. The lack of understanding between the National Peasant Party and the urban parties enabled King Carol of Rumania to assume, in 1939, a one-man rule and to disband all political parties. In 1936, in Greece, General Metaxas resorted to dictatorial methods, prohibited all parties, and proclaimed himself premier for life, when the growing strength of the

⁷ *Ibid.* See also Tomašić, D., "Peasants and Propaganda in Croatia," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, I (1937), 68-74.

opposition, supported by the peasants and the workers, threatened to terminate the monopoly rule of the dynasts and the military.

In this manner, the military strengthened themselves in power, and open authoritarianism became the rule in Eastern Europe before World War II. The peasants, who in the political battle relied exclusively upon their voting strength, were at a disadvantage in this struggle against the military, whose effectiveness lay in organized violence. It was the same advantage which the military had over the peasants and the middle classes at the end of World War II. In that war, the peasants and middle classes in many instances opposed the rule of the German and Italian conquerors by noncooperation and civil disobedience, but some factions of the army and the intelligentsia, and the herdsmen in the mountains, resorted to their traditional guerrilla warfare in fighting the enemy. Following their customary pattern of factionalism, they also split into pro-Russian and pro-Western groups and often fought each other rather than the common enemy, each faction striving for exclusive power at the end of the war. This was, for instance, the case of the Chetniks and the Partisans in Yugoslavia, the ELAS and the Zervas guerrillas in Greece, the Partisan and the nationalist guerrillas in Poland and in Albania.

Just as earlier, when the Osmanlis withdrew from the Balkans and former outlaws and mercenaries became statesmen and political leaders, so in World War II, as soon as the German armies withdrew from Eastern Europe, the guerrillas took the power and leadership. The Red Army, which occupied most of the countries in Eastern Europe favored the rise of the pro-Russian and Communist-led guerrilla and military factions; and the British army, which occupied Greece, favored the ascendancy of the pro-British guerrillas and military factions. Thus, not representative democracy, but regimes dominated by the military were reestablished in Eastern Europe. It was to be expected, therefore, that the traditional factional patterns of the military and the intelligentsia in this area, the overlapping "security zones" of the Great Powers, the conflict between Eastern and Western influences, and the local struggles for power would again provoke international tension in this part of the world—a

situation that will last until a radical reconstruction of the political and social structure of this area takes place.

III

Realizing in advance the potential explosiveness of the Eastern European situation, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union pledged themselves, in the Yalta declaration, "to concern . . . the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples . . . to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems." But the concept of democracy and the approach to the solution of economic and political problems are understood in one way in the system of Soviet totalitarian socialism, and in another way in the countries of the West where competitive enterprise and representative government prevail. Besides, the victory over the Nazis enabled the Soviet Union to expand its military power and influence to the center of Europe, towards the Mediterranean and in the direction of the Near East, where Russian interests clash with those of the West—a situation which makes both the Soviet Union and the Western world greatly suspicious of each other's activities in this contested territory. These were the fundamental reasons which prevented the great Powers from finding, in their recent international conferences, a satisfactory solution to the internal difficulties of Eastern European countries.

From the point of view of the interests of the peoples in this part of Europe, and from the point of view of peace in the world, it seems that the solution of the problem of Eastern Europe can be found only in internationalization and in the elimination of the dominance of the military in these countries. If this is achieved, not only will relations between the peoples of this part of Europe improve, but also the possibilities of friction between the great Powers in this part of the world will considerably decrease. But as a pre-condition to successful internationalization and demilitarization, the Balkan countries must advance economically and become politically independent of the great Powers.

The main economic problem common to all countries in Eastern Europe is the low standard of living of large layers of the people, especially the peasants and the herdsmen, who

together comprise sixty to eighty per cent of the population.⁸ The lack of good marketable crops means that the peasants and herders are unable to buy sufficient quantities of manufactured products. In turn, the industries in these countries, protected by high tariff barriers and limited to small markets, produce only at a prohibitive cost. It is this resulting disparity between the low cash income of the peasant and herder and the exorbitant prices of manufactured goods which keeps the standard of living at a very low level, and which prevents industrialization of these countries. Consequently, the rural surplus population can not be absorbed by urban industries.

