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THE
PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS
OF
SPINOZA

∴

A STUDY
IN THE HISTORY AND LOGIC
OF IDEAS

∴

BY DAVID BIDNEY, PH D.

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DEDICATED TO
MY INSTRUCTOR AND FRIEND
PROFESSOR WILMON H SHELDON
OF YALE UNIVERSITY

NOTE ON ENGLISH TEXT AND ABBREVIATIONS

THE English translation most frequently quoted in the course of this study, with the permission of Charles Scribner's Sons, is the *Spinoza Selections* edited by John Wild and published by Charles Scribner's Sons. Occasionally the writer has modified the translation so as to give a more faithful rendering of the Latin text and, in a few instances, to correct actual mistakes (as in 3-58).

In referring to the *Ethics*, only the number of the part and the proposition is indicated, *e.g.* 2-7 refers to part two, proposition seven, of the *Ethics*. Where other works are mentioned the full title is indicated.

PREFACE

THIS critical and historical study of *The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza* is the sequel to a doctoral dissertation submitted to Yale University in 1932 and entitled *The Problem of Value in the Metaphysics of Spinoza*. The contents of this dissertation were partially summarized in an article published in the *Philosophical Review* for May, 1936, on "Value and Reality in the Metaphysics of Spinoza." A second article in the same journal (November, 1936) dealt with "The Problem of Substance in Spinoza and Whitehead." The major thesis of the aforementioned writings; namely, the conflict of original and traditional ideas in Spinoza's metaphysics, has been here applied to his psychology and ethics.

In presenting this book for publication, the writer hopes to achieve a triple objective. In the first place, he trusts that this volume may fill a long-felt need for a comprehensive and critical analysis of Spinoza's psychology of the emotions. Hitherto most scholars have concerned themselves with his metaphysical thought but have paid little or no attention to his psychology, although three fifths of the *Ethics* is devoted to the description of the nature and laws of the emotions. Bearing this professional attitude of the philosophers in mind, one can hardly blame modern historians of psychology if they too have failed to show adequate appreciation of Spinoza's unique and all-important contributions to their subject. A serious consideration of the evidence presented in this treatise will, it is hoped, do much to rectify this injustice.

Secondly, in view of current Spinozistic scholarship, the author has endeavored to present a critique of Spinoza's philosophy which would avoid the extremes of those who commit the normative fallacy by reading into Spinoza ideas

which belong to a subsequent period, as well as the narrowness of the classical scholars who interpret his thought entirely by reference to past traditions. The writer would claim that he has provided a scientific interpretation of Spinoza's psychological and ethical thought which, avoiding all *a priori* assumptions as to the unity and coherency of the latter's work, has made clear the essential originality of Spinoza as well as his relations to traditional ideas.

Thirdly, he has endeavored to trace the influence of Spinoza's psychology and ethics upon the development of modern thought and to indicate the relation of some of these basic principles to those of contemporary thinkers in the fields of metaphysics, psychology, and value theory. Particular attention has been given to English and American writers such as William James and Charles Spearman in psychology, G. E. Moore, W. M. Urban and John Dewey in value theory, S. Alexander and A. N. Whitehead in metaphysics. It should be noted, however, that the writer has been careful *not* to read characteristically contemporary ideas into Spinoza's work. On the contrary, in dealing with a subject such as "The Metapsychology of Spinoza and Freud" (chap. xiv, §4), he has been critical of those who would read the Freudian doctrine of the unconscious into Spinoza, claiming that the latter was entirely ignorant of the notion. The chief value of this comparative analysis of psychological and ethical ideas for the modern reader consists in the elucidation of some of the basic issues involved in contemporary thought. By demonstrating the continuity in the history of ideas, the distinctively original contributions of Spinoza as well as of our contemporary thinkers is revealed.

Whatever merit this book may have as a critical and yet constructive study in the history and logic of ideas, is due in large measure to long years of study and research under competent and devoted scholars, since critical appreciation is a delicate flower which requires prolonged and careful cultivation. The author would therefore take this oppor-

tunity of acknowledging his indebtedness to his former instructors in philosophy at the University of Toronto and at Yale University. In particular he would mention Professor G. S. Brett, the chairman of the department of philosophy and the Dean of the Graduate School of the University of Toronto, whose lectures and seminars he had the privilege of attending for many years and to whom he owes an abiding interest in the philosophical aspects of psychology. Professor F. H. Anderson, also of the University of Toronto, deserves special recognition as the one who first introduced the writer to the study of Spinoza and who gave freely of his time to long discussions of the subject. The writer is also proud to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor E. Gilson of the Institute of Medieval Studies at St. Michael's College, in the University of Toronto, whose seminar on scholastic ethics he attended and to whose published works on medieval philosophy he owes a great deal.

To the eminent men of Yale the author is particularly grateful for an appreciation of contemporary philosophical issues as well as for their personal interest over a period of ten years. The chapter dealing with contemporary value theory (chap. xv), for example, could never have been written without the critical interest of Professor W. M. Urban whose inspiring lectures and seminars opened up new horizons of thought. For comprehensive and acute analyses of philosophical problems involved in ancient and modern science, the writer would mention Professor F. S. C. Northrop, the present chairman of the department, who has given freely of his time and who has made many constructive suggestions in the course of this work. My good friend Dr. Warren S. McCulloch of the Institute of Human Relations has been very helpful and stimulating in discussions of contemporary psychological and psychiatric problems. Professor Walter Miles, also of the Institute of Human Relations, has taken a kind, personal interest in the publication of the book. Finally the author would speak of Professor Wilmon

H. Sheldon, without whose constant interest and encouragement this treatise would never have been written. It was in his seminar at Yale that he learned to consider Spinoza problematically with a view to "the strife of systems" involved, though Professor Sheldon should not be held responsible for any particular interpretations here advanced. Professor Sheldon kindly read the entire manuscript and in his delightful, Socratic manner made many constructive criticisms and influenced the final form of this study. It is the writer's sincere hope that the work herewith presented may be deemed worthy of the genial philosopher and kind friend to whom it is dedicated in tribute.

I would also note the kind assistance rendered me by Mrs. Dorothy M. Gray of the Yale University Press in editing the manuscript for publication.

Finally, it is my special privilege to acknowledge that this book was completed under the auspices of a Sterling Research Fellowship held at Yale University during 1938-39.

D. BIDNEY

*New Haven, Conn.,
November, 1939*

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THE PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS OF SPINOZA

INTRODUCTION

1. ON THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF INTERPRETING SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY

JUDGING from the tremendous influence of Spinoza's philosophy upon the development of modern thought, it would appear as though his *Ethics* has become a veritable philosopher's bible. The comparison of the *Ethics* with the Bible is justifiable in more ways than one. The prophets spoke in the name of the Lord and considered their utterances as supernatural revelations. Spinoza also spoke in the name of God but he appealed to the natural revelation of the divine active intellect to human intuitive reason. But whereas the prophets apparently relied for their inspirations upon chance visions, Spinoza, with all the presumption of a radical rationalist, attempted to deduce logically the content of the mind of God. Instead of proclaiming as did the prophets, "Thus saith the Lord," Spinoza affirms quietly and complacently the equivalent of "this truth I have conceived through God" or "this idea follows necessarily from the nature of the divine attributes." Historically too there is much similarity. As in the case of the prophetic books we find great diversity of opinion, each religious sect claiming the authentic interpretation of the Scriptures, and each group finding support therein for its own special interests, so in the interpretation of Spinoza there have arisen many commentators of the most diverse persuasions, each maintaining that his interpretation is the valid one. In both cases there has been the common presumption of a unity of doctrine and an absoluteness of truth. In the case of the Scriptures faith and tradition have provided a basis for this attitude, in the case of Spinoza the a priori mathematical form of his ex-

position gave support to this notion. It is noteworthy that Spinoza himself was quite prepared to interpret the Scriptures from a temporal, historical point of view, but considered his own system as valid *sub specie aeternitatis*.

It will prove instructive therefore for us to examine in this connection Spinoza's teaching concerning the scientific method of interpreting Scripture. We shall then have a precedent which he himself would acknowledge as valid for the interpretation of his own "scriptures." In the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* (chap. vii) he writes. "I may sum up the matter by saying that the method of interpreting Scripture does not widely differ from the method of interpreting nature—in fact, it is almost the same. For as the interpretation of nature consists in the examination of the history of nature, and therefrom deducing definitions of natural phenomena on certain fixed axioms, so Scriptural interpretation proceeds by the examination of Scriptures and inferring the intention of its authors as a legitimate conclusion from its fundamental principles. By working in this manner every one will always advance without danger of error—that is, if they admit no principles for interpreting Scripture and discussing its contents, save such as they find in Scripture itself."

In the same chapter he continues. "As in the examination of natural phenomena we try first to investigate what is most universal and common to all nature—such for instance as motion and rest and their common laws and rules, which nature always observes and through which she continually works—and then we proceed to what is less universal, so too in the history of Scripture we seek first for that which is most universal and serves for the basis and foundation of all Scripture, a doctrine in fact, that is commended by all the prophets as eternal and most profitable to all men."

Spinoza further stresses the point that in interpreting the Bible one should be concerned with the meaning of the writers and not with the question of whether it is true or not. We must not, he counsels, explain away the common meaning of terms in order to make them accord with our natural reason. Thus he observes: "In order not to confound the meaning of

a passage with its truth we must examine it solely by means of the signification of the words or by a reason acknowledging no foundation but Scripture . . . If the verbal expressions would not admit of being thus harmonized, we should have to set them down as irreconcilable and suspend our judgment concerning them."

Spinoza was among the first to stress the importance of a knowledge of the temporal conditions and environment in which the various books of the Bible were written, the life and character of their authors, and the subsequent history of those books. In this way one is able to interpret various injunctions in their proper perspective and to avoid the fallacy of regarding as absolute what is relative to a particular situation.

By way of contrast, Spinoza cites the example of Maimonides who in his *Guide for the Perplexed* attempted to reconcile the Old Testament with Scholastic science and metaphysics. Maimonides presumed that the Bible, as the Word of God, was necessarily in accord with natural reason and science. Hence his method was to explain all passages which in their literal meaning appeared to conflict with the currently accepted truths of science and philosophy, in a metaphorical manner. "For if," Spinoza remarks critically, "he had been convinced by reason that the world is eternal, he would not have hesitated to twist and explain away the words of Scripture till he had made them appear to teach his doctrine . . . So that however clear the meaning of Scripture may be, he would not feel certain of having grasped it, so long as he remained doubtful of the truth of what was written."

Maimonides' opportunistic and casuistic method of interpreting the Scriptures is due, Spinoza explains, to the fact that "he supposes that the prophets were in entire agreement one with another and that they were consummate philosophers and theologians. Further he supposes that the sense of Scripture cannot be made plain from Scripture itself, for the truth of things is not made plain therein." In contrast to Maimonides, he therefore insists that the meaning of Scripture is to be explained only through Scripture itself and that

the question of meaning should not be confounded with the problem of absolute truth.

This distinction between the meaning of a passage and its truth in relation to our contemporary standards has been overlooked by translators of Spinoza's *Ethics* and where they have found a Latin term which Spinoza defines contrary to the conventional meaning of the term, they have rendered it into an English term which they consider to be more in agreement with English usage. A typical case in point is the definition of conscientiae morsus (3-def 17) which the Everyman edition renders as "disappointment" although the Latin term clearly signifies remorse or more literally "the prick of conscience." Such translators fail to differentiate between what Spinoza does actually mean and what they think he ought to mean in order to speak truly.

When we turn to the expositors of Spinoza's philosophy we find a similar confusion between the normative and factual approach.

In his article entitled "Spinoza the Conciliator" published in the *Chronicon Spinozanum* for 1922, Professor A. Wolf maintains that the reason why there has never been a Spinozistic school of philosophy is that Spinoza's philosophy is essentially a harmony of opposites which does not lend itself to partisan adherents. Thus he writes: "Now Spinoza's philosophy is not an eclectic work but a completely rounded system. Spinoza did not form his conclusions by compromising between opposite views after the manner of certain scholastics." Here we see the essential harmony of Spinoza's thought is maintained, though Professor Wolf does not make clear the grounds of his assumption.

In his volume entitled *Aeternitas* Professor H. F. Hallett adopts a similar attitude. In the preface to his work he remarks: "The situation is curious: the traditional exposition having uniformly failed to explain certain doctrines so definitely and so pointedly advanced that they could not be overlooked, the overwhelming majority of expositors have passively preferred to believe that Spinoza was inconsistent, stupid or even dishonest, instead of concluding as they ought to have done, that the exposition was faulty. For to no phi-

losopher could these epithets be less suitably applied and it has been my constant aim to discover the true place and significance of the main teachings of Spinoza in a coherent system of thought" ¹ Professor Hallett, it appears, feels that all previous commentators who have found inconsistencies or deficiencies in Spinoza's thought, instead of concluding that their own reasoning was at fault, are essentially untrue to the master's teaching. The only adequate interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy, he assumes, is the one which renders it as the supremely "coherent system of thought."

Similarly Professor Richard McKeon in his work on *The Philosophy of Spinoza* ² deplores the attitude of previous commentators who, like John Caird, find that Spinoza's philosophy is a "composite result of conflicting tendencies" (quoted, p. 6) "The apparatus alone [he suggests, p. 7] of Spinoza's demonstrations argues unmistakably, since propositions are referred to axioms, definitions and propositions through the whole length of the five books of the *Ethics*, that he supposed his thought to follow through coherently and consistently [p. 17] From the method he employed and from the confidence he had in the efficacy of deductive or synthetic reasoning, one is led to expect that the answer will be a consistent and autonomous doctrine . . . [p. 314] Beside the unity which a single purpose gives the philosophy of Spinoza there is the basis of a logical unity."

Professor McKeon's own general conclusion is (p. 50) that "Spinoza's philosophy is to be interpreted then in terms of the earlier philosophies to which it forms a fitting coping-stone, rather than in terms of subsequent philosophies which it in no sense anticipated or of philosophies contemporary with it, to which it was antagonistic [p. 51] The two thousand years of modification between the *Ethics* of Aristotle and the *Ethics* of Spinoza accomplished in this respect nothing of radical importance." According to Mc-

¹ H. F. Hallett, *Aeternitas* (London, Oxford University Press, 1980) By permission of the Clarendon Press, Oxford

² R. McKeon, *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1928) Reprinted by permission of Longmans, Green & Co., New York

Keon, then, Spinoza's philosophy is a coherent, unified system of thought, incompletely expressed, which is essentially Scholastic in character. All Spinoza did was to give precise logical expression to these medieval ideas and to combine them in a unique form not to be found in any of his predecessors. Spinoza's work, in brief, marks the consummation of Scholasticism.

By far the most comprehensive historical analysis of Spinoza's thought in English philosophical literature is to be found in Professor H. A. Wolfson's encyclopædic two volumes on *The Philosophy of Spinoza*. Professor Wolfson has shown once for all the importance of a knowledge of Scholastic philosophy for an understanding of Spinoza. As a result of his researches no one can now venture to approach the study of the *Ethics* with the naive assumption that it may be adequately understood simply by a logical analysis of his propositions somewhat as one usually undertakes the study of Euclid. The *Ethics* was written in a definite historical context and no adequate interpretation of its contents can be obtained without reference to these intellectual influences. What we do find fault with in Professor Wolfson's study is the uncritical use he frequently makes of this Scholastic literature. He assumes that the terms used by Spinoza are identical in meaning with those employed by the Scholastics whereas in many important instances this is not the case.

The really serious criticism we have to offer of Professor Wolfson's work concerns his so-called historico-critical method with its ad hoc hypotheses and assumption of the logical unity of Spinoza's thought. In the preface to Volume I³ of his study he explains his general method at length. "Starting with the assumption that the *Ethics* is primarily a criticism of fundamental problems of philosophy as they presented themselves to Spinoza, we proceed to analyse these problems, to set forth their salient features, to construct hypothetically the arguments which constitute the criticism and to show how these arguments and criticism un-

³ H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1934), 2 vols. Reprinted by permission of the Harvard University Press.

derlie the statements which we have before us in the *Ethics*. As the result of this procedure, the *Ethics* emerges as a logically constructed work throughout which there is order, and sequence and continuity, propositions apparently disconnected group themselves into unified and coherent chapters; words, phrases, and passages, apparently meaningless or commonplace assume meaning and significance and the philosophy of Spinoza as a systematic whole and in all its fulness of detail appears in a new light and in a new setting and perspective.”⁴

Again later in his first chapter (p 25) he writes “*If there is anything arbitrary in our interpretation, it is the initial assumption that Spinoza thought his philosophy in a logical, orderly and coherent manner, and that he wrote it down in a work which is logical, orderly and coherent and in a language which is self-explanatory* But having started out with this assumption and finding that the *Ethics* is far from being a book which is logical, orderly and coherent and that the language in which it is written is far from being self-explanatory, we have a right to believe that any interpretation, historically substantiated that will help to explain the entire *Ethics* as a logically orderly, coherently and intelligibly written book, is not fictitious like the plot of a historical novel”

And finally we note on page 27 “But problems of still greater difficulty presented themselves to us on frequent occasions, such for instance, as apparent misuse of terms on the part of Spinoza, or apparent contradictions in his own statements, or apparent misrepresentation of the views of others Invariably in the solution of such problems, we set up some distinction in the use of the term which Spinoza seemed to misuse, or we discerned some new aspect in the statement of the idea in which Spinoza seemed to misrepresent others *Here again, most often these new distinctions aspects and interpretations were invented ad hoc*, merely for the purpose of solving a certain difficulty, and the evidence corroborating them was discovered afterwards [p. 30] *And so in innumerable instances external corroborative evidence was found for previously conceived conjectures.*”

We have quoted these passages at length because Professor Wolfson is so explicit in expressing the basic presuppositions of his method. To begin with, he admits that if there is anything arbitrary in his interpretation, it is the assumption of the unity and coherency of Spinoza's thought. He believes, however, that his assumption can be justified by introducing ad hoc hypotheses which reconcile "apparent" contradictions and "seeming" misuse of terms and by finding external evidence in writers who use the term in the sense required for the solution of a given problem in Spinoza.

In view of our previous analysis of the scientific method of interpretation advocated by Spinoza, it appears evident that Professor Wolfson is confusing the normative aspect or truth value of Spinoza's statements with the factual evidence for a given meaning in the *Ethics*. His assumption of the essential unity of Spinoza's thought is in itself an a priori prejudice which undermines all claim to objectivity, as may be seen from his attempts to explain away all contradictions and difficulties as "seeming" or "apparent"—a procedure which reminds us of Spinoza's own solution of the problem of evil once he had assumed the perfection of the whole cosmos. Professor Wolfson assumes that Spinoza went about writing the *Ethics* "more scholastico rabbinicoque," whereas in fact this was precisely the method to which he objected and which he took great care to avoid.

Furthermore, Professor Wolfson's appeal to ad hoc hypotheses and external verification through other writers violates the fundamental principle of interpretation laid down by Spinoza, namely, that we acknowledge no meanings save those found in the treatise under investigation. That was why Spinoza criticized Maimonides who, beginning with the assumption of the harmony of the Old Testament with the science and philosophy of the Scholastics, attributed new meanings to biblical terms so as to explain away "apparent" contradictions. Maimonides' method was casuistic precisely because he assumed arbitrarily the essential agreement of the meaning of Scripture with the "truth" of Scholastic science. Professor Wolfson, it appears, has committed the same fal-

lacy in his interpretation of the testament of Spinoza as Maimonides had committed in interpreting the testament of Moses. As Galileo once said of Aristotle, so now we say of Spinoza. The best way to follow Spinoza is by applying his own critical method and not by inventing ad hoc hypotheses or by appealing to external authorities, for such was not his spirit or his method.

The uncritical assumption of the single-mindedness and consistency of Spinoza's thought which Santayana in particular has helped to foster through his introduction to the Everyman edition of the *Ethics* accounts, we believe, for the scandalous diversity of opinion concerning Spinoza's writings. Indeed, as was once said of Aristotle, the philosopher of the Middle Ages, so now it may be said of Spinoza: All philosophers agree that Spinoza has spoken the truth but none agree as to what it is.

In general, it would appear, two methods have been pursued, each of which goes to an opposite extreme. On the one hand, there are those who would read into Spinoza's thought the principles of some subsequent philosophy, notably those of Hegel and Marx, thereby committing the normative fallacy. On the other hand, there are the classical scholars who go to the opposite extreme and who would interpret his philosophy primarily by reference to Greek and Scholastic thought, so that for them Spinoza finally emerges as "the last of the medievals"—a method which we hold involves the genetic fallacy. Typical of the first tendency are such earlier writers as Caird, Blewett, and Martineau who have read Spinoza through the eyes of Hegel and J. F. Hecker who (in his *Moscow Dialogues*) interprets him as a forerunner of Marx. Representative of the second tendency are the contemporary classical scholars, H. A. Wolfson and Richard McKeon, who have ransacked classical and medieval literature to provide parallels to Spinoza's arguments.

In order to avoid the normative fallacy of extreme modernism as well as the genetic fallacy of classicism, we have endeavored to follow Spinoza's method as closely as possible. We began with no a priori assumptions as to the unity or coherency of Spinoza's thought and hence were saved the

futile trouble of providing apologetic *ad hoc* hypotheses to explain away "apparent" difficulties. We allowed Spinoza to speak for himself so far as possible and based our conclusions upon the internal evidence of his own arguments as well as upon those of the writers to whom he referred. Whenever in the course of our analysis of his psychological and moral theory we found propositions which could not be logically reconciled with some of his professed premises, we did not hesitate to say so. In this manner we succeeded in showing that many of the difficulties encountered by past investigators were due to Spinoza's conflicting premises and were not the result of any chance oversight. Furthermore, we hope to have made it clear that there is an actual basis in Spinoza's work for the many diverse doctrines attributed to him, as for example, the conflict between the mechanistic, structural aspect of his psychology and the dynamic, teleological notions. In all such cases, our method has been to show Spinoza's all-inclusiveness in contrast to the oversimplified versions accepted by most commentators. Spinoza's terms, we found, were frequently equivocal and hence capable of various applications—a situation which holds particularly in the so-called parallelism of body and mind as well as in his conception of adequate ideas and adequate causes. Because of this equivocation he could demonstrate almost anything he wanted.

We would note in this connection that our historical excursions and references, though frequent, are of secondary importance and have been undertaken solely for the purpose of making clear the adventures of a given idea in the history of human thought. The history of ideas provides one with an objective record of the mental experiments which civilized man has conducted for many centuries and from a critical analysis of this record we may learn a good deal concerning the reasons for the great successes and great failures of the human mind. And often, as in the case of Spinoza, we may learn more from the failures of a great mind than from the narrow consistency of a lesser one. Our main objective, therefore, has been, not to present a comparative study of texts, but rather to trace the development of a given concept in

order to appreciate its special role in Spinoza's thought. (See Note 1, following)

As we see it, Spinoza's essential greatness consists in the comprehensive effort he made to apply the new discoveries of Renaissance science to psychology and ethics and to adapt his new philosophy so as to include as much of traditional philosophy as appeared not to be inconsistent with the former. As a result of our study Spinoza finally emerges as he himself wished to be regarded, namely, as essentially a modern or Renaissance philosopher, basing his theories upon the evidence of the natural sciences and human reason, but without willing to consider the testimony of the great traditions for any lasting insights which they may have to offer.

NOTE 1 Among contemporary works we find Professor A. O. Lovejoy's *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Harvard University Press, 1936) the most eminent example of a thoroughly scholarly and critical study wherein this method is applied. We find ourselves in complete agreement with Professor Lovejoy's method of analyzing a "unit-idea" and tracing its development and applications in the history of human thought. As a result of this procedure the basic issues involved in the history of human thought are made vivid and clear, material from the most diverse sources is brought within a systematic unity, and the history of philosophy, far from being an aimless procession of "systems" and "isms," is shown to center about certain well-defined issues and principles. One then comes to appreciate Professor Lovejoy's point that "most philosophic systems are original or distinctive rather in their patterns than in their components" (*ibid.*, p. 3). In this manner one learns to distinguish the really novel and seminal ideas which occur periodically from the new and unstable compounds of old unit-ideas which are constantly being formulated.

2 ON THE CONFLICT OF TRADITIONS IN SPINOZA'S PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS.

IN current philosophical literature the articles published in *Mind* during 1937-38 by Professor A. E. Taylor and Pro-

fessor H. Barker are important as an indication of a new critical attitude which goes far beyond the rather mild criticism of Joachim.⁴ Professor Taylor in his papers on "Some Incoherencies in Spinozism" (*Mind*, 1937) expresses his opposition to the prevalent "attitude of Spinoza-worship." In his analysis of the problem of the relation between substance and modes as well as in his evaluation of Spinoza's theory of the control of the emotions, he points out various incoherencies in Spinoza's thought and attempts to estimate the truth of the latter's conclusions. Professor Barker in his three papers entitled "Some Notes to the Second Part of Spinoza's Ethics" (*Mind*, 1938) continues with a critical examination of Spinoza's theory of the body-mind relation as well as the problem of knowledge. Similarly Professor John Laird has made a brief but acute analysis of Spinoza's value theory in his treatise on *The Idea of Value*.⁵ All these writers fail to find the single-mindedness and consistency which Santayana, Hallett, McKeon, and Wolfson find in Spinoza.

In our present study we have endeavored to combine the critical attitude of the British philosophers with the historical approach of the classical scholars. We venture to suggest that most of the critical points submitted by Taylor, Barker, and Laird in the form of notes and queries will, by means of our historical supplements, find a systematic explanation in this work. The incoherencies to be found in Spinoza, we show, are not accidental shortcomings, but are inherent in the very structure of the *Ethics*.

The fundamental theme of our study of *The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza*, and the refrain which recurs in every chapter, is that there is a logical and historical conflict of ideas throughout his thought. Contrary to the uncritical assumption of contemporary writers that Spinoza's philosophy constitutes a systematic unity, we maintain that an unprejudiced analysis of his work reveals no such inner harmony and consistency, even though Spinoza's mathematical

⁴ H. H. Joachim, *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza* (London, Oxford University Press, 1901).

⁵ J. Laird, *The Idea of Value* (Cambridge University Press, 1929).

method of deduction gives one the impression of strict logical rigor. We wish to emphasize, however, that in making this criticism, we do not refer to the truth value of Spinoza's work as judged by the present writer's or any other contemporary standard. We are concerned only with the factual question of Spinoza's premises, his method, and the logical validity of his arguments as determined by a careful analysis of his works. In general we find evidence of the conflict of the two major philosophical traditions; namely, the great tradition originating in Plato and Aristotle (which includes Neo-Platonism, Stoicism, and Scholasticism) and the atomic-mechanistic tradition originating in Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius.

Spinoza himself professed his agreement with and respect for the atomic-mechanistic tradition which he knew from the works of Hobbes and Descartes. In his correspondence he proclaims (let 56 to Boxel) "The authority of Plato, Aristotle and Socrates has not much weight with me. I should have been surprised had you mentioned Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius or any one of the atomists or defenders of the atoms. It is not surprising that those who invented occult qualities, intentional species, substantial forms and a thousand other trifles, should have devised spectres and ghosts and put their faith in old women in order to weaken the authority of Democritus, of whose good repute they were so envious that they burnt all his books which he published amidst so much praise." In his disparagement of the Scholastics, Spinoza was at one with the other men of the Renaissance, notably, Bacon, Galileo, Hobbes, and Descartes.

The characteristic features of Renaissance philosophical thought were the revival of the atomic theory in conjunction with mathematics and the consequent stress upon the primary importance of the efficient cause as a principle of definition and explanation. Beginning with the experiments of Galileo and his success in measuring the rate of acceleration of falling bodies, the conviction gradually arose that nature as a whole was subject to immutable laws which could be mathematically expressed—a process which Newton brought

to a brilliant culmination. In other words, there were universal laws of becoming, laws of change which governed the correlation between particular events. This was an entirely new and seminal idea which was destined to revolutionize the natural sciences.

As Professor F. S. C. Northrop has pointed out in his *Science and First Principles*,⁶ it was no accident that the notion of laws of becoming was associated with the atomic theory. The latter is the exact contrary of the Scholastic theory so far as the status of form and matter is concerned. According to the Scholastics form was the determinate principle of being, that which gave a thing its essence or made it what it was, while matter per se was mere potentiality and had no actual existence unless united to a given form. According to the Scholastics, therefore, a form of becoming or change was a contradiction in terms, since forms were by nature immutable principles of being. This explains why Scholastic science was for the most part a classification of the forms of nature. On the other hand, according to the atomists form is something acquired by matter in time. Form, that is to say, is an attribute of matter but matter is something actual in its own right. The atoms themselves are eternal and immutable whereas the forms of things change or become in time. When the notion of forms of becoming was joined to the Platonic-Pythagorean idea of mathematical forms of nature, there emerged the notion of mathematical laws of becoming—a principle which is the foundation of modern science.

The originality of Spinoza consists in the fact that he for the first time applied the doctrine of laws of becoming to the mind as well as to the body—a point which modern historians of psychology, as for example Professor Charles Spearman, seem to have missed. The mind he considered as a "spiritual automaton" subject to necessary laws of its own, even as the body was subject to the universal laws of motion. Furthermore, Spinoza was the first of the moderns to apply the Galilean law of inertia to psychology and ethics when he

⁶ F. S. C. Northrop, *Science and First Principles* (New York, Macmillan Co., 1931)

maintained that every form of life by nature endeavors to persevere in existence for an indefinite time. The notion of the primacy of the conatus for self-preservation, we claim, marked a complete departure from the theory of the Scholastics who held that all forms of nature were directed to fixed ends or final causes and that human nature was for the sake of some transcendent end. Spinoza realized fully the revolutionary consequences of this Renaissance principle and in his *Ethics* he endeavored to construct a psychology of the emotions in which the emotions were treated as dynamic forces subject to determinate laws capable of being logically deduced—a principle which anticipated the James-Lange theory as well as the psychoanalytical theory of Freud (see chap. xiv).

In moral theory Spinoza's originality is shown by the comprehensive effort he made to transvaluate traditional moral values and to interpret human virtue in terms of the efficient power of the individual. He was the first of the moderns to appreciate fully the social responsibilities of man to man and the organic, interdependent nature of society, even though he was handicapped at times by his inadequate, mechanistic physics. Spinoza, one may say, extended the dictum of Francis Bacon by maintaining that human nature as well as nature as a whole must first be understood and obeyed before it can be commanded and controlled. Not as Kant was later to maintain "thou canst because thou oughtest," but rather "thou oughtest because thou canst" is the basic premise of his ethical theory.

It should be noted, furthermore, that in Spinoza ethics and religion are blended. His work marks the first and as yet unexcelled attempt to construct a rational, universal system of human salvation which dispenses with supernatural sanctions and avoids any special appeal to historical revelations made to chosen peoples or individuals—a fact which accounts for his continued influence upon men of science and liberals in general who deplore the scandalous prejudices and acts of intolerance fostered by most forms of traditional religion. Spinoza's *Ethics* may truly be called "The Faith of a Rationalist" as distinguished from all forms of Scholasticism which are in the last analysis "rationalizations of faith."

In view of the above considerations, it is easy to understand why we cannot help but contend that Professor McKeon missed the essential contributions of Spinoza's *Ethics* by not realizing its radical difference from the *Ethics* of Aristotle. In like manner, it follows that Professor Wolfson's conclusion that "Spinoza's treatment of emotions and virtues is only a variation of the traditional manner of treatment" (*Philosophy of Spinoza*, II, 355) shows lack of appreciation of Spinoza's creativeness and modernity.

There are, however, some basic elements in Spinoza's psychology and ethics which are essentially Scholastic and inherently incompatible with his mechanistic theory, though he himself did not realize this. In general we try to show in the course of this study that Spinoza's psychophysical determinism breaks down in his psychology, epistemology, and ethics. For example, in psychology he reintroduces the Scholastic doctrine of the autonomy and ultimate immortality of the intellect, though this is obviously inconsistent with the doctrine of the inseparability or parallelism of body and mind. In epistemology this breakdown occurs on the problem of the relation of adequate ideas and adequate causes (see chap. 1, §§ 3, 4). Although Spinoza begins with the assumption that adequate ideas always involve adequate or sufficient causes (a supposition which has led to the erroneous notion of Joachim and others that for Spinoza cause and logical ground are identical),⁷ he is led to admit their extrinsic relation in order to account for the adequate knowledge of the passions by reason. That is to say, he implicitly distinguishes between an adequate idea of a cause and an idea of an adequate or sufficient cause, although he originally assumed their identity. Stated in other terms, Spinoza's episte-

7 It is true, as Joachim in his *Study of the Ethics of Spinoza* (p. 230) and others have pointed out, that Spinoza does speak of "a cause or reason" (*causa seu ratio*, 1-11 second proof). This, however, can easily be explained on the presupposition that "reason" refers to the logical or objective essence of a thing and "cause" refers to its actual or formal essence. The phrase "cause or reason" need not therefore mean that all causality is logical or that cause refers only to "logical ground." Spinoza's parallelism of ideas and things (2-7) leads him to speak as if there were complete correspondence between the order and connection of "reasons" and that of the actual, efficient "causes" involved.

mological difficulties are due to the fact that he has provided us with an intrinsic criterion of an adequate idea but with an extrinsic criterion of a true idea. The reader's attention is drawn especially to our analysis of the relation between intellectual intuition and adequate ideas (chap x, § 6) in which we show further that Spinoza postulated a double criterion of intuitive knowledge because he confused the metaphysical adequacy or sufficiency of the cause with the epistemological and psychological adequacy of an idea. Historically, we therefore maintain, Spinoza's difficulty is due to the fact that he attempted to combine a Neo-Platonic theory of causality with the Cartesian theory of mathematical intuition.

In ethics he found it impossible to construct a theory of virtue without introducing implicitly ideals or final causes similar to those of the Scholastics. Moral theory, he found, was futile unless one could presuppose a desire for increase of perfection and "improvement of the understanding"—ideals which could not be accounted for simply on the basis of the *conatus* for self-preservation, which was only a principle of inertia. In fact, insofar as he follows the Scholastic theory he identifies perfection and reality and tends to conceive human virtue *sub specie aeternitatis* as something pertaining to the essence of a thing irrespective of its duration in time. Finally in common with the great religious traditions Spinoza maintains that ultimate happiness consists in liberation from temporal existence and in the attainment of a timeless state of immortality, whereas according to his mechanistic-naturalistic theory happiness centered in the temporal efforts for self-preservation.

The extreme difficulty encountered by the student of Spinoza's thought, and the source of much misunderstanding, is due in no small measure to the fact that Spinoza attempted to adapt these Scholastic ideas to his mechanistic-Renaissance theories by means of his mathematical method. In other words, he tried to modernize Scholastic philosophy and terminology in such wise as to render it compatible with the science and methodology of the Renaissance—a fact which makes the comparative, textual method of criticism

extremely hazardous Spinoza did not share the illusions of Francis Bacon that Scholastic philosophy was to be entirely discarded and a "Novum organum" substituted. He was a conservative, in the best sense of the term, namely, one who seeks to conserve and retain all that is best in past traditions. At the same time, he wished to ally himself with the scientific progress of his time by taking full account of the philosophical significance of the new ideas and methods. That is why he is concerned to point out that his new philosophy does not destroy the essential and universal truths of the classical traditions, all that he is destroying, he urges, are the prejudices and follies of the past which modern science has shown to be false.

In brief, the general tenor of our interpretation is that Spinoza was first and foremost a man of the Renaissance and a creative thinker, and not, as he has recently been portrayed, merely a critic of Scholasticism who overcame its inner contradictions by special "acts of daring" and constructed a logically coherent system upon its foundations. Our major thesis is that his fundamental principles are essentially modern and original and that his Scholasticism plays a secondary role—an interpretation which accounts for the wide range of his continued influence upon the development of modern thought. Our contention is that Spinoza's endeavor to reconcile Renaissance thought with traditional philosophy by superimposing Scholastic, Neo-Platonic, and Stoic doctrines upon his mechanistic premises, explains the essential incoherency of the *Ethics*. The value of our study consists primarily in the light it casts upon his genuine and original contributions as well as upon the nature of the conflict of ideas involved in his work. Even if we cannot share completely Spinoza's sublime assurance as to the eternal validity of his arguments we can, however, profit by his preeminent and unexcelled effort to synthesize the basic insights of the ancients and the science of the moderns. Indeed, as we show in our two final chapters (chaps. xiv, xv) most of the issues of modern psychology and value theory are essentially those which Spinoza faced and to which he gave classic expression. A critique of Spinoza's

thought is therefore of the utmost importance for a better appreciation of the task confronting modern philosophy. (See Note 2, following)

NOTE 2 In his *Strife of Systems and Productive Duality* (Harvard University Press, 1918), Professor Wilmon H. Sheldon has argued for a "logic of cooperation" as over against an "exclusive logic" (p. 460) which arbitrarily sets up contrary alternatives. The fertility of reality, he maintains, lies precisely in its ultimate, productive duality, in its ability to combine internal with external relations and identity with difference. Otherness, he argues, does not necessarily involve denial or opposition. "If reality," he remarks (p. 454), "marries two antagonists, thought has no power to forbid the banns, its sole function is to follow reality." Professor Sheldon's argument implies that the categories of thought are ultimately correlative, since reality itself, to which the categories apply, is a harmony of such apparent contraries.

With this position we are in fundamental agreement. Our criticism of Spinoza has been directed, not at his attempts to "map the universe" and to present a comprehensive, synthetic view of nature, but rather at his failure to harmonize the various alternatives in a logically coherent scheme. One cannot be a pluralist after he has laid down monistic premises which exclude such pluralism. One cannot attach any meaning to the temporal process if one's initial assumption is the complete realization of all actuality in an eternal, infinite substance. One cannot maintain the autonomy and immortality of the intellect alone and yet retain an ultimate psychophysical parallelism. Spinoza, we have shown, maintains each alternative separately and in a manner which excludes its opposite. He realized the need of having correlative concepts in order to account for all the facts of experience and the requirements of a normative ethics, but he did not make clear how we can logically have both on his premises.

PART I
THEORY OF EMOTIONS

I

ON THE NATURE OF THE SOUL AND THE ORIGIN OF THE AFFECTS

1. THE SOUL AS A SPIRITUAL AUTOMATON

SPINOZA begins his analysis of the emotions or affects in the third book of the *Ethics*. His professed approach is a thoroughly naturalistic one. Human emotions are to be understood according to the same universal laws and rules as the rest of nature. "I shall consider," he writes (3-pref), "human actions and appetites just as if I were considering lines, planes and bodies."

Spinoza's fundamental thesis is that the soul (*anima*) like the body is a mechanism, a spiritual automaton, which acts necessarily according to fixed laws of its own, corresponding to the laws of physical nature. The affections of the soul are not primarily subjects for praise and blame, they must first be understood dispassionately and their modes of operation and production investigated just as if one were analyzing any other natural force. "This conclusion," Spinoza remarks (*De intellectus emendatione*, p. 34), "is identical with the saying of the ancients that true science proceeds from cause to effect, though the ancients so far as I know, never formed the conception put forward here that the soul acts according to fixed laws and is, as it were, an immaterial automaton [*automa spirituale*]."

The human soul has various functions all of which are subject to rigid necessary laws of their own. The laws of the imagination, for example, are different from the laws of the intellect (*ibid.*, p. 34). But what Spinoza is particularly opposed to is the Greek and Scholastic conception that there are functions or faculties of the soul, such as desire and imagination which are irrational, as distinct from the rational functions of the soul such as practical and contempla-

tive reason which act uniformly. The soul in all its functions, Spinoza insists, is to be conceived as acting according to fixed, universal laws

Spinoza himself was aware of his originality in postulating that the mind is a spiritual automaton as is shown by the comparison he makes with the ancients. In fact, the notion that the mind is a spiritual mechanism subject to universal laws makes its first appearance in his *Ethics* and treatise *On the Improvement of the Understanding* and constitutes the foundation of the modern science of psychology, though historians of psychology have hitherto failed to credit Spinoza with this contribution

2 THE DEFINITION OF AFFECTION, AFFECT, ACTION, AND PASSION

As we intend to follow Spinoza's terminology as closely as possible in our analysis of his psychology we shall begin with brief notes concerning the terms affection (affectio), affect (affectus), action (actio), and passion (passio)

The term affection refers to any change or modification which may occur in a thing, whether it be animate or inanimate. Thus Spinoza postulates (§-post 1) that "the human body can be affected in many ways [multis affecti modis] by which its power of acting is increased or diminished and also in other ways which make its power of acting neither greater ~~nor~~ less." The term affect is reserved to designate a modification either of the body or mind alone or of both together whereby the power of the body or mind is in any way increased or diminished (§-def 3, §-General Definition of Affect). Thus an affect is a species of affection, since the latter term refers to any modification whatsoever whether it involves a change in the vitality of the individual or not.

Spinoza further classifies the affects into two distinct groups, namely, actions (actio) and passions (passio). In order to understand the basis of this distinction we must consider the significance of the terms adequate and inadequate cause. An adequate cause (causa adaequata) he defines (§-def 1) as one "whose effect can be clearly and dis-

tinently perceived by means of the same cause." Similarly an inadequate or partial cause (*inadaequatam seu partialem*) is one "whose effect cannot be understood by means of the cause alone" Adequacy as applied to a cause means self-sufficiency in producing given effects In fact, in the *Cogitata metaphysica* (II, chap. xii) Spinoza uses only the phrase "*causa sufficiens*" when referring to the fact that the mind may be the proper efficient cause of its ideas An affect of which the individual is the adequate or sufficient cause is called an action, an affect of which the individual is the inadequate or partial cause is a passion (3-def. 2)

The term action (*actio*) should be distinguished from activity (*actus*) Any activity depends upon some affect and may be either an action or passion An individual is said to act (*agere*) insofar as his activities (*actus*) depend upon affects which are actions (*actio*), he is said to suffer (*pati*) insofar as his activities or functions depend upon affects which are passions (*passio*) Spinoza, however, is not always precise in his use of these terms Thus he states (4-59). "To all actions [*actiones*] to which we are determined by an affect which is a passion we may, without the affect be determined by reason" Here obviously we should expect the term for activity (*actus*) since he tells us explicitly that the function may be either an action or passion On the whole, however, these distinctions are kept clear

Spinoza stresses the point that the actions of the body correspond to similar actions of the mind and that the passions of the body involve passions of the soul Thus he writes (2-13 schol.) "This much nevertheless I will say generally, that in proportion as one body is better adapted than another to do or suffer many things, in the same proportion will the mind at the same time be better adapted to perceive many things, and the more the actions of the body depend upon itself alone and the less other bodies co-operate with it in functioning, the better adapted will the mind be for understanding distinctly" And again (3-3 schol.) "We see therefore that the passions are not related to the mind unless insofar as it possesses something which involves negation, in other words, unless insofar as it is considered as a

part of nature which by itself and without the other parts cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived. In the same way I could show that passions are related to individual things, just as they are related to the mind and that they cannot be perceived in any other way."

Here two points are to be noted. First, the adequacy of the mind's ideas depends upon the adequacy of the body's causality. If the body is the adequate or sufficient cause of its affects the mind likewise, which is the idea of its body (2-12, 13), perceives adequate ideas of these affects. The ideas are said to be adequate because of their intrinsic clearness and distinctness (2-def 4 explan), the body is said to be an adequate or sufficient cause if its affects depend upon it alone. Secondly, with reference to the mind alone, it may be said that the mind is the inadequate, partial or insufficient cause of its inadequate or confused ideas. The individual mind is part of the cosmic mind and hence some of its ideas are partially determined by its relations to other finite minds. Hence what is psychologically a confused or inadequate idea is metaphysically due to the imperfection or negation of the finite mind.

3 ADEQUATE IDEAS AND ADEQUATE CAUSES.

SPINOZA's argument for the correspondence of adequate ideas and adequate causes is, it appears, partially metaphysical and partially epistemological and psychological. Metaphysically it is based on the postulate of the agreement or identity of the attributes and therefore of the modes of extension and thought (2-7). From this premise it follows that the mind agrees intrinsically with its body and hence if the body is the inadequate cause of its affects the ideas of these affects in the mind must likewise be inadequate. Epistemologically considered his argument *may* be based on the axiom (1-ax 6) that a true idea is one that agrees with its ideatum or object. From this it would follow, if interpreted in accord with Spinoza's metaphysics as meaning intrinsic agreement, that the true idea of an inadequate idea must also be inadequate, just as the idea of an adequate idea

is also adequate (2-43) Hence it could easily be demonstrated that (2-21) "the idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body," since the mind according to Spinoza is nothing but the idea of its body (2-12, 13) Spinoza himself professes to demonstrate the above proposition not on epistemological grounds as we have suggested, but on the metaphysical ground of the identity of the modes of extension and thought Nevertheless, he cannot avoid introducing a purely epistemological and psychological reference In the scholium to 2-21 he concludes: "For indeed the idea of the mind, that is to say, the idea of the idea is nothing but the form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thought and without relation to the object, just as a person who knows anything by that very fact knows that he knows and knows that he knows that he knows and so on ad infinitum" Spinoza does not here employ the axiom of the agreement of a true idea with its ideatum but reasons instead on psychological grounds that knowledge of an idea involves consciousness of the idea and the knowledge of this consciousness There are, however, epistemological implications as may be seen on comparison with 2-43 where the immediate consciousness of the truth of ideas is maintained

We are then confronted with the curious fact that Spinoza employs the metaphysical argument for the parallelism of adequate ideas and adequate causes but does not explicitly refer to the axiom of the agreement between a true idea and its ideatum which seems to be required The ground for his roundabout procedure and his avoidance of the epistemological issues may be found, we suggest, in the equivocal use of the terms "idea of idea" (*idea ideae*) and agreement (*convenire*) The phrase "idea of idea" may refer either to a psychological or epistemological fact Psychologically it means the consciousness or awareness of an idea. In this sense, he who perceives an idea knows or is conscious of the fact that he perceives it Epistemologically an "idea of an idea" means a judgment concerning the truth of a given idea The given idea is treated as an object or ideatum just as if it were a physical object to which the idea refers All

conscious ideas involve psychological "ideas of ideas" which agree intrinsically with one another, but this does not imply that all conscious ideas necessarily involve "ideas of ideas" in the sense of truth judgments concerning their validity. In the latter instance the epistemological agreement between an idea and its ideatum (whether mental or physical) is extrinsic or external (2-def 4 explan) and not intrinsic or internal as in the case of psychological agreement.

Again, metaphysically, modes of thought and extension agree necessarily because of the intrinsic agreement of their attributes. But a true idea and its object or ideatum agree extrinsically, they are not "one and the same thing" (*unum et idem*) (2-7 schol, 2-21 schol). For example, "the idea of a circle is not something having a circumference and a centre" (*On the Improvement of the Understanding*, p 12, Wild edition). Hence in order to demonstrate the correspondence of adequate ideas and causes Spinoza had to resort to the intrinsic metaphysical agreement between the attributes of thought and extension. Had he based his epistemological axiom of the agreement between true ideas and their objects on his metaphysical parallelism, he would have had no ground for distinguishing between a true idea and a false one, since all ideas on this premise necessarily agree with their physical correlates. In brief, the theory of psychophysical parallelism breaks down in epistemological theory, though Spinoza did not realize this.

To illustrate the incompatibility between metaphysical parallelism and epistemology one has but to interpret the axiom of agreement between a true idea and its ideatum as if it meant intrinsic agreement. This would imply, as previously suggested, that a true idea of an inadequate idea must also be inadequate. That is to say, one could never know adequately that some of his ideas were false and inadequate. In practice, however, we find that Spinoza assumes the intrinsic agreement between an idea and its mental ideatum only as regards adequate ideas (2-43) but not as regards inadequate ideas. That is to say, the agreement between an idea and its ideatum is extrinsic if the ideatum or the object be an inadequate idea or a physical object;

the agreement is intrinsic if the mental ideatum is adequate.

The same issue may be illustrated further by reference to the relation between adequate and true ideas. An adequate idea is said to be one which is intrinsically clear and distinct, but a true idea is one that agrees extrinsically with its ideatum (3-def 4 explan) Spinoza repeats this distinction more explicitly in his letter to Tschirnhaus (let 60, Wolf edition) "I recognize," he writes, "no other difference between a true idea and an adequate idea than that the word true refers only to the agreement of the idea with its ideatum while the word adequate refers to the nature of the idea itself So that there is really no difference between a true and adequate idea except this extrinsic relation " The point to be noted here is that Spinoza does not give us an intrinsic definition of a true idea, though he assures us that the marks of a true idea are intrinsic and that a true idea "reveals itself" and is the standard (norma) of itself and the false (2-43 schol) The point is one that concerned him very much and we find he comes back to it again and again "If anyone were to ask," he comments (2-43 schol), "how a man can know that he has an idea which agrees with its ideatum (that of which it is the idea) I have shown almost more times than enough that he knows it simply because he has an idea which agrees with its ideatum, that is to say, because truth is its own standard " What Spinoza failed to see is that if a true idea is true because of its extrinsic agreement with its ideatum, then its adequacy must also be extrinsic, and conversely, if its adequacy is intrinsic then its truth must be so likewise Instead he tried to combine an extrinsic criterion of truth with an intrinsic criterion of adequacy.

In general we conclude that Spinoza found difficulty in harmonizing his metaphysical parallelism of adequate ideas and adequate causes with his epistemological theory Epistemologically the human mind may have an adequate or clear idea of a given finite cause irrespective of whether the cause itself be self-sufficient to explain all its effects Similarly a given cause may be adequate or self-sufficient to produce its effects though our ideas of it may not be adequate or clear In brief he is compelled to differentiate implicitly between

an adequate idea of a cause and an idea of an adequate cause, even though explicitly he professes to identify them.

4 INADEQUATE IDEAS, INADEQUATE CAUSES, AND THE ORDER OF NATURE

THE same difficulties occur when we examine Spinoza's theory of falsity and inadequacy. If a true idea reveals both itself and what is false, then there should be some internal or intrinsic marks of a false or inadequate idea which are revealed by the adequate idea. That is to say, there should be something positive about an inadequate or false idea whereby it is differentiated from one that is adequate and true. This is implied also by Spinoza's assertion in *On the Improvement of the Understanding* (p. 28) that "falsity consists only in this, that something is affirmed of a thing which is not contained in the conception we have formed of that thing, as motion or rest of a semicircle." Here we see that a false idea is one that makes a positive affirmation which does not follow from the formal essence of a given idea.

But in the *Ethics*, Spinoza explicitly rejects any such suggestion and goes out of his way to demonstrate (2-33) that "in ideas there is nothing positive on account of which they are called false." His argument is that if a false idea contained something positive it would be an imperfection attributable ultimately to the nature of God. He therefore explains falsity and inadequacy as due to negation or privation of knowledge (2-35), since all imperfection or finitude is due to negation of being (1-8 schol. 1). Intrinsically an idea is false or inadequate because of what it lacks and not because of its positive affirmations. Inadequate ideas arise because the mind perceives things partially and is not aware of all the causes involved. As Spinoza puts it (*On the Improvement of the Understanding*, pp. 28-29). "But if it be the nature of a thinking thing, as seems *prima facie* to be the case, to form true or adequate thoughts, it is plain that inadequate ideas arise in us only because we are parts of a thinking being whose thoughts, some in their entirety, others in fragments only, constitute our mind." In short, the in-

adequacy of our ideas is due to the fact that the human mind is the inadequate cause of its ideas

It should be noted, however, that by the inadequate cause of knowledge, Spinoza explains more than mere ignorance. The very nature of perception involves inadequate ideas, since all perception depends upon the interaction of some external body with the human body. From this it follows (2-16 corol 2) that "the ideas we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body rather than the nature of external bodies." That is to say, perceptual ideas are by nature inadequate since the mind falsifies the formal essence of the things perceived. In perception the mind is not a dry light which reveals the nature of things—though contrary to Francis Bacon, Spinoza would maintain that the intellect per se was such a dry light (see *Novum organum*, 1-§§ 41, 49). "From this it is evident," Spinoza concludes (2-29 corol), "that the human mind when it perceives things in the common order of nature has no adequate knowledge of itself nor of its own body nor of external bodies, but only a confused and mutilated knowledge." The ideas of perception and imagination are intrinsically inadequate, a fact which is not to be explained away simply on the grounds of ignorance. Indeed, Spinoza himself admits that inadequacy and ignorance are not identical. He writes (2-35 schol) "Just in the same manner, when we look at the sun we imagine its distance from us to be about two hundred feet, the error not consisting solely in the imagination, but arising from our not knowing what the true distance is when we imagine and what the causes of our imagination. For although we may afterwards know that the sun is more than six hundred diameters of the earth distant from us, we still imagine it near us, since we imagine it to be so near, not because we are ignorant of its true distance but because an affection of our body involves the essence of the sun insofar as our body itself is affected by it." From this it appears that the human body is the positive cause of the inadequate ideas of perception and imagination—an inference which Spinoza himself does not wish to draw.

In fact, Spinoza reintroduces the same example later

(4-1 schol.) to demonstrate that "nothing positive contained in a false idea is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it is true" In the scholium he adds "For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine his distance from us to be about two hundred feet, and in this we are deceived so long as we remain in ignorance of the true distance. When this is known the error is removed but not the imagination, that is to say, the idea of the sun which manifests his nature insofar as the body is affected by him, so that although we know his true distance, we nevertheless imagine him close to us .

So with the other imaginations by which the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body or an increase or diminution in its power of action, they are not opposed to the truth, nor do they disappear with the presence of the truth" Here Spinoza contrasts the inadequacy of ideas due to ignorance or privation of knowledge and the inadequacy due to the very nature of perception and imagination which depend upon the constitution of the human body If falsity and inadequacy were merely a matter of privation of knowledge, then the positive content of the adequate ideas would exclude the inadequate ones Insofar as this does not occur, we must infer that inadequate ideas have a necessary, positive basis in human nature which the conception of adequate ideas does not remove It is, in other words, the very positive characteristics of inadequate ideas which account for the fact that they cannot be removed by true ideas—and not, as Spinoza attempts to demonstrate, because there is nothing positive about a false idea which can be removed by a true one What Spinoza is really admitting is that the mind may have an adequate idea of the causes involved in perception and imagination without being able to change the intrinsically inadequate nature of the experience of perception or imagination

From Spinoza's own examples we conclude, therefore, that there does seem to be something positive in virtue of which ideas are said to be false or inadequate If the criterion of inadequacy be intrinsic, then an inadequate idea is one that affirms something which does not follow from the formal essence of that idea, as motion of a semicircle If the

criterion of inadequacy be extrinsic, then a false or inadequate idea is one which affirms something of its object or ideatum which does not agree with its true or formal essence, just as a true idea is one that agrees with its ideatum. If falsity were due to ignorance then there could be no disagreement between an idea and its object, since partial agreement is still only agreement. The first grade of knowledge is inadequate, but Spinoza does not call it false (2-49 schol 2)

As said, Spinoza was concerned to deny the positive nature of inadequate and false ideas since he could not attribute any imperfection to the mind of God through which all ideas are conceived. Hence he attempted to explain the inadequacy of human ideas by the finitude or inadequate causality of the human mind. This left the problem of how adequate knowledge was possible if the human mind by nature was an inadequate cause. Spinoza's reply is that the human intellect conceives an adequate idea, that is, an idea which is perfect and absolute in its kind (2-34), when God acts or expresses Himself absolutely through a particular mind and not in conjunction with other finite minds (2-11 corol) "All ideas insofar as they are referred to God are true" (omnes ideae quatenus ad deum referuntur, verae sunt) (2-32), and Spinoza refers an idea to God only when he regards it as adequate and true, otherwise it is said to be due to the inadequate causality of the human mind. In order to account for the possibility of adequate knowledge Spinoza postulates that God acts directly through a particular mind apart from its relations to other minds—a postulate which violates the distinction between things of which God is the proximate immediate cause and those finite modes of which He is the mediate cause (1-28 schol).

The difficulties inherent in Spinoza's theory of inadequate ideas can be well illustrated by reference to his notion of "the common order of nature." In 2-29 scholium he states that "in the common order of nature [ex communi naturae ordine] the mind perceives things externally and 'by a chance coincidence' [ex rerum fortuito occursu]" Similarly, in *On the Improvement of the Understanding*, Spinoza contrasts

"the series of particular mutable things" with "the series of fixed and eternal things." He tells us there that "the essences of particular mutable things are not to be gathered from their series or order of existence which would furnish us with nothing beyond their extrinsic denominations, their relations or at most their circumstances, all of which are very different from their inmost essence." Finally we note that Spinoza contrasts the "uncertain and unsettled" (*incertos et vagos*) order of the affects with the arrangement of the affections brought about "by the order of the intellect" (*secundum ordinem ad intellectum*)

These passages suggest that there are real contingency and confusion in the relations among particular, mutable things. The "mutilated and confused manner" in which the mind perceives things is due primarily to the contingency of the common order of nature. In other words, the order and connection of perceptual experience is identical with the order or disorder found in physical nature (2-7)

But in the attempt to be consistent with his metaphysical premises Spinoza was compelled to deny any real contingency in nature (1-29). The contingent or fortuitous, he explains, is simply human ignorance when "the order of causes is concealed from us" (1-33 schol. 1). Contingency, in other words, is an attribute of the imagination and not of the nature of things; the mind attributes disorder to nature only because it fails to form an adequate idea of things. Thus Spinoza concludes (2-31 corol.) "Hence it follows that all particular things are contingent and corruptible, for we can have no adequate knowledge concerning their duration. And this is what is to be understood by us as their contingency and possibility of corruption, for there is no other contingency but this."

Spinoza began by declaring that perceptual knowledge is inadequate and confused because the mind is determined to perceive by the fortuitous, common order of nature and the extrinsic relations of things. He ends by explaining the contingent order of things by the inadequacy of human perception. On the one hand, the imperfection of human knowledge is explained by the imperfection of the common order

of nature, on the other hand, the contingency of external nature is explained by the finitude or inadequacy of human knowledge. In the last analysis it may be said that Spinoza attributes a real order to nature but attributes all disorder to the mind of man. This accounts for the fact that he gives an intrinsic definition of adequate ideas but only an extrinsic definition of inadequate ideas, namely, their inadequate causality.

5 THE AFFECTIONS OF THE INTELLECT AND IMAGINATION

THE validity of our criticism of Spinoza's position is supported by his actual procedure in the development of his thought. We said before that Spinoza maintains a complete parallelism between the adequacy of the affections of the body and mind. We now wish to show that insofar as Spinoza acknowledges the independent formal reality of the mind as a mode of thought, he also attributes to the mind an independent causality or power of activity. In this manner he comes to introduce a sharp dualism or bifurcation between the affections of the body and mind.

The mind is divided according to its functions into the intellect on the one hand, and the power of perception and imagination on the other. The intellect per se is the source of all adequate ideas and therefore of all the actions of the mind, it does not involve any reference at all to the affections of the body. Perception and imagination are the source of all inadequate ideas or passions of the soul and always involve corresponding passions of the body. *There is a real difference in kind between the affections of the intellect and corporeal imagination.* This change in Spinoza's theory is also due to Stoic influence through the mediation of Cicero and Descartes, as I shall show later.

The evidence for our present thesis is ample. Already in the second book of the *Ethics*, where Spinoza describes the various grades of knowledge, he attributes adequate ideas to the intellect or understanding, and inadequate ideas to perception and imagination. We are told explicitly (2-28) that

"the ideas of the affections of the human body insofar as they are related only to the human mind are not clear and distinct but confused" Similarly he concludes (2-29 corol.). "From this it is evident that the human mind when it perceives [percipit] things in the common order of nature, has no adequate knowledge of itself, nor of its own body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused and mutilated knowledge" Spinoza's reason for this conclusion is that in all perception, whether of oneself or of external things, the individual is not the adequate or sufficient cause of his ideas and therefore his ideas are necessarily inadequate or confused (2-29 schol.) By nature perception and imagination are the source only of inadequate or confused ideas and are never the cause of adequate ideas

In the *De intellectus emendatione* (p. 33) he states explicitly that the imagination in particular is the source of all passions. Thus he writes "But one may take any view one likes of the imagination as long as one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding and that the soul is passive with regard to it. The view taken is immaterial if we know that the imagination is something indefinite with regard to which the soul is passive and that we can by some means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the understanding." *The laws of the imagination are entirely different from those of the intellect because the imagination requires the interaction of the human body with external things, whereas the ideas of the intellect are conceived through and follow from the intellect alone.* "We know," Spinoza continues (*ibid.*, p. 34), "that the operations whereby the effects of the imagination are produced, take place under laws [leges] quite different from the laws of the understanding [diversas a legibus intellectus] and that the soul [animam] so far as its imagination is concerned, has cause for suffering [habere rationem patientis]"

The imagination never gives rise to really clear and distinct ideas though it may appear to do so due to the vividness of the images. "Let us beware," Spinoza warns (*ibid.*, p. 35) "of another great cause of confusion which prevents the intellect from reflecting on itself. Sometimes while making

no distinction between the imagination and the intellect, we think that what we more readily imagine is clearer to us, and also we think that what we imagine we understand. Thus we put first that which should be last; the true order of progression is reversed and no legitimate conclusion is drawn." The imagination is never the source of adequate ideas though the images may more easily (*facilius*) come to mind than the adequate ideas of the intellect. The fact that the mind imagines things simply, that is without reference to causes (5-5), and lacks ideas to exclude these images, misleads it to mistake them for an adequate knowledge of the nature of things (2-35 schol.)

In like manner Spinoza goes on to show that all the actions of the individual involve the intellect alone. If an idea is adequate it necessarily originates in the intellect, if it is inadequate it originates in the imagination. *Properly speaking there can be no inadequate ideas of the intellect.* Thus he demonstrates (2-40 schol. 2) that knowledge of the second and third grades—that is, knowledge of common notions and intuitive science, always involves adequate ideas, since each idea as conceived by the intellect gives a knowledge of the eternal essence of God. Spinoza devotes a special proposition (5-28 demons.) to show that "ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are related to the third kind of knowledge, cannot follow from mutilated and confused ideas which are related to the first kind of knowledge, but from adequate ideas, that is to say, from the second and third kind of knowledge." We are also informed (4-35 corol. 1) that "a man acts absolutely from the laws of his own nature when he lives according to the guidance of reason" (*homo ex legibus suae naturae absolute agit, quando ex ductu rationis vivit*). *Reason or the intellect is then the only adequate cause of a man's actions and is the exclusive source of all his adequate ideas.* The imagination is the source of all inadequate ideas and of all affects which are passions.

It seems to me, however, that from a purely logical point of view Spinoza's argument for the inadequacy of the ideas of the imagination may also be applied to the intellect. For the human intellect is a part of the divine intellect and may

therefore be regarded as conceiving its ideas partially or inadequately. Spinoza himself states (5-40 schol). "It is evident that our mind insofar as it understands [quatenus intelligit] is an eternal mode of thought which is determined by another eternal mode of thought and this again by another, and so on ad infinitum, so that all taken together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God" On this premise no mode of thought can be said to act absolutely, that is without reference to others Spinoza, nevertheless, speaks of the intellect as acting absolutely (absolute agit) without relation to other modes of thought Insofar as the mind does function in relation to other modes, then it is no longer the intellect but the imagination This argument, it seems to me, is arbitrary and is the source of much difficulty later

6 AFFECTS OF THE SOUL, BODY, AND INTELLECT

SPINOZA's radical differentiation between the functions of the intellect and imagination led him to change his general conception of the affects There are, it would appear, three kinds of affects, namely, affects which refer simultaneously to the body and imagination, those which are conceived through the body alone, and intellectual affects which follow from the intellect alone and have no reference to the body

His general definition of affects (3-after def 48) refers to affects which pertain simultaneously to body and mind, though they originate in the body Such affects are necessarily passions and involve inadequate ideas since the body is not their adequate cause Thus Spinoza explains "An affect which is called a passion of the soul [animi pathema] is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body or any part of it, a greater or less power of existence than before, and this increase of power being given the mind itself is determined to one particular thought rather than to another"

Not all affects, however, refer simultaneously to the body and mind Spinoza was aware that many modifications occur in the body of which the mind is not conscious or over which

it has no control Hence he concluded that some affects were corporeal by nature and did not involve a corresponding affection of the mind For example, he points out (3-59 schol) some affects "such as trembling [tremor], paleness [livor], sobbing [singultus], laughing [risus], and the like .

belong to the body alone without relationship to the mind [ad solum corpus absque ulla ad mentem relatione referuntur] " These affects are conceived through and follow from the body alone and do not involve the mind at all, except incidentally Tears and laughter follow mechanically from the nature of the body insofar as it is a mode of extension and not insofar as the body is united to the mind Spinoza is ready to make this assumption because he claims that many actions follow from the body alone considered as a mechanism, just as Descartes had claimed that brutes were physical automata whose functions were to be explained purely in terms of matter and motion In the scholium to proposition two of book three this point is taken up in detail "For what the body can do," he writes, "no one has hitherto determined, that is to say, experience [experientia] has taught no one hitherto what the body, without being determined by the mind [nisi a mente determinetur] can do and what it cannot do from the laws of its nature alone [ex solis legibus naturae corpus] insofar as nature is considered merely as corporeal

For no one as yet has understood the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions, not to mention the fact that many things are observed in brutes which far surpass human sagacity, and that sleep-walkers in their sleep do very many things which they dare not do when awake, all this showing that the body itself can do many things from the laws of its own nature alone at which the mind belonging to that body is amazed

I have already shown, however, that they do not know what the body can do, nor what can be deduced from the consideration of its nature alone, and that they find that many things are done merely by the laws of its nature which they would never have believed to be possible without the direction of the mind, as for example those things which sleep-walkers do in their sleep and at which they them-

selves are astonished when awake I adduce also here the structure itself of the human body, which so greatly surpasses in workmanship all those things which are constructed by human art, not to mention what I have already proved, that an infinitude of things follows from nature under whatever attribute it may be considered "

This long quotation makes it amply evident that Spinoza, like Descartes, was prepared to interpret the affects of brutes and some of the affects of man such as laughing, crying, and trembling in purely corporeal and mechanical terms. In such cases, the affects are not properly affections of the mind at all—as is shown by the example of sleep-walkers. *The notion of an unconscious mind did not occur either to Descartes or Spinoza—though Leibnitz in his Monadology makes much of this point in his theory of "petites perceptions"* In this respect Leibnitz was more consistent than Spinoza, since the identity of body and mind requires that all affections of the body are simultaneously affects of the mind, whether the mind be clearly conscious of them or not. Spinoza, however, argues that the mind is necessarily aware of its ideas and the affections of its body (2-12, 22). Hence if anything happens of which the mind is not conscious, it must follow from the nature of the body alone—an inference which undermines his doctrine of the identity of body and mind, and the intrinsic agreement of the attributes of thought and extension. The body of man may be regarded as a very intricate and subtle mechanism some of whose affections follow from the laws of its corporeal nature alone—though the extent of these corporeal affections has not been completely determined by experience. The significant conclusion here is that there are purely corporeal affects as well as affects which, though corporeal in their origin, involve simultaneously the nature of the mind. Both kinds of affects are passions since they do not follow from the power of the individual alone.

There is, in addition, a third kind of affect, namely, intellectual affects (though Spinoza does not use the precise term), which are actions as distinct from the affects of the body and imagination which are passions. This obviously

does not mean that there is a direct parallelism of the affects of the intellect and imagination, since the laws of the intellect differ from those of the imagination. For example, there are no actions or intellectual affects of sorrow (3-59). Thus we find Spinoza writes (3-58) "Besides the joys and desires which are passions [passiones] there are other affects [affectus] of joy and desire which are related to us insofar as we act [agimus]." Similarly he speaks (4-15) of "desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil," and of favor and self-satisfaction which arise from reason (4-51, 52). There are then intellectual affects or actions which have no direct reference to corresponding affections of the body.

7 THE INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC CRITERION OF ACTIONS AND PASSIONS

THE question now arises, how do we know whether a given affect originates in the intellect or imagination? Spinoza's answer is that the criterion is a purely internal one. An affect originates in the intellect if we find that it involves adequate ideas, it originates in the imagination if it involves inadequate ideas. Spinoza even goes so far as to suggest that there may be parallelism or one-to-one correspondence between the affects of the intellect and the imagination, though as said there is no metaphysical basis for this. Thus he writes (5-4 schol.) "For it is above everything to be observed that the appetite by which a man is said to act, is one and the same as that by which he is said to suffer. For example, we have shown that human nature is so constituted that everyone desires that other people should live according to his way of thinking, a desire which in a man who is not guided by reason is a passion which is called ambition and is not very different from pride, while on the other hand, in a man who lives according to the dictates of reason [ex rationis dictamine] it is an action or virtue which is called piety. In the same manner all the appetites or desires are passions only insofar as they arise from inadequate ideas and are classed among virtues whenever they are excited or

begotten by adequate ideas; for all the desires by which we are determined to any action may arise from either adequate or inadequate ideas."

It appears from this passage that one and the same affect or desire may originate either in the intellect or imagination and is then classed as a virtue or passion respectively. The serious difficulty occurs in the case of the affects of sorrow which are excluded from having any corresponding intellectual affects (3-59)

In the above quotation Spinoza assumes that an affect which is in accord with the dictates of reason and one which originates in the intellect are one and the same. This assumption, as suggested in our discussion of adequate ideas and causes, is open to question. It presupposes that a given affect may be classified as an action or passion by a consideration of the intrinsic properties of the ideas involved and without reference to the functions of the body or the nature of the object toward which the affect is directed.

We find, however, that elsewhere Spinoza, like the Scholastics, maintains that an affect is to be judged by its effects on human power or perfection. That is to say, an affect is considered an action or passion according to its practical consequences in promoting or hindering human virtue and social harmony. This, we submit, is equivalent to introducing an extrinsic criterion of the affects, namely, their end, function, or purpose, in promoting human well-being, which is radically different from the intrinsic criterion of adequacy and inadequacy by which the affects were previously judged. This I take to be the significance of Spinoza's statement that "love and desire may be excessive" (*excessum*) (4-44). The terms *excessive* and *immoderate* which Spinoza introduces in this proposition do not apply to the adequacy or inadequacy of ideas. They are intelligible only in relation to functions and their effects in accomplishing a given end.

From this it follows that *an affect which does not originate in the intellect may nevertheless be in accord with the dictates of reason if the consequences for the perfection of the individual are beneficial*. By nature man functions in different parts at various times and it is therefore in accord

with the dictates of right reason to experience those affects which refer only to a part of the body so long as they are not in excess—that is to say, so long as they do not possess the mind's attention to the complete exclusion of other modes of activity required for the perfection of the individual. This aspect of Spinoza's argument is best illustrated by his example in 5-10 scholium where he writes "For example, if a man sees that he pursues glory too eagerly, let him think on its proper use [*de ejus recto usu cogitet*] for what end it is to be followed [*in quem finem sectanda sit*] and by what means it can be obtained [*a quibus mediis acquiri possit*], but let him not think upon its abuse and vanity, and on the inconstancy of men and things of this sort, about which no one thinks unless through disease of mind." *Here we see that the virtue of an affect is judged by its right use, proper end, and means—traditional Scholastic notions which require reference to a final cause.* An affect is said to be in accord with right reason insofar as the intellect conceives its consequences to be in agreement with its idea of human perfection as a whole. An affect is a true good when the idea thereof in the intellect and its formal effects on the individual are in agreement—for a true idea must agree with its ideatum and in this case the ideatum is the actual perfection of man. The intellect conceives the utility of the individual affects and controls them with a view to the welfare of the man as a whole, of themselves the affects are blind and partial and have no regard to the profit of man as a whole, and therefore tend to be excessive (4-50). That is to say, *the affects in themselves involve only inadequate ideas but they may be controlled and guided by the adequate ideas of the intellect.* In other words, an affect is in accord with the dictates of reason when there is an extrinsic agreement between the ideas of the intellect and the formal consequences of the affect—the intrinsic criterion of the adequacy of the ideas and causes involved is not sufficient.

Spinoza did not realize the full implication of his admission, for otherwise he would have seen that it is not the origin or efficient cause of the affects but rather the end or final cause which is the criterion of actions and passions, virtues

and vices. One cannot determine whether a given affect is good or evil, helpful or harmful, unless he considers the perfection or functions of the individual and the nature of the end or objects by which he is affected. It is a virtue of the intellect to have adequate ideas, but while an affect may involve the virtue of the intellect it is not reducible to the latter. In other words, an affect is thought to agree with the dictates of right reason because it is conceived in relation to some good or ideal of perfection, the goodness or value of the affect is prior in nature to its rationality. An affect is rational because reason acknowledges its inherent virtue or perfection, but it is not a virtue simply because it is conceived by reason, as otherwise there would be no inherent difference between affects and conceptions of the intellect. There is a parallelism between actions and passions only because any given affect may be controlled by reason. There are not two sets of affects, one of which originates in the intellect and the other in the imagination, as Spinoza seems to assume in order to retain a nominal agreement between the attributes of thought and extension. Spinoza, it seems to me, confused psychology and ethics, the origin of human functions with their final worth or value. This in turn is due to the fact that he wished to exclude all final causes from his ethical theory as well as from his metaphysics.

8 THE SOUL AND ITS AFFECTS HISTORICAL SURVEY

UP to this point we were concerned with the analysis of Spinoza's conception of the affects and noted some of the logical incoherencies to be found. It is important to bear in mind, however, that these logical incoherencies are due primarily to Spinoza's effort to synthesize all the basic philosophical traditions concerning this subject. He felt that a really adequate psychology should be impartial to all the facts and capable of harmonizing the doctrines of the rival schools. This synthetic motive made him go out of his way to demonstrate that his philosophy was essentially in agree-

ment with all the really universal ideas of the great philosophic and religious traditions. It will prove instructive therefore for us to examine some of the leading theories concerning the nature and origin of the affects with which Spinoza was acquainted, whether directly or indirectly, and to show what use he made of them in constructing his own synthetic psychology of the emotions. From this analysis we shall show that Spinoza's logical incoherencies are largely due to the fact that his initial premises were incompatible with the historical ideas he tried to incorporate in what he wished to be an all-inclusive system.

We shall begin accordingly with the Platonic theory of the nature and functions of the soul and then pass on to brief surveys of the thought of Aristotle, the Stoics, St. Thomas, and Descartes on this subject. In the final section we shall treat of the relation of Spinoza to his predecessors.

According to Plato the soul or psyche was the only self-moved mover and the efficient cause of motion in all bodies. Bodies can only be moved but cannot of themselves originate motion. Plato called all the activities of the soul motions and hence included the affects or emotions. In the *Lures* we find he writes (Bk. X) "The soul then directs all things in heaven and earth and sea by her movements, and these are described by the terms will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, love and other primary motions akin to these, which again receive the secondary motions of corporeal substances and guide all things to growth and decay, to composition and decomposition and to the qualities which accompany them, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those other qualities which the soul uses, herself a goddess, when truly receiving the divine mind, she disciplines all things rightly to their happiness, but when she is the companion of folly, she does the very contrary of all this." And again in the following passage "And if this is true do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all

that is, or has become or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion of all things?"

Plato we see first maintains that the soul is the self-moved mover and the primary efficient cause of motion in all things Insofar as the rational principle in the soul initiates the motion then the bodies move in uniform and perfect order as is the case with the planets which move in circles (*Timæus*) On the other hand, when the irrational principle of the soul initiates the motion, then we have disorderly motion in all directions as we see in some human activities All the activities of the soul are likewise regarded as motions (*kinesis*) and *thus Plato considers willing, thinking, and feeling as motions of the soul* The soul as a whole is a unity, its rational and irrational functions may be distinguished though not separated into parts Hence he believes the soul as a whole, since it is prior to the body, is immortal (*Phædo*) What the relation is between the soul or psyche and the "ideas" or "forms," Plato does not make clear He postulated the eternal ideas to account for the principle of being in things and the psyche to account for the origin of motion, without explaining the metaphysical interrelation of the two principles

Aristotle, on the other hand, notwithstanding his criticism that the universal ideas of Plato cannot account for motion, denied that the soul or psyche is a moved mover, and the efficient cause of motion in bodies The reason for his denial of the Platonic doctrine is found in the fact that Aristotle identified the form of a thing with its soul as we see from the *De Anima* The form is the entelechy or immanent final cause of motion in all natural things That is to say, the form, soul, or entelechy acts only as the unmoved mover of bodies, determining the order and goal of their processes Composite things, which are unions of matter and form, are capable of motion and act as self-moved movers, but the form itself, properly speaking, does not move at all, except incidentally because of its union with some body Motion pertains only to bodies which have the potentiality of becoming various things and receiving different forms The form

itself, however, as the principle of actuality has no potentiality and is therefore incapable of motion or becoming. Thus although Plato and Aristotle agree in distinguishing the mover from the thing moved, they differ very definitely in the role they assign to the soul

Plato, by introducing two distinct principles, namely, the ideas or essences and the soul or psyche as the source of motion, was able to account both for the permanence of things and their motion or becoming. Aristotle, on the other hand, by identifying the form with the psyche, became involved in serious difficulties. The Aristotelian forms are principles of being and at the same time the physis, or internal source of motion. Aristotle then attempts to get out of the difficulty by making the form-souls the final causes of motion. But how a final cause is able to initiate motion in a body which of itself is supposedly incapable of motion, remains a mystery.

Aristotle's theory of motion and the function of the soul influenced his psychological conceptions as well. As opposed to Plato, he denied that the soul is capable of emotions and hence would not attribute the various feelings to the soul itself. Thus he writes in the *De Anima* (408a) "A tentative description of the soul as subject to movement would be more plausible in view of the following considerations. We say that the soul is pained or rejoices, is confident or afraid, and again is angry and perceives and thinks, and all of these are thought to be movements. From this one might suppose that it is moved, but that is not necessary. For however much pain and enjoyment and thinking are movements and each of them is a being moved, the being moved is produced by the soul, e g., to be angry or afraid is the heart's being moved in a particular way and thinking is a movement either as is probable of the heart or of something else, and some of these phenomena take place owing to certain parts being in locomotion and others owing to their being altered in quality (which parts these are and how they are moved is another question). To say then that the soul is angry is like saying that the soul weaves or builds, it were better perhaps not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does so with his soul, but this not in the sense that the move-

ment is in the soul, but that it sometimes reaches the soul and sometimes proceeds from it; e g , perception proceeds from particular outward things while reminiscence proceeds from the soul to the movements or permanent traces of movement in the sense organs But reason seems to come to be present in us as an independent substance and not to be destroyed . Therefore old age consists not in something having happened to the soul, but in something having happened to that in which the soul resides, just as happens in intoxication and disease Similarly then thought and scientific contemplation dies away through the destruction of something else within but is itself impassive Thinking, and love and hate however, are not affections of reason but of that which possesses it, qua possessing it And so too when this possession perishes we neither remember nor love, for these did not belong to reason but to the composite being which has perished, while reason is presumably something more divine and impassive ”

From this lengthy passage we gather that Aristotle considers and rejects the Platonic theory that the soul itself is moved or has various motions which we perceive as thinking and feeling The soul is only the final cause of the motions, the motions themselves are to be properly attributed only to the body and its various organs In thinking, for example, there is, so Aristotle believes, a motion of the heart of which the soul is the final cause The soul is aware of the motions of the body and it may be said that the body is the efficient instrument of the soul The soul however does not always originate the motions of its body Sometimes the body is affected or moved by some external object and the soul is merely conscious of the motions originating in its body

It is to be further noted that Aristotle conceives the human soul as composite Reason or nous is something eternal and incorruptible, and as such is not destroyed with the body The so-called irrational functions of the individual are due to his corporeal soul or form which perishes along with his body There is then a difference in kind or function in the parts of the soul The irrational soul is really the inseparable

form of its body but the rational soul is an independent substance which comes from without and cannot be destroyed along with the body. Just how the union and separation of the rational and irrational parts of the soul come about we are not told.

With this background in mind, it is easy to see just how the Stoics arrived at their particular conclusions concerning the nature of the soul. *They simply identified the entire soul with the reason or intellect and dispensed altogether with its irrational functions.* The Stoics further differed from Aristotle in that the rational soul as conceived by them was not an immaterial form, the soul was a subtle fire or pneuma, finer and more volatile than the matter of the body—a doctrine going back to Heraclitus. The soul as an independent material principle survived the death of the body, though it too was subject to destruction in the final conflagration of the world.

The soul as a subtle fire was capable of moving itself, as in thought, and was the efficient cause of locomotion, as Plato held. Unlike Plato, however, the Stoics denied any irrational function of the soul and hence did not attribute the emotions to the activity of the soul. They conceived the emotions as originating in the body and hence as something to which the soul is passive. That is to say, *the emotions were passions, commotions, or discases which disturbed the apathy or calm and order of the rational activity of the soul.* By eliminating the emotions from the activity of the soul, the Stoics were led to consider them as in opposition to reason or human nature. For Plato and Aristotle the *pathé* involved the activity of the psyche, either as efficient or final cause, and were regarded as essential functions of the individual to be controlled by the rule and measure imposed by reason for the good of the individual. For the Stoics, on the other hand, there was a real conflict between the rational soul and the passions. Hence they counseled, as we find Epictetus in his *Discourses* doing, that a man should limit and restrain his desires to those things inherently within human power and should give the consent of his will only to the dictates of rea-

son and the necessary order of nature. By limiting his desires the individual is rendered more self-sufficient and therefore less moved by passions for external things

The Stoics however also admitted three *eupathé* or good passions which have their origin in the soul and are to be found in the wise man. These include will (*voluntas*), joy (*gaudium*), and caution (*cautio*). Sorrow, they held, was by nature contrary to reason and hence never found in the wise man (Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, IV, § 6)

Although little has remained of primary sources dealing with this subject, there is traditional agreement in the reports of their views on the emotions. Thus Cicero in his *Tusculan Disputations* (IV, § 6) writes "This then is Zeno's definition of disorder which he terms *pathe*, that it is an agitation of the soul alien from right reason and contrary to nature [*perturbatio animi aversa a recta ratione et contra naturam*]" The Stoics, we are further informed by Cicero, rejected the Platonic assumption of rational and irrational faculties of the soul. They considered the soul as a unity having only rational functions which were disturbed by the corporeal passions afflicting the soul.

Similarly St. Augustine in the *De civitate Dei* (Bk. VIII, chap. iv, Temple Classics edition) reports "Concerning emotions of the mind which the Greeks call *pathe* and styled by some of our writers Cicero for instance, disturbances [*perturbationes*], by some affects or affections, while others more expressly from the Greek passions, there are two opinions of the philosophers. Some say that they may befall a wise man, yet so as they are still awed by reason and by the rule of the mind obliged to what conditions discretion imposes. The holders of this are Platonists or Aristotelians, for Aristotle the first peripatetic was Plato's scholar. But others (as the Stoics) exempt a wise man from any touch of these passions

because the Stoics will not admit the external helps of the body or estate to the name of goods, reserving that only for virtue as the art of living fixed in the mind." Augustine concludes that the controversy is verbal and nominal because members of both parties ultimately allow affects or emotions a place insofar as they do not prejudice reason or virtue.

Later on St. Thomas Aquinas correctly reports St. Augustine on the Stoics as follows (*Summa Theologica*, Prima Secundae, Vol VII, Quest 59, § 2) "The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point as Augustine relates For the Stoics held that the soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man, whereas the Peripatetics who were founded by Aristotle maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue if they are reduced to the mean . . . Accordingly if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man so that he consent to them, as the Stoics maintained But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man insofar as they are subordinate to reason Hence Aristotle says [*Ethics* II] that 'some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passions and disturbances' This is incorrect because the assertion should be qualified 'They should have said virtue is freedom from those passions that are not as they should be as to manner and time'

St. Thomas refers to the Stoics again in similar terms in a different connection (*Summa Theologica*, Prima Secundae, Vol VI, Quest 24, § 2) In answer to the question "whether every passion of the soul is evil morally" he replies "On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics, for the Stoics held that all passions are evil while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good This difference although it appears great in words, is nevertheless in reality none at all, or but little if we consider the intent of either school For the Stoics did not discern between sense and intellect, and consequently between the intellectual and sensitive appetite Hence they did not discriminate the passions of the soul from movements of the will, insofar as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, but every rational movement of the appetitive part they called will, while they called passion a movement that exceeds the limits of reason Wherefore Cicero following their opinion calls all passions diseases of the soul whence he argues that 'those who are diseased are unsound, and those who are unsound are wanting in sense' Hence we speak of those who are wanting in sense as being unsound On the

other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of passions to all movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem them good when they are controlled by reason and evil when they are not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in disapproving of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions when he says that 'every evil though moderate should be shunned, for just as a body though it be moderately ailing is not sound, so this mean in the disease or passions of the soul is not sound.' For passions are not called diseases or disturbances of the soul save when they are not controlled by reason."

The last quotation is particularly significant insofar as St. Thomas touches upon the fundamental source of disagreement between the Stoics and Peripatetics, namely, the fact that the Stoics failed to distinguish between sense and reason and hence between the sensitive appetite and the will. A desire was either a movement of the will or intellect, or else it was a passion. The notion of an irrational desire capable of control by the intellect did not occur to them.

Descartes in the seventeenth century continued the Stoic tradition of ethics and psychology though he differed from them considerably. Descartes agreed with the Stoics that the essence of the soul consisted in its rational functions and was a substance other than and separable from its body. But he followed the Scholastics when he maintained that the soul or reason in man was spiritual or completely immaterial. The soul was not the form or function of the body as Aristotle and the Scholastics maintained, it was a pure form having an existence independent of the body similar to the active intellect which Aristotle first distinguished.

