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GREECE'S ANATOLIAN VENTURE
—AND AFTER



H.M. KING GEORGE II OF THE HELLENES

GREECE'S ANATOLIAN VENTURE —AND AFTER

*A Survey of the Diplomatic and Political Aspects
of the Greek Expedition to Asia Minor
(1915-1922)*

by
A. A. PALLIS

*With 8 Half-tone Plates
and an Endpaper Map*



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TO
THE COMMON PEOPLE OF GREECE
AND TO
THE RANK AND FILE OF THE GREEK ARMY

WHO, DURING TEN YEARS OF ARDUOUS STRUGGLES FOR THE EMANCI-
PATION OF THEIR BRETHREN IN MACEDONIA, THRACE AND ASIA
MINOR, GAVE FREELY OF THEIR BLOOD AND TREASURE, AND WHOSE
SACRIFICES WERE LARGELY RENDERED VAIN THROUGH THE FAULTS
AND DISSENSIONS OF THEIR LEADERS

FOREWORD

THE acute political controversy aroused in Greece over the question of that country's intervention in the Great War—a controversy which, starting in January 1915, came to a disastrous conclusion, or rather climax (for the controversy continued to rage unabated), in August 1922, with the *débâcle* of the Greek Army in Anatolia, the destruction of Smyrna, and its tragic epilogue of the execution of the Greek Prime Minister, M. Gounaris, and five of his colleagues, has already given birth to an abundant literature in Greece itself and abroad.

It would be too much to expect those who were themselves either directly or indirectly implicated in the events of that stormy period—be they Greeks or foreigners—to be free from bias.

Practically everything that has appeared in print up to now on the subject has been more or less tendentious in character, bearing the hardly disguised stamp of party animosity or national prejudice.

Whether one takes the collections of official documents published during or immediately after the war by the various Governments concerned—Greek or foreign—the memoirs of statesmen and soldiers—Allied or Greek—who, having played a prominent part in the events in question, have written in explanation of their country's policy or in vindication of their own personal conduct,¹ or the innumerable articles published in the Greek and

¹ Such as Mr. Winston Churchill, Admiral Dartige de Fournet, General Sarraïl, General Xenophon Stratigos, and others.

foreign press—generally speaking, the selection of the facts, the manner of their presentation, the interpretation placed on them and the conclusions drawn are all, to a greater or lesser extent, coloured by the aims or sympathies of the writer.

In Greece itself, the circumstances were such that every Greek found himself forced to take sides either with one or the other of the two contending factions into which the country became divided. Hence every word uttered or written in that country on the questions at issue has, of necessity, been in the nature of an *ex parte* statement, bearing strongly the impress of the prevailing spirit of violent partisanship.

The same remark applies, in a hardly lesser degree, to the numerous publications dealing with Greek affairs during the years 1915-22 which have appeared in the allied countries—more especially England and France—either during or immediately after the war. The fact that one of the two Greek political parties—the Venizelist—supported the policy of intervention on the side of the Allies, whereas the other—the Constantinist—was for Greece remaining neutral, has created, naturally enough, a strong bias in favour of the former and so made it difficult for the public in the countries of the Entente to take an entirely objective and impartial view.

As a Greek and as one who found himself involved in the political events of that stormy period of our country's history, I can naturally make no claim, any more than any other contemporary, to be regarded as a perfectly impartial witness. My bias, on balance and with considerable reservations, is bound to be in favour of the side I happened to back and with whose policy, in spite of its many shortcomings, I, in the main, agreed.

I state this in fairness to my readers who may, if they

be so disposed, check the sources from which I have drawn and which, on that account, are stated in as full detail as possible.

On the fundamental question of intervention or neutrality which divided the Greek nation, from 1915 onwards, into two opposing camps, I found myself unhesitatingly—particularly after Roumania's entry into the war in August 1916—a convinced partisan of the policy of intervention championed by Venizelos. At the time when the final break between Venizelos and Constantine took place (Sept. 1916), I occupied a post in the Greek Administration in Macedonia and was one of the first officials to take service with the Revolutionary Government set up by Venizelos, in association with Admiral Coundouriotis and General Danglis, at Salonica.

It is always distasteful to become a rebel against the lawful government of one's country. But great national interests were then at stake and we were given to understand that there was no time to be lost.

I do not wish, on that account, to claim on behalf of the partisans of intervention any monopoly of patriotic motive. On the contrary, I am quite prepared to admit that those of my compatriots—and they were extremely numerous, perhaps even the majority—who took the other view, were, with few exceptions, actuated by equally patriotic motives in wanting Greece to remain neutral.

The indiscriminate charges of pro-Germanism and of deliberately sacrificing Greek interests and national ideals to dynastic considerations or from unworthy motives of petty political spite, so freely levelled against King Constantine and all those who supported the policy of neutrality—charges which found the widest credence in foreign countries at the time—I believe to have been grossly exaggerated and intentionally circulated for

purposes of war-propaganda. Fear of Germany, perhaps belief in her ultimate victory—that there may have been ; but active sympathy with the Central Powers, a desire to see them win or a deliberate intention to intervene on their side, no.¹ The obloquy with which King Constantine was overwhelmed was, to a great extent, unmerited and the result of the acute tension between the two parties. For Greece to join the Allies in 1915 was, it must be admitted, somewhat of a gamble, and, although with nothing to stake, nothing to win, it was hardly fair to brand as traitors and criminals those who hesitated to plunge their country into a war whose issue was, to say the least of it, doubtful.

The Venizelist and Allied propaganda which resulted in every Greek being labelled as either an Ententophil or a Pro-German was, in my opinion, a grave tactical error, the fatal implications of which only became apparent after the restoration of Constantine in December 1920, for it furnished the governments and press of the Allied countries, *whose interests were opposed to those of Greece on the question of the Turkish peace-settlement*, with a plausible excuse for evading their obligations towards their former ally.²

¹ This is likely to be the conclusion reached by all those who, not having been directly implicated in the events of that period, will examine the facts with the cold and impartial eye of the independent investigator. See the opinion of a distinguished historian, Professor R. B. Mowat of Bristol University, whose verdict, arrived at, as he justly claims, *sine ira et studio* (without hatred and partisanship), I am inclined to endorse as the fairest appreciation I have yet read of the role played by the two principal actors in the Greek tragedy. (R. B. Mowat, *History of European Diplomacy*, Vol. III, p. 57 *seq.*)

² Mr. Winston Churchill (in *The World Crisis—The Aftermath*, p. 388) voices the prevailing point of view in the following passage : ' Here was a potentate who, as we saw it, against the wishes and

I have tried to do justice to the two protagonists in the Greek drama—Venizelos and Constantine. Both can still claim the fanatical adherence of a large section of the Greek people, and the degree of their mutual responsibility for the fearful tangle of the years 1915-22 has not yet been fully assessed by history.

the interests of his people, had *for personal and family reasons* thrown his country, or tried to throw it, on the enemy side.

'The return of Constantine therefore dissolved all Allied loyalties to Greece and cancelled all but legal obligations.

'For the sake of Venizelos much had to be endured, but for Constantine less than nothing.

'After the first astonishment (i.e. at Venizelos's defeat at the polls on 14 November 1920, just after the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres) had worn off, an air of relief became manifest in controlling circles. There was no need any more to pursue an anti-Turkish policy.'

Count Bosdari (Italian Minister at Athens in 1915-17), in his memoirs (Conte Alessandro di Bosdari, *Delle guerre Balcaniche, della Grande Guerra, &c.*, Milan, 1928), expresses the opposite point of view, in somewhat more dispassionate language (p. 106): 'Concepì fin da allora (July 1914) l'idea che qualunque potessero essere le preferenze e le simpatie del Re degli Elleni, l'alleanza con la Germania in questa guerra era preclusa come cosa assurda e praticamente impossibile; e gli avvenimenti posteriori provarono la verità di questo mio concetto'; and p. 136 (commenting on Constantine's unconstitutional dismissal of Venizelos on 4 October 1915, the practical results of which he does not regard as having been so injurious to the interests of the Allies as has been commonly represented): 'In linea pratica, il re Costantino violando (come dissero i suoi avversari) il Trattato e la Costituzione, salvò la Grecia e pagò coraggiosamente con la perdita della sua corona questa sua "felice colpa". Non ebbe torto poi il re Costantino quando più tardi asserì che con la sua politica di astensione aveva reso all'Intesa un servizio immenso. Difatti, se, come è più che probabile, la Grecia, uscendo allora dalla neutralità, fosse stata invasa ed occupata dagli Austro-Germanici, tutti i porti greci sarebbero rimasti dalla parte di terra in possesso dei nostri avversari per tutta la durata della guerra.'

On one important issue of Venizelos's policy—the occupation of the Smyrna enclave—I have been led, in the light of subsequent events and the evidence which has become available since the war, thanks to the publication of numerous memoirs and official documents, somewhat to modify my original opinion concerning the soundness of that portion of the great Cretan's political programme.

I am aware that the statements and conclusions contained in this book will not meet with the approval of the 'Diehards', to whichever faction they may belong. No statement which does not represent them as 100 per cent white and their opponents 100 per cent black will satisfy the party fanatics. But, as Clémenceau well points out in speaking of Foch, in his *Grandeurs et misères d'une victoire*, although the general public likes unqualified, 'whole-hogging' judgements, the latter very rarely tally with the truth.¹

In spite of that, or rather on account of that, I believe that my presentation of the facts is fairer and nearer to the truth than any other that has as yet emanated from a Greek source.

Party interests and the reputation of politicians are to me of far smaller moment than the honour of the great mass of the Greek people whose good name before the bar of history would remain under an unjustified stigma, if the official version of either faction were to stand unimpugned.

A. A. PALLIS

ATHENS, 10 February 1936

¹ G. Clémenceau, *Grandeurs et misères d'une victoire* (p. 20). 'Les esprits simples, qui sont le nombre, aiment à juger les hommes en bloc, d'une qualification approximative qu'ils veulent définitive. Mais la nature humaine est trop complexe, trop variable, pour se prêter d'emblée à ces procédures sommaires, &c.'

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE history of Greece, from the date of her erection into an independent State in 1830 down to the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, has been marked by frequent periods of internal strife and external vicissitude.

Greece's record, during those first eighty years of independent national existence, was hardly such as to justify the high hopes originally entertained by the more enthusiastic among the Philhellenes that the new Hellenic Kingdom was destined soon to play a dominant part in the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula and to become the natural successor of the Ottoman Empire, then tottering to its fall.

At a moment when discipline and organization were the two things the country stood most in need of, in order to enable it to qualify for the rôle, to which it aspired, of liberator of the Balkan peoples, the Greeks of the Kingdom preferred to indulge their passion for oratory and politics, and threw themselves with vehement zest into the futile game of pseudo-liberal parliamentarism.

From 1843—the date of the granting of the first Constitution—down to 1909, Greek politics were not an edifying spectacle. The least estimable features of the political life of other countries—the party intrigues, the governmental instability and the unbridled licence of the press of contemporary France; the spoils-system

of the United States; the military juntas of modern Spain; and the frequent and ephemeral military *coups d'Etat* of the South American Republics—all found their counterpart in the Greece of that period.

Two rulers of undoubted patriotism and considerable ability—the Greek Count Capodistrias and the Bavarian King Otho, both of whom had worked strenuously to establish some sort of order in the administration, had succumbed in the attempt, the former by assassination, the latter by the sacrifice of his throne.

Otho's successor, the Danish Prince William, who ascended the Greek throne in 1863 under the name of George I, was much less ardent in his zeal than his two predecessors, but he possessed the worldly shrewdness of a Charles II determined not to go on his travels again. George played his part impeccably as a constitutional monarch and, while always ready to advise, was careful not to assume direct responsibility, and allowed the politicians a free hand in internal politics. In foreign affairs his intervention was somewhat more active. Profoundly sceptical as to the possibility of Greece ever being strong enough to maintain her position unaided, George put his principal trust in his family connexions with the English and Russian Courts, in order to preserve Greece from external danger. No more fortunate than Charles II who had seen the Dutch sail up the Medway, he had to suffer the humiliation of seeing the Turks, in 1897, invade Greece as far as Lamia.

This unsatisfactory situation continued until the year 1909. Meanwhile Bulgaria, at that time looked upon by all European statesmen and publicists as the Prussia of the Balkans, was gaining ground in Macedonia, while Turkey, turned violently nationalist after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, seemed about to acquire a new lease of life and determined to reassert her much-

impaired sovereign rights in the troubled regions of Macedonia and Crete.

The Greek people suddenly reacted to these dangers. With Turkey adopting a threatening attitude over Crete, and with Bulgaria forging ahead in Macedonia, it was felt that things could not be allowed to go on as they were and that a serious effort must be made to pull the country together. The military *coup d'Etat* of 1909 was the result. Its leaders showed their patriotism by not attempting themselves to take on the government of the country, and their political acumen by inviting a new man, who had already won a reputation for statesmanship in Crete, but had not so far been involved in the demoralizing party politics of Old Greece, to come and take over the reins of government. That man was Eleutherios Venizelos.

From that moment a new spirit seems to have been infused into the Greek people. Like some plant which, after years of struggling growth, all of a sudden, through some hidden action at its roots, shoots up with newly acquired vigour, Greece seemed to gather strength and to make progress. Under a leader possessed of the confidence of the whole nation, there came a truce to the petty and disintegrating party politics which, throughout the nineteenth century, had paralysed all effective national action and had led to the humiliations of 1854, 1897 and 1908.

Under the firm and wise guidance of Venizelos, from 1910 onwards, all efforts were concentrated on preparation for the great Balkan crisis which, for all who had eyes to see, had been steadily working up to a climax ever since the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.

Those efforts reaped their reward in the successes of the two Balkan Wars of 1912-13 which resulted in Greece's securing an accretion of territory far exceeding

anything that had ever been expected by even the most sanguine enthusiasts for the Greek cause. The troublesome and exhausting Cretan and Macedonian questions were finally laid to rest, and Bulgaria, at that time Greece's most redoubtable rival in the Balkans, placed definitely *hors de combat*.

This favourable result had been achieved by that ideal combination of a strong statesman, enjoying the full confidence of his countrymen, and a wise monarch, prepared to back up and follow the advice of his Minister. What Italy had attained through the co-operation of Victor Emmanuel I and Cavour, and Germany through that of William I and Bismarck, Greece seemed destined to attain through the happy collaboration of King George I and Venizelos.

After King George's untimely end in 1913, it was the earnest hope and belief of the majority of the Greek people that the same close co-operation between Sovereign and Statesman would continue under George's successor, Constantine, to whom the military successes of the Balkan Wars had given a prestige and popularity hardly, if at all, inferior to that of Venizelos himself.

It was due to an envious fate that, at a most critical period of the country's fortunes, there should have arisen between these two men an acute difference of opinion on a matter of fundamental policy. It was Greece's misfortune that, in the face of the great crisis brought on by the outbreak of the European War in 1914, there should have been two alternative policies—neutrality and intervention—each with its pros and cons, each backed by the prestige of a powerful and popular personality.

Unable to agree on a common national policy, the country lapsed into acute party strife. The unity of purpose and effort so happily achieved during the

Balkan Wars, which had seemed destined to carry Greece forward to even higher achievements in the near future, was destroyed. During the whole duration of the war—that is from 1915 to 1922—Greece found herself torn between two contending factions hating each other with a deadly hatred and bent on mutual extermination.

The resulting decline of national strength and efficiency, from 1915 onwards, was continuous—even during the years of Venizelos's apparent triumph in 1917-20. It culminated, as it was bound to do, in disaster—the military *débâcle* of August 1922 in Asia Minor.

The causes which led up to this collapse have never been set forth with even an approach to impartiality. They have been obscured and distorted by party passion—inevitable under the circumstances—in Greece itself; by war-propaganda and the relics of war-prejudice in the Allied countries which, as the result of the events of 1915-17, had become hopelessly entangled in Greek party politics.

There is a marked tendency on the part of those Allied statesmen who, like Mr. Asquith, Lord Grey, Mr. Winston Churchill and M. Poincaré, have written about the events of the Great War, to evade a full discussion of the facts connected with the policy of the Allies towards Greece during and immediately after the Great War. Their accounts are summary, confused, contradictory, and full of garbled statements. One detects beneath the surface a desire not to probe too deeply into a distasteful and compromising subject; perhaps too a certain feeling of remorse, as if they feared that a too full discussion would lead to an admission of partial responsibility for the disaster of 1922. The tragic fate of Smyrna and the uprooting of the Christian populations from Asia Minor and Thrace, countries in

which they had been established for centuries, was undoubtedly felt by Greece's former Allies as a humiliation for which they themselves were partly to blame.

As a consequence of this reticence, the efforts and sacrifices made by the Greek people throughout this critical period of its history have not received the recognition they deserved. When I say the Greek people, I am referring more especially to the rank and file of the nation. For, whatever blame may attach to the leaders—whether political or military—of the two rival Greek parties for failing to achieve, in the face of a great national crisis, that union which is indispensable to the success of any country engaged in war, the rank and file, whichever the party to which they belonged, did their duty to the full. Under both régimes—the Venizelist of 1917-20 and the Constantinist of 1920-22—the people of Greece gave all that was asked of them, whether by their own Government or their Allies.¹

Whatever the view one may hold concerning the respective parts played by Venizelos and Constantine—and on this point it is likely that the verdict of history will always remain divided—justice demands that the immense and courageous efforts displayed by the Greek people during those six years of war from 1917 to 1922 should not be underestimated and that the sacrifices of the brave men who, bewildered by the dissensions of their leaders, still did their duty to their country irrespective of party allegiance, should receive due recognition.

¹ The dispatch of a Greek Army Corps in December 1918, at the request of M. Clémenceau, to the Ukraine on an expedition in which not only were no Greek interests at stake but Greece stood to lose much owing to the large Greek population resident in Russia, is a case in point.

CHAPTER II

THE ANATOLIAN ADVENTURE

‘A colossal political and geographical blunder.’ (A. STERGIADIS, Greek High Commissioner of Smyrna, 1919–22, interview published in the *Patris* of 6 January 1930.)

‘The Asia Minor expedition was condemned to certain failure as the result of the change of régime in Greece in November 1920.’ (Editor’s comment on above in *Patris* of 7 January 1930.)

‘I cannot understand to this day how the eminent statesmen in Paris—Wilson, Clémenceau, Lloyd George and Venizelos—could have been betrayed into so rash and fatal a step.’ (WINSTON CHURCHILL, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath*, p. 369.)

THE first two quotations printed at the head of the present chapter illustrate the diverging views which are held by opposite parties in Greece concerning the merits of her Asiatic venture and the causes of its failure.

M. Aristide Stergiades, once the most trusted friend of Venizelos though since estranged from him by political differences, whose opinion is printed first, was appointed by Venizelos Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna in May 1919. He held this office during the whole of the three years that the Greek occupation lasted. His verdict, based on his own practical experience on the spot, unreservedly condemns Venizelos’s Asiatic venture as fundamentally unsound.

The second opinion, that of the editor of the *Patris*, one of the leading Venizelist newspapers—voices the prevalent view in Venizelist circles—namely, that the failure of the Anatolian venture was not inherent in the nature of the enterprise itself but was entirely due

to the change of régime which took place in Greece as the result of the General Election of November 1920, when Venizelos was defeated and King Constantine restored to the Greek throne.

The third opinion is that of Mr. Winston Churchill who has devoted to Greek affairs two chapters in his brilliant book on the World War.

Which of these opinions is right?

Only a careful objective analysis of all the facts, discarding, as far as possible, all national or party prejudice, can give the answer.

* * *

The origin of Greece's Anatolian adventure, which came to such a disastrous ending in August 1922, goes back to 24 January 1915, when Sir Edward Grey, in the name of Great Britain, first made Greece the offer of 'large concessions on the coast of Asia Minor' as compensation for her immediate participation in the European War on the side of the Entente.

The acceptance of that offer in principle by Venizelos entailed, as its logical consequence, four years later, the occupation of Smyrna by Greece in May 1919, when, after the victory of the Entente and the triumph of Venizelos's interventionist policy, the Allies were called upon to honour the promise they had made to Greece at the beginning of the war.

The acquisition of the promised territory in Asia Minor became, as from the date of Sir Edward Grey's offer of 24 January 1915—an offer made with the assent of the British, French and Russian Governments—the principal plank in the Venizelist platform and was the dominating issue in Greek politics during the nine years from 1915 to 1923. All the subsequent political upheavals in Greece—the overthrow of the Monarchy

and the establishment of the Republic in 1924—were the direct consequences of the collapse of Greece's effort in Asia Minor and the *débâcle* of August 1922.

No chapter of the eminent Cretan statesman's conduct of Greek affairs, which up to the beginning of 1915 had, by common admission of both friends and foes, been conspicuously successful, has come in for so much criticism both at home and abroad. In Greece itself, the acceptance or rejection of the Entente's offer of Smyrna became, from 1915 onwards, a party question and gave rise to the most acute political controversy, dividing Greek public opinion into two opposing camps.

Outside Greece, the soundness of Venizelos's policy of Asiatic expansion, though not questioned at the time when it was first initiated, i.e. in 1915, has since met with almost unanimous condemnation,¹ even on the part of avowed admirers of that statesman.²

The question of the expediency of accepting the Allies' offer of Smyrna and of the responsibility for the failure of that policy are matters on which history has not yet delivered its final verdict. An impartial examination of the facts connected with Greece's Anatolian expedition is essential to a proper understanding of the Greek political crisis which, beginning with the rupture between King Constantine and Venizelos over the question of Greek intervention in 1915, came to its tragic conclusion in 1922 with the military disaster in Asia Minor and the execution of General Hadjanestis and five members of the Gounaris Cabinet by the Revolutionary Government of Colonel Plastiras.

Many of those who have treated of Greek affairs during the period in question, while expressing approval

¹ Poincaré, Winston Churchill, Nitti, Sforza, Bosdari, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson.

² e.g. Mr. Winston Churchill in *The World Crisis—The Aftermath*.

of Venizelos's policy of intervention in the European War, at the same time express unqualified condemnation of his subsequent action in insisting on occupying Smyrna in 1919. In doing so they seem to overlook the fact that there existed a very intimate connexion between these two chapters of Venizelist policy; that, in fact, the promise of territorial compensation in Asia Minor was the corollary and basic condition of Greece's intervention in the war on the side of the Entente.

Mr. Winston Churchill, for instance, who in his book devotes two somewhat rhetorical and imprecise chapters to the Greek question, is guilty of this inconsistency. For Mr. Churchill, all is well, as long as it is merely a question of Greece ranging herself on the side of the Allies; all is not well (he 'cannot understand to this day how eminent statesmen in Paris—Wilson, Clémenceau, Lloyd George, Venizelos—could have been betrayed into so rash and fatal a step'),¹ as soon as Venizelos claims the reward for which the Greek people had fought and Greece had gone through a revolution which had burnt deep into her soul and destroyed her national unity.

Perhaps this inconsistency, this disposition to ignore the real point at issue, is not entirely unintentional but veils a desire not to probe too deeply into the responsibilities for the Greek disaster of 1922. It is easy enough to say to Venizelos: 'You ought not to have stayed there,' but it is more difficult to answer the inconvenient question which automatically rises to the lips of any careful examiner: 'How do you defend your behaviour in first promising Greece Smyrna with the object of dragging her into the war, and then not backing her up, when the moment came to fulfil your promise? Between Constantine's policy of "No war—no Smyrna"

¹ *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (p. 369).

and Venizelos's of "War cum Smyrna", you chose, or rather imposed, the latter course. Did not that choice entail certain obligations on your part ?

In all this tragic affair, then, the historian has three sets of responsibilities to examine. First, there is the responsibility of the Allies, who cajoled, incited and bullied Greece into joining them, promising, in return, Smyrna ; secondly, there is the responsibility of Venizelos himself for taking the Allies at their word and, on the strength of it, committing his country to an undertaking which many have compared to Napoleon's Russian expedition of 1812 ; and, finally, that of Venizelos's successors for attempting to carry on a policy of which they themselves had, from the very start, expressed the most emphatic disapproval.

Ten years ago, when the fumes of war-hate and party animosity had not yet lifted, a dispassionate and frank discussion of Greek policy and the Allied treatment of Greece during the years 1915-22 would have been practically impossible. It would have involved the admission of too many errors, the confession of too many questionable acts ; it would have shaken confidence in too many reputations. During all that troubled and, for Greece, disastrous period, no country, no party, no statesman or general can claim to have had the monopoly of either success or failure. Even the most eminent among them made mistakes, nor will their greatness be diminished by admitting them. Napoleon at St. Helena was an objective critic of his own errors. Yet it has not diminished the Corsican's stature in the eyes of history.

The name of Venizelos, to whom Greece owes a period of brilliant expansion, in the course of which

she succeeded in almost doubling the extent of her territory and population, will always be associated in Greek history with Greece's unsuccessful attempt to establish herself on the Asiatic shore of the Aegean. In order to enable one to pass a fair judgement on this, one of the most momentous acts, and certainly the most disputed, of his career, it is necessary to trace the genesis of the 'Mictasiatic idea' as well as the psychological and political factors which influenced him in its adoption.

The idea of directing Greek national aspirations towards a policy of territorial expansion in Asia Minor does not appear to have entered into Venizelos's calculations—even as a remote contingency—before the outbreak of the European War. Neither the political conditions created in the Balkans as the result of the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 nor the general diplomatic situation in Europe immediately after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 were favourable to the germination of such a scheme.

In the Balkans, the preservation of the newly acquired Macedonian territories against a Bulgarian *revanche* seemed likely to absorb the whole energies of Greece for many years to come.

Turkey, in spite of the crushing defeat she had sustained at the hands of the Balkan Allies in 1912, was still an Empire possessing great potential resources in men and money. Under the vigorous and militant direction of the Young Turks, who had ousted the decrepit Pashas of the old régime from power in 1913, she was still spoiling for a fight and hardly concealed her intention of embarking, as soon as ever the completion of her naval armaments should turn the scales in her favour, on a fresh war with Greece in order to recover the Aegean Islands off the Anatolian coast,¹

¹ Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Imbros and Tenedos.

whose annexation to Greece, in virtue of the Conference of London's decision of 1 August 1913, Turkey had refused to recognize.

The Great Powers, already sufficiently ill-pleased by the disturbance of the Near Eastern *status quo* caused by the Balkan Allies, were in no mood to encourage any further projects aimed at the integrity of what was left of the Ottoman Empire. Germany, France and, to a lesser degree, Great Britain were all actively engaged in wooing the Young Turks and pursuing the traditional policy of economic exploitation of Turkey through the granting of loans in return for concessions.

There was also a fairly general feeling among all the European chancelleries that Bulgaria had been hardly used by her former Balkan Allies in having been deprived of almost all share in the partition of Macedonia. This feeling, more or less platonic in the case of Great Britain, France, Germany and even Russia, was far from being so in the case of Austria-Hungary. The latter was determined to avail herself of the first possible pretext in order to upset the territorial arrangements effected by the Treaty of Bucharest, which had resulted in the dangerous aggrandizement of her Balkan neighbour, Serbia.

Under the circumstances, for Greece, in 1914, to have even dreamt of fresh conquests beyond the Aegean would have been the height of folly. Venizelos, who since his assumption of the control of Greek foreign policy in 1910, had proved himself an eminently practical statesman with a keen sense of realities and a freedom from that visionary megalomania so prevalent among Greek politicians of the previous generation, was not the man to be attracted by a project which, at that moment, would have seemed a veritable wild-cat scheme.

It is characteristic of the Cretan statesman's sense of

moderation in those days that, during the Balkan peace-negotiations at Bucharest in 1913, he refused to yield to the persistent injunctions of King Constantine, backed by the Greek General Staff, that he should demand the cession of the whole of Thrace as far as the Maritza. Notwithstanding the fact that, at the time, the territory in question was actually occupied by the Greek forces, Venizelos resolutely refused to press what he regarded as being an exaggerated claim. Such a claim, he well realized, would have estranged Roumania, then acting the part of mediator between the former Balkan Allies and whose support was essential to the conclusion of a satisfactory peace. He even went so far as to threaten resignation, unless the King withdrew his instructions.

When criticized later in the Chamber by the Opposition for having sacrificed Thrace to Bulgaria, Venizelos was even more categorical, declaring that 'even if he had been offered Thrace, he would not have accepted it, because Greece's spine was far too weak to carry such a heavy load'.¹

Even after the outbreak of the European War, when the possibility of both Turkey and Bulgaria, Greece's hereditary enemies, throwing in their lot with the Central Powers opened up prospects of far-reaching territorial changes in the Near East, the idea of demanding a share of Asia Minor as the price of Greek intervention on the side of the Entente does not appear at first to have even entered his head. That this is so is abundantly clear from the reply he gave, in November 1914, to the Roumanian Government's suggestion that, in order to facilitate the reconstitution of the Balkan *bloc*, Roumania, Greece and Serbia should each agree to make certain territorial concessions to Bulgaria. The following extract shows sufficiently what were, at that

¹ Quoted in X. Stratighos, *Greece in Asia Minor* (p. 14).

time, Venizelos's views on the advisability of accepting territorial compensation for Greece in Asiatic Turkey in return for the surrender to Bulgaria of territory in Macedonia :

De plus, l'amitié sincère qu'il (i.e. le Gouvernement Hellénique) professe à l'égard du Gouvernement Roumain lui fait un devoir de déclarer *qu'il ne pourra, en tout cas, rien abandonner des territoires qu'il a acquis en 1913*, après tant de sacrifices et en parfaite conformité avec les droits que lui donnaient l'histoire, l'ethnographie et la *configuration géographique de ses possessions*. Si la Grèce cédait quelque chose, outre qu'elle abandonnerait des populations essentiellement grecques, elle compromettrait sa sécurité, et ces sacrifices, à la fois pénibles et périlleux, n'auraient même pas l'excuse d'un suffisant agrandissement à obtenir d'un autre côté, *car la dispersion des Hellènes de Turquie ne lui permet pas d'en espérer aucun qui puisse effectivement les compenser*.¹

It is hardly likely that the last paragraph, constituting as it does a complete disclaimer of any ambitions in the direction of Turkey, would have been couched in such categorical terms, if Venizelos had already at that date been meditating a demand for future territorial concessions in Anatolia.

There seems not to be, therefore, a shadow of doubt that, as late as November 1914, Venizelos was not in favour of Greece sacrificing her 'bird in the hand' in Macedonia in exchange for two birds in the Anatolian bush. The very fact of the Greek population in Turkey being so dispersed made the establishment of a claim in any single area in Asiatic Turkey appear of somewhat doubtful expediency, given the absence of an overwhelming Greek majority in even the coastal districts.

Such seems to have been Venizelos's state of mind at the end of 1914. How then did it come about that, six weeks later, he had completely changed his mind and

¹ Quoted in Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (I, 169). Dispatch of 14/27 November 1914.

allowed himself to become converted to a policy involving the cession of the Macedonian districts of Drama and Cavalla to Bulgaria against the acquisition of 80,000 square miles¹ of territory in Western Asia Minor?

The 'Asiatic idea' seems to have first begun fermenting in his brain during the early days of January 1915. To all outward appearances, Turkey's entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers, in October 1914, seemed definitely to seal the fate of the Ottoman Empire in the event of the Entente being victorious. Plans for the eventual partition of the European and Asiatic provinces of Turkey were already in the air by the end of 1914. An echo of these plans appears to have first reached Venizelos's ears from Rome about the middle of December of that year. In a dispatch dated 14/27 December, the Greek Minister at Rome reported what views were entertained at the Consulta concerning the future fate of Asia Minor.

The Italian Government [he wrote] hopes that, in the event of Germany's defeat, the moment for the partition of Anatolia will arrive, and that then Italy will get her chance of securing a footing there. According to the Italian Government's forecast, Russia will be awarded the Armenian provinces, thus obtaining an outlet on the Mediterranean opposite Cyprus.² France will get Syria, and Great Britain Arabia. There will be plenty of territory left over for Italy west of the Russian zone. The Italians realize, to their great chagrin, that it will not be possible entirely to ignore the claims of Greece, but, as everybody wants Smyrna and the Meander valley, they feel confident that the region in question will not be given to us. In any case, they will do everything in their

¹ 125,000 square kilometres.

² As a matter of fact, Russia did not include the Vilayet of Adana among her claims.

power to reduce Greece's share of the Anatolian inheritance to a minimum.¹

Was it this or similar information from other quarters that set Venizelos thinking and turned his eyes towards Smyrna? Or was it simply the general conviction that, in the event of the Entente being victorious, the partition of the Ottoman Empire among the principal Allied Powers was to be regarded as a foregone conclusion and so would render Western Asia Minor—Greece's legitimate sphere of influence taken on historical, geographical and ethnographical grounds—a comparatively easy morsel for her to digest?

By 9 January 1915, the idea appears to have fully ripened in his mind. On that day, Venizelos had an interview with the British Minister, Sir Francis Elliot, on the question of sending Greek troops to the assistance of Serbia, for which the Entente Governments had been consistently pressing all through the previous November and December. He assured the British Minister of his ability to overcome the combined opposition of the King, the General Staff and public opinion to immediate intervention and the dispatch of troops to Serbia—a somewhat risky proceeding in view of the still ambiguous attitude of Bulgaria—provided he were in a position to hold out the prospect of brilliant territorial gains.²

What exactly those territorial gains were to be he did

¹ Quoted in Ventiris, *Greece in 1910-20* (I, 265).

² Driault, *Hist. diplom. de la Grèce* (V, 174): 'Je suis sûr d'une opposition résolue de la part de l'État-major général et je ne pourrais compter sur l'appui ni du Roi ni de l'opinion publique dans une guerre entreprise pour la Serbie seule, mais je pourrais ramener l'opposition de l'État-major et lui persuader de courir des risques, si je lui faisais entrevoir *des compensations magnifiques*.' In this last surmise he was wrong. Colonel Metaxas, the chief of the General Staff, did not allow himself to be dazzled by the promised territorial gains, for the reasons given below (see p. 22 *et seq.*).

not at the time specify. There can, however, be little doubt that the reference was to Asia Minor, for at that date there could not yet have been any question, as far as Greece was concerned, of obtaining either Thrace or Constantinople, both of these being ruled out owing to the prior claims of Bulgaria and Russia.

In any case, the British Government interpreted the remark as referring to Smyrna, for, a fortnight later, (10/23 January 1915), Sir Edward Grey made Greece his historic offer of 'important territorial concessions on the coast of Asia Minor'.¹ The British Government's offer also had the assent of France and Russia.

At the same time, in order to secure the co-operation or, at least, the neutrality of Bulgaria, Sir Edward Grey suggested that Bulgaria should be given the assurance that, in the event of Greece and Serbia receiving compensation elsewhere (i.e. Serbia at the expense of Austria-Hungary, and Greece at that of Turkey), Bulgaria should be compensated by the cession of Serbian and Greek territory in Macedonia.

From that moment, Venizelos's mind seems to have been finally made up. Sir Edward Grey's Note was received on the morning of 11/24 January. The same afternoon sees the former drawing up a confidential memorandum to the King in which is formulated, for the first time, Venizelos's new policy of Asiatic expansion—the creation of a greater Greece beyond the seas.

I would not hesitate [he writes] to recommend—however painful the operation might be—the sacrifice of Cavalla, if only to save the Ottoman Greeks and so ensure the foundation of a really big Greece, to include practically all the regions in which the influence of Hellenism has been paramount throughout the ages.²

¹ Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (I, 172) and Driault, *Hist. diplom. de la Grèce* (V, 176).

² Driault, *Hist. diplom. de la Grèce* (V, 177).

He is referring, of course, to the coastal regions of Western Asia Minor, comprising the ancient territories of Ionia and Aeolis, the cradle of Hellenic civilization.

It was a historic document, for it was committing himself and the country, in the event of his policy being accepted by the King, to the conquest of Asia Minor.

Sir Edward Grey's dispatch of 23 January 1915, coupled with Venizelos's memorandum to King Constantine of 24 January, may be said to constitute the starting-point of Venizelos's Anatolian policy—a brilliantly conceived scheme for the legitimate aggrandizement of his country, according to one point of view; an unsound and chimerical enterprise doomed to certain failure, according to the other.

Which of these two views was correct? What should be the verdict of history on this much-discussed chapter of the great Cretan's record? Should he have said 'no' to Sir Edward Grey's tempting offer? That would have meant that Greece would have remained definitely neutral, for, in the absence of any other possible alternative compensation (Thrace and Constantinople, as we have seen, being at the time both ruled out), what inducement could there have been for the Greek people to go to war?

On the other hand, having once accepted the offer, was he irretrievably committed to invoking it later on in 1919, in order to embark, under conditions none too favourable, on a war of conquest in Anatolia? Or, in doing so, was he not making a blunder as fatal as that committed by Napoleon when he invaded Russia in 1812? Finally, given the political and military conditions prevailing in 1919, was the enterprise in itself feasible, and must its failure be put down *exclusively* (as is usually maintained) to the political errors and administrative incapacity of Venizelos's successors, who in 1920

had alienated British and French public opinion by the restoration of Constantine?

Such are the principal questions which the impartial historian is called upon to examine and answer.

After the receipt of the Grey Note of 23 January 1915, Venizelos gave himself up, with all his usual ardour, to an intensive study of the geography and ethnology of Anatolia, with a view to defining the extent of Greece's new territorial aspirations.

The person to whom he applied for information was Colonel Metaxas, at that time Acting Chief of the General Staff. Metaxas was a highly competent staff-officer, who had been largely responsible for the successful conduct of the two Balkan Wars of 1912-13. German-trained, a believer in the superior efficiency of the German army, convinced that the war would end in a stalemate without giving the victory either to the Entente or the Central Powers,¹ he was in favour of Greece remaining neutral. He did not believe in the ability of the combined Greek and Serbian armies to withstand the attack of the Austro-Germans on the Danube, given

¹ It has been asserted by Colonel Metaxas's political opponents that he was, right from the start, committed to a belief in the victory of Germany. This does not appear to have been the case, judging from the text of his memorandum addressed to M. Venizelos as Prime Minister on 20 January 1915 (subsequently published in the Athenian Press in September 1922 and later in the *Politeia* of 1 July 1924, in an article entitled 'The responsibilities for the Anatolian expedition from 1915 onwards') in which, examining the possibilities of the outcome of the European War, Metaxas says: 'On the other hand, a German victory, such as would enable Germany completely to impose her will on the Entente Powers, is not at all probable. The most favourable result that Germany can look forward to is that she should come out of the war without loss.'

the tremendous risk of their being assailed on the flank and rear by the united forces of Bulgaria (at that time still maintaining an ambiguous neutrality) and Turkey.

Venizelos was aware that Metaxas had, for some time past, been engaged, privately, on a study of Anatolia from the military and political point of view. The latter, in the account which he subsequently published of these events,¹ says that when Venizelos, then Minister of War, first came to hear of his Anatolian studies, in October 1913, he twitted him for what he was pleased to call his Chief of Staff's 'Byzantine megalomania' (Anatolia at one time having formed part of the Greek Empire of Byzantium). The incident is interesting as showing how far Venizelos himself was at that time from entertaining thoughts of possible future conquests in Anatolia.

Colonel Metaxas's studies now came in unexpectedly useful. Between 13 and 19 January the two had a number of confidential talks at which the Entente's request that Greece should send troops to the Danube in order to assist Serbia in repelling an Austrian attack, as well as the proposed territorial concessions in Asia Minor, were exhaustively discussed. Besides expressing his views verbally, Colonel Metaxas also drew up for the Prime Minister two memoranda, dated 27 and 31 January,² in which he not only opposed, on military

¹ This account, with extracts from the various memoranda submitted by Metaxas to Venizelos in January 1915, was published in the Athenian paper *Politeia* of 1-5 July 1924, under the title of 'The responsibility for Greece's Anatolian policy from 1915 onwards'.

² The sequence of dates here is important: 11/24 January, Venizelos receives the Grey Note; Venizelos's first memo to the King; 13/26 January, first conversation between Venizelos and Metaxas; 14/27 January, Metaxas's first memo re Asia Minor; 15/28 January, second conversation between Venizelos and Metaxas; 17/30 January, Venizelos's second memo to King; 18/31 January, Metaxas's second memo.

grounds, the dispatch of a Greek army to Northern Serbia, but also expressed a most emphatic opinion that it would be highly inexpedient, both on military and political grounds, for Greece to accept any offer of territory in Anatolia, as this was bound to involve her, sooner or later, in a long and costly campaign in the interior of that difficult country.

The following is a summary of Colonel Metaxas's principal arguments. In view of what actually did take place later on during the Anatolian Campaign of 1919-22, his words sound almost prophetic¹:

'(1) Firstly, as regards the ethnological distribution of the population of Anatolia, Metaxas pointed out that, out of a total population of approximately 10,000,000, only about 2,000,000 (taking the most generous estimate) could be reckoned as Greeks. Further, the Greek population, instead of being concentrated in a single region, was scattered here and there, mostly along the sea-board, in comparatively small groups. The Moslems were everywhere in the majority. Even in the Vilayet of Aidin, which included the Sandjak of Smyrna where the largest Greek group was located, the proportion of Greeks to Turks was only 5:7. In the area which Venizelos proposed to claim (i.e. the whole of Asia Minor west of a line from Cape Phenika on the Gulf of Adalia to the peninsula of Artaki on the Sea of Marmara), the proportion of Greeks to Moslems was even smaller.

