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SOME FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF IMAM CHAZZALI'S THOUGHT

By

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OPINIONS

Dr. De Lacy O'Leary, D.D., Bristol University, England : "Please accept my very sincere thanks for the copy of your essay on the "Psychological Basis of Imam Ghazzali's Religious Philosophy" which I have read with the greatest interest and which I regard as *serious contribution to the study of one of the greatest Muslim philosophers. I can find no criticism to make. Your subject is very convincingly and lucidly set forth. It will, I hope, be followed by further studies I shall be deeply grateful if you would be kind enough to put me in touch with any other studies you may publish on this or kindred topics.*"

Prof Dr. F. Krenkow, Ph.D, Cambridge, England : "Pray accept my sincere thanks for your article on the "Psychological Basis of the Imam Ghazzali's Religious Philosophy" which *I have read with the greatest interest and delight* You have succeeded in giving a *lucid exposition* based principally upon the utterances in his "Ihya" and I hope you will pursue your researches into other works and give us similar expositions.....

"*I congratulate you upon the first work of yours I have seen and I should very much like if you could give a similar clear account of the Philosophy of Farabi because the texts and the translations (into German) by Dietrich tzi leave very much to be desired and I found the Hyderabad editions to be textually better.*"

"With kindest regards and in the hope of hearing from you again".

Prof. Mohammad Shafi, M A. (Cantab),
Head of the Arabic Department, University of
the Punjab: Thanks for the reprint of your article
on the "Psychological Basis of Imam Ghazzali's Philosophy". I have read it with the greatest interest. You
*have stated the views of the Imam in a very successful
manner, putting them in Modern scientific language easily
intelligible to the student of Psychology. I congratulate
you on the performance*

Dr Wahid Muzia, M A., Ph D., Reader
and Head of the Arabic Department and
Oriental Studies, Lucknow University: "I was
glad to get *excellent* tract. "The Psychological Basis of
Ghazzali's Religious Philosophy" a few days ago. I
read through it with keen interest and was struck by
its *lucid style and good arrangement*. I am sure *you have
succeeded very well in interpreting correctly and clearly* the
rather baffling theories of that great scholar. Let us
hope this small work would form the nucleus for a wider
and deeper study of not only Ghazzali but of Islamic
Philosophy in general. My warmest wishes for this
work and the many more that I am confident will
follow it."

Dr Sir Mohammad Iqbal, Kt, M A., Ph.D.,
LL.D., Barr-at Law, Lahore (India): "Thank you
so much for the booklet you have sent me. *It is a very
interesting account of Ghazzali's Ethical teaching. It is*

true that the thinker needs a coherent universe of thought and, is, therefore, driven to build systems of Ethics and of Metaphysics. Experience, however, shows that the average man needs a discipline—individually as well as collectively—in his own interest as well in the interests of the group to which he belongs he should not question the authority of this discipline. This I think is the secret of Islam as a people-building force.

“*Your thesis is inspiring. I do hope you will do further research work in the same field.*”

“*...Papers on Ghazzali and Shahabuddin Maqtul. Both are interesting as chapters in the History of Muslim Thought.*”

Professor R. A. Nicholson, Cambridge.

“.....You have given a clear and well arranged analysis which shall be useful as an introduction to the subject. I have read it with pleasure and interest.”

Professor Dr. Storcy, Professor of Arabic
Cambridge.

“.....an exposition of al-Ghazzali's views on the problem of the Freedom of the will and Suhrawardi Maqtul's philosophical position according to the works of his youth. I am very glad to see studies of this kind emanating from Aligarh.”

Dr. Zakir Husain, M.A, Ph D., Principal
Jamia, Delhi :

آپ نے ان قیمتی مقالوں کا ایک ایک نسخہ مجھے بھیجا ان پر رائے دینے کا اہل نہیں ہوں - لیکن ایک جاہل شخص بتی اس انہماک اور محنت کی تعریف تو کر سکتا ہے جو آپ کی خصوصیت امتیازی ہے - فلسفہ اسلام سے آپ کا شغف واقعی قابل داد ہے اور اُمید ہے کہ ملت کے تخیلات ذہنی کو پھر اس کی شعوری زندگی کا جزو بنانے میں آپ جیسے اہل علم کی مساعی کامیاب ہونگی۔

The Idea of Love in the Philosophy of Al-Ghazzali :—
آپ نے اپنا مقالہ ارسال فرمایا.....میں نے اس مقالہ سے کچھ سیکھا ہے اسلئے دل سے شکر گزار ہوں۔

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INTRODUCTION

The book in hand comprises of a number of research papers read before different sessions of the All India Philosophical Congress and in other learned societies and published in well known journals of the country. They have been written under a well-conceived scheme, each paper forming one major idea constituting the whole; the apparent independence of the chapters is only superficial and arbitrary, its necessity being occasioned by the long duration of time taken to cover the entire thesis of the book and the academic engagements of the writer

This small work, however, undertakes to discuss the most urgent and basic problem of human life, the problem of the physical, mental and spiritual capacities and limitations of man, on the right or wrong evaluation of which hangs the entire fabric of social organisation, and on the proper understanding of which depends the moral health and happiness of humanity

This theme has been the object of serious thinking and deep speculation with all the great leaders of human thought, for a clear decision on it is but essential for any one who tries to build a philosophical system. In the present work an attempt has been made to present the viewpoint of Gazzali on the subject. Ghazzali has examined the whole field resolutely and intelligently and reached a definite conclusion. He believes that man has been fully endowed with all the

powers and virtues necessary to lead him to the perfection of the self and to the ultimate reality. But more often than not these powers come into conflict with each other and a struggle ensues between the lower faculty and the higher faculty, that is, between appetite and self-assertion on one hand and reason on the other. The success of the lower faculty brings man down to the level of the brute, while the triumph of the higher faculty raises him high to the status of angels. It is the doing and undoing of man himself which makes or mars his career in this world as well as in the world hereafter. By nature he is not handicapped but helped and equipped to arrive at the goal for which he is destined

Another function of this little contribution is to remove some very important objections, often raised against the philosophical writings of Ghazzali, chiefly those brought against him by the late Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal. He has declared that Ghazzali was ignorant of the fact that thought and intuition are organically related, that the finitude of thought is imposed upon it by its own nature, that thought and intuition rejuvenate each other, that intuition is only a higher form of intellect, etc. The following pages will sufficiently reveal that these objections do not hold at all; Ghazzali, in fact, holds the very views of the ignorance of which he has been charged. Further, Dr. Iqbal says that Ghazzali was unaware of the dynamic nature and internal infinitude of thought. But the fact is that Ghazzali was not unaware, he did say that thought is free and dynamic and it can

approach the infinite internally; he however differed in the conception of the approach and asserted that thought is capable of reaching the infinite, provided the heart is completely purged of all that is un-Godly and is filled with the longing for the ultimate reality. Moreover, he said that thought can visualise only the symbolic representation of the infinite, a representation in terms of associated ideas; a physical view, in his opinion, is impossible.

Also, with due regard to the scope and the physical limitation of the book, I have tried to set forth the real position of Ghazali as a great Islamic thinker. He was the Mujaddid of his age. His mission was to shatter the hold of alien thought and culture, particularly Greek, from the minds of the Muslims. He subjected to a severe test the existing sects and systems and pointed out their inconsistencies and contradictions, and presented Islam in its real glory and native glamour.

In the end he accepted Sufism as the only tolerable form corresponding to real Islam. But he purged sufiism, in theory and practice both, of the un-Islamic elements, and effected a famous compromise between the formalists, who adhered to the letter of the law, and the esoterics, who emphasised the meaning of the law.

He achieved a great triumph in freeing Islam from the foreign encrustations. His own interpretation was so impressive and logical, so much in keeping with the spirit of Islam that he not only dominated his own times as an overtowering personality, but left a formi-

dable and most shining mark on the succeeding generations; and it would be no exaggeration to say that after him there has not appeared another genius who has so much influenced and shaped the course of Islamic thinking and the daily code of life of a Muslim.

In the end it will be worth while to point out that many of the misunderstandings and fallacies about Ghazzali have been occasioned by the fact that his philosophical system is not wholly laid down in one single work, it is scattered in thousands of pages, clothed in anecdotes, sayings, stories, aphorism, similies, metaphors and allegories. This method of treatment has been a perpetual source of error and wrong calculation with the students of Ghazzali.

Even in the preparation of this book I have taken great pains in collecting the necessary material and putting it to my advantage. In doing so I have followed my own precedent My procedure is simple : I have created problems of my own and tried to discover their solutions in the speculations and writings of Ghazzali. Thus for me it has been a searching and researching from beginning to end, and the onus of constructing the phases of Ghazzali's philosophical system has fallen on my own humble shoulders.

M. UMARUDDIN

Muslim University, Aligarh.

15th July, 1946.

AL-GHAZZALI

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HIS INNER DEVELOPMENT

I

Education and Career

AL-GHAZZALI is one of the greatest personalities in Islam, and ranks with the greatest thinkers of the world. He was the most original mind amongst Muslim philosophers. He was, according to MacDonald, "the greatest, certainly the most sympathetic figure in the history of Islam," and "the equal of Augustine in philosophical and theological importance." There have been many religious scholars in Islam and other religions; but the peculiarity of Ghazzali is that his life and work are so intimately connected that it is difficult to separate the two. "Everything that he thought and wrote came with the weight and reality of personal experience." A study of his inner development is, therefore, of interest and value to thinkers and religious devotees alike. In this brief sketch it is proposed to describe his internal development in his pursuit of truth.

Fortunately, Al-Ghazzali has himself revealed his mind in a book called *al-Munqidh min ad-Dalal*—"Deliverer from Error"—which is an autobiographical account of his spiritual development. It is a book of

philosophical confessions and an account of his voyage through the different philosophical systems of his time. It has been compared with the *Confessions* of St. Augustine and with Newman's *Grammar of Assent* in intellectual subtleties ; and with Bunyan's *Grace Abounding* in its puritanical sense. This little book, in short, is one of the greatest genuine confessions of a seeker after truth.

Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazzali, surnamed Hujjat-ul-Islam, i.e., ' the Proof of Islam,' was born in 1059 A.D at Tus in Khurasan. Having studied for some time with a pious Sufi, and at a school in his native town, he went to Jurjan to study with Abu Nasr al-Isma'ili. He then went to Naishabur to study with the well known divine Imam-ul-Haramain, who taught at the Nizamiyyah Academy there. He soon became the most distinguished of his pupils and was called by him "an ocean of learning,"¹ and was chosen as assistant to the Imam, with whom he remained till the latter's death in 1085 A.D His studies were vast and wide, comprising theology, *fiqh*, sciences philosophy, dialectics, logic and the doctrines of the Sufis. Even during the life-time of Imam-ul-Haramain, Al-Ghazzali had become famous for his learning. When after the death of his teacher, he left Naishabur at the age of 28 years, he had no equal among the learned in the Muslim world. He went to the court of the great patron of learning, the famous Nizamul-Mulk Tusi, who appointed him the president of

(۱) بحر مغدق lit. 'A plenteous ocean'

the Nizamiyyah Academy, the most coveted of all honours in the learned world and an honour which had not before been conferred on any one else at so early an age. At this point when Al-Ghazzali had attained all that a scholar could aspire to in the matter of worldly success—when he had become famous as a scholar and wielded an influence equal to that of the highest official of the Government, his advice being sought on both religious and political matters, and his position thoroughly established—a great change took place in him. He became a prey to spiritual unrest so much so that his health failed: he lost all appetite, and could hardly utter a word. His physicians despaired, declaring that his trouble was mental. At last he left Baghdad for Syria, giving up all his fortune. While at Damascus he performed religious exercises for days and days continuously, though not altogether giving up his literary activities. One day Al-Ghazzali, hearing a professor at an academy saying in the course of his lecture, “Al-Ghazzali says so and so,” and fearing lest his vanity be flattered, fled from Damascus, and reached Jerusalem, where he shut himself up in the Dome of the Rock, and underwent most rigorous religious exercises. From Damascus he went on pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, where he stayed for a long time. During these travels he took three vows: first, that he would never visit the court of a king; second, that he would never accept any help from a king; third, that he would never take part in disputations (*munasara*).

After wandering in search of truth for about ten

years, Al-Ghazzali returned to his home and devoted himself to teaching and religious exercises. But, looking around, when he found that philosophy had taken hold of men's minds, and that the spread of irreligious doctrines and the increasing religious indifference of the masses had shaken the very foundations of religion, he was filled with profound grief and immediately made up his mind to stem the tide of this evil with the whole force of his personality and learning. When he was thinking of coming out of his retreat, he was requested to accept the presidentship of the Nizamiyyah Academy at Naishabur. After teaching at the Academy for some time he, however, retired to Tus. A request by the Caliph at the instance of the learned and the people of Baghdad was sent to Al-Ghazzali, imploring him to take over the charge of the Nizamiyyah Academy at Baghdad once more, but he chose to remain at Tus, where he founded a madrasah at which he taught both *fiqh* and mystic lore till his death in 1111 A.D.

II

His Times

In order to fully appreciate and understand the significance of the work and the internal development of Al-Ghazzali, it is desirable to have a rapid glance over the intellectual and religious conditions of the age in which he lived. In as much as the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet laid a special stress on the importance of knowledge, the Muslims from the earliest times regarded it as their duty to seek knowledge wherever

they went in course of their conquests. يرفع الله الذين امنوا منكم والذين اوتوا لعلم درجات "God elevates those of you who believe and those to whom knowledge is given," says the Quran طلب العلم فريضة علي كل مسلم و مسلمة "To seek knowledge is a duty for every Muslim, male and female", لموت قبيلة ايسر من "The loss of a whole tribe is easier to bear than the loss of a scholar," said the Holy Prophet. So when the Muslims, imbued with these ideas, came out from Arabia into Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Persia, which were seats of culture from ancient times, they made the study of the sciences and arts of the peoples of those countries their special concern.

In Persia the Muslims came in contact with Zoroastrian dualism of Ormuzd and Ahriman, i.e., Light and Darkness, and with the Greek Philosophy as interpreted by the Christian settlers in Persia; in Syria with Christian and Jewish religions and mysticisms and Greek Philosophy as interpreted by the Syrian Christians and the Jews; in Egypt with Egyptian lore and with neo-Platonism; while in Iraq they found the home of a number of creeds and religions.

The influence of those cultures, however, was not appreciably felt by Islam till the rise of the Abbasides. It was especially in the reign of Al-Mamun and under his patronage that the Syriac versions of Greek philosophy were translated into Arabic. The Muslims applied themselves whole-heartedly to the study of Greek philosophy which by and by dominated their outlook; and

ultimately they looked upon the doctrines of Aristotle and Plato as unquestionable. Hence they believed that this philosophy and the Quran, whose truth was also unquestionable, must be compatible with one another. They argued like this : The Quran is truth, and Philosophy is truth, but truth can only be one ; therefore, the Quran and Philosophy must agree. As a result of the attempt to solve religious problems by reason, various rationalistic schools of thought came into existence, in almost all of which the influence of Greek philosophy can clearly be traced. The result of all this was to disintegrate the solidarity of Islamic culture. Naturally the theologians of Islam viewed this state of affairs with great concern, and bethought themselves of defending religion—thus arose the school of the Mu'tazilites, but they made no organized effort to do so till the time of Al-'Ashari who founded a new school of Ilm-ul-Kalam (Theology). The attempts which were made to defend religion did not, however, prove very effective ; and philosophy still held a great sway over people's minds, till the advent of Ghazzali.

III

Inner Development

In this connection I wish to point out how the inside of the man was influenced by the outward circumstances. In other words, how the yearnings of the soul of Ghazzali, strengthened or modified by the influence of other men and the requirements of his age, tended to approach the goal which we find realised in him. Briefly

put, the point is this: Ghazzali had an innate, unquenchable thirst for knowledge. Left alone, he might have become only a great philosopher or a great scientist. But he became a great divine and a mystic because of the early influences on the surroundings in which he was brought up, and the crying spiritual need of humanity in which he lived

Now Ghazzali's own father was, to quote the words of an Arab historian, "a pious dervish who did not eat but what he earned with his own hand. He very often visited those versed in religious law (*mutafaqqihun*) and was found in their company. Whenever he listened to their sermons, he wept and prayed to God to grant him a son who would be a *faqih*." "God granted," adds the same historian, "the prayer of his father and Al-Ghazzali became the most learned of all *faqih*s, and the *imam* of the people of his age"¹ Naturally the life and tenets of his father must have exerted an influence on the mind of the child. Then, as mentioned above, the 'first teacher to whom his early education was entrusted by his father was 'a pious Sufi,'² whose teachings and example must have impressed his mind consciously and unconsciously. These early influences it was, I believe, that brought Ghazzali round to Sufism, when he failed to find truth anywhere else. Again, we find that other teachers of Al-Ghazzali, such as Abu Nasr Ismaili of Jurjan, and Imam-ul-Haramain, were not only men of learning but also men of great piety. We must

1. As—Subki. 2. Ibid.

also particularly mention here the name of Al-Farmadi, with whom Ghazzali came in close contact and who was a great Sufi. From him Ghazzali learned the elements of Sufism.

Let us now follow the inner development of Ghazzali closely. Al-Ghazzali was by nature inquisitive and restless from the very beginning, and filled with an intense earnestness for truth. 'The thirst for knowledge,' he writes, "was innate in me from an early age ; it was like a second nature implanted by God." "No sooner had I emerged from boyhood than I had already broken the fetters of tradition and freed myself from hereditary beliefs ' That is, very early he broke away from *Taqlid* or simple acceptance of religious truths on hearsay; and he began to investigate theological problems before he was twenty. From the very first "the diversity in beliefs and religions, and the variety of doctrines and sects which divide men" attracted his attention, "which," he adds, "are like a deep ocean strewn with shipwrecks . . . each sect believing itself in possession of the truth and of salvation." Says Ghazzali, "From the period of adolescence, that is to say, previous to reaching my twentieth year, to the present time when I have passed my fiftieth, I have again and again plunged myself into this vast ocean; I have fearlessly sounded its depths, and, like a resolute diver I have penetrated its darkness and dared its dangers and abysses. I have interrogated the beliefs of each sect and scrutinised the mysteries of each doctrine, in order to disentangle truth from error."

"Struck with contradictions which I encountered

in endeavouring to disentangle the truth and the falsehood of these opinions, I was led to make the following reflection: The search after truth being the aim which I propose to myself, I ought in the first place to ascertain what are the foundations of certitude. In the next place, I recognised that certitude is the clear and complete knowledge of things, such knowledge as leaves no room for doubt, nor possibility of error."

The diversity of sects and doctrines therefore perplexed Al-Ghazzali; he wanted to find certitude, he wanted to find knowledge. He examined the sum-total of the knowledge that he possessed and found that none of it could stand the test. Sense-perceptions and rational principles are all that is certain. "We cannot hope to find truth," says he, "except in matters, which carry their evidence in themselves—*i.e.*, in sense-perceptions and intallible and necessary principles." "We must," he proceeds, "therefore establish these on a firm basis." He then sets himself earnestly to examine the data of sense. The result of a careful examination, however, was, says Ghazzali, "that my confidence in them was shaken." These data "are subsequently contradicted and convicted of falsity in an irrefragable manner by the verdict of reason." He then turns to what he called "necessary principles." "Since I cannot trust," he argues, "the evidence of my senses, I must rely on intellectual notions based on fundamental principles, such as 'ten is more than three,' 'affirmation and negation cannot co-exist,' etc." But his doubt of sense-perceptions puts him in doubt as to the infallibility of reason too. Who could

guarantee that he could trust to the evidence of reason more than to that of the senses? He believed in the testimony of the senses till it was contradicted by the verdict of reason "Well," says Ghazzali, 'perhaps there is above reason another judge who, if he appeared, would convict reason of false hood And if such a third arbiter is not yet apparent, it does not follow that he does not exist'

Al-Ghazzali could not find a way out of this doubt, and his experience of the phenomenon of dream deepened it the more "While asleep, you assume your dreams to be indisputably real. Once awake, you recognise them for what they are—baseless chimeras. Who can assure you, then, of the reliability of the notions, which, when awake, you derive from the senses and from reason? In relation to your present state they may appear real but is it not possible that you may enter upon another state which will bear the same relation to your present state as the latter does to your condition when asleep? In that new sphere you will recognise that the conclusions of reason are only chimeras." Al-Ghazzali suggests that state may be death itself; or it may be the state which the Sufis call ecstasy (حال), when "absorbed in themselves with sense-perception suspended, they have visions beyond the reach of intellect."

These were not mere idle reflections, they were earnest and serious misgivings. Al Ghazzali actually fell into a state of utter doubt, which lasted for about two months. During this period, he was, to quote his

own words, "a thorough-going sceptic" in all but name. It seemed as if the ground had been cut from under his feet.

Now when Al-Ghazzali seems at the edge of an abyss, with no certitude, no knowledge, it is not to reflection or argument, or to a concatenation of proofs and arguments that he owed his deliverance. He owed it, as he says, "to the light which God caused to enter his heart." Descartes started with doubt, disbelieving his senses, distrusting the knowledge gained through experience and stops at Thought, finding certainty in the proposition "Cogito ergo sum," which proposition he makes the basis of his whole system of philosophy. Al-Ghazzali, too, passed through all the stages of doubt, doubting everything, discarding all authority, disbelieving his senses. But he went further than Descartes and seriously doubted also Thought as an organ of knowledge. He finds certainty only in the will-to-believe inspired by Divine Will, *i.e.*, in the proposition "Volo, ergo sum." Another interesting point of difference between these two great thinkers is that while Descartes holds that philosophy ought to explain *religion*, prove the existence of God, etc., Al-Ghazzali, like Kant, disbelieves reason and finds it incompetent to explain religious truths.

Al-Ghazzali tells us that when he emerged from this state of doubt through the Divine light which entered his heart, and as the result of which his mind recovered its sanity and equilibrium, he resumed the primary assumptions of reason with all their stringency and force and

started a study of the beliefs of those who were engaged in the search for truth. These he divides into three main groups:—

- (1). Scholastic theologians,
- (2). Philosophers, and
- (3). Sufis.

“The truth ” he says, “must be found within these three classes of men who devote themselves to the search for it ” He, therefore, thoroughly studies them one by one. First he devotes himself to the study of the doctrines of scholastic theologians, but they fail to satisfy him, for, grant them their premises and they could argue; deny them, and they are nowhere.

Now he takes up philosophy and devotes three years to it, spending the first two in studying different systems, and the third in thinking them out and arriving at conclusions. The results of this study and reflection he gives in a remarkable book which he named *Tahafut-ul-Falasifa*, i.e., “Refutation of Philosophers.” In its preface, Al-Ghazzali himself describes the motive which actuated him to write it. It was to shatter the hold which Greek philosophy had over the minds of the people and to bring them back to the fold of Islam. For there had arisen thinkers who had discarded all religious observances for the simple reason that the wise Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle did not follow them. In the *Tahafut* Al-Ghazzali summarises Greek philosophy, reducing it to twenty propositions, and refutes them one by one. He demonstrates that the

Greek philosophers cannot prove any of the theses such as that God exists or that He is one, or even that the world has any creator at all. In it Al-Ghazzali has, says MacDonald, "smitten the philosophers hip and thigh ; he has turned, as in earlier times did Al-Ashari, their own weapons against them and had shown that with their premises and methods no certainty could be reached. In that book he goes to the extreme of intellectual scepticism, and seven hundred years before Hume he cuts the bond of causality with the edge of his dialectic and proclaims that we can know nothing of cause or effect but simply that one thing follows another". "We know," says Al-Ghazzali, "only the simultaneous, never the causally connected Causality is nothing but the will of God, which ordains that two things should ordinarily follow one another. Laws of nature never exist, they are only the expressions of a habitual fact." "Hume," writes Renan, "never said anything more than that." In pointing out the contradictions in the arguments of the philosophers, al-Ghazzali definitely anticipates Kant and shows that reason cannot find the ultimate solution of metaphysical problems.

Thus we see that both scholastic theologians and philosophers fail to satisfy al-Ghazzali. They cannot lead him to truth. He, therefore, turns to Sufism. It was characteristic of al-Ghazzali that to whatever subject he directed his attention, he studied it thoroughly so as to master it fully. Accordingly, he now began with a thorough study of the works of all the eminent Sufis, and soon acquired a thorough mastery of the

subject. His conclusion was that the Sufis were the true seekers after truth. But since the basis of Sufism was experience and not knowledge, he, in order to get to truth, must himself be initiated as a Sufi and live their life and perform their practices. Al-Gazzali concluded that the aim of the Sufi was to free the soul from the yoke of passions and purge it from all animal and wrong inclinations in order that God himself might live in his purified soul.

He must therefore sacrifice honours and riches and sever all worldly relations. This was the result of his enquiry into Sufism. But what about initiation into that life? For a long while he was torn asunder by the opposite forces of earthly passions and religious yearnings. He searched his heart. "I probed," he says, "the motives of my work as teacher, and found that, in place of being sincerely consecrated to God, it was only actuated by a vain desire for honour and fame. I perceived that I was on the edge of an abyss, and that unless I am immediately converted I should be doomed to eternal fire." "And yet undecided, one day I decided to leave Baghdad and to give up everything, the next day I gave up this resolution. I advanced one step, and no sooner I had taken it, I relapsed. In the morning I was sincerely resolved only to occupy myself with the future life; in the evening a crowd of earthly thoughts assailed and dispersed my resolutions. On the one side the worldly desires kept me bound to my post in the chains of covetousness, on the other, the voice of religion cried to me, 'Up, up, thy life is nearing its end and thou hast a long journey to

make.' Now my resolve was firm, I wished to give up all and to flee ; and then the Tempter, returning to the attack, said, 'You are suffering from a transitory feeling, don't give way to it, for it will soon pass. If you obey it, if you give up this fine position, this honourable post, exempt from trouble and rivalry, this seat of authority safe from attack you will regret it later without being able to recover it,' Finally, conscious of my weakness and the prostration of my soul, I took refuge in God as a man at the end of himself and without resources. 'He who hears the forlorn when they cry for help deigned to hear me.' He made the sacrifice of honours, wealth and family ties easy to me." At last al-Ghazzali left Baghdad. He spent ten years roaming in Syria, the Hedjaz and Egypt, visiting "holy shrines and mosques, wandering into deserts, undergoing religious discipline and performing religious exercises." During this period of meditation there were shown to him things which he abstains from mentioning. However he came to know for certain that the Sufis alone were the true pilgrims in the path of God. They were the illumined,— illumined with the light which proceeds from the central radiance of Divine inspiration.

It was also during this period that he wrote his *magnum opus*, the *Ihya-ul-Ulum*, the "Revival of Religious Sciences," about which the verdict of the Muslim world was that if all the books on Islam were destroyed, it would be but a slight loss provided al Ghazzali's *Ihya* was preserved. About it a European writer makes the following remarks: "This work, probably owing to

originality, was never translated into Latin during the Middle Ages and remained a closed book to all but Arabian scholars. It bears so remarkable a resemblance to the *Discourse on Method* of Descartes that, had any translation of it existed in the days of Descartes, every one would have cried out against the plagiarism."

After these wanderings al-Ghazzali returned to his native town Tus, having at last succeeded in obtaining that inner satisfaction which he had been seeking so long. He himself describes his search after truth thus: "There is no philosopher whose system I have not fathomed, nor a theologian, the intricacies of whose doctrine I have not disentangled. Sufism has no secrets into which I have not penetrated. The devout worshipper of the Deity has revealed to me the aim of his austerities; and the atheist has not been able to conceal from me the grounds of his unbelief." And the result of this search he sums up in these words: "The searches to which I had devoted myself, the path which I had traversed in studying religious and speculative branches of knowledge, had given me a firm faith in three things—God, Revelation, and the Last Judgment. These three fundamental articles of belief were confirmed in me, not merely by definite arguments, but by a chain of causes, circumstances, and proofs which it is impossible to recount."

The death-scene of al-Ghazzali, as described by his brother Ahmad, is worth recording in this brief sketch for its calm serenity which is in great contrast to the

tumults of the soul through which he had passed. "On Monday at dawn," says his brother, "my brother performed the ablutions and said his prayers. Then he said unto me, 'Bring me my grave-clothes.' He took them and kissed them and laid them on his eyes and said, 'I hear and obey the command to go unto the Master.' And he stretched out his feet and was gone—gone to meet Him, being taken up by the grace of the Most High."

Speaking of Al-Ghazzali a German scholar writes, "This man was, if any one has ever deserved the name, truly a divine, and he may be justly placed on a level with Origen. So remarkable was he and gifted with such a rare faculty for the skilful and worthy exposition of the revealed doctrine. From every source he sought the means of shedding light and honour upon religion; while his sincere piety and lofty conscientiousness imparted to all his writings a sacred majesty."¹ "Islam," writes MacDonald in his book on Muslim Theology, "has never outgrown him, has never fully understood him. In the renaissance which is now rising to view, his time will come and the new life will proceed from a renewed study of his work."

1 Tholuck.

PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF AL-GHAZZALI'S RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

No sound ethical system is possible without firm psychological foundations. Thales and Socrates amongst the ancients realised that a knowledge of man's complete nature should precede the formulation of any rules of conduct for him, but they did not work out an ethical system. Systems of morality like those of the Stoics and the Epicureans failed because they were based on defective human psychology. Stoics assumed that man was essentially a rational being and had nothing of the animal nature in him, while the Epicureans failed because they took only his animal nature into consideration and ignored that he was also a rational being. Psychological Hedonism wanted to base its system of morality on the complete analysis of the actual nature of man; but it mistook his animal nature for his actual self, ignoring that both facts and ideals go to constitute it. It took facts into consideration, but regarded the ideals which distinguish him from animals as mere illusions. Ethical Hedonism recognised both facts and ideals, but it failed because its psychology was wrong. That is why, 'know thyself' has been the cry of many a philosopher amongst the ancients as well as amongst the moderns. The Holy Prophet too enunciated the same truth when he said, 'مَنْ عَرَفَ نَفْسَهُ فَقَدْ عَرَفَ رَبَّهُ'—He who knows his Self, knows his Lord.'