It appears that only through a regional economic organization of these countries which would entail common tariff barriers or reciprocal trade agreements, intensification of farming, and regional allocation of industries could these countries produce at a lower cost, increase home demand, and develop dependable and economically sound home markets.⁹ But a project of regional industrialization affecting some hundred million people or more would need abundant capital and a pool of technical knowledge which could not possibly be provided internally, but could be supplied only through the investments and technical advice of the capital-exporting countries. Rivalries over priorities of investment have not been unknown, however, and in order to avoid such conflicts—and the ensuing political and economic dependency and exploitation which often occurred in the past—the United Nations or a like international organization should supervise schemes of economic development in such a way that these territories will be open for investment on equal terms to all countries. In order to avoid political loans, a close study of investment possibilities, from the point of view both of the lending and of the borrowing countries, should be conducted by such an international body. This is the only hope of avoiding a monopolistic and colonial-like

⁸ This low standard of living is illustrated by the average annual pre-war import in these countries, which was only \$6 to \$9 per capita as compared to \$96 in Belgium and \$99 in Britain. The low food consumptions are illustrated by the average annual per capita sugar consumption, which was 5 kg. in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, as compared to 50 kg. in the United States and 44 kg. in Britain.

⁹ Tomašić, D., "Reconstruction in Central Europe," *American Political Science Review*, XXXVII (1943), 888-903.

exploitation of Eastern European countries which would hamper their economic, cultural and political advancement.¹⁰

An internationally controlled regional economic project in the east of Europe would have great political ramifications. It would eliminate economic and political dependence on any one outside power; such economic and political emancipation is not compatible with the existing high degree of militarization. In the past, the power of militaristic groups was often rationalized on the grounds of the necessity for defense, since these countries were constantly threatened by their aggressive neighbors. But the last war has clearly demonstrated that no one of these small countries was able to defend itself. Their safety in the future will be even more precarious, owing to new techniques of warfare which are beyond the economic capacities of small countries, and which put these countries completely at the mercy of more powerful neighbors. The maintenance of large, expensive national armies in small countries seems to be out of date, both from an economic and from a military point of view.

At present, as in the past, some Eastern European countries are spending up to fifty per cent or more of their national budgets on armies. Partisan Yugoslavia, for instance, maintains an army and a police force the numerical strength of which is estimated to be at least six hundred thousand men,¹¹ a figure which means that about four per cent of the population of that country is under arms. Before World War II, the United States had a standing army of one hundred twenty thousand, which was less than 0.1 per cent of its population. If economic independence is to be achieved, and the standard of living in Eastern Europe is to be raised, expenditures for armies and armed police forces will have to be kept down to a minimum agreed upon by the United Nations. In return, the United Nations should guarantee the territorial and political integrity of these countries against any potential aggressor. Such an organization of Eastern Europe not

¹⁰ J. E. Meade, *The Economic Basis of a Durable Peace*: (New York, 1940), pp. 112-13.

¹¹ This figure was given by Foreign Minister Bevin in a speech before the House of Commons. Other estimates put the figure at seven hundred thousand. Partisan sources have recently boasted that the strength of the Yugoslav land army is second only to that of the Soviet Union. (Raymond Daniel, "Pattern for a Totalitarian State," *New York Times Magazine*, April 11, 1948).

only would increase general economic and political security, but would also necessarily limit the internal influence of the military.

The main cultural problem of Eastern Europe consists in establishing politically independent units whose national borders shall coincide with the areas of ethnic and cultural integration. This is an especially delicate and difficult problem in these ethnically mixed regions containing a mosaic of races, religions, cultures and nationalities, and therefore strong islands of ethnic and national minorities. The solution of the minority problem involves the question of ethnic pride, historical and local traditions, national aspirations, and other sensitivities. It is for this reason that the solution should be sought primarily on the basis of the wishes of the peoples concerned and through direct negotiation between the nations and populations involved. Undoubtedly a gradual and painless assimilation through social amalgamation is the most desirable solution of a minority problem. Such a painless process of national integration has been taking place, for instance, among national and racial minorities in the United States. But such a process can not be expected in the regions of Eastern Europe, where some religious minorities identify themselves with nationalities across the state borders. Such an identification of religion and nationality has worked for centuries against assimilation with the majority. The Eastern Orthodox minority in Croatia, for instance, has identified itself with the Serb nationality. Notwithstanding identity of language with the Croatian people, this Serb-Orthodox minority has refused for several centuries to assimilate itself with the native Croatians, and has created one of the most difficult internal and international problems in that part of the world.¹² At the same time, the German Catholic and Protestant minorities in Croatia, though originally speaking an alien language, were intermarrying and assimilating with the majority population, which is Catholic by religion. Also the Moslem minority, especially the intelligentsia, did not have much difficulty in adopting Croatian national symbols and ideals.