Furthermore, Descartes agreed with the Aristotelians that motion pertained only to matter or to the body. He preferred however to follow the mechanical tradition of the atomists and denied the validity of final causes. Motion could be produced in bodies only through some external efficient cause. The soul was not required either as a self-moved mover or as the final cause of motion. In his treatise *On the Passions of the Soul*, Descartes explicitly denies that the soul is the principle of motion in the individual. The error, he

points out (*On the Passions of the Soul*, § 5) "arises from the fact that from observing that all dead bodies are devoid of heat and consequently of movement, it has been thought that it was the absence of soul which caused these movements and this heat to cease, and thus without any reason, it was thought that our natural heat and all the movements of our body depend on the soul, while in fact we ought on the contrary to believe that the soul quits us on our death only because this heat ceases and the organs which serve to move the body disintegrate" "In order that we may avoid this error" he continues (*ibid*, § 6), "let us consider that death never comes to pass by reason of the soul but only because some one of the principal parts of the body decays, and we may judge that the body of a living man differs from that of a dead man just as does a watch or other automaton (i.e. a machine that moves itself) when it is wound up and contains in itself the corporeal principle of those movements for which it is designed along with all that is requisite for its action, from the same watch or other machine when it is broken and when the principle of its movement ceases to act" "In this way," Descartes concludes (*ibid*, § 16), "all the movements which we make without our will contributing thereto (as frequently happens when we breathe, walk, eat and in fact perform all those actions which are common to us and the brutes) only depend on the conformation of our members and on the course which the spirits, excited by the heat of the heart, follow naturally in the brain, nerves, and muscles, just as the movements of a watch are produced simply by the strength of the springs and the form of the wheels"

We see from the above quotations that Descartes is opposed to the Platonic theory which makes soul the principle of motion in all things. Aristotle, he would say, had only partly emancipated himself from Plato in attributing all motion to the body, because the former still thought the soul was necessary as the final cause of motion. Descartes on the contrary insists that the body itself is a mechanical automaton or self-moved mover and requires no principle other than itself to initiate motion. The soul leaves the body when

the latter ceases to act, the body does not cease to act because the soul leaves. The corporeal seat of motion is in the heart. "So long as we live," he remarks (§ 8), "there is a continual heat in our heart which is a species of fire which the blood of the veins there maintains and this fire is the corporeal principle of all the movements of our members." The secret of life apparently is to keep the heart fires burning.

Although body and soul are different substances having diverse functions or activities, Descartes believed that they interacted. The motions or affections which follow from the body are perceived by the soul or mind and to this extent the soul is said to be passive and to suffer passions. On the other hand the soul is able to originate motion in the body by means of the pineal gland, even though that is not its primary function. Thus he explains (§ 34) "Let us here add that the small gland which is the main seat of the soul is so suspended between the cavities which contain the spirits that it can be moved by them in as many different ways as it may also be moved in diverse ways by the soul, whose nature is such that it receives in itself as many diverse impressions, that is to say, that it possesses as many diverse perceptions as there are diverse movements in this gland. Reciprocally and likewise the machine of the body is so formed that from the simple fact that this gland is diversely moved by the soul, or by such other cause, whatever it is, it thrusts the spirits which surround it towards the pores of the brain which conduct them by the nerves into the muscles by which means it causes them to move the limbs."

The highly significant point here is that though the soul is not primarily the principle of motion in the body, it may nonetheless upon occasion and indirectly through this pineal gland be the final cause, as it were, and unmoved mover of the body—though Descartes himself believed he had excluded all final causes from his physics. In spite of his criticism of Aristotle and the Scholastics, he is forced to give a similar explanation of some of the motions of the body.

All the functions which pertain to the soul in virtue of its own nature are called actions. These include thinking, willing, and feeling. The functions or affections which are at-

tributed to the soul through its interaction with the body are called passions, which include various modes of perception, desire, and feeling or emotion. So Descartes writes (§ 17). "After having thus considered all the functions which pertain to the body alone, it is easy to recognize that there is nothing in us which we ought to attribute to our soul excepting our thoughts, which are mainly of two sorts, the one being its actions and the other its passions." The passions Descartes defines (§ 27) as "the perceptions, feelings or emotions of the soul which we relate specially to it and which are caused, maintained and fortified by the spirits."

Among the actions of the soul we noted there are also feelings or emotions. These are then intellectual affects which have their origin in the soul and are not dependent upon the body. There are, on this basis, two sets of emotions, namely, intellectual emotions or actions and corporeal emotions or passions of the soul. This seems to be the implication of Descartes's conclusion when he says (§ 147) "Our good and our harm depend mainly on the interior emotions which are only excited in the soul by the soul itself in which respect they differ from its passions which always depend on some movement of the spirits." How far this duplication of the emotions extends, Descartes does not make clear, though he specifies desire, love and hatred, joy and sorrow as cases in point. Thus the passion of desire which is "an agitation of the soul caused by the spirits which dispose it to wish for the future the things which it represents to itself as agreeable" (§ 86), is distinguished from the desire of the intellect or soul which is called will (§ 18). Similarly in speaking of love and hatred (§ 79) Descartes explains: "I say that these emotions are caused by the spirits in order to distinguish love and hate which are passions and depend on the body, both from the judgments which also induce the soul by its free will to unite itself with the things it esteems good and to separate itself from those it holds to be evil, and from the emotions which these judgments excite of themselves in the soul." Finally with reference to joy and sorrow he writes (§§ 91, 92) "Joy is an agreeable emotion of the soul in which consists the enjoyment that the soul possesses in the

good which the impressions of the brain represent to it as its own. . . I also add that it is of the good which the impressions of the brain represent to it as its own, in order not to confound the joy which is a passion with the joy that is purely intellectual, and which comes into the soul by the action of the soul alone and which we may call an agreeable emotion excited in it, in which the enjoyment consists which it has in the good which its understanding represents to it as its own

Sadness is a disagreeable languor in which consists the discomfort and unrest which the soul receives from evil or from the defect which the impressions of the brain set before it as pertaining to it. And there is *also an intellectual sadness* which is not a passion, but which hardly ever fails to be accompanied by it "

The significance of this dual classification of the emotions can be best appreciated by comparison with the Scholastic theory to which Descartes was consciously opposed

The Scholastics following Aristotle had conceived the soul as composite and as having diverse functions, namely, rational and irrational functions. There were the rational functions of the theoretical and practical intellects, as distinct from the irrational functions or faculties of desire, perception, and emotion. The important doctrine which they stressed was that the higher and lower functions of the soul cooperate in such a manner that the higher is always the form in relation to the lower which provides the matter. Thus they held that all emotions originate in the soul and are guided and controlled by the practical intellect according to the principle of the mean. That is to say, *one and the same emotion may be either an action and virtue or a passion and vice, insofar as it is guided by a rational concern for the good of the individual or not*

Descartes, on the other hand, was opposed to the Scholastic doctrine that there are higher and lower faculties of the soul. *The soul is a unity and has only rational functions, the so-called irrational functions are due to the power of the body which affects the soul with passions*. Thus he writes (§ 47) "There is within us but one soul and this soul has

not in itself any diversity of parts; the same part that is subject to sense impressions is rational, and all the soul's appetites are acts of will. The error which has been committed in making it play the part of various personages usually in opposition one to another, only proceeds from the fact that we have not properly distinguished its functions from those of the body, to which alone we must attribute everything which can be observed in us that is opposed to our reason." The above passage confirms St. Thomas' criticism of the Stoics, noted previously, namely, that they did not distinguish between sense and reason or between the sensitive appetite and the will. Descartes in common with the Stoics introduces a radical separation between the rational functions of the soul and the corporeal mechanical functions of the body and the passions they produce in the soul. All non-rational functions are either corporeal functions or passions of the soul due to interaction with the body. *That is why Descartes is forced to postulate two sets of affects having separate origins in the soul and the body, whereas the Scholastics required only one set of emotions capable of union with the practical intellect.* In his attempt to simplify and unify the soul, Descartes succeeded only in increasing the number and complexity of the emotions.

9 SPINOZA'S THEORIES OF THE SOUL AND ITS AFFECTS

WE turn finally to indicate the relation of Spinoza's theories of the soul and its affects to those of his predecessors.

Body and Soul as Automata

To begin with it may be said that Spinoza extends the Cartesian principle of the machine or automaton to the mind. Descartes had maintained that the body was a mechanical automaton whereas the soul was a thinking thing acting freely according to the consent of its will. Spinoza goes one step further. He agrees with Descartes that the soul is not the form of its body but claims that the soul also is,

as it were, a spiritual automaton, lacking freedom of will and subject to necessary laws, just as the body is a material or extended automaton (see § 1)

Furthermore, Spinoza insists in accordance with his metaphysics that the modes of thought and extension can have nothing in common with one another and hence that there can be no interaction between soul and body. The soul cannot be the cause of motion in the body, even occasionally; and the body cannot be the proximate cause of ideas in the mind. Thus we find Spinoza criticize Descartes (*Ethics* 5-pref) for affirming "that each volition of the mind is united in nature to a certain motion of the (pineal) gland"

In place of interaction between body and soul, Spinoza postulates that they agree intrinsically and are really one and the same thing conceived under different attributes (2-7 schol., 2-21 schol.). From this premise it follows that there is a direct correspondence between the actions and passions of the body and its mind or soul. The more fit the body is for acting, the greater is the power of its mind (5-39)

In order to account for the metaphysical agreement of body and mind, Spinoza postulates that the mind (*mens*) is nothing more than the idea (*idea*) of its body. Thus he writes (2-11) "The first thing which constitutes (or primarily [primum] that which constitutes) the actual essence [*actuale esse*] of the human mind is nothing else than the idea of an individual thing actually existing, [*idea rei aliqujus singularis actu existentis*]" And again (2-13) "The object of the idea [*objectum ideae*] constituting the human mind is a body or a certain mode of extension actually existing [*actu existens*] and nothing else." The significance of these propositions consists in the fact that Spinoza hereby denies that the mind or soul is the form of its body. The body as matter is actual in its own right and requires no form to account for its actuality.¹ The mind is only the idea of its

1 On this point our conclusion is opposed to that of Professor Wolfson who claims (in his *Philosophy of Spinoza* II, p. 48) that Spinoza's definition of the mind as the idea of its body "is nothing but a new way of stating the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body." Our contention is that Spinoza's conception of the soul is radically opposed to the Aristotelian definition.

body and the body is the object of the mind. Each has its own proper functions.

Spinoza wishes to assure us that body and mind are of equal status. Thus he writes (2-21 schol.) "The mind and the body are one and the same individual, which at one time is considered under the attribute of thought and at another under that of extension. The idea of the mind there-

fore and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is considered under one and the same attribute, that of thought.

For indeed, the idea of the mind, that is to say, the idea of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea [forma ideae] insofar as this is considered as a mode of thought and without relation to the object [absque relatione ad objectum consideratur]. We note here that the mind is considered as having a form of its own and that its nature does not necessarily involve relation to any object or body.

Nevertheless, in his psychological theory Spinoza does give the primary status to the body. This is shown by his demonstration "that the mind does not know itself [mens se ipsam non cognoscit] except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body" (2-23). If the mind were really conceived through itself alone, then it would know itself intrinsically without reference to its body. Spinoza instead regards the mind as passive, as doing nothing more than reflecting or affirming the motions of its body. The mind itself does not originate its ideas independently of the body, the mental ideas affirm only the prior affections of the body. In brief, the mind appears to be nothing more than the objective essence of its body, without a formal active essence of its own, though on general metaphysical grounds Spinoza would grant them both equal formal status.

Stated with reference to the history of philosophy, Spinoza's position may be said to be in part similar to, and in part the exact contrary of, the Scholastic doctrine. Spinoza and the Scholastics agree that body and soul [sensitive] are inseparable, though for different reasons. The Scholastics regard the soul as prior by nature to the body and the final cause of the body's activities. Spinoza on the contrary re-

gards the body as prior by nature to the mind which is its passive idea.

Insofar as Spinoza regards the mind as dependent upon the body he admits that the mind's ideas are by nature inadequate and hence that the mind is passive. We are told (2-29 corol.) that "the human mind when it perceives things in the common order of nature has no adequate idea of itself nor of its body [*nec sui ipsius nec sui corporis*], nor of external bodies but only a confused and mutilated knowledge." In a previous section on the imagination (§ 5) we pointed out that Spinoza explicitly maintains the passivity of the imagination. We here wish to stress the further point that the mind as a whole, considered as the idea or objective essence of its body, is really passive, the imagination is but a special instance of this passivity. Since the mind perceives only the affections of its body, it is passive in a double sense: first, because it affirms only the motions of its body and has no formal activity of its own aside from its relation to the body, second, because it perceives and imagines external things in relation to which the body itself is passive.

Here I wish to note that an automaton or mechanism as conceived by Spinoza was essentially passive and not active or dynamic. Like Descartes he conceived a mechanism as a machine, similar to a watch, which involves the interaction of various parts. In a so-called natural automaton the parts of the thing not only determine one another but are also determined by external things. That is to say, there really is no automaton or self-moved mover, as Plato considered the psyche to be. On the mechanistic, atomic physics there are only moved movers, since motion does not pertain intrinsically or necessarily to the nature of matter itself and therefore requires some external cause. No thing is the internal or adequate cause of its motion. This accounts for the fact that though Spinoza speaks at times as if the body considered as an automaton were capable of actions, that is, of functions of which it is the adequate or sufficient cause, he is forced nevertheless by the mechanistic presuppositions of his physics to consider the body as a mode determined for action and existence by external things and hence as essentially pas-

sive. Since he postulated an intrinsic agreement between the mind and its body, the mind too was considered as essentially passive and the inadequate cause of its perceptions. Thus both body and mind as so-called automata were really mechanical modes in relation to others and hence by nature passive.

Whereas Descartes regarded the soul as by nature active, though capable of suffering passions due to interaction with its passive, mechanical body, Spinoza on the contrary, though he denied all interaction, considered the mind or soul as by nature passive due to its intrinsic agreement with its passive body. According to Spinoza's radically mechanical theory, all the affects of the soul and body were by nature passions involving external causes, that is to say, Spinoza denied passions due to internal causes, only to render soul and body completely subject to external causes. In his attempt to safeguard the inherent activity of the mind by denying any interaction with its body, Spinoza succeeded only in reducing the mind along with the body to complete passivity.

The Active Autonomy of the Intellect

Spinoza was accordingly forced by his own logic as well as by the facts of experience to reintroduce the major thesis of Descartes, namely, the active autonomy of the intellect, as distinct from the *automatic*, passive functions of the mind when it perceives and imagines the affections of its body. That is to say, Spinoza really brought back the composite soul which the Scholastics advocated and which Descartes opposed. In effect, Spinoza now denied the parallelism between the mind as a mode of thought and the body as a mode of extension. The intellect is autonomous and has no relation to the affections of the body and, as such, it is to be separated from the passive part of the mind which is merely the idea of its body and is inseparable from the latter. Whereas Descartes identified the mind as a whole with the intellect and then affirmed that the soul suffers passions through perceiving the motions of its body, Spinoza, on the other hand, maintained that the active, rational portion of the mind was

by nature active and hence could not suffer passions. The passions of the mind therefore were due to a different part of the mind which was necessarily dependent for its knowledge upon its inherent association with the body. This was similar to the Scholastic procedure which distinguished the rational from the irrational part of the soul, the only difference between the former and Spinoza being that the irrational soul or form of the Aristotelians is also active, whereas the perceiving mind of Spinoza is by nature passive.

Thus we find Spinoza now writes (5-40 corol) "For the part of the mind which is eternal is the intellect through which alone we are said to act, but that part which we have shown perishes is the imagination itself through which alone we are said to suffer." Similarly he insists (5-pref) "There is no comparison between the power or strength of the body and that of the mind [*nulla comparatio inter mentis et corporis potentiam seu vires*] and consequently the strength of the body can never be determined by the strength of the mind."

Spinoza, however, did not regard himself as having forsaken his former principle concerning the identity of the body and mind, and argued that the power of the intellect is dependent in some way upon the strength and maturity of the body. Thus he writes (5-39 schol) "To understand this more clearly, it is to be here considered that we live in constant change and that according as we change for the better or the worse we are called happy or unhappy. Moreover he who like an infant or boy possesses a body fit [*aptum*] for very few things and almost altogether dependent on external causes, has a mind which considered in itself alone is almost entirely unconscious of itself, of God and of objects. On the other hand, he who possesses a body fit for many things possesses a mind which considered in itself alone is largely conscious of itself, of God and of objects. In this life therefore it is our chief endeavor to change the body of infancy so far as its nature permits and is conducive thereto, into another body which is fit for many things, and which is related to a mind conscious [*conscia*] as much as possible of itself, of God and of objects, so that everything which is re-

lated to its memory and imagination in comparison with the intellect is scarcely of any moment "

Here we see that the eternal intellect in some way depends upon and varies with the temporal fitness and maturity of the body. The special significance of this passage consists in the fact that Spinoza is attempting to retain the metaphysical parallelism of body and mind, by saying that the body like the intellect is capable of actions and that the power of the intellect corresponds to the fitness or adequate power of the body. He does not appear to realize the contradiction involved between this argument and his previous assertion that the body and the mind which is its idea are by nature passive, and the inadequate causes of their functions.

In his effort to retain the metaphysical unity of body and the whole mind, Spinoza even speaks as if there were an eternal body or mode of extension, conceived "under an aspect of eternity" (*sub specie aeternitatis*) corresponding to the eternal intellect (5-22), though he does not go the length of maintaining the immortality of the temporal body (5-23), as logically he should have done if body and mind are of equal status. Instead, following Aristotle, Maimonides, and St. Thomas, he acknowledges only the immortality of the intellect, in contrast with the mutability and destructibility of perception and imagination.

On the whole, it appears, Spinoza followed Aristotle and the Scholastics in his division of the soul, though he added a strong Stoic flavor. The Stoic flavor of Spinoza's interpretation consists in this, that he opposed the mind considered as passive (in perception and imagination) to the active intellect, thus reintroducing the dualistic opposition between body and soul which the Scholastics tried so hard to overcome by their doctrine of the potential harmony of cooperation between the higher and lower faculties of the soul. Though Spinoza does not agree entirely with Descartes and the Stoics, he was sufficiently influenced by them to believe that at least part of the mind was by nature passive due to its natural union with the body, whereas the Scholastics maintained that the soul as a whole was by nature active and the primary source of all the functions of the individual.

whether they be mental or physical. According to Scholastic theory, the body acted only through the prior agency of the soul, and hence the former could not be the source of any passivity in the soul.

Spinoza's dualistic conception of the mind inevitably led him to accept the Cartesian doctrine of the emotions. That is to say, Spinoza agreed that there were two distinct sets or groups of affects, namely, those which originated in the intellect and those which had their origin in the corporeal imagination. As noted in our previous discussion of the kinds of affects (§ 6) Spinoza maintains that there are affects of joy, love, and desire which are actions and originate in the intellect (3-58). Like Descartes he distinguishes between the joy of contemplation (3-53) and the joy which is a corporeal passion. Similarly he distinguishes between the will or intellect and the corporeal passion of desire (2-48 schol.). There is also a radical difference between the intellectual love of God (5-32 corol.) and the love which is a blind passion (3-def. 6). He is opposed to Descartes and in agreement with the Stoics only in denying that there are intellectual affects of sorrow or hatred (3-59) since all modes of sorrow are necessarily passions.

The Scholasticism of Spinoza

Spinoza, however, did not consistently follow this dualistic conception of the emotions which he inherited from Descartes. He could not help but realize the implications of his Scholastic theses concerning the diversity of the soul's functions and their relation to those of the body. With the Scholastics he came to see that there may be an extrinsic agreement between the ideas of the intellect and the formal affects of the body, even though the adequate ideas of the intellect do not necessarily involve any reference to the body. Hence Spinoza now demonstrates (5-4, and corol.) that "there is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. . . . Hence it follows that there is no affect of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception." That is to say, the intellect may form adequate ideas of the affects or passions. An affect may be a pas-

sion accompanied by an inadequate idea in that part of the mind which has the body for its only object. But the ideas of the intellect agree with their ideata, and hence one may have an adequate idea of his passions. There is no necessary parallelism between the adequacy of the intellect's ideas and the affects of the body to which they refer as to their objects.

This implies that the intellect is not to be regarded as in conflict with the imagination and the body. The intellect co-operates with the imagination and its affects and guides their activities with a view to the happiness of the individual. That is to say, the affections of the body and imagination are not necessarily passions in the moral sense and therefore evil. The rigid distinction between actions and passions no longer applies. Spinoza makes the highly significant observation that one and the same affect as regards its formal essence (*affectus forma*) may be joined to either adequate or inadequate ideas. "An affect which is a passion," he remarks (5-3), "ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it." Indeed the control of the passions is possible precisely because the intellect is able to separate the corporeal affects from the inadequate idea of some external cause and to unite these affects with some adequate idea (5-20 schol.) "If we detach a commotion of the soul [*commotionem animi*] or affect," Spinoza proves (5-2), "from the thought of an external cause and connect it [*jungamus*] with other thoughts, then the love or hatred towards the external cause and the fluctuations of the soul [*animi fluctuationis*] which arise from these affects will be destroyed."

It is obvious that this conception of the affects differs radically from Spinoza's previous notions. The intellect is not regarded as functioning apart from the affects but rather in conjunction and harmony with them. This is essentially the Scholastic theory of the emotions which differs fundamentally from the Stoic theory which forms the basis of most of Spinoza's psychology.

To sum up Spinoza began with the theory of the metaphysical identity or correspondence of body and mind and hence with a direct parallelism of actions and passions. His mechanistic conception of the modes as automata led him to

deny to them any activity or adequate causality. Hence the mind as the idea of its body was regarded as essentially passive. Spinoza then separated the active autonomous intellect from the passive perception and imagination and reintroduced the Cartesian dualistic theory of the emotions. Finally he implicitly follows the Scholastic theory by regarding one and the same affect as capable of union with either adequate or inadequate ideas, and hence denies the necessity of two origins for the affects themselves. This really involves the notion of an extrinsic, final cause or end and the denial that affects are to be judged exclusively by their adequate or inadequate ideas and by their efficient cause. But Spinoza, it appears, was unaware of the incompatibility of this Scholastic doctrine with the Cartesian-Stoic doctrine which he also accepted.

II

ON THE PRIMARY AFFECTS PLEASURE AND PAIN

1 THE NUMBER OF PRIMARY AFFECTS HISTORICAL SURVEY

SPINOZA divides the affects into two main groups, namely, the primary or primitive and the secondary or derivative affects. There are, he claims, only three primary affects whereas there are an indefinite number of derivative affects. The three primary affects are pleasure or joy (*laetitia*), sorrow or pain (*tristitia*), and desire (*cupiditas*). "I acknowledge," he writes (3-def 4), "only three primitive or primary affects, those of pleasure, pain and desire." And again (3-def 48 explan.) "Moreover it follows from the definitions of the affects explained that they all arise from desire, pleasure and pain or rather that there are none but these three which pass under names varying as their relations and external signs vary."

It will be worth while in this connection to compare Spinoza's classification of the primary affects with those of his predecessors so as to ascertain wherein and why he differs from them.

In the *Tusculan Disputations* of Cicero (IV, § 6) we find a brief account of the Stoic classification of the passions. According to Cicero the Stoics divided the passions into two main groups, namely, disorders or perturbations contrary to reason and good passions (*eupatheia*) or constancies which are also found in the wise man. The perturbations or commotions of the soul (*animi commotio*) which are contrary to right reason are lust (*libido*), pleasure (*laetitia*), fear (*metus*), and vexation or pain (*aequitas*). Lust refers to the desire for some future good, pleasure is the delight in some present good. Similarly fear refers to some future

evil and pain to some present evil. As opposed to these four commotions there are three constancies or equable states (*constantiae*) which are compatible with reason or nature. These are will (*voluntas*), joy (*gaudium*), and caution (*cautio*) whereby the wise man avoids evil and danger. There is no equable state corresponding to pain because the wise man is not considered to be subject to the influence of present evil. The four passions or perturbations and the three constancies together constitute the seven primary passions.

In the *De civitate Dei* (Temple Classics edition, Bk. XII, chap. viii) St. Augustine reports the Stoic doctrine and indicates his disagreement with their position. He writes: "Those which the Greeks call *eupatheiai* and Tully *constantiae*, the Stoics make to be three according to the three passions in a wise man's mind, taking will for desire, joy for elation (pleasure) and wariness (caution) for fear, but instead of that egrotude or dolour which we call sadness they deny that a wise man can entertain anything. For the will they say affects good, joy concerns the good he has attained and wariness avoids that he is to avoid. But seeing sadness arises from an evil cause already fallen out, therefore wisdom admits nothing in place thereof. Then none but wise men can will, rejoice and be vigilant, and none but fools can covet, exult, fear and be sad. The first are the three constancies says Tully and the latter the four perturbations. The Greeks as I said call the three *eupatheiai* and these four *pathe*."

The Stoic division of the emotions into commotions and constancies corresponds, it appears, to the distinction Descartes and Spinoza make between intellectual affects or actions and affects of the imagination or passions. Spinoza even followed the Stoics more closely than Descartes in that the former also denied that sorrow could ever be in accord with reason. Descartes's position as regards sorrow is in agreement with that of St. Augustine who maintains that sorrow is becoming to the wise man in this life. Even the Christian Saviour, Augustine remarks, insofar as he was a man was subject to sorrow.

St Augustine accepted the Stoic fourfold division of the passions though, like the Peripatetics, he was opposed to the classification of the passions into perturbations and constancies. The four passions, namely, desire, pleasure, pain, and fear, may be either good or bad according to their agreement or disagreement with right reason and the Christian faith. Thus he explains (*De civitate Dei*, Bk XII, chap. ix) "But according to our religion and the Scriptures, the citizens of God, as long as they are pilgrims in the way of God, do fear, desire, rejoice and sorrow. But then love being right, straightens all those affections. They fear eternal pain and desire eternal joy, they sorrow for the present because as yet they sigh in themselves, waiting for their adoption, even the redemption of their bodies, they rejoice in hope . . .

They fear to offend, they sorrow for sin and rejoice in doing good. Our Lord Himself living in the form of a servant, exercised them when He thought requisite, for we may not think that having man's essential body and soul, He had but seeming affections. As long as we live in this infirmity we shall live worse if we want those emotions. For

to want the sense of sorrow in this mortal life never befalls a man without great stupidity of body and barbarism of mind."

In his *Summa Theologica* (Prima Secundae, Vol VI, Quest 25, § 4) St Thomas also enumerates four principal passions, though his classification differs from that of St Augustine. According to St Thomas the four principal passions are joy, sadness, hope, and fear, that is to say, he substitutes "hope" for "desire" found in Augustine's list. Joy and sadness are said to be principal passions "because in them all the other passions have their completion and end (as Aristotle held), wherefore they arise from the other passions." Fear and hope are also called principal passions because all movement ends with them. "In respect to the good," St Thomas writes, "movement begins with love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope, while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion and ends in fear." Movement refers to the future, and rest refers to the present. Thus joy and sorrow relate to present good and evil, hope and fear relate to future good and evil—a point which

the Stoics also made St Thomas does not regard desire as a principal affect because he believes desire and aversion are involved in hope and fear, since they all refer to future good and evil. Hope and fear are the movements which complete desire and aversion. In fact all the principal passions, namely, joy, sorrow, hope, and fear, are such because they complete all the other passions—not because they originate all the others as Spinoza held. Had St Thomas thought the principal passions were the first in order of generation he would have included only two, namely, love and hatred, because the latter are the beginning of all movement. Pleasure and the avoidance of pain may be first in order of intention (*ibid*, Quest 25, § 2) though not first in the order of generation.

We must bear in mind also that according to St Thomas all the emotions were dependent on the sensitive appetite or *conatus* which is the final cause of all the individual's affects. This sensitive appetite has two distinct faculties, namely, the concupiscible faculty whereby the soul seeks apparent good and the irascible faculty whereby the soul avoids and destroys apparent evil. Each faculty has its own basic pairs of passions (Quest 23). Thus in the concupiscible faculty there are three pairs of passions, the members of each couple being contraries. These include love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. Included under the irascible faculty there are hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has no opposite. According to this classification there are eleven cardinal passions.

St Thomas, it will be seen, selected only four out of these eleven as the principal passions. The basis of his selection is the fact that joy and sadness, hope and fear are the ends or final causes of all the passions, joy and sorrow complete present good and evil, while hope and fear complete future good and evil. Hope and fear pertain to the irascible faculty, joy and sorrow to the concupiscible faculty. It is noteworthy that, according to St Thomas, hope and fear are not proper contraries as are joy and sorrow.

According to the *Leviathan* of Hobbes (Pt. I, chap. vi) there are seven "simple passions." These include appetite,

desire, aversion, love, hate, joy, and grief. He points out that desire is a general term and appetite a more particular name for the desire for food. Similarly, we are told, "that which men desire they are also said to love and to hate those things for which they have aversion, so that desire and love are the same thing, save that by desire we always signify the absence of the object, by love most commonly the presence of the same. So also by aversion we signify the absence and by hate the presence of the object." Again, desire and aversion refer to the voluntary, external motion to and away from something, whereas joy and grief indicate a vital, internal motion. "All appetite, desire and love," Hobbes remarks, "is accompanied with some delight more or less, and all hatred and aversion with more or less displeasure and offence." Joy and grief are due to "the expectation that proceeds from foresight of the end or consequences" and as such are to be distinguished by actual, sensual pleasure and pain.

It is difficult to understand why Hobbes selected seven "simple passions" in view of his own explanations. Desire apparently includes appetite and love, both the latter differing only extrinsically from the former. We are left then with desire, aversion, joy, and grief as the only passions which have some claim to be called "simple" or elemental. It is interesting to observe that if Hobbes had taken his own criticism into account, his classification would have been almost identical with that of St. Augustine, except for the fact that the latter includes "fear" where Hobbes substitutes "aversion."

According to Descartes's account in his treatise *On the Passions of the Soul* (§ 69) there are six "simple and primitive passions," namely, wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness. "All the others," he remarks, "are composed of some of these six or are species of them." Descartes, like Hobbes, was opposed to the Scholastic division of the passions in relation to the concupiscible and irascible faculties. He comments on this point in particular (*Passions of the Soul*, § 69): "In this I know well that I am parting company with all those who have written on this subject before, but it is not without great reason that I do so. For these de-

rive their enumeration from the fact that they distinguish in the sensitive part of the soul two appetites which they name the concupiscent and irascible respectively. And because in the soul I recognize no distinction of parts, as I have said above, this seems to me to signify nothing but that it has two faculties, the one of desire and the other of anger, and because in the same way it has the faculties of wondering, loving, hoping, fearing, and thus of receiving in itself every other passion, or else bringing about actions to which these passions urge it, I do not see why they have desired to refer them all to concupiscence or anger." Descartes himself, however, has not provided us with any definite indication as to why he adopted the six primitive passions enumerated before, and what was the basis of his selection.

The peculiar features of Descartes's list of primitive passions are his inclusion of wonder (*admiratio*) and his omission of aversion. Wonder he defines (§ 70) as "a sudden surprise of the soul which causes it to apply itself to consider with attention the objects which seem to it rare and extraordinary." That is to say, wonder is due to perception of some unique object and is not an indication of intellectual activity at all. Here Descartes differs from Hobbes who defines "curiosity" as the "desire to know how and why"—a passion he claims, following the Scholastics, which distinguishes man from other animals. Spinoza, as I shall show later, accepted Descartes's definition but criticized him for considering wonder as a primitive passion. Wonder, according to Spinoza, has no positive cause and is not even a passion, it is due to the limitation of the imagination which is held passive by the singularity of its object (3-def. 4).

Desire, according to Descartes (§ 86), is "an agitation of the soul caused by the spirits, which dispose it to wish for the future the things which it represents to itself as agreeable. Thus we do not only desire the presence of the absent good, but also the conservation of the present and further, the absence of evil, both of that which we already have, and of that which we believe we might experience in time to come." It is noteworthy that Descartes's definition of desire differs from that of Hobbes who claimed that desire

involves reference to an absent object, whereas Descartes holds that desire may refer to the conservation of some present object as well

Descartes then proceeds to make the significant remark (§ 87) that desire has no opposite in aversion. Aversion is simply the desire to avoid evil involved in the desire for some good. Spinoza, as I shall show later, followed Descartes in this respect and also maintained that there is no need for a special passion of aversion as Hobbes and the Scholastics held.

Descartes's conception of the interrelation of the passions also differs from that of the Scholastics. In describing the functions of the affects in relation to body and soul he writes (§ 137) "And regarding this it must be observed that in accordance with the institutions of nature they all relate to body, and are only bestowed on the soul insofar as it is united to body. In this way their natural use is to incite the soul to consent and contribute to the actions which may serve to maintain the body, or to render it in some manner more perfect. And from this point of view sadness and joy are the two foremost that are employed. For the things that are hurtful to the body are immediately made known to the soul only by the feeling of pain which it experiences, and which first of all produces in it the passion of sadness, then the hatred of what causes this pain, and in the third place the desire to rid oneself of it. Similarly the soul is only immediately notified of things useful to the body by some sort of pleasant stimulation which causes joy within it, then causes the love of that which is believed to be its cause to arise, and finally brings about the desire to acquire what is capable of causing a continuance of that joy, or else causes us to rejoice again in the future after a similar sensation. And this shows us that they are all five very useful relatively to the body, and even that sadness in some way ranks higher and is more essential than joy, and hatred than love, because it is of more importance to repel the things which injure and may destroy, than to acquire those which add some perfection without which we may subsist." From this passage we gather that the natural sequence of the passions is either

from the feeling of pain to the passions of sadness, hatred, and desire for destruction, or else from the feeling of pleasure to the passions of joy, love, and desire for the presence or continuation of the object. St. Thomas, as we saw previously, described the movement of the passions as beginning either with hatred and passing on to aversion and fear, or else as beginning with love and passing on to desire and hope. Desire, for Descartes, completes the movement of the passions, whereas for St. Thomas desire and aversion are intermediate stages, completed by hope and fear.

There is one final point which deserves additional comment, and that is concerning the function of the passions. In the above passage Descartes maintains that the primary function of the passions is to conserve or promote the perfection of the body. The passions incite the soul to those actions which conserve or increase the body's power. That is to say, the passions render the soul subservient to the needs of the body. For the Scholastics on the other hand, the perfection of the soul is always prior to that of the body. The perfection of the body is due to the perfection of the soul, the body is always for the sake of the soul.

In relation to the foregoing survey, we can appreciate the extent of Spinoza's originality in composing his list of the primary affects. Spinoza, it appears, followed St. Augustine, Hobbes, and Descartes in regarding desire as a primary affect. He differs from all his predecessors in retaining only two other primitive passions.

The simplicity of Spinoza's classification is due to the fact that he follows Hobbes's principle that all the passions are to be defined as modes of motion without reference to any final causes. On this basis he finds only three distinct and primary modes of motion, namely, joy, sorrow, and desire. It seems to me that on this premise Spinoza should have included aversion also as a primary affect, as did Hobbes. Motion from a thing is obviously different from motion toward a thing. Spinoza preferred to retain the Cartesian notion of desire which includes aversion, because he did not realize that the Cartesian definition of desire was incompatible with the mechanistic theory of Hobbes. Desire, as Descartes under-

stood it, is a disposition or inclination to or from something, and as such it is quite similar to the sensitive appetite of the Scholastics. But desire as defined by Hobbes is the actual motion or endeavor toward some object—and not merely some potential movement. Hobbes therefore distinguished appetite or desire from aversion since they were contrary motions, corresponding to the Greek *horme* and *aphorme* which he kept in mind. *What Spinoza did apparently was to combine the Cartesian notion of desire which also included aversion, with Hobbes's mechanistic interpretation of desire in terms of motion.* This strange combination later involved Spinoza in many serious difficulties concerning the problems of human virtue.

2 THE DEFINITION OF PLEASURE AND PAIN

WE turn now to examine in more detail Spinoza's definition of pleasure and pain.

Pleasure or joy (*laetitia*) he defines (3-11 schol.) as "the passion [*passionem*] by which the mind passes [*transit*] to a greater perfection." Similarly pain or sorrow (*tristitia*) is "the passion by which it passes to a less perfection." Titillation and hilarity are distinguished from pleasure in that the former are said to refer simultaneously to body and mind whereas the latter is said to refer to the mind alone. In like manner, grief (*dolor*) and melancholy are distinguished from pain or sorrow which is said to be primarily a mental passion. At the conclusion of book three, however, Spinoza redefines pleasure as "man's passage [*hominis transitio*] from a less to a greater perfection," and pain as "man's passage from a greater to a less perfection." In referring to man rather than to the mind he apparently wished to include body as well as mind in his definition of pleasure. It is interesting to note that after making this change in his definition Spinoza described titillation, hilarity, grief, and melancholy as "related rather to the body than to the mind," whereas previously he thought they referred equally or simultaneously to body and mind.

The significant point to be noted in Spinoza's definitions

of pleasure and pain is his use of the term "transition" (transitio). By employing this term he wishes to indicate that in all affects of pleasure and pain the individual's perfection or power undergoes change. This implies that affects of pleasure and pain can occur only in imperfect individuals who have the potentiality of acquiring new forms of perfection. Thus he explains at length (3-def 3 explan) "I say passage for joy is not perfection itself. If a man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess it without the affect of joy, a truth which will appear the more clearly from the affect of sorrow which is the opposite to joy. For that sorrow consists in the passage to a less perfection but not in the less perfection itself, no one can deny, since insofar as a man shares any perfection he cannot be sad. Nor can we say that sorrow consists in the privation of a greater perfection, for privation is nothing. But the affect of sorrow is an actuality [actus] and it therefore must be the actuality of the passage [actus transeundi] to a lesser perfection or the actuality by which man's power of acting [agendi potentia] is diminished or limited."

This also renders intelligible the proposition (4-68) which states that "if men were born free they would form no conception of good and evil so long as they were free." A free man or one who has only adequate ideas would not be subject to passions of sorrow or any other passions which by nature involve inadequate ideas and hence he would have no knowledge of good and evil. In this manner, Spinoza would reconcile his own metaphysics with the narrative of Genesis which states that Adam and Eve were created perfect by God and knew neither good nor evil until they hearkened to the serpent, who is the symbol of animal passion. It is easy to see furthermore why God is said to be free from passions of joy and sorrow (5-17), since God can neither pass to a greater perfection nor become less perfect. The passions of pleasure and pain can occur only in an individual capable of experiencing a transition from one state of perfection to another.

The problem, however, arises. Just what is meant by experiencing a transition? The answer appears to be that the

mind experiences a transition when it affirms or is conscious of the actual processes or motions which occur in its body. If the motion is such that the body's power of activity is increased, the mind perceives an affect of pleasure, if the motion is such as to hinder the vital processes, then the affect is perceived as pain. The pleasure and pain consist then in the awareness of the actual transitions or processes from one state of perfection, to another and hence involve some actual disturbance of mental and physical equilibrium. This explains why Spinoza is so emphatic in his insistence that pleasure consists in the passage to perfection but not in the actual perfection itself. To illustrate his meaning he remarks that the affect of sorrow consists in the actuality of the transition (*actus transeundi*) from a greater to a lesser perfection, but not in the less perfection itself, which is a privation and therefore nothing (§-def 3 explan). He is explicit in pointing out that "insofar as a man shares any perfection he cannot be sad" and hence the affirmation of a positive state of perfection, even if it involve less perfection than before, cannot possibly give rise to sorrow. It is, in short, the experience of the transition itself as a mode of motion which constitutes an affect, it is not the affirmation of the resultant state of perfection which ensues upon the process. Professor Hallett in his *Aeternitas* (p. 51) comes to the same conclusion. "Spinoza is emphatic in his insistence upon the identity of the affect with the process and not with the terminus of the process." Otherwise, there would be no way of distinguishing between an affect and any other affection of the mind.

It is noteworthy that in his explanation of the general definition of the affects (§-conclus.) Spinoza writes as if the mind affirms the perfection acquired by the body rather than the process of transition itself. An affect is said to be a confused idea "by which the mind affirms of its body or any part of it, a greater or less power of existence than before." By way of explanation he adds "I do not mean that the mind compares the present with the past constitution of the body but that the idea which constitutes the form of an affect [*affectus forma*] affirms something of the body which ac-

tually involves more or less reality than before. Moreover since the essence of the mind consists in the affirmation of the actual existence of its body and since we understand by perfection the essence itself of the thing, it follows that the mind passes to a greater or less perfection when it is able to affirm of its body or some part of it, something which involves a greater or less reality than before." From this passage one gathers that the mind affirms the consequences of the corporeal changes which have occurred. Viewed in retrospect an affect of pleasure or pain involves some past change in the constitution of the individual such that the body and therefore the mind involves a greater or less perfection than before. The form of the affect consists in the affirmation of the new physical form of perfection already acquired or achieved.

The problem naturally arises, what led Spinoza to describe the affects in the above manner after he had expressly warned the reader that an affect affirms the actuality of the transition rather than some determinate form of perfection? The answer, we suggest, may be found in a historical analysis of the notions of the actual and potential.

According to Aristotle and the Scholastics, motion or change was a state of becoming or transition intermediate between being and nothing. All motion was defined by reference to the end or form of being toward which a given substance was moving. A thing was said to be potentially that form of being which it was capable of becoming after it had realized its potentiality. That is to say, potentiality was defined by reference to the end or final cause, e.g., the acorn is potentially the oak.

Now Spinoza, on the other hand, had decided to reject all reference to a final cause in favor of the efficient cause. In practice this meant that he had to reject the Scholastic category of the potential. The motion of a thing was simply its actual power of activity. This explains why he argues that the mind affirms nothing more than the actual existence of its body (2-13 corol.). By this he means that the mind affirms nothing more than the body's actual perfection or power. A difficulty, however, arose over the concept of

change Things are affected by other modes in many ways whereby their power of acting is increased or diminished (3-post 1) In the case of man, "since nothing can happen in the body which is not perceived by the mind," (2-12) it follows that the mind not only perceives the changes which have occurred in its body but also the process of change itself as it occurs Spinoza was thus led to acknowledge that the mind not only affirms the actual form or power of its body but also the affects or transitions toward new forms of perfection That is to say, he admitted that change or development as it occurs in man involves an implicit end or direction which defines its significance for the individual The mind, in other words, affirms not only the actual power of the body but also its potential power as defined by the goal of its physical motions or transitions

In view of the above analysis, it would appear that Spinoza adopted a definition of pleasure and pain which involved the categories of the potential and the final cause but subsequently tried to explain these affects in terms of his mechanistic principles That is why he speaks as if an affect affirms a form of perfection which has been achieved or completed rather than the process toward perfection

3 PLEASURE AND PAIN AS COMPLETIONS OF ACTIONS AND PASSIONS

So far we have seen that an affect of pleasure or pain is an idea whereby the mind affirms its body's transition toward an increase or decrease of perfection Pleasure as well as pain is a passion due to an external cause which affects the human body

Spinoza, however, also postulates that the mind has a formal essence or power of its own and hence he conceived of affects of pleasure and pain which refer to the mind alone There are "affects which are attended by the idea of something within us as the cause" (3-24 explan) Thus he demonstrates the proposition (3-53) that "when the mind contemplates itself [se ipsam contemplatur] and its power of action [agendi potentiam] it rejoices [laetatur] " Similarly

(3-55) "when the mind imagines its own impotence [*suam impotentiam imaginatur*] it is saddened by itself [*eo ipso contristatur*]"

We see then that affects of pleasure and pain may arise when the mind reflects upon its own actual power or impotence. In such cases, obviously, the idea of the mind's power or perfection is other than the affect of pleasure which ensues. This appears to be the significance of Spinoza's axiom (2-ax 3) to the effect that "modes of thought such as love, desire or the affects of the soul [*affectus animi*] by whatever name they may be called are not given unless in the same individual the idea be given of a thing loved, desired etc. But the idea may be given although no other mode of thinking be given." In other words, there may be ideas of things without affects, but there cannot be an affect without the idea of the object or end toward which it is directed. On this premise, affects complete or accompany the ideas of one's perfection or activity but are not identical with it.

Among the affects which arise from an "internal cause" there are some which are due to the imagination, as are the modes of pleasure and pain just cited, and some, notably affects of pleasure and desire but not of sorrow, which are due to the intellect alone. Affects of pleasure which originate in the intellect and accompany its conceptions are themselves actions, affects which complete the passive perceptions of the imagination are themselves passions, e.g., self-satisfaction may be either an action or passion, depending upon whether it originates in the intellect or imagination. In brief, the character of an affect which completes the mind's idea of its own power depends upon the adequacy of the idea with which it is associated.

In comparison with those affects of pleasure and pain which Spinoza defined as transitions toward perfection, affects due to the mind's internal power affirm the actual state of perfection of the individual. That is why Spinoza can demonstrate that intellectual love or joy pertains to the infinite intellect of God (5-35), even though God cannot experience affects or passions of pleasure or pain, as previously noted. Intellectual pleasure may be simply the enjoy-

ment of one's innate perfection and hence does not necessarily involve any transition or potentiality. Spinoza, it appears, did not realize that his definition of pleasure as involving a transition was inadequate to account for modes of pleasure and pain due to an internal cause and was especially inadequate to explain intellectual affects

As Professor A E Taylor has pointed out in his Gifford Lectures entitled *The Faith of a Moralist* (series I, p 111),¹ Spinoza's diverse notions of pleasure reflect the ancient controversy between the Platonists and Aristotelians. The Platonists maintained as against the Hedonists that pleasure cannot be the chief good since pleasure involves movement or becoming and not a state of being. When the good is attained the pleasure ceases. The Aristotelians on the other hand claimed that pleasure is always the accompaniment and completion of any unimpeded activity and therefore even attributed continuous delight to the life of God. Thus we find Aristotle writes (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk X, 1174 a & b). "For this reason too it (pleasure) is not a movement. For every movement takes time and is for the sake of an end and is complete when it has made what it aims at. But of pleasure the form is complete at any and every time. Plainly then pleasure and movement must be different from each other and pleasure must be one of the things that are whole and complete . . . From these considerations it is clear that these thinkers are not right in saying that there is a movement or coming into being of pleasure." Spinoza, it appears, utilized a Platonic definition of pleasure but later introduced internal and intellectual pleasures which involved the Aristotelian doctrine, without realizing the logical inconsistency of his thought.

4 THE VALUE OF THE AFFECTS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN

ONE important consequence of Spinoza's various theories of the status of joy and sorrow is that he evaluates these emotions in different ways.

1 A E Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist* (London, Macmillan Co, 1930), 1st ser.

According to his first theory, we have seen, joy or pleasure is the idea of the transition of the body to a greater form of perfection. Sorrow or pain is similarly the idea of the transition to a lesser form of perfection. From this Spinoza concludes that an affect of pleasure is by nature good and that an affect of sorrow is by nature evil, because he assumes implicitly that an increase of perfection is intrinsically good and a decrease of perfection is inherently, or metaphysically evil. This metaphysical assumption forms the implicit premise upon which is based his proposition (4-8) that "knowledge of good and evil [cognitio boni et mali] is nothing but an affect of joy or sorrow insofar as we are conscious [consciu] of it." "A thing is called by us good or evil as it increases or diminishes, helps or restrains our power of action" (demon). The mind perceives a particular object as good or evil because it is conscious (or has an idea of an idea) of the transition to greater or less perfection in the form of its body. Pleasure or the affirmation of the body's perfection is therefore by nature good and is the measure of the goodness of external things. The contrary holds true for pain.

Some modes of pleasure, Spinoza later demonstrates (4-43), may be evil indirectly or by accident. For example, pleasure in the sense of titillation, which we have seen refers to one part of the body more than to others, may be evil or excessive, insofar as the mind attends to it exclusively and neglects to seek the good of the other parts of the body. That is to say, *in itself, every pleasure is by nature good since it involves an increase of perfection. A given form of pleasure becomes evil indirectly insofar as the perfection of the part becomes incompatible with or contrary to the good of the whole individual.* This explains why hilarity, which refers to the body as a whole, can never be excessive but is always good (*semper bona est*), while melancholy, which is sorrow pertaining to the body as a whole, is always evil (*semper mala est*) (4-42). Hilaritas and melancholia, Spinoza remarks (4-44 schol.), are rare affects since most of the passions by which men are agitated are modes of titillation or dolor which refer to some part of the body more than to others. To this extent, then, affects of pleasure may indirectly be evil.

and a kind of disease or madness. In the same way, an affect of pain such as dolor may indirectly be good as a means of restraining excessive titillation. Thus Spinoza summarizes his position by demonstrating (4-60) that "the desire which arises from joy or sorrow which is related to one or to some but not to all the parts of the body, has no regard to the utility of the whole man [*utilitatis totius hominis*]"

According to Spinoza's second theory, the affects are considered good or evil because of their origin. An affect of joy is good if it originates in the intellect and accompanies the actions of the intellect. An affect of joy is evil if it originates in the passive imagination and is united to the passions of the mind. In brief, affects which are actions, or of which the mind is said to be the adequate cause, are by nature good or virtues, affects which are passions and of which the mind is the inadequate cause, are by nature evil or imperfections. On this basis, there can be no question of excessiveness or immoderation concerning any given affect. *If an affect is an action or virtue then it admits of no excess, if it is a passion it admits of no moderation.* Even a moderate passion is still a passion and therefore evil. Thus we find Spinoza writes (4-61) "A desire which springs from reason can never be in excess [*cupiditas quae ex ratione oritur excessum habere nequit*]" From this it follows, though Spinoza does not formulate a separate proposition, that a desire which springs from sorrow or from the imagination is necessarily in excess (or defective), since the ideas of the imagination are inadequate or partial (4-64).

Finally, on the basis of Spinoza's Scholastic theory, *the affects of joy and desire are considered in themselves neither good nor evil*, their value depends entirely upon the nature and adequacy of the ideas with which they become united. That is to say, the good or evil character of the affects is judged extrinsically by relation to the ideas which control them. Only affects of sorrow, Spinoza persists in maintaining, are by nature evil. All modes of desire and pleasure are in themselves neither good nor evil. Thus we find Spinoza now claims (4-59 demon. 2) - "An action [*actio*] is called evil insofar as it arises from our being affected with hatred

or some evil affect. But no action considered in itself alone is either good or evil [at nulla actio in se sola considerata bona aut mala est] but one and the same action is sometimes good and sometimes evil [sed una eademque actio jam bona jam mala est] "Spinoza here uses the same term "actio" which he technically employs for an affect which is an action as distinct from a passion (passio). He does not say that no affect considered in itself is either good or evil since he wishes to exclude affects of sorrow which he regards as by nature evil. He therefore chooses the term actio to designate any activity following from the active power of the individual and demonstrates that any such action or affection is considered in itself neither good nor evil. *This conception of the intrinsic neutral value of the affects of joy and desire differs radically from the Stoic, dualistic estimation of natural good and evil pertaining to the affects, as well as from the Epicurean naturalistic doctrine which identifies the good with the idea of pleasure and evil with the idea of pain.* Spinoza, however, attempts to identify all three.

In comparing Spinoza's views with those of his predecessors we find that he is in agreement with the Aristotelian theory that pleasure is not itself a movement or transition, it merely supervenes upon the movements and activities of the individual "as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age" (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1174b). Spinoza, however, does not consistently distinguish perceptions from feelings as does Aristotle, he follows the latter only as regards intellectual pleasures but identifies perception and pleasure in dealing with the sensitive pleasures. Furthermore Spinoza also accepts the Aristotelian doctrine that affects of pleasure and desire differ in kind and moral quality in relation to the activity of the soul involved and the objects to which they are directed.

Spinoza, as noted, also inclines toward the Stoics and tends to set up a radical bifurcation between intellectual affects which are actions and the affects of the imagination which are passions. On this basis, active pleasures are by nature good, passive pleasures are perturbations of the soul

and by nature evil. Modes of sorrow are inherently contrary to reason and are always bad.

Finally, Spinoza follows closely the Epicurean doctrine of Hobbes and maintains that man's knowledge of good and evil is nothing more than conscious perception of pleasure and pain. The affect of pleasure is not distinguished from the mind's perception of the state of its body. By nature all animals desire that which they feel to be pleasant and hence all pleasure is by nature good and all pain is evil. Pleasure, on this premise, becomes bad only by accident, that is to say, insofar as it prevents the individual from attending to the needs of his whole body. Pain is likewise good indirectly as a sign which leads the individual to render himself more fit by removing the causes which hinder his activity.

In general we can say that Spinoza begins by constructing his psychology on a mechanistic, Epicurean foundation but that in time he finds it necessary to bolster his psychological and moral structure by strong pillars of Stoic and Scholastic doctrine.

III

DESIRE AND THE CONATUS OF MAN

1 THE DEFINITION OF DESIRE

WE turn now to a similar analysis of desire, the third of the primary affects. By desire in general Spinoza means the actual effort which an individual makes to act in a determinate manner and not merely an inclination toward or away from something. As in the case of pleasure and pain there are, it appears, three kinds of desire, namely, desires (*cupiditas*) properly so-called which refer simultaneously to the body and mind and of which the mind is therefore conscious, appetites (*appetitus*) which refer primarily to the body and of which the mind is not conscious, and volitions (*voluntas*) which are conceived through the intellect alone (3-9 schol.). In all cases, whether the desire be psychophysical, physical, or intellectual, it is determined by the affect of pleasure or pain which originates it. This we take to be the significance of Spinoza's definition (1) at the conclusion of book three: "Desire is the essence itself of man insofar as it is conceived as determined to any action by any one of his affections." In the explanation of this definition he adds: "For by an affection of the human essence we understand any constitution of that essence, whether it be innate, whether it be conceived through the attribute of thought alone or of extension alone or whether it be related to both. By the word desire therefore I understand all the efforts, impulses, appetites and volitions of a man, which vary according to his changing constitution and not infrequently are so opposed to one another that he is drawn hither and thither and knows not whither to turn." Here we see that by the term desire Spinoza intends to designate all modes of human effort, though he also uses the term in a special sense.

Furthermore, it is to be noted that Spinoza describes desire as the essence of man (*ipsa hominis essentia*). This iden-

tification becomes intelligible if we bear in mind the early propositions of book three which are presupposed. In 3-7 Spinoza states "The effort [conatus] by which each thing endeavours to persevere in its own being is nothing but the actual essence [actualem essentiam] of the thing itself." From this proposition it appears that by desire or effort Spinoza means the actual power, the efficient force of the individual to live and act, and not merely some inclination toward or away from something as the term is usually employed to mean. A thing's actual essence or nature is shown by the actual efforts it makes, by the activities of which it is capable, and by the nature of the objects which can so affect it as to impel it to react toward them.

We note finally that Spinoza also describes desire as determined by the affects of pleasure and pain. By this he wishes to imply that desire itself is only indirectly the cause of an increase in human perfection. The affects of pleasure and pain are the primary causes of transitions in human perfection (see chap. 11, § 3), desire alone is simply the force which conserves and continues the perfection apparently attained by the affects. This explanation is in agreement with Spinoza's propositions (3-12, 13) which state that "the mind endeavours as much as possible to imagine those things which increase or assist the body's power of acting" and that "whenever the mind imagines those things which lessen or limit the body's power of acting, it endeavours as much as possible to recollect what excludes the existence of those things." In affirming the power of existence of its body the mind necessarily endeavors to keep before it those objects which produce affects of joy and to exclude those objects which produce pain. In itself, however, *desire does not involve an effort to increase one's perfection, there is only desire for continuation of the perfection already attained.* (See Note 1, following.)

NOTE 1 Professor H. F. Hallett argues in his *Aeternitas*¹ that desire by nature tends to resist all change. He writes (p. 51)

1 H. F. Hallett, *Aeternitas* (London, Oxford University Press, 1980). Reprinted by permission of the Clarendon Press, Oxford.

"Conscious of its finitude each fluctuating mode suffers continual change, which it as continually resists so far as it can, i.e., so long as it exists. This change and the striving against change are experienced as joy or sorrow and desire respectively." It is true that logically desire or the conatus is merely a principle of inertia and as such should be opposed to all change whether it be for the better or the worse. The fact remains, however, that this is not Spinoza's usage. The conatus, according to Spinoza, tends to promote the continuation of pleasure and resists only affects of sorrow. The principle of inertia shows itself in the unlimited desire of pleasure which frequently leads to excess (4-44), that is, to ultimate destruction. In this sense desire is opposed to any change which would bring about a cessation of a given pleasure. It may be said in this connection that Spinoza implicitly combines the notion of the conatus with an immanent end or final cause, namely, increase of perfection, just as he did in defining pleasure and pain as transitions toward perfection.

2 THE SCHOLASTICS, HOBBS, AND SPINOZA ON THE CONCEPT OF THE CONATUS

THE originality of Spinoza's theory of the conatus will become evident by comparison with that of the Scholastics to whom he was consciously opposed on the subject. As the status of the conatus is intimately bound up with the problem of motion, I shall begin with a brief analysis of the Aristotelian theory of motion which was later adopted by the Scholastics.

According to Aristotle all motion involved three distinct factors, namely, the mover, the thing moved, and the end or limit of the motion. This meant that the mover or form was a principle distinct from the body moved and predetermined the limit or goal of the motion. The nature or form imparted an impulse (*orexis*) to the body which incited it to move toward its given end. In general, it may be said that the end of all motion or becoming was a state of rest or being.

St. Thomas, following Aristotle's theory that the form was the final cause of motion, distinguished four kinds of ap-

petite or innate impulse First, there is the natural appetite of the elements to move to their proper places, e.g., fire naturally seeks the limit of the cosmic circle and earth tends to the bottom or center Secondly, there is the vegetative form or soul which has a natural impulse to grow and develop in a definite way Thirdly, there is the animal or sensitive appetite which desires some perceived good By nature no animal can refrain from seeking the objects which it perceives as good and which determine its desires Sensitive appetite, however, takes two forms, namely, the concupiscible and the irascible Each animal naturally desires whatever is agreeable to its nature and helpful to its preservation and all such positive desires are classified as concupiscible Similarly, every organism naturally seeks to destroy or at least to avoid whatever is contrary to its nature and harmful to its self-preservation, and all such negative active efforts are said to pertain to its irascible faculty of desire

Finally, there is the rational appetite or will The intellect which distinguishes man from other animals has a function of its own other than that of the senses, and therefore it must have an appetite or conatus distinct from that of the senses The proper objects of the will or rational appetite are universal ideas which are conceived by the intellect The ultimate object of the human will is God or the supreme intelligible good, and hence the will has a natural inclination to seek union with God That is to say, God Himself is the proper object of the intellectual conatus—a thesis which Aristotle himself never advocated since God or the first unmoved mover was the proper object only of the first heavens

The term "rational appetite" also has a second meaning which must be differentiated from the one given above In man, the will or intellectual appetite controls the sensitive appetite so that the individual is not moved to act except through the consent of the will That is to say, the sensitive appetite becomes a rational appetite when it receives the consent of the will or intellectual appetite The rational-sensitive appetite is obviously other than the will or purely intellectual appetite taken by itself Rational appetite, however, differs from desire of the sensitive appetite alone in that the

former is free whereas the latter is determined necessarily by the objects perceived

The point common to all modes of desire is that all grades of appetite are natural inclinations of the soul toward some object or good which agrees with its nature and tends to preserve it. The appetite or conatus of the soul inclines the individual to seek some given object, though insofar as he has a will he need not necessarily do so. The individual as a whole has the potentiality for motion or activity in accord with his desire, though he may not make any actual efforts to act so as to achieve his objective.

We must note further that desire so conceived is only part of the functions of the soul. For Aristotle and the Scholastics, the cognitive function of the soul was distinguished from the conative or appetitive faculty or power. The cognitive faculty acts as the final cause or unmoved mover of the appetitive powers. That is to say, the idea of the object perceived or conceived is prior by nature to the desire or inclination to which it gives rise. Similarly, the desire of the soul is to be differentiated from the actual efforts which the soul impels the individual to make so as to fulfil his desire. The soul may incline or impel the individual to seek or avoid something but it does so only as a final cause but not as an active, efficient cause.

Thus we find Hobbes criticizes the Scholastic doctrine of desire for its failure to explain the origin of motion. He writes (*Leviathan*, chap. vi) "For the Schools find in mere appetite to go or move no actual motion at all but because some motion they must acknowledge, they call it metaphorical motion, which is but an absurd speech, for though words may be called metaphorical, bodies and motions cannot." Hobbes therefore defined the conatus as an actual, internal mode of motion which was the efficient cause of the individual's external actions. The individual, as conceived by Hobbes, was a natural automaton (*Leviathan*, introduction) stimulated to act by the various objects about him. "Life itself," he concluded (*ibid*, I, chap. vi), "is but motion and can never be without desire." "To have no desire is to be dead" (*ibid*, I, chap. viii).

It is highly significant that though Hobbes criticized the Scholastic notion of a rational desire and insisted that desire itself is the efficient cause of action, he nevertheless defined the conatus of man with reference to particular ends or final causes. The preservation of one's existence is indeed a positive natural right (*jus naturale*) and a law of nature (*lex naturalis*) "by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserving same" (*ibid*, I, chap. xiv). But Hobbes does not identify the essence of man with his effort to self-preservation. Life or the essence of man is the desire for power found in the pursuit of apparent goods (*ibid*, I, chap. x). All desire for power presupposes the conservation of the individual as its natural condition, but the direct object of desire is power as achieved through the possession of particular goods.

Hobbes, however, was consistent in his mechanical interpretation of the mind. Contrary to the Scholastic notion that the intellect was a separate part or function of the mind other than the imagination and desire, Hobbes defined "deliberation" simply as a succession of desires and the will as the last appetite or desire. Thus he explains (*ibid*, I, chap. vi) "The whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears continued till the thing be either done or thought impossible is that we call deliberation. In deliberation the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the action or to the omission thereof is that we call the will, the act (not the faculty) of willing, and beasts that have deliberation must necessarily also have will. Will therefore is the last appetite in deliberating."

The significance of this passage lies in the fact that Hobbes here reduces all the cognitive functions of the mind to variations of its conative functions—a procedure which is the exact contrary of Spinoza's who identified the will with the intellect. According to Hobbes there is no intellect with purely theoretical functions. All contemplation is practical—a doctrine which he has in common with the modern Pragmatists—and all deliberation is nothing more than the succession of desires and emotions inclining the individual now one way, now another. Similarly, the will is not a distinct

faculty or power of assent passing judgment upon the desires; the will is simply the last effort or appetite which terminates the so-called process of deliberation. Hence *willing is not a prerogative of man alone, even brutes may be said to will*—a proposition opposed to the teaching of the Scholastics and especially to Descartes who claimed that animals lacked souls. For Hobbes then, will, intellect, and desire are identical, since they are all expressions of vital motion.

In fact, Hobbes makes all intellectual life directly dependent upon the conative functions and passions of the individual. Thus in speaking of "virtues intellectual (which) go commonly under the name of good wit" Hobbes remarks (*ibid*, I, chap. viii) "The causes of this difference of wits are in the passions and the difference of passions proceedeth partly from the different constitution of the body and partly from different education. The passions that most of all

cause the difference of wit are principally the more or less desire of power, of riches, of knowledge, and of honour. All this may be reduced to the first, that is, desire of power. For riches, knowledge, and honour are but several sorts of power.

And therefore a man who has no great passion for any of these things, but is as men term it indifferent, though he may be so far a good man as to be free from giving offence, yet he cannot possibly have either a great fancy or much judgment. For the thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies to range abroad and find the way to the things desired, all steadiness of the mind's motion all quickness of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no desire is to be dead, so to have weak passions is dulness, and to have passions indifferently for everything, giddiness and distraction, and to have stronger and more vehement passions for any thing than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call madness."

From this passage we see that all thinking is but a means of satisfying desire for power. Desire is identical with life itself and to have weak desires and passions is to lack in vitality and vigor of thought. The passions, it is important to note, are not considered by Hobbes as disturbances or

hindrances to intellectual life; on the contrary, they are the very foundation and source of intellectual activity. The passions are not diseases or species of madness, since madness is a relative term and indicates nothing more than that the passions of a particular individual are stronger than the usual or normal. In all this Hobbes's naturalism is opposed to the rationalism of the Stoics and Scholastics which Spinoza for the most part accepted.

Spinoza on the Conatus

The distinguishing feature of Spinoza's theory of the conatus is its opposition to that of the Scholastics. According to the Scholastic view the conatus or natural appetite of a thing was simply an inclination to move or to act with reference to a given end or object. The conatus so conceived was the inherent final cause of motion. For Spinoza, on the other hand, the conatus or effort to move was, as we have seen in Hobbes, the efficient cause of motion. A thing once in motion or at rest continues indefinitely in its state of motion or rest unless hindered by some external cause (2-lemma 3, corol. 1), there is no need for a distinct form or appetite to predetermine the limit of the motion.

Thus we find Spinoza defines the "conatus ad motum" as follows (*Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*, Pt. III, def. 3): "By the conatus to motion we are not to understand some thought [cogitationem] but rather that a part of matter is so situated and incited to motion, that it would be truly something in process [aliquo itura], if it were hindered by no cause." This definition of the conatus, with its explicit denial of thought as a cause of motion, is obviously intended as a criticism of the Scholastic notion of final causes.

The question now arises, how did Spinoza come to identify the conatus with the active essence of the individual? The answer, I believe, is to be found in his metaphysics.

We have seen that the essence of God and His power of acting are identical (1-34, "Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia"). That is to say, God manifests His infinite power of existence by His power of acting and producing infinite

things in infinite ways (1-16; 1-35). The perfection of God is inconceivable except as expressed through the modes which follow necessarily from His active power

The nature of man as of all other modes is to be similarly understood. Since "nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow" (1-36), man's essence is also his active power (potentia). The perfection of man, as of all other modes, varies with his power of activity (5-40). All this can more readily be understood if we bear in mind that each finite mode expresses in a determinate way part of the infinite power or nature of God (3-6 demon). Man as a finite mode differs from God inasmuch as God's nature or power of acting involves an infinite power of existing, whereas the nature of man involves only an indefinite but not an infinite power of existing (1-28, 3-8). Both God and man do not really act with any ends, final causes, or goods in mind, they act necessarily as efficient causes in accordance with the necessary laws of their natures and their powers of existence (*Cogitata metaphysica*, II, chap. x).

In comparison with the Scholastics Spinoza can say. The conatus or effort of the individual is identical with his whole essence, it is not merely a part of its nature or function. The nature of a thing is not shown by its static perfection of form, and it is not defined by reference to some end which it tends to realize. The nature or essence of a thing is rather expressed by its actual functions and power to continue in existence. And since the form of each mode is nothing other than a combination of parts in a definite proportion of motion and rest (2-def. after ax. 2) it follows that each mode by nature endeavours to persevere indefinitely in its particular form (4-pref.).

In the *Cogitata metaphysica* (II, chap. vi) Spinoza explicitly criticizes the Peripatetic conception of the soul or form. Thus he writes, "However we shall not trouble much to refute these views, for as regards those three souls [animas] which they attribute to plants, brutes and men, we have already demonstrated sufficiently that they are nothing but figments, for we have shown that in matter there is noth-

ing except mechanical structure [mechanicas texturas] and operations ”

In another section of the *Cogitata metaphysica* (I, chap vi) Spinoza also discusses his position in detail and reveals important differences between himself and the Scholastics “Those moreover,” he remarks, “who seek some metaphysical good [bonum metaphysicum] which is lacking to all, are labouring under a false prejudice, because they confuse a distinction of reason with a real or modal distinction. *For they distinguish between the thing itself and the conatus which is in everything to conserve itself, although they do not know what they understand by conatus.* For these two although they are to be distinguished in reason or rather in words, which deceive them most, are in no way to be distinguished from one another in the thing itself. In order that this may be clearly understood, we shall introduce (let place before the eyes) an example of a most simple thing. Motion has the force of persevering in its state [motus habit vim in suo statu perseverandi], this force is nothing else than the motion itself, that is, because the nature of motion is such. If then I were to say that in this body A there was nothing other than a certain quantity of motion, from this it would clearly follow, so long as I attend to this body A, that I ought always to say this body is moving. For if I were to say that it lost its power of moving from itself [vim movendi ex se amittere] I would necessarily be attributing to that body something other than that which we supposed in the hypothesis, by which it lost its nature. For if indeed this reason seems more obscure, we shall readily concede this effort of self-motion to be something other than the laws themselves and the nature of motion [illum conatum se movendi aliquid esse praeter ipsas leges et naturam motus]. Since again you suppose this conatus to be some metaphysical good, then necessarily this conatus will have a conatus to persevere in its existence and thus again another, and so on to infinity—a thing more absurd than this I know cannot be done. The reason moreover, why they distinguish the conatus of a thing from the thing itself, is because they find in them-

selves a longing for self-conservation [*desiderium se conservandi*] and imagine such a longing in everything "

Here Spinoza argues at length against his Scholastic opponents. His argument is twofold: first, he says, the effort to move (*conatus movendi*) is nothing else than the force or quantity of motion which continues indefinitely unless hindered by some external cause. The distinction between the *conatus* and the actual motion is only verbal or nominal. If we were to distinguish between the internal mover and the thing moved, then we should also require an infinite series of movers to explain any particular motion. Secondly, how a thing itself unmoved can be the cause of physical motion is unintelligible. There is no metaphysical good independent of desire which moves the latter; on the contrary, a thing is good only because it is desired. The Scholastics seem to project their own mental processes into natural things and imagine the latter to have longings or inclinations just as they do themselves. In truth, the force or effort to continue in motion has no reference to any ulterior object or end which prescribes its goal; there is no appetite which inclines a thing to a definite end and ceases acting when the appetite is attained. The desire or appetite is the motion itself and is not merely the unmoved cause of motion. (See Note 2, p. 99.)

If we are to avoid confusion of thought, Spinoza maintains, we must not attribute desires for some good to modes of extension. The science of physics and the arguments of metaphysics are in agreement that *the universal conatus in all things is identical with the essence of those things and is nothing other than the effort or force of each thing to continue in its form of motion and rest, whether that form be innate or acquired accidentally, it is inertial, efficient power.* On this basis, matter and thought have each a natural appetite of their own to preserve themselves in the ways appropriate to them. Matter does not derive its *conatus* from some mental form or final cause.

Spinoza's conception of the *conatus* thus combines in one definition the natural, sensitive, and rational appetites distinguished by the Scholastics. *The appetites of a thing are not to be defined by reference to their distinct objects but rather by the function or power which is common to all*

modes, namely, self-preservation. Although Hobbes, the Scholastics, and the Stoics acknowledged the tendency for self-preservation found in animals, they neither identified this effort with the whole active essence or power of the individual, nor did they regard it as a universal principle applicable to all finite things, whether they be animate or inanimate, whether they be conceived through thought or extension alone.

It is noteworthy that Spinoza himself in the *Cogitata metaphysica* makes the distinction between the essence of a thing and its life (*vita*) or power of perseverance, though this is obviously in contradiction to his principle that the conatus of a thing and its essence are identical. To quote (*Cogitata metaphysica*, II, chap. vi) "Hence we understand by life, the force by which things persevere in their being. And because that force is different from the things themselves we properly say things themselves have life [et quia illa vis a rebus ipsis est diversa, res ipsas habere vitam proprie dicimus]. The force however with which God perseveres in His being, is nothing other than His essence, hence they speak well who call God Life. Nor are there lacking theologians who believe that the Jews, for this very reason, namely, because God is life and is not distinguished from life, when they swore said, 'By the living Jehova' [*vivus Jehova*, חַי יְהוָה (*Hai Jehova*)], rather than 'By the life of Jehova' [*vita Jehovae*, חַי יְהוָה (*Hai Jehova*)], as Joseph, when he swore by the life of Pharaoh, said 'By the life of Pharaoh' [*vita Pharaonis*, חַי פַּרְעֹה (*Hai Pharaoh*)]". This argument, it seems, contradicts directly Spinoza's theory of the conatus. If the conatus is the active essence of a thing, then it is identical with the life of the thing. That is to say, life is not separable from its actual essence.

The same difficulty occurs in the *Ethics* as well. In 1-24 we find the proposition "The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence" (so 1-ax. 7). His argument there is that a thing whose essence involves its existence is necessarily eternal or timeless and this is obviously not the case as regards finite modes. Hence he concludes that the essence of any finite mode is an eternal truth but not its ex-

istence. In the case of God, however, essence and existence are identical and hence His existence also is an eternal truth (1-20 and corol 1) On this basis, Spinoza maintains with the Stoics and Scholastics that all things by nature endeavor to continue in existence but this conatus for existence is not identical with the essence or degree of perfection of any thing That is to say, there is no parallelism between essence and power of continuing in existence, "the connection between essence and power of existence is extrinsic and not intrinsic as the identification of conatus with essence originally leads one to suppose The essence of various things differ from one another but not their natural conatus for indefinite existence, which is common to all (4-pref)

On the other hand, if Spinoza had continued consistently to identify the actual essence of a thing with its life, then he would have maintained that essence as well as existence of finite things was temporal The difference between God and man would consist in the fact that God's power of life was eternal or infinite whereas man's power of life was finite or indefinite That is to say, for both God and man essence and power of life would be identical, though God's essence like His existence would be eternal whereas man's essence and existence would be temporal In actual fact we find that Spinoza explicitly argues later that the virtue of a form of life is measured by its survival-power in the struggle for existence We are told, for example, that "the more each person strives and is able to seek his own profit, that is to say, to preserve himself, the more virtue does he possess" (4-20) This sounds very much like the Darwinian doctrine of "the survival of the fittest "

Spinoza, however, was too much of a Scholastic to interpret and measure all virtue in relation to temporal existence In agreement with the Scholastics he maintained that there are real differences in the nature of things such that one form of being is more perfect or contains more being than another Measured in relation to God or the most perfect being, things are found to be arranged in a scale of value or perfection On the other hand, measured simply as efficient causes and in terms of their initial effort to exist, all

things are equal according to the law of inertia. Hence he reverted to the Scholastic theory which distinguished between the form or essence which, logically conceived, is an eternal truth, and the actual existence of the individual which is temporal and contingent upon its relations to other modes. Only essences differ in perfection or degree of being, all things are alike by nature in their inertial power of continuing in existence indefinitely.

In practice, Spinoza never completely abandoned either theory and continued to utilize both in developing his theory of moral conduct.

NOTE 2 In his recent study entitled *The Philosophy of Plato*,² Professor R. Demos describes the Platonic eros in terms which apply equally well to Spinoza's conatus. He writes (pp. 84-85): "Thus the *eros* becomes generalized in the mind of Plato into the fact of transition, the eros is the aspect of duration, and time is the measured aspect of the Eros. We find the eros not only in living things but in inanimate things too. The eros is a stream of life running throughout the whole of nature, all nature is a perpetual coming-to-be and a perpetual perishing and thus an achievement of eternality in time. The instinct of procreation is a variation upon the instinct for self-maintenance and the sexual impulse is ultimately the eros of immortality." Professor Demos then goes on to explain that for Plato the eros also signifies the ascent of the soul in its quest for ultimate beauty and good. In a later chapter he comments (p. 299): "In his conception of the ascent of the soul along the line of being, Plato has anticipated and perhaps borrowed from the content of religious insight, and his view of the *eros* of truth has a certain similarity to Spinoza's doctrine of the *conatus*. But whereas the conatus is not governed by purpose, Plato's intellectual impetus has the idea of the good as its goal." What Professor Demos fails to realize is that in Spinoza as in Plato the conatus signifies both the impulse for self-maintenance and the desire for increase of perfection. Spinoza, it is true, is inconsistent in this respect inasmuch as he had ruled out all ref-

2 R. Demos, *The Philosophy of Plato* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939). Reprinted by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

erence to a final end; both meanings are nevertheless, to be found in the *Ethics*, particularly when he comes to discuss the intellectual love of God which corresponds to the Platonic intellectual eros for the "idea of the good"

3 DESIRE AS ESSENCE AND AS AFFECT

IN the foregoing analysis we have seen that Spinoza defines desire as the actual essence of man whereby he manifests his natural power to continue or persevere in his present state of existence indefinitely. At the same time, Spinoza also regards desire as one of the three primary affects or passions. The question now arises, if desire is the essence of man how can it also be an affect? Affections are predicated of a thing as of their proper subject and hence are not to be identified with that subject. That is to say, the essence of a thing is prior in nature to its various affections. Spinoza himself informs us that an individual may be affected in many ways and yet retain his essential nature (2-lemma 7). The problem then remains, how can desire constitute the essence of man and be an affect at the same time? It seems to me that Spinoza is again attempting to combine two fundamentally incompatible notions. How this came about I shall now try to show.

As noted, Spinoza defines the essence of a thing, whether it be finite or infinite, as its power of activity (1-34). The essence of a thing is not merely its form or structure, it is its present actual function, or force of existence. Spinoza is opposed to the Scholastics who maintain that the form is the final cause of the activity of matter, the principle through which a thing is impelled to move toward a given good, and to preserve itself in order to attain that end. In the Scholastic theory all action or becoming is for the sake of some final end or state of rest, some immutable form of being. A thing acquires actuality of being when it ceases moving. Spinoza's position, on the other hand, is in direct opposition to this dualistic theory of motion. The form as the final cause or unmoved mover is superfluous. The essence of a thing is simply its force of motion or activity, no matter how acquired, and no separate form is required to account for its present mo-

tion or its continuation in the future. Thus motion, far from being an indication of potentiality, is a mark of actual perfection or power of being, rest and inactivity on the contrary, involve imperfection and lack of being (5-40). In this respect Spinoza agrees with Hobbes that "life itself is but motion" and that a thing which ceases to move ceases to live.

With reference to desire in particular, the Scholastics held that an animal was moved with desire or aversion toward a thing by the perception of that thing as good or evil, as agreeable or contrary to its nature. That is to say, the object perceived was the final cause, the unmoved mover of animal appetite. No object perceived as good or evil could move an individual so as to seek or avoid it, unless he were predetermined so to act through the concupiscible or irascible appetites (or faculties) of the soul. Every animal then is moved by two unmoved movers, namely, the object perceived as good and evil, and the active power of the soul which inclines him to move toward or away from a thing. A desire for a particular object is considered a passion because the animal concerned is predetermined by its own nature to be moved by desire for such a thing and lacks the freedom to act otherwise.

Now Spinoza, we have seen, regards a final cause of motion as superfluous. Hence he denies the need of postulating any faculties of desire to account for particular acts of desire or the need of external goods to act as final causes of desire. The problem then arises, how shall we explain the origin of particular desires or passions? Spinoza's answer is identical with that of Hobbes and is given in mechanistic terms. External objects, he explains, are the efficient causes of desire. The individual is affected by some external thing and the motions so communicated are perceived as affects of pleasure and pain. These latter affects in turn give rise to a motion or impulse to pursue or avoid the object. The thing pursued or avoided is then termed good or evil. In brief, desire is nothing more than the last affect which follows upon joy and sorrow.

According to this position man is not a self-moved mover

mature years believes the nature of children to be so different from his own, that it would be impossible to persuade him he had ever been a child, if he did not conjecture regarding himself from what he sees of others ”

From the above quotation it is evident that the body of man is constantly though gradually acquiring different forms from infancy to old age. In the case of disease, this transition may even happen suddenly. From this Spinoza concludes that the mental and physical nature of man is constantly being destroyed, so that it cannot properly be said that an individual remains one and the same throughout the duration of his life. The conatus or formal essence of man is primarily an affection of his body and varies with his changing constitution.

4 DESIRE AS THE ACTIVE CAUSE OF THE AFFECTS

SPINOZA, however, also granted that each mode as conceived through its substantial attribute had a formal essence of its own (2-10) and was the adequate cause of its affects (see chap. i). But the essence of man, we have seen, is his power of activity or conatus. Hence desire or the conatus is necessarily prior to the affects of which it is the adequate cause. That is to say, we must distinguish between the general desire for self-preservation and the particular desires or affects which agree with and follow from this essential conatus. On this premise, the formal essence of man determines the nature of his affects and is not determined by them. Spinoza would differ from the Scholastics only insofar as he regarded the conatus as the efficient rather than as the final cause of the affects.

Thus we find that Spinoza acknowledges (3-58) that some desires may be due to the individual's power of action. In 4-15 he explicitly contrasts the desires of which the mind is the adequate cause with those of which it is the inadequate cause. "Desire," he writes, "which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or restrained by many other desires which take their origin from the affects by which we are agitated" (so also 4-16, 17) (*Cupiditas quae*

ex vera boni & mali cognitione oritur multis aliis cupiditatibus quae ex affectibus, quibus conflictamur, oriuntur, restringi vel coerceri potest) Similarly he refers (5-26, 28) to "the effort or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge" (conatus seu cupiditas cognoscendi res tertio cognitionis genere)

The significant point in these propositions is the admission that the desire or affect of the individual may be determined by the true ideas concerning good and evil which follow from the power of the intellect, rather than by the corporeal passions of joy and sorrow (4-15, 5-20 demon) This, it seems evident, is fundamentally identical with the Scholastic thesis that the ideas of good and evil are the final causes of desire and aversion The Scholastics were more consistent than Spinoza and postulated that the ideas of perception and imagination as well as the ideals of the practical intellect served as the final causes of desire Spinoza, on the other hand, claims that external things and the affects of joy and sorrow are the efficient causes of perceptual desire, though he grants implicitly that rational desires may be due to true ideas of good and evil which are prior in nature to the desires Spinoza apparently was not aware that in granting the priority of true ideas as factors determining desire, he was implicitly granting the priority of the final cause as well.

Thus, it seems, Spinoza's theory of desire is eclectic To begin with, he attempts to dispense with the Scholastic theory of final causes of desire The conatus of a thing is nothing more than its power or force of existence, as determined by external causes According to this theory the essence of each thing varies with its affects and the nature of one individual differs from that of another On the other hand, Spinoza also maintains that each mode has an inherent fixed, formal essence of its own The essence of each mode is something eternal and common to other individuals of the same species (2-44, corol 2 demon) since it follows from the eternal nature of God This universal essence is the source of common affects in individuals of the same species, as will be shown later. This rationalistic conception of the form of

things inevitably leads Spinoza to the Scholastic theory that the knowledge of good and evil is the cause of desire, though he admits this to be the case only as regards adequate ideas of the intellect

5 THE INTERRELATION OF DESIRE, JOY, AND SORROW

THE problem involved in Spinoza's theory that desire is the essence of man as well as a primary affect can be best demonstrated by an analysis of the interrelation of the three primary affects

We have seen from our analysis of Spinoza's definition of desire that insofar as desire is a passion it is determined by the affects of joy and sorrow. This implies that joy and sorrow are *priori* by nature to desire and are indeed the efficient causes of desire. That is to say, an individual does not desire a thing for the sake of pleasure as if pleasure were the end of his activity. It is more proper to say that an individual desires a thing because it has affected him with pleasure. Thus Spinoza informs us (3-37) that "the desire which springs from sorrow or joy from hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the affect is greater." The affects of joy and sorrow move or determine a man to desire or destroy, pursue or shun the object which causes these affections in him (3-28). On this premise the desire or active essence of an individual will vary with the form of his affects.

The moral significance of this position is that Spinoza hereby denies that the terms "good" and "evil" have any formal status independent of the individual. As noted, if we examine the causes of the affects, it will be seen that a person calls a thing good because it has affected him with pleasure and desire, he does not desire the thing as a final cause which is intrinsically good in itself. In the last analysis the goods the individual desires are the affects of joy which promote his power of existence. The good is but the shadow or appearance of desire. Spinoza himself enlarges on this point in detail when he writes (3-39). "By good [bonum] I understand every kind of joy and everything that conduces to

it chiefly, however, everything that satisfies longing [quod desiderio satisfacit] By evil [malum] I understand every kind of sorrow and chiefly whatever thwarts longing [quod desiderium frustratur] For we have shown that we do not desire a thing because we adjudge it to be good but on the contrary we call it good because we desire it and consequently everything to which we are averse we call evil Each person therefore according to his affects judges or estimates what is good and what is evil, what is better and what is worse and what is best and what is worst Thus the covetous man thinks plenty of money to be the best thing and poverty the worst The ambitious man desires nothing like glory and on the other hand dreads nothing like shame To the envious person again nothing is more pleasant than the misfortune of another and nothing more disagreeable than the prosperity of another And so each person according to his affects judges a thing to be good or evil, useful or useless "

From this explanation we gather that the nature or active essence of each individual varies with the nature of his affects A man is covetous because riches affect him with a dominant desire for them Another is ambitious because his greatest joy is in the pursuit of honor In brief, we must look to the effect of external objects upon the constitution of the individual if we wish to understand the nature of his desires In the last analysis, the goodness or evil of a thing depends upon the pleasure or pain it affords Each individual in accordance with his affects is the measure of good and evil.

It is interesting to note that Hobbes, who employed the same mechanistic theory of the passions, came to a similar conclusion Thus he writes (*Leviathan*, chap vi) "But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calls good, and the object of his hate or aversion evil For these words of good and evil are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves " Spinoza, it appears, simply followed Hobbes in his doctrine of the relativity of good and evil to the desire of the individual

Spinoza, however, follows Descartes in demonstrating that there is a real difference in quality among the affects due to the nature of the objects by which the individual is affected. He notes (3-56) that "of joy, sorrow and desire and consequently of every affect which either like vacillation of mind [*fluctuationis animi*] is compounded of these, or like love, hatred, hope and fear is derived from them [*derivatur*], there are just as many kinds as there are species of objects by which we are affected [*tot species dantur quot sunt species objectorum a quibus afficimur*] . . . [demon] The nature of each passion must necessarily be explained in such a manner that the nature of the object by which we are affected is expressed. The joy, for example, which springs from object A involves the nature of that object A, and the joy which springs from B involves the nature of that object B and therefore these two affects of joy are of a different nature.