One of the greatest attempts ever made to base morality on a complete understanding of the Self, on a

thoroughgoing analysis of human nature, was that of Ghazzali. We shall see how he bases the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality on the knowledge of the Self, and, how after a thorough investigation of the nature of the Self, he bases his ethical system on this knowledge. What is the nature of the Self? What is its ultimate purpose? and wherein lie its misery and Happiness? — are the problems that he sets before himself to solve.

According to Ghazzali the conception of the Self is expressed in Arabic by four different terms namely **العقل**, **الروح**, **النفس**, and **القلب**. Ghazzali has himself defined them and has also given the different meanings in which they are generally used. **القلب** denotes two things (1) the physical heart, and (2) a 'divine entity'. **الروح** means the same spiritual entity as denoted by the word **القلب** in the verse of the Qur'an **قل الروح من امر ربي** 'say, the spirit proceedeth at my Lord's command.' it has been used in this sense. It also means a subtle, vapour-like substance,* which issues from the hollows of the physical heart and through the tissues spreads over into the whole body. The third word **النفس** also signifies the same spiritual entity as denoted by the words **الروح** and **القلب**; as also according to the Sufis the combined forces in man of anger (**الغضب**) and animal

1. *Ihya*, vol. III, pp. 3-4.

2. *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 3 **هو لطيفة ربانية روحانية**.

3. *The Quran*, XVII, 85.

4. *Ihya*, vol. III, p. 3.

desires (الشهوة) ⁵ It represents life on the side of passions and appetites as constituting the evil tendencies in man. But النفس is also described by different attributive names in accordance with the different states that predominate at one time or the other ⁶. (1) When it is in agreement with the will of God and is not disturbed by animal passion, it is called النفس المطمئنة the 'pacified soul' (Cf. the Quran⁷ : يا ايها النفس الراضية مرضية Oh, thou soul which art at rest, return to thy Lord, pleased, and pleasing Him). (2) When it is not 'pacified' and though the desire-nature is not under its complete control, yet it offers resistance to it, then النفس is called النفس لا اقسم the 'self-accusing soul' (Cf. the Quran⁸ : لا اقسم بالنفس اللوامة I swear by 'the self accusing soul'. And (3) when the soul ceases to struggle against the onslaughts of passions and is under their complete control, it is called النفس الامارة 'the insinuating soul' (Cf. the Quran⁹ : وما ابرئ نفسي ان النفس لامارة بالسوء yet I hold not myself clear, for the heart is prone to evil) In this last sense النفس is equivalent to النفس الشهوانية (the desire-nature), which according to the

5. Ihya, p. 3 الجاسع لقوة الغضب والشهوة في الانسان:

6. Ihya, vol. III, p. 4—

ولكنها توصف باوصاف مختلفة بحسب اختلاف احوالها

7. LXXXIX, 27-30.

8. LXXV.

9. XII, 51.

Sufis, stands for the bad qualities in man. The fourth word **العقل** (Reason) means the knowledge of the true nature of thing¹⁰. It also means the same spiritual entity or percipient mind as denoted by the other three words.

Leaving aside their differences, each of these terms stands for a divine spiritual entity. Of these Ghazzali prefers to use **القلب** in all his religious and moral writings. This idea of spiritual entity is expressed in modern Philosophy by various terms *eg*, 'the soul', 'the mind', 'the self'; etc. I shall use the word 'self' as the best equivalent of the Arabic word **القلب**¹¹.

Now **القلب**, is the knowing, perceiving, abiding spiritual entity in man¹². It does not belong to the visible, but to the invisible world. It is called **القلب** (heart), because it is connected with the physical heart, though the connection is transcendental (metaphysical). Its relation with the physical heart is like the relation of Substance with its acci-

10. Ihya, vol. III, p 4. **العلم بحقائق الاسرار**

11. While the remaining three words **الروح** and **العقل** will be used to mean a subtle substance (see above) **النفوس الشهوانية** (animal spirit or desire-nature), and intellect respectively.

12. Ihya, vol. III, p. 3—

وهو المدرك العالم العارف من الانسان وهو الممضاظب والمعاقب والمعايب والمطالب

dents. Though directly connected only with physical heart, it controls all the bodily functions. It is the knowledge of this entity (Self) which is the key to the knowledge of the ultimate reality.

The Self has an ideal to realise, for which it has an inborn yearning and for which it has been specially equipped. In order to achieve this ideal the Self must dwell in a physical body in this world which is its preparatory ground.¹³ For the realization of the ideal the first preliminary, therefore, is to provide for the physical needs of the body. For this purpose the Self has three powers¹⁴ (1) الشهوة والغضب (2) القدرة (3) الادراك.

1. (a) الشهوة is the disposition which enables the body to obtain what is good for it, it includes such qualities as hunger, thirst, etc. (b) الغضب is the disposition which enables it to repel or avoid what is harmful; it includes such qualities as anger, pugnacity, etc. These basic dispositions are called by Ghazzali البواعث¹⁵ (the 'pushes'); he describes them as inherited psycho-physical dispositions, which modern psychology terms 'instincts'.

2 القدرة is the capacity which enables the body to carry out the behests of الشهوة والغضب. القدرة is distributed in all parts of the body, and acts as a 'moving force'.¹⁶

3. الادراك is that faculty in the body which

13. الدنيا مزرعة الاحرة: الحديث

14. Ihya, vol. III, p. 5.

15. Ihya vol. III, p. 6.

16. Ihya. vol. III, p. 5: المعبرك

perceives and knows the objects which should be acquired and those which should be avoided¹⁷. It acts as an instrument of perception and recognition of what is good for the organism. Without it the above mentioned forces would have floundered blindly. This faculty of العلم (knowledge) and الادراك (apprehension) is formed by two main groups: (a) the special senses, namely, sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch, which have special sense organs; and (b) the five internal faculties of تخيل (imagination), تفكر (reflection), تذكر (recollection), الحفظ (memory), and الحس المشترك (common-sense)¹⁸: these have no special sense organs, but are located in the folds of the brain.¹⁹ The five special

17 Ihya, المتعرت للاشياء كالحواسيس

18 Ibid., الحس المشترك as described by Ghazzali is a special faculty which by synthesizing the sensuous impressions coming to the brain gives a meaning to them:—

ثم يجمع جملة معاني المحسوسات في خياله بالحس
المشترك بين المحسوسات

19. Ihya, vol III, p 5. Ghazzali like some of the modern psychologists believes in the localization of functions, i.e. every mental faculty has a corresponding seat in the folds of the brain. For instance, on page 8, Ihya, vol III, he says that memory is located in the hinder lobe of the brain *القوة الحافظة التي مسكنها* and the power of imagination is located in the frontal lobe of the brain *القوة الخيالية*. *المودعة* في مقدم الدماغ

senses enable the organism to act in present situations, the five internal faculties enable it to learn from past experience, and to foresee future situations.

These forces and faculties control the whole physical organism which acts as a vehicle for their manifestation; while all these forces together with all the bodily organs, though unconscious of themselves and their ends, have been so fashioned as to obey the Self implicitly. Thus it is really the Self that controls all the bodily functions of the organism,—It may be noted here that with regard to the correlation of mind and body, Ghazzali is in modern philosophical terminology, an 'Idealist'. He believes in the supremacy of mind over matter. Mind is the source of all activity, it is the active principle which fashions matter according to its own needs; nay, even the growth of bodily organs is to be ascribed to the inward yearnings of the soul

Of all the forces which have been described above **الادراك والعلم** are from our point of view, the most important, for it is they which make the understanding of human nature possible.

Animals share with man all the qualities which have been mentioned above, namely, qualities that come under **الشهوة والغضب** as well as 'external' and 'internal' senses.²⁰ Ghazzali ascribes even the powers of reflection

20 Ihya, vol. III, p. 5. Ghazzali describes these forces—instincts—in detail in Ihya, vol. III, Bk 3, 4 and 5. It is interesting to note that his analysis of them tallies

(See on next page)

and of learning by experience to animals²¹. He would not agree with Descartes that animals are machines, or with the Behaviorists that their movements are reflexes and conditioned reflexes, devoid of all mental processes. No, on the contrary, he believes with most of the modern psychologists, that animals possess mental powers such as apprehension, memory, reflection, etc.

Further, we find that Ghazzali does not believe that the various species of organisms were created in water-tight compartments, but, like the modern evolutionists he sees a continuity in life²²; and, he even believes that

(Continued from page 24)

with some of the latest theories about instincts, for as analysed by him, they are inherent qualities of the mind for the use of the body, i.e., psycho-physical inherited dispositions, enabling the organism to perceive and know the objects of its desires, etc., exciting it with regard to these objects, and finally, acting as moving forces in them Cf. W. MacDougall's definition of instincts: "an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least, to experience an impulse to such action". (Wm. McDougall: *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 29, 1923).

21. *Ihya*, vol. III, p. 7.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

man is capable of progress to an infinite degree²³. It is most interesting, and thought-provoking to note that he believes in the evolution, not of matter, but of mind. While the modern theory of Evolution regards mind as a by-product, Ghazzali considers mind to be the moving force in the universe, and matter a by-product. Mind contains in itself a great possibility of development, and can, according to him, progress to an infinite degree.

But what is that by which man can make such progress and attain to such spiritual perfection? There are in man two qualities which raise him above the animal and make him capable of perfection. They are (1) العلم (knowledge), and (2) الإرادة (will). العلم stands for the knowledge of the affairs of this world and the next²⁴, as well as the knowledge of abstract truths and self evident truths²⁵. علم cannot be acquired through the senses alone, it lies behind the objects of sense²⁶. It is gained through intellect (العقل) which enables man to generalize and form concepts. الإرادة (will) has been defined by Ghazzali thus: When a man understands the full significance of the consequences of an act and its desirability, a strong desire is aroused in him to achieve that end by procuring the proper means

23. Ibid, p 7

24. Ihyā, vol III, p. 7: العلم بالامور الدنيوية والاخرية

25. Ibid, العلوم الكلية الضرورية

26. Ibid.

for it, then that strong desire in him is his *إرادة* or will²⁷. The will should be distinguished from conation in animals, which latter consists only in the qualities of *الشهوة والغضب*.²⁸

An interesting question arises here. What is the relation between *العقل* (reason) and *الإرادة* (will)? And is reason the only motive to action? According to Ghazzali, it is reason which determines the end, but the power behind it is supplied by the will. That is, reason acts as a guiding principle and dictates to the will that which is to be done, whereas will acts as a moving force²⁹ to achieve the end. Ghazzali, like Kant, regards reason the supreme factor in determining the end; but, unlike Kant, he regards reason powerless in achieving the determined end without the intervention of the will.

So it is knowledge and will that distinguish man from animals. Children do not possess this knowledge and will. They develop these qualities as they grow. The will grows with the development of knowledge. Knowledge develops in a child in two stages: (1) Knowledge of self-evident truths and (2) Acquired know-

27. Ibid., *و أمم الإرادة فانه إذا أدرك بالعقل عاقبة الامر و طريق لصالح فيه انبعث من ذاته شوق الى جهة المصلحة والى تعاطى اسبابها*

28. Ibid., On page 5 Ghazzali calls these basic forces *الإرادة*, since *المبوعات*—motive forces—they impel the organism to action

29. *Ihya*, vol., III, p. 7.

ledge.³⁰ The child gets to know self-evident truths intuitively step by step, and he acquires knowledge through experience and reflection gradually—of course the possibility of knowing was always in him. Once acquired, knowledge is stored up in him in the form of dispositions to be used whenever needed. When the child has gained the knowledge of self-evident truths and acquired knowledge by experience and reflection he is said to have attained to a very high stage of human development³¹. But there is no limit to the possibility of development; indeed it is infinite. It has however grades. These grades vary from the experience of an ordinary man to the direct vision of saints and the divine revelations of prophets. Again, there are no bounds to the knowledge of the spiritual kingdom of truth, and it comes to different people differently. To some the mysteries of the universe are revealed all of a sudden, through علم المباشرة while to others knowledge comes slowly after a good deal of المجاهدة (self-cultivation). Prophets attain all of a sudden to the highest grades of spiritual development to which human nature can rise. Further, one can know only about the stage he has reached and the stages which he traversed during his progress and nothing beyond that; just as a child does not know anything of the experiences of a

30. Ibid. vol III p. 7—

الثانية ان تتصل له العلوم المكتسبة بالتجارب
والفكر

31. Ibid., vol. III, p. 7.

grown up person, so an ordinary man can know nothing of the experiences of a prophet.

Thus the human Self is capable of infinite spiritual development³². The only hindrance to man is the darkness of his own heart which acts as a veil between him and the ultimate truth³³. It is only through knowledge that he can dispel this darkness from his heart and approach reality. Knowledge is not only the distinguishing feature of his nature, it is also the object for which he has been created³⁴.

We now come to the question of the relation in which **القلل**, **الشهوة**, **الغضب** stand to one another and the consequences of their interplay³⁵. **العقل** is the guiding principle and **الشهوة** and **الغضب** the unharnessed forces; but they are there to be exploited and utilised by **العقل** for the good of the Self³⁶. These energies can be turned to the benefit or the detriment of the Self, and it is the function of **العقل** to divert these

32. Ihya, vol. III, p 14 :

اعلم أن القلب بغريزته مستعد لقبول حقائق
المعلومات

33. Ibid , p. 8 : خبث وكدورة وشغل من جهة القلوب :

34. Ibid., p. 8 : خالدين مركب للنفس و النفس محل :
للعلم و العلم هو مقصود الانسان و خاصية
التي لاجله خلق

35. Ibid., vol. III, pp. 9-10.

36. Ibid., p. 6.

great stores of energy into the right channel. These forces are the outcome of three³⁷ elements in his nature, *viz*, الربانية, the divine, البهيمية, the beastly, and السبعية, the ferocious.³⁸ At the other end of this triangle of forces and directly opposed to العقل, stands another element in his nature, which is called الشيطانية (the satanic element), and which functions in contradiction to العقل too, like العقل, is inborn in man and is not to be found in animals. There are, therefore, four elements in the nature of man, there are in every man the sage, the dog, the pig, and the devil³⁹. The pig in him is his شهوة or his lust and gluttony, the dog is his غضب or his anger and ferocity, and the devil is the attribute which incites these two animals to rebel against العقل. and the sage is العقل. A man is any one of them or partakes of the natures of more than one of them according as the one or the other element or elements predominate in him. Before explaining how the equilibrium between these forces is maintained or disturbed, let us describe the nature of العقل which is the most important factor in human nature

37 Ibid.; vol. III, pp 9-10.

38. Adjective noun from يعج wild animals, like the lion, etc

39 Ihya, vol. III, p. 9 —

وكل انسان فيه شوب من هذه الاربعة اعنى الربانية والشيطانية والسبعية والبهيمية وكل ذلك مجموع فى القلب فكان المجموع فى اهاب الانسان خنزير و كلب و شيطان و حكيم

العقل is distinct from **العلم** inasmuch as the former is the source of, or the basic force underlying the latter; but sometimes it is identified with the latter altogether when it has developed to a certain extent as explained below. It is in this sense that **العلم** too is sometimes called the distinguishing feature of man and one of the forces in him. At first, **العقل** is only an undeveloped inborn rational faculty, ready to develop and expand,⁴⁰ and **العلم** is but another name for its development and extension, for **العقل** develops and expands in proportion to the knowledge that is acquired.⁴¹ It is only when it has acquired knowledge that it makes possible the realization of the ideal.⁴² It is because of this intimate connexion between the two that sometimes the one is identified with the other.⁴³ **العقل** reaches the first stage of its development when a child begins to learn the self-evident truths (العلوم الكلية الضرورية) which gradually become known

40. Inya. vol. I, p. 67: **فأول هو الأصل والسبب والمأبج**: the first is the foundation and origin and source.

Ibid., p. 75—in the words of Muhasibi **يتهيأ** فالأول أنه غير موزة ببا' لا تراك العلوم النظرية وكأنه نور يقدت في القلب به يستعد الإدراك الاستيعاب

41. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 76, 77.

42. Ibid., vol. III, p. 24—

أن لا يمكن التقرب بالغريزة القطرية ولا بالعلوم الضرورية بل بالهكتسبه

43. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 67, 77, 71.

to him as he grows up. The second stage in its development is reached when a man begins to learn by experience and reflection,⁴⁴ and can handle abstruse intellectual problems, learn theoretical sciences (العلوم النظرية), acquiring ultimately a mass of knowledge. It can develop to the extent of foreseeing consequence of events, enabling man to act according to them, and not according to the impulses of the moment. It is in this stage that **العقل** is identified with **العلم**⁴⁵. The third stage is reached when the divine element (الربانيه) in man begins to assert itself. This element is in reality the aboriginal rational faculty in man, and it becomes the nucleus in the expansion of **العقل** or the basic principle throughout the various stages of its development. The other stages in its development are as accretions (المكتسبات) with relation to it, and it gathers force or weakens according to the nature of these accretions and according to the workings of the various other forces at a given time.⁴⁶ When allowed to grow, it becomes the guiding principle—a divine light, unerring, ever-struggling for the good of the Self. It reaches the highest stage of development when it understands the

44. Ibid., vol. III, p. 7. أن تتحصل له العلوم المكتسبه بالتجارب والفكر

Of. vol. III, p. 76.

45. Ihya, vol. I, p. 76 : وانها اطلق على العلوم من حيث انها ثمرتها

46. Ibid., vol. III, p. 6, 14. Cf. vol. I, p. 76.

true nature of things, and even knows the meaning of the ultimate realities, like God, soul, etc.

It is clear that the Arabic word **العقل**, especially as used by Ghazzali, is more comprehensive than the English word *reason*. Ghazzali has traced four stages or elements in **العقل** as it develops in man: (1) an undeveloped primitive rational faculty, (2) self-evident truths, (3) knowledge (**العلم**), and (4) a highly developed faculty in man capable of understanding or knowing the ultimate realities.⁴⁷ Of these (3) is generally expressed by the word *reason*. The last stage is, according to Ghazzali, the same original rational faculty, only developed to the highest pitch. **العقل** is, therefore, human intellect or human understanding by which man can know anything from the simplest objects of sense to the ultimate realities. There is, therefore, no separate faculty in man for knowing the spiritual truths, which can be known by **العقل** when it develops to a certain degree. This knowledge of spiritual realities is not only an intellectual experience, but a living spiritual apprehension of the most *intimate* nature. Though all these stages or elements can be clearly traced, they do not exist in separate water tight compartments. Except the self-evident truths, they vary both in intensity and extensity in different individuals.⁴⁸ In a fully developed **العقل** all

47. Ibid., vol. I, p. 76—

والمقصود ان هذه الاقسام الاربعة موجودة والاسم يطلق على جميعها

48. Ihya, vol. I, p. 77.

these elements exist: and the divine element is at its strongest, and co-extensive and in co-operation with the other elements when all these have developed and are working rightly; otherwise, when cut off from them, it weakens: and in proportion to its weakness the satanic element and the animal forces get strong⁴⁹.

العقل and الشيطانيه work as opposing forces in the human self. Both work through the animal forces لنضب the one using them as sources of constructive energy and the other as instruments of destruction. The animal forces, instigated by الشيطانيه, revolt against العقل and try to overcome it. العقل with the help of the divine element, fights those forces and tries to control them and divert them into the right channels so as to make them useful for the Self. If it succeeds in controlling them and making them completely submissive to itself, the evil tendency is weakened and rendered ineffective, and a harmony conducive to the realization of the ideal is produced in the self. When العقل has thus checked the evil tendency and has subdued and harmonised the animal forces, its struggle ceases and the self is enabled to pursue its progress unimpeded towards its goal. It is this state of the self—when struggle in it has ceased and harmony prevails—which is described by the Quranic phrase as النفس المطمئنة (the tranquil soul). But if الغضب والشهوة instigated by الشيطانيه, rebel against العقل and overcome it, the evil tendency gets strong and gains complete

49. Ibid, vol III, pp 9-10.

ascendency over them; while the divine element becomes weaker and weaker till it is almost completely smothered. All the other faculties then become subservient to the satanic element and even reason becomes the slave of passions, instead of their master. It is so subdued that it devises ways for the gratification of passion and even makes that which they seek look pleasing.⁵⁰ The evil tendency becomes stronger and stronger, continually inciting them to gratify themselves, even at the expense of the good of the self.⁵¹ It instigates the animal forces to revolt, and is the active principle in النفس الامارة (the instigating soul). The divine element, however, usually keeps on struggling against the evil tendency; it is seldom completely subdued. The condition of the human self, viz., when the divine element is continually struggling with the evil tendency, is denoted by the

50. Cf. the Quran, XVI 63 فزين لهم الشيطان اعمالهم 'Satan made pleasing to them their actions'

51. Ihya, vol. III p. 10. Cf. Hume: A Treatise on Human Nature, Bk. II, p. 127 (Everyman's Library series): "Reason is and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." But Ghazzali's position is fundamentally different from that of Hume. According to Hume, reason is the slave of passions and its function is to devise ways and means to satisfy them. Ghazzali believes that, though reason *can*, when degraded, be 'the slave of passions', yet its natural function is to rule and control them

Quranic expression النفس اللوامة (the striving soul)⁵².

The relation of all these forces with one another and their respective functions—how it is the duty of the *عقل* to keep in check the satanic and animal forces and how they revolt against it, have been described figuratively by Ghazzali in *احياء العلوم*. "The simile of the soul of man in his body", he writes, "is the simile of a king in his kingdom. The body is the kingdom of the soul and its abode and its capital, the members of his body and its faculties are like the artisans and workers; while his intellect the reflective power, is like a sincere adviser and a wise vizier. His desire is like a wicked servant who brings food and provisions to the town, and his anger and indignation are like the police. The servant who brings in the provisions is a liar, a trickster, deceitful and wicked; but he pretends to be sincere, and under the garb of his sincerity is concealed frightful mischief and deadly poison. His habit and custom is to dispute with the sincere vizier about his opinions and measures so that the latter is never let free from disputation and opposition for a moment. If the king avails himself of the vizier in his administration and seeks his advice and turns away from the counsel of the wicked servant, believing that right consists in rejecting his advice; and if under the guidance of his vizier he appoints the police (not forgetting to keep it also under due control, as advised by the vizier) upon the treacherous servant and his aids and abettors so that the police disciplines the

52. Lit. 'the upbraiding soul'.

servant and compels him to listen to the vizier, thereby making the latter admonisher and supreme over this wicked servant and his followers and helpers, until he becomes a subdued subject and not the ruler, and is kept under order and control and is not the commander and administrator; in that case the affairs of the state would be righted and justice established throughout the kingdom. Thus, if the soul seeks the help of the intellect and establishes anger and indignation over desire, at the same time not permitting anger and indignation to become head strong, and even making use of desire to keep them under due restraint, thus making use of one against the other as the occasion demands, then its powers will remain justly balanced and its qualities become virtuous⁵³.

So the struggle for supremacy amongst the basic forces, **العقل** on one side, and **الغضب** and **الشهوة** instigated by **الشیطانیه** on the other, continually goes on in the human self. It is the equilibrium between them all, inclusive of **عقل**, that results in qualities of character which are conducive to the realization of the ideal; but the disturbance of this equilibrium results in the predominance of one of them over the others, producing qualities which impede the progress of the self towards its goal. For instance, if **الغضب** becomes predominant, qualities of the wild animal such as enmity, hatred, aggrandisement, etc. follow, and if the divine element transcends its bounds, qualities such as overlord-

ship, despotism, etc., result. All these qualities have been worked out in detail by Ghazzali and arranged in groups as follows⁵⁴.

A.—Qualities produced by the Predominance of الشهوة, الغضب, impeding the Progress of the Self.

(1) When الشهوة is predominant, the following qualities and activities result:—

Shamelessness or impudence (وقاحة), wickedness (خبث), extravagance (تبذير), stinginess (تقتير), hypocrisy (رياء), disgracefulness (هتكة), wantonness (مجانة), vanity or triviality (عيبث), greed (حرص), covetousness (جشع), flattery (ملق), jealousy (حسد), grudge (حقد), wicked glee or joy at another's misfortune (شماقة), gluttony (شره), voluptuousness (شبق), etc.

(2) When الغضب predominates, the following qualities result:—

Rashness (تهور), prodigality (بذالة), haughtiness (بدخ), bragging (صلف), pride or self-elation (تكبر), self-love (عجب), derision (استهزاء), contempt (استخفاف), humiliation of others (تحقير), mischief-making (إراادة الشر), love of aggrandisement (شهوة), enmity (عداوة), hatred (بغضاء), etc.

54. Ihya, pp. 9—10.

and oppression of people with violence
and abuse **بالشتم على الناس** (التهجم
(و الضرب). etc.

- (iii) The predominance of الشيطانيه through the predominance of both الشهوة and الغضب produces the following qualities and activities:—

Trickery (مكر), deceit (خداع), cunning (حيلة), deceitfulness (دهاء), daring (جراءة), deception (تلبيس), exciting enmity (غش), insincerity or dishonesty (تضريب), wickedness (خبث), foul speech (خنا), etc.

- (iv) When the divine element in man transcends its bounds, the following qualities result:—

Lordship (ربوبية), love of overlordship (حب الاستيلاء), love of supremacy or predominance (حب الاستعلاء), appropriation or claim to special privileges (تخصص), despotism or desire to appropriate everything for oneself (الاستبداد بالصور كلها), uniqueness in lordship (تفرد بالرياسة), fleeing from the yoke of serfdom and humiliation (انسلا), etc. Further man possessed of these qualities desires the knowledge of all sciences, and claims for himself knowledge, cognisance, and comprehension of essences of things and rejoices when knowledge is ascribed to him

and grieves when ignorance is imputed to him. ⁵⁵

B.—Qualities produced by controlling الشهوة and الغضب conducive to the realization of the ideal.

(1) When الشهوة is controlled and kept in moderation, the following qualities are produced:—

Chastity (عفة), contentment (قناعة), tranquillity (هدوء), abstinence (زهد), piety (ورع), fear of God, resulting in piety (تقوى), cheerfulness (ابسطاء), pleasing appearance (حسن الهيئة), modesty (حياء), gracefulness and wit (ظرف) helping others (مساعدة),

etc.

(2) When الغضب is controlled, the following qualities result:—

Courage and bravery (شجاعة), generosity (كرم), courage (نجدة), self-control (ضبط), patience and fortitude (صبر), forbearance (حلم), endurance (احتمال), forgiveness (عفو), firmness and steadiness (ثبات), nobility (نبيل), gravity and wisdom (وقار), etc.

55. Ihya, vol. III, p. 9.—

ويشتهى الاطلاع على العلوم كلها بل يدعى لنفسه العلم و المعرفة والاحاطة بحقائق الامور ويفرح اذا نسب الى العلم ويعزن الى نسب الى الجهل والاحاطة بجميع العقائق والا ستيلاء بالقهر على جميع الخلائق

(iii) When الشهوة and الغضب are subordinated to the divine element, the following qualities are produced:—

Knowledge (علم), wisdom (حكمة), faith and conviction (يَقِين), and comprehension of the essences of things, knowledge of things as they are, supremacy over everything by virtue of knowledge and insight, and the right of supremacy over creation through perfection of knowledge, and greatness, and freedom from the servitude of الشهوة and الغضب, etc.⁵⁶

Thus, man occupies a position midway between animals and angels, and his true differentia is knowledge. He can either rise to the level of angels with the help of knowledge, or fall to the level of animals by letting his anger and lust dominate him. It is, therefore, knowledge which helps the growth of the divine element in him and makes possible the realization of the ideal. "The horse", says Ghazzali, "shares, for instance, with the ass the quality of carrying burdens, but is distinguished from it by his swiftness and beauty, if these qualities were taken away from him, he would be reduced to the level of the ass. Similarly man shares with the ass and the horse certain qualities and is distinguished from

56. Ihya, vol. III, p. 10—

والاحاطة بحقائق الامنياء ومعرفة الامور على ما هي عليه
والاستيلاء على الكل بقوة العلم والبصيرة واستحقاق التقدم
على الخلق لكمال العلم وجلاله ولاستغنى عن عبادة الشهوة
و الغضب

them by certain other qualities. These latter qualities are his distinguishing features; and these qualities are of the nature of the qualities of the angels nearest to God. Man, therefore, occupies a position midway between animals and angels. Inasmuch as man eats and procreates, he is on the level of plants, and in as much as he feels and makes voluntary movements, he is an animal, and inasmuch as he has a form and stature, he is like an inanimate object.⁵⁷ His special quality is the knowledge of the true nature of things; so whoever uses all the members of his body and his faculties in assisting him in seeking knowledge and doing good actions, he resembles angels and deserves to rank with them; he deserves to be called angel and a divine person. But whoever expends his power in the pursuit of his physical pleasures, eating as animals eat etc., he falls to the lowest level of the animals, becoming either a dunce like an ox, or voluptuous and gluttonous like a pig, or ferocious like a dog, or revengeful like a camel, or proud like a leopard, or cunning like a fox,—or he, combines all these qualities in him and becomes a veritable devil⁵⁸.

From the foregoing psychological analysis of human nature it is clear that all bodily organs and mental faculties have been created to help man to realize the ideal; but it is *knowledge* which enables him to the right use of all these qualities, and makes the realisation of the ideal possible.