'(2) The Moslems, numbering about 7,000,000, not only occupied the whole of the Central Anatolian plateau in a compact mass, but also outnumbered the Greeks in most of the coastal districts.

'(3) The bulk of the Moslem population—Turks, Circassians, Kurds, Yuruks and other warlike races—

¹ Quoted at length in X. Stratigkos, *Greece in Asia Minor* (pp. 24 *et seq.*).

was composed of peasants, inured to the use of arms, whereas the contrary was the case with the Greeks and Armenians, a predominantly urban population totally devoid of military training of any sort.¹

‘(4) The attempt to annex any portion of Anatolia was bound to entail a long and arduous campaign in the interior. The difficulties of such a campaign would necessarily be immense, given the lack of roads and other means of communication, as well as the rugged nature of the country which was traversed from north to south by a series of lofty mountain-ranges. The invading army would find itself compelled to pursue the Turks into the interior, into the heart of a country inhabited by a hostile population and bristling with physical obstacles. The Greek army, even if numerically superior and successful in the initial stages of the campaign, would gradually see its strength dwindle, as it advanced farther into the interior, owing to the necessity of guarding its flanks and lines of communications.

‘Thus, sooner or later, a point was bound to be reached, where equilibrium would be established between the forces on either side. From that moment onwards, the Greek army would be forced to act on the defensive, the initiative passing to the enemy. The Turks, fighting on interior lines in their own country, would be able to bide their time, so as to attack the Greek army when it was deployed over a vast front, finally dealing it a crushing blow.

‘In other words, Napoleon’s experience of 1812, when

¹ Until the Turkish Revolution of 1908, non-Moslems were exempt from military service. After 1908, this exemption was suppressed, but the non-Moslems, though obliged to serve, were not given proper military training but employed as auxiliaries, mostly in the so-called labour battalions (*emelâ tabourou*).

he invaded Russia, would be repeated over again.¹ Napoleon, when he first crossed the Russian frontier, had an army of 500,000. By the time he had reached Moscow, these had dwindled to 80,000, the remainder being left behind to guard the lines of communications and flanks. In these circumstances, retreat and disaster were the inevitable consequence.

‘(5) Even in the event of Greece gaining a temporary military advantage, thus enabling her to occupy Smyrna and part of the hinterland, the task of preserving this overseas possession in the face of a constantly menacing Turkey was bound to be a tremendous drain on her military and financial resources.

‘In the event of political complications arising in the Balkans, Greece would find herself compelled to abandon her Asiatic possession to its fate. The local Greek population (the only one on which it would be possible to rely, in such an eventuality, for purposes of defence) would, at best, only be able to supply 40,000 men capable of bearing arms, a force obviously inadequate for the defence of Smyrna and the surrounding country.

‘In other words, the retention of Smyrna by Greece presupposed that no serious political complications were ever likely to arise either in the Balkans or in Anatolia itself. But so favourable a concurrence of circum-

¹ The parallel is interesting. The distance covered by Napoleon from the Niemen as far as Moscow was 900 kilometres (just the distance from Smyrna to Sivas). The farthest point in the interior reached by the Greek army during the Asia Minor campaign (battle of the Sakkaria, August 1921) was 500 kilometres from Smyrna. At that point the advance was checked and the army had to fall back. The distance from Smyrna to Angora is 600 kilometres, to Sivas 900, to the Russian frontier 1,600. The above figures give some idea of the immensity of the country in which the Greek army had to operate. (See sketch-map at end of book.)

stances was hardly to be anticipated, at any rate for any length of time.

‘(6) Separating a portion of Anatolia from the main trunk and placing it under the sovereignty of a country other than Turkey would inevitably create complications both of an economic and ethnological nature, seeing that Anatolia formed a single indivisible geographical unit. The result would be constant friction, which could only end in the two parts sooner or later becoming reunited.’

The above is a summary of the main arguments advanced by Colonel Metaxas against accepting the proffered territory in Anatolia.

As an alternative, however, in the event of Greece being unable to resist the pressure put upon her by the Entente and so being forced to accept the offer, Metaxas insisted that consent should be subordinated to the following *sine qua non* conditions :

Firstly, that, when it came to actually occupying Asia Minor, the Allies should bind themselves to participate in the campaign with forces sufficient to enable the operation to be brought to a successful conclusion.

Secondly, that the whole of Anatolia should be partitioned among the Allied Powers or, failing this, that the portion left under Turkish sovereignty be reduced to such small proportions as no longer to constitute a serious menace to the Greek possessions around Smyrna.

In conclusion, Metaxas gave it as his considered opinion that, failing acceptance of these conditions, the Anatolian venture could only spell disaster and would ultimately involve the ruin of Greece and the Anatolian Greeks.

Colonel Metaxas's views, as set forth above, coincide with the opinions subsequently expressed by the highest Allied military authorities, including Marshal Foch,

Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, General Weygand and Colonel Georges, on the question of the cession of Smyrna and its hinterland to Greece, during the discussions before the Supreme Council in 1917-20. Metaxas must, however, be given the credit of priority and of having formulated his objections *before any political engagements had been entered into between the Entente and Greece.*

There is no evidence to show that, at the time when the original offer of Smyrna was made to Greece, that is in January 1915, any objections were raised either in British or French military quarters, or that any voice of warning was even uttered. On the contrary, we know for a fact that the British War Office, whose opinion was voiced by Lord Kitchener, not only acquiesced but was particularly urgent in its desire to see Greece accept Sir Edward Grey's offer.¹ This is significant in view of the fact that the partition of Anatolia among the Entente Powers, though doubtless already under discussion, had not yet, at that date, been formally decided upon.²

Clear-headed, practical, unsentimental, with all the cold logic of a German-trained staff-officer, Metaxas had the courage to state what was bound to be, once it was made public, an unpopular opinion, given the glamour with which the names of Smyrna and Ionia were surrounded and the strong appeal they made to the imagination of the Greek people, nurtured on the classic

¹ M. Gennadius, Greek Minister in London, reports an interview he had with Lord Kitchener on 3 February 1915, in which the latter expressed his surprise at Greece's not at once accepting the Allied offer. (See Ventiris, *Greece in 1910-20*, vol. I, 272.)

² The Secret Treaty of London between Great Britain, France and Russia was signed on 4 March 1915, that between the same Powers and Italy on 26 April 1916. Further concessions to Russia in the Eastern Vilayets were made as late as January 1917.

memories of its historic past. It is all the more to be regretted that Metaxas should subsequently have allowed himself to depart from this strictly professional attitude, and that by indulging in activities of a political nature, he should have become suspect both to the Allied Governments and to that section of the Greek public which sympathized with the Entente. Were it not for his later lapses, the frankness with which Metaxas stated his opinion and the soundness of many of his arguments would have received wider recognition and, in time, left him with an enhanced reputation, as a far-sighted soldier, who had foreseen all the disastrous implications of the Anatolian adventure.

As soon as Metaxas's hostile attitude on the question of the Smyrna offer was divulged to the public, he became the object of much unjust vituperation. The Ententist press branded him as a Pro-German. In Greece he was called a defeatist and the equivalent in Greek of a 'little Englander'. He was taunted by the patriotic press with treating a war of liberation for the recovery of Smyrna and Ionia, which had been the cradle of the Hellenic race, as if it was some colonial¹ expedition for the conquest of Somaliland or Jubaland. The statistics of population, the geographical and other technical objections which Metaxas had only done his

¹ This expression was actually used by M. Zografos, the Foreign Minister in the Gounaris Cabinet of March–August 1915, in a conversation with the Italian Minister, Count Bosdari (see Bosdari, *Delle guerre Balcaniche, della Grande Guerra*, p. 120): 'Simili discorsi mi teneva Zografos, il quale aggiungeva che i compensi nell' Asia Minore i quali sembravano aver fatto tanta gola a Venizelos, erano illusori. Li definiva come "interessi coloniali" difficile ad acquistare e ancora piu difficile a conservare.' The unfortunate phrase 'Αποικιακή πολιτική' (i.e. 'colonial' policy) as applied to Smyrna was exploited by the Opposition with almost as much effect as Bethmann Hollweg's celebrated 'scrap of paper'.

duty in pointing out, were ignored and drowned in a sea of shallow sentiment and party controversy.


It has been the fashion to fasten the whole blame for the disastrous termination of the Anatolian Expedition and the loss of Smyrna on the governments which succeeded Venizelos after the latter's defeat at the polls in 1920, on the principle of *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*.

In all fairness, it must be admitted that the responsibility for the disaster which ultimately overtook Greece in Asia Minor, is divided.

No one can deny that the diplomatic and military errors of the Greek Governments of 1920-2 were principally responsible for the *magnitude* of the final catastrophe.

But the principle of the expedition, as originally planned and launched by Venizelos in 1919, was, as Metaxas had rightly anticipated, intrinsically unsound and contained within itself the germs of ultimate failure. The conditions essential to its success, as postulated by Metaxas in his memoranda of January 1915—namely, the partition of Anatolia among the Allied Powers and the participation of adequate Allied forces in the campaign—had not been fulfilled. The responsibility for the failure to secure these must rest on Venizelos himself.

Further, the gross bungling of the Greek landing at Smyrna on 15 May 1919, which resulted in much unnecessary disorder and bloodshed and undoubtedly queered the pitch for all the subsequent operations by the unfavourable effect produced on the Turkish population throughout Anatolia as well as on public opinion in Europe and America, is entirely attributable to the incompetence of the Greek High Command and must.



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be laid at the door of the then (Venizelist) Government.

Every foreign authority—whether British, American, French or Italian—is agreed that the landing of the Greek army at Smyrna in May 1919 was, given the circumstances, both a political and a military ‘gaffe’. It fanned to a flame the smouldering fires of Turkish nationalism and gave Mustafa Kemal his chance. By the middle of 1920—when Venizelos was still in power—the Nationalist movement in the interior of Anatolia had assumed such formidable proportions, that, to the eye of every impartial observer, all chance of a successful issue to the expedition had been hopelessly compromised and the situation of the Greeks in Asia Minor had already reached an impasse. Unable to advance into the interior in order to get to grips with the enemy, unable to demobilize owing to the necessity of guarding the occupied territory, it was merely a question of time before the Greek army was faced with the only remaining alternative—that is, evacuation.

It is conceivable that, had Venizelos remained in power after November 1920 or had fewer mistakes been committed by his successors, Greece might have succeeded in extricating herself from the position in which she found herself with somewhat smaller losses both to her military forces and the local population. One thing, however, appears certain—that the retention by Greece of the territory round Smyrna was a physical impossibility in view of the lack of effective Allied support and the unwillingness of the Allied Powers to coerce Turkey. Thus evacuation would have been ultimately forced upon Greece as the only course, whatever the Government in power. Greece could never have commanded the necessary resources in men and money to enable her to carry on for years—as France had done in Algeria and

Morocco, and Italy in Tripoli—a guerilla war entailing the maintenance in Asia Minor, for an indefinite period, of a large expeditionary force.

Given the impossibility of getting British and French, let alone Italian, public opinion after the war to sanction fresh sacrifices of men and money, in order to impose the Treaty of Sèvres on the Turks, it is vain to pretend that Greece, with only the platonic goodwill of Great Britain (for that is what it amounted to), could have maintained herself in Asia Minor by her own unaided efforts for any length of time.

To return to the events of January 1915.

Venizelos does not seem to have attached much importance to his Chief of Staff's objections concerning the dangers of becoming involved in Asia Minor. On 17/30 January he submitted to King Constantine a second memorandum in which he reiterated, in greater detail, the arguments contained in his previous memorandum of 11/24 January in favour of the immediate intervention of Greece in the war, in return for territorial compensation in Asia Minor. He expressed his conviction that 'there would emerge from the war a new Greece as large and as rich again as the Greece which had resulted from the two victorious Balkan Wars'.¹

This time Venizelos defined the area to be claimed by Greece as the whole of Western Asia Minor, west of a line starting from Cape Phineka on the Gulf of Adalia and running north, through Afium Karahissar and Kioutahia, to Artaki on the Sea of Marmara (or, alternatively, if it was not possible to secure an outlet on the Sea of Marmara), to Adramit opposite Mytilene. The above comprised an area of 125,000 square kilometres

¹ Driault, *Hist. diplom. de la Grèce* (V, 177).

(about 80,000 square miles) with a Greek population of 800,000, in exchange for which he was prepared to recommend the cession to Bulgaria (at that date still neutral) of the Macedonian districts of Drama and Cavalla, an area of 2,000 square kilometres (about 1,200 square miles) with a Greek population of only 30,000, the majority of the population of the districts in question being composed of Turks.

On 13/26 January Venizelos had sent a reply to Sir Edward Grey giving a conditional acceptance. The reply was accompanied by a map showing the extent of the Greek claims in Asia Minor, as detailed above. Greece's intervention was made conditional on the simultaneous entry into the war of Roumania and Bulgaria.

Both these countries, however, having refused to move, the offer came to nothing and so Greece continued to remain neutral.

The immediate participation of Bulgaria on the side of the Entente was, in the opinion of the Greek General Staff, an essential condition, as it would have been running a very great risk for Greece to engage in military operations on the Danube as long as the attitude of Bulgaria remained uncertain. The Entente Governments, recognizing the validity of these objections, did not press the matter further for the moment.

Matters once more came to a head towards the end of February, when fresh pressure was put upon Greece by the British and French Governments to take part in the attack on the Dardanelles.

Again Colonel Metaxas was consulted and again he turned down the proposed scheme of operations as unsound. This happened on 15/28 February. This time, however, Venizelos appears to have been convinced by his military adviser's arguments and decided not to move.

Not for long, however.

The next day (16 Feb./1 March) there came a powerful appeal, forwarded through the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, from Clémenceau (at that time President of the Senatorial Commission on Foreign Affairs and War) urging Greece to come in at once and holding out hopes of the ultimate possession of Constantinople.¹ On the same day, M. Romanos, the Greek Minister in Paris, arrived in Athens in order to back up the appeal by verbal representations.

Under the influence of this combined pressure, Venizelos yielded. On 17 February/2 March he submitted to the King a fresh memorandum, recommending the immediate participation of Greece in the operations against the Dardanelles. It was assumed that Greece would get the compensation previously promised—that is, Smyrna. As regards Constantinople, Venizelos expressed the hope that that city would be internationalized, a solution which, next to actual annexation, was the most acceptable from the point of view of Greek interests. On the same day on which Venizelos submitted his memorandum to the King, he communicated to the Chief of Staff his decision to take part in the expedition, at the same time instructing him to draw up the necessary detailed plans. Metaxas, rather than accept the responsibility for what he regarded as an act of folly, at once resigned.

The King having upheld the views of his military advisers, Venizelos was himself forced to resign on 21 February/6 March.

After the final rupture between King Constantine and Venizelos, in October 1915, the Entente continued for some time to urge the Greek Government to intervene in the European conflict. As the position of Serbia

¹ Quoted in Ventiris, *Greece in 1910-20* (I, 276).

became more and more desperate, the solicitations of the Entente became increasingly pressing. Venizelos, then in opposition, suggested to the Allies that they should increase their offers of territorial compensation. As by now Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers, Great Britain and France proposed that Greece should also be promised Thrace, but to this both Russia and Italy demurred.¹

Finally, on 17 October, Great Britain offered Greece Cyprus. The offer was, however, refused by the Zaimis Government, which decided to remain neutral, and was not subsequently renewed.

From that moment onwards, the struggle between interventionists and non-interventionists in Greece became more and more bitter, finally culminating—in September 1916—in Venizelos setting up a revolutionary Government of his own at Salonica under the protection of the Allies, who had landed troops there in October 1915 in order to go to the help of Serbia.

With the expulsion of King Constantine by the Allies in June 1917 and the re-establishment of a Venizelist Government at Athens, the interventionist policy finally triumphed. Greece declared war on the Central Powers on 30 June 1917. The mobilization, which, up to that moment, had been confined to the part of Greek territory under the jurisdiction of the Salonica Revolutionary Government, was now extended to the rest of Greece.

¹ Driault, *Hist. diplom. de la Grèce* (V, 209) and the Russian State Papers edited by Adamov, *Die grosse Politik der Mächte im Weltkrieg*, (Zweiter Teil: Die Europäischen Mächte in Griechenland, Nos. 33–40, 4/17 Oct.–7/20 Oct. 1915). The idea of offering Greece Western Thrace was dropped after the refusal of the Zaimis Government to accept the Entente proposals (see dispatch of Minister Demidov to Sazonov, No. 480 of 7/20 Oct. 1915).

The Greek army, its strength thus increased from three to ten divisions, became a serious asset which was able to make a substantial contribution to the victory of the Allies on the Macedonian Front.

After the Armistice, at the request of the French, Greece also contributed an army corps to the ill-starred French expedition to the Ukraine in December 1918.

Greece had contributed all that was demanded of her by the Entente. It was natural that, after the victory of the Allies, she should claim her reward. In November 1918 Venizelos proceeded to Paris to lay before the Peace Conference Greece's territorial claims, amongst which figured, first and foremost, Smyrna.

Before proceeding further with the history of the negotiations which led up to the sanctioning of the Greek occupation of Smyrna, let us revert once more to the Entente's original offer of that territory to Greece in January-February 1915. One thing stands out clearly from the history of all those fateful negotiations—namely, that, at that date, there was unanimity among the three principal Allied Powers—Great Britain, France and Russia—on the question of Greece obtaining Smyrna and its hinterland as compensation for her participation in the war. At that time not a single one of the Allied Statesmen or Generals who subsequently, when the war was over, opposed the cession of Smyrna to Greece, raised a dissentient voice. Neither Mr. Winston Churchill (then First Lord of the Admiralty) nor Mr. Montagu nor General Sir Henry Wilson nor M. Poincaré nor M. Millerand seems, in 1915, to have expressed the smallest doubts as to the expediency of offering Greece

Western Asia Minor. The doubts, the objections, the risks, were first discovered after the war was over and the moment had arrived to honour the promise so unanimously made.

And yet one would have thought that most of the arguments subsequently invoked by Mr. Winston Churchill, Mr. Montagu and Sir Henry Wilson in December 1919 and again in May 1920, against Greece's being given Smyrna—the enormity of allowing the Greeks, only yesterday the despised subjects of the Sultan, to rule over a piece of the Turkish homeland, the martial qualities of the Turks, the financial strain and military hazards of an expedition in Asia Minor, the effect on the Indian Moslems, &c.—would have held equally good in 1915.

Reading the account of the momentous interview on 18 March 1920, at which Mr. Winston Churchill and Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson laid before Venizelos all the difficulties and risks involved in persisting in the Anatolian venture¹—the vastness of the country, the formidable opposition of a warlike race carrying on a guerilla warfare in its own country, the difficulties of transport, the financial burden involved in maintaining the Greek army for an indefinite period on a war-footing—one is inclined to ask: Why were not all these difficulties present to the minds of those who offered Greece Smyrna in 1915? Turkey at that time was not a *terra incognita* to the heads of the British General Staff, nor would it have required a very great effort of the imagination to have foreseen the seriousness and difficulty of the task which would devolve on Greece, when the hour of fulfilment should arrive.

¹ Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (pp. 37 and 383).

Ought not what Mr. Churchill only realized in April 1919 to have been a 'deadly step'¹ and 'a fatal event'²—with a Turkey prostrate and a Greek army still relatively fresh—to have been envisaged, from the very start, as a highly risky and problematical enterprise which could only be brought to a successful conclusion—as Colonel Metaxas rightly divined—by the combined military and financial resources of the Entente Powers and Greece?

The ease with which the Allied Governments acquiesced, in 1915, in the proposal to give Greece Smyrna and its hinterland contrasts strangely with the violent opposition which the same proposal evoked in both British and French official circles in 1919, when Venizelos presented for payment the cheque so rashly drawn four years previously.

The explanation is to be sought in the fact that, in January–February 1915, the Allied Governments, especially Great Britain, were all extremely anxious to bring about the immediate intervention of Greece in the war. Greece occupied a strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, her coasts and islands abounded in excellent harbours that could be used as bases for naval and military operations against Turkey or as secure refuges against German and Austrian submarines. Further, the Greek islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Tenedos commanded the entrance to the Dardanelles and their occupation was essential to any one directing an attack against the Straits.

But in order to induce Greece, only just emerged from the exhausting Balkan conflict of 1912–13, to face the hazards of a fresh war, it was obviously necessary to make it worth her while by offering her compensation

¹ Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (p. 365).

² *Ibid.* (p. 367).

such as would make a strong appeal to the imagination of the Greek people.

In the case of Greece, as in that of Italy and Roumania, war could only be popular if it were a war of liberation. Just as to the Italian people war meant the redemption of their brethren of Trieste and the Trentino from the Austrian yoke, just as to the people of Roumania it meant the liberation of the old Rouman lands of Transylvania and Bukovina, so in the case of Greece the only war-aim which was certain to arouse the enthusiasm of the Greek people was the liberation of those portions of the Hellenic race which were still under foreign rule.

At the beginning of the war 'Graecia irredempta' comprised the following territories : (1) Northern Epirus (forming part of Albania) ; (2) Western Thrace (at that time still Bulgarian) ; (3) Eastern Thrace, Constantinople, Western Asia Minor and Pontus (under Turkish rule) ; (4) the Dodecanese (under Italian occupation) ; and (5) Cyprus (in the possession of Great Britain).

The Allies, looking round, at the beginning of 1915, for a bait with which to draw Greece into the war, had to make their choice between all the above. What made them choose Smyrna, in preference to the other alternatives ?

Let us take each one in order.

Northern Epirus was already under Greek administration, Greece having reoccupied that territory in the autumn of 1914 at the request of the Powers, in order to put a stop to the chronic state of anarchy prevailing there since its cession to Albania. Hence an offer by the Powers to legalize Greece's possession of this small and mountainous district would not, in itself, have formed a sufficient inducement to make her willing to face all the risks of a fresh war.

Western Thrace at that date belonged to Bulgaria.

Bulgaria in January 1915 was still neutral, and the Entente Powers were doing their best to bring her into the war, or at least to purchase her neutrality, by concessions at the expense of Serbia and Greece in Macedonia. Under the circumstances, the Allies were obviously precluded from offering Greece a piece of Bulgarian territory.

Similar reasons ruled out the Dodecanese. At a moment when Italy was still neutral, there could be no question of asking her to sacrifice territory for the benefit of Greece. Further, Italy, who herself nourished ambitions in the direction of South-Western Anatolia, was hardly likely to want to give up to Greece such a valuable base as Rhodes and the other islands off the Anatolian coast.

Cyprus, the Greek population of which had long been agitating for union with the mother-country, was not included in Sir Edward Grey's original offer of January 1915, though subsequently (in October of the same year) it was offered to the Zaimis Government and refused.¹

To come to Turkey. Eastern Thrace, with Constantinople, was ruled out owing to the claims of Russia, who demanded Constantinople, with its hinterland and the region of the Straits, for herself.² Even if Russia had not been an obstacle, it would have been difficult to have offered Greece Eastern Thrace, a district not geographically contiguous to Greece, as long as Western Thrace remained Bulgarian. The Black Sea littoral (Pontus) was also out of the question as being too far away. Thus, by a process of elimination, there remained only Smyrna and Western Asia Minor.

¹ Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (I, 220-1).

² The claims of Russia to Constantinople and its hinterland were subsequently recognized by the secret Treaty of 6 March 1915.

It is obvious that the Allied Governments, in their anxiety to get Greece at all costs into the war, her co-operation being essential to the success of the Allied operations, both in Serbia and at the Dardanelles, shut their eyes to the risks which the acquisition of Smyrna was bound to entail, ultimately, for Greece. They may also have thought (an idea doubtless shared by Venizelos) that, with the greater part of Anatolia divided up between Russia, France and Italy,¹ Greece would not have much difficulty in maintaining her hold on Smyrna.

This does not, of course, diminish the Allies' responsibility for having offered Greece 'a pig in a poke'. Had the British and French Governments' military advisers been asked, in January 1915, to express a *technical* opinion on the Smyrna offer, they would doubtless have criticized it on very much the same grounds on which they opposed it at the Peace Conference, in 1919. But in 1915 they do not appear to have been consulted on the technical aspect of the question at all. The whole matter was handled by the politicians and diplomats as a purely political move to bring Greece into the war. At that moment it was nobody's interest to raise difficulties. In January 1915, the British and French General Staffs were only too anxious to secure the extra man-power, the harbours and the bases that Greece's entry into the war would place at their disposal. The rest did not matter to them.

The mistake, if it was one, was only discovered four years later, but then it was too late. Venizelos had

¹ It should however be remembered that, at the time when the British Government first made Greece the offer of Smyrna (24 Jan. 1915), nothing had yet been decided as regards the partition of the Ottoman Empire. France was still opposed to Russia getting Constantinople and the Straits, nor had Italy's share yet been fixed.

delivered the goods and naturally demanded payment. Had he not done so, he would have been accused by his own people—with some reason—of having made a fool's bargain.

Although, after the refusal of the Zaimis Government to go to the assistance of Serbia, the Entente's original offer of Smyrna to Greece lapsed, it may be said to have automatically revived after Greece's entry into the war in 1917, although no formal renewal of the offer appears to have been made.

Such, at any rate, was the position taken up by Venizelos in a letter and memorandum addressed to Mr. Lloyd George on 2 November 1918,¹ in which he reasserted Greece's claim to the whole of Western Anatolia, from Makri opposite Rhodes to Artaki on the Sea of Marmara.

In principle, the Greek claim was not disputed, except by Italy, who claimed Smyrna and the whole of South-Western Anatolia in virtue of the Treaty of St. Jean-de-Maurienne of April 1917.

Of the representatives of the Four Great Powers on the Supreme Council, Lloyd George and Clémenceau, from the very outset, supported the Greek claims. President Wilson was also won over, in spite of considerable opposition on the part of the American experts. Italy alone remained recalcitrant, and her consent to the Greek occupation of Smyrna in May 1919 was only obtained *pro forma*.

The landing of Greek troops at Smyrna was sanctioned as a temporary measure by the Supreme Council, on 12 May 1919, and was carried out three days later. The ostensible reason given for authorizing the occupation was in order to protect the Greek and Armenian

¹ Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, 21).

population against massacre ; the real reason, however, was the desire of President Wilson, Lloyd George and Clémenceau to forestall any attempt on the part of Italy to occupy Smyrna and so create a *fait accompli*.

The step was taken against the advice of the British War Office, which protested.¹

On 19 May, Mustafa Kemal, at that time newly appointed Inspector-General of the Turkish forces in North-Eastern Anatolia, landed at Samsoun with the connivance of Italy,² in order to organize the Turkish National Movement in resistance to the decisions of the Powers. By December the whole of Anatolia was ablaze. The disarming of the Turkish army had never been anything but purely nominal, even in those regions which were under the effective occupation of the Allied troops ;³ in the interior it was not so much as attempted. The dumps and depots, in many cases, were actually under the guard of Turkish sentries and were constantly being broken into.⁴

With the outbreak of the Kemalist Movement, any semblance of disarmament in the interior of Anatolia at once ceased, while arms and munitions poured in

¹ Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (p. 366).

² Count Sforza, the Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople, is known to have been privy to the departure of Kemal for Anatolia and knew of his intention to resist the Allied projects. Count Sforza, in his book, *Les bâtisseurs de l'Europe*, p. 348, makes no secret of the encouragement given by Italy to the Turkish National Movement.

³ Field-Marshal Sir H. Wilson, *Diaries* (vol. II, p. 229) : ' March 3, 1920 . . . The Frocks (i.e. the members of the Supreme Council) . . . are completely out of touch with realities, they seem to think that their writ runs in Turkey in Asia. We have never, even directly after the Armistice, attempted to go into the backward parts.'

⁴ Thus the depot at Tashkishla, in the heart of Constantinople, was broken into and arms abstracted.

over the Russian frontier and through the port of Adalia, in the Italian zone of occupation.

Meanwhile, the discussion of the peace terms to be imposed on Turkey went on merrily in Paris. These included the creation of an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdish State in the north-eastern vilayets; the cession of Eastern Thrace and the Smyrna district¹ to Greece; the demilitarization of Constantinople and the Straits Zone; the annexation of Cilicia to France; and the partition of Anatolia into economic spheres of influence between Great Britain, Italy and France.

All these plans were strongly opposed by the British General Staff on the ground that they were impracticable without an increase in the strength of the British army of occupation in Turkey—an increase which the British Government was on no account prepared to countenance.²

In France the opposition was even stronger. Influential political, military and financial circles conducted a powerful press campaign in favour of conciliation with Turkey and against the policy of partition. With the fall of Clémenceau and the advent of the Millerand Government, French policy underwent a complete change and became openly hostile both to the Greek claims and to the other Allied projects for the dismemberment of Turkey. In December 1919, the French Government opened direct negotiations with Kemal through the High Commissioner in Syria, M. Picot,³ and agreed to the retrocession of Cilicia, which the French had taken over from the British in September 1919.

¹ Nominally under a provisional mandate.

² Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (p. 371).

³ Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, p. 134).

In March (24 March 1920), Millerand informed M. Romanos, the Greek Minister in Paris, that the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople had unanimously reported that it would be impossible to impose the proposed peace terms on Turkey without a fresh war and the dispatch of an Allied expeditionary force to Anatolia¹ and that, in view of this report, he had asked the Supreme Council to revise its decisions. Poincaré also supported the demand for revision in a series of articles on the Eastern Question published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*; he openly told Venizelos that, in his opinion, the Powers had committed a serious blunder in authorizing Greece to occupy Smyrna.²

Venizelos, however, who was bent at all costs on obtaining Smyrna because of the serious reaction that failure to do so would have had on the internal situation in Greece, succeeded in overcoming this opposition. Strong pressure was brought to bear on Millerand by Clémenceau and Briand. The decisive argument invoked, which seems to have broken down the official—though not the powerful unofficial—French opposition, was that, if Smyrna was not given to Greece, the Venizelist régime in Greece would collapse.³

The Allied Powers were under strong obligations to Venizelos for having brought Greece into the war in the teeth of the opposition of King Constantine and the anti-interventionist party in Greece. To have let him down now would have savoured of betrayal.

¹ Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, p. 137).

² Ibid. (II, p. 140).

³ See dispatch of 24 March 1920 of M. Romanos to M. Venizelos quoted in Frangoulis, vol. II, pp. 137–8: 'J'ai dit à M. Millerand que s'il ne faisait pas preuve de plus de justice à l'égard de la Grèce il ébranlerait le régime au détriment du pays et au détriment de la France.'

Mr. Lloyd George, in spite of the opposition of both the War and India Offices, strongly upheld the Greek claims and was able finally to carry the British Government with him.¹

On 10 August 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, the United States alone abstaining. Greece obtained Thrace and Smyrna; an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan were created; Constantinople and the Straits were demilitarized; the whole of Turkey was parcelled out into economic zones of influence among the Powers. All this, of course, on paper.

M. Poincaré announced, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, that the Treaty would prove to be as fragile as the porcelain vases made in the famous Sèvres factory where the Treaty had been signed.

The general attitude of British and French—more especially, military—circles towards the Treaty was that Greece was up against a stone wall and was free to bang her head against it, if she chose.

Such was the position—already discouraging enough, it must be admitted—on the eve of Venizelos's fall.

In November there came the first crash. The Venizelist Party was completely defeated at the General Election of 1/14 November 1920. In December, King Constantine was recalled from exile by a plebiscite. Public opinion in England and France, strongly prejudiced against that monarch by his refusal to join the Allies in 1915 and his alleged pro-German sympathies, became estranged. The British and French Governments seized eagerly upon the pretext in order to liberate

¹ Mr. Harold Nicolson (at that time Secretary to the British Delegation) makes it quite clear, in his book, *Peacemaking 1919*, p. 312, that the British Delegation was fully aware that the refusal to give Smyrna to Greece would have involved the immediate downfall of Venizelos.

themselves from their irksome alliance with Greece and climb out of their engagements.

The revisionists in France triumphed. The French Government at once reopened negotiations with Kemal. An agreement was signed at Angora on 30 October 1921. Shortly afterwards, the French evacuated Cilicia, handing over to the Turks the whole of their munitions and dumps in South-Eastern Anatolia.

Pressure meanwhile was repeatedly brought to bear by the Allied Governments to induce the Greek Government to withdraw from Asia Minor. In the case of the British Government, however, this pressure was somewhat half-hearted; it was felt that, as long as peace had not yet been concluded with Turkey, the presence of the Greek army on Turkish soil was still useful in covering the Allied Army of Occupation at Constantinople.

The Greek Government, on the other hand, could not bring itself to face evacuation, fearing the reaction this would have on Greek public opinion. It therefore hung on, like Mr. Micawber, in the hope that something would turn up, or that there might come about a change of attitude on the part of the British Government. It received a certain amount of unofficial encouragement from Mr. Lloyd George.

After some ineffectual negotiations in London in February–March 1921 and an unsuccessful attempt to force an issue with Kemal by an advance on Angora in August of the same year, the Greek army relapsed into a waiting attitude, until finally it was attacked by Kemal in August 1922 and completely routed. The debris of the army withdrew to the Aegean Islands and Thrace, carrying along with it the whole Christian population of Western Asia Minor.

A revolution, headed by Colonels Plastiras and Gonatas,


broke out among the troops at Chios and Mytilene. The Government was overthrown, and King Constantine for the second time deposed and driven into exile. In November 1922, a Revolutionary Tribunal was set up to try the principal members of the late Cabinet and General Hadjanestis, who had been Commander-in-Chief at the moment when Kemal launched his offensive. Five Ministers and the general were condemned to death and shot.

Such was the tragic ending of Greece's adventure in Asia Minor.

On whom must the responsibility for the disaster rest? Greek opinion is and will always be sharply divided on this point, at any rate during the lifetime of the present generation.

Venizelist writers are inclined to put all the blame on the Royalist Party which, by estranging the Allies through the restoration of King Constantine and by their mismanagement of the campaign in Anatolia, destroyed the work of their predecessors. This point of view, of course, assumes rather too readily that both the diplomatic and military position, before the fall of Venizelos in November 1920, was built on so solid a foundation as to have ensured Greece's being able to maintain her hold on her conquests in Anatolia.

The apologists of the opposite side put the principal blame on Venizelos, whom they accuse of having gone to Asia Minor in the face of the explicit warnings of the highest military authority, both Greek and foreign. According to them, the whole Venizelist policy was tainted with original sin—*péchait par la base*, as the French would say—and so was bound to end in failure and military disaster. They deny that the political and



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military conditions under which Venizelos had entered on the expedition were such as to ensure the success and permanence of Greece's establishment in Anatolia.

Foreign writers, who should be the natural mediators between the two points of view, have, for the most part, evaded the question of fixing responsibility. While they are almost unanimous in condemning Venizelos for wanting to go to Smyrna in 1919, they are almost equally unanimous in supporting his interventionist policy in 1915, thus tacitly approving of Venizelos's acceptance of the Allied offer of 'important concessions on the coast of Asia Minor', as promised by Sir Edward Grey. They do not attempt to reconcile the contradiction involved.

The verdict of history will probably be that all parties—Venizelos, his opponents, the Entente Governments—must bear a share of the blame. How should this be apportioned?

I have already summarized the position, as it presented itself at the beginning of 1915—the three Allied Governments, Great Britain, France and Russia—all agreed in offering Greece Smyrna, the Allied military advisers acquiescing, Venizelos persuaded to accept, the Chief of the Greek General Staff, backed by the King, alone dissenting.

Did Venizelos make a mistake when he accepted the Allies' offer? I think, as things *then* stood, no.

Venizelos was firmly convinced—and he was probably right—that it was in Greece's interest to intervene in the war on the side of the Allies *on general grounds unconnected with the question of ultimate compensation*. Here was a unique opportunity, as he saw it, of striking a death-blow at one of her two hereditary enemies, Turkey (the other, Bulgaria, was still neutral, and being assiduously wooed by the Entente as a prospective ally). Turkey's attitude, ever since the end of the Balkan

wars, had been a constant menace to Greek naval supremacy in the Aegean and to the security of the Aegean Islands. She had forced Greece to embark on a costly competition in naval armaments, in which the latter, as being the smaller and poorer country, was bound to be ultimately worsted. Thus a war against Turkey, waged in alliance with three of the most powerful nations in Europe, was an opportunity not to be missed.

But, as Venizelos was fully aware, it would have been impossible to secure the support of Greek public opinion for a fresh war, so soon after the end of the previous exhausting struggle in the Balkans, unless it could be represented as being a war of liberation. The only quarter in which compensation could be obtained at that moment was, as we have seen, Smyrna. He therefore deliberately shut his eyes to the objections of his military advisers, however valid these may have been from a technical point of view, and decided to go ahead, taking what was offered and trusting to luck for the situation to develop in such a way as to preclude the difficulties anticipated by his Chief of Staff. The principal consideration for the moment, as he saw it, was to get into the war and help to put Turkey *hors de combat*. The question of compensation was, in his view, secondary.

Besides, in 1915, there was every reason to hope that Turkey would either be completely wiped off the map or else so reduced in size as to become, in future, a negligible quantity. It seemed probable that Russia would get Constantinople with the neighbouring part of Eastern Thrace, and a large part of North-Eastern Anatolia,¹ while France was to get Cilicia and Syria,

¹ See Sazonov, *Les années fatales* (p. 275-9). Agreement concerning the division was not actually reached till April 1916, but the exchange of views on the subject had already begun at the end of 1914.

Great Britain the Arab provinces, and Italy the region round Adalia.¹

With Anatolia parcelled out between the principal Powers, it did not seem an impossible task for Greece to be able to maintain herself at Smyrna, with a Turkey practically reduced to the vilayets of Konia, Castamouni, Sivas and a portion of Brusa.

By the end of the war, however, the situation had undergone a radical change owing to a new factor which neither Venizelos nor the Governments of the Western Powers had foreseen at the time of the negotiations in 1915. This new factor was the elimination of Russia as a claimant to Turkish territory.

In 1919, not only was there no longer any Tsarist Russia to take over Constantinople, the Straits and the Armenian vilayets and pursue the traditional Moscovite policy of browbeating the Turk, but the new Russia of the Soviets, which had taken its place, far from wanting to annex Turkish territory, had now become Turkey's best friend and ready to give her every possible assistance in her struggle for independence against the 'capitalistic' Western Powers.

The enormous importance of this change in the attitude of Russia towards Turkey and the vacuum which it created in the original scheme for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was not, at the time, fully appreciated either by Venizelos or by the other Allied statesmen, who saw in Russia's withdrawal merely the elimination of an unwelcome competitor for Turkish territory. Not only was the material assistance given by the Soviets to Mustafa Kemal during the earlier stages of his struggle very considerable, but the friendly attitude of Russia towards the Turkish National Movement was an asset of enormous political and moral

¹ Treaty of London of 26 April 1915.

importance. Kemal was free to conduct his operations against the Greeks and Allies with the knowledge that his rear was safe from attack and that, however stringent a blockade might be enforced by the Allies in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the Russian frontier always lay open for the passage of munitions and supplies.

Besides the defection of Russia, another unfavourable element in the situation, from the Greek point of view, was the hostile attitude of Italy.

Italy was a claimant to Smyrna in virtue of the Treaty of St. Jean-de-Maurienne of 19 April 1917. Although the United States refused to be bound by the provisions of the Secret Treaties concluded between the Allies before the entry of America into the war, and although the non-ratification of the Treaty of St. Jean-de-Maurienne by Russia had furnished the British and French Governments with a legal excuse for declaring it null and void, Italy persisted in maintaining her claim to Smyrna under the provisions of that Treaty at the Peace Conference. The proposal of Great Britain, France and the United States to cede Smyrna to Greece met with strong opposition from Italy, and the latter's hostility was a factor that had to be reckoned with, even after the Greek claim had been formally allowed by the Supreme Council.

Venizelos, faced with the vacuum created by the defection of Russia, found it necessary to fall back on a new proposal to create two buffer-states—one in the West and the other in the East of Anatolia.¹

In the West, to fill the gap resulting from Russia's renunciation of sovereignty over Constantinople and the Straits, he proposed that that city, together with

¹ See memorandum of 2 November 1918 addressed to Mr. Lloyd George, quoted in Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, 21-7).

the adjoining portion of Eastern Thrace and the Straits, should be placed under the administration of the League of Nations, or, failing that, of an International Administration composed of delegates of the Powers principally interested in the navigation of the Straits, i.e. Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Roumania, Greece and Bulgaria.

In the East, he proposed the creation of an independent or mandated Armenian State, to include both Turkish and Russian Armenia. The proposal to include Russian Armenia reveals the weak point in the whole scheme. Without the inclusion of Russian Armenia, Venizelos admitted that the new state would not be '*viable*', seeing that, as he himself states in his memorandum, 'a large part' of the population of Turkish Armenia was composed of Turks and Kurds bitterly hostile to the Armenians. Even 'a large part' was very much of an understatement, for nearly the whole of the population *at that date* was composed of Moslems, as there were hardly any Armenians left in the Eastern vilayets of Turkey, the majority having been massacred during the course of the war.

Nothing shows up more strikingly the inability of the 'frocks' (as the Allied Plenipotentiaries were picturesquely dubbed by Sir Henry Wilson) at the Peace Conference to look the facts of the Near Eastern situation in the face—a situation which others outside the circle of the Big Four, such as M. Poincaré, Count Sforza, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson and Harold Nicolson,¹ saw much more clearly—than this futile proposal to create an Armenian State out of the miserable remnants of the Armenian nation, composed of a few hundred thousand refugees scattered about in Syria, Russia,

¹ See H. Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (Book II, chaps. III–VIII *passim*).