And therefore as a person is affected by external causes with this or that kind of joy, sorrow, love, hatred etc., that is to say, as his nature is constituted in this or that way, so must his desire vary and the nature of one desire differ from that of another, just as the affects from which each desire arises, differ."

Here we see first that the nature or quality of an affect of joy or sorrow varies with the formal essence or species of the object by which the individual is affected, secondly, that the quality of joy and sorrow in turn determine the quality of one's desire. In brief, differences in human nature or desire are acquired and depend upon the differences in the formal essence or species of the objects by which the individual is affected.

At this point a real difficulty arises. If the nature or kind of affect depends upon the kind or species of its object, then there is a formal basis in the nature of things for our judgments of good and evil. That is to say, although the knowledge of good and evil be nothing more than the affect of pleasure or pain, affects nevertheless differ in kind in accordance with the species of object which produced them. There is a universal basis in the objects themselves for one's

judgment of good and evil. Spinoza, however, attempts to combine this realistic theory with his nominalistic doctrine which denies any formal basis in the nature of things for one's judgments of good and evil

So far we have seen that the nature and species of one's affects determine the nature of one's essence or desire. On the other hand, Spinoza also emphasizes the thought that desire as the active essence or power of the individual is the source or cause of all his actions. Desire as the universal, formal essence of the individual is prior in nature to the various affections which are conceived through it. That is to say, the individual does not change his nature along with his affects as was previously thought, on the contrary, the active desire of the individual determines the nature of his affects. The object is only the occasion for the affects, the real efficient and adequate cause is the formal desire of the individual himself. Thus we find Spinoza now writes (3-57) "The affects of one individual differ from the corresponding affect of another, as much as the essence of one differs from that of another [*quilibet uniuscujusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat, quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt*] [demon] All the affects are related to desire, joy and sorrow. But desire is the very nature or essence of an individual and therefore the desire of one individual differs from the desire of another, as much as the nature or essence of the one differs from that of the other. Again joy and sorrow are passions by which the power of an individual or his effort to persevere in his own being is increased or diminished helped or limited [3-11 schol.] But by the effort to persevere in his own being insofar as it is related at the same time to the mind and the body we understand appetite and desire. And therefore joy and sorrow are desire or appetite insofar as the latter is increased, diminished, helped or limited by external causes, that is to say, they are the nature itself of each person. The joy or sorrow of one individual therefore differs from the joy or sorrow of another as much as the nature or essence of one person differs from that of the other."

Spinoza's proposition can be more clearly understood if we recall to mind our previous discussion on pleasure and pain (chap 11) We have seen that Spinoza at one time regards pleasure as the idea of transition to greater perfection and at another time, as the completion of an action following from the power of man In the present proposition, Spinoza regards all affects of pleasure and pain as feelings completing the conatus for self-preservation Joy and sorrow follow upon man's active endeavor to preserve himself and to obtain the things useful to that end Joy completes the conscious desire whose power has been increased Sorrow completes the idea of desire whose power has been decreased Hence the qualities of joy and sorrow which complete the conatus of individuals of the same or different species will vary with the essence of these individuals That is to say, *the nature of desire does not depend upon the affects of joy and sorrow as Spinoza previously maintained, on the contrary, the nature of joy and sorrow depends upon the nature of the essential desire which they complete*

It is highly significant that Aristotle, whom we quoted in our chapter on joy and sorrow (chap 11, § 3), also explicitly states that the pleasures completing the activities of different species of animals differ in kind Thus he writes *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1176a) "Each animal is thought to have a proper pleasure as it has a proper function, viz, that which corresponds to its activity If we survey them species by species, too, this will be evident, horse, dog and man have different pleasures As Heraclitus says, 'asses would prefer sweepings to gold', for food is pleasanter than gold to asses So the pleasures of creatures different in kind, differ in kind, and it is plausible to suppose that those of a single species do not differ But they differ to no small extent, in the case of men at least, the same things delight some people and pain others, and are painful and odious to some and pleasant to and liked by others"

The above quotation is important because it shows definitely that Spinoza was simply following the Aristotelian tradition in distinguishing different species of pleasure cor-

responding to and completing the nature or desire of the individuals involved. On this basis, one feels joy or sorrow in the presence of a particular object because he desires or is hindered from desiring it and the nature of his affect varies with that of his species.

If the affects of joy and sorrow determine the nature of desire, then there is no reason why the desire of a beast should differ from that of a man. All pleasures are alike when judged simply by the physiological effects on the corporeal constitution of the individual. Spinoza introduces differences in the nature of the affects because he conceives of intrinsic, universal differences in the nature or desires of the individuals. I submit that there is a real conflict between these two views and that this conflict is a necessary consequence of the eclectic nature of Spinoza's definition of desire.

The problem involved in Spinoza's theory of desire has its parallel in the modern controversy concerning the relation of the individual to his environment. The Behaviorists in psychology and the mechanists in biology stress the efficacy of the environment as the predominant condition in shaping the nature and disposition of the individual. On the other hand, there are the vitalists who stress the innate forms of ability which develop even where the environment is uniform. In Spinoza both tendencies are found, though he passes from one position to the other without apparently realizing the problem involved. (See Note 3, following.)

NOTE 3 Martineau in his *Study of Spinoza* (p. 260) has previously noted the conflict involved in Spinoza's theory of the interrelation of the primary affects. He writes "The question whether desire is cause or effect of the idea of pleasure (i.e. knowledge of good) is thus answered in opposite ways. The contradiction, though irresolvable, may perhaps be accounted for if we constitute two types of desire conforming respectively to two orders of origin and suppose Spinoza, without noticing the distinction to have in view now the one and then the other. . . . Identify the conatus with desire and then nothing can be prior to it, and only in its satisfaction does pleasure arise. . . . When

Spinoza in treating of the three primary affects gave precedence to pleasure and pain and set down desire as dependent on them, he cannot have been thinking of the earlier of these types " ⁸

6 SPINOZA AND WILLIAM JAMES ON EMOTIONS AND INSTINCTS

WE have noted in the previous discussion that the conatus of an individual determines the nature of his affects and the objects by which he is affected Spinoza does not differentiate explicitly between instincts and emotions but it seems that he did have the notion of instinct in mind Thus in speaking of the desires of different animals he writes (3-57 schol) "Hence it follows that the affects of animals which are called irrational [irrationalia] (for after we have learnt the origin of the mind we can in no way doubt that brutes feel) [bruta sentire], differ from human affects as much as the nature of a brute differs from that of a man Both man and the horse, for example, are swayed by the lust to propagate [libidine procreandi] but the horse is swayed by equine lust [libidine equina] and the man by that which is human The lusts and appetites of insects, fishes and birds must vary in the same way, and so although each individual lives contented with his own nature and delights [gaudeat] in it, nevertheless the life with which it is contented and its joy are nothing but the idea or soul of that individual [idea seu anima ejusdem individui], and so the joy of one differs in character from the joy of the other, as much as the essence of the one [essentia unus] differs from the essence of the other Finally it follows from the preceding proposition that the joy by which the drunkard is enslaved [gaudium ebrius] is altogether different from the joy which is the portion of the philosopher [gaudium quo potitur philosophus], a thing I wished just to hint in passing."

From this passage we gather that Spinoza is opposed to the Cartesian doctrine that animals are simply corporeal automata without feeling since they have no soul According

⁸ J Martineau, *A Study of Spinoza* (London, Macmillan Co, 1895) Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers

to Spinoza all modes of extension are united to modes of thought, although there are degrees of perfection among animate things (2-13 schol.). Hence the so-called irrational brutes feel or are conscious of the affections of their bodies (It is to be noted however that at times Spinoza follows Descartes [3-2] and interprets the affections of brutes in purely physical terms [see chap. 1])

Furthermore, each species of animal has an essential form or soul whereby it differs from other species. The libido of the horse differs from the libido of the man because the conatus of the horse in propagation is directed toward horses and that of man toward humans. That is to say, the conatus of each species of animal is directed toward a specific, final cause or end in agreement with its nature—a Scholastic doctrine which contradicts Spinoza's avowed thesis that the conatus of an individual has no reference to any end other than its own preservation.

The same point is involved in Spinoza's statement (4-37 schol. 1) that "reason indeed teaches us to seek our own profit, the necessity of uniting with men and not with brutes, nor with things whose nature is different from human nature" (*cum hominibus jungere sed non cum brutis aut rebus quarum natura a natura humana est diversa*). The conatus of man as expressed through desire and reason impels him to unite with individuals who agree with him in nature and not with those whose nature is altogether different from his own.

The significant feature of Spinoza's argument is his insistence that the affections of the individual are not produced mechanically, that is to say, they are not the direct result of some external object. Mechanical interaction does not explain the essential individual differences found in the various species of animals. He postulates that the specific form or idea of the individual impels him to acknowledge or perceive a particular object as a stimulus to which he responds. An object which moves one individual will not move another to act at all. In other words, an individual must first be potentially or naturally inclined toward some specific object or end in order to react toward it—a requirement for which Aristotle introduced the notion of the entelechy or im-

manent final cause. Spinoza, however, did not realize the full implications of his admission

Spinoza, moreover, did not differentiate clearly between the instincts or natural impulses of animals and the other affections or emotions. To him they were all affects dependent upon the active essence of the individual. This is shown particularly by the fact that at the conclusion of the scholium he remarks that the delight of the drunkard and the philosopher differs because their natures differ, although the differences here are those of character or moral habits and are not the equivalent of the difference between man and horse. Then again the affect of delight is not an instinct in the same way as libido is, since the former does not involve any impulse or necessary tendency to action.

Spinoza's implicit conception of instincts or natural desires which depend on the conatus of the individual is especially modern and in agreement with psychological theory based on evolutionary postulates. Thus we find William James in his chapter on the "Emotions" in his *Principles of Psychology* (chap. xxv) links up instincts with emotional reactions. "Every object," he explains, "that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well." Emotions however, fall short of instincts in that the emotional reaction usually terminates in the subject's own body whilst the instinctive reaction is apt to go farther and enter into practical relations with the exciting object. The class of emotional is thus rather larger than that of instinctive impulses commonly so-called. The physiological plan and essence of the two classes of impulse however is the same."

Again in his article in *Mind* for 1884 James remarks "The labours of Darwin and his successors are only just beginning to reveal the universal parasitism of each special creature upon other special things, and the way in which each creature brings the signature of its special relations stamped on its nervous system with it upon the scene. The nervous system of every living thing is but a bundle of predispositions to react in particular ways upon the contact of particular features of the environment."

Here we see that James regards instincts like the emo-

tions, as predisposed or preadapted reactions or impulses of an organism to the objects of its environment. Both instincts and emotions are affections of the physical constitution of the organism which predetermine it to react in specific ways toward some object

It seems to me, however, that the same difficulty which characterizes Spinoza's theory of desire is found in James's psychology There is, I submit, a real conflict between James's mechanical or reflex physiology and his Darwinian notion of natural adaptation According to James's reflex theory of the emotions and instincts, an object necessarily produces a given reaction in the organism by virtue of the organic changes it gives rise to In this sense, *the object or stimulus is the efficient cause of the particular reflex reaction* But if one grants with James and Darwin that the reactions of the organism are prearranged or predisposed in relation to some things rather than others, then the connate impulse of the individual is the final or teleological cause of his reactions ⁴ The object or so-called stimulus is only the occasion for evoking a given response for which the organism is potentially adapted and must not therefore be considered the real cause of the affection In brief, the James theory of the emotions and instincts, like Spinoza's theory of the affects, rests upon a mechanistic metaphysics involving only efficient causes and this is incompatible with the notion of the priority of the final cause implicit in his doctrine of the predetermined adaptation of the organism to its specific environment (See later chap xiv, § 3)

7 THE CONATUS OF THE INTELLECT

So far our analysis has shown that Spinoza's attempt to define desire both as the essence and as an affect of man inevitably led him to maintain alternate theories concerning the interrelation of the primary affects I now wish to show that Spinoza endeavored to solve the problem of the relation of the conatus of man to his passions by reintroducing the radical bifurcation between the active intellect and the passive part of the mind which has the body for its object

⁴ See M C Nahm, *Philosophy of Science*, October, 1939

Spinoza, we find, employs the term will (*voluntas*) to denote the active essence of the intellect as distinct from desire (*cupiditas*) which is a corporeal passion. In agreement with the Scholastics, he now maintains that the *conatus* of the body does not constitute the essence of man, the essential nature of man as distinct from other animals is the *conatus* of the intellect. There is no direct parallelism between the power of the intellect and the rest of the mind dependent upon the body. In the following passage we find he explicitly distinguishes the will or intellect from desire, though he previously used them as synonyms (3-def 1). He writes (2-48 schol.) "I must observe that by will [*voluntas*] I understand a faculty of affirming or denying but not a desire [*cupiditas*], a faculty I say, by which the mind affirms or denies that which is true or false and not a desire by which the mind seeks [*appetit*] a thing or turns away from it [*aversatur*]"

In the *Short Treatise* Spinoza also distinguishes between will and desire but describes desire in the Scholastic manner as an inclination toward the good. Thus he writes (Pt II, chap. xvi) "Desire is the inclination which the soul has toward something which it chooses as good, whence it follows that before our desire inclines toward something outside we have already inwardly decided that such a thing is good and this affirmation, or stated more generally, this power to affirm and to deny is called will." And again in the following chapter (xvii) he continues "According to Aristotle's definition, desire appears to be a genus containing two species. For he says that the will is the longing or inclination which one feels towards that which is or seems good. Whence it appears to me that by desire (or *cupiditas*) he means any inclination, be it towards good be it towards evil, but when the inclination is only towards what is or appears to be good or when the man who has such inclination, has it under the appearance of good, then he calls it *voluntas* or good will, while if it is bad, that is, when we observe in another an inclination towards something which is bad, he calls that *voluptas* or bad will. So that inclination of the soul is not something whereby affirmations or denials are made, but only

an inclination to obtain something which appears to be good, and to flee from what appears to be bad ”

For Spinoza, unlike the Scholastics, there is no distinct intellectual appetite or will other than the contemplative function of the intellect “The will and the intellect,” he insists, “are one and the same” (2-49 corol) The affirmation involved in *any* idea or concept is identical with the so-called assent of the will. “In the mind,” he argues (2-49), “there is no volition or affirmation and negation excepting that which the idea insofar as it is an idea involves ” In general he concludes (4-26) that “all efforts which we make through reason are nothing but efforts to understand ” In other words, *Spinoza does not differentiate between the conative and cognitive functions of the intellect—though he does differentiate between the conative and cognitive functions so far as desire and imagination are concerned* (2-axiom 3)

In this connection it is instructive to recall that Hobbes also identified the conative and cognitive functions of the mind, but he was more consistent than Spinoza in this respect Hobbes considered deliberation as nothing more than a succession of desires, all thinking was practical deliberation and served as the instrument of fulfilling desire Spinoza, on the other hand, excluded desire from the activity of the intellect but he identified the theoretical and practical or voluntary functions of the intellect

The problem must now be faced, what led Spinoza to identify will and intellect? The answer, we suggest, is to be found in his doctrine of the parallelism of the attributes According to his theory of the divine attributes, the attribute of thought merely affirms the powers of substance as constituted by extension and the other unknown attributes Since there is no potentiality or possibility in God (1-16, 33) it follows logically that there can be no ideas which God first conceives and then wills to realize The divine mind simply affirms the modes which follow from thought and the other attributes Viewed in retrospect it may be said that God willed whatever followed from the divine attributes Spinoza himself explicitly states this argument in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* (chap iv) “The will and intellect of God

are in reality one and the same, and are only distinguished in relation to our thoughts which we form concerning God's understanding. For instance, if we are only looking to the fact that the nature of a triangle is from eternity contained in the divine nature as an eternal verity, we say that God possesses the idea of a triangle or that he understands the nature of a triangle, but if afterwards we look to the fact that the nature of a triangle is thus contained in the divine nature, solely by the necessity of the divine nature and not by the necessity of the nature and essence of the triangle—we then style God's will or decree that which before we styled His intellect. Wherefore, we make one and the same affirmation concerning God when we say that He has from eternity decreed that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two rights, as when we say that He has understood it." To say that God wills something and that He affirms it as necessarily following from His attributes is to make one and the same assertion.

In like manner Spinoza argues that the volitions or decisions of the human mind are nothing but the ideas affirming the affects of the human body. Thus he writes (2-2 schol.) "All this plainly shows that the decree of the mind [decretum], the appetite and determination of the body are coincident in nature [simul esse natura] or rather that they are one and the same thing, which, when it is considered under the attribute of thought is called a decree and when it is considered under the attribute of extension and is deduced from the laws of motion is called a determination. This, however, will be better understood as we go on, for there is another thing which I wish to be observed here—that we cannot by a mental decree do a thing unless we recollect it. We cannot speak a word for instance unless we recollect it. We must necessarily grant that this decree of the mind, which is believed to be free is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory, and is nothing but the affirmation which the idea necessarily involves insofar as it is an idea. These decrees of the mind, therefore, arise in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of things actually existing." Here again we see that a decree or volition of the

mind is nothing but some past idea or memory of the affections of the body. The mind wills nothing but the ideas of its body. Thus for both God and man idea and volition or decree are identical.

The above argument implies that the human mind as a whole, and not only the intellect, is identical with its will. Spinoza himself grants this point in the course of his refutations of the Cartesian arguments for freedom of choice. He writes (2-49 schol) "I grant that the will extends itself more widely than the intellect, if by the intellect we understand only clear and distinct ideas, but I deny that the will extends itself more widely than the perception or the faculty of conception." The fact, nevertheless, remains that he explicitly identifies the will only with the intellect; the will is the conatus of the intellect as distinct from desire which involves the inadequate perceptions of the mind. Spinoza, it appears, following the Scholastics, wishes to introduce a purely intellectual appetite other than the physical or sensual appetite. He differs from the Scholastics only insofar as he does not distinguish between the intellect and its conatus as they do.

At this stage a new difficulty arises. In what sense can the intellect be said to will its ideas? The divine will and intellect are said to be identical because God is the efficient cause of the essence as well as existence of all ideas or eternal truths (1-25). That is why even the Scholastics, whether Hebrew or Christian, admitted that will and intellect are identical in God (1-33 schol 2) (2-7 schol). But the human intellect differs from the divine precisely in that the human intellect is not the cause of the essence of its ideas which are eternal truths, the human will is therefore directed only to the existence of ideas but not to their essence. From this it follows that the divine and human intellects must differ entirely in kind, that is to say, in man will and intellect are not identical as in the case of God. The human intellect may conceive many eternal truths which it cannot be said to will. Spinoza himself, following Maimonides, reasons in the same manner. Thus he argues (1-17 schol) "Moreover—to say a word too here about the intellect and will which we

commonly attribute to God—if intellect and will pertain to His eternal essence, these attributes cannot be understood in the sense in which men generally use them, for the intellect and will which could constitute His essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will and could resemble ours in nothing except name. There could be no further likeness than that between the celestial constellation of the Dog and the animal which barks. This I will demonstrate as follows. If intellect pertains to the divine nature, it cannot, like our intellect, follow the things which are its objects (as many suppose), nor can it be simultaneous in its nature with them, since God is prior to all things in causality, but, on the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is what it is, because as such it exists objectively in God's intellect. Therefore the intellect of God insofar as it is conceived to constitute His essence, is in truth the cause of things both of their essence and of their existence—a truth which seems to have been understood by those who have maintained that God's intellect, will and power are one and the same thing. Since therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence, it must necessarily differ from them with regard both to its essence and existence, for an effect differs from its cause precisely in that which it has from its cause. For example, one man is the cause of the existence but not of the essence of another, for the essence is an eternal truth, and therefore with regard to essence the two men may exactly resemble one another, but with regard to existence they must differ. But the intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and existence of our intellect, therefore the intellect of God so far as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both with regard to its essence and its existence, nor can it coincide with our intellect in anything except name, which is what we essayed to prove. The same demonstration may be applied to the will, as anyone may easily see for himself."

As said, if Spinoza had followed the above argument consistently he would not have identified human will and intellect, since such identification is possible only in the case of

God Who is the cause of the essence as well as existence of things

By way of summary we observe that Spinoza's premise concerning the parallelism of attributes and modes led him to identify all ideas with volitions. Just as the attribute of thought only affirms its own power and that of the other attributes, so the modes of thought only affirm modes of thought and extension. Hence he maintains that the decrees of the human mind are simply the ideas which affirm the appetites of its body. But, as discussed at length, Spinoza does not maintain the parallelism of the modes consistently. The essential power of man is said to consist in the conatus or efforts of the intellect and not in those of the passive, human body. Hence he identified the conatus or will of the intellect with its power to conceive adequate ideas. He did not realize fully the significance of his admission concerning the separability of essence and existence in finite things. Had he appreciated this point adequately he would have realized that just as man's essence is separable from his existence, so man's intellect must be distinguished from his will or power to promote the existence or becoming of things. (See Note 4, following)

NOTE 4 As Wolfson has previously noted (*The Philosophy of Spinoza*, I, 317) Spinoza's references to those of his predecessors who maintained the identity of will and intellect in God may be traced to Maimonides' *Guide for the Perplexed*—a point which is corroborated by the fact that Spinoza explicitly refers to "some of the Hebrews" who identify "God, the intellect of God and the things which are the objects of that intellect" (2-7 schol.) According to Maimonides, the identity of will and intellect in God is a mark of divine perfection which serves to differentiate the divine from the human will and intellect which have distinct functions. This led him to his famous doctrine of the negative attributes of God in which he denied that there is any comparison between finite and infinite attributes.

Spinoza, it appears, used the same argument and example in insisting upon the radical difference in kind between the human and divine intellect but in practice he proceeded to describe both

in similar terms He failed to realize that the human will and intellect may not be identified since man is not the cause of the essence but only of the existence of things In other words, he failed to draw the logical implication of the contrast between the finite and the infinite which he, following Maimonides, for the moment accepted in the scholium to 1-17

On the other hand, it may be said that Spinoza did not realize that the doctrine of the incomparability of divine and human nature logically leads to the denial of any positive knowledge of God and hence to the undermining of the basic premise of his epistemology and methodology, namely, the postulate of man's adequate knowledge of the infinite essence of God (2-47) and the deduction of all finite things from the idea of God The doctrine of the immanence of God in nature means that knowledge of the finite involves knowledge of the infinite (5-24)—a thesis which is the exact contrary of the Maimonidean argument which he also accepted

8 THE INTELLECTUAL CONATUS AND FREEDOM OF WILL

WE proceed now to analyze Spinoza's reasons for denying freedom of will in God and man In general it may be said that he offers two distinct and contrary arguments for determinism, one of which is compatible with freedom of will and the other of which is not Let us consider each of these arguments in detail

As noted in the preceding section, the will is nothing but an expression of the actual power of God or man as confirmed by thought The will is not as the Scholastics thought a power or faculty of choice between possibles which may or may not be realized, it is rather the affirmation of the efficient power of the individual, the affirmation of something achieved and not merely an appetite directed toward some unrealized final cause. God is not free to create whatsoever and whenever He pleases, He necessarily creates from all eternity whatever He has the power to create That is why Spinoza insists that insofar as will and intellect pertain to the essence of God they are an immediate expression of divine power

and cannot conceivably be otherwise without changing the divine nature, since "the power of God is His essence itself" (1-34). Thus he explains in detail (1-33 schol. 2) "For if God had decreed something about nature and her order other than that which He has decreed—that is to say, if He had willed and conceived something else about nature—He would necessarily have had an intellect and a will different from those He now has. And if it be allowed to assign to God another intellect and another will without any change of His essence and of His perfection, what is the reason why He cannot now change His decrees about creation and nevertheless remain equally perfect? Moreover, all the philosophers whom I have seen admit that there is no such thing as an intellect existing potentially in God, but only an intellect existing actually. But since His intellect and His will are not distinguishable from His essence, as all admit, it follows from this also that if God had had another intellect actually and another will, His essence would have been necessarily different, and hence, as I showed at the beginning, if things had been produced by God in a manner different from that in which they now exist, God's intellect and will, that is to say, His essence (as has been granted) must have been different, which is absurd."

The above explanation is intelligible only on the presupposition that will and intellect pertain essentially to the divine attribute of thought of which they are the direct expression. If for will we substitute "the laws of nature," it is easy to demonstrate that since "God acts according to the laws of His own nature and is compelled by no one" (1-17), therefore God alone is a free cause (1-17 corol. 2). That is to say, God acts in accordance with the determinations of His own will which pertains intrinsically to His nature, and therefore He is an adequate, self-sufficient or free cause of His volitions or acts. God does not have freedom in the sense of freedom of choice between possibles. His freedom consists in complete self-determination. Had Spinoza followed the implications of his premise that God's power and essence are identical and that His will or intellect is nothing but a necessary and immediate expression of His power, then he would

have attributed the divine will and intellect to *natura naturans* which is the dynamic, active aspect of God's power rather than to *natura naturata*, which is the passive, created order of modes (1-29 schol.), since *natura naturans* is "God insofar as He is considered a free cause"

But it is precisely at this point that Spinoza's logic breaks down. We are informed instead that will or intellect does not pertain to the very essence of God, "the actual intellect whether it be finite or infinite, together with will, love, desire etc., must be referred to the *natura naturata* and not to the *natura naturans*" (1-31). "For," he continues, "by the intellect (as is self-evident) we do not understand absolute thought but only a certain mode of thought which mode differs from other modes such as desire, love etc. and therefore must be conceived through absolute thought." And again he remarks, (1-32) "The will cannot be called a free cause, but can only be called necessary [corol 1] Hence it follows that God does not act from freedom of will . . . [corol 2] Therefore will does not appertain to the nature of God more than other natural things, but is related to it as motion and rest and all other things are related to it."

According to Spinoza's first argument the divine attribute of thought in accordance with the laws of its nature wills or determines both the essence and existence of its particular finite volitions or modes. That is to say, God's will or absolute power is prior in nature to His finite acts or volitions which are the modes or expressions of His power. The divine will is free in the sense of being self-determined by His nature, it is not free in the sense of being arbitrary or indeterminate. According to the second argument, however, the divine intellect or will is nothing but a name for a combination of infinite ideas or eternal truths. There is no one entity such as the divine mind or thought to which they pertain intrinsically or directly, they are modes which yet do not inhere directly in the substance of which they are the modes. There is a sharp bifurcation between the absolute nature of thought and the infinity of ideas which have no direct connection with the attribute of thought. The modes, unlike the attribute of thought, are not self-determined and therefore

there cannot be free acts of volition since there is no general will which is their adequate cause.

Spinoza, it appears, is working with two different sets of postulates and this explains why he at one time speaks of God as a free cause and at another time denies that God acts from freedom of will. If God's causality were identified with His will—and this possibility Spinoza rejects—then the contradiction would be removed.

On the human level the same difficulties occur. We have seen that the human intellect is the adequate or sufficient cause of its ideas or actions (chap. 1, § 3). This again is intelligible only if the intellect be conceived as a thinking entity which is prior in nature to its various ideas which are the expressions of its activity. Now since the human will and intellect are identical, it is just as true to say that the will is the adequate cause of its various volitions, as to say that the intellect is the adequate or internal and free cause of its ideas. There is a general will or intellect which is the self-determined cause of all particular actions or volitions. To illustrate our point we have but to cite Spinoza's own argument in the *Cogitata metaphysica*, (II, chap. xii) where he grants that the mind is the adequate or free cause of its volitions. We find he writes: "We say that the human mind is a thinking thing, from which it follows that from its own nature alone considered in itself it can do something, namely, think, that is, affirm and deny. . . . Actions, moreover, of this thought which acknowledge no other cause of themselves than the human mind are called volitions. In truth, the human mind insofar as it is conceived as the cause sufficient [causa sufficiens] to produce such actions is called will [voluntas]. . . . Moreover, it is to be noted, although the soul [anima] is determined by external things to affirm or deny something, it is not however so determined as if it were thought by external things, but it itself always remains free [ipsam semper liberam manere]. For no thing has the power of destroying its essence, because that which it affirms or denies, it always affirms and denies freely [semper libere affirmat et negat]." And again: "We in a way say and indeed show clearly that the will is nothing other than the mind

itself, which we call a thinking thing, that is, something affirming and denying, from which we clearly gather, when we attend solely to the nature of the mind that it has an equal power of affirming and denying, for this, I say, is to think. Thus if we conclude from the fact that the mind thinks, that it itself has the power of affirming and negating, why then do we seek adventitious causes to effect that which follows solely from the nature of the thing? Here we see that Spinoza identifies the will with the intellect or the mind's power of conceiving, that is, affirming and denying, and at the same time insists that the mind is the free or sufficient cause of its volitions.

Similarly in the *Ethics* Spinoza later speaks of the free man, meaning by that term "a man who lives according to the dictates of reason alone" (4-67 demon). That is to say, a free man is one whose intellect is the adequate or sufficient cause of his actions or volitions.

But Spinoza does not maintain the above position consistently. Instead he considers the human intellect as if it were nothing but a series of ideas determining one another's existence. The mind is reduced to a flux of ideas which think or affirm themselves. Thus parallel to his argument concerning the status of the divine will he now proposes that (2-48) "in the mind there is no absolute or free will, but the mind is determined to this or that volition by a cause, which is also determined by another cause, and this again by another, and so on ad infinitum." In the scholium he elaborates this point: "In the same manner it is demonstrated that in the mind there exists no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving etc. These and the like faculties, therefore, are either altogether fictitious, or else are nothing but metaphysical or universal entities, which we are in the habit of forming from individual cases. The intellect and will therefore, are related to this or that idea or volition as rockiness is related to this or that rock, or as man is related to Peter and Paul. The will and intellect are nothing but the individual volitions and ideas themselves" (2-49, demon to corol).

Thus we see that Spinoza at first considers the intellect as a distinct entity with adequate internal powers to conceive

adequate ideas, in order to distinguish the actions or conceptions of the mind from its passions or perceptions; but he reverts to mental atomism when it comes to the problem of the will. Will and intellect alike are denied any causal efficacy of their own, they are nothing but terms used to connote a multiplicity of ideas or volitions. There is no universal will or intellect prior to the particular ideas and volitions. The human intellect is nothing but a passive stream of ideas which affirm or will themselves. The same argument also occurs in the *Short Treatise* where the passivity of the intellect is stressed (II, chap. xvi). He writes "For because man has now this, now that volition he forms in his soul a general mode which he calls will, just as from this man and that man, and because he does not adequately distinguish the real things from the things of reason, he comes to regard the things of reason as things which really exist in nature and so he regards himself as a cause of some things. Thus then as there is no thing that has any power to maintain itself or to produce anything, there remains nothing but to conclude that God alone therefore is and must be the efficient cause of all things and that all acts of volition are determined by Him alone. For we have said that the understanding is purely passive, it is an awareness in the soul of the essence and existence of things, so that it is never we who affirm or deny something of a thing, but it is the thing itself that affirms or denies in us something of itself." Here we see that Spinoza denies the internal or adequate causality of the human mind and therefore denies freedom of willing as well.

In general we are left with the paradox that *Spinoza admits in the Ethics that the intellect is the adequate cause of its ideas to which it is prior by nature but he denies that the will is the adequate cause of its volitions, though will and intellect are supposed to be identical*. He considers the human intellect absolutely when he wishes to establish the possibility of human action as distinct from passion, but he suddenly invokes the relativity and mutual determination of all modes of thought when he comes to consider the nature of the will. The intellect as a distinct entity then disappears

and we are left with nothing but a flux of ideas which affirm or conceive themselves. The requirements of his moral theory led Spinoza to admit that man like God may be a free or self-determined cause so far as he lives in accord with the laws of reason, but he never explicitly identified the will with the power of the intellect. In this manner he was able to retain an appearance of consistency.

The reader should recall in this connection that the problems arising from Spinoza's theory of will and intellect are quite similar to those found in connection with his theory of the relation of desire to pleasure and pain (chap. III, § 5). There too the difficulties centered about the question whether desire as the essence of man was prior to particular affects of desire, pleasure, and pain or whether pleasure and pain determined the nature of one's desires. The problem of the adequate and inadequate activity of the modes is thus basic for an understanding of Spinoza's moral theory.

IV

THE BASIS OF AGREEMENT AND CONTRARI- TRARINESS IN HUMAN NATURE

1 THE PROBLEM OF AGREEMENT AND CONTRARI- NESS IN HUMAN NATURE

IN our discussion of the interrelation of the primary affects we noted that Spinoza introduced the notion of individual differences. On the one hand, he maintained that the nature of the individual varies with the affects produced by external things. On the other hand, we found that the nature or quality of the affects depends upon the conatus or essence of the individuals, and hence that the affects of each species of animal differ from those of other species. Spinoza also suggested that there were similar differences between men, as for example, between the delights of the drunkard and the philosopher.

The question now arises, what is the source or basis of agreement and disagreement among individuals of the same or different species? In our previous analysis these agreements and differences were assumed. We now wish to investigate just how it comes about that some modes are in agreement with one another and others are opposed to each other. In order to answer this problem we must first analyze the metaphysical basis of agreement and disagreement in nature as a whole and then proceed to the particular modes.

2 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF AGREEMENT AND CONFLICT IN NATURE AS A WHOLE.

THE fundamental principle involved in Spinoza's metaphysical monism is that of the unity of nature. All forms of being are modes or expressions of the one substance which is God and hence are necessarily interrelated with one another.

so as to express the unity of the divine nature. That is to say, *the unity of God involves the unity of the order of nature.* Nature as a whole is one vast, infinite mechanism whose parts cooperate and interact with one another to maintain the form or order of created nature (*natura naturata*). Thus Spinoza writes (2—lemma 7 schol.) “Up to this point we have conceived an individual to be composed merely of bodies which are distinguished from one another solely by motion and rest, speed and slowness, that is to say, to be composed of the most simple bodies. Thus if we advance ad infinitum we may easily conceive the whole of nature to be one individual whose parts, that is to say, all bodies, differ in infinite ways without any change of the whole individual.” Here we see that Spinoza combines the notion of individual difference among the modes with the complete unity and agreement among the parts so as to constitute a single form and infinite whole.

The fundamental unity and harmony of nature may be further supported by the consideration that all things involve the power or essence of God (1—34). From this it necessarily follows that just as there can be nothing within the nature of God Himself which can negate His existence (1—11 demon 2), so there can be nothing within created nature to destroy its essential unity or the agreement among its parts. The perfection of God’s immanent power is such that the totality of the modes are internally related to one another so as to constitute a single harmonious order of nature.

Furthermore, Spinoza’s metaphysics involves a linear or monistic theory of causality. Just as logically the properties of a thing are deduced from its idea or “objective essence,” so actually or formally all effects follow from the cause and can neither be nor be conceived without the cause. This I take to be the significance of Spinoza’s axiom (1—ax 4) that “the knowledge [*cognitio*] of an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of the cause.” This implies that there can be no disagreement among the effects of a given cause because the idea or objective essence contains nothing which negates itself. Hence there can be no essential con-

trariety among the modes of nature as a whole, since they all follow from the power of the infinitely perfect cause

Nevertheless Spinoza was forced through experience of actual facts to admit that there is real disagreement and conflict among some of the parts of nature. Thus he introduces the axiom (4-ax 1) that "there is no individual thing in nature which is not surpassed in strength and power by some other thing [*qua potentior et fortior non detur alia*], but any individual thing being given, another and a stronger is also given, by which the former can be destroyed." That is to say, the modes are not only the proximate cause of one another's existence (1-28) but also of their destruction. Indeed, Spinoza's entire doctrine of the affects is based upon the postulate that some things help and others hinder or destroy human power of action (3-post 1). Similarly men endeavor to destroy whatever threatens their existence (3-39).

Faced with this obvious conflict in nature, Spinoza's reply is that the apparent disharmony among the parts does not involve any imperfection in the whole. Thus in answer to the question "why God has not created all men in such a manner that they might be controlled by the dictates of reason alone," he replies (1-append) "I give but this answer. Because to Him material was not wanting for the creation of everything from the highest down to the lowest grade of perfection, or, to speak more properly, because the laws of His nature were so ample that they sufficed for the production of everything which can be conceived by an infinite intellect." In other words, Spinoza's answer is that the infinity of the divine perfection requires the creation of all or an infinite number of things, but he does not tell us how the real contrariety among the parts is compatible with the unity of the whole. On the whole, his tendency is to deny that there is any real conflict among the modes of nature or any real imperfection in nature; all such notions are simply fictions of the imagination. "The perfection of things," he observes (1-append), "is to be judged by their nature and power alone; nor are they more or less perfect because they delight

or offend the human senses or because they are beneficial or prejudicial to human nature ”

The infinite order of nature is something which transcends the human imagination and hence the human categories of order and disorder do not apply. As Spinoza puts it (1-append) “Moreover, since those things are more especially pleasing to us which we can easily imagine, men therefore prefer order to confusion as if order were something in nature apart from our own imagination [quasi ordo aliquid in natura praeter respectum ad nostram imaginationem esset]. And they say that God has created everything in order and in this manner they ignorantly attribute imagination to God, unless they mean perhaps that God out of consideration for the human imagination has disposed things in the manner in which they can most easily be imagined. No hesitation either seems to be caused by the fact that an infinite number of things are discovered which far surpass our imagination and very many which confound it through weakness ”

Spinoza would agree with Kant that the mind is all too prone to attribute order to the modes or phenomena of nature. But as a Rationalist and realist he maintains that the human reason is able to conceive intuitively the essence and formal relations or connections among things, as they exist independent of the human mind. In fact, far from maintaining that nature is to be conceived through the categories of the human mind, Spinoza criticizes this anthropomorphic view of things. The real “Copernican Revolution” consists precisely in abandoning the relative, anthropomorphic perspective of the human imagination and in conceiving things *sub specie aeternitatis* from the infinite, absolute perspective of God. (See Note 1, p. 136)

Aside from the general problems concerning the order of nature and the nature of order, the question arises. What is the basis for this agreement and disagreement among individual modes? Spinoza’s answer is that the only things which can help or hinder one another are those which have something in common (4-29). “No individual object,” he points out, “whose nature is altogether different from our own, can either help or restrain our power of acting and absolutely

nothing can be to us either good or evil unless it possesses something in common with ourselves" (*nisi commune aliquid nobiscum habeat*) This turns out to mean that only modes conceived through the same attribute can affect one another (4-29 demon)—a point already involved in axiom 5 of book one, namely, that "those things which have nothing mutually in common cannot through one another be mutually understood"

Spinoza's present proposition (4-29) contributes nothing new to our knowledge. Granted that only modes of extension can affect one another, the problem still remains, why are some modes contrary by nature to others?

Obviously there must be some intrinsic differences in the nature of modes of extension themselves. But Spinoza does not draw this inference. Instead he continues (4-30) to demonstrate that "nothing can be evil through that which it possesses in common [commune] with our nature, but insofar as a thing is evil is it contrary [contraria] to us." When we examine this proposition it turns out to be nothing more than a tautology. Spinoza grants that the bare common nature of things cannot account for their actual contrariety. But he refuses to say that things are contrary because of intrinsic differences since he fears that would contradict his previous proposition that things must have something in common in order to interact at all. Hence he tells us that "insofar as a thing is evil to us, is it contrary to us"—which is equivalent to saying that "a thing which is contrary to us (evil) is contrary." In the same tautological manner Spinoza demonstrates (4-31) that "insofar as an object agrees with our nature [*cum nostra natura convenit*] is it necessarily good." In the corollary to 4-31 Spinoza adds some further comments. "For insofar as it does not agree with our nature it will necessarily be either diverse from our nature or contrary to it [*diversa vel contraria*]. If diverse it can be neither good nor evil [*si diversa neque bona neque male esse poterit*], but if contrary, it will therefore be contrary also to that which agrees with our nature, that is to say, contrary to the good, or in other words, it will be evil."

Here we see Spinoza distinguishes between that "which is

diverse from our nature" (*a nostra natura diversa*) and that "which is contrary to it" (*vel eidem contraria*). That which is diverse from our nature can have no relations with it and hence cannot be the source of either good or evil affects. That which is contrary to our nature is by definition the source of evil only. Hence that which agrees with our nature is necessarily the source of good affects only. The significant point in this corollary is the implication that the diverse cannot be contrary.

We are then left with the following argument. Only things which have something in common can interact and be the source of good and evil affects in others. That in virtue of which a thing produces good affects in others is the element it has in common with others. But thus, Spinoza continues, does not imply that evil affects are due to some diverse element or that whereby one thing differs from others. Insofar as a thing is diverse from others, it cannot be the source of any affect—whether good or evil. On the other hand, the evil cannot be due to some common element. The evil therefore is due to the fact that things are contrary—and they are contrary because they produce evil affects.

Spinoza is unwilling to grant that there is an inherent basis in the nature of things whereby they are both different (diverse) and contrary and so involves himself in a vicious circle. In the last analysis, he fails to account for individual differences. Beginning with the unity of nature and harmony of the modes, he can find no inherent basis in the order of nature for any necessary contrariety, since logically the objective essence of nature cannot be contrary to itself. Empirically there appears to be a contrariety in the nature of things themselves such that one thing must destroy another in order to preserve itself. Practically, a mode agrees with some things and is diverse from or contrary to others. On the basis of his metaphysical principles, however, Spinoza can acknowledge no such necessary strife or mutual opposition. There must be ultimate harmony or peace in the order of nature since God is at peace with Himself.

The general conclusion of Spinoza's metaphysics is that the infinite unity and perfection of God are the basis of

agreement among the modes which partake of His perfection. In other words, *perfection or the positive essence of things is that in virtue of which things agree and is never a source of disagreement or opposition. From this it follows that disagreement among modes is always due to their finiteness, to their impotence, imperfection, and negation.* Things disagree not because of what they intrinsically possess but rather because of what they lack in power or perfection. *This doctrine is in direct opposition to the doctrine of Heraclitus that "all things take place by strife" (frag 46) and to the theory of Hegel that natural opposition among forms of being is essential to the harmonious synthesis in the order of nature.* The position of Hegel involves a dualistic theory of causality but Spinoza's doctrine is essentially monistic. All things follow, Spinoza maintains, from a single source and their ultimate agreement is due to their essential community of substance and not to any intrinsic diversity or conflict.

As eternal modes of substance there is then an essential agreement among the modes. It is true that modes differ in the degree of perfection which they involve but there is nothing positive in any mode whereby it is opposed to others. All modes together constitute the eternal order of *natura naturata*. As modes of thought they constitute the infinite intellect of God. As modes of extension they form the face of the universe (1-30). In this sense, the eternal order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of extended things (2-7).

But in the temporal or common order of nature there is an actual contrariety among modes. Things are extrinsically or externally so related that they negate one another's power of existence. For example, "the force by which man perseveres in existence is limited [*vis est limitata*] and infinitely surpassed [*superatur*] by the powers of external causes" (4-3). Metaphysically also this must be so, since the essence of things produced by God does not involve existence (1-24). That is to say, finite things by nature have a determinate existence (2-def 7) and the termination of their existence can be brought about only by the agency of some

external mode (3-4). If there were no inherent opposition between individual modes then each mode could continue in existence indefinitely, as it in fact endeavors to do (3-8)

Spinoza apparently did not realize the contradiction between his notion of the temporal and eternal order of modes. From the eternal point of view, there is an eternal harmony among the modes since they all partake of the divine perfection. From the temporal point of view, however, there must be an intrinsic opposition between modes since it is their nature to have a determinate existence. Otherwise the essence of each mode would also involve actual indefinite existence. The facts of physics and biology prompted Spinoza to acknowledge such mutual conflict, though metaphysically he could not account for this contrariety on the basis of his monistic theory.

NOTE 1 In *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*,¹ Chap. XII, p. 245, Professor Gilson makes this point in contrasting Kant with the philosophy of the Middle Ages. He writes "When Kant proclaimed that he was about to effect a Copernican revolution by substituting his critical idealism for the dogmatic realism of the Middle Ages, the thing he really brought about was the very opposite." Spinoza, it may be said, really introduced the Copernican revolution into theology and metaphysics by denying the Scholastic doctrine that nature was made for man and by considering man as a mode of nature. Kant's so-called revolution was, really, as Professor Gilson points out, anti-Copernican.

3 HUMAN NATURE AND SELF-CONTRARIETY

MORE specifically the same problem occurs with reference to the nature of man alone. The question remains, is there anything in the nature of man alone which is contrary to himself? And if not, how do we account for the fact that some individuals commit suicide or seek to destroy one another?

1 E. Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937). Reprinted by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.

To the first question Spinoza replies (3-4 demon.) as in the case of substance that "the definition of any given thing affirms and does not deny the essence of the thing, that is to say, it posits the essence of the thing and does not remove it" The answer we note is given in logical terms For a thing to be actually contrary to itself is equivalent logically to self-contradiction Just as the self-contradictory cannot be thought, so the self-contrary cannot have actual existence This argument applies to the nature of God as well (1-11 demon 2).

From this premise Spinoza concludes that all destruction or contrariety is always due to some external cause (4-4), since nothing by nature is contrary to itself A thing and its contrary negate each other in the same subject (3-5) (*catenus in eodem subjecto esse nequeunt*) That is to say, a thing and its contrary cannot subsist in the same subject, one or the other must be destroyed Thus Spinoza submits the axiom (5-ax 1) that "If two contrary actions [*actiones contrariae*] be excited in the same subject, a change must necessarily take place in both, or in one alone, until they cease to be contrary"

The fact that the logical or objective essence of a thing affirms its existence and is never self-contradictory implies, as we said, that the formal or subjective essence cannot be contrary to itself From the point of view of physics and biology this means that each mode by nature endeavors to persevere in its being (3-6) and continues to do so for an indefinite time unless hindered by some external force (3-8) By nature each mode involves an indefinite power of existence and seeks to avoid or destroy whatever is contrary to it or threatens its power of existence (3-13, 25, 28, 4-19) In brief, the *conatus* to continue in existence corresponds to the objective essence which posits or affirms the existence of a thing

Suicide, on these premises, is never really due to the essential desire of the individual. Suicide as a self-contrary act cannot be really due to one's own power and must therefore be attributed to external forces which compel the act Real

self-destruction is logically inconceivable and practically impossible. Thus Spinoza writes (4-18 schol.) "It follows that all persons who kill themselves are impotent in mind and have been thoroughly overcome by external causes opposed to their nature." And again in the scholium to 4-20: "No one therefore unless defeated by external causes and those which are contrary to his nature neglects to seek his own utility or preserve his being. No one I say refuses food or kills himself from a necessity of his nature but only when forced by external causes. The compulsion may be exercised in many ways. External and hidden causes also may so dispose his imagination and may so affect his body as to cause it to put on another nature contrary to that which it has at first and one whose idea cannot exist in the mind [3-10], but a very little reflection will show that it is as impossible that a man from the necessity of his nature should endeavour not to exist, or to be changed into some other form, as it is that something should be begotten from nothing."

Spinoza here distinguishes between those actions which follow "from the necessity of one's nature" (*ex necessitate suae naturae*) and the actions one is compelled to perform when "overcome by external causes contrary to his nature" (*a causis externis et suae naturae contrariis victus*). The external cause, he points out, which compels self-destruction need not be actually present, it may produce its effects through the passive imagination. External causes may so change the body and imagination of a man that he ceases to be the same individual and the mind ceases to affirm the former body. In this sense, a man may become contrary to his former self. That is to say, he may assume a nature contrary to that which he had previously and this new nature may endeavor to destroy or exclude his former self. Two contrary natures cannot subsist in the same subject and therefore one necessarily endeavors to destroy the other. This appears to be voluntary self-destruction but in reality it is one formal essence produced by external causes destroying another which is the usual form of the individual. No

individual by the necessity of his nature tries to change his essential form of being, even if the change of nature should involve an increased form of perfection. For example, "a horse would be as much destroyed if it were changed into a man as if it were changed into an insect" (4—pref.). In brief, each individual by the necessity of his nature desires only his own preservation and what he considers his own good (4—19) and is never the free cause of anything that produces evil or destruction in himself.

In the passage quoted, Spinoza argues that in so-called suicide the newly acquired nature destroys the previous form of being. But how can this be if the previous form ceases to exist when the new form is acquired? How can one destroy that which has ceased to exist? What Spinoza is really saying is that an individual may terminate his existence through his own efforts as if he were some other thing contrary to himself.

Spinoza assumes that each mode necessarily desires its own preservation. But this it appears is a false assumption. Under special circumstances a person may regard his own destruction as a lesser evil than the destruction, say, of his country. On some occasions a person may regard his own destruction as a good in comparison with something else which he regards as more excellent and wishes to preserve through his death. The desire for self-preservation is not necessary since it is not always desired as the greatest good, just as pleasure ceases to be good when it becomes excessive (4—43). Thus a soldier who is killed in war really commits suicide insofar as he exposes himself to danger in order to reach an objective, even though someone else fire the fatal shot. It is not essential that the deed be done directly by himself, the important thing is the will or consent. On the other hand, he who is ordered by a tyrant to kill himself as, for example, Seneca by Nero, does not really commit suicide, even though he himself perform the final deed, since he does not truly give his consent to his death. There is a real difference between suicide and compelled destruction, irrespective of who performs the final deed. Spinoza was led to deny free suicide

because he would not grant that there was any good or final cause for the sake of which one may desire to live or die (4-25)

As said, the fundamental presupposition of Spinoza's theory of suicide is that there is nothing within the individual himself which can be contrary to himself. But Spinoza himself grants that the laws of the imagination differ from those of the intellect and hence may frequently be contrary to one another. This, as noted, explains why he, like the Stoics, regards the passions of the soul as diseases which hinder intellectual activity. This implies that what one perceives and imagines as good is often contrary to the true good conceived by the intellect. For example, the desire which concerns only part of the body may conflict with the good of the whole as counseled by reason (4-43, 44). "Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil," Spinoza observes (4-15), "can be extinguished or restrained [*restingui vel coerceri potest*] by many other desires which take their origin from the affects by which we are agitated." *In other words, the conatus of the body may be contrary to the conatus of the intellect.* The rational desire for a life of virtue may bring one into opposition with his corporeal inclination as well as with the current social order—as Spinoza himself experienced—and bring about an end to his corporeal existence (4-72). So conscious was Spinoza of this conflict that he explicitly counsels in his *Ethics* that "A free man thinks of nothing less than of death" (4-67), that is to say, he leads a life of virtue regardless of the consequences for his preservation. "Even if we did not know," he continues, "that our mind is eternal we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion" (5-41). Life and its continuation after death are not to be looked upon as a reward of virtue (5-41 schol.)

In all these instances, Spinoza implicitly admits that there is an actual, practical conflict between the dictates of reason and the apparent good of the imagination and passions. Man's nature is not simple but complex and the eternal part may be in conflict with the temporal part (5-23). In other words, though logically the objective essence of a thing

always affirms its subjective existence,² morally this is not so, since man does not always desire life as the greatest good. In brief, the laws of physics and the principle of identity in logic do not necessarily pertain in biology and ethics. Man may be contrary to himself precisely because he does contain within himself contrary laws or forces of activity.

4 THE AFFECTS AS THE SOURCE OF SOCIAL AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT

IN the previous sections we examined the sources of agreement and conflict in nature as a whole and in human nature in particular. We turn now to examine the role of the affects in promoting social agreement and strife.

We have seen that a thing which produces an affect of joy is regarded on that account as agreeing with human nature (4-30). Similarly a thing which gives rise to an affect of pain is regarded as disagreeing with or as being contrary to our nature (4-31). Spinoza thereby wishes to maintain that there is a basis in the very nature of things for the affects they produce in us—though what this is particularly in the case of evil affects is not clear. The general principle is that things can be said to agree in nature only in virtue of something positive or affirmative which they share in common. They are not said to agree in that which they both lack. Thus Spinoza writes (4-32 schol.)

“For he who says that black and white agree solely in the fact that neither of them is red, absolutely affirms that black and white agree in nothing. So also if we say that a stone and a man agree solely in this, that they are both finite or impotent or do not exist from the necessity of their nature or are both to an indefinite extent dominated by external causes, we affirm that a stone and a man agree in nothing, for things

2 Here, as throughout this study, we have followed Spinoza's scholastic usage of the terms “objective” and “subjective,” which is the exact contrary of the Kantian meanings employed nowadays. The objective essence of a thing is its essence logically conceived as an object or idea of the mind. The subjective or formal essence of a thing is that thing as it exists in itself independently of our contemplation. Compare Spinoza's *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy*, I, def. 3.

which agree in negation only, or in that which they have not, really agree in nothing" (*quae enim in sola negatione, sive in eo quod non habent conveniunt, ea revera nulla in re conveniunt*)

From this Spinoza infers that men agree only in their common powers and disagree in their impotence or passions. He demonstrates (4-32) that "Insofar as men are subject to passions they cannot be said to agree in nature" And again (4-33) "Men may vary in nature from one another insofar as they are agitated [made to conflict] by affects which are passions [*Homines natura discrepare possunt, quatenus affectibus qui passiones sunt, conflictantur*]" Insofar as men are agitated by affects which are passions can they be contrary to one another [*invicem esse contrarii*]" (4-34)

Here the difficulty arises that passions are not merely negations, they are positive affections of the soul which are called passions because of their consequences in hindering the power of reason Spinoza himself insists in his explanation of the affect of sorrow (3-def 3 explan) that passions are actual affections of the individual's nature (*affectus actus est*) and not merely privations or negations (*nec dicere possumus quod tristitia in privatione majoris perfectionis consistat, nam privatio nihil est*) If so, it should be possible for individuals to agree in their passions as well as in affects which are called actions

Indeed, Spinoza's whole analysis of the social relations involved in joy and sorrow implies that individuals may agree as well as disagree in their passions For example, he demonstrates (3-24) "If we imagine that a person affects with joy a thing we hate, we are therefore affected with a hatred towards him On the other hand, if we imagine that he affects it with sorrow, we are therefore affected with love towards it" That is to say, by nature we desire that another similar to ourselves should share our emotions toward the same or similar things—we want him to share our "tastes" and attitudes, and if he fails to do so we become opposed to him By the fact that men agree in nature they tend to imitate each other's affects And so it may happen (3-27) "although we may not have been moved towards a thing by any

affect yet if it is like ourselves, whenever we imagine it to be affected by any affect we are therefore affected by the same " Thus it may be said that men agree in nature because they have similar affects or passions and, conversely, men have similar affects because they agree in nature The basis of agreement is the similarity of attitude toward similar objects as well as the community of human nature Not only do men desire that others share their affects but they also naturally tend to act as others desire them to, in an effort to win their favor and approval (3-39) Hence we can appreciate the powerful influence of custom and social community

What then is the cause of human disagreement? The answer appears to be that the very agreement of men is also the source of their disagreement If two men desire to possess one and the same object which cannot be shared by both, they will necessarily hate each other, since each regards the other as depriving him of his good (3-32). Thus Spinoza explains at length (4-34 schol) "For Peter and Paul are not injurious to one another insofar as they agree in nature, that is to say, insofar as they both love the same object but insofar as they differ from one another . . . For we suppose Peter to have an idea of a beloved object which he now possesses and Paul on the other hand, to have an idea of a beloved object which he has lost The former is affected with joy and the latter on the contrary with sorrow and so far they are contrary to one another " In other words, while a man may desire that others share his affects toward the things he loves and hates (3-31 corol), he does not usually want them to share his possessions themselves. Hence it comes about that a man frequently desires others to share his love for something and yet fears that love at the same time (4-37 schol) "Since the highest good which men seek from an affect [summum bonum quod homines ex affectu appetunt] is often such that only one person can possess it, it follows that persons who love are not consistent with themselves and while they delight to recount the praises of the beloved object, fear lest they should be believed "

A person is said to be envious (*invidia*) when he desires to possess that which belongs to another The envious person is

so disposed as to rejoice at the sorrow of another and to be saddened at his joy (3-24 note) Envy is the exact opposite of compassion which disposes a man to rejoice at the prosperity of others and to be sad when evil befalls them (3-def 24) Thus it is due to one and the same property of human nature that men both agree and disagree in varying circumstances "From the same property of human nature," Spinoza observes (3-32 schol), "from which it follows that men pity one another, it also follows that they are envious and ambitious " Men become contrary or opposed to one another because they have desires for material property and hence they pity those that suffer through poverty and envy those who possess what they cannot attain The tendency to imitate others thus brings men together and unites them in commiseration in time of trouble, but it is also the source of conflict in time of prosperity

Spinoza finds this tendency particularly pronounced among children "We find," he points out (3-32 schol), "that children because their body is, as it were, continually in equilibrium, laugh and cry merely because they see others do the same, whatever else they see others do they immediately wish to imitate, everything which they think pleasing to other people they want " There seems then to be a natural tendency from childhood onward to desire equality or similarity of affects and possessions and this is the source of human association and strife

The main sources of human disagreement are then two first, a person by nature envies those who have things and powers (3-35) which he himself does not possess This disagreement is accidental and varies with the circumstances of the individual, so that he who is envied today may be pitied tomorrow Secondly, there is a real or essential basis in human nature for disagreement, though Spinoza does not stress the latter point Men differ in their constitution and hence are affected differently by one and the same thing or one individual may be affected in diverse ways (*diversi modo*) at different times (*diversis temporis*) (3-51) And so Spinoza concludes (3-51 schol) "We thus see that it is possible for one man to love a thing and for another to hate it, for this

man to fear what the other does not fear, and for the same man to love what before he hated and to dare to do what before he feared ”

Spinoza bases his proof of natural human differences on the axioms and postulates of the second book of the *Ethics* (after prop 13). There he informs us that bodies are distinguished from one another as regards their mode of motion and rest (2-lemma 1), although they all agree (conveniunt) in being modes of extension. The human body which is composed of a number of individuals of diverse natures (2-post 1, ex individuīs diversae naturae), can be affected by external bodies in many ways (2-post 3). Hence diverse men (diversi homines) can be affected by one and the same object in diverse ways (diversi modo) (3-51).

The highly significant point to be noted here is that, though men do not differ substantially from one another, they are diverse as regards their particular forms. *There is real diversity of nature along with community or agreement of attributes*

The argument here maintained is to be contrasted with Spinoza's argument in the fourth book of the *Ethics* (4-31 corol), previously discussed in the section dealing with the metaphysical basis of agreement and contrariness. There we noted that Spinoza distinguishes between “that which is diverse from our nature” (a nostra natura diversa) and “that which is contrary to it” (eadem contraria). That which is diverse from our nature, he argued, cannot be the source of good or evil affects in us since it has nothing in common with our nature. As a result, he failed to account for the actual contrariety of things and was led to explain contrariness by evil affects and vice versa. In the postulates and lemmas of the second book of the *Ethics* which form the basis of the present explanation, Spinoza does grant that there is a real diversity in the particular forms of nature. *Hence he finds a positive basis in human nature for the diversity of affects and the contrariety of desires*. That is to say, men disagree not merely because of what they lack, but because they possess naturally contrary dispositions.

5 SPINOZA'S REALISM AND NOMINALISM.

THE final point to which I wish to draw attention is that Spinoza's conception of the basis of agreement and disagreement in human nature is historically related to the medieval controversy of the realists and nominalists.³ The Scholastic controversy concerning the status of universals involved the problem as to the basis of agreement and diversity among individuals. On the whole, the realists such as William of Champeaux and Duns Scotus stressed the essential, universal forms common to all particulars as the source of agreement among things and our ideas of them. The diversity of particulars was accidental though proper. On the other hand, the nominalists such as Roscelin (and to some extent Abelard and Ockham) stressed the inherent, essential diversity of the particulars and denied any universal basis in the nature of things themselves. Hence the latter were forced, as in the case of Ockham, to attribute the universals to the mind or imagination. Universals, they explained, were confused mental abstractions due to the fact that the mind selects or abstracts similar qualities in things and compounds them together to constitute one objective essence, though the formal or subjective essence of things is actually diverse. In Spinoza we find both the realistic and nominalistic tendency. Although he professes the nominalistic theory in his epistemology (2-40 schol.), his metaphysics and Stoic theory of the passions led him to maintain a realistic conception of the universals.

Thus insofar as Spinoza denies that the diverse can interact, he regards all contrariety as accidental. Human nature is in fundamental agreement and all individual differences are due to external causes, such as exclusive property, which dispose men to seek one another's destruction. Similarly the affects themselves are contrary by accident and are defined (4-def. 5) as "those which although they may be of the same kind [ejusdem generis] draw a man in different directions

³ For a clear account of this problem in its medieval setting see E. Gilson's *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, Chap. I, on "Logicism and Philosophy" (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937).

[*diversum trahunt*], such as voluptuousness and avarice, which are both a species of love [*amoris species*] and are not contrary to one another by nature but only by accident [*nec natura sed per accidens sunt contrarii*] ” Similarly men who experience these contrary affects are not contrary by nature but only by accident. All men agree in nature insofar as they are members of the same species.

On the other hand, insofar as Spinoza acknowledges a real diversity in the particular forms of things, he is also prepared to grant that individuals may be essentially different and opposed to one another by nature. Thus he maintains that the similarity between things is only accidental and there is no necessary basis in the nature of things for sympathy and antipathy (3-15 schol.) The agreement in attributes through which particular things are conceived serves as a basis for interaction which only intensifies the contrariety due to intrinsic diversity of the modes. This is but another way of saying what can be verified by daily experience—that one disagrees most with those who in other respects are most similar. The feuds among rival political groups and the persecution of religious minorities are tragic and common illustrations. It is precisely the small though important differences among individuals of the same species or profession which lead to mutual conflict.

The problem of human agreement and conflict troubled Spinoza greatly and he found it necessary to utilize both the realistic and nominalistic traditions to account for the facts. Here as elsewhere he developed both alternatives without realizing their mutual incompatibility. At times he found an essential agreement and community among things and then regarded all individual differences as accidental. At other times, he emphasized the essential diversity of particular things and despaired of finding any basis of agreement.

6 THE INTELLECT AS THE PRIMARY BASIS OF HUMAN AGREEMENT

IN our previous analysis we showed that according to one aspect of Spinoza's thought there is an essential, universal

basis of agreement in human nature and that all disagreement is due to human impotence and is caused by the passions. We now turn to examine in more detail this common element in human nature.

Briefly put, Spinoza following the Stoics maintains that the common element in all men is the reason or intellect. Human power or perfection consists in the activity of the intellect and the latter is therefore the only positive element in virtue of which all men may agree. All corporeal affects are passions which indicate human impotence and are therefore the source of human conflict (4-32, 33, 34). This aspect of Spinoza's thought is best shown by the advice he gives to those who would live according to the dictates of reason. Thus he writes (4-50 corol) "Hence it follows that a man who lives according to the dictates of reason endeavours as much as possible to prevent himself from being touched by pity [*commiseratione*]." Then again later (4-73 schol) "Nor do I think it worth while to demonstrate here one by one, all the properties of fortitude and still less to show how its possessor can hate no one, be angry with no one, can neither envy be indignant with nor despise anybody, and can least of all be proud. For this reason his chief effort is to conceive all things as they are in themselves and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride and others of this kind which we have before noticed."

Here we see that Spinoza condemns indiscriminately all passions of sorrow, such as pity, even though they may be a source of human unity, along with passions which foment human discord, such as hatred and envy. It is this attempt to be dispassionate and impassive which renders Spinoza's *Ethics* so inhuman at times. Fundamentally it all goes back to his failure to distinguish clearly between passions which depend upon the agreement in human nature and those passions which are intrinsically contrary and render men contrary to one another.

The theory that the intellect is the only universal bond of agreement between men takes on special significance when it is considered in relation to nature as a whole. We noted

in our discussion of the metaphysical source of agreement in nature that there was an essential unity or harmony among the parts of nature, since they all followed from the unity of the divine nature. We now see that Spinoza regards man insofar as he is led by reason as a law unto himself. *Although man is a part of nature he is governed by rational laws which pertain only to his own kind, nature as a whole is not governed by the laws of reason.* Hence there is an inevitable conflict between man considered as a rational animal and the rest of nature. Thus we find Spinoza writes (4-37 schol 1) "The difference between true virtue and impotence may, from what has already been said, be easily seen to be this—that virtue consists in living according to the guidance of reason alone, and that impotence therefore consists in this alone—that a man suffers himself [patiatui] to be led by things which are outside himself, and by them to be determined to such actions as the common constitution of external things demands and not to such as his own nature considered in itself alone demands [quae ad ea agendum determinetur quae rerum externarum communis constitutio non autem ea quae ipsa ipsius natura in se sola considerata postulat]

From them we see that the law against killing animals is based upon empty superstition and womanish tenderness rather than upon sound reason [ratione fundatam]. For reason teaches us to seek our own profit and the necessity of uniting with men [necessitudinem cum hominibus jungere sed non cum brutis] but not with brutes or with things whose nature is diverse [diversa] from human nature, but the same right [jus] which they have over us, we have over them."

From the above passage it is evident that Spinoza ascribes human impotence or passion to the fact that man tends to live in agreement with the common constitution of external nature (rerum externarum communis constitutio) and not in accordance with the demands of their own specific nature. The good of man is not necessarily in agreement with the rest of nature or with that of other animals. Hence man as a rational animal need not unite with or seek to conserve brutes, even though the latter have feelings. Reason demands that men unite only with their own kind and not with any-

thing whose nature is diverse from theirs. Hence man has a rational right to utilize all things for his own advantage—even though this involve the destruction of other forms of life. In this respect Spinoza's position is contrary to that of the Stoics who thought that the whole of nature was a harmony guided by universal laws and that man must strive to unite so far as possible with the whole of nature. There was, so they claimed, a natural sympathy between all parts of nature since all things were organically interrelated. Spinoza, on the other hand, denied such universal affinities and, like Aristotle, stressed the specific independent natures of the various forms of life. The similarity between things was accidental and provided no rational ground for assuming community of nature (3-15 schol.)

The diversity between man and brutes is mentioned again later in Spinoza's allegorical interpretation of the story of the Fall in Genesis—an interpretation based on Augustinian sources. Thus he writes (4-68 schol.) "This appears to have been what was meant by Moses in that history of the first man. In that history no other power of God is conceived excepting that by which He created man, that is to say, the power with which He considered nothing but the advantage of man. Therefore we are told that God forbade free man to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and warned him that as soon as he ate of it, he would immediately dread death rather than desire to live. Afterwards we are told that when man found a wife who agreed entirely with his nature [quae cum sua natura prorsus conveniebat] he saw that there could be nothing in nature which could be more profitable to him than his wife. But when he came to believe that the brutes were like himself he immediately began to imitate their affects [bruta sibi similia esse credidit statim eorum affectus imitare incepit] and to lose his liberty which the Patriarchs afterwards recovered being led by the spirit of Christ [ductu spiritu Christi] that is to say, by the idea of God [hoc est dei idea], which alone can make a man free and cause him to desire for other men the good he desires for himself."

According to this interpretation, God gave Adam the only

true good he required; namely, a wife who agreed with his own nature. But Adam and Eve fell and lost their primitive virtue and freedom because they began to imitate the corporeal passions of the brutes of which the serpent is typical. They failed to realize that there was no essential similarity between the nature and affects of a man and those of a brute and hence that the desires of a brute for good and evil were contrary to the rational desires of a man. Adam and Eve should have lived in conformity with the demands of their own nature and the divine commands of reason. Man is governed by the special laws of God and not by those which govern the rest of nature. The freedom of man thus lost through Adam's impotence was regained, Spinoza explains, following Christian theology (Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, Bk. XIII, chap. xi), through acceptance of the spirit of Christ, which metaphysically is to be identified with the infinite intellect or Logos of God, which is "the son, product or immediate creation of God" (*Short Treatise*, I, chap. ix). The divine truth revealed anew to man helped him to regain his vision of perfection and to destroy the power of the passions which man has in common with other forms of life.

It is instructive to observe that T. H. Huxley in his address on "Evolution and Ethics" warned against a similar "fall" of man through the uncritical application of the universal laws of biological evolution to present human conduct. The origin of man, he counseled, is no guide to man's final end and future laws of evolution. The common origin of all forms of life is no guide to their present and future development. Human morality frequently requires man to act contrary to the common order of nature.

7 THE COMMUNITY OF THE DIVINE AND HUMAN INTELLECTS

So far we have gathered evidence to show that for Spinoza the reason or intellect is that which is common to all men and distinguishes them from the rest of nature. The question now occurs, what ground has Spinoza for saying that the human intellect functions identically in all? Spinoza's an-

answer in effect is that each idea conceived by the human intellect is an eternal truth which constitutes the eternal intellect of God. To say therefore that the human mind conceives a true and adequate idea means that some human intellect conceives this eternal truth as it follows necessarily from the divine attribute of thought. The eternal truth as it exists in the divine intellect is the common norm or object of all the ideas conceived by the various human intellects. Each human intellect can form an adequate idea of this single eternal truth because the human intellect itself is a mode of the divine intellect. Hence when it is said that the human mind conceives this or that eternal truth adequately, this means in metaphysical terms that God, as expressed through the finite human intellect, conceives this or that idea of Himself. Spinoza states his position briefly in the following passage (2-11, corol.) "Hence it follows that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God, and therefore when we say that the human mind perceives this or that thing, we say nothing else than that God has this or that idea, not indeed insofar as He is infinite, but insofar as He is manifested through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as He forms the essence of the human mind." Similarly he writes (5-40 schol.), "It is evident that our mind insofar as it understands is an eternal mode of thought, which is determined by another eternal mode of thought, and this again by another, and so on ad infinitum, so that all taken at once [simul] constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God."

All human intellects conceive the eternal nature of the divine intellect from a different, finite point of view. By nature then all human intellects are essentially in agreement because they all participate in the unity of the divine intellect and necessarily conceive the formal essence of things as eternal truths in the mind of God. The intellect is intrinsically a "dry light" which reveals clearly and distinctly the eternal formal essence of things insofar as it is not prevented from doing so by the power of external forces. In this respect, Spinoza is opposed to Francis Bacon (*Novum organum*, Aphorism 40) who regarded the human intellect as an instrument inherently fallible by its very nature and one which

distorts the truth like an uneven mirror (Spinoza Correspondence let 2, to Oldenburg, 1661).

8 THE INTELLECT AS THE FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL HARMONY.

THE community of the intellect in all men and the identity of the truths so conceived imply that all men will necessarily agree in their judgment of good and evil "so far as they live in conformity with the guidance of reason [ex ductu rationis]" (4-35) What is good for one individual who lives according to the guidance of reason is a universal good "because that which from the dictates of reason we judge to be good or evil is necessarily good or evil" (4-35 demon) The community of human nature involves an essential agreement as to the nature of the objects or goods they will desire each for himself

There is another important implication of Spinoza's theory, namely, that man insofar as he is rational is essentially social That is to say, the good of those who live the life of reason cannot be enjoyed alone and requires the union of other minds, there is no individual good apart from the social good It is in the interests of each person that others agree with him in nature so far as possible and hence that they possess the highest possible perfection "It is part of my happiness," Spinoza feels convinced, "to lend a helping hand that many others may understand even as I do, so that their understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own" Similarly he concludes in the *Ethics* (4-append § 9-§ 12) "Nothing therefore can agree better with the nature of any individual than other individuals of the same kind and so there is nothing more profitable to man for the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of a rational life than a man who is guided by reason Above all things is it profitable to men to unite in communities [consuetudines jungere] and to unite themselves to one another by bonds which make all of them as one man [de omnibus unum efficiant] and absolutely to do whatever may tend to strengthen their friendships [firmandis amicitias]"

The mark of perfection in a society is indicated by the extent to which there is an internal harmony among its component parts. Peace, concord, friendship are the products of essential agreement due to community of rational life. The harmony of human social life reflects the peace and unity of the infinite perfection of God. The apparent lack of strife which is produced by fear is without good faith (*sine fide*) (4-append § 16) and is but a temporary condition disguising a fundamental dissatisfaction and lack of equilibrium. "Minds," Spinoza counsels, "are not conquered by arms but by love and generosity." All this is in opposition to those modern societies who would produce unity within their borders through coercion and persecution of minorities and who carry the "blessings" of their "civilization" to foreign countries with the sword.

V

ON THE DERIVATIVE AFFECTS

1 THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE DERIVATIVE AFFECTS

THE difficulties inherent in Spinoza's doctrine of the primary affects as well as in his conception of human nature become most apparent when we consider his definitions of the derivative affects. By derivative affects we refer to the sum total of the affects which involve some one of the primary affects in their definition. So considered the derivative affects are either combinations or modifications of the primary ones and are distinguished from the latter principally by the variety of their objects. The all-important point to note is that Spinoza divides the derivative affects into two major groups, namely, those which are modifications of joy and sorrow and those which are modes of desire (3-def 31 explan). He attempts to redefine the common affects in such a manner as to make it immediately apparent whether a given passion pertains to one or the other of the three primary affects. The method of definition, I shall try to show, frequently renders his definitions arbitrary and narrow.

One of the major sources of difficulty in classifying the derivative affects is the problem of the interrelation of the three primary affects (see chap III, § 5). Insofar as joy and sorrow are prior by nature to desire, then it follows that all derivative affects are to be conceived as modes of joy and sorrow. On the other hand, if desire is regarded as prior to joy and sorrow then all derivative affects are really modes of desire. Spinoza compromises by defining most of the derivative affects as modes of joy and sorrow and the remainder as modes of desire so as to conform so far as possible with the customary definitions. Thus we find the first thirty defini-

tions listed at the conclusion of book three of the *Ethics* are classified as modes of joy and sorrow, while the remaining seventeen are classified as modes of desire. Spinoza even admits, as we shall see, that among the modes of desire there are some that are properly modes of joy and sorrow, though he defines them as modes of desire out of regard for custom (3-def 32 explan). At other times, he defines some affects as modes of both joy and desire (3-34 45-48).

In book three of the *Ethics* Spinoza begins by defining the three primary affects and then proceeds to define their various modes. He begins his list of derivative affects with wonder (admiration) and contempt (defs 4, 5) which are followed by love, hatred, inclination, and aversion. This order differs from that of the *Short Treatise* where he begins with wonder and then defines love, hatred, aversion and desire, joy and sorrow. In the *Short Treatise* Spinoza follows Descartes's enumeration of the emotions as found in the latter's treatise *On the Passions of the Soul*, though unlike Descartes he does not there mention any primitive or primary affects. Historically, we may note, this Cartesian order of the passions beginning with love and ending with sorrow is identical with that enumerated by St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologica* (Pt II, 1st pt, Quest 23). In fact, the passions mentioned are precisely the six mentioned by St. Thomas as pertaining to the concupiscible faculty (chap 11, § 1). According to the latter, the passion of love comes first and this gives rise to desire for the object and finally joy. In like manner hatred, aversion, and sorrow follow one another. The important point to note here is that in the *Short Treatise* Spinoza agrees that desire, joy, and sorrow are consequences of love and hatred. Thus he remarks (*Short Treatise*, II, chap vi) "From hatred there ensues sorrow and when the hatred is great it produces anger which not only like hatred seeks to flee from what is hated, but also to annihilate it when that is practicable, from this great hatred comes also envy. But from aversion there comes a certain sorrow because we consider ourselves to be deprived of something."

It is obvious then that in the *Short Treatise* Spinoza's

conception of the order of the passions beginning with love and passing on to desire and joy or beginning with hatred and aversion and passing on to sorrow is basically the same as that of St Thomas. In the *Ethics*, however, Spinoza no longer follows the Scholastic order, though he still shows traces of Cartesian influence insofar as he begins his list of derivative affects with wonder and contempt, love and hatred, inclination and aversion.

2 THE PECULIAR STATUS OF WONDER.

THE one exception to this triple subdivision of the affects is "wonder" (*admiratio*), and its contrary "contempt" (*contemptus*). Wonder Spinoza defines (3-def. 4) as "the imagination of some object, in which besides the mind remains fixed, because the singular imagination has no connection with others." Similarly "contempt" (3-def. 5) "is the imagination of an object which so little touches the mind that the mind is more moved by the presence of the object to imagine those qualities which are not in it, rather than those which are in it."

Wonder is due to the impotence of the imagination in the presence of some strange or singular object. That is to say, there is no positive cause in the object as such for wonder and hence wonder cannot properly be considered as an affect of the mind (3-def. 4 explan.). Indeed, wonder arises from the absence of any positive cause whereby the mind may pass from one idea to another. Spinoza's definition is thus contrary to the Cartesian definition that wonder is a primary affect of the mind, as well as to the Scholastic doctrine which regards wonder as a positive attribute of the intellect.

Spinoza includes wonder and contempt in his list of affects because both the former enter into various combinations with the three primary affects of joy, sorrow, and desire, and the resultant derivative affects bear new names. Thus he explains (3-def. 4) "The only reason which has induced me to speak of wonder is, that it has been the custom to give other names to certain affects derived from the three

primitives whenever these affects are related to objects at which we wonder. This same reason also induces me to add the definition of contempt."

As examples of such combinations of wonder with the three primary affects, Spinoza mentions (3-52 schol.) veneration (*veneratio*), horror, devotion (*devotio*). Veneration is wonder plus love of some good, such as wisdom or industry. Devotion is love and veneration and is therefore a more ardent form of love than that involved in veneration alone—although in 3-def. 10, Spinoza does not distinguish between veneration and devotion. Similarly horror is wonder joined to hate. "In the same manner," he adds (3-52 schol.), "it is possible to conceive of hatred, hope and confidence and other affects being joined to wonder, so that we could deduce more affects than are usually indicated by the accepted vocabulary. From which it appears, that names have been invented more from their common use than from an accurate knowledge of them."

Among the modes of contempt, Spinoza mentions derision (*irrisio*) which is a combination of contempt with fear or hate (3-52 schol., 3-def. 11). In his formal definition (3-def. 11) he remarks that derision is a mode of joy rather than of sorrow, though it also involves an element of sorrow. "Derision is joy arising from the imagination that something we despise is present in an object we hate." We must note further that derision is to be distinguished from ordinary laughter (*risus*) which is an agitation of the body alone and has no proper reference to the mind at all (3-59 schol.). Scorn (*dedignatio*) is contempt plus hatred of folly (*ex stultitiae contemptu*) and as such is contrary to veneration which is wonder plus love of wisdom. Contempt may likewise be joined with love, hope, and glory (3-52 schol.). Thus we see that although wonder and contempt are not themselves affects of desire, joy, or sorrow, they do enter into combination with these affects to produce new compounds which bear different names. Considered themselves, however, there is nothing positive in wonder or contempt which should induce one to consider them as affects of the mind.

The question remains, how did Spinoza arrive at this un-

usual conception of wonder and why did he object to the traditional definition of the Scholastics?

In answer to the first question we can point to Descartes's definition of wonder which is practically identical with that of Spinoza. In the treatise *On the Passions of the Soul*, Descartes defines wonder as (§ 70) "a sudden surprise of the soul which causes it to consider with attention the objects which seem to it rare and extraordinary." While adopting this definition, Spinoza denied that wonder per se was properly an affect of the mind, since the rare, novel, or singular was not a positive attribute of things but rather an accidental quality attributed to things due to the impotence of the imagination and the ignorance of the mind. Wonder as conceived by both Descartes and Spinoza is really equivalent to what we call astonishment, though they apparently identified wonder and astonishment.

The special significance of this definition consists in the fact that the novelty of the object is considered as if it were the efficient cause of wonder. That is to say, wonder is not the desire of the intellect to discover the unknown causes of things as Aristotle and the Scholastics thought, it is not a positive effort to acquire such knowledge as is lacking. Such descriptions imply that knowledge is the final cause of wonder, the end or good which the mind seeks. In opposition to this conception, Spinoza therefore maintains that wonder is a passive affect, which arises because the mind is hindered from actively conceiving other ideas through the impotence of the imagination.

It is interesting to note that Hobbes, who is usually no friend of the Scholastics, follows the latter in his definition of wonder or curiosity. We find he writes (*Leviathan*, I, chap. vi) "Desire to know how and why is curiosity, such as is in no living creature but man, so that man is distinguished not only by his reason but also by this singular passion from other animals in whom the appetite of food and other pleasures of sense, by predominance take away the care of knowing causes, which is a lust of the mind that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of

any carnal pleasure. . Joy from apprehension of novelty is admiration; proper to man because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause"

Hobbes, we note, regards "curiosity" as a mode of desire; namely, the desire for knowledge of causes, and distinguishes the latter from "admiration" which is a mode of joy directed toward some novel object. For all his devotion to efficient causes, Hobbes failed to see that in admitting a "desire to know how and why" as the proper function of man, he was also acknowledging the validity of the final cause as an explanation of desire. As said, in this respect Spinoza, who defined wonder and its modes as passions due to singular efficient causes, was more consistent than Hobbes.

3 THE DEFINITIONS OF LOVE AND HATRED

THE most striking illustration of the difficulties inherent in Spinoza's definitions of the derivative affects is afforded by his definitions of love and hatred.

In the *Ethics* (3-def. 6) Spinoza defines love as "joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause" (*amor est laetitia concomitante idea causae externae*). Similarly hatred (*odium*) is "sorrow with the accompanying idea of an external cause." These definitions are unusual for two reasons: first, why does Spinoza define love as a mode of joy, second, why does he specify that love involves the idea of an external cause? In answer to the first question we can say that Spinoza defines love in accordance with his mechanistic conception of the origin of the passions. On this theory, we have seen (chap. III, § 5) the external object is the efficient cause of joy and the latter affect determines the nature of desire. Hence love is essentially an affect of joy, the desire which it involves is a property following from the perception of the external cause. Thus Spinoza speaks of "the desire which springs from sorrow or joy, from hatred or love" (3-37), evidently implying that love and hatred like all other modes of joy and sorrow are prior to desire and determine its nature.

Similarly the reason why Spinoza mentions specifically

that love involves the idea of the external cause is found in his conception of the affect of joy. Joy, as we have seen, is defined as the idea of man's transition to a greater form of perfection (see chap 11, § 2) He does not say that the affect of joy considered as a mode of mind refers to an object other than the human body, although he does grant that the quality of the pleasure depends upon the nature of the object by which the human body is affected (chap 11, § 5) In other words, Spinoza does not distinguish between the feeling or affect of joy and the perception of the mind involved (chap 11, § 3) Hence when he comes to define love, he finds it necessary to specify that joy proper differs from love in that the latter affect is accompanied by or united to the idea of the external cause of joy There is no love without an idea of the object loved (2-ax 3), although there may apparently be pleasure without an idea of the external cause

There is, however, another important reason why Spinoza found it necessary to mention the idea of the external cause in his definition of love He was aware that Hobbes, for example, had distinguished love from desire by saying that love "most commonly" involves the presence of the object whereas desire involves the absence of the thing desired (see chap 11, § 1) Spinoza, it appears, disagreed with Hobbes's assertion that love involves the presence of the object In love as in desire, he maintains, it is sufficient that the mind have an idea or image of the object, whereby the latter is regarded as if it were present This notion is shown most clearly illustrated by Spinoza's explanation in the *Short Treatise* (II, chap 11) where he says. "Desire, whether (as some will have it) it consists only in a longing or inclination to obtain what is wanting or (as others will have it) to retain the things we already enjoy, it is certain that it cannot be found to have come upon anyone except from an apparent good [sub specie boni] It is therefore clear that desire as also longing which we have already discussed is the outcome of the first kind of knowledge [note] The first definition is the best because when the thing is enjoyed the desire ceases, the form (of consciousness) which then

prompts us to retain the thing is not desire but a fear of losing the thing loved." Here we see Spinoza contrasts the views of Hobbes and Descartes on the nature of desire and indicates his preference for that of the former which asserts that desire involves the absence of the object rather than the continuation of an object which is present. Similarly "love arises from the idea and knowledge that we have of a thing" (*Short Treatise* II, chap. v), the efficient cause of love is the idea of some object and not the actual object itself.

The idea of the cause of joy may then give rise to a desire to continue the mind's attention toward this idea and to be conscious of it so far as possible. Thus Spinoza demonstrates (3-12) "The mind endeavours as much as possible to imagine those things which increase or assist the body's power of action" (*mens quantum potest, ea imaginari conatur quae corporis agendi potentiam augent, vel juvant*). Similarly (3-13) "When the mind imagines those things which lessen or limit the body's power of action, it endeavours as much as possible to recollect what excludes the existence of those things . . . [corol.] Hence it follows that the mind is averse to imagine those things which lessen or limit its power and that of the body [hinc sequitur quod mens ea imaginari aversatur quae ipsius et corporis potentiam minuunt vel coercent]"

In like manner, speaking of the love of God, Spinoza implicitly demonstrates that by the mind's union with God he means the attention which the mind pays to the idea of God. Thus he writes (5-11) "The greater the number of objects to which an image is related, the more constant is it, or the more frequently does it present itself and the more does it occupy the mind [*mentem magis occupat*]" [5-14]. The mind can cause all the affections of the body or the images of things to be related to the idea of God . . . [5-5]. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his affects loves God and loves Him more the better he understands himself and his affects [5-16]. This love to God above everything else ought to occupy the mind [*hic erga deum amor mentem maxime occupare debet*]." In all these demonstrations Spinoza aims to prove that a conse-

quence of the love of God is the effort the mind makes to contemplate the idea of God exclusively and continuously.