57. Lit. Like an image drawn on the wall.

58. Lit. a rebellious devil.

THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND MORALITY IN THE ETHICAL SYSTEM OF AL-GHAZZALI

Knowledge is one of the corner-stones of al-Ghazzali's ethical system. Morality and good conduct are not possible without knowledge. The contents, source and conditions of knowledge must, therefore, be understood in detail. The faculty of knowledge is intellect or reason (*aql*). Intellect is the innate rational faculty of man, which distinguishes him from animals, because it is the source¹ of the kind of knowledge of which the latter are incapable. Intellect is found in all men, though differing in intensity and extensity².

Distinct forms of intellect are described at different places by al-Ghazzali. These forms can be classified according to a scheme. Initially intellect is a potentiality for the development of knowledge under conditions of experience and intuition. This knowledge has two aspects, *viz*, formal knowledge and existential knowledge. The former is the knowledge of the form in which the various objects of experience and intuition are apprehended. It is the knowledge of self-evident principles. Such knowledge, though it begins with

1 Ihya, Vol. I, p. 76. **فأول هوالاس والسنخ والمنبع**

i. e., the first is the foundation, origin and source.

Al-Muhasibi's definition is as follows :—

انه غريزة يتهيأ بها ادراك العلوم النظرية وكأنه نور يقدت
فى القلب به يستعد الادراك الاشياء

2. Ihya, Vol. I. p. 77

experience, is more than what is given in experience and as such is not based on experience it is *a priori*³. For in such propositions as, "A person cannot be in two places at the same time," we have asserted more than what we have actually observed.

Existential knowledge is the knowledge of the objects and events given in experience and intuition. It comprises the contents of knowledge in contradiction to the form of knowledge. Existential knowledge, again, is of two kinds, viz., phenomenal, and spiritual. The former grows gradually with the growth of the child as his experience accumulates⁴. At first the person acquires the knowledge of what is present now. This knowledge once acquired is stored in the form of dispositions to be revived and used whenever needed. The next stage is marked by foresight, a man is able to foresee the consequences of events and to act according to them, and not according to the impulses of the moment.

Knowledge of the spiritual is the highest form of knowledge. When a man has acquired this knowledge, he comes to know the significance of the spiritual realities, *e.g.*, God, soul, etc. This knowledge depends upon intuition (*Mukashafa*), but it comes differently to different people. To some it comes slowly through good deal of self-cultivation (*Mujahada*) and to a few it is revealed directly.

3. *Ihya*, Vol. III. p. 14. *Ibid.* Vol. I, pp. 76—78.

4. *Ihya*, Vol. II p. 7: ان تتحصل له العلوم المكتسبة : بالتجارب والفكر

Both intellect⁵ and, on its basis, knowledge develop along with the age of the person. At first intellect is a potentiality. Through experience and intuition, it leads to the growth of knowledge⁶. Formal knowledge is innate and existential knowledge is acquired, but both occur together. In the young child formal knowledge is implicit. As experience accumulates it becomes explicit. Existential knowledge, to begin with, is very meagre and is primarily concerned with the material objects and events which immediately present themselves in

5. In this connection it is to be noticed that al-Ghazzali sometimes uses '*aql*' and sometimes *qalb* to denote the percipient mind. The word '*aql*' is used in various senses, viz., knowledge, intellect, etc. *Aql* in the sense of intellect is identical with *qalb* which means transcendental spiritual subtlety that perceives and knows (Ihya, Vol. III, pp. 3—4). Although al-Ghazzali is conscious of the differences between intellect and the self, he identifies one with the other. *Qalb* stands for the mental life of man and comprises the lower and the higher faculties. *Aql* is the highest faculty of *qalb* which distinguishes man from animals, and as such is sometimes used to mean the whole of man's mental powers, and *aql* is related to it as light is related to the sun or vision to the eye (Ihya, Vol. III, p. 14).

6. The intellect possesses the potentiality of acquiring knowledge. But this potentiality cannot be converted into actuality unless two conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, that the development of intellect is dependent upon

(see on next page).

experience. The next stage is reached when the person is able to think of the objects which were experienced before. Further development is marked by foresight. The highest development culminates in the knowledge of the spiritual realities.⁷

(Continued from page 45)

bodily growth (Ihya, Vol. III, p. 14). Secondly, that there must be some external cause to excite it to action (Ihya, Vol. I, pp 76, 77 . وهذه العلوم كائنيًا مضمدة في تلك الغريزة بالفطرة ولكن تظهر في الوجود اذا جري سبب يخرجها الي الوجود حتي كان هذه العلوم ليست بشئ وارد عليها من خارج و كائنيًا كانت مسكنة فيها فظهرت)

Just as there must be something to see if the eye is to see (Ihya, Vol. III, p. 14), al-Ghazzali concludes that all sciences reside potentially in the intellect and do not come from without; what comes from without is the cause that brings them out (Ihya Vol. I, p 77).

-7 The highest development of intellect is reached when it understands the true nature of things, and even knows the meaning of the ultimate realities like God, soul, etc. It is therefore human intellect by which man can know anything from the simplest object of sense to the ultimate realities. There is, therefore, no separate faculty in man for knowing the spiritual truths. The knowledge of spiritual realities is not only an intellectual experience, but a living immediate spiritual apprehension of realities

Theoretically there is no limit to the possibilities of the development of intellect and knowledge⁸. The grades of actual development, however, vary from the experience of an ordinary man to the direct spiritual vision of saints and the divine revelation of prophets. A man may be subject to various restraints and limitations which keep him down to a limit⁹. The heart may

8. Ihya, Vol. III, p 14 : اعلم ان القلب بغريزته مستعدة لقبول حقائق المعلومات We find that al-Ghazzali does not believe that the various species belong to discreet forms in the absolute sense, but sees a continuity in life which the evolutionists have done recently (Ihya, Vol. III, p 3) and, though he regards man to be the highest of creations he believes in the possibility of further progress by him to an infinite degree (Ihya, Vol. III, p. 7). Though the sciences have made great progress and fathomed the mysteries of matter with great success, the problem of human happiness is far from solved, and the world is at a loss to understand where to go for the solution of this problem. Some of the great thinkers of the modern world are of opinion that the solution of human happiness consists in the right understanding of human nature. In this direction Al-Ghazzali can guide humanity. Al Ghazzali considers mind to be the moving force in the universe and matter a by-product. Mind includes in itself a great possibility of development, and it can according to him, progress to an infinite perfection.

9. Ihya, Vol III p 8 : حبس وكدورة و مثل من :
حبة القلوب

be prevented from further development because of the following causes¹⁰ : (1) It may be undeveloped, *e.g.*, the heart of the child. (2) Sins may have rendered it dark. (3) The heart may be occupied solely with its own purification so that it does not strive towards the objects. (4) Some prejudices may stand between the heart and the object, *e.g.*, sectarian beliefs. (5) A man may be ignorant as to how the truth is to be sought.

Knowledge serves a two-fold purpose.¹¹ It is, firstly, an apprehension of objects and their significance, and secondly, a guide to conduct. Accordingly, intellect or reason is considered to have two aspects, *viz.*, theoretical and practical.

Theoretical reason (*al-Aql an-Nazuri*) is concerned with the understanding of the phenomenal and the spiritual realities. It apprehends, generalises, and forms concepts. It goes from the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to the general, from the diversity to the unity, embracing wider and still wider fields under one principle as it advances. It is this same theoretical reason that looks up towards the transcendental world and receives knowledge and influence from it—knowledge of God, His attributes, His actions, the mysteries of creation, etc. Intuition is nothing but theoretical reason working at a higher plane. The mode of its operation, however, seems to be different in the region of the transcendental world. But this

10. *Ihya*, Vol. III, p. II.

11. *Mizan al-Amal*, pp. 83-85.

question does not belong here. Theoretical reason has given us various systems of knowledge called sciences, the ethical significance of which will be discussed below.

Practical reason (*al-'Aql al-'Amali*) is the hand-maid of theoretical reason. It receives from theoretical reason its ennobling influence. But its active function lies in the domain of human conduct. It gives direction to voluntary individual acts. An individual act of a saint, or a patriot is directed by practical reason, but the whole life of the saint, patriot, or artist is guided by ideals conceived by theoretical reason which influences the practical reason in most of its decisions in individual acts. In opposition to reason which works for construction there is in the self a satanic element which works for destruction. So it is essential that all human faculties should remain under the absolute sway of practical reason, for if it loses its supremacy over them, there follows the wreck of human character.

The ethical nature of the various systems of knowledge depends upon their ethical utility. Sciences (*'ulum*) which are of two kinds, *Shar'yya* (religious), e.g., Qur'an, Sunna etc, and *'Aqliyya* (intellectual), e.g., Philosophy, etc. A science derives its value from its relation to the goal. It is good if it helps its realization and bad if it hinders it¹². Of the sciences which are good,

12. Ihya, Vol. I. p. 96 ;

لعلك تقول العلم فهو معرفة الشئ علي ماهو به وهو من صفات الله تعالى فكيف يكون الشئ علما و يكون مع كونه علما مذموما

there are some the acquisition of which is *fard Kifaya* (optional), e.g., medicine and others the acquisition of which is *fard 'ayn* (obligatory)¹³. Al-Ghazzali maintains that the acquisition of religious sciences ('ulum 'Shar'iyya) is *fard kifaya*. They are the means to the purification of the self which is a further means to the realization of the ultimate end. However, they pass from the external to the internal judgment. When the individual begins to see in their laws not only the commands of God but also the true ways to the attainment of eternal happiness, they become *fard 'ayn*¹⁴. What is really binding on man is the knowledge of the method how to acquire the happiness of the next world¹⁵. It consists of 'ilm al-Mu'amala, which comprises both knowledge and a conduct¹⁶ and 'ilm al-Mukashafa, i.e., pure knowledge¹⁷. Man can acquire both, but very few attain to the latter. So ethically speaking, 'ilm al-Mu'amala is the only science which is *fard ayn*

It includes the knowledge of 'ibadat (man's relation to God), 'adat (man's relation to man), and the know-

13 Cf. Ihya, Vol. III, pp. 12, 14, 15 ; Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 14-19, *fard 'ayn* is that science which is obligatory on every Muslim (Ihya, Vol I, pp. 13f), whereas *fard kifaya* is that what is not binding on every Muslim, if there are sufficient people versed in it to satisfy the needs of the community (Ihya, Vol. I, pp. 16 ff).

14 Ihya, Vol I, p. 17.

15 Ihya, Vol. I, pp. 18-19.

16 مركب من العلم والعمل

17 علم مجرد

ledge of good and bad qualities of the soul. In reality the knowledge of these qualities alone is *fard 'ayn*, *ibadat* and *adat* are only means to these qualities. The knowledge of these qualities is necessary to lead one to the ultimate goal. This knowledge alone is *'ilm al-Mu'amala*. It is the science of the various good qualities of the self like patience (*sabr*), thankfulness (*shukr*), fear (*khawf*), hope (*raja'*), abstention (*zuhd*), as well as of bad qualities like jealousy (*hasad*), pride (*kibr*), self-esteem (*'uqb*) etc., and discusses the real nature and limits of these qualities, the means of acquiring and avoiding them together with the symptoms thereof and training required for it — *'Ilm al-Mukashafa* is the end¹⁸ and culmination of *'ilm al-Mu'amala*. It is the highest end of man in this world. Ethical and practical sciences are not concerned with it for it does not deal with conduct. It comes at the stage, when man is wholly absorbed in God after purifying the heart. It is a light which reveals itself in the heart of man; from this light many things that were vague or were only hearsay become real and living. In it is given to man the knowledge of all spiritual realities such as God, His attributes, His actions, prophethood, revelation, heaven, hell, etc. By it the curtain of doubt is removed till the truth becomes absolutely manifest, and all spiritual realities are perceived as if with one's own eyes. ✓

AN EXPOSITION OF AL GHAZZALI'S VIEWS ON THE PROBLEM OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

The problem of the freedom of the will because of its ethical significance is very important for al-Ghazzali. He discusses it in different connections in his works. The present chapter brings together his treatment of the problem

Al-Ghazzali bases his argument for the freedom of the will on experience. He conceives of the world as consisting of three realities, viz., the physical ('*Alam al-Mulk*'), the mental ('*Alam al-Jabrut*') and the spiritual (*Alam al-Malakut*) The spiritual world which is beyond the ken of the physical senses, can be apprehended through intuition only by the enlightened. To al-Ghazzali the spiritual world is a reality known directly. It is essential to take full cognisance of these regions of his experience in order to understand his position with regard to the problem of the freedom of the will.

I

Light is thrown upon the problem of the freedom of the will by common sense and practical experience. Al-Ghazzali holds that the fact that human character can be changed and improved indicates that man is free ¹. The ethical significance of this discussion is obvious. He asserts emphatically that human character is capable of improvement. Some people deny it. They argue that *Khulq* is an expression which stands for man's inner

1. Ihya, Vol. III, pp. 48-50 ; Mizan-al 'Amal, pp. 68-70.

form, just as *Khalq* is an expression which stands for the outer form of man. Neither can be changed. But Ghazzali brings experience in practical life for his evidence. If the assertion of those who argue against the possibility of the improvement of character were correct, all moral imperatives would cease to have any meaning, all instruction exhortation education, self-discipline would become meaningless. But for these, what would have been the state of human society. As a matter of fact, not only men but even animals are capable of being trained by practice and instruction.

Al-Ghazzali admits the limits beyond which human efforts cannot be fruitful. For instance, man can only regulate and discipline his passions, but cannot root them out, nor is it desirable that he should do so, for without them life would be not only imperfect but also impossible.

Again, he admits, there are two factors which enhance the difficulties in the change of character:

- (a) The greater inherent strength of the passions in certain individuals, and
- (b) The greater habitual gratification of the passions in the past. In this respect he describes four classes of men²:
 1. Those whose character is yet unformed, who are without ability to distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong. They are ignorant, devoid of reflection and self-con-

2. *Ihya*, Vol. III, pp. 49; *Mizan-al-'Amal*, pp. 69-70.

sciousness, have no moral character, no will, and no belief. They are not yet wholly subjected to the pleasures of the senses. The character of such men can be improved easily. They need only a guide, a determination and a motive to actuate them to follow the right path. All children by nature are such. Their parents mislead them and excite their worldly desires, thus making them greedy and uncontrolled.

2. Those who are under the control of passions, which they yet regard as evil. They can distinguish between good and evil. Their self-consciousness is developed. They realise that the rational self is the only true self. Yet they follow their lower self because they are not accustomed to act rightly. They have knowledge. They can be reformed firstly, by uprooting the evil habits and secondly by cultivating the virtuous habits. Such men are amenable to good influence, if they have the will to improve their character.
3. Those who are addicted to evil ways and are convinced that those ways are good and to act according to them is absolutely necessary. The real nature of things has been obscured from their minds and the gratification of the lower self has become the purpose of their lives. Their self-consciousness consists only of the animal desires. The rational

self has been wholly suppressed and rendered ineffective. These people have been brought up on these ideas. To improve their character is almost impossible, because the grounds which mislead them are too many.

- 4 Those who in addition to being brought up on the ideas mentioned above, are proud of doing evil and of leading others astray and regard it as a thing of honour. Improvement of such a character is the hardest of all. Only a conversion through Divine power can bring about a revolutionary change under these circumstances.

It is about the third and the fourth types of men that God has said³, "God has set a seal upon their hearts and upon their hearing, and over their eyes is a covering, and there is a great chastisement for them."

The first type is ignorant, the second ignorant and misguided, the third ignorant, misguided and wicked, and the fourth ignorant, misguided, wicked and devilish.

Improvement in character till man begins to act as a free agent involves development, and the seeker of truth in his upward flight may pass through three stages⁴.

1. That which is wholly evil. It is overpowered by passion, and acts according to their dictates. It tries to find ways and means

3. Cf. Quran, II, 7.

4. Ihya, Vol. III, pp. 39-41.

to gratify them. The light of reason has been almost extinguished. There is no distinction between the higher and the lower self. The lower self has become the ideal self. This consciousness is called in the Quran⁵ *an-Nafs-al-Ammarah*, the insinuating self.

2. That which is not settled and is unstable in good or evil, between which there is a constant struggle. Sometimes it is under the sway of the one and sometimes of the other. It is capable of doing both good and evil. There is a clear distinction between the lower and the higher self, but the lower self reveals itself in occasional impulses which one cannot quite subdue. This is called in the Quran⁶ *an-Nafs-al-Lawwamah*, the reproaching self.
3. The fixedly good and illumined consciousness. It has received the Light. It always acts according to the dictates of reason. The evil element has been rendered ineffective. In such a consciousness the destructive qualities are eliminated and the constructive ones are cultivated. At this stage the distinction between the two selves is lost to sight. The higher self, which is the true self, has become the master. Man has achieved perfect freedom.

5. Quran, XII, 53.

6. Quran, LXXV, 2.

This rational self has been called in the Quran⁷ as *as-Nafs al-Mutmainnah*, the self at Peace. The progress from the *an-Nafs-al-Ammarah* stage to the *an-Nafs-al-mutmainnah* stage through the efforts of man indicate clearly that man is free.

II

A close study of *Alam al-Jabrut*, the world of the human mind (Reason, Will, and Power), which is the bridge between '*Alam al-Mulk*' and '*Alam al-Malakut*' reveals how far man is free. Al-Ghazzali analyses the processes in the human mind leading to action, and points out the limits of human freedom and determinism⁸.

Impressions and ideas which enter unceasingly through the internal and external senses affect the human heart in one way or the other. Even if the senses are closed imagination and ideas which are already in the heart, affect it. Imagination through these ideas shift from one object to the other and with it the heart passes from one state to the other. The heart is never in the same state constantly.

Whatever impressions assail the heart are called *al-Khawatur*, i.e., ideas, which consist of thought and recollections, that is, the knowledge apprehended by the heart. Whatever the heart intends, resolves, etc., must first come to it as thought. These ideas are the springs

7 Quran, XXXIX, 27.

8. Ihya, Vol III, pp 23-27, Ibid, 35-38

of human action. They first excite *ar-Raghbah*, i.e., inclination or impulse. This inclination must, if an action is to take place, be followed by a process of the intellect leading to *al-I'tiqad*, i.e., conviction or permission of reason. Conviction is followed by *al-Iradah*, i.e., will. When will is formed it excites power, and action is carried out. Of these, idea and inclination are not under the complete control of man.

The ideas which lead to the operation of will are of two kinds⁹:

1. Those which lead to a good action, and
2. Those which lead to an evil action.

The first are known as *Ilham*, inspiration and the second as *al-Waswas*, lit. whisperings of Satan, i.e., seductions. Now, these two types of ideas are due to different elements in the nature of man, known as *ar-Rabbaniya*, the Divine, and *As-Shaitaniya*, the Satanic.

These elements in the nature of man are under the direct influence of forces in the cosmos, known as angelic and satanic forces, which are created to help or hinder the workings of the universe. The divine influence which enables the heart to receive the good idea is called *at-Taufiq*, the divine aid, and if the heart accepts the evil idea, it is called *al-Khidhlan*, the forsaken. In this way the heart of man is between the pulls of the angelic and the satanic influences¹⁰. By nature,

9. *Ihya*, III, p. 23.

10. *Ihya*, III, p. 23.

however, the heart is equally susceptible to the angelic as well as the satanic influences¹¹. The divine element is guided by "al-'Aql", i.e., reason, and the satanic element is led by "ash-Shahwah", i.e., "appetition," "al-Ghazab", i.e., "self-assertion" (lit., anger). Appetition and self-assertion inhabit the flesh and blood of man and through them the evil rules, and so the heart becomes the abode of Satan. But if appetite and anger are ruled and brought under the subjection of reason, the heart becomes the resting place of angels. The devil has many gates to enter the heart, but the angels have only one, i.e., reason. (Ihya, III, p. 27). The avenues of the devil's approach to the heart are appetite, self assertion and their innumerable offshoots, for example, envy, greed, malice, etc.¹²

The passage of ideas through the mind cannot be completely controlled. Good and bad ideas will flit across the mind of the saint or the moral wreck in spite of himself. The mind must be concentrated on God and spiritual things. But concentration of mind on one idea is only of a short duration. Good and bad ideas come into mind in quick succession. A man in deep meditation remains unaffected by every other thing. But the succession of ideas is so quick that the distinction cannot be marked. The heart is susceptible to both good and bad ideas. However, concentration of mind on God and spiritual things will greatly promote good

11 Ihya, III, p. 24.

12 Ihya, III, pp 27-31.

ideas and check bad ones¹³.

Idea is naturally and of necessity followed by inclination. Man cannot intervene.

Before pointing out the free or determined nature of the third step, conviction, knowledge, or permission of reason, we may discuss the various types of human action with reference to human reason and will¹⁴. Ghazzali gives three types of human actions.

1. Natural action (al-fi'l at-Tabi'i). The displacement of water as a man swims or wades through is a natural action, and obviously unaffected by human will.

2. Intentional action (al-fi'l al-Iradi). If a needle is raised towards the eye, the eyelids are at once closed. A man cannot do otherwise. The closing of the eye-lids in this case is an intentional action. The analysis of an intentional action gives the following facts¹⁵:

If a man moves a needle towards one's eyes or moves a drawn sword towards one's head, one's eyes in the former case will at once be closed and in the latter case one's hand will suddenly be raised to shield one's head. These prompt actions are due to the consciousness of the evils to be avoided, and this gives rise to volition which moves the eye and the hand without the least delay. Intentional actions are not blind responses, but are conscious processes. When a needle or a sword is raised, its perception comes to the mind and the knowledge of the dangers to be avoided is aroused at once. This gives

13. Ihya, III, pp. 38 & 39

14. Ihya, Vol. IV, pp. 219 ff

15. Ihya, Vol IV, p. 219.

rise to volition and the volition causes movements.

The natural as well as the intentional actions are both involuntary and necessary. The difference between the two is that the intentional action is preceded by perception and knowledge, while in the natural action perception of the object is not there

3. Voluntary action (al-fi'l-al-ikhtiyarī). All actions in which an alternative is possible and reason makes a choice, are voluntary actions, for example, committing suicide, and most of our actions in our daily practical life. In this respect we can say that things presented to the mind are of two types ¹⁶.

- (i) Those which our introspection or observation pronounces without deliberation as agreeable or disagreeable. No alternative is presented to the mind.
- (ii) Those about which our reason hesitates to pronounce such a judgement. Here an alternative is presented to the mind. The example of the first is that of the movement of a needle towards our eyes. Here we know that the averting of the danger is advantageous and therefore we do not hesitate. On account of this knowledge our will is at once formed and our power is roused to act in order to avoid the needle and our eye-lids at once closed. Though this action happened with intention, yet the intention was without hesitation or deliberation. Most of our actions where we

have a choice are voluntary actions. In these cases reason hesitates or is suspended until we know whether the action which is to be executed is agreeable or not, and we need deliberation until the intellect decides in favour of acceptance or rejection.

This is, however, a complex process during which the Satanic element in man tries to sway decision of reason. But it is for reason to repel its on-slaughts. The inherent strength of the instincts of appetition and self-assertion, and tendencies formed by previous acts are factors which often disturb the balance of this conflict. But when the intellect decides finally, it is followed by the will to execute the action, and the action will be executed unless there are any external hindrances in the way, e. g., sometimes the source of this will is too weak, to shake off the inertia, yet if the first idea is attractive to the heart, this will become strong and firm. Even then, sometimes something still more powerful suddenly claims one's attention and one forgets all about it¹⁷.

In voluntary actions too will is produced by knowledge, as it is produced in the first kind of actions. Now this will, which is produced after deliberation, when translated into acceptance or rejection constitutes "Ikhtiyar", lit. choice, i. e., freedom. The word "al-Ikhtiyar" is derived from "Khair" which means "Good". So "al-Ikhtiyar" means the choice of an idea or an object. When the decision of the intellect

17. Itya, Vol III, pp 35-37.

is accepted as good, one is impelled to act accordingly¹⁸.

From this discourse we understand that man is determined in natural and intentional actions¹⁹. In voluntary actions the occurrence of an idea is followed by inclination, or, in other words, the occurrence of desire is not under the complete control of man; but his reason is free to choose. Thus man is free to do what he desires, but his desiring is not in his power²⁰.

III

In Ghazzali another apparently opposite tendency stands out clearly. On the one hand, man can make or mar himself, he is free to choose, and, on the other, God is the disposer of everything. Nothing happens without His will. Whom He wills, He guides aright

18. Ihya, Vol. IV, pp. 219.

19. Ihya, Vol. IV, pp. 219.

20. Ihya, Vol. IV, pp. 218-219:—

فاعلم أنه لو كان مع هذا يشاء أن أراد أن يشاء
ولا يشاء أن لم يرد أن يشاء لكان هذا مزلة القدم وموقع
الغلط ولكن علم أنه يفعل ما يشاء إذا شاء أن يشاء أم
لم يشاء فليس المشيئة إليه إذ لو كان إليه لا فتقرت الي
مشيئة أخرى وتسلسل إلى غير نهاية. الخ

—*Cf.* Quran, Ch 77, 30-31. "This is a reminder so whoever please takes to his Lord a way. And you do not please except that God pleases. He makes whom he please to enter His mercy and for the unjust, He has prepared painful chastisement".

and whom He wills He leads astray. He wishes and decides what he chooses. All in heavens and earth proceeds from Him²¹.

To understand this apparently double tendency in Ghazzali with regard to freedom and compulsion, the responsibility of actions attributed to God and man, we now turn to another aspect of the problem.

Ghazzali, like Hume 700 years after, holds the sequence theory and rejects the efficiency theory of causation²².

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21. Ihya, Vol. III, pp. 41 & 42 Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 211-223 Cf. Quran, VI, 125; LXXXII, 13, 14; XXI, 23, etc.
22. (a) For a full discussion of this theory see Ghazzali's Tahafut, pp 277-296 ; Ihya, Vol. IV, pp. 220-223 , also Obermann, Der Philosophische und Religiöse Subjectivismus Ghazzali's (Leipzig, 1929) pp. 68-85.
- (b) D. B. MacDonald, "Journal of American Oriental Society for 1899," Vol. XX, part I, p 103, says, "In the Tahafut he had smitten the philosophers hip and thigh; he had turned, as in earlier times al-Ash'ari, their own weapons against them, and had shown that with their premises and method no certainty could be reached. In that book he goes to the extreme of intellectual scepticism, and, seven hundred years before Hume, he cuts the bond of causality with the edge of his dialectic, and proclaims that we can know
on next page)

Ghazzali denies that anything can produce anything. There is no power in the cause to produce the effect. There is no causal connection between things. They are not connected but conjoined. We see one thing preceding the other over and over again, and through habit begin to think that they are connected. In reality there is nothing as cause which produces effect. The fact is that antecedents have consequents.²³

"God alone is the efficient cause, but the ignorant have misunderstood and mis-applied the word, power."²⁴

"As to the orderly succession, let it be understood that the two events are conjoined like relations between the 'condition' and the conditioned'. Now, certain conditions are very apparent and can be known easily even by men of little understanding. But there are conditions which are understood only by those who see through the light of intuition. Hence the common error of miscalculating the uniformity of events"²⁵.

(Continued from page 64)

nothing of cause or effect, but simply that one thing follows another" Renan, "Averroes", p 74: "Hume n'a rien dit de plus". Munk in his book "Melange" (p. 379) has admirably summarized the arguments of Ghazzali against causality.

23. Ihya, Vol. IV, p. 220.

24. Ihya, Vol. IV, p. 220.

25. Ihya, Vol. IV, p. 220.

There is a divine purpose linking the antecedents to the consequents and manifesting itself in the existing orderly succession of events, without the least breach or irregularity²⁶ Some events succeed others in orderly succession, as the conditioned follows the condition in occurrence. We cannot say that life has been caused by the body, though body is the condition of life. In the same way, we must imagine the orderly succession of events in the universe. Whatever happens in the heavens or on the earth, happens according to a necessary and true order. As they occur, so must they occur. No other order can be conceived or imagined²⁷

26. Ihya, Vol. IV, p. 220

ولم يكن بعض المقدورات مترتب علي البعض
ترتب المشروط على الشرط .. كذا

27. Ihya, Vol. IV, p. 220. ولا يتقدم ولا يتأخر
مناحر الالهاحق والكرام Ghazzali, like Leibnitz, believes that the order of the things in which they occur is the only true order and it is according to the pre-ordained plan of the Creator who knew everything by fore-knowledge. No other order than the one in which the things happen can be conceived. This is the perfect and the most complete of the possible arrangements. And if there was a better arrangement and God could make it and He did not make it, then it shows a kind of niggardliness on the part of God. This is against His goodness and therefore impossible. And if God was

(see on next page)

"Verily", says the Quran, "We did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in sport. We did not create them both but with truth. But most of them do not know" (Cl. Quran, XLIV, 38, 39)

In short, God created life, knowledge, will and action, on the one hand, and, on the other an order (a system) external to them. He imposed the order upon the items. These items must conform to the order external to but imposed upon them. This order of succession is obligatory and necessary and is the result of divine planning (*al-hikmat al-azaliya* (Ihya, Vol. IV, p 221), which is very difficult to understand. Ghazzali does not want to enter into the metaphysical implications of this problem, because his aim is only to warn in the way of Tauhid which leads to action.

Ghazzali, as we have seen, denies cause in the sense of power or efficient force when applied to things other than God. The efficient cause is only one. According to him there is only one eternal power (*al-qudrat al-azaliya*) which is the cause of all created things. The meaning of this eternal power is known only to the illumined. The substance is one. All other

(Continued from page 66)

unable to make it better, it is against His power and wisdom. But He is all powerful and all-wise. Therefore it is unthinkable. So whatever is, is for the best and there is everywhere great harmony, order and beauty. (Ihya, Vol. IV, pp. 220-221).

things are accidents, they are created. The doer is only one.