Cilicia and various parts of Anatolia,¹ who were to be called in to be installed as rulers over an immense tract of mountainous country, peopled by wild and martial races whose principal sport for generations had been massacring Armenians.

Of all the weak points of the Treaty of Sèvres—and there were many—this was certainly the weakest. It is surprising that so acute a mind as that of Venizelos should have been led into treating the proposed Armenian State as a serious element in his calculations. Had the United States been prepared to step into the breach left vacant by Russia and take over the mandate for Constantinople and Armenia, there might have been some grounds for hoping that Armenia would be able to maintain an artificial, if harassed, existence. But the discovery that it would require anything up to five American divisions in order effectively to occupy Armenia,² not to speak of an expenditure of many millions of dollars, for which the American people would have to foot the bill,³ though it did not at first cool the ardour of President Wilson, excluded all possibility of such a scheme receiving the approval of Congress, as the more practical-minded of President Wilson's advisers, like Lansing, Bliss and Benson, at once realized.

The arguments in favour of the creation of Armenia, which Venizelos put forward in his memoranda to the Peace Conference, were founded on somewhat optimistic

¹ According to a memorandum submitted to the Peace Conference by the Armenian Delegation in 1919, the Armenian population of North-Eastern Anatolia in 1914 was 1,535,000. Of these some 650,000 perished during the war. Of the remaining 880,000, nearly all had been deported to other parts of Turkey or were refugees in Russia. In the three vilayets of Erzeroum, Van and Bitlis, there was not a single Armenian left at the end of the war.

² Field-Marshal Sir H. Wilson, *Diaries* (II, 188).

³ Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations* (pp. 142-3).

estimates of the Armenian population, based, no doubt, on the figures supplied to him by the Armenian Delegation in Paris.

Thus his memo of 2 November 1918 to Mr. Lloyd George contains the following statement :

Le maintien de l'Empire Ottoman après que la Syrie, la Palestine et le Mésopotamie en seraient de fait détachées, contiendrait pour l'avenir des germes de nouveaux conflits.

En réalité, cet Empire contiendrait encore 1,500,000 Arméniens et 2,473,000 Grecs. Tel était au moins leur nombre avant la guerre,¹ car il est difficile de préciser jusqu'où a été l'extermination de ces populations de la part des Turcs pendant la guerre.

And further on :

Ce n'est qu'ainsi que cet État (i.e. Armenia), lequel nécessairement comprendra aussi des populations kurdes² mêlées aux Arméniens de Turquie, pourra s'étayer sur une majorité arménienne et devenir viable.

The same error is repeated in his memo of 27 October 1919, also addressed to Mr. Lloyd George.

Le nombre des survivants arméniens dans les vilayets arméniens (Erzeroum, Kharpout, Diarbekir, Bitlis et Van) n'est pas connu exactement mais il est à espérer qu'il monte au moins à 1,500,000,

¹ The figures supplied by the Armenian Delegation to the Peace Conference are the following :

	Pre-war (1914)	Losses (1915-18)	Survivors (1918)
Eastern vilayets	1,535,000	655,000	880,000
Constantinople, Smyrna, Syria	230,000	—	230,000
Rest of Turkey	335,000	185,000	150,000
Total	<u>2,100,000</u>	<u>840,000</u>	<u>1,260,000</u>

Of the 1,260,000 survivors, only 120,000 were still *in situ* in the Eastern vilayets (Diarbekir and Kharpout). Some 760,000 were refugees in Russia or deportees in various parts of Turkey.

² The Moslem population of the Eastern vilayets was given by the Armenian Delegation at the Peace Conference as 1,875,000.

—a strange mistake considering that he gives the same figure as being that of the *pre-war* Armenian population of the *whole* of the Ottoman Empire (Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia excluded).

In his memorandum of 30 December 1918 to the Peace Conference he goes even further, actually suggesting that the vilayet of Adana (Cilicia) should also be included in Armenia, which, in that case, would have been made to extend right across Anatolia as far as the shores of the Mediterranean.

This 'conception' of a large Armenian State, absorbing nearly the whole of Eastern Anatolia, formed an essential part of Venizelos's scheme for reducing Turkey to such narrow limits, that the latter would no longer constitute a menace to the existence of a Greek enclave round Smyrna. According to this plan, Turkey was only to survive as a small state in the Central Anatolian plateau. On paper, in the pretty coloured maps specially prepared for the Conference, the thing looked feasible and convincing.

The unfortunate part of the whole business was that this plan was purely theoretical and took no account of the real facts of the situation. The numerical inferiority of the Armenians, their dispersal in the midst of a warlike and hostile Moslem population, the inaccessible nature of the country—all these things, it must be admitted, rendered the creation of an independent Armenian State, on the lines imagined by Venizelos, a chimera incapable of practical realization.

Let us now turn our attention to Western Anatolia, the whole of which, west of a line stretching from Makri opposite Rhodes to Artaki on the Sea of Marmara, was claimed for Greece by Venizelos at the Peace Conference.

In order to enable one to form a just estimate of Greece's ability to absorb this vast territory of approximately 125,000 square kilometres (= 80,000 square miles), it is necessary to take account of certain basic factors, because these formed the bed-rock of solid fact on which the hypothetical and purely abstract schemes of the statesmen at the Peace Conference were ultimately wrecked.

What were the respective areas and populations of Greece and Anatolia? What were the relative strengths of the Greek and Turkish elements in the population of Anatolia? How were these distributed? What proportion of the Christian population was capable of bearing arms? What was the burden of defence likely to be thrown on Greece by such an extension of her territory and frontiers?

All the above are highly relevant points for any one desirous of forming an objective opinion based not on sentiment or political prejudice but on facts.

Before the European War, the area of Greece was 122,000 square kilometres (= 78,000 square miles) with a population of 4,817,000, of whom about 400,000, or one-twelfth, were Moslems (Turks and Albanians).¹ The length of the land-frontier was 791 kilometres.² The potential strength of the army and navy, on a war-footing, might be reckoned at 350,000,³ though the actual forces mobilized were in the neighbourhood of 300,000.

After the accessions of territory secured in 1919-20 as the result of the Treaties of Neuilly and Sèvres, the

¹ 380,000 Turks, mostly in Macedonia, and 20,000 Albanians in Epirus.

² With Albania 270 kilometres, Serbia 225, Bulgaria 296.

³ Calculated as follows: Total population, 4,817,000, less 400,000 Moslems = 4,417,000. Eight per cent of 4,417,000 = 353,360.

area of Greece had increased to 171,000¹ square kilometres (= 109,400 square miles), with a population of 6,477,000,² of whom about 1,100,000, or one-sixth, were Moslems.³ The length of the land-frontier had expanded to 1,750 kilometres, of which 1,310⁴ in Europe and 440 in Asia. The potential strength of the army and navy, on a war-footing, had risen to 430,000.⁵

Let us now turn to Anatolia, the country whose partial conquest was undertaken by Greece during the years 1919-22.

By Anatolia we mean the whole of Turkey in Asia, as it was before the Great War, from the Aegean to the Russian frontier.

The area of this region is approximately 520,000 square kilometres (330,000 square miles).

Although absolutely reliable figures are not available for the pre-war population of Anatolia, competent authorities⁶ estimate it at 11,000,000 to 12,000,000, of

¹ 150,833 square kilometres in Europe and about 20,000 in Asia.

² 5,531,474 in Europe (800,000 Moslems) and 946,000 in Asia (590,000 Greeks and Armenians, 300,000 Turks, 56,000 foreigners and Jews).

³ 1,080,000 Turks (principally in Macedonia, Thrace and Asia Minor) and 20,000 Albanians in Epirus.

⁴ With Albania 270, Serbia 245, Bulgaria 705, Turkey in Europe 90.

⁵ Calculated as follows: Total population, 6,477,000, less 1,000,000 Moslems = 5,377,000. Eight per cent of 5,377,000 = 430,000. The strength of the Greek army actually mobilized during the Anatolian War of 1919-22 was 233,000 (see Dousmanis, *Ἡ ἐσωτερικὴ ἀποικία τῆς Μικρασιατικῆς ἐμπλοκῆς* (The internal aspect of the Anatolian imbroglio), p. 33).

⁶ Maccas, *L'Hellénisme de l'Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1919), pp. 78-87, and A. Souliotis, *Οἱ κάτοικοι τῆς Μικρᾶς Ἀσίας* (The inhabitants of Asia Minor) (Athens, 1921, pp. 49-50), who base their figures on the Turkish census of 1912, give about 10,000,000, omitting, however, the Eastern vilayets (Erzeroum, Bitlis, Van, Mamouret-

whom 8,000,000 were Moslems (Turks, Kurds, Lazes, Circassians, &c.), 1,500,000 Greeks, 1,200,000 Armenians and 500,000 miscellaneous (Jews, foreign subjects, Levantines, Nestorians, &c.).

The Greek population was not concentrated within a given area but scattered here and there, mainly in the coastal districts: some 800,000 on the Aegean seaboard (the Ionia and Aeolis of classical times), 270,000 in the region of the Straits comprising the Asiatic suburbs of Constantinople, Ismidt Peninsula, southern shore of the Sea of Marmara and Troad), 230,000 on the Black Sea littoral (Pontus), and the rest in Central, Southern and Eastern Anatolia.

The above figures underwent considerable modification during the war as the result, on the one hand, of the massacres and deportations to which the Greek and Armenian population were subjected, and, on the other, of the Russian invasion of North-Eastern Anatolia, during which a large part of the Moslem population of those regions perished.

The losses during the war, due to the above causes, are estimated at 800,000 Armenians, 600,000 Moslems and 300,000 Greeks.

The total Greek population of Anatolia, at the moment of the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres (10 Aug. 1920), probably did not much exceed 1,200,000, distributed as follows: 800,000 in Western Asia Minor and the region of the Straits, 200,000 in the Black Sea provinces and 200,000 in the Central, Eastern and Southern vilayets.

The area claimed by Venizelos at the Peace Conference ¹

el-Aziz, Diarbekir). The population of the latter, according to the figures of the memorandum of the Armenian Delegation to the Peace Conference, was about 2,600,000.

¹ Memorandum of 30 December 1918.

included practically the whole of the vilayet of Aidin, the independent Sandjak of the Dardanelles and the Western portion of the vilayet of Brusa. This comprised an area of approximately 125,000 square kilometres (80,000 square miles), with a population of about 830,000¹ Greeks and Armenians and 1,300,000 *Moslems*.

This was the area, in exchange for which Venizelos had originally proposed, in 1915, that Greece should cede the Macedonian districts of Cavalla and Drama to Bulgaria.²

In order to strengthen the racial basis of his claim, which admittedly was somewhat weak—the Greek population being only in the proportion of 8:13 as compared with the Moslems—Venizelos ingeniously argued, in his memorandum to the Peace Conference, that, *for statistical purposes*, the islands off the Anatolian coast, from Imbros in the North to Castelorizzo in the South, should be reckoned as part of Western Asia Minor, to which the islands in question geographically belonged. As the population of these islands was predominantly Greek (370,000 Greeks as against 130,000 Turks, Jews and foreigners),³ this brought up the total of the Greek population of Western Asia Minor, on this somewhat hypothetical basis, to round about 1,200,000.

He made the further suggestion that, in the event of the territory in question being annexed to Greece, it would be possible to arrange for a process of racial redistribution by a mutual exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations left stranded on the wrong side of

¹ About 800,000 Greeks and 30,000 Armenians.

² Driault, *Hist. diplom. de la Grèce* (V, pp. 177 and 343); Makkas, *L'Hellénisme de l'Asie Mineure* (p. 156).

³ See Memo of 30 December 1918. The islands included were: Imbros, Tenedos, Chios, Mytilene, Samos, Icaria, the Dodecanese and Castelorizzo.

the border, as had been done in the case of the Greeks and Bulgars in Eastern Roumelia, Macedonia and Western Thrace.¹

The Supreme Council whittled down the Greek claims to an area of about 20,000 square kilometres (12,800 square miles) round Smyrna, including only those *casas* in which the Greek element constituted the majority, or at any rate a large minority, of the population.²

The total population of the region thus finally assigned to Greece was approximately 950,000, of whom 550,000 were Greeks, 20,000 Armenians, 300,000 *Turks* and the rest Jews, Levantines and foreign subjects.

This Greek enclave of 20,000 square kilometres, surrounded on three sides—North, South and East—by Turkish territory, resembled a narrow wedge driven into the heart of Anatolia.

The rest of Anatolia—480,000 square kilometres (307,000 square miles), with a population of 8,000,000 to 9,000,000, *seven-eighths Moslem*—save for the eastern portion of the vilayet of Adana (Cilicia), which was ceded to France, and an undefined region³ in the North-East, which was to constitute the new State of Armenia, was left to Turkey.

Such were the territorial adjustments contemplated by the Treaty of Sèvres, as regards Anatolia.

In Turkey-in-Europe, Greece received Eastern Thrace as far as the Tchataldja Lines.

Given the unfavourable physical factors—the vastness and inhospitable nature of the country, the numerical

¹ Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, 25 and 31).

² Smyrna, Vourla, Aivali, Tchesmé, Kara-Bounar, Sivri Hissar, Phocaea, Koush Adasi, Mainemen, Baidir, Magnesia, Tiré, Endemish, Bergam, Ak-Hissar and Cassaba.

³ Parts of the vilayets of Trebizond, Erzeroum, Bitlis and Van (Treaty of Sèvres, art. 89).

inferiority of the Greek and Armenian population, the numerical superiority and warlike character of the Moslems, Greece's limited resources in man-power, and the great extent of her European land-frontier; given also the changed political conditions, so different from those contemplated in 1915—the elimination of Russia, the open hostility of Italy, the veiled obstruction of France, the war-weariness of Great Britain—one may well ask the question: Was Venizelos wise in insisting on his pound of flesh, and in offering to shoulder the white man's burden in Anatolia?

I think there can only be one answer: No. In 1915, Venizelos had seemed justified in accepting Sir Edward Grey's offer, because a far more radical solution of the Turkish question had at that time been in contemplation. Further, though Smyrna may have been the bait used to attract the masses of the Greek people, Greece's principal interest in entering the war (which no one understood better than Venizelos himself) was not so much the acquisition of fresh territory as the consolidation of her recently acquired territories in Macedonia and the Aegean Islands, a result successfully achieved in the Great War with the help of the Allies, by the crushing defeat of Turkey and Bulgaria.

This main object once achieved, one might have expected that Venizelos, who had on previous occasions (e.g. in 1913) shown such statesmanlike moderation in the moment of victory, would have weighed more carefully the pros and cons involved in the annexation of Smyrna, in view of the changed and distinctly unfavourable conditions prevailing at the end of the war.

Colonel Metaxas had warned him in 1915 of all the difficulties that a war of conquest in Anatolia would entail. Those difficulties had not diminished in 1919; they had, if anything, increased.

The acquisition of Thrace and Smyrna meant an enormous complication of the problem of defence. In 1913, Greece, with a land-frontier of 791 kilometres and a mobilizable population of 350,000, could put into the field 442 soldiers for every kilometre of frontier. In 1920, with a frontier increased to 1,750 kilometres (1,310 in Europe and 440 in Asia) and a mobilizable population of 430,000, she could only muster 246 men for every kilometre of frontier (see Appendices III and IV).

In the Asiatic territory which she proposed to take over, only the Greek and Armenian element—that is, barely five-ninths of the total population—could be relied on in the event of war with Turkey or Bulgaria. The remaining four-ninths, consisting of Turks, were bitterly hostile to Greek rule, and were sure to become a source of anxiety and weakness, in the event of Greece becoming involved in hostilities against her Turkish neighbour. In 1919–22 the Greek army in Asia Minor discovered, to its cost, that, as soon as it got away from the coast, it was operating in an enemy's country. The *zeibeks* and other guerillas, who harassed the Greek lines of communication, were mostly recruited from the Turkish villages within the Greek Zone.

Further, the Christian population of Western Asia Minor—both Greek and Armenian—was mainly urban and notoriously unwarlike. The local levies would have been of very little use against the Turks.¹

¹ During the Greek occupation of Smyrna, the local Greek population were very averse to military service. Even during the campaign of 1921–2, when the danger threatening the Greek occupation had become imminent, there were reckoned to be 20,000 defaulters and deserters in the Smyrna district. This was one of the principal reasons why M. Stergiades, Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna in 1922, turned down as impracticable the proposal made to set up a local Government of National Defence to take the place of the Hellenic Administration and army.

What power of resistance could this isolated outpost of Greek territory offer to the solid Turkish masses—six to seven millions strong—which surrounded it on every side?

As for crushing out all resistance, it had taken France fifteen years to conquer Algeria and almost as many for Morocco, while Italy had required twenty to subdue Tripoli.

It was 600 kilometres from Smyrna to Angora, 900 to Sivas, 1,600 to the Russian frontier. Napoleon, as we have seen, had marched 900 to Moscow and had been beaten in the end. The Greek successes in May 1919, June 1920 and July 1921 were as indecisive and exercised as little effect on the final issue of the campaign as Napoleon's victories at Smolensk and Borodino had done.

It is true that Venizelos was deeply committed to the Anatolian venture and doubtless found it difficult to draw back. He was hampered by considerations of internal politics. His whole policy since 1915—the policy of intervention on the side of the Allies—had been justified in the eyes of a large section of the Greek people by the promise of Smyrna and the historic shores of Ionia. To have gone through all the vicissitudes of the last five years—civil strife, foreign occupation, the Macedonian, Ukrainian and Anatolian campaigns—only to be told at the end that the Promised Land was not to be theirs might, he reasonably feared, have strained the loyalty of even his most devoted followers, while it would have furnished fresh arguments to his opponents.

It was fear of the possible reaction on the internal situation in Greece which finally turned the scales in favour of granting Venizelos's request for Smyrna, in spite of all the doubts and misgivings concerning the wisdom of the step. It is the final appeal to this argu-

ment which, in the end, prevailed on both the British and French Governments to withdraw their opposition. As early as 14 April 1919, Harold Nicolson, Secretary to the British Delegation at the Peace Conference, noted in his diary :

We shall be unable to put the Greeks into Smyrna—I mean keep them there. They can't hold it without Allied support or unless the whole of Turkey behind them is split up among the Allied Powers. *Yet if they do not get Smyrna Venizelos will fall from power.*¹

A year later, when Millerand, in an interview with M. Romanos, the Greek Minister in Paris, on 24 March 1920, announced his intention of proposing to the Supreme Council a revision of the Turkish peace terms, Romanos warned the French Prime Minister that, if he persisted in his hostility to the Greek claims, it would mean the downfall of the Venizelist régime in Greece, to the great detriment of French interests.²

On both occasions it was this appeal to the Allies' solidarity with the Venizelist régime which finally turned the scales. It was the desire not to endanger Venizelos's position in Greece, after the signal services he had rendered to the Allied cause during the war, coupled with the equally weighty consideration that, in order to secure Great Britain's support on the Rhine, France must be prepared to humour her British ally in the Near East, which seems to have finally overcome the opposition of the French Premier. As for Mr. Lloyd George, notwithstanding the misgivings of many of his colleagues, he was an early convert to the Greek point of view.

Venizelos in 1920 was admittedly in an awkward dilemma. If retreat from the position he had taken up over the question of Smyrna was, on account of his

¹ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (p. 312).

² Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, 138).

internal embarrassments, already difficult enough in 1919—that is, before the Greek troops had yet landed at Smyrna—it had become doubly so after a year's occupation and warfare in Asia Minor. The withdrawal of the Greek army from Asia Minor, even if effected in the spring of 1920 when Venizelos was still in power, would have exposed the local Greek and Armenian populations to the same reprisals which accompanied the evacuation, two years later, in 1922. Venizelos fully realized this and it was this humanitarian aspect of the case on which he specially insisted, in a letter addressed, in 1920, to the *Daily Telegraph*, in reply to an article in that paper urging the withdrawal of the Greek troops from Smyrna.¹

But, though one should not underestimate the difficulties of Venizelos's position, he had an argument which he could have used to good effect in order to persuade Greek public opinion of the necessity of giving up Smyrna.

In 1915 the Allies had offered Greece—as the *sole* price of her services—Smyrna, together with a portion of the hinterland, and that conditionally on her surrendering to Bulgaria one of her richest Macedonian provinces.² But in 1920 the Allies were prepared to be much more generous and to give her Western Thrace (formerly Bulgarian territory) as well as the major

¹ X. Stratigos, *Ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐν Μικρᾷ Ἀσίᾳ* (p. 137).

² The serious economic loss which the cession of Drama and Kavalla would have involved for Greece has not been sufficiently stressed. Although the area was not considerable (2,000 square kilometres), the sacrifice of this district, one of the finest tobacco-growing regions in the Near East, would have meant a loss of many millions of revenue to the Greek Treasury, which has always relied on the tobacco tax as one of its principal sources of revenue. The revenue of this small district was equal to nearly one-fifth of the total revenue of Greek Macedonia (see *Documents et tableaux relatifs à la répartition de la Dette Publique Ottomane* (1924), pp. 82-4).

portion of Eastern Thrace as far as the lines of Chataldja, *without any corresponding sacrifice of territory in Macedonia.*

Surely here was an argument which could have been used with good effect in order to justify the abandonment of Smyrna in the eyes of the Greek people. Venizelos could have said to them: 'We have to give up Smyrna because circumstances have changed and the conditions under which we would have to take over that province to-day are very different from the ones I contemplated when I accepted the original offer in 1915. But in lieu of the 20,000 square kilometres of Anatolian territory which it would cost us millions to defend, we are getting in exchange a large and fertile territory of 30,000 square kilometres¹ in Thrace, which we had never bargained for and which, in addition, has the advantage of being contiguous to our Macedonian territory, besides bringing us within sight of Constantinople and the domes of Saint Sofia. We are gainers, not losers, by such an exchange.' No doubt the premature occupation of Smyrna in May 1919—a full year before the Treaty of Sèvres was signed—complicated matters. It made evacuation more difficult, because the Greek and Armenian populations of the occupied territory would thereby have been condemned either to emigrate or else to run the risk of extermination. But even so, it would have been worth while. Eastern Thrace, a fertile and sparsely inhabited² region, could easily have absorbed the 590,000 Greeks and Armenians of the Smyrna enclave or even the 800,000 of the whole Anatolian territory under Greek military occupation in 1920.

¹ Western Thrace—8,405 square kilometres; Eastern Thrace—20,634 square kilometres.

² The population of Eastern Thrace was about 510,000 or 25 inhabitants to the square kilometre, as compared with 39 in the rest of Greece.

It was an unfortunate circumstance that the decision of the Supreme Council confirming the cession of Thrace to Greece should have been taken at a considerably later date than the decision which gave her Smyrna. By May 1919, all the members of the Supreme Council (except Italy) had agreed that Greece should have Smyrna, whereas the decision to let her have Eastern Thrace was taken a full year later, in April 1920. This was due to the opposition of President Wilson, who wanted to give the greater part of Eastern Thrace (the districts of Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse) to Bulgaria, as a sort of consolation-prize for having been despoiled of the fruits of her victory in the first Balkan Wars.¹ In the meantime, Greece had already occupied Smyrna under a provisional mandate from the Supreme Council and the fat was in the fire.

If the decision to give Eastern Thrace to Greece had been reached a year earlier, it would have made all the difference, as it would have furnished the Allies with a powerful argument for rejecting the Greek claim to Smyrna, of which nobody really approved. Mr. Harold Nicolson, in his book on the Peace Conference, has revealed for the first time the interesting fact that, in April 1919, Sir Eyre Crowe actually submitted to the Supreme Council a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Harold Nicolson and Professor Arnold Toynbee, recommending that Greece should be given Thrace while leaving the whole of Anatolia to Turkey.² If this proposal had been accepted by the Supreme Council in April 1919, the Greek occupation of Smyrna in May 1919 would not have been authorized and the whole

¹ See Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, 51) and *What really happened at Paris* (edited by Colonel House) (p. 193 ff.).

² H. Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (pp. 312-13).

course of events in the Near East would thus have been changed for the better.

It is particularly to be regretted that President Wilson, who had persisted in overruling his technical advisers' much more valid objections to the cession of Smyrna to Greece, should have offered such strenuous opposition, on quite insufficient grounds, to the Greek claims in Thrace which, both on geographical and ethnical grounds, were far more reasonable than her claim to Smyrna. This opposition on the part of the American President made Venizelos throw the whole of his weight on the side of the Smyrna claim.¹

In any case, Venizelos's insistence on retaining the Smyrna enclave, after the situation had been fully put before him by Mr. Winston Churchill and Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson in their interview of 18 March 1920, and the inability of the Allies to render effective assistance in order to impose the acceptance of the Treaty on the Turks had been made clear to him, cannot be defended.

As Mr. Winston Churchill points out,² Venizelos 'admitted the inequality of the warfare but professed confidence that, with the support of the three greatest Powers, he could reach a satisfactory and final conclusion'. What that support was worth, we already know. Nowhere was there the will to help effectively—that is, by co-operating in a campaign to crush the

¹ Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, 22). Venizelos, in his preliminary memorandum of 2 November 1918 to Mr. Lloyd George says: 'Si le développement de la Grèce n'était pas dirigé de ce côté-là (i.e. Smyrna), il devrait être poursuivi du côté de la Thrace et tendre à une extension de ses frontières jusqu'à la Mer Noire. Mais cette solution se heurterait à des obstacles encore plus grands que ceux que soulèverait une extension vers l'Asie Mineure Occidentale.'

² *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (p. 383).

Turkish resistance. In the circumstances, it was not much use saying to the Powers: 'Here I am, you have got to see me through.'

The astute Cretan, whose balanced judgement had brought Greece successfully through the ordeal of the Balkan Wars, seems, for once, to have allowed himself to be dazzled by the brilliant image which he himself had conjured up, of a Greater Greece astride the Aegean.¹ For once his judgement failed him.

* * *

If Venizelos must be held responsible for the original error of going to Smyrna, his successors are equally to blame for wanting to stay there under conditions ten times more inauspicious than those Venizelos had had to face. Public opinion in France and Great Britain had been estranged by the restoration of King Constantin in December 1920. The French and British Governments had used this as a convenient excuse to wriggle out of their previous engagements, and had declared themselves neutral in the conflict between Greece and Turkey. All hopes of financial assistance were summarily cut off. France announced her intention of making a separate peace with Turkey.² Under the circumstances, there was only one possible policy: Evacuation.

The Anti-Venizelist party, which was returned to power at the General Election of November 1920, had

¹ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (p. 341): 'May 17 . . . Drive back with Venizelos. He is pleased by the Smyrna landing. He says Greece can only find her real future from the moment when she is astride the Aegean.'

² By the Franco-Turkish Agreement of Angora of 30 October 1921, France agreed to the immediate evacuation of Cilicia. She also handed over to the Turks the greater part of her stocks of guns and munitions in Anatolia.

always been strongly opposed to the Smyrna expedition. No doubt the decision to liquidate Greece's Anatolian venture would have required considerable moral courage on the part of Venizelos's successors, but, at any rate, no one could have accused them of inconsistency.

Instead of doing so, however, they seem to have deluded themselves into believing that perhaps, after all, they might succeed in bringing the thing off and so reaping where others had sown. Instead of proceeding to evacuate at once, they chose to continue the operations in the interior of Anatolia in the hope of forcing an issue with Kemal.

It was in vain that the ex-Chief of Staff, General Metaxas, who had returned to Greece after the fall of Venizelos, warned the new Government, as he had warned Venizelos, of the futility of continuing the expedition. His advice was rejected by the very people one would have expected to have used it as a justification for evacuation.

Dread of public opinion which, insufficiently informed as to the real situation in Asia Minor, would not hear of evacuation; fear lest the Venizelist Opposition should exploit the abandonment of the fruits of Venizelos's diplomacy; a legitimate anxiety, too, for the fate of the Greek population of Asia Minor, for whom evacuation would mean either flight or massacre—all these considerations together combined to restrain the Gounaris Government from taking the only action through which Greece might still have saved her gains in Eastern Thrace.

The only alternative was to try and force an issue by military action. It was impossible to sit still, as time was working against Greece. The result was the Sak-karia offensive of August 1921, a heroic but fruitless attempt to destroy the enemy's forces and capture his

capital, which was merely a prelude to the final disaster of a year later.

Better leadership might, perhaps, have mitigated the extent of that disaster; it could never have averted the ultimate necessity for evacuation. If Venizelos had remained in power after November 1920, he would have been faced with precisely the same dilemma as his successors—that is, either of having to advance into the interior in an attempt to crush the Kemalist forces, or else of having to evacuate the occupied territory and withdraw to Thrace. It is probable that Venizelos, like his successors, would have chosen the first course. This is clear from a telegram (dated 27 June 1920) sent from Paris to M. Repoulis, then Vice-President of the Council,¹ immediately after the Conference of Boulogne at which Venizelos had succeeded in securing the Supreme Council's consent to a great advance of the Greek troops into the interior with the object of smashing the Turks. After recounting how he had succeeded in overriding the objections of the French and Italian delegates who were in favour of coming to terms with Kemal, he goes on to outline his future plan of action as follows:

At this critical moment of our history, after carefully weighing all the circumstances, I assured Lloyd George that not only did I undertake to send a division to the assistance of the British at Ismidt, but also to crush the Kemalist army on our front, thereby rendering the whole of the Marmara littoral secure from aggression. After the successful termination of these operations, I added, Kemal's prestige would be greatly impaired and consequently the signing and execution of the Treaty might then be looked upon, if not as a certainty, at any rate as a probability. Further, I declared that I asked for no assistance, financial or otherwise, to enable me to carry out the operations in question.

¹ Ventiris, *Greece in 1910-20* (in Greek) (II, 386).

I added that should we not be successful in compelling the Turks to accept and carry out the Treaty, I undertook then to increase the strength of the army sufficiently to enable us, with the assistance of the existing British force in Turkey, to impose our will by force of arms. In that case, however, I would require to have the help of Great Britain both in money and munitions. But above all, in order to enable me to make this fresh appeal to the Greek people, it would be necessary for the Powers to decide on the dismemberment of Turkey, thenceforward to be relegated to the Central Anatolian plateau.

We have succeeded in winning over Mr. Lloyd George to accepting our proposals and it is entirely due to him that we were given permission at Boulogne (to advance into the interior).

The facility with which the Greek army had advanced and taken Brussa in June 1920—an operation undertaken against the express opinion of Marshals Foch and Sir Henry Wilson—had greatly impressed the naturally sanguine mind of Mr. Lloyd George who, we know, did not, in general, entertain a very high opinion of the brains of his military advisers. But the only result of these operations, as Mr. Winston Churchill rightly points out,¹ was to spread the Greek forces over an ever wider area and so burden them with heavier responsibilities. The Greek front now extended over some 600 kilometres. Judged from the point of view of its effect on the final issue of the campaign, the capture of Brussa was about as ineffectual as Napoleon's victory at Borodino.

It was perhaps fortunate for Venizelos that the swing of the pendulum, which brought his political opponents back to power in November 1920, dispensed him from trying to put into effect the grandiose policy of conquest outlined in his telegram to M. Repoulis. Given the physical facts of the situation; given, above all, that important personal factor—the military genius of Kemal

¹ *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (p. 384).

—it is idle to pretend that the result could have been very different from that of 1922.

But if Venizelos can be criticized for having been unduly optimistic¹ and his successors for having been inconsistent and incompetent, the responsibility of the statesmen who directed the fortunes of the Entente throughout all this period is of a much graver order. They had made use of Greece under Venizelos, they were prepared to do the same under Constantine. They had in turn intrigued and promised and bullied, in order to get Greece into the war. In 1915, when fixing the compensation to be allotted to Greece, they had consulted everybody's interests except hers. 'We cannot give you Thrace, because that must go to Bulgaria, nor Constantinople, because that is Russia's. If you like, you may take part of Anatolia.' Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clémenceau, M. Delcassé, M. Sazonov, Lord Kitchener—all had waxed quite indignant, when Greece had showed signs of hesitancy in accepting the above terms. Thus pressed, Venizelos had been finally won over. With the help of the Allies, he had swept aside all opposition, Constantine had been driven from his throne, Colonel Metaxas deported to Corsica. The Greek army, first demobilized in November 1916 on the demand of the Allied Governments, then re-mobilized in July 1917, was rushed to the Macedonian Front and, after helping to break down the resistance of the Bulgars, employed on police-work in the Ukraine and Turkey.

After much haggling and chiefly through the insistence of those enthusiastic Philhellenes—Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clémenceau—Greece was finally awarded Smyrna and Thrace. But there the obligation seemed to end. There was no concerted action, no goodwill, no dis-

¹ Winston Churchill, *op. cit.* (p. 366).

position to share in the burdens and sacrifices that were necessary, if the peace settlement was to be enforced on Turkey. Greece might go to Smyrna as the mandatory of the Allied Powers, but that did not prevent one of the Allies—Italy—from giving direct help and encouragement to the Turkish Nationalists. Having sent Greece to Asia Minor and thus compromised the whole of the local Greek and Armenian population, those same Powers then wanted, a year after, to turn her out again and patch up peace with the Turks, in the hope of thus being able to salvage their interests in Turkey, now threatened with destruction. The Capitulations, the Ottoman Public Debt, the multifarious concessions and economic spheres of influence, the freedom of the Straits—all these things were of much greater importance in the eyes of the Allied Powers than the lives of the hundreds of thousands of Greeks and Armenians in Anatolia.

The Greece of Venizelos had been treated like a poor relative, whose importunities decency did not permit entirely to ignore.¹ The Greece of Constantine was treated as an impostor who had penetrated, under false pretences, into the family circle. And yet the same 300,000 men, who had acted as the Allied policemen in Turkey under Venizelos, continued under Constantine to mount their weary vigil on the edge of the Anatolian Marches. The Allies acted on the strange theory that their debt was due to the individual, not to the Greek nation. It did not matter to them that it was the nation that had fought and paid. The Allies, by giving Smyrna and Thrace to Greece, had only meant to reward the 'fidelity' of Venizelos. By bringing back Constantine, Greece

¹ Winston Churchill, *op. cit.* (p. 388): 'For the sake of Venizelos much had to be endured, but for Constantine less than nothing.'

had been guilty, retrospectively, of infidelity and must be penalized accordingly. A strange theory indeed.

It would have been more charitable, though somewhat brutal, if, after the restoration of Constantine in December 1920, the Powers had said at once to Greece: 'Get out.' The French, more cynical than the British, were quite prepared to do so. The British Government was less frank or else, more likely, less sure of its own mind; in any case, it wobbled. Officially it supported the French, unofficially it encouraged the Greeks to hang on and see what happened.¹

Venizelos, Constantine, Gounaris and his friends, all have their share of responsibility for the Anatolian disaster. But surely their share is comparatively light as compared with that of the leaders of the powerful nations for whom Greece was a mere pawn in the great war-game of 1914-22.

¹ Winston Churchill, *op. cit.* (p. 410): 'Meanwhile many efforts were made by the British Government to bring about a Turkish settlement and a Greek withdrawal. But they were all made half-heartedly and with a lack of collective vigour and conviction unworthy of a Government whose leading men had been schooled in the greatest of wars. This feebleness can only be explained by the general mental exhaustion of war-worn Ministers, by divergences of sentiment and by grave domestic preoccupations.'

CHAPTER III

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ALLIES

OF all the episodes of the Great War, that which concerns the history of the Allies' dealings with Greece makes the most sorry reading.

Those dealings fall into two periods—the first, from 1915 to 1917, when the Entente was trying to bring Greece into the war on its side; the second, from 1917 to 1922, when, the interventionist party in Greece under Venizelos having finally triumphed, Greece participated in the war against the Central Powers and was rewarded by the acquisition of new territory in Thrace and Asia Minor, most of which she lost again after the disastrous termination of the Anatolian campaign in 1922.

During the first of these two periods, the Allied efforts to get Greece into the war were by no means concerted and the methods employed were such as partially to vitiate the advantages which the Allies expected to derive from that country's entry into the war. The divergent policies of Russia and Italy, each of whom, for different reasons, at first opposed Greek co-operation; the violent methods of coercion adopted by France; the hesitations and scruples of the British Government, desirous of attaining the end but loth to adopt the means—all these were factors which contributed to create an 'imbroglio' out of which Greece finally emerged no longer a united people, as she had been during the period of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, but hopelessly divided into two irreconcilable factions.

During the second period, the Allies, after exploiting to the full Greece's resources in men and money which enabled them to deal the Central Powers the decisive blow on the Balkan front, again showed the same want of unanimity when it came to deciding on the compensation to be allotted Greece for her aid. The energy with which the Allies had combined to impose their terms on Germany evaporated when it came to imposing peace on Turkey. England and France alleged war-weariness and financial exhaustion as reasons for relaxing their efforts in the Near East, while Italy, by active opposition and secret intrigue, did all in her power to render both the peace-settlement and the compensation accorded illusory.

Finally, all three eagerly seized on the pretext afforded by the restoration of Constantine to the Greek Throne in December 1920, in order to declare themselves released from their obligations towards their former ally.

The result was a disaster such as the Greek nation had never sustained in all its previous history. The consequences of that disaster have been such as to render the existence of even the surviving portion of the nation extremely precarious.

In the following sections, I shall try to analyse separately the responsibility of each one of the Allied Powers—Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy and the United States—for, as previously stated, each one of the Allies, in dealing with the Greek question, pursued an independent line of action, and it was this lack of harmony among the Allies which was primarily responsible for the ensuing catastrophe.

In the present section I shall confine myself to certain comments of a general nature.

The policy of the Allied Governments towards Greece during the period preceding the latter's entry into the war

(1915-17) was so incoherent that it was difficult at the time for the general public in the Allied countries to grasp exactly what was going on. This was because, from the very start, there was a misapprehension as to the true facts of the internal situation in Greece, and this misapprehension gradually grew and deepened, under the influence of party-spirit and war-propaganda.

The whole Allied action in Greece was based on the assumption that the great majority of the Greek people were burning to come into the war on the side of the Allies and that a pro-German King and Court, backed by a group of pro-German politicians and officers, was restraining this bellicose enthusiasm by force and by fraud,¹ with the object of ultimately bringing Greece into the war on the side of the Central Powers; that all the efforts of the King and his pro-German Ministers were directed towards giving the Central Powers such indirect assistance as it was in their power to give, whether by secretly supplying information, facilitating the sending of foodstuffs to the enemy countries or revictualling enemy submarines.

Under the circumstances, it was hard for the public in Great Britain and France to understand why the Allied Governments did not adopt a more drastic line earlier, why they did not treat Greece as an enemy, seize King Constantine by the ear and expel him, and

¹ M. Jonnart himself admitted, after his expulsion of King Constantine in June 1917, that the action of the Allied Governments had been undertaken under a complete misapprehension as regards the extent of the King's popularity and influence in Greece (see report of Mr. C. Rentis, quoted in Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (I, 548), giving an account of his interview with M. Jonnart on board the *Justice* on 3/16 June 1917), and M. Jonnart's own letter of 22 July 1917 addressed to M. Ribot, quoted in Frangoulis, *op. cit.*, I, 498, which ends: 'Il y a là une page peu glorieuse pour la France, je la ferme bien vite.'

so settle the question once and for all. Even persons occupying responsible positions in the Allied countries and intimately connected with the conduct of the war but who were dependent for their information concerning the position in Greece on their Foreign Offices and the press, were at a loss to understand the real situation.¹

Indeed the situation *was* incomprehensible, because people were not being told the truth, and the tendentious information disseminated by the Allied press, out of sympathy for the war-party in Greece, created erroneous impressions which naturally led to equally erroneous expectations and conclusions. Constantine may have been the brother-in-law of the Kaiser; he may have admired or been in holy terror of German military organization and German authoritarian methods, but, nevertheless, all that has been published since the war has failed to prove that there was the least disposition on his part to help the Central Powers or attack the Allies, or that he even wished the former to win.

On the contrary, Constantine never departed from

¹ See *Diaries of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson* (I, p. 263). Wilson, commenting on the situation in the Balkans in September 1915, is all impatience to have King Constantine declared an enemy and turned out. (His editor, General Callwell, writing *ex post facto*, comments as follows: 'A reluctance to compel a small state to become a belligerent was in the circumstances at least excusable, however inconvenient from the purely soldier's point of view.')

Wilson himself changed his views on hearing the report of Colonel Fairholme, the British Military Attaché at Athens. He now veered right round. (See vol. I, p. 308. 'Long talk with Fairholme. He is of opinion that we are wrong in backing Venizelos and ought to change and back Tino. He says our F.O. has been absolutely hopeless—never once a decision on any point, . . . undoubtedly we have played fast and loose and false with Tino. He may have done the same with us; but Faurey is quite clear that he does not want to go to war with us.')

the point of view which he expressed in his reply to the Kaiser, when the latter, at the outbreak of war, urged his brother-in-law to throw in his lot with the Central Powers—namely, that it would be suicidal for Greece, with her far-flung coast-line and island possessions, ever to think of going to war with the Entente Powers who were masters of the sea.¹ Apart from platonic assurances of sympathy, which may or may not have been sincere,² the help which he was disposed to give to the Central Powers was, at most, of a purely negative character, in that, by keeping Greece neutral, he was refraining from adding one more to the list of Germany's adversaries.