In such cases, when the problem of assimilation proves to be insoluble and threatens to endanger peaceful relations among the neighboring countries by creating *Irredentas*, a

¹² See Tomašić, D., "Croatia in European Politics," *op. cit.*

planned transfer of minorities on a *voluntary* basis could be arranged between the countries concerned. Such a plan, however, should be financed and supervised by the United Nations or a like international organization in order that all those desirous of emigrating to the country of their national adoption might be given sufficient economic assistance in establishing themselves in their new home.

With increasing political security, intensification of agriculture, industrialization, economic independence, cultural integration and national self-government, the conditions which in the past perpetuated the age of warriors and supported the power of the military in this area would be eliminated; and with the decline of their importance, the fighting effectiveness of the military would be reduced. At the same time, industrial labor would grow in strength and influence. In such circumstances the peasants, the middle classes, and industrial labor, who rely on their voting strength in the political struggle, would take the power from the military and would undoubtedly support a system of representative government. In such a system, the rights of the broad strata of population would be affirmed against the vested interests of the dynasts, the military, the bureaucracy, the landed aristocracy, and the monopolistic and state-protected business circles, which in the past as well as in the present have so readily allied themselves with all the anti-democratic forces in European politics. This trend of events had taken place, for instance, in Hungary where free elections were held soon after the war, and where the Small Landholders' Party, representing the peasants and the urban middle classes, won the majority. It was only when the Soviet Army interfered that a *coup d'état* was staged and the Small Landholders' government was overthrown in the interest of the ascendancy of a Communist minority.

It was with a view to strengthening the representation of the broad strata of the population that the United States and Great Britain insisted, in a conference with the Soviet Union, that representatives of the peasant parties and of the liberal urban parties be introduced as members of the governments of Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. But the rule of the military can not be abolished by outside forces alone, as was demonstrated by subsequent events in that part of

the world where all non-Communist representatives were forced out of the cabinets notwithstanding the agreements among the great Powers. These countries, therefore, must be reconstructed in a way which would make the rule of the military obsolete.

Once the governments in these countries were controlled by the peasants, the middle classes and industrial labor, not by the military and the police, it would be to their advantage not to engage in "power politics" and war adventures, but to center all their attention and energies upon modernizing and intensifying agriculture, developing trade and industry, and raising the general standard of living and of education, of prestige and of civic activity in all strata of the population. Demilitarized, democratized, economically and politically independent, culturally integrated, and educationally advanced, the states of Eastern Europe could be grouped together in the form of a commonwealth, organized along the lines of the British Commonwealth of Nations.¹³ Such an arrangement would be the best safeguard of peace in this crucial crossroads of empires, churches, races and cultures, which has already precipitated two world wars. An area of one hundred million people or more would be set up, with freed national energies directed toward peaceful and constructive goals, with a rising standard of living, and with an increasing consumption of imported goods that would benefit all the exporting countries.

On the other hand, if the great Powers proceed in the tradition of rivalry and spheres of interests in this part of the world, each will tend to control Eastern Europe economically and politically, supplying their puppets with arms, and supporting them with military alliances. The Soviet Union, for instance, has already established its economic and political monopoly over most of Eastern Europe, and is arming its satellite countries, backing their mutual military alliances with its own military might. Such a trend of events has already provoked the United States to formulate the Truman Doctrine, and to inaugurate a policy of

¹³ Compare Tomašić, D., "Reconstruction in Central Europe," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXXVII, Oct. 1943, pp. 888-903. Also Tomašić, D., "Nationality Problems and Partisan Yugoslavia," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 6, July 1946, pp. 112-125.

active resistance to Soviet expansion. As a result of such developments, not only will the economic, the political, and the intellectual growth in the Eastern world be retarded, but the rule of the military will be perpetuated. Sooner or later, such a course will again precipitate events which neither Russia nor the West will be able to control.

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- Zbornik za Narodni Život i Običaje* (Zagreb, 1896-). The emphasis is on Croatian regions, but there is considerable material on Montenegro. The collection was published by the Zagreb Academy of Sciences (*Jugoslavenska Akademija*, later *Hrvatska Akademija*) in more than forty volumes. The collection was organized, and for some time edited, by Antun Radić, the noted Croatian ethnologist. It is one of the most

complete collections of data on both material and nonmaterial culture. It is aimed to give a complete picture of life in each region covered.