Man is the author of his actions from one point of view and God from another. The relation of man's actions, on the one hand, to his power and will, is like the connection of the conditioned with the condition; and the relation of man's action to the divine power, on the other hand, is like the connection of the effect with its cause. But by common usage anything which is visibly connected with power, though it be only the abode or channel (*Mahall*) of power, is regarded as "cause". God is the real cause of man's actions, as a creative power. But man is the apparent cause of actions as in him the manifestation of uniform succession of events takes place. One who attributes all his actions to God has found the truth and has reached the real source.

Thus we have the apparent paradox that man is determined in his freedom²⁸. The Ash'arites use for this kind of determined freedom the word 'Kasb'.

When fire burns, it burns out of necessity (*jabr*). It is completely determined. God is wholly free. Man's action is between the two. He is not determined as fire, nor free as God. 'Kasb' (acquisition) is neither against freedom nor against determinism. For those who have insight, it is the sum of the two. God's action is *Ikhtiyar*, but that of man is not like that of God, because man's will is formed after hesitation and deliberation,

28. *Ihya*, Vol. IV, p. 220:—**فأذا هو مجبوراً على الاختيار**

which is impossible in the case of God. Deliberation is due to lack of knowledge. God's knowledge is perfect. He need no deliberation for His Ikhtiyar, i. e., choice²⁹

The word cause is used in the Quran in different

29 Cf W. R. Sorely 'Moral Values and the Idea of God', Cambridge, 1918, pp. 446-447. 'If we form a conception of a perfect or infinite mind, it is in this sense that we must speak of such a mind as free. To speak of choice between alternatives is to suggest that other than the best might be chosen and this would be inconsistent with the idea of perfection.

"A finite mind, limited in knowledge and power and distracted by desires other than the will of goodness, may yet have a partial measure of self-determination, which is complete only in the infinite. It is incompletely determined by forces external to itself. And if it stands as it does between the realm of nature and the realm of goodness, conscious of the good and yet beset by many temptations to fall to a lower level, then the relative independence or partial spontaneity of such a mind may be exhibited in the power to direct its own path toward the goal of goodness or to allow it to lapse into evil. Its freedom will not be complete agreement with the ideal of goodness but it will exclude total subordination to the forces beyond itself, and give opportunity for choosing and serving the good. In spite of its restrictions, human activity will be recognized as possessing a core of spontaneity."

senses: "The angel of death who is given charge of you shall cause you to die, then to your Lord you shall be brought back" (XXXII-II). "Allah takes the soul, at the time of their death" (XXXIX-42). "Have you considered what you saw?" (LVI-63) "We pour down the water pouring it down in abundance. Then we cause to grow therein grain" (LXXX-25-27). Fight them: Allah shall chastise them by your hands and will bring them to disgrace" (IX-14). "So you did not slay them, but it was Allah who slew them, and thou didst not smite when thou didst smite but it was Allah who smote, that He might confer upon the believers a good gift from Himself" (VIII, 17). "Whatever good befalleth thee (O man) it is from Allah, and whatever of ill befalleth thee it is from thyself."

"Ghazzali points out that negation and affirmation for one and the same action throw new light on the nature of causation. Negation affirms God as the real and efficient cause, Affirmation establishes man's free will faithfully executing divine order³⁷".

The above passages show that the word 'cause' signifies creative power, and must be applied to God alone. But as man's power is the image of God's power, to him the word has been applied only in its secondary sense. God alone is the real efficient cause, and the word must be applied to Him in its root sense, i.e., power. Is not everything delusive except God? A thing which cannot exist without the help of the other is not

real but delusive. There is only one such existence, the existence of God. He alone is self-existing. The existence of all other things depends upon Him. Everything is in His grip. He is the eternal and the everlasting. He is the manifest and the hidden. He is the first and the last. He is the eternal and the first and the last. He is eternal and first as compared with all created things. They have emanated from Him one after another in an orderly succession. He is the last from the point of view of the seeker. In his spiritual progress, He is the last stage to be reached. So He is the first in existence and the last in experience. Similarly, He is hidden to those who want to see Him in this sensible world through their senses, and He is manifest to those who see Him through the eye of reason and to whom the mysteries of the supersensuous world have been unfolded.

This is the doctrine of "Tauhid" (Unity of Existence) which means that all the causes, nay, all activity mental or material begins and terminates in Him who is the first cause, the mover and fashioner of the universe.

Further light can be thrown on the problem of determinism and freedom of the will by giving a brief resume of a long and detailed allegory which al-Ghazzali cites to illustrate his views²¹ :—

A devotee saw a paper with a spot of ink on it. He asked the paper why it had blackened its face. The paper excused itself by making the ink responsible for it. The ink being asked, made the pen responsible, saying that it was living in an inkpot quite innocently

31. Ihyā, Vol. IV, pp. 215-218.

when the pen disturbed its comfort. The pen on its part tried to prove its innocence and related its life history and the cruelty of the hand in depriving it of its home and removing its skin and shaping it with a sharp knife and then putting it into the ink-pot and removing the ink from it and letting it fall on the paper. The pen had no power and the hand was wholly responsible for the spot. The hand on its part explained its inability to do anything of its own accord. It was no better than a piece of clay or stone. It was moved only by Power without which it was no better than a dead mass of matter. The devotee then asked Power which answered thus: "I am not to blame. I was latent in the hand long before it moved. I was absolutely inactive. I was neither in motion nor had I the ability to impart motion of my own accord. A certain agent came, shook me and obliged me to work. I had no power to resist its orders. This agent is called 'Will' I know it only by name." The answer of Will when asked for was: "The mind sent an agent named 'Knowledge,' who delivered his message to me through Reason to raise Power to action and I was simply compelled to obey, though I do not know the reason of my obedience. By nature I am inactive and I remain so as long as my master hesitates and deliberates. As soon as he has decided, I accept his orders unquestionably. So please do not rebuke me but ask Knowledge." The devotee then turned to Mind, Knowledge and Reason for an explanation. Reason said that it was a lamp which was not self-illuminated and did not know who lighted it. Mind replied that

it was a mere *tabula rasa* which had been spread by some one other than himself. Knowledge excused itself by saying that it was a mere inscription made on tablet after the lamp of Reason had become luminous. Knowledge was not the author of the inscriptions. "You better ask the Pen³²," said Knowledge, "as there can be no inscription without the Pen."

When the devotee heard from Knowledge about Pen, Lamp, Tablet, Inscription etc., he was perplexed and made the observation that he was being driven from pillar to post without getting a satisfactory reply. Hitherto he had been receiving some concrete answers, but the answers given by Knowledge had cut the ground from under his feet and he knew no where to go next. The ink, the reed, the pen, the hand, etc., could be seen. But the Tablet other than that of wood or metal, the Lamp other than those lighted with oil and fire, the Writing other than written with ordinary pen on ordinary paper or tablet were wholly incomprehensible to him. He was, therefore, wholly at a loss what to do.

Knowledge, hearing the complaints of the devotee answered that he (the devotee) was right, for he was not in a position to continue his journey, not having the equipment necessary to pursue the path successfully and reach the destination. But if he was still determined to attain his goal, he must listen to Knowledge most attentively. Seeing that the devotee was determined, Knowledge proceeded as follows—

"Your journey consists of three stages : (1) The

32. i. e., the celestial Pen.

terrestrial world (*'Alam al-Mulk*), the objects of which can be perceived with the physical senses. This region you have left behind. (2) The celestial world (*'Alam al-Malakut*) which lies beyond the physical senses. The Pen which writes on the heart belongs to this world which will begin when you see this Pen. This world is full of dangers and I do not know you will be able to overcome them. (3) The intermediate world (*'Alam al-Jabrut*) or the world of power. It lies between the first two and serves as a link between them. You have travelled three stages of this, viz., Power, Will and Knowledge.

“The celestial world begins when the Pen which records Knowledge on the heart becomes visible and man acquires unshaken faith of the reality of the unseen world. If you cannot see the Pen then you better discontinue your journey.”

The devotee opened his eyes wide to see the celestial Pen, as he was in the habit of seeing a physical pen. His mind was accustomed to experience the things of the physical world. He failed to see the celestial Pen. Knowledge again helped him by giving him further hints to have conception of the celestial world which was devoid of physical determinations and limits, and proceeded to explain in this way. “The furniture of the house is according to the status of the dweller. Now, God does not resemble anything. So His attributes are also transcendental. He is beyond space and time. His Hand, Pen, Writing, Speaking, etc., are unlike the things we experience in this world. One who has a right con-

ception of Him can apprehend Him and His attributes. You do not seem to have a right conception of Him. Then listen, there are three categories of men as regards their apprehension of Him: (1) Those who conceive Him as transcendental and believe Him to be not only above all material limitations but also above the limitations of metaphor. (2) Those who conceive Him as an anthropomorphic being. (3) Those who believe Him to be neither of the two and yet both. They hold a middle position. It seems that you belong to this position. You believe that He is immaterial and yet you cannot have a transcendental conception of His Hand, Pen and Tablet.'

As the devotee heard this learned discourse of Knowledge, he realized his shortcomings. This realization was the starting point of his ascent. His consciousness of his ignorance regarding the nature and essence of the reality of things aroused in him a sense of shame and self-reproach which tore away the curtain which was hindering him from seeing the realities. The light of Knowledge dawned upon his heart and the curtains from his eyes fell away. He witnessed the spiritual realities as they were. The devotee then thanked Knowledge for its invaluable help and proceeded on his journey further. Now he asked the invisible Pen as to why it writes sentences on the heart of men, which produce Will which moves the Power whereby voluntary actions result. The invisible Pen told him to address the inquiry to the Hand which was the cause of its activities. The Hand told him to direct his inquiries

to the Power. The devotee then asked the Power and received the answer: "I am merely a quality, you should better ask the possessor of the quality." The devotee was about to ask the Omnipotent, when he heard a voice from on high, saying: "He cannot be asked what He does, and they shall be asked". The devotee was overawed and became unconscious, in which state he remained for a long time. When he came to his senses he poured forth his heart in silence. "Thou art divine and beneficent. I shall fear no mortal. Thy forgiveness is my solace. Thy mercy is my refuge. O, God! open my heart so that I may know Thee. Untie the knot of my tongue." A voice came from behind the curtain, "Stop, do not transcend the limits of the prophets. Return and follow them in everything. Take what they give you and do what they ask you to do. You can have only this from the Divine favour, that you have known the great fact that you cannot know Him, His beauty and grandeur".

When the devotee heard the voice he realized his limits and returned to the World of Power (*'Alam al-Jabrut*) and accepted the excuses of Knowledge, Reason, Will. Power, the hand, the pen, the ink and the paper, because the devotee had realized now that God was the only cause (*fa'il*). The other substances spoken of as causes were merely such in a metaphorical sense. Every thing proceeds from Him and returns to Him. He is

32. Quran, XXI, 23.

34. *Ihya*, Vol IV, p. 917

the first and the last, the manifest and the hidden, the architect of the universe.

It would not have been logical if al-Ghazzali had derived his doctrine of God as the cause of all causes from his sequence theory of causation. It seems that al-Ghazzali derived his sequence theory from his realization of God as the sole cause and the moving force in the universe.

Al-Ghazzali describes four classes of those who profess faith in the doctrine of the one Doer. Of these only two relevant classes need be mentioned.

1. The common people who believe in it by faith, or on the basis of philosophy.
2. The 'illuminated' who had a vision of Reality, and spiritually realized that He is all in all, the only Doer, the only Mover.

This experience is, in rare cases, a permanent state. In other minds this vision sometimes flashes through like lightning. But to the illuminated the evidence of this experience is more real than that of the physical senses.

Al-Ghazzali was not only a great philosopher but a great mystic too. His position with regard to the freedom of man is based upon his study and experience of the phenomenal and the transcendental worlds ('*Alam al-Mulk*', '*Alam al-Jabrut*' and '*Alam al-Malakut*'). This is what explains his apparently paradoxical position, that man is determined and yet free.

**AL-GHAZZALI'S APPROACH TO ULTIMATE
REALITY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
RELATION OF THOUGHT AND INTUITION
IN HIS AND IQBAL'S SYSTEMS
SYNOPSIS**

- I. The three grades of the knowledge of God, taqlid (imitation) deduction and intuition '*ilm al-mukashafa*?
- II. (i) What is '*ilm al-mukashafa* ?
 (ii) '*Ilm al-mukashafa* of non-seekers of God.
 (iii) Saints without '*ilm al-mukashafa*.
 (iv) The roots of '*ilm al-mukashafa* in love of God and yearning for Him.
- III. (i) The two worlds—Sensual and spiritual—one shadow, the effect or the symbol of the other
 (ii) Man must naturally yearn for the knowledge of the spiritual world.
 (iii) Physical world-Spiritual World
- IV. (i) Man is endowed with the power to apprehend the spiritual world-Reason.
 (ii) Reason, a spiritual essence equipped with the senses essential for existence in this world of time and space This equipment is a veil which might, through purification, be made into a transparent glass as it were. The

veil will be dropped temporarily during this life as well, if the light of reason is pure and uncorrupted, and there is a desire for the knowledge of God

V Al-Ghazzali has been charged by Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal with the ignorance of the following:—

- (i) That thought and intuition are organically related.
- (ii) That the finitude of thought is imposed upon it by its very nature,
- (iii) That thought and intuition complement and rejuvenate each other.
- (iv) That intuition is only a higher form of intellect. But al-Ghazzali exactly holds the views with the ignorance of which he has been charged.

Al-Ghazzali does not deny thought as means of reaching the infinite. In what sense he believes it and in what sense he denies it?

Again, Dr. Iqbal charges al-Ghazzali with the ignorance of the dynamic nature and the internal infinitude of thought.

Al-Ghazzali's conception of the infinitude of thought and process of knowledge.

VI. Forms of intuitive experience, *ilham-wahy*.

- (i) *Ilham*. Dropping of an idea in the mind, the "whence" and "how" of which is not understood. Example from al-Ghazzali's life.
- (ii) In sleep
- (iii) While awake, intuition of an idea clothed in

familiar forms. In *muraqaba*, sudden dropping of the veil of the senses.

Intuition may be symbolic-idea or impression from unseen world clothed directly in images from the storehouse of memory within the range of experience

VII. Reality seen face to face-Examples.

Inherent difficulties in acquiring the knowledge of God.

- (i) Mysteries and wonders of the world, an evidence of God. But we come in contact with them when 'aql is immature, later on they appear as common-place. The veil of dominance of passions and appetites.
- (ii) God's Light by which everything manifests itself and even exists, like the light which manifests colour. He is too obvious to be observed. Method of contraries inapplicable. Were God to be withdrawn the universe would collapse simultaneously.

VIII. '*Ilm al-mukashafa* at its highest reveals not only that God is the only Light but also the only being. Everything exists in its God-aspect. Nothing but God exists by itself. This is called realising One-and Onliness of God-Unitarian experience, misunderstood as *ittihad*, highest point of ascent. Next stage in progress: Descent-Goal of goals, what next ?

Foot Note :—(i) Examination of al-Ghazzali's conception of God re-pantheism. Writer's opinion of al-Ghazzali's position.

(ii) Brief view of Mujaddid Ahmad Sirhindi about descent: quotation from Dr. Iqbal to the 'same effect.

IX. The veils to the knowledge of God. Al-Ghazzali's classification of men and creeds; men who have the veils of pure darkness, mixed light and darkness, pure light and men who are unveiled. The unveiled and God absolutely unpredicable. Various beliefs relating to the relation of God to the movement of the heaven made the difference for various grades of the gnostics of Allah. The problem of *muta'*, the Obeyed One

Gairdner's opinion that this scheme embodies the inner-most thoughts of al-Ghazzali. Writer's opinion that the scheme is stupendous but insufficiently thought out—Why? Al-Ghazzali's attitude as revealed in his life-work.

There are various grades of the knowledge of God. The lowest grade is the faith of the common people based on authority and tradition. The higher grade is the knowledge of the learned based on deduction and reflection. But the highest knowledge is *'ilm al-Mukashafa* (Ihya, Vol. 3, 14; Vol. 1, pp. 18-19)

'Ilm al-Mukashafa is a certitude which is the result of the light that God instils into the heart when it is purged of vices and filled with virtues, through *'ilm al-Muamala* (Ihya, Vol. 2 p. 17). It is the knowledge which comes to the intimates (siddiqin) of God³⁵, and relates to God and the unseen.

35. Writers on sufiism are agreed that certain forms of visionary experiences are common to men, irrespective of what religion they belong to. Mujaiddid Ahmad Sirhindi points out (Epistle, No. 293) that there are two forms of *'Ilm al-Mukashafa*. One relates to the knowledge of God, His attributes, and His acts, this is the peculiar privilege of those who are near unto Allah. The second is bits of information relating to the unseen in this world of men and their affairs. This latter can be acquired by self-discipline and freedom from dominance of the senses even by those who do not seek God. Those who are filled with the love of God and are always occupied with his remembrance, pay no heed to this world and are often deficient in this type of *'ilm al-Mukashafa*, and are, therefore, not recognized by the common people. They are occupied with that which relates to God and His acts, in which kind of knowledge the common people are not interested. Al-Ghazzali, though he did not make this distinction clearly, pointed out that *'ilm al-Mukashafa* relates to the knowledge of God, the essence of things, and that it cannot be attained without acquiring *'ilm al-mu'amala*, of which the love of God and

(See on next page)

Its basis is direct vision or experience. One realizes with certainty through personal experience the truths which formerly one accepted on the evidence of authority or deduction. Believers hold different views about the nature of God, angels, Heaven, Hell, Prophethood, revelation and essence of things. But through 'ilm al-Mukashafa doubts are removed and realities are revealed sometimes in their nakedness, though often symbolically. 'Ilm al-Mukashafa is acquired gradually as one's heart becomes more and more purified. Sometimes, in rare cases, it comes with a single leap. Another factor that determines 'ilm al-Mukashafa is Divine Grace. But God promises His grace to those who toil in His way. However, the mysteries that are not revealed on this earth will be revealed in the next³⁶.

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thirst for the knowledge of Reality is the most important aspect. He has unambiguously pointed out (Ihya, 3, p. 12) that if a man occupies himself with the purification of the heart and does not seek God he will not attain the knowledge of God. Whatever then he attains will not be 'Ilm al-Mukashafa. Even Mujaddid Ahmad Sirhindi arrives exactly at the same conclusion. Moreover, Allah does not look upon this effort and this kind of knowledge with favour for it keeps man occupied with non-God.

36. Visionary experiences and knowledge of mysteries of God are no certain criterion for determining the nearness to Allah. 'Ilm al-Mukashafa brings a

(See on next page)

So he who seeks God sets before himself *'ilm al-Mukashafa* as his goal. He starts with *taqlid* and knowledge by contemplation and meditation, but seeks to know God and the essence of things directly for himself through *'ilm al-Muamala*.

Al-Ghazzali conceives the world as having two faces (*Mishkat al-Anwar*, p. 28), naming them differently as the material (*'Alam al-Mahsus* or *Mushahadah* or *mulk*) and the Celestial world (*'Alam al-Malakut*) or the world of senses (*'Alam al-Hiss*) and the world of intelligence (*'Alam al-Aql*) or the Higher World (*'Alam al-'Alawi*) and the Lower World (*'Alam al-Sifli*). All these expressions mean one and the same thing. This transcendental world is beyond the ken of sense and imagination. The physical world is a direct consequence, a manifestation, a symbol of the transcendental world. "The seen world is to the World Celestial as rind is to the kernel, or as the form to the spirit, or as darkness to light, and lowness to loftiness". He who never yearns for the knowlegde of the spiritual world and remains occupied

(Continued from page 83)

certitude of knowledge. There are often true ones (*siddiqin*) of God who are granted this certitude without visionary experiences or other forms of *'ilm al-Mukashafa*. But al-Ghazzali would regard this certitude fixed in the heart of the Friend (*Wali*) of God as a form of *ilham* dropped in the heart without the Friend's consciousness of its sources or its manner of coming to him, and in his opinion this would constitute one of the real forms of *'ilm al-Mukashafa*.

wholly with the seen world is a brute, nay, worse than that, for the brutes are not furnished with wings for flight to the unseen world as man is.

It is only through the physical world that one can rise to the spiritual world, for they are related to each other intrinsically. The world that is beyond the apprehension of sense and imagination may, from the viewpoint of the pilgrim to God, be called the Fold of the Divine, the Holiness. There are folds within folds and no man shall attain unto Allah until he has traversed the highest. Thus, there are grades of ascension in the spiritual world, and the pilgrim's progress along the 'Straight Path' (Qur'an, 1, 4) is his progress through these folds (Mishkat al-Anwar, pp 28-29). The lowest heaven of the pilgrim is that of the earth from which proceeds his bodily movement. his sensation proceeds from the next heaven above, and his Reason from the next still above. From here the soul spreads wings for its upward flight to what seems unity with Pure Deity, a Seven-Fold way (Mishkat al-Anwar, p 24).

Man is endowed with the power to apprehend the spiritual world. It is a power in the heart of man which is termed variously as the transcendental prophetic spirit (Mishkat al-Anwar, p. 40), the Human Soul (Mishkat al-Anwar, p 6), the Divine Light, the light within, the Hidden Light, the Light of faith, Insight, Reason (Ihya, p 255), etc. To the man who knows, says al-Ghazzali, this multiplicity of terms implies only one idea (Mishkat al-Anwar, p. 6). He prefers to call it Reason. This is the power to which God referred in the

Qur'an, "And thus did we inspire thee with a spirit from our power. Thou didst not know what the book was, nor (what) the faith was but we made it a light guiding thereby whom we please of our servants (Qur'an, 42, 52) "

Reason is as free to move in the world of dominance and sense as in the Realm Celestial (Mishkat al-Anwar, p 7). In itself its proper sphere is the Realm Celestial. But for the perception and knowledge of the world of Dominance and Sense it is equipped with external and internal senses. But this equipment, while it is essential for the existence of this spiritual entity in the Physical world, becomes a veil between Reason and the unseen world and a source of error in the apprehension of that world (Mishkat al-Anwar, p. 10.) This veil of the senses will be cast off after Death and, then, man will witness the unseen Realities, as if with his physical eyes. God will say unto man, 'We have stripped from thee the veil that covered thee, and thy vision this day is sharp' (Cf. Mishkat al-Anwar, p. 10). This verse is quoted by al-Ghazzali and the use of the word *kashf* in this case confirms the theory developed subsequently that 'ilm al-Mukashafa is the direct intuition of Reality when the veil of the senses has been lifted

The authority of the senses is, in certain circumstances, suppressed even when we are alive, as in sleep. It so happens often also while we are awake. Then if the light of Reason is pure and uncorrupted and man is lost in the remembrance of God, (Ihya, Vol. 3, pp. 17-18) he will perceive unseen Realities directly in a way that can be best expressed by saying 'intuitively'. But this.

veil of 'sense and imagination' though gross may also be clarified and refined by freeing life from the Dominance of the senses so that the light of Reality may filter through. In the case of the prophets this veil becomes, as it were, transparent glass and they can see God in the physical world which becomes a 'Niche' for His Light.

Dr. Iqbal says that al-Ghazzali "...failed to see that thought and intuition are organically related and that thought must necessarily simulate finitude and inconclusiveness because of its alliance with serial time" (Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 5). He himself points out the relationship between thought and intuition in another passage in the same book. 'Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring up from the same root and complement each other. The one grasps Reality Piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspect of Reality. The one is present enjoyment of the whole of Reality; the other aims at traversing the whole by slowly specifying and closing up the various regions of the whole for exclusive observation. Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek visions of the same Reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life. In fact intuition, as Bergson rightly says is only a higher kind of intellect' (Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 2-3).

Al-Ghazzali not only holds the same view, as men-

tioned above but also develops it elaborately. As shown above, according to al-Ghazzali, the proper activity of reason is intuition. Thought is a form of activity imposed upon reason by the necessity of the senses, in a world of time and space, and the finite and temporal nature of thought is conditioned by these limitations. Thus, thought and intuition, according to al-Ghazzali also, have the same roots and they are organically related. Intuition, Bergson says, is only a higher form of intellect. Intuition, al-Ghazzali would say, is the higher form of intellect, when the intellect is freed from the limitations of the senses (Mishkat al-Anwar. p. 37),

Al-Ghazzali does not deny thought as means of reaching the Infinite. "These grostics of God after their descent from the Heaven of Reality are agreed that they saw nothing existent but One Being. But of these some have reached this stage by thought while others have reached it by ecstasy and experience" (Mishkat al-Anwar, p. 19)

Again, "The knowledge of the reality of the world that is in the heart sometimes comes through the senses (thoughts directed to the world of senses) and sometimes from the preserved Tablet itself even as the form of the sun is perceived by the eye, sometimes by looking at it direct and sometimes by looking at its reflection through water, and this reflection does not differ in its form from the original" (Ihya, Vol 3, p 11). There is no difference between intuitive knowledge (ilham) and knowledge acquired by reflection with regard to their respective nature, seats and sources except in so far as

they are different forms of activity. Intuition, according to al-Ghazzali, depends on Divine grace as well. The introduction of the religious element cannot make his theory unacceptable until the unknown factor in intuition is determined. (Ihya, Vol. 3, p. 16, 18). We might say in the words of Iqbal that the one (intuition) fixes its gaze on eternal, the other (thought) on the temporal aspect of Reality. Both seek visions of Reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life.

Thought and intuition complement each other. The learned in their search after God insist more on thought and contemplation, while the Sufis emphasize more the purification of the heart, to prepare it for direct intuitive experience, yet contemplation is an essential part of the discipline of the Sufi, and it is often during contemplation that intuitive experience comes as a climax; as if sense and imagination suddenly become like a transparent glass. The learned who seek Reality through thought are greatly rejuvenated by intuitive experience, for with this experience they become established in knowledge (Qur'an, 3: 6).

Al Ghazzali, denies thought as a means to the knowledge of God, when it is scrupulously divorced from non-conceptual modes of approaching Reality, and based entirely upon logic. To take an illustration from the life of al-Ghazzali himself, when at the age of twenty-eight he set his mind on the search for truth, and began to examine the foundations of certitude he found that he could not trust the evidence of his senses. But logi-

ally, he could not trust the evidence of his intellect either, for who knows that all this life be like a dream and we might find all knowledge attained here vain and unreal when we wake up in another life. Al-Ghazzali was filled with profound scepticism and left paralysed. He was in this state for two months, and then came light not from argument and logic but from within, came as a reassurance that the light of reason was not a mere hallucination. Al-Ghazzali trusted this light and proceeded on his journey sifting truth from falsehood by argument and logic till he found that truth lay with the sufis. If he had remained consistent and logical distrusting the light of intuition he would have wandered far from truth as has done many another philosopher. It is in this sense that al-Ghazzali distrusts thought as an instrument for the knowledge of God. To know Reality, Thought and Intuition should work as allies complementing and rejuvenating each other.

Dr Iqbal says further: "Both Kant and Ghazzali failed to see that thought, in the very act of knowledge passes beyond its own finitude. The finitudes of Nature are reciprocally exclusive. Not so the finitudes of thought which is, in its essential nature, incapable of limitation and cannot remain imprisoned in the narrow circuit of its own individuality. In the wide world beyond itself nothing is alien to it. It is in its progressive participation in the life of the apparently alien that thought demolishes the walls of its finitude and enjoys its potential infinitude. Its movement becomes possible

only because of the implicit presence in its finite individuality of the infinite, which keeps alive with it the flame of aspiration and sustains it in its endless pursuit. It is mistake to regard thought as inconclusive, for it too, in its own way, is a greeting of the finite with the infinite'. (The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam p. 2)

Again 'In its essential nature, then, thought is not static, it is dynamic and unfolds its internal infinitude in time like the seed which, from the very beginning, carries within itself the organic unity of the tree as a present fact. Thought is therefore, the whole in its dynamic self-expression, appearing to the temporal vision as a series of definite specifications which cannot be understood except by a reciprocal reference. Their meaning lies not in their self-identity, but in the larger whole of which they are the specific aspects. This larger whole is, to use a Qur'anic metaphor, a kind of 'Preserved Tablet', which holds up the entire undetermined possibilities of knowledge as a present reality, revealing itself in serial time as a succession of finite concepts appearing to reach a unity which is already present in them' (The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 6)

The following will throw light on the dynamic nature of thought and its internal infinitude which Dr. Iqbal has pointed out

Al-Ghazzali pointed out (Ihya, Vol 3, p. 25. Urdu) that no knowledge through thought can be attained without previous knowledge. There take place analyses synthe-

ses and various dispositions of the known as we advance towards the unknown. Thus the parent thought always has in it the germs of all the knowledge that follows, and it is in a way a self-unfoldment of the same seed with nourishment and engrafting from observation, experience, and reflection. To illustrate by analogy the germ-plasm of the first parent of humanity has not yet died out. It is living on from man to man and generation to generation and is still unfolding itself in the germ plasm of the new births.

While explaining the Light-Veree (Mishkat al Anwar pp 24-25) in the Qur'an he says that the light of thought is symbolised in the Qur'an by 'a Blessed Olive tree which is neither of East nor of the West'. From the trunk of a parent proposition we advance towards a complete tree of knowledge the ramifications of which are un-ending ever-progressing, 'each conclusion becoming a seed for further conclusions'. The Tree is not to be symbolised by a quince or apple or pomegranate tree, but by Olive tree because the fruit of the Olive tree yields light and the brightest of all oils and so does the fruit of thought yield bright light. Since the fruit of thought is unlimited it is to be symbolised by an Olive tree that is Blessed. Since thought does not exist in space and recognizes no direction nor nearness nor distance, it is said that this tree is neither from the East nor from the West (Mishkat al-Anwar, p 44). The above is only a prosaic way of saying what Dr. Iqbal has expressed in a terse and definite language. "Thought in the very acts of knowledge passes beyond its finitude, etc."