Another consequence or property of love is that the individual not only seeks to contemplate the idea of the external cause of joy, but also endeavors to promote the actual existence and preservation of the object itself. Thus Spinoza explains (3-13 schol), "We see too that he who loves a thing necessarily endeavours to keep it before him and to preserve it, and, on the other hand, he who hates a thing necessarily endeavours to remove it" And again (3-28): "We endeavour to bring into existence [*conamur promovere ut fiat*] everything which we imagine conduces to joy, and to remove and destroy [*amovei vel destitueret conamur*] everything opposed to it or which we imagine conduces to sorrow

[demon] But the mind's effort or power in thinking is equal to and simultaneous with the body's effort or power in acting [2-7] and therefore absolutely whatever conduces to joy we endeavour to make exist, that is to say, we seek after it and aim at it [*sed mentis conatus seu potentia in cogitando aequalis and simul natura est cum corporis conatu seu potentia in agendo, ergo ut id existat absolute conamur sive appetimus et intendimus*]" Here we see that through love the individual as constituted by body and mind desires and endeavors to bring into existence the actual object of his love and is averse or opposed to the existence of whatever he hates. The individual's desire for union with the object is a property or consequence of his love and is nothing more than the effort he makes to promote the actual or formal presence of the thing beloved in addition to the presence of its idea or "objective essence" in the mind.

This renders intelligible Spinoza's remarks in the explanation to his definition of love (3-def 6 explan) "This definition explains with sufficient clearness the essence of love, that which is given by some authors who define love to be the will of the lover to unite himself to the beloved object, expressing not the essence of love but one of its properties. And inasmuch as these authors have not seen with sufficient clearness what is the essence of love, they could not have a distinct conception of its properties and consequently their

definition has by everybody been thought very obscure . I must observe, however, when I say that it is a property in a lover to will a union with the beloved object, that I do not understand by will a consent or deliberation or a free decree of the mind nor even a desire of the lover to unite himself with the beloved object when it is absent nor a desire to continue in its presence when it is present, for love can be conceived without either one or the other of these desires ”

The above passage makes it evident that the will for union is, according to Spinoza, a property following from the essence of love but not one constituting the very essence of love itself In view of the propositions previously quoted (3-13, 28) it is, however, difficult to see why Spinoza denies in the above passage that “a desire [cupiditatem] of the lover to unite himself with the beloved object when it is absent nor a desire to continue in its presence when it is present” is a property of love It appears that he is reverting to his radical distinction between will and desire (2-48 schol) in direct contradiction to the propositions of book three

The author whom Spinoza had especially in mind in making his critical remarks was undoubtedly Descartes and those who like Leo Hebraeus, the author of the *Dialogue on Love*, followed in the Platonic tradition In order to appreciate the full significance of Spinoza's criticism we must bear in mind the Cartesian definitions of love to which he referred In the treatise *On the Passions of the Soul*, Descartes writes (§ 79) “Love is an emotion of the soul caused by the movement of the spirits which incites it to join itself willingly to objects which appear to it to be agreeable . . . Hatred is an emotion caused by the spirits which incite the soul to desire to be separated from the objects which present themselves to be hurtful . . . I say that these emotions are caused by the spirits in order to distinguish love and hate which are passions dependent on the body, both from the judgments which also induce the soul by its free will to unite itself with the things which it esteems to be good and to separate itself from those it holds to be evil, and from the emotions which these judgments excite of themselves in the soul [§ 80] By the word will I do not here intend to

talk of desire which is a passion apart and one which is related to the future, but of the *consent* by which we consider ourselves from this time forward as combined with what we love, so that we imagine a whole of which we conceive ourselves as only constituting one part while the thing beloved constitutes another part "

From the above quotation we gather that Descartes distinguishes between the passion of love and intellectual love. The passion of love is primarily corporeal in origin and is essentially a desire for union or the continuation of a union with some physical object which appears agreeable, just as hatred is an aversion or desire for separation from some disagreeable object. Intellectual love, however, involves three distinct factors, namely, the judgment of what is good, the consent or free will to unite with objects conceived as good, and the emotion or agreeable feeling which arises from and accompanies this consent. The free will or consent involved in intellectual love pertains to the mind alone and is to be distinguished from the corporeal desire whereby the soul is disposed to wish for the future the things which it represents to itself as agreeable (*On the Passions of the Soul*, § 86) (so Plato in *Symposium*). This will or consent for union is not even a rational desire for the object, it is rather the affection which binds or unites the lover to the object conceived as good.

When we reexamine Spinoza's explanation in the light of Descartes's definition, it becomes evident that Spinoza was primarily opposed to the Cartesian notion that the passion of love is "a desire of the lover to unite himself with the beloved object when it is absent nor a desire to continue in its presence when it is present" (3-def 6 explan). Instead he maintains that the affect of love is nothing more than the joy accompanied by the image which affirms the presence or existence of the external cause. Similarly Spinoza is opposed to the Cartesian conception of intellectual love. In accordance with his general metaphysical theory he denies the existence of free will since the ideas of the mind are all determined (2-48). Furthermore, we have seen (chap III) that Spinoza identified the cognitive with the conative functions

of the intellect and hence did not distinguish between the mind's judgment of the good and its will for union.

It is important to note here that by will for union Descartes means not an intellectual effort or desire for union with the object, but a consent or affection of the soul whereby it regards itself as united to its object so as to constitute a single whole. The full significance of Descartes's conception of intellectual love is best illustrated by the definition of St Augustine whom he apparently followed. In the *De Trinitate* (viii, 10) St Augustine writes: "What then is love except a vital principle which unites or seeks to unite together some two things, namely, him that loves and that which is loved." According to this definition love is the relation of union between the lover and his object.

Similarly St Thomas distinguished between "real union" which is an effect of love, and "the love of affection" which constitutes the essence of love (*Summa Theologica*, Pt II, 1st pt, Quest 27, § 1). By real union he means "the active desire for the presence of the object which follows from the agreement or co-adaptability between the lover and the beloved whereby the lover apprehends the object as suitable to his well-being." On the other hand, the "love of affection" is essentially love itself. It is the apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved and the lover, it is the bond of affection which unites the lover to the object as to himself if it be the love of friendship, or as to something belonging to himself if it be the love of concupiscence. Descartes, it appears, had in mind this "union of affection" to which St Thomas and St Augustine referred when he explained that by the will for union he meant the consent (*consensum*) or bond of union between the lover and his object.

Spinoza, it appears, followed Descartes in his conception of intellectual love but differed from the latter in regarding the will for union as an effect and not as a cause of love. Thus we find he remarks (3-def 6 explan.) "By will I understand the satisfaction [*acquiescentia*] that the beloved object produces in the lover by its presence, by virtue of which the joy of the lover is strengthened or at any rate sup-

ported." Here we see that by will (*voluntas*) Spinoza means the satisfaction which the mind feels in affirming the presence of the efficient cause of its love. The will is not an effort or desire to unite the lover to its object, it is rather the relation of satisfaction or agreement between the lover and the thing loved. Furthermore, the mind's acquiescence is not the efficient cause of love, it is rather the effect of such love. Spinoza's theory is based on the premise that the mind wills the presence of the object, not because it first apprehends the object as good in itself, but because the mind contemplates the joy of which the object is the efficient cause and therefore wills the continuation of that state.

In his formal definition of love at the end of book three (3-def 6) Spinoza provided only a single definition of love instead of the two submitted by Descartes, though the former also required two distinct definitions. Descartes, we have seen, distinguished between the love which is a passion involving a desire for union, and intellectual love which involves the free will or consent of the individual. Spinoza, on the other hand, tried to combine the two kinds of love in a single definition but tended to stress those properties which Descartes attributed to intellectual love. This explains why he too denied that by will he meant any kind of desire and added that by will he meant in this connection only acquiescence or satisfaction in the continued presence of the object. Spinoza simply substituted the Latin term "*acquiescentia*" for the term "*consensum*" employed by Descartes in order to distinguish his conception of will from that of Descartes who presupposed a free or autonomous faculty of will other than the intellect. It is noteworthy, however, that in his original definition of love (3-13 schol.) Spinoza does state that desire for union with, and preservation of, the object is a property or consequence of love, though he does not find any place for desire in his later definition. In other words, *Spinoza distinguished between the desire for union which is a property of the passion of love and the will for union which is a consequence of intellectual love, though this distinction is not clearly made in his definition*

4 ST THOMAS AND SPINOZA ON THE ORIGIN OF LOVE

SPINOZA's use of the term *voluntas* to mean *acquiescentia* is very peculiar and differs from the usual meaning of the term throughout the *Ethics*. I wish now to suggest that Spinoza's reference to *acquiescentia* in this connection reflects the definition of love as given by St Thomas or by some Scholastic treatise based on the latter.

We have seen in our discussion of the Scholastic theory of the *conatus* (chap. III, § 2) that St Thomas distinguishes three kinds of appetite, namely, the natural, sensitive, and rational. In each case the appetite is characterized by the nature of the end or good which it seeks and the power or faculty of the individual which is involved.

Starting from this premise St Thomas likewise explains the nature and origin of love. Thus he writes (*Summa Theologica*, Pt II, 1st pt, Quest 25, § 2) "Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end has in the first place an aptitude or proportion to that end, secondly, it is moved to that end, thirdly, it rests in the end after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good, while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence and rest in good is joy or pleasure. According to this order, love precedes desire and desire precedes pleasure—But in the order of intention it is the reverse because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, while enjoyment is in a way the end, just as the good itself is."

From this passage it is evident that love is the complacency (*complacentia*) of the appetite due to the aptitude of the subject for the object. Love is that disposition of the appetite for an object whereby the individual is moved to desire the object and finally to enjoy it. Love is a passion since the appetible object produces this form of complacency or adaptation in the appetite whereby the individual is moved to seek the object and finally to delight in its presence.

(Quest 26, § 2). In the words of St Thomas "Accordingly the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called love and is nothing else than complacency [complacentia] in that object and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object and this movement is desire [desiderium] and lastly there is rest which is joy [quies quae est gaudium] "

It is especially noteworthy that St Thomas regards union with the beloved object as a relation or consequence following from the disposition of complacency or agreement produced by the object and not as the very essence of love itself. This view, he is aware, is contrary to that of St. Augustine in the *De Trinitate* (viii, 10). In the reply to objection two of Question 26, § 2, St Thomas maintains ¹ "Union belongs to love insofar as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear, that love is not the very relation of union but that union is a result of love (Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis sed unio est consequens amorem). Hence too Dionysius says that 'love is a unitive force' and the Philosopher says (*Politica* 11) that union is the work of love "

In a later question of the same volume (Quest 28, § 1) St Thomas again takes up the question "whether union is the effect of love" and differentiates between "real union" which is an effect of love and the essential "love of affection" which is the apprehension of the bond of unity which joins the lover to his object. In this manner he endeavors to reconcile his own position with that of St. Augustine.

Corresponding to the three species of appetite St Thomas likewise distinguishes three kinds of love, namely, natural, sensitive, and intellectual love. "Now in each of these appetites," he points out (Quest 26, § 1), "the name love is given to the principle of movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends and may be called natural love [amor naturalis],

¹ All abbreviated references in this section refer to the *Summa Theologiae*, Pt II, 1st pt, first number.

thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre is by reason of its weight and may be called natural love. In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called sensitive love or intellectual or rational love [*amor intellectivus seu rationalis*]. So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible power because it regards good absolutely and not under the aspect of difficulty which is the object of the irascible faculty."

Love, it appears from the above, is an internal principle of motion and consists in the agreement, complacency, or aptitude whereby one thing is attracted by another which is suitable to its nature. On the level of natural, inanimate objects this agreement or connaturalness between the appetitive subject and its object is something predetermined by the Creator Himself. Thus the force of gravity which for Aristotle was due to weight is the natural love of one object for another place. On the level of animal life, the object which is perceived as a good is the proper object of love and desire. That is to say, sensitive love requires an idea or perception of the good which is loved. Similarly, intellectual love requires a prior conception of the idea of the good (Quest 27, § 2). That is to say, in both sensitive and intellectual love, knowledge is the final cause of love whereas in natural love the cause is found in the predetermined agreement between the two bodies. The good is however the proper cause of love in all cases (Quest 27, § 1).

In comparing St. Thomas and Spinoza we note first that the former's use of the term *complacentia* corresponds to the latter's use of the term *acquiescentia*, the two terms have a similar meaning and refer to the satisfaction or agreement produced by the beloved object in the subject. For St. Thomas, however, the complacency is the formal cause of love in the subject produced by the idea of the good, whereas for Spinoza acquiescence is the effect of love produced by the presence of the efficient cause of the love. They both agree that the will for "real" union is a property of love and

does not constitute its very essence. In both cases the disposition of complacency or acquiescence is distinguished from desire. For Spinoza, however, the will for union is identical with the acquiescence of the lover in the presence of the beloved, that is to say, he does not distinguish between acquiescence or complacency and will as does St. Thomas. This in turn is due to the fact that Spinoza wished to avoid all reference to occult qualities. The complacency which St. Thomas and the Scholastics attributed to the subject was an occult form or potency which determined the subject to seek or will a particular object as its final goal. For Spinoza, on the other hand, the acquiescence of love was nothing but a mode of will whereby the individual affirmed his satisfaction in the presence of the object which caused him joy. As a result of this identification there was no need to postulate any unique, occult, metaphysical agreement or aptitude in order to account for the power of attraction between two things. This renders intelligible Spinoza's remarks in the scholium to 3-15 where he writes "We now understand why we love or hate certain things from no cause which is known to us, but merely from sympathy or antipathy as they say.

I know indeed that the writers who first introduced the words sympathy and antipathy desired thereby to signify certain hidden qualities of things, but nevertheless I believe that we shall be permitted to understand by those names qualities which are plain and well known." Love, according to Spinoza, is due to efficient causes whose properties may be clearly defined and does not require any reference to occult formal or final causes.

It is instructive to note that in the *Short Treatise* Spinoza actually follows the Scholastic theory and maintains that all love originates in the idea or perception of some object. Thus he writes (*Short Treatise*, II, chap. III, mss. B) "The second is love. This arises either from hearsay or 2) from opinion or 3) from true ideas. As regards the first, we generally observe it in the attitude of children to their father; because their father tells them this or that is good they incline towards it without knowing anything more about it. As

regards the second, it is certain that whenever anyone sees or thinks he sees something good, he is always inclined to unite himself with it, and for the sake of the good which he discerns therein he chooses it as the best outside which he then knows nothing better or more agreeable. Yet if ever it happens (as it mostly does happen in these things) that he gets to know something better than this good at present known to him, then his love changes immediately from the one to the other. All this we shall see more clearly when we treat of the freedom of man. As to the love from true ideas, as this is not the place to speak of it, we shall pass it over for the present." Here we see that Spinoza, like St. Thomas, maintains that all love originates from some idea of the good, though the idea may be more or less adequate. In the *Ethics*, however, Spinoza discarded the notion of an independent good or final cause and identified the good with the affect of pleasure. The individual then desires or wills the presence of the object on account of the pleasure it affords him.

5 INTELLECTUAL LOVE

SPINOZA also follows St. Thomas and Descartes in distinguishing intellectual from sensual love. He modifies, however, the notion of intellectual love in an attempt to make it conform to his general definition of love, without apparently realizing their essential incompatibility.

Intellectual joy and love arise from the mind's knowledge of the cause of its power, whether that cause be the finite intellect or the infinite intellect of God. That is to say, intellectual joy, which is an action, follows from the adequate idea of the internal cause of the mind's power, whereas the passion of love is pleasure accompanied by the idea or image of the external cause (3-53, see also chap. 11, §§ 2, 3). Thus in describing the origin of the intellectual love of God Spinoza demonstrates (5-15) "He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his affects loves God and loves Him the better the more he understands himself and his affects." And again (5-32) "We delight [*delectamus*] in whatever

we understand by the third kind of knowledge and our delight is accompanied with the idea of God as its cause . . . [corol.] From the third kind of knowledge necessarily springs the intellectual love of God [*amor dei intellectualis*]. For from this kind of knowledge arises joy attended with the idea of God as its cause, that is to say, the love of God, not insofar as we imagine Him as present but insofar as we understand that He is eternal and that is what we call the intellectual love of God ”

Similarly *acquiescentia in se ipso* (3-def 25), which is usually translated self-satisfaction, is really intellectual self-love Spinoza defines it as “joy which is produced by contemplating ourselves and our own power of action” (*lactitia orta ex eo, quod homo se ipsum suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur*) He could also have said more briefly that the latter affect is “joy accompanied with the idea of an internal cause,” which would have made it immediately obvious that this affect was self-love as distinct from love of some external object It turns out, furthermore, that this intellectual self-acquiescence is really identical with the intellectual love of God Man’s conception of God is nothing but the idea of God as expressed immanently through his finite intellect Hence God’s or man’s self-love or acquiescence and man’s intellectual love of God are identical As Spinoza puts it (5-36) “The intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love with which God loves Himself . . . [corol.] Hence it follows that God insofar as He loves Himself loves men and consequently that the love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are one and the same thing ” He could also have added that the intellectual love of man for himself is part of the intellectual love of God for Himself

From the above we gather that the intellectual love of man or of God arises from the intellect’s knowledge of the cause of its power (5-33 schol) The idea of this internal cause is prior to the joy which ensues It would be more proper, therefore, to say that intellectual love is joy which follows from an idea of the good (the power of the individual)

rather than joy accompanied by an idea of the external cause. In the passion of love the mind perceives the pleasure itself as good and then endeavors to imagine the external cause of this pleasure, whereas in intellectual love the knowledge of the good, namely, the perfection of the individual, is prior to the joy which follows from and accompanies it.

Spinoza apparently did not realize that his conception of intellectual love was inconsistent with his general definition of love. His conception of intellectual love, like that of Descartes whom he professed to criticize, involves three distinct factors, namely, the idea of the thing or power conceived as good, the joy of the mind which follows from this idea, and the will or acquiescence of the mind in the presence of the object which is a property of love. Spinoza's theory differs from that of Descartes only on the nature of the will. His attempt to provide a single definition of love which would apply to corporeal as well as intellectual love involved him in serious difficulties from which he tried vainly to extricate himself.

We must note in conclusion the problem arising from Spinoza's definition of "acquiescentia in se ipso" as a mode of joy (3-def 25). The term *acquiescentia* here used is the same as that employed by Spinoza in his explanation subsequent to the general definition of love, where we found he specified that "*acquiescentia*" was identical with *voluntas* or will. From this it clearly follows that *acquiescentia in se ipso* must be a mode of will or rational desire, yet we find that Spinoza defines this latter affect as a mode of joy. Nominally, he is consistent since self-love like love of another should be mode of joy. But if *acquiescentia* is a mode of will, then it should really be distinguished from joy.

The criticism here made gains further support from the consideration that Spinoza regards self-satisfaction as the highest virtue arising from reason (4-52, and corol), and at the same time maintains that "*animositas*" and "*generositas*," which are the basic forms of virtue or the action of the intellect, are themselves modes of desire (*cupiditas*) (3-59 schol). If so, self-satisfaction which arises from intellectual desire or effort should also be a mode of desire.

6. THE NATURE OF THE UNION BETWEEN THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT OF LOVE.

It is significant that, insofar as Spinoza regards love merely a joy accompanied by the idea of the external cause, he interprets the union of the mind with the object as meaning that the object is imagined or conceived as present. An individual is said to love an object to the extent that the idea of that object occupies his mind (*mentem occupat*) (5-11, 19). Hence it comes about that desire may be excessive (4-44, 3-def 45-48), since the affect of the body and image of the mind "may cling obstinately" and overpower all other affects.

On the other hand, insofar as the idea of the good is the cause of love, then the nature or form of love is determined by the nature of the object. There is then an essential union or relation between the mind and its object, such that the mind becomes identified with its idea, there is then complete identity between subject and object of love. This seems to have been Spinoza's argument in the *Short Treatise* where he writes (II, chap. v) "Love which is nothing else than the enjoyment of a thing and union therewith we shall divide according to the qualities of the object, the object that is, which man seeks to enjoy and to unite himself with. Love then arises from the idea and knowledge that we have of a thing and according as a thing shows itself greater and more glorious, so also is our love greater." And again continuing "Love is a union with the object which our understanding judges to be good and glorious, by this we mean such a union whereby both the lover and what is loved become one and the same thing or together constitute one whole. He is indeed always wretched who is united to transient things."

Similarly in the *Ethics* Spinoza demonstrates (3-56). "Of joy sorrow and desire and consequently of every affect which like love and hatred, hope and fear is derived from them, there are just as many kinds as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected." Later he continues (5-20

schol) "Again it is to be observed that our sorrows and misfortunes, mainly proceed from too much love towards an object which is subject to many changes, and which we cannot possess [et cujus numquam compotes esse sumus]. For no one is troubled or anxious about any object he does not love, neither do wrongs, suspicions, hatreds arise except from love towards an object of which no one can be truly the possessor [nisi ex amore erga res quam nemo potest revera esse compos] Moreover it (the third kind of knowledge) begets a love towards an immutable and eternal object of which we are really partakers [cujus revera sumus compotes] a love which therefore cannot be vitiated by the defects which are in common love, but which can always become greater and occupy the largest part of the mind and thoroughly affect it" Similarly speaking of the social virtues he explains (3-59 schol) "By generositas I mean the desire by which each person from the dictates of reason alone endeavours to help others and to join them to him in friendship [et sibi amicitia jungere] "

From the above quotations we gather that the formal essence of love depends upon the metaphysical perfection of the actual object which the individual desires to possess or be joined to. Hence he concludes that love toward an eternal, immutable object is preferable to love toward temporal, mutable things which are the exclusive possession of one or few.

Spinoza's conception of the relation of the union between the subject and object of love depends upon his epistemological theory concerning the agreement between an idea and its ideatum. A true idea agrees with its ideatum (1-ax 6) and hence the mind may become united in love to various objects of which it has adequate ideas. Thus the mind or soul as the idea of the body is naturally united to its body, so that together they form a single whole (2-11, 13, *Short Treatise*, II, chap. xix). But it is also possible for the intellect to unite itself through love with God or the most perfect being. Thus Spinoza concludes in the *Short Treatise* "If once we get to know God at least with a knowledge as

clear as that with which we also know our body then we must become united with Him even more closely than we are with our body, and be as it were released from the body " Similarly in the *Ethics* Spinoza reasons (5-20). "This love of God is the more strengthened the more people we imagine to be connected with God by the same bond of love [quo plures homines eodem amoris vinculo cum deo junctos imaginamur] " This bond of love between God and man enables man to contemplate God rather than external temporal things

The full significance of this argument can be appreciated only if the reader bears in mind our previous discussion concerning the extrinsic union of affects with ideas (chap 1, §§ 4, 7) There we noted that one and the same affect may be united with either adequate or inadequate ideas Hence one and the same affect of love may be united with different objects Thus Spinoza demonstrates (3-48) "Love and hatred towards any object, for example, towards Peter, are destroyed if the joy and the sorrow which they respectively involve be joined to another cause " And again more generally (5-2) "If we detach [amoveamus] a commotion of the soul or affect from the thought of an external cause and join it with other thoughts [aliis jungamus cogitationibus] then the love or hatred towards the external cause and the fluctuations of the soul which arise from these affects will be destroyed " In brief, the mind has the power to separate an affect of love from the inadequate idea of the external cause of pleasure and to unite it to an adequate idea of the true good which agrees with its nature An affect of love is considered an action or virtue to the extent that it is united through adequate ideas to a more or less perfect object In other words, the mind acquires perfection, not indirectly through the transitions of the body produced by external causes, but directly through its identification in love with the perfection of the object which it conceives The object to which the mind and the affect of love are joined need not be the efficient cause of its joy, on the contrary, the joy involved in intellectual love arises subsequent to the concep-

tion of the object or activity as good. Otherwise it would be impossible to detach an affect of joy from one object and unite it to another

The importance of Spinoza's divergent doctrines concerning the nature of the union involved in love is shown, in the last analysis, by the status which he assigns to the individual in love. Insofar as love is primarily a mode of joy accompanied by the idea of the external cause, then all love is essentially self-love. Each individual by nature loves and desires the preservation of his own existence and power and loves external things only as a means to his pleasure and increase of power. It makes no difference whether the love is a passion or action, physical as well as intellectual love refers primarily to the individual himself and is nothing more than a form of self-love.

On the other hand, insofar as love is primarily a union or identification with an object, then the object is loved as a good or end in itself. The individual loses himself, as it were, in the object and becomes possessed by it instead of being the possessor. In this sense the intellect of man may identify itself with the thought of God and conceive itself through God as a mode of His power. The human intellect is then conceived as an eternal mode of the divine intellect and its perfection depends upon the number of eternal truths which it has conceived and loved (5-38, 5-40 schol.) In short, Spinoza's conception of love as essentially an identification between the mind and its object leads him to a mystical doctrine of human immortality which involves absorption in the nature of God. This doctrine is incompatible with the previous theory according to which all love is fundamentally self-love, and there is no transcendent object toward which the mind is directed (See Note 1, following.)

NOTE 1 In his Introduction to the English translation of the *Dialoghi d'Amore* under the title *The Philosophy of Love*,² Professor Cecil Roth writes: "Above all Benedict Spinoza had in his

² Leone Ebreo, *The Philosophy of Love*, translated by Cecil Roth (London, Soncino Press). Reprinted by permission of the Soncino Press, London.

library a copy of the Spanish edition of the work, and, according to a view which has recently gained ground, derived from it his doctrine of the Intellectual love of God." Although, as shown, the doctrine of the intellectual love of God is to be found in Scholastic literature and Descartes, there are some passages in the *Dialoghi* which bear a remarkable resemblance to passages in the *Ethics*, particularly those which deal with the mystical union of the divine and human intellects. Thus in the English edition Leone Ebreo writes (pp 31, 32) "Love of God not only partakes of good, but comprises the goodness of all things and all loves, for the Godhead is at once origin, means and end of all good deeds. The Godhead is their origin inasmuch as on Him depends the intellect through which all human good is achieved. For the intellect is nothing but a tiny beam of the infinite splendour of God, assigned to man to make him rational, deathless and happy, although before it can achieve good deeds it must again communicate with the divine light. It cannot attain to the noble disposition of virtue or the clear concepts of wisdom unless rekindled in the divine light for the achievement of such ends." And again (p 34) "We love infinite God in the measure of our knowledge of Him [p 35] Truly love of God is ever united with ardent desire, namely, to gain whatever we lack in the knowledge of God, so that the increase of our love keeps pace with that of our knowledge."

There can be no mistaking the essential similarity between the mystical, Neo-Platonic doctrine of Leone Ebreo and that of Spinoza as outlined in the fifth book of the *Ethics*. The divine active intellect was regarded by platonizing Scholastics as immanent in finite form in the human intellect, even though God was regarded as the transcendent cause of nature.

On the other hand, it should be noted that Leone Ebreo's definition of love is contrary to Spinoza's. According to the former, "satisfaction in the beloved object is not love, but the cause of love as it is of desire. For love is none other than the desire of that which is pleasing, hence pleasure is only love if accompanied by desire, so that love and desire are in reality the same and both presuppose pleasure. And although desire is motion, it is the motion of the soul towards the object of desire, as love is the motion of the soul toward the beloved, and satisfaction is

the origin of this motion we call love and desire" (*Philosophy of Love*, pp. 244-245) Spinoza, on the other hand, did identify love with the pleasure or satisfaction of the lover in the presence of the beloved. Like Hobbes he could attach no meaning to the idea of the motion of the soul, motion pertained only to bodies. Hence he defined love as a mode of pleasure rather than a mode of desire.

7 THE ORIGIN OF INCLINATION AND AVERSION

INCLINATION (*propensio*) Spinoza defines (3-def 8) as "joy with the accompanying idea of some object which is by accident the cause of joy" (*laetitia concomitante idea alicujus rei, quae per accidens causa est laetitiae*). Similarly aversion (*aversio*) (3-def 9) is "sorrow with the accompanying idea of some object which is accidentally the cause of the sorrow."

The question may be raised, what is the difference between inclination and aversion on the one hand and love and hatred on the other? The answer appears to be that inclination differs from love in that the former refers to an accidental external cause while the latter refers simply to an actual external cause. In order to understand what Spinoza means by an accidental cause (*causa per accidens*) we must refer to previous propositions of book three which he had in mind. In proposition 3-15 he maintains that "anything may be accidentally [*per accidens*] the cause of joy, sorrow or desire." This he demonstrates by pointing out that a thing becomes an object of joy or sorrow simply because it happens to be associated in the imagination with some other thing which is the actual efficient cause of these affects. Hence he concludes (3-15 corol.) "The fact that we have contemplated a thing with an affect of joy or sorrow of which it is not the efficient cause, is a sufficient reason for being able to love or hate it." In like manner it follows that a thing may be regarded immediately as an object of love or hatred simply because it happens to be similar to an efficient cause of these affects, even though the individual never perceived the former object in association with the lat-

ter "If we imagine," he writes (3-16), "a certain thing to possess something which resembles an object which usually affects the mind with joy or sorrow, although that in which the thing resembles the object is not the efficient cause of these affects, we shall nevertheless (by virtue of the resemblance alone) love or hate the thing." Thus we see that a thing may be accidentally the cause of love or hatred in us either because it happens to be associated in the imagination with the actual efficient cause of these affects or because it happens to resemble the latter in some way. In either case one is said to be affected with inclination or aversion toward the accidental cause of the affects of joy or sorrow respectively. In brief, inclination is accidental love and aversion is accidental hatred.

Spinoza also identifies inclination with sympathy (*sympathia*) and aversion with antipathy (*antipathia*), although that is not the usual meaning of the terms (3-15 schol.). As noted in our section on love, Spinoza is opposed to the Scholastic and, we may add, Stoic doctrine of natural sympathy and antipathy between things based on the supposition of occult qualities. Such explanations are circular and postulate more obscure forms and qualities to explain the less obscure. Spinoza probably had in mind the Stoic doctrine of cosmic sympathy, according to which all things in nature are organically interconnected and influence one another because of hidden affinities. Hence grew up the practice of "sympathetic magic" whereby a process initiated in one object was supposed to initiate a similar process in some remotely similar object. Spinoza was radically opposed to this form of obscurantism as contrary to scientific method. Human sympathy and antipathy toward various objects reflect nothing more than the power of the imagination to unite our affects with accidental causes, and not any hidden powers of attraction in the nature of things.

In the *Short Treatise*, as usual, we find an earlier view which differs from that of the *Ethics*. In the former treatise, Spinoza maintains that aversion involves only natural or necessary causes and not contingent or accidental ones. Thus he writes (*Short Treatise*, II, chap. vi) "Now I say that ha-

tred is a perturbation of the soul against some one who has done ill to us willingly and knowingly. Aversion is the perturbation which arises in us against a thing on account of some infirmity or injury which we either know or think is in it by nature. I say by nature, for when we do not suppose or think that it is so, then even if we have suffered some hindrance or injury from it, we have no aversion for it, because we may on the contrary, expect something useful from it. Thus when some one is hurt by a stone or a knife he does not on that account feel any aversion for the same." Here we see that Spinoza contrasts hatred with aversion. Hatred is felt toward a person who has done us some harm intentionally or knowingly whereas aversion is felt toward some natural object which is necessarily and always contrary to our nature, as for example, some poison. One does not feel aversion toward an object which is the contingent cause of good as well as evil, such as a stone or knife.

In the *Ethics* on the other hand, Spinoza defines hatred as due to any natural cause, whether that cause be necessary or contingent, intentional or unintentional. Aversion, he maintains, is felt toward some object which is accidentally associated by the imagination with the idea of the actual cause of sorrow and hatred. In the *Short Treatise*, however, Spinoza denies that an actual contingent cause can be the object of aversion and hence would deny that an accidental cause which was not even the actual cause could possibly be an object of aversion or inclination.

8 AVERSION AND ITS RELATION TO DESIRE AND SORROW

THE most important point in Spinoza's definition of aversion is the fact that aversion is regarded as a mode of sorrow contrary to inclination, instead of as an affect contrary to desire, as Hobbes and the Scholastics held. The problem then arises, why did Spinoza regard aversion as a mode of sorrow rather than as a mode or contrary of desire? The answer, I believe, is to be found in Descartes's treatise *On the Passions of the Soul* which Spinoza here as elsewhere fol-

lowed closely. Concerning aversion Descartes writes (§ 87). "I know very well that usually in the Schools the passion which makes for the search after good which alone is called desire, is opposed to that which makes for the avoidance of evil, which is called aversion. But inasmuch as there is no good whose privation is not an evil, nor any evil considered in a positive sense whose privation is not a good and that in seeking riches, for example, we necessarily shun poverty, in fleeing from sickness we make for health, and so on with other things, it seems to me that it is always an identical movement which makes for the search after good and at the same time for the avoidance of the evil which is contrary to it. I merely remark this difference in it, that the desire which we have when we make for some good is accompanied by love and then by hope and joy, while the same desire, when it tends to remove itself from evil contrary to this good, is accompanied by hate, fear and sadness, which is the cause of our judging it to be contrary to itself. But if we wish to consider it when at the same time it relates equally to some good with the view of seeking it, and to an opposed evil in order to avoid it, we may very clearly see that it is but one passion which brings about the one and the other."

Here we see that Descartes, unlike Hobbes and the Scholastics, introduces the innovation of including aversion as a mode of desire. Desire and aversion are really one and the same affect but differ only in the nature of their objects and the contrary affects which accompany them. Desire properly so-called is always for some good and is accompanied by love, hope, and joy, aversion is desire for the removal of some evil which threatens the good really desired and is accompanied by hate, fear, and sadness.

Now Spinoza, it appears, follows Descartes though with some important differences. Spinoza agrees that desire has no real contrary affect but the reason he offers differs from that of Descartes (see chap. 11, § 1). According to the former desire is the very essence of man and nothing, as we have seen, can be contrary to itself. But Spinoza goes even further than Descartes and does not even formally include aversion under desire at all. The accompanying feeling of sadness is the es-

sential feature of aversion, he holds, and as such the latter affect is the contrary of inclination (*propensio*). But in practice he, like Descartes, speaks of aversion as the effort to destroy included under the effort to live. Thus he says (3-13 and corol) "Whenever the mind imagines those things which lessen or limit the body's power of action, it endeavours [*conatur*] as much as possible to recollect what excludes the existence of those things [corol] Hence it follows that the mind is averse [*aversatur*] to imagine those things which lessen or hinder its power and that of the body." And again (3-28) "We endeavour to bring into existence everything which we imagine conduces to joy, and to remove or destroy everything opposed to it, or which we imagine conduces to sorrow [*amovere vel destituerie conamur*]." Here we see Spinoza uses the term "*aversatur*" as equivalent to the effort or *conatus* to destroy, or remove. But strangely enough, he defines aversion itself as a mode of sorrow rather than of desire, since he had already defined love and hatred as modes of joy and sorrow.

I said before that according to Spinoza desire has no contrary. By this I meant that desire has no contrary passion. But desire as a corporeal passion has a contrary in the intellectual virtue called fortitude (*fortitudo*) or strength of mind (*animositas*) (3-59 schol), which restrains the passions of desire. In other words, Spinoza opposes "strength of mind" which is "the desire by which each person endeavours from the dictates of reason alone to preserve his own being" (*cupiditatem qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo rationis dictamine conservare*) to desire which is a passion or affect and involves inadequate ideas. We thus have a conflict of desires, namely, the active and passive desires, which is precisely the point which Hobbes and the Scholastics made when they opposed desire to aversion. Spinoza only increased the difficulty by making the two desires entirely different in kind and origin.

The difficulties arising from Spinoza's conception of aversion can be illustrated more clearly from a consideration of its relation to the affect of sorrow. We have seen that an affect of joy or pleasure is good because it helps the power of

man to continue in existence and that an affect of sorrow is evil because it hinders the conatus of man. This implies that the affect of joy is positive in character and the affect of sorrow is negative or essentially passive. Logically then, a positive desire cannot arise from sorrow since the latter serves only to restrain desire. Yet we find Spinoza demonstrates (3-37) that "the desire which springs from sorrow or joy, from hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the affect is greater." In the actual demonstration of this proposition he continues: "Sorrow lessens or limits a man's power of action, that is to say, it lessens or limits the effort by which a man endeavours to persevere in his own being and therefore is opposed to this effort. Consequently if a man be affected with sorrow, the first thing he attempts is to remove that sorrow, but the greater it is, the greater is the human power of action to which it must be opposed, and so much the greater therefore will be the power of action with which the man will endeavour to remove it, that is to say, with the greater eagerness or desire will he struggle to remove it."

Here we see that Spinoza begins with the admission that sorrow hinders a man's effort to exist but then states that the affect of sorrow somehow gives rise to a new desire which varies in strength with the sorrow to be removed. Although the affect of sorrow or pain weakens a man's effort at the start, it finally impels him to greater desire in order to remove the cause of this passion. In other words, sorrow is not merely a privation of power, it is an actual affect which gives rise to a contrary desire. Spinoza simply introduces the notion of a negative effort to remove or destroy the object causing pain (3-28) but he has not shown how this is conceivable according to his premises. He does not even employ a different term, such as aversion, to denote this effort to destroy but uses the same term "conatus" for both positive and negative efforts.

It may be true, as Descartes first pointed out, that the desire for the good includes the avoidance of evil, but the impulse to destroy what is evil does not include the desire for the good—as experience daily testifies. In desiring health we may avoid sickness, but the cure of sickness does not in-

clude the positive pursuit of health. In brief, a positive or constructive desire indirectly includes a negative or destructive one, but a destructive desire does not include either directly or indirectly a constructive effort. That is to say, the effort to pursue some good and the desire to destroy some evil are not identical. The effort to destroy some evil may be for the sake of some good which the individual desires, but surely the destruction itself is not identical with the active pursuit of the good desired.

Spinoza himself provides us with examples of the logical implication of his theory of sorrow. If sorrow is that which by nature hinders the active power of man, then he concludes, there can be no affect of sorrow originating in the intellect of man which is the source of actions exclusively. In Spinoza's words (3-59) "Amongst all the affects which are related to the mind insofar as it acts there are none other than those which refer to joy or desire." And again (4-63 demon. to corol.) "For the desire which springs from reason cannot spring from sorrow but only from an affect of joy which is not a passion." In brief, there can be no active desire originating from sorrow.

On the other hand, we find that Spinoza acknowledges the value of negative efforts arising from reason, as when he remarks (4-69) that "the virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in avoiding danger [declinandis periculis] as in overcoming it." Similarly (4-70), "the free man who lives amongst those who are ignorant strives as much as possible to avoid their favours [beneficia declinare studet]." Obviously, the desire to avoid some danger cannot originate from joy and the direct desire for some positive good, as in the cases of the passions, such an attitude of withdrawal presupposes some sorrow or fear. Yet many of Spinoza's propositions of the fifth book of the *Ethics* are concerned with the virtues of restraint and avoidance of passions.

The problem appears to be one that concerned Spinoza greatly and is, indeed, basic for his whole theory of virtue. Thus we find he states explicitly that (4-63) "he who is led by fear and does what is good in order that he may avoid what is evil, is not led by reason." [corol.] By the de-

sire which springs from reason we follow good directly and avoid evil indirectly" (*cupiditate quae ex ratione oritur, bonum directe sequimur et malum indirecte fugimus*). "The knowledge of evil," he informs us further (4-64), "is inadequate knowledge." [4-64 corol.] If the human mind had none but adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil. It is noteworthy that Spinoza employs the same example as Descartes, namely, the case of a healthy and sick man. "The sick man," he writes (4-63 schol. 2), "through fear of death, eats what he dislikes, the healthy man takes a pleasure in his food and so enjoys life more than if he feared death and directly desired to avoid it. So also the judge who condemns a guilty man to death not from hatred or anger, but solely from love for the public welfare is led by reason alone." All these examples make it clear that he who is led by reason will act only from affects of joy and desire but not from affects of sorrow or fear since the latter involve only inadequate ideas. He who makes a positive effort to preserve his health thereby avoids the evil of sickness. In this way, the positive desire for some good involves indirectly the negative effort to avoid some evil.

On the other hand, the doctrine of the control of the passions presupposes that the human mind has an adequate idea of the passions which are evil by nature. Thus Spinoza demonstrates (5-4) "There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception." That is to say, although a passion as an actual affect of the body and mind involves inadequate ideas, the intellect may nevertheless conceive this affect adequately. Hence it follows that the mind may have adequate ideas of evil—an inference which directly contradicts Spinoza's earlier proposition (4-64), namely, that the knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge. Evil as an actual experience of a transition to lesser perfection may involve inadequate ideas, but the concept of the evil affect may be adequate. Otherwise the improvement of moral character would be impossible.

From this it follows that the mind's control of the passions does not come about indirectly through its efforts to cultivate the powers of the intellect, on the contrary, it is

because the intellect forms adequate ideas of the nature and origin of the affects that it endeavors to remove them directly by an analysis of their true causes and effects on human relations

If the above argument be valid, it follows further that there may be affects of sorrow originating in reason, as Descartes maintained. When the intellect contemplates the impotence of that part of the mind which has the body for its object, it may be saddened. This sorrow simply completes the activity of reason and does not hinder its activity at all. This sadness may give rise to a positive desire to increase the power of the intellect and its knowledge of nature in order to be subject as little as possible to the force of the passions. Spinoza, however, does not draw any of the above inferences because he arbitrarily assumes that only joys may originate in, and complete the activities of the intellect, but no sorrows. Although he did grant that affects of sorrow may arise when the mind reflects upon or is conscious of its impotence, he attributed such ideas of sorrow to the imagination and not to the intellect (3-55). This argument in turn is based on the assumption (see chap. 1) that the idea of an affect of sorrow must also be inadequate, a theorem which, as said, contradicts his entire doctrine concerning the control of the emotions.

To conclude Spinoza begins by defining aversion as an affect of sorrow contrary to the affect of inclination (*propensio*) and distinct from desire. But in practice he really makes the *conatus* of the intellect contrary to the corporeal *conatus* or passion of desire, thus reintroducing the Scholastic notion of two kinds of desire from a different point of view. Furthermore, in his theory of intellectual desire Spinoza, like Descartes, maintains that the desire arising from a love of the true good inductively includes avoidance of evil (*vitare, fugere*). *That is to say, like Descartes he includes intellectual aversion or avoidance under active desire but, unlike Descartes, he defines the affect or passion of aversion as an affect of sorrow other than the passion of desire. In like manner, we are left with the paradox that aversion, insofar as it is a mode of sorrow, is considered in*

itself a hindrance to desire and yet it gives rise to contrary desires which aim to destroy the cause of this passion. Similarly on the level of the intellect, Spinoza denies that sorrow can arise from reason or that a wise man will directly attempt to avoid evil. Yet we find he acknowledges that the intellect may form adequate ideas of affects of sorrow and lays down rules whereby the free man may directly avoid social evils and gain control of the passions

VI

OTHER DERIVATIVE AFFECTS

1 MODES OF HOPE AND FEAR

THERE is a group of derivative affects which Spinoza calls vacillations of the mind (literally fluctuations of the soul—*fluctuatio animi*) (see ref 3—def 48 explan , 5-2) because they involve elements of contrary affects such as joy and sorrow, desire and sorrow. Thus he demonstrates (3-17 and schol) “If we imagine that a thing that usually affects us with an affect of sorrow has any resemblance to an object which usually affects us equally with a great joy, we shall at the same time [simul] hate the thing and love it . [schol] This state of mind which arises from two contrary affects is called vacillation of mind [*haec mentis constitutio quae scilicet ex duobus contrariis affectibus oritur animi vocatur fluctuatio*] It is related to an affect as doubt is to the imagination [2-44 schol] Nor do vacillation and doubt differ from one another except as greater and less [*nec animi fluctuatio et dubitatio inter se differunt nisi secundum majus et minus*] It is to be observed that in the preceding proposition I have deduced these vacillations of the mind from causes which produce the one affect directly and the other contingently [per se et per accidens—causa] This I have done because the affects could thus be more easily deduced from what preceded and not because I deny that these vacillations often originate from the object itself which is the efficient cause of both affects ”

From the above passage we gather that vacillation of mind is to the affects as doubt is to the imagination. Doubt occurs in the imagination if the association or conjunction of the things to which the images refer is not constant. Similarly there is a doubt or wavering among the affects if one and the same object gives rise to contrary affects in us. Jealousy

(zelotypia) (def. 48 explan) is an example of one and the same object producing both love and hate in us (3-35 schol.).

This fluctuation of the soul may also be produced through an accidental cause, that is a cause which per se cannot affect us and does so only because it resembles the efficient cause. Thus it may happen that an object which per se is the cause of joy may accidentally be a cause of sorrow (and vice versa) and so produce in us simultaneously contrary emotions.

Spinoza provides us with definitions of some affects which illustrate this combination of affects or wavering of mind. Hope (spes) he defines (def. 12) as "an inconstant joy arising from the idea of something future or past about the issue of which we sometimes doubt" (spes est inconstans laetitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus). Similarly fear (metus) (def. 13) "is an inconstant sorrow arising from the idea of something future or past about the issue of which we sometimes doubt" (so 3-18 schol. 2). He adds in explanation to the latter definition that there can be no hope without fear and vice versa.

Spinoza also lists a mode of fear or timidity (timor) which he regards as a mode of desire, the desire, namely, of avoiding the greater evil which we fear by the less (def. 39) (cupiditas majus quod metumus malum minore vitandi). In the scholium to 3-39 this affect is explained in further detail. "We notice moreover, that this affect by which a man is so disposed as not to will the thing he wills and to will that which he does not will, is called fear [timor] which may therefore be defined as the fear [metus] which leads a man to avoid an evil in the future by incurring a lesser evil."

From the above definitions we note that Spinoza defines fear in two distinct ways. Fear or metus he regards as a mode of sorrow, but fear as timor he regards as a mode of desire—the desire of something feared in order to avoid something more greatly feared. From the Latin we see that the term "metus" appears in the definition of timor. The question naturally arises, why does Spinoza define timor as a mode of desire and metus as a mode of sorrow? The answer appears to be that timor involves a choice or preference between two fears whereas metus is concerned with one object.

The same ambiguity is illustrated by Spinoza's definition of pusillanimity (3-def 41), namely, that it "is said of him whose desire is restrained by fear of danger which his equals dare to meet" (dicitur de eo cujus cupiditas coercetur timore periculi quod ejus aequales subire audent). In his explanation he adds "Pusillanimity therefore is nothing but the dread of some evil which most persons do not usually fear, and therefore I do not ascribe it to the affects of desire. I wished nevertheless to explain it here because insofar as we attend to desire, it (pusillanimity) is the true opposite of the affect of audacity." Here we see that although Spinoza defines pusillanimity as an affect of desire, he really does not refer it to the affects of desire. Timor itself, which recurs in this definition, was defined similarly as a mode of desire, pusillanimity is simply timor which is judged by others to be excessive, because they themselves have no such fear for the object. Spinoza confesses that the only reason why he speaks of pusillanimity as a mode of desire is because it appears to be the opposite of audacity (audacia) which is excessive fearlessness (3-def. 40) and involves a positive desire to meet danger which others fear to meet. Desire itself is something positive and the desire to avoid—cupiditas vitandi—is not properly speaking a desire at all, as we have seen from our discussion of aversion, it is rather a restraint of desire (cupiditas coercetur). Spinoza's final argument for describing timor and pusillanimity as affects of desire rather than of sorrow is seen to be an extrinsic one, namely, their contrariness to audacity and courage which are positive affects of desire. Judged by the intrinsic evidence, however, Spinoza would have defined them as modes of sorrow. This illustrates as clearly as possible that *Spinoza could not help employing the affect of aversion as a mode of desire, even though nominally he defined it as a mode of sorrow*.

Closely connected with the affect of timor is consternation (consternatio) (3-def 42) "which is said of him whose desire of avoiding evil is restrained by wonder at the evil which he fears" (dicitur de eo cujus cupiditas malum vitandi coercetur admiratione mali quod timet). In the scholium to 3-39 Spinoza words his definition somewhat differently "If

the desire of avoiding the future is restrained by the fear of another evil so that the man does not know what he most wishes [quod potius velet] then this fear [metus] is called consternation especially if both the evils feared [quod timetur] are very great." In the scholium of 3-52 he returns to the same subject "This affection of the mind or imagination of a singular thing insofar as it alone occupies the mind is called wonder and if it is moved by an object which we fear [quod timemus] it is called consternation, because wonder at the evil, so holds a man suspended in his own self [suspensum in sola sui] that he cannot think of other things by which he could avoid the evil [malum vitare posset]." We must remember that consternation as a species of timor involves two objects, it differs from timor only in the fact that wonder at the objects feared prevents the mind from deciding between them. Due to the singularity of both objects the mind is held in wonder by them since it has no basis of comparing them. Thus I take to be the significance of Spinoza's remark that consternation arises if the objects feared be very great, because then the wonder is increased (3-39 schol.) The notion that consternation involves two objects feared is not clearly stated in Spinoza's definition (3-def 42) or in the scholium of 3-52, though it is clearly expressed in the scholium of 3-39. In the explanation to definition 42 he also draws attention to this "double fear" (ex duplici timore) "But because consternation springs from a double fear it may be more aptly defined as that dread [metus] which holds a man stupefied or vacillating [stupefactum aut fluctuantem], so that he cannot remove an evil. I say 'stupefied' insofar as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be restrained by his astonishment [cupiditatem malum amovendi admiratione coerceri]. I say also 'vacillating' insofar as we conceive the same desire to be restrained by the fear of another evil which equally tortures him [cupiditatem coerceri timore alterius mali], so that he does not know which of the two evils to avoid [ut quodnam ex duobus avertat, nesciat]." Here we see that consternation involves a double fear, but because of the strangeness of the objects feared the mind is stupefied and held inactive by

them At the same time, because of the singularity of these objects the mind can find no ground of comparison between them and hence vacillates or fluctuates from one to the other.

Spinoza's definition of hope (*spes*) provides problems similar to those of his definitions of fear *Desiderium* or regret he defines (3-def 32) as "the desire or appetite to possess something, the affect being strengthened by the memory of the object itself, and at the same time being restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the desired object" (*desiderium est cupiditas sive appetitus rei aliquae potiundi, quae ejusdem rei memoria fovetur et simul aliarum rerum memoria quae ejusdem rei appetendae existentiam secludunt, coercetur*) In the explanation to the above he adds "When therefore we recollect a thing which affects us with any kind of joy, we thereby endeavour to contemplate it with the same affect of joy as if it were present—an attempt which is however immediately restrained by the memory of that which excludes the existence of the thing *Desiderium* therefore is really a sorrow which is opposed to the joy which arises from the absence of what we hate But because the name *desiderium* seems to connect this affect with desire, I therefore ascribe it to desire [*sed quia nomen desiderium cupiditatem respicere videtur, ideo hunc affectum ad cupiditatis affectus refero*]"

This explanation is instructive because it reveals Spinoza's uncertainty *Desiderium*, like hope and fear, is really a combination of joy and sorrow He therefore admits that *desiderium* should properly be defined as an effect of sorrow, but instead he decides to define it as an affect of desire because the name *desiderium* in Latin means desire This obviously is a lame argument and reveals the arbitrary nature of his definition

It is interesting to compare Spinoza's argument here with his own objection to a similar argument by others Thus he writes (3-def 20 explan) "I am aware that these names (favour and indignation) in common usage bear a different significance But my object is not to explain the meaning of words, but the nature of things and to indicate them by words whose meaning shall not be altogether opposed to the meaning

which I desire to bestow upon them. I consider it sufficient to have said this once for all" (so 3-def 31 explan.). Spinoza, we see, objects to the criticism that the meaning of some of the terms employed by him to designate the affects are not those usually assigned. His retort is that he is explaining the nature of things and not of names. And yet, in the case of *desiderium*, we find he declines to define that affect as he believes it ought to be on his premises, namely, as an affect of sorrow, in deference to the customary meaning of the term. The point at issue is whether the affects or emotions have a formal, universal essence and objective meaning of their own independent of one's metaphysical theory. Some of Spinoza's definitions of the affects do not agree with the traditional meanings or descriptions of the terms. In the case of *desiderium* he admits and gives the preference to language rather than his own metaphysics. In the majority of cases, however, he proceeds to introduce new definitions, to the confusion of translators and commentators alike.

2 CONFIDENCE AND DESPAIR, REJOICING AND REMORSE, REGRET AND REPENTANCE

CLOSELY related to the affects of hope and fear are two pairs of affects, namely, confidence and despair, and rejoicing and remorse. Hope, we have seen, Spinoza defined as a "a joy not constant arising from the idea of something future or past about the occurrence of which we sometimes doubt" (3-def 12). Fear is sorrow in a similar relation (3-def 13). Fundamentally, hope and fear are almost identical since "there is no hope without fear nor fear without hope" (3-def 13 explan.).

Confidence, we are informed, springs from hope and despair from fear whenever the reason for doubting the issue is taken away. Thus Spinoza defines confidence (*securitas*) (3-def 14) as "joy arising from the idea of a past or future object from which cause for doubting is removed." Despair (*desperatio*) is sorrow in the same relation (3-def 15). Special attention must be paid to the phrase "from which cause for doubting has been removed" (*de qua dubitandi*

causa sublata est) One is said to be confident or in despair about a past or future event, that is, about the effect a thing has had or will have upon him (3-18 schol) when he no longer doubts the result Lack of doubt, however, is not, Spinoza explains (3-def 15 explan), equivalent to certainty "It is one thing not to doubt and another to possess certitude " Doubt is removed "because we imagine a thing past or future to be present and contemplate it as present, or because we imagine other things which exclude the existence of those things which made us doubt " One may be confident or in despair about a past or future event so long as he imagines it as present or as having occurred, even though this may not actually be the case In brief, confidence and despair are modes of joy and sorrow involving past doubt, that is, hope and fear, about the occurrence of some past or future event

The same definition is stated somewhat differently in the *Short Treatise* (II, chap ix) where he writes "If however the thing is regarded by us as good and at the same time as something that necessarily must come, then there comes into the soul that repose which we call confidence, which is a certain joy not mingled with sorrow, as hope is. But when we think that the thing is bad and that it necessarily must come, then despair enters into the soul, which is nothing else than a certain kind of sorrow We may now proceed in a converse manner and define them negatively. We hope that the evil may not come, we fear lest the good should not come, we are confident that the evil will not come, we despair because the good will not come " Here we see that Spinoza does not distinguish between lack of doubt and certainty as he does in the *Ethics* In confidence and despair alike, the good and evil are regarded as "something that necessarily must come " Later in the chapter he remarks, however, that "confidence and despair never arise unless hope and fear (from which they derive their being) have preceded them "

We are now in a position to understand the import of Spinoza's definitions of rejoicing (gaudium) and remorse (conscientiae morsus, literally prick of conscience) Rejoic-

ing, he defines (3-def. 16) as "joy with the accompanying idea of something past, which, without hope [praeter spem] has happened" Similarly remorse (3-def 17) is "sorrow with the accompanying idea of something past which, without hope (or fear) has happened" [conscientiae morsus est tristitia concomitante idea rei praeteritae quae praeter spem evenit] From these definitions it appears that rejoicing and remorse agree with confidence and despair in that both pairs of affects involve past hope and fear, that is to say, all doubt has been removed in both cases They differ, however, insofar as rejoicing and remorse refer to past events only, whereas confidence and despair refer to the past as well as to the future Furthermore, in the former affects there is certainty that the thing has actually happened and hence is *beyond hope and fear of being otherwise*, whereas the latter affects do not involve certainty but only lack of doubt about the past or future occurrence of the thing Thus it may be said that rejoicing follows from confidence even as remorse follows from despair One rejoices at the actual occurrence or fulfillment of a thing about which there had previously been hope and confidence, he feels remorse at the actual occurrence of something he once feared or despaired of It would facilitate the understanding of the definition of remorse if instead of "without hope" (praeter spem), we substitute "without fear" (praeter metus) since the terms are interchangeable

Our interpretation of rejoicing and remorse is corroborated by Spinoza's more explicit statements in 3-18 schol 2 There he writes "Hope is nothing but inconstant joy arising from the image of a future or past thing about whose issue we are in doubt Fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant sorrow, arising from the image of a doubtful thing If the doubt be removed, then hope and fear become confidence and despair, that is to say, joy or sorrow arising from the image of a thing for which we have hoped or which we have feared [quam metuimus vel speravimus] Rejoicing again is joy arising from the image of a past thing whose issues we have doubted [de cujus eventu dubitavimus] Remorse, finally, is the sorrow which is opposed to rejoicing [conscientiae morsus est tristitia opposita gaudio]" From this passage it is clear

that confidence and despair involve joy and sorrow which depend upon past hope and fear. Rejoicing (*gaudium*) we are explicitly informed refers only to a past object about which also we previously doubted. It is highly significant that the phrase "*de cujus eventu dubitavimus*" used in 3-18 scholium 2 corresponds to the briefer phrase "*practer spem*" used in 3-definition 16. This should dispel any doubt in the translator's mind as to how to render the ambiguous Latin term "*practer spem*." It obviously does not mean here "contrary to hope or expectation" since one does not rejoice when the contrary of the good hoped for occurs. All Spinoza is trying to say is that rejoicing like confidence involves something one previously hoped for or feared, that is, doubted. One does not rejoice or feel remorse about a thing not previously hoped for or feared.

As if to clarify the point Spinoza himself later refers again to these affects and remarks (4-47 schol.) "We may here add that these affects indicate want of knowledge and impotence of mind. And for the same reason confidence, despair, rejoicing and remorse are signs of weakness of mind. For although confidence and rejoicing [*gaudium*] are affects of joy, they nevertheless suppose that sorrow has preceded them, namely, hope or fear" (*nam quamvis securitas et gaudium affectus sint laetitiae, tristitiam tamen eosdem praecessisse supponunt, nempe spem et metum*). Here again we find Spinoza insists that rejoicing like confidence involves past doubt, that is, hope and fear. The latter affects are considered interchangeable, so that even rejoicing may be said to contain an element of past fear or sorrow.

One reason that commentators and translators alike are so puzzled by Spinoza's definition of remorse in particular is that for us the term remorse is literally "a prick of conscience" (*Gewissensbiss*) and as such has a moral connotation. But Spinoza's definition has no moral significance whatever. It is simply the sorrow or regret one feels that something once merely hoped for and feared has actually happened—and not that one ought to have acted otherwise. This has led some translators to render the term *conscientiae morsus* not literally as remorse, but as disappointment, so as to make

Spinoza mean by the term what they think he ought to mean. My criticism of this procedure is that it is obtaining consistency at the price of scientific accuracy. One has the privilege of accepting or rejecting Spinoza's definitions, but he may not explain them away.

Nietzsche, who in his *Genealogy of Morals* was opposed to traditional values, appreciated the purely naturalistic insight of Spinoza's conception of remorse but he erred in attributing to it a meaning not warranted by the text. Thus Nietzsche writes¹ (§ 15) "This truth came insidiously enough to the conscience of Spinoza—when one afternoon he indulged in the question of what was really left for him personally of the celebrated *morsus conscientiae*—Spinoza who had relegated good and evil to the sphere of the human imagination and indignantly defended the honour of his free God against those blasphemers who affirmed that God did everything *sub ratione boni*. For Spinoza the world had returned again to the innocence in which it lay before the discovery of bad conscience. What then had happened to the *morsus conscientiae*? 'The antithesis of *gaudium*,' said he at last to himself, 'a sadness accompanied by the recollection of a past event which has turned out *contrary to all expectation*.' Evil does have through thousands of years felt when overtaken by punishment exactly as Spinoza on the subject of their offence. 'Here is something that went wrong contrary to my anticipation,' not 'I ought not to have done this.' They submitted themselves to punishment just as one submits oneself to a disease, to a misfortune or to death. . . . Punishment tames a man but does not make him better."

Nietzsche admired Spinoza for having held that remorse of conscience has no intrinsic moral worth and does not involve any principle or absolute norm of good and evil conduct. The phrase "*praeter spem*" he translates "contrary to expectation," and some later commentators have followed his example. My contention, however, is that though it be true that the Latin term "*praeter*" is ambiguous and may be translated to mean contrary as in Cicero's phrase "*praeter naturam*" as well as beyond, past and without, the fact re-

1 See Nietzsche's second essay on "Guilt" and "Bad Conscience."

mains that the former meaning will not apply here since it makes nonsense of Spinoza's definition of *gaudium* where the same phrase occurs. Besides, as shown, there are references in other passages which show definitely how he wished the term to be taken.

The full import of Spinoza's definition of remorse becomes more apparent when we contrast it with that found in Descartes's treatise *On the Passions of the Soul*, where he writes (III, § 177) "Remorse is a species of sadness which comes from the doubt which one has that a thing he is doing or has done is not good. And it necessarily presupposes doubt. Because if one were entirely assured that what he is doing was bad, he would abstain from doing it, the more so as the will has nothing to do except with things which have some appearance of goodness and if one were assured that what he has already done was bad, he would repent of it and not only feel remorse [on en auroit du repentir non pas seulement du remors]."

Now the usage of this passion is to bring it about that one examines if the thing which one doubts is good or not and to prevent one from doing it a second time, so long as he is not assured whether it be good.

[§ 191] Repentance is directly contrary to self-satisfaction and it is a kind of sadness which comes from the fact that one believes to have done some evil action."

From the above passage it is evident that according to Descartes remorse of conscience is an affect of sorrow which is felt when one doubts whether his conduct be good or evil. Insofar as one is certain of the evil character of his action, he can no longer feel remorse, he can only repent of having done it. Repentance so conceived is opposed to self-satisfaction. In the *Short Treatise* (II, chap. x) Spinoza also follows this definition but differs in his estimate of the affect. "Remorse," he explains, "comes only from this, that we do something about which we are in doubt, whether it is good or whether it is bad, and repentance from this that we have done something which is bad. If however, we will get a proper insight into them we shall find that they are not only not good, but that they are on the contrary pernicious and that they are consequently bad. For it is obvious that we

always succeed better through reason and the love of truth than through remorse and sorrow. They are therefore pernicious and bad because they are a certain kind of sorrow ”

When we compare Spinoza's position in the *Ethics* with the definitions found in Descartes's treatise *On the Passions of the Soul* and in the *Short Treatise* we find some outstanding points of difference. In the *Short Treatise* he like Descartes maintained that remorse involved present doubt whether one's act was good or evil, one is said to feel remorse because he is doubtful about the nature of his conduct. In the *Ethics*, on the other hand, he holds that remorse involves only past doubt concerning the nature of the effects produced on us by external things. Remorse is then the sorrow felt when things have happened to us as feared, it involves past hope and fear, not any in the present. Another significant point to note is that in the *Short Treatise* remorse like repentance has for its object the nature of one's personal conduct, whereas in the *Ethics*, remorse is simply a mode of despair, and has for its object the relation of external things to us. Spinoza's estimate of the negative value of remorse is, however, the same in the *Ethics* and *Short Treatise*, and is opposed to the opinion of Descartes that remorse has a positive preventive value which is in accord with reason.

Spinoza's definition of remorse as given in the *Ethics* is contrary to the traditional and commonsense meaning of the term. As the Latin term *conscientiae morsus* indicates, conscience was regarded by the Stoics and Scholastics as an internal, universal principle of practical wisdom common to all men which testified as to the goodness or evil of one's conduct. In the *Ethics* Spinoza omits all reference to conscience as well as to personal conduct and speaks as if remorse were a kind of disappointment—a fact which has prompted some to translate Spinoza's Latin term accordingly.

We should note that remorse as defined in the *Ethics* is practically identical with the affect of regret (*desiderium*) as defined in Descartes's *On the Passions of the Soul* and in the *Short Treatise*. Regret, Descartes defines (*Passions of the Soul* § 209) as “a kind of sadness which has a particular bitterness inasmuch as it is always united to a certain despair

and to the memory of the pleasure which gave us joy, for we regret nothing but the good things regarding which we rejoiced and which are so lost that we have no hope of recovering them at the time and in the guise in which we regret them." Similarly Spinoza in the *Short Treatise* (II, chap. xiv). "Now regret [desiderium] is a certain kind of sorrow arising from the contemplation of some good we have lost (and lost) in such a way that there is no hope of recovering same." Here we see that desiderium, like remorse in the *Ethics*, is a mode of despair. Both are modes of sorrow arising from the idea of a past object from which cause for doubt or hope has been removed.

In the *Ethics*, however, we find that Spinoza changed his definition of desiderium so as to make the latter a mode of desire. Thus he now writes (3—def. 32 explan.) "Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something [desiderium est cupiditas sive appetitus re aliqua potiundi] the affect being strengthened by the memory of the object itself and at the same time being restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the object sought." In his explanation to this same definition he acknowledges that "desiderium therefore is really a sorrow which is opposed to the joy which arises from the absence of what we hate." In other words, he admits that desiderium is really a mode of despair, though out of deference to the usual meaning of the term, he explains, it ought to be defined as a mode of desire. It appears then, in the last analysis, that desiderium or regret is a mode of remorse, namely, remorse for the good lost accompanied by hopeless desire for the same object. They are but positive and negative ways of saying the same thing. Remorse is sorrow at the presence of the evil once feared, regret is sorrow at the absence of the good desired and hoped for. The definition of desiderium therefore really belongs immediately after that of remorse (def. 17) rather than further down the list (def. 32) as the first of the affects of desire, where it evidently has no connection whatever with either of the affects immediately preceding or succeeding it, namely, shame and emulation.

We said before that Spinoza's definition of remorse as given in the *Ethics* goes contrary to his definition in the *Short Treatise* as well as to the usual meaning of the term by ignoring the personal conduct of the individual, as he defines the term it corresponds to what we usually understand by disappointment and regret. It is instructive to note therefore that in his definition of repentance (*poenitentia*) he reintroduces the personal reference once more. Thus we find he defines repentance (3-def 27) as "sorrow accompanied by the idea of something done which we believe to have been done by a free decision of the mind" (*poenitentia est tristitia concomitante idea alicujus facti quod nos ex libero mentis decreto fecisse credimus*). Here we see that repentance unlike remorse arises from the idea one has of himself rather than of external things. As such repentance, together with humility (def 26), is the contrary of self-satisfaction (*acquiescentia in se ipso*—3-def 25)—a point Descartes also made. Spinoza acknowledges that the notion of repentance is meaningless apart from a belief in the freedom of willing, one cannot repent of an action if it is impossible for him to do otherwise. But as there is no place for freedom of will in Spinoza's system, he is forced to treat the notion as an illusion due to ignorance. Only those who naively believe in the free decision of the mind can accept repentance seriously. For the wise man it is doubly evil: first, because it involves an affect of sorrow, second, because the sorrow is fostered by an inadequate idea of human power. Spinoza, nevertheless, realizes the social value of this affect in restraining the desires of the individual and in making him conform to the laws and customs of the community (3-def 27 explan.). He is, however, opposed to the notion that repentance involves any innate, absolute conscience which judges the conduct of the individual. In agreement with modern Behaviorists he maintains that the conscience of the individual is nothing but the feeling of sorrow which follows upon the commission of some act and varies with the past experience and training of the individual. The remorse and repentance one feels after performing some wicked deed are a consequence of the conditioning, the praise

and blame, reward and punishment previously experienced "Education alone therefore will determine whether a man will repent of any deed or boast of it" (3-def 27 explan)

3 IMITATION OF AFFECTS OF JOY AND SORROW

WE turn now to analyze another group of affects which involve the principle of imitation. For Spinoza imitation is a general term for any similarity of affection based on similarity of nature and does not necessarily involve any conscious effort to reproduce in oneself the qualities of others (see chap iv, § 4). By the fact of a common human nature in which all men agree, individuals tend to imitate each other's affects. As Spinoza puts it (3-27) "Although we may not have been moved towards a thing by an affect yet if it is like ourselves, whenever we imagine it to be affected by an affect we are therefore affected by a similar affect" (ex eo quod rem nobis similem et quam nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, eo ipso simili affectu afficimur). The affects due to imitation are in accordance with Spinoza's general scheme classified as modes of joy and sorrow and desire. In the present section we shall select only those affects of imitation which are modes of joy and sorrow without regard to the particular position which they happen to occupy in Spinoza's list.

This imitation of affects (*affectuum imitatio*) is exemplified by commiseration (*commiseratio*) which Spinoza defines (3-27 schol, 3-def 18) as "sorrow with the accompanying idea of evil which has happened to someone whom we imagine like ourselves" (*tristitia concomitante idea mali quod alteri quod nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit*). In the explanation to the same definition he continues "Between commiseration (or pity, as in 3-27 corol 2, 3) and compassion (*miserecordia*) there seems to be no difference excepting perhaps that commiseration refers rather to an individual affect and compassion to it as a habit." Later on (def 24) compassion is again defined but this time it is "love insofar as it affects a man so that he rejoices at the good of another person and on the other hand, is saddened at the harm of another" (*amor*

quatenus hominem ita afficit ut ex bono alterius gaudeat et contra ex malo alterius contristetur) If we stop to examine Spinoza's two definitions of *miser cordia* we find that they differ in an important detail Insofar as compassion is considered to be just a habit of commiseration, then the former is also a mode of sorrow But if compassion is a mode of love as in the second definition, then it may be an affect of joy as well as of sorrow, "notwithstanding the usual signification of the word" (def 23 explan) which is that compassion is a mode of sorrow only

It appears that Spinoza came to this conception of compassion only gradually In 3-22 scholium he defines commiseration as "sorrow which springs from another's loss " "By what name," he continues, "the joy is to be called which springs from another's good I do not know " By the time he composed the list of affects he apparently concluded that compassion also included rejoicing at the happiness of others He deferred to common usage by limiting the meaning of commiseration to sorrow and distinguishing it from compassion which was a mode of joy as well as of sorrow

Envy (*invidia*, def 23) is the contrary of compassion and is defined as "hatred insofar as it affects a man so that he is saddened at the happiness of another person, and on the other hand, rejoices at the evil of another" (*invidia est odium quatenus hominem ita afficit ut ex alterius felicitate contristetur et contra ut ex alterius malo gaudeat*) Envy then as a mode of sorrow may involve joy as well as sorrow Spinoza's definition is in general similar to that of Descartes, though the latter does not altogether condemn the passion Descartes writes (*On the Passions of the Soul*, § 182) "What we usually call envy is a vice which consists in a perversion of nature which causes certain people to be annoyed with the good which they see coming to others, but I here use the word to signify a passion which is not always vicious Envy then insofar as it is a passion is a kind of sadness, mingled with hatred, which proceeds from our seeing good coming to those whom we consider unworthy of it, and we cannot think this with any reason excepting in relation to the good things of fortune For as regards those of the soul, inasmuch as we

possess them from birth, it is sufficient so far as worthiness is concerned that we have received them from God before being capable of committing any evil." In his definition Spinoza also regards envy as a mode of hatred, but adds that it also involves rejoicing at another's misfortune. He avoids any reference to the worth of the object, being simply concerned with the efficient cause.

We should recall to mind in this connection Spinoza's conception of sympathy and antipathy previously mentioned in our section on the origin of inclination and aversion (chap. v, § 7). There we noted that sympathy and antipathy were regarded by Spinoza as accidental love and hatred. A thing may become an object of love or hatred simply because it happens to be similar to an actual efficient cause of these affects, even though the former object be in itself incapable of producing these affects in us. Human sympathy and antipathy toward external things reflect nothing but the power of the imagination to originate affects toward various accidental objects. There is no need to assume any hidden affinity between man and the rest of nature (3-15 schol.). There is a real similarity only between individuals of the same species, other similarities are accidental and depend upon the former.

Commiseration, compassion, and envy are the necessary result of a community of nature between two persons and should properly be regarded as modes of sympathy and antipathy if we pay attention to the Latin meaning of the terms, namely, feeling in harmony with or contrary to one another. Spinoza, however, was reacting against medieval occultism and arbitrarily narrowed the meaning of *sympathia* and *antipathia* to denote accidental inclination and aversion toward some object incapable of sharing our affects. The most one can do is imitate through compassion another's sympathy and antipathy toward some object. Spinoza suggests this notion in 3-52 scholium: "To wonder is opposed contempt which is usually caused nevertheless by our being determined to wonder, love or fear towards some object because we see that another person wonders at, loves or fears this same object, or because at first sight it appears like other objects at which we wonder or which we love and fear." The example of other

people often affects an individual so that he feels reverence or contempt, love or hatred for some object or group which otherwise would not give rise to these affects in him

The affects most closely approximating sympathy and antipathy in the sense of accidental love and hatred are favor (favor) and indignation (indignatio) Favor, Spinoza defines (def 19) as "love towards those who have benefited others" (*amor erga aliquem qui alteri benefecit*) Indignation (def 20) is "hatred towards those who have injured others" (*odium erga aliquem qui alteri malefecit*) The full significance of these definitions becomes apparent if we bear in mind earlier propositions (3-22 schol , 3-27 corol 1) which Spinoza had in mind In 3-22 scholium he writes "Love towards the person who has done good to another we shall call favour [favor] whilst hatred towards him who has done evil to another we shall call indignation [indignatio]. It is to be observed too that we not only feel pity for the object we have loved, as we showed in prop 21, but also for that to which we have been attached by no affect, provided only we adjudge it to be like ourselves, and so we shall regard with favour him who has done any good to the object which is like us, and on the other hand, be indignant with him who has done it any harm." In like manner he writes further on (3-27 corol 1) . "If we imagine that a person to whom we have been moved by no affect, affects with joy a thing which is like us, we shall therefore be affected with love towards him If on the other hand, we imagine that he affects it with sorrow, we shall be affected with hatred towards him "

From the above passages we gather that favor is love toward an individual who has done good to another person, indignation is hatred toward an individual who has done evil to another person That is to say, the love or hatred is felt not toward the person who is directly affected by joy or sorrow but toward the individual who produced these affects in another like ourselves One may say then that favor is a kind of sympathetic or accidental compassion, just as indignation is an antipathetic compassion directed toward the cause of the affects of joy and sorrow respectively Spinoza himself suggests this comparison (def 24 explan) "These

are affects of joy and sorrow which are attended by the idea of an external object as their cause either of itself or accidentally" (*causa per se vel per accidens*) Favor and indignation are examples of accidental love and hatred.

In this connection we should also bear in mind Spinoza's conception of praise and blame. In 3-29 & scholium he writes "We shall endeavour to do everything which we imagine men will look upon with joy and on the contrary we shall be averse to doing anything to which we imagine men are averse [*nos id omne etiam agere conabimur quod homines cum laetitia aspicere imaginamur et contra id agere aversabimur quod homines aversari imaginamur*]. Again the joy with which we imagine another person's action, the purpose of which is to delight us [*nos delectari*], I call praise [*laudam voco*] and the sorrow with which we turn away from an action of a contrary kind I call blame [*vituperium voco*]." In other words, we praise an action which we imagine is to be or has been done out of special consideration for our pleasure, we blame an action which shows lack of such consideration or a contrary disposition. One praises things for which he has an inclination and blames or criticizes those for which he has an aversion [def. 8, 9]. Properly speaking, we do not praise or blame a person whom we favor or are indignant with in Spinoza's sense of the terms, because the latter affects refer to benefits conferred on others rather than on ourselves (def. 19, 20). The egocentric reference in praise and blame corresponds to that found in Spinoza's definitions of love and hatred (def. 6 & 7). One may not praise or blame a person or a thing for its own sake and without regard to the consequences for us, unless indeed one entertains the illusion of free will and the possibility of repentance (def. 27 explan.).

Thus not only do men tend to imitate one another's affects through reciprocal love and hatred but they also tend to regard themselves as they think or find others regard them. This may be called reflexive or self-conscious imitation since the individual imitates in himself the affects which he believes others have or should have toward him when they praise or blame him. Examples of such affects are glory (*gloria*),

shame (pudor), and fear of shame (verecundia) Glory (def 30; *Short Treatise*, II, chap xii) is "joy accompanied with the idea of some action of ours which we imagine others to praise" (gloria est laetitia concomitante idea alicujus nostrae actionis quam alios laudare imaginamur) So shame (pudor; def 31) is "sorrow accompanied with the idea of some action which we imagine others to blame" Fear of shame (metus seu timor pudoris) (verecundia def 31 explan, 3-39 schol, bashfulness and modesty are not adequate translations) arises when a man is restrained from committing any disgraceful act by the notion that others might blame it (def 41 explan) Pusillanimity is an extreme form of verecundia

The significant point in all these affects is that the idea which the individual has of himself is determined by the idea or opinion which he imagines others have concerning him, he esteems himself as he believes others do Glory, shame, and modesty are thus a kind of mediated self-satisfaction and humility The difference between glory and shame on the one hand, and compassion on the other, consists in the fact that in the latter affect "the imitation of affects" (affectuum imitatio) determines our attitude to others whereas in the former group the imitation determines our attitude toward ourselves

Shame and verecundia or fear of shame, Spinoza remarks (def 31 explan), have no proper contrary in shamelessness or impudence (impudentia) "which indeed is not an affect, as I shall show in the proper place" In the *Short Treatise*, however, Spinoza like Descartes originally included impudentia as one of the affects "Shamelessness," he there explains (II, chap xii), "is nothing else than a want or shaking off of shame, not through reason, but either from innocence of shame, as is the case with children savages etc, or because having been held in great contempt, one goes now to any length without regard for anything"

Spinoza points out later (4-58 schol) that only glory may be in accord with reason, shame or fear of shame is not properly a virtue since it involves sorrow and consequently inadequate ideas, though he grants that it is indirectly good. "I will only add," he remarks, "that pity, like shame, al-

though it is not a virtue, is nevertheless good, insofar as it shows that a desire of living uprightly is present in the man who is possessed with shame, just as pain is called good insofar as it shows that the injured part has not yet putrefied. A man therefore who is ashamed of what he has done, although he is sorrowful is nevertheless more perfect than the shameless man who has no desire of living uprightly." Similarly in the *Short Treatise* (II, chap. xii) Spinoza counsels "For glory and shame are not only of no advantage, because of what we have observed in their definitions, but also (inasmuch as they are based on self-love and on the opinion that man is the first cause of his actions and therefore deserving of praise and blame) they are pernicious and must be rejected.

I will not however, say that one ought to live among men in the same way that one would live away from them where glory and shame have no place, quite the contrary, I admit that we are not only free to utilize them when we apply them in the service of mankind and for their amelioration, but that we may even do so at the price of curtailing our own (otherwise perfect and legitimate) freedom." In social life, as distinct from the state of nature, Spinoza recognized praise and blame and therefore glory and shame as indispensable forces for maintaining peace and obedience of the law. He appreciated the regulative role of imitation through praise and blame and gave it its due place as one of the dominant factors in social life.

4 IMITATION OF AFFECTS OF DESIRE

WE now proceed to examine those affects due to imitation which are modes of desire. Here as in dealing with imitation of affects which are modes of joy and sorrow, Spinoza distinguishes between the automatic tendency to imitate and self-conscious imitation.

Thus he defines emulation (*aemulatio*, def. 33) as "the desire which is begotten in us of a thing because we imagine that other persons have the same desire" (*aemulatio est alicujus rei cupiditas quae nobis ingeneratur ex eo quod alios eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur*). By way of ex-

planation he adds: "He who seeks flight because others seek it, he who fears because he sees others fear, or even he who withdraws his hand and moves his body as if his hand were burning because he sees that another person has burnt his hand, such as they, I say, although they may indeed imitate the affect of another, are not said to emulate it, not because we have recognized one cause for emulation and another for imitation but because it has been the custom to call that man only emulous who imitates what we think honorable, useful or pleasant" (*vocemus aemulum qui id quod honestum, utile vel jucundum esse judicamus, imitatur*). Here we see that Spinoza distinguishes between automatic, reflexive imitation which follows immediately upon the perception of some action such as flight or the bodily contortions due to burning of the hand, and the conscious imitation of another's desires for the good. Emulation involves a double imitation, first, of the affect of an individual like ourselves, second, of the particular object of desire which another seeks, a tendency which gives rise to envy.

Thankfulness or gratitude (*gratia seu gratitudo*) is a mode of love involving desire of imitation. It is defined (def 34) as "the desire or endeavour of love, with which we strive to do good to others who from an equal affect of love, have done good to us" (*gratio seu gratitudo est cupiditas seu amoris studium quo ei beneficere conamur, qui in nos pari amoris affectu beneficium contulit*). That is to say, gratitude is a desire originating in love to reproduce in others an affect of joy similar to that which they have caused in us. It is "reciprocal love" (*reciprocus amor*, 3-41 schol.) giving rise to reciprocal desire to benefit (3-37, *conatus beneficiendi*). Gratitude is then a mode of joy as well as desire.

Benevolence (*benevolentia*, def 35) also involves "the desire of benefiting another" but its object differs from that of gratitude in that the former has for its object someone we pity without any regard to benefits conferred upon us. Benevolence is the effort to destroy the cause of sorrow in another whom we perceive to be similar to ourselves (3-27 schol. 2). Hence benevolence is a mixed mode of sorrow and desire.

Vengeance (*vindicta*, def 37) is the opposite of gratitude, since it is "the desire by which we are incited through reciprocal hatred to inflict harm upon him who by an equal affect has inflicted some injury upon us" (*vindicta est cupiditas qua ex reciproco odio concitamur ad malum inferendum ei, qui nobis pari affectu damnum intulit*)

Cruelty or savageness (*crudelitas seu saevitia*, def 38) "is the desire by which a man is incited to injure anyone whom we love or pity or who loves us" (3-41 schol 2) Cruelty necessarily gives rise to indignation or hatred of him who has injured those similar to ourselves whom we love or pity (def 20) Indignation in turn gives rise to anger (*ira*, def 36) "by which we are incited through hatred, to injure those whom we hate" (3-39) Anger differs from vengeance in that the latter affect involves "the attempt to return the evil inflicted on ourselves," whereas the former (anger) is "the attempt to bring evil on those we hate" because they have injured others we love or pity (3-40 schol 2) Spinoza does not mention the term for the contrary of anger, namely, the desire to benefit those whom we love through favor (def 19)

Humaneness or politeness (*humanitas seu modestia*, def. 43) is also to be conceived as a mode of imitation, since it is "the desire of doing those things which please men and omitting those which displease them" (*cupiditas ea faciendi quae hominibus placent et omittendi quae displicent*) *Humanitas* corresponds to the affect of *gloria* (def 30) which is the joy resulting from some action which we imagine others praise Humaneness is the active desire to do those things which are conducive to glory for us There is no mention of a contrary of modestia (3-29 schol), it also appears to be an affect for which there is no term in common speech (def 48 explan)

At this point I should refer the reader again to the problem of aversion discussed in the previous chapter (chap v, § 8) Vengeance, anger, and cruelty are all forms of aversion which Spinoza describes as positive desires to injure others (*cupiditas ad malum inferendum*) and not as mere hindrances to desire *He makes use of this conatus for destruction as if it were a positive desire contrary to the desire of conferring*

benefit involved in gratitude and benevolence, but fails to define aversion as a primary affect contrary to desire or even as a mode of desire

Of the affects discussed here, those which are modes of desire and joy may be in accord with reason, while those which involve sorrow are evil or contrary to reason. Thus emulation insofar as it involves imitation of the desire for virtue or honestas is in accord with reason (4-37 schol. 1). Similarly humanitas may serve to unite men in friendship and to that extent is good. Insofar, however, as it is equivalent to flattery (*praesentia parasitorum seu adulatorum*) it is evil since it tends to foster pride (4-57). Gratitude may also be in accord with reason, though it may be overdone, particularly among ignorant people (4-70). None but the truly free show real gratitude (4-71). Benevolence insofar as it involves pity or sorrow is not good, though on the whole it is a source of good for men living in the common social order. "We must add also," Spinoza remarks (4-50 schol.), "that a man who is easily touched by the affect of pity, and is moved by the misery or tears of another, often does something of which he afterwards repents, both because from an affect we do nothing which we certainly know to be good and also because we are so easily deceived by false tears. But this I say expressly of the man who lives according to the guidance of reason. For he who is moved neither by reason nor pity to be of service to others is properly called inhuman for he seems to be unlike a man."

On the other hand, the affects following from hatred or anger, such as revenge and cruelty, are by nature evil. "Hatred," we are told, "can never be good" (4-45, corol. 1). "Envy, mockery, contempt, anger, revenge, and the other affects which are related to hatred or arise from it, are evil." Instead he advocates a policy of pacification, hatred and anger are to be repaid by love and generosity (4-46 schol.).

5 EXCESSIVE AFFECTS OF JOY AND SORROW

So far we have seen Spinoza attempted to define the affects simply in terms of their proximate efficient cause and in

relation to the primary affects. We turn now to examine a group of affects which have an a priori moral flavor, that is to say, they are defined at the outset as extremes of excess and defect. This implies, it would appear, some ideal or criterion of the good in relation to which these affects are judged, an implication which is contrary to Spinoza's avowed principle that only efficient causes are valid. In the present section we shall analyze those excessive affects which are modes of joy and sorrow, reserving the final section for modes of desire.

Examples of these moralistic affects are overestimation (*existimatio*) and underestimation (*despectus*), pride (*superbia*) and despondency (*abjectio*), and pusillanimity. Overestimation (*def* 21) or love-prejudice "consists in thinking about anyone through love more than is right" (*de aliquo prae amore plus justo sentire*). Underestimation or hate-prejudice (*despectus* *def* 22) "consists in feeling about anyone through hate less than is right" (*de aliquo prae odio minus justo sentire*) (see also 3-26 *schol*). The English term prejudice covers both of Spinoza's Latin terms, one is said to be prejudiced in favor of or against others, when he is unduly influenced by the love or hate he bears them. Over- and underestimation "are respectively effects or properties of love or hatred" (*effectus sive proprietates*) (3-*def* 22 *explan*) and so may also be defined as love and hatred insofar as it affects a man so that he either thinks too much or too little of some object.