- Antun Radić, *Sabrana Djela* (Zagreb, 1936-39). Collected works of Antun Radić, in nineteen volumes. See, especially, Volumes I-IX, which contain primarily Radić's studies and ideas on peasant life.
- Josip Predavec, *Selo i Seljaci* (Zagreb, 1935). A study of the structure of the Croatian village, by an outstanding Croatian peasant leader.
- Stjepan Radić, *Program Hrvatske Pučke Seljačke Stranke* (Zagreb, 1905). The platform of the Croatian Peasant Party, written by its founder and main organizer. See also other works on peasant questions by the same author.
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T. Panov, *Psihologia na Bulgarskia Narod* (Sofia, 1914). A study of the psychology of the Bulgarian people, including source material on family organization, religion, folk poetry, and intelligentsia. Also, geographic, economic, historical and racial factors are discussed. There is, too, an account of the Slav and of the Ural-Altaic theories of the origin of the Bulgarian people.

Marin Popescu-Spineni e Constantino Noe, *I Romeni in Bulgaria* (Craiova, 1939). A study of the Rumanian herdsmen in Bulgaria, by two Rumanian scholars. Maps, plates and statistics are included.

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- Eugene Pittard, *La Roumanie* (Paris, 1917). An important anthropological study of the population of Rumania (Valachia, Moldavia and Dobroudja), by a distinguished anthropologist.
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- Jacques Ancel, *Peuples et Nations des Balkans* (Paris, 1930). A study of human geography and of peasant societies in the Balkans, by an outstanding French scholar. A number of maps are included.
- C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (London, 1937). Deals with the consequences of the treaty of Trianon from economic, political and social points of view. Burgenland, Slovakia, Ruthenia, Transylvania, Croatia, Voivodina and Fiume are extensively discussed.
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- Magyar Szemle* (Budapest, 1929-). A leading Hungarian periodical on current political and social issues. See also *Ungarische Jahrbücher* (Berlin, 1921-) and *Ungarisches Wirtschafts Jahrbuch*, (Berlin, 1925-). See also *Magyar Statisztikai Szemle* (Budapest, 1923-).
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C. Economic Structure (before World War II)

- Hitler's Route to Bagdad* (London, 1939). A study of the economic structure, and political and social condition of Balkan states before World War II. There are separate studies for

- Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. The studies were prepared for the International Research Section of the Fabian Society. A number of maps are included.
- Southeastern Europe*, London, 1939. An economic and political survey of Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece Bulgaria and Turkey, prepared by the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in collaboration with the London and Cambridge Economic Service. Maps and statistical tables are included.
- David Mitraný, *Economic Development in Southeastern Europe* (Oxford, 1945). A study of nutrition, agriculture, industrial development, transport, marketing, and finance in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece. Includes many statistical tables.
- Leo Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States* (New York, 1928). A study of the economic policies of the succession states, that is, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. See also, by the same author, *Bulgaria's Economic Position*, which completes the former study. Statistics and documents are included.
- European Conference on Rural Life* (Geneva, 1939). National monographs drawn up by governments. See monographs on Southeastern European states.
- Osteuropäische Länderberichte* (Breslau, 1927). Economic studies of Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, published by Ost-europa Institut in Breslau.
- K. D. Spissarevski, *La Bulgarie au Travail* (Marseille, 1929). A description of economic life in Bulgaria. It covers agriculture, industry, mining, transport and banking.
- B. Dembo, *Rumunia*, (Moskva, 1937). A study of the economic structure of Rumania from the Soviet point of view, published in a series on the economics of capitalist countries. A number of maps and statistical tables are included.
- Joseph S. Roucek, *Contemporary Rumania and Her Problems* (Stanford, 1932). A study of the economic and political life and policies of modern Rumania. Maps, plates, and statistical tables are included.
- La Grèce Actuelle* (Athens, 1933). A description of economic resources and of cultural life, published by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many maps, plates and statistical tables are included.
- Ferdinando Milone, *L'Albania Economica* (Padova, 1941). A study of Albanian agriculture, forestry and industries, published by the Italian Royal Academy of Sciences.
- Kiril Popov, *Stopanska Bulgaria* (Sofia, 1934). A competent work on the economic structure of Bulgaria before World War II,

by a prominent scholar and statistician. Includes statistical tables and maps.

Asen Chakalov, *Nacionalen Dohod na Bulgaria* (Sofia, 1946). A study of Bulgarian national income, by an outstanding Bulgarian economist, with statistical tables.

View of the Social and Economic Structure of Bulgarian Agriculture (Sofia, 1937). A collection of economic studies published by the Statistical Institute for Economic Research, State University of Sofia, under the editorship of Y. Mollov, professor of agrarian economy. Includes statistical tables and a number of maps.