Again, in *Mishkat* contrasting the light of Reason with the eye he points out that Reason apprehends concepts and concepts cannot be conceived as finite. The knowledge content presented to the mind or present in it at any one moment is finite, but potentially it is cognitive of the infinite; for example, reason apprehends the series of integers which are infinite, again, Reason knows that it possesses the knowledge of things and so on to ad infinitum.

From this it seems that al-Ghazzali was conscious of the infinite reaches of thought and of the fact that thought is potentially a microcosm containing infinity within it as the seed has the tree. The progress of thought is a process of self-unravelling, for as thought is progressing from concept to concept each time it is materialising and presenting the potentialities with a larger concept. *

All forms of *'ilm al-Mukashafa* or knowledge from the higher world, are conveyed to man by agents of that world known as angels (*Mishkat al-Anwar*, p. 30). The highest form of *'ilm al-Mukashafa* or intuitive experience is *wahy*, which is the privilege of the prophets and in which the Messenger Angel assumes a visible form before the prophet. All other forms of intuitive experience are *'ilham*. The commonest form of intuition is putting in the mind some knowledge or an idea the whence, why, or how of which we do not know and cannot understand. Other forms in which intuitive knowledge comes to man are dreams or waking visions (*Ihya*, Vol. 3, p. 16).

In sleep the senses cease to function and the soul is

left free from the preoccupation with the world of senses. Then often enough for the souls of the virtuous the veil from the unseen world is withdrawn, and a person receives knowledge, from that world, of things distant in space and time, especially of things that are yet in the womb of the future, and ideas or impressions imprinted and preserved in *al-Lawh al-Mahfuz* are conveyed to him in advance. All objects and all acts, all that exists in this world, or has existed since its creation or will exist till the day of resurrection, already exist, imprinted in the spiritual world on the *al-Lawh al-Mahfuz* or the Preserved Tablet. It, only for a time assumes a physical garb and then doffs it. Just as the imagination clothes ideas that come to the mind with words, similarly in that state of sleep the imagination clothes the ideas and impressions conveyed to it from the unseen world, in familiar forms stored in memory, which are either a direct representation of the idea or are symbolic of it (Al-Madnun, p. 5; Mishkat al-Anwar, p. 38). We never see in dream God or the prophet themselves but the idea of them clothed in form and colour. This idea or image is made by God a vehicle of knowledge. Only this symbol or image will have some correspondence with the quality of the imagined or the symbolised, e.g., the image of God must be usually light, or some beautiful form as befits the beauty and greatness of God. An enemy may be symbolised by a snake, a voluptuary by a pig, the devil by a toad, etc. Similarly God may be visualised by the symbol of beauty, grandeur and majesty.

Preoccupation with passion and appetites acts as a

veil between the mind and the spiritual world. The soul is not drawn towards the spiritual world but towards its dominant interests and so dreams are a fulfilment of the secret desires of man. (Ihya, Vol. 4, pp. 154-155)

What is possible in sleep is possible in wakefulness, if the authority of the senses over the soul is suppressed by self-discipline, inherent strength of the transcendental prophetic spirit, and the grace of God. An illustration (Mishkat al-Anwar, pp 37-39) of a waking vision may be cited from al-Ghazzali. The prophet said that he saw Abdur Rahman b. Awf enter Paradise crawling. The Prophet saw this while awake. The soul got the intuition of the idea, and directly the internal senses clothed the idea in a form analogous to the idea. The riches of Abdur Rahman dragged him down to this world, so much so that his strong faith and great piety could but with difficulty work his salvation. The difficulty of entering heaven due to the downward pull of excessive worldly possessions was symbolised by the imagination by a crawl. The Prophet saw the image with his eyes. It was a truth that he saw, but it was not the person of Abdur Raman but the personified idea. It is a universal truth perceived intuitively in the person of Abdur Rahman. Thus can be explained all the waking visions of the Prophet relating to the dead or the living as visions of spiritual ideas clothed in analogous images.

This phenomenon of intuitive experience by symbols could be explained by assuming that the heart has two windows (Ihya, Vol. 3, pp. 34,35), contiguous to each other,

one opening towards the world of sense, and the other towards the Realm Celestial forming the opening for the entrance of *illham* and *wahy*. This latter window opens for those who are not under the dominance of senses. Whatever knowledge or light comes to the heart from the Realm Celestial casts its reflection on both these aspects of the heart. Whatever is perceived by this celestial aspect of the heart is perceived by means of images, directly drawn from the great storehouse of images from the celestial world itself and corresponding to the impressions realised by the senses. In the world of sense where we perceive first the image and then idea there is always a room for discrepancy between the form and the spirit, for in the case of those whose sense and imagination have remained gross on account of slavery to the senses the light of Reality will not filter through, therefore in the resultant darkness there will always be found room for mistake (Mishkat al-Anwar, p 37). But in the knowledge from the Celestial world the idea is perceived first and then directly given a suitable form. Hence there is a certain correspondence between the form and the spirit. (Ihya, Vol. 3, pp 34-35). In the case of spiritual adepts this window is almost constantly opened so that the spiritual perception is not interrupted even during the waking hours (Ihya, Vol. 3, p 13).

In purging the heart of vices, and adorning it with virtues, as indicated above, rests the principle of general self-discipline which prepares the heart for the intuitive knowledge of God. *Marqaba* or Contemplation is a particular form of practice which prepares the heart for-

immediate intuitive experience provided the heart is already sufficiently purified. It consists of complete mental detachment from all environment, and concentration upon the physical heart, and then, as it were, waiting for the light to come to the heart. This is how often knowledge from God is directly flashed or communicated to the heart.

The method of seeking knowledge from the depths of the heart by closing completely the paths of the senses may be likened to the digging out of the pond, and obtaining purer and fresher water from beneath, after the inlets pouring in water from outside have been closed (Ihya, Vol. 3, p. 17). About the explanation, already given in this section, of the source and manner of the knowledge that comes to man Macdonald says, "It is a startling anticipation of Wordsworth's 'eternal deep haunted forever by the eternal mind' and of a still more recent conception of a subliminal self in direct touch with the Infinite" (The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam, pp. 263—264).

Sometimes one sees reality not in symbols but clothed in physical nakedness. The Prophet usually saw the Messenger Angel in the form of *Wahya Kalby* who possessed an extremely beautiful person. Twice however he saw the Angel in his real form. Once he saw him on the night of his Ascent at *Sadrat-al-Muntaha*, and once, on another occasion, when at the request of the Prophet the Angel appeared at the top of *Koh-i-Hira*, and filled the whole earth from East to West (Ihya, Vol. 3, p. 15).

Such a vision may usually take the form of sudden flash which might overwhelm the soul. It may be of a short or long duration, and may occur at short or long intervals. This dropping off of the veil of senses might be something analogous to the experience of Wordsworth, frequent in childhood though rare in advanced age:—

“Those obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things.
Falling from us vanishings;
Blank misgiving of a Creature
Moving about in worlds not realised,
High instincts before which our mortal
nature
Did tremble like a guilty [thing surprised”
(Ode : “Intimations, etc)

The infinite marvels of the universe are an overwhelming evidence of the living, infinitely wise and powerful God. Yet the common people often do not realise it. One of the reasons is that man comes into contact with the wonders and mysteries of the heavens and the earth, and what is between them, almost from the beginnings of life when his reasoning faculties have not yet developed. When he becomes mature the objects have become too familiar, and seem commonplace ; moreover now he becomes the victim of appetites and passions which act as a veil to truth. Men are familiar with such an infinite variety of forms of life and beauty that a sudden revelation of something new may not move them to wonder and yet it is often on such occasions

that men cry out, spontaneously, in praise and admiration of their Creator, "The hand that made us is Divine". If a wise man, blind by birth, were suddenly to possess sight and stand in the midst of the wonderful panorama of form and colour and witness the mysterious forces and the stupendous powers and magnitudes of the universe, he would be simply filled with awe and ecstasy, rather the probability is that he would be overpowered and bewildered, and even lose his reason (Ihya, Vol. 4, p. 276).

"God is the Light of the Heavens and the Earth", (Qur'an, 24-35) but only to those who know there is nothing so utterly manifest as Allah; and yet it is by this very fact that He is hidden from the sight of the common people. When we see the various colors, the red, the blue, and the green during the day time, we may deny that there exists light, alongside the blue and the red and the green. We see the colors and think that they exist by themselves. Were there eternal sunlight of unchanging shade, only the wisest few would believe that colours owe their manifestation or even existence to something inseparably blended with the sunlight, although that something is the most manifest of all things and through it along all things become manifest. The truth of this phenomenon, though difficult to conceive, becomes evident when night follows the day. This method of contraries however, cannot be applied to God. Allah is obscure to the common people because He is too obvious. He is concealed in the excessive effulgence of His own glory (Ihya, Vol. 4., pp. 275-276; Mishkat al-Anwar, pp. 24-27).

But Allah's gnostics (*Arifeen*) know as if they witness, with their own eyes, not only that Allah alone is the Real Light, but also He alone is the Real Being; not only that there is no Deity but He but also that "There is no He but He". "None but He possesses selfhood and identity, all other individualities are referred to only in a figurative sense, that is, their existence is only a reflection of the actual and they are only an image of the real." (*Mishkat*, p. 22, translated by Gardner). Nothing exists by itself; everything exists only in its God aspect, for from Him alone it derives its being. Thus man reaches the highest point of ascent in the realization of God, namely, the kingdom of pure and absolute One-and-Onliness. Plurality vanishes here into totality; and there remains no room for further progress.

It is most tempting to examine these mystical and ecstatic outpourings of al-Ghazzali for any lurking pantheism in them. They will certainly not bear the close scrutiny of an orthodox theologian. "Allah's gnostics, when they reached the ultimate point of the ascent to Reality, witnessed, as if with their physical eyes, that there exists nothing save Allah alone". (*Mishkat al-Anwar*, p. 19). We could easily argue from this that 'Allah is all and all is Allah'. Yet in the same breath al-Ghazzali tells us that Allah's gnostics witness that, "everything else is perishing except His countenance, and not that it is perishing at any point of time but it is perishing from eternity to eternity" (*Mishkat al-Anwar*, p. 18). Here is something beside Allah that is perishing. Again "All existence is exclusively His Aspect. Now it .

is impossible that he should be greater than His own Aspect. The meaning is that He is too absolutely Great to be called Greater, or Most Great by way of relation or comparison" (Mishkat, p. 19 translated by Gairdner).

Allah cannot be greater than His aspect nor lesser, and therefore must be one with it. Yet though things are not self-subsistent and exist only in their God-aspect, they have an actual being.

There is no doubt that in isolated sentences we will get reflections of pantheism. But if we remember al-Ghazzali's rational and practical attitude as a whole, we will find that we cannot associate him with pantheism in any form. He himself would have vehemently denied it. He had great respect for mystics like al-Hallaq. His seemingly blasphemous utterances were not to be taken account because they were made in a state of inebriation. If they could perceive nought but God and lost consciousness of their own-selves it was because they were so overwhelmed that they lost all capacity for thought of aught else. "But the one grace of God that created balance in the life on 'his earth', says al-Ghazzali is 'Reason' (Mishkat, p. 20).

His position is between the orthodox who divide God and his creation in two entities and that of the pantheists who would deny the existence of every thing except God. The universe has a being but only with relation to God. This is the meaning of the Qur'anic verse, "Everything perisheth except His countenance, His aspect" (Qur'an, 88:28). It is difficult to determine exactly what al-Ghazzali means by 'aspect'. In any case it does away

with pantheism and yet retains mystical verity of the One and-Onliness of God.

This truth is revealed either to the learned through study and contemplation or to the saint-friends of God through ecstasy. These latter sometimes in the state of transport are so overwhelmed by the experience that they lose their reason for the moment, lose consciousness of everything, even of their own selves and become, as it were, identified (*muttahiḍ*) with Allah. This is the stage of '*Fana-fi'l Fana*'. Some of them in that state have cried out "I am the One Real" (Al-Hallaj), Or "Glory be to me, How great is my glory" (Abu-Yazid al-Bistami). But when they return to themselves they realize that it was not actual Union with Allah, not *ittihad* but *Tawhid*, that is, perception of the Unity of Allah

There is no point of ascent beyond the Unitary experience, and though the mystic would fain remain there, this is not the goal of goals. The next stage in his progress is his descent to the lowest heaven—the world of physical activity of sense and reason—bringing along with him the light he has found. Al-Ghazzali says, "This is the goal of goals, and the highest object of spiritual search but only the gnostics can fully understand it".³⁷

37. Mujaddid Ahmad Sirhindi has said on numerous occasions that the ascent is the first part of Saint-hood and the descent is the next. The descent is one of the characteristics of prophetic sainthood. Then man not only 'goes' but also 'carries' (Epistle 35, 302, etc.). The following from Iqbal is illuminating:—

'Muhammad of Arabia ascended the highest
(See on next page)

"It is no wonder," he says, "if the learned liken this descent towards the heaven of this earth to the descent of the angel. But some gnostics have gone further. Being immersed in the One-and-Onliness of God they have declared that this descent is the descent of God to use physical parts and senses" (Mishkat al-Anwar, p 24) This descent, therefore, is into

Continued from page 103)

Heaven and returned. I swear by God that if I had reached that point, I should never have returned'. These are the words of a great Muslim saint, Abdu'l Quddus of Gangoh. In the whole range of Sufi literature it will be probably difficult to find words which, in a single sentence, disclose such an acute perception of the psychological difference between the prophetic and the mystic types of consciousness. The mystic does not wish to return from the repose of 'unitary experience' ; and even when he does return, as he must, his return does not mean much for mankind at large. The prophet's return is creative. He returns to insert himself into the sweep of time with a view to control the forces of history, and thereby to create a fresh world of ideals. For the mystic the repose of unitary experience is something final ; for the prophet it is the awakening within him, of world-shaking psychological forces, calculated to completely transform the human world. The desire to see his religious experience transformed into a living world-force is supreme in the prophet. (The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 118).

the life of mankind spiritually rejuvenated with the Unitary experience. What would be the nature of the saint-friend after his descent is not made clear by al-Gazzali. He cannot mean by this descent merely a return to the normal self for this return is inevitable and cannot be therefore, called the goal of goals. He merely says that this is what only the gnostics can understand.

That this activity consists in not cutting oneself away from mankind but *da'ua al-Hag* can be inferred from his writings, e.g., here is a definite statement

"The most beautiful qualities in the Saint-friends of God which draw the human heart towards them lie in three directions - firstly, in their knowledge of God, His angels, His books, His prophets and their teachings; secondly, in the power they possess of reforming their own souls and the souls of their fellowmen. This latter fact they accomplish by *'irshad* and *Siya* (by direction and administration), and, lastly, in their purity from all that is base and evil, and their purity from the dominating passions that lead astray from God and beckon towards evil (Ihya, Vol. 4, p. 261).

Here is a tradition of the prophet. it runs: "Allah hath seventy thousand veils of light and darkness; were He to withdraw them, the splendour of His Aspect would surely consume any one who apprehended Him with his sight" (Mishkat al-Anwar, p. 47 translated by Gairdner); (Ihya, 1, p. 40).

Allah is pure and glorious Light, therefore the veils must relate to those from whom Allah is veiled. Al-Ghazzali makes an attempt to give a classification of

the veiled among mankind, which incidentally brings into prominence many baffling conceptions of the nature of God. Mankind is divided into four classes: those who are veiled with darkness, those veiled by mixed light and darkness, those veiled by pure Light, and lastly those who attain unto Allah. (Mishkat-al-Anwar pp 33-35.)

The most startling parts of this scheme are the problem of the *Mut'a* or the Vicegerent and the theory that the knowledge of the Movement of the Heavens is the sole basis for the gradations of nearness to Allah. But in spite of the fantastic schemes like that of *Mut'a* in Mishkat, his position is quite clear:—

1 That God can be apprehended, through '*ilm al-Mukashafat*'. To attain the knowledge of God is the highest perfection of man on this earth. That the highest knowledge of God should consist in knowing that He is absolutely unknowable has been rejected, among other opinions, by al-Ghazzali himself in *Ihya*, in his remarks regarding '*ilm al-mukashafa*', as the opinion of people who do not know

2 That there is a certain symbolic correspondence between man and God in outward form as also there is certain affinity in spirit. "There is an affinity between man and God not in outward form but in spirit. Of this affinity part can be put on paper, and part it is impossible to lay down in clear terms and it is right to hold our tongue with regard to it so that the wayfarers to God might discover it for themselves when they have reached their destination. That which can

be put down is that man should be near unto Allah in those of His attributes which we are commanded to cultivate in ourselves, e.g., knowledge, love, charity, etc.,.....The affinity which cannot be elaborated in writing and speech is that which is an exclusive characteristic of man and is hinted at in the Qur'anic verse. 'And they ask you about the soul; say the soul is divine affairs (Quran, 17, 85), and further in the verse, 'when I made him, breathed into him of my soul' (Qur'an, 15, 29), and again in the verse, "We have made thee a successor on the earth, etc". (Qur'an, 38, 26; Cf. *Ihya*, p. 263).

The problems of the Viceregent and the movement of Heavens do not play any part in the religious philosophy of al-Ghazzali. The highest point of ascent in the knowledge of God lies in the Unitary experience and the goal of goals is the descent thereof from to the life in the midst of men.

IDEA OF LOVE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF

AL-GHAZZALI

Love of God, according to al-Ghazzali, is the essence of Islam. He makes it the supreme end of man in this world. *Sabr* (patience), *zuhd* (abstinence), etc., which in themselves are virtues of very high order, are merely subservient to love of God; and the virtues like *shawq* (yearning), *uns* (affability), *rida* (satisfaction), etc., are the more advanced aspects of this love.¹ Some theologians have criticised the possibility of love of God. They argue that love can exist only between members of the same species, and since man and God are not homogeneous, no love can exist between them. Love they hold, is nothing other than the obedience of man to God.² Al-Ghazzali in reply explains the meaning of love between man and God and establishes its possibility and supreme value on the basis of the Qur'an and the Hadith, e. g., "God loves them and they love God"³;

I. *Ihya*, Vol. IV, 252 فان المحبة الله هي غاية القصوي من المقامات والذروة

العليان الدرجات فما بعد ادراك المحبة مقام الاوهو ثمرة من ثمارها وتابع من ثوابها كالشوق والاسس والرضا و اخواتها ولا قبل المحبة مقام الاوهو مقدمة من مقدماتها كالقبول والصبر والزهد وغيرها*

2 *Ihya*, Vol. IV, 252

3. Qur'an, V, 57 ; Cf. II, 165.

"No one will be truly faithful till God is dearer to him than all else."⁴

It has been said above that the perfection of man lies in the knowledge of God. How then, it may be asked, is love of God also an ultimate end? The relation of knowledge to love, which al-Ghazzali has explained, indicates a solution of the inconsistency in question.⁵ Love is a natural inclination towards objects

4. Hadith. Cf. Ibya, Vol. IV p. 253.

5. Shihabuddin Suhrawardī Maqtul, the greatest philosopher of the 6th century A. H., who was under a definite influence of al-Ghazzali has very clearly pointed out the relation of love with knowledge. In his *Munis al-'ushshaq* "Lovers Friend" (ed. and tr. by O. Spies, Pp 24-25) he says, 'when 'affection' reaches the utmost extremity it is called 'love'. 'Love is excessive affection. Love is more particular than affection because all love is affection but all affection is not love. And affection is more particular than 'knowledge' because all affection is knowledge but all knowledge is not affection. And two opposite things come out of knowledge, which are called 'friendship' and 'enmity'. Because knowledge pertains either to a thing which is agreeable and suitable to the body or the spirit which is called 'pure good' and 'absolute affection'; and the human soul seeks it, and desires to betake itself to that, and attain perfection; or, it pertains to a thing which is not suitable and not agreeable to the body and the spirit which is called 'pure evil' and 'absolute defect';

(see on next page)

that gives pleasure. Hate, on the contrary, is natural repulsion that gives pain. Both love and hate imply knowledge of objects that give pleasure or pain. Unless objects become known, there can be no occasion for either inclination or repulsion to them. Knowledge of objects may give pleasure or pain to the person or leave him indifferent. In the case of pleasure, the person is drawn nearer to objects but in other cases he is repelled from them.

Similarly, knowledge of God may or may not give pleasure to the person. A person given to temptations of the flesh and thereby burdened with hindrances in the heart will not feel pleasure in the knowledge of God. Why should a person feel pleasure, is a question which will be taken up below. A person who knows God and loves him is at a higher plane of spiritual development than the one who knows God without loving Him. Al-Ghazzali holds knowledge of God as the perfection of man because without it love of God is not possible. But knowledge of God does not mean love of God in all instances. Hence love of God is a higher ideal than mere knowledge.

(Continued from page 108)

and the human soul always flies from that and it has a natural aversion towards that. From the first comes 'friendship' and from the second 'enmity'. So the first round is knowledge, the second round is affection, and the third round is love. And one cannot reach the world of love which is the highest of all, unless he makes two rounds of the stair from knowledge and affection'.

Within knowledge of God there are various stages and the highest stage is related to the highest form of love. Knowledge may be perceptual or super-perceptual.⁶ The former is apprehension of objects through senses. Perceptual knowledge of objects and their love is common to men and animals. God cannot be known immediately through knowledge, nor can He be an object of love determined by such knowledge. Knowledge of God is super-perceptual. Man alone is capable of such a knowledge.⁷ This knowledge comes through faith, reflection, reasoning and intuition (*'ilm al-Mukashafa*), the enumeration being in the increasing order of spiritual development. Love of God is associated with each type of superperceptual knowledge of God, in the heart of the seeker. But the highest and the most complete love is associated with intuition, the highest type of knowledge.

Why should a person feel pleasure in the knowledge of God and direct his love to Him? Al-Ghazzali explains at length that God is the supreme object of love because He is the ultimate and absolute source of all the causes because of which objects are loved.

The impulsion to love may be broadly put to four causes : (1) Love of the self.⁸ Every living individual is instinctively compelled to struggle for its own preservation. At the perceptual level man strives for his existence not for horror of death or of the Divine retribution

6. *Ihya*, Vol. IV, p. 225.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ihya*, Vol. IV, P. 255.

after death but simply because he loves his existence for its own sake. He loves not only the self as such but also the perfections of the self. He dislikes his imperfections because every imperfection means a non-existence of an aspect of the self. Next to the self and its perfections, a person loves that on which all this depends, e.g., his limbs, strength, wealth, progeny, family, friends, tribes, etc.⁹ (2) Love of a benefactor for the benefits received from him. A man's love for his benefactors¹⁰ is nothing but a desire for the preservation of those who minister to his desire for self-preservation. It is a form of self-love. The benefactor is not loved for his own sake as the self is. This love may cease when the benefits cease, even if the benefactor be still alive, and is more or less directly proportional to the urgency of the gifts received. (3) Love of beauty. Beauty is loved for its own sake irrespective of any benefit or gain. Its apprehension gives rise to pleasant aesthetic feelings¹¹ which constitute an end in itself. The quality of beauty resides in the harmony and

9. Ibid., P. 255. His love, in al-Ghazzali's opinion, for his son appears to be unselfish, but a close inspection will reveal that he loves him, because he finds in him his own preservation and perfection. In the same way in the preservation of the tribe he sees his own preservation. His son represents him even after his death. Thus he lives further in his son who is his own flesh and blood.

10. Ibid., p. 256.

11. Ihya, Vol. IV, pp. 255-56.

perfection of objects. Beautiful objects include not only perceptible bodies like the human limbs, but also conceptual forms, *e. g.*, character, virtue, knowledge¹². We often love those who have gone before us and whose excellent qualities of head and heart, we have never directly observed. Knowledge of these qualities has called for the highest sacrifices from men in order to advance the cause which was dear to them. If some persons, for example, love Abu Bakr and 'Umar, it is because they represented in their persons and conduct the highest expressions of some of the noblest qualities of the heart such as knowledge, power, devotion, love, courage, piety, etc., which enabled them to control and curb their baser nature and develop their nobler and higher self. These qualities did not die with them, after their bones and flesh had decomposed and disappeared¹³. (4) Love 'based on affinity between two souls. Good souls are naturally attached to each other.

Al-Ghazzali explains how God holds all the causes that inspire man to love. Therefore He alone is worthy of love. Love for the Prophet is also excellent since it

12. Ibid, p 256

13. How a man has come to appreciate these qualities is well-known. He has been hearing all his life the stories of their valour, their self sacrifice, their charity, etc., which have made lasting impressions on him, without himself being the recipient of their favours, etc., there is a beauty in their actions, which is capable of making a stirring appeal to his inner self.

leads to the love of God. Those who love objects other than God, have no knowledge of God. Knowledge of God is the source of the love of God.

Since man loves the self he must love God who is the Creator and also the Creator of what he desires for his preservation and perfection. Man cannot achieve anything without His grace and blessing.

The second cause too must lead man to love God Who is the ultimate Benefactor. From Him alone all the benefits are received. The human philanthropist is only the instrument of the Divine Benefactor. The beneficence of man is born of his selfish motives. He expects and longs for something better than what he sacrifices by way of popularity, influence, or gratification of some of his desires. God does not expect anything from His creatures and has no selfish end in view.

The third cause of love is also present in God. He possesses the qualities of power, knowledge and beauty to an absolutely supreme degree. These qualities as man discerns them in himself are the gifts of God. As compared to God in these qualities, man has no entity. God's knowledge is boundless, His power absolute and His beauty perfect. Therefore God alone deserves complete and exclusive love.

Further, man possesses a certain affinity or like-

VI. 14. Ihya, Vol. IV, P. 257. Al-Ghazzali would have been counted as gross hedonist had he not mentioned also the fourth cause of love.

ness to Allah.¹⁵ It is evident from the Qur'an, and the Hadith. Man is enjoined to adorn himself with the virtues of Allah. "Characterise yourself", said the Prophet, "with the virtues of Allah",¹⁶ *e.g.*, knowledge, love, charity, etc. But there is also a deeper correspondence and affinity between man and God which is hinted at in numerous verses of the Qur'an, *e.g.*, "And they ask thee about the soul, say: the soul is an affair of God"¹⁷; "When I made him and breathed unto him of My soul"¹⁸; "We have made thee a Vicegerent on the earth"¹⁹. But this deeper affinity, al-Ghazzali says, is impossible to express in words. It can only be experienced and realised by the intimates of God.

The realization that God possesses all the four factors which command love to an infinite and perfect degree, and that He and none else deserves our love and adoration comes to man by hearsay, by thought and reflection, or by direct intuitive knowledge of God. Complete love, when the love of everything except God is entirely obliterated from the heart so that man lives, breathes and acts in and for God, and finds no joy, nor peace except in that which relates to Him, comes to man when he has wholly purified himself

15 Ihya, Vol. IV, P. 263

16. Cf. Ihya, Vol. IV, P. 363.

17. Qur'an, XVII, 15.

18. Qur'an, XV, 29.

19. Qur'an, XXXVIII, 26; Cf. also the Hadith:

"God created man in His own image" (Ihya, Vol. IV, p 363).

through *'ilm al-Mu'amala* and has attained to *'ilm al-Mukashafa*.

That God also loves man is proved by a number of verses from the Qur'an such as, "He loves them and they love Him"; "Verily, Allah loves the repentant and those who purify themselves", etc.²⁰ Now love means an inclination towards an agreeable object. This inclination is the impulse to satisfy a need. Need implies a defect, a want of something, an urge towards the perfection of what is an imperfection. It is self-evident that such an inclination in God towards anything is impossible. God has no need, no defect and imperfection. Therefore the word love when used for God must not have the same sense as when used for man, and for that matter all their words when used for God have a Divine connotation, so to say²¹. God is eternally the All-Perfect. No change can affect Him. So His love is not the same as the love of man towards other objects. Then, what is His love like? When God loves His creatures, He loves them, not as separate beings from Himself, for affection for anything other than Himself will imply an imperfection or need in Him. It may be said that God's love of man is like His love for His own works, which means that He alone exists. In everything He loves, He loves Himself.

Further, the love of God for man means that He removes the veil from the heart or draws him nearer, or

20. *Ihya*, Vol. IV, p. 28 ff; Qur'an, V, 54; and Qur'an, II, 222.

21. *Ihya*, Vol IV, p 231.

He had ordained him from eternity to be able to approach Him.¹ Now, if love is attributed to the eternal Will of God; through which man has become able to approach Him, the love of God for man will be eternal². But if the love of God for man is attributed to the actions of God through which the veil has been removed from the heart of man, the love of God for man will be *hadith* (created, new), because of the newness of the cause. This is impossible. But the fact is, that whatever happens, happens through purification of the heart, which is also according to the Will of God. The purification of the heart has its natural consequences. But by nearness to God is not meant that any change can take place in God; for God is unchangeable. Whatever happens, happens to man. Man becomes nearer to God not in space and time but in good qualities by controlling his appetites and anger, etc. In this way the position of man becomes higher without constituting any difference in the position of God. In short the love of God for man means that after man has purified his heart, God has admitted him to His proximity and has removed the veil of his heart in order to enable him to observe Him with the eyes of his heart.