Underestimation or disparagement differs from contempt in that the latter does not *per se* involve any hate (*def* 5). *Despectus* may therefore be defined as *contemptus* joined with hate. *Derisio* (*irrisio*, *def* 11) seems to be a property or effect of *despectus* since one is said to find pleasure in imagining despicable qualities in the object despised because of hate. In this way one finds an unstable joy in the evils befalling the object causing him pain (*def* 11 *explan*).

We have seen that overestimation and underestimation are defined as extremes, one's opinion is either more than is right (*plus justo*) or less than is right (*minus justo*). This seems to imply that there may be affects of estimation which are "just right" under the circumstances. Spinoza does not

provide us with such terms; favor (def 19) and indignation (def 20) approximate this notion, though there is nothing in his definitions of *existimatio* and *despectus* to suggest that there is anything accidental involved, or that the love and hatred depend upon benefits to individuals other than oneself.

The chief peculiarity of pride (*superbia*) and despondency (self-despising, *abjectio*) as of self-satisfaction (*acquiescentia in se ipso*) and humility (*humilitas* def 26) is that they are "affects which are attended by the idea of something within us as the cause (*quos idea rei internae comitatur tanquam causa*) (3-def 24 explan.) Thus pride (*superbia*, def 28) Spinoza defines as "thinking more than is right of oneself through self-love" (*de se prae amore sui plus justo sentire*). In 3-26 scholium the same notion is expressed in more detail "When a man thinks too much of himself, this imagination is called pride and is a kind of delirium because he dreams with his eyes open, that he is able to do all those things to which he attains in imagination alone, regarding them therefore as realities, and rejoicing in them so long as he cannot imagine anything to exclude their existence and limit his power of action. Pride therefore is that joy which arises from a man's thinking too much of himself." Pride may also be engendered from indiscriminate praise and glory (def 30) which so disposes a man that he loves the presence of flatterers who foster his pride (4-57). In brief, pride is excessive self-love as distinct from self-satisfaction (def 25) which may be in accord with reason. Just as overestimation is an effect or property of love, so pride is an effect of self-love (def 28 explan.)

Despondency (*abjectio* def 29) Spinoza defines likewise as "thinking less than is right of oneself through sorrow" (*de se prae tristitia minus justo sentire*). It is to be noted that in this definition he refers to sorrow rather than to hatred because he maintains that a thing by nature cannot be contrary to itself or hate itself (3-props 4, 5). Hatred is always due to and directed toward an external cause. Nevertheless he grants (def 28 explan.) that an individual may form too low an opinion of himself because he imagines others despise him. This may come about through excess of fear of

shame (*verecundia* [3-39 schol], *here* described as “*ex nimio pudoris metu*”) or through pusillanimity. So understood pusillanimity (def 41) gives rise to despondency, just as audacity gives rise to pride (def 40). As Spinoza puts it (def 28 explan), “a man thinks too little of himself when we see that from an excess of fear of shame he does not dare to do what others who are his equals dare to do.” Again despondency may also arise when one underestimates his future powers of attaining certainty or doing good and avoiding sin. In brief, despondency is excessive humility, just as pride is excessive self-satisfaction. The former affects, Spinoza claims, are very rare, since they are contrary to the natural human tendency to affirm concerning oneself only what is good and praised by others. Indeed, he suggests, despondency and humility are all too frequently but a disguise for pride and ambition (def 29 explan).

From Spinoza's comparison of humility and despondency one might infer that the former affect involves a just estimate of one's impotence and is therefore in accord with reason. But here as in all cases of modes of sorrow, he maintains that humility cannot by nature involve an adequate idea (4-53), though the estimate of one's impotence be right. In this respect he was opposed to Descartes who claimed that humility may be in direct accord with reason (*On the Passions of the Soul*, § 158).

6 EXCESSIVE AFFECTS OF DESIRE

WE turn finally to examine that group of affects which Spinoza describes as immoderate modes of desire. This group includes ambition (*ambitio*), voluptuousness (*luxuria*), drunkenness (*ebrietas*), avarice (*avaritia*), and lust (*libido*).

Ambition (def 44) is the immoderate desire of glory (*immodica gloriae cupiditas*). This affect increases and strengthens all the affects, due to man's desire to win social approval (def 44 explan). Similarly voluptuousness (def 45) “is the immoderate desire or also love of good living” (*immoderata convivendi cupiditas vel etiam amor*). Drunk-

eness, avarice, and lust are the immoderate desire and love of drinking, riches, and women respectively (def 46-48).

These definitions are exceptional in three ways First, Spinoza mentions a specific object of desire whereas previously this was not done, secondly, they are all modes both of desire and of love or joy (*cupiditas vel etiam amor*)—a fact which is opposed to Spinoza's rigid classification of the derivative affects as modes of one or the other of the three primary ones, thirdly, in each of the above definitions he uses the terms excessive or immoderate (*immodica, immoderata*) which do not occur in other definitions, though equivalent terms of excess (*plus et minus, justo*) occur in some affects of joy and sorrow previously mentioned

The reason why Spinoza mentions love along with desire in defining the above affects is made clear in his explanation to the definition of lust (def 48) There we are told "Absolutely therefore these affects have reference not so much to the acts themselves of eating and drinking as to the appetite and love itself" One is said to be ambitious, avaricious, or lustful, not only when he actively endeavors to satisfy his desires but also and primarily because he loves them excessively and allows them to occupy his mind (4-prop 44)

We must bear in mind, however, in considering these immoderate affects, that there may also be a moderate desire for the objects mentioned Thus modesty or humaneness (def 43) is a moderate desire of glory Ambition is but excessive modestia Thus Spinoza explains in 3-29 scholium "This effort to do some things and omit others, solely because we wish to please men, is called ambition, especially if our desire to please the common people is so strong that our actions or omissions to act are accompanied with injury to ourselves or to others Otherwise this endeavour is usually called humaneness" This immoderate desire for glory may also be described as desire for vainglory (*vana quae dicitur gloria*) (4-58 schol) which he defines as "self-satisfaction nourished by nothing but the good opinion of the multitude" This opinion of the many is very fickle being based on confused and often false notions. The desire for glory may, however,

be good and moderate insofar as it originates from a desire to please those whom we praise for their honorableness or virtue and is then akin to piety (*pietas*) (4—append 25)

In the case of lust (*libido*) there is no special term to denote a moderate love of sexual intercourse "This desire of intercourse," Spinoza remarks (*def* 48 *explan*), "is usually called lust, whether it be moderate or not" (*sive haec coeundi cupiditas moderata sit sive non sit, libido appellari solet*) Later on he explicitly distinguishes between "meretricious love" (*amor meretricious*, 4—append 19) and matrimony The former "arises from mere external form, easily passes into hatred, unless, which is worse, it becomes a species of delirium" On the other hand, matrimony (4—append 20) is "in accord with reason if the desire of corporeal union [*miscendi corpora*] is engendered not merely by external form but by a love of begetting children and wisely educating them, and if in addition the love both of the husband and wife has for its cause not external form merely but chiefly liberty of mind"

There are no terms likewise to denote a moderate desire of good living, drinking, and riches, though Spinoza acknowledges their proper value (4—append 27) Hobbes in his *Leviathan* (I, chap vi) also notes this peculiarity and offers as his explanation the unceasing economic struggle "Covetousness," he remarks, "is a name used always in signification of blame because men contending for them are displeased with one another's attaining them, though the desire in itself is to be blamed or allowed according to the means by which those riches are sought" Similarly ambition which is "the desire of office or precedence," is "a name used also in the worst sense, for the reason before mentioned"

As observed in the previous section, the notion that some affects are immoderate or excessive implies some norm or idea of the good other than the affects themselves in relation to which they are judged to be immoderate (chap 1, § 7, chap. II, § 4) An affect of joy, sorrow, or desire when defined simply by its efficient cause can be neither excessive nor defective The conclusion seems to be inevitable that Spinoza implicitly introduced the notion of a final cause though ex-

plicitly he was opposed to the idea. He has, as shall be shown at length later, an ideal of human perfection in relation to which all the affects are judged to be good or evil and some are considered as immoderate. This conception of the affects as conforming more or less to the ideal of human perfection conflicts with his initial avowal that he would treat the affects just as if he were considering lines, planes, or bodies (3-introduction)

VII

THE CONTRARY AFFECTS

1 NATURAL CONTRARY AFFECTS

IN our analysis of the derivative affects we have seen that Spinoza attempts to group the affects into pairs of contraries or opposites so far as that is possible. We are now prepared to examine more carefully just what he means by contrary affects and how his doctrine compares with the traditional Scholastic teaching. Why, for example, do some affects have contraries while others have none? How does Spinoza's conception of the contraries compare with his various implicit and explicit views on the nature and functions of the affects in general? The answer I shall try to give is that Spinoza has not one but several distinct notions as to the meaning and function of the contrary affects, although he does not stress them all equally.

We have seen in our section on the classification of the derivative affects (chap. v, § 1) that Spinoza divides these affects into two main groups, namely, those dealing with modes of joy and sorrow, and those which are modes of desire. Affects of joy and sorrow are contrary by nature because the ultimate practical effects on the constitution of the individual are contrary (chap. iv, § 4). Affects of joy are modes of transition to a greater state of perfection or power, affects of sorrow are modes of transition to a lesser state of perfection or being.

An affect is then said to be contrary to human nature insofar as its effects are harmful to man, it is in agreement with human nature insofar as its effects are beneficial (see also chap. iv, § 2), (4-31). Similarly one affect is contrary to another insofar as the presence of one excludes or destroys the existence of the other (5-ax. 1). That is to say, *contrary*

affects are not merely logical opposites, they are also efficient forces opposed to one another

Spinoza's conception of contrary affects appears to be dependent upon his Cartesian mechanical physics. In his analysis of the *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy* he speaks (2-ax 19) of bodies having contrary motions (*corpora quae contrarios habent motus*) when they are forced to undergo some variation upon meeting. Contrary motions are those which repel one another and hence hinder one another from continuing otherwise indefinitely in the same state (*Principles of Cartesian Philosophy*, 2-14 corol., 2-ax 18, 2-19). This conception of contrary motions was carried over to the theory of contrary emotions or affects. Emotions or affects are said to be contrary when they are mutually exclusive and determine the individual in contrary directions. This, as we see from Hobbes, is the reason why the Greeks and Scholastics originally regarded appetite and aversion as contraries, though Spinoza failed to appreciate this point and, following Descartes instead, included aversion as a mode of desire (see chap. II, § 1, see also chap. v, § 8).

The question now arises, can affects of joy or sorrow be contrary to affects of desire? Spinoza's answer is that affects of desire may be contrary to affects of sorrow, but not to affects of joy (3-37). Desire as the essence of man is opposed to sorrow which by definition decreases human power. But joy increases human power and hence is in accord necessarily with man's natural desire to preserve himself (3-9). Hence each person by nature endeavors to foster the affects of pleasure and to possess and preserve the objects which promote them. On the other hand, he seeks to avoid affects of pain and to destroy the objects which produce them. As Spinoza puts it "The mind endeavours as much as possible to imagine those things which increase or assist the body's power of action [3-12]. Whenever the mind imagines those things which lessen or limit the body's power of action it endeavours as much as possible to recollect what excludes the existence of those things [3-13, so 3-25, 26]. We endeavour to bring into existence everything which we imagine conduces to joy and to remove or destroy every-

thing opposed to it, or which we imagine conduces to sorrow "

Because individuals experience contrary affects of joy and sorrow they too become contrary to one another in the sense that they are opposed to each other (4-30, 32) But in the case of individuals their opposition or antagonism is shown by the fact that they have similar negative affects, e.g. persons who hate one another are mutually contrary This may come about in two ways first, a person may begin by loving someone who hates him and as a result the hatred may destroy the love so that they become more intense enemies (3-38) Second, one may experience no previous love at all and merely reciprocate the hatred observed in another (3-40) Sometimes, however, one tends to love another who shows him love (3-41) Or again, where one person shows love and another hate, the love may prevail and destroy the hate and render the two in agreement (3-43) Such hatred overcome by love passes into greater love Sometimes, no change at all is brought about and the individual may continue to hate the one who loves him and cruelty is the result (3-41 schol 2) Finally, the affects of love and hatred may exist together and then one undergoes a wavering of mind (3-17 schol , 3-51 corol , 3-56) The laws governing these various reactions to one and the same object are not mentioned

Finally, it should be noted that a thing which is the cause of joy when it is regarded as present is the cause of sorrow when it is imagined as absent Thus one and the same thing is the cause of contrary affects by its presence or absence. In such instances, the sorrow is an effect or consequence of the love one has toward the object On the other hand, he who hates a thing will rejoice at its absence or destruction, and hence joy is then the effect of hatred In Spinoza's words (3-19) "He will be saddened who imagines that which he loves to be destroyed, if he imagines it to be preserved he will be rejoiced He will be rejoiced who imagines what he hates to be destroyed" (3-20)

Similarly it may happen that affects which are contrary modes of joy and sorrow are due to desire for one and the

same object. The desire for some good also includes aversion from the contrary evil, which is absence of the good. Hence the sorrow which arises from negation of the good is due to desire for the good. The identity of the object of desire thus serves to unite passions which in themselves are natural contraries. This Spinoza explains in the note to his definition of despondency (*abjectio-def 29 explan*). "We are nevertheless often in the habit of opposing humility to pride but only when we attend to their effects rather than to their nature. For we are accustomed to call a man proud who boasts too much who talks about nothing but his own virtues and other people's vices, who wishes to be preferred to everybody else and who marches along with the stateliness and pomp which belong to others whose position is far above him. On the other hand, we call a man humble who often blushes, who confesses his faults and talks about the virtues of others, who yields to everyone, who walks with bended head and who neglects to adorn himself. These affects, humility and despondency, are very rare, for human nature considered in itself, struggles against them as much as it can and hence those who have the most credit for being abject and humble are generally the most ambitious and envious."

Considered in their effects on human power, pride and excessive humility or despondency are contraries. But in relation to a particular individual they may both be due to the same cause. Pride is due to ambition, to an excessive desire for praise, and despondency or excessive humility may be the sorrow due to the failure to obtain such praise as is desired. Hence it may be that in many instances "those who are most believed to be abject and humble, are generally the most ambitious and envious." The character of Uriah Heep in Charles Dickens' story of *David Copperfield* is a good example of the type of man to which Spinoza alludes. An excess of sorrow is usually due to an unfulfilled desire or in modern terminology, repression, which nevertheless persists and occupies the mind, however different the actions of the individual appear to be. We can say that though despondency is the contrary of pride, it is frequently also a result or consequence of the latter.

2 ACCIDENTAL CAUSES OF CONTRARY AFFECTS

The Changing Disposition of the Body

ALTHOUGH the nature of an affect of joy, sorrow, or desire remains constant, the objects which produce them vary. This is due to the fact that the constitution or disposition of the human body varies in different individuals or in one and the same individual at different times. Thus Spinoza writes (3-51) "Different men may be affected by one and the same object in different ways and the same man may be affected by one and the same object in different ways at different times." For example (3-59 schol.), food may be a source of pleasure when one is hungry but when the appetite is satisfied it produces loathing or disgust (*fastidium et taedium*). Similarly the health or disease of the body will determine whether a given object produces joy or sorrow, desire or aversion.

The Changing Disposition of the Mind

Once the mind ceases to wonder at the novelty of an object, it ceases to feel pleasure in the presence of that object. This often gives rise to the contrary feeling of contempt and aversion, so that the mind thinks of the defects of the thing and not of its positive qualities. In Spinoza's words (3-52 schol.), "But if the presence of the object or a more careful contemplation of it should compel us to deny that there exists in it any cause for wonder, love, fear etc., then from its presence itself the mind remains determined to think rather of those things which are not in it, than of those which are in it, although from the presence of an object the mind is accustomed to think chiefly about what is in the object."

Affects Due to the Association of Images

It may happen that an object which is not itself an efficient cause of joy or sorrow may nevertheless give rise to such an affect in the mind because it happens to be imagined in conjunction with an object which is an efficient cause. In this way it comes about that "anything may be accidentally the cause of joy, sorrow or desire (3-15) The fact that we

have contemplated a thing with an affect of joy or sorrow of which it is not the efficient cause, is a sufficient reason for being able to love or hate it" (3-15 corol.). In fact, a person may even feel sympathy or antipathy toward an object because of its accidental similarity to some object which affects him with sorrow or joy, though the two objects may never even have been perceived together (3-15 schol) (3-16) On the same principle "anything may be accidentally the cause of hope and fear (3-50 schol)," a fact which accounts for the notion of good and evil omens among other superstitions So too vacillation of mind (*animi fluctuatio*) is due to the fact that an object which is usually the cause of sorrow is accidentally similar to another object which is a cause of joy, and so the individual both loves and hates the object (3-17) This wavering of mind may also be due to the fact that another person hates what one loves (3-31)

3 CONTRARY AFFECTS DUE TO IMITATION

THIS brings us again to the topic of the imitation of the affects Individuals, we have seen, tend to imitate the affects of others simply because they regard one another as similar in nature (3-27) Not only do people tend automatically to imitate one another's affects, but they actually endeavor to influence others to feel as they do toward themselves and external things (3-31 corol, 3-33) This ambition frequently produces a contrary result

For example, the desire for imitation is hindered in case the object loved can be possessed by one only Under such circumstances the desire to be like others leads to envy and mutual contrariness (4-34 schol) On the other hand, if we see someone who lacks the necessities which we believe he should have to support life, then this desire for similarity gives rise to pity (3-32, see also chap iv, § 4) The principle involved is the same as that discussed in a preceding section (chap vii, § 1), namely, that one and the same object gives rise to contrary affects because of its presence or absence In the case of imitation, envy, which is a mode of sorrow, arises when one imagines himself to be deprived of a good which he

desires and might otherwise have "For we suppose Peter to have an idea of a beloved object which he now possesses and Paul on the other hand, to have an idea of a beloved object which he has lost" (4-34 schol.) This envy becomes jealousy (*zeloty pia*) when the beloved object shows greater favor or love toward another, particularly in the relations between members of the opposite (and all too frequently contrary) sexes (3-35 schol.) In like manner, pity arises from sympathy with someone whom we desire to have the thing he lacks, particularly when his possession does not exclude us from having the same. It is then, as Spinoza notes, from the same property of human nature that people are envious and compassionate (3-32 schol., chap. iv, § 4).

A person may imitate another's undeserved hatred of him and then they become mutually contrary (3-40). Reciprocity of hatred leads to vengeance (3-40 schol. 2). This imitation of contrary affects may also be due to an indirect cause, e.g. "if an individual imagines another person similar to himself to be affected with hatred towards a thing similar to himself which he loves, he will hate that other person" (3-45, 3-def. 20).

Because of the power of association of the imagination a person may accidentally feel contrary to and seek to injure not only the one individual whose hatred he reciprocates, but also all the other members of his group, class, or race. "If anyone has been affected with joy or sorrow by another person of a class or nation different from his own accompanied by the idea of that person under the general name of that class or nation [*sub nomine universali classis vel nationis*] he will love or hate not only that person, but all of that class or nation" (3-46). Here, it appears, Spinoza the Jew as well as social psychologist speaks.

4 THE PASSIONS OF DESIRE AND THE CONTRARY POWERS OF THE INTELLECT

DESIRES which spring from the contrary affects of joy and sorrow involve contrary efforts. If the desire springs from

joy, the individual makes positive efforts to preserve and possess the object, if the desire springs from sorrow he makes negative efforts to remove or destroy that particular thing. But, according to Spinoza, the affect of desire itself has no contrary, even though the efforts result in contrary consequences. Desire itself is always something positive, involving the very essence of man since nothing can be self-contrary (chap. iv, § 3). In place of the traditional opposition between desire and aversion, Spinoza substitutes inclination and aversion which are accidental modes of "joy and sorrow" (3-def 8, 9 chap. v, §§ 7, 8). Inasmuch as the primary affect of desire has no contrary, there can be no derivative affects of desire which have contraries.

In opposition to the modes of desire, Spinoza introduces the strength of the intellect itself. In other words, desire and the imagination on the one hand, and the intellect on the other, are conceived as contraries—as Spinoza had previously done in speaking of the will (2-48). Thus we find he writes (3-56 schol.) "Amongst the different kinds of affects which must be very great in number, the most remarkable are voluptuousness, drunkenness, lust, avarice and ambition, which are nothing but notions of love or desire, which explain the nature of this or that affect through the objects to which they are related. It is to be observed that these affects insofar as we distinguish them by the object alone to which they are related have no contraries. For temperance, sobriety and chastity which we are in the habit of opposing to voluptuousness, drunkenness and lust, are not affects or passions but merely indicate the power of the mind which restrains these affects" (*affectus seu passionēs non sunt sed animi indicant potentiam quae hos affectus moderatur*).

In 3-59 scholium, Spinoza elaborates this point further. "All the actions which follow from the affects which are related to the mind insofar as it thinks I ascribe to fortitude [*fortitudo*] which I divide into strength of mind [*animositas*] and generosity [*generositas*]. By strength of mind [*animositas*] I mean the desire [*eupiditatem*] by which each person endeavours from the dictates of reason alone [*ex solo*

rationis dictamine conatur] to preserve his own being [suam esse conservare] By generosity [generositas] I mean the desire by which from the dictates of reason alone each person endeavours to help other people and to join them to him in friendship Those actions therefore which have for their aim the advantage only of the doer, I ascribe to strength of mind whilst those which aim at the advantage of others, I ascribe to generosity Temperance, therefore, sobriety and presence of mind in danger are species of strength of mind [temperantia igitur, sobrietas, et animi in periculis praesentia animositatis sunt species] whilst humaneness [modestia] and mercy [clementia] are species of generosity”

From both scholia we gather that temperance, sobriety, and chastity as well as presence of mind in danger, modestia, and mercy are modes of reason which restrain the corresponding affects to which they are opposed, though these powers of reason are not themselves affects or passions The reader will note the contradiction in the last statement concerning the affect of modestia (def 43) which we previously discussed as one of the affects and found to be a moderate desire for glory (chap vi, § 6) But aside from this difficulty, it is obvious that Spinoza regards these intellectual desires as contrary to the desires which are passions Rather than admit that there may be contrary affects of desire, he prefers to say that the desires originating in the intellect restrain and exclude the corresponding affects or passions of desire, even though properly speaking, the actions of the intellect may not be said to be the contraries of the passions from which they differ in kind

In truth, Spinoza's theory of the affects involves two kinds of contraries First, there are the modes of joy and sorrow which are natural contrary affects because of their contrary effects on the power or perfection of the individual Second, there are two contrary kinds of desire, namely, the desire of the intellect and that of the body and the imagination The affections of reason are actions, those of the corporeal imagination are passions The two powers of the mind are in conflict (see chap i, §§ 5, 6, 9) (also chap v, § 8)

5 SPINOZA AND THE SCHOLASTICS ON CONTRARY AFFECTS

WE noted at the beginning of the previous section that for Spinoza desire has no proper contrary and hence that there can be no derivative affects of desire which have essential contraries. The desire for some object also includes the effort to remove or destroy anything which hinders the satisfaction of this desire (see chap. v, § 8). *It is really one and the same affect with contrary objects and actions.* The true contrary of an affect of desire is an affect of sorrow and not an opposing mode of aversion.

In this respect, Spinoza differs from the Scholastics (and Hobbes) who regard aversion as the contrary of desire. This accounts for the fact that the Scholastics have a triple classification of the modes of desire, namely, the extremes of excess and defect and the ideal mean, e.g., the contrary of voluptuousness or intemperance is asceticism or insensibility and the mean is temperance. Similarly, rashness is opposed to cowardice and courage is the mean. In each instance we have the extremes of desire and aversion harmonized by moderate desire for the good.

When we turn to Spinoza on the other hand, we notice an almost complete absence of contrary affects of desire. There is only one instance where he even approaches the Aristotelian classification, namely, in his definitions of audacity (*audacia*) and pusillanimity (def. 40, 41) (3-51 schol.). A man is audacious or intrepid (*intrepidus*) when he does not fear the things his equals do, he is pusillanimous when he is restrained by fear of danger which his equals dare to meet. These affects are extremes of desire and aversion in the Aristotelian sense and hence really contrary desires, of which courage or presence of mind in danger (*animi in periculis praesentia*) is the mean. But Spinoza will not grant this, and hastens to explain (3-def. 41 explan.) that pusillanimity is a mode of fear which is not to be ascribed to the affects of desire. "I wish notwithstanding to explain it here," he adds, "because insofar as we

attend to desire, pusillanimity is the true opposite of the affect of audacity [quia quatenus ad cupiditatem attendimus affectui audaciae revera opponitur] ” In other words, any mode of aversion is properly a mode of sorrow and not of desire, though out of deference to custom and language Spinoza is willing to classify it among the modes of desire (see also definition of desiderium, def. 32) This, as said, is the only instance where he introduces a contrary extreme of desire, though as I shall soon show he does give examples of extremes of joy and sorrow As regards ambition which is an extreme desire for glory, he does mention modestia which may be a moderate desire for glory, but he does not indicate the contrary extreme to denote lack of ambition In all other instances, he mentions only one extreme of desire as in the definitions of voluptuousness, drunkenness, avarice, and lust and opposes to the latter affects the corresponding virtues or powers of reason That is to say, he opposes an extreme to a mean

It is noteworthy that Spinoza does designate contrary extreme affects of joy and sorrow, since the latter are natural or essential contraries Thus he cites pride and despondency (def 28, 29), and overestimation and underestimation (def 21, 22) Self-satisfaction (def 25) may be considered a mean between the two former extremes Thus we see that insofar as he deals with derivative affects of joy and sorrow, he is able when he chooses to follow the Scholastic method of classification into logical negatives or opposites Most of the derivative affects are, however, classified by him simply as pairs of opposites without any reference to the extremes of excess and defect, as for example, confidence and despair, rejoicing and remorse, envy and compassion, glory and shame, sympathy and antipathy In all the latter instances, the affects of joy and sorrow are logical opposites or negations as well as natural, efficient contraries

As may be seen from our discussion on “The nature of the soul and the origin of the affects” (chap 1, § 9 in particular) Spinoza’s conception of human nature is largely Stoic and this accounts for the differences between his theory of the affects and that of the Scholastics As noted in the pre-

vious section (§ 4) Spinoza opposes the active power of reason to the passive power of the imagination, whereas according to the Scholastics there is no such conflict. For Spinoza the intellect is contrary to the passions, not in the formal sense of being their negation or logical opposite, but in the practical dynamic sense of being a contrary power capable of controlling and restraining the passions. As he sees it, *there is a conflict of forces in the human soul similar to that in the physical world*. The passions are the natural result of the forces of nature of which man is a part. Human reason also is a mode of natural or divine activity and strives to assert itself in opposition to the passions. If proper care be taken, victory is inevitably with the intellect, even though man as part of nature must necessarily be subject to some passions (4-4).

According to the Scholastics, on the other hand, one and the same affect may be either a virtue or passion depending on whether it is guided by the practical intellect or the imagination. The rational part of the soul cooperates with and controls the lower, irrational functions of the soul and there is no necessary conflict between them. But Spinoza, who, like Descartes and the Stoics, identified the active soul with reason, regarded the efforts of the intellect as by nature opposed to those of the passions. All the virtues therefore originated in the intellect and all the passions in the imagination. An affect which originated in the imagination was necessarily either evil as all the affects of sorrow, or else an extreme of some modes of joy or desire. Insofar as a desire was moderate and involved an adequate idea, it originated in the intellect and was not to be considered an affect or passion at all.

In seeking remedies for the control of the affects, Spinoza later acknowledged that one and the same affect may be united to adequate as well as inadequate ideas (see chap. 1, § 7, 8, 9). Had he realized the full implication of his admission he would have redefined the intellectual virtues or modes of desire, such as temperance and courage, as affects guided by reason instead of as powers of the intellect distinct from the passions.

6 ACCIDENTAL CONTRARY AFFECTS OF DESIRE

WE see then that Spinoza, unlike the Scholastics, denies that there can be affects of desire which are essentially contrary. He does grant, however, that affects of desire may be contrary to one another accidentally, that is, insofar as the objects of the various desires are mutually exclusive. Strangely enough, this is the basis of Spinoza's only formal definition of contrary affects (4-def 5) where he states "By contrary affects I understand in the following pages those which, although they may be of the same kind, draw a man in different directions, such as voluptuousness and avarice which are both species of love and are not contrary to one another by nature but only by accident [*per contrarios affectus in seqq. intelligam eos qui hominem diversum trahunt, quamvis ejusdem sint generis, ut luxuries et avaritia, quae amoris sunt species, nec natura sed per accidentis sunt contrarii*]" Voluptuousness and avarice, the immoderate desire for good living and riches, are contrary extrinsically or by accident only, since they are both modes of desire, as distinguished from love and hatred which are natural contraries. Avarice is opposed to voluptuousness because an excessive desire for wealth may restrain one from spending it and "having a good time," although essentially the desire for riches is quite compatible with the desire for good living.

It is instructive to note in this connection that what Spinoza considers contraries by accident would not be regarded as such by the Scholastics. The Aristotelian contraries refer to one and the same kind of object by way of excess and defect. Affects which depend on different objects are incomparable, they may conflict with one another but may not be said to be contraries or logical opposites. Spinoza, on the other hand, regards affects as contrary by accident because they are or happen to be mutually exclusive, even though their objects differ in kind.

Spinoza's doctrine that affects similar in nature may yet prove to be contrary by accident is illustrated at length in the following passage (3-def 48 explan.) "Even supposing

that an avaricious, ambitious, or timid man refrains from an excess of eating, drinking or sexual intercourse—avarice, ambition and fear are not therefore the opposites of voluptuousness, drunkenness or lust. For the avaricious man generally desires to swallow as much meat and drink as he can, provided only it belongs to another person. The ambitious man too, if he hopes he can keep it a secret, will restrain himself in nothing, and if he lives among drunkards and libertines, will be more inclined to their vices, just because he is ambitious. The timid man too does what he does not will and although in order to avoid death, he may throw his riches into the sea, he remains avaricious, nor does the lascivious man cease to be lascivious because he is sorry that he cannot gratify his desire.”

Thus we see that due to the accidents of circumstance and dominant desire, one passion or desire may temporarily exclude another, even though by nature they are not at all opposed to one another. Spinoza gives the same example here as cited in his definition of contrary affects, namely, the case of an avaricious man refraining from self-indulgence. Contrary affects are those which exclude or destroy one another and this may be due to nature or accident. *In the case of the affects of desire there can be only accidentally contrary affects, since desire has no essential contrary*

VIII

THE CONTROL OF THE PASSIONS

1 SPINOZA'S CRITICISM OF DESCARTES ON THE CONTROL OF THE PASSIONS

SPINOZA turns to the problem of the control of the affects in the fifth book of the *Ethics* where he deals with the power of the intellect and human liberty. In his preface to the fifth book he examines critically Descartes's theory of the control of the passions and indicates the general tendency of his own position. We shall try to show in the course of this chapter that Spinoza is greatly indebted to Descartes's teaching which he so disparages, though he does introduce some original ideas of his own.

Spinoza criticizes the Stoics and Descartes who followed them for maintaining that the control of the passions depends absolutely on the human will. "The Stoics," he remarks, "thought that the affects depend absolutely on our will and that we are absolute masters over them, but they were driven by the contradictions of experience, though not by their own principles to confess that not a little practice and study are required in order to restrain and govern the affects. To the Stoical opinion Descartes much inclines."

Then follows a restatement of Descartes's theory that the pineal gland is the seat of the soul whereby the latter governs the movements of the animal spirits by the mere exercise of will. To each volition there is said to correspond a certain motion of the gland. "From this he concludes that there is no mind so feeble that it cannot, when properly directed acquire absolute power over its passions, provided only we determine our will by fixed and firm decisions by which we desire to direct our actions and bind with these decisions the movements of the passions we wish to have."

Spinoza cannot refrain from expressing his astonishment

that Descartes who professed to deduce nothing except from clear and distinct ideas should yet have submitted the hypothesis of the pineal gland, "a hypothesis more occult than any occult quality" of the Schoolmen. Descartes's rigid separation of the mind from the body forced him to assume without evidence this connecting link and finally he had to have recourse to the infinite power of God to join together what he in his theory had separated.

On his own account, Spinoza concludes that since body and mind differ totally in kind—a Cartesian postulate—there can be no interaction between them. "Since," he writes, "there is no relation between the will and motion, so there is no comparison between the power or strength of the body and that of the mind and consequently the strength of the body can never be determined by the strength of the mind" (*cum nulla detur ratio voluntatis ad motum, nulla etiam datur comparatio inter mentis et corporis potentiam seu vires et consequenter hujus vires nequaquam viribus illius determinari possunt*).

Spinoza's conclusion that there is no interaction between body and mind does not, however, mean that the mind has no control over the corporeal passions. The mind, he acknowledges, has a limited control over the passions, though not an absolute one. All he insists upon is that the remedies proposed for the control of the affects should follow from the necessary laws of the mind. The mind's control of the passions is subject to universal, necessary laws and is not the result of a free will arbitrarily and mysteriously intervening upon the actions of the body. Spinoza's criticism is based upon his general theory discussed at the beginning of this work (chap. 1, § 9), namely, that the soul as well as the body is an automaton lacking freedom of will and subject to necessary laws of thought, just as the body is a mechanism determined by the laws of extension and motion.

2 THE STRENGTH OF THE PASSIONS

IN place of the Cartesian theory of the interaction of body and mind Spinoza introduced the original theory that body

and mind are identical though conceived under different attributes (see chap 1, § 9). The mind is nothing but the idea of its body (2-13)—not the form of its body as the Scholastics held. In his theory of the passions Spinoza tended to regard the mind as the passive reflector of the affections of its body (2-23), the mind as well as the body became completely passive to external forces. This accounts for Spinoza's position on the problem of the strength of the affects.

We have spoken of affects contrary by nature destroying, restraining, or prevailing over one another. The question now occurs, how is it possible for one affect to exclude another? What is the cause which renders one affect stronger than another? Spinoza's answer is that the strength of an affect depends on the increase or decrease in the power of the body which it affirms. An affect which affirms a greater perfection of its body restrains or destroys the weaker affect. Thus he writes (4-7 demon) "An affect insofar as it is related to the mind is an idea by which the mind affirms a greater or lesser power of existence for its body than the body possessed before. When therefore the mind is agitated by an affect, the body is at the same time affected with an affection by which its power of action is increased or diminished. Again this affection of the body receives from its own cause a power to persevere in its own being, a power therefore which cannot be restrained nor removed unless by a bodily cause affecting the body with an affection contrary to the first and stronger than it. Thus the mind is affected by the idea of an affection stronger than the former and contrary to it. And this stronger affect will exclude the existence of the other or remove it."

In the corollary to the above demonstration he continues "An affect insofar as it is related to the mind cannot be restrained nor removed unless by the idea of a bodily affection opposed to that which we suffer and stronger than it. For the affect which we suffer cannot be restrained nor removed unless by an opposed and stronger affect; that is to say, it cannot be removed unless by the idea of a bodily affection stronger than that which affects us and opposed to it."

According to this doctrine it follows that an affect of joy

is by nature stronger than an affect of sorrow, since by definition joy increases one's power and sorrow decreases it. And so Spinoza finds it easy to demonstrate (4-18) that "the desire which springs from joy, other things being equal, is stronger than the desire which springs from sorrow" (*cupiditas quae ex laetitia oritur, caeteris paribus fortior est cupiditate qua ex tristitia oritur*). It may be, however, that an affect of sorrow is stronger than an affect of joy, as will be shown later.

Sometimes one affect of joy may be greater than another affect of joy and one affect of sorrow may be greater than another. Hence it comes about that affects of joy which are not contrary by nature may nevertheless conflict with and exclude one another due to the fact that one may affirm a greater perfection of its body and mind than the other. And likewise one affect of sorrow may be restrained by another and greater. Thus, for example (3-39) if a man hates another he will endeavor to do him evil unless he fears a greater evil, and on the other hand, he who loves another will endeavor to do him good by the same rule. (Logically, however, the smaller affect of sorrow should restrain the larger since the former involves more perfection.)

3 THE STRENGTH OF THE AFFECTS AND THE IMAGINATION

WHATEVER be the cause of the strength of the affects, Spinoza is emphatic on all accounts that one affect can be restrained only by another contrary and stronger affect (4-7). A true knowledge of good and evil cannot per se restrain an affect since there is nothing positive in a false idea which can be removed by the presence of a true idea (4-1, 14). In fact, even a false idea may remove an affect if it gives rise to a stronger, contrary affect. Thus Spinoza explains (4-1 schol.) "So with the other imaginations by which the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body or an increase or diminution in its power of action, they are not opposed to the truth, nor do they disappear with the presence of the truth. We know that when we

groundlessly fear any evil, the fear vanishes when we hear correct intelligence, but we also know, on the other hand, that when we fear an evil which will actually come upon us, the fear vanishes when we hear false intelligence, so that the imaginations do not disappear with the presence of the truth, in so far as it is true, but because other imaginations arise which are stronger, and which exclude the present existence of the objects we imagine, as we have shown in prop. 17, pt 2" Hence Spinoza demonstrates (4-15) that desires which arise from passions may restrain or exclude desires which arise from adequate knowledge of good and evil

We see then that the strength of an affect of joy, sorrow, or desire depends upon the strength of the image which it involves. Insofar as the mind imagines the cause of its passion with reference to time, then it makes a great difference to the strength of the affect whether its object be imagined as present or not (4-9 schol). Other things being equal, the image of a past or future object is weaker than the image of a present object. Similarly among objects imagined as future or past, the affect will be stronger according to the proximity of the object to the present. Of two future events, the one that will happen soonest evokes the stronger affect, and of two past events, the one which happened most recently will give rise to the stronger affect (4-10).

Furthermore, the strength of an affect also varies with the imagination of the relations of the cause to other things. For example (5-5), "an affect towards an object which we do not imagine as necessary, possible or contingent, but which we imagine simply [simpliciter] is other things being equal, the greatest of all." By a "simple" imagination Spinoza means a cause imagined without relation to other causes, that is to say, as a free cause (3-49). This explains why people love and hate one another more than other modes of nature, since they imagine one another as free (3-49 schol). Where, on the other hand, the cause is imagined in relation to other causes, that is, as either necessary, contingent, or possible, then the image of a necessary cause gives rise to an affect stronger than that which originates from the imagination of things contingent or possible (4-11). In like man-

ner, the affect arising from the image of a possible future cause is stronger than the passion due to a contingent cause, since a possible cause is one which posits the existence of the object, whereas a contingent cause is one which we imagine excludes the existence of the object in the future (4-12 demon) Similarly, an affect toward a contingent object is weaker than the affect toward a past object (4-13)

The number of causes which concur to produce a given affect is also a deciding factor in determining the strength of the affect (5-8) and serves to offset the advantages due to time or relation to other causes The more objects which the mind imagines as contributing causes of a given passion or affect, the more will that affect tend to occupy the mind (5-11) On the other hand, the novelty or singularity of an object may cause the mind to be suspended in wonder, so that it cannot pass on to the contemplation of other things (3-52 and schol).

4 THE FORCE OF THE PASSIONS AND THE POWER OF NATURE

IN speaking of the power of the imagination we noted that the image of the nature of the external object determines the strength of the affects irrespective of the truth or adequacy of the ideas involved The imagination is passive to the objects by which the body is affected and continues to imagine things in the same way even though the mind be convinced of the falsity of its notions (4-1 schol) In other words, Spinoza is concerned to distinguish between the force (vis) of a passion and human power of action The force by which a man endeavors to act is limited and surpassed by the infinite power of nature (4-3), man is a mode of nature and is determined for action and existence by other modes (4-4; 1-28) From this it follows that "a man is always necessarily subject to passions" (4-4 corol) and that "the force and increase of any passion are not limited by the power by which we endeavour to persevere in existence, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own" (4-5) The power of an effect is limited by the power of its cause (5-ax 2) and

as the power of nature as a whole infinitely surpasses that of man, it follows that the force of the passions exceeds the power of action which depends on human nature alone. This implies that the power of a passion and the power or perfection of man are two entirely different things. That is to say, the fact that one affect causes pleasure and another pain is no indication that the former is necessarily stronger than the latter. We must first look to their respective external causes, it may well be that the affect of sorrow is stronger than the affect of joy.

We have then so far three distinct meanings for the power of an affect. First, the power of an affect depends on the power of its external cause as compared with human power alone. Second, the power of an affect is relative to human perfection. An affect of joy is stronger than an affect of sorrow because the former involves an increase and the latter a decrease in human perfection or power. Thirdly, among the affects themselves, the strength of an affect is shown by its ability to exclude and dominate over other passions, irrespective of the perfection of the individual. Spinoza himself draws attention to the last point (5-20 schol.) "We call the affects great [magni] when we compare the affects of one man with another and see that one man is agitated more than another by the same affect, or when we compare the affects of one and the same man with one another, and discover that he is affected or moved more by one affect than by another."

These three notions of the power of the passions are not in agreement. The power of the external cause does not always explain the dominance of a particular desire and its exclusion of others (chap viii, § 3). The greater strength of a passion seems to depend on and be relative to, the individual's notions of good and evil, that is, on his conception of a final cause. Again, the strength of an affect considered from the point of view of the external cause is no indication of its effect on the constitution of a man. An affect may be strong and determine human action because it assists man's conatus to live (4-18). On the other hand, it may be strong precisely for the contrary reason, namely, because it is ex-

cessive and impedes his activities (4-6, 4-44) The attribute of strength or force as applied to a passion is then very ambiguous

The equivocal nature of Spinoza's conception of the force of an affect may be illustrated particularly by his demonstration in 4-18 There he explains that the desire which springs from joy is, *cæteris paribus*, stronger than that which springs from sorrow because "the force of the desire which springs from joy must be limited by human power together with the power of an external cause, while that which springs from sorrow must be limited by human power alone" (*vis cupiditatis quæ ex lætitia oritur, potentia humana simul et potentia causæ externæ, quæ autem ex tristitia sola humana potentia definiri debet*) From a biological point of view it follows that an individual affected with joy is by nature stronger than one affected by sorrow, and that everyone seeks those objects which increase his perfection and avoids those which hinder it (3-28, chap viii, § 2) But this does not necessarily imply that the desire arising from joy is by nature stronger than the one arising from sorrow Spinoza himself admits that the desire of doing good may be restrained by a greater evil (3-39) But how is it possible for an affect of sorrow to be greater than an affect of joy? Obviously we must have recourse to some criterion other than the efficiency or power of the individual

Furthermore, the argument that the desire which springs from sorrow is limited by human power alone contradicts Spinoza's principle that sorrow always involves the power of an external cause which is contrary to human nature alone (3-4, 5; 4-append § 6, chap iv, § 3) It is precisely the greater power of the external cause as compared with human power which accounts for the fact that the affect of sorrow may prevail over the affect of joy Spinoza himself suggests elsewhere (3-37) that "the desire which springs from sorrow or joy, from hatred or love is greater [major] in proportion as the affect is greater" His proof rests on the argument that sorrow gives rise to a contrary desire or effort which varies with the strength of this sorrow (see chap v, § 8) From this it follows that the strength of a desire due to an

external cause is no indication of its effect in increasing human perfection. A desire arising from sorrow may be greater than one originating in joy precisely because the affect of sorrow impedes human vitality and determines the individual to make efforts to destroy its cause. Sorrow, as Spinoza himself admitted (3-def 3 explan), is not a mere privation of power, but rather something actual depending for its force on external causes. This accounts for the fact to which he draws attention (5-10 schol), namely, that the common tendency is for people to dwell on abuses and the shortcomings of others rather than on the positive good to be obtained through cooperation and the benefits for which one ought to be thankful.

5 THE STRENGTH OF THE AFFECTS AND THE PRIMACY OF DESIRE

WE observed in the preceding section that an affect is also said to be great in relation to other affects when it dominates over and excludes the latter without regard to the perfection of the individual. There is great diversity in the relative strength of particular affects in different individuals and from time to time in one and the same individual (chap IV, § 5). The problem now arises, how are we to account for this difference in strength?

Spinoza's answer is that terms like good and evil, better and worse, stronger and weaker, are determined by the character of the individual and the nature of his desire. If a man desires or prefers one object rather than another, so that he is willing to forego other objects and pleasures in order to possess it, then he may be said to love it more strongly than that other thing, even though the actual consequences on his power or efficiency may prove to be harmful due to excess of this love (4-43). In Spinoza's words (3-39 schol.) "Every person therefore according to his affect judges or estimates what is good and what is evil, what is better and what is worse, and what is the best and what is the worst. Thus the covetous man thinks plenty of money to be the best thing and poverty the worst. The ambitious man desires nothing like glory and

on the other hand, dreads nothing like shame. To the envious man again, nothing is more pleasant than the misfortune of another, and nothing more disagreeable than the prosperity of another. And so each person according to his affect, judges a thing to be good or evil, useful or useless."

Here we see that the strongest affect or desire is the one which prevails over all others and dominates the mind. This is what we mean by character. The covetous man, for example, is one who has a dominant desire and love for wealth and his judgment of all other human values is determined by this norm or standard. So too the ambitious and the envious man have excessive desires for specific kinds of objects and estimate all other goods in relation to them. These passions often prove harmful and involve much sorrow (4-43, 44). My point here is that according to this account the strength of an affect is relative to the nature, essence or desire of the individual and this accounts for the fact that the desire of one person will not be as strong as the desire of another for one and the same object. The strength and weakness of the affects depend on the intrinsically different natures of men and the kinds of objects by which they happen to be affected. According to this doctrine, one affect is stronger than another insofar as the former happens to conform to and support the desire of the individual for some object. The strength of one's desire depends on the value one attaches to a particular object of desire and is not to be explained in terms of the increase or decrease of the efficient power of the individual.

The difficulty here presented is parallel to that discussed in our section dealing with the interrelation of the affects of desire, joy, and sorrow (chap. III, § 5). There we found two conflicting theories concerning the primacy of desire on the one hand, and joy and sorrow on the other. We now see that insofar as Spinoza gives the primacy to the affects of desire he explains the strength of the modes of joy and sorrow by reference to the natural or dominant desire of the individual and the value he attributes to some object. On the other hand, insofar as he gives the primacy to the affects of joy and sorrow, he tends to explain the strength of the affects of desire

in terms of the increase or decrease in the efficient power of the individual or by the power of the external cause as compared with human perfection

6. THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT OVER THE IMAGINATION

WE see from the preceding sections that insofar as Spinoza regarded the mind as nothing but the idea of its body he also regarded the affects of the soul as passions due to external forces. The mind as well as the body was a mechanical automaton. Spinoza, however, did not constantly maintain this doctrine. Like Descartes and the Stoics he acknowledges the active autonomy of the intellect and its conflict with the imagination and the body.

We have noted in our analysis of the power of the imagination (chap. viii § 3) that the passions due to a cause imagined simply, that is, without relation to other causes, is stronger than an affect due to an image of a necessary, possible, or contingent cause. Where the cause is imagined in relation to others (5-5), then the image of a necessary cause is stronger than the image of a possible or contingent cause (4-11, *rem quam ut necessarium imaginamur*).

Strictly speaking, however, the mind does not perceive or imagine anything as necessary, since perception is concerned only with the common order of nature and the contingent order of things (2-29 schol.) (chap. i, § 4). Thus Spinoza concludes (2-44 corol. 1) that "it is through the imagination alone that we look upon things as contingent both with reference to the past and the future." It pertains to the nature of the intellect alone to conceive things according to their necessary, internal relations to one another (2-29 schol., 2-44). These adequate, necessary ideas by nature exclude the inadequate, contingent notions of the mind. Similarly, the intellect destroys or restrains those passions which, like hope and fear, involve a fluctuation of the mind due to contingent events in the past or future. The intellect separates the emotion from the idea of its object and the passion thereby loses its force (5-2). Spinoza's example in the scholium to 5-6

is particularly striking "The more this knowledge that things are necessary is applied to individual things which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the greater is this power of the mind over the affects—a fact to which experience also testifies For we see that sorrow for the loss of anything good is diminished if the person who has lost it, considers that it could not by any possibility have been preserved So also we see that nobody pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk or reason, and lives so many years not conscious of itself as it were, but if a number of human beings were born adult and only a few here and there were born infants, everyone would pity the infants because we should then consider infancy not as a thing natural or necessary but as a defect or fault of nature Many other facts of a similar kind we might observe" The great attraction of Spinoza's *Ethics* for so many minds lies precisely in the comfort it gives by rendering the individual superior to his environment and his misfortunes

As a result of the power of the intellect to destroy the passions due to the imagination, it follows (4-59) that the mind may be determined by reason alone to perform all those actions to which it may be determined by the imagination and its passions (*ad omnes actiones ad quas ex affectu qui passio est, determinatur, possumus absque eo a ratione determinari*)

Aside from the extrinsic power of the intellect due to the relation of necessity among its ideas, the intrinsic strength of the intellect consists in its function of conceiving clear and distinct ideas Hence "an affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it" (5-3) (*affectus qui passio est, desinet esse passio simulatque ejus claram et distinctam formamus ideam*) "In proportion then as we know an affect better, is it more within our control and the less does the mind suffer from it" (5-3 corol) (*eo magis in nostra potentia est et mens ab eo minus patitur*). Since there is no passion of which we cannot form some adequate conception (5-4) it follows that (5-4 schol) "every one has the power partly at least if not absolutely [*si non absolute ex parte saltem*] of understanding clearly and dis-

tinctly himself and his affects and consequently of bringing it to pass that he suffers less from them. We have therefore mainly to strive to acquire a clear and distinct knowledge as far as possible of each affect so that the mind may be led to pass from the affect to think those things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, and with which it is entirely satisfied, and to strive also that the affect may be separated from the thought of an external cause and connected with true thoughts." It is instructive to observe here that Spinoza's conclusion is precisely the same as that of Descartes, without the latter's reference to the pineal gland. Once Spinoza granted the autonomy or self-determination of the intellect, he was inevitably led to acknowledge the almost complete if not absolute power of the intellect over the imagination and its passions.

The significance of Spinoza's present position is best appreciated by comparing it with his previous demonstrations. Previously we saw he maintained that an adequate or true idea *per se* was impotent to restrain an affect (4-14). A given affect could be restrained only by a stronger contrary affect. Now we find he claims that a clear and distinct idea *per se* can restrain or exclude a passion (5-3). "There is no remedy within our power," he counsels, "which can be conceived more excellent for the affects than that which consists in a true knowledge of them, since the mind possesses no other power than that of thinking and forming adequate ideas" (5-4 schol.) (*nulla alia mentis potentia datur quam cogitandi et adaequatas ideas formandi*).

From the latter position it follows that there is something positive in an adequate idea whereby it excludes an inadequate idea or one which involves some negation (3-3 schol.). Just as light excludes or destroys darkness by its very presence, so an adequate idea removes an inadequate one by revealing itself and its negation (2-43 schol.). The superior strength of an adequate idea is due to the fact that it contains more perfection or reality than does the inadequate idea. Just as in the case of the passions, one passion was said to be stronger than another because of the greater strength of

perfection of the body which it affirmed, so with reference to ideas, one idea is stronger than another because of its intrinsic greater perfection. The point at issue may be illustrated by a citation from Spinoza's treatise *On the Improvement of the Understanding* (*ibid*, p. 21) "In proportion as the mind's understanding is smaller and its experience multiplex, so will its power of coining fictions be larger, whereas as its understanding increases, its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas also becomes less. For instance, in the same way as we are unable while we are thinking to feign that we are thinking or not thinking, so also when we know the nature of a body we cannot imagine an infinite fly, or when we know the nature of the soul we cannot imagine it as square, though anything may be expressed verbally. But as we said above, the less men know of nature the more easily can they coin fictitious ideas, such as trees speaking, men instantly changed into stones, or into fountains, ghosts appearing in mirrors, something issuing from nothing, even gods changed into beasts and men and infinite other absurdities of the same kind." Here we see that Spinoza himself argues that the more perfect one's ideas are, the less is he capable of imagining less perfect ones. In other words, the more perfect ideas necessarily exclude the less perfect, and inadequate ideas.

In the fourth book of the *Ethics* Spinoza denies that a true or adequate idea can per se restrain a passion because he there conceives the strength of the passions as due to the power of the efficient external cause over the body. The power of the passions as due to the infinite power of nature was therefore regarded as superior to the finite power of human reason. Spinoza discounted the power of an adequate idea because he claimed that there was nothing positive in a false idea which could be removed by the presence of a true idea (4-1). In the fifth book of the *Ethics* Spinoza concedes that adequate ideas may exclude the passions by removing the inadequate ideas which they involve. That is to say, an inadequate idea per se is not a mere negation or privation but rather something actual or positive, even though that in

virtue of which it is regarded as inadequate or imperfect is due to a negation of being (3-3 schol ; 3-def. 3 explan) Hence *an inadequate idea is something positive which can be removed by the presence of a true idea or one regarded as true or more perfect* (chap 1, § 4)

It is true that the corporeal affections due to an external cause cannot be removed by a true idea per se but the latter may restrain the mind from estimating their value in accordance with its present imagination As Spinoza admits, the error involved in an image may be removed, even though the image itself may persist (4-1 schol) Spinoza seems to forget in parts of book four of the *Ethics* that the power of an external cause depends not only on its actual physical effect on the human body, but also upon the nature of one's ideas of the object as well as upon the character or desire of the individual (chap viii, § 5) He considers the passions primarily with reference to the body and not in relation to the mind alone as he promised to do He grants that one affection of the body excludes another because of the greater perfection of the human body involved, but he seems to forget the cardinal principle of his doctrine of the attributes, namely, that one idea may exclude another simply because of its intrinsic greater perfection without reference to any body at all (chap 1, § 3) The strength of the affects which involve an idea of the external cause depends primarily upon the intrinsic adequacy of this idea and only secondarily upon its effects on the human body

There is then, I submit, a real conflict between these two conceptions of the power of the affects On the one hand, Spinoza maintains that the power of the passions is independent of the power of the intellect The power of the passions is superior to the finite power of human reason, and functions according to the mechanical laws of the imagination On the other hand, he demonstrates that the adequate ideas of the intellect are by virtue of their intrinsic perfection superior to the inadequate ideas of the passions, and can remove or destroy the latter, by excluding the ideas from which they originate.

7 THE CONFLICT OF INTELLECTUAL AFFECTS AND PASSIONS

THE difficulty inherent in Spinoza's notions of the relation between the intellect and the imagination is best exemplified by his conception of intellectual affects. We have seen from our previous analyses (chap i, §§ 5, 9, chap vii, § 4) that Spinoza, like Descartes, contrasted the intellectual affects which originate in reason, with the passions originating in the imagination. Intellectual affects may be either modes of desire or joy but not modes of sorrow (3-59). The general term for intellectual desires is fortitude (*fortitudo*) which is subdivided into *animositas* and *generositas* (3-59 schol.), that is to say, the desire to preserve oneself and others. Strictly speaking, only will (*voluntas*) pertains to the intellect and desire to the body and imagination, but Spinoza uses the term *cupiditas* here to refer to the *conatus* or power of the intellect alone. Among the modes of intellectual joy he mentions self-satisfaction, favor, and intellectual love.

The intellectual modes of desire are regarded by Spinoza as by nature contrary to the desires which are passions (chap. vii, § 4, chap v, § 8). For example, temperance is opposed to voluptuousness, sobriety to drunkenness, chastity to lust, humaneness (*modestia*) to ambition. Thus although Spinoza maintained that desire as the essence of man has no natural contrary and therefore contrasted aversion with inclination, nevertheless he granted that the desires or efforts of the intellect may be contrary essentially to corporeal desires.

In his formal definition of contrary affects (4-def 5) Spinoza denies explicitly that one mode of desire can be contrary to another by nature, the conflict of desires is due to the accidental difference of objects which are mutually exclusive under the circumstances (chap vii, § 6). In this sense, one passion of desire may conflict with another by accident. In the case of the intellectual desires, however, their object is the same as that of the corresponding passions and hence the conflict between them is due to the real diversity of their

natures and origins and not to the accidental diversity of their objects. The conflict between an intellectual desire and a passion may also be accidental insofar as they involve different objects. Similarly two or more intellectual desires may be accidentally opposed to one another insofar as one involves a greater good than another (4-65, 66). Reason always counsels a man to seek a greater good before a less.

Spinoza's notion of the nature of sorrow and aversion had a decided influence on his doctrine of the control of the passions. First, the fact that there was no intellectual mode of sorrow meant that an affect of sorrow could be restrained only by an intellectual mode of joy or desire. So too the passion of joy could be restrained only by another mode of joy and desire. In other words, in accordance with reason one avoided evil indirectly through desire for some positive good (4-63 corol.). This positive good could be either some other object (5-2) or the same object adequately conceived (5-4 schol.), but no mode of sorrow such as repentance could arise directly from reason and exclude the passion. Spinoza, however, does not maintain this doctrine consistently. Insofar as he grants that an adequate idea of the passions, that is, of good and evil (4-8), can destroy the passions (5-3) he proposes remedies whereby the mind may control the passions directly through a knowledge of their origin and effects on human perfection (5-4 schol.). He states expressly (4-66 corol.) that "according to the guidance of reason we shall seek the lesser present evil which is the cause of a greater future good and the lesser present good which is the cause of a greater future evil we shall neglect" (*malum praesens minus quod est causa majoris futuri boni, ex rationis ductu appetemus, et bonum praesens minus, quod causa est majoris futuri mali, neglegemus*). Here we see that reason may counsel one not only how to avoid some evil indirectly but also how to attain some good indirectly through some direct or present evil.

The problem now occurs, is an intellectual affect by nature stronger than the corresponding passion, and if so, to what is this due? Insofar as Spinoza maintains that a more perfect idea by nature excludes the less perfect, then it follows that

intellectual affects necessarily restrain or remove the corresponding passions. Thus the intellectual love of God or the most perfect being dominates the mind because the idea of God is the most perfect and adequate conceivable (chap v, §§ 5, 6). Considered metaphysically, any finite mode is mutable and its existence is contingent upon the existence of other modes, whereas the existence of God is eternal and necessary. Hence the love of this eternal and necessary being by nature excludes the love of any finite or contingent being (4-11, 5-6). In the last analysis God is the only being whose existence is necessary and whose activity is absolutely free (1-17 corol 2) and hence the desire of reason must necessarily be for Him exclusively. Spinoza's words in the introduction to the treatise *On the Improvement of the Understanding* now take on an added significance. "After experience had taught me that all things which frequently occur in social life are vain and futile, seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad except insofar as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly to the exclusion of all else [a quo solo, rejectis caeteris omnibus animus afficeretur]. Love towards a thing eternal and infinite fills the mind wholly with joy and is itself unmingled with any sadness, wherefore it is greatly to be desired [desiderandum] and sought for with all our strength [quaerendum totisque viribus]." In these confessions Spinoza tells of his moral struggles and of his conclusion that only the absolutely perfect being could satisfy his quest for a supreme good. The dominance of the intellectual love of God and its power to exclude all other affections and passions depends on the perfection as well as adequacy of the idea of God. As noted in our discussion of intellectual love (chap v, § 6) the mind and its ideas acquire perfection, not indirectly through affirming the affections of the human body, but directly through identification or union with other objects conceived by the intellect.

On the other hand, Spinoza also maintains (4-7 corol) that "an affect insofar as it is related to the mind cannot be

restrained nor removed unless by the idea of a bodily affection opposed to that which we suffer and stronger than it " From this it follows that an intellectual affect which by definition has no reference to the body at all cannot restrain a passion Spinoza in fact asserts expressly (4-15) that "a desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or restrained [*restringi vel coerceri potest*] by many other desires which take their origin from the affects by which we are agitated " For example, the desire for a thing imagined as present can exclude the intellectual desire for some future or contingent good (4-16, 17)

It appears then that we are confronted here by a major contradiction in Spinoza's theory of the control of the passions *Insofar as he attempts to retain a complete parallelism between body and mind he is forced to say that passions can be restrained only by contrary and stronger passions On the other hand, insofar as he postulates the autonomy or self-determination of the intellect he, like Descartes, is forced to imply some interaction between the intellect and the corporeal passions, though there is no place for such interaction in his system* As I shall show in the following sections, this dilemma led Spinoza to seek for a *via media* in the Scholastic notion of the unity of the affects of the intellect and imagination

8 THE AGREEMENT OF THE INTELLECT AND IMAGINATION

SPINOZA attempts to overcome the difficulties arising from his bifurcation of the intellect and imagination by maintaining their essential cooperation and harmony That is to say, contrary to his previous Platonic notion that the intellect functions independently of the imagination, he now asserts the Aristotelian theory that there may be images of things of which we also have adequate ideas Thus he demonstrates (5-10) that the mind has "the power of arranging and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect" (*potestatem habemus ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones secundum ordinem ad intellectum*)

To arrange properly and connect the affections of the

body according to intellectual order means for the mind to imagine the common properties of things and their necessary relations to one another (5-20 schol) This union of concepts with images (2-def 3) makes it proper to speak of an object which is imagined as necessary (4-11, 5-5, 5-6 schol), though the mind only imagines things which the intellect conceives as necessary (chap viii, § 6). From the point of view of duration or time such necessary images are more powerful than images depending on contingent things perceived (5-7)

Furthermore, the intellect may determine the order of the imagination by associating the image of some injury or passion with the true, necessary cause, thereby enabling the intellect to exercise fortitude in controlling the passions and to practice those maxims of life which make for happiness (5-10 schol, 5-20 schol) The intellect does not endeavor to eradicate the affect due to external objects, it simply associates the image of the external object with an adequate idea of its good or utility in furthering human perfection The intellect is concerned with the positive qualities of things rather than with their negative aspect or abuse and directs the imagination accordingly (5-10 schol)

The control of the imagination by the intellect is assisted by the fact that the intellect conceives the universal interrelation of all modes and hence determines the mind to imagine a multiplicity of particular causes which otherwise would not be imagined together (5-20 schol) The intellect thus prevents the mind from being enslaved by strange superstitions due to excessive regard for some one object (5-9) In this manner, the power of the intellect increases the power of the imagination and of the affects which depend on the latter (5-8) Intellectual affects support one another whereas the passions of the imagination tend to exclude one another Thus Spinoza demonstrates (5-11) "The greater the number of objects to which an image is related the more constant is it, or the more frequently does it present itself and the more does it occupy the mind" And again (5-12) "The images of things are more easily connected with those images which are related to things which we clearly and distinctly under-

stand than with any others" (*rerum imagines facilius imaginibus quae ad res referuntur quas clare et distincte intelligimus junguntur quam aliis*) Finally (5-14): "The mind can cause all the affections of the body or the images of things to be related to the idea of God" (*Mens efficere potest ut omnes corporis affectiones seu rerum imagines, ad dei ideam referantur*)

It is noteworthy that God is the only being whom the intellect conceives as a free cause (1-17 corol 2) Hence God or the most perfect being may not only be imagined simply or apart from relationship to other things, as are the modes of whose cause we are ignorant (5-5 demon), but this simplicity of the image of God is also in accord with the adequate idea of reason. This unique relationship between the intellectual and imaginary ideas of God accounts for the fact that the love of God is necessarily the greatest of all affections (5-16), since He is the only free cause and there is no other cause besides God which can exclude the idea of Him from the mind (5-9, 5-15, 5-20 schol)

Nevertheless due to the limitations of the power of the finite imagination, it is not possible for the human mind to imagine the infinite perfection of God as clearly and distinctly as the nature of some finite object—or rather as vividly as some object perceived by the senses, since Spinoza attributes clearness and distinctness to the concepts of the intellect alone (see chap 1, § 5) , (chap x, § 6) As Spinoza explains it (2-47 schol) - "The reason why we do not possess a knowledge of God as distinct as that which we have of common notions, is that we cannot imagine God as we can bodies and because we have attached the name of God to the images of things which we are in the habit of seeing, an error which we can hardly avoid, inasmuch as we are continually affected by external objects " From this passage it appears that the distinctness of an idea in some way depends on the imagination—an implication which undermines Spinoza's notion of the complete autonomy of the intellect and its adequate ideas The imagination of the infinite perfection of God is impossible and difficult not only because of its infinity, but also because it transcends in kind the perfection of the finite objects

perceived through the senses or known in the common order of nature For example, there could be no further likeness between the divine and human intellect or will "than between the celestial constellation of the dog and the animal which barks" (1-17 schol) It is true (1-15 schol) "there are those who imagine God to be like a man composed of body and soul and subject to passions, but it is clear enough from what has already been demonstrated how far off men who believe this are from the true knowledge of God But these I dismiss for all men who have in any way looked into the divine nature deny that God is corporeal" It appears therefore that the imagination may assist the contemplation of God's existence, though it is also necessary for the intellect to restrain the imagination from attributing to Him anthropomorphic or purely corporeal attributes

In his treatise *On the Improvement of the Understanding* Spinoza also mentions implicitly the power of the imagination in facilitating intellectual conception of the essence of a thing through its proximate efficient cause (*ibid*, pp 27-28, 43) "The mind," he writes (*ibid*, p 43) "can determine in many ways the ideas of things which the understanding forms from other ideas, thus for instance, in order to define the plane of an ellipse, it presupposes a point adhering to a cord to be moved around two centres, or again, it conceives an infinity of points always in the same fixed relation to a given straight line, or a cone cut in an oblique plane so that the angle of inclination is greater than the angle of the vertex of the cone or in an infinity of other ways" And again (*ibid*, pp 27-28) "For instance, in order to form the conception of a sphere, I invent a cause at my pleasure, namely a semicircle revolving round its centre and thus producing a sphere This is indisputably a true idea and although we know that no sphere in nature has ever actually been so formed, the perception [perceptio] remains true and is the easiest manner of conceiving a sphere" (formandi conceptum globi) (Vol I, p 22, Latin edition of Van Vloten)

The above quotations all illustrate our thesis that in his final position Spinoza came to regard the imagination as a power of the mind capable of facilitating the functions of

the intellect. Contrary to his original Stoic-Cartesian notion (chap 1, § 5) that the imagination is something essentially passive to external forces with laws which differ from those of the intellect, he now regards the imagination as subject to intellectual control (5-10) and even as strengthening the power of reason.

9 THE UNITY OF THE AFFECTS OF THE INTELLECT AND IMAGINATION

ONCE Spinoza granted that the mind may imagine an idea adequately conceived, he was then forced to alter the criterion of actions and passions. We saw (chap 1, § 3, *Ethics* 3-def. 2) that he formerly considered an affect to be an action when it originated from an internal cause of which the mind was the adequate cause, it was a passion if the mind was its inadequate cause. This turned out to mean that all affects which are properly actions originated in the intellect and all passions in the imagination (3-3). He now comes to maintain with the Scholastics that any external cause may be adequately as well as inadequately conceived. One and the same affect may be united to the adequate or inadequate idea of an external object and becomes an action or passion accordingly (5-4 schol.). This I take to be the significance of Spinoza's assertion that it is possible for the mind to detach an emotion of the mind from one idea and to join it with others (5-2). That is to say, the connection between an affect and the idea of its cause is purely extrinsic (chap 1, § 7). The affects considered as affections of the mind do not merely affirm the affections of the body, on the contrary, the mind may unite and identify itself in love or desire with many external objects other than its body (chap x, § 6). *There is no necessary parallelism between the ideas of the intellect and the affections of the body.*

Spinoza, however, is not quite clear on this point. He seems to maintain that an object adequately conceived is an internal cause of an affect. He is forced to argue thus in order to retain his dualistic distinction between the self-determination of the intellect and the passivity of the imagination. He there-

fore assumes the identity of an adequate or clear idea of a cause and an idea of an adequate or sufficient cause, though they are by no means the same (chap. 1, § 4). Indeed such an identity of adequate idea and adequate cause would imply that the adequate ideas of the intellect were in themselves the objects of desire and not the objects or ideata to which these ideas refer. Here again we meet up with the problem arising from Spinoza's failure to recognize that his definition of an adequate idea referred to a purely internal or intrinsic property of the idea without regard to any object or ideatum, whereas his definition of a true idea referred to the extrinsic agreement between an idea and its object. According to his definition of a true idea, one may desire the object adequately conceived by the intellect, but according to his definition of an adequate idea and cause, one could desire only himself or his own ideas—an egocentric inference which Spinoza in fact actually draws in the case of the intellectual love of God which he regards as a mode of self-satisfaction or self-love (chap. v, § 5).

The difficulty in which Spinoza found himself was due primarily to the fact that he wished to avoid all reference to final causes. If affects are said to originate from ideas, then the mind itself must be the efficient cause of these ideas and not some external cause. On the other hand, he was forced by the facts of experience to acknowledge that we desire external things. Hence he admitted that we may have adequate as well as inadequate ideas of these external causes (5-10). The intellect simply examines the proper use or perfection of each object with a view to increasing human perfection and avoiding excessive preoccupation with any particular thing. That is to say, Spinoza was forced to introduce an Aristotelian, extrinsic criterion of an action, namely, its perfection and function as well as that of its object in promoting human happiness—a standard differing radically from the intrinsic criterion of adequacy and inadequacy (chap. 1, § 7).

Put in different terms, Spinoza confuses the notion of an intellectual affect and an affect in accord with reason. The latter may refer to an external cause which is adequately conceived and sought in moderation. It is really not neces-

sary to detach an affect from its external cause, it is only necessary to regulate one's desires in accordance with the ideals of reason. In short, there may be rational passions—passions regulated by reason. An intellectual affect, on the other hand, is due to an idea of which the intellect is the internal or adequate cause and which does not in any way depend upon an external object.

Finally it may be recalled that insofar as Spinoza opposes the intellect to the imagination, he has two sets of affects differing in origin, namely, the intellectual affects and the corporeal passions. On the other hand, insofar as he postulates agreement between the intellect and imagination, he has only one set of affects, any one of which may be either an action or passion (chap. i, § 7)—though Spinoza refuses to go the full length of his position and denies that affects of sorrow may be in accord with reason. Had he followed out the full implications of his Aristotelian position he would have realized that the perfection of an object was the final rather than the efficient cause of desire (chap. iii, § 4). He was apparently unaware of the conflict between his Aristotelian-Scholastic theory of the emotions and the Stoic-Cartesian principles which predominate in his psychology and ethics.

PART II
ETHICAL THEORY

IX

THE NOTION OF PERFECTION AND IMPERFECTION

1 THE INSEPARABILITY OF PERFECTION AND REALITY

WE turn in the second part of this study to investigate the relation between Spinoza's theory of the emotions and his doctrine of the virtue or good of man. As Spinoza's theory of human virtue is bound up with his idea of the metaphysical status of perfection and imperfection in general, we shall begin with an analysis of the latter notions.

In his metaphysics, Spinoza identifies perfection and reality (2-def 6). But the reality of a thing is nothing other than its essence, and its essence in turn is simply its power of acting and existing. Hence the perfection of a thing and its power of action are identical. God who is the infinitely perfect being possesses infinite attributes each of which manifests His power of being or essence (1-11, 1-34). Each finite mode is perfect in its kind to the extent that it expresses in finite form the infinite power or perfection of God. The perfection of each thing is something pertaining intrinsically and absolutely to its essence, irrespective of its appearance to the senses (1-append). "For as to the first point," Spinoza remarks (correspondent let 19), "we know well that everything that is, considered in itself and without regard to anything else, includes perfection, which always extends in each thing as far as does the essence of the thing itself."

Similarly ideas have a perfection of their own in agreement with the objects to which they refer. Thus Spinoza writes ¹ explicitly, "The more ideas express perfection of any ob-

¹ *Improvement of the Understanding*, p. 43, John Wild edition of *Spinoza Selections*.

ject, the more perfect are they themselves " And again (2-13 schol) "W cannot however, deny that ideas, like objects differ from one another just as the object of one idea is more excellent and contains more reality than another " There are then degrees of perfection among ideas or modes of thought as well as among modes of extension In relation to God or the most perfect being, finite things are imperfect and involve a negation of the totality of being

2 CAUSALITY AND PERFECTION

THE notion of degrees of perfection or reality is linked up in Spinoza's metaphysics with his doctrine of causality. All the perfection which any thing possesses it owes to its cause God or the most perfect being is a *causa sui* whose essence and existence are identical (1-20), but all finite or created things owe their perfection to God who is prior to all things in causality (1-17 schol) And here Spinoza introduces an important distinction based on Neo-Platonism Whatever follows directly or immediately from any attribute of God participates in a greater degree of divine perfection than does a mode which follows indirectly, from some other mode To quote (1-append), "That effect is most perfect which is immediately produced by God, and in proportion as intermediate causes are necessary for the production of a thing is it imperfect " In other words, "whatever follows directly from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must forever exist and must be infinite, that is to say, through that same attribute they are eternal and infinite" (1-21, 23) And again (1-28 schol), "Since certain things must have been immediately produced by God, that is to say, those which necessarily follow from His absolute nature, these primary products being the mediating cause for those things which nevertheless without God can neither be nor be conceived "

In brief, there are degrees of reality or perfection among created modes, depending upon the immediacy or mediacy with which they follow from the divine attributes Those modes which follow immediately, such as the divine understanding and motion and rest, are infinite and eternal, those

modes which follow mediately from these infinite modes are finite and have a limited duration Spinoza does not trace the intellectual order of the various grades of perfection in their relation to the first cause, and hence the problem remains of how the finite modes are derived from the infinite, though this does not concern us here The important point is that degrees of perfection among natural things correspond to the degree of immediacy with which they are related to the most perfect being

In this respect Spinoza's Neo-Platonism is in complete accord with his doctrine of the primacy of the efficient cause. The perfection of an effect depends directly upon the perfection of its efficient cause This theory is to be contrasted with the Scholastic theory of creation which regards the end or final cause as primary According to the Scholastics therefore the end or final product is literally more perfect than the first product of creation This in fact is Spinoza's criticism of the Scholastics. In 1-Appendix he writes "This much nevertheless, I will add, that this doctrine concerning an end altogether overturns nature For that which is in truth the cause it considers as the effect, and vice versa Again, that which is first in nature it puts last, and, finally, that which is supreme and most perfect it makes the most imperfect For it is plain that that effect is the most perfect which is immediately produced by God, and in proportion as intermediate causes are necessary for the production of a thing is it imperfect But if things which are immediately produced by God were made in order that He might obtain the end He had in view, then the last things for the sake of which the first exist, must be the most perfect of all." The Scholastic theory, it is interesting to note, is more in accord with the modern doctrine of progress and evolution than is Spinoza's theory which denies the importance of time in nature as a whole For Spinoza, the perfect is the eternal and immutable

3 PERFECTION AND DURATION

It is to be noted that perfection as conceived has no reference to time or duration The perfection of a thing refers to the

quantity or power of being, to the kinds of functions it can perform, and not to the process or duration in which it performs them. A man is a more perfect being than a horse even though the horse may live longer. In Spinoza's words (4-pref) "Finally by perfection generally I understand as I have said, reality, that is to say, the essence of any object insofar as it exists and acts in a certain manner, no regard being paid to its duration. For no individual thing can be said to be more perfect because for a longer time it has persevered in existence, inasmuch as the duration of things cannot be determined by their essence, the essence of things involving no fixed or determined period of existence, any object, whether it be more or less perfect always being able to persevere in existence with the same force as that with which it commenced existence [*cadam vi qua existere incipit, semper in existendo perseverare poterit*]. All things therefore are equal in this respect." The perfection of things as conceived through the most perfect being or *sub specie aeternitatis* has no reference to actual duration (5-29 schol). This raises the problem as to the relation between perfection and existence.

According to Spinoza's reasoning in the first book of the *Ethics* (1-11 schol) "perfection does not prevent the existence of a thing, but establishes it, imperfection on the other hand, prevents existence." On this basis the power of a thing to persevere in its existence is part of its perfection. Spinoza, however, separates the essence and existence of finite things, the essence of any mode does not involve any fixed duration. All things by nature tend to persevere in existence for an indefinite time and are prevented from doing so only by the interference of some other mode, and therefore in this respect all are alike. It appears then that at one time Spinoza regards perfection as correlated to the power of existence and at another he completely separates perfection and existence (compare chap III, § 2). We shall return to this problem when we come to consider the virtue of man and the *summum bonum*.

4 PERFECTION, COMPLETENESS, AND PURPOSE

So far we have seen that perfection pertains intrinsically or essentially to the nature of reality. In the fourth book of the *Ethics* we find a different doctrine. There we are told that perfection and imperfection are nothing positive in things themselves. Perfection means completeness and is relative to each individual's desires. The desire of each person is the efficient cause of the perfection or imperfection of things. Spinoza writes (4-pref) "If a man has proposed to do a thing and has accomplished it [perfectit] he calls it perfect [perfectum esse dicit] and not only he but everyone else who has rightly known or has believed that he has known the mind of the author and the scope of that work will call it perfect too. For example, having seen some work (which I suppose to be as yet not finished) if we know that the intention [scopum] of the author of that work is to build a house we shall call the house imperfect while, on the other hand, we shall call it perfect as soon as we see that the work has been brought to the end [finem] which the author had determined for it. But if we see that any work such as we have never seen before and if we do not know the mind of the workman, we shall then not be able to say whether the work is perfect or imperfect." The adjective "perfectus" is based on the verb "perficere" and this means that each individual according to the limit and scope of his work determines whether the thing he is making shall be called perfect or imperfect.

Spinoza suggests that natural objects are called perfect by analogy with artificial objects which are the product of the artisan. People imagine nature to be acting with some end in view, and hence call natural things more or less perfect as if nature were striving to realize some end or ideal and did not always succeed in accomplishing her objective. In truth, since created nature follows necessarily from the power of God who does not act with a view to some external end, natural objects cannot be called perfect or imperfect. Things are called perfect only by accident, that is, according to their relation in satisfying human desire, but they

are not intrinsically such. Spinoza's own statement reads (4-pref) "Thus we see that the custom of applying the words perfect and imperfect to natural objects has arisen rather from prejudice than from true knowledge of them. For we have shown in the appendix to the first part of this work that nature does nothing for the sake of an end [*propter finem non agere*] for that eternal and infinite being whom we call God or nature acts by the same necessity by which He exists [1-16]. The reason or cause therefore why God or nature acts and the reason why He exists are one and the same. Since therefore He exists for no end, He acts for no end [*nullius finis causa existit, nullius etiam finis causa agit*]. And since He has no principle or end of existence, He has no principle or end of action." God or the most perfect being is self-sufficient and does not therefore act to realize some external end or final cause.

5 PERFECTION, THE EFFICIENT AND THE FINAL CAUSE

THOUGH man as a finite being does act for the sake of some end, this does not mean, according to Spinoza, that the end is a final cause having an absolute perfection which the individual strives to reproduce. Desire is not moved by an ideal, perfect form or unmoved mover. On the contrary, the desire itself is the efficient cause of the perfection of things. Desire determines the perfection of its objects, the objects or their ideas do not move the desire toward their perfection. As Spinoza explains (4-pref) "a final cause as it is called, is nothing therefore but human desire insofar as this is considered as the principle or primary cause of anything [*causa autem quae finalis dicitur, nihil est praeter ipsum humanum appetitum, quatenus is alicujus rei veluti principium seu causa primaria consideratur*]. For example, when we say that habitation [*habitatio*] was the final cause of this or that house, we merely mean that a man because he imagined the advantages of a domesticated life, desired to build a house. Therefore habitation insofar as it is considered as a final cause, is merely this particular desire, which is really an

efficient cause [*qui revera causa est efficiens*] and is considered as primary because men are usually ignorant of the causes of their desires, for as I have often said, we are conscious of our actions and desires but ignorant of the causes by which we are determined to desire anything "Man cannot desire the perfection of some object, since the object is not the principal or primary cause of his action, desire itself is the efficient cause of human action and determines what the individual shall consider perfect or imperfect ✓

It should be noted that Spinoza's conception of the perfection of artificial things is compatible with a doctrine of final causes We can say that each individual sets up for himself some particular idea or objective form, even though there is no absolute or universal standard The particular plan or intention as conceived does determine whether a particular thing shall be called perfect or imperfect and therefore the perfection of the idea is prior in nature to the actual perfection of the completed thing In the case of God, it is true, we cannot say on this premise that anything in nature is perfect or imperfect since He acts with no ends in view

Spinoza, however, maintains that in the case of man as in that of God, there is no need of final causes, since man too acts by the necessity of his nature, though man unlike God is not self-determined If so, Spinoza should have inferred that no man-made thing is either perfect or imperfect, since the idea or intention is not the primary cause of human desire He does, nevertheless, retain the notion of perfection as applying to man and man-made things, while apparently denying its application to natural modes

The point I am concerned to establish is that the notion of perfection and imperfection has no meaning except in relation to some final cause—whether that final cause be absolute or relative to the individual mind Spinoza realizes with regard to God that no part of nature can be called perfect or imperfect since God does not act with reference to ends He fails to see in the case of man that if one's desires have no final objective, then nothing human can be called perfect likewise Spinoza, it appears, confused the desire with its proper object and therefore failed to distinguish between

the perfection or completeness of an action or efficient cause and the perfection of the ideal form or final cause which precedes the action

The difficulty inherent in Spinoza's reasoning becomes apparent when we consider the problem of the perfection of the modes. If the efficient cause per se were sufficient to account for the perfection of things, then it should be possible to say whether any natural mode is perfect or imperfect, even supposing God does not act for the sake of some end. On this basis, whatever is, is perfect, since the perfection of things is relative to the efficient power of the divine nature. *From this it follows that if the will or intellect of God were entirely different from what it is, we should not on that account attribute any imperfection to God, or to created nature. But Spinoza, it will be seen, shrinks from drawing this inference which would place him in agreement with the nominalists and voluntarists.* Instead he claims with the Scholastics that the perfection of God is something absolute and determines the absolute nature of all things. If the modes were any different it would argue imperfection in the divine nature and will. He says expressly (1-33 schol.). "If things had been produced by God in a different manner from that in which they now exist, God's intellect and will, that is to say, His essence must have been different which is absurd. Since therefore things could have been produced by God in no other manner or order, this being a truth which follows from His absolute perfection, there is no sound reasoning which can persuade us to believe that God was unwilling to create all things which are in His intellect, with the same perfection as that in which they exist in His intellect."

This passage is highly instructive because Spinoza is here grappling with the problem of God's efficient power and its relation to the perfection of things. He is unwilling to grant the voluntaristic position that there is nothing perfect or imperfect in things except as willed by God. In opposition to the voluntarists he maintains that the divine nature or intellect is intrinsically or absolutely perfect. Created things are perfect because they follow necessarily in agreement with the perfect modes of thought in the divine intellect. Spinoza

is thereby implicitly granting that the divine ideas are prior in nature to all created modes and serve as final causes of these modes. If the efficient cause per se were sufficient to account for the perfection of things, then perfection would be entirely arbitrary and variable, and the doctrine of the voluntarists would have to be accepted.

6 THE NOTION OF PERFECTION AND NOMINALISM

SPINOZA'S doctrine of perfection as just explained involves an extreme form of nominalism. Only particular things are real, universal types have no formal being of their own. Hence there cannot be a universal form of being which is absolutely perfect in its kind as the Platonists held. The universals are mental notions of the mind—an *ens rationis*—without any status outside it. The mind imagines the common or average qualities of things perceived and comes to imagine universal or general types (2-40 schol.). The universal notions so imagined vary with different individuals.

In like manner, things are called perfect or imperfect when they possess the qualities usually found in or attributed to certain objects. The general notion of perfection is therefore due to the extrinsic relations of things and the impotence of the imagination in associating together those qualities in which things appear to agree. Spinoza himself describes the transition from particular to universal notions of perfection as follows (4-pref.). "But afterwards men began to form universal ideas [*ideas universales formare*], to think out for themselves types of houses, buildings, castles [*exemplaria excogitare*] and to prefer some types of things to others, and so it happened that each person called a thing perfect which seemed to agree with the universal idea which he had formed of that thing, and on the other hand, he called a thing imperfect which seemed to agree less with his typical conception, although according to the intention of the workman it had been entirely completed [*consummatum*]. This appears to be the only reason why the words perfect and imperfect are commonly applied to natural objects which are not made with human hands, for men are in the habit of form-

ing both of natural as well as of artificial objects, universal ideas which they regard as types of things, and which they think nature has in view, setting them before herself as types too, it being the common opinion that she does nothing except for the sake of some end [*nihil nisi alicujus finis causa agere existant*]. When therefore men see something done by nature which does not altogether answer to the typical conception which they have of the thing, they think that nature herself has failed or committed an error, and that she has left the thing imperfect. Thus we see that the custom of applying the words perfect and imperfect to natural objects has arisen rather from prejudice [*ex praejudicio*] than from true knowledge of them. Perfection therefore and imperfection are really only modes of thought [*modi cogitandi sunt*], that is to say notions which we are in the habit of forming from the comparison with one another of individuals of the same species or genus" [*notiones quas fingere solemus ex eo quod ejusdem speciei aut generis individua ad invicem comparamus*].

We see from the above lengthy quotation that the notion of perfection like that of universals in general is due to knowledge of the first kind (2-40 schol 2), to confused opinion and imagination. Perfection and imperfection are entirely extrinsic or accidental characteristics attributed by the mind to particular things which it perceives or imagines as being similar. The universal perfection so imagined is relative to each individual and varies with his experience.