The stories of the revictualling of German submarines in Greek waters, which were so freely circulated in the Entente press and contributed more than anything to inflame public opinion in the Allied countries against Greece, were never proved and appear to have had little, if any, foundation, as Admiral Dartige de Fournet, at the time commanding the Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean and so the person best qualified to know, himself admits,³ while the numerous charges of allowing supplies to go through to the enemy countries, to which prominence was also given in the Entente press, were based on the one-sided assumption (not of course shared by the Greek Government as long as Greece remained neutral) that Greece ought to close her frontiers to the

¹ Greek White Book (first edition). No. 21. *Telegr.* 25 July/7 Aug. 1914.

² See Constantine's reply of 7 August 1914 to the Emperor William, quoted in Driault, *Hist. diplom. de la Grèce* (V, 164): 'L'empereur sait que mes sympathies personnelles et mes opinions politiques m'entraînent de son côté. Je n'oublierai jamais que c'est à lui que nous devons Cavalla.'

³ Dartige de Fournet, *Souvenirs de guerre d'un Amiral 1914-1916* (p. 304).

Central Powers, while keeping them open to the Entente. This, of course, it was impossible for the Greek Government or any other neutral government, however friendly, to do. Roumania behaved in exactly the same way up to the moment of her entry into the war and nobody seriously thought of blaming her.¹ If the Greek Government had really given the Germans all the active or secret assistance alleged, or if the Greek King was only biding his time in order to throw in his lot with the Central Powers,² no one could have known that better than the Germans themselves and surely the fact could hardly have failed to have been confirmed from German sources after the war, when all reasons for reticence, following the change of régime both in Germany and Greece, had disappeared.

On the contrary, we have the evidence of General Falkenhayn, the Chief of the German General Staff, that Germany's allies—Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey—were persistently clamouring for the Central Powers to declare war on Greece, for which there would have been ample justification in view of the repeated violations of Greek neutrality on the part of the Entente Powers and the subservience—whether forced or not—of the Greek Government to the Allied demands. The German Chief of the General Staff, in resisting the demands of Germany's allies, was sensible enough to

¹ See *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, edited by C. Seymour (vol. II, p. 24). Ambassador Gerard reports on 27 July 1915: 'Germany has the Balkan situation well in hand. Roumania can do nothing in the face of recent Russian defeats and has just consented to allow grain to be exported to Austria and Germany.'

² Mr. Winston Churchill in the *World Crisis—The Aftermath*, p. 388, voices the current opinion of the time when he writes: 'Here was a potentate who, as we saw it, against the wishes and interests of his people, had, for personal and family reasons, thrown his country, or tried to throw it, on the enemy side.'

realize the extraordinarily difficult position in which the Greek Government was placed, and that a too great insistence, on the part of the Central Powers, on the observation of strict neutrality by Greece, would inevitably have ended by driving that country openly into the camp of the Entente.¹

Constantine and his party doubtless were guilty of a grave *political* error² in wanting to keep Greece neutral,

¹ Falkenhayn, General von : *Le commandement suprême de l'armée allemande* (1914-1916) (French edition), p. 139 *seq.* (commenting on the situation created by the landing of Allied troops at Salonica in the autumn of 1915) : ' Les alliés de l'Allemagne avaient la tendance d'en tirer prétexte pour traiter la Grèce en ennemie. On ne parvint pas sans peine à faire valoir une autre conception. D'après la lettre du droit international, la Grèce aurait bien été tenue de ne pas tolérer la violation de sa neutralité. Mais le devoir de la conservation personnelle est au-dessus des principes de droit international, et il avait forcé la Grèce à agir ainsi qu'elle l'avait fait. Ni les Puissances Centrales ni la Bulgarie n'avaient alors aucune possibilité de lui fournir une aide militaire quelconque ou un secours dans ses préoccupations alimentaires. C'était déjà bien beau d'avoir réussi à amener le Gouvernement Grec à une attitude favorable, si l'on tient compte de la situation du pays, de son histoire et de l'influence que l'Entente pouvait exercer sans limites sur le peuple grec. L'Allemagne n'avait certainement aucun motif de se donner un nouvel ennemi sans aucun avantage militaire palpable, uniquement pour répondre aux vœux politiques d'avenir de ses confédérés, et surtout un ennemi dont la simple existence devait exercer une très grande influence sur les opérations qui venaient de commencer contre la Serbie. Finalement ni l'Autriche-Hongrie ni la Bulgarie ne purent méconnaître la force persuasive de cette raison. Il fut donc reconnu par tout le monde *qu'on devait éviter à l'avenir tout ce qui pourrait pousser la Grèce dans les rangs de l'ennemi.*'

² Count Bosdari (*Delle guerre Balcaniche, della Grande Guerra*), speaking of the surrender of Fort Ruppel to the forces of the Central Powers (p. 154), shares this point of view : ' Questa dichiarazione, fattami un mese prima della presa di Ruppel da parte degli Austro-Germanici, mi permette di asserire che la redizione di quel forte

under circumstances which rendered this impossible, instead of facing the risks of war and seizing the unique opportunity presented of settling accounts once for all with Greece's hereditary enemies, Turkey and Bulgaria. To one, however, who reads the evidence dispassionately after the war, it seems difficult to convict the Greek King of pro-Germanism in any active sense or of the degree of moral obliquity involved in Mr. Winston Churchill's statement that Constantine, 'for personal and family reasons, had thrown or wanted to throw his country on the German side'.¹ He was neither fool enough to want to commit suicide,² nor criminal enough to desire the victory of his country's hereditary foes.

The charges of pro-Germanism and duplicity, which were so persistently circulated in the Allied countries against Constantine and his partisans during the years 1915-17, as well as the numerous attempts made to fix responsibility on the Greek Government for acts inimical to the Allies were really due to a motive which the Allies, for reasons of political expediency, were unable at the time to avow publicly. The principal article in the Entente's public indictment of Germany as the aggressor in the war had been the German violation of Belgian neutrality. In England especially, the argument had made a tremendous impression and

può essere stata da parte della Grecia *un insanabile errore dal punto di vista politico*, ma che non si trattò di tradimento verso di noi, perchè eravamo stati prevenuti di ciò chi doveva accadere.'

¹ Winston Churchill, op. cit. (p. 388), quoted above.

² Bosdari (op. cit., p. 106) is again right when he says: 'Concepiti fin da allora (1914) l'idea che qualunque potessero essere la preferenza e le simpatie del Re degli Elleni, l'alleanza con la Germania in questa guerra era preclusa *come cosa assurda e praticamente impossibile*; e gli avvenimenti posteriori provarono la verità di questo mio concetto.'

been the decisive factor in bringing the British people into the war. Germany, with her openly avowed principle of 'necessity knows no law', brutally violating the frontiers of a small neutral nation protected by treaty in order to score an immediate strategic advantage, had been held up to the execration of the British public. The French Government may have played, in the years before the war, with the idea of (in certain circumstances) anticipating a German attack by violating Belgian territory, but the British point of view had never wavered nor had the British Government ever ceased impressing on the French that no considerations of military expediency would ever justify, in the eyes of the British Government and the British people, such a violation of the territory of a neutral state.¹

At the end of 1914, the state of war between the Entente and Turkey had suddenly made Greece's accession a question of vital importance to the Allies. The carrying on of active operations against the Dardanelles and the Turkish coasts was impossible without the possession of the Greek islands at the mouth of the Straits (Tenedos, Imbros, Lemnos and Mytilene); the closing of the Adriatic against raids by the Austrian fleet was equally impossible without the occupation of Corfu; the guarding of the routes to Egypt and the Suez Canal was extremely difficult without the possession of intermediate bases east of Malta, and such bases

¹ See the *Memoirs of Marshal Joffre* (I, p. 510, English edition) for the whole discussion at the meeting of the French Council of National Defence on 9 January 1912. Neither M. Poincaré nor MM. Millerand and Delcassé were averse to accepting the plan proposed by Joffre, as Chief of the Staff, for a march through Belgium and Luxemburg in order to anticipate a German attack, provided Great Britain did not object. But the plan was categorically vetoed by the British Government in its reply of 27 November 1912.

could only be found in the Greek Archipelago, at Milo, Suda Bay and other of the Greek islands; the rendering of assistance to Serbia was only possible if the Allies were allowed a free passage through Salonica and Greek Macedonia.

After the unsuccessful bombardment of the outer forts of the Dardanelles in February 1915 and the decision to undertake combined naval and land operations in order to force the Straits, the necessity for bringing in Greece increased a hundred-fold. A somewhat flimsy legal excuse was discovered for the occupation of Lemnos, Tenedos and Imbros, on the ground that Turkey herself had never recognized the decision of the Powers of 1 August 1913 concerning the cession of those islands to Greece and, consequently, from the Turkish (though not from the German and Austrian) point of view, those islands still remained Turkish territory and, as such, might be legitimately used as a base of operations by the Allies against Turkey herself. Even so, the eminent jurist M. Politis, at that time Director-General of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had pronounced pro-Entente sympathies, expressed disapproval of the Allied seizure of the three islands (which took place on 11 March 1915) as being a violation of Greek neutrality and put it down, as he told the Italian Minister, Count Bosdari, to the *affolement* of the Allies.¹

But, after this preliminary step which, as stated, possessed some sort of legal justification and, moreover, had received the secret approval of Venizelos, then Prime Minister,² the British Government showed itself

¹ Bosdari, *Delle guerre Balcaniche, della Grande Guerra* (p. 123).

² Demidof's dispatch of 14 March 1915 quoted in *Documents diplomatiques secrets Russes* (1914-1917). Traduc. Polonsky (Payot, 1928).

averse to further measures of violence or the exercise of pressure which might expose the Allies to the charge of violating Greek neutrality. The hesitations, the tergiversations, the contradictions of British policy right down to the dethronement of King Constantine by the Allies in June 1917, must be put down to this moral scruple. Hence also the importance attached to the controversy as to whether it was the Allies who took the initiative of landing troops at Salonica in October 1915, or whether they did so at the invitation of Venizelos, that is, of the Greek Government. For, in the former case, the responsibility for the violation of Greek neutrality would have rested with Allies, in the latter with Greece herself.¹

The French, however, were less squeamish. They were realists in politics and not disposed to be too scrupulous about the rights of neutrals, where the fate of France was at stake. Further, the French were inclined to class the Greeks as Orientals and held the view that a different standard of conduct was applicable in dealing with them than with western nations, on the principle that Orientals can only understand force ('*la manière forte*'). This theory found special favour with Admiral Lacaze, the Minister of Marine, whose influence in shaping French policy towards Greece during the years 1916-17 was both decisive and disastrous.²

France, however, had to reckon with the scruples of the British Government. Hence the extreme desire of all concerned to convict the Greek Government itself of infringements of its neutrality such as would justify

¹ Falkenhayn, *Le commandement suprême de l'armée allemande* (1914-1916) (p. 139 *seq.*).

² See Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale*, (I. 495), quoting report of French Parliamentary Commission of enquiry of 24 September 1919.

the Entente in exercising reprisals ; hence the efforts of the subordinate Allied agents on the spot to compromise the Greek Government by the creation of ' incidents '.

In this respect, it must be admitted that the information which has come to light since the war from Allied sources, concerning the activities of some of these agents, is not very edifying. The report of the French Parliamentary Commission,¹ which inquired into the activities of Captain de Roquefeuil, the French Naval Attaché and Chief of the French Secret Service at Athens, and the revelations of his British colleague, Mr. Compton Mackenzie, in regard to some of his own activities, show to what lengths these over-zealous agents were prepared to go, in order to throw upon the Greek Government the onus of a breach between Greece and the Allies. The story of the bogus bomb outrage of 9 September 1916 against the French Legation at Athens, which was proved to have been engineered by Captain de Roquefeuil himself,² and Mr. Compton Mackenzie's admission that he tried to stage an attack on himself in order to create an ' incident ' which would serve as a justification for an Allied ultimatum to Greece,³ must

¹ See Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (I, p. 397), for the whole of this document.

² Confirmed by Mr. Compton Mackenzie (*Greek Memories*, pp. 341-2): 'In Athens M. Guillemin's conversion to the belief that the King was seriously intending to enter the war (e.g. on the side of the Allies) had infuriated de Roquefeuil, and it was actually planned at the French School (i.e. de Roquefeuil's headquarters) to kidnap poor M. Guillemin and carry him off to the mountains to create an incident. This plan was abandoned to create another "incident" equally farcical' (follows the description of the bomb outrage against the French Legation).

³ Compton Mackenzie (*Greek Memories*, pp. 193-4): 'On reconsidering the telegram I had drafted (to the F.O.) I found that it lacked a final and convincing argument and it occurred to me that if an act of violence could be committed against a fairly prom-

surely arouse serious misgivings in the minds of all those who until now had taken the guilt of the Greek Government for granted. Rather than adopt such methods, would it not have been far better to have been frankly brutal, like the Germans, and to have openly proclaimed the doctrine that necessity knows no law? It was only after the situation in Greece had developed into a running sore, that the French finally decided to prick the ulcer. Jonnart was sent out, with wide (though apparently not full) powers to deal with the situation and, by boldly taking upon himself the responsibility of exceeding his instructions, brought the situation to an end in the only manner in which, at the pass matters had reached, it could be terminated.

Although the British Government had refrained from giving its official approval to the taking of such drastic measures, it was quite glad when all was satisfactorily over. After Constantine had been successfully dethroned without so much as a drop of blood being shed, a British Minister not particularly given to methods of violence was heard to exclaim, with a sigh of relief: 'All's well that ends well.'¹

The Allies had insisted on taking on themselves the whole responsibility of this *opération de police*, as the dethronement of Constantine was euphemistically termed, but, as things turned out, it would have been far better, in the long run, if it had been carried out by the Venizelists themselves, without the aid of foreign troops, for it was this foreign intervention which finally weighted the scales against Venizelos and the pro-Entente party inent individual, such an act might be the spur to prick the F.O. into firmness. The only person I could think of was myself. If to-night on my way back to Phaleron I could be shot at and wounded, that would probably clinch matters' (follow the details).

¹ Driault, *Le Rio Constantin* (Greek ed., p. 172), ascribes the remark to Lord Robert Cecil.

in Greece. The Salonica Government actually did offer to send troops to Athens to turn out the King, but the offer was refused by the Allies, on the ground that they wished to avoid bloodshed.¹ Politically, this was a mistake. Civil war is always a bad thing, but if Venizelos in 1917 had been allowed a free hand and had succeeded in overthrowing the Athens Government by the use of his own troops, he would not have laid himself open to the charge of having been forced on his country by foreign bayonets—a charge which was fatal to his popularity and was the principal cause of his defeat at the elections of November 1920.

(a) THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GREAT BRITAIN

The traditional friendship of Great Britain for Turkey, which had developed during the nineteenth century under Beaconsfield—much less under the influence of any sentimental affection for the brave 'old Turk' than of a perfectly legitimate fear of Russian ambitions in the Near East and Turkish intrigues in India and Egypt—received a severe shock as the result of the Turkish military collapse during the Balkan War of 1912.

A certain number of British statesmen, among whom the most prominent were Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Winston Churchill and Lord Curzon, then began to realize that it was no use going on with Beaconsfield's policy of backing the 'wrong horse'; that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, in spite of the regenerating efforts of the Young Turks, was inevitable, and that the future lay with the young and vigorous Balkan nations, which until then had been regarded by the Great Powers as unruly and unwelcome troublers of the peace of Europe, to be severely repressed on every possible occasion.

¹ See Venizelos's speech in the Greek Chamber on 13 August 1917 (ed. Mantzevelakis, Athens, 1917, pp. 196-8).

Of the latter, the three Slav nations, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria—the first two more than the last—moved within the orbit of Russia, so that any increase of their territory and influence might logically be regarded, under the political conditions prevailing in Europe before the war, as portending an extension of Russian influence in South-Eastern Europe.

It was therefore natural that Great Britain should turn with sympathy to the one non-Slav Balkan country—Greece—whose interests conflicted with those of Russia and whose expansion in the regions bordering on the North-Eastern Aegean could be justified both on ethnological and historical grounds.

It is true that Greece, throughout the nineteenth century, had not given many proofs of capacity, as judged from the point of view of military efficiency and civil organization. But since the military *coup d'État* of 1909, which had brought to the helm of Greek affairs a statesman of the first order, Venizelos, there had been a change, and the creditable achievements of both the Greek army and navy during the two Balkan Wars had considerably raised Greece's prestige and made her a valuable potential ally in the event of a European War.

Commercially, too, the Greeks were by far the most active and advanced of the Balkan nations. The Greek merchant marine was steadily expanding and came top of the list in the Black Sea and Aegean. The flourishing Greek communities at Constantinople, Smyrna and the other principal ports and centres of the Ottoman Empire provided a solid basis of commercial and economic penetration.

Financially, Greece was bound by the closest ties to London. The Greeks were England's best clients in the Eastern Mediterranean for British coal, British

manufactures, British insurance and British banking. A great deal of the liquid wealth of the Greek people was deposited in London.

During Venizelos's stay in London during the Balkan peace negotiations in December 1912, certain members of the British Government had already begun to discuss the possibility of coming to an arrangement with Greece over Cyprus, by which that island, four-fifths Greek in population, should be ceded by Great Britain to Greece in return for the permanent lease of a naval base at Argostoli in the island of Cefalonia.¹

In January 1914, on the occasion of a second visit to London, Venizelos again took the opportunity of discussing, this time with the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, plans for closer co-operation between Great Britain and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean. At that date, Turkey was bent on recovering the Aegean islands off the coast of Asia Minor and at the mouth of the Dardanelles (Lesbos, Chios, Tenedos, Imbros), and the Greek Premier had found it necessary to appeal for British support.

After the outbreak of the European War it was assumed, in view of the known sympathies of Venizelos and the Greek people for the Entente and of Greece's treaty of alliance with Serbia, that Greece would, as a matter of course, co-operate with the Allies.

In August 1914, Mr. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, had already approached the Greek Government through Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, the Chief of the British Naval Mission in Greece, with a proposal that conversations should begin between the

¹ Ventiris, *Greece in 1910-20*, (I, p. 208), gives details of the unofficial *pourparlers* with Mr. Lloyd George (then Chancellor of the Exchequer), Mr. Winston Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) and Prince Louis of Battenberg (First Sea Lord).

British and Greek General staffs with a view to working out a plan of operations for forcing the Dardanelles in the probable event of both Great Britain and Greece being shortly involved in a war with Turkey.¹

The ambiguous attitude of Bulgaria, who, still smarting under the loss of Macedonia, did not conceal her intention of trying to recover that province at the first opportunity, made the Greek Government unwilling to commit itself to joining in operations against Turkey, as long as Greece was not guaranteed against a Bulgarian attack.

In January 1915, with an Austrian attack on Serbia imminent and the maturing of Mr. Winston Churchill's project for an attack on the Dardanelles, the need for Greek co-operation became more pressing. The question of fixing the compensation to be offered Greece in reward for her participation therefore automatically arose.

It is not clear, from the documents hitherto published, who first suggested the idea of offering Greece compensation in Asia Minor. That the suggestion was not originally put forward by Venizelos himself is clear from his reply to the Roumanian Government quoted in a previous chapter,² in which he rejects all notion of Greek expansion at the expense of Turkey.

It is particularly unfortunate that, at the time, the British Government, and more particularly Sir Edward Grey, who were still in the dark as to the real intentions of the Bulgarian Government, were obstinately bent on obtaining the co-operation of Bulgaria, although that Power was already committed to joining the Central Powers. This circumstance precluded the conclusion of even a secret agreement offering Greece Western (Bulgarian) Thrace and a portion of Eastern (Turkish)

¹ Ventiris, *op. cit.* (I, p. 248).

² See page 15.

Thrace—concessions which would have constituted a natural extension of Greece's European territory and would, further, have been fully justified on a combination of ethnological, economic and geographical grounds. Such an offer, with possibly Cyprus and Northern Epirus thrown in, would certainly have been a sufficient inducement to bring Greece into the war.

Unfortunately, not only did it not occur to the British Government at that time to propose what was, after all, the *natural* solution of the Greek problem, but there was constant pressure put upon Greece to consent to the sacrifice of the most fertile portion of her Macedonian territory (the famous tobacco-producing districts of Drama and Cavalla) in favour of Bulgaria, in the vain hope of bringing in that country on the side of the Entente. Mr. Noel Buxton, a Liberal M.P. well known for his pro-Bulgarian sympathies and possessing considerable influence in liberal political circles and the press, was the prime mover in urging these disastrous tactics upon the British Government.¹ It was this unfortunate combination of circumstances which apparently led Sir Edward Grey to offer Greece—*faute de mieux*—compensation in Asia Minor—the famous 'concessions territoriales très importantes sur la côté de l'Asie Mineure' of Sir E. Grey's note of 23 January 1915.² The offer was also approved by France and Russia, who followed the same unfortunate policy of trying to propitiate Bulgaria at the expense of Greece and Serbia.

From that moment onwards, all the British Ministers became firmly wedded to the idea of Greece being given

¹ See Sir J. Stavridi's letter of 5 March 1915 to M. Venizelos quoted in Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (I, p. 191), reporting conversation with Mr. Lloyd George concerning Noel Buxton's activities.

² Quoted in Frangoulis, *op. cit.* (I, p. 172).

a slice of Asia Minor. Mr. Lloyd George (then Chancellor of the Exchequer) was the most ardent advocate of this solution.¹ There is no record of any of the other Ministers having expressed a contrary opinion. Lord Kitchener, we know, was also fully in agreement with this policy.²

Great Britain thus had a major responsibility in switching Greek energies and ambitions off in the direction of Smyrna and Anatolia.

It was only after the European War was over, when the Allies began discussing among themselves the peace-terms to be imposed on Turkey, that certain British Ministers—notably Lord Curzon, Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Montagu—began to have misgivings about the wisdom of letting Greece loose in Anatolia. War Office opinion, in particular, as voiced by Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was dead against such a course, on the ground that Greece was not strong enough to do the job unaided, while further military or financial help from her allies was out of the question. The India Office also expressed anxiety about the possible reactions of the Indian Moslems, among whom pro-Turkish agitators were trying to stir up trouble by appeals to religious fanaticism, on the ground that the Caliphate was in danger.

The main, in fact the sole responsibility for adhering to the original policy, in the face of such considerable opposition, must, undoubtedly, rest with Mr. Lloyd George.

¹ See conversation between Lloyd George and Mr. Gennadius on 3 February 1915, reported in Ventiris, *op. cit.* (I, p. 272): 'Above all, Great Britain desires to see the establishment of Greece on the further shore of the Aegean, at Smyrna. What Great Britain does not desire is to see Russia lording it over the whole of Anatolia at the end of the war.'

² Ventiris, *op. cit.* (I, 272) (conversation of Mr. Gennadius with Lord Kitchener).

Mr. Lloyd George, more than any of his colleagues, was imbued with the old Gladstonian tradition of Philhellenism and hatred of the barbarian Turk. His enthusiasm was genuine and sincere. Unfamiliar with the physical facts of the situation in Anatolia, he was not in a position to visualize the difficulties of the task Greece would be called upon to undertake. His enthusiastic and sanguine temperament led him to brush aside the objections of his technical advisers and of those of his colleagues who were more expert in the affairs of the East. Further, Lloyd George, we know, did not entertain a very high opinion of the military mind and was thus inclined not to attach too much weight to the opinions even of a Foch and a Wilson, whereas, on the contrary, he allowed himself perhaps to be unduly influenced by the persuasive eloquence and personal charm of Venizelos, who was a man after his own democratic heart. A layman himself in such matters, he did not take sufficiently into account the fact that the Greek Premier was also a layman and, besides, an interested party, whose arguments were bound to be biased by his own desires and by the peculiar circumstances of his political position.

Looking back, one cannot but feel that Mr. Lloyd George's warm Philhellenism was, in the particular matter of Smyrna, a misfortune for Greece. He knew by that time (Dec. 1919)¹ that there were no more British troops available to reinforce the Allied Army of Occupation in Turkey and that public opinion in England would be strongly opposed to a single extra British soldier being employed or a single extra penny spent on a fresh campaign in Turkey. He knew that the same was the case in France. As for Italy, she was not only unwilling to give the smallest help but had,

¹ Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (p. 371).



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ever since the Armistice, been intriguing with the Turks to put up a resistance against the Allied demands. Thus all Mr. Lloyd George could, in effect, offer Venizelos was, not British assistance, but British goodwill. This unfortunately was not enough to conquer Asia Minor with.

There will always be a warm place in every Greek's heart for Mr. Lloyd George. As Mr. Winston Churchill has rightly pointed out in *The World Crisis—The Aftermath*, on Mr. Lloyd George had fallen the mantle of Canning and Gladstone. There can be no doubt of his ardent desire to see Greece develop into a strong and prosperous Power, dominating the Aegean and Sea of Marmara. Every Greek feels that, if Mr. Lloyd George erred in sanctioning Greece's adventure in Asia Minor, he did so out of excess of friendship.

But where Mr. Lloyd George committed his most dangerous error was when, even after the fall of Venizelos and the return of Constantine in 1920, he continued to give indirect encouragement to the Greek Government to carry on the struggle in Anatolia. Mr. Lloyd George was a friend of Greece, not of any particular *party* in Greece. He was a sincere admirer of Venizelos but, after the latter's fall, he showed, by his friendly attitude towards the new Greek Government, that his sympathy continued to be with the Greek nation, irrespective of the party in power. He appears even to have been disposed to recognize Constantine,¹ if only France had been willing to do the same.

There can be little doubt that, if Mr. Lloyd George had identified himself with the somewhat harsher attitude

¹ Winston Churchill, *op. cit.* (p. 388), and dispatch of M. Rhangabé, Greek Chargé d'Affaires in London, of 9 August 1921, quoted in Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, 188).

adopted by the French Government towards Greece after the fall of Venizelos and had insisted on the situation being cleared up, by compelling the Greek Government to consent to an armistice and the immediate evacuation of Anatolia, it would have been far better for all concerned. The evacuation, if effected at that date (at the beginning of 1921) under the direct auspices of the Allied Powers, would not have entailed the same disastrous consequences for the Greek army and the civil population as it did two years later. Greece, if induced in time to evacuate Smyrna—and Lloyd George had only to say the word—might still have retained Eastern Thrace, which would have been sufficient compensation for all her sacrifices and would have provided ample room for the settlement of the Christian (Greek and Armenian) population of Anatolia.

The fact that the British Government, up to the very last moment,¹ pursued an ambiguous policy, or rather, had two mutually inconsistent policies—one officially neutral and unfriendly to Greece, the other unofficial, which consisted in encouraging the Greek Government to persist in its efforts and hang on at all costs in Anatolia—had fatal consequences.

Mr. Winston Churchill, himself a member of the Cabinet at the time, has described in two eloquent chapters² the inconsistencies, the hesitations, the incoherences of British policy in Turkey during those four fateful years (1919–22) which followed the Armistice of Mudros. Those who read those chapters will agree that it is a page of history one would fain forget.

¹ Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, p. 352). See Lord Curzon's reply of 6 March 1922 to M. Gounaris' last appeal of 15 February 1922, depicting the critical situation of the Greek army.

² Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (chaps. XVII–XVIII).

(b) THE RESPONSIBILITY OF FRANCE

Of all the Entente Powers, France had been the most ardent in pursuing the policy of bringing Greece, by hook or by crook, into the war on the side of the Allies.

Untrammelled by the dynastic considerations which had made both Great Britain and Russia unwilling to resort to extreme measures against King Constantine and the Greek Dynasty, France, from the very start, put all her money on Venizelos in his struggle against the King and backed the Venizelist party through thick and thin.

It was she who, in June 1917, assumed the unpleasant duties of the Allied policeman in Greece, who sent M. Jonnart as High Commissioner to Athens to turn out the King, and reinstalled Venizelos in power.

It was under French auspices that Greece was able to put ten divisions into the field on the Salonica Front, thus enabling the Allies to break through in September 1918, and so bring about the capitulation of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary.

It was France who had commandeered the services of a Greek army corps for the ill-fated Ukraine expedition in December 1918, thus involving Greece in hostilities with the Bolsheviks, to the great detriment of Greek interests and the numerous Greek colony in Russia.

Thus, France was under a deeper obligation than any of the other Allies to give wholehearted support to the claims of Greece at the Peace Conference.

She was, further, under a special obligation to Venizelos, because the French Government was fully aware that his policy had been anything but popular in Greece, that the expulsion of Constantine had been deeply resented by a very considerable section of the Greek people, that a régime of repression had had to be

established in order to enable the Greek army to be re-mobilized in the interests of the Allies, and that, consequently, the position of Venizelos required to be consolidated by substantial external successes.

Notwithstanding these considerations, the attitude of the French Government and of the majority of French statesmen (with the exception of Clémenceau and Briand) during the whole period from the conclusion of the Armistice of Mudros (30 Oct. 1918) right down to the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920) was anything but favourable to Greece, and at the Peace Conference Venizelos encountered the greatest difficulty in overcoming French opposition to nearly all the Greek claims.

The French representatives in the Near East—General Charpy, the Military Governor of Western Thrace, and Monsieur Defrance, the French High Commissioner at Constantinople—both by word and deed manifested a spirit which was consistently unfriendly towards Greece. The Greek civil and military authorities had constantly to complain of the obstruction of the subordinate French agents, who showed open sympathy with the Turks and did their level best to place obstacles in the way of the Greek authorities, even though the latter were acting as the direct mandatories of the Allied Governments. Colonel Delaunay, the French officer in control of the Oriental Railways—the line running across Western and Eastern Thrace to Constantinople—was particularly active in putting spokes in the wheels of the Greek Army Command and, when the occupation of Eastern Thrace by the Greek army was authorized by the Supreme Council, in May 1920, did everything in his power to retard the transport of troops and material.

The French opposition to Greece at the Peace Conference, backed by powerful support at the Quai d'Orsay,

in the press, and in financial and military circles, increased in intensity after M. Clémenceau, who had always warmly upheld the Greek claims, resigned from the Presidency of the Council at the beginning of 1920. Finally things got so bad that the Greek Minister in Paris, M. Romanos, had to remind M. Millerand, Clémenceau's successor, that if the French Government persisted in its unfriendly attitude, the position of Venizelos and the Francophil party in Greece would be seriously shaken.¹ This argument was decisive in bringing about a change in the official attitude of the French Government, although unofficially and in the press the opposition to the Greek claims continued unabated. M. Venizelos, perhaps with reason, attributed this unfriendly attitude to the fact that M. Millerand² was under the influence of the powerful French financial corporations who had vested interests in Turkey and desired the maintenance of Turkish rule—naturally with all the old safeguards of Capitulations, fiscal exemption, &c.—over as large a portion as possible of the old Ottoman Empire. That the local French influences—both financial and religious—were hostile to the extension of Greek rule and far preferred the maintenance of the *status quo*—of that there can be no doubt. The influential business inter-

¹ Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, p. 138).

² Frangoulis, *op. cit.* (II, p. 140). Dispatch of 26 March 1920: 'Mais nous courons le danger durant la durée des négociations avec la Turquie de voir la France agir contre nos intérêts, car son Président du Conseil actuel subit l'influence des cercles financiers.'

See also, *op. cit.*, p. 32. Letter, of 27 October 1919 to Lloyd George: 'Il est extrêmement désolant de voir les efforts systématiques tentés, en France, par certains groupes financiers dans le but de rejeter dans l'oubli les leçons de l'histoire et de laisser la Turquie reprendre librement l'œuvre d'extermination des populations chrétiennes. La présence de M. Clémenceau à la tête du Gouvernement français est un obstacle précieux à l'influence de ces groupes.'

ests, represented by such institutions as the Banque Ottomane, the Régie des Tabacs and the Administration de la Dette Publique Ottomane, were alarmed at the prospect of their activities and profits being curtailed in the territories which, in the event of the Greek claims prevailing, would pass under Greek rule. For this fear there was, admittedly, some ground, for, after the Balkan Wars, Greece, in common with the other Balkan Governments, had suppressed the Régie des Tabacs and the services of the Ottoman Public Debt in the former Turkish territories annexed as the result of those wars. In the case of the Ottoman Public Debt, the Greek Government, while accepting liability for a share proportionate to the revenues of the new territories, had refused to allow the Ottoman Public Debt Administration to continue collecting the ceded revenues through its own agents and had made itself directly responsible for the service of the debt. The same principle had been applied to the Régie des Tabacs. The rights of private companies, such as the French Compagnie des Quais at Salonica, had, however, been respected. On the other hand, the Ottoman Bank, which in Turkey enjoyed the privileges of a State Bank, had naturally seen a large part of its activities in the annexed territories transferred to the National Bank of Greece. Thus an extension of Greek territory at the expense of Turkey would be bound to entail for these foreign institutions a diminution of business and the loss of many profitable jobs. It was therefore natural that all those whose interests were bound up with the institutions in question, such as the members of the Governing Boards and the higher officials, who were mostly Frenchmen, should be in favour of the maintenance of Turkish rule over as wide an area as possible and should use all their influence in that direction.

The same may be said of the French religious missions which, from time immemorial, had enjoyed the right of maintaining Roman Catholic schools in the Ottoman Empire. These religious orders—the 'Frères', as they were familiarly called—possessed educational establishments all over Turkey. Their schools were mostly frequented by pupils drawn from the various Christian communities—principally Greeks and Armenians—from whom the commercial, clerical and professional classes in the Ottoman Empire were mainly recruited, a thorough knowledge of French being essential for any one wishing to obtain a post in a bank or one of the big international administrations such as the *Régie*, *Dette Publique*, *Compagnie des Quais*, &c.

As the Greek and Armenian pupils in these French Mission schools mostly belonged to the Orthodox and Gregorian Churches, a certain amount of proselytizing was combined with teaching, conversions to the Roman Catholic Church being fairly frequent. The Turkish Government did not interfere with the proselytizing activities of the Missions, as long as no attempt was made to convert Moslem pupils to Christianity.

Similar schools, run by Catholic missions, also existed in Greece, the right of these missions to carry on education in Greece having been recognized by the London Protocol of 1830 at the time of the foundation of the Greek Kingdom. But proselytizing was expressly forbidden by Article 1 of the Greek Constitution, experience having shown that, in the Near East, political aims were frequently pursued under the cloak of religion and that children educated in French or Italian schools tended to become partially, if not totally, denationalized. It was by such methods that that somewhat unattractive type—the Levantine—was produced.

Further, in territories under Greek rule, the Catholic

mission schools had to compete against the State-maintained Government schools, whereas in Turkey no such competition was to be feared, as the local Christians, on principle, never sent their children to the Turkish Government schools, which were exclusively frequented by Moslems.

For these reasons, the influence of the Roman Catholic Missions and of the Roman Catholic Church—a very considerable factor—was also thrown into the scale in favour of the maintenance of Turkish rule and against the claims of Greece.

It is doubtful, however, if these financial and religious influences would, in themselves, have been sufficient to induce the French Government to ignore the just claims of an ally who had made such considerable sacrifices in the *common cause*, had it not been for the *extremely unfavourable military situation in Turkey after the Armistice*. This was undoubtedly the dominant factor in determining the attitude of the French Government.

The latter, basing its opinion on that of its political and military representatives in the Near East, was convinced that the Allies were not in a position to enforce on a recalcitrant Turkey the drastic terms (amounting almost to the annihilation of Turkish independence) contemplated by the Treaty of Sèvres, nor did it believe in the capacity of Greece to impose those terms on the Turks unaided or with the limited aid that it was possible for the Allies, under the circumstances, to give her.

As we now know from the documents since published, Venizelos—and, among allied statesmen, Mr. Lloyd George—were alone in maintaining that belief and in underestimating Mustafa Kemal's powers of resistance. The Allied High Commissioners and Generals at Constantinople, and the British and French General Staffs at home, were unanimous in maintaining the contrary,

and their opinion was shared by a majority of the Ministers in both countries.

Even if one eliminates the Italians as being prejudiced against the Greek claims—Italy being a rival claimant for Smyrna—it is absurd to pretend that the British and French High Commissioners at Constantinople and Generals Milne and Franchet d'Esperey, who commanded the Allied Armies of Occupation in Turkey, were similarly prejudiced and that they intentionally exaggerated the difficulties of the situation. It was they who had to grapple with the almost impossible task of disarming the Turks and maintaining the semblance of Allied control in the interior of Turkey. It would be doing them less than justice to insinuate that these two distinguished generals, of whom Milne, at any rate, was friendly disposed towards the Greeks, were not stating their independent opinion but were under the thumb of self-seeking financiers or of the intriguing Italian High Commissioner, Count Sforza. As for Marshal Foch and General Weygand, we know that they were not the sort of men to allow their technical opinions to be influenced by the wishes or opinions of politicians. In this respect, M. Venizelos allowed himself to be misled, partly, no doubt, because he was unwilling to admit that their objections were well founded.¹

One cannot but be surprised that a statesman of the calibre of Venizelos should have allowed his wish to become so entirely master of his thought as to be incapable of seeing the situation in its true light. Nor

¹ Frangoulis, *op. cit.* (II, p. 136). See dispatch of 15 March 1920 from M. Venizelos to Colonel Ractivan, military representative of the Greek Government on the Inter-Allied Military and Naval Committee at Versailles, and (p. 138) letter of 24 March 1920 from M. Romanos to M. Venizelos.

is there sufficient reason for convicting MM. Poincaré and Millerand of pro-Turkish bias, although they may not have shared Clémenceau's ardent Philhellenism.

Poincaré told M. Venizelos, at that time in Paris, in March 1920, that he regarded the sending of the Greek army to Smyrna as having been a grave error;¹ that, while fully recognizing Greece's right to Smyrna from the historical and ethnographical point of view, he was convinced that, on general grounds, it was preferable to leave that city in Turkish hands; and that the terms of peace should be such as to make their acceptance by the Turks possible.² M. Poincaré, in his weekly political articles published throughout this period (1920-1) in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, that is, both before and after the fall of Venizelos from power,³ always maintained the same point of view. Further, his anglophobia made him ascribe to British influence (meaning Lloyd George) the evolution of Venizelos's annexationist ambitions in Asia Minor.⁴

The same conclusion was reached by M. Cruppi, a prominent politician and ex-Minister, who was sent out to Constantinople in October 1919 to examine the situation on the spot. He reported that French interests required that France should come to terms as soon as

¹ Frangoulis, *op. cit.* (II, p. 140). Dispatch of 24 March 1920.

² Frangoulis, *op. cit.* (II, p. 139). Dispatch of 25 March 1920.

³ *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 August, 1 September, 25 October 1920, 1 March 1921.

⁴ *Revue des Deux Mondes* (25 Oct. 1920). 'M. Venizélos, très sagement inspiré, n'avait émis que des vœux beaucoup plus modestes; il ajournait à des temps lointains des annexions que son pays ne lui semblait pas en état de supporter. Ce n'est qu'après de longs séjours en Angleterre qu'il a, peu à peu, conçu de si grandes ambitions. Nous ne pouvons cependant ignorer qu'en augmentant la part faite à la Grèce, nous augmentions nos risques et nos responsabilités' (Frangoulis, *op. cit.*, II, 119).

possible with Mustafa Kemal's insurgent government in Anatolia.¹

French military opinion, too, never seems to have varied on this point. At the Allied Military Council held on 27 March 1920, the possibilities and prospects of a Greek advance into the interior were carefully examined by the Council presided over by Marshal Foch and pronounced extremely hazardous. The Council pointed out that it would not be sufficient merely to defeat the Kemalists in the field, but that, even after such a victory, it would be necessary to subdue the country and stamp out the guerilla bands.² The undertaking of a fresh campaign, with Brusa as base, meant that the Greek army would have to maintain the whole of Western Anatolia in subjection, in order to secure its lines of communication with the coast. Out of a total force of eight divisions, which the Greek army could put into the field in Asia Minor, three to four would be required for the defence of Smyrna and two for keeping open the lines of communication, thus leaving only two or three for the offensive against Kemal. The military resources of the Greek Government appeared to the Council to be insufficient for such an undertaking.

This opinion was reiterated at the meeting of the Supreme Council in London subsequently held in February 1921,³ the spokesmen on that occasion being General Gouraud and Colonel Georges.

It is clear that neither M. Venizelos nor Mr. Lloyd George attached sufficient importance to the opinions of the allied military advisers. Venizelos was obsessed by the idea that both Foch and Wilson were prejudiced against Greece or else were influenced by political con-

¹ Frangoulis, *op. cit.* (II, p. 142).

² *Idem* (II, p. 193).

³ *Idem* (II, p. 183).

siderations—meaning the views of those circles which were unfavourable to the extension of Greek rule over Asia Minor. This is clear from a letter, dated 15 March 1920, addressed by Venizelos to Colonel Ractivan, the Greek Military Delegate on the Military and Naval Committee at Versailles.

Please note [he writes] that the French Government, in its desire to see the terms of peace imposed on Turkey made as lenient as possible, tends to exaggerate the dangers of possible resistance on the part of the Turks. The French Government is supported in the above view by the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople, who, *under the influence of their environment*, also tend to magnify the dangers of Turkish resistance. I fear that the French military representatives on the Council allow their military judgement to be influenced by the political views of their Government.¹

We know, however, from Mr. Winston Churchill's narrative of the events of this period, that the above views were not those of the French military advisers alone but were shared by the British General Staff as well.²

The comparatively slight resistance encountered by the Greek army during the earlier stages of the Anatolian campaign and the facile successes scored during the practically unopposed advance on Brusa and Eastern Thrace in June–July 1920, seem to have misled both Lloyd George, Venizelos and the Greek General Staff as to the Turkish powers of resistance and the difficulties of bringing the campaign to a decisive issue. They do not seem to have realized that all this was part of Kemal's game; that the latter was not going to stake everything on the fate of a single battle near the coast but preferred to draw the enemy gradually into the interior of the country, harassing them all the while. It was the old game of the Parthians versus the Romans

¹ Frangoulis, op. cit. (II, p. 136).

² Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (p. 376).

of Crassus in 53 B.C., of the Russians versus Napoleon in 1812. Colonel Metaxas, the Chief of the Greek General Staff in 1915, had, as we have seen, opposed the project of Greek territorial expansion in Asia Minor on those very grounds. But in 1919-20 Metaxas was out of the army, and an object of suspicion as a pro-German and anti-Venizelist, and his opinion carried no weight.

That Venizelos, notwithstanding the unfavourable opinion expressed by the highest allied military authorities, fully contemplated carrying the campaign into the interior of Anatolia with a view to compelling the submission of the Turks to the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, is clear from a dispatch¹ which he sent from Paris to M. Repoulis, Vice-President of the Council, on 27 June 1920, immediately after the Conference of Boulogne. In this dispatch he reports an important conversation which he had had, shortly before the Conference, with Mr. Lloyd George, concerning the course to be adopted in the event of Kemal's refusing to accept the peace-terms. 'I added that, in the event of our not succeeding in bringing about, as the result of the proposed operations (i.e. the military operations in North-Western Anatolia), the signature and execution of the Treaty, I would undertake so to increase the strength of the Greek army as to make it possible, with the help of the existing British force in Turkey, to impose our will by force of arms. In that case, however, I would require British assistance both in money and munitions. Further—most important of all—in order to enable me to call upon the Greek people to make a fresh effort of such magnitude, the dismemberment of Turkey would have to be decided upon, Turkey to be confined in future to the Anatolian plateau.'

¹ Ventiris, *Greece in 1910-20* (II, p. 386).

He goes on to tell M. Repoulis that 'If the Turks, as seems probable, persist in their blind obstinacy and consequently we have to undertake the dismemberment of Turkey, the task does not exceed the combined powers of Greece and Great Britain. . . . We shall only call up fresh men to the colours after the decision concerning the virtual partition of Turkey has been finally arrived at and after having previously secured all the necessary assistance, lest we should find ourselves, on the morrow of the signature of peace, confronted by insurmountable financial obstacles'.

From the above it is evident that Venizelos seems to have envisaged the problem of compelling the submission of the Turks as being almost exclusively a question of financial supplies which, in any case, Great Britain was to provide. But we know that it was much more than a financial problem—it was also and above all a question of men and of distances. Foch had estimated at twenty-seven divisions the forces required in order to carry out an effective pacification of the country.¹ Greece had 130,000 men in Asia Minor. Even if it had been possible to increase the strength of the Greek army to 200,000—a very doubtful matter—by calling up fresh reserves, this force, with the 31,000 British and Indian troops stationed at Constantinople, the Ismidt Peninsula, Chanak and Batoum,² would still have been far below the strength estimated as necessary by Foch, seeing that the British troops garrisoning Constantinople and its environs would not, in any case, have been available for operations in the interior of Anatolia. The French, who had had some experience in North Africa of what it meant to pacify a Moslem country, and had all their work cut out in keeping the

¹ Frangoulis, op. cit. (II, p. 190).

² Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (p. 371).

Turks out of Cilicia with a force of 50,000 men,¹ were surely better judges of the situation than the Greek General Staff and the Greek Prime Minister, with whom—it must be admitted—the wish was, to a great extent, father to the thought.

If Venizelos, instead of being defeated at the General Elections of November 1920, had remained in power to carry out the policy of enforcing the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres by a military expedition, such as that envisaged in his telegram of 27 June 1920 to M. Repoulis, one is led to the inevitable conclusion that the situation was bound to have led to results very similar to those which attended the Greek offensive in July–August 1921, when the Greek army advanced to within a short distance of Angora. The essentials of the military situation would have been the same and the same problems would, of necessity, have arisen. Venizelos would ultimately have been faced with the same alternative as his successors—namely, the necessity either of coming to terms with Kemal, involving inevitably the evacuation of Asia Minor, or else of carrying on the war indefinitely, with the prospect of ultimate defeat through a process of attrition. That Venizelos would not have allowed things to reach such a pass and would have succeeded in extricating himself more skilfully than the hapless Gounaris Government—of that, given his gift of realistic adaptation, there can be little doubt. By cutting his losses and sacrificing Smyrna in time, before military collapse became inevitable, he would—one may almost be certain—have succeeded in saving Eastern Thrace.

But whatever the errors committed by the Greek Governments—both Venizelist and Constantinist—in persisting in their Asiatic policy despite the warnings

¹ Frangoulis, *op. cit.* (II, p. 190).

of the highest military authorities, both Greek and Allied, this does not absolve the French Government from the responsibility of having acted in such a manner as to counteract what was, after all, the official policy of the Allies. Thus, instead of the Allies presenting a united front to Turkey, each one pursued a separate policy with a view to securing individual advantages, all at the expense of the weaker partner—Greece.

In December 1919 the French were already negotiating privately with Mustafa Kemal, through M. Georges Picot, the French High Commissioner in Syria, with a view to evacuating Cilicia in return for the concession of special economic privileges.¹

The French Government's excuse was that public opinion in France, already weary of war, would not tolerate fresh financial and military sacrifices and the continuance of hostilities in the East.

If this feeling was already strong in France before the fall of Venizelos—and it was sufficiently so for Mr. Lloyd George to warn Venizelos that, in the event of further operations against Kemal being necessary, he must not rely on French support²—it gained a hundred-fold in intensity after the restoration of Constantine to the throne in December 1920.

Morally and legally, the King's restoration was certainly no justification for leaving Greece in the lurch after all the sacrifices incurred by the Greek people in the Allied cause—in Macedonia, the Ukraine and Turkey. When all is said and done, the restoration of the King was an internal matter. What alone concerned the Allied Governments, logically speaking, was that Greece should continue to fulfil her obligations as an ally against

¹ Frangoulis, *op. cit.* (II, p. 134).

² Telegram of 19 March 1920 quoted in Stratigos's *Ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐν Μικρᾷ Ἀσίᾳ* (p. 88).

Turkey, and this the new Constantinist Government was prepared, in spite of its earlier convictions, to do.

But Constantine's restoration provided a convenient and unhopcd-for excuse which was eagerly seized upon by the opponents of the pro-Greek policy in Great Britain and France. The party which was responsible for bringing Constantine back ought to have taken this into account. International politics are ruled by considerations of interest and expediency, not morality. If the situation was already difficult enough for Greece under Venizelos, to whom the Allies were under a deep personal obligation, why make it doubly so by bringing back Constantine, for whom the Allies entertained a profound aversion? It was bound to complicate matters.

M. Poincaré, who had led the agitation against the Turkish peace-terms, voiced in moderate language what others expressed in a much more violent and illogical form :

Whatever feelings of resentment we may harbour against King Constantine [he writes in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of 1 March 1921] we should be only too glad that Greece should not have to pay too heavy a price for a compromise and that she should be able to reap as much as possible of the fruits of our common victory. Nevertheless, we are bound to take into due account the interests of France ; neither financially nor militarily, are we any longer in a position to go on supporting the heavy charges which weigh upon us in the Levant.¹

The result was the conclusion of a separate Franco-Turkish Agreement on 20 October 1921, signed at Angora by M. Franklin Bouillon, which, at the time, aroused intense indignation in England, both in Parliament and the press. In addition to the other conditions specified in the Agreement, France handed over to the Turks a large part of the munitions and other war

¹ Frangoulis, op. cit. (II, p. 135).

material of the French Army of Occupation in Cilicia. As the Turks were still officially at war with the Entente and engaged in hostilities against the British at Ismidt and the Greeks in Western Anatolia, the handing over of all this war material to the enemy, to be used against friends and former allies, was an act which cannot but be severely condemned from the point of view of international morality.

France's whole attitude after the Armistice—'we have got what we want in Germany and Syria, we don't care what happens elsewhere'—is entirely indefensible. The French, in 1916-17, had been the hardest of all the Allies on Greece, when it was a question of forcing the latter to carry out her obligations towards Serbia, and had not hesitated to go to extreme lengths in order to instal in Greece a Government favourable to the Entente and intervention. By doing so, she had assumed moral obligations towards the Greek people (not only towards Venizelos and his party) which she ought not to have so lightly repudiated.

Most Frenchmen to-day will agree that France's policy in the Near East during the period 1919-21 is a page of French history of which they cannot be proud. The unfortunate victims of that policy were the Armenians of Cilicia and the Greeks of Smyrna, whom the Allies had set out to liberate but had ended by abandoning to their fate.

The policy was not even, in the end, profitable to France.

The French had hoped, by the sacrifice of their friends and Allies and by dissociating themselves in the eyes of the Turks from the official anti-Turkish policy of the Allies, to save from the general wreckage the very considerable financial and educational interests which France possessed in Turkey before the war. This,

however, proved an illusion. The Turkish Nationalists, with great diplomatic skill, exploited the dissension among the Allies but, with laudable impartiality, refused all concessions which ran contrary to their newly promulgated programme of complete national independence. The three and a half thousand millions of francs of French capital invested in Turkish loans and public companies¹ have suffered almost the same fate as the French investments in Russia. The activities of the French educational establishments in Turkey have also been greatly curtailed. The prosperous Europeanized Greek and Armenian Communities of Turkey, which, previous to the war, had been the best clients of French trade and French schools, have been ruined and forced to emigrate to Greece.

There remains only the frugal Anatolian peasant who neither consumes French goods nor sends his children to French schools.

(c) THE RESPONSIBILITY OF RUSSIA

Although Great Britain and France appear as the protagonists of Entente policy towards Greece, both during the period of the preliminary negotiations for bringing Greece into the war (1915-16) and during the subsequent events (1917-22), the part played by Russia, both before and after the Russian Revolution, was perhaps the decisive factor in 'queering the pitch' for Greece.

It was Russia's insurmountable objection to seeing Greek sovereignty established over any part of the territory in the neighbourhood of Constantinople and

¹ Sixty per cent of the Ottoman Public Debt was in French hands and 54 per cent of the foreign capital invested in private enterprises in Turkey was French (Frangoulis, *op. cit.*, II, p. 141).

the Straits which made the offer to Greece of compensation in Asia Minor inevitable, with all the disastrous consequences that that offer ultimately entailed.

It was Russia who, in 1915, by first of all vetoing the participation of Greece in the Dardanelles Expedition at a time when both Great Britain and France were eager to secure Greece's assistance, and then making it a condition of her acceptance that the Greek troops were to be debarred, in the event of victory, from entering Constantinople, was largely responsible for throwing cold water on the pro-Entente sympathies and warlike ardour of the Greek people, whose imagination had been fired by the prospect of entering the coveted city as liberators and hearing the Greek Patriarch once more celebrate Mass in the Church of Saint Sophia. In February 1915 Prince Demidof, the Russian Minister at Athens, reported that Greek public opinion was following with keen interest the operations against the Dardanelles and that the desire to see Greece accomplish her historic mission by the side of the Entente was daily gaining in strength.¹ Unfortunately, the suggestion contained in this dispatch was promptly squashed by the Russian Government,² M. Sazonov replied in the most uncompromising fashion that, in the Imperial Government's opinion, Smyrna was the part of Turkish territory which should be offered as compensation to Greece.³

Prince Demidof did not, after that, persist, and, taking his cue from his Government, thought it his duty to pooh-pooh the warlike demonstrations in favour of the intervention of Greece on the side of the Allies. In

¹ See dispatch No. 72 of 27 February 1915 in *Documents Secrets Russes 1914-1917* (Payot, Paris, 1928), p. 265.

² See Sazonov's dispatch of 2 March 1915 (op. cit., p. 266).

³ See Sazonov's dispatch of 6 March 1915 (p. 254 of above).

this he was readily seconded by his Italian colleague, Count Bosdari, whose Government had its eye on Smyrna and so was just as averse to Greece coming into the war as Russia. This attitude on the part of the representatives of Russia and Italy was a distinct encouragement to the advocates of neutrality.

If the *presence* of Russia among the Allies in 1915, by ruling out all question of compensation to Greece in Europe, was the decisive factor in deflecting Greek ambitions in the direction of Asia, the *absence* of Russia from the peace-settlement in 1919 was equally a misfortune for Greece.

The fact that Soviet Russia not only had renounced all interest in the 'Sick Man's' inheritance, but actively sympathized with the Turks in their struggle for independence against the 'Capitalist' Western Powers created a vacuum in the Entente's original plan for the partition of Turkey which fundamentally altered the whole situation to the disadvantage of Greece. The importance of this was not sufficiently realized at the time either by Venizelos or by those among the Allied statesmen who, like Lloyd George and Clémenceau, supported the policy of establishing Greece in Asia Minor. Even so acute a statesman as Venizelos was deceived into thinking that the elimination of Russia as a claimant to Constantinople and Turkish territory was rather a good thing for Greece, whereas exactly the contrary was the case, for Russia's withdrawal threw the whole burden of enforcing the peace-settlement on the weak shoulders of the Hellenic army.

If there had been no Russian Revolution and no Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russian troops would have participated, after the Armistice, in the occupation not only of Constantinople but also of North-Eastern Anatolia, to which Russia was entitled under the secret agreements of

March 1915, April 1916 and January 1917. In that case, the conditions which made possible the success of Mustafa Kemal's insurrectionary movement in 1919, could hardly have arisen. Greece, instead of having to fight the Turks—left in possession of nearly the whole of Anatolia—single-handed, would then have had the comparatively light task of maintaining herself at Smyrna, with Turkey confined to the Central Anatolian plateau and cowering beneath the constant menace of the Russian bear, firmly ensconced at Trebizond, Erzeroum, Van, Bitlis, Ismidt and Constantinople.

The Russian Government, we have seen, had in 1915 been most persistent in encouraging Greece to seek compensation in the direction of Smyrna and Western Asia Minor, as being outside the range of Russian territorial aspirations. Russia, above all, did not want to see Greece in occupation of Eastern Thrace, in immediate proximity to Constantinople, where Greece, both on historical, ethnographical and religious grounds, could advance claims which, if sponsored by Great Britain or France, might at some future date prove inconvenient.

At the beginning of January 1915, when the question of obtaining the assistance of the Greek military and naval forces for the projected attack on the Dardanelles was being discussed between London, Paris and Petrograd, M. Paléologue, the French Ambassador at the Russian capital, informed his Government that 'if, for strategic reasons, it became necessary for the Greek troops to land in the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Greek Government should be informed that Russia could not consent to the final establishment of Greek sovereignty over the Dardanelles'.¹ Prince Demidoff and Count Benckendorff made communications to the same effect

¹ Dispatch of 13 January 1915 in Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (I, p. 197).

at Athens and in London. This was followed shortly afterward (24 Jan.) by the British offer to Greece of Smyrna, which, as Sir E. Grey expressly stated in his dispatch, had the approval both of Russia and France.

The Russian point of view is clearly stated in a telegram from M. Ion Dragoumis, then Greek Minister at Petrograd, to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 22 February/5 March 1915.¹

M. Sazonof told me that, as he had telegraphed to the Russian Minister at Athens, the Russian Government was not of the opinion that Greece's assistance was necessary in the operations against the Dardanelles; that the question of the Straits and of Constantinople was one to be settled by the Powers among themselves, without the intrusion of third parties; and that Russia did not want Greek troops to enter Constantinople. . . . In general, I got the impression that the Russian Government does not want to see us take part in the operations against Constantinople and on that account wishes to push us in the direction of Smyrna. Amongst other things, *Sazonof told me that he was very glad the British had offered us Smyrna and a large part of Asia Minor.* Personally, he was convinced that we had no views on Constantinople but Russian public opinion required to be reassured on that point; that was the reason why the Russian Government did not desire our collaboration in the capture of that city.

Russia's share in the ultimate partition of the territories of the Ottoman Empire had been fixed by a series of secret agreements concluded between the Allies during the years 1915-17. The cession to Russia of Constantinople and the Straits—the goal of Russian policy throughout the nineteenth century—although it encountered strong opposition in certain French circles, was finally assented to by the Anglo-Franco-Russian secret Agreement of 17 March 1915. Besides the city of Constantinople itself, Russia was to receive a considerable hinterland on both sides of the Straits, including, on the

¹ Frangoulis, op. cit. (I, p. 199).

European side, Eastern Thrace as far as the Enos-Midia Line, together with the islands of Tenedos and Imbros, and on the Asiatic side, the Sandjak of Ismidt as far as the river Sakkaria.¹

The fate of the Asiatic territories was determined by a later agreement concluded in April 1916. Russia received a large extension of territory in North-Eastern Anatolia, including the vilayets of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, as well as a portion of Kurdistan lying south of the last two regions. By the same agreements France was given Syria, Cilicia and Kharput, and Great Britain Mesopotamia.²

By an earlier agreement (the Treaty of London of 26 April 1915) Italy was allotted Adalia and a hinterland of undefined extent in Southern Anatolia.

The effect of all these agreements, had they been put into effect, would have been to leave a small Turkish State in the centre of Anatolia (including only the vilayets of Sivas, Brusa, Castamuni and part of the vilayet of Konia) hemmed in by the Russians on the North-East and North-West, the Greeks on the West, the Italians on the South, the French on the South-East and the British on the East.

Under such conditions Greece's position in the vilayet of Aidin would have been comparatively secure.

The collapse of Tsarist Russia and the advent of the Bolsheviks to power completely upset all the presuppositions on which the settlement of the Turkish question, as planned by the secret treaties, had been based. The Bolsheviks not only renounced all territorial ambitions at the expense of Turkey but also ceded to Turkey the Caucasian districts of Kars and Ardahan which Russia had acquired as the result of the Russo-

¹ *Les Années fatales—Souvenirs de S. Sazonof* (p. 275).

² *Ibid.* (p. 279).

Turkish war of 1877-8. Further, Russia, for over two centuries the traditional enemy of Turkey, now became her friend. The mere fact that Turkey was in the opposite camp to Great Britain and France—the Capitalist States *par excellence*—made the Bolsheviks sympathetic towards the Turks and hostile to Greece who, particularly since her participation in the ill-starred French expedition to the Ukraine in 1918-19, was regarded by the Bolsheviks as being a mere satellite of the Western Powers.

Although no formal agreement was concluded between the Soviets and Turkey until 1921 (Treaty of Moscow, 16 March 1921), the relations between the two countries, from 1919 onwards, were intimate and cordial. Even if the material assistance in money and munitions actually received by Turkey from the Soviets during the earlier stages of the National Movement was not very considerable, it was a fact of capital importance, which made all the difference, that, during his arduous struggle against the Greek, British and French invaders in Western and Southern Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal had not to fear any hostile action on the part of Russia in his rear.

As for the unfortunate Armenians, in whose favour President Wilson and the Allies had schemed to create a State comprising the greater part of the six Eastern vilayets, they were soon disposed of by Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha in a short and decisive campaign in the autumn of 1920.

To sum up—the fact that, in 1915-17, Russia was one of the Allies, made it inevitable that the compensation offered to Greece by the Entente should be in Asia rather than Europe; the fact that, in 1918-22, Russia was no longer among the Allies rendered that compensation valueless and turned it into a Nessus's shirt, from whose deadly folds the unfortunate recipients of the gift found it impossible to escape.

(d) THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ITALY

The lack of a united front among the Entente Powers in dealing with the Greek situation, both during and immediately after the Great War, and the divergency of their respective aims, which had such disastrous consequences for all concerned, is nowhere more evident than when one comes to consider the policy pursued by Italy.

However much one may desire to eschew the use of epithets, it is hard to avoid employing the term 'machia-vellian'¹ when describing the astounding record of double-dealing which characterized Italian policy towards Greece during the fateful years 1915-20.

Whatever errors Great Britain and France may have committed in the handling of individual phases of the Greek situation, it must be admitted that both the British and French Governments, as long as the fate of the war

¹ I do not hesitate to use the word 'machiavellian' because I see it is used in the same context by Mr. Compton Mackenzie, the Head of the British Intelligence Service at Athens (see on p. 223 of *Greek Memories* his report dated 27 June 1916: '(3) Supervision of the Italian Intelligence: As you probably know, Count Bosdari, the Italian Minister, was always against going to war with the Central Powers and is still greatly opposed to going to war with Germany. He is also a personal enemy of Venizelos and is certainly working to promote ill-feeling between Greece and the Entente. From his point of view it is much better for Italian ambitions in Epirus, Asia Minor and Albania that at the end of the war we should not have the slightest desire to gratify any Greek ambitions. . . . Inasmuch as the Italians definitely refused to associate themselves with the other Entente Powers in the original *démarche* on the grounds that Italy was not one of the Protecting Powers, it was to say the least a *Machiavellian* policy to send immediately afterwards an Italian ship to take part in the demonstration and land soldiers at The Piraeus.'

was trembling in the balance, subordinated all other considerations to the principal one of winning the war and were throughout actuated by no other motive than the desire to bring in the largest possible number of allies on the side of the Entente. In order to assure the common victory, neither England nor France hesitated, when it became necessary, to consent to making considerable sacrifices of their individual interests, as, for instance, when they agreed, by the Secret Treaty of 1915, to recognize Russia's claim to Constantinople and the Straits—a complete reversal, as Lord Asquith well points out in his *Memoirs*, of Great Britain's traditional policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.¹

Italy's attitude, on the contrary, was far more calculating. While the main object of England and France was to win the war, Italy had her eye on what would happen when the war was over. From the outset, she was opposed to the policy of bringing Greece into the war. In Greece she saw not a fresh ally but an inconvenient partner in the future spoils of the Ottoman Empire. Unable, however, to frustrate the combined British, French and Russian policy of inducing Greece to throw in her lot on the side of the Entente, Italy paid lip-service to her Allies' policy, while doing her level best to counter it by every means of obstruction in her power.

During the crucial years 1915-16, when the issue of intervention versus neutrality was being fought out between Venizelos and Constantine, the representative of the Italian Government at Athens, Count Bosdari, was at no pains to conceal his sympathy with King Constantine and the party of neutrality. Italy, herself a claimant to Western Asia Minor, was opposed to Greek

¹ *Memoires and Reflections*, by the Earl of Oxford and Asquith (II, 65).

participation in the war, because the price of the Greek alliance was Smyrna.

Notwithstanding, the Italian Government did not hesitate to associate itself with most of the harsh and repressive measures—blockades, police-measures, comminatory Notes—by which the Entente Powers attempted to coerce Greece into entering the war and which the Italian Minister, with secret joy and far more discernment than his colleagues, realized would only have the effect of increasing the unpopularity of the Entente and of damping any enthusiasm that the Greek people may have felt for the Entente cause.¹

For similar reasons the Italian Government studiously dissociated itself from any measure which might tend to strengthen the position of Venizelos and the partisans of intervention, on the specious ground that Italy did not desire to interfere in the internal politics of Greece.

After Venizelos had set up his Provisional Government at Salonica—in September 1916—in open opposition to King Constantine, Italy was the last of the Allies to recognize the new Government. The attitude of the Italian military authorities in Macedonia, where Italy had landed a division in order to participate in the Salonica Expedition, was consistently unfriendly and aimed at thwarting the efforts of the Venizelist Government in matters of local recruiting and administration.²

After the signature of the Armistice with Turkey (30 Oct. 1918), all the efforts of the Italian Government were directed towards depriving Greece of the legitimate fruits of her participation in the war. Having failed to obtain recognition of Italian claims to Smyrna under the

¹ See Compton Mackenzie's *Greek Memories* (p. 223), quoted above.

² At the time I was Deputy Governor-General of the Salonica Province and had personal experience of the above.

terms of the Treaty of St. Jean-de-Maurienne, the Italian Government found itself forced to acquiesce—much against its will—in the mandate given to Greece by the Allied Supreme Council, in May 1919, to occupy that city; Italy, none the less, proceeded to do everything in her power to render nugatory the policy of her Allies by putting spokes in the wheels of the Greek occupation in Asia Minor. Through Count Sforza, her representative at Constantinople, she encouraged the insurrectionary movement of Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia which was directed not only against the Greeks but against all the Allies in common. The Italian military authorities in occupation of the territory south of the Meander, while giving open assistance and shelter to the Turkish guerilla bands operating against the Greeks, would not allow the latter to pursue their enemy into the Italian Zone.

Italy thus bears a heavy responsibility for checking what, down to November 1920, was the official policy of the Allies in Turkey and for assisting the Turkish Nationalist movement in the interior of Anatolia at the expense of her ally, Greece.

No one can deny that she was eminently successful in her main object, which was to prevent Greece from establishing herself at Smyrna. But in doing so she was instrumental in bringing about that new set of conditions in Turkey as the result of which Italy herself was forced to relinquish her own cherished ambitions of colonial expansion in Southern Asia Minor.

In order better to understand the motives of Italian policy in the Near East, it is necessary to go back to the period before the outbreak of the Balkan War of 1912-13.

Italy's interest in Asia Minor may be said to date from 1912, with her occupation of the Dodecanese during the Turco-Italian War.

In May of that year Italy, in order to bring pressure on Turkey to evacuate Tripoli, seized Rhodes and the other islands of the Dodecanese lying off the south-western point of Anatolia.

By the Treaty of Ouchy (15 Oct. 1912), which put an end to the war, Turkey ceded Tripoli to Italy and the latter was authorized to remain in provisional occupation of the Dodecanese as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the clauses of the Treaty and until the complete evacuation of Tripoli by the Ottoman troops.

The possession of this group of islands in the immediate proximity of the Anatolian coast was henceforward regarded by the Italians as a stepping-stone towards the fulfilment of more ambitious dreams of colonial expansion on the Asiatic mainland. Save among a few idealists and Philhellenes who justly regarded the annexation of the islands, whose population was predominantly Greek, as a glaring violation of the principle of nationalities and advocated their cession to Greece, the idea was sedulously cultivated that the occupation of the Dodecanese was to be a permanence. The alleged continued presence of a number of Turkish officers among the Arab insurgents in Tripoli, who kept up a ceaseless guerilla warfare, furnished a sufficiently plausible excuse for the indefinite continuation of the occupation.

The great problem of modern Italy, for the last generation, has been over-population. The colonies acquired by Italy previous to the Great War—namely, Eritrea, Italian Somaliland and Tripoli—could only provide a very limited outlet for her surplus agricultural population, seeing that the amount of cultivable land immedi-

ately available for settlers or even of waste land capable of reclamation was negligible; nor are the regions in question capable of extensive industrial development such as might provide employment for emigrants of the urban class.

Further, emigration to foreign countries—particularly to the United States and the French possessions in Northern Africa which had absorbed large numbers of Italians during the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth—was always liable to be stopped through emigration restrictions which those countries at any time might choose to impose, and which, in fact, both the United States and France have imposed since the war.

What more natural then than that Italy should cast longing eyes in the direction of Anatolia, that vast 'No man's land' lying at the very gates of Europe, with its area of 520,000 square kilometres, with its fertile soil and great potential resources in wheat, cotton, timber, coal and minerals of all sorts.

The population of Asiatic Turkey, previous to the outbreak of the European War, was reckoned to be about 8,500,000 or only 16 inhabitants to the square kilometre. Except for the regions adjoining the Aegean, Black Sea and Marmara sea-boards, all the other parts of the country were (as they still are) very sparsely populated. The Moslem population had for generations been steadily diminishing, owing to the constant drain of military service, to which the Moslems alone were liable, while the Christians (Greeks and Armenians) had been decimated by massacre and deportation which, particularly since 1914, had assumed formidable proportions. In the Southern and Central vilayets, with the single exception of the vilayet of Aïdin, which included the city of Smyrna, the density of the population was even smaller

—11 to the square kilometre in the vilayet of Konia, 10 in that of Adana.¹

Italian statesmen, even before Mussolini, had begun to cultivate a belief in Italy's historic mission in the Mediterranean. Was she not the heir to the traditions of Venice in Dalmatia, to those of the Knights of St. John in Rhodes and Malta, to the Roman Empire in Northern Africa and Asia Minor? Was not 'Asia' (Western Anatolia) the oldest Roman *provincia*, a country full of the monuments of Republican and Imperial Rome?

Thus necessity and sentiment combined made Italy look upon Asia Minor as the Promised Land.

Italian ambition began to assume a more concrete form with the entry of Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers, in the autumn of 1914. The folly of the Young Turks in throwing in their lot with Germany against England and France who had for centuries been Turkey's protectors against the danger of Russian aggression, seemed destined to give Italy her chance of realizing her dream of Asiatic expansion. Turkey, once defeated, would become fair game for the victors. The Ottoman possessions in Asia were quite extensive enough to provide a generous share for all the victors.

Italy's claims did not conflict seriously with those of the other principal Allies. Russian ambitions were centred on Constantinople and the Straits, and the Armenian provinces adjoining the Caucasian border; France claimed Syria and part of the vilayet of Adana (Eastern Cilicia); Great Britain, Palestine and Mesopotamia. The only country with whom Italy's claims were likely to overlap was Greece, whose title to Smyrna and the Western Asiatic coastal region was, both on ethno-

¹ A. Souliotis, *The Inhabitants of Asia Minor* (Athens, 1921), p. 46 (in Greek).

logical and historical grounds, much stronger than that of Italy.

Premonitory signs of a future Italo-Greek conflict over the possession of this coveted region appear as early as the winter of 1914 in a dispatch from M. Coromilas, the Greek Minister in Rome, to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 December, reporting the views prevailing at the Consulta on the subject of the eventual partition of Turkey.¹

The Italian Government [he wrote] hopes that, in the event of Germany's defeat, the moment for the partition of Anatolia will arrive, and that then Italy will get her chance of securing a footing there. According to the Italian Government's forecast, Russia will be awarded the Armenian provinces, thus obtaining an outlet on the Mediterranean opposite Cyprus.² France will get Syria, and Great Britain Arabia. There will be plenty of territory left over for Italy west of the Russian zone. The Italians realize, to their great chagrin, that it will not be possible entirely to ignore the claims of Greece, but, as everybody wants Smyrna and the Meander valley, they feel confident that the region in question will not be given to us. In any case, they will do everything in their power to reduce Greece's share of the Anatolian inheritance to a minimum.

Italy had her eyes on the vilayets of Konia and Aidin, both of which she regarded as falling within her legitimate sphere of influence, as lying immediately opposite the Dodecanese.

The offer made to Greece by Sir Edward Grey, in the name of Great Britain, Russia and France in January 1915, of 'large concessions on the coast of Asia Minor' (subsequently interpreted as including Smyrna and the greater part of the vilayet of Aidin) cut across the Italian claims. Italy, however, at the time when the offer to Greece was first made, was not in a position to raise objections, as she herself was still neutral.

¹ Quoted in G. Ventiris, *Greece in 1910-20* (I, p. 265).

² As a matter of fact, Russia did not include the Vilayet of Adana among her claims.

This was the cause of the hostile attitude taken up from the very start of the Greek crisis by the Italian Government and its representative at Athens, Count Bosdari, towards Venizelos and the interventionist party in Greece. It was obviously in the interests of Italy—looked at from an exclusively Italian, if not from an Allied point of view—that Greece should remain neutral, in which case the latter would have no claim to territorial compensation in Asia Minor, thus leaving the field free for Italy. It is important, when judging the attitude of King Constantine and the party opposed to intervention, to remember that, at a moment when Great Britain and France were urging Greece to throw in her lot with the Entente and participate in the expedition against the Dardanelles, one of the Allies—Russia—was showering cold water on the project by refusing Greece the moral satisfaction of taking part in the eventual occupation of Constantinople, while another of the Allies—Italy—was bringing her whole weight to bear on the side of the partisans of non-intervention.¹

While negotiations were still proceeding between the Allies and Greece, Italy, by the Secret Treaty of 26 April 1915, obtained the recognition of her claims to Adalia, together with a portion of the hinterland, to be delimited later. Subsequently, after Greece had definitely rejected the Allies' offer and decided to remain neutral, Italy succeeded in obtaining, by the Treaty of St. Jean-de-Maurienne (19 April 1917), an extension of her zone so as to include Smyrna and a portion of the vilayet of Aidin.

¹ For Italian policy at this time, see Bosdari, *Della guerra Balcaniche, della Grande Guerra, &c.* His view of Sir E. Grey's offer is the following (p. 107): 'A disastrous political idea which was based on the absurd hypothesis that Greece would be in a position effectively to conquer and to keep the immense Asiatic territories offered her.'

At the Peace Conference all the above arrangements were once more thrown into the melting-pot. The situation in the meantime had undergone so radical a change that the engagements entered into in virtue of the Secret Treaties concluded during the war could no longer be regarded as binding. On the one hand the United States, which had not been a party to those treaties, was not prepared to recognize them without further discussion. President Wilson had to be consulted and was bent on having a determining voice in the settlement of the Turkish question.

On the other hand Russia, one of the principal beneficiaries under the Secret Treaties of 1915-17, was no longer an interested party, the Soviets having withdrawn from the war and concluded a separate peace with Turkey.

Furthermore, Greece, who had finally been brought into the war on the side of the Allies by Venizelos in 1917, was entitled morally, if not legally (there having been no official renewal of the offer of 1915), to claim the compensation previously offered her in return for her services. The acceptance on the part of the Allies of Wilson's Fourteen Points, as the basis of the future Peace, made it incumbent on them to take into account the principle of nationalities which, in the case of Smyrna, was in favour of the claims of Greece—the only Allied Power possessing a large kindred population in Turkey—and unfavourable to those of Italy.

Italy at first refused to forgo her claims under the Treaty of St. Jean-de-Maurienne, though that treaty was no longer recognized as binding by the other Allies. In order to force the hand of the Conference and place her Allies before a *fait accompli*, Italian troops landed at Adalia on 5 March 1919. Detachments penetrated into

the interior as far as Konia. Early in May they occupied Makri and Marmaris, opposite Rhodes.

It was then that the Supreme Council, composed of Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clémenceau and President Wilson, fearing an Italian *coup de main* on Smyrna, decided, on 6 May 1919, to authorize Venizelos to land troops at Smyrna. At the time when this decision was taken, Italy was not represented on the Supreme Council, her delegation having withdrawn in consequence of the rupture with President Wilson over the question of Fiume.

At first the intention of the Supreme Council had been to send the Greeks to Smyrna without even consulting Italy, but at the last moment Clémenceau, fearing a complete rupture with Italy and its possible reactions on French interests on the Rhine, decided to notify the Italian Government. The latter formally assented to the landing of the Greek troops. Nevertheless, the subsequent behaviour of the Italians towards the Greeks in Asia Minor clearly indicated that the former regarded their consent as having been extorted and consequently as not being morally binding.

Mr. Winston Churchill, in his book, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath*,¹ criticizes the Greek Government which succeeded Venizelos in power after 1920, for having placed too much reliance on the unofficial encouragements of Mr. Lloyd George which, he says, were no substitute for treaties, agreements or formal diplomatic communications. Yet the whole policy pursued by the Allied Powers in the Near East subsequent to the Armistice of Mudros was so frequently at variance with their official engagements that the criticism is hardly valid. The unofficial encouragement and support given to the Turks—in direct contravention of Treaties of

¹ p. 393.

Alliance and formal agreements—first by Italy and, later, by France—was, unfortunately for Greece, of infinitely greater importance in practice than the signatures which those Powers had appended at the bottom of numberless diplomatic instruments. If one may criticize the policy of Venizelos all through this period (1918–20), it is for having attached undue importance to what constituted, to a great extent, mere paper victories, and for ignoring the menacing realities of the situation concealed behind the imposing official façade of formal diplomatic agreements. His reply to the objections raised by Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson and others who thought it their duty to point out to him the difficulties and risks involved in the Anatolian venture was invariably the same refrain:

Was he not the mandatory of the Powers, did he not land at Smyrna with the official consent of all the Allies? Was it not written in black and white that Turkey should be divided up between the Powers, Greece, the Armenians and the Kurds?¹

In the shaping of events in Anatolia during the critical four years which followed the conclusion of the Armistice of Mudros (30 Oct. 1918), and in the creation of the local conditions which brought about the collapse both of Greece's attempt to implant herself in Asia Minor and of the Allied projects for the political subjugation and economic exploitation of Turkey, Italy played an important and often dominant part.

Although associating herself, officially, with the policy adopted by the Allies towards Turkey down to the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920), Italy had, in fact, ever since the Armistice, pursued an independent policy, paying mere lip-service to the measures of coercion and projects of partition, the

¹ Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (p. 384).

initiative of which belonged to Great Britain and France, more especially the former.

This duality of policies—the official and the unofficial—is responsible, in great part, for the incoherences, the weaknesses and the failures which marked Allied policy in the Near East during all this period.

While officially committed to her Allies' policy of imposing on Turkey terms of peace which amounted to the almost complete suppression of Turkish independence, the unofficial action of her representatives on the spot was guided by the conviction of the impossibility of enforcing such terms and, consequently, on the necessity of compromising with the nationalist and intransigent elements among the Turks.

The principal promoter and executant of this 'unofficial' Italian policy was the able and crafty Count Sforza, Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople during the years 1918–20, and subsequently Foreign Minister in the Giolitti Cabinet.

Italy thus had two strings to her bow. The first entitled her, in the event of Mr. Lloyd George's policy of coercion and of the break-up of Turkey being successful, to participate in the common benefits and spoils; the second would, she hoped, enable her, in the more probable event of the triumph of the Turkish Nationalists, to exploit the services unofficially rendered to the latter during their struggle for independence in order to obtain commercial privileges and, in general, a treatment more favourable than that to which the other Allies would, under the circumstances, be able to aspire.

This Italian policy of re-insurance, which, though at the time skilfully veiled from the public gaze in the Allied countries, was no secret for all those who happened to be in immediate contact with the situation on the spot at Constantinople, Smyrna and other parts of

Turkey during the Armistice period, has since been revealed by Count Sforza himself in the following passage of his book, *Les Bâtisseurs de l'Europe Moderne*, in which he admits, with unblushing sincerity, the part played by himself in helping Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish Nationalists : ¹

La réalité était que la Turquie n'était pas morte, loin de là ; qu'un gouvernement central inepte donnait certes l'impression de la débâcle, mais que la vraie Turquie pourrait se retrouver, que par conséquent il était dangereux de trop tendre la corde ; que rien ne nous empêchait de rester les maîtres à Constantinople ; mais que nous risquions de le rester d'une maison vide ; et que si les forces vives de la Turquie allaient se retirer en Asie, elles se retourneraient contre nous, une fois hors de notre portée.

Cette situation et ces prévisions, je les avais communiquées dès le début à mon Gouvernement à Rome et à la Conférence de la Paix. J'avais déclaré nettement que je sentais ne pouvoir servir utilement mon pays qu'en luttant pour une paix rapide et honorable qui devait nous assurer les avantages les plus larges mais qui excluait toute idée du partage de la Turquie. Connaissant les projets de division du territoire Ottoman en sphères d'influences, formulés pendant la guerre, et qu'on caressait encore à Paris, *je n'exigeais point l'approbation formelle de ma conception. Il me suffisait d'énoncer mon programme. . . . Orlando et Sonnino ne gênèrent nullement mon action politique. Leur silence fut une approbation, du moins passive. Avec son bonnête brusquerie, Sonnino me signifia que si le cours des événements allait faire pressentir que je m'étais trompé, je serais désavoué, ce à quoi je consentis volontiers.*

After the signature of the Armistice of Mudros, the Turks, like all the other enemy countries, had got rid of their pro-German war-Cabinet, and, in order to propitiate the victors, had installed in power a government of Ententist sympathies. Talaat, Enver and Djemal, the leading lights of the Young Turkish Party, who had brought their country into the war on the side of Germany, were allowed to escape abroad, and Ferid

¹ Sforza, *Les Bâtisseurs de l'Europe Moderne* (Paris, 1931), p. 347.

Pasha, a Turkish *grand seigneur* of the old school and son-in-law of the Sultan, who had been educated at Oxford and was of known Anglophil sympathies, became Grand Vizier.


The policy of the new Government was to propitiate the Entente by falling in with all the behests of the Allies who, in the meantime, had occupied Constantinople, in the hopes of saving from the general wreckage what might still be saved.

Count Sforza, alone among the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople, pursued an independent policy and became from the outset the confidant of the Turkish Nationalist Opposition, which was bent on resistance to the allied peace-terms—to the great scandal, as he himself admits, of his British and French colleagues, Admirals Calthorpe (later succeeded by de Robeck) and Amet—whose straightforward sailor's loyalty did not allow them to become parties to such double-dealing.

Through the intermediary of two Turkish journalists—the brothers Djellal and Sedat Noury, proprietors of the Turkish paper, *Ileri*—Sforza got into touch with Mustafa Kemal, at that time stranded at Constantinople without a job and actively engaged in preaching resistance to the allied demands. He even went so far as to take the latter under his special protection and, when the Chief of the British Military Police at Constantinople, desirous of putting an end to the Turkish general's dangerous anti-ally activities, suggested that Mustafa should be arrested and deported to Malta, Count Sforza obligingly offered the Pasha a refuge at the Italian Embassy.¹

There is considerable evidence to show that Sforza not only knew of Kemal's plan for starting an insurgent

¹ Sforza, *Les Bâisseurs de l'Europe Moderne* (p. 358, note).