Love is a mental activity. It expresses itself in the conduct of man. The tongue, the eyes, the lips and all the bodily organs betray it. The man who loves God is desirous of union with God. Therefore a lover of God loves death for it is a means of achieving the cherished end. Only in one case he may not desire to die for the time being. It is when he is not quite prepared to meet his Beloved. He, then, wants to

prepare himself better by means of more worship and more acts of piety.

He who loves God is wholly in the hands of God²². God looks after all his deeds and thoughts. He is his adviser, the cleanser of his heart and the mover of his limbs for good actions. He unites his inner self with the outer self. He makes him concentrate all his thoughts on one object, i.e., on Himself. He removes the veil between Himself and the creature. The will of such a man becomes the Will of God. However, such a man is not infallible, a minor transgression might be committed by him, as when for a moment his lower self might get the better of him.

One who loves God loves all His creatures, even the sinners²³. He loves the sinners for they are God's creatures though he hates their sin-aspect. He does not love anything which is against God. But his actions are based on equity and justice, not on bigotry etc. They are severe on the unbelievers and merciful to one another²⁴.

Among other signs of love are that man likes to be alone, he sings hymns to God, he is consoled and comforted by being obedient to God. One who loves God, also stands in awe of Him. Just as the knowledge of His beauty begets love, even so the knowledge of His Sublime Majesty begets awe.

22. Iyya, Vol. IV, p. 381.

23. Iyya, Vol. p. 292ff.

24. Iyya, Vol. IV, p. 286.

25. Qur'an, XLVII, p. 28.

In short, love is the essence of religion. All the highest social and moral virtues are born of the love of God. All that is not the fruit of this love is to be considered as the result of the pursuit of the appetites and the passions. Whatever is the result of appetites and passions is a vice.

Besides the above-mentioned signs of love, there are some specific virtues which follow from it. In fact, they are the higher aspects of love itself. They are *shawq* (yearning), *uns* (affability) and *rida* (satisfaction)²⁶.

When the lover has an eye upon all the perfect beauty which is yet behind and beyond his reach, there is in his heart a restlessness and a fond yearning to reach Him. Then this yearning of the heart towards God is called *shawq*²⁷.

When the lover is overwhelmed with the joy of the nearness to Allah, the experience of the Divine Presence through '*ilm al-MuKashafa*' is dominant, and thus when his eye is set only upon that which has been revealed to him and is present to his inner perception, and not upon that which is yet veiled, then this joy is called *uns*²⁸.

When the lover in this state thinks of the Majesty and the absolute self-sufficiency of the Beloved, and the possibility of his falling away from Him, then he feels pain which is called *Khauf*²⁹.

26. Joyous submission to the will of God, willing resignation.

27. *Ihya*, Vol. IV, p. 291.

28. *Ihya*, Vol. IV, p. 291.

29. *Ihya*, p. 291.

Rida is to remain ever pleased with God. It is a fruit of the love of God and is the property of the soul nearest to Allah; and the seeming contradictions and doubts involved in it cannot be completely resolved till one becomes gifted with the knowledge of God³⁰.

In the heaven when man will get a vision of Allah, he will be allowed to ask for whatever he desires and those in the highest stages of the Heaven will ask only for the *rida* of the Beloved. God will be pleased with them. This highest blessing of the pleasure of Allah will be granted to those who are ever pleased with Him. "O soul that art at rest ! Return to thy Lord, well-pleased (with Him), well pleasing (Him), so enter among My servants, and enter into My garden' ".³¹

Some people who believe that in suffering and in things against one's will only patience is possible and *rida* is unimaginable, deny love altogether. Any one occupied in doing any serious work does not often notice any noise, etc. One engaged in fighting does not often know that he is wounded and does not feel pain until afterwards when he sees the blood flowing. Then again often in love of the things of the world one is conscious of pain but instead of being sorry he is pleased with it, because of the achievement of the aim at the end. The troubles of travel may be pleasures at the prospect of reaching the destination.

When the pains coming from other sources are pleasant, how much more pleasing are the pains coming from

30. Ihya, p. 294ff.

31. Qur'an, p. 27. 30.

the beloved This is the state with a worldly beloved seen by the bodily eyes when one is also conscious about the origin of the beloved which was a drop of dirty water, and the beloved carrying within the body nothing else besides filth. What will be the state in relation to God as beloved, whose beauty is seen by the eyes of the heart; and is the perfect Beauty.

There are several problems involved in *rada*. The first is the possibility of *rada* in the most acute or prolonged sufferings³². There is the overwhelming evidence of innumerable cases of men and women who suffered death and the most cruel tortures and pains cheerfully because it was the will and pleasure of Allah. There are grades of cheerful submission to the will of Allah. The first is the hope of a reward in the next world. The next is the feeling that whatever is befalling him is the will of his Beloved, and hence he must accept it cheerfully, yet apart from this he may have his own will too. The highest stage is reached when the desire of the lover becomes identified with the will of his Beloved and that becomes highest pleasure. Such instances are met with in life amongst lovers of mortals. It is no wonder that this love should be found even in a higher degree in those who have realised the infinite and eternal beauty and goodness of Allah.

The second problem involved in the conception of *rada* is this: God is the source of all good and of all evil, and hence should he who is ever pleased with

32. *Ihya*, Vol. IV, pp. 297 ff.

33. *Ihya*, Vol. IV, p. 300.

Allah welcome sin and evil in himself as well as in others? According to al-Ghazzali, though evil may ultimately be traced to God; yet He is neither pleased with it nor with the evil-doer by whose acquisition (*kasab*) the evil has materialised. The lover of God does not ask the 'Why'. He hates evil, and is 'oppressed' to it, yet remains reconciled to the fact that it exists in the universe because it is not without the will of God.

It may be claimed that according to the Qur'an and the Hadith one must be satisfied with what is decreed by God. It is impossible to conceive that sin is not decreed by God; for, then, it must be caused by some one else and this would contradict the Unity of God. If it is decreed by God, to regard it evil and be angry at it is to regard what is decreed by God an evil. How to reconcile the two contradictions? How can fear and dissatisfaction be referred to the same thing at the same time? Only the people weak in understanding and ignorant of the secrets of knowledge can take this matter and regard the silence at forbidden things as the stage of satisfaction (*rida*) and call it good character, although it is sheer ignorance. The truth is that fear and dissatisfaction are mutually exclusive and contradictory when both are referred to the same object at the same time from the same point of view. But if dissatisfaction is from one point of view and *rida* from another they cannot be regarded as contradictories. For example, if an enemy of yours, who is also an

enemy of another enemy of yours, and who had been trying to kill this second enemy of yours, dies, you are both sorry and glad at his death. You are sorry because he had been trying to kill another enemy of yours, and you are glad, because he himself was an enemy of yours. Similarly, the sin has also two points of view. It may be considered, firstly, with reference to God because it happened as an act of God by His power and intention. From this point of view satisfaction may be expressed with sin. He is the absolute Master and has a right to do as He likes. The other consideration is from the point of view of man. The sin resulting from action is a quality of his conduct and it indicates that he has the anger of God on him and that God has brought about the causes of anger and disgrace of him. From this point of view the sin is bad and must be despised.

There are many examples to show that one likes a thing from one point of view and dislikes it from another point of view. When a man commits a sin, it had been decreed from the very beginning. It was the plan of God. Therefore, if a man loves God, he ought to hate a man who is hated by God, and be angry with a man with whom God is angry. A man who loves God ought to love him whom God loves and hate him whom God hates. All these things belong to pre-determination and an explanation of it in terms is forbidden. Good and evil both are from His intention. Evil is decreed but is hated, whereas the good is desired and liked

But the complete understanding of this problem involves the problem of predestination and relates to

'ilm al-Mukashafa. The Prophet declared, "Predestination is a secret of God. Don't disclose it". However, there is the overwhelming evidence of the Qur'an and the Hadith condemning vice and lauding virtue, making *Amr bil-Ma'ruf* and *Nahy'anil-Munkar* a duty for a Muslim.

Lastly, *rida* may be said to entail a rejection of prayer on the part of the lover whose pleasure is the will of the Beloved. To seek in prayer forgiveness, refuge from sins and all forms of evil, and all that is good, is enjoined by the Qur'an as a form of worship. And this was the constant practice of the Prophet. Praying to God for forgiveness is not against the pleasure of God. We must let our souls rise up in prayers to God, for this is the will of God. Prayer induces a state of humility and meekness towards God, purges and cleanses the heart, opens the breast and makes one more susceptible to the Divine influence and knowledge³⁵.

To fly from a place stricken with sin or plague is, again, not contrary to *rida*. The Prophet forbade flying from a plague-stricken place not because it is against *rida*; but because if all healthy men desert the place there will be none to look after the sick and the dead. The Prophet compared it to the flight from the fighting line³⁶. Al-Ghazzali relates numerous traditions about the lovers of God as to how they were very pleased with God and how He too was pleased with them.³⁷ This

35. Ihya, Vol. IV, pp. 302-303.

36. Ihya, Vol. IV, p. 303

37. Ihya, pp. 304 ff.

is indeed the attainment of the highest spiritual progress, on earth. Man's highest pleasure lies in the purest thoughts and words and in the noblest conduct, for this is always the will of God.

But people differ in love with regard to God's be-
cause the grades of the love of this world and the know-
ledge of God are different with different persons. There
are three such grades: (1) Those who have heard
the qualities and names of God and have simply learned
them and know nothing more. Though sometimes they
understand their meaning wrongly and do not know
the true fact, yet with acceptance and confirmation be-
lieve, and begin to worship, leaving aside all discussion.
These men are called 'the men of the right.' (2) Those
who have false ideas. They are led astray. (3) Those
who have the true knowledge. These are the intimates,
the nearest ones to God. As has been said, love of
God increases with the knowledge of God. The whole
universe is His work. The more one knows of his work,
the more one knows Him. The grades of knowledge of
His work, the universe, are unnumerable. That is why
people are so different in grades with regard to love of
God. By increasing our knowledge about the creation
which is the act of God, our knowledge of God is
increased. With the increase of this knowledge, increases
the love of God, which is the source of eternal joy and
blessing.

38. *Ihya*, Vol. IV, p. 248—286.

39. *Ashab al Yumin*, lit. people of the right-hand side.

40. *Siddiqun*, the most truthful.

Al-Ghazzali on the vision of God.

Belief in life after death is a fundamental tenet of every revealed religion. Rewards for good deeds and punishment for evil ones are the guiding incentives of religious life. Heaven, hell, pleasure, pain, etc. are common conceptions of almost all religions. Al-Ghazzali is a great defender and exponent of Islam which, as he explains, demands a right adjustment of men's conduct to an unseen order of things lying at the basis of the phenomenal world. His interpretation of the Islamic conception of the life after death slightly differs from that of many of his contemporaries. The latter believed in the physical existence of the things of the hereafter. Al-Ghazzali besides believing in the physical existence, gives them a spiritual meaning.

Al-Ghazzali has established on Islamic principles that the summum bonum, the complete or the ultimate end of a man's endeavour in this world is the vision of God which will become possible in the life hereafter. The Quran declares the sight of God or His countenance to be the highest felicity of man. "And the good that ye shall give in alms shall redound unto yourselves, and ye shall not give but as seeking the face of God." "And whoso from desire to see the face of their Lord, are constant amid trials, and observe prayer, and give alms in secret and in the open, out of what we have bestowed upon them, and turn aside evil by good: for these is

the recompense of that abode''². "And who offereth not favours to any one for the sake of recompense, but only as seeking the face of his Lord the most High''³. "And thrust not thou away those who cry to their Lord at morn and even, craving to behold his face''⁴. "Be patient with those who call upon their Lord at morn and even, seeking his face''⁵. "Whatever ye put out at usury to increase it with the substance of others shall have no increase from God : but whatever ye shall give in alms, as seeking the face of God, shall be doubled to you''⁶.

The phrase 'the face of Allah' which occurs frequently in the Quran was interpreted by the early theologians as the sight or vision of God. And it was considered by them the highest end of man. They held out hopes that at least some of the believers will be able to see God.' They "agreed that in the next world God the Almighty will create in man a perception in the sense of vision, to see God without mediation''⁸. The M'utazilites, on the contrary, regarded the vision of God as an impossibility, because it 'involved a directing of the eyes on

2. Quran, XIII, 22

3. Quran, XCII, 19, 20.

4. Quran, VI, 52.

5. Quran, XVIII, 27.

6. Quran, XXX, 37.

7. Cf. D. B. Macdonald : Aspect of Islam, pp. 186-187

8. Shihabuddin Suhrawardi, Maqtul : Three Treatises on Mysticism, ed., and trn., O Spies, p. 31 ; Ihya, Vol. IV, p. 264.

the part of the seer, and position on the part of seen'⁹. They argued that God being beyond space, can never be delimited and assigned a particular place and direction. They, consistent to their position, tried to explain away the passages of the Quran bearing on the subject. Al-Ghazzali to meet their objections argued that this vision has no special claim to the eye or any other sense organ. It is a complete knowledge which God can create in man without the mediation of the senses. Just as the conception of God as we have it here, is free from the implications of spatial and temporal characteristics, the immediate knowledge of God, *i.e.*, the special perception or the vision of Him, in the next world will be free from such limitations¹⁰.

Al-Gazzali explains the nature of the vision of God as the perfect and direct knowledge of God which will constitute the highest bliss for the percipient.

In this world the believer has the conceptual knowledge of God. He cannot perceive Him directly. In the next world, the direct knowledge of God will become possible. It will be not only direct but also perfect¹¹. The conception of God and the vision of God differ in this way that the latter is by far the more vivid, complete and direct experience than the former. To take an analogy from the present life, this difference may be compared to the perceptual knowledge of a

9. D. B. Macdonald : Development of Muslim theology, p. 145.

10. Ihya, Vol. IV, p 263.

11. Ihya, Vol. IV, p 263.

physical object which is distinctly more comprehensive and direct than the mere idea or image of it¹².

The knowledge of God acquired through the vision is called *ruya* (vision), *liqn* (meeting), *mushdhada* (seeing), *wajh* (face), *nazr* (look), etc.¹³. It is an actual seeing of God. One can think of God here on earth and have some knowledge of Him but cannot see Him¹⁴. The highest knowledge of God on earth is not, then, direct or complete knowledge. On this earth Moses was told "Thou canst not see me"¹⁵, nor could Muhammad, the Prophet get vision of God here without a veil interposed in between¹⁶. "Eyes apprehend Him not"¹⁷; is the verdict of the Quran. True knowledge cannot come until we have "shuffled off this mortal coil". It is after death that God will say to man, "We have stripped off thy veil from thee so thy sight, today is keen"¹⁸.

The percipient will experience the highest bliss in the vision of God¹⁹. This 'happiness' is due to the fact that love of God is essentially involved here. This point will be discussed more fully below. Here we have to understand that of all the pleasures that a man can find,

12. Ihya, Vol IV, p 267.

13. Ihya, Vol, IV, pp. 264, 268, 465; Ihyā, Vol. II,

p. 2

14. Ihya, Vol. IV, p 268.

15. Quran, VII., 139; Ihyā, Vol. IV, p. 268.

16. Ihya, Vol IV, p 268.

17. Quran, VI, 104.

18. Quran, 50, 22.

19. Ihya, Vol IV, pp. 268, 270.

the pleasure of the vision of God is the highest in value, perfection and permanence. It has been shown before that the pleasures of the intellect are superior to those of the sense. But among the intellectual pleasures, the pleasure which accrues from the knowledge of God is the highest pleasure. And the pleasure of the knowledge is inferior to the pleasure that one would derive from the vision of God²⁰. Just as the pleasure we take in the idea of an absent friend, is much less than the pleasure we experience when he is actually present. The knowledge of God we possess here is based on thinking, while vision will be an actually seeing of God. To sum up, this vision, the summum bonum of a man's endeavours, will involve pleasure without pain, wealth without poverty, perfection without defect, joy without sorrow, glory without disgrace and knowledge without ignorance²¹.

As to the conditions which a man must fulfil in order to become qualified to have the vision of God, they are two, *viz*, knowledge of God and love of God. Knowledge of God in this world is conceptual. It will lead to the vision of God, *i.e.*, to the direct, immediate and complete knowledge of God, in the next. Love that the believer has in the world will lead to his appreciation of, and delights from the vision.

The conceptual knowledge of God that one possesses in the world will reach its culmination in the vision of God in the life hereafter²². It has been rightly said that

20. Ibid., p. 270.

21. Mizan al-Amal, p. 3.

22. Ihya, Vol. IV, p. 268-269.

man will rise after death with the same faculties and ideals which he had when he died. He who has no knowledge of God, will not have vision. The perfection of vision will be in direct proportion to the comprehensiveness of his knowledge. God is one, but different persons will see Him differently, their knowledge being different.

However, no believer is without some knowledge of God. The knowledge and the freedom from the love of this world will pass over to the life after death. But no heart will pass on absolutely pure. It will be purged by God by punishment or grace before it becomes worthy of the vision of God.

So the vision of God will be determined by the knowledge of God one possesses in this world; and the joy of it will be proportionate to the love of God one has in this world. The joy which the Prophet will derive out of the vision of God will be quite different from the joy of the learned, and that of the learned will be different from that of the gnostic (*Arif*) whose heart is dominated by the love of God. The heart which is dominated with the love of God in this world will find more pleasure from the sight of God than the one which is full of the love of this world. If persons with equal faculty of vision, gaze on the same beautiful face, the one with love for the face will get more pleasure than the other who has no love for it.

But the love of God can only enter a pure heart, which is free from the love of this world. On the contrary, if man's heart is full of the love of this world, he

will find the next world quite strange to him and the vision which will give joy to others will cause a misery to him, since in the next life he will miss the filth of this world. The spiritual pleasures will increase his misery as he has no affinity for the things of the spirit. The affinity which one should acquire is the love of God. This love can be acquired through the purification of the heart, as sins stand as veils between man and God. Therefore, the Qur'an says, "And undone is he who hath corrupted it (soul)²³".

Man's condition as to the knowledge of God can be compared to a lover who sees his sweetheart's face in the darkness while he is being constantly troubled by snakes and scorpions. He cannot fully enjoy the sight of his sweet-heart in the presence of such hindrances. Now suppose, he sees his sweetheart's beautiful face in the broad daylight when the troublesome scorpions, etc., have left him, his joy will be unmixed. Similarly, God's lover, being released from the worldly desires, will have nothing to mar his happiness when he comes face to face with God.

Deeds done on earth according to al-Ghazzali will be evaluated in the world to come and places in Heaven and Hell will be allotted accordingly. No heart, in his opinion, will depart from the world without some impurity attached to it. Hence, no one will escape punishment, even though it be nothing more than a pain in the grave²⁴. There will be different grades of

23. Quran, XCI, 10.

24. Ihya, p. 268.

good and evil, and marks the dawn of reason. A child with a sense of shame has to be taken more care of than the child in whom shame is not developed.

The child's earliest desire is for food. He ought to be taught the manners concerning it. He must begin with *Bismillah* (saying Grace), eat with his right hand, eat from what is in front of him, not look greedily at one who is eating, not be hasty in eating, chew well, not take in morsels in quick succession, not smear his hand and clothes with food, and not overeat. Sometimes he ought to eat bread only in order to form the habit of eating coarse food without dishes. Those who eat moderately must be praised before him. He ought to be made to consider it a good thing to give away food to others and become self-sacrificing.

The boy should be taught to prefer plain *clothes* to coloured or silk dress. Before him despise the boys dressed in silk and in gay colours. Do not allow him to mix with such boys as are fond of and indulge in comfort and funny clothes.

Then, he ought to be sent to school and be taught the Quran, Hadith and the stories of the pious people, so that their love takes roots in his heart. He must not be allowed to read amatory poetry and to meet persons who consider such poetry a sign of cleverness and wit. Such poetry will sow the seed of evil in him.

Reward the boy if he does something good, and praise him before the people for it. He will be pleased and encouraged. Overlook him if he does something unpleasant for the first or second time. Do

not expose his secrets. If revealing brings him no great harm, he will not care much about it in future. Warn him not to repeat it again or his faults would be made known to others. Do not scold him frequently. If he gets accustomed to it, he would not mind the scolding and would stick to his faults and fall in evil ways. The father ought to talk to him considerately and scold him but seldom. The mother also ought to stop him from evil things. She ought to remind him of his father's warnings.

He must not be made accustomed to sleep in the day as it causes laziness. But he must not be stopped from sleeping in the night except if he tries to do it in soft beds. In short the love of comfort in the matter of bed, dressing and food must be avoided.

A boy must not be allowed to do anything in *secret* for he does in secret only what he considers evil. If he has the habit of doing everything openly, he will not do anything bad.

A time in the day must be fixed for a walk to avoid laziness. He must have the habit of not yawning and walking seriously. He must not yawn before others, must not turn his back towards others, must not put one article of food upon another, must not support his chin on his hand and must not make of his arm a pillow for his head, because all these are signs of laziness.

He must not *boast* among his companions of the things of his father. He must also not be proud of what he eats, wears, or possesses. On the contrary, he

APPENDIX II
SUHRAWERDI MAQTUL'S PHILOSOPHICAL
POSITION ACCORDING TO THE WORKS
OF HIS YOUTH
INTRODUCTION

Shihabuddin Suhrawardi Maqtul (ob. 587 A. H.) is one of the original Muslim thinkers of the 6th century A. H. Even in youth he stood unrivalled as a thinker¹. He is the author of many books, especially on philosophy and mysticism², the most characteristic work of which is *Hikmat ul-Ishraq* ("The philosophy of Illumination"), a book on the metaphysics of light. He conceives reality as light and endeavours to prove that it is the source and origin of all things. Although thorough studies have been published on the philosophy of light by various writers, there remains much investigation to be done.

The numerous works of Suhrawardi can be classified according to the stages of mental development through

1. Muhammad Iqbal, *Development of Metaphysics in Persia*. London 1908, pp. 123 sqq.

2. A detailed and exhaustive list of his works is given by O. Spies, *Three Treatises*, pp. 101-02 (Arabic text) and *Mu'nisul-'Ushshaq*, pp. 11-14.

which he passed. We can differentiate between three clear-cut periods.³

(a) Works of his youth.

(b) Works of the peripatetic Period.

(c) Works of the Avicenna-Platonic period.

Among books of his youth are *Hayakulun-Nur* and a number of *rasa'il* written in Persian.

The present paper is an attempt to collect the scattered philosophical ideas of Suhrawardi and to describe systematically the philosophy of his youth on the basis of his utterances in "Three Treatises on Mysticism"⁴ and on "Mu'nis-ul-Ushshaq."⁵ These treatises belong to the period of his youth and are therefore important for the study of his mental growth. The titles and the purport of those *rasa'il* are as follows.

I. Laughtat-i-Muran, "The Language of the Ants". Here Suhrawardi has explained the most abstruse and mystical ideas in commonplace terms. Birds and animals are employed as characters who talk and think. The treatise as a whole deals with the nature, purpose and destiny of man.

II. Safir-i-Simurgh, "The Note of Simurgh". It deals with the aims and objects of mysticism.

3. L. Massignon, *Recueil de Textes Imédits*, Paris 1929, p. 113.

4. O. Spies and S. K. Khatak, *Three Treatises on Mysticism*, Stuttgart 1935, *Bonner Oriental Studien*, Heft 12.

5. O. Spies, *The Lovers' Friend*. Stuttgart 1934, *Bonner Oriental. Studien*, Heft 7.

III. *Risalt ut-Tair*, "The Treatise of the Bird" which points out the difficulties that beset the seeker after truth

IV. *Mu'nis-ul-'Ushshaq*, "The Lovers' Friend" is an allegory based on the Quranic story of Joseph. It is a symbolic discourse on how God created the universe. Reality is conceived as an eternal beauty which can be realised through Divine Love which is the highest spiritual grade of perfection to be achieved by man here on earth. The perfection can be attained only through the knowledge of self, the universe and God. The most abstruse part of the book is the description of the powers of man who is conceived as a microcosm. The influence of Plato and Neo-Platonism seems traceable in the book and, therefore, we think it belongs to the third period of Suhrawardi.

The ideas contained in these *rasa'il* are made to conform to the doctrines of the Quran and bear no antagonism to the Quranic spirit. However, the one outstanding foreign influence, viz., the Persian, is that he conceives all spiritual things to be of the nature of light. There seems to be a struggle between the Islamic and Persian doctrines wherein the Islamic elements predominate

6. This treatise is called *ترجمة لسان الحق*. Al-Baihaqi in his *Tatimmat*, ed. Mohd Shafi, Lahore, 1935, Vol I (Arabic text), p. 127 calls 'Omar b. Sahlan as "Lisan al Haqq" and therefore the reference is to him, and not to the title of the work which is *Risalat ut-Tair*.

I. The Background of Suhrawardi's Thought.

Muslim thinkers can mainly be divided into three schools, viz., the rationalists, the orthodox theologians, and the Sufis. The rationalists, i.e., the Mu'tazilites and the philosophers, regard reason as the source of knowledge and truth. The Mu'tazilites are more consistent thinkers than the philosophers, as the latter with a few exceptions end invariably in mysticism. The orthodox theologians rely mainly on revelation as the source of truth. The Sufis admitting the claims of reason and revelation as the sources of truth consider intuition as the only sure source of the knowledge of spiritual truths.

Though all the schools of Muslim thinkers are indebted to external influence, e.g., the Greek, the Persian, the Christian, etc., yet the school which is affected most is that of the philosophers. The philosophers gave a higher value to the Greek culture and science than to the Islamic culture. The Sufis, on the whole, taking their stand on the Quranic doctrine, absorbed in their systems all sorts of elements. They always kept before them the spirit and not the letter of the law which became the central principle of their systems.

The Sufis may be divided into three main classes, viz, the ascetics, the speculative metaphysicians and the moderate group who tried to reconcile the extremist claims of the former two. The early Sufis were ascetics, e.g., Ibn Adham, etc. It was the fear of the eternal hell-fire which drove them to rigorous disciplines and austerities. The moderate group by an attempt to

reconcile the claims of asceticism and free speculation aimed to bring Sufism within the fold of Islam. These thinkers respected both the letter and the spirit of the law. The formal disciplines prescribed by the law are means to an end, which end is the purification of the heart from the animal passions. Abu Talib al-Makki, al-Ghazzali, al-Qushairi, etc., belong to this mode of thought. The speculative metaphysicians from the point of view of philosophy are of paramount importance. They thought out the most original and detailed theories, such as those about the universe, soul, etc. The chief characteristic of this school is that they tried to find out the hidden and esoteric meaning in the law of Islam. Ibn al-'Arabi and Suhrawardi are the best representatives of this school.

The main causes which led to this esoteric mode of thought are as follows : (1) The mystical expressions in the Quran, e. g., **الم** which led people to interpret them esoterically. (2) The over-emphasis of the orthodox theologians on the formal side of the law at the cost of its spirit. (3) The influence of the Magians who claimed esoteric knowledge of truth (4) The belief of the Shi'ites in the doctrine of the infallible Imam who alone could know and interpret the law.

The most powerful sect of these Shi'ites was that of the Isma'ilians whose doctrine of Ta'wil proved fatal to the formal side of the law. They held the Quran to be an allegory and interpreted it and also Hadith in an esoteric manner. Spiritual meanings were given to Heaven, Hell, pleasure, pain and other Quranic conceptions. The doctrine of Ta'wil later on became the central

principle with the speculative Sufis.

At one time in their history the Isma'ilians became a very great danger to the rest of Islam. Many great men like Nizam ul-Mulk at-Tusi, al-Ghazzali, etc., had to write books against their doctrines to check the menace⁷. Many of the thinkers who wrote against the Isma'ilians gradually assimilated some of their doctrines as did Imam-al Ghazzali⁸. It is through him that Ibn al-'Arabi and Suhrawardi inherited esoteric ideas. Al-Ghazzali besides giving physical meaning to Hell, Heaven, pleasure and pain gives them a spiritual meaning as well. Similarly the use of allegory after the fashion of the Isma'ilians became common. Ibn Sina wrote an allegory, "Hayy Ibn Yaqzan"⁹ in which he expressed

7. Cf. at-Tusi, *Siyasat-Nama*, chapters 1-9; al-Ghazzali's *Munqidh min ad-Dalal*, pp. 18-24; al-Mustazhiri was written to check the onslaught of the Batinites.

8. In his book *at-Tafriqa bain al-Islam waz-zandiqa* while propounding the rules for the criterion how to interpret the Quran, Hadith and the doctrines of other sects Ghazzali himself has yielded to the doctrine of Ta'wil, and mostly he sides with the spirit and not the letter of the law. His *Ihya* is a struggle between the formal and the inner side of Islam. He favours the inner side of it. The formal, though necessary, is a means to the inner. Books like "*Kitab al-madnun bihi an ghairi ahlihi*", etc. follow only the esoteric side of the law of Islam.

9. Ibn Tufail later on also wrote an allegory under the same title.

the most subtle and abstruse ideas in commonplace terms. Al-Ghazzali popularised the use of the allegory (*e. g.*, *Ihya*, vol. IV, pp. 215-16). Closely connected with the doctrines of allegory and esotericism is the common belief of the Muslim philosophers that the masses cannot understand the nature of ultimate things.

Suhrawardi's allegories are the oldest allegories in Persian literature known so far. He is the strongest supporter of the belief that the truth should not be revealed to the masses¹⁰ and, therefore, he always tried to clothe commonplace things in obscure terminology. "To save himself from the troubles the Sufi should not express all that is in his own ken as only a few can understand those conceptions."¹¹ Suhrawardi says "To divulge the Divine secret is unbelief, to divulge the secret of predestination is rebellion and to publish a secret is unbelief...."¹² In the allegory¹³ pertaining to the *poopoo* the animal is made to say:—

"Many a time have I said that I will divulge
Whatever secrets there are in the world.