Spinoza goes so far as to say that the notion of being is only an *ens rationis*, a mental entity with no formal existence. His surprising statement reads (4-pref) "And this is the reason why I have said that by reality and perfection I understand the same thing [*per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligere*], for we are in the habit of referring all individuals in nature to one genus which is called the most general [*generalissimum*] that is to say, to the notion of being which refers absolutely to all the individual objects in nature. Insofar therefore as we refer the individual objects in nature to this genus and compare them one with another

and discover that some possess more being or reality than others, insofar do we call some more perfect than others [*alia plus entitatis seu realitatis quam alia habere comperimus eatenus alia aliis perfectiora esse dicimus*], and insofar as we assign [*tribuimus*] to the latter anything which, like termination, end [*finis*], impotence etc., involves negation [*quod negationem involvit*] shall we call them imperfect, because they do not affect our minds with strength equal to those we call perfect, but not because anything which really belongs to them is wanting or because nature has committed an error [*quia nostram mentem non aeque afficiunt ac illa quae perfecta vocamus*] ”

In this passage Spinoza develops the extreme implications of his nominalistic thesis. Being or reality is simply the most general genus under which we can conceive all the things of nature. On this premise it follows that the most perfect being is simply an *ens rationis*, a figment of the imagination, and not some actually existing being. The most perfect being is apparently a general name for the sum total of entities in nature, there really is no individual thing which is absolutely perfect. This thesis would obviously destroy the very foundation of Spinoza's metaphysics which posits the most perfect being to be the one substance whose existence is necessary. Spinoza, it appears, does not see any contradiction between his thesis that perfection and reality are identical (chap. ix, § 1), and the doctrine of extreme nominalism which regards being or reality as a mere mental notion due to the general imagination of things. He fails to see that, according to his monistic metaphysics, all modes are really imperfect because they are limitations of the absolutely perfect being (1-8 schol.) from which they follow. In the preface to the fourth book of the *Ethics* Spinoza is led to deny this and to maintain instead that no modes are really imperfect, though we regard them so when we compare their extrinsic relations to one another. In his anxiety to demonstrate the primacy of the efficient cause, he fails to realize that he is undermining the very foundations of his metaphysics which presupposes a final cause, and a realistic conception of universals.

7 THE EXEMPLAR OF HUMAN NATURE

SPINOZA, however, is aware that his extreme nominalism would make all normative ethics meaningless. If universals are only things of the imagination and if there is no intrinsic perfection pertaining to forms of being, then the notion of a perfect man has no formal validity. Man as he actually is, is perfect and whatever he does as an efficient cause is likewise perfect. There is no universal standard of excellence applicable to all men. The concept of ethics becomes an illusion, a fiction of society. And so Spinoza the philosopher and practical moralist is forced to acknowledge the objective validity of a universal model or norm of human nature. Thus he admits (4-pref.) "But although things are so, we must retain these words. For since we desire to form for ourselves an idea of man upon which we may look as a model of human nature, it will be of service to us to retain these expressions in the sense I have mentioned [*nam quia ideam hominis tanquam naturae humanae exemplar quod intueamur formare cupimus*]. Again, I shall call men more or less perfect or imperfect insofar as they approach more or less nearly to this same model [*deinde homines perfectiores aut imperfectiores dicemus, quatenus ad hoc idem exemplar magis aut minus accedunt*]."

A similar passage occurs in the treatise *On the Improvement of the Understanding* (pp. 4, 5 Wild edition). "Nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or imperfect, especially when we are aware that all things which come to pass do so according to the eternal order and fixed laws of nature. However, human weakness cannot attain to this order in its own thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human nature much more stable than his own and sees that there is no reason why he should not himself acquire such a nature. Thus he is led to seek for means which will bring him to this degree of perfection and calls everything which will serve as such means a true good. The chief good is that he should arrive together with other individuals if possible at the enjoyment of the aforesaid nature. What that character

is we shall show in its place, namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing between the mind and the whole of nature. This then, is the end [*finis*] to which I tend, to acquire such a nature myself and to endeavour [*conari*] that many should attain it with me."

The importance of these passages consists in the fact that Spinoza acknowledges the utility of a universal norm or exemplar of human perfection. The idea of human nature is not one that is or has been attained, it is rather an ideal of perfection conceived by reason which man should strive to acquire so far as possible. The perfection of this exemplar of human nature is not a confused notion derived from the imagination of the common qualities of things. On the contrary, it is an adequate idea conceived by reason. The intrinsic objective perfection of this idea refers to the potential, formal nature of man. The idea of the absolutely perfect man is prior in nature to its actual attainment by any individual, a man is more or less perfect to the extent that he approaches this exemplar. In other words, the exemplar of human nature serves as final cause or end of human effort. The universal form of human perfection is an *ens rationalis*, a form of being conceived by reason, and not merely an *ens rationis* without an objective validity of its own (chap. iv, § 5).

On this basis a man may be imperfect insofar as he really lacks something which ought to pertain to him. God is the only being in whom the actual and the ideal are identical, and hence He is actually infinitely perfect. In a letter to his correspondent Hudde (let. 36) this point is clearly made: "Here I would have you note that I have just said with regard to the word imperfection, namely, that this means that a thing lacks something which nevertheless belongs to its nature. . . . And since the nature of God does not consist of a certain kind of being but of absolutely unlimited being, His nature also requires all that perfectly expresses being, otherwise his nature would be limited and deficient." It would be an imperfection in God to lack any mode of perfection whatever, but it is an imperfection in man to lack whatever pertains to the rational exemplar of human nature which is perfect in its kind.

8 THE IDEA OF PERFECTION AND THE THREE GRADES OF KNOWLEDGE.

I BELIEVE to have shown in the preceding analyses that Spinoza has three distinct conceptions of the nature of perfection. It remains for me to show that these three views are parallel to the three grades of knowledge (2-40 schol. 2.)

According to Spinoza's first view of perfection, reality and perfection are identical, and the most perfect being is prior in nature to all other modes. All finite things are said to lack in perfection when compared with the infinitely perfect being, though there are degrees of perfection among the modes depending upon their natural proximity to the first cause. This idea of perfection involves the third grade of knowledge according to which the mind "advances from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things." The mind intuitively or immediately conceives all finite modes in their relation to the absolutely perfect being from whom they derive their various degrees of perfection.

According to the second view of perfection, the exemplar of human nature is a universal form of being which has a formal and objective essence of its own. Men are more or less perfect insofar as they conform to this rational ideal of human perfection. This idea of a form perfect in its kind involves the second grade of knowledge, according to which reason conceives the common properties of things (2-40 schol. 2., 2-38, 39).

According to the third view of perfection, the relation between the perfection of a thing and its essence is accidental or extrinsic. A thing is said to be more or less perfect when compared with other particular things, though really the perfection of each thing varies with its particular efficient cause. Perfection and imperfection are attributed by the mind to particular things because it forms universal notions, though the universal *per se* is nothing but an *ens rationis* without a formal essence of its own. This conception corresponds to the first grade of knowledge which involves

inadequate knowledge and confused imagination of the common properties of things. Such notions vary with the experience of different individuals.

The parallel we have drawn between the notions of perfection and the three grades of knowledge is not drawn by Spinoza himself. Had he done so his argument would have been intelligible and consistent. Instead we find that he tries to identify the three notions of perfection as if they were all in agreement. He passes from one view to the other without any apparent realization of the problems involved.

X

THE PERFECTION OR VIRTUE OF MAN

1 THE IDENTITY OF VIRTUE, POWER, AND PERFECTION

WE have seen from our preceding analysis that perfection and power of being are identical. We now find that Spinoza identifies virtue and power of being. He writes (4-def. 8) "By virtue and power I understand the same thing [per virtutem et potentiam idem intelligo], that is to say, virtue insofar as it is related to man is the essence itself or nature of the man insofar as it has the power of effecting [potestatem efficiendi] certain things, which can be understood through the laws of its nature alone." From this it follows that virtue, power, and perfection are identical.

The question now arises, how did Spinoza come to identify virtue and power of being? Furthermore, what evidence is there of a correlation between virtue and perfection? In the following sections I shall try to show that there is a definite basis in Scholastic philosophy for Spinoza's conception of virtue. The general point I shall try to establish is that there are as many different meanings for human virtue as we found for the notion of perfection.

2 ST THOMAS AND SPINOZA ON VIRTUE AND POWER

THE first problem to be considered is, how did Spinoza come to identify virtue and power of being? The answer, I believe, is to be found in Spinoza's knowledge of Scholastic literature. In the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas we find the following statement (Pt. II, 1st pt., Vol. VII, Quest. 55, § 1) "Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power [poten-

tia] Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act. Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts, for instance the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues.

Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object or to its act, for instance, we give the name faith, to that which we believe, or the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe.

For the furthest point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue, for instance, if a man can carry one hundred weight and not more his virtue is put at a hundred weight and not at sixty." Again later (*ibid*, Quest 55, § 2) "Virtue from the very nature of the word implies some perfection of power. Wherefore since power is of two kinds, namely, power in reference to being and power in reference to act, the perfection of each of these is called virtue."

From these passages of St. Thomas we see that virtue is perfection of power. The virtue of anything is judged by the limit of its activity—a thing is called perfect when it completes or performs its function well. In this sense virtue may be attributed to any natural object. The Scholastics following Aristotle combined this naturalistic conception of virtue which involves the nature of a thing considered as an efficient cause together with the notion of the final cause. The virtue of a thing was estimated not only by its actual function but also by potential power to act with reference to a fixed end or object. Where the act was its own end, the furthest limit of that function determined the virtue of the thing.

Now Spinoza, it appears, took over the Scholastic notion of virtue but modified it in some important respects. He wished primarily to exclude all reference to a final cause, aim, or limit of activity, and hence he defined human virtue as the power of man to produce given effects. The essential point in his conception of virtue is that the action must be such as follows from the efficient power and laws of human nature alone (chap. III, § 2). Whatever man himself does or desires indicates human perfection or virtue as well as the

perfection of his products. Just as a thing is said to be perfect when it is such as the individual desires it to be (chap ix, §§4, 5), so man himself is perfect insofar as he desires or acts in any way involving his own powers.

On this basis, the virtue or efficient power of man is judged by the effects he produces on others with whom he competes for self-preservation. All virtue is egocentric. The virtue or perfection of the individual depends on his power or effort to preserve himself and to endure so long as possible (3-8, 9). As Spinoza puts it (4-20) "The more each person strives and is able to seek his own profit, that is to say, to preserve his own being, the more virtue does he possess, on the other hand, insofar as each person neglects his own profit, that is to say, neglects to preserve himself, is he impotent." And again (4-22) "No virtue can be conceived prior to this" (namely self-preservation). The virtue of man is then primarily self-preservation, "the endeavour after self-preservation is the primary and only foundation of virtue" (4-22 corol) (*conatus sese conservandi primum et unicum virtutis est fundamentum*). There is no end or good for the sake of which man acts and endeavors to preserve himself (4-25).

3 HUMAN VIRTUE AND THE POWER OF REASON

SPINOZA's second theory of human virtue or perfection postulates that there is a nature or power common to all men, namely, their reason or intellect. The reason in man is the only principle in virtue of which he may be said to act according to the laws of his own nature. The body is the source of all passivity and is the cause of human servitude. Properly speaking, virtue pertains only to human reason which constitutes the active essence of man, there is no corporeal virtue at all. Thus we find Spinoza writes (5-40 and corol) "The more perfection a thing possesses, the more it acts and the less it suffers and conversely, the more it acts the more perfect it is. That part of the mind which abides, whether great or small is more perfect than the other part. For the part of the mind which is eternal is the intellect through which alone we are said to act, but that part which as we

have shown perishes, is the imagination itself through which alone we are said to suffer " Spinoza differentiates sharply between the actions of the mind which involve the adequate ideas of reason and the passions which involve the inadequate ideas of the imagination (3-3) The human intellect is conceived through itself and is determined (chap. viii, § 7) by itself as a distinct eternal idea in the active intellect of God (1-31) ; the human body, on the other hand, is a mode of extension subject to the mechanical laws of external modes Spinoza concludes (4-23) "A man cannot be absolutely said to act from virtue [*ex virtute agere*] insofar as he is determined to any action because he has inadequate ideas, but only insofar as he is determined because he understands " And again (4-37 schol 1) "True virtue consists in living according to the guidance of reason alone [*ex solo rationis ductu vivere*], and impotence [*impotentia*] therefore consists in this alone—that a man allows himself to be led by things which are outside himself and by them to be determined to such actions as the common constitution of external things demands and not to such as his own nature considered in itself alone demands "

It is important to note that Spinoza unites this rationalistic conception of virtue with his previous doctrine that virtue consists in the effort of self-preservation His argument is that reason itself directs each individual to preserve himself "To act absolutely through virtue," he writes (4-24), "is in us nothing other than acting, living and preserving oneself (these three signify the same thing) as reason directs [*ex ductu rationis*] from the ground of seeking one's own profit " This direction of reason for self-preservation is, however, nothing other than the effort to understand. As Spinoza puts it (4-26) . "All efforts which we make through reason are nothing but efforts to understand, and the mind insofar as it uses reason, adjudges nothing as profitable to itself excepting that which conduces to understanding [*quicquid ex ratione conamur, nihil aliud est, quam intelligere*] " Spinoza stresses the point that this effort to understand is the primary and sole foundation of virtue and that "We do not endeavour to understand things for the sake of any end,

but, on the contrary, the mind insofar as it reasons, can conceive nothing as being good for itself, except that which conduces to understanding [*nec alicujus finis causa res intelligere conabimur*] " He is apparently anxious to demonstrate that the virtue of reason consists in its power as an efficient cause and does not involve any reference to some external final cause

4 THE VIRTUE OF REASON AND THE NATURE OF THE SOUL HISTORICAL SURVEY

IN the preceding section we simply stated that Spinoza identifies human virtue with the activity of reason. The question may now be raised, how did Spinoza come to conceive human perfection in this way? How does his theory compare with that of the classical philosophers with whom he was acquainted? To answer these questions we shall present a brief survey of the doctrines of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics and Scholastics on the subject of human virtue.

Plato regarded the soul as complex, that is, as having rational as well as irrational faculties or functions. The irrational parts of the soul have the virtues which are proper to them, namely, temperance for the appetite or desire, courage or fortitude for the spirited element (*thumos*). The proper virtue of the rational part of the soul is wisdom and justice is the virtue of cooperation among the various parts of the soul. The highest virtue and that which is peculiar to man is the exercise of reason which involves a knowledge of the "idea of the good."

Aristotle follows Plato in distinguishing between the rational and irrational functions of the soul, but differs from him in subdividing the rational part of the soul into theoretical or contemplative activity and practical or deliberative reason. The virtue of the theoretical reason (*sophia*) is wisdom and is concerned with the conception of eternal metaphysical truths or forms of being, the virtue of the practical reason is practical wisdom (*phronesis*) which is concerned with the mutable objects of desire. Moral or practical virtue

depends on the control of the passions in accordance with the ideals of the practical reason. The moral virtues are defined by him with reference to specific objects which serve as the end or final cause of particular desires. The exercise of moral virtue involves three factors, namely, the function of the soul, the object, and the individual's state of character. Moral wisdom or virtue involves the discernment of the ideal, mean course of action under particular circumstances with reference to a given end, in accordance with the character of a good man. In the last analysis it may perhaps be said that according to Aristotle the only universal moral ideal is the personal ideal, the ideal of the wise man of practical insight, rather than the Platonic impersonal idea of the good.

It is noteworthy that Plato had a specific object for reason as a whole, namely, the idea of the good, the activity of reason was not an end in itself. The major moral virtues he defined only by the part of the irrational soul involved and without reference to specific objects. Aristotle, on the other hand, had no specific object for the theoretical reason, its exercise was an end in itself. But he defined the practical virtues with reference to a universal personal ideal of character and many particular kinds of objects.

The Stoics, being eclectics, attempted to combine both theories. They identified the essence of man with his reason but made the intellect entirely practical. *Theoria*, the disinterested contemplation of eternal truths, was no longer the crowning activity of reason as Plato and Aristotle held. They made practical wisdom the highest virtue and proceeded to identify virtue with knowledge—thereby confusing both notions. The wise man was he who could restrain the emotions which perturbed the soul and prevented a rational life. For man to live in accord with the laws of nature meant for him to live in accord with the ideals of the Stoic wise man.

The Scholastics combined aspects of the teaching of Plato and Aristotle together with original Christian elements. For our present purpose it is sufficient to state that they followed Aristotle in distinguishing contemplative from practical virtue but agreed with Plato in making God (similar to though

different from the Platonic idea of the good) the object of human contemplation

Generally it may be said that Spinoza follows the Stoics in identifying theoretical and practical virtue and the Scholastics in making God the highest object of contemplation (see later § 6). Reason is the active or essential principle in man and all practical virtues are modes of the activity of reason, the passions are due to the force of external things. In introducing a radical dualism in his conception of human nature, Spinoza forsook the naturalism of the Greeks and Scholastics which he himself in part followed, and substituted instead a mystic rationalism based on the metaphysical unity of man and God.

5 PLATO, FRANCIS BACON, AND SPINOZA ON KNOWLEDGE AND POWER

SPINOZA'S doctrine of intellectual virtue must likewise be distinguished from the Platonic-Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge. What Plato meant primarily was that a knowledge of the true good invariably led to virtuous conduct. To know the nature of the good was to act in conformity with that knowledge, vice was the result of ignorance. Plato maintained this doctrine because he did not distinguish between theoretical and practical reason or between the will and intellect. To know the truth and to consent to its performance were therefore one and the same thing. The ideas were the final causes of virtue and moved the individual to desire and imitate them. In other words, the power of the ideas, as we see from the Sophist, consisted in their influence on human conduct, though the ideas themselves were in no sense the efficient cause of anything. In brief, the phrase "virtue is knowledge" meant for Plato first, that the highest form of virtue was the contemplation of the ideas and particularly the idea of the good, second, that all practical or moral virtue depended on the theoretical knowledge of the good, which served as the final cause of human conduct.

Francis Bacon in the sixteenth century introduced a new

meaning to the phrase "knowledge is power" In reaction against the Scholastics he maintained that knowledge must not be sterile and an end in itself Knowledge, Bacon insisted, was power—the means whereby man controlled nature and invented the instruments wherewith to foster human enjoyment of life All knowledge was essentially practical or instrumental and must be judged by its consequences in increasing human control over the forces of nature In this respect Francis Bacon was the prophet of modern science.

For Spinoza as for Francis Bacon the phrase "knowledge is power" means that knowledge is the efficient cause of human power and not its final cause, but the former differs from the latter in that Spinoza like the Scholastics granted that the activity of the intellect was its own end or an end in itself, whereas for Bacon knowledge was a means to an end other than itself, namely, power and the enjoyment of living According to Spinoza, all human virtue consists in the activity of the intellect because the intellect alone is self-determined and as such is the proximate efficient cause of its ideas That is to say, the virtue of the intellect is conceived through itself and does not refer to its extrinsic consequences in controlling nature Bacon, Spinoza would say, made the intellect subservient to human activity rather than the essence of that activity

We see then that the phrase "knowledge is power" has three distinct meanings as applied to Plato, Francis Bacon, and Spinoza respectively For Plato it meant that knowledge of the ideas was the final cause of all virtue, for Francis Bacon it signified that knowledge was the instrument or means of human progress, and thirdly for Spinoza it referred to the doctrine that all human virtue was identical with the power or activity of the intellect It would appear then as if one single syllogism had been evolved from Plato to Spinoza Plato had said. All virtue is knowledge. Francis Bacon added. All knowledge is power. Spinoza concluded. Therefore all virtue is power Spinoza accepts the Platonic doctrine that virtue is knowledge but interprets knowledge in the Baconian sense of efficient power.

6 INTELLECTUAL INTUITION, ADEQUATE IDEAS, AND THE HIGHEST VIRTUE

ACCORDING to Spinoza's third theory of perfection all modes are conceived through God and partake of His perfection in varying degrees. This notion of perfection involves, we observed, the third grade of knowledge whereby each mode is conceived directly through the divine attributes (chap ix, § 8). This implies that God is as it were the universal exemplar of infinite perfection in relation to Whom the perfection of all modes is estimated.

With reference to man Spinoza now distinguishes two main grades of intellectual virtue or perfection. The virtue of the intellect in general is to conceive adequate ideas or common notions, which he calls knowledge of the second kind to distinguish it from sense perception and the confused association of images (2-40 schol 2). All men by nature can conceive such common notions due to the common properties of all modes and the community of attributes. The second kind of knowledge depends upon prior sense perception of particular things, the understanding simply abstracts the essential or universal properties of the things which it perceives. These common or universal notions are common or identical for all men and hence differ from the confused notions of the first kind which vary with the experience and imagination of different individuals, "each person forming universal images according to the constitution of his body" (2-40 schol 1). These common notions, furthermore, apply equally to all individuals of a given class and are the basis of all syllogistic deduction whereby knowledge of the properties of the particular is derived from the idea of the universal form. Knowledge of the second kind is then mediate knowledge in two ways: it is mediated by the senses and the knowledge of the particular is deduced from the idea of the common notion.

Spinoza distinguishes this second grade of knowledge from knowledge of the third kind, which he calls intuitive science (*scientia intuitiva*, 2-40 sch 2). This intellectual intui-

tion is a direct or immediate conception of the essence of a thing and does not require any mediation by sense perception or by common notions. An idea is said to be conceived intuitively when it is conceived directly "solely through its essence" and does not require any other idea through which it is conceived. "For everything," Spinoza explains (5-28 demon), "that we clearly and distinctly understand we understand either through itself or through something which is conceived through itself" (nam quicquid clare et distincte intelligimus, id vel per se vel per illud, quod per se concipitur, intelligimus).

Since God or the most perfect being is the only being who is a *causa sui*, that is, one whose essence and existence are conceived through himself alone, it follows that the idea of God is the only one which can be intuitively known. Only God is known *per se* and He alone can reveal Himself directly to the mind. Thus Spinoza writes (*Short Treatise* II, chap. xxii) "Since then reason has no power to lead us to the attainment of our well-being, it remains for us to inquire whether we can attain it through the fourth and last kind of knowledge. Now we have shown that this kind of knowledge does not result from something else but from a direct revelation of the object itself to the understanding. . . . That this fourth kind of knowledge which is the knowledge of God, is not the consequence of something else, but immediate, is evident from what we have proved before, namely, that He is the cause of all knowledge that is acquired through itself alone and through no other thing, moreover, also from this that we are so united with Him by nature that without Him we can neither be nor be known. And for this reason since there is such a close union between God and us, it is evident that we cannot know Him except directly."

All finite things, therefore, are known mediately or as conceived in relation to their ultimate, efficient cause. But even mediated knowledge when it is conceived as following directly from the perfection of God is also a mode of intuitive knowledge. To conceive things *sub specie aeternitatis* (2-44 schol 2, 5-29) as properties or modes following from the nature of God in a fixed intellectual and hierarchical order, is also

to have intuitive knowledge, though a mediated intuition as it were. As Spinoza explains (2-47 note) "But as all things are in God and through Him are conceived, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge many things which we may adequately know and therefore form that third kind of knowledge." That is to say, the essence of God as well as the properties or modes which are conceived to follow from his eternal nature are conceived intuitively, the idea of God as well as the relations of all other ideas to Him may be known intuitively. This intuitive knowledge of the relations of all modes to God is also common or identical in all minds, since all finite intellects are part of the infinite intellect of God (see chap. IV, § 7). God is, so to speak, conscious of Himself through the finite intellects which conceive Him (5-40 schol.)

Practically, however, this does not mean that the human mind can dispense with deduction or knowledge of the second kind. The finite human mind acquires most of its knowledge a posteriori, through the mediation of sense-perception and common notions. Intuitive knowledge of all the modes in their relation to God is an ideal which the mind only partially realizes. In practice, we must first strive to acquire adequate common notions before we can even hope to conceive things in their relation to God sub specie aeternitatis later. This I take to be the significance of Spinoza's proposition (5-28) which states that "the effort or the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind but may arise from the second kind of knowledge." In the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* (chap. 1) he is even more explicit. "We may," he writes, "be able quite to comprehend that God can communicate immediately with man for without the intervention of bodily means. He communicates to our minds. His essence, still, a man who can by pure intuition comprehend ideas which are neither contained in nor deducible from the foundations of our natural knowledge, must necessarily possess a mind far superior to those of his fellow men, nor do I believe that any have been so endowed save Christ. To Him the ordinances of God leading men to salvation were revealed directly without words or visions." Theoretically, it should be possible to conceive a priori the whole

of nature through the divine attributes, but practically, Spinoza like Plato found it was necessary to scale the intellectual ladder gradually, employing the senses and ordinary deduction from common notions, before one could hope to catch a glimpse of the eternal order of things. Spinoza, however, differs from Plato and agrees with the Neo-Platonists, in maintaining that the idea of God, far from being last known, reveals itself directly to the human mind. Most finite ideas must be known first mediately as common notions and later intuited in their relation to God, but the idea of God Himself is known immediately and is not deducible from other notions. The intuition of God is mystical while the intuition of the modes depends on previous rational demonstration. That is why Spinoza maintains that the ontological proof of God which proves the existence of God from the idea of His essence or perfection is the only valid one (1-11), since it does not attempt to demonstrate the existence of God *a posteriori* from less perfect things.

Spinoza, however, was not quite consistent even as regards the idea of God. If the idea of God is intuitively or immediately known, then by definition it should not require demonstrations and deduction which is an inferior mode of knowledge. Yet we find Spinoza devotes the first eleven propositions of the *Ethics* to demonstrate the existence of God from the nature of substance. Logically, the nature of substance should be conceived through God. Spinoza, in fact, was clinging to the Scholastic-Aristotelian method of demonstration instead of to the mystical, intuitive method which he professed (see author's paper, "Value and Reality in the Metaphysics of Spinoza," *Philosophical Review*, May 1936).

At this stage the question may be raised. Are all adequate ideas known intuitively? It would appear at first sight that some adequate ideas are not known intuitively. The common notions, Spinoza demonstrates (2-38), "can only be adequately conceived" and yet they constitute knowledge of the second or non-intuitive kind. On the other hand, as we have shown in our previous discussion of "adequate ideas and adequate causes" (chap. 1, § 3), an adequate idea is one whose truth is conceived through itself alone and has nothing to

do with the perfection of its object. On this basis the adequacy of any idea whatsoever is known intuitively. A true idea, we are told (2-43 schol.) "reveals itself, just as light reveals both itself and the darkness," and this is precisely what is meant by intuitive knowledge (*sicut lux seipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est*).

The difficulty arises primarily from the equivocal nature of the phrase "conceived through itself" (*per se concipitur*). Metaphysically, it means *causa sui*, that whose essence involves existence. God or the absolutely perfect substance is the only being who is the adequate cause of His existence, and therefore the idea of God is adequate and is conceived through itself alone. In this sense, an adequate idea and an adequate cause are identical (chap. 1, § 3). From this metaphysical point of view, therefore, all finite modes of extension and thought, which by nature are not the adequate cause of their essence or existence, cannot be conceived intuitively or through themselves alone.

On the other hand, from a psychological and epistemological point of view, ideas of particular things, such as triangles or circles, may be adequately conceived through themselves alone, though they are not the adequate causes of their own existence. Spinoza himself states¹ explicitly "A conception or definition of a thing should be such that all the properties of that thing insofar as it is considered in itself and not in conjunction with other things can be deduced from it, as may be seen in the definition given of a circle, for from that it clearly follows that all straight lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal." Similarly Spinoza's illustration of intuition in the *Ethics* and in *On the Improvement of the Understanding* is the example of seeing immediately what is the fourth proportional in a simple case of arithmetic. The "simpler" the example, the more likely the intuition. From these examples it follows that an idea may be adequately or intuitively conceived through itself alone without being conceived through itself alone in the sense of being an adequate or self-sufficient metaphysical cause.

It is highly instructive to observe that Spinoza's definition

¹ *Improvement of the Understanding*, p. 38, Wild edition.

of intuitive knowledge as given in the *Ethics* differs from that given in *On the Improvement of the Understanding* though the example cited, namely, the method of finding the fourth proportional, is the same. In the *Ethics*, Spinoza writes (2-40 schol 2) "Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is a third, as I shall show hereafter, which we shall call intuitive science. This kind of knowing advances from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things." In *On the Improvement of the Understanding* (p 7) he writes. "Lastly there is the perception arising when a thing is perceived solely through its essence or through the knowledge of its proximate cause (p 8) A thing may be perceived solely through its essence when from the fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know that thing, or when from knowing the essence of the mind I know that it is united to the body. By the same kind of knowledge we know that two and three make five or that two lines each parallel to a third are parallel to one another." The significant point evident here is that Spinoza makes no reference to God at all in *On the Improvement of the Understanding*, any finite thing is said to be known through its essence when we see its properties immediately. In the *Ethics*, on the other hand, intuitive knowledge is identified with knowledge of and through God, though Spinoza proceeds to illustrate such divine knowledge with the example of finding the fourth proportional to 1, 2, and 3.¹ *Spinoza was really employing a double criterion of intuition, precisely because he confused the metaphysical adequacy of the cause with the epistemological adequacy of an idea.*

From a historical point of view it may be said that *Spinoza attempted to combine a Neo-Platonic metaphysics with the Cartesian theory of mathematical intuition.* According to the Neo-Platonic theory the more perfect forms of being are prior in knowledge as well as nature to the less perfect. The most perfect being which is the source of all less perfect things is also the principle of their intelligibility, like the sun it reveals both itself and them, as Plato suggested in the *Republic*. The mystical intuition of the One or the Idea of the Most Perfect Being is therefore the source of the intelli-

bility of the ideas which follow from and are conceived through it

On the other hand, Descartes's theory of intuition is completely rationalistic and psychological and has no reference to the metaphysical status of its object. Taking his examples from mathematics, he defined intuition in his "Rules for the Direction of the Mind" (rule 3) as "the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind (which) springs from the light of reason alone." "By intuition," he explains, "I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand." Examples of things known intuitively are the fact of one's existence, that the triangle is bounded by three lines only etc. "Facts of such a kind," he remarks, "are far more numerous than many people think, disdaining as they do to direct their attention upon such simple matters." The characteristics of rational intuition are then immediacy and certainty of knowledge and the objects of intuitive knowledge are all those whose nature is simple and therefore self-evident.

Intuition Descartes distinguishes from deduction, which also yields certain knowledge, but only indirectly through inference from facts known intuitively. "Many things are known with certainty," he observes, "though not by themselves evident, but only deduced from true and known principles by the continuous and uninterrupted action of a mind that has a clear vision of each step in the process. Hence we distinguish this mental intuition from deduction by the fact that into the conception of the latter there enters a certain movement or succession, into that of the former there does not. Further, deduction does not require an immediately presented evidence such as intuition possesses, its certitude is rather conferred upon it in some way by memory. The upshot of the matter is [Descartes concludes] that it is possible to say that those propositions indeed which are immediately deduced from first principles are known now by

intuition now by deduction, i.e., in a way that differs according to our point of view; but the first principles themselves are given by intuition alone, while on the other hand, the remote conclusions are furnished only by deduction "

In brief, while Descartes distinguishes the immediate certainty and self-evident character of intuitive knowledge from deduction, which is mediated by other ideas and involves memory, he does concede also that deduction from intuitively known facts may also be intuitive. Spinoza, as we have seen, made the same point when he said that intuitive knowledge could arise from deductive knowledge or knowledge of the second kind. Finally, it is to be noted that although Descartes claimed "these two methods are the most certain routes to knowledge, and the mind should admit no others," he did not wish to rule out the evidence of scriptural revelation which he held to be "more certain than our surest knowledge." "This does not prevent us from believing," he is careful to note, "matters that have been divinely revealed as being more certain than our surest knowledge, since belief in those things as all faith in obscure matters, is an action not of our intelligence but of our will."

When we turn to compare Descartes and Spinoza on the idea of intuition, it appears that the latter accepted the definition of the former. Both agree intuition is a conception of reason and not a perception of sensation, involving immediate and self-evident certainty. Deduction, they both maintain, is concerned with general notions and mediate inference, though what was once a matter of deduction may become the object of intuition. What Spinoza apparently did was to identify this mathematical intuition with the mystical, metaphysical intuition of the Neo-Platonists. God as the most perfect being reveals Himself as the Absolute Truth to the human intellect and all other forms of Truth are conceived through this most perfect Idea. For Spinoza, unlike Descartes, divine revelation is a natural illumination available to the human intellect and is not to be accepted by faith or on the authority of the Church. (See Note 1, p. 292.)

The superior status of intellectual intuition has a direct bearing upon Spinoza's theory of virtue. He demonstrates

(5-25) that "the highest effort of the mind [summus mentis conatus] and the highest virtue [summa virtus] is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge." The virtue of the understanding in general is to conceive adequate ideas or common notions of the second kind (chap. x, § 3) but the highest virtue (summa virtus) of the mind is to conceive ideas intuitively and sub specie aeternitatis in relation to the divine attributes. We are told explicitly in an earlier proposition (4-28) that "the highest good [summum bonum] of the mind is the knowledge of God and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God." The highest virtue of the mind therefore depends not only on the intuitive function of the intellect but also upon the infinite perfection of the object which it conceives. That is to say, Spinoza introduces an extrinsic criterion of human perfection, namely, the perfection of God, although he had professed to demonstrate that human virtue should be conceived intrinsically by reference to actions of which man alone was the adequate cause.

Stated differently, Spinoza's conception of degrees of intellectual virtue (5-24, 5-31 schol.) implies reference to a goal or final cause of human perfection and cannot be rendered intelligible in terms of the efficient cause alone. By combining intuitive knowledge with the metaphysical notion of perfection and adequate causality, he was forced to acknowledge a final cause or goal of human development as well as degrees of human perfection. In this respect his position was identical with that of the Scholastics with whom he for the most part disagreed.

NOTE 1. In a recent article entitled "La Pensée intuitive chez Descartes et chez les Cartésiens" (in the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* for 1937) Professor Leon Brunschwig points out the conflict implicit in Descartes' theory of intuition. On the basis of the intrinsic adequacy of simple ideas Descartes is led to conclude that "Cogito ergo sum" is the fundamental truth of intuition. On the other hand, he also maintains with the Platonists that the intuition of the infinite and therefore also of God is prior to the knowledge of oneself as well as of all finite things. My point here is that though this conflict is to be found

in Descartes, his main exposition of scientific method is based on the notion of simple, adequate ideas whose truth is known immediately by reason. He does not employ the principle of natural divine revelation which is the foundation of Spinoza's *Ethics*, and which is the real ground for the latter's identification of adequate ideas and adequate causes.

7 PHYSICAL, MORAL, AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE

INsofar as Spinoza introduces the notions of degrees of intellectual virtue, he also implicitly distinguishes between physical and moral virtue. In other words, he differentiates between the physical power of the human body to perform certain acts and the relation of these physical effects to the ideals of reason. In the scholium to 4-59 Spinoza provides an instructive example of the two kinds of virtue. "The action of striking, for instance, insofar as it is considered physically [physice] and we attend only to the fact that a man raises his arm, closes his hand, and forcibly moves the whole arm downwards is a virtue which is conceived from the structure of the human body. If therefore a man agitated by anger or hatred is led to close the fist or move the arm, this comes to pass as we have shown in the second part because one and the same action may be joined to different images of things and therefore we may be led to one and the same action as well by the images of things which we perceive confusedly as by those we conceive clearly and distinctly. It appears therefore that every desire which arises from an affect which is a passion would be of no use if men could be led by reason. We shall now see why a desire which arises from an affect which is a passion is called blind."

Here we see that Spinoza explicitly differentiates between the physical virtues of the body and the virtues of rational desire. Physical virtue without the guidance of reason is a blind passion. *There is no necessary parallelism between physical and mental virtue as Spinoza at times strives so hard to maintain (5-39). An action of the body may be accompanied by a mental passion.*

As said, Spinoza does not distinguish clearly between intel-

lectual and moral virtue (chap x, § 4), that is, between a desire in accord with reason and a desire originating in reason (chap viii, § 9), because he was concerned to explain all virtue in terms of an adequate, efficient cause. Moral or practical virtue properly so-called is a desire for some external thing in accord with the ideals of reason and involves reference to a final cause or end of desire. But intellectual virtue is, as Aristotle first noted, self-sufficient and does not involve dependence upon external goods—at least not to any very large extent. By identifying moral and intellectual virtue Spinoza, following the Stoics, was able to avoid the notion of a final cause and to regard all human actions as depending upon the adequate or self-sufficient causality of the intellect.

8. VIRTUE AND THE THREE GRADES OF HUMAN CHARACTER (A) THE NATURAL MAN, (B) THE SOCIAL MAN, (C) THE FREE MAN

The Natural Man

SPINOZA's three conceptions of the nature of human virtue also involve three distinct notions of the perfection of human character.

Corresponding to the first theory of perfection, we have the natural man or man in the state of nature (*status naturalis hominis*) (4-37 schol 2). The natural man does whatever follows from the necessity of his nature and consults his own advantage exclusively. Man's virtue is judged by his efficient power in relation to others with whom he competes for life and self-preservation. In a state of nature each individual has the highest right (*summo naturae jure*) to do whatever he can do or has the natural power or virtue to perform. Each is the measure of right and wrong according to his own desire. Spinoza explains his position in detail (4-37 schol 2). "We can now easily see that in the natural state there is nothing which by universal consent is good or evil, since every one in a natural state consults only his own advantage, deciding according to his own way of thinking what is good and what is evil, and is not bound by any law to obey

any one but himself." Man in a state of nature, that is, prior to the formation of a civil state, is regarded purely as an efficient mechanism who acts in accordance with the laws of his nature. There is then no universal norm of good and evil. Morality is a purely social product and is the result of social convention.

The Social Man

Parallel to Spinoza's second theory of perfection, we have the social man or the citizen (*civis*) who dwells in the civil state (*status civilis*). The social man acts in conformity with social laws which define what is in accordance with the common good. The civil state (*civitas*) decides the common norm of human virtue and enforces the common rule by restraining and punishing those who wish to follow their own private tendencies. Instead of each individual conflicting with every other in his efforts to satisfy his desires, the civil state limits the right of each for the good of all.

Although life in society is the result of human law and effort and is not part of the necessary order of nature, nevertheless the civil state is in accord with the dictates of right reason. We have seen that the virtue of all men who live a rational life is common to all and that all men so far agree in nature. In fact, it is necessary for each individual's intellectual virtue that others share in the life of reason. Hence the state, by setting up and enforcing common laws for the good of all, is the instrument of reason itself and should therefore be regarded as a necessary product of human nature, though Spinoza, following Hobbes, speaks as if the state were a matter of convention and did not pertain necessarily to the natural order of human life. Spinoza realizes that the laws of society do not always agree with the laws of human reason since the rulers are not always wise men. Nevertheless he counsels that "far more advantages than disadvantages arise from the common society of men" (4-35 schol.) In fact, "a man who is guided by reason is freer in a state where he lives according to the common laws than he is in solitude" (4-73). The state is not merely an instrument of coercion and restraint, on the contrary, the state is

founded upon honestas, the rational desire for others' friendship As Spinoza puts it (4-37 schol 1) "The desire to join others in friendship to himself, with which a man living according to the guidance of reason is possessed, I call honor [honestatem voco]" The man who is led by honor seeks the society of others, not through fear of harm, but from a positive desire for their mutual well-being

We see then that Spinoza, like Hobbes, begins his theory of the origin of the state with the idea of mutual fear and the necessity of a supreme force to maintain peace Unlike Hobbes, however, he ends by conceiving the state as founded upon the common laws of reason and the positive desire for mutual friendship and universal happiness

The Free Man

Finally, corresponding to Spinoza's third conception of human virtue, we have the ideal of the free man (homo liber) The free man, who is also the Stoic wise man (sapiens, 5-pref), is the one who is self-determined and active from the intuitive knowledge of God, and His relation to the rest of nature. The free man, like the natural man, is an individualist who lives according to the laws of his own nature But the free man acts from a knowledge of God and seeks his true good, whereas the natural man acts as a part of nature and is determined by external things and the passions to which they give rise

The free man who is guided by a true knowledge of himself and others is thus a cosmopolitan who strives to unite himself in friendship with all men (4-37) but is bound to none by favors (4-70) The wise man who conceives the necessary order of nature sub specie aeternitatis is not restrained by the social customs and prejudices of his particular locality since these vary with time and circumstance (3-def 27 explan) In this sense, he transcends social morality and goes beyond the common notions of good and evil (4-68), though he strives so far as possible not to give unnecessary offence (4-70) or to run unnecessary dangers (4-69 corol) In the last resort, a free man will endeavor to uphold the integrity of the civil state rather than act deceitfully and preserve his life

(4-72 schol)—a Socratic counsel which is not in accord with Spinoza's previous assumption that reason teaches self-preservation as the highest virtue (chap x, § 3) In this life, man's greatest instrument for good is the state, though the latter is not an end in itself which transcends the life of the individual as Aristotle and Hegel held Spinoza is basically an individualist and democrat and would have the state subservient to the common, rational needs of its citizens from whom alone it derives its authority

9 SPINOZA, ALBERT EINSTEIN, AND ABRAHAM
LINCOLN ON DETERMINISM, FREEDOM,
AND SLAVERY

WE have seen in the preceding section that Spinoza identifies human virtue and freedom with the power or activity of the intellect alone The intellect of man is autonomous or self-determined and man is free to the extent that he lives according to the dictates of reason The free man then is a free cause, that is, one who is determined by the necessary laws of his own nature to act and desire what is good for him Negatively, the wise man is free from external compulsion or passions That is to say, the true contrary of freedom is not necessity but compulsion or slavery Spinoza states this conviction at the beginning of the *Ethics* where he defines freedom (1-def 7) "That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its own nature and is determined to action by itself alone That thing on the other hand, is called necessary or rather compelled which by another is determined to existence and action in a fixed and prescribed manner [ea res libera dicitur, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit, et a se sola ad agendum determinatur Necessaria autem, vel potius coacta, quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione] "

The difference between the free or wise man and the impotent or ignorant one may also be expressed by saying that the former is self-sufficient (see chap x, § 7) whilst the latter is dependent upon external things or the accidental trend of fortune Freedom then means self-sufficiency or freedom from

want This I take to be the significance of Spinoza's conclusion in the appendix to book two of the *Ethics* (§ 2) "It (this doctrine) is of service to us insofar as it teaches us how we ought to behave with regard to the things of fortune or those which are not in our power, that is to say, which do not follow from our nature [*docet quomodo circa res fortunae nos gerere debeamus*], for it teaches us with equal mind [*aequo animo*] to wait for and bear each face of fortune, because we know that all things follow from the eternal decree of God according to that same necessity by which it follows from the essence of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles"

Spinoza's conclusion here is identical with that of the Stoics who taught that the supreme good of man lies within him in the life of virtue and does not depend upon the goods of fortune (Cicero *De Finibus*, Pt IV)

The wise man may therefore be said to be free in three ways first and positively, he is free in the sense of being self-determined and the proximate efficient cause of his actions, second and negatively, he is free from passions which are contrary to his nature, thirdly and again negatively, he is self-sufficient and therefore free from want or dependence upon the goods of fortune

In the first book of the *Ethics* (1-17) Spinoza speaks as if God alone were a free cause God is said to act from the necessary laws of his own nature and to be compelled by no one (1-17) From this he concludes (1-17 corol 2) "It follows secondly that God alone is a free cause" (*solum Deum esse causam liberam*) God who is by nature free is also by nature "free from passions" (*Deus expers est passionum*) (5-17)

The reason for this apparent contradiction lies in the fact that Spinoza uses the term "necessary" equivocally God acts necessarily in the sense that He is self-determined completely according to the eternal laws of His nature of which He Himself is the cause, as it were (*causa sui*) But the modes act necessarily in the sense that their essence and existence are determined by God as well as by other modes In the first book of the *Ethics* Spinoza denied that any mode could be abso-

lutely self-determined (1-28) and hence he denied that a mode could be a free cause. In the third book of the *Ethics*, however, Spinoza grants that each mode has a formal essence or power of its own and hence maintains that each mode or at least the intellect of man is the proximate efficient cause of its actions as distinct from its passions. Spinoza was led to make this admission because of the requirements of his moral theory, since all moral criticism and counsel as to what one ought to do (*nos gerere debemus*, 2-append) would otherwise be vain and futile. Through the mystical, intuitive knowledge of God man participates in the intellectual order of nature and the free causality of God, but no other finite modes apparently share this freedom.

The reader should recall in this connection that Spinoza denies freedom of will to God and man (see chap III, § 8) because he regards the will as a mode of intellect (1-32; 2-48) and not as a power independent of the intellect. From this it appears that he acknowledges the free causality of God and man but denies their freedom of willing. As noted in a previous discussion (chap III, § 8), this distinction is logically untenable. Logically Spinoza could have retained his identification of the will and intellect while admitting the freedom of the will, since the intellect is the adequate cause of its affections. His failure to do so can be explained as due to his reaction against the Cartesian-Scholastic doctrine that the will is free in the sense of being indifferent or completely indeterminate (2-49 schol)

- But aside from these difficulties, Spinoza is clear on the point that the opposite of freedom is not necessity but compulsion or slavery. A thing is not free insofar as it is compelled by some external thing to act other than it would if left to itself alone. For example, nothing by nature endeavors to harm or destroy itself (3-4), harmful activities must be attributed to the superior power of external forces which disagree with or are contrary to the nature of a particular mode. Internal causality and freedom of activity are identical (see chap IV, § 3). An individual is free to the extent that he is the sole, efficient, and adequate cause of his activities. The evil man is simply the impotent slave of his passions.

of which he is the inadequate cause. Spinoza states this cardinal principle briefly in the first scholium to 4-37 as follows: "The difference also between true virtue and impotence may, from what has already been said, be easily seen to be this—that true virtue consists in living according to the guidance of reason alone, and that impotence therefore consists in this alone—that a man allows himself to be led by things which are outside himself, and by them to be determined to such actions as the common constitution of external things demands, and not to such as his own nature considered in itself alone demands." The evil or impotent man like the slave serves not for his own benefit but according to the arbitrary compulsion of his masters, the superior forces of nature, whereas the free and good man acts with a view to his own perfection and according to the dictates of his own reason.

Spinoza's theory of moral freedom has a direct bearing upon his conception of political freedom and the rights of man. We have seen (chap. x, § 8) that man in the state of nature has a natural right to do whatever he can do or has the efficient power to do. Hence an individual has the right to enslave others if he has the power or might to conquer them. On the other hand, insofar as virtue and the power of reason are identical, then no one has the natural or rational right to enslave others and to use them for his private advantage. On the contrary, according to the laws or dictates of reason, each person endeavors to promote the perfection of others so far as possible since it is to the advantage and happiness of each that all others lead a rational life along with him (4-37 schol. 2, see chap. iv, § 8). In brief, *the free man desires that others be free too, whereas the "natural" man who is the slave of his passions desires to enslave others as well*.

It is a psychological paradox that the belief in universal determinism liberates the mind from hatred as well as from praise and blame which a belief in human freedom would foster (3-def. 27 explan.). Historically it is highly instructive to compare the attitudes of our contemporary Albert Einstein and of the famous emancipator Abraham Lincoln, both of whom believe in complete, cosmic determinism, and

who have also shown devotion to the cause of human liberty and the rights of minorities

Professor Albert Einstein in his biographical chapter in the cooperative study entitled *Living Philosophies*² writes. "I do not believe we can have any freedom at all in the philosophical sense, for we act not only under external compulsion but also by inner necessity . . . This conviction is a perpetual breeder of tolerance, for it does not allow us to take ourselves or others too seriously, it makes rather for a sense of humour" Nevertheless, it is this same Einstein who in his popular writings and public speeches has more than once declared his unqualified opposition to the so-called necessity of war and has given constant support to the Zionist movement for the reestablishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine

William Herndon, the law partner of Abraham Lincoln for twenty-five years who took a Boswellian interest in the career of the president, records that Lincoln early in life had formed a fatalistic philosophy which was later strengthened by the reading of works on science and religion. In a letter to Jesse W. Weik, his collaborator on a biography of Lincoln, Herndon wrote (quoted from *The Hidden Lincoln*: From the Letters and Papers of William H. Herndon,³ edited by Emanuel Hertz, p. 167) "What was Lincoln's philosophy? He was honestly a fatalist and has been often heard to say 'I always was a fatalist,' and quoted Shakespeare as follows 'There's a divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will' He believed in predestination, foreordination, that all things were fixed, doomed one way or the other, from which there was no appeal. He has often said to me 'What is to be will be and no efforts nor prayers of ours can change, alter, modify or reverse the decree' Lincoln was somewhat superstitious, had a kind of foreboding of his fate, he said to me more than a dozen times this 'I feel as if I shall meet

² Albert Einstein, John Dewey, Sir James Jeans, and others, *Living Philosophies* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1931)

³ *The Hidden Lincoln* From the Letters and Papers of William H. Herndon, edited by Emanuel Hertz (New York, Viking Press, 1938) Copyright 1938 by the Viking Press, Inc., New York. Reprinted by permission

with some terrible end ' And then would become more sad. Lincoln always to me in our private conversations said that there was no freedom of the will, rather the mind as a whole, he maintained that there was no conscious act of any man that was not moved by a motive first, last and always. Finally Mr Lincoln believed in constant modes of operation in nature, continuous and unchangeable ones eternally, law in short that ruled both matter and mind. This philosophy of Lincoln I have heard him state many, many times in our philosophical discussions, private office conversations. Mr Lincoln was a natural, necessary and inevitably doomed infidel—logically and absolutely so, he was under his law, and it is all folly for any man to say that Mr Lincoln was a Christian and believed in the efficacy of prayer."

The conviction that man was the necessary product of the universal forces of nature taught Lincoln forbearance and tolerance toward others so that he felt "malice towards none and charity towards all," in spite of bitter provocation in his domestic and political life. But this fatalistic attitude was blended in him as in Spinoza with a profound respect for the natural worth and dignity of man and the inalienable right of each person to be his own master. Lincoln's success in emancipating the slaves of America was one of the supreme, creative acts of history and altered what seemed to be the inevitable destiny of millions. In this respect he carried into practical social life the principles on which Spinoza founded his *Ethics*. Both were inconsistent—in the grand manner—and allowed practice to take precedence over theory.

XI

THE PRIMARY VIRTUES AND MORAL CHARACTER

1. THE PRIMARY AFFECTS AND THE PRIMARY VIRTUES.

IN the last chapter we discussed Spinoza's doctrines of human virtue in general. We turn now to examine his conceptions of the principal or primary virtues. The question occurs: Are affects and virtues to some extent identical? What is the relation between the affects, the virtues, and human character? How are the virtues distinguished from one another? Do virtues differ essentially or only accidentally from one another? In what follows I shall try to show that there is a definite correlation between Spinoza's theories of the principal virtues and his doctrines of human virtue in general.

To begin with, insofar as "virtue is power" means success in the effort for self-preservation, then there is complete identity between the primary affects of joy and desire and the primary virtues. Whatever affect tends to increase the individual's power of existence in relation to others is by that very fact a virtue, and contrarily, whatever affect tends to hinder the individual's power of existence and action is an evil. In general it may be said that affects of pleasure are virtues and affects of pain are passions or evils (4-41, 42).

Similarly of the various derivative affects, affects of joy and desire are considered as naturally good and modes of sorrow as intrinsically evil. For example, "hatred can never be good" (4-45). Similarly, "envy, mockery, contempt, anger, revenge and the other affects which are related to hatred or arise from it, are evil" (4-45 cor. 1). Again (4-47), the affects of hope and fear cannot be good of themselves, since they involve an element of sorrow. "For the same reason," he con-

tinues, "confidence despair, gladness and remorse are signs of weakness of mind. For although confidence and gladness are affects of joy, they nevertheless suppose that sorrow has preceded them, namely, hope and fear." In like manner, pity is an evil and unprofitable (4-50) though the presence of pity may be preferable to its absence in a man who is not guided by reason. In brief, "the knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an affect of joy or sorrow insofar as we are conscious of it" (4-8).

In other places, Spinoza modifies this doctrine. He realizes that the power of an affect varies with the strength of its external cause and that therefore affects of joy and desire tend to be excessive and to occupy the mind exclusively (4-43, 44). That is to say, the dominance of a particular affect is no necessary indication of the relative virtue or efficient power of the individual (chap viii, § 4). The consciousness of pleasure is not, as previously held, a necessary indication of the virtue of man.

2 THE PRIMARY INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

WE have seen that the dictum "virtue is power" is also used by Spinoza in a purely intellectual sense. On this basis, the virtue of man consists primarily in the exercise of his intellect. The virtue of the intellect is however differentiated into a variety of specific forms, each of which manifests the power of the intellect in a different way.

In order to understand Spinoza's reason for introducing distinct virtues of the intellect, we must bear in mind his conception of the affect of desire. We have seen that desire as an affect has no contrary (chap v, § 8). In place of the traditional opposition between desire and aversion, Spinoza substitutes inclination and aversion which are accidental modes of joy and sorrow. Similarly, there can be no derivative affects of desire which have contraries. In opposition to the derivative passions of desire, Spinoza is therefore compelled to introduce the power of the intellect itself (chap viii, § 4). Thus in 3-56 scholium Spinoza mentions voluptuousness (luxuria), drunkenness (ebrietas), lust (libido), avarice

(avaritia), and ambition (ambitio), all of which are excessive modes of desire. To these are opposed the intellectual virtues of temperance (temperantia), sobriety (sobrietas), and chastity (castitas).

This list bears a close resemblance to that submitted by Cicero. In the *Tusculan Disputations* (IV, §11) Cicero mentions the various subdivisions of sickness (aegrotatio) or weakness (imbecillitas) to which the soul is subject. Among the diseases of the soul he enumerates avaritia, ambitio, mulierositas, pervicacia (stubbornness), ligurratio (love of good living), vinolentia (intoxication), and others. The Latin terms used by Cicero are not always those used by Spinoza, e.g., Spinoza uses libido for mulierositas, ebrietas for vinolentia, luxuria for ligurratio. The important point is that the five major diseases attributed to the Stoic theory by Cicero are also mentioned by Spinoza, though the former includes some which the latter omits.

In the scholium to 3-59 Spinoza introduces a general classification of the primary intellectual affects or virtues. All the intellectual affects of desire are there said to be modes of fortitude (fortitudo). Fortitude itself is subdivided into two main forms, namely, strength of mind (animositas) and generosity (generositas). Animositas refers to the intellectual desire for self-preservation, generositas to the rational desire for social welfare. Thus temperance, sobriety, and courage or presence of mind in danger are modes of animositas, while mercy (clementia) and humaneness (humanitas) are modes of generositas. Honestas (4-37 schol. 1) is either a mode of generositas or identical with it. Similarly piety (pietas) seems to be identical with fortitudo, since the former is said to be the desire of doing well which follows the guidance of reason (4-37 schol. 1).

Spinoza does not provide us with a corresponding systematic summary of intellectual modes of joy. The principal intellectual mode of joy is self-satisfaction (acquiescentia in se ipso (3-def. 25) or what is the same; the intellectual love of God (5-32) (chap. v, § 5). This self-satisfaction when conceived intuitively through the idea of God is blessedness or the eternal enjoyment of intellectual virtue (5-33 schol.,

5-27, 4-52 schol.). Spinoza does not distinguish the affect of joy which follows from the contemplation of one's intellectual power from the virtue itself, since he regards this joy as nothing but the idea of the perfection attained (see chap. II, § 3)

3 SPINOZA AND THE STOICS ON REASON, SORROW, AND ASCETICISM

ONE of the noteworthy features of Spinoza's theory of intellectual virtue is his exclusion of sorrow. There are no intellectual modes of sorrow (3-59) since sorrow as a mode of imperfection is incompatible with the life of the wise man. In this respect Spinoza's doctrine is in agreement with that of the Stoics whom he apparently followed. In the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas (Prima Secundae Vol. VII, Quest. 59 § 3) we find the following record: "As Augustine says (*De civitate Dei* xiv) 'the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three *eupatheiai*, i.e., three good passions in place of the three disturbances, viz., instead of covetousness, desire, instead of wrath, joy, instead of fear, caution. But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man,' for two reasons: first, because sorrow is for an evil already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to the wise man, for they thought that just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man, so man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. . . . Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come, even as pleasure is about a present good while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed or the desire to have a good that one possesses not may be consistent with virtue, but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary to reason. Wherefore it is incompatible with virtue."

In comparing this passage with Spinoza's doctrine we find agreement in their regard for desire, joy, and caution or presence of mind in avoiding danger as possible virtues (3-58, 4-69). Spinoza agrees with the basic dictum of the Stoics

that the wise man is always free from sorrow, since sorrow is an evil passion not to be found in man insofar as he is wise. The wise man who is by nature the adequate efficient cause only of what is good for him can never be the cause of sorrow in himself or others. In Spinoza's words (4-append, § 6) "But because all those things of which man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, it follows that no evil can befall a man except from external causes." Sorrow is by nature incompatible with the virtue of the wise man.

Spinoza, however, does not always or consistently follow the Stoics in their evaluation of external things (2-append § 2). He is opposed to complete asceticism and apathy. In agreement with Aristotle he maintains that moderate pleasures due to the satisfaction of various human needs are good—only the excesses are to be avoided. In other words, Spinoza regards the good of man as depending on his internal power as well as upon external objects, he agrees with the Stoics that all evil is due to the power of external things alone. Thus we find he writes (4-45 schol.) "Nothing but a gloomy and sad superstition forbids enjoyment. For why is it more seemly to extinguish hunger and thirst than to drive away melancholy? My reasons and my conclusions are these: no god and no human being except an envious one, is delighted by my impotence or trouble or esteems as any virtue in us tears, sighs, fears and other things of this kind, which are signs of mental impotence, on the contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass thereby, that is to say, the more do we necessarily partake of the divine nature. To make use of things, therefore, and to delight in them as much as possible (provided we do not disgust ourselves with them, which is not delighting in them) is the part of a wise man. It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and invigorate himself with moderate and pleasant eating and drinking, with sweet scents and the beauty of green plants, with ornament, with music, with sports, with the theatre and with all things of this kind which one man can enjoy without hurting another. For the human body is composed of a great number of parts of diverse nature, which constantly need new and varied nourish-

ment in order that the whole of the body may be equally fit for everything which can follow from its nature and consequently that the mind may be equally fit to understand many things at once. This mode of living best of all agrees both with our principles and with common practice. Therefore this mode of living is the best of all and is to be universally commended."

The wise man, we see from the above, is not entirely self-sufficient, man as part of nature to which he is internally related requires many diverse things for his proper perfection. All the varied pleasures to be derived from the satisfaction of one's desires and needs are therefore directly good, provided one does not indulge to excess. Spinoza includes good food, clothing, fragrant odors, the beauty of nature, music, theaters, sports as objects making for the good life.

Spinoza's counsel of good cheer takes on special importance when it is viewed as a reaction against the traditional and current doctrine of the religious orders which held up the "via lacrimosa," celibacy, and the renunciation of the pleasures of life as the ideal life of man while on earth. Sorrow, he insists, is never a virtue and does not meet with the approval of the divine will. The way to the knowledge of God is through joy and not through suffering and self-accusation for "original" sins. It is not true religion but superstition which affirms "that which brings sorrow is good and on the contrary, that which brings joy is evil" (4-append § 31).

4. FORTITUDE, COURAGE, AND CAUTION

SPINOZA's conception of fortitude differs from the traditional or Scholastic usage. According to St. Thomas, fortitude is the mean between fear and daring and has for its object some danger (*Summa Theologica*, Prima Secundae, Vol. VII, Quest. 60, § 4). Fortitude and courage are for him identical.

Descartes, however, in his treatise *On the Passions of the Soul* (Pt. III, § 171) distinguishes fortitude from courage. Fortitude is the passion "which disposes the soul forcibly to bind itself powerfully to the execution of the things which

it desires to do of whatsoever nature they may be " Bravery or courage is a species of fortitude and refers specifically to danger Cowardice is the opposite of bravery.

Spinoza, it appears, follows Descartes in this distinction, though, as seen, he defines fortitude differently Fortitude for Spinoza is the general term for the intellectual conatus Courage or presence of mind in danger is a mode of animositas (3-59 schol , 5-10 schol) These intellectual virtues are not regarded as a mean between the extremes of rashness and cowardice but rather as intellectual forces contrary to the passions (see chap vii, § 4) There is, Spinoza appears to maintain, no absolute criterion of what act is an extreme and what is a mean, it is all relative to the desires and dispositions of particular individuals as Hobbes also held In the scholium to 3-51 Spinoza illustrates "For example, I shall call a man intrepid [intrepidum] who despises an evil which I usually fear, and if, besides this, I consider the fact that this desire of doing evil to a person whom he hates or doing good to one whom he loves is not restrained by that fear of evil by which I am usually restrained, I call him audacious [audacem] On the other hand, the man who fears an evil which I usually despise will appear timid [timidus] and if, besides this, I consider that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil which has no power to restrain me, I call him pusillanimous, and in this way everybody will pass judgment "

Here we see that intrepidity as well as audacity, timidity, and pusillanimity are excessive modes of desire and aversion which are considered extremes in relation to different individuals Presence of mind in danger [animi in periculis praesentia] is not regarded as an absolute mean but simply as a contrary intellectual force which restrains these passions.

Spinoza's proposition (3-59) which states that "the virtue of the free man is seen to be as great in avoiding danger as in overcoming it," recalls the Stoic "good passion" of caution (chap xi, § 3) Fear is a passion not found in the free or wise man but caution or prudence in avoiding danger is a virtue in accord with reason. That is to say (3-59 corol) "A free man chooses flight by the same strength or presence of mind [animi praesentia et fortitudine] as that by which

he chooses battle " This is in agreement with Spinoza's theory that desire also includes aversion (chap v, § 8) Hence caution is a mode of courage

5 THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES AND THE FORMS OF MORAL CHARACTER

THE really significant point in Spinoza's conception of the relation between the passions and the intellectual affects is the implicit notion of moral character. The passions mentioned are all excessive modes of desire, affects which dominate the human mind and predispose one to act in accordance with the strongest desire. In other words, these dominant passions are modes of character which habitually dispose a man to desire certain things rather than others even though no overt act is performed. In this sense, character or the dominant desire is the efficient cause of habit, as well as the essence of man.

In like manner, the intellectual affects or virtues are also types of character which predispose a man to desire and love certain things, such for example as those which conform to the ideals of temperance, sobriety, and chastity. The virtues of character involve the intrinsic power of man himself but the vices or passions involve the extrinsic power of external things. In both cases, the moral character of one's affects does not depend on the consequences of some overt act but rather on the disposition or tendency to act or will one thing rather than another. It may happen that a really vicious man may restrain his passions through fear of some greater evil, or through lack of opportunity to satisfy them (3-def. 48 explan.) "Absolutely therefore these affects have reference not so much to the acts themselves as to the appetite and love itself" (see chap viii, § 5).

To the dominance of the corporeal passions must be opposed the dominance of the intellectual affects. The intellectual affects differ from other conceptions of the intellect in that the former involve some specific ideal or exemplar of moral perfection, whereas the latter refer to any object of nature. In the last analysis, the wise man whose greatest de-

sire is for wisdom and self-determination is also the most perfect morally—since Spinoza, as we have seen, did not distinguish practical from theoretical virtue (chap x, § 4). Thus he writes (4—append 4) “To perfect the intellect is nothing but to understand God together with the attributes and actions of God which flow from the necessity of His nature. The final aim therefore [*finis ultimus*] of a man who is guided by reason, the chief desire [*summa cupiditas*] by which he strives to moderate all his other desires, is that by which he is led adequately to conceive himself and all things which can be conceived by intelligence.” The desire for wisdom is nothing but self-knowledge through God (a strange combination of Socratic and Scholastic ethics) and this may be the chief desire which controls all the passions.

6 CHARACTER, HABIT, AND THE MAXIMS OF THE GOOD LIFE

SPINOZA himself does not assign a conspicuous role to habit in the formation of character. Habit, we have seen, is an effect of the dominance of a particular desire. The dominance of the intellectual affects is due to the superior power of the intellect (chap viii, §§ 6, 7) as compared with the passions. In either case, habit is a direct indication or consequence of the strength of one's desire.

But Spinoza also maintains that the intellect *per se* cannot control the passions, a passion can be controlled only by another and contrary passion or affect (4-14) (chap. viii, § 2). Spinoza's problem was then to find some way whereby the knowledge of the intellect could be converted into an intellectual affect. His solution is that the intellect and the corporeal imagination cooperate and enforce each other's powers (chap viii, § 8). The affections of the imagination determine the nature of one's desires and the intellect in turn strives to arrange the accidental order of the images according to the necessary “order of the intellect” (5-10). On this basis, habit is nothing more than a certain association of images whereby the mind passes from the thought of one to that of another, and moral character is a certain habit of

desire produced by the association of images (see 3-def. 27 explain)

As aids to the formation of rational habits of conduct Spinoza enumerates certain "sure maxims of life" (dogmata) which are to be committed to memory and applied "to the particular cases which frequently meet us in life so that our imagination may be widely affected by them and they may be always ready to hand" (5-10 schol) For example, there is the maxim of life that "hatred is to be conquered by love and generosity and is not to be met with hatred in return " And again, more briefly, "minds are not conquered by arms but by love and generosity" (4-append § 11) In order to apply this universal maxim "we must think over and often meditate upon the common injuries inflicted by men and consider how and in what way they may best be repelled by generosity, for thus we shall connect the image of injury with the imagination of this maxim and it will be at hand whenever an injury is offered to us" (5-10 schol) The imagination and memory associate the universal maxim with a particular situation so that the individual applies the maxim when the occasion requires it

Spinoza does not provide us with a comprehensive list of such maxims As usual, he merely indicates a few implied by his propositions. Another important maxim is, "Always look to those qualities which in each thing are good, so that we may be determined to action always by an affect of joy " The mind must take a positive rather than a negative attitude toward things and try to imagine the proper use of things rather than their abuse Constant preoccupation with human abuses arises from the passion of sorrow and is really a disease of the mind Passionate criticism of frailty and vice takes on the semblance of virtue and piety although, in truth, the intensity of one's hatred of "the vanity of the world" is really the result of disappointment and excessive love for the very things one presumes to despise (5-10 schol) Spinoza's insight was derived from direct experience of manners and men "For with such thoughts," he writes, "do those who are ambitious greatly torment themselves when they despair of obtaining the honours for which they are striving, and while

they vomit forth rage, wish to be thought wise . . . Nor is this a peculiarity of the ambitious but is common to all to whom fortune is adverse and who are impotent in mind, for we see that a poor and avaricious man is never weary of speaking about the abuse of money and the vices of the rich thereby achieving nothing save to torment himself and show to others that he is unable to bear with equanimity not only his own poverty but also the wealth of others. So also a man who has not been well received by his mistress thinks of nothing but the fickleness of women, their faithlessness and their oft-proclaimed failings—all of which he forgets as soon as he is taken into favour by his mistress again." Spinoza's analysis of human character is consistent with his theory of the origin of contrary passions (see chap. vii, § 1). The desire for some good also includes aversion from the contrary evil, which is absence of the good. Hence an excess of hatred may be due to an excessive desire for and love of some thing which one has not been able to satisfy. A man's true character, his dominant or habitual desire is shown not by his negative attitudes and the things he criticizes, but by his positive attitudes, the things he does when he is given an opportunity to fulfill his desires. He who would lead a rational life must strive to imagine the positive good in things and the constructive use to which they may be applied.

Closely connected with the last maxim is the rule (4-append § 13) "to bear with each according to his disposition and to refrain from imitating his affects." One should strive to strengthen others who are momentarily controlled by passions, rather than to increase the force of the passions through criticism and hatred. One should strive to imagine the bases of human agreement, such as liberality, integrity, and honor (4-append § 15) rather than magnify human differences which do not constitute the essence of human nature and are due to the passions. "Those, on the contrary," Spinoza remarks (4-append 13), "who know how to revile men, to denounce vices rather than teach virtues and not to strengthen men's minds but to weaken them, are injurious both to themselves and others, so that many of them through an excess of impatience and false zeal for religion, prefer living with

brutes, rather than among men, just as boys or youths unable to bear with equanimity the rebukes of their parents fly to the army, choosing the discomforts of war and the rule of a tyrant rather than the comforts of home and the admonitions of a father, suffering all kinds of burdens to be imposed upon them in order that they may revenge themselves upon their parents." True religion, Spinoza teaches, endeavors to unite men and to bring about peace and harmony. Only those who are imbued with "a false zeal for religion" spend their time denouncing what appear to them as vices and inciting men to oppose and destroy one another in the name of religion and the love of God. True religion counsels toleration—an idea, it appears, which needs re-emphasis in every generation.

The significant point in this application of the maxims of life to particular problems of moral conduct is Spinoza's recognition that virtue is not merely knowledge. He agrees with Aristotle that virtue involves character and is a habit of desire in accordance with reason such as the free or wise man would approve.

Finally, it should be noted that Spinoza's conception of the role of habit in character depends upon his notion of the primacy of desire in relation to the other passions (chap. III, § 5). *Insofar as desire is prior to the affects of joy and sorrow, then habit is the effect of desire which determines the individual to prefer one kind of thing rather than another* (chap. XI, § 5). *On the other hand, insofar as desire depends upon joy and sorrow and the image of their causes, then habit is the association of these images with particular affects and is the efficient cause of character*.

7 THE UNITY OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

ONE of the questions we raised at the beginning of this chapter was how the virtues were to be distinguished from one another. Do virtues differ essentially or accidentally from one another? According to Spinoza's theory of knowledge, no external object can determine the intellect to think (2-5)

(3-2); the intellect is completely self-determined (3-3). Hence there cannot be any intellectual affects involving the nature of some external body. Spinoza therefore conceived the ingenious solution of making the passions the objects of the intellectual virtues, thereby indirectly endowing the latter with objects, e.g., temperance restrains voluptuousness, sobriety controls drunkenness. Each virtue is accidentally distinguished from another by the particular passion which it restrains, but essentially all the virtues involve one and the same power of mind, namely, fortitude.

The significance of Spinoza's conception of the moral virtues can best be shown through comparison with the Platonic theory. Plato, we have seen (chap. x, § 4), conceived four primary virtues corresponding to the different functions of the soul. Temperance was the virtue of the appetite, courage was the virtue of the spirited element, wisdom of the reason, and justice pertained to the proper interrelation between these functions. Aristotle agreed with Plato on the psychological division of the soul into rational and irrational functions, though the former differed from the latter in distinguishing between theoretical and practical virtue.

On the other hand Spinoza, like Descartes and the Stoics, regarded the active soul as a unity identical with reason. According to him all the virtues depend directly on the activity of the intellect alone and hence the only ground of distinction among the virtues is their extrinsic relation to the various passions. The Stoic theory of the cardinal virtues is alluded to by St. Thomas in the following passage of the *Summa Theologica* (Prima Secundae Vol. VII, Quest. 61, § 4): "These four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions of the human mind to be found in all the virtues e.g. prudence is merely a certain rectitude in discretion in any actions, justice a certain rectitude of the mind whereby a man does what he ought in any matters, temperance a disposition of the mind moderating any passions or operations so as to keep them within bounds, and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is

in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions or the toil involved by any operation . . . It is only in the point of having discretion that there seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs to reason whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application to passions or operations ”

Here we see St Thomas refers to those who do not differentiate the cardinal virtues according to the function of the soul and the objects involved Temperance is said to modify all the passions and fortitude is not only concerned with danger but is a strengthening of the soul against the passions in general Spinoza, it appears, agrees with the Stoics to whom St Thomas here refers insofar as he too maintains that fortitude is a general virtue of the soul as a whole He differs from the Stoics, however, insofar as he defines the various virtues, such as temperance and courage, by reference to specific objects and passions In other words, *Spinoza apparently combines a Stoic theory of the unity of intellectual virtues with Scholastic definitions of the particular virtues*

8 THE ABSOLUTENESS OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

ONE very important implication of Spinoza's theory of intellectual virtue is his conception of the absoluteness of the virtues—a doctrine which Kant later on developed By this is meant the doctrine that a virtue does not vary with the temporal circumstances of the individual A virtue of character must be performed regardless of consequences to the individual If telling the truth is a virtue, then it is an absolute good for all men under all conditions To make exceptions is to invalidate the principle of the universality of the dictates of reason Thus we find Spinoza demonstrates (4-72) “A free man never acts deceitfully but always in good faith [cum fide] ” In the scholium to the above proposition he continues. “If it be asked whether if a man by breach of faith [perfidia] could escape from the danger of instant death,

reason does not counsel him for the preservation of his being [suum esse conservandi] to break faith, I reply in the same way that if reason gives such counsel, she gives it to all men and reason therefore generally counsels men to make no agreements for uniting their strength and possessing laws in common except deceitfully, that is to say, to have in reality no common laws, which is absurd "

Here we see that Spinoza counsels the Socratic virtue of absolute obedience to the laws of the state even though such idealism involves certain death. A free man must never act in bad faith. If reason were to permit perfidy to one man it would permit the same to all. Such a procedure, he claims, would make life in the civil state impossible. Either the rational virtues are constant and universal or else one destroys the very foundations of virtue. This doctrine is clearly in conflict with Spinoza's theory that the essence of virtue is self-preservation (4-21, 22) (chap x, § 2, chap xi, § 1). *Spinoza's Stoic rationalism with its acknowledgment of absolute moral standards is incompatible with his biological naturalism which teaches the complete relativity of all good and evil, virtue and vice, to the requirements of self-preservation.*

Both extremes are avoided in the Aristotelian doctrine that virtue is a mode of character concerned with the mean as conceived by the wise man under particular circumstances. But Spinoza, as noted, did not distinguish between theoretical and practical virtue and considered all virtue as involving self-determination and self-sufficiency. Virtue was in itself the absolute good of man irrespective of consequences for the preservation of the individual.

Finally, it is instructive to note the paradox that the Scholastic doctrine which maintained the validity of an absolute final cause of life makes for self-preservation insofar as it grants discretion to the wise man to determine for himself the right mean under particular circumstances. On the other hand, Spinoza who begins with the primacy of self-preservation and denies that life is for the sake of some good other than itself, concludes with an uncompromising Stoic absolute idealism which discounts self-preservation.

9 THE VIRTUES OF MODERATION

ACCORDING to Spinoza's third conception of virtue, the power or virtue of man consists in the exercise of all his potencies in accord with the dictates of right reason (chap viii, § 9). There is no inevitable conflict between the corporeal desires or passions and the intellectual affects. It is not the origin of the affects that matters, but rather as Aristotle held, their purpose or utility, their consequences for human well-being. On this basis, no desire or affect considered in itself alone is either good or bad. Everything depends on whether the given desire for a particular object is or is not in accord with the ideal of reason. As Spinoza puts it (5-4 schol.) "the appetite by which a man is said to act is one and the same as that by which he is said to suffer."

For example, the desire for imitation is a good or virtue when it involves an adequate cause or idea of human well-being and is then called piety (*pietas*), but it is an evil when it involves an inadequate idea and is then called ambition or pride. Similarly glory (*gloria*) when it is in accord with reason is *humanitas* (3-def 43) and is considered a virtue (4-58), it is a passion called ambition when it is excessive and depends only on the opinion of the multitude. Self-satisfaction may be a virtue to be distinguished from the extremes of pride and despondency (4-52). Favor too is a moderate love of some individual as compared with the extremes of overestimation and underestimation (4-51) (see chap vi, §§ 5, 6). Again, pleasure (*titillatio*) which refers to a part of the body may be excessive and evil (4-44 schol.). So also avarice is a passion for riches but there may be a moderate desire for money in accord with one's needs (4-append § 29).

Spinoza points out that the overt actions arising from such affects are to be considered good or evil depending on the adequacy of the ideas which they involve. "No action [*actio*] considered in itself alone is either good or evil but one and the same action is sometimes good and sometimes evil" (4-49 demon 2). On this premise, virtue is not an absolute,

universal activity as we saw in the previous section. The virtue of man is relative to the adequacy of his ideas—but the adequacy of one's ideas is now determined extrinsically, that is to say, by their agreement with the personal requirements of human nature under varying circumstances. The end or utility of one's desire, rather than the intrinsic adequacy of the ideas involved, determines whether a given action is a virtue or not (see chap. 1, § 7, chap. 11, § 4). Thus in his social theory in his *Tractatus theologico-politicus* Spinoza maintains that a good citizen is to be judged by his actual social conduct and its effects on the peace of the state rather than by the theory he professes.

Spinoza himself does not provide any classification of the principal virtues insofar as they are defined by specific objects. All we can do is infer what such a classification would be. The primary considerations are the perfection of the object desired (chap. ix, §§ 1, 8), the functions of the mind involved (chap. x, § 6), and the usefulness for the life of virtue of the things desired. For example, the intellectual love of God is the highest virtue since it involves the most perfect being, intuitive knowledge, and is besides useful for understanding the rest of nature.

Next to intellectual love would be the social or humanitarian virtues, such as piety or honestas, whereby one strives to live the life of reason in common with others. Lowest in the scale are the temporal, practical virtues which have for their objects temporal, mutable things which serve to preserve the body. The significant point in all this classification is the fact that there is a hierarchy of virtues depending upon the perfection of the object of desire.

XII

THE SOCIAL VIRTUES

1 IMITATION, PRAISE, AND BLAME AS SOCIAL FORCES

IN our description of the derivative affects (chap iv, §§ 3, 4) we found that some affects were due to the imitation of one person by another. These affects of imitation are thus social in origin and are to be distinguished from the other affects which are due to non-human, external causes.

Social affects are of two kinds. There are, first, those affects which are unconsciously and automatically produced in an individual simply because he perceives another similar to himself so affected (3-27). Examples of this necessary imitation are commiseration, benevolence, and envy. Secondly, there are those affects which are due to the desire to be imitated or to imitate. Emulation, for example, is the conscious desire to imitate another's action (3-def 33). Thankfulness or gratitude is imitation which takes the form of reciprocation, one desires to reproduce in others affects of joy such as they produced in him. Similarly vengeance is the desire to reciprocate hatred.

Praise and blame are the social responses to actions which are found to help or hinder social life. Praise and blame in turn act as dynamic forces which tend to produce actions of a kind that are likely to be praised. Men tend to act and to regard themselves as they think others desire them to act and as they imagine others regard them. Each individual living within a community is influenced by praise and blame in the opinion he has of himself and of others. In this sense, ideals of moral conduct are socially conditioned. For example, glory is the joy derived from the imagination of some action of ours which is praised or which we imagine would be praised (3-def 30). Shame, its contrary, is the sorrow

which we imagine others to blame (3-def 31) In this way it may happen that an individual may overestimate himself and be affected with vainglory (4-58 schol) or underestimate himself as in despondency (3-28 explan) Ambition is the immoderate desire for social approval or glory (3-def 44) Modestia or humanitas (3-def. 43) is a desire in accord with reason to do those things which please men and to avoid those which displease them

Praise and blame are, then, not only the effects of one's actions upon others, they are also potent social forces which determine the behavior of the individual in the community Praise and blame strengthen or weaken all the other affects and the desire for social approval and esteem becomes in turn the efficient cause of one's actions As Spinoza puts it (3-def 44 explan) "Ambition is a desire which increases and strengthens all the affects (3-27, 31) and that is the reason why it can hardly be kept under control For so long as a man is possessed by any desire, he is necessarily at the same time possessed by this Every noble man is led by glory and even the philosophers who write books about despising glory place their names on the title page" Perhaps this explains why Spinoza was not concerned to publish his *Ethics* in his life time

2 HUMAN FREEDOM, PRAISE, AND BLAME

ONE of the leading characteristics of Spinoza's *Ethics* is the unequal status of praise and blame To begin with he points out that praise and blame involve the illusion of freedom of will Men praise and blame one another, rejoice and repent for their actions, because being ignorant of the true causes they believe themselves to act "by a free decree of the mind" (3-def 27, 3-2 schol) In reality praise and blame are nothing more than the joy or sorrow one feels because of another's action. What is praised or blamed varies with the affects of the individual who expresses this opinion

Insofar therefore as one realizes that freedom of willing is an illusion based on ignorance of the true causes, he should cease to praise or blame anyone The so-called human will

is nothing but a mode of thought determined by other modes of thought and so cannot be free or self-determined. The actions we call good and find socially beneficial proceed with the same regularity and necessity as those we call evil and find harmful. A man therefore is not to be blamed for the actions which displease others or praised for those which please them. Praise and blame merely indicate our own joys and sorrows rather than the power of the individual to determine his actions.

The illusion of freedom is, however, a socially and pragmatically useful factor. Praise and blame do serve effectually to control the passions. And it is better for a man to feel shame rather than to live shamelessly and without virtue (4-58 schol.). Because man is led by glory and shame to act as others desire him to, the customs and laws of society become potent, efficient forces for regulating social conduct and restraining the passions. By living in the civil state, man simply exchanges the bondage of nature for the coercive power of the laws and customs of society.

Such a doctrine, however, makes a normative ethics impossible (chap. III, § 8; chap. VIII, § 6, chap. X, § 9). And so, Spinoza was led to introduce the notion of the free man (4-67) (chap. X, § 8). The free man who is determined by his reason is self-determined and is therefore a free cause. All actions which a man performs insofar as he is free are good and make for his own as well as others' well-being (4-61, 4-27). On the other hand, all actions which involve inadequate ideas do not follow from the individual's power alone and are therefore evil passions. Evil acts always involve slavery to the external power of nature (4-64, 4-append § 6).

This theory of freedom and slavery has very important social consequences. It means that insofar as we follow the dictates of reason, we shall praise and honor a man for those actions which we regard as good in the conviction that he is a free cause. On the other hand, we shall not and must not blame anyone for actions we regard as evil, since no man is the free cause of evil deeds, to himself or others. In fact to censure anyone or to be angry with anyone involves act-

ing from an affect of sorrow and thus imitating the very affects one blames in others (4-45 corol.) Generosity requires, as the Christian ethics teaches, that we repay the hatred and anger of others with love (4-46) Thus Spinoza preaches (4-73 schol) "Nor do I think it worth while to demonstrate here one by one all the properties of fortitude and still less to show how its possessor can hate no one, be angry with no one, can neither envy, be indignant with nor despise anybody and can least of all be proud" And again (2-append § 3) "This doctrine contributes to the welfare of our social existence, since it teaches us to hate no one, to despise no one; it teaches everyone, moreover, to be content with his own and to be helpful to his neighbour not from any womanish pity, from partiality or from superstition, but by the guidance of reason alone, according to the demand of time and circumstance"

By shifting the responsibility for human evil upon the external order of nature, the wise man frees himself from all passions and so ceases to hate or despise anyone. He bears with equanimity all the misfortunes of man and nature, certain that they cannot disturb his peace of mind. The wise man takes joy in all he finds perfect, orderly, and good but he blames no one and feels angry with no one because things appear to be imperfect, disorderly, or evil. He realizes that order and perfection are real attributes of eternal nature but imperfection and disorder are nothing positive in themselves and hence cannot be attributed to the essence of nature. All the good, therefore, that men do he attributes to their intrinsic rational power, but all their evil he assigns to human impotence and the external power of things.

In this manner, the individual is freed from the prick of conscience, inasmuch as he ceases to feel remorse for anything he may have done (3-def 17, def. 27, see also chap vi, § 2) If his conduct is evil he may rest assured that it was necessary and unavoidable, if it is good he may be satisfied with himself (3-def 25) and accept the credit for his virtue—a truly comfortable doctrine. The greatest evil apparently is to feel sorrow in any form.

Spinoza, however, makes the practical concession that for

common men living in the common order of nature it is better to feel remorse and repentance for their misdeeds than not to feel anything at all "For," he observes (4-54 schol), "if men impotent in mind were all equally proud, were ashamed of nothing and feared nothing, by what bonds could they be united or constrained? The multitude becomes a thing to be feared if it has nothing to fear. It is not to be wondered at therefore that the prophets thinking rather of the good of the community than of a few should have commended so greatly humility, repentance and reverence. Indeed, those who are subject to these affects can be led much more easily than others, so that at last they come to live according to the guidance of reason, that is to say, become free men and enjoy the life of the blessed."

In the last analysis, it may be said that the wise man will feel neither humility nor repentance, because insofar as he really is a wise man (compare "the wise man insofar as he is considered as such" 5-42 schol), he will never commit any act of which he need be ashamed. The moment he does anything which reason acknowledges to be evil, he may be sure that to this extent he belongs among the ignorant and that therefore his sorrow will do him more good than harm. The way to enjoy the autonomous life of the free man is to learn to submit to the restraints of social life. Theoretically and in its absolute form, Spinoza's *Ethics* tends to be Stoical in character and regards all human emotions of sorrow as a species of mental disease.

Similarly, Spinoza is careful to point out, he who commits a breach of the civil law may be punished, provided it be done without passion by the magistrate and for the good of society. "Indignation," he writes (4-51 schol) "as it is defined by us is necessarily evil, but it is to be observed that when the supreme authority, constrained by the desire of preserving peace, punishes a citizen who injures another, I do not say that it is indignant with the citizen, since it is not excited by hatred to destroy him, but punishes him from motives of piety." From this it appears that reason may counsel a magistrate to harm or punish a citizen by way of reciprocation for injury to another, though this no longer

is to be considered as due to passion. On Spinoza's premises, however, it is difficult to see how the reciprocation of evil can ever be in accordance with the dictates of reason. One would have to say furthermore that according to the dictates of reason we avoid evil directly—a conclusion which would contradict Spinoza's demonstration (4-63 corol.) which states that "by the desire which springs from reason we follow good directly and avoid evil indirectly" (see chap. v, § 8). If the knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge (4-64) then it is inconceivable how a magistrate can punish evil directly and in accord with the dictates of reason. Spinoza's appreciation of the practical requirements of social life led him to approve of civil punishment for the sake of maintaining law and order, but he denied the individual citizen in his private capacity the rational right to do likewise. We have apparently two codes of ethics, one for social use by the government and one, Christian and Stoic in character, to be practised by individuals.