COUNT CARLO SFORZA

movement in Anatolia but actually encouraged him, promising him Italian sympathy and support. He undoubtedly had his finger in the pie when Kemal was appointed Inspector of the 3rd Turkish Army Inspectorate at Erzeroum early in May 1919, and it was at the request of the Italian High Commissioner that the pass enabling Kemal to land at Samsoun (at that time in the British military zone) on 19 May (four days after the Greeks had landed at Smyrna) was issued.

Count Sforza, we know, had previously expressed to his colleagues in strong language his disapproval of the Supreme Council's decision to permit the occupation of Smyrna by Greek troops,¹ a step which, he declared, would have fatal consequences for the Entente and Greece herself.

During the earlier stages of the Kemalist movement in Anatolia, Italy rendered valuable help to the insurgents. Not only were arms and ammunition allowed to penetrate freely into the interior through the port of Adalia, at that time under Italian occupation,² but the guerilla bands which had been formed under Kemal's direction to oppose the Greek invasion were allowed to use the Italian zone south of the Meander as a base from which to harass the flank of the Greek army.

It is difficult to imagine a more extraordinary and anomalous situation—on the one hand, the Allied High Commissioners and Generals at Constantinople officially pursuing a policy of disarming Turkey, on the other one of the Allied Representatives doing everything in his power to facilitate the rearming of the enemy who was engaged in active hostilities not only against the Greeks

¹ Ibid. (pp. 165-6).

² These movements were regularly reported to G.H.Q., Constantinople, by Major Hadkinson, the British Intelligence officer in South-Western Anatolia.

at Smyrna, but also against the French in Cilicia and the British at Ismidt.

While the Italians, by their behaviour in Anatolia, were actively promoting the state of chaos which had arisen after the Greek landing at Smyrna and the outbreak of the Kemalist Movement, the Italian representatives at the Peace Conference consistently opposed all the Greek claims for territorial compensation whether in Asia Minor or Thrace, the former on the ground that Smyrna and its hinterland had already been adjudged to Italy by the Treaty of St. Jean-de-Maurienne of 19 April 1917, the latter on ethnological and political grounds.¹

In order to break down Italian opposition at the Conference, which was holding up the conclusion of peace with Turkey and creating in the meantime a highly dangerous situation in Anatolia, Venizelos found himself forced, in July 1919, to enter into direct negotiations with the Italian Government. He finally succeeded in persuading the latter to withdraw their opposition to the Greek claims in Eastern Thrace, Northern Epirus and Asia Minor in return for the promise of Greek support at the Conference for the Italian claims in Albania and Southern Anatolia. Greece at the same time withdrew her claims to the Sandjaks of Denizli, Mentesh and Aidin, limiting herself to the Sandjak of Smyrna.

These negotiations culminated in the signature of the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement of 29 July 1919.² Besides undertaking to support the Greek claims in Thrace, Asia Minor and Northern Epirus, Italy also consented to renounce in favour of Greece the sovereignty of all the islands of the Dodecanese, with the exception of Rhodes, the cession of the latter island being made conditional

¹ Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, pp. 37-8).

² Ibid. (II, pp. 93-8).

on the cession by Great Britain to Greece of Cyprus.¹ It was stipulated, however, that in the event of Italy not obtaining from the Conference the satisfaction of all her claims in Anatolia, that Power was entitled to resume full liberty of action.

Taking advantage of this clause, the Giolitti Government, which succeeded that of Signor Nitti, denounced the Agreement, in July 1920. Count Sforza, who had become Foreign Minister in the new Cabinet, was primarily responsible for its denunciation. He held that the terms of the Agreement—particularly those concerning the cession of the Dodecanese—were unduly unfavourable to Italy. As he wrote later, he considered it *infra dig.* that a Great Power like Italy should stipulate for the support of a secondary Power like Greece.²

This action on the part of the Giolitti Government evoked a strong protest from Venizelos, who declared that he would refuse to sign the Treaty of Sèvres (by then ready), Greece having given her assent to the stipulations of that Treaty on the assumption of the validity of the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement. The Greek protest was upheld by Great Britain who in turn put pressure on the Italian Government by threatening not to sign the Tripartite Agreement defining the economic spheres of influence of the three Powers (Great Britain, France and Italy) in Anatolia, unless Italy previously came to an agreement with Greece over the Dodecanese.

Yielding to this pressure, Italy was forced to conclude a fresh agreement with Greece (signed at Sèvres on 10 August 1920) by which she again agreed to cede to Greece all the islands except Rhodes. This agreement, the execution of which was made dependent on the ratifica-

¹ Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, p. 101).

² Sforza, *Les Bâtisseurs de l'Europe Moderne* (p. 163).

tion of the Treaty of Sèvres, remained inoperative in consequence of the non-ratification of the latter treaty.

After the conclusion of the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement in July 1919, the Italian delegation at the Peace Conference had for a time withdrawn its opposition to the Greek claims in Anatolia. The advent of Count Sforza as Foreign Minister in the Giolitti Cabinet of 1920 once more brought about a change in the attitude of the Italian delegation. Both at Boulogne (June 1920) and Spa (July 1920), Sforza pressed for a revision of the whole proposed peace-settlement with Turkey on the ground that it would be impossible to crush the Turkish Nationalist Movement in Anatolia. Greece, he said, if accorded all she asked for, would die of indigestion.¹

However, the Italian objections were again overruled by Mr. Lloyd George, and Italy signed the Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920 without more ado.

Together with the Treaty was signed the Tripartite Agreement, which parcelled out what was left of Turkey into a number of economic spheres of influence between Great Britain, France and Italy, the latter getting as her share the vilayet of Konia, part of the vilayet of Aidin and the coal basin of Eregli on the Black Sea.

The Italians, however, like the French, made no secret of their conviction that the Treaty was not worth the paper it was written on.

Count Sforza, who, as Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople, had had the opportunity of making the personal acquaintance of Mustafa Kemal and the principal Turkish Nationalist leaders, was convinced that the Turks still had sufficient 'kick' left in them to retain their independence and that all efforts to conquer them in their Anatolian fastnesses would be doomed to failure. It was at Sforza's instigation that Italy of her

¹ Sforza, *Les Bâtisseurs de l'Europe Moderne* (p. 166).

own accord renounced her dream of territorial expansion in Asia Minor.

In the light of subsequent events, it must be frankly admitted that Sforza was the only one among the allied statesmen who diagnosed the Turkish situation correctly. All the others—Lloyd George, Clémenceau, Curzon, Venizelos—thought that Turkey was ‘done and out’. Sforza alone realized the indefinite powers of resistance possessed by a primitive and warlike nation like the Turks, entrenched in a vast and trackless country, given a suitable leader—and that leader the Turks had found in the person of Mustafa Kemal.

Sforza, unlike his predecessors, was not anti-Greek merely because he wanted to get Greece out of the way in order that Italy might have a larger share of the spoils in Asia Minor. On the contrary, he realized what was the truth—namely, that neither Italy nor any of the other Allied countries was in a position or in a mood, at the end of the European War, to start a fresh war for the conquest of Turkey. Italy had already had enough trouble with the Arabs in North Africa where the war had dragged on for over ten years. She had no desire to create a second Tripoli in Anatolia.

If, in spite of Count Sforza’s renunciation, Turkey continued to harbour suspicions of Italian intentions for some time after the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne, this was due to certain bellicose utterances of Mussolini which the Turks were inclined to take too much at their face value. The action of Italy in creating a naval base in the island of Leros (close to the Anatolian coast) has helped to keep alive these suspicions.

In any case, in spite of the services rendered by Italy to the Turkish National Movement, Mustafa Kemal’s Government has shown no inclination to facilitate the establishment of Italian immigrants in his country. Italy

will have to look elsewhere for the solution of the problem of her surplus population.

(d) THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States had not been a party to the Secret Treaties concluded between the Allies during the course of the war. Consequently they were not committed to a recognition of the territorial arrangements concerning the fate of the Ottoman Empire as laid down in those Treaties. This fact, together with the elimination of Russia as a claimant to Constantinople and North-Eastern Anatolia, created, at the end of the war, an entirely new situation necessitating a radical revision of the original arrangements.

The necessity for a revision of the provisions of the Secret Treaties was accepted, without much difficulty, by Great Britain and France, though not by Italy. The latter, throughout the earlier stages of the Peace Conference (1919), continued to insist on her right to the possession of Smyrna and its hinterland, as recognized under the Treaty of St. Jean-de-Maurienne of 19 April 1917.

President Wilson had come to Europe with an open mind as far as the details of the Turkish settlement were concerned. In theory (Article 12 of the Fourteen Points) he wished the settlement to be based—as far as possible—on the principle of nationalities. The legitimate aspirations towards independence of the Christian subject races—Greek, Armenian and Bulgar—were to be satisfied in the areas where those elements were dominant, while Turkey was to retain those parts of the country in which the Turks were indisputably in the majority.

The President was accompanied by an army of experts—Isaac Bowman, William Westermann, Charles Seymour, Clive Day and others—composing the personnel

of Colonel House's 'Inquiry'—mostly drawn from the ranks of American University professors. These were reinforced, where the Balkan and Turkish settlements were concerned, by members of the American missionary, educational and philanthropic organizations in the Near East, who supplied the local knowledge. The information of the experts was further supplemented by investigations carried out on the spot by special commissioners, such as General Harbord in Armenia, Mr. Crane in Syria, and others.

Apart from the general principles enumerated above, President Wilson cannot be said to have had any particular bias in favour of the Greek claims. The United States had not been a party to the Allied offer of Smyrna to Greece in 1915, as at that time they were still neutral, and consequently they were not bound, even morally, by that offer.

At the Peace Conference, the American experts, who examined the Greek claims put forward by Venizelos to Western Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, reported unfavourably on both.

As regards the first, they disputed the statistics of population on which Venizelos based his case before the Conference, maintaining that the Greeks were in a majority only in the Sandjak of Smyrna, and that the population of the other districts was predominantly Turkish. Further, they strongly opposed the cession to Greece of Smyrna itself on the ground that that port constituted the principal and natural outlet for the exports of the produce of Central Anatolia, and consequently that the separation of the city from its hinterland would be equally prejudicial to the commerce both of the interior and of the city itself.¹

¹ Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, p. 49), and Colonel House, *What Really Happened at Paris* (p. 192).

The consent of President Wilson to the landing of Greek troops at Smyrna, in May 1919, was given mainly with the object of anticipating a threatened occupation of that port by Italy. The President, at the time, was in violent conflict with the Italians over the question of Fiume, a conflict which had led to the temporary withdrawal of the Italian representative, Signor Orlando, from the Conference.

The step was taken without the American experts on the Territorial Commission on Greek Affairs being consulted.¹

Far more serious, however—owing to their reaction on the course of the decisions of the Peace Conference—were President Wilson's objections to the cession to Greece of Eastern Thrace.

A majority of the Conference's Commission on territorial questions interesting Greece had pronounced in favour of giving Greece the whole of Eastern Thrace, save for a small bit of territory east of the Chataldja lines which was to be left to Turkey as a hinterland for Constantinople. This decision was taken on 1 March 1919.² The British and French members of the Supreme Council—that is, Lloyd George and Clémenceau—both agreed to this proposal, but President Wilson dissented and insisted that the northern half of Eastern Thrace,

¹ See *What Really Happened at Paris*, edited by Colonel House and C. Seymour (p. 194). 'When Premier Orlando broke with President Wilson upon the Fiume issue and left Paris, the astute Venizelos immediately pushed forward his Smyrna claim. He was able to gain the support of the American leaders at the Peace Conference, in the face of the contrary American stand as represented upon the Greek Territorial Commission. Under a secrecy which kept knowledge of this decision absolutely from the office of the American advisers upon Turkish Affairs, he gained permission to occupy Smyrna with Greek troops.'

² Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, p. 36).

comprising the districts of Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, should be given to Bulgaria, although only about one-fifth of the population of the districts in question were Bulgars. Certain of the American experts had developed a theory, which the President seems to have adopted, that Bulgaria was entitled to receive part of Eastern Thrace in recognition of

the historic fact that in the First Balkan War it was the effort of the Bulgarian army which defeated the Turkish legions and that the flower of Bulgarian manhood had fallen in the sieges and campaigns against the Turkish strongholds in Eastern Thrace.¹

In spite of the pressure brought to bear on President Wilson by his French and British colleagues on the Supreme Council and by Venizelos himself, and notwithstanding a resolution passed on 21 January 1920 by the American Senate in favour of the Greek claims in Thrace, the President remained obdurate and refused to budge from the position he had taken up. Finally, matters having reached an impasse and as the President's recalcitrant attitude on the Thracian question was holding up all progress on the rest of the Turkish Treaty, the decision to give Greece the whole of Thrace as far as the Chataldja Lines had to be carried over his head by a majority vote of the Supreme Council as late as April 1920.²

Looking back on the sequence of decisions at the Peace Conference, one is forced to the conclusion that President Wilson's obstinacy over Eastern Thrace had fatal consequences for Greece and exercised a disastrous influence on the whole course of events in the Near East.

If the Greek claim to Eastern Thrace had not met with

¹ *What Really Happened at Paris*, edited by Colonel House and C. Seymour (p. 174).

² Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (II, p. 57).

such strong opposition from the President, thus threatening to deprive Greece of a substantial portion of the reward which she could legitimately lay claim to for her participation in the war, it would have been easier for the Allies to have prevailed on Venizelos to relinquish his claim to Smyrna. Seeing that Eastern Thrace had not been included in the Turkish territory promised to Greece by the Entente in 1915, its offer now, if made in time, could have been set off, as a *quid pro quo*, against the renunciation on Greece's part of her claim to Smyrna, which the highest Greek and allied military authorities were unanimous in looking upon as a white elephant.

Mr. Harold Nicolson, in his book on the Peace Conference (*Peacemaking 1919*), reveals the interesting fact that he and another of the British experts, Professor Arnold Toynbee, actually submitted a memorandum in the above sense to Sir Eyre Crowe (then Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office and a member of the British Delegation in Paris), who approved it and passed it on to Mr. Balfour for submission to the Supreme Council. This was on 14-16 April 1919.¹ Had this memorandum been accepted by the Supreme Council there and then (the decision of the Supreme Council to authorize the occupation of Smyrna by Greece was only taken on 6 May), the whole course of events in the Near East might have been altered for the better.

As a consequence, however, of President Wilson's holding up the question of Eastern Thrace for a full year

¹ *Peacemaking 1919* (pp. 312-13): 'They (the Greeks) can't hold it (Smyrna) without Allied support or unless the whole of Turkey behind them is split up among the Allied Powers. Yet if they do not get Smyrna, Venizelos will fall from power. We agree, therefore, to propose to cut the Gordian knot. Let the Turks have Anatolia as their own. Give the Greeks European Turkey only. . . . Crowe . . . sends our memorandum to A. J. B. with his blessing.'

after Greece's occupation of Smyrna, a situation was created there from which it was difficult for Venizelos to withdraw without loss of prestige and serious risk to the local Greek and Armenian population.

The other part of the Turkish settlement in which President Wilson took a direct personal interest, was the question of Armenia. The sufferings of the Armenians in Turkey made a strong appeal to his humanitarian nature. Many of these Armenians had been educated at American schools in Turkey. The President therefore came to the Peace Conference strongly predisposed towards the idea of creating an independent Armenia in the north-eastern provinces of Anatolia where the remnants of the Armenian race might be gathered together.

But it soon became evident to all who had seriously studied the details of the question, that it was quite hopeless to expect the wretched remnant of the Armenian nation—numbering barely a few hundred thousands—which had survived the massacres and deportations of the war, to hold its own unaided in the midst of their implacable and ferocious enemies, the Turks and Kurds, unless the country were placed under the military protection of one of the Great Powers.

None of the other Powers were inclined to accept this difficult and costly honour. Hence it was suggested that the United States, who had no other entanglements in the Near East, should take on the mandate for Constantinople and Armenia. It was hoped that the great and wealthy American Republic would be ready to step in and fill the gap which had been created in the original scheme of the Turkish settlement by the withdrawal of Russia, to whom the regions in question had been originally allotted under the Secret Treaties of 1915-17.

President Wilson, encouraged by some of the members

CHAPTER IV

THE AFTERMATH

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL, in the book which bears the above title, has given a brilliantly worded account of the catastrophes and upheavals that followed hard upon the trail of the Great War—in Germany, in Russia, in Ireland, in Central Europe, in the Near East—during the four years that immediately succeeded the conclusion of the Armistice.

In his record of events in the East he stops at Chanak (Sept. 1922). But, for Greece, the aftermath of the European, and of its sequel, the Anatolian, war was a much longer and more painful process which can only be said to have come to an end, after fourteen years of intermittent internal strife and revolution, in November 1935, with the restoration of the Monarchy and the recognition of that restoration by Venizelos, until then the principal opponent of the dethroned dynasty, and the other Republican leaders, thus eliminating the principal cause of conflict which had divided Greece, since the year 1915, into two bitterly hostile camps.

The Anatolian disaster, involving as it did the final collapse of a national ambition—the so-called ‘Megáli Idéa’, or dream of the restoration of the Byzantine Empire, with Constantinople as its capital—which the Greek nation had nurtured for generations, and the influx of over a million exasperated and penniless refugees from the European and Asiatic provinces of Turkey and Russia, had been a tremendous moral and material

shock, which had thrown the country completely off its balance.

The sanguinary sanctions applied by the Revolutionary Junta of 1922 to the principal members of the Government which had been responsible for the conduct of the war in Asia Minor after the fall of Venizelos in November 1920, created a blood-feud which completely poisoned Greek political life during all the subsequent period. Half the country—that portion which sympathized with the victims—maintained an attitude of sullen protest which even broke out occasionally into open revolt, as in the case of the military rebellion of October 1923.¹

The new refugee population, which had abandoned nearly all its worldly possessions during the precipitate flight from Turkey, full of legitimate indignation at being the principal victims of a policy which had routed them out of hearth and home, clamoured for immediate and full compensation, and their pressing needs and often exaggerated claims were all too readily exploited by politicians eager for power.

All this created a general state of tension and unrest which, if it did not actually lead to a violent social upheaval of the kind witnessed in certain other countries after the war, nevertheless was the cause of a long period of turmoil and political instability.

During the fourteen years which followed the *débâcle* in Asia Minor, there took place nineteen changes of Government, three changes of régime (the institution of the Republic in March 1924, the Dictatorship of

¹ On 23 October 1923, a military rebellion, headed by Generals Gargalides and Leonardopoulos, broke out in Macedonia and the Peloponnese with the object of overthrowing the revolutionary Government of Colonel Plastiras, which had expelled King Constantine and executed the five Ministers and General Hadjanestis, former Commander-in-Chief of the Greek army in Asia Minor.

General Pangalos in January 1926 and the restoration of the Monarchy in November 1935), seven military revolutions or *coups d'Etat*,¹ and innumerable minor acts of sedition due to the constant intervention of military juntas in the government of the country.

And, as if these internal difficulties were not enough, there were external complications such as the Italian seizure of Corfu in August 1923² and General Pangalos's mad raid into Bulgaria in 1926.

Further, the finances of the country collapsed under the double strain of the settlement of the refugees and the world economic crisis. Greece, faced with the formidable task of settling and indemnifying over a million refugees and emigrants from Turkey, Russia and Bulgaria, had to borrow large sums both abroad and at home in excess of the financial capacity of the country, with the result that, when the economic crisis broke over the world, particularly affecting the agricultural states of Central and South-Eastern Europe owing to the slump in the value of their produce, Greece became bankrupt and had to suspend the service of her foreign loans.³

¹ (a) Revolution of Colonels Plastiras and Gonatas in September 1922. (b) Abortive counter-revolution of Generals Gargalides and Leonardopoulos in October 1923. (c) *Coup d'Etat* of General Pangalos in June 1925. (d) *Coup d'Etat* of General Condylis in August 1926. (e) Abortive *coup d'Etat* of General Plastiras on 6 March 1933. (f) Abortive Venizelist rebellion in March 1935.

² On 31 August 1923, Italy, in retaliation for the murder of General Tellini, President of the Greco-Albanian Frontier Delimitation Commission, for which the Italians held the Greek Government responsible, seized Corfu. The island was evacuated after the payment by Greece of an indemnity of fifteen million lire.

³ The interest on the internal loans was also reduced by 25 per cent after the drachma had been devalued to about half of its 1928 gold value. The service of the foreign loans was resumed in

But, apart from the purely ephemeral changes involved in the rise and fall of governments and political régimes, the catastrophe of 1922 had consequences of an infinitely more important and permanent nature, through the displacement of vast populations which profoundly modified the ethnological character of entire regions in the Balkan Peninsula and the Near East.

In this respect, the Anatolian defeat of 1922 had, so far as the Greek nation was concerned, effects even more disastrous than the fall of Constantinople and the overthrow of the Greek Empire in May 1453. The Turkish conquest of 1453 did not result in the uprooting of the Greek race from the European and Asiatic regions where it had dwelt since the dawn of history. The Greeks had then been allowed by their Mohammedan conquerors to go on living there as *rayahs* (subjects), until, with the reawakening of the spirit of nationality in Europe in the nineteenth century, they were able to recover—partially at any rate—their independence.

But the Anatolian disaster of 1922, far more catastrophic in its consequences, resembled a tidal wave which submerges hundreds of thousands of victims, casting up a few wretched remnants on the neighbouring shores. It uprooted and swept all the Greeks, not to mention the Armenians who shared their fate, out of Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, where they had been settled for centuries, and deposited them across the Aegean, never to return.

An international act—the Lausanne Convention for the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey of 30 January 1923—confirmed the expul-

1934, the Greek Government agreeing to pay 27½ per cent of the interest, to be increased gradually as the economic and financial situation improved.

sion of the fugitives and rendered compulsory the emigration of the few hundred thousands who had remained behind. It made Anatolia Turkish from end to end for the first time since the Osmanli Turks had conquered that country in the fourteenth century. On the other hand, it made Macedonia Greek for the first time since the Slav invasions of the sixth and seventh centuries had submerged the Balkan provinces of the Byzantine Empire.

Greece, which, if Venizelos's policy of 1919-20 had succeeded, would have become a sort of neo-byzantine empire with a hybrid population of Greeks, Turks, Slavs, Albanians, Armenians and Levantines, became, as the result of the collapse of that policy—thanks to the influx of Greeks from Turkey and the other surrounding countries and, vice versa, the exodus of Turks and Bulgars from Greece—a homogeneous Hellenic state, in fact more homogeneous and compact than she has ever been at any period of her previous history.

The losses have been terrible, but the gains have been great. Most people to-day are agreed that the gains, on balance, exceed the losses.

The same, it may be added, has been the case with Turkey, rejuvenated and transformed through the same circumstances from an effete oriental empire into a vigorous national state.

In the following two sub-chapters we shall deal separately with these two sets of consequences of the Anatolian *débâcle*—the ephemeral and the permanent. The first comprise the political events in Greece from the Revolution of 1922 down to the restoration of the Monarchy in November 1935, the second the exchange of populations and the settlement of the refugees, factors which have profoundly modified the racial structure and economic life of post-war Greece.

(a) POLITICAL EVENTS IN GREECE

(Sept. 1922-Nov. 1935)

The Anatolian disaster, followed by the loss of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, swept away the Greek Monarchy just as Sedan had swept away the Second French Empire and the military collapse of the Central Powers in 1918 the German and Austro-Hungarian Monarchies.

But the revolution which, in September 1922, de-throned King Constantine, was a military rather than a popular movement, and the same might be said of the second revolution which, a little more than a year later (in December 1923), compelled Constantine's successor, the young King George II, to leave Greece, thus preparing the way for the setting up of a Republic.

The Republic was actually proclaimed on 25 March 1924, under pressure from the extremist military elements which had played a leading part in the Revolution of September 1922, after the failure of the abortive military counter-revolution led by Generals Gargalides and Leonardopoulos and sponsored by General Metaxas (the former Chief of the General Staff who had headed the opposition to Venizelos's Anatolian projects), whose object was to liberate the King from the enforced tutelage of the revolutionary junta which had deposed his father.

The Republican officers found a willing ally in an ambitious politician of advanced views, M. Alexander Papanastassiou, who saw his opportunity of stealing a march on his former chief, Venizelos, the latter having declared himself opposed to an immediate change of régime, though theoretically in favour of a republic.

A plebiscite—a solemn and futile parody when its only object is to confirm *ex post facto* a decision already arrived at and put into effect by the party in power—

ratified the change of régime, three weeks after the Republic had been proclaimed (on 25 March 1924) by the newly elected National Assembly.¹

Throughout the whole of this troubled period the political leaders are mere puppets. The political stage is dominated by the military leaders, of whom the most active is General Theodore Pangalos.

This ambitious officer, who had been one of the first to follow Venizelos when he set up his Revolutionary Government at Salonica in 1916, had subsequently served with distinction as Chief of Staff during the earlier stages of the operations in Asia Minor in 1919-20. After the *débâcle* of 1922, he had been appointed Commander-in-Chief in Thrace and it was thanks to his energy that the Greek army had been reconstituted on the Maritza.

As Commander-in-Chief, he had had differences of opinion with Venizelos, when the latter, at the request of the leaders of the Revolution of September 1922, took charge of the peace-negotiations with Turkey at Lausanne. Pangalos, finding the demands of the Turks excessive, had proposed that Greece should denounce the armistice and that the Greek army should reoccupy Eastern Thrace. The Government at Athens, however, less confident of the success of such a venture, which would certainly have been strongly disapproved of by the Great Powers anxious to put an end, at all costs, to the conflict in the Near East, vetoed the proposal and instructed Venizelos to sign the Treaty of Lausanne, notwithstanding the angry protests of General Pangalos.

The latter, together with another former supporter of Venizelos—Admiral Hadjikyriakos—who had also emancipated himself from the control of his old chief, now

¹ The plebiscite was held on 13 April 1924 and, of course, resulted in a majority in favour of the Republic.

embarked on a political career, determined to use his influence in the army in order to forward his own ambitions.

The moment was peculiarly favourable to the ascendancy of a strong man. Venizelos, who, after the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, had returned to Greece and once more had become Premier on 11 January 1924, had been forced to resign only a month later in consequence of a heart-attack, brought on as the result of an incident in the Chamber, when his former henchman, Admiral Hadjikyriakos, had sharply criticized him.

Venizelos having retired again to France, there had followed a series of unstable governments under various political chiefs—Cafandaris, Papanastassiou, Sofoulis, Michalakopoulos—all of them men of considerable attainments but whose prestige was insufficient to enable them to cope with an unruly assembly and the still more unruly military element composed of generals and colonels who had played a leading part in the events of the last two years.

Public opinion became increasingly impatient and disgusted at the futilities of the politicians. Dictatorship was in the air. The example of Mussolini, who had brought order out of chaos in Italy, was not without exercising a powerful influence on people's minds. The idea of a strong man, of a dictator who would take the reins of Government into his hands, reorganize the country, and solve—*manu militari*—the many pressing problems which awaited a settlement, sweeping away the corruption and bureaucratic obstruction of the existing parliamentary and administrative system, was rapidly gaining ground. It found special favour among the refugees from Turkey, who have always shown themselves partial to the type of soldier-politician that has

figured so prominently in the annals of recent Greek political history.

On 26 June 1925, Pangalos, who had been biding his time, overthrew the Government with the help of a few officers and a squad of troops, under the approving or indifferent gaze of the public and the army. On 29 July, he dissolved the National Assembly which, only a few weeks previously, had obsequiously given him, at the instance of the Republican leader M. Papanastassiou, a vote of confidence, and on 23 January 1926 proclaimed himself dictator. Obsessed, however, by a sort of confused notion that he might be able to convert his dictatorship into a democratic presidency of the American type, he announced his candidature for the presidency of the Republic and had himself triumphantly elected, by an *ad hoc* popular vote, on 16 March 1926.

Five months later the General-President, whose short reign had been a hopeless fiasco both from a financial, administrative and external point of view, thus completely disappointing the public expectation of a Greek Mussolini, was overthrown by a military *coup d'État* organized and led by another soldier-politician—General Condylis.

This remarkable man, who was destined to play a leading part in the political events of the next few years, was of peasant origin (his parents were small peasants at Trikkala in Thessaly) and had risen from the ranks. His enthusiastic temperament, ardent patriotism and adventurous spirit, had led him, as a young N.C.O., to join Colonel Vassos's expedition in aid of the Cretan insurgents in 1897. Later, as a subaltern, he had trained himself in the rough school of guerilla warfare in Macedonia which had attracted all the more ambitious and adventurous spirits in the Greek army during the period preceding the Balkan Wars.



CONDYLIS

When, in 1916, Venizelos, breaking with King Constantine, set up his revolutionary Government at Salonica and declared war on the Central Powers, Condylis threw himself with ardour—an ardour which occasionally led him into committing regrettable excesses—into the work of raising a revolutionary army in Macedonia to fight on the side of the Allies. His recruiting activities met with strong opposition on the part of the Macedonian peasants, who were mostly hostile to the revolution, and Condylis repressed this opposition with a heavy hand.

Later he served with distinction in the Macedonian, Russian (Ukraine) and Anatolian campaigns, but in 1920, on the restoration of King Constantine to the throne, was obliged to retire to Constantinople (then under Allied occupation), things having become too hot for him in the army, where some of the Macedonian soldiers from the Chalcidicé had not forgotten his rough-and-ready methods in 1917.

From his retreat in Constantinople he conducted a violent newspaper campaign—the least creditable episode of an otherwise patriotic career—against the conduct of the campaign in Asia Minor by the Constantinist generals, and these defeatist articles had been exploited by the Turks in order to depress the already reduced moral of the Greek troops.

After the *débâcle* of 1922, Condylis returned to Greece and, resigning his commission in the army, embarked on a political career. Ambitious to play a leading part, he refused to join any of the existing political parties, but founded a party of his own—the National Radical Party. He could rely on a considerable following among the officers of the army, at that time a potent and active influence in politics, and was popular among the refugees, who saw in him a possible successor to Venizelos.

General Pangalos, who knew and feared his ability, had exiled Condylis to one of the Aegean islands—a favourite place of banishment for political suspects since the time of the Roman Emperors—whence he had contrived to escape, and had organized the dictator's overthrow in August 1926 by suborning the officers of the Republican Guard, a corps of praetorians who constituted the dictator's body-guard. But when the latter, emulating their Roman prototypes, attempted to dictate to him and organized an unauthorized military demonstration in the streets of Athens, Condylis received them outside the War Office with shot and shell and broke them up.

It is then that the Thessalian peasant showed that he was no vulgar adventurer merely aiming at power. After his overthrow of Pangalos and the Republican Guards, everybody expected Condylis to step into the former's shoes and proclaim himself dictator. Instead of doing so, with true statesmanlike spirit he declared himself in favour of a return to normal political conditions by holding parliamentary elections. In order to disarm the suspicions of the other party-leaders, he decided not to stand as a candidate himself and officially proclaimed the dissolution of his own party. After the holding of the most exemplary elections known in the annals of Greek parliamentary history he retired quietly to Paris to study French and improve his mind, amid the ironical comments of the other short-sighted politicians.

The next two years (1926-7) were a period, all too short, of rest and constructive work. A national government was formed in which, for the first time since 1915, Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists, Republicans and Monarchists co-operated. The finances of the country were reorganized under the able guidance of M. Cafandaris,

who had succeeded his former chief, Venizelos, in the leadership of the Liberal (Venizelist) Party; a new foreign loan, sponsored by the League of Nations, was obtained to carry on the work of refugee settlement, currency stabilization and road-construction, and a beginning was made with healing the breach between Venizelist and Anti-Venizelist officers in the army by reinstating a number of Royalist officers who had been ejected by the previous governments on account of their political opinions.

The only persons not satisfied with this state of things were the extremist officers of the Venizelist camp who now found themselves relegated to a back seat and nursed various grievances. The chief of these, General Othonaios—a politically-minded officer who had taken an active part in the political intrigues of the previous period—encouraged by certain friends of Venizelos, began to urge the veteran Cretan statesman, who was chafing in enforced retirement in Paris, engaged on the not very congenial task of translating Thucydides, to return to Greece and re-enter active politics.

Venizelos, who had found a quiet life in the French capital and the study of the Athenian historian by no means a sufficient compensation for the excitements of Greek political life, accepted the invitation with alacrity. His return was effected by stages. He first repaired to his native island, Crete, whence, after a short stay, he proceeded to Athens and embarked on a campaign of criticism against the acts of his successor in the leadership of the Liberal Party, Cafandaris. The latter, harassed and galled by these attacks which were often conducted in an unfair and carping spirit, was finally driven to resign and at the same time threw up the leadership of the party. The Coalition Government—the nearest thing to a real national government that

Greece had ever known—was broken up and Venizelos triumphantly reassumed the reins of power.

Thanks to an intensive press-campaign, which had sedulously prepared the way for his return to power, to his immense popularity with the refugees who, notwithstanding their misfortunes, still regarded him as having been their liberator, and to his own extraordinary energy in conducting the election campaign, Venizelos was returned to power by an enormous majority at the General Election of 19 August 1928. Buoyed up with optimism at this renewed confidence of his country, he announced that in the course of the next four years he would render Greece unrecognizable.

His optimism was not rewarded. His four years' administration (1928-32) was a failure and terminated in an orgy of ministerial scandals, waste and maladministration. His former subordinate—M. Cafandarís—whom he himself had displaced in so cavalier a fashion, kept up a volley of telling and bitter criticism against his financial administration. The Gods themselves fought against him. The world economic crisis broke over Greece during his tenure of office and the stigma of national bankruptcy, in glaring contrast to the rose-coloured promises of the General Election, finally discredited his Government.

The only outstanding achievement—an achievement worthy of the old Venizelos and an act of high courage and statesmanship—was the conclusion of an agreement with Turkey (30 Oct. 1930) which passed a sponge over the past, cancelled the outstanding claims arising out of the exchange of populations, and inaugurated a new period of friendly relations between Greece and her former adversary.

Other agreements, concluded with Italy and Jugoslavia, placed the relations with both those countries

on a satisfactory footing. Venizelos had again shown that, in the domain of diplomacy and foreign politics, his was a masterhand.

From 1932 onward, the political situation, which had suffered a serious set-back through the fall of the Coalition Government in 1928, began seriously to deteriorate. In two successive General Elections—in September 1932 and March 1933—the popular verdict was unfavourable to Venizelos.

An ill-advised attempt by that statesman's supporter, General Plastiras, to set up a dictatorship on 6 March 1933, the day after the Elections had given a majority to the Popular (Anti-Venizelist) Party of M. Tsaldaris, failed ignominiously and exasperated public opinion, which interpreted the general's action as an attempt to impose the rule of the Venizelist Party by force on the country. Although Venizelos tried to disculpate himself, appearances were too much against him and his explanations did not carry conviction.

From that moment Venizelos was definitely on the defensive. There ensued a period of unrest troubled by plots and counter-plots. The old hatreds between Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists flared up again. There were stormy scenes in the Chamber and when Venizelos, replying to an attack by General Metaxas who wanted to impeach him for high treason, made an ill-timed reference to the former services of General Plastiras (the latter, as head of the Revolutionary Junta in November 1922, had been the person mainly responsible for the execution of the five Anti-Venizelist ministers and General Hadjanestis, who had commanded the army in Asia Minor at the time of the *débâcle*), he was shouted down and had to retire from the House.

This incident was followed—on 5 June 1933—by an attempt made on his life one night when he was return-

ing to Athens with his wife from the suburb of Cephissia. The veteran statesman escaped unscathed, but one of his body-guards was killed and Madame Venizelos was slightly wounded. An ex-brigand and a number of high police officers were implicated. The participation of the latter, for which there was strong presumptive evidence, made the affair particularly serious and the opposition openly accused the Minister of the Interior, M. Jean Rhallys, of having been party to the conspiracy. The latter, in order to clear the Government of responsibility, was forced to resign.

The abortive *coup d'Etat* of General Plastiras, followed by the attempt on the life of the Liberal Leader, created what almost amounted to a state of open war between the two parties. The opposition withdrew on several occasions from the Chamber on the ground that the right of free speech was denied them. They also raised the cry that the Republic was in danger and that the Anti-Venizelists, notwithstanding the fact that the old Royalist Party in November 1932, had officially recognized the republican régime, were plotting to restore the Monarchy. This was, tactically, a mistake, because at the General Election of September 1932, Venizelos had threatened his opponents that he would not allow them to assume office, unless they first officially recognized the Republic. Consequently, now that the latter had done so, the accusation of Monarchist tendencies could no longer logically be upheld and was regarded by public opinion as merely an excuse in order to stir up party passion.

Towards the end of 1934 there were rumours that the Venizelists were conspiring to overthrow the Government by a military *coup d'Etat*. The rumours were not without foundation. On the night of 1 March 1935, a group of Venizelist army officers, at the head of a

rabble of civilians recruited among the refugee settlements, seized one of the barracks and the military Cadets' School at Athens. At the same time a number of Venizelist retired naval officers, with the connivance of other officers of the fleet, seized the cruiser *Averof* and a number of other ships lying at anchor off the arsenal in Salamis Bay. In Macedonia, the garrisons at Serres, Drama and Cavalla also mutinied and prepared to march on Salonica.

The Government, however, was equal to the occasion. The mutineers in the barracks at Athens were promptly surrounded and forced to surrender, troops were dispatched from Salonica to the river Struma to oppose the march of the mutinous regiments from Eastern Macedonia, martial law was proclaimed throughout the country, and reservists were called to the colours.

Venizelos, who was in Crete, issued a proclamation placing himself at the head of the rebellion with the somewhat futile justification that the Government had behaved unconstitutionally in proclaiming martial law, as if any Government, faced with a widespread military conspiracy, could have behaved otherwise.

In less than a fortnight, thanks to the energy displayed by General Condylis, now Minister of War, the mutineers in Macedonia had lain down their arms, the fleet had surrendered, and Venizelos, with the principal civilian and naval conspirators, had taken refuge on Italian soil. The hero of the moment was General Condylis. In 1928 he had returned from France and had been re-elected to Parliament. In November 1932, after the old Royalist Party had officially recognized the Republic, he had been the first of the Republican leaders to declare his willingness to co-operate, in the interests of national unity, in a cabinet formed by M. Tsaldaris, the head of the Popular (Anti-Venizelist)

Party. It was an act of true statesmanship—consistent with the whole line of conduct he had adopted since he overthrew the dictatorship of General Pangalos in 1926—but it earned him the enmity of the Venizelists. The suppression of the rebellion of March 1935 now placed him in a commanding position.

The failure of the rebellion, with the flight of Venizelos and his principal political and military partisans, was a crushing blow to the Venizelist Party and was equally fatal to the Republican régime of which that party had been the champions. The Monarchist feeling, which had been more or less dormant since 1926, automatically revived. The institution of the Republic, as we have seen, had been the result not so much of any deeply-rooted republican feeling among the people, as of the hostility felt by certain military and political circles towards the Dynasty. The Monarchy had been suppressed in 1924, not as the result of a popular upheaval but under pressure from the military elements in question. The population of Old (Southern) Greece had remained predominantly Monarchist and attached to the Dynasty. The Republic, through all those years from 1924 to 1935, had been acquiesced in, but neither loved nor respected.

With the removal of the Venizelist officers, the majority of whom had participated or sympathized with the rebellion of 1 March 1935, from the army and navy, the bottom had fallen out of the Republic and the partisans of Monarchy again felt themselves in the ascendant.

In spite of this, the leaders of the old Royalist parties were by no means unanimous concerning the expediency of an immediate restoration. M. Tsaldaris, the leader of the Popular Party, by nature, timid and undecided, was particularly hesitant.

On the other hand, General Metaxas, up till then the leader of a small and unimportant section of the anti-Venizelist party, placed himself at the head of a vigorous agitation throughout the country in favour of an immediate restoration. M. Tsaldaris was obliged to promise that the question would be settled by a plebiscite. On this programme he went to the country in June 1935 and was returned by a large majority.

Nevertheless, he continued to hesitate, and put off from day to day the decision for fixing the date of the plebiscite. In the meantime, affairs were rapidly drifting into a state of confusion and the more energetic elements among the Royalists were beginning to become restive.

On 10 October the leaders of the Army and Navy intimated to M. Tsaldaris that the armed forces demanded that he should hand over the Government to firmer hands. M. Tsaldaris, yielding to this pressure, resigned, and a Government was formed under General Condylis, who, since the election in June, had openly declared in favour of the Monarchy, in co-operation with M. Theotoky, leader of the right-wing Monarchists. This Government, taking a leaf out of the book of the Republican leaders of 1924, proclaimed the Monarchy by a vote of the National Assembly. Following the precedent of 1924, a formal plebiscite was held on 3 November 1935 which confirmed—*ex post facto*—the change of régime.

On 25 November 1935, the exiled King, after twelve years' banishment, was welcomed back to his capital.

The Republic had failed, because it had been monopolized by one party. Its fall was the work of its friends rather than of its foes. The new King was determined that this should not also be the case with the Monarchy.

But the events subsequent to the restoration do not fall within the scope of this book.

(b) THE EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS

At the date of the outbreak of the European War, there were close on two million Greeks living in the European and Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Although several hundred thousands of these perished during the massacres and deportations to which the Greek and Armenian populations were subjected during the war, there were still about a million and a half left at the date of the signature of the Armistice of Mudros in November 1918, which terminated the official hostilities between Turkey and the Entente Powers. A special commission, financed by the Greek Government and aided by the British High Commission at Constantinople, after the occupation of that city by the Allied troops, repatriated and re-settled the remnants of the Christian population which, at the instigation of Liman von Sanders, the German general commanding the 1st Turkish Army Corps, had been deported during the war from the littoral of Thrace and Asia Minor to the interior as a preventive measure against their rendering assistance to the troops and submarines of the Allies, with whom they were known to be in sympathy.