But out of fear of the sword and slaps on the neck
There are a thousand ties on my tongue."

10. *Three Treatises*, p. 13. "Speak to the people according to their intelligence", p. 21; see also pp. 20-23, where he has illustrated this truth.

11. *Three Treatises*, pp. 20-22

12. *Ibid.* p. 21.

13. *Ibid.* pp. 20-23.

As to the sources of Suhrawardi's philosophy, he drank deep at various sources and made use of every idea, principle, story, etc., which served his purpose. He took his materials from the Quran, Hadith and the Sufis. He was influenced by Plato Aristotle, Neo-Platonism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, Iranian and Shi'ite conceptions.

In spite of the fact that he borrowed ideas from many sources, he did not accept them slavishly. He differed from Aristotle, and Plato very freely in many points and rose above all the minds that influenced him. He built a system of his own which is unique and original.

II Existence and Nature of the Ultimate Principle

Suhrawardi has not systematically discussed the existence and the nature of the ultimate principle in the treatises. The following conclusions have been drawn on the basis of his utterances therein. It appears that these treatises were addressed to his intimate associates and confidants who knew his metaphysical views.

Suhrawardi, Sufi as he is, believes that logical reasoning cannot prove the existence of God, etc. Instead of making him a believer¹⁴, it rather leads a man to doubt and despair. It is only through gnosis "*ma'rifa*", that one is led to believe in the existence of God, etc. Gnosis does not depend on arguments and proofs to establish its conclusions. It relies on an observation (*mushahada*) of a very intimate nature. *viz.*,

14. Three Treatises, p. 31.

an observation with the eye of the heart. It is possible only in the state of ecstasy when one's senses are suspended and one is absorbed in God and is unconscious of the self and the world around him. The order of the 'aql (intellect) too is removed, and the 'kaun' and the 'makan' are lost to sight. The seer has gone beyond the physical world and above the category of being¹⁵. When the Sufi is in such a state, a divine light dawns upon his heart, through which the nature of many entities, e. g., God, Soul, etc., becomes manifest. The things are seen as if with the eyes. It is an intuition or inner perception. The theologians believe that God, in the next world, will create a perception in man through which he will be able to see Him. Suhrawardī says that God can create a similar perception in man enabling him to see God in this world directly without the help of arguments and proofs¹⁶. A sufi was once asked, "What is the proof of the existence of the Creator?" to which he replied: "The semblance of the one who seeks after the Truth through arguments is like one

15. Ibid, p 15.

16. Three Treatises, p 31; Cf. al-Ghazzalī, Ihya, vol. I, pp. 18-29. The science through which the knowledge of spiritual realities comes to the heart is called علم المباشرة by al-Ghazzalī. According to him علم المباشرة comes at a stage when man transcends the limits of علم and عمل and is wholly absorbed in God, after his heart is purified. It is light that reveals itself in

(see on next page)

searching after the sun with a lamp"¹⁷. It was through this divine light that the Prophet, lost in ecstasy, ascended the Heavens and perceived the Truth. "My heart has seen my Lord," said 'Omar. "If the veil is removed my belief is not increased," said 'Ali, the prince of Sufis¹⁸. It was through this light of the heart that 'Omar and 'Ali (peace be upon them) saw God.

As to the nature of the ultimate principle. The ultimate principle is only one. It is substance (*wujud*) according to Suhrawardi, who uses it in the same sense as did Spinoza. External phenomena are merely accidents. They are the manifestations of the substance¹⁹. To prove this Suhrawardi quotes the following verses from the Holy Quran :

(Continued from page 146)

the heart of man, when it is purified and purged of all its evil qualities. With this light many things that are vague, or are only heard of, become real and living. Knowledge about all spiritual realities such as the person of God, His attributes, His action, His dispositions of the affairs of the universe, prophet-hood, Satan, angels, Hell, the Heavens, etc., is revealed to him. It removes the curtain of doubt till the truth becomes absolutely manifest, and spiritual realities are perceived by man as if with his own eyes. It is possible in the very nature of man, if his heart were not soiled by the filth of this world....."

17. Three Treatises, p. 31.

18. *Ibid* , pp. 31-32.

19. Three Treatises, P. 13.

"So that they worship not Allah who bringeth forth the hidden in the heavens and the earth"²⁰. "And there is not a thing but with Us are the stores thereof, and we send it not down save in appointed measure"²¹. It is unique in existence. It cannot be compared with anything else²².

"Naught is as His likeness; and He is the Hearer, the Seer"²³. He alone will remain for ever; all else is transitory

"Every one that is thereon will pass away; there remaineth but the countenance of thy Lord of Might and Glory"²⁴.

'Is not every thing except God in vain?'²⁵ He is the first, the last, the manifest and the hidden²⁶. He is omniscient and knows all the secrets in the heavens and the earth²⁷. "Not a secret of you will be hidden"²⁸.

It is on the basis of such utterances, mainly Quranic that a hazy picture of Suhrawardi's metaphysical views of his younger days, can be formed. The utterances make it quite clear that he was not an anthropomorphist

20. Quran, XXVII, 25.

21. Quran, XV, 27.

22. ليس كمثل شيء

23. Quran, XLII, 9.

24. Quran, LV, 26-27.

25. Three Treatises, p 27.

26. Cf. Quran, LVIII, 3.

27. Three Treatises, pp. 17, 27

28. Quran, LXIX, 18.

Like the orthodox theologians especially the Hanbalites, The anthropomorphists attributed human qualities to God and believed that God sits tightly on the 'arsh as mentioned in the Quran. By doing so they confined Him to place and direction. It is the knowledge of God, they said, and not God Himself that is present every where²⁹

Suhrawardi can also be distinguished from the Mu'tazilites and the Muslim philosophers who denied omniscience to God. God they said, only knows the universals and has no knowledge of the particulars³⁰.

His conception of God resembles that of al-Ghazzali who believes that He is unique and incomparable to anything. Al-Ghazzali holds the attributes and words which are used to connote certain qualities in Him to be merely metaphors. He goes so far as to say that even the description of God is beyond all metaphor³¹. In short, Suhrawardi is neither an anthropomorphist nor like those who believed God to be nothing but a metaphorical entity devoid of any power to govern the universe. On the contrary he believes God to be omniscient and omnipotent-

As to his attitude to his instinctive belief of his country that there are two independent realities, the good

29. Three Treatises, p. 26.

30. Cf. Al-Ghazzali's *tahafut*, pp. 223-238: He has shattered into pieces the argument of the philosophers who held that God has no knowledge of the particulars (الجزئيات)

31. *Ihya*, Vol. IV, pp. 215-221.

and the evil, the light and the darkness which create all the good and evil things respectively, we cannot say anything with certainty. There are only two utterances on the basis of which it may be said that philosophically, he is a dualist. He says, 'whatever retreats to pure darkness has also that (darkness) for its source.' And "whatever seeks light is also from light" ³².

Theologically, he is a monotheist and believes that all things proceed from a single cause. The nature of that cause is conceived by him to be light. God is the absolute light, the other lights are non-existent as compared with it. It is the source and origin of other lights which are transitory ³³. "Light upon light; Allah guideth into this light (Himself) whom He will; and Allah speaketh to mankind in allegories" ³⁴. "You have all the lights of this world through the light of the sun. All the luminous objects obtain light and acquire brilliancy from it" ³⁵. The sun is the source of light and it gives light to moon and other objects ³⁶. On the basis of such expressions we can discern the rudiment of the conception of reality as light ³⁷.

32 Three Treatises, p. 13.

33 Three Treatises, p. 14

34 Quran, XXIV, 35

35 Three Treatises, p. 21

36. Three Treatises, pp. 21, 25.

37. Al Ghazzali also conceives the nature of reality as light. His book *mishkat al-anwar* is a commentary on the verse of the Quran: "Allah is the light of the heavens and earth." God in this book is conceived to be absolute light, i.e. the source of all things.

It is dimly perceived at this stage of his intellectual development

Further, he conceives reality as beauty also, which conception is very clearly brought out. "Verily, God is beautiful, He likes beauty" ³⁸ His beauty is unmingled with any evil and His perfection without any defect ³⁹. Beauty (*Jamal*) and perfection (*Kamal*), according to Suhrawardi, are terms identical in significance. All things seek perfection ⁴⁰, and this perfection is the attainment of absolute beauty ⁴¹ The conception of reality as beauty becomes very clear, as we will find below, when he explains how the One created the many,

III. Creation of the Universe

The things were created through agencies by way of emanation The order of creation is as follows The first thing which God created was a 'luminous essence' called '*aql*' This essence was endowed with three qualities,

38. The Lover Friend, p 23

39. Three Treatises pp 50-51.

40. Cf. al-Ghazzali's conception of perfection, *Mizan-al-amal*, pp 19 f: "The perfection of every thing consists in the realization of the perfection peculiar to that thing. The perfection which is peculiar to man consists in the apprehension of the true nature of things"

41. The Lover' Friend, p. 23.

42. Cf. Al-Ghazzali, *Ihya*, Vol. I, p. 73—

اول ما خلق الله العقل

Sharh-al-Ihya, Vol. I, p. 452. "The first thing which God the Almighty created was intellect."

viz., the knowledge of truth, the knowledge of the self, and the knowledge of the phenomenal world *Husn* (beauty) came into existence from the quality of the knowledge of truth; *Ishq* (love) came into existence from the quality of the knowledge of the self; *Huzn* (sorrow) came into being from the quality of the knowledge of the phenomenal world. All the three emanated from the one source and were related to each other⁴³. *Husn* which was prior in existence contemplated on its own beauty and found himself extremely beautiful. A cheerfulness appeared in his face, out of which came into existence all the angels⁴⁴. *Ishq* (love) who has an affection for *Husn* gazed at him unceasingly and when a smile appeared on the face of *Husn*, *Ishq* was disturbed and wanted to move but *Huzn* suspended himself on to him and from this suspension came into being the heavens and the earth⁴⁵. These three elements constitute nature of all things. The celestial and the terrestrial worlds are ruled by them.

When Adam was created, the inhabitants of the celestial world were disturbed. *Husn* who was the king of the spiritual world came to see Adam and finding the place pleasant, took possession of him. Love

43. Lovers' Friend, pp. 3-4.

44. Mohd. Iqbal, *Metaphysics in Persia*, London, 1908, p. 113:—The Sufis like Avicenna "look upon the ultimate reality as 'Eternal Beauty' whose very nature consists in seeing its own 'face reflected in the Universe-mirror.'"

45. Lovers' Friend, p. 4.

and Sorrow also followed *Husn* because they could not live without it and joined it. Since then they have been ruling both the worlds⁴⁶. When the time of Yusuf came, *Husn* came to see him and took possession of him and there remained no difference between *Husn* and Yusuf. 'Ishq also came after *Husn* putting his hand in the neck of *Husn*⁴⁷. They failed to reach the parlour of *Husn* and departed to do ascetic exercises in order to see *Husn* again⁴⁸.

Husn went to Canaan and took possession of Ya'qub. 'Ishq took its way to Egypt and identified itself with Zulaikha⁴⁹. 'Ishq and *Husn* in the end succeeded in finding *Husn* without which they could not live⁵⁰.

The allegory illustrates, firstly, how God created the Universe and secondly, how beauty or perfection which is the ideal of man's life can be attained through the universal force called love. It is love which underlies all movements⁵¹. It is a traveller by profession⁵². "Every time I turn my face to a direction, every day I am at a stage...". It goes to different countries and has different names in different places "In heaven I am celebrated as the 'mover' and on the earth I am

46. *Lovers' Friend*. pp. 4-6.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-11.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-11, 20-24.

51. *Lovers' Friend*, p. 29.

52. *Lovers' Friend*, p. 11.

known as the "quieter" ⁵³

Suhrawardi's position is as follows: God created one thing and then another till the process of creation was complete. This is the doctrine of Neo-Platonic emanation. The workings of the force of love are obvious.

"Love", according to Ibn Sina is defined "as the appreciation of Beauty" ⁵⁴. "This striving for the ideal is love's movement towards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love which actualises all striving, movement, progress" ⁵⁵ 'Jamal' and 'Kamal', according to Suhrawardi, are the two different names of Husn ⁵⁶. Suhrawardi's doctrine of love and perfection agrees with that of Ibn Sina

The fundamental difference between the God of Neo-Platonism and that of Suhrawardi is that to the former the universe is the eternal emanation, while to the latter it is merely a manifestation ⁵⁷ of God.

IV. Nature and Destiny of the Human Soul

Human soul is of divine origin which like all other things yearns to return to whence it had come and in

53. Ibid., p. 11.

54. *Metaphysics of Persia*, p. 38.

55. Ibid., p. 39.

56. *Lovers' Friend*, p. 23.

57. *Three Treatises*, p. 13.

attaining this end consists its perfection⁵⁸. "Whatever retreats to pure darkness has also that (darkness) for its source". "Whatever seeks light is also from light"⁵⁹. "If it (a thing) is watery it cannot live without water"⁶⁰. "The proof of this is the fish that when it leaves the water its life cannot continue"⁶¹. "And that thy lord, He is the goal"⁶².

Though it is natural for the human soul to seek union with God, yet it often forgets its destiny and goes astray. Suhrawardi has illustrated this point in an allegory⁶³. We give here a short resume of it. A king had a beautiful garden full of beautiful flowers of all kinds. It was inhabited by beautiful and sweet birds. Every imaginable beauty was to be found in it. One of the peacocks was caught by the order of the king and imprisoned after being sewn in a leather. He could not see anything except the inside of the basket. With the passage of time, he forgot all about the garden and its contents. He thought that there was no better and nicer

58. Three Treatises, p 14. Cf. Al-Ghazzali, *Mizan-al-'Amal*, pp. 19-20:— The perfection of the human soul lies in knowing God, His qualities and the disposition of the affairs of the universe. He also believes that there is an affinity between soul and God. (Ihya, vol. IV, p. 254)

59. Three Treatises, p 14.

60. Three Treatises, p. 14.

61. Three Treatises p 15.

62. Quran, LIII, 43.

63. Three Treatises, pp. 22-25.

place than the inside of the basket. But sometimes when the sweet breeze came from the garden, he felt an impulse, and he knew not where the impulse came from. One day he heard the following:—

“There came to me the mornin^g almost saying;
I am a messenger to you from the friends”⁶⁴.

But the bird could not recognize whence the message came from

“O lightning that flashes,
From what sides of the enclosure do you spread”⁶⁵.

The ignorance was due to his having forgotten the garden and the things connected with it “They forgot Allah, therefore He caused them to forget their souls”⁶⁶. When the bird was set free and came to his companions, he felt ashamed of his previous state “Alas, my grief that I was unmindful of Allah”⁶⁷ “And now we have removed from thee thy covering and piercing is thy sight this day”⁶⁸.

The goal of man is his union with God. Suhrawardi believes that this union is possible. He brings for his support many verses of the Quran :

“The day when they shall meet Him”⁶⁹.

All will be brought before Us”⁷⁰.

64. *Three Treatises*, p. 23.

65. *Three Treatises*, p. 23

66. Quran, LIX, 20

67. Quran, XXXIX, 57.

68. Quran, L, 27.

69. Quran, XXXIII, 43.

70. Quran, XXXVI, 32.

"Unto Us is their return"⁷¹.

But there are obstructions between him and his goal. In order to attain his goal, man should detach himself from the worldly distractions and master his passions.

As regards the powers of man, he stands midway between angels and animals. "No wonder", says Suhrawardi, "if an angel commits no crime, or if a beast or an animal does an evil act, because the angel does not possess the capability of doing evil and the beast does not possess the capability of understanding. On the other hand, the (real) wonder is, the act of a man who carries the commands of passion and submits himself to passions in spite of the light of the intellect. And, by the honour of God, the Great, that the man who remains firm-footed at the time of the attack of passions is superior to an angel, and again, one who is submissive to passions is far worse than a beast"⁷².

The human soul has the following powers⁷³.

1. External senses : sight, hearing, taste, smell

71. Quran, LXXXXVII, 25.

72 Three Treatises, p. 46. Cf. Al-Ghazzali, Psychological Basis, Musl. Univ. Jour. Aligarh, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 97 :—"Man occupies a position midway between the animals and angels and his true differentia is knowledge. He can either rise to the level of angels with the help of knowledge or fall to the level of animals by letting his anger and lust dominate him."

73. Lovers' Friend, pp. 11-20.

and touch⁷⁴.

2. Internal senses which are physiological :

- (1) قوت جاذبة
- (2) قوت هاضمة
- (3) قوت ماسكة
- (3) قوت دافعة
- (5) قوت ناسيد etc.

3. Internal senses which are perceptive :

I. *Hiss-i-Mushtarik* (general sense or sensorium) :

It is located in the frontal lobe of the brain. Sense impressions coming from all the senses are received by it. It only apprehends sensible forms.

II. *Quwwat-i-Khayal* (imagination) : It is located in the middle lobe of the brain. It deals with the sensible as well as conceptual objects. Its function is to create new ideas out of the old material with which it is endowed. It is divided into :

- (a) *Quwwat-i-Wahm* : It gives only senseless imagination. It always misleads.
- (b) *Quwwat-i-Mutakhayyila* : It gives both truth and falsehood. Sometimes it acts as an angelic power and sometimes as devilish. Thoughts which are ruled by عقل are called مفكر and are angelic, and those ruled by wahm are bad and are called mutakhayyila.

74. The sense of touch, he says, comprises all these senses.

III. *Quwwat-i-Hafiza* (Memory) It is located in the hinder part of the brain, and conserves what comes to it.

4. Internal senses which are appetitive and self-assertive : قوت غضب and قوت شهوة : These are the basis of human actions. They stand in contradiction to عقل. All other internal and external senses are subordinate to them. If they are let loose, they degrade man to the level of animals and if properly controlled, they elevate him to the rank of angels⁷⁵.

(a) قوت شهوة enables man to take what is useful to him.

(b) قوت غضب enables man to repel what is harmful to him⁷⁶.

5. قوت عقل : A rational faculty which distinguishes man from animals and enables him to know all abstract truths and intellectual sciences. It is through this عقل that man attains his salvation⁷⁷.

6. عقل اول (Eternal Intellect) : It is the impersonal and the universal soul which permeates the whole universe. The individual soul partakes of it. All the mental virtues are its manifestations. It is immaterial, imperishable and transcendent.

75. Cf. *Three Treatises*, p. 46

76. *Lovers' Friend*, p. 19.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 10

tal. It knows all the secrets of the heavens and the earth⁷⁸.

Man, then, is celestial as well terrestrial, قوت شهوة and قوت غضب bind him to the physical world, whereas عقل connects him with the spiritual world. Sometimes these faculties overpower the intellect and make man their slave. But the right position of intellect is that it should control and guide them so that the person should realize his perfection which consists in knowing the secrets of the self, the universe, etc.⁷⁹ The knowledge is possible in the very nature of man. There is no limit to such knowledge. The control of passions, love, contemplation and the guidance of wisdom, in short can enable man to attain to his perfection.

But there are difficulties which beset the soul in search of truth. Suhrawerdi illustrates this fact in an allegory known as the "Treatise of the Bird"⁸⁰. This allegory points out how worldly distractions and impediments can be surmounted by the seeker after truth, and how after great difficulties, the seeker can have the knowledge of truth. The bird narrates how a flock of birds in which he was flying was allured by hunters into a trap, how the bondage and the imprisonment became comfortable and congenial to it and how ultima-

78. Cf. Al-Ghazzali's division of human faculties, *Ihya* III, p. 5-6. There is hardly any difference between the division of al-Ghazzali and that of Suhrawerdi.

79. *Lovers' Friend*, p. 20.

80. *Three Treatises*, pp. 45-51.

tely after many privations the birds secured their freedom.

Human heart cannot know truth until it is properly oriented in the direction of truth. It is a mirror which reflects the universe⁸¹. If the heart is purified, the whole universe can be reflected in it. But many things come between it and the truth⁸².

The essential condition for apprehending the spiritual truths is self-purification⁸³. The way to apprehend God is that the heart should be purified and the worldly attachments effaced from it. The more will one detach himself from the world and turn his attention to God, the more will he be able to reach spiritual heights 'as the divine favours are proportionate to human labours, and the utmost exertions are met with unbounded munificence'⁸⁴.

Self-purification, then, 'is the only road to self emancipation'⁸⁵, and to 'turn the face towards God entirely

81. Three Treatises, p. 26.

82. Three Treatises, p. 17. Cf. al-Ghazzali, *Ihya*, Vol. III, p 11 : He gives five reasons which may prevent the heart from apprehending the truth. (1) It may be undeveloped, (2) sins may render it dark, (3) it may be occupied with its own purification, (4) some traditional prejudices may check the reflection of truth, and (5) man may be ignorant as to the direction of truth.

83. Cf. Quran, LXXXIV, 3.

84. Three Treatises, p. 5; *ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

85. Three Treatises, p. 5.

is liberation' ⁸⁶.

The tortures and mortifications which sufi's encounter in order to gain liberation from the thralldom of passions are pleasures to them. Suhrawardi has illustrated this fact in an allegory ⁸⁷. Some bats became hostile to a chameleon and agreed to punish him by throwing him in the sun as this was the greatest punishment according to the bats. But to their surprise, the sun gave life to him instead of death. Husain-i-Maneur says :

"Kill me, O my confidants; killing me is my life.

"My life is my death, and my death is my life" ⁸⁸.

Abu Sulaiman Darani says, "If the heedless knew what pleasures of the gnostic they lack, they would die out of sadness' ⁸⁹.

V. Knowledge of God (Ma'rifa)

We now pass on to his mystical and ethical philosophy. Man's aim in this life is to attain his perfection which consists in his union with God. This is only possible through Ma'rifa. If man desires to rise above the common run and wants to see God face to face, he must have a faith in the unseen, a desire to see the unseen, both of which lead him to the knowledge of the unseen, which in turn make him realize the unseen. Knowledge is the central part of the Sufi doctrine; it

86. *Three Treatises*, p. 27.

87. *Three Treatises*, pp. 19-20.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

arises from faith and yearning and leads man to apprehend God.

Suhrawardi constantly prays to God to increase his knowledge⁹⁰. He says that the more learned the man the more perfect he is⁹¹. The prophet said, "Never has God created an ignorant *wali*"⁹². Although the prophet was an embodiment of perfection, yet God said to the prophet in the Quran, "And say, O my Lord, increase me in knowledge"⁹³.

This knowledge is not the knowledge of taxation, marriage, business, and the like⁹⁴. It is gnosis which comes to the heart through intuition and revelation. It pertains to the knowledge of God, His qualities, His disposition of the affairs of the Universe, the secrets of the spiritual world, the heaven and the earth, etc.⁹⁵. These mysteries about God, the soul and the universe should be known but not divulged because every heart cannot contain them⁹⁶. The highest perfection of man, then, lies in attaining the resemblance of God⁹⁷.

Knowledge of perfection is a quality of man. One who has more knowledge about the realities of the

90. Ibid., p 13

91. Three Treatises, p. 39.

92. Ibid, p. 39.

93. Quran, XX, 113.

94. Three Treatises, p. 36.

95. Ibid., p 39; Of, al-Ghazzali, Ihya, vol. I, pp.18-19.

96. Three Treatises, p. 39.

97. Ibid., p. 40.

Universe is noble⁹⁸, and one who does not possess it is imperfect⁹⁹.

The acquisition of the science of knowledge of God is superior to all the other sciences. A science is preferable because of its subjectmatter, the strong arguments and proofs it uses and the advantages it brings to the seeker¹⁰¹. *Ma'rifa* has all these advantages over other sciences¹⁰². Its aim is truth, it uses observation (*mushahada*), and it is an established fact that observation is more convincing than argumentation.¹⁰³ And the advantages that will accrue from it will be everlasting¹⁰⁴.

98. Three Treatises, pp. 40-41.

99. Ibid., p. 40.

101. Three Treatises, p. 30.

102 Three Treatises, 31-32; Cf al-Ghazzali, *Ihya*, Vol. 1, pp 12-14. "The nobility of a science depends on three factors : (1) The faculty by which that knowledge is sought, *e. g.*, intellectual sciences are superior to philological sciences, because philosophy is acquired through intellect and philology through hearing, and intellect is superior to hearing. (2) The generality of the benefits which can be derived from it. (3) The kind of material which it employs, *e. g.*, teaching is superior to tannery, since the teacher works upon the human mind and the tanner upon the skins of animals, minds being superior to the dead skins'. He further proves that science which leads one to God is the noblest of all the sciences.

103 Three Treatises, p. 31.

104. Three Treatises, p. 32.

It is through ecstasy (*dhaug*) that *m'arifa* is possible. The seeker in its attainment rises by steps to the knowledge of the spiritual realities. The main steps are as follows:

1. When the heart is purified, divine lights from the transcendental world begin to appear in the heart.

These are merely flashes and accidents. They are not constant and permanent. They suddenly appear and disappear. "He it is who shows you the lightning"¹⁰⁵ God says about it that "the splendour of His lightning almost takes away the eye-sight" (Quran, XXIV, 43). These flashes are delightful. They increase with the increase of the ascetic exercises. But he believes that in a purified heart such flashes can come without exercises¹⁰⁶. Sometimes man begins to apprehend some of the states belonging to the next world in every thing that he sees. Sometimes he becomes mentally unbalanced. At the time of the break, the seeker finds consolation in the past memories against the onslaughts of passions¹⁰⁷. This is the first stage.

When the light from the spiritual world reaches 'the utmost extremity' and remains for a long time, it is called 'tranquillity'. This stage is more perfect than the first one. When the seeker comes back to his physical self, he feels highly regretful for its separation. In the Quran this 'tranquillity,' says Suhrawardi, is mentioned many times.

105. Quran, XIII, 13

106. Three Treatises, p. 34.

107. Ibid., p. 33.

"And God sent down His 'tranquillity'¹⁰⁸. One who has attained to this height, can read the hearts of others and the meaning of many unknown things become clear to him. The Prophet once said about 'Omar,' "Verily, tranquillity speaks through the tongue of 'Omar.'" Sometimes he hears discourses from the divine world¹⁰⁹. This is the second stage

"And this Tranquillity becomes such that if man desires to keep it off from himself he cannot do so. Then man reaches such a stage that whenever he likes, he gives up the body and goes to the world of (divine) Majesty, and his ascents reach the high spheres. And whenever he likes or desires he can do so. So whenever he looks at himself he becomes happy, because he discerns the radiance of God's light (falling) on him. Hitherto it is a defect

' If he exerts further, he also passes this stage. He becomes such that he does not look on himself and his knowledge of his existence is lost; this is called "*Fana-i-Akbar*" When one forgets himself and also forgets the forgetfulness it is called "*Fana dar fana*"¹¹⁰. At this stage the seeker after truth has reached the highest end and has realized what is possible for him. This is not an end of man's efforts in the Buddhist sense of *Nirvana*. In *Nirvana* the individual passes into annihilation. According to the Sufi philosophy the individual soul

108. Quran, XLVIII, 25

109. Three Treatises, pp. 35-36.

110. Three Treatises, pp. 36-37.

attains everlasting existence by joining with the universal soul.

Sufis consider it a polytheism to delight in the knowledge one has gained about God. In doing this, they say, the seeker has made knowledge and not God his object of worship. The Sufi loses, firstly, the delights of knowledge, and, secondly, himself and the world around him. This stage is called 'Obliteration'¹¹¹. "Every one that is in it, will pass away and there remaineth but the face of Thy Lord, the glorious and beneficent"¹¹².

In his ascent to the divine, the seeker after truth passes through the following stages¹¹³:—

1. "There is no God but God", At this stage the seeker only realizes that there is no other Deity except God. Divinity is negated from all other things

2 "There is no He but Him" In the first stage the divinity is negated from what is not God. But at this stage existence also is negated to all other things except God. It is He and He alone that exists. All other things are only phenomenal. They are only manifestations of Him.

3 "There is no Thou but Thou". This stage of unification is still higher. "Him" is used for the absent but "Thou" stands for the one who is present. At this stage, besides the unification, the presence of God is also felt

4 "There is no I but Me" This is a still higher

111. Three Treatises, p 37.

112. Quran, LV. 27, 28

113. Three Treatises, pp. 37-38,

stage. In "Thouship" there is a duality because one addresses another. At this stage, the *Sufi* is absorbed in God and there is no distinction between the seeker and the sought. "And every thing will perish save His face"¹¹⁴.

There is no limit to the spiritual grades. But as long as man wears the garb of humanity, he cannot fully comprehend the world of divinity. "A *Sufi* was once asked 'what is *Tasawwuf*?' He answered. "Its beginning is God and as regards the end it has no end"¹¹⁵.

VI Love of God

Suhrawardi regards love of God as the highest end of man in this world. It is the highest virtue or quality of the heart which a man should develop in order to attain his perfection. But love of God is not a quality isolated from the knowledge of God. It is an aspect of the knowledge which is higher in point of spiritual development. The theologians believe that Man's love for God is an impossibility since man and God are not homogeneous. Love can take place, they argue, between beings which are homogeneous. Man's affection for God consists, according to them, in his obedience to Him¹¹⁶. Suhrawardi says that homogeneity is not condi-

114. Quran, XXVIII, 88.

115. Three Treatises, p. 38

116 Three Treatises, p. 41; Cf. al-Ghazzali, *Ihya*, Vol IV, p 252. Suhrawardi's words and arguments are similar to those of al-Ghazzali. Al-Ghazzali says that
(see on next page)

tion of love as sometimes a man loves a colour or an object, though they are not homogeneous with him. "Love consists of an affection which has transgressed its limit"¹¹⁷. It implies an imperfection on the part of the lover ; the lover has not acquired all what is desirable. Something still remains to be realized, which is not yet acquired. If man comprehends God's beauty fully, he will have no further desire. But full comprehension of God's beauty is impossible for man.