Spinoza was led to this one-sided emphasis on praise and blame because he seemed to forget that one can form adequate ideas of the passions (chap. i, §§ 3, 4, chap. viii, § 6). When one blames a person for his passions, this does not imply that the critic is necessarily participating in or imitating the passions of others.

Furthermore, just as good and evil are correlative terms and are inconceivable apart from one another (4-68 demon.), so praise and blame must be correlative. The right to praise an action also involves the right to blame it if need be. Though evil may be due to the superior power of external forces, it is not therefore entirely excusable, since the human intellect has the power of making man free (chap. viii, § 9, chap. x, § 9). A man may be blamed for not controlling his passions since it is in his power to put himself under the guidance of reason. If human virtue is to be praised, not only because of the extrinsic joy it causes in others, but also because of the intrinsic power of the agent, then human impotence is to be censured insofar as we consider it in man's power to overcome it.

Spinoza at times argues that insofar as a man is governed

by his passions, he is necessarily ignorant and lacks the power to act otherwise and to restrain his passions. As he puts it (3-def 28 explan) "For whatever he imagines that he cannot do that thing he necessarily imagines and by his imagination is so disposed that he is actually incapable of doing what he imagines he cannot do. So long therefore as he imagines himself unable to do this or that thing, so long is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it impossible for him to do it." Here Spinoza takes no account of the category of potentiality. Even the so-called impotent man has the potentiality of cultivating his intellectual powers, though under particular circumstances he may not be able to govern himself. An individual is punished by the state not only for his socially harmful conduct but also for neglecting to utilize his potentiality for common reason. Spinoza, however, was handicapped in his explicit use of the notion of the potential because he was concerned to avoid all reference to the final cause.

3 CONSCIENCE AND THE RELATIVITY OF THE SOCIAL VIRTUES

WE have seen that each person by nature acts as others desire him and feels joy and sorrow toward himself and others in accordance with the praise and blame meted out to him. From this it follows that an individual living in a community is largely determined or, as we say, conditioned by social approval as regards his notions of good and evil, virtue and vice. Inasmuch as social standards differ in various countries and in one and the same country from time to time, it follows that there is a certain relativity in the social standards which each individual derives from his community. This implies that the conscience of a person is a social product conditioned by the current practices and institutions of society and is not to be considered as in any way an absolute and fixed criterion of virtue and vice. Thus we find Spinoza explains (3-def 27 explan) "Here I must observe that it is not to be wondered at that sorrow should always follow all

those actions which are from custom called wicked, and that joy should follow those which are called good. But that this is chiefly the effect of education will be evident from what we have before said. Parents by reprobating what are called bad actions and frequently blaming their children whenever they commit them, while they persuade them to what are called good actions and praise their children when they perform them, have caused the emotion of sorrow to connect themselves with the former and those of joy with the latter. Experience proves this, for custom and religion are not the same everywhere, but on the contrary, things which are sacred to some are profane to others and what are honorable with some are disgraceful with others. Education alone therefore will determine whether a man will repent of any deed or boast of it." Each community is the measure of virtue and vice and the individual only expresses the opinions which he has been conditioned to accept by education and habit. Spinoza's conception of the relation of conscience (though he does not use the term, see chap. vi, § 2) to education and the association of the emotions with particular acts is particularly in accord with modern behavioristic psychology.

4 THE CONVENTIONALITY OF THE SOCIAL VIRTUES

SPINOZA is concerned to demonstrate not only the relativity of social virtues but also the extrinsic, conventional character of these virtues as contrasted with the intrinsic, natural virtues which pertain to the individual apart from society or "in a state of nature." Spinoza follows Hobbes in maintaining that the civil state arose out of a contract, as it were, whereby individuals promised to give up their individual, natural rights for a common security. Man by nature seeks only his own private profit, but he is forced through fear and "the war of all against all" to forego his private life. The "state" then determines the common civil rights of each individual (see chap. x, § 8).

From this political theory Spinoza concludes that the no-

tions of justice and injustice, merit and sin are civic virtues which do not pertain to man by nature but only insofar as he is a member of society "Hence in a natural state," he concludes (4-37 schol 2), "sin [peccatum] cannot be conceived but only in a civil state where it is decided by universal consent what is good and what is evil, and where everyone is bound to obey the state Sin, therefore is nothing but disobedience, which is punished by the law of the state alone, obedience, on the other hand, being regarded as a merit [meritum] in a citizen, because on account of it he is considered worthy [dignus] to enjoy the privileges of the state Again, in a natural state no one by common consent is the owner of anything, nor is there anything in nature which can be said to be the rightful property of this and not of that man, but all things belong to all, so that in a natural state it is impossible to conceive a desire of rendering to each man his own or taking from another that which is his, that is to say, in a natural state there is nothing which can be called just or unjust, but only in a civil state, in which it is decided by universal consent what is one person's and what is another's Justice and injustice therefore, sin and merit, are extrinsic notions, and not attributes which manifest the nature of the mind [Justum et injustum, peccatum et meritum, notiones esse extrinsecas, non autem attributa quae mentis naturam explicant] "

Spinoza, it appears from the above, prefers to follow Hobbes and the Greek Sophists in opposition to Plato, Aristotle, and the Scholastics who regard sin and merit, justice and injustice as virtues inherent in the very order of the cosmos and the mind of man Sin, far from being an original attribute of man, is simply civil disobedience, and justice is primarily an economic notion dependent upon the possession of private property and is not therefore to be considered as an inherent quality of reason and order, as Plato thought Thus social virtues are social conventions produced in time by the civil state and relative to the culture and economic requirements of the state

5 THE NATURAL SOCIAL VIRTUES

SPINOZA, however, does not consistently maintain the doctrine of the relativity and conventionality of the social virtues. We also find he acknowledges rational social virtues as intrinsic, inherent attributes of the human intellect. Thus we have seen (chap xi, § 2) he postulates that *generositas* (3-59 schol) is a desire which follows from reason alone whereby each person endeavors to help others and to win their friendship. *Humanitas* and mercy are special modes of this generic, inherent social virtue. *Honestas* (4-37 schol) is defined in the same way as *generositas*, namely, as "the desire to join others in friendship to himself with which a man living according to the guidance of reason is possessed." *Piety* (*pietas*) again is defined like fortitude and is described (4-37 schol 1) as "the desire of doing well, which is born in us [*quae eo ingeneratur*] because we live according to the guidance of reason." Later on (5-4 schol) *pietas* is defined by contrast with ambition. "For example, we have shown that human nature is so constituted that everyone desires that other people should live according to his way of thinking, a desire which in a man who is not guided by reason is called ambition, and is not very different from pride, while, on the other hand, in a man who lives according to the dictates of reason it is an action or virtue which is called piety." From this latter example it appears that *pietas* is a mode of *generositas*. But whatever be the precise meaning, the significant point to note is Spinoza's explicit statement that piety is an inborn desire following from reason and hence is an inherent attribute of the human mind.

It is highly instructive to observe that Spinoza also speaks of justice along with *honestas* as pertaining to the very essence of the human mind. He writes (4-append § 15) "The things which beget concord, are those which are related to justice, integrity and honour [*quae ad justitiam aequitatem, et honestatem referuntur*], for besides that which is unjust and injurious, men take ill also anything which is esteemed base [*turpe*] or that any one should despise the received customs of the state. But in order to win love, those things

are chiefly necessary which have reference to religion and piety" Here we see that justice as well as honestas and pietas are attributes of human reason and the source of human agreement—and not a consequence thereof as the earlier account suggested Praise and blame are not merely relative to social approval There is also the praise and blame of the wise man who is an absolute criterion of good and evil, virtue and vice To quote "I call that thing honourable [honestum] which men who live in accordance to the guidance of reason praise, and that thing on the contrary, I call base [turpe] which sets itself against the formation of friendship" (4-37 schol 1) The wise man through his intuitive knowledge of God is the absolute, human measure of good and evil, virtue and vice The cardinal social virtues are innate properties of the human reason, and hence far from being the product of the civil state are really the efficient cause of communal life. The man who is led by honor and piety seeks the good of others, not through mutual fear, but rather from a positive desire for the well-being of others Reason is the necessary bond of human agreement (chap iv, § 6), and man insofar as he is rational is essentially social (chap iv, § 8) Each individual finds his own good or interest in promoting the good of others along with his own, since nothing is more useful to man than another person who is also guided by reason (4-18 schol) (4-35, corol 1) Justice, in particular, is a necessary property of the human reason, since "men who are governed by reason desire nothing for themselves which they do not desire for other men, and therefore they are just, faithful and honorable" (justos, fidos atque honestos) (4-18 schol) Justice is in accord with the dictates of reason which teach us that "the highest good [summum bonum] of those who follow after virtue is common to all" (4-36). That is to say, *justice is based on the realization of the essential community of human interests* (4-36 schol) *and not at all on the exclusive possession of property* In fact, it is the desire for equality which leads a person to desire for other men the good which he seeks for himself (4-37) The natural power and rights of each are most increased when each person is free to lead a rational life (chap x, § 9)

6 EGOISM AND ALTRUISM

IN his general social philosophy Spinoza combines a fundamental egoism with a benevolent altruism. He has faith in the principle that "when each man seeks most that which is profitable to himself then are men most profitable to one another" (4-35 corol 2). It is most useful for each individual to have others agree with him in nature, since a thing which agrees with our nature is necessarily good (4-31). Through social union and mutual assistance men further their common aim of self-preservation and perfection of life.

Spinoza's altruism is then a kind of utilitarian altruism. This, however, does not mean that the purpose of others is to serve merely as means for one's private advantage. For example, he who seeks to benefit others primarily in order to enhance his own reputation or superiority defeats his own end. As Spinoza explains (4-append § 25) "Modestia, that is to say, the desire of pleasing men, which is determined by reason is related to piety. But if it arises from an affect, it is ambition or desire by which men generally under a false pretense of piety excite discords and sedition. For he who desires to assist other people either by advice or by deed, in order that they may together enjoy the highest good [*summo fruuntur bono*] will strive above all things to win their love and not to draw them into admiration so that a doctrine may be named after him, nor absolutely to give any occasion for envy." True or rational egoism teaches that other men are to be treated as part of oneself and not as a means of self-aggrandizement.

In fact, Spinoza was much ahead of his times in his realization of the social responsibilities of the state. "The care of the poor," he held, "is incumbent on the whole of society and concerns only the general profit" (4-append § 17). Private initiative, he pointed out, is incapable and insufficient "to assist every one who is needy." This argument sounds particularly modern and is a good illustration of Spinoza's benevolent egoism.

On the other hand, Spinoza is opposed to self-sacrifice. Each man who is governed by reason will seek the good of

others as part of his own, but not more than his own. Each person's life is an end in itself and must not be used as a means for the life of others. In the last analysis, since self-preservation is the foundation of all virtue (4-22), the good of each person is prior to that of others. Justice demands that each person seek the good and perfection of others as much as his own but not more so. The justification of altruism is egoism.

XIII

THE SUMMUM BONUM

I ST THOMAS AND HOBBS ON HUMAN FELICITY AND THE END OF LIFE

SPINOZA like the Scholastics is much concerned with the problem of the summum bonum of man, but as may be expected he differs from them in his conception of this supreme good. The differences between them go back to their diverse conceptions of the nature of the conatus and hence we shall begin with a brief review of this topic.

We have seen (chap. III, § 2) that according to Aristotle and the Scholastics all motion involved three factors, namely, the mover, the thing moved, and the end or limit of the motion. In animal forms the appetite is moved with desire for some object which is perceived as good and which therefore is the end or goal of the motion of the organism. In all cases the good or end is the final cause which predetermines the activity of the individual. The goal of all motion or becoming is a state of rest or being which is the attainment of the good desired. To quote St. Thomas (*Summa Theologica*, Prima Secundae, Vol. VI, Quest. 1, § 2) "Every agent of necessity acts for an end. And just as this determination is effected in the rational nature by the rational appetite which is called the will, so in other things it is caused by their natural inclination which is called the natural appetite. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason, move themselves to an end, because they have dominion over their actions, through their free will which is the faculty of reason." In all forms of being the good is the end or object of desire and "that at which all things aim" whether consciously or naturally. This end or good may, however, be understood in two ways. The end may be some thing or object which one desires to attain, or it may be the use, possession, or actual

enjoyment of that good brought about through some particular function of the individual (*ibid* Quest 2, § 7).

The question now arises, what is the specific and supreme good of man whereby he fulfils his function and desire for perfection of being? According to Aristotle and the Scholastics, the supreme good of man is happiness (*eudaimonia*, *felicitas*). They agree that happiness consists in the operation of man's highest power, namely, the speculative reason. But St Thomas differs from Aristotle in that the former assigns a specific object toward which the intellect is directed, whereas the latter does not provide any such object. According to St Thomas the specific object of the intellect is God who is the supreme good from whom all good things derive their goodness (*Summa Contra Gentiles*, Vol III, Pt I, chap xvii). In this respect St Thomas agrees with Plato in setting up a supreme idea of the good as the highest object of human reason though of course, as Professor A. E. Taylor¹ and Professor E. Gilson² have pointed out, the Platonic idea of the good and the God of St Thomas are not identical. In the *Summa Theologica* (Prima Secundae, Vol VI, Quest 2, § 8) St Thomas states his argument in detail. "It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good which lulls the appetite altogether, else it would not be the last end if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, that is, of man's appetite is the universal good, just as the object of the intellect is the universal truth. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature but in God alone, because every creature has goodness by participation. Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness." It is to be noted that though God is the universal good or end of all things since He is the source of all goodness, He is not the direct object of natural and animal appetite which have their particular

¹ See A. E. Taylor, *Plato: The Man and His Work* (New York, The Dial Press, 1936), chap. xi, pp. 288-289.

² See E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, translated by A. H. C. Downes (Gifford Lectures 1931-32, London, Sheed, 1936), chap. iii, pp. 54-55.

goods. God as the universal good is the direct object only of the will or rational appetite first found in man.

St Thomas, however, proceeds to distinguish between God who is the supreme good or happiness of man, and the actual enjoyment of this happiness which is the beatific vision of God (*ibid* Quest. 3, § 8) "Two things are needed for happiness," he remarks (*ibid* Quest 3, § 4), "one which is the essence of happiness, and two, that is, as it were, its proper accident, that is, the delight connected with it For at first, we desire to attain an intelligible end We attain it through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained " And again (*ibid* Quest 4, § 3) "And therefore these three things must concern happiness, to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end, comprehension which implies presence of the end, and delight or enjoyment which implies repose of the lover in the beloved object "

The significant point here is that man's supreme good or happiness depends on a transcendent good other than himself St Thomas (as opposed to Spinoza) is emphatic in his insistence that human life is not its own end God alone, he argues, whose essence and existence are identical, is His own happiness, "for in God there is happiness essentially since His very being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself But in men according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God" (*ibid* Quest 3, § 2, reply 4).

Since man himself is not the supreme good, it evidently follows that the preservation of man's being is not the supreme good of man (*ibid* Quest 2, § 5) Whatever goodness is in the soul is derived from the supreme good and therefore the life of the soul cannot be its own end Man attains happiness through his soul, but the source of human happiness is outside the soul (*ibid* Quest 2, § 7) Similarly it follows that man's happiness does not consist in power, since power is the source both of good and evil, whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good (*ibid* Quest 2, § 4) It is also evident that happiness cannot consist in any of the goods of

fortune such as wealth, since these are properly the means to an end, and do not pertain to the perfection of the soul itself. Honor and pleasure likewise do not constitute happiness, though they may be the proper accidental results of happiness (*ibid* Quest 2, § 6) Happiness consists essentially in the vision and enjoyment of God who is the proper End of the human intellect and intellectual love, as well as the universal good and source of all other forms of being

The Thomistic doctrine of human happiness and the *summum bonum* is the direct contrary or antithesis of the naturalistic theory of Hobbes, as indeed the latter himself was aware. In his *Leviathan* (I, chap vi) Hobbes writes "Continual success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering is that men call felicity, I mean the felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we live here, because life itself is but motion and can never be without desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense. What kind of felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour Him, a man shall no sooner know than enjoy, being joys, that now are as incomprehensible as the word of schoolmen 'beatifical vision' is unintelligible." And again (*Leviathan* I, chap xi) "To which end we are to consider that the felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such *finis ultimus* nor *summum bonum* as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose desires are at an end, than he whose senses and imagination are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another, the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is that the object of man's desire is not to enjoy once only and for one instant of time but to assure forever the way of the future desire. So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but because he cannot assure the

power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more."

From the above quotations we see that Hobbes is opposed to the whole Scholastic theory of the summum bonum. There is no one supreme good other than man himself and on which human felicity depends. Life itself is essentially motion and seeks its own indefinite continuation—and not some good outside itself. The so-called summum bonum of man is nothing other than the continuous fulfilment of desire for power. Power is the means of self-preservation and enjoyment of life and hence is the supreme object of man's restless and ceaseless desire (see chap. III, § 2). *To cease desiring is to cease living*. Hence man's felicity or summum bonum consists not in the cessation of desire due to the attainment of the supreme good, but rather in the "continual progress" or satisfaction of desire for power. The notion of a "beatifical vision" has no intelligible meaning for Hobbes.

2 SPINOZA AND THE STOICS ON SELF-PRESERVATION AND HAPPINESS

THE foregoing analysis of the theories of St. Thomas and Hobbes will enable us to appreciate the originality of Spinoza as well as the influence of his predecessors.

We have seen (chap. III, § 2) that Spinoza identifies the conatus with the active power of the individual to preserve himself and act in as many ways as possible. The conatus so conceived is the efficient cause of virtue. Spinoza is opposed to the Scholastic theory that the good is the final cause of desire. The individual, he claims, does not desire a thing because it is good, it is good because someone desires it. The act of desiring is prior to the goodness of the object. The qualities of good and evil when attributed to things are relative to their usefulness in promoting one's effort to live. The imagination forms general notions of things by which it is usually affected and attributes the qualities of good and evil to these types of things, as if the good and evil were something fixed and inherent in the things themselves. In reality, things considered in themselves are neither good nor bad (1-append.).

As said, the significance of this conception of the good lies in the implication that the end of human action consists in the fulfilment of desire itself and not in some good or object other than desire "No one," Spinoza writes (4-25), "endeavours to preserve his own being for the sake of another object " The desire is, so to speak, a self-moved mover which forms its own ends or goods. The final cause as such is superfluous. Self-preservation which is the beginning of all virtue is also its end.

Thus we see that although Spinoza accepted the Scholastic doctrine that the end of man is happiness, he identified it with the conatus involved in the life of virtue itself "No one," he explains (4-21), "can desire to be happy [beatum esse], to act well and to live well, who does not at the same time desire to be, to act, and to live, that is to say, actually to exist " And again (4-22 corol) "The endeavour after self-preservation is the primary and only foundation of virtue " And lastly (4-25), "No one endeavours to preserve his own being for the sake of another object " Life, in short, is its own end and is not directed to some final cause or transcendent end other than itself "A final cause, as it is called," he remarks (4-pref), "is nothing therefore but human desire insofar as this is considered as the principle or primary cause of anything." As Hobbes held, the summum bonum of man is nothing but the fulfilment of his desire for indefinite continuation (3-8) and the preservation and increase of his power of action or virtue (see chap. X, § 2).

In formulating the "dictates of reason" (4-18 schol) Spinoza presents three major propositions first, "that the foundation of virtue is that endeavour itself to preserve our being and that happiness consists in this that a man can preserve his own being" (felicitatem in eo consistere quod hominum esse conservare potest) Secondly, "that virtue is to be desired for its own sake, nor is there anything more excellent or more useful to us than virtue for the sake of which virtue ought to be desired " Thirdly, "that all persons who kill themselves are impotent in mind and have been thoroughly overcome by external causes opposed to their nature." From these three dictates of reason he concludes the principle

"that everyone is bound to seek his own utility" is the foundation of all virtue and piety. "Reason demands nothing which is opposed to nature" (cum ratio nihil contra naturam postulet)—and the nature of each thing is to seek its own preservation and perfection. Self-sacrifice is, for Spinoza, no virtue at all. Virtue is not a meditation on death, as Socrates and the Platonists held, but rather a meditation on the continuation and enjoyment of life. "A free man," Spinoza counsels (4-67), "thinks of nothing less than of death and his wisdom is not a meditation upon death but upon life."

Spinoza's philosophy of life is opposed to the "via lacrimosa" of the Christian ethics as well as to the Stoic doctrine of suicide. Life is not a kind of "Pilgrim's Progress" to a region which will compensate man for his suffering on earth. The enjoyment of happiness is to be found here on earth while man exists in time.

The Stoic sages put the emphasis on fortitude, on strength of mind in facing hardships which befall one. The wise man, they counseled, is unattached to the goods of fortune and is prepared to depart this life if he can no longer live with honor (honestas). Thus Cicero in expounding the Stoic attitude to suicide writes (*De Finibus*, Bk IV, § 18) "When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is his duty [officium] to remain alive. When he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of contrary things, it is appropriate [officium] for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion proper for the wise man to quit life although he is happy and also for the foolish man to remain in life, although he is miserable." And again, "For the virtuous man is not necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also these who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek death. And very often it is appropriate for the wise man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying supreme happiness if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that happiness which means life in harmony with nature [convenienter naturae vivere] is a matter of seizing the right moment, so that wisdom herself upon occasion bids the wise man to leave her. Hence as vice does not possess the power of

furnishing a cause of voluntary death, it is clear that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a predominance of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance with nature " (See Schopenhauer's essay "On Suicide ")

From Cicero's account we gather that the Stoics thought suicide in accord with reason and nature, even though all things by nature tend to preserve themselves. The Stoic wise man thought so little of life and so much of virtue that he was prepared to terminate his own existence if the occasion required it. Happiness consisted in the timely act of virtue and not in the duration or preservation of life. The virtue of the wise man and his happiness were not increased by the duration of his life, on the contrary, it could on occasion be increased by making a timely exit.

As for Spinoza, although he agreed with the Stoics that the summum bonum of man consisted in virtue and life in accord with reason or nature, he denied nevertheless that suicide was in accord with nature. *If all things by nature tend to exist and to preserve themselves, then wisdom also must counsel self-preservation as the foundation of virtue* (see chap. xi, § 8 for exception). Historically, it may be said that Spinoza combined the biological naturalism of Hobbes who taught that human happiness consisted in the process of living, in the indefinite desire for life and power (chap. xiii, § 1), together with the Stoic doctrine that virtue is the summum bonum of man.

3 ARISTOTLE AND SPINOZA ON HAPPINESS AND COMPLETENESS OF LIFE

SPINOZA, be it noted, maintained not only that happiness consisted in self-preservation, but also that it involved the complete development of all one's powers or perfections. In this respect his doctrine is in accord with that of Aristotle. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle maintains that happiness (eudaimonia) consists in living a complete life of virtue, that is, one in which the individual has the opportunity to develop in time all his potentialities. A man whose life is

brought to a premature end or who fails to develop all his human powers cannot be called happy. Thus he writes (*ibid* 1100a) "For this reason also a boy is not happy; for he is not yet capable of such acts owing to his age. And boys who are called happy are being congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for them. For there is required as we said, not only complete virtue but also a complete life, since many changes occur in life and all manner of chances and the most prosperous may fall into great misfortune in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan cycle. And one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy. [1101a] Why then should we not say that he is happy who is active in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period, but throughout a complete life." For Aristotle, it appears, only man at his best living a complete life can be called happy or blessed. When we turn to the *Ethics* of Spinoza, we find a parallel statement. In 5-39 scholium he writes "To understand this more clearly, it is to be considered here that we live in constant change and that according as we change for the better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy [quod nos in continua vimus variatione, et prout in melius sive in pejus mutamur, eo felices aut infelices dicimus]. For he who passes from infancy or childhood to death is called unhappy, and, on the other hand, we consider ourselves happy if we can pass through the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. Moreover, he who like an infant or child possesses a body fit for very few things, and almost altogether dependent on external causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is almost entirely unconscious of itself, of God and of objects. On the other hand, he who possesses a body fit for many things, possesses a mind which, considered in itself alone, is largely conscious of itself, of God and of objects. In this life therefore, it is our chief endeavour to change the body of infancy so far as its nature permits and is conducive thereto, into another body which is fitted for many things, and which is related to a mind conscious as much as possible of itself, of God and of objects, so that everything which is related to its

memory and imagination, in comparison with the intellect is scarcely of any moment "

From the above passages it is evident that Spinoza and Aristotle are in agreement concerning the nature of happiness. Happiness, they both maintain, involves complete virtue in a complete life—that is, a body fit for many things plus a rational mind of which the greater part is active or eternal, enjoyed through a complete span of life. But here a difficulty arises for Spinoza's theory.

We have seen from a previous analysis of "St. Thomas and Spinoza on Virtue and Power" (chap. x, § 2) that the Scholastics following Aristotle combined the notions of the efficient and final cause in their conception of virtue. The virtue of a thing was defined not only by its actual function but also by its potential powers with reference to a fixed end. They realized that an organism was subject to change and development and that therefore one could not define its real or perfect nature except by reference to the furthest limit or goal of its development. Happiness or the *summum bonum* of man consisted in living such a life as made it possible for him to develop all his potentialities of perfection without misfortune or hindrance. In brief, from a purely humanistic point of view, the happiness of man consisted in attaining the final form of his perfection or power.

Now Spinoza, we have also seen, opposed all reference to a final cause. The virtue of man was to be defined only in terms of his actual efficient power, his power of self-preservation. In the passage just quoted, however, we find that Spinoza too speaks of the individual as subject to continuous change and as changing "for the better or the worse." This, it appears, necessarily involves the notion of a final cause, since the qualities of better and worse have no meaning except as approximations to a given ideal or goal (see chap. ix, §§ 5, 7). The fact that an organism develops its powers or perfections in time and is subject to many changes of form forced Spinoza to acknowledge an implicit final cause which rendered the whole process intelligible. Insofar as Spinoza was concerned only with the actual, eternal nature of human perfection, he could avoid all reference to change and time.

But when he turned to define human happiness, he found he had to introduce an exemplar of human perfection, the *summa virtus*, which the individual could acquire in the process of time (chap x, § 6) *Happiness, that is to say, consists not in self-preservation alone, but in self-preservation for the sake of attaining the maximum degree of human perfection. Self-preservation without the acquisition of the highest perfection or even of normal perfection, does not constitute happiness* For example (5-6 schol), "nobody pities an infant because it does not know how to speak, walk or reason, and lives so many years not conscious as it were of itself, but if a number of human beings were born adult, and only a few here and there were born infants, every one would pity the infants because we should then consider infancy not as a thing natural and necessary, but as a defect or fault of nature" (ut naturae vitium seu peccatum consideraret). Self-preservation in the form of infancy would be considered a human tragedy and not at all a mark of perfection and happiness. In brief, contrary to Spinoza's conclusion that self-preservation is identical with virtue and happiness (4-18 schol), we now find that *self-preservation is only a condition of human happiness* (4-21) but is not identical with the latter. *Happiness is based upon self-preservation but completeness of duration is required in order that the individual may develop his potentialities and acquire the greatest perfection possible*

4 THE ACTIVITY OF THE INTELLECT AS THE SUMMUM BONUM

So far we have shown that Spinoza professes to identify happiness with self-preservation though, as noted, he implicitly introduces the notion of an end or final cause insofar as self-preservation is bound up with completeness of life (§ 3). We now turn to examine Spinoza's second theory of the summum bonum which depends upon his identification of virtue with the activity of the intellect.

We have seen that insofar as Spinoza regards the effort of self-preservation as the foundation of all virtue he defines

the good in relation to this conatus. Whatever one regards as helping or hindering his power to exist is good or evil accordingly, the knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the perception of pleasure and pain (4-8). Life is but a brief struggle for existence in competition with other modes impelled by common illusions of freedom and purpose.

On the other hand, insofar as the essence of man is identified with the perfection of his intellect, we find Spinoza defines the true good (*verum bonum*) as primarily that which is useful for or conducive to understanding. Thus he writes (4-18 schol.) "Since reason demands nothing which is opposed to nature, it demands that every person should love himself, should seek what is useful to him—what is truly useful [*quod revera utile est*—should desire everything that really leads man to greater perfection and absolutely that everyone should endeavour as far as in him lies to preserve his own being." And again more emphatically (4-27). "We do not know that anything is certainly good or evil [*nihil certo scimus bonum aut malum esse*] excepting that which conduces to understanding or which can hinder us so that we understand less." We note here Spinoza's express emphasis on the nature of "the true good" which really promotes human perfection as distinct from the good which is relative to desire. The good so understood has a formal and necessary basis in the very nature of things, a thing is necessarily good because it agrees with our nature (4-31) and not merely because it is conducive to pleasure.

The ultimate good or object of rational desire is the maximum perfection of man and all things are considered good or useful insofar as they promote this end. In fact, the supreme good as conceived by reason is that ideal form of human perfection which ought to be desired and not merely the self-preservation which is actually desired (chap. x, § 6). Spinoza states this new conception in the preface to book four. "For since we desire to form for ourselves an idea of man upon which we may look as a model [*exemplar*] of human nature, it will be of service to us to retain these expressions in the sense I have mentioned. By good I understand in the following pages everything which we are certain is a

means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature we see before us [medium esse ut ad exemplar humanae naturae accedamus] By evil on the contrary, I understand everything which we are certain hinders us from reaching this model " Similarly in *On the Improvement of the Understanding* he writes "I will here only briefly state what I mean by true good [verum bonum] and also what is the nature of the highest good [summum bonum].

However human weakness cannot attain to this order in its own thoughts but meanwhile man conceives a human nature much more stable than his own and sees that there is no reason why he should not himself acquire such a nature Thus he is led to seek for means which will bring him to such perfection [ad tatem perfectionem] and calls everything which will serve as such a means a true good The chief good [summum bonum] is that he should enjoy [fruat] together with other individuals if possible, the aforesaid nature What that nature is we shall know in due time, namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing between the mind and the whole of nature [cognitionem unionis quam mens cum tota natura habet] This is the end toward which I shall tend, to acquire such a nature myself and to endeavour that many should attain it with me In other words, it is part of my happiness [de mea felicitate] to lend a helping hand that many others may enjoy even as I do, so that their understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own" (*ibid*, pp 4, 5)

From these passages we gather that Spinoza distinguishes between the ultimate end or supreme good which is an ideal of human perfection and the "verum bonum," the truly useful means to achieve this end What this ideal of human nature is he indicated briefly by saying that it is "the knowledge of the union existing between the mind and the whole of nature " He also suggests that his happiness in achieving this end is a social ideal and necessarily depends upon a similar nature in others In the *Ethics* Spinoza defines the supreme good of man more explicitly In 4-26 (demon) he writes "Again since this effort of the mind by which the mind insofar as it reasons endeavours to preserve its being, is nothing

but the effort to understand, it follows that this effort to understand [*intelligendi conatus*] is the primary and sole foundation of virtue [*primum et unicum virtutis fundamentum*] and that we do not endeavour to understand for the sake of any end [*nec alicujus finis causa*].” The activity of reason is not a means to some more ultimate good, on the contrary, all things are good as means to rational activity. The good of man is to be found in the perfection of his intellect and not in some good which transcends him.

It is noteworthy that Spinoza previously spoke (4-22 corol.) of the endeavor for self-preservation as “the primary and sole foundation of virtue” and repeats the same phrase when speaking of the activity of the intellect. This implies that he identifies the activity of reason with the effort of self-preservation. His argument is that all efforts which the intellect makes to increase its power of understanding are also expressions of man’s general effort to live and act (3-6, 7). This explains why he demonstrates (3-9) that “the mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas, and insofar as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persevere in its being for an indefinite time and is conscious of this effort.” Man’s endeavor to understand presupposes and is therefore in accord with his general effort to persevere in existence. Intellectual activity, in brief, is a form of self-preservation. This does not mean that the intellect is only a means of self-preservation, the activity of the intellect is an end in itself and is a direct expression of man’s power of existence.

In fact, Spinoza’s main point is that the activity of reason in conceiving adequate ideas is the best expression of man’s effort to live, since the individual himself is the adequate cause of his adequate ideas. This I take to be the significance of his demonstration (4-24) that “to act absolutely in conformity with virtue is, in us, nothing but acting, living and preserving our being (these three things having the same meaning) as reason directs, from the ground of seeking our own profit.” [demon.] “To act absolutely in conformity with virtue is nothing but acting according to the laws of our own proper nature. But only insofar as we understand do we act. Therefore,” etc. Spinoza’s point here is that only in intel-

lectual activity does man show his true power of action and existence All things are truly good as means insofar as they promote man's power of thinking

It appears, therefore, that by self-preservation Spinoza means two distinct things *In the first place he means the preservation of the individual considered as a psychophysical organism In the second instance he means the preservation of the intellect which is the real or true self and principle of being and activity Insofar as he maintains the latter doctrine physical self-preservation is for the sake of intellectual perfection* That is to say, the virtue of the body is subservient to that of the intellect—a thesis common to Plato, Aristotle, and the Scholastics Here again the parallelism between the virtue of the body and the mind which Spinoza elsewhere maintains breaks down

5 INTUITION AND SELF-SATISFACTION

So far then we have seen that Spinoza defines the summum bonum as consisting in some activity of man, namely, either the effort of self-preservation or the intuitive knowledge of the intellect In other passages, however, he maintains that man's supreme good and happiness consist in the joy arising from his power of activity Thus he regards (4-52) "the self-satisfaction [*acquiescentia in se ipso*] which arises from reason" as "the highest [*summa*] which can exist" In the scholium to 4-52 he continues "Self-satisfaction is indeed the highest thing [*summum*] for which we can hope, for no one endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any end [*nemo finis causa suum esse conservare conatur*]" The supreme good or end of man is the enjoyment of intellectual activity, and all may equally enjoy it (*omnes aequè gaudere possunt*) (4-36) This power of enjoying intellectual activity is so essential to the very nature of man that "man could not be nor be conceived if he had not the power of rejoicing in this highest good" (*quia homo nec esse nec concipi posset si potestatem non habet gaudendi summo bono*) (4-36 demon) (See Note 1, p 348)

The intuitive knowledge of God gives rise to self-satisfac-

tion or self-love since the human intellect is regarded as the adequate cause of its ideas. Thus Spinoza writes (5-27). "From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible satisfaction of mind [summa quae dari potest mentis acquiescentia oritur] [demon] He who knows things by this third kind of knowledge passes [transit] to the highest human perfection and consequently is affected with the highest joy [summa laetitia afficitur] which is accompanied with the idea of himself and his own virtue" (concomitante idea sui suaeque virtutis). This Socratic, humanistic tendency appears again later (4-append). "The final aim [finis ultimus] therefore of a man who is guided by reason, that is to say, the chief desire [summa cupiditas] by which he strives to moderate all his other desires, is that by which he is led adequately to conceive himself and all things which can be conceived by his intelligence."

Man delights in himself because he has an intuitive knowledge of himself through the idea of God. The primary reference is to the perfection or virtue of man and not to that of God. For Spinoza, adequate self-knowledge means an intuitive conception of one's intellect as constituting part of the divine intellect and of his body as an eternal mode of extension (5-29, 5-30). *Man cannot know himself adequately except insofar as he has a prior knowledge of God. Spinoza could well say Cogito Deum ergo sum.*

NOTE 1 Spinoza's distinction among the objects of love corresponds closely to that of Leone Ebreo. The latter classifies the objects of love into (a) the useful, (b) the pleasant, (c) the virtuous. Spinoza, of course, tries to show that the three are really identical, though he agrees with the classical tradition in maintaining that intellectual virtue is the most inclusive and that things are truly useful and pleasant insofar as they make for a life of virtue. The conclusion of Leone Ebreo in the *Philosophy of Love* is worth quoting as an anticipation of Spinoza. The former writes (p. 25) "Whereas unbridled lust for pleasure and insatiable greed of gain debase our intellect, plunging it into the slough of matter and dimming the light of our mind in the mists of sensuality, on the other hand, our inextinguishable

burning love of wisdom and virtue makes godlike our human mind [p 29] Honour or glory is of two kinds one false and spurious, the other authentic and true Spurious honour is that which flatters power, true honour—that which rewards virtue . But true honour inasmuch as it is a reward of virtue, though essentially pleasurable, yet has its pleasure commingled with good [p 21] So that the purpose of man consists in acting well, virtuously, and wisely, which exceeds in worth every other activity of man, all other love and all other desire ” The curious feature of Spinoza’s *Ethics* consists in the fact that he tried to identify these distinctions instead of finding for each its proper place, in a logical scheme

6 THE INTUITIVE LOVE OF GOD AND THE IDEA OF THE GOOD

NEVERTHELESS, Spinoza does also speak of “the intellectual love of God” (*amor intellectualis dei*, see chap v, § 5, 5–32 corol) This intellectual love of God is human self-love but as conceived through God In the demonstration he makes this dual reference “From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible satisfaction [*summa mentis acquiescentia*] that is to say, the highest joy [*laetitia*] attended moreover with the idea of oneself [*concomitante idea sui*] and consequently attended with the idea of God as its cause [*et consequenter concomitante etiam idea dei tanquam causa*] ” To conceive oneself as cause, Spinoza argues, is the same as to conceive God as cause

The full significance of Spinoza’s reasoning here can be understood only if the reader bear in mind our discussion of intuitive knowledge in chapter x, § 6 There we showed that there was an inherent equivocation in Spinoza’s theory of intuitive knowledge due to the fact that *he confused the metaphysical adequacy of a cause with the epistemological adequacy of an idea* Hence on the one hand, he maintains that the knowledge of God is prior to all other ideas and is the only adequate source or cause of all knowledge intuitively conceived through Him On the other hand, he also held that the human intellect was the adequate cause of all its intuitive

or adequately conceived ideas. This he explained metaphysically by saying that God acted or expressed himself directly through a particular human mind instead of indirectly through the mediation of other modes of thought. Epistemologically, however, Spinoza like Descartes did not find it necessary to refer to God when speaking of this mathematical mode of intuition. *In brief, Spinoza's metaphysics led him to attempt to deduce all things from the idea of God, but his mathematical epistemology led him to regard ideas as self-evident and self-revealing entities which required no reference to anything other than themselves.*

The consequences of this dual method appear in Spinoza's theory of intuitive or intellectual love. To begin with, since man himself is the adequate cause of all his intuitive knowledge, it follows that all love is self-love or self-acquiescence, that is, joy accompanied with the idea of one's own power of action. On the other hand, all things are and are conceived through an intuition of the nature of God (5-30). Hence it follows that intuitive knowledge of God must lead to the love of God who is the immanent, efficient cause of all our knowledge. "He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his affects loves God" (5-15). *Spinoza attempts to combine these two radically conflicting notions by saying that the intuitive love of oneself is the same as the intuitive love of God, although they involve two entirely different sets of premises.* Man is said to love God in loving himself and God, for His part, loves all men in loving Himself (5-36 corol.). But man does not love God as the *summum bonum per se* nor does he strive that God should love him in return (5-19).

At this stage the problem may be raised, why does Spinoza speak of delight originating from intuitive knowledge rather than from common notions? The answer is, I believe, because intuition is, as it were, intellectual vision which directly conceives the essence of a given particular thing just as perception is sensuous vision of a particular, physical thing. "For the mind," Spinoza explains (5-23 schol.), "is no less sensible of those things which it conceives through intelligence than of those which it remembers [*mens non minus*

res illas sentit quas intelligendo concipit, quam quas in memoria habet] For these demonstrations are the eyes of the mind by which it sees and observes things . . . [5-24] The more we understand particular things [res singulares] the more we understand God " In intuitive conception as in perception and imagination, the mind regards its object as actually present, though in different ways In intellectual vision the mind regards its object as eternally present in the attributes of God, whereas in sensation and imagination, the mind perceives its object as actually present in time And so Spinoza explains (5-29 schol) "Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways either insofar as we conceive them to exist with relation to a fixed time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. . . [5-30 demon] To conceive things therefore under the form of eternity is to conceive them insofar as they are conceived through the essence of God as actually existing things, or insofar as through the essence of God they involve existence "

Later he refers to the superior conviction conveyed by intuitive knowledge as compared with knowledge by demonstration through universals "Again," he writes (5-36 schol), "since the essence of our mind consists in knowledge alone, whose beginning and foundation is God, it is clear to us in what manner our mind with regard both to essence and existence follows from the divine nature and continually depends upon God I thought it worth while to notice this here, in order that I might show by this example what that knowledge of individual objects [rerum singularium cognitio] which I have called intuitive or of the third kind, is able to do and how much more potent it is than the universal knowledge which I have called knowledge of the second kind [potiorque sit cognitione universali, quam secundi generis esse dixi] For although I have shown generally in the first part that all things and consequently also the human mind depend upon God both with regard to existence and essence, yet that demonstration although legitimate and placed beyond the possibility of a doubt, does not nevertheless so affect our mind as a proof from the essence itself of any

singular object which we say depends upon God " In other words, the demonstration that God is the immanent cause of the essence and existence of things does not give rise to intellectual love The mind feels an immediate and spontaneous love toward God only when it is intuitively aware of God's eternal presence and of its own dependence upon Him. Intuitive love arises when the mind is aware of the essential union between itself and the divine infinite intellect, so that it regards its own power as an expression of the divine perfection *That is to say, the intellectual love of God is not a desire for union with God or a desire for the beatific vision as the Scholastics would hold, on the contrary, the intellectual love of God is joy due to the prior intuition of the essential immanence of God in all created nature* Man's happiness consists in the intellectual love of God, not because man desires union with God who is per se the summum bonum and the consummation of human desire, as St. Thomas said, but because our mind intuitively knows and feels that God is the immanent, efficient cause of its highest perfection Psychologically, man's union with God consists in the fact that his mind acquiesces in the presence of the idea of God in his mind and allows it to occupy his mind so far as possible (5-16, chap v, § 6)

In like manner, Spinoza denies that God acts for the sake of any good other than Himself In 1-33 scholium 2 he argues at length "I confess that this opinion which subjects all things to a certain indifferent will of God and affirms that all things depend upon God's good pleasure [beneplacit] is at less distance from the truth than the opinion of those who affirm that God does everything for the sake of the good [sub ratione boni agere] For these seem to place something outside of God which is independent of Him to which he looks as it were as to a model [exemplar] or at which he aims as if at a certain mark [scopum] This is indeed nothing else than to subject God to fate [fato], the most absurd thing which can be affirmed of Him "

So also in the Appendix to book one he continues "But if things which are immediately produced by God were made in order that He might obtain the end He had in view [finem

suum] then the last things for the sake of which the first exist must be the most excellent of all [praestantissimae] Again this doctrine does away with God's perfection For if God acts to obtain an end [propter finem agit] He necessarily seeks something of which He stands in need [aliquid appetit quo caret] And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between the end of want and the end of assimilation [finem indigentiae et finem assimilationis], they confess that God has done all things for His own sake and not for the sake of the things to be created, because before the creation they can assign nothing excepting God for the sake of which God could do anything, and therefore they are necessarily compelled to admit that God stood in need of and desired those things for which He determined to prepare the means [media] ”

The above arguments are meant to demonstrate that God cannot be said to act for the sake of some end, good, or final cause God produces infinite modes by the necessity of His nature and not because of any ideal purpose or exemplar He has in mind and to which He looks as to a model If God were to act with reference to some end or ideal, it would involve, Spinoza believes, an admission of divine imperfection or potentiality We must say then that all things express in finite ways the infinite perfection of God only *Spinoza denies that the conatus or power of God as well as man is directed toward any good or end other than itself.*

It is noteworthy that in the Short Treatise, *Spinoza speaks as one of the Scholastics and admits that God is good in Himself and that the summum bonum of man consists in union with God* He writes (*Short Treatise*, II, chap xxii) “Now we have said that this kind of knowledge does not result from something else, but from a direct revelation of the object itself to the understanding . And if that object is glorious and good, then the soul becomes necessarily united with it, as we have also remarked with reference to the body Hence it follows incontrovertibly that it is this knowledge which evokes love So that when we get to know God after this manner then (as He cannot reveal Himself nor become known to us otherwise than as the most glorious and best of all) we

must necessarily become united with Him and only in this union does our blessedness consist ”

Here we see that Spinoza stresses the point that the blessedness or happiness of man consists in the union with God who is Himself the supreme good—a doctrine which is contrary to that of the *Ethics* but which is in complete agreement with the Scholastics

It is instructive to observe, however, that in his very earliest work, the *Cogitata metaphysica*, Spinoza expresses himself in conformity with his teaching in the *Ethics*. In Part I, Chapter VI of the *Cogitata* he writes “An object considered in itself is neither good nor evil, but only in respect to another being which it helps to acquire what is desired . . . God is called good because He preserves all things . . . Those who seek for some metaphysical good which shall be free from relativity are laboring under a misapprehension of the case ” Here we see that God is good, not as the end of desire, but rather as the universal means of satisfying the natural desire of all things for self-preservation. Similarly in the fifth book of the *Ethics*, God is said to be loved because He is conceived as the immanent, efficient cause of human perfection. *The goodness of God is a quality attributed to Him in virtue of His infinite power in producing and preserving all things and not because He is the end or final cause whom all things desire*

7 THE TEMPORAL AND ETERNAL NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL LOVE

IN our analysis of pleasure (chap. II, § 4) we noted that Spinoza’s definition of the affect of pleasure as “man’s transition to greater perfection” did not account for intellectual pleasure. The latter mode completes the activity of the intellect and does not involve transition from one state of perfection to another. That is why Spinoza could demonstrate (5-35) that “God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love,” since He delights in His own infinite perfection or power, even as man delights in his finite perfection. Spinoza, we have seen (chap. V, § 5, chap. XIII, § 6), goes on to identify human

self-satisfaction with the intellectual love of God for Himself, since man's intellectual self-love is part of the infinite intellectual love of God for Himself. From this it follows logically that man who loves God as the immanent, efficient cause of his perfections can be certain that God, in loving Himself, loves him in return. Strange to say, however, Spinoza fails to draw this inference and proposes instead that (5-19) "he who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return." His argument is in principle that if God were to love man in return God would have to be subject to passions and hence would pass from one state of perfection to another, and this would imply that God was not eternally and absolutely perfect (5-17, 1-20 corol 2). Spinoza arrived at this conclusion because he failed to realize in this connection that intellectual joy does not involve any transition as does corporeal pleasure and hence may be attributed to God in the form of the divine love for man. *He applied the notion of intellectual joy to God in order to demonstrate the intellectual love of God for Himself but reverted to his definition of corporeal love in order to demonstrate that God could not reciprocate the love of man* (See Note 2, p 359)

There is a sense, however, in which the notion of transition applies to human intellectual joy and love as well. Insofar as an individual acts, he does so in time. Thus, for example, when the human mind acquires knowledge of God or nature it does so by degrees and hence may be said to pass from a lesser to a greater state of perfection. Spinoza himself remarks (5-27 demon) "Therefore he who knows things by this (third) kind of knowledge passes [transit] to the highest human perfection and consequently is affected with the highest joy which is accompanied with the idea of himself and his own virtue." This explains why Spinoza in agreement with Aristotle maintains (§ 3) that happiness involves a complete life in which the individual develops to the maximum possible perfection. If this be granted it follows that although intellectual joy is in itself a completion of an action, human action itself, as a psychological experience, involves transition from one degree of perfection to another. In this respect, human joy and love would differ from that of

God who can delight only in His eternal, actual perfection. God's intellectual love does not originate in time and hence he cannot reciprocate man's temporal, intellectual love

Thus, it appears, we are faced with the following problem. On the one hand, Spinoza identifies the self-love of God and man and can, but does not, demonstrate that God may reciprocate man's love. This argument implies, as he acknowledges (5-33), that "the intellectual love of God which arises from the third kind of knowledge is eternal." On the other hand, he also admits that human perfection is something acquired in time and thus implies that human intellectual love occurs in time. On this premise he cannot identify human and divine intellectual love, since the former is temporal and the latter is eternal.

The problem of the relation of the intellectual love of man for himself and for God and the intellectual love of God for Himself seems to be one which troubled Spinoza very much since he finds it necessary to comment further (5-33 schol.) "Although this love to God has no beginning, it nevertheless has all the perfections of love, just *as if* it had originated [*ac si ortus fuisset*] Nor is there any difference excepting that the mind has eternally possessed these same perfections which we imagine as now accruing to it and has possessed them with the accompanying idea of God as the eternal cause. And if joy consist in the passage to a greater perfection, blessedness must consist in this, that the mind is endowed with perfection itself."

Again in the scholium to 5-36 he continues "Hence we clearly understand that our salvation or blessedness or liberty consists in a constant and eternal love towards God or in the love of God towards men [*nostra salus, seu beatitudo seu libertas consistit nempe in constanti et aeterno erga Deum amore sive in amore Dei erga homines*] This love or blessedness is called glory [*gloria*] in the sacred writings and not without merit. For whether it be related to God or to the mind, it may properly be called satisfaction of soul [*animi acquiescentia*] which is in truth not distinguished from glory. For insofar as it is related to God it is joy [*laetitia*] (granting that it is allowable to use this word) accompanied with

the idea of Himself and it is the same thing when it is related to the mind "

Here we see that Spinoza acknowledges that ordinary sensuous pleasure (*lactitia*) involves a transition to a greater form of perfection but he denies that this is the case as regards that self-satisfaction or satisfaction of soul (*acquiescentia animi*) which follows upon intuitive knowledge as conceived through God. True happiness is the joy of eternity while existing in time Spinoza prefers to substitute the terms "gaudium" (3-def 16), "delectamur" (5-32), "fruor," and "acquiescentia" for *lactitia* wherever possible

The fact remains, however, that intuition, from the human point of view, is a process occurring in time which leads to an increase in the perfection of the mind (5-38) The intellectual joy of man is therefore something originating in time and may not on this account be identified with the timeless joy of God It may be true that insofar as the intellect is immortal and is an eternal mode of the divine intellect, its joy is immutable too but insofar as the mind exists in time it is subject to ceaseless change The consciousness of this supreme or eternal kind of joy is, from the human point of view, itself temporal That is to say, the intellect may conceive *sub specie aeternitatis* the nature of the intuitive joy enjoyed by God, but as a mode existing in time its own joys are subject to transitions in time By attempting to identify human self-satisfaction with the intellectual love of God for Himself, Spinoza was really trying to combine time and eternity in contradiction to his own definition (1-def 8) which states that "eternity cannot be manifested through duration" (5-29 demon) *Spinoza, in opposition to Hobbes was so concerned to demonstrate that happiness consists in an eternal enjoyment of one's perfection, in an eternal form of being rather than in a state of ceaseless becoming, that he was even prepared to deny that happiness or blessedness has a real beginning in time and involves the duration of a complete life* (chap xiii, §§1, 3) It only appears as if (*ac si*) the intellectual love of man originated in time, actually or in truth, the joys due to intuitive knowledge are timeless

The problem of the correlation between the eternal per-

fection of the soul and its temporal development reappears in Spinoza's theory of knowledge. Briefly put the alternatives are these: first, if the perfection of the soul like intellectual love has no beginning in time, it follows that the mind's intuitive knowledge is also eternal and therefore innate. That is to say, all so-called conception of ideas is really reminiscence as Plato held. But if, on the other hand, the perfection of the intellect is acquired and developed in time, then the joy or love due to this intuitive knowledge also originates in time.

Spinoza himself actually faced this problem and decided to reject any theory of innate knowledge. "The mind," he claims, "can imagine nothing, nor can it recollect anything that is past, except while the body exists" (5-21). And again (5-23 schol.) - "It is impossible, nevertheless, that we should recollect that we existed before the body because there are no traces of any such existence in the body and also because eternity cannot be defined by time or have any relationship to it [*nec aeternitas tempore definiri nec ullam ad tempus relationem habere potest*]." But if this be the case, then the mind must acquire its actual intellectual perfection and therefore its joy in time.

To conclude Spinoza following the Platonic-Parmenidean metaphysical theory gave preeminence to the principle of eternal being and therefore tended to regard development in time as illusory. Intellectual love or blessedness appears "as if" it originates in time though really it is timeless. That is why Plato had maintained that the soul in its entirety was by nature immortal, and that all knowledge was really recollection. (See Note 3, p. 361.)

On the other hand, he also accepted the Aristotelian theory of happiness and hence maintained that all human perfection was acquired in time. On this basis, the degree of one's immortality depends upon the quantity of perfection attained by the intellect (5-40 corol.). Only part of the soul is therefore immortal and not the whole of it as Plato maintained. Spinoza, it appears, agreed with the Platonists that the intellectual love of God was eternal but maintained with

the Aristotelians that intellectual perfection was acquired in time and was not simply recollection

Besides the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines, both of which involve the notion of an eternal essence (the soul or part of it) joined to a temporal existence, Spinoza also tries to find place for the mechanistic, Galilean theory which identifies human essence with power of self-preservation in time (chap xiii, § 2, chap iii, § 2) It is small wonder that students of Spinoza have found his theory of human virtue and happiness hard to comprehend. The reason is, we suggest, that his doctrine is essentially eclectic

NOTE 2 Historically, it is to be noted that the most significant characteristic of both the Old and New Testaments is the doctrine of the love of God for man and the divine concern for human salvation This necessarily follows from the fact that the God of the Hebrew-Christian tradition is a living God who can reciprocate human love and take account of human conduct Spinoza, however, like Maimonides before him, attempted to re-form the personal God of the Hebrews so as to exclude any human, finite attributes In the case of Maimonides the result was a close duplicate of the transcendent God of Aristotle Whose activity was "a thinking on thinking" Spinoza, on the other hand, while professing the immanence of God (1-18), also tried to include the Aristotelian-Maimonidean theory of the divine transcendence and that is why he argues that God cannot reciprocate human love, even though the love of God for Himself is identical with the intellectual love of God for man Spinoza does not harmonize the immanence and transcendence of God, he maintains each alternative separately

It is highly significant that S. Alexander in his paper on "Spinoza and the Philosophy of Religion" in *Septimana Spinozana* (1932) regards Spinoza's doctrine of the intransitive relation of love between God and man as most in accord with his own theory of Emergent Evolution God or Deity according to Alexander is the next highest stage in evolution, the goal which nature strives to attain but which it has not yet realized Deity so conceived is a Platonic ideal, or objective which is loved and

which because of this love may become actual. It is nonsense, however, to speak of the reciprocal love of Deity and man since the former is only a conceptual ideal and not a living, actual being. The God of Alexander can be admired intellectually but He is not a being to whom one can pray for help and guidance and love. In brief, Alexander's God is a purely human creation and not the eternal creator of man as the Old Tradition held. Alexander's own words follow (*Septimana Spinozana*, p. 132):

"So conceived, God in the process of time is, in respect of His deity, in the future, and present only in the sense that the whole world is striving to produce deity. Doubtless, it might seem to many that a God whose deity belongs to the future is no fit object of worship. To which the answer is Spinoza's, the answer which moved Goethe so profoundly, that man's love for God asks for no return.

Instead of prayer to a being who may answer it, even of the magnificent gratitude of man expressed by Wordsworth in Spinozistic mood as a thanksgiving to the power which made him, we should have, what indeed prayer always is, the fortifying of a man by himself to help in making something better than himself, in a word, instead of a religion of admiration we should have one of aspiration.

The union which pantheism proclaims of man with his God is retained while the difference of quality between the worshipper and the object of his worship which theism insists upon remains, and is softened into the recognition that this new existence is to be in part at least our work." Deity is something to which man is to aspire—and create in time because of his love, but God is never sufficiently actual to reciprocate love.

In like manner, Santayana in his essay on "Ultimate Religion," also published in *Septimana Spinozana*, approves the Spinozistic doctrine that the love of God asks for no return. His argument is that God is to be conceived as the harmony or synthesis of infinite, eternal ideals with which the human intellect identifies itself in love. (Incidentally, in granting the compatibility of infinite ideals Santayana is opposed to Whitehead who denies that this is logically tenable.) In other words, Santayana and Alexander agree in conceiving God as an objective or Platonic ideal and therefore maintain that the God-ideal is something to be acknowledged as an object of enjoyment and

aspiration but that God is not a personal, living being who can reciprocate such love. They differ only insofar as the God of Santayana is a synthesis or harmony of infinite ideals, whereas the God of Alexander is a finite ideal, being the next higher stage in cosmic evolution. In the aforementioned essay Santayana writes "The universal good cannot fall short of being the sum of all those perfections, infinitely various, to which all living things severally aspire. These varied perfections are rivals

and enemies in the press of the world where there seems not to be matter or time enough for everything, but to impartial spirit no good can render another good odious. . . Physically, one good may exclude another—but in eternity the most opposite goods are not enemies. To love things as they are would be a mockery, a true lover must love them as they would wish to be.

And if we wish to make a religion of love, we must take universal good, not universal power for the object of our religion. God is the good of the universe. All objects of love form a single ineffable good. Thus the absolute love of anything involves the love of universal good, and the love of universal good involves the love of every creature."

Santayana, in other words, deprives the Spinozistic God of His power and retains only the harmony of the infinite modes of perfection which are said to follow from the divine nature. On this basis, it becomes meaningless to speak even of the intellectual love of God for Himself, as does Spinoza for whom God at least was an actual, living being endowed with infinite power. In separating perfection from power, Santayana and Alexander deny the fundamental thesis of Spinoza's metaphysics, and while they employ his terminology, they are no longer true to his religious insight.

NOTE 3 Spinoza's insistence upon the eternal nature of intellectual love seems to reflect the Platonic arguments to be found in the *Philosophy of Love* of Leone Ebreo. In the third Dialogue the following statements occur "The first love and procreative cause of the universe is that of God for Himself as eternal lover and beloved. I have understood your doctrine of the intrinsic love of God, namely, that although we speak of it as having been born and allow that it was born of God as both lover

and beloved, none the less this love was born of God from all eternity and is one with His eternal unity to all eternity" Spinoza does not, however, follow Leone Ebreo when the latter continues to speak of the love of God for the world

8 IMMORTALITY AND THE REWARD OF VIRTUE.

IN view of Spinoza's insistence upon the eternal nature of intellectual love, it comes as a sort of anticlimax to be told (5-41) that "even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion and absolutely everything which in the fourth part we have shown to be related to strength of mind and generosity." His argument here is that the primary foundation of virtue is for each to seek what is truly useful for his perfection of being. Hence the life of virtue requires no additional justification by any appeal to the eternity of the soul. The virtues of fortitude have been shown to be desirable goods in themselves inasmuch as they enable the mind to lead a self-determined life instead of being subject to the passions produced by external forces. The eternity or immortality of the mind is therefore extrinsic to the life of virtue, perfection of being is its own reward irrespective of its duration in time or continuation in eternity.

"The creed of the multitude," Spinoza remarks (5-41 schol.), "seems to be different from this, for most persons seem to believe that they are free insofar as it is allowed them to obey their lusts and that they give up a portion of their rights insofar as they are bound to live according to the commands of divine law. Piety, therefore, and religion and absolutely all those things that are related to fortitude they believe to be burdens which they hope to be able to lay aside after death, hoping also to receive some reward for their bondage, that is to say, for their piety and religion. It is not merely this hope, however, but also and chiefly fear of dreadful punishments after death, by which they are induced to live according to the commands of divine law, that is to say, as far as their feebleness and impotent mind will permit, and if this hope and fear were not present to them, but if they

on the contrary believed that minds perish with the body, and that there is no prolongation of life for miserable creatures exhausted with the burden of their piety, they would return to ways of their own liking, they would prefer to let everything be controlled by their passions and to obey fortune rather than themselves [et fortunae potius quam sibi parere vellent] This seems to be as absurd as if a man because he does not believe that he will be able to feed his body with good food to all eternity, should desire to satiate himself with poisonous and deadly drugs, or as if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal he should therefore prefer to be mad and live without reason—absurdities so great that they can scarcely deserve to be repeated ”

Spinoza evidently is criticizing the all-too-common attitude toward religion with its stress upon the rewards of obedience such as riches and length of days and the punishment after death for a life of sin or disobedience. People generally do not seem to realize, he feels, that virtue is its own intrinsic reward and is its own end, and is not to be regarded as an extrinsic means to a non-virtuous life after death or as an escape from severe punishment.

Similarly Spinoza demonstrates (5-42) that “blessedness is not the reward of virtue but is virtue itself” (*beatitudo non est virtutis praemium sed ipsa virtus*). Blessedness or happiness is the joy or self-satisfaction arising from the contemplation of one’s virtue or power. Hence happiness is intrinsically bound up with the active life of virtue or self-determination. It is true that satisfaction of soul (*acquiescentia animi*) follows upon the consciousness of one’s actions, but this joy is not to be regarded as the end or final cause of virtue. Happiness or human felicity is nothing but the enjoyment of the life of virtue and it is therefore absurd to regard this joy as the reward of virtue. The two are intrinsically inseparable.

In both the above propositions Spinoza tries to show that the life of virtue is separable from belief in the immortality or eternity of the mind. His main assumption is that virtue is based on self-determination, upon actions of which man alone is the adequate cause, and that such self-determination

is inherently preferable to a life determined by external forces. Man's blessedness depends therefore as the Stoics held primarily upon himself, one delights in himself when he contemplates his own power of action. In this respect, Spinoza's position is contrary to that of the Scholastics who maintained that God alone was the source of His own happiness and that all other things depended upon Him as their *summum bonum*.

We have also seen, however, that Spinoza employs the notion of intuitive knowledge in the sense that God alone is the adequate cause of all human knowledge. Hence insofar as the human intellect conceives ideas intuitively through God, it conceives them *sub specie aeternitatis* as eternal truths in the mind of God. In like manner, it conceives itself intuitively as an eternal mode in the divine intellect. "Our mind," Spinoza writes (5-30) "insofar as it knows itself and the body *sub specie aeternitatis* necessarily has a knowledge of God and knows that it is in God and is conceived through Him." And again (5-31), "The third kind of knowledge depends upon the mind as its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal."

These passages make it clear that by its intuitive knowledge or vision the mind not only conceives eternal truths through the idea of God, but also conceives and feels itself to be eternal as well (5-23 schol.). The mind is partially at least immortal, as Aristotle also held, and therefore "cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body" (5-23). The extent of the mind's immortality depends upon the degree of perfection or intuitive knowledge which it acquires while existing in time. "Death," Spinoza demonstrates (5-38 schol.), "is by so much the less injurious to us as the clear and distinct knowledge of the mind is greater and consequently as the mind loves God more. Again, since from the third kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible satisfaction, it follows that it is possible for the human mind to be of such a nature that that part of it which we have shown perishes with the body, in comparison with the part of it which remains, is of no consequence." In this sense, it appears, immortality is the direct reward of virtue. The fact that the

human mind is an eternal mode in the divine intellect is no guarantee of its personal or individual immortality (2-8 corol.), that is something acquired in varying degrees through a life of contemplative virtue. Only insofar as the intellect knows eternal truths or ideas sub specie aeternitatis does it participate to some extent after death in the eternal, intellectual love of God for Himself, that is to say, in the glory or blessedness of God. Man's happiness or felicity is essentially or intrinsically united to that of God and hence it can neither be nor be conceived apart from the immortality of the intellect.

In other words, the mind's immortality is not merely extrinsically related to the life of virtue. It arises from no accident, to use a Spinozistic phrase (4-36 schol.), that virtue involves the eternity and immortality of the mind, since the superior power of intellectual love as compared with the passions consists primarily in the fact (5-20 schol.) that the object of intellectual love, namely, God, is eternal and infinitely perfect, whereas the objects of the passions are temporal and finite. That is to say, intellectual love is supreme because of the eternity and perfection of the object to which the mind is essentially united and in which it participates, in contrast with the mind's union with temporal, finite things which is extrinsic and accidental (see chap. v, § 6).

In the final scholium of the *Ethics* (5-42 schol.), Spinoza contrasts the life of the ignorant and the wise man and declares that the superiority of the latter consists in the consciousness of his eternal relations to God. "For the ignorant man," he counsels, "is not only agitated by external causes in many ways and never possesses true satisfaction of soul [nec unquam vera animi acquiescentia potitur], but lives also as it were unconscious of himself, and God and things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer ceases also to live. On the contrary, the wise man [sapiens] insofar as he is considered as such, is scarcely ever perturbed in his mind [animo moveatur], but being conscious by a certain eternal necessity of himself, of God and of things, never ceases to be and always possesses true satisfaction of soul." The wise man, it appears,

does not lead a life of virtue regardless of the eternity and immortality of his mind, in fact, his wisdom and happiness consist precisely in his intuitive love of God and in the knowledge of himself and other things as eternal modes in the mind of God

Spinoza's criticism, therefore, of "the common opinion of men" is too severe. They too feel as he does that the life of the soul does not cease with the death of the body and that virtue is somehow bound up with immortality. His only valid criticism can be directed at their notion of immortality and its relation to virtue. Thus in 5-34 scholium he admits. "If we look at the common opinion of men [*si ad hominum communem opinionem attendamus*], we shall see that they are indeed conscious [*conscios*] of the eternity of their minds, but they confound it with duration and attribute it to imagination and memory which they believe remain after death." Similarly his criticism is valid when he maintains that the relation between virtue and immortality is not extrinsic, as the many suppose. Virtue is not a burden to be borne for the sake of immortality. Virtue is its own reward in the sense that the mind acquires that degree of perfection worthy of immortality in accordance with its intuitive knowledge of nature and insofar as the intellectual love of God is expressed in common efforts to promote peace and the happiness of all men.

We conclude, therefore, that Spinoza has two distinct theories of the relation of virtue to immortality which in turn depend upon Stoic and Scholastic presuppositions. *Insofar as he follows in the Stoic tradition, the doctrine that "virtue is its own reward" means that the life of virtue is an end in itself and completeness of life as well as immortality is extrinsic to happiness. On the other hand, insofar as he follows in the Scholastic tradition of Maimonides and St. Thomas he regards immortality as a direct consequence or what is the same, a direct reward of intellectual virtue.* The degree of one's immortality depends intrinsically or essentially upon the degree of intellectual virtue attained throughout a complete life. Spinoza apparently did not realize the

essential conflict between the Stoic and Scholastic theories which he utilized

On the whole, it may be said that Spinoza, like the Stoics, is so concerned to identify himself with the divine order of nature that he is quite willing to adopt any philosophy of life which seems to be in accord with the facts, even though it be such as to render moral life meaningless. In practice, the principle that virtue is life in accord with nature, far from being a certain or absolute criterion of moral conduct, serves but to conceal human ignorance of God as well as man and may be utilized as a blanket justification for any type of conduct.

Anatole France in his novel *Thaïs* has made a poignant and dramatic criticism of the inhuman complacency and presumption of the Stoic attitude. In the story the Stoic Eucrites explains to the sceptic Nicias: "But if it were true that virtue were forever extinguished upon the earth, in what way would the loss of it affect my happiness, since it does not depend on me whether it existed or perished? Only fools place their happiness out of their power. I desire nothing that the gods do not wish and I desire all that they do wish. By that means I render myself like unto them and share their infallible consent. If virtue perishes I consent that it should perish and that consent fills me with joy as the supreme effort of my reason or my courage. In all things my wisdom will copy the divine wisdom and the copy will be more valuable than the model." Nicias: "I understand, you put yourself on the same level as divine providence. But if virtue consists only in effort, Eucrites, and in that intense application by which the disciples of Zeno pretend to render themselves equal to the gods, the frog which swelled itself out to try and become as big as the ox, accomplished a masterpiece of Stoicism." The Stoic readiness to "accept the universe" no matter what form it took, and to justify any occurrences by appeal to divine sanctions, tended to obscure the fact that there were different orders of nature to which one might conform. In like manner, Spinoza, having the advantage of historical perspective, attempted to identify the

principal insights of all the great traditions under this Stoic formula, without apparently realizing their conflicting natures

One great lesson, however, emerges from this detailed study and it is this Any adequate ethics or philosophy of life must concern itself with the fundamental and perennial issues which Spinoza raised Spinoza's greatness and vitality as a thinker which have made him a source of inspiration and a living force in the development of Western thought, lie primarily in the fact that he more than any previous thinker attempted to combine together all the great philosophical traditions If, as is the general theme of this study, his synthesis was not logically coherent, it should be remembered that no one has ever accomplished in systematic form what he failed to do If this study has made clear the fundamental issues involved in Spinoza's and therefore in any attempt to correlate these basic traditions, it will have accomplished its purpose

9 S ALEXANDER ON SPINOZA AND TIME

IN view of the difficulties arising from Spinoza's theory of time and eternity it will be instructive to compare his general philosophical outlook with that of the late Professor Samuel Alexander whose monumental volumes on *Space, Time and Deity* show marked Spinozistic influence Our task is facilitated by Professor Alexander's illuminating lecture on *Spinoza and Time*³ where he has analyzed the relation of his own evolutionary metaphysics to that of Spinoza and shown "what difference it would make to Spinoza's philosophy if we assign to time a position not allowed it by Spinoza himself"

Briefly put, Alexander like Bergson and Whitehead regards time, and not substance, as the fundamental metaphysical category This can be understood if we bear in mind two fundamental notions, namely, the evolutionary theory of Darwin and the electrical theory of matter arising from

³ S Alexander, *Spinoza and Time* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1927)

the researches of Faraday and Clerk Maxwell. As Alexander points out, according to the electrical theory, matter is regarded as essentially a process, a series of events, and so-called permanent things are nothing but "chunks of events." Time is indeed relative to things as the Scholastics held, but since all things are processes of events, it follows that time pertains to their very nature. Eternity is an abstraction from time and is nothing but time regarded as static or fixed. According to Alexander, the ultimate stuff of all things is space-time, that is, indeterminate matter which is essentially in process. By hyphenating space with time and endowing it with a *nisus* or Platonic *eîros* for creativity, Alexander like Whitehead believed he had an ultimate principle capable of originating the cosmic evolutionary process and the various levels of reality.

Alexander observes that Spinoza conceived motion and rest as infinite modes following immediately from the divine attribute of extension. This implies that substance conceived as extended is essentially dynamic. But activity and life involve change and change involves time. Hence Alexander reasons that motion can be conceived as an infinite mode of God's extension only if time is joined to extension.

On this basis, time would replace the Spinozistic attribute of thought which, for Alexander, is a product of space-time. The introduction of time as an essential attribute of reality would mean that the order of nature was intrinsically temporal. The various grades of reality or perfection conceived by Spinoza would not be a series of static forms but a hierarchy emerging in time.

Alexander realizes that space-time as conceived by him may not be identified with the God of Spinoza. The latter regards the absolutely perfect being as prior by nature to, and the efficient cause of, all finite forms of perfection. Alexander, on the other hand, regards the more perfect forms as caused by the less perfect levels of existence. Space-time is somehow endowed with a striving or *nisus* toward higher levels of existence. The *nisus* so understood is a transcendent direction of becoming, whereas the *conatus* of Spinoza is a principle of being which does not refer beyond itself.

Deity is the general term which Alexander applies to the higher unattained level of existence toward which any particular form of being is striving. Thus Life is Deity for matter striving to attain it and Mind or Thought is the Deity for the level of Life. For us humans who have attained the level of mind, Deity or God is the next highest stage toward which mind is striving, though we know not yet what it is. God in the absolute sense of the term is always the Great Unknown. God or the Deity toward which we strive is an ideal not yet realized, for if it were realized it would no longer be God for us. In this sense, God is a transcendent objective of worship and religion is the response we make to that *nus* for Deity.

By way of estimating the general relation of Spinoza's metaphysical outlook to contemporary process-philosophy we note that Alexander as well as Whitehead retains Spinoza's monism but substitutes a creative process, an indeterminate space-time flux for the substance or perfect being of Spinoza. Instead of beginning with a substance or fixed form of being which is the underlying source of all "apparent" processes, Alexander begins with an indeterminate creative process whose function it is to evolve the various levels or types of reality.

Both Alexander and Whitehead are opposed to Spinoza's doctrine of an absolutely infinite being which is the sum of perfection, though they differ in their objections. Whitehead, following Plato, maintains in his *Adventures of Ideas* (pp. 330, 375) that "all realization is finite and there is no perfection which is the infinitude of all perfection. . . all realization of the good is finite and necessarily excludes certain other types." For Whitehead, God in his "consequent nature" or insofar as He is completely actual and conscious is the harmony of those forms of perfection which have been realized at a given time. But since forms of perfection of diverse types are intrinsically discordant, it follows that the nature of God must be finite and contain only those forms of perfection which can be harmonized at the time. Hence God in His consequent nature is finite, transcendent, and subject to change in time. God, in Whitehead's phrase, is

always "in the making " For Alexander, on the other hand, an actual God, even though He be finite, is a contradiction in terms, since God or Deity is an unrealized ideal. In sum, *for Alexander, God is always becoming but never is, for Whitehead, God actually is but is always becoming something else* They both agree, however, that God insofar as He transcends nature, is a finite form of perfection and not infinite as Spinoza held

Again, for the evolutionists, the cosmic process is essentially temporal There is a transformation of forms such that a higher form of existence is evolved from a lower form According to Spinoza, however, the hierarchy of forms of being is the eternal order of nature, one form of perfection does not evolve from another, though it may be the efficient cause of a lower form On Spinoza's premises, the conatus or effort to maintain one's form of being would prevent any evolutionary or transformation process To cite Spinoza's example (4-pref), "a horse, for instance, would be as much destroyed if it were changed into a man, as if it were changed into an insect "

The crucial problem of contemporary as well as Spinoza's metaphysics is the relation between time and eternity If we begin, as Spinoza does, with a completely actual and infinite perfection, then the temporal process becomes illusory and meaningless On the other hand, if we begin with an indeterminate temporal process, then the notion of development or progress from lower to higher forms becomes unintelligible It is inconceivable how an indeterminate flux can evolve in a definite direction or toward a definite goal without some kind of final cause to direct the process, since otherwise the problem always remains why there are actual degrees of reality rather than none at all An adequate philosophy of nature must reconcile Spinoza's insight concerning the primacy of the most perfect being with modern evolutionary theory

XIV

ON SPINOZA AND MODERN PSYCHOLOGY

1 SPINOZA AS THE FOUNDER OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY

AS stated in our Introduction and in the first chapter, the originality of Spinoza's psychology of the emotions consists in his assertion that the soul is a spiritual automaton or mechanism. This point seems to have been overlooked by contemporary historians of psychology who are nevertheless careful to note that he originated the doctrine of psychophysical parallelism. What we, on the contrary, are concerned to stress is not so much the parallelism as the mechanism of mind as well as body. The significance of our contention can be best appreciated if one takes into consideration the development of modern psychology since the time of Hobbes and Descartes.

In his *Leviathan* Hobbes conceived all life as being nothing but matter in motion and hence regarded the human organism as essentially a physical automaton determined by the influence of external, mechanical forces. The mind, on this basis, was a sort of epiphenomenon, an appearance or reflection of the primary physical processes.

To Descartes who wrote before Hobbes belongs the credit of having made the first detailed application of the mechanical theory to the study of the human body and the nature of the emotions. In his treatise *On the Passions of the Soul* he describes the human body as if it were a machine subject to the laws of reflex motion. This physical automaton, he held, was joined to an autonomous, rational soul which had free will and was not therefore subject to the laws of the body, though it necessarily suffered passions through interaction with its body. In spite of Descartes's oft-repeated criticism of the Scholastics, his conception of the nature and auton-

omy of the soul differed but little from theirs. He differed from them significantly only as regards the relation between the body and the soul. For the Scholastics the soul was the principle of motion in the organism and determined the nature of all corporeal processes as well as the goal of development of the organism as a whole. For Descartes, on the other hand, the relation was one of interaction between a free soul and a purely mechanical body subject to the reflex laws of motion.

The importance of the Cartesian theory consists in the fact that it prepared the way for the science of physiology and physiological psychology. The theory that bodily processes were independent of the soul and conditioned the nature of the emotions marked a complete departure from Scholastic principles and was a leading influence in the development of a scientific study of human behavior.

Spinoza carried the doctrine of Descartes one important step further. Not only the body but also the mind, he maintained, is to be regarded as an automaton or mechanism. The mind like its body must be regarded as subject to natural laws. It is a mistake on the part of the Cartesians, he argued, to consider the mind or soul as free while the body is thought to be completely determined. The order and connection of physiological processes are identical with the order and connection of ideas or mental processes, they are one and the same thing conceived from different points of view or through different attributes of substance (2-7).

To Spinoza, therefore, belongs the credit of being the founder of the independent science of psychology, if by psychology be meant the investigation of the laws of mind, since he was the first to conceive the principle that mind and body were of equal status and that both alike were subject to necessary laws.

Spinoza's immediate successor, Leibnitz, appreciated the significance and originality of the former's thought. In place of Spinoza's double-aspect theory Leibnitz introduced the notion of preestablished harmony, according to which mind and body were regarded as independent of one another and acting according to definite laws of their own, but created

by God so as to agree or harmonize with one another, somewhat as two clocks. In his *Monadology* (§ 79) Leibnitz maintains with the Scholastics that the mind acts according to final causes, whereas the body acts as determined by efficient causes. That is to say, he agreed with Spinoza as against Descartes that there was no interaction between body and mind but he was opposed to Spinoza's principle that the mind also acted in conformity with the laws of efficient causes. This virtually meant that Leibnitz left the mystery of the interrelation of body and mind precisely where the Occasionalists had left it, even though he professed disagreement with the Occasionalist theory of divine intervention upon every occasion of experience.

In view of the historical evidence available, it is rather surprising to find that Professor Charles Spearman in his monumental volumes on *Psychology Down the Ages*¹ declares that there is no mention of laws of mind prior to the eighteenth century. Thus he writes (Vol. II, chap. xxvi, § 5) "What then has been the general attitude taken up towards scientific laws by the psychologists themselves? In the beginning and for a very long period, these too seem to have given the matter little or no consideration. Take Aristotle who anticipated modern thought so widely and so deeply and whose bent was so pre-eminently scientific. His main work on psychology seems to leave laws entirely out of account, and such an abstention would seem to continue not only through the middle ages but even into the Renaissance. In the work of Locke, for instance, laws . . . would appear to find no mention whatever. [§ 6] But a great change came over the scene about the middle of the eighteenth century. By such authors as Cumberland, Wolff, Hartley, Reid, and even Tetens, laws were not only mentioned but pushed to a front place. Clearly enough this movement was in emulation of the laws of physics which had just been propounded with extraordinary success by Newton. The movement persisted with all vigour throughout the nineteenth century.

¹ Charles Spearman, *Psychology Down the Ages* (London, Macmillan & Co., 1937), 2 vols. Reprinted by permission of the Macmillan Company, publishers.

Some prominent names were Herbart, Stewart, Hamilton, Bain, Volkmann, and Wundt. At the present day many psychologists continue the lines indicated by Hartley and others in the eighteenth century. This may be instanced by the work of Thorndike and his followers on the 'law of effect'. That and kindred laws play no small part in the universally popular text-book of Woodworth. On a much vaster scale have been the eighty or more laws propounded by Yerkes and J. S. Moore complains that even these are far too few."

According to Spearman, then, there is no mention of laws of mind prior to the eighteenth century when Associationist psychology was in vogue. I submit that an impartial examination of explicit statements in Spinoza's *Ethics* and unfinished treatise *On the Improvement of the Understanding* will provide ample evidence of the validity of Spinoza's claim to be considered as the originator of the theory of laws of mind. Professor Spearman seems to overlook the fact that the Associationist psychology of the eighteenth century was simply empiricism of the nominalistic type. For the Associationists the mind was not a dynamic entity with laws and activities of its own; it was rather something passive whose structure and content depended upon physical impressions and then accidental conjunction. On this premise there can be no laws which pertain to the mind alone since mind is not regarded as having any proper activity of its own. What distinguishes modern scientific psychology from the psychology of the eighteenth century is precisely the principle of determinate laws of mind subject to experimental investigation. *Looked at in true historical perspective, the development of modern psychology is not by way of Associationist psychology but rather around it.* The direct line of development of scientific psychology in the sense of psychophysical laws is from Spinoza and Leibnitz to Herbart, Johannes Muller, Weber, Fechner, and Wundt.

Those modern historians who, like Professor Murphy in his *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*,² are inclined to think that Spinoza "despite his position in philoso-

2 G. Murphy, *An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology* (London, Kegan Paul, 1932).

phy had strangely little influence upon psychologists" are simply ignoring the actual historical facts.

Johannes Muller's contributions to physiological psychology and in particular his theory of specific sense energy were based on the principle that the human organism must be treated as a whole in which specific physical processes are correlated with particular conscious experiences. In his epochal work on the *Physiology of Man* (1840) he drew attention to the scientific importance of Spinoza's psychology of the emotions and even went so far as to say (Vol II, Bk VI, § 3, p 543, German edition) that "with regard to the static relations of the emotions to one another, it is not possible to put forward anything better than what Spinoza with unexcelled mastery taught"

Weber applied the notion of psychophysical parallelism to the perception of weight. By experimental investigation he discovered what has since been universally recognized as Weber's Law, the principle, namely, that there is a determinate mathematical relation between the strength of the stimulus and the limen or threshold in the perception of differences. In his psychophysics Fechner generalized this law and applied it to the other senses. In this manner Spinoza's theory that mathematical method may be applied to mental phenomena was, partially at least, verified.

In the psychological laboratories originated by Wundt, psychology as an independent science based on experimental evidence was established. It is therefore instructive to note that he too based his doctrine of an independent science of psychology upon the postulate of the unity of body and mind. In his *Principles of Physiological Psychology*³ we find he writes (Introduction) "The division of vital processes into physical and psychical is useful and even necessary for the solution of scientific problems. We must, however, remember that the life of an organism is really one, complex it is true, but still unitary. We can therefore no more separate the processes of bodily life from conscious processes than we can mark off an outer experience mediated by sense percep-

³ W. Wundt, *Principles of Physiological Psychology*, translated by E. B. Titchener from the 5th German edition (London, Sonnenschein, 1904)

tion and oppose it, as something wholly separate and apart to what we call 'inner experience,' the events of our own consciousness." Wundt insists that "psychology is called upon to trace out the relations that obtain between conscious processes and certain phenomena of the physical life," but he warns us against "psychophysical materialism," the theory that all causation is primarily physical and that mental phenomena are states without causal efficacy of their own. "The assumption," he concludes, "that mental life lacks all causal connection and that the real and primary object of psychology is therefore not the mental life but the physical substrate of that life, this assertion stands self-condemned." Wundt did not wish to do away with introspection, all he aimed to do was to "make exact introspection possible" by controlling the conditions of experience. The mind as well as the body, he maintained, was capable of initiating activity according to definite laws. Psychology proper is the investigation of conscious processes and their modes of connection, it avails itself of the evidence of physiology only insofar as this is required for a knowledge of the physical conditions of these unique psychical experiences.

In Wundt as in Spinoza we find that the principle of the unity of body and mind is interpreted in two ways. Wundt begins by affirming that bodily processes are not to be separated from conscious experience. In practice, however, he like Spinoza tended to consider mental life apart from its relation to the body, as though the mind were an independent entity. In the work of Wundt's followers, notably in Titchener, the introspective method became dominant and this led to contrary movements such as Behaviorism and physiological psychology which denied or ignored the existence of mind.

We conclude from the above survey that Spinoza's psychophysical theory, far from being ignored, was in fact the major influence in the development of modern scientific psychology. The German psychologists of the nineteenth century (as well as the philosophers and theologians) appreciated fully the originality of his thought and were led thereby to investigate experimentally the laws of mental life.

They realized that the significance of Spinoza's psychology of the emotions lay in the fact that he considered the mind as an efficient, dynamic mechanism subject to universal laws of its own, and having a determinate relation to physiological processes This was an entirely new and seminal idea which opened up new domains for science to conquer

2 THE DYNAMIC AND STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF SPINOZA'S PSYCHOLOGY

IN an important monograph entitled "Associationism and Act Psychology" published in *The Psychologies of 1930*, Professor G S Brett surveys the development of modern psychology and observes two major trends. On the one hand there are those for whom "it seems axiomatic that the most important point is the growth and activity of the mind. The very datum of psychology is the unique kind of activity which constitutes a psychological event." On the other hand, there are those for whom "it is equally axiomatic that nothing is innate. The order of thought and the connection of ideas is a copy of the order and connection of objective events." Professor Brett concludes that neither position is open to refutation and that in the last analysis there is a measure of truth in each. In the following section we shall try to show that Spinoza attempted to fuse both theories and that this accounts for the contradictory nature of his thought.

The issue concerning the content and activity of the mind is, in truth, one that goes back to the conflict between Plato and Aristotle. For Plato the activity of "the intellect is autonomous and is in some way independent of sense-perception. The truth of the absolute ideas is something discovered by or revealed to the intellect alone. This is the significance of Plato's recourse to the poetic notion of reminiscence and innate knowledge as an explanation for the knowledge of truths supposedly not due to sense experience. For Aristotle, on the other hand, the knowledge of universals depends upon prior sense-experience. Knowledge is something acquired in time through experience of external

things. Through memory and imagination the mind combines its perceptions in various ways and this gives rise to universal notions and associations between particular ideas. Aristotle did not deny the creative activity of the intellect, but he did distinguish between passive understanding and the active reason. The understanding is passive in that it depends upon prior sense-perception, whereas the active intellect does not depend upon sensation and is therefore separable from the body. The active intellect is the formative, dynamic principle common to all human minds which acts upon the "matter" or content provided by the passive understanding.