The landing of the Greek troops at Smyrna in May 1919, though really intended to forestall an Italian occupation of that city, had been authorized by the Supreme Council on the pretext of protecting the Christian populations of the interior against molestation by the Turks. But, instead of achieving that object, it instantaneously provoked fresh bloodshed, massacres and deportations which neither the Greek army in occupation of the coastal regions round Smyrna nor

the Allied troops garrisoning Constantinople were in a position to prevent. Further, the Moslem population of the regions occupied by the Greek army was in a state of suppressed revolt, and the invaders were obliged to have recourse to bloody reprisals and even—after the failure of the advance to Angora in 1921—the devastation of whole areas.

The bitterness engendered by these events created an unbridgeable gulf between Greeks and Turks. The latter were particularly incensed against the local Greeks who, although Turkish subjects, naturally sympathized with the invaders, whom they regarded as liberators.

The disastrous termination of the Anatolian campaign in August 1922 was thus fatal to the population concerned. The abandonment of the occupied territories in Asia Minor by the Greek army was accompanied by the emigration *en masse* of the Greek and Armenian inhabitants of those regions, who would otherwise have fallen victims to the fury of the advancing Turkish army and the local Moslems.

The evacuation of Eastern Thrace, which took place after the signature of the Armistice of Mudania on 10 October 1922, was accompanied by a similar exodus from that province and from the city of Constantinople itself.¹

The sudden arrival of this mass of refugees in Greece—numbering, together with the previously arrived refugees from Russia and about fifty thousand emigrants from Bulgaria, some 1,200,000 souls—was one of the most serious consequences of the Anatolian disaster

¹ Some 50,000 Greeks and Armenians, comprising the wealthier section of the population, fled from the city before its reoccupation by the Turks. About 100,000 Greeks and 20,000 Armenians remained behind, forming to-day the entire Greek and Armenian minority in Turkey.

and created a social, economic and administrative problem of a magnitude which few other countries, during the post-war period, had to face.

The question at once arose as to whether those refugees would be allowed to return to their homes in Turkey after the conclusion of peace. But when it was raised by the Greek Delegation at the Peace Conference at Lausanne, the Turks made it perfectly clear that they were not prepared to take back a single Greek or Armenian, and that they regarded this wholesale emigration as a heaven-sent solution of the problem of Greek irredentism which had so long threatened Turkey with disruption.

In the face of this categorical declaration and the impossibility of forcing Turkey to readmit the refugees except by a fresh recourse to arms, Greece bowed to the inevitable. In compensation, however, she demanded that, in order to enable her to settle this vast new population, in view of the lack of available land, the Moslem population of Macedonia and other regions of Greece, amounting to some 400,000 souls, should be forced to emigrate, leaving their lands to be occupied by the new-comers. The Turkish Government, itself faced with the serious economic problem created by the emigration of a numerous and industrious urban and rural population, readily accepted the proposed solution, which permitted it partly to refill the gaps and re-people its desolated territories.

An agreement confirming this gigantic and unprecedented barter of populations, entitled the 'Convention for the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey', was signed at Lausanne on 23 January 1923.

The interest and importance of this convention, apart from the immediate political and financial consequences which it entailed for the two countries concerned, con-

sists in the fact that it marks the end of an era and the opening of a new period in the history of the Near East.

For a hundred years, the Balkan Peninsula and the countries round the Aegean had been convulsed by the struggles of rival nationalities which, during the course of centuries, had been implanted there by successive invasions, in an inextricable mixture of races. Nowhere was this racial hotchpotch greater than in the regions bordering the Aegean—namely, in Macedonia, Thrace and Western Asia Minor.

Thus the exchange of populations, by re-grouping the various nationalities within the frontiers of the States to which they racially belonged, has undoubtedly contributed, to no small degree, to the final elimination of what had, from all time, been the principal cause of friction and conflict in the Balkans.

After the exchange, an entirely new phase of the Eastern Question begins, or it would be more correct to say that the old Eastern Question, as it presented itself during the course of the break-up of the Byzantine and Ottoman empires, finally disappears.

The Eastern Question had arisen long before the Ottoman conquest, with the decline of the Byzantine Empire and the invasion of the Balkan Peninsula by the peoples of the North—the Slavs and others. There then began a general scramble for the territories where formerly the Greek and Roman civilizations had flourished. The new States founded by the Serbs and Bulgars, that is, by the nations which had invaded the Balkans during the sixth and seventh centuries of our era, were the first claimants to the Byzantine inheritance. Next came, in the thirteenth century, the Venetians and other Western European invaders who, after the capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204, succeeded in provisionally establishing themselves in those regions.

The Ottoman conquest, which began in the fourteenth century and was finally consolidated by the capture of the Byzantine capital in 1453, put an end to this first phase of the Eastern Question by establishing Turkish hegemony throughout the Balkans.

After a lapse of three centuries, the progressive decline of the Ottoman Empire raises anew—from the beginning of the eighteenth century—the question of the succession to the ownership of Constantinople and the other Balkan territories. There are numerous claimants: firstly, the Greeks, who claim their national heritage, secondly, the Balkan Slavs—the Serbs and the Bulgars—thirdly, Russia and the Western Powers.

The ensuing struggle for the Ottoman succession falls into two periods. During the first of these periods—that of the wars of liberation of the Balkan peoples in the nineteenth century—the Greeks, Serbs and Bulgars succeed in first freeing their home-lands—Ancient Hellas as far as the Thessalian frontier, Serbia of the Morava valley, and Northern Bulgaria.

The second period is the struggle for the possession of the territories with a mixed population—namely, Macedonia and Thrace and, finally, Asia Minor. The struggle begins, in 1912, with the coalition of the Balkan States against Turkey. It is followed by the partition among the Balkan Confederates of Macedonia and the western portion of Thrace. Greece, pursuing her dream of the reconquest of Constantinople, the ancient capital of the Byzantine Empire, succeeds—in 1919—in temporarily occupying Eastern Thrace and the eastern littoral of the Aegean in Asia Minor. This effort terminates in the Anatolian disaster of 1922.

By the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the frontiers of Greece are brought back to the Maritza, the river which separates Eastern from Western Thrace. The decision

to proceed to an exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey is then taken.

This exchange, thanks to which the racial have been made to coincide more or less with the territorial boundaries, marks the end of what may be called the Byzantine period of Balkan history. It would, in fact, be wrong to fix the end of the Byzantine epoch, as most historians do, at the fall of Constantinople in 1453. It is true, there was at that date a change of political régime, but, in other respects, the change was entirely superficial. The fundamental conditions of economic and social life throughout the peninsula remained practically as they had been previous to the Ottoman Conquest.

The Ottoman Empire was merely a continuation of the Byzantine Empire, accompanied by such modifications only as the Mohammedan religion of the conquerors rendered necessary. The Sultans took the place of the Greek Emperors on the throne of the Caesars, the ceremonial of the old Seraglio continued that of the Sacred Palace, the Turkish beys and pashas stepped into the shoes of the Byzantine or Frankish nobles as owners of the great landed estates. Ethnographically, there was the same mixture of races—the result of the Slav invasions of the sixth and seventh centuries—with the further addition of a new racial element—the Turks—who spread all over the Balkan territories and settled among the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians and Vlachs, without assimilating them or being assimilated.

In the ecclesiastical domain, the Moslem Faith takes the place of Christianity as the State religion. But the Greek Orthodox Church continues to exist with all its ancient organization, its patriarchates, its privileges and even its estates which the Sultans leave untouched. In

all the provinces of the Ottoman Empire we find a Greek Metropolitan and a Moslem Cadi. The old ecclesiastical dioceses, with their Byzantine names, are maintained. The Greek ecclesiastical courts function side by side with the Moslem religious tribunals, the Oecumenical Patriarchate side by side with the Sheikh-ul-Islamate.

In the rural districts almost nothing is changed. In the plains, where the best lands are, the peasants continue to be mere serfs *adscripti glebae*, as under the Byzantine Emperors, cultivating the estates of the gentry or those of the Church. The only difference is that the Turkish bey has taken the place of the Byzantine or Latin lord. The Turkish *chiflik* is merely another name for the Byzantine *metochion* or *latifundium*. The *yaridji* (the Turkish term for a peasant-farmer who cultivates the land on a crop-sharing basis)¹ is the same as the Byzantine *collēghos* (derived from lat. *collēga*), as the *métayer* or tenant-farmer was called to distinguish him from the peasant proprietor owning his own land. The *vakoufs* or Moslem real estate endowments for the maintenance of mosques or *tekkes* (dervish convents) spread all over the land, like the Greek monastic estates. In the cities, the guilds of artisans, a Byzantine institution, continue to exist under the Turkish rule, under the name of *esnâf*. Persons of the same craft are still grouped in separate wards or streets, as was the case in the Byzantine towns.

In the treatment of foreigners, the Turks simply continued the system that had prevailed under the Byzantine Emperors. The Capitulations or special privileges granted by the Sultans to foreign Powers, such

¹ *Yari* in Turkish means 'half'. The farmer took half, in some cases only a third, of the crop, after deduction of the tithe (*ushûr*) which went to the Government.

as France, England, Holland, &c., whose subjects were exempted from the jurisdiction of the local courts and the payment of certain taxes, were merely a continuation of the privileges granted by the Byzantine Emperors to Venice, Genoa, Ragusa and the other Italian Republics.

All this motley organization, of Byzantine origin, survived almost intact down to 1923, the year of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne.

In the same way it may be said that the political evolution of the Balkan States, down to that date, was in the direction of a revived Byzantine State.

It is true that Greece, Serbia, and later, Bulgaria, during the first stage which immediately followed their emancipation from the Turkish yoke, had become national States on the lines of the States of Western Europe, whose strength lies in the homogeneous character of their population and the absence of large minorities of alien race.

Thus, for instance, the Greece of 1830, whose frontiers only extended as far as Thessaly, was peopled only by Greeks. There were no Turks, no Slavs, no *chifliks*, no *vakoufs*. Small peasant-farmers, owning and cultivating their own lands, were the rule everywhere, the *chiflik* or large landed estate having disappeared with the extermination or emigration of the Turkish landlords. With the disappearance of the Moslems, the mosques and other Moslem religious institutions had disappeared too. In fact, the Greece of 1830, freed from all this incubus of the past and with a population homogeneous in race and religion, was Hellenic rather than Byzantine.

But, after the annexation of Thessaly in 1884, Greece began to revert to the old Byzantine type. The population ceased to be homogeneous, for this time a large number of the Turkish landowners remained. Larissa

and Volo, after the annexation, retained to a great extent their Turkish character. The presence of a Moslem population had, as its logical consequence, the preservation of Moslem institutions, such as muftis, mosques, *vakoufs* and religious courts. The old system of land-tenure—that is, the large landed estates—remained together with the Turkish beys and pashas. The Thessalian peasant continued to be a *collighos* or tenant-farmer just as he had been ever since Byzantine times.

After the annexation of Macedonia, Epirus, Crete and the Aegean Islands in 1912, Greece reverts definitely to the Byzantine type of State. She ceases to be a homogeneous national State, as she was after 1830, and becomes a country with a mixed population containing a numerous alien element of Turks, Slavs, Albanians and Vlachs. One has only to compare the figures of population in 1910 (two years before the Balkan Wars) with those of 1913 (the year following the annexation of the new territories) in order to see the difference. In 1910, 99 per cent of the population were Greeks, in 1913, 20 per cent were of alien race. There are then 640,000 Moslems, and the Treaty of Athens of 1913 provides for the maintenance of special Moslem institutions for their benefit. The frontier has reached the border of Thrace and the urge towards Constantinople becomes irresistible. It is the return to the ideal of the Byzantine State, with Hellenism as the dominant element in a mixed State of Greeks, Turks, Slavs and Armenians.

The conquest of Eastern Thrace and Western Asia Minor, where the non-Greek elements in the population were even more numerous than in Macedonia, would have perpetuated this hybrid character of the Greek State.

The failure of the Greek attempt at penetration into Asia Minor, with the resultant loss of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace and the emigration of the Greek population of those territories to Greece, changed all that.

The exchange of populations has brought about a complete transformation. With the wholesale emigration of the alien elements in the population and the settlement in their place of the refugees and other emigrants from Turkey, Russia and Bulgaria, the new territories added to Greece since 1884 have become predominantly Greek in population. One hundred thousand Turks in Western Thrace, some 80,000 to 90,000 Slavs in Macedonia, and 20,000 Albanians in Western Epirus are all that is left to-day out of the former numerous alien population of those regions. They represent merely 12 per cent of the total population of Greece (15 per cent if we include the 70,000 Spanish-speaking Jews of Salonica).

Politically speaking, the result is one of immense importance, when one considers the difficulties and complications which have resulted in other neighbouring countries from the presence of large alien populations differing in race, language, religion and national sympathies from the dominant race.

The settlement of the refugees in Greece has also resulted in certain profound changes of a social and economic character. The necessity of providing the new settlers with land has meant the break-up of the large estates—whether belonging to Greeks or foreigners. Wholesale expropriation, which has affected even the monastic estates belonging to the monasteries of Mount Athos, has swept away practically all the large estates, and to-day it would be difficult to find, throughout the length and breadth of Greece, an estate exceeding 1,200 acres. Only forest-land and plantation (vineyards, olive-

yards, &c.) have been exempted from the application of the above measure.

Further, the new settlers are not tenants of the State, but free-holders, the aim of the Greek Government being to create a class of independent peasant-proprietors. The only reservation to the above is that, before acquiring their full title to the land, they must pay off what they owe the Government—a comparatively trifling sum—for the value of the land, house and other expenses incurred in settling them. The amount of these debts has been repeatedly reduced under political pressure, and it will not be long before the new population will have acquired the full ownership of their lands.

The very aspect of the country has changed as the result of this radical transformation. Instead of the conglomeration of low mud-huts, the dwellings of the old *collighoi* or tenant-farmers—with the tall *kulá* or *konák* (manor-house) of the Turkish bey towering in their midst—the traveller who visits Macedonia and the other regions of Northern Greece to-day will see rows of small cottages, built for the new settlers by the Refugees Settlement Commission, while the most prominent building in the village is no longer the land-owner's *konák* but the school and church erected by a benevolent Government. The change is significant of the passing of an epoch.

Rising out of the smoking ashes of Smyrna, the Greek phoenix, symbol of the eternal vigour of the Hellenic race, has been re-born on the Macedonian and Thracian plains.

CHAPTER V

CONSTANTINE

‘Comme le dit le Cardinal de Retz, l’art de la politique est de choisir entre deux inconvénients.’ (POINCARÉ, *Au Service de la France*, IX, 177.)

CONSTANTINE was brought up under the influence of four Courts—those of England, Denmark, Russia and Germany.

The influence of the first two was democratic, that of the latter two autocratic.

In externals, the English influence was the strongest. English was the home language used by the Greek Royal Family. Queen Sophie, Constantine’s consort, German though she was, had a strong leaning towards English ways, the result of her early upbringing at the Court of her grandmother, Queen Victoria. English life appealed to her more than any other. As Crown Princess, she often took a house in the South of England, where she and her family would spend the summer holidays.

English influence was also paramount at the Danish Court, where a note of simplicity and informal family life prevailed. King Edward and his Danish wife Alexandra, sister of King George I of the Hellenes, were the favourite relatives. Even at the autocratic Russian Court, the home life of the Emperor Nicholas and his wife was modelled on English lines.

But this English influence at the Greek Court was

confined to private life and somewhat superficial. Politically, it was less powerful.

The English Parliamentary system and the role of the British Sovereign as a constitutional monarch without direct responsibilities was admitted to be good for England and the English, the latter being looked upon as a superior race with a genius for politics and self-government who did not abuse the system and consequently made it work. The operation of the parliamentary system in Continental countries—particularly France—was not admired, and the more authoritative position of the Crown in Germany was not without exercising its attraction.

It should not, however, be supposed that Constantine's father, King George I, had cherished leanings towards autocracy. On the contrary, although his theoretical preferences may have favoured a somewhat less democratic form of government than prevailed in Greece, nearly half a century's experience of Greek politics had made him wise in his generation and taught him a lesson which his predecessor, the well-intentioned and patriotic but none too intelligent Otho, had failed to learn—namely, that in Greece, of all countries, it was a dangerous thing for the King to aspire to direct rule, and that, if he valued his throne, it was safer for him to confine himself strictly to the role of an adviser.

The Russian connexion—through Constantine's mother Olga, daughter of the Grand Duke Constantine, and through his brother Nicholas's wife Helen, also a Russian Grand Duchess—never exercised more than a personal and limited influence. Russian policy in the Balkans, with its Pan Slavist ambitions in the direction of Constantinople, conflicted too openly with Greek national aspirations for Russia ever to be popular at the Greek Court. Further, the oppressive atmosphere of



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terrorism and constant anxiety which hung over the existence of the Russian Imperial Family and with which the Greek Princes were familiar from their visits to the Russian Court, was such as to bring home to the latter the disadvantages of extreme autocracy.

The German influence in Constantine's case, on the other hand, was stronger, being due to the double effects of education and family ties. Constantine, as Crown Prince, had studied at the University of Heidelberg, where he had been a member of the exclusive Saxo-Borussia Corps reserved to members of the German aristocracy. Subsequently he had completed his military education at the Berlin Military Academy. He had ended by marrying the Emperor William's sister. The efficiency of the German army and the spirit of order and method prevailing in all branches of the German civil and military administration were bound to have exercised a profound influence on his early training and habit of mind. The current German professional opinions concerning British military 'amateurishness' under the system of a voluntary army, reinforced no doubt by the none too brilliant performance of the Boer War, must also have left their impression on Constantine's mind. German estimates of the French army, too, were unduly coloured by the still fresh recollections of the Franco-German war of 1871, while the more recent experiences of political influences and lack of *esprit de corps* among the French officer-class, as revealed by the *fiches* system under the Combes-André administration, gave strength to the prevailing unfavourable opinions of French army organization.

But, apart from the above factors, the direct political influence exercised by the Emperor William over his Greek brother-in-law *was much less than what has been commonly assumed*. This was due, firstly, to the strong

dislike of Germany entertained by Constantine's father, King George I, who belonged to the generation which had seen Denmark despoiled of Schleswig-Holstein and retained all a Dane's bitterness against Prussia; and, secondly, to the strong Turcophil tendencies of German policy in the Near East, tendencies which found expression in the ostentatious friendship manifested by the Emperor William for Sultan Abdul Hamid and Islam, in Germany's persistent opposition to Greek aspirations in Crete, in her unconcealed lack of sympathy for the sufferings of the Greek *rayahs* in Turkey, and in the reorganization of the Turkish army under German instructors, such as Von der Goltz and Liman von Sanders.

Further, the personal relations between William and Constantine, though close, were never exactly cordial. The Kaiser had, in the first place, taken objection to his sister's changing her religion and being received into the Greek Orthodox Church on the occasion of her marriage to Constantine. Secondly, the Kaiser's attitude towards his Greek brother-in-law was rather that of a wealthy and overbearing man towards a poor relation, the latter being obliged to keep on good terms with the former on account of his wealth and power and to humour him, even to the extent of submitting to a certain amount of bullying, while in his heart of hearts cordially resenting his treatment.

It is true that Greco-German relations somewhat improved after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. During the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest, the Emperor William's personal intercession with King Charles of Roumania was instrumental in obtaining for Greece the much-coveted and rich province of Cavalla in Eastern Macedonia (a fact of which the Kaiser did not fail to remind his brother-

in-law when, in August 1914, he appealed to the latter to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Central Powers¹). Further, the German Emperor expressed himself in enthusiastically laudatory terms about Constantine's generalship during the Balkan Wars and flattered him by conferring upon him the dignity and baton of a German field-marshal, a distinction Constantine could not fail to appreciate as coming from the head of the greatest military Power in Europe.

A strong anti-Slav bias, due to fear of Russian expansion in the Balkans, as well as the fact that both Bulgaria, Greece's defeated enemy, and Serbia, her victorious ally, cherished aspirations to Balkan hegemony and the possession of Salonica, also doubtless contributed to make Constantine, after the Balkan Wars, incline towards a line of policy which should not be openly hostile to Germany as being the principal opponent of Slav ambitions in South-Eastern Europe.²

The above may be taken as a fair estimate of the conflicting influences to which Constantine was subjected and which were each one not without their bearing on the latter's subsequent attitude during the crisis provoked by the outbreak of the European War.

That attitude was uncertain, shifting, vacillating and contradictory. Constantine was torn by doubts and opposing considerations between which he found himself unable to make up his mind—on the one hand, fear of German military power and of incurring his Imperial brother-in-law's wrath,³ coupled with a not unjustifiable

¹ See Greek White Paper (2nd Greek edit.), No. 24 (Dispatch of M. Theotokis, Greek Minister in Berlin, dated 22 July 1914).

² See Constantine's reply of 14/27 July 1914 to the Kaiser's appeal, quoted in Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (I, 143).

³ See Constantine's letter of 7 September 1914 to Venizelos, quoted in Ventiris, *Greece in 1910-20* (I, 367).

anxiety concerning the danger of future Slav predominance in the Balkans ; on the other, a full appreciation of British naval power and the physical impossibility of a maritime State like Greece ranging itself on the side of great Britain's enemies.¹

In reading through the records of the correspondence exchanged between Constantine and the Kaiser, as revealed by the publication of the Greek and German State Papers, which throw a full light on the workings of Constantine's mind during the fateful years 1914-15, one sees the play of all the above-mentioned fears and motives.

Had Constantine been a man of greater political acumen, he would, no doubt, have realized from the very start that Greece, by reason of an overwhelming combination of historical, political and geographical factors, could not hope to keep out of the world-conflict and that it was therefore better for her to range herself boldly on the side of the Entente, notwithstanding the undoubted risks involved.

Unfortunately, Constantine was not gifted with the necessary imagination to enable him to look so far ahead nor with the courage required to take so bold a leap. He preferred to steer a middle course, playing for time and what he deemed to be safety.

The allegation that he was actuated by unworthy and petty motives, or by a pronounced sympathy for the German cause,² thus making him sacrifice the interests

¹ See Constantine's reply of 25 July 1914 to the Kaiser, quoted in Greek White Book (2nd Greek edit.), No. 26.

² Much has been made of the phrase 'The Emperor knows that my personal sympathies and my political opinions incline me to his side' contained in Constantine's reply, dated 25 July 1914, to the Kaiser's appeal (see Greek White Book (2nd Greek edit.), No. 26) but, given the circumstances and the obvious necessity for

of his country to presumed dynastic considerations, seems unfounded. The interests of the Greek Dynasty cannot reasonably be said to have been bound up with a German (which would also have been a Bulgarian and Turkish) victory—far from it. In all fairness it must be admitted to-day that the charges of pro-Germanism which were so freely bandied about during the war and from which few neutrals were exempt, were grossly exaggerated. If even the heroic Queen of the Belgians was not spared by the voice of calumny,¹ one can hardly be surprised that the Kaiser's brother-in-law should have been assumed by all to have sold his soul to the devil.

Constantine was hardly what one would call a clever man—on the contrary his acts show him to have been lacking in that mental suppleness so necessary in the sovereign of a democratic country. His qualities were those of a conscientious and unimaginative soldier and administrator. From his German education he had imbibed habits of industry, order and authority which proved of undoubted value in the reorganization of the Greek army during the period preceding the Balkan Wars and were an important factor in the successful conduct of the campaigns of 1912–13.

Against these qualities must be set a certain lack of self-control and a tendency to the use of intemperate and indiscreet language. Strangely enough, this fondness

humouring the Kaiser at that critical moment, it is doubtful whether the words in question are more than a mere platonic expression of courtesy.

¹ See Poincaré, *Au Service de la France*. IX. *L'année trouble 1917* (p. 196): 'Nouveaux commérages, nouvelles attaques à la Chambre contre le Président de la République. Mais ai-je le droit de me plaindre, alors que d'après une note du G.Q.G. on accuse aujourd'hui l'admirable reine Elizabeth de trahison?'

for homely expression and strong language, in which Constantine freely indulged in public, was an element in his popularity with the masses and the rank and file of the army, though offensive to the officers and politicians who were usually the victims of these outbursts and who often, for this reason, cherished feelings of animosity against him.

Though inclined to caution where military matters were concerned, Constantine, from his earliest years, had a tendency to be impulsive and indiscreet in word and action. As Crown Prince, he several times gave trouble by taking independent action in opposition to the policy of the Government, thereby placing his father, the prudent King George I, in a difficult position.¹ The latter possessed quite a different temperament; he was cautious, calculating, afraid of taking responsibility, always inclined to follow the line of least resistance and ready to bow to the storm, a quality which made him a pliable instrument in the hands of his Ministers and was all to his advantage when his Prime Minister happened to be a commanding personality like Eleutherios Venizelos.

Estimates vary as to Constantine's military capacities. It is generally admitted that he was in no way responsible for the Greek defeat in Thessaly during the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, when he was put at the head of an army which was entirely unprepared for war, owing to the neglect and ineptitude of the politicians. His generalship during the Balkan Wars, in spite of some errors of judgement, justified itself by results. He certainly possessed qualities of leadership which enabled him to impose his authority on his Generals, always prone to personal bickerings and jealousies, while he

¹ See N. Apostolopoulos, *Ὁ Ἑλληνικὸς Μοναρχισμὸς (Monarchy in Greece)*, Chap. I, 'Constantine as Crown Prince'.

inspired enthusiasm verging on adoration among the rank and file. His great popularity with the common soldier was partly due to his physique (he was a man of imposing appearance), partly to a familiar and democratic manner which endeared him to the simple peasants from whose ranks the Greek army is mainly drawn.

After his successes in the Balkan Wars, Constantine became the idol of the Greek people, who saw in him the incarnation of their hopes. There was a tendency on the part of his entourage to exalt the King's military virtues to a degree savouring of adulation. This, perhaps, was not without effect on Constantine's character.

On the other hand, it is a mistake to think that the line taken by Constantine in 1915, both as regards Greek participation in the Dardanelles Expedition, the proposed allied co-operation in Macedonia and the rejection of the allied offer of territorial compensation in Asia Minor, was a purely personal policy. In all three questions he was backed by the authority of the General Staff, and the fact that the opinion of his principal military adviser, Colonel Metaxas, who enjoyed great prestige in the eyes of the Greek public as having been mainly responsible for the successful conduct of the operations during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, was unfavourable to Greek participation in the war very naturally influenced the King's judgement. Even allied military opinion was by no means unanimous on the question.¹

One may hold that, on general political grounds, Constantine ought perhaps to have taken the risk of

¹ See the opinion of Colonel Fairholme, British Military Attaché at Athens, quoted and apparently shared by Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson in the latter's *Diaries* (I, p. 308).

joining the Allies in 1915. But, from the strictly *military* point of view, his position was, if not unassailable, at any rate capable of justification. Even Mr. Lloyd George, in his *Memoirs*, is inclined to take a lenient view of Greek policy at this time.¹

The charges of *unconstitutional behaviour and autocratic leanings*, based on Constantine's dismissal of Venizelos after the latter's victory at the General Election of May 1915, are partly founded but have been exaggerated in such a way as to create the impression abroad that Constantine deliberately aimed at installing a sort of military dictatorship. In spite of a certain amount of irresponsible talk among his military entourage,² there is no evidence, before the crisis of 1915 arose, to show that Constantine was bent on exercising a personal influence in politics, except where purely military matters were concerned. He never interfered in matters of civil administration; his whole interest appears to have been centred on the army, to which he was wholeheartedly devoted.

On two occasions previous to 1915 Constantine came into conflict with Venizelos as Prime Minister—the first

¹ See Lloyd George's *Memoirs* (I, pp. 512-13): 'Greece was pressed to send troops to assist in saving Serbia, but the appeal came to her too late, because by that time the armies of the Central Powers and Bulgaria had overwhelmed Serbian resistance. The Greeks had Serbia's fate before their eyes. Serbia had been abandoned by the Allies in defiance of solemn pledges of timely support. The Greeks were naturally apprehensive of a repetition of the same desertion in their own case. The Germans, already in the defiles of the Balkans, would soon be on their southern slopes. Greece, with her small army, would easily be devoured by this terrible monster' (situation in October 1915).

² See letter of General Dousmanis (Chief of the General Staff) to Lieut. Basdekis, quoted in Ventiris, *Greece in 1910-20* (I, 200), for which General Dousmanis was suspended.

time in 1912, during the first Balkan War, on the question of the advance to Monastir, the second in 1913 over the peace-terms at the Conference of Bucharest. But on both those occasions he finally deferred to his Prime Minister's opinion, so that, although these two cases may be quoted against him as evidence of his lack of political 'flair', they can hardly be brought up as proof of unconstitutional leanings.

In his great conflict with Venizelos over the question of intervention in 1915, Constantine was undoubtedly guilty of a technical violation of the Constitution. On that occasion, he openly took the line that, on so grave an issue as that of peace or war, in which military considerations played a paramount part, he felt it his duty as King and eventual Commander-in-Chief—a dangerous but inevitable combination of offices—to exercise his personal discretion, even if, by doing so, he was brought into conflict with the opinion of his Prime Minister. This dangerous doctrine for a constitutional sovereign was bound, none the less, to be challenged.

But, while Constantine's attitude is indefensible from the point of view of constitutional theory, it is going rather too far to construe it as a symptom of deliberate autocratic tendencies. Every constitutional monarch is liable, on some occasion or other, to find himself placed in a similar dilemma—that is, of having to choose between sanctioning a policy recommended to him by his constitutional advisers but which he believes to be injurious to the national interests, or else of rejecting that advice, thereby incurring the responsibility of a violation of the Constitution. King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy found himself faced with just such a dilemma, when, on 28 October 1922, he was asked by the Facta Government to sanction the proclamation of martial law in order to repel Mussolini's march on Rome. Victor

*Emmanuel defended his action in refusing to sign the Decree on the ground that he wished to avert civil war. Such conduct, though perfectly laudable in motive, was nevertheless a technical violation of the Constitution and, as such, is severely condemned by the opponents of Fascism. Were the Fascist régime in Italy to be overthrown, there can be little doubt that the King would be called to account for his unconstitutional act.*¹

King Alphonso XIII of Spain's action in countenancing the dictatorship of Primo de Riveira is another case in point. The King had to choose between the continuation of a chronic state of maladministration and parliamentary corruption, of which, if he would respect the Constitution, he must remain a passive, if not indifferent, spectator, and a radical reform of the whole system of Government and administration, rendered possible only by the temporary suspension of parliamentary liberties. King Alphonso, by choosing the second alternative, placed himself deliberately in the invidious position of violating the Constitution. He has had to pay the penalty of his choice but, in so far as that choice was dictated by what he felt was the national interest, no moral blame can attach to his action.

Constantine, by dismissing Venizelos a second time, after the latter's policy had been endorsed by the electorate—at any rate by implication²—at the general election of 31 May 1915, was guilty of a grave tactical error which was bound to be exploited against him by

¹ See Gaetano Salvemini, *The Fascist Dictatorship*.

² The question of peace or war was not actually put to the electorate (see Bosdari, *Delle guerre Balcaniche, della Grande Guerra* (p. 122): 'Tanto poco quel partito (i.e. the Venizelist Party) si rendeva conto essere disposto al popolo alla guerra che doveva evitare con cura di farne una piattaforma elettorale').

his opponents, both at home and abroad.¹ It cannot, however, be said to reflect on his moral character as a sovereign and a man.

His father, George I, if placed in the same position, would certainly have acted otherwise. Not that George was more devoted to the interests of his country than Constantine. On the contrary, the latter took his duties, if anything, more earnestly than his father who, being something of a cynic, was only too ready to throw all the responsibility on the politicians. George, too, had been faced with the issue of peace or war in October 1912, at the outbreak of the Balkan War. Eminently pacific and firmly convinced as he was that Greece's interests could better be served by his own personal intercession with the monarchs of Europe than by recourse to arms, he was opposed to Greece's entry into the war by the side of the Balkan Allies. On Venizelos's insistence, however, he finally consented, under protest, to sign the decree of mobilization. George I was intelligent enough to place his trust in Venizelos, either because he recognized that his Prime Minister was a bigger man than himself or else because he was shrewd enough to realize the dangers of refusing to carry out the policy of his constitutional advisers.

If Constantine had had fewer conscientious scruples² and a more modest estimate of his own intellectual

¹ Bosdari (op. cit., p. 136) takes a lenient view. 'In linea pratica certamente, il Re Costantino violando (come dissero i suoi avversari) il Trattato e la Costituzione, salvò la Grecia e pagò coraggiosamente con la perdita della sua corona questa sua "felice colpa".'

² See record of conversation between Constantine and Venizelos on 10/23 September 1915, quoted in Ventiris, *Greece in 1910-20* (II, 20): 'In internal questions I obey the people's verdict. But on questions of great national importance, if I consider that a thing is right or wrong, it is my duty to insist on its being done or not done, because it is I who am responsible before God.'

powers, he would not have committed such a grave political error as his dismissal of Venizelos after the election of May 1915. The task of dealing with the subsequent crisis, for which he thus assumed the responsibility, certainly overtaxed his powers. He adopted a vacillating policy, which, though officially neutral, satisfied neither the Allies nor their adversaries. He toyed with the idea of intervention (on several occasions he seemed on the point of consenting to Greece joining the Allies), but always changed his mind at the last moment under the influence of other counsels. His illness in May 1915 seems certainly to have affected both his judgement and his memory, as the Russian Minister, Prince Demidof, notes in his *Memoirs*.

As the interference of the Allies, often ill-judged, in the internal affairs of Greece became more and more frequent and provocative, Constantine became increasingly exasperated and dug his toes obstinately into the ground. His determination not to go to war with Germany at any cost, strengthened by the German successes on the Eastern and South-Eastern Fronts, became fixed. In his desire to preserve Greece's already gravely compromised neutrality by treating both sets of belligerents on an equal footing, he was led to consent to the occupation of Eastern Macedonia by the Central Powers, as he had previously consented to other parts of Greek territory (Lemnos, Mytilene, Corfu) being occupied by the Allies. Logical though this may have been, it was, politically, a fatal error, because a large section of Greek public opinion was not prepared to tolerate the idea of the Bulgars—Greece's hereditary enemies who openly coveted Greece's Macedonian provinces—being placed on the same footing as the Allies.¹

¹ Bosdari, *Delle guerre Balcaniche, della Grande Guerra* (p. 154), says of the surrender of Ruppel: 'Questa dichiarazione, fattami circa

It was straining the policy of neutrality to breaking-point. But Constantine was too obstinate to realize that, once things had reached the point where neutrality could only be maintained at the cost of surrendering territory to the Bulgars, the moment had clearly arrived when a final decision had to be taken, and that there was really no choice left for Greece but to throw in her lot with the Allies. The surrender of Fort Ruppel to the armies of the Central Powers, which had followed on the surrender of Fort Dova Tepé, north of Salonica, to the Allies, though not an act of treachery, as was represented at the time, was the culminating point in a long series of political errors due to Constantine's obstinate refusal to look the facts of the situation in the face.

The history of Constantine's subsequent relations with the Entente is too well known to require repeating here. It is worth noting, however, that the events of 1916-17 are almost a repetition of what happened in 1854, when another King of Greece—Otho—also came into conflict with Great Britain and France, at that time allied with Turkey against Russia. Otho, strongly supported by public opinion, wanted to declare war on Turkey and invade Thessaly. In order to forestall this action on the part of Greece, a combined British and French fleet occupied the Piraeus and blockaded Athens. Otho, who at first had refused to yield to the intimidation of the Powers, suddenly found himself a popular hero, as the champion of the rights of the nation against the encroachments and bullying of the Great Powers.

Constantine's popularity, which was greatly enhanced

un mese prima della presa di Ruppel da parte degli Austro-Germanici, mi permette di asserire che la reddizione di quel forte può essere stata da parte della Grecia un insanabile errore dal punto di visto politico, ma che non si tratto di tradimento verso di noi perché eravamo stati prevenuti di ciò che doveva accadere.'

by the events of 1916-17, was due to somewhat similar causes. The Allied blockade of 1917, by imposing severe privations and suffering on the population of Old Greece, was fatal to the very cause which it was intended to further. The resentment aroused by that action among the Greek people was so deep that the successes and advantages subsequently secured by Venizelos never succeeded in obliterating the painful impression left by the blockade.

In judging Constantine's conduct and policy, it is necessary to reject the extreme versions both of his adherents and his opponents, since both have been distorted by the prejudices and passions of the war period. The estimate of Professor Mowat,¹ based on an impartial and objective study of the facts made in the calm and secluded atmosphere of a scholar's study—as he says, *sine ira et studio*—is, with some qualifications, perhaps the fairest of any which have yet seen the light on this highly controversial subject. Professor Mowat sees in the career of Constantine, with its extraordinary vicissitudes of alternate triumph and defeat, one of the great tragedies of history. After criticizing Constantine for lack of discernment and too obstinate a reliance on his own judgement—a criticism not entirely borne out, it must be admitted, by the facts, if one takes into consideration that the King, in 1915, undoubtedly had the bulk of competent Greek military opinion on his side—he concludes as follows:

Those things being said, it is fair to put the case for Constantine. Apart from his personal sympathy with the German military and authoritarian system, he honestly held that the good of his kingdom lay in a neutral course. He saw two mighty groups of Powers fighting against each other. If either group were going to win,

¹ R. B. Mowat, *History of European Diplomacy* (III, p. 57).

he thought that the Central Powers would do so. But, if he joined either group, his own weak country, before the final victory, might become the sport of hostile armies, might be sacked and ravaged like Belgium or Northern France. He was not going to risk that. So he took the course that led eventually to exile, to the fall of his dynasty, and almost to the ruin of his country.

CHAPTER VI

VENIZELÓS

‘Les esprits simples, qui sont le nombre, aiment à juger les hommes en bloc, d’une qualification approximative qu’ils veulent définitive. Mais la nature humaine est trop complexe, trop variable pour se prêter d’emblée à ces procédures sommaires, d’où la plus belle sincérité n’arrive pas toujours à dégager la véritable formule d’une énergie en cours.’ (CLÉMENTEAU on Foch in *Grandeurs et Misères d’une Victoire*, p. 20.)

MUSTAFA KEMAL and Venizelos are the only outstanding statesmen of this generation that the Balkans have produced.

More or less everybody can explain why Mustafa Kemal is entitled to be ranked among the world’s great statesmen. By an unusual combination of political and military gifts of a high order, he succeeded first in saving his country from annihilation and then in regenerating her. A ruthless iconoclast in the midst of the most conservative of peoples, Kemal had the courage to suppress age-long institutions, like the Sultanate and the Caliphate, which, though still enjoying great popular prestige, had outlived their time. A bold innovator, he set himself to recast the whole social structure of his country by the introduction of sweeping reforms which bid fair to set the Turks, until yesterday one of the most retrograde of Eastern nations, along the path of Western progress.

Venizelos, too, by an almost general consensus of opinion, enjoys the reputation of being a great statesman.

Unlike Mustafa Kemal, who is not personally known to the Western public, the Greek statesman has enjoyed, for the last twenty years, an immense personal popularity in Western countries with which he had had frequent and direct contact. The press of all shades of opinion and public men of all parties have been unanimous in acclaiming him.

Yet, notwithstanding this chorus of acclamations, there is not the same agreement, where it is a question of interpreting the events on which Venizelos's claim to greatness rests.

In his own country, where opinions are sharply divided, that large section of his countrymen which hails him as the greatest statesman of modern Greece, points to the Treaty of Sèvres, by which Venizelos obtained for Greece the cession of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, as his most signal achievement.

In England and France, on the other hand, Venizelos seems to owe his popularity principally to the fact that he showed himself throughout the Great War a staunch friend of the Allies and had the courage to beard a King, who happened at the same time to be the Kaiser's brother-in-law, in order to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Entente. His policy, from 1919 onwards—particularly his Asiatic policy—finds scant approval outside Greece.

The fact is that the elements of Venizelos's greatness have been, to a great extent, misconstrued both in his own country and abroad. Neither his ephemeral diplomatic successes of 1919-20—the fruit of his superlative skill as a negotiator rather than of his foresight as a statesman—nor his faithfulness to the cause of the Allies during the war can be said to constitute his real title to be considered a great statesman. His policy of Asiatic expansion, which has received the rather indiscrimin-

ating praise of a section of his countrymen, has been almost unanimously condemned by the most eminent foreign opinion, both civil and military, whether British, American, French or Italian. Rarely has a treaty come in for such unanimous condemnation as the ill-fated Treaty of Sèvres. 'The most insensate of all Peace-Treaties',¹ 'more fragile than a piece of Sèvres porcelain',² 'an anachronism and a by-word to all the peoples most vitally concerned',³ 'obsolete before it was ready',⁴ are some of the uncomplimentary epithets bestowed upon it. The pages of Mr. Winston Churchill's *Aftermath*,⁵ of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson's *Diaries*,⁶ and Colonel House's *What Really Happened at Paris*,⁷ tell us what they thought of the consequences of the Greek landing at Smyrna. Even Mr. Stergiades, Venizelos's trusted friend, who was sent to Smyrna as Greek High Commissioner, calls it 'a colossal political and geographical blunder'.⁸

Those who came in contact with Venizelos at the Peace Conference lay stress on his astuteness,⁹ his powers

¹ Sforza, *Les Bâtisseurs de l'Europe* (p. 344).