Human faculties have certain functions to perform. They are created to fulfil a mission. In carrying out this mission lies their perfection and pleasure. The pleasures of the senses of sight, hearing and smelling, *e. g.*, consist in seeing beautiful forms, hearing melodious voices, and smelling fine odour, respectively. Similarly, all the external and internal senses have certain functions to perform. The performance of such functions which are peculiar to particular senses, gives the greatest pleasure to them. Man shares his external and internal senses with animals. But over and above all these, man has another faculty known as intellect whose function is to realize the intellectual truths. The

(Continued from page 168)

the theologians hold that love cannot exist between man and God. They define the love of God as obedience to Him. According to them love can exist between the members of the same species. Ghazzali refutes their arguments. He also established that love of God is the highest ideal of man and is the essence of Islam.

117. *Three Treatises*, p. 41; *Lovers' Friend*, pp. 24-25.

function of the intellect and the rational soul is the knowledge of truth, and comprehension of realities. And when the soul has acquired this, it has reached its perfection and experienced the highest pleasures. This pleasure cannot be compared with any other pleasure as "one who did not taste, does not know"¹¹⁸

'*Jamal* and '*Kamal*' are only different names for *Husn* (Beauty). Everything, whether spiritual or corporeal, seeks not only perfection but also beauty¹¹⁹.

118 Three Treatises, p. 42 ; Cf. al-Ghazzali, *Ihya*, Vol. IV, p. 254 There seems to be no difference between the views of al-Ghazzali and those of Suhrawardi. Affection may be defined as a natural inclination towards objects which give pleasure. If the inclination becomes strong it is called love. Affection is of different kinds according to different senses. Every sense perceives a particular kind of object which gives it pleasure or pain. The eye, for instance, apprehends beautiful forms, the ear musical sounds, the nose sweet odour, etc. In the apprehension of these objects lies the perfection of these senses. But man shares with the other animals the external and internal senses. But over and above these senses man has another inner sense or faculty of perfection which is implanted in the heart. It is only through this faculty that God and other mysteries of the heaven and earth can be known. And in apprehending these objects lies the perfection of this faculty.

119 Lovers' Friend, p. 23 ; Cf. al-Ghazzali, *Ihya*, Vol. IV, p. 256 He also conceives '*Kamal* and '*Jamal* as one and the same thing. He too conceives reality as beauty.

It can be realized through '*Ishq*. '*Ishq* comes to man through *Huzn* (Sorrow), *i. e.*, when one has purified his heart by subduing his passion and has used his internal and external senses properly. '*Ishq* comes only at a time when the worldly attachments are eliminated from the heart. And it is '*Ishq* which takes the seekers to the sought, *i. e.*, perfection or beauty which is man's desired object¹²⁰. "Eject hollow imaginations from your head ; languish through coquetry ; and increase supplication. Your teacher is love, when you reach there he will himself utter with the tongue of ecstasy : Act thus"¹²¹.

Love is the 'utmost extremity' of affection¹²². It is 'excessive affection' "Love is more particular than affection, because all love is affection but all affection is not love. And affection is more particular than 'knowledge', because all affection is knowledge, but all knowledge is not affection. And two opposite things come out of knowledge, which are called 'friendship' and 'enmity'. Because knowledge pertains either to a thing which is agreeable and suitable to the body or the spirit which is called 'pure good' and 'absolute affection'; and the human soul seeks it, and desires to betake itself to that, and attain perfection ; or, it pertains to a thing which is not agreeable to the body and the spirit which is called 'pure evil' and 'absolute defect'; and the human soul always flies from that and it has a natural aversion

120. Lovers' Friend, p. 24.

121. Lovers' Friend, p. 24.

122. Lovers' Friend, p. 24.

towards that. From the first comes 'friendship' and from the second 'enmity'. So the first round is knowledge, the second round is affection, and the third round is love. And one cannot reach the world of love which is the highest of all, unless he makes two rounds of the stair from knowledge and affection'. "The world of love is 'the end of the world of knowledge and affection'".

"One who is in union with it is the end of the learned scholars and illustrious philosophers. And therefore it is said :

No created being has love,

None but the mature has love"¹²³.

The word '*Ishq*' is derived from the name of a plant known as '*Ashaqah* (ivy). This plant grows at the foot of a tree, shoots its roots in the ground and becomes very firm and then slowly and gradually climbs on the tree and ultimately covers the whole of it. It begins to suck the nourishment of the tree with the result that the tree dries up¹²⁴.

Similarly, in the heart of a man there is a tree. It faces to the spiritual as well as the physical world. The one which faces to the spiritual world is the real tree, and the other which faces to the physical world is the shadow tree. If man indulges in the worldly things, the shadow tree becomes stronger and gradually occupies the whole heart of man. Then the real tree becomes weaker and sometimes withers away. As it gets shrivelled, man forgets all about the spiritual world. But when

123. Lovers' Friend, pp. 24-25.

124. Lovers' Friend, p. 26.

man begins to nourish the real tree with the water of knowledge, love jumps in, shoots its roots into the heart, and covers the shadow tree with the result that this tree becomes paler and paler and the real tree begins to grow again and its numerous branches begin to draw spiritual nourishment from the divine fountain. And when it has reached its perfection, the shadow tree dies and the soul of man becomes identical with the real tree and he attains the highest perfection¹²⁵.

This stage is reached through '*Ishq* which may be called the pious deed leading one to the first beloved, "Unto Him good words ascend, and the pious deed doth He exalt"¹²⁶. It is through the purification of the heart that '*Ishq* becomes perfect and in its perfection lies the perfection of man¹²⁷. *Ishq* cannot enter a heart unless the lower appetites of the soul are sacrificed¹²⁸. But every one cannot reach this height of perfection ; "it requires years that an original stone through the sun becomes a ruby in Badakhshan or a cornelian in Yaman¹²⁹"

Love, in short, is at the basis of all creation as well as of perfection¹³⁰.

"But for you, we wouldn't have known Love,
But for Love, we wouldn't have known you"¹³¹.

125. Lovers' Friend, pp. 26-28.

126. Quran, XXXV, 11.

127. Lovers' Friend, pp. 29-30.

128. Lovers Friend, p. 29.

129. Lovers' Friend, p. 29.

130. Ibid., p 30.

131. Ibid. p 3.

Conclusion

Suhrawardi in his younger days conceived reality as both light and beauty. The conception of reality as beauty can be established on the basis of the utterances in the Treatises but the conception of reality as light is dimly perceptible and therefore cannot be established. These views are not without precedent. Ghazzali also conceived reality as beauty as well as light.

The human soul is of divine origin. Its perfection lies in reaching its origin. This perfection can be realized through knowledge which is the differentia of man. Knowledge means the knowledge of God, His qualities, His actions, angels, the secrets of the heavens, and the earth, etc.

Everything seeks perfection or beauty which is possible through the cultivation of love. When man has wholly detached himself from the worldly desires and is solely occupied with God, he sees all realities. And here lies his perfection.

Suhrawardi has followed al-Ghazzali in his younger days both in letter and spirit. He seems to be a thoroughgoing Ghazzalian.

APPENDIX III

A REVIEW

The Doctrine of the Sufis (Kitab al-Ta'arruf fi-madhhib ahl al-tasawwuf). Translated from the Arabic of Abu Bakr al-Kalbadhi

By A. J. Arberry,

Cambridge University Press, 1935, 10s 6d. Net.

In order to interpret the meaning and spirit underlying the Muslim institutions, the Orientalists of the West have, of late, been busy with the study of original and old literature on the culture and religion of the Mussalmans. As Sufism has played a most important part in the make-up of their traditions and culture, this subject has received special attention.

Mr. A. J. Arberry, Assistant Keeper of Old Books and Mss. in the India Office, London, edited in 1934, in Egypt the Arabic text : "*Kitab al-Ta'arruf fi-madhhib ahl al-tasawwuf*" of al-Kalabadhi, d 380 A. H. He has now brought out an English translation of the same.

The work is one of the oldest, systematic and authoritative treatises of its kind in Arabic on Sufi doctrines. Shihabuddin as-Suhrawardi al-Maqtul, d. 587 A. H., held it in great esteem and wrote also a commentary on it (Cf O. Spies, the Lev re' Friend, p. 13). He is credited to have said, "But for the Ta'arruf we should not have known of Sufism." (Cf. "Introduction.")

p. XII). It ranks as high as the "*Risalah*" of Qushayri, and "*Qut al-Qulub*" of Abu Talib al-Makki.

The author attempts to reconcile the views of the theologians with those of the Sufis. The early Sufis were ascetics. They did not question the validity of the Islamic doctrines but quenched their yearning for the unseen by finding a hidden meaning under the conventional laws of Islam. But, later on, some of the Sufis introduced heretical doctrines into their system. The orthodox who had looked askance on Sufism from its very inception, became all the more hardened in their opposition with the introduction of heretical elements into it. Various attempts were made to soften this opposition by purifying Sufism from un-Islamic elements, e. g., by Muhasibi, d. 243 A. H., Al-Kalabadhi, d. 380 (in the book under review), and later on by Al-Ghazzali.

The book comprises an Introduction by the translator, 75 Chapters and a list of Technical Terms. the Introduction is a mine of valuable information concerning the book and the life of the author. The subject matter of the book is concerned with (a) the nature, the significance and the derivation of the conception of Sufi, etc. (Chs. 1-4), (b) main doctrines of the Sufis, e. g., the doctrine of unity, the doctrine of attributes, the doctrine of vision, etc., which, according to the author, form the very essence of Islam (Chs. 5-30), (c) the spiritual grades such as fear, hope, love, etc. (Chs. 31-51), (d) the technical terms of Sufism, e. g., "union," "separation," "passing away," etc. (Chs. 52-63), and (e) evaluation of the phenomena of Sufism (Chs. 64-75). Al-

Kalabadhi admirably summarises the most subtle problems of Sufism with great ease and simplicity : note, e-g., his description of the scope of human reason ; "They are agreed that the only guide to God is God Himself, holding that the function of the intellect is the function of an intelligent person who is in need of a guide : for the intellect is a thing originated in time, and as such only serves as a guide to things like itself". (p. 46). The author illustrates his remarks copiously with appropriate quotations, both in prose and verse.

The translation is literal. The Arabic verses are, however, rendered into English verse form. Translation itself is a very difficult task and its inherent difficulty is enhanced when one has to deal with a subtle science like Sufism. Mr. Arberry has admirably succeeded in his task. He has kept intact intrinsic beauties of both the languages. We compared the translation with the original and found that besides a few minor mistakes, it is on the whole lucid and has an ease of diction. It has been done very well.

Mr. Arberry is one of the few English Orientalists who have grasped the spirit of the Arabic Language and of Sufi philosophy. He has placed a store-house of indispensable information at the disposal of the student of mysticism and Islamic philosophy. No history of Sufism will be written without laying this work under contribution.

APPENDIX IV.
**MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY—ITS SCOPE
AND MEANING**

*Presidential Address to the Section of Islamic Philosophy
All-India Philosophical Congress, Lahore Session, 1948.*

A few years ago the Indian Philosophical Congress constituted the Section of Muslim Philosophy to stimulate its study and research. The Indian Universities are according recognition to the subject, though it must be said, rather tardily. At the initial stages of the study of the subject in which at present it is in Indian Universities, I would like to make certain observations on its scope and meaning, which will necessarily be of a sketchy character in the short time at my disposal.

Arabian Philosophy, Islamic Philosophy and Muslim Philosophy are the terms used interchangeably. But since our subject is not limited to the contributions made by the Arabs, the term Arabian Philosophy is too narrow for our purpose. It has been cultivated by the peoples of various races and religions. The term Islamic Philosophy will likewise limit its scope, meaning thereby the interpretation of the fundamental principles of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran. It will, therefore, exclude many important aspects of Muslim thought like Metaphysics, etc. Hence Muslim Philosophy seems to be the most preferable of the three terms, because it includes all the Philosophical systems cultivated by the Muslims, and, by extension the contributions made by non-Muslims to the development of these systems.

When Islam extended beyond Arabia, Muslims came in contact with various peoples and their cultures. The

contact raised many religious, political and social problems which led the Muslims to study the literatures of these peoples. The study was prosecuted with zeal under the injunction of the Holy Quran and the Tradition of the Prophet (may peace be upon him!). The Holy Quran says, "To whom wisdom is given has been given a great good." The Tradition of the Prophet says, "Seek knowledge even if it be in China". What the Muslims produced after the assimilation of different philosophies is a unique contribution with distinctive characteristics of its own, having its foundations in the Holy Quran. The Muslim philosophers, *e.g.*, assimilated the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, in the light of the divine knowledge of the Quran. synthesizing these ideas into metaphysical theories, at once original and coherent. Muslim thought represents a stage in the development of human thought—philosophical as well as scientific. "The Arab has impressed his intellectual stamp upon Europe," Draper says, "and not in too remote a future will Christendom concede this truth. He has left unfading traces of his finger on the sky, which every one can see, who reads the names of the stars on any ordinary celestial globe".

In the course of its development Muslim thought came to express itself in the various systems of Dialectics, Philosophy and Mysticism. I shall make a very brief mention of these systems.

(1) *Dialectics* :—Dialecticians are those who express their contention in logical forms. They differed amongst themselves as to the sources of knowledge.

Some considered it to be reason, while others revelation. The former may be called the Rationalistic and the latter the Orthodox or Scholastic Dialecticians ;

(a) *Rationalistic Dialecticians*:—There never has been a set of Philosophers who exalted human understanding to such an extent as the Rational School of Dialectics. In their Metaphysics, Ethics, etc., they are thorough-going rationalists. The knowledge of good and bad, the real and the 'non-real' can only be attained through reason. No human action, in their opinion, has any value unless it is governed by rational motives. They regarded man as the creator of his own action and maker of his own destiny.

In Metaphysics their reasoning led them to a concept of God as wholly devoid of personality. They are Monotheists and their attempt to purify God from anthropomorphic elements, has shorn Him of all qualities which they thought man had bestowed on Him. No attributes can be assigned to Him other than negative qualities. Like Hegel, they identified in God the subject and the object, the knower and the known. God, they held, acts according to a plan, and is not a free creative force, as the Theologians believed. In short, their God is a sort of vague unity without any personality. Their God is eternal law bound by rational motives and aims.

These Dialecticians started as theologians but ended as metaphysicians. They discussed such problems as the nature of Thing. They defined Thing as a concept that can be known and can stand as a subject to a predicate. Even before the quality of existence is

added to a thing, it has both essence and accident. When the quality of existence is added to the essence, it becomes an actuality, while without this quality it remains only in a state of non-existence.

(b) *Orthodox or Scholastic Dialecticians*:—Many schools of Scholastic Dialecticians rose simultaneously in different countries as Ibn-Hazm's school in Spain, at-Tahawi's school in Egypt, Maturidi's school in Samarqand and Ashari's school in Iraq. Ashari's school surpassed all other schools. This had for its exponents such original thinkers as Baqillani, Ghazzali, etc.

This school believes that revelation is the only source of knowledge. Secular knowledge may be gained through reason, but it is incompetent to know the really real. This school is a protest against the view that the mysteries of the Universe can be solved by human thought. They regarded God as an absolute power and a free creative agent directing the course of the Universe. He is not circumscribed by any aim or plan as this would limit His power. The solution they offered with regard to the freedom of the will and the thing-in-itself bears so close a resemblance to Leibnitz's theory of the 'pre-established harmony' and Kantian conception of existence that they may be regarded as their forerunners in the development of human thought. The earlier thinkers regarded existence as one of the qualities of existing things. The things were there. When the quality of existence was added to other qualities it became existent. Asharites refuted it arguing that existence was the self of the entity and not a quality added to it.

In their daring and thorough metaphysical schemes we find, in the words of MacDonald, that "Lucretian atoms raining down through the empty void, self-developing monads of Leibnit's 'pre-established harmony' and all, the Kantian things-in-themselves are lame and impotent in their consistency beside the parallel Asharite doctrines. The object of the Asharites was that of Kant, to fix the relation of knowledge to the thing-in-itself. But in reaching that thing-in-itself they were much more thorough than Kant. Only two of Aristotelian categories survived their attack, substance and quality. The others, quantity, place, time, and the rest were only relationships (*Itibars*) existing subjectively in the mind of the knower, and not things. Relationships had no real existence . . . all the categories had gone except substance and quality" (MacDonald, *Theology*, pp. 200 f).

Now qualities are of two kinds, negative and positive. There is always a change in the qualities but the qualities cannot exist without substance. Therefore substance also changes. The remaining two categories, viz., substance and quality, also vanish. Thus their reasoning led them to Atomism. Their Atomism, however, is not only of space, but of time also, and like the modern physicist they introduced the conception of 'Leap'

Ghazzali in his book, 'Deliverer from Error' anticipated Descartes in the Method of Doubt and passed through all the stages of doubt, discarding all authority and disbelieving even his senses. But Ghazzali went

further than Descartes and seriously questioned the validity of thought as an instrument of knowledge. He finds certainty only in the 'will to believe', inspired by Divine Will. It is 'Volo ergo sum' with Ghazzali, whereas with Descartes it is 'Cogito ergo sum'. About his another book 'Revival of Sciences', in which Ghazzali has discussed at length the fundamental principles of his ethical and philosophical doctrines, a European writer observes: "This work, probably owing to its originality, was never translated into Latin during the Middle Ages, and remained a closed book to all but Arabian Scholars. It bears so remarkable a resemblance to the 'Discourse on Method' of Descartes that had any translation of it existed in the days of Descartes, every one would have cried out against the plagiarism."

Ghazzali wrote another book to prove the incompetency of analytical reason, called 'Refutation of the Philosophers', in which while discussing the law of causation, "he" in the words of MacDonald, "cuts the bond of causality with the sharp edge of his dialectic and proclaims that we can know nothing of cause and effect but simply that one thing follows another". Summing up the views of Ghazzali on causation Renan says, "Hume never said more than that".

In the same book Ghazzali has demonstrated, like Kant, that theoretical reason cannot solve the fundamental problems of religion and philosophy, such as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, or the eternity of the universe.

(2) *Philosophers*.—There was a group of Muslim thinkers who has great faith in Plato's and Aristotle's infallibility. Aristotle in their eyes was the greatest teacher ever-born. This group of Muslim philosophers may be divided into several school's Peripatetics, Ishraqi philosophers and Natural philosophers.

(a) *Peripatetics* :—They are called Peripatetics after Aristotle. They believed in the capacity of human reason to solve the mysteries of the Universe. The main representatives of this school are Kindi, Farabi, Ibn Miskawaih, Ibn-Sina, Ibn-Rushd, etc. This school believed that Aristotle possessed the most perfect intellect. They regarded philosophy as a manifestation of Truth. They summed up their position as philosophers and Muslims in a syllogism: "Philosophy is truth; Quran is truth, but truth is one; therefore Philosophy and Quran must agree "

Greek Philosophy reached the Muslim thinkers not in its original form but full of inconsistencies and transformed out of shape. Neo-Platonists, who were mostly Christians, were responsible for shaping Greek philosophy in the light of Christianity. They represented Greek philosophers as great saints and mystics, and Greek philosophy as the truth compatible with the Christian doctrine. Rationalism of the Greeks was changed into Intuitionism. It took the Muslim thinkers a long time to free Greek philosophy, as it had reached them, of the accretions and inconsistencies that had crept into it. Besides, on the basis of Greek philosophy, Muslim thinkers made great advances. Farabi, known among the

Mussalmans as the Second Teacher, improved upon the system of Aristotle. With Aristotle Logic is merely a method to arrive at the truth, but with Farabi it is a method as well as the truth itself: it is a part of metaphysics. Unlike Aristotle, Farabi is a thoroughgoing Idealist, and Aristotle's theory of the eternity of matter had no place in Farabi's Metaphysics. Matter, according to him, is the adumbration of the mind which is the fashioning force in the Universe.

In his Ethics Farabi follows Plato; but he regards a philosopher as insufficient to guide the destinies of humanity, unless he is also a man of character, namely, a prophet.

Ibn Sina, who claims to be an humble follower of Aristotle, in his system embraces problems which had not been envisaged by Aristotle. He took Aristotle's fragmentary psychology and infused into it a dynamic principle. The void between man and God is filled with a hierarchy of spiritual agencies. Ibn-Sina believed in the eternity of the Universe like Aristotle but differed from him in regarding it as the creation of God. Aristotle's theory assumed that cause always precedes the effect. Ibn-Sina argued that it is not necessary for cause to precede its effect in time. Cause and effect may be simultaneous *e.g.*, in the case of the movement of a key as it opens or fastens a lock. Love, according to Ibn-Sina, is an appreciation of beauty. It is the Universal force that exists in every thing from mineral world to the animal kingdom, impelling everything to become more and more perfect or beautiful. In the

vegetable kingdom it manifests itself in assimilation, growth and production. It becomes somewhat conscious and unified in the animal kingdom, while in man it becomes fully conscious and can develop to an unlimited degree. In short, it is a spiritual principle which is striving to realize itself in various degrees of perfection through different strata of existence.

Most of the Muslim Philosophers advocated the theory of evolution of mind and matter. But the dynamic force of evolution was ascribed to mind, matter being only a by-product. It is from the primal mind that the world has evolved. The best representatives of this theory are Ibn-Miskawaih, Rumi and Ibn-Khaldun. Ibn-Miskawaih explains the evolution of matter as follows:--

"The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass: then plants and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the borderland of animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and animal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal nor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g., Coral). The first step beyond this intermediary stage of life is the development of power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl upon the earth. The sense of touch owing to the process of differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we

reach the plane of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins" (*The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*—Iqbal—pp. 33-34).

In their cosmology, Muslim Philosophers did not content themselves with presenting merely an intellectual conception of the Universe, but they also endeavoured to present a conception in which the whole being of man,—his moral, religious and æsthetic self, could find expression.

(b) *Ishraqi Philosophy (Philosophy of Illumination)*:—This school affiliates itself to Plato and the Platonists. They disregarded analytical reason as an instrument of truth. Observation, contemplation, intuition and ecstacy are the means through which this school tries to reach the truth. The greatest representative of this school is Shahabuddin Suhrawardy Maqtul, who has expounded his philosophy in a book called *Hikmatul-Ishraq* (Philosophy of Illumination). He conceives reality as light—all else being darkness or non-existence. Light creates darkness or non-light. All that is not light is the product of light, which is the fountain-head of all existence. Another representative is Ibn Tufail of Spain who, though generally regarded as Peripatetic is an Ishraqi. Just as Suhrawardy's Philosophy is Iranian in content but Platonic in form, so Ibn-Tufail's philosophy is Aristotelian in content but Platonic in

form. Ibn-Tufail has explained his philosophy in an allegory, '*Hayy Ibn-Yaqzan*', in which he imagines a man on an island where there are no human beings. Hayy through his own observation, introspection, contemplation and ecstasy attains to the highest form of knowledge

(c) *Natural Philosophy*—Natural philosophy does not form part of modern philosophy, but the ancients regarded it as a part of philosophy. They confine themselves to the study of the natural phenomena. They believed that the knowledge gained through the senses can lead man to universal truth. The sciences which they cultivated were Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Geography, History, Medicine, Ethnology, etc. I shall mention a few of the chief representatives who left their impress on their successors

Abu-Bakr Mohammad Zakarya, (d. 952) cultivated almost all the natural sciences but his fame rests on medicine, ranking according to some, above Ibn-Sina as a physician. He based his investigations on experience, individual as well as collective, which he believed has a greater value than logical deduction.

Geber or Jabir, the chemist, was the first scholar who employed the scientific method. He founded a Chemical School in the West; and just as Aristotle was regarded as the founder of Logic, Jabir was regarded as the founder of Chemistry.

Ibn-ul-Harham (Alhazen) (d. 1038), a great scientist and mathematician, an acute thinker, is famous for his

book on Optics, in which he discusses vision in a scientific way. Knowledge according to him is based on sense perception elaborated by understanding.

Another great scientist, perhaps the greatest of them all, was Al-Biruni, at once a mathematician, historian, astronomer and physicist. In his book '*Qanun Masudi*' he comes so near the modern astronomical researches that it must be said 'that modern methods are as old as genius.'

A great philosophical writer on almost every topic connected with human society was Ibn-Khaldun. He is the founder of the science or philosophy of History. In his famous Prolegomena to his Universal History he discusses such problems as the rise and fall of nations, inter-relation of the various grades of society, production of foods, labour, etc.

(4) *Mysticism*.—The Sufis regard real knowledge as immediate and personal which is only gained by intuition in a state of ecstasy. In an ecstasy a Sufi sees realities and experiences the presence of God.

The Sufis regard human soul to be of divine origin, temporarily lodged in the human body, but restless to return to God—God being the only reality which they conceive as Will, Beauty or Light. On the basis of these conceptions they have built their Metaphysical systems. Sufism in its development passed through ascetic, theosophic and pantheistic stages. Strictly speaking Muslim Sufis have never been pantheists, since they could never dissolve the personality of God. Similarities, though of a superficial nature, between Sufism

Buddhism, Vedantism, Christianity, and Neo-Platonism have given rise to numerous theories regarding its origin.

"A Superficial resemblance exists," says O'Leary, "between the Buddhist Nirvana and the *fana* or the re-absorption of the soul in the divine spirit of Sufiism. But the Buddhist doctrine represents the soul as losing its individuality in the passionless placidity of absolute quiescence, whilst the Sufi doctrine, though also teaching a loss of individuality, regards ever-lasting life as consisting in the ecstatic contemplation of the Divine Beauty" (O'Leary, *Arabic Thought*, p 191)

(5) *Muslim Thought and Europe*:—Muslim culture penetrated Europe through Spain and Southern Italy and Sicily. Muslims in Spain had reached a very high degree of culture when Europe was steeped in ignorance. Scholars from all over Europe flocked to Spanish Universities to study Arab sciences and philosophy. The second great factor in the spread of Muslim philosophy were the Jews, who translated works from Arabic into Hebrew, and being a mercantile community, carried philosophical knowledge wherever they went in Europe. They made a particular study of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) the greatest Muslim Philosopher of Spain, who was regarded by them as the greatest commentator of Aristotle

After the re-conquest of Toledo by the Christians Raymond Archbishop of Toledo (1130-1150 A.D.) founded a College for the translation of Arabic scientific and philosophical works into Latin, and in a short time

works of Ibn Rushd and other Muslim philosophers became available in Latin translations.

When Fredrick II of Sicily was crowned Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in 1215 A.D., he, being a great admirer of Arab culture and Muslim sciences, established a college of translation at Palermo. He himself could read Arabic Philosophical works in the original. In 1224 he founded the University of Naples which became a centre for the spread of Arab sciences and philosophy into Europe. By the middle of the 14th century nearly all the important works of Ibn Rushd and other Muslim philosophers had been translated into Latin. "By the close of the 13th century Arab Science and Philosophy had been transmitted to Europe and Spain's work as an intermediary was done. The intellectual avenue leading from the portals of Toledo through the Pyrennes wound its way through Provence and the Alpine passes into Lorraine, Germany and Central Europe, as well as across the Channel into England." (Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, p. 589).

Throughout the 13th century Muslim Philosophy dominated in the Paris University.

Through Franciscan Friars Muslim philosophy reached England. As early as 1209 A.D. we find that a Latin translation of a book of Ibn Rushd was prescribed in Cambridge. Roger Bacon, the father of modern inductive method, studied at Toledo and could read and speak Arabic, and came directly under the influence of Muslim thought.

Many European universities were noted for their cultivation of Muslim science, e.g., Padua and Bologna. It is from these centres that Averroism spread to North-East Italy. The professors of these universities under the influence of Muslim philosophy were regarded as free-thinkers. The influence of the Muslim philosophy was the precursor of the Renaissance. Muslim thought "was the direct parent of the Philo-Pagan element in the Renaissance" (O'Leary, *Arabic Thought*, p. 294). "It made a deeper impression on Christian and Jewish thought... and attained its final evolution in North-East Italy, where, as an antiecclesiastical, it prepared the way for the Renaissance. (O'Leary p. 295). European culture in fact has been nursed and brought up on Muslim thought. Many a thinker like Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Dante, Spinoza, etc., were influenced by it

In the words of Iqbal, "The Political fall of Islam in Europe unfortunately took place, at a moment when Muslim thinkers began to see the futility of Deductive Science, and were fairly on the way to the building of Inductive knowledge. It was practically at this moment that Europe took up the task of research and discovery. Intellectual activity in the world of Islam particularly ceased from this time, and Europe began to reap the fruit of the labours of Muslim thinkers. The Humanist Movement in Europe was due to a large extent to the force set free by Muslim thought. It is not at all an exaggeration to say that the fruits of Modern European Humanism in the shape of Modern Science and Philosophy are in many ways only a further development of

Muslim Culture." (Extract from the letter of Dr. Iqbal to Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan, dated 4th June, 1925).

I would conclude this hurried survey of the various schools of Muslim Philosophy with a brief reference to some of the chief characteristics which made the Muslim Philosophers worthy of their place with the greatest thinkers of the world. Muslim philosophers not only studied, commented upon and enlarged Greek philosophy but also discovered inconsistencies and weak spots in it and endeavoured to remove them. They investigated regions which the Greeks had left unexplored, by introducing as problems demanding serious enquiry, such topics as phenomenon of dreams, miracles, future life, immortality of the soul, Divine attributes, Divine unity, etc. They enriched the human self by proving that it was not only an intellectual self but also a moral and a spiritual self. In short, they made philosophy the instrument not only of solving the problems which confronted man in his everyday life but also of solving the riddle of the universe.