² Poincaré, *Revue des Deux Mondes* (August 1920).

³ *What Really Happened at Paris*, edited by Colonel House and C. Seymour (p. 187).

⁴ Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (p. 376).

⁵ *Ibid.* (pp. 365–9). ⁶ *Diaries* (II, pp. 190, 213, 230).

⁷ *What Really Happened at Paris* (pp. 194–7).

⁸ In Athens paper, *Patris* (6 Jan. 1930).

⁹ Clémenceau, *Grandeurs et Misères d'une Victoire* (p. 125): 'Venizelos, fils d'Ulysse et de Calypso, loyalement imprégné d'une astuce hellénique.'

What Really Happened at Paris (p. 194): 'When Premier Orlando broke with President Wilson upon the Fiume issue and left Paris, the astute Venizelos immediately pushed forward his Smyrna claim.'

Sforza, *Les Bâtisseurs de l'Europe* (p. 165), calls Venizelos 'l'Ulysside'.



VENIZELOS

of persuasion, his skill at putting a case, his mastery of diplomatic technique, his 'silver tongue',¹ but these qualities can hardly be said, by themselves, to constitute greatness.

And yet Venizelos has an undoubted claim to be considered a great statesman, *notwithstanding* the failure of his Anatolian policy. Few statesmen have been uniformly successful; in order to judge them, we must strike a balance between their successes and their failures. Napoleon was not less of a great soldier for having lost his last battle. The fact that Venizelos made a mistake in going to Smyrna in 1919 cannot annul the great and lasting achievements of his previous career.

When in 1909 he was summoned from Crete by the Military League to take over the Government of Greece, he found her a small and discredited country, without prestige, without organized military forces, without alliances, without a policy, whose wildest dreams of territorial expansion hardly extended beyond Crete, Epirus and a small portion of Southern Macedonia.

Within twelve years (1910-22), Venizelos had created a respectable army and navy, had secured for Greece the moral and material advantage of valuable alliances, and had doubled her territory.

Besides his exceptional qualities of eloquence, energy, versatility and diplomatic skill, Venizelos possessed a quality which raises him head and shoulders above the other Greek politicians who were his predecessors or his contemporaries—a sense of realities. Many of the latter were no doubt ardent patriots who also desired the aggrandizement of their country. But they gave the impression of children crying for the moon—as if their whole policy consisted in hanging up a Kiepert's atlas

¹ Mr. Isaiah Bowman (Chief Territorial Adviser, American Peace Commission), in *What Really Happened at Paris* (p. 472).

of the Balkan Peninsula on the walls of the Greek Foreign Office, seeing how far the Byzantine Empire stretched at the period of its greatest extension, painting the whole thing blue, and then waiting fatalistically for it to drop one day into their mouths.

With Venizelos, the method of approach to the problem was quite different. One felt that he stated it to himself in the following precise terms :

Given a small country, like Greece, with only three and a half million inhabitants and strictly limited resources, what is the maximum attainable under the most favourable combination of circumstances which may arise in the immediate future ?

His was an eminently practical, eminently realistic conception of international diplomacy. He always cut his coat according to his cloth. He never waited too long nor asked for too much. At any rate, that is true of his policy till 1919.

Take the Balkan Alliance of 1912. Many of Venizelos's opponents criticized him for joining the Alliance. They would have kept Greece out of the Alliance with Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro, on the erroneous hypothesis that the three Slav States, without Greece's help, would have broken their heads against the Turkish stone wall, and then Greece, at the convenient moment, would have stepped in and helped herself to whatever she wanted. Venizelos possessed a more modest estimate of his country's strength. With a Young Turkey waxing yearly more powerful, he realized that it was a case of now or never. Greece, by herself, might at most have hoped to obtain Crete. But it would have been highly dangerous to have left the three Slav States to engage the Turks alone. Had they been beaten, it would not have helped Greece. Had they been successful, Greece would have lost all chance of obtaining a

share of Macedonia. The share she could reasonably hope to get, by joining the Balkan Alliance, might possibly be a much smaller one than Greece—on historical or ethnological grounds—thought herself entitled to; but something—reasoned Venizelos—was better than nothing. Other Greek statesmen, less practical and more intransigent, would have been satisfied with nothing less than a Macedonia and Thrace stretching from Monastir to the Maritza. But by remaining outside the Alliance and playing a waiting game, Greece would probably, in the end, have got nothing at all. Venizelos showed his wisdom in following the old Greek adage, ‘πλέον ἢμισιν παντός’¹ (‘half a loaf is better than no bread’).

Another decisive moment, when Venizelos showed his quick grasp of a situation, occurred during the first Balkan War in 1912, just after the Greek army had scored its first victory at Sarantaporo on the road from Larissa to Salonica. There were two possible objectives—Salonica to the East or Monastir to the North-West. The Crown Prince Constantine, who commanded the army, backed by the opinion of the General Staff, wanted to march on Monastir, in order to disperse the main body of the Turkish forces in Western Macedonia. Venizelos realized at once that Salonica was the vital objective and that, unless the Greek army succeeded in occupying it before the arrival of the Bulgars, who were advancing from the North-East, the hopes of Greece securing that important city at the final division of the spoils would be very slight indeed. That division, he rightly foresaw, was bound to be on the principle of *beati possidentes*. He therefore insisted, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the Crown Prince and General Staff, on the army marching on Salonica.

¹ Hesiod (E. 40).

He proved to be right. The Greeks only got there in the nick of time, a short twenty-four hours before the Bulgars. It made all the difference. Salonica remained Greek. If the Crown Prince had been left to march on Monastir, Greece would have got neither.

A third example occurred during the Second Balkan War in 1913. An armistice had been signed and peace negotiations were proceeding at Bucharest. The Greek army was in actual occupation of the whole of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace as far as Dedeagatch. Constantine, now King, telegraphed to Venizelos at Bucharest, instructing him to accept nothing less than the whole of the occupied territory as far as the Maritza. Venizelos replied, saying that he was only prepared to ask for Macedonia as far as the Nestos, since Roumania would refuse to support Greece if the latter insisted on getting more; thus, if the Greek Government persisted in claiming the whole of Thrace as far as the Maritza, the negotiations were bound to break down and war start afresh, with uncertain results. At first Constantine refused to yield, whereupon Venizelos threatened to resign. Finally, the King had to give way. Here again Venizelos showed his sense of realities by taking his profit while he could, rather than risk everything by asking for too much.

Poincaré ¹ quotes the Cardinal de Retz as saying: 'L'art de la politique est de choisir entre deux inconvénients.' Venizelos possessed this consummate art of knowing how to choose.

His opponents would have had him quarrel with Serbia over Monastir, with Albania over Koritza, with Italy over the Dodecanese, with Roumania over the Koutsovlachs of Macedonia, with Turkey over the rights

¹ Poincaré, *Au Service de la France*. IX. *L'Année Trouble* 1917 (p. 177).

of *muftis*¹ in Greece. In other words, they wanted every question kept open amid a general atmosphere of wrangling with all her neighbours. Venizelos preferred to draw a line somewhere—thus far and no further—and bide his time till a fresh opportunity should present itself.

That opportunity came in 1915. He tried to seize it. But the factors on that occasion were less favourable, the situation more complicated than in 1912. He was induced to accept Smyrna—against his better judgement, perhaps. Having once accepted, he dared not turn back. He had told the Greek people that they would get Smyrna, if they joined in the war. Venizelos was a self-willed man and when he once said a thing, he did not like taking it back. So in 1919, in spite of warnings from friends and foes, he charged into Smyrna, more or less damning the consequences. Smyrna turned into a Frankenstein's monster which ended by throttling its maker and master.

Great men sometimes make great mistakes. Let it stand at that.

¹ The heads of the Moslem Communities of Greece, as recognized by the Treaty of Athens of 1913.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

A DISPASSIONATE examination of all the facts and evidence connected with Greece's ill-starred expedition to Asia Minor will, I think, lead the impartial investigator, whose sole desire is not to inculcate or disculpate this or that political party or to exalt or disparage this or that politician, to the following general conclusions :

1. That the Entente Powers' offer to Greece, in 1915, of a portion of Western Asia Minor was made purely with the object of inducing Greece to enter the war and without any thought being given at the time to the practical difficulties which the fulfilment of such a promise was ultimately bound to entail. The Allied Governments must bear the blame of having somewhat lightly made a promise which the sequel showed they had neither the power nor the will to honour. The hopes induced in Greece by the promise of Smyrna and the fact that Venizelos, having exploited that promise as the principal trump in favour of the policy of intervention as against the pacifist party, thus found himself irrevocably committed to the Asiatic venture, were decisive elements in shaping the whole subsequent course of events in Greece during the period 1915-22.

2. That Venizelos rightly discerned that Greece's interests demanded her intervention in the war on the side of the Entente, once Turkey and Bulgaria had ranged themselves in the opposite camp. Apart from the question of ultimate compensation, Greece's intervention

was necessary in order to consolidate her position in Macedonia and the Aegean Islands, which was threatened by the respective claims of Bulgaria and Turkey.

3. That, on the other hand, it was a fatal error on the part of Venizelos to have insisted in 1919, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the highest military authorities, both Allied (Foch, Wilson) and Greek (Metaxas)¹, on being allowed to occupy Smyrna, before the peace terms had been finally settled. This error might still have been repaired if, in 1920, after having obtained the recognition of the Greek claims to Western and Eastern Thrace and the Dodecanese, Venizelos had availed himself of this excuse in order to abandon Smyrna.

The gravity of the Kemalist resistance, which Venizelos certainly underestimated, coupled with the undisguised hostility of two of the principal Allies (France and Italy) and the fact that he had behind him not a united but a divided people and army, ought to have opened his eyes to the dangers of persisting in a policy which was bound, sooner or later, to lead to the financial and military exhaustion of his country.

4. That the Entente Powers—particularly France and Great Britain—after all the pressure they had put on Greece in order to bring her into the war on their side,

¹ Colonel Metaxas's advice, though given in 1915, was still valid in 1919, as far as his arguments concerning the difficulties of a war of conquest in Asia Minor were concerned; in fact, they had acquired still greater force owing to the increase of the unfavourable factors, e.g. the elimination of Russia as a participant in the division of Asia Minor (under the Secret Treaty of 1915 Russia would have obtained the five Eastern vilayets and the Ismidt peninsula, with its hinterland, as far as the Sakkaria), and the fact that Venizelos had behind him a divided instead of a united nation. The state of Greece in 1919-20 was not unlike that of France in 1814-15.

were in honour bound to have given Greece adequate compensation. It was, however, a grave mistake on their part not to have made the cession of Eastern Thrace to Greece contingent on the abandonment of Greek claims to Asia Minor, as proposed in Sir Eyre Crowe's Memorandum of 16 April 1919.

5. That the decision of the Supreme Council (Clémenteau, Lloyd George, Wilson) in May 1919, to allow Greece to occupy Smyrna, before the peace-terms had been finally settled, and against the express opinion of their military advisers, was a serious error. But once having done so, they were in honour bound to give Greece their full support against the Turks, instead of each one pursuing divergent policies and—as in the case of Italy and France—giving direct and indirect encouragement to the Turkish Nationalists, thus undermining the position of their Ally.

6. That the restoration of King Constantine to the Greek throne in 1920 was hardly an adequate—moral or legal—ground for adopting retaliatory measures which made it more difficult for Greece to carry on the struggle in Asia Minor. The restoration of a King, who had, rightly or wrongly, incurred the displeasure of the Allies, was a purely sentimental grievance which ought not to have outweighed consideration of the services rendered by Greece as a nation to the allied cause. The attitude taken up by the Powers, viewed to-day in its true perspective, appears in the light of a paltry personal pretext for wriggling out of somewhat onerous obligations towards a small country which had incurred great sacrifices in the common cause.

7. That the main responsibility for sending Greece to Smyrna must rest with Mr. Lloyd George, who pursued a purely personal policy in direct opposition to the views of his colleagues at the Foreign Office

(Curzon), the War Office (Winston Churchill) and the India Office (Montagu) and against the expressed opinion of his principal technical advisers (Field-Marshal Sir H. Wilson and Foch).

Mr. Lloyd George's persistence in this policy, after the fall of Venizelos, would only have been justified if the British Premier had succeeded in persuading the other Allies to recognize Constantine and give Greece their full support in order to carry on the war. On the contrary, by arousing false hopes of eventual British support in the minds of the Gounaris Government, Mr. Lloyd George deterred the Greek Government from adopting the only reasonable course under the circumstances—namely, the evacuation of Asia Minor.¹

8. That Gounaris and the Royalist party-leaders, who succeeded Venizelos in power in November 1920, aggravated what was already an unsatisfactory situation by ignoring the unfavourable effect on allied public opinion of bringing back King Constantine and, secondly, although in principle opposed to Venizelos's policy of Asiatic expansion, by not having the moral courage to evacuate Smyrna as soon as they assumed office. Although they cannot be held solely responsible for the failure of the Asiatic venture—a failure which, as had been rightly foreseen by the military experts (Metaxas, Wilson, Foch), was a foregone conclusion from the very start—they must be held responsible for the magnitude of the military disaster in 1922, which could have been avoided, had they accepted in time the Allies' offers of mediation, which would have enabled the army and

¹ Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (p. 393): 'The sentimental support of an eminent man may be a powerful encouragement, but it is no substitute for treaties, agreements or formal diplomatic communications.'

native Greek populations to withdraw from Asia Minor in a more or less orderly fashion.

9. That King Constantine, although not the out-and-out pro-German he has been represented to be by war-propagandists, and although admittedly backed by a large section of Greek public and military opinion in wishing to adopt a policy of neutrality, showed a lack of political discernment, coupled with vacillation and timidity. He failed to realize that the initial breaches—whether voluntary or involuntary—of Greek neutrality involved in allowing the Allies to occupy certain points in Greek territory (Mudros, Milo, Mytilene, Salonica, Corfu) made it impossible for Greece to maintain her neutrality. By not grasping in time the essential fact that the Entente Powers, owing to the exigencies of the strategic position in the Near East, were prepared to go to any lengths in order to force Greece to intervene in the war, he adopted a policy of 'kicking against the pricks' which Greece was not strong enough to carry through. No diplomatist, he tried to be his own Foreign Minister and so became enmeshed in a diplomatic tangle from which he was quite unable to extricate himself. The attachment of a large section of the Greek people to his memory, an attachment which time has not weakened, proves that he was regarded as more sinned against than sinning, and as the victim of an inexorable Fate.

APPENDIX I

THE SOURCES

A VOLUMINOUS literature has sprung up dealing with the history of events in Greece during the years 1915-22. In the first place, there are the accounts written by many of the principal actors—both Greek and foreign—in explanation or justification of the parts played by themselves in those events. Thus we have the books of Admiral Dartige du Fournet,¹ the French Admiral who was made the scapegoat for the unfortunate Zappeion incident of 1 December 1916; of General Sarrail,² Commander-in-Chief of the Allied army on the Salonica Front during the years 1916-17; of Mr. Compton Mackenzie,³ who was the Chief of the British Secret Service at Athens in 1915-16; of Sir Basil Thomson,⁴ Head of the Intelligence Service in London in 1919-21; of some of the allied diplomats who represented the Entente at Athens during the period in question, such as M. Deville⁵ (France), Count Bosdari⁶ (Italy), Prince Demidoff⁷ (Russia); and a host of others.

¹ Dartige du Fournet, Amiral, *Souvenirs de Guerre d'un Amiral* (Paris, Plon, 1920).

² Sarrail, Général, *Mon Commandement en Orient* (Paris, Flammarion, 1918).

³ Compton Mackenzie, *Greek Memories* (Cassell & Co., London, 1932). A translation appeared in the Athenian newspaper, *Ἀθηναϊκά Νέα* (in 1932-3). Venizelist in tendency.

⁴ Sir Basil Thomson, *The Allied Secret Service in Greece* (London, Hutchinson, 1931). Constantinist in tendency.

⁵ Deville, G., *L'Entente, la Grèce et la Bulgarie* (Paris, s.d.).

⁶ Conte Alessandro di Bosdari, *Delle guerre Balcaniche, della Grande Guerra, &c.* (Milano, Mondadori, 1927).

⁷ These have not been published in book form, but a translation appeared in the Athenian paper *Πρότα* (in 1928).

On the Greek (Venizelist) side we have, first, M. Venizelos's own speeches in the Chamber in 1915, 1916 and 1917¹ and some works of minor importance, such as that of Major G. Melas,² formerly Private Secretary to King Constantine, who resigned his post in 1916 in order to join the Venizelist Revolutionary army at Salonica.

On the other (Constantinist) side we have, first, the accounts published by members of the Greek Royal family: by Prince Nicholas³ (brother of King Constantine) and Prince Andrew⁴ (another brother who was court-martialled by the Greek Revolutionary Government of 1922 for alleged incapacity during the operations in Asia Minor in 1921 and was only saved by the intervention of the British Government); secondly, by three of King Constantine's principal advisers: General Metaxas⁵ (Acting Chief of the Greek General Staff in January 1915, when the question of Greek intervention in the war was first mooted); of General X. Stratigos,⁶ who was Chief of the General Staff during the operations in Anatolia in 1921; and of General Dousmanis,⁷ Chief of the General Staff during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and also, for a short interval, in 1921.

Secondly, we have the works of numerous propagandists and official apologists on both sides, published during or after

¹ *Greece in her true light as expounded by E. K. Venizelos* (translated by Xanthaki and Sakellarios (New York, 1916)); and *'Αγορεύσεις 'Ελ.Βενιζέλου* ('Αθήναι, Μαντζεβελάκης, 1917).

² G. Melas, *Ex-King Constantine and the War* (Hutchinson, London, 1920).

³ *Political Memories 1914-1917*, by Prince Nicholas of Greece (Hutchinson, 1928).

⁴ *Δορύλαιον-Σαγγάριος 1921*, by Prince Andrew of Greece (Imprimerie 'Agon', Paris, 1928).

⁵ Memoranda submitted by Colonel Metaxas to M. Venizelos in January 1915, published in the Athens *Πολιτεία* of 1-4 July 1924, and *'Η 'Ιστορία τοῦ 'Εθνικοῦ διχασμοῦ* (Athens, 1935).

⁶ *Ε. Στρατηγού, 'Η 'Ελλάς ἐν Μικρᾷ 'Ασίᾳ* (Athens, S. Christou, 1925).

⁷ *Β. Δούσμανη, 'Η ἐσωτερικὴ ὄψις τῆς Μικρασιατικῆς ἐμπλοκῆς* (Athens, Pyrsos, 1928).

the war : of D. Vaka (Mrs. Kenneth Brown)¹ for the Venizelists ; of Paxton Hibben,² G. Abbott³ and S. Cosmin⁴ for the Constantinists. All these, by their sins both of commission and omission, are for the most part unreliable and give a one-sided and, to a great extent, distorted version of events.

Under the same head of propagandist literature should also be classed all the newspaper articles published in the Greek and foreign press during the period in question, for the press, under the combined influence of the censorship and national or party interests, either suppressed or distorted all the facts which happened to be unfavourable to their own particular point of view.

Thirdly, we have the references to allied policy in Greece during the war in the various memoirs published subsequent to the war by allied statesmen, generals, &c., such as those of Viscount Grey of Fallodon,⁵ Mr. Asquith,⁶ Mr. Winston Churchill,⁷ M. Poincaré,⁸ Count Sforza,⁹ Field-Marshal Sir H. Wilson,¹⁰ Count Sazonov,¹¹ and others. These, of course, are

¹ Demetra Vaka (Mrs. Kenneth Brown), *Les intrigues Germaniques en Grèce* (Paris, Plon, 1918).

² Paxton Hibben, *Constantine I and the Greek People* (New York, The Century Co., 1920).

³ G. Abbott, *Greece and the Allies (1914-22)* (London, Methuen, 1922).

⁴ S. Cosmin, *Diplomatie et Presse dans l'Affaire Grecque (1914-16)* (Paris, 1921).

⁵ Viscount Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916* (London, 1925).

⁶ H. Asquith, *The Genesis of the War* (London, Cassell, 1933).

⁷ Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis—The Aftermath* (London, Butterworth, 1929).

⁸ R. Poincaré, *Au Service de la France. IX. L'Année Trouble 1917*, and articles in *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1920-1.

⁹ Conte Carlo Sforza, *Les Bâtisseurs de l'Europe* (Paris, Gallimard, 1931).

¹⁰ *Diaries of Field-Marshal Sir H. Wilson*, published by Major-General Callwell (London, Cassell, 1927).

¹¹ S. Sazonov, *Les Années Fatales* (Payot, 1927).

not entirely impartial, in so far as the authors aim at defending or interpreting their own conduct or that of their Government, but they possess, for all that, an intrinsic value, as indicating the motives and points of view of the principal actors on the European political stage who helped to shape the course of events at the time.

Fourthly, there are the series of publications of official documents bearing on the Greek question issued by the Greek and other Governments, such as the Greek White Book on the events of 1913-17, published by M. Venizelos's Government in 1920,¹ the German State Documents on the origin of the war, edited by the Socialist Deputy Kautsky,² and the Russian State Papers dealing with the Secret Treaties of 1915-17 published by the Soviet Government in 1919.³ The Greek White Book is not an unimpeachable source, as the text of the documents has been partially mutilated for reasons of political expediency.

The above form the raw material of history, but they are not history in themselves.

Fifthly, we have what purport to be objective historical surveys, written subsequent to the war, in which use has been made of all the hitherto published material as well as of the Greek and other Foreign Office Archives.

Of these the principal are : In Greek : G. Ventiris, *Greece in 1910-20* (published in 1931), written from the Venizelist point of view ; in French : A. Frangoulis, *La Grèce et la Crise Mondiale* (published in 1926), written from the anti-Venizelist point of view ; E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, *Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce Contemporaine de 1821 jusqu'à nos jours* (published in 1926) ; in English : Professor Mowat's *History of European Diplomacy* (vol. 3) ; and, in Italian : M. Caracciolo, *L'intervento della Grecia nella guerra mondiale* (published in 1925).

¹ *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de Grèce—Livre blanc* (Athens), 1917 (1st edit.), 1920 (2nd edit.).

² *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, published by Comte Mougelas and Dr. W. Schirking (Charlottenburg, 1919).

³ *Documents publiés par les Bolchéviks* (Paris, Bossard, 1919).

The books of Professor Driault and Professor Mowat are the work of professional historians who have had no personal connexion, direct or indirect, with the events with which they deal. Consequently, their judgement may be accepted as impartial.

Professor Driault, a distinguished member of the French Educational Service, was commissioned by M. Venizelos's Government in 1920 to write the diplomatic history of Greece. His mission was undertaken with the approval of the Quai d'Orsay and he had access to both the Greek and French Foreign Office records. In his conclusions, he is by no means sparing in criticism of the policy pursued by his own country in the Near East during the years 1915-22 and judges with considerable severity the policy of the Entente towards Greece. It is regrettable that the Greek Government of 1925 should have attempted, on ill-judged grounds of political expediency, to prevent the publication of Driault's fifth volume, which deals with contemporary events (1908-23), apparently because the author found himself unable fully to endorse what had been up till then the accepted version of the events of 1915-22 and of the attitude of King Constantine in the question of Greek intervention, which Driault is inclined to judge somewhat leniently.¹

Of the two Greek works quoted above, that of Ventiris, although particularly illuminating on the events of the years 1910-16, is deficient in objectivity when dealing with the Anatolian expedition, his judgement being warped by an excess of sentimental nationalism. Frangoulis makes a much more critical use of the diplomatic documents concerning the expedition.

In spite of all this wealth of material, both original and second-hand, a clear and concise picture of the causes which

¹ For the strange story of this intrigue see Driault, *Le Roi Constantin* (Post-scriptum). Driault quotes a letter from the eminent Greek jurist and diplomat, M. N. Politis, whose Ententophil and Venizelist sympathies are above suspicion, testifying to the impartiality of his narrative.

led up to Greece's Anatolian expedition has up to now been lacking. Works like those of Driault, Ventiris and Frangoulis, although useful for clearing the ground and providing the necessary documentary foundation, are voluminous and contain such a mass of detail that one cannot see the wood for the trees.

In order to make the main facts and conclusions stand out, I have intentionally avoided repeating in the text all the detailed documentary evidence which has already been placed at the disposal of the public in previously published works. I refer to them where necessary, in order that the reader may verify the original sources if he so desires, and I give a few essential quotations.

Below will be found the principal bibliography, classified according to countries, an arrangement which, in the present case, will, I think, be helpful to the reader who wishes to examine the policy of any particular country. For similar reasons, I have dealt in separate sections with the responsibility of each one of the Great Powers, at the expense of a certain amount of inevitable repetition.

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APPENDIX II

LIST OF PRINCIPAL DATES

(I) THE BALKAN CRISIS (1911-14)

- 1911, 29 Sept. Italo-Turkish War begins
1912, 21 Apr. Italy occupies Dodecanese
15 Oct. Treaty of Ouchy (between Italy and Turkey)
18 Oct. First Balkan War begins
1913, 30 May Treaty of London (between Balkan Allies
and Turkey)
1 June GRECO-SERB TREATY OF ALLIANCE
29 June Second Balkan War begins
1 Aug. Decision of Conference of London *re* cession
of Aegean Islands to Greece
10 Aug. TREATY OF BUCHAREST (between Balkan Allies
and Bulgaria)
29 Sept. Treaty of Constantinople (between Bulgaria
and Turkey)
15 Nov. TREATY OF ATHENS (between Greece and
Turkey)
15 Nov. Turco-Bulgar Convention for Exchange of
Populations
17 Dec. Protocol of Florence, fixing frontiers of
Albania
1914, 25 May First Greco-Turkish Agreement *re* exchange
of populations
30 May Protocol of Corfu *re* Autonomy of N. Epirus

(II) THE EUROPEAN WAR

(a) *The Declarations of War*

- 1914, 28 June Murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at
Serajevo

- 1914, 28 July Austria declares war on Serbia
 1 Aug. Germany declares war on Russia
 3 Aug. Germany declares war on France
 4 Aug. Great Britain declares war on Germany
 29 Oct. Turkey begins hostilities with Russia
 1915, 23 May Italy declares war on Austria
 11 Oct. Bulgaria attacks Serbia
 1916, 26 Aug. Roumania declares war on Central Powers
 27 Nov. Greek Salonica Government declares war on Bulgaria and Germany
 1917, 14 Mar. Russian Revolution breaks out
 2 Apr. U.S.A. declare war on Germany
 30 June Greece declares war on Central Powers
 1918, 18 Dec. Ukraine expedition

(b) *Events in Greece (1915-17)*

- 1915, 24 Jan. Sir E. Grey offers Greece concessions in Asia Minor
 24 Jan. First Memorandum of Venizelos to King proposing cession of Cavalla-Drama to Bulgaria
 30 Jan. Second Memorandum on same subject
 30 Jan. Memorandum of Colonel Metaxas against Greek participation Dardanelles expedition
 19 Feb. First bombardment Dardanelles
 2 Mar. Third Memorandum of Venizelos to King
 6 Mar. Venizelos resigns over Dardanelles expedition
 11 Mar. Allies occupy Lemnos
 31 May General Election. Victory of Venizelist party
 1 Oct. Entente land troops at Salonica
 5 Oct. Second Disagreement of King Constantine and Venizelos over Greek intervention in War. Venizelos resigns. Zaimis Government
 15 Oct. Great Britain offers Greece Cyprus
 29 Oct. King dissolves Chamber

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- 1916, 10 Jan. Allies occupy Corfu
- 27 May Surrender of Fort Ruppel to Germano-Bulgars
- 26 Aug. Roumania enters the war
- 30 Aug. Outbreak Salonica Revolutionary Movement
- 29 Sept. Venizelos leaves Athens for Salonica
- 1917, 14 June Allies dethrone King Constantine
- 27 June Venizelos returns to Athens

(c) *The Secret Treaties (1915-17)*

- 1915, 4 Mar. Treaty of London between Great Britain, France and Russia, ceding to Russia Constantinople, the Dardanelles, Thrace as far as the Aenos-Midia line and Sandjak of Ismidt as far as Sakkaria river
- 26 Apr. Treaty of London between Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy, ceding to Italy Vallona, the Dodecanese and Adalia with hinterland
- 1916, 16 May Anglo-French agreement *re* Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Anatolia
- 18 Aug. Treaty between Allies and Roumania, ceding to latter Transylvania and Bukovina
- 1917, — Jan. Treaty between Russia, Great Britain and France, confirming Treaty of 4 March 1915 and ceding to Russia vilayets of Trebizond, Erzeroum, Van and Bitlis; to France Syria and vilayet of Adana; to Great Britain Mesopotamia and Palestine
- 19 Apr. Treaty of St. Jean-de-Maurienne between Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy, extending Italy's zone of influence to Smyrna
- 18 Aug. Agreement between Great Britain, France and Italy *re* Anatolia

(d) Period of the Peace Treaties (1918-23)

- 1918, 3 Mar. Treaty of Brest-Litvosk between Central Powers and Soviets
 7 May Treaty of Bucharest between Central Powers and Roumania
 29 Sept. Armistice with Bulgaria
 30 Oct. Armistice of Mudros with Turkey
 1919, 28 June Treaty of Versailles
 20 Sept. Treaty of St. Germain
 18 Oct. Greece occupies Western Thrace
 30 Dec. Memorandum of Venizelos to Peace Conference
 15 May Greeks land at Smyrna
 19 May Mustafa Kemal lands at Samsoun
 29 July Venizelos-Tittoni Agreement *re* Dodecanese
 27 Nov. Treaty of Neuilly
 1920, 20 July Greeks occupy Eastern Thrace
 10 Aug. Treaty of Sèvres
 10 Aug. Greco-Italian Convention of Sèvres *re* Dodecanese
 1921, 16 Mar. Treaty of Moscow between Turkey and Soviets
 30 Oct. Franco-Turkish Agreement of Angora
 1922, 26 Aug. Turks defeat Greeks in Asia Minor
 9 Sept. Turks reoccupy Smyrna
 29 Sept. Armistice of Mudania
 1923, 30 Jan. Greco-Turkish Convention for Exchange of Populations
 24 July Treaty of Lausanne between Allies, Greece and Turkey

(e) Events in the Dardanelles Expedition

- 1914, 3 Nov. First Naval bombardment of outer forts
 25 Nov. Mr. Churchill proposes expedition to War Council
 1915, 28 Jan. Expedition approved by British Cabinet
 19 Feb. Second Naval bombardment of outer forts

- 1915, 25 Feb. Third Naval bombardment of outer forts
 11 Mar. Allies occupy Lemnos
 18 Mar. Disastrous attempt to force the Narrows
 28 Apr. Landing at Seddulbahr and Koumkaleh
 1916, 8 Jan. Evacuation of Dardanelles

(f) *The Anatolian War*

- 1919, 15 May Greeks land at Smyrna
 19 May Mustafa Kemal lands at Samsoun
 19 July Congress of Pontine Greeks at Batoum
 23 July Congress of Erzeroum
 13 Sept. Congress of Sivas
 — Sept. French occupy Cilicia
 1920, 28 Jan. Turkish National Pact published
 16 Mar. Allies deport Nationalist leaders to Malta
 23 Apr. Grand National Assembly meets at Angora
 22 June First Greek offensive. Greeks occupy Brusa
 and Panderma
 7 July Turkish ultimatum to Armenia
 20 July Greeks occupy Eastern Thrace
 10 Aug. *Treaty of Sèvres signed*
 24 Aug. First Turco-Soviet Agreement
 3 Oct. Reactionary rebellion at Konia
 25 Oct. Second Greek offensive. Capture of Yeni-
 Shehir and Inegiol
 30 Oct. Turks capture Kars
 2 Dec. Treaty of Gumru (Turkey and Armenia)
 29 Dec. Rebellion of Tcherkes Edhem
 1921, 6 Jan. Third Greek offensive. First Turkish vic-
 tory of In Eunu
 22 Jan. Defeat of rebel Tcherkes Edhem
 23 Feb. Turkey occupies Ardahan and Batoum
 25 Feb. Kemalists attend Conference of London
 16 Mar. Treaty of Moscow (Turkey and Soviets)
 23 Mar. Fourth Greek offensive. Second Turkish
 victory of In Eunu
 10 July Fifth Greek offensive
 19 July Greeks occupy Eski Shehir

- 1921, 23 Aug. Sakkaria offensive begins
 13 Sept. Sakkaria offensive ends
 30 Oct. Franco-Turkish Agreement of Angora
 1922, 26 Aug. Final Turkish offensive begins. Touloum
 Bunar
 9 Sept. Turks reoccupy Smyrna
 29 Sept. Conference of Mudania
 1 Nov. Sultanate abolished
 21 Nov. Lausanne Conference begins
 1923, 24 July Treaty of Lausanne signed
 13 Oct. Angora made capital
 28 Oct. Proclamation of Turkish Republic
 1924, 3 Mar. Caliphate abolished

(g) *Political Events in Greece (1920-4)*

- 1920, 25 Oct. Death of King Alexander
 14 Nov. General Election. Defeat of Venizelos
 20 Nov. Plebiscite
 6 Dec. Return of King Constantine
 1922, 23 Sept. Military revolution at Mytilene
 27 Sept. Second abdication of King Constantine
 28 Nov. Execution of Five Ministers and General
 Hadjanestis
 1923, 11 Jan. Death of Constantine
 21 Oct. Gargalides' counter-revolutionary movement
 19 Dec. Expulsion of King George II
 1924, 4 Jan. Return of Venizelos
 10 Mar. Venizelos again leaves Greece
 25 Mar. Proclamation of the Republic

APPENDIX III

TABLE SHOWING THE LENGTH OF THE LAND-FRONTIERS OF GREECE IN
1913 AND 1920, AFTER THE TREATIES OF BUCHAREST AND SÈVRES
RESPECTIVELY

(Greek General Staff figures)

Frontier	1913 (kilometres)	1920 (kilometres)
Greco-Albanian	270	270
Greco-Serbian	225	245 ²
Greco-Bulgarian	296 ¹	705 ³
Greco-Turkish (Europe) .	—	90 ⁴
Greco-Turkish (Asia) . .	—	440
Total	791	1,750

¹ Northern 228, Eastern 68.

² Increased owing to cession of Strumnitza district to Yugoslavia.

³ Macedonia and Western Thrace 486, Eastern Thrace 219.

⁴ Tchataldja lines.

APPENDIX IV

TABLE SHOWING THE (THEORETICAL) STRENGTH OF THE MOBILIZABLE
POPULATION OF GREECE IN 1913 AND 1920, AFTER THE TREATIES
OF BUCHAREST AND SEVRES RESPECTIVELY

	1913	1920
Total population . . .	4,820,000	6,473,000
Deduct : Moslems ¹ . .	402,000	1,101,000
Foreign subjects .	50,000	73,000
	<u>452,000</u>	<u>1,174,000</u>
	4,368,000	5,299,000
Theoretically mobilizable : 8 per cent (Army and Navy) . . .	349,440	423,920
Actually serving ² . . .		306,000

¹ The Moslems were not legally exempt from military service by law, but, in practice, they were not called to the Colours.

² Army only.

APPENDIX V

TABLE SHOWING THE AREA AND POPULATION OF GREECE AND THE
TERRITORY ACQUIRED BY THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST (1913) AND
SÈVRES (1920)

(figures to nearest thousand)

	Area (square kilo- metres)	Population (Census of 1920)			
		Greeks	Moslems ³	Others ⁴	Total
Territory before the Balkan wars : Old Greece ¹ . .	65,000	2,782,000	3,000	44,000	2,829,000
Territories acquired in 1913 :					
Macedonia . . .	34,000	518,000	348,000	213,000	1,079,000
Epirus	7,000	271,000	20,000	2,000	293,000
Crete	8,000	321,000	23,000	3,000	347,000
Aegean Islands ²	4,000	247,000	8,000	5,000	260,000
Territories acquired in 1920 :					
Western Thrace	8,000	69,000	100,000	40,000	209,000
Eastern Thrace .	21,000	188,000	300,000	27,000	515,000
Smyrna Enclave	20,000	550,000	299,000	92,000	941,000
Total	167,000	4,946,000	1,101,000	426,000	6,473,000

¹ Peloponnese, Continental Greece, Euboea, Thessaly and Arta, Ionian Islands, Cyclades.

² Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, Icaria.

³ Turks, Albanians, Gypsies, Pomaks.

⁴ Foreign subjects, Bulgars, Armenians, Spanish Jews, &c.

PROPORTION TO TOTAL POPULATION

	Per cent.
Greeks	76
Moslems	17
Others	7

APPENDIX VI

TABLE SHOWING THE POPULATION OF ARMENIA, AS CLAIMED BY THE
ARMENIAN DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE, ACCORDING
TO NATIONALITIES, IN 1912

	Armen- ians	Greeks and other Christians	Moslems ⁵	Miscel- laneous ⁶	Total
1. Vilayet of Trebi- zond ¹	60,000	140,000	400,000	—	600,000
2. Six Eastern Vilay- ets ²	1,018,000	165,000	1,178,000	254,000	2,615,000
3. Sandjak of Kaisarié	50,000	20,000	100,000	—	170,000
4. Vilayet of Adana ³ } ⁴ . .	407,000	60,000	197,000	60,000	724,000
5. Sandjak of Marash }					
Total	1,535,000	385,000	1,875,000	314,000	4,109,000

¹ Less the Sandjak of Djanik .

² Vilayets of Erzeroum, Van (less the Sandjak of Hakkîari), Bitlis, Diarbekir (less the Sandjak of Mardin), Mamouret-el-Aziz and Sivas (less the Sandjak of Amassia and Tokat).

³ Less the Sandjak of Itch-Ili.

⁴ Cilicia.

⁵ Turks, Kurds, Lazes, Circassians, &c.

⁶ Foreign subjects, Yezidis, &c.

APPENDIX VII

TABLE SHOWING THE POPULATION OF ANATOLIA IN 1912 ACCORDING TO NATIONALITIES

(The figures for Regions 1-4 are taken from Maccas, *L'Hellenisme d'Asie Mineure* (pp. 78-87), 5 from the memorandum of the Armenian Delegation to the Peace Conference and 6 from Souliotis, *The Inhabitants of Asia Minor* (p. 50).)

Regions	Greeks	Armenians	Moslems ⁷	Miscellaneous ⁸	Total
1. Western Anatolia ¹ . . .	773,756	23,914	1,187,694	82,922	2,068,286
2. Region of the Straits ² . . .	180,421	86,531	380,132	31,228	678,312
3. Northern Anatolia ³ . . .	378,452	53,829	1,896,301	2,087	2,330,669
4. Central and Southern Anatolia ⁴ .	359,745	361,633	3,442,535	30,626	4,194,539
5. Eastern vilayets ⁵ . .	129,537	935,884	1,385,286	314,000	2,764,707
6. Adana ⁶ . . .	66,200	97,450	102,000	16,050	281,700
Total . . .	1,888,111	1,559,241	8,393,948	476,913	12,318,213

¹ Vilayet of Aidin and Sandjak of Balikesser (vil. Brusa) (Aegean islands not included).

² Caza of Scutari (vil. Constantinople), Sandjaks of Ismidt and Dardanelles.

³ Vilayets of Castamoni and Trebizond.

⁴ Vilayets of Brusa (less Sandjak of Balikesser), Angora, Konia and Sivas.

⁵ Vilayets of Erzeroum, Bitlis, Van, Diarbekir and Mamouret-el-Aziz (less the Sandjaks of Hakkari and Mardin; for which no figures are available).

⁶ Vilayet of Adana.

⁷ Turks, Kurds, Lazes, Circassians, &c.

⁸ Jews, foreign subjects, Levantines, Nestorians, &c.

APPENDIX VIII

TABLE SHOWING THE POPULATION OF THE SMYRNA ENCLAVE CEDED TO GREECE BY THE TREATY OF SÈVRES, ACCORDING TO NATIONALITIES

(Taken from Maccas, *L'Hellénisme de l'Asie Mineure* (pp. 78-9), who bases his figures on the Turkish Census of 1912. M. Venizelos used these figures in his memorandum to the Peace Conference of 30 December 1918).

Cazas	Greeks	Armenians	Moslems ¹	Miscellaneous ²	Total
Sandjak of Balikesser :					
Aivali	46,130	—	89	—	46,219
Sandjak of Smyrna :					
Smyrna	243,879	7,628	96,250	68,737	416,494
Vourla	40,670	—	4,445	275	45,390
Tchesmé	50,709	—	7,780	550	59,039
Karabounar	15,510	—	8,000	—	23,510
Sivri-Hissar	11,667	—	9,800	140	21,607
Phocaea	19,514	350	2,100	350	22,314
Koush-Adasi	11,052	59	8,775	340	20,226
Mainemen	11,216	508	10,309	1,600	23,633
Baindir	6,850	150	9,300	25	16,325
Tiré	5,000	—	20,500	310	25,810
Eudemish	7,700	1,200	19,500	200	28,600
Bergam	25,277	1,500	22,735	1,586	51,098
Sandjak of Magnissa :					
Magnissa	38,926	2,000	37,900	1,600	80,426
Akhissar	9,586	882	14,500	—	24,968
Cassaba	6,090	1,000	26,900	600	34,590
Total	549,776	15,277	298,883	76,313	940,249

¹ Turks, Circassians, Lazes, Albanians, Kizilbashis, &c.

² Foreign subjects, Jews, Bulgars.

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