In the subsequent history of psychology and epistemology the fusion of these two principles as found in Aristotle was destroyed. The empiricists stressed the temporal origin of knowledge and the mind's dependence upon its physical environment—a position maintained by the nominalists in the Middle Ages. The rationalists on the other hand emphasized the autonomy of the intellect and its creative function in conceiving universal truths—a position with which the medieval realists were in sympathy. In modern times we have the empirical-associationist tradition carried on by such writers as Hobbes, Hume, Hartley, Thomas Brown, James Mill, and Alexander Bain. Equally persistent has been the dynamic-activist tradition as maintained by Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Lotze, and Brentano.

The immense difficulty encountered in the interpretation of Spinoza is due, I believed, largely to the fact that he attempted to synthesize the empirical and rationalistic traditions without apparently realizing their contradictory nature. The conflict between the dynamic aspect of his psychology and the structural, associationistic tendency⁴ can

4 A good example of the conflicting, one-sided interpretations of Spinoza's psychology may be found in comparing J. H. Dunham's *Freedom and Purpose* (Princeton, Psych. Rev. Co., 1916) with a recent article by John M. Anderson in the *Journal of Philosophy* (Vol. XXXV, 1938) entitled "Change and Personality." The former stresses the dynamic aspect of Spinoza's psychology and the teleological nature of the conatus. Anderson, on the other hand, complains that Spinoza had only a mechanistic theory of human personality and that he had no appreciation of the dynamic nature

be best appreciated when approached from the point of view of the body-mind problem

We have seen that the most original aspect of Spinoza's psychological thought is his theory of the parallel nature of body and mind. This parallelism may mean either of two things: it may mean in the first place that neither body nor mind is to be studied independently since they are both aspects of the same organism; it means secondly that mind and body are to be conceived through themselves alone and without reference to one another. Spinoza in fact utilizes both meanings of the "identity" of body and mind according to his requirements.

In practice, however, he does not carry out his professed parallelism, sometimes the body and at other times the mind is given the primary or dominant position. Thus we find he defines the mind as nothing more than the idea of its body (2-13). That is to say, the mind or self as known empirically is not a distinct entity with a unity of its own; it is, rather, a complex combination of many ideas referring to the various parts of the human body (2-15). Spinoza in fact actually reverts to the theory of Hobbes and the materialists in general, according to whom the mind is but the passive reflector of the prior corporeal changes. The mind cannot be studied by itself; all its contents depend upon the nature of the body to which it refers. Epistemologically, the primacy of the body over the mind means that all perception is inadequate or confused knowledge, since all perception and imagination are due to the interaction of an external body with the human body (see chap. 1, § 3). In like manner the character of different individuals varies with the nature of their experiences.

On the other hand, following the Scholastics, he acknowledges the activity of the intellect and its independence of the body. The intellect is the adequate cause of its adequate ideas. That is to say, intellectual intuitions or conceptions depend upon the mind alone and do not require the media-

of human conduct and the autonomous forces of the mind. Our thesis throughout is that both theories are to be found in Spinoza—a fact which renders his thought at once so rich and so baffling.

tion of sense perception The intellect immediately or directly conceives the true essence of an idea and the properties which follow from it, e g , the idea of God and simple mathematical truths are conceived intuitively.

When we examine his theory of the emotions the same conflict appears Insofar as he stresses the dynamic conception of the individual then the notion of the conatus becomes of primary importance The conatus he regards as the essence of a thing and thus consists in its power of acting and existing All things are by nature efficient forces In physics, the conatus of a thing is shown by its inertia, by the Galilean law that any body will continue in motion or rest indefinitely unless prevented from doing so by some external force In biology the conatus of an organism is its effort or appetite to act and continue in existence indefinitely In psychology, the conatus of the mind is shown by its endeavor or desire to perceive and conceive as many ideas as possible With reference to the emotions in particular, desire is said to be prior to the affects of joy and sorrow An individual is said to feel joy or pleasure when an object assists his effort to live, he feels pain or sorrow when something hinders this desire That is to say, the affects of pleasure and pain follow from, and are conditioned by, the desire of the individual

On the other hand, insofar as Spinoza regards the mind as the passive idea of its body which is determined for acting and existence by external forces, then he tends to conceive pleasure and pain as passions prior to desire (see chap. in, §§ 3, 4) An individual is moved to desire something because he has previously been affected with pleasure, he avoids something because he has been affected with pain The passion of desire and aversion is nothing but the last motion produced by some external object This conflict between the dynamic and passive conceptions of desire is to be found throughout the *Ethics*

On the intellectual level the same difficulties appear Spinoza, as we have noted, contrasts the activity of the intellect with the passivity of the body and imagination (see chap. i, § 3) All affects which originate in the intellect are actions, those which originate in the imagination are passions The

conatus of man, his will to live, is best expressed through those emotions of joy and desire which are actions and follow from the innate power of the intellect (*intelligendi conatus*). Insofar as the activity of the intellect is identified with the will to live, it should follow that the intellect is by nature a free or self-determined cause. But Spinoza refuses to draw this inference, though he does speak of the free man (*homo liber*). Instead he regards the intellect as nothing but a name for the sequence of ideas which determine one another. There is no general will or intellect, there are only particular ideas or volitions which are determined by one another and hence there cannot be such a thing as a free or self-determined will (see chap. III, § 7, 8).

To conclude. The significance of Spinoza's theory of the emotions consists in the fact that he anticipated the major trends of modern psychology. His theory of the parallelism of body and mind and the idea that there are laws of mind led to the psychophysical experiments of Johannes Müller, Weber, Fechner, Wundt, and Titchener. The theory that the essence of mind and body consists in active conation finds its counterpart in the hormic psychology of McDougall and the biological speculations of Lloyd Morgan. The doctrine that emotions and ideas are active forces which assist or oppose one another and that contrary emotions are frequently due to the presence and absence of the same cause finds its modern consummation in psychoanalytic theory though, as said, Spinoza himself did not have the notion of the unconscious. Furthermore, Spinoza's tendency to regard the body as primary and the mind as secondary or dependent is represented in modern psychology by the physiological psychology of Lashley and Dodge. Finally his explanation of sleep-walking as due to the body alone is close to the Behaviorism of John Watson.

Historians of philosophy and psychology alike have largely failed to appreciate the many-sided contributions of Spinoza's psychology because they regarded him as primarily a metaphysician and not as he actually was and considered himself to be, namely, a psychologist and moralist concerned to analyze the laws and efficient causes of human

behavior. Spinoza more than any of his predecessors realized the futility of abusing men for their vices or their failure to follow high ideals so long as they have neither the power nor the means to act otherwise. Human nature, like nature as a whole, must first be adequately understood and obeyed before it can be commanded or controlled—an insight which Spinoza may have derived partially from Francis Bacon and applied to the study of human nature. Not, as Kant said, "thou canst because thou oughtest" but rather, "thou oughtest because thou canst," is the guiding principle of his *Ethics* and Psychology.

3 SPINOZA AND THE JAMES-LANGE THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS

A PARTICULARLY striking instance of Spinoza's anticipation of modern psychology may be found in the James-Lange theory of the emotions. The latter theory, like that of Spinoza, rests on the assumption that the mind perceives only the affects produced in its body by external mechanical forces and that the conscious feelings are dependent upon these prior corporeal changes. A brief analysis of the statements of James and Lange will serve to substantiate this claim. (See also chap. III, § 6.)

William James in a paper published in *Mind* during 1884 on "What is an Emotion" and the Danish physician Georg Lange in an independent monograph published in 1885 propounded the theory which has become a classic of modern psychology. Contrary to the usual common-sense notion that the mental state precedes the physical expression, they claimed that physiological evidence proves that physical change in the body actually precedes the mental feelings. Thus James in his usual graphic style writes (*Mind*, 1884) "Our natural way of thinking about these standard emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact and that our feeling of the same

changes as they occur is the emotion . . . Common sense says that we lose our fortune, are sorry, weep. We meet a bear, are frightened, and run, we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says, that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble and not that we cry, strike or tremble because we are sorry, angry or fearful as the case may be." In brief, the mental feeling always follows the physical change and bodily expression and not vice versa. There is no need to introduce a distinct mental emotion preceding the physical expression.

James and Lange justified their theory in terms of physiological mechanics. A mental emotion is primarily the consciousness of the reflex, organic effects produced by the exciting object to which the human body or nervous system is naturally adapted. All conventional stimuli of civilized society owe their effects to association with natural stimuli. In this way, the final intent or "animus" of another person's activities may give rise to an emotion. The organism is as it were a sounding-board which reverberates with any change of perception. "There is no shade of emotion," James believes, "without a bodily reverberation as unique as the mental mood itself" (*Principles of Psychology*, chap. xxv).

Lange adduced as evidence for the physical origin of the emotions the fact that so-called mental emotions may be produced by drugs, such as alcohol and potassium bromide. There is no way, he points out, of differentiating between an emotion of "mental" and one of physical origin. Similarly pathological cases of morbid fear have no appropriate external cause, and yet have all the symptoms of those produced by actual situations.

There is the further fact, James points out, that it is possible to work oneself up into a frenzy of feeling through gesticulation, or imitation of another's features. Any voluntary arousal of the expression of a given emotion produces the corresponding feeling. And so James lays it down as a

moral precept that "if we wish to conquer undesirable emotional tendencies in ourselves, we must assiduously and in the first instance cold-bloodedly go through the outward motions of those contrary dispositions we prefer to cultivate" The expression produces the mental state, the mental feeling is not the cause of the organic change In the last analysis, to disprove the hypothesis, James suggests one would require some instance of a patient afflicted with total corporeal anaesthesia to see if it be possible to go through expressions without feeling an emotion

It is particularly instructive to observe that Lange in the notes to his monograph (as edited by Knight Dunlap) ⁵ acknowledges that Spinoza's doctrine comes closest to his own He writes "I do not know whether a similar conception of the nature of the affections has ever been made before At least there are no records of it in scientific physiology Spinoza approaches most closely insofar as he does not make the bodily phenomena in affections dependent upon mental activity, but in that he places them in the same plane as the latter, as is evident from his definition But he pursues the problem no further" Lange finds that Spinoza's definition of pleasure, namely, that it is "the transition from a less to a greater perfection" is, to quote his words, "purely nominal" Yet Lange himself describes joy or pleasure in the sense intended by Spinoza The former writes "In the case of joy, a heightening of the functions of the voluntary motor apparatus takes place The heightening functions of the voluntary muscles and nerves cause the feeling of lightness of joy, such as anyone experiences whose muscles are strong and unfatigued He feels an increased motor impulse, moves swiftly and alertly and gesticulates violently The most striking characteristic in the physiology and also in the physiognomy of sorrow is its inhibitory effect upon the voluntary motor apparatus" One can hardly blame Lange who, after all, was no philosopher for not comprehending the significance of Spinoza's definitions of these

5 G Lange and W James, *The Emotions*, edited by Knight Dunlap (Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins Co, 1922) Reprinted by permission of the Williams & Wilkins Company, Baltimore

affects, though they are actually identical with his own. Spinoza, as noted often, uses perfection in the sense of power of existing or vitality and hence joy for him is precisely that increase or heightening of motor functions to which Lange refers

I repeat, then, that the main features of the James-Lange theory of the emotions are to be found in Spinoza as also in Hobbes. Both James and Lange were medical men and their theory grew out of observation of pathological cases and clinical physiology. Historically they drew their inspiration from Darwin's work on the origin of the emotions. From a philosophical point of view, however, their theory is mechanistic—though James kept an open mind as to the possibility of intellectual emotions—and in this respect they were essentially in agreement with the seventeenth-century mechanists who also acknowledged the primacy of the material, efficient cause.

4 THE METAPSYCHOLOGY OF SPINOZA AND FREUD

IN view of the basic similarity of Spinoza's mechanistic theory to the James-Lange theory of the emotions, it is highly instructive to take note of the fact that some modern scholars have attempted to show that Spinoza's theory of the emotions is essentially similar to the psychoanalytic theory of Freud which is contrary to that of James. On the basis of our thesis that there is an essential conflict between the mechanistic and dynamic aspects of Spinoza's psychology we can account for some similarity between the Freudian and Spinozistic theories without going to the extreme of maintaining that Spinoza's psychology is essentially Freudian. If one examines logically the premises of Spinoza's metaphysics it becomes evident that the differences between the metapsychology of Spinoza and Freud are far greater than their agreements.

The most significant fact about Spinoza's metaphysics of the emotions is his psychophysical determinism. Since all things are but modes of the divine nature or substance it follows that all things whether mental or physical are sub-

ject to law and order and that there is no intrinsically irrational principle such as the Indeterminate Boundless or Receptacle of which Plato speaks in the *Timæus*. With reference to the emotions in particular this means that there is a definite logic of the emotions, a necessary order and connection which may be conceived by reason—a doctrine in which Spinoza anticipated Freud. The emotions are not irrational forces acting contingently as Plato and Aristotle thought, on the contrary, the emotions are determinate, efficient forces whose power and particular associations can be deduced with geometric accuracy.

The central concept of Spinoza's psychology is the notion of the *conatus* (see chap. III, also chap. XIV, § 2). This *conatus* which is identical with the power of acting and existing of anything pertains to God as well as man. Spinoza's theory is, as he admits (1-33 schol. 2), close to Voluntarism in this respect since the *conatus* is the will conceived as determined by itself alone and not as subject to any final cause or idea of the good. So understood, *the conatus is primarily the principle of inertia, that in virtue of which a thing endeavors to maintain indefinitely its nature or status quo*. Stated in biological terms it means the force of self-preservation. Spinoza, however, also uses the *conatus* as the principle of plenitude or self-expression, as that which determines a thing to manifest its potentialities. *Whatever is in the power of God or man necessarily exists* (1-35). This use of the term *conatus* involves implicit reference to an immanent final cause, though Spinoza himself does not seem to be aware of this.

The significance of the role of the *conatus* in Spinoza's psychology and metaphysics can be best appreciated in contrast with the pantheism of the Vedanta philosophy of India. Spinoza like Plato in the *Timæus* makes creation of finite things an essential expression of the divine perfection of power. The Hindus on the contrary regard cosmic creation as an illusion (*maya*) due to some kind of ignorance (*avidya*) and hence as a mark of imperfection. For Spinoza as for the Vedanta philosophy the real is the infinite, and to this extent they differ from Plato and Aristotle for whom

the real is the finite or formal and the infinite is the formless or indeterminate Spinoza however is in agreement with the Western tradition of naturalism in maintaining that creation and self-expression are inherently good and a mark of perfection, whereas the Hindus tend to regard creativity and the fulfilment of desire as essentially evil and a mark of imperfection

From Spinoza's theory of the conatus one important consequence follows, namely, that death is always due to an external cause and never to an internal one (See Note 1, p 404) The conatus or formal essence of a thing is a positive force whose idea or mind logically affirms its existence and never negates it (3-4) That is why he insists that so-called suicide is never voluntary or internal (see chap iv, § 3), suicide is always due to some passion or disease of the mind brought about by the external forces of nature A truly free man (4-67) who is guided by reason "thinks of nothing less than of death and his wisdom is not a meditation upon death but upon life"

It is no accident that Spinoza in his definitions of the emotions failed to provide a contrary for desire, the fact is that his monistic conception of human nature prevented him from doing so That is why he does not consider aggression as a positive force in its own right, he includes it rather under the conatus as the special form which the latter takes to combat those things which produce pain and threaten the continuation of its existence (chap v, § 8) Aversion, which the Scholastics contrasted with desire, he opposes to inclination (chap. v, § 7) which is a mode of pleasure The only true contraries are modes of pleasure and pain.

Spinoza is careful to point out that any given affect of pleasure or pain may be due to either a positive or negative cause For example, pain may be due to an object which decreases the perfection or vitality of the individual through its direct effects upon his body It may also occur through the imagination of some good which the individual regards as lacking Similarly pleasure may be due either to some positive stimulus or to the absence of some evil From this Spinoza deduces that contrary affects of pleasure and pain

may be due to one and the same object—pleasure when it is present, pain when it is absent (see chap vii, § 1) Thus he remarks (4-32 schol) - "We see also that from the same property of human nature from which it follows that men pity one another, it also follows that they are envious and ambitious" (see also 3-35 schol)

The same principle of explanation is carried over to the modes of desire. An object which is the source of desire when it is present may give rise to professed aggression and abuse when it is absent. In modern terminology, frustration of desire may give rise to aggression, at least in verbal form. The professed aversion to the given object when absent should not be taken at its face value as an indication of that individual's normal attitude in the presence of that object. Human character is to be judged by one's positive desires—not by one's aversions and negations. Spinoza is explicit on this point (3-def 29 explan) - "These affects, humility and despondency, are very rare, for human nature considered in itself, struggles against them as much as it can and hence those who have the most credit for being abject and humble are generally the most ambitious and envious." An excess of sorrow and humility, in other words, is generally due to an unfulfilled desire which continues to occupy the mind even though it is not openly professed. In a later passage, the same point is illustrated in more detail (3-def 48 explan) - "For the avaricious man generally desires to swallow as much meat and drink as he can, provided only it belongs to another. The timid man too does what he does not will, and although, in order to avoid death, he may throw his riches into the sea, he remains avaricious, nor does the lascivious man cease to be lascivious because he is sorry that he cannot gratify his desire. Absolutely, therefore, these affects have reference not so much to the acts themselves of eating and drinking as to the appetite and love itself." And finally he observes (5-10 schol) - "Indeed it is certain that those who covet glory the most are loudest in declaiming against its abuse and the vanity of the world. Nor is this a peculiarity of the ambitious, but is common to all to whom fortune is adverse and who are impotent in mind, for we see

that a poor and avaricious man is never weary of speaking about the abuse of money and the vices of the rich, thereby achieving nothing save to torment himself, and show others that he is unable to bear with equanimity not only his own poverty but also the wealth of others. So also a man who has not been well received by his mistress thinks of nothing but the fickleness of women, their faithlessness, and their oft-proclaimed failings—all of which he forgets as soon as he is taken into favour by his mistress again." These examples show clearly how Spinoza explains what appear to be contrary attitudes of mind as in reality positive and negative expressions of one and the same desire. One rationalizes his frustration into a virtue.

Spinoza, it would appear, has anticipated the Freudian doctrine of "the ambivalence of the emotions," though of course he had no comprehension of its application to neuroses. It should be noted, however, that the conflict of desires is for Freud a conflict between a conscious prohibition or aversion and an unconscious desire, whereas for Spinoza the conflict is entirely on the conscious level (see Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, p. 830, Modern Library edition).

A further characteristic of Spinoza's psychology of the emotions deserves to be mentioned and that is the secondary role of the affect of love. For the Greeks and Scholastics love or eros was the primary emotion which determined all desire and motion toward a given end or final cause (see chap. II, § 1, chap. III, § 2). Spinoza, on the other hand, regards love simply as a mode of pleasure accompanied with the idea of some external cause (chap. V, § 3). That is to say, love is not a direct expression of the essence of man or of his conatus to live, as it is for Schopenhauer and Freud.

Spinoza, however, does define libido or sexual love as a mode of desire (3-def. 48). Libido is a particular expression of the conatus and varies with the nature of the individual so affected. Thus he writes (3-57 schol.) "Hence it follows that the affects of animals which are called irrational differ from human affects as much as the nature of a brute differs from that of a man. Both the man and the horse, for example, are swayed by lust [libido] to propa-

gate, but the horse is swayed by equine lust and the man by that which is human. The lust and appetites of insects, fishes and birds must vary in the same way, and so although each individual lives contented with its own nature and delights in it, nevertheless the life with which it is contented and the joy are nothing but the idea or soul of that individual and so the joy of one differs in character from the joy of the other as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other." Here we see that Spinoza describes libido in teleological terms as an impulse toward an individual of the opposite sex similar in nature or species. He does not, however, identify libido with the conatus of the individual, libido is but one among many passions of desire. Freud, on the other hand, tends to regard all desires as essentially sexual or erotic, hence he uses the term "sublimation" to indicate the evolutionary origin of higher from lower desires. Jung's position is similar to Spinoza's insofar as the former regards sexual energy as but one factor in desire; but Jung's identification of all psychic energy with libido is not Spinozistic.

Furthermore we should bear in mind in estimating the significance of Spinoza's theory of the emotions that he had no notion of the unconscious as an independent mental force determining human behavior. He defined the mind as the idea of its body and was careful to demonstrate that the mind was necessarily conscious of all that occurred in its body (2-12, 13). Memory he defined purely in physical terms and appeared to have no notion of latent psychic energy (2-17, 18). In fact, so far as the passions were concerned, Spinoza actually maintained that the corporeal processes were primary and that the mental affects simply reflected or affirmed the physical changes which had occurred. When confronted with the facts of sleep-walking and other forms of behavior of which the individual is not conscious, he attempted to explain them, following Descartes, as due to the body alone and as having no relation to the mind at all. Thus he writes (3-2 schol.) "For what the body can do no one has hitherto determined, that is to say, experience has taught no one hitherto what the body without

being determined by the mind can do and what it cannot do from the laws of its nature alone, insofar as nature is considered merely as corporeal. No one as yet has understood the structure of the body so accurately as to be able to explain all its functions, not to mention the fact that many things are observed in brutes which far surpass human sagacity and that sleep walkers in their sleep do very many things which they dare not do when awake, all this showing that the body itself can do many things from the laws of its nature alone at which the mind belonging to that body is amazed." Here we see Spinoza speaks like a modern behaviorist and explains animal functions and unconscious acts purely in corporeal terms. For Spinoza, it appears, the mental was identical with the conscious and all unconscious behavior was attributed to the body acting independently of its mind. (See Note 2, p. 404.) All conflict between ideas, whether clear or confused, was always on the level of consciousness. It is true that insofar as Spinoza conceives the human mind as nothing but a collection of ideas, he does speak of the determination of ideas by one another even where the mind is ignorant of such mental causes (3-2 schol.) and this would imply the notion of unconscious ideas. The fact remains, however, that he nowhere makes use of the unconscious as a mental force in conflict with conscious ideas.

It is highly interesting to note in this connection that Spinoza was inclined to explain insanity and other mental abnormalities in physical terms as due to radical changes in the constitution of the body. Thus he writes (4-39 schol.) "Here I observe merely that I understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed as to acquire a different proportion of motion and rest to each other. For I dare not deny that the human body, though the circulation of the blood and the other things by means of which it is thought to live be preserved, may, nevertheless, be changed into another nature altogether different from its own. No reason compels me to affirm that the body never dies unless it is changed into a corpse. Experience, indeed, seems to teach the contrary. It happens sometimes that a man undergoes

such changes that he cannot very well be said to be the same man, as was the case with a certain Spanish poet of whom I have heard, who was seized with an illness, and although he recovered, remained, nevertheless, so oblivious of his past life that he did not believe the tales and tragedies he had composed were his own, and he might, indeed, have been taken for a grown-up child if he had also forgotten his native tongue. But if this seems incredible, what shall we say of children? The man of mature years believes the nature of children to be so different from his own, that it would be impossible to persuade him he had ever been a child, if he did not conjecture regarding himself from what he sees of others. But in order to avoid giving to the superstitious matter for new questions, I prefer to go no further in the discussion of these matters." *The notion that insanity or forgetfulness might be due to mental causes or that an unconscious was in any way involved did not occur to Spinoza. As he saw it, mental disease was essentially neurological and physiological in origin.*

On the other hand, it is clearly evident to the student of Spinoza's *Ethics* that the conscious life of reason was the ultimate force which determined human behavior (see chap. viii). Like Descartes, Spinoza concludes that reason is competent to control the passions simply by joining the affects to adequate instead of confused, inadequate ideas. The active rational emotion then destroys the mechanical, physical passion. This doctrine, as we noted in our discussion of the control of the emotions (chap. viii), is obviously inconsistent with his psychophysical parallelism according to which one passion can be conquered only by another and stronger passion. In this respect the difficulties of Spinoza's metapsychology are, as we shall show, quite similar to those of Freud who also maintains the ultimate primacy of reason though he too cannot logically account for this rational autonomy.

Finally, it should be remembered that Spinoza's philosophy is essentially a religious one. From the temporal point of view the conatus of man expresses itself teleologically in the efforts he makes to acquire a maximum of perfection or reality. Happiness consists in the enjoyment of complete

physical and intellectual virtue or power. From the eternal point of view, happiness or blessedness consists in the liberation from the body and in the enjoyment of intellectual being as part of the infinite intellect of God. The temporal process of living, Spinoza is careful to stress, is an end in itself, even though it is also a means to eternal life as well. Temporal death ushers in eternal life—a doctrine which Spinoza holds in common with all the great religious traditions. In this respect also Spinoza's philosophy differs radically from the evolutionary, materialistic philosophy of Freud for whom life is but an accidental form of lifeless matter and death marks the complete annihilation of the individual. (See Note 3, p. 405) Spinoza summarizes his philosophy of temporal and eternal life at the conclusion of his *Ethics* (5-42 schol.) where he writes "The wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is scarcely ever moved in his mind but being conscious by a certain eternal necessity of himself, of God and of things, never ceases to be and always enjoys true peace of soul."

Turning to Freud we find that he was led to postulate an unconscious mental force in order to explain the origin and cure of neuroses. In his *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (chap. 11) he remarks "We call a process unconscious when we have to assume that it was active at a certain time although at that time we knew nothing about it." The unconscious is essentially irrational, it is an autonomous conative force in conflict with the conscious forces of the mind. In the history of philosophy Schopenhauer's theory of the cosmic, unconscious will approximates Freud's position most closely but the application of the concept to mental therapy is undoubtedly original with Freud.

The latter distinguishes between two kinds of unconscious. There is first that which was once conscious in the lifetime of the individual but has since been repressed, and secondly, there is an unconscious which is innate and inherited. In both cases Freud utilizes the evolutionary method of explanation, interpreting the present phenomenon in terms of the primitive, efficient causes involved. The repressed uncon-

scious is taken to involve memories of the first few years of infancy and childhood, while the innate unconscious is described in terms of racial memories. In both cases unconscious behavior involves reference to, if not repetition of, something which occurred in the past

In order to account for the evolution of life in general and unconscious, instinctive behavior in particular, Freud has recourse to a materialistic theory of development. We must assume, he believes, that all determinate forms of life somehow originated from lifeless matter. An instinct he then defines as "a tendency innate in living organic matter impelling it towards the re-establishment of an earlier condition" (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*)⁶ All instincts, that is to say, though they appear as forces for the maintenance of life are in reality death-forces—a position which is the exact contrary of the Spinozistic doctrine. Freud states his argument most clearly in the following passage (*New Introductory Lectures* pp 146–147)⁷ "If it is true that once in an inconceivably remote past and in an unimaginable way life arose out of inanimate matter, then, in accord with our hypothesis an instinct must at that time have come into being whose aim it was to abolish life once more and to re-establish the inorganic state of things. If in this instinct we recognize the impulse to self-destruction of our hypothesis, then we can regard that impulse as the manifestation of a death-instinct which can never be absent in any vital process." And again "If we may assume as an experience admitting of no exception that everything living dies from causes within itself and returns to the inorganic, we can say 'the goal of all life is death' and casting back, 'the inanimate was there before the animate'." (See Note 4, p 405)

Santayana lauds the originality of Freud's theory of the regressive nature of instincts⁸ and in his essay entitled "A

6 S Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, translated by C J M Hubback (The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1922)

7 S Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, translated by W J H Sprott (New York, W W Norton & Co, 1933) Reprinted by permission of W W Norton & Company, Inc, New York

8 G Santayana, *Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1933)

Long Way Round to Nirvana" describes it graphically. "Something let us call it matter must always have existed and some of its parts must have got tied up into knots like the mainspring of a watch in such a violent and unhappy manner that when the pressure is relaxed they fly open as fast as they can and unravel themselves with a vast sense of relief. Hence the longing to satisfy latent passions with the fugitive pleasure in doing so."

Although, as it appears, all instincts have but one aim, namely, the reduction to an indeterminate state of matter, Freud nevertheless distinguishes two basic instincts, the eros instinct which is the love-life impulse and the death instinct properly so-called which manifests itself in violent self-destruction and in aggression toward others. In his clinical practice Freud's attention was drawn to cases of sadism and masochism and concluded that there must be an innate impulse to destruction of oneself (which is subsequently directed toward others) contrary to the positive eros or life instinct (See Note 5, p 406)

Freud acknowledges that his philosophy is quite similar to that of Schopenhauer in this respect. He writes (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p 63) "And we cannot disguise another fact from ourselves, that we have steered unawares into the haven of Schopenhauer's philosophy for whom death is the real result of life while the sexual instinct is the incarnation of the will to live." In his later *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* Freud returns to the same subject and is there careful to point out that his metapsychological position is different from that of Schopenhauer, since the latter really has only one instinct, namely, the will to life. The negation of the will is not a positive force of aggression as it is in Freud—even suicide is a mode of self-assertion—but rather the absence of will which is equivalent to a kind of passive resistance to life. Freud, on the other hand, maintains that the organism is impelled by two distinct and contrary instincts neither of which may be reduced to the other. Thus he writes (p 147) "And besides, what we have said is not even true of Schopenhauer. We do not assert that death is the only aim of life, we do not overlook

the presence of life by the side of death. We recognize two fundamental instincts and ascribe to each of them its own aim.

[p 148] The question whether all instincts without exception do not possess a conservative character, whether the erotic instincts also do not seek the re-instatement of an earlier state of things, when they strive towards the synthesis of living substance into larger wholes—this question too must be left unanswered " (See Note 6, p. 406.)

This passage is important because it draws attention to the basic difficulty of the Freudian metapsychology. On the one hand, as we have seen, his theory of the regressive nature of all instincts logically leads him to maintain a philosophy of death, such that even the eros impulse is nothing but a roundabout way to death. There is no inherent impulse making for the evolution of more perfect forms of life as Bergson and S. Alexander maintain. Contrary to the latter writers he says explicitly "The existence of a general impulse towards higher development in the plant and animal world can certainly not be established though some such line of development is a fact unquestionable . . . But I do not believe in the existence of such an inner impulse and I see no way of preserving this pleasing illusion . . . The restless striving toward perfection which may be observed in a minority of human beings is easily explainable as the result of that repression of instinct upon which what is most valuable in human culture is built" (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 51-52). For Freud the impulse to life and the development of higher forms of perfection are an accident due to external causes, only the impulse to death is natural and internal—a position which is radically contrary to the Spinozistic doctrine which attributes death to external causes and life to internal impulse.

On the other hand, in his later work Freud is apparently having some misgivings concerning the monistic aim of all instincts and is more inclined to adopt a dualistic theory in which the eros impulse is opposed to the death instinct. The two principles are conceived as constantly in conflict with one another. All evolution of life and culture is brought about through the negation or suppression of the aggressive

impulses—a conclusion which is the opposite of Schopenhauer's who held that the negation of life is the ultimate good. Freud assumes that the eros instinct retains the enforced changes as sources of pleasure and that the aggressive instinct becomes subservient to the life-force. In brief, he regards eros as dominant or as capable of becoming dominant in human life, and agrees with the optimistic evolutionists that the force of life is progressive rather than regressive.

The difficulties in Freud's metapsychology are parallel to those found in Spinoza's theory of the conatus because the issues in both cases are quite similar. *Spinoza, as we have seen, also begins with the notion that the conatus is the force of inertia, though he differs from Freud in regarding it as the inertia of life rather than of death.* But then, in order to account for effort to acquire a maximum of perfection and the normative ideals which regulate human conduct, he finds it necessary to maintain that the conatus not only preserves life but also enforces and continues all affects of pleasure and desire which by definition involve a transition to a greater form of perfection. On the intellectual level, the conatus of the intellect is specifically directed toward the knowledge and love of God, which implies that it is essentially teleological and progressive rather than inertial and opposed to change (see chap. xiii). (See Note 7, p. 407.)

The equivocal nature of Freud's theory of the instincts can be further illustrated by reference to the repetition-compulsion tendency which he mentions (*New Introductory Lectures*, p. 145). He notes that the human embryo tends to pass through the various stages of phylogenetic development and that animal organisms have the capacity to form fresh organs which have been lost. This conservative tendency, he believes, is indicative of the regressive character of instincts. Freud, it appears, fails to distinguish between a conservative and reactionary. The tendency of some organisms to restore lost organs is evidence of a conservative impulse akin to the Spinozistic conatus; it is a force for the conservation of life. But repetition in the sense of a return to more primitive forms of life involves a perverse eros which

is contrary to the progressive eros which makes evolution possible

Applying the evolutionary method of explanation to the instincts, Freud traces the various forms assumed by the eros and death impulses. From a metaphysical, cosmic point of view the eros is the impulse to unity, determinateness, and order, death is the tendency to indeterminateness, chaos, and separation—a dualism quite similar to the cosmic love and hate of which Empedocles first spoke. As Freud puts it (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 79) "The sexual instinct became for us transformed into the eros that endeavours to impel the separate parts of living matter to one another and to hold them together." And again "Thus the libido of our sexual instincts would coincide with the eros of poets and philosophers which holds together all living things" (*ibid.*, p. 64).

On the human level, eros or libido is essentially a certain quantum of sexual energy with which is associated the impulse of self-preservation and all forms of organic pleasure. At the infant stage this sexual pleasure is oral and anal, that is to say, the infant derives pleasure narcissistically from its own body. At puberty sexual pleasure enters the phallic phase which later in the adolescent stage manifests itself as an attachment toward some person of the opposite sex. With intellectual development this essentially sensual love becomes sublimated or idealized into the love of artistic creation, social unity, and preoccupation with intellectual and moral ideals. The important point to notice here is that for Freud all love is originally narcissistic or self-love which in time becomes transferred to external objects or transformed into the narcissistic love of artistic creation. Freud even goes so far as to explain mysticism as practised by the Yogi in terms of "limitless narcissism." The feeling of unity with the all is but a return to the primitive feeling whereby the ego includes everything (*Civilization and its Discontents*, p. 21).⁹ For Freud the individual ego is the most real thing and self-love is primary—a position which is the exact an-

⁹ S. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, translated by Joan Riviere (New York, J. Cape and Smith, 1930). Quotations reprinted by permission of The Hogarth Press, London.

tithesis of that maintained by Schopenhauer and the Hindus for whom the self or ego is an illusion (maya) and only the cosmic, infinite principle of being is real.

In like manner, the death instinct is originally the impulse to self-destruction which later expresses itself in cruelty to others and in the willingness to inflict punishment on others as well as on oneself. At its highest stage this aggressive impulse takes the form of conscience which is the censorship and punishment inflicted by one's ideal conscious self or super-ego upon the practical empirical ego in its dealings with the external world.

In general, it may be said Freud tends to explain human behavior in terms of the primitive, material-efficient causes which he assumes to be involved. His method is therefore the exact contrary of that of Plato and the Scholastics who described the eros as desire directed toward some ideal of good or beauty (See Note 8, p. 407). That is to say, both Freud and the Scholastics acknowledge the primacy of eros or love in human conduct, they differ only in that Freud tends to reduce the higher forms of love to the lower, whereas the Greeks and Scholastics described love by reference to some end or final cause which transcended the individual so affected. In brief, *Freud maintains that love of the ideal is a sublimation of sex, the classical tradition maintains that sexual love is subservient to the love of the ideal.* Schopenhauer expresses the same argument as Freud when he states: "For all love, however ethereally it may bear itself, is rooted in the sexual impulse alone, nay, it absolutely is only a more definitely determined, specialized and indeed in the strictest sense, individualized sexual impulse" ("Essay on Metaphysics of Sexes"). Schopenhauer differs from Freud in that he makes all love essentially altruistic, having for its aim the reproduction of the species rather than the pleasure of the individual. Schopenhauer, furthermore, agrees with Plato that the ideals of beauty have an objective validity and are not simply reproductions of parental ideals.

Spinoza's conception of love is similar to Freud's insofar as he too maintains that love is to be defined solely in terms of the material-efficient cause involved. They agree further

in regarding all love as essentially self-love. Indeed, Freud's notion that love for another is nothing but the libido as attached or transferred to some external object is partially the same as Spinoza's definition of love, namely, that "love is pleasure with the accompanying idea of an external cause" (3-def 6). In both cases, the essence of love consists in pleasure, though Freud finds pleasure only in the fulfilment of desire-instinct. It is worth noting therefore that Schopenhauer, whose anticipation of Freud we mentioned, referred to Spinoza's definition of love "for the sake of amusement" as an example of "excessive naïveté" ("Essay on Metaphysics of Sexes"). For Schopenhauer all love was essentially altruistic, having for its aim the well-being of the species rather than that of the individual, and hence Spinoza's emphasis on pleasure seemed to him to miss the point.

Spinoza, however, was not quite consistent on this subject and followed the Scholastics in distinguishing sharply between sensuous and intellectual love. This is best illustrated by his remarks on marriage (4-append § 20). "With regard to marriage," he observes, "it is plain that it is in accordance with reason, if the desire of connection is engendered not merely by external form, but by a love of begetting children and wisely educating them, and if, in addition, the love both of the husband and wife has for its cause not external form alone but chiefly liberty of mind." True happiness, Spinoza counsels, is based on intellectual love, physical love is secondary and considered in itself alone is an irrational passion. That is why, following Scholastic usage, he defines libido (3-def 48) as "the immoderate desire and love of sexual intercourse." To lust is opposed chastity, which is the moderate indulgence in sexual intercourse in accordance with the dictates of reason, although the term chastity is usually employed as meaning complete asceticism. Libido as a passion is not at all expressive of the active conatus or power of the individual. Only in intellectual love of God and man does Spinoza find true joy and fulness of life.

The inherent weakness of the Freudian metapsychology appears most clearly in his theory of the control of the emo-

tions We have seen that Freud, like Schopenhauer, began with an irrational monism. Somehow matter took on the various forms of life and evolved an individual with conscious and unconscious mind. On this premise reason or conscious mind is primarily the tool of the unconscious and functions so as to satisfy one's irrational impulses. All reasoning so far as human conduct is concerned is nothing but a rationalizing of one's unconscious desires. On the other hand, Freud grants that psychoanalysis as a technique of healing mental diseases points to a rationalistic theory which acknowledges the autonomy and power of the intellect over the forces of the unconscious. In his book on *The Future of an Illusion*,¹⁰ Freud's rationalism is most explicit. He says (p. 93) "We may insist as much as we like that the human intellect is weak in comparison with human instincts and be right in doing so. But nevertheless there is something peculiar about this weakness. The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing. Ultimately after endlessly repeated rebuffs it succeeds. The primacy of the intellect belongs to a very distant but probably not to a wholly unattainable future." From a therapeutic point of view Freud is prepared to acknowledge the primacy of reason and even to prophesy the time of the "dictatorship of the intellect" in human life. His metapsychology however, which postulates only a material, irrational principle, fails to provide a metaphysical basis for the supremacy of reason.

Freud apparently felt this difficulty for we find that in his treatise on *The Future of an Illusion* he follows Plato in setting up a dualistic metaphysics contrasting the power of Logos with Anagke (necessity) which represents the irrational, indeterminate principle in nature. Like Plato he now asserts (*ibid.*, pp. 94, 95) "our God Logos will realize those (ideals) which external nature (necessity) permits. Our God Logos is not perhaps a very powerful one. He may only fulfil a small part of what his forerunners have promised." Freud also speaks of eros and necessity as being the

10 S. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, translated by W. D. Robson-Scott (London, I & Virginia Woolf at Hogarth Press, 1928).

parents of human culture From this it follows that he identifies eros and Logos, though this involves a confusion of Platonic principles Furthermore, on Freud's own premises, such an identification is not valid since eros is for him essentially irrational impulse to life which does not involve reason, in fact, the ideals of the super-ego are considered to be contrary to eros On the whole, it appears, he does not take his metaphysical dualism seriously, he introduced it simply as a practical requirement of psychoanalysis but did not see the theoretical implications involved

The secondary importance attached by Freud to the Logos principle is most clearly revealed by his attitude toward religion Had he been consistent in his dualism then like Plato and Spinoza he would have given the Logos principle cosmic significance by identifying it with God Instead we find he reverts to his irrational monism and by his evolutionary method reduces the idea of God to a rationalization of the father-ideal and the infantile wish for protection from the terrors of nature Religion, according to Freud, "is a universal, obsessional neurosis of mankind," an illusion due to be destroyed when mankind has overcome its infantile prejudice God, in short, is nothing but a creation of man The age of reason, he maintains, will be one in which a cosmic, rational principle will be denied Freud's rationalism, it appears, is of the narrow, humanistic variety He has reduced religion to primitive ancestor-worship but has forgotten the universal living God of his fathers (See Note 9, p 407)

In general, it may be said *the basic paradox of the Freudian metapsychology consists in this, that psychoanalysis as a cathartic method of mental healing involves a philosophy in which reason and the urge to life are primary, whereas actually his irrational monism and theory of regressive instincts lead to a philosophy of death Spinoza's metapsychology on the other hand has in the conatus only a life principle but fails to give an adequate explanation of death Both Spinoza and Freud conclude by maintaining the primacy and autonomy of reason and both are inconsistent in doing so Spinoza's inconsistency lies in the fact that the*

supremacy of reason is not compatible with psychophysical parallelism, Freud's inconsistency lies in his attempt to base his rationalism on an irrational monism. They both begin as metaphysical monists and are forced into dualism in order to provide a normative basis for human conduct.

To conclude Spinoza's psychology of the emotions is based on mechanistic and dynamic principles. This accounts for the fact that his theory of the origin of the emotions which concedes the primacy of the material-efficient cause has been found to anticipate the James-Lange theory in all essentials. On the other hand, his doctrine of the conative nature of the self, of the dynamic nature of the emotions and the therapeutic value of reason in controlling the passions is in agreement with psychoanalytical theory. The best illustration, however, of the Freudian notion of rationalization and wishful thinking is the attempt to interpret Spinoza's psychology of the emotions as essentially Freudian in character.

NOTE 1 Constance Rathbun in the *Psychoanalytical Review* for 1934, though admitting that Spinoza does not speak of a death instinct, does nevertheless presume to find a foreshadowing of such a theory in the modes of pain which decrease the power of the individual. She writes "What is not found in Spinoza's concept of the conatus is what Freud terms the death instinct.

There are, however, for Spinoza those passions which decrease and lessen the activities of the body and which in a sense imply a regressive turning inward of the conatus and thus may be said to foreshadow the theory of the death instinct." Miss Rathbun seems to overlook the fact that Spinoza insists that affects of pain are always due to some external cause and that such affects always give rise to a positive effort which excludes them (3-28). The conatus simply has no contrary in human nature.

NOTE 2 W. Hamblin-Smith in the *British Journal of Medical Psychology* for 1925 finds what appear to him to be many anticipations of Freud's theory of the unconscious throughout the *Ethics*. He even interprets Spinoza's theory of imagination as evidence for the unconscious. Thus he argues "And a man is

affected with the same emotion from the image of a thing past or future as from the image of a thing present. Leave aside the future and we see the immense importance of past emotion repressed but not destroyed in the unconscious" Smith neglects the fact that the image of a past thing is something actually present in the conscious mind, it is not at all repressed. Besides Spinoza explains all imagination in physical terms and has no conception of repressed psychic energy. Similarly Spinoza's statement that the mind endeavors to persist insofar as it has adequate or inadequate ideas is not evidence for the unconscious, he explicitly states in the same proposition (3-9) that "the mind is conscious of this effort." *The distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas does not by any means correspond to that between the conscious and unconscious.* In contrast, see R. A. Duff's *Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy* where the identity of desire and consciousness is maintained.

NOTE 3 Spinoza in common with the Scholastic and Hindu traditions finds justification for the doctrine of immortality in the principle that all finite souls are modes of the divine infinite intellect from which they derive their being. The Nirvana doctrine of the Hindus also involves a return of the soul to the original source of its being, but the soul becomes absorbed in the Cosmic All and does not retain its individuality. Freud's instinct for death cannot be identified with the Nirvana of the Hindus since the latter do not believe in annihilation. All the religious philosophies agree that the soul in becoming liberated from its body attains a more perfect form of being. Freud, on the other hand, regards death as the return of matter to a more primitive state. For a further elaboration of this point, see K. T. Behanan, *Yoga*, chap. viii.

NOTE 4 In the *Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci* as edited by MacCurdy (Vol. I, pp. 80-81), we find the following passage which seems definitely to anticipate Freud's theory of the regressive nature of instincts: "Behold now the hope and desire of going back to one's own country or returning to primal chaos, like that of the moth to the light, of the man who with perpetual longing always looks forward with joy to each new

spring and each new summer and to the new months and the new years, dreaming that the things he longs for are too slow in coming, and who does not perceive that he is longing for his own destruction. But this longing is in its quintessence the spirit of the elements, which finding itself imprisoned within the life of the human body desires continually to return to its source.

And I would have you to know that the same longing is in its quintessence inherent in nature, and that man is a type of the world " (*The Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci*, New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1938)

NOTE 5 Freud himself informs us in his *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* that he arrived at his dualistic theory of the instincts after a long process of development. Originally he had started with hunger and love as the two primary impulses. Hunger involved the ego instinct, the impulse for self-preservation, love was essentially sexual and was directed toward the opposite sex. Then came the discovery of narcissism and Freud decided to distinguish between the ego-libido and the object-libido. Finally the discovery of sadism and masochism led him to postulate an innate aggressive impulse contrary to the eros or life-instinct. In his original theory Freud regarded the tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain as the ground of all activity, aggression was simply the reaction due to frustration of pleasure and desire. That is to say, all aggression was primarily directed outward and was directed inward only when external action was inhibited—a position quite similar to that of Spinoza. In his later theory, however, Freud regards aggression as an innate impulse directed primarily inward and only secondarily outward. Modern psychologists do not accept Freud's doctrine of the autonomy of the impulse to aggression, as witness the recent book on *Frustration and Aggression* (p 21) issued by the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University.

NOTE 6 Freud is aware of the Platonic and Hebrew myths concerning the creation of man and woman. In Plato's myth as stated in the *Symposium* man and woman were imagined as originally one being which was subsequently severed in twain. According to the Hebrew version, Adam seemed to be of a her-

maphroditic nature. In both stories, the love of the sexes is portrayed as the return to a more primitive state. See *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 74.

NOTE 7 Constance Rathbun in her article in *Psychoanalytical Review* for 1925, previously mentioned, draws attention to the same problem. She writes "On the basis of strict logic a thorough-going determinism should eliminate all differences in value. Such a conclusion would be impossible of acceptance by either Spinoza or Freud as not providing a working basis for living. Actually the effect of determinism on Spinoza's system of thought is to give Ethics a subordinate place in the sense that distinctions in moral values are not final and absolute. What is real is the concrete thing as it actually is, and the assertion that it ought to be something else, is utterly irrelevant. And whatever is, is good in that it proceeds from and is contained in God. On the contrary, even at the expense of being criticized as inconsistent, both assert that there is a direction and goal to life, this goal being the complete life."

NOTE 8 Professor Demos in his recent book on *Plato* draws attention to the points of similarity and difference between the Freudian and Platonic use of eros. He writes (p. 84). "The similarity of Plato to Freud is striking. Both agree that love is a fundamental impulse. Both alike construe love in terms other than the obvious expression and the difference between the two is a regular difference. For Freud love of the ideal is a sublimation of sex, for Plato sex is a sublimation of the love of the ideal."

NOTE 9 It is noteworthy that Freud like Marx before him denies the validity of religious experience in the name of reason and science. Freud, however, goes out of his way to point out that the Marxian interpretation of history in terms of the economic struggle is not scientific. Marx's interpretation rests on the illusion that human nature is essentially good and that man's evil tendencies are determined by the economic system. Freud, on the other hand, that the economic system only offers an occasion for the expression of the instinct of aggression which is bound to assert itself under any system.

XV

ON SPINOZA AND CONTEMPORARY VALUE THEORY

1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SPINOZA'S THEORY OF MORAL VALUES

WE are accustomed nowadays to accept as a truism that "transvaluation of values" which Nietzsche first preached in his *Genealogy of Morals* as the gospel of the Superman. It is, however, no exaggeration to say that in this respect also Spinoza was the first of the moderns, and that his *Ethics* was written as an attempt to bring about a revolution in moral theory. He was the first of the moderns to identify the virtue of man with his power of self-preservation and hence anticipated the Darwinian doctrine of the "survival of the fittest" (see chap. III, § 2). For Spinoza, as we have seen, self-preservation is the end of life, there is no transcendent good for the sake of which one lives (4-25). All values are, to use the modern phrase, "survival-values." It is this naturalistic aspect of Spinoza's teaching which finds favor with those modern writers who, like R. B. Perry and J. R. Reid, advocate a psychobiological theory of value.

Spinoza, however, did not consistently hold to his biological naturalism. Unlike our moderns he tried to retain most of the Hebrew-Christian virtues as well, since he realized the inadequacy of his naturalistic theory to render all the facts of life intelligible. Man, he admitted, is not only a creature of emotions but also a rational animal that endeavors to understand the order of nature apart from any practical consequences for survival. Hence he modified his original thesis by saying that man's real or true efforts for self-preservation consist in his efforts to understand adequate ideas of which man alone is the adequate cause (4-24). The

virtue of man is his rational, efficient power in conceiving true ideas and in restraining his passions. All external things are truly good insofar as they are useful for promoting the power or perfection of the intellect (4-26). Psychologically, the knowledge of good is self-satisfaction (*acquiescentia in se ipso*) or the enjoyment which follows upon the consciousness of one's intellectual power. Here again, it should be noted, there is no transcendent object or end to which the understanding is directed. Spinoza still believes the principle holds that for each form of being self-preservation and the exercise of all its powers are the only intrinsic good and all external things are good as a means to this end. In the case of man, however, this *conatus* for self-preservation is best seen in the efforts of the understanding.

So far then, we have seen, Spinoza attempts to formulate a theory of human life and values apart from any reference to a final cause whether immanent or transcendent. He could not, however, by the very nature of the case, deny that men do act to achieve certain ends or ideals. He could not help but realize that ethics is concerned not only with the actual power or efforts of man for self-preservation, but also and primarily with the nature and validity of the ideals and norms of human character. He admits accordingly (4-pref.) that "we desire to form for ourselves an idea of man upon which we may look as a model [*norma*] of human nature.

By good therefore I understand in the following pages everything which we are certain is a means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature we set before us. By evil, on the contrary, I understand everything which we are certain hinders us from reaching that model. Again I shall call men more or less perfect insofar as they approach more or less nearly to this same model."

Here we see that Spinoza acknowledges ideals or norms of human character. These universal ideals are for him, as for the modern Pragmatist, simply creations of the imagination which serve as a guide to conduct and which have no ontological status independent of the imagination. But the important point for us here is that Spinoza does acknowl-

edge the intrinsic validity of these norms of perfection as final causes of human behavior. The true good he explicitly regards as a means, not primarily for self-preservation, but rather for approximation to a given ideal of perfection.

Similarly in his conception of the summum bonum Spinoza follows the Scholastics in acknowledging implicitly an immanent final cause which determines the course of human development to a maximum of power or perfection. Happiness, he admits, consists in living a complete life of virtue throughout the natural duration of life. Self-preservation without the attainment of a maximum human perfection—as for example, the self-preservation of a lunatic or an individual in a subnormal state—would not constitute happiness.

Furthermore, Spinoza distinguishes various degrees of virtue. There is the highest virtue (*summa virtus*) which is the knowledge of God and there are lower degrees of virtue, such as the social and physical virtues. On the basis of self-preservation alone there is no meaning for degrees of virtue, since the quality of the virtue is no consideration in the *conatus* for self-preservation. The notion of degrees of virtue has meaning only insofar as it is linked up with degrees of perfection or reality and hence applies only to the essence of a thing and not to its existence (1-24, 4-pref.) There are no degrees of existence, since all actual things are like in this respect (chap. III, § 2).

The point at issue can be summarized by saying that there appears to be a conflict in Spinoza's theory as to the meaning of self-preservation. On the one hand, the self or being which one desires to preserve is regarded as temporal, the physical self of which the mind is the idea. On the other hand, he conceives the real self to be the eternal, intellectual self which is separable from the temporal body. Self-preservation as applied to the intellect does not refer to time but rather to immortality and eternity. Spinoza attempts to combine both notions by saying that the activities of the intellect are the only true acts of self-preservation. In the actual development of his *Ethics* we find, however, that the ideals of intellectual perfection are frequently in conflict

with the biological effort for self-preservation, as for example, when the obligation to keep faith conflicts with the desire to live (4-72 schol.). From the temporal point of view the indefinite continuation and enjoyment of one's actual power are the only things that matter. From the eternal point of view, duration in time is of no importance and all the emphasis is put upon the degree of intellectual and moral perfection attained. In practical life, the two points of view are found to be frequently opposed—a fact which explains the perennial presence of reformers and revolutionaries who conflict with the dictatorial powers of their day. In his *Ethics*, Spinoza tended to minimize the significance of this conflict.

The particularly modern message of Spinoza's *Ethics* is his emphasis upon the identity of virtue and healthful, joyous living. The life of virtue is not something to be endured for the sake of some ulterior reward in this world or the next, virtue is independent of supernatural sanctions. It is its own reward in the sense that it makes for self-preservation and the happiest form of life. Virtue consists in the fulness of life, in the maximum of perfection, and this includes complete development of physical as well as mental powers. A universally satisfying theory of morals is naturalistic in the radical sense that it satisfies all natural human aspirations, it harmonizes man's desire to live and enjoy himself with his innate love of truth and justice.

2 SPINOZA'S THEORY OF SOCIAL VALUES

SPINOZA himself, as a social philosopher, recognized the importance of this distinction between the mere conatus for self-preservation and the desire for perfection of being. Man living "in a state of nature," that is, in a state or condition where each individual lives for himself alone and is concerned only with the satisfaction of his own desires, is frequently opposed to other individuals who have similar desires. Thus in the natural struggle for existence there is, to use Hobbes's phrase, "a war of all against all." Society or the civil state arose when individuals realized their com-

mon predicament and decided to yield their "natural rights" to some common power which establishes by law and force "a common rule of life"

Spinoza, following Hobbes, thought he explained the function of the state by its supposed origin, thereby confusing the efficient with the final cause or ultimate purpose. The "state of nature" is simply a fiction suggested by the discovery of the Americas. The social contract explains not so much the actual origin and practice of the state as its ideal function, what it ought to be. As Spinoza sees it, he who lives according to the guidance of reason desires that others should share in his advantages and realizes that nothing is so useful to man as another individual similarly guided by reason (4-37). The state therefore by establishing common laws and common rights is, or should be, the instrument of reason. The state, in short, should make it possible for a man to live the life of reason (4-73). The ideal function of the state is to remove the conflict between the desire for self-preservation and the will for perfection of being, and so make it possible for man to live a full life, that is, a life involving length of days and complete physical, moral, and intellectual virtue. But that, as is too evident from our contemporary international situation, is not the actual practice of national governments.

In fact, Spinoza himself for all his praise of the state as being in accord with the laws of reason, reserved the right of freedom of thought to the individual alone. An individual must yield his natural right of external action to the state "for if everyone were free to interpret the laws of his country as he pleased, no state could stand but would for that very reason be dissolved at once, and public rights would become private right" (*Tractatus theologico-politicus*, chap. vii). But each person has the inalienable right to the free use of individual judgment in all matters of a speculative or theoretical character. In classic words which deserve more recognition Spinoza proclaims "Simplicity and truth of character are not produced by the constraint of laws, nor by the authority of the state, and no one the whole world over can be forced or legislated into a state of blessedness,

the means required for such a consummation are faithful and brotherly admonition, sound education and above all, free use of the individual judgment . . . Therefore as the supreme right of free thinking, even on religion, is in every man's power, and as it is inconceivable that such power could be alienated, it is also in every man's power to wield the supreme right and authority of free judgment on his behalf and to explain and interpret religion for himself "

Perhaps Spinoza's own experience and religious excommunication made him acutely self-conscious on the subject of freedom of thought and religious belief. At all events, the principle involved is a pillar of democratic society

Spinoza, perhaps more than anyone else in his time, was conscious of the importance of a proper social environment. Just as in the world of nature as a whole, each mode is determined for acting and existing through its relation to other modes, so in social life each man depends upon his social environment for his nature and power of moral development. The culture and moral character of an individual are a product of his education and the customs of his community in which he is raised. Praise and blame as well as natural imitation are potent factors which make for social conformity. "Education alone," Spinoza concludes, "will determine whether a man will boast of any deed or repent of it" (3-def. 27 explan)

He therefore who would live a life of reason and freedom must do his utmost to help others acquire a similar state of perfection or at least to appreciate its significance so far as possible. It should be part of a man's happiness that others agree with him, in nature and have the opportunity to derive a maximum of satisfaction from living. In other words, he who would live a complete rational life must endeavor to create a rational social environment. Conversely, it is the proper function of government to guarantee the equal rights and opportunities of its citizens to lead the life of maximum virtue. In sum, the ultimate function or final purpose of the state is to resolve the perennial conflict between the struggle for existence and the desire for the realization of moral and cultural values.

3. SPINOZA'S COSMOLOGICAL ETHICS.

WE noted previously that Spinoza's theory of morals is naturalistic in the radical sense of being in accord with all naturalistic human desires and aspirations; he who truly seeks his own good seeks not only to preserve himself physically but also to develop and enjoy the intellectual virtues in common with other men. That is to say, a naturalistic ethics is one that is in accord with the laws of human nature as a whole.

There is, however, another sense in which his theory is naturalistic, namely, in that it regards man as part of nature. Man is a part of nature and his ultimate good is bound up with the cosmic laws of nature. This means that man while living in accord with the laws of his own nature and reason must also conform to the universal, necessary laws of nature as a whole. Human nature to be commanded, must obey cosmic nature.

Thirdly, his theory is naturalistic in the religious sense that he identifies God with the immanent, dynamic principle of order in nature. The immanence of God in nature means that man as well as all other modes participates in the divine perfection. The highest ideal of man therefore is to know and feel himself at one with God so far as possible. The great emotional appeal of Spinoza's pantheistic philosophy (for example, to such great poets as Goethe and Wordsworth) consists precisely in the vision it affords of direct union with God and nature. A completely transcendent God such as the God of Aristotle and the later Deists leaves man emotionally unmoved, only an immanent God in whose nature one can participate in some degree can be an object of intellectual or intuitive love. Spinoza's monistic metaphysics made it possible for him to raise man, partially at least, to the level of God and hence he concluded that the love of man for God was in some measure identical with the love of God for Himself. It should be noted, however, that Spinoza's theory of intellectual love does not involve ecstatic absorption in the

One as the Neo-Platonists and Hindus held; the intuitive love and vision of God are a dynamic, rational force which determines an individual to seek knowledge of created nature and to take an active interest in social affairs (See Note 1, below) At this point religion, ethics, and science merge

In his *Ethics* Spinoza tried to present a rational system of universal salvation, one that would be independent of unique supernatural revelations in time through chosen individuals or nations. The revelation of God, he believed, was something rational and natural which was common to the great teachers of all peoples at all times True religion and morality, he held, unite all men and are invincible forces for the maintenance of peace When one takes into consideration the unceasing strife throughout the ages between men of diverse religious and ethical persuasions, one cannot but conclude that Spinoza's *Ethics* still bears a vital message for the modern world

NOTE 1 The practical conflict between the materialistic quest for power and other-worldly asceticism is graphically described by Rabindranath Tagore in his poetic book entitled *Sadhana* Like Spinoza, Tagore maintains that an adequate, sane philosophy of life is one that harmonizes naturalism and idealism, the interest in life of the humanist and the quest for permanent being of the mystic This, they agree, can be brought about only by realizing the immanence of God in nature and the heart of man

What the world needs, according to Tagore, is a harmonization of the virtues of the West and the East The West has physical power but physical power in and by itself is blind and does not make for happiness A philosophy of becoming where everything, including God, is "in the making" leads to ultimate irrationality On the other hand, the East tends to disregard the world and to concentrate on the salvation and liberation of the soul The East tends to disparage human individuality and self-assertion and to aggrandize Brahma which is the cosmic principle of being True freedom, Tagore counsels, lies, not in the negation of action and physical power but in the

effort to utilize it in the service of the divine, spiritual power. All nature is an expression of God or Brahma and therefore all nature is intrinsically good and is to be consecrated to Him.

4 THE ORIGIN OF MODERN VALUE THEORY

ONE of the most distinctive and significant contributions of modern thought has been the investigation of the nature and origin of values in general, a branch of philosophy technically known as axiology. By way of concluding our estimate of Spinoza's theory of moral values we propose therefore to examine the relation of his thought to the basic trends of contemporary axiology.

The rise of modern value theory is due primarily to the influence of evolutionary theory upon philosophy. Stated generally, the tendency has been to interpret all the phenomena of nature and human experience by considering their origin and the primitive, efficient causes involved. This method is directly contrary to the method originated by Aristotle and continued by the Scholastics, namely, that of explaining things by their end, purpose, or final cause. In other words, according to the evolutionary method all the higher forms of life are conceived through the lower forms from which they developed, whereas according to the classical tradition the more perfect or higher being was the cause of the less perfect forms.

As applied to the domain of ethics and human culture in general the evolutionary theory was used to explain the temporal, human origin of all forms of value. All human ideals were considered as inventions created by man in his struggle for existence. Values are not ends-in-themselves but means for self-preservation. In order for man to know himself he must study, not the dictates of his intellect, but the primitive impulses of his instinctive nature.

Nietzsche, more than any other writer of the nineteenth century, raised the issue as to the cultural implications of the theory of evolution. Unlike the Darwinians, he maintained that the driving force of evolution was not merely self-

preservation but the will to power, the will to create ever higher forms of perfection. On the basis of this voluntarism he argued in his *Genealogy of Morals* for the necessity of a "transvaluation of values." The life-force creates its own goals in time and the will to power must therefore determine what is to be considered good and evil. Every social system which is contrary to the will to power and the development of the superman is inherently bad, only the ideals which are in harmony with the manly virtues of the strong are really good. Nietzsche's ethics, it appears, is essentially aristocratic, ruthless, and individualistic, rather than democratic and compassionate. That is why he was so vehement in his denunciation of the Hebrew-Christian tradition which is based on the principles of the equality of all souls before God, the preservation of the weak, and the universal happiness or salvation of man. According to Nietzsche, the virtues of nobility, courage, and laughter are superior to the Scholastic virtues of love, humility, and charity.

The idealists and the religiously minded objected to this naturalistic procedure since it undermined their cultural traditions and rendered ethics or a normative theory of human conduct valid for all men impossible. Moral ideals, they held, must have a universal objective validity in themselves in order to serve as a criterion of civilization. Ethical theory must be based on the specific requirements of a rational life and not on the supposed demands of life in its most primitive stages.

The problem then arose, how to harmonize the theory of evolution with the postulates of a normative ethics. The answer which the idealists gave was that the origin of any particular institution or system of culture was no indication of its present worth and significance. In other words, they separated origin from end or present value. All human ideals, they held, should be interpreted in traditional fashion as having an intrinsic value in themselves, their supposed origin in primitive times has no bearing upon their present significance. To think otherwise is to commit what has since become known as "the naturalistic fallacy."

5. NORMATIVE THEORIES OF VALUE G. E. MOORE AND W. M. URBAN.

G. E. Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy

THE first English writer to advocate a normative theory of value was Professor G. E. Moore. In his *Principia Ethica* (1903) ¹ he maintains that value or the good in general is an indefinable quality which is predicated of many existing things but which is not to be identified with any of the properties of those things. According to Moore, ethics is concerned not only with the knowledge of the predicate good and evil as applied to human conduct but also as applied to all things whatsoever. The quality good refers to a universal datum of intuitive experience, like the quality yellow, which is simple by nature and hence not further analyzable into, or definable by, constituent parts. This simple, universal quality may be predicated of many things, which are said to possess this quality in various degrees, but it may not be identified with any actual thing. As Professor Moore puts it (*Principia Ethica*, § 10). "It may be true that all things which are good are something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain vibration in the light. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good, that properties in fact were simply not 'other' but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness .

[§ 13] Whenever he thinks of intrinsic value, of intrinsic worth or says that a thing 'ought to exist' he has before his mind the unique object—the unique property of things—which I mean by good." For Moore an intrinsic good is a thing of which it is said that it ought to exist in virtue of the quality good which is predicated of it. This intrinsic quality is known intuitively and can be neither proved nor disproved. Only questions of means, questions as to the causal relations of particular things leading to an intrinsic good, are capable of proof or disproof (*Principia Ethica*, pref.)

1 G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge University Press, 1929). Quotations reprinted by permission of the Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

It is important to bear in mind that the universal, indefinable value quality is, for Moore, independent of the actual existence of specific objects to which it may be attributed. The validity of the universal good does not depend in any way upon the nature of ultimate reality. To regard ethical values as dependent upon metaphysics is to commit the naturalistic fallacy again. Thus he writes (*ibid*, chap. iv, § 67). "To hold that from any proposition asserting reality is of this nature we can infer any proposition asserting 'this is good in itself' is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. . . . It rests upon failure to perceive that any truth which asserts 'this is good in itself' is quite unique in kind . . . that it cannot be reduced to any assertion about reality and therefore must be unaffected by any conclusions we may reach about the nature of reality. This confusion as to the unique nature of ethical truths is, I have said, involved in all those ethical theories which I have called metaphysical."

The naturalistic fallacy is committed not only when one seeks to explain higher values in terms of lower functions but also when one regards values as in any way dependent upon metaphysical reality. Moore illustrates his argument by particular reference to the *Ethics* of Spinoza, wherein value or perfection and reality are identified. What we are really saying in asserting "this is good in itself" is "this would be good if it existed" (§ 69). The latter judgment must not be confused with the proposition "this existing thing is good" which refers to an intrinsically good thing of which the quality good is predicated. The failure to make this distinction gives rise to the naturalistic fallacy.

W. M. Urban and the Primacy of the Value Category.

The second advocate of a normative theory of value whose work we shall consider is Professor W. M. Urban of Yale University who has constructed a theory of value based on Neo-Kantian and phenomenological postulates. In his early work, *Valuation: Its Nature and Its Laws*,² as well as in his

² W. M. Urban, *Valuation: Its Nature and Its Laws* (Library of Philosophy Series, edited by J. H. Muirhead, London, Swan, 1909). Reprinted by permission of the Editor.

latest book, *The Intelligible World*,³ he maintains that the value category is the ultimate category at the basis of all meaning and reality whatsoever. In order that we may make clear the originality of his theory, we shall briefly consider the phenomenological method and its relation to Neo-Kantian epistemology and axiology.

The phenomenological method as developed by Meinong, Husserl, Scheler, and Hartmann owes its origin in part at least to the distinction first introduced by Meinong between an object and an objective. Judgments of fact are concerned with the existence of objects and their relations to one another. An objective, however, is the reflective judgment *that* something is true (the *Dass* construction in German) and such judgments may be made irrespective of the actual existence of the object involved. For example, when it is said, "A exists," A refers to an object and the truth of this statement depends upon empirical verification of A's existence. But when we say, "B said *that* A exists," then the clause "that A exists" is an objective and the truth of the proposition as a whole does not depend upon the actual existence of A. In like manner, a value is regarded by phenomenologists as an objective whose validity is to be acknowledged irrespective of its actual realization in some object. Value so understood is undefinable either in terms of the properties of things or their relations to the individual. The value indicates rather a certain bearing on existence, the value is *that which ought to be* or that which ought to be acknowledged, whether it is actually realized in some form of being or not. The phenomenologist, in other words, separates the question of validity and meaning from that of the origin of a particular value and its actual realization in space and time. Values are objective data to be acknowledged and intuitively conceived through themselves alone; they must not, under any circumstances, be identified with any particular, actual form of existence.

Turning now to Kant, we find that he distinguished be-

3 W. M. Urban, *The Intelligible World* (Library of Philosophy Series, edited by J. H. Muirhead. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1929). Quotations reprinted by permission of the Editor.

tween the theoretical and practical reason. The pure reason or understanding, he maintained, organizes the data of experience according to certain a priori categories. The practical reason, however, postulates the existence of external things, God, reward and punishment in the hereafter, in order to provide sanctions for morality, but it is not apparently endowed with any specific categories of its own. That is why Kant, in the last analysis, is forced to distinguish between knowledge and faith. In his *Intelligible World*, Professor Urban criticizes Kant for this lack of uniformity as regards the theoretical and practical reason (pp. 344-345). "It was one of Kant's most serious limitations that while he recognized that the knowledge of nature, in our terms intelligibility, is conditioned by certain forms immanent in mind, to the equally necessary forms of the interpretation of life and the world he allowed merely the character of practical postulates and regulative ideas. It escaped him entirely that reality as we live it and know it, is likewise our reality only as the stuff of experience is formed by the categories of value . . . Non-temporal and non-empirical forms of value are also the a priori of an intelligible world . . . It is impossible to insist upon this point too strongly. Kant's fatal distinction between the practical and theoretical reason—and his no less fatal vacillation between knowledge and faith in his characterization of the status of the "postulates" of value—is the source of much of the sophistication and sophistry of modern thought."

In his *Intelligible World*, Professor Urban has attempted to overcome this inherent weakness of the Kantian theory. All reasoning, he maintains, is practical. There is one category at the basis of all theoretical and practical thinking, namely, the value category or objective. There is no bifurcation between knowledge of fact and value. The primacy of the value category in all thinking means that all judgments of fact, whether they be ontological or logical propositions, are ultimately special forms of the value judgment. In agreement with Royce he claims that the question "how I ought to conceive the real" is prior to the question, "what is the real." In his article on "Value Theory" in the current edition of the

Encyclopædia Britannica, this argument is summarized most clearly "The Neo-Kantian axiologists point out that the desire for truth and rationality, the demand for logical consistency or validity is itself a craving for what ought to be and that here too we are moved by an ideal and directed by a norm, as surely as in the realm of ethical and aesthetic values"

Briefly put, then, Professor Urban's theory is a synthesis of phenomenological method with Neo-Kantian epistemology *Value, as he conceives it, is the ultimate, undefinable objective whose validity must be acknowledged a priori by the human mind as the basis of any intelligible world and as the necessary condition of the communication of meaning between minds.* Modifying Hegel's dictum, it may be said the real is the axiologically intelligible and the axiologically intelligible is the real Thus he writes (*Intelligible World*, p 134). "Part of the meaning of value is its validity, its worthiness to be and this cannot be reduced to existential terms. . . . [p 151] Value as such neither exists nor subsists, it is simply valid" Urban, like Moore, regards value phenomenologically as a category independent of any particular metaphysics and hence as "beyond realism and idealism" They differ, however, insofar as Urban adopts the Neo-Kantian position that the value judgment is not only autonomous but also determines all logical and ontological judgments whatsoever In contemporary philosophy the extreme antithesis of this position is found in the treatise by Ayer on *Language, Logic and Truth*⁴ where the logical-positivistic thesis is maintained, namely, that the so-called value judgment is nothing but an expression of emotion which has no bearing on fact and is therefore meaningless

The logical priority of the value judgment to all judgments of truth does not mean, Professor Urban points out, that there are any a priori actual values in the space-time order Referring to Nietzsche's doctrine in the *Genealogy of Morals*, namely, that it is quite possible to transvaluate all accepted or traditional norms of valuation, he concedes the principle of complete relativity of specific, actual values

⁴ A. J. Ayer, *Language, Logic and Truth* (London, Gollancz, 1936)

Nevertheless, he remarks, the form of all thinking, the acknowledgment of the priority of the value category and the a priori notion of degrees of value, *that* holds no matter *what* actual system of values is accepted. Put in Kantian terms, the form of value and valuation is a priori and absolute, but the content or matter is empirical and relative. Professor Urban is explicit on this point (*ibid*, pp 337–338): “We can contemplate a world in which men never die, and perhaps equally one in which happiness is not better than unhappiness, or life better than death. There is no value the opposite of which cannot conceivably be affirmed. Transvaluation of values is conceivable indefinitely, and with this it follows that there is no fate of our empirical values which is not abstractly conceivable. This is the element of truth in all merely relativistic theories of value, and to this relativism the critic of teleology always may, and always does, appeal. Yet recognizing this element of truth in relativism, there is still something a priori in all valuation which the relativist overlooks, something here, also the opposite of which cannot be contemplated . . . Given any values at all, it lies in the nature of values that they must be related as higher and lower. Values may conceivably be transvalued, ‘perverted’ indefinitely, but any such transvaluation, however complete, leaves the value relation as such untouched . . . [339] One may admit the relative and contingent character of all values and yet there are essentials or principles of value that are true no matter what.”

Just as the value judgment is logically prior to all truth judgments or judgments of fact, so is the value category ontologically prior to all categories of being. Value transcends all forms of metaphysical being. Only the transcendence of value, Professor Urban argues, can render significant the idea of evolutionary progress. The essence of time, he holds, consists in the “inalienable difference” between the transcendent objective, that which ought to be, and the actual achievement which resembles the ideal in some degree. There is an intransitive relation between value and being such that “while it is possible to reduce truth and existence to value, the converse reduction is not possible” (*Intelligible World*, p 164). That is to say, though value and being are insepa-

able, they are not to be identified. In the last analysis, the transcendence of value implies that value is primarily a direction of becoming which transcends all forms of being and directs their evolution and progress. Though value is inseparable from being, both logically and ontologically, it is nevertheless beyond all essence and existence, and is, as it were, their final cause.

Professor Urban finds a suggestion of his theory of the transcendence of value in the Platonic Idea of the Good. Thus he writes (*Intelligible World*, p. 130). "In a sense it means but the restoration of the original and in its essentials imperishable insight of Plato, namely, that 'value is the highest and last object of science' and that it is 'from value that objects derive the gift of being known' and finally that 'value far from being identical with actuality or existence transcends it in dignity and power'." Later he adds (p. 353) "The value that is thus appreciated and acknowledged must be conceived as the cause of the existence of something, that is, that the values are effective in reality. The cause must, moreover, be effective by reason of its value."

Looked at historically, Professor Urban's metaphysics of value appears to be in fundamental agreement with the Platonic tradition. Plato had maintained that the ideas were forms absolutely perfect in their kind and were not to be identified with actually existing things. The ideas were more perfect than the existing things which derived what reality they had from participation in these eternal, universal forms. Moreover, Plato postulated ideas of value, such as the idea of the beautiful and the just, which he distinguished from ideas of natural objects and numbers. The idea of the good he conceived as transcending all other ideas and as in some sense their cause. Those modern idealists and phenomenologists who, like Scheler and Hartmann, postulate a distinct realm of values are in truth but adding footnotes to the doctrine of Plato. Professor Urban, however, does not postulate a realm of values other than the realm of essences. He only utilizes the Platonic idea of the good as the ultimate value objective which is the transcendent cause of all being, and all degrees of value.

The full significance of Professor Urban's insistence upon the ultimate priority and externality of the value category is shown by his early refusal to accept the logical validity of the ontological proof for the existence of God which is based on the identity of absolute value and being. In his first book on *Valuation Its Nature and Its Laws* published more than a quarter of a century ago, he writes (p. 427): "As the critics of the Ontological proof have clearly seen, the proof of the truth or existence of the idea of the perfect being, adds nothing to its reality. In the intrinsic appreciation of the meaning of the demand or postulate of such a being, whatever reality it has is already involved. Its central place in the spiritual life, its value must guarantee its reality, and the attempt to translate such ultimate reality into the subordinate concepts of outer existence and truth, can certainly add nothing to that reality and may even by falsely interpreting the presupposition of reality, lead to error and unreality."

Urban, like Moore, maintains that the external validity of the value ideal is not increased by the attribution of existence, or by its realization in any form of being, even though that being be God. Because of this separation of value and being, value is described as an undefinable regulative objective lacking all determinate content and quite compatible with any existential order of nature. Urban and Moore differ, however, inasmuch as the former attributes to the value category a reality superior to that of all forms of essence and existence, whereas the latter (Moore) is concerned only with the logical autonomy of the value quality but does not grant it any superior ontological status.

6 JOHN DEWEY AND THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF VALUE.

THE full significance of the normative theories of value can be best appreciated by contrast with the pragmatic theory of Dewey. In general it may be said that the latter adopts a temporal point of view in opposition to the eternal, a priori view of the normative axiologists.

Professor Dewey (in common with Whitehead) has postu-

lated the primacy of process or becoming. Time is of the essence of things, there is no static, eternal being. History is not ultimately cyclical as the Greeks held, it is rather, on its cultural side at least, fundamentally creative and progressive. Man is capable of discovering ever new intellectual horizons and of achieving increased control over the forces of nature if only he dares to wonder and seek. In brief, Dewey regards all truth and culture as temporal in origin and validity.

The idealists and rationalists on the other hand, following the tradition of the Platonists and Scholastics, allow time a secondary role. They make a sharp distinction between the eternal and temporal. Just as being is prior to process or becoming so is the eternal prior to the temporal. With reference to truth and value this implies that all truths and values discovered (not created) by human reason have an eternal origin and validity which it is possible to establish a priori.

In developing his theory of value, Dewey was fully aware of the conflict between his temporal, experimental attitude and the a priori phenomenological method of the Platonists and Neo-Kantians. Thus in his chapter on "Experimentation in Moral Theory" (Modern Library edition of works entitled *Intelligence in the Modern Mind*, p. 775) ⁵ he writes: "To assume the existence of final and unquestionable knowledge upon which we can fall back in order to settle automatically every moral problem involves commitment to a dogmatic theory of morals. The alternative method may be called experimental. It implies that reflective morality demands observation of particular situations rather than fixed adherence to a priori principles. . . . [p. 783] On this basis all ends are ends-in-view, they are no longer ideal as characters of being, as they were in Greek theory, but are the objects of conscious intent."

On the other hand, Dewey is also opposed to a purely psychobiological theory of value in which value is defined in terms of actual satisfactions or fulfilment of desire. He dis-

⁵ John Dewey, *Intelligence in the Modern Mind*, edited by J. Ratner (Modern Library Giant Series, New York, Random House, 1939). Reprinted by courtesy of Modern Library.

tinguishes between the fact of satisfaction or enjoyment and the value or satisfactoriness of a particular object or activity. In his essay on "The Satisfying and the Valuable" (quoted from *The Quest for Certainty*, Modern Library edition, pp. 783-784) he remarks "To say that something is enjoyed is to make a statement about a fact, something already in existence, it is not to judge the value of that fact. The fact that something is desired only raises the question of its desirability, it does not settle it. . . To declare something satisfactory is to assert that it meets specifiable conditions. It is, in effect, a judgment that the thing 'will do'. . . That it is satisfying is the content of a proposition of fact; that it is satisfactory is a judgment, an estimate, an appraisal. It denotes an attitude to be taken, that of striving to perpetuate and to make recur."

We see then that a judgment of value is according to Dewey something regulative; it denotes that a certain liking or enjoyment is to be striven for and that certain facts of experience are to be expected. "Judgments about values," he concludes (Modern Library edition, p. 707), "are judgments about the conditions and the results of experienced objects, judgments about that which should regulate the formation of our desires, affections and enjoyments. . . [p. 789] Even in the midst of direct enjoyment there is a sense of validity, of authorization which intensifies the enjoyment. There is solicitude for perpetuation of the object having value which is radically different from mere anxiety to perpetuate the feeling of enjoyment. . . [p. 790] There is no value without satisfaction, but there have to be certain conditions fulfilled to transform a satisfaction into a value."

A value, that is to say, involves a judgment as to the true nature of the enjoyment or experience to be derived from a particular object. The value judgment is an hypothesis to be tested and confirmed by experience and not an a priori eternal truth which must be acknowledged irrespective of consequences. Dewey is obviously opposed to the theory of Urban and Moore that the value judgment is unique and is to be distinguished from judgments of fact (see Dewey's latest work, *Logic. Theory of Inquiry*, p. 179). According

to Dewey, to say that anything "ought to be" is merely to make a factual judgment which is regulative of future conduct

It is interesting to note that both Dewey and the phenomenologists maintain that the validity of values is independent of their present actual realization, but they do so for contrary reasons. For Dewey, a value involves a judgment that something ought to exist or ought to be enjoyed and hence constitutes a program for future activity. For the phenomenologists on the other hand, the assertion that something ought to be or is worthy to be, refers to a unique attribute of worth and has no reference to future realization. The value objective is sharply differentiated from all attributes of being and becoming. According to Urban and Moore, Dewey commits the "naturalistic fallacy" par excellence by maintaining that values are definable in terms of their practical consequences for man.

Dewey's humanistic conception of values is clearly illustrated by his interpretation of the idea of God. In his *Common Faith* (Modern Library Selections, p. 1024) he argues "These considerations may be applied to the idea of God or to avoid misleading conceptions, to the idea of the divine. This idea is, as I have said, one of ideal possibilities unified through imaginative realization and projection. But this idea of God or of the divine is also connected with all natural forces and conditions, including man and human association, that promote the growth of the ideal and that further its realization. We are in the presence neither of ideals completely embodied in existence nor yet of ideals that are mere rootless ideals, fantasies, utopias. For there are forces in nature and society that generate and support the ideals. They are further unified by the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is this active relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name 'God'. I would not insist that the name must be given. There are those who hold that the associations of the term with the supernatural are so numerous and close that any use of the word 'God' is sure to give rise to misconception and be taken as a concession to traditional ideas."

The above passage shows clearly that for Dewey all values are simply ideals of human conduct and experience constructed by the imagination and capable of realization in nature. A value is nothing but a temporal judgment as to the means to be taken and the method to be pursued for the satisfaction of the requirements of the individual and society, and as such its validity depends on the consequences to which it leads. *A value, in brief, is a direction of becoming rather than a principle of being.* There is no need therefore for supposing that all the ideals conceived by man are actually realized in some transcendent being who is absolutely perfect, as all philosophers of the great tradition have held. God is only a name for those selected ideals which man holds most precious and in this sense God is the principle of limitation (as He is for Whitehead) and the final cause of human conduct. Like the deity of S. Alexander, God is for Dewey an ideal objective rather than an actual ens perfectissimum. A religious man is therefore one who strives actively to realize in nature and society the highest ideals of the time. Dewey's argument is opposed to that of William James who, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, was disposed to acknowledge the objective existence of God or of an absolutely perfect being because of the fruitfulness or value-for-life of the religious experience.

7. SPINOZA IN RELATION TO CONTEMPORARY VALUE THEORY

So far as Spinoza's metaphysics is concerned, it is evident that it is radically opposed to the Neo-Kantian and phenomenological theories of value which involve the separation of value and being. It should be noted, however, that the inseparability of value and being is to be understood in two distinct ways.

In the first place, Spinoza's acceptance of the ontological proof for the existence of God is based on the postulate that value or perfection of essence is logically prior to existence and is, as it were, its internal, efficient cause (See author's paper "Value and Reality in the Metaphysics of Spinoza,"

Philosophical Review, May 1936). "Perfection," he argues (1-11 schol), "consequently does not prevent the existence of a thing, but establishes it, imperfection, on the other hand, prevents existence and so of no existence can we be more sure than of the existence of the being absolutely infinite or perfect, that is to say, God." In brief, the ontological proof is an attempt to demonstrate a priori that actuality and eternity of existence are inseparable from absolute perfection of essence—a condition which holds only in the case of God or the infinitely perfect being.

Secondly, so far as finite things are concerned, value is inseparable from actual power of being. That is to say, Spinoza agrees with the Scholastics that essence and existence of finite things are separable, but he insists with them that value is an attribute of actual essences (3-7). A thing is said to be perfect in virtue of its actual powers or functions and things may be arranged in a hierarchical scale of being in accordance with the virtues or powers of activity which they manifest. In all cases of finite objects, the actual thing is logically prior to the value which is attributed to it. Perfection or value is an attribute of actual things and not vice versa. Perfection of essence so understood has no reference to duration of existence (4-pref).

It should be observed, however, that this dynamic conception of value is quite compatible with a normative theory in which the intrinsic validity of value essences is acknowledged. In fact Spinoza does admit that ideas have a reality and perfection of their own independent of physical objects (2-7 schol, 3-explan after General Definition of Affects). Furthermore, insofar as he admits the autonomy of the intellect, he also affirms the intrinsic validity of final causes or value norms (see chap xv, § 1). Thus the separability of essence and existence has a double meaning. It means first that the actual essence or perfection of power is not measured by duration of existence in time but rather by excellence of function. Value, in other words, is an attribute of finite things considered as actually existing, though it is in no way dependent upon the length of their duration in time. Secondly, it means that actual ideas insofar as they are conceived by a mind

have an intrinsic perfection of their own independent of the physical objects or activities to which they may refer. In other words, Spinoza will agree with the Platonists that universal ideals have an intrinsic a priori validity, they will differ only as regards the ontological status of these value norms. For Spinoza these ideas are actual only insofar as they are conceived by an intellect and have no transcendent status of their own independent of a mind.

Spinoza's dynamic doctrine of value may historically be traced back to Aristotle. The latter, as is well known, was opposed to the Platonic separation of perfect forms or essences from imperfect things. Form and matter, Aristotle held, were inseparable so far as natural objects were concerned. This meant that the perfection of a thing was shown by its actual powers or functions and not by the mathematical perfection of its formal structure. On this basis, the good, virtue, or value of anything consists in the exercise of its actual powers and in the development of its potencies. For each thing to be and to act, is to enjoy the value of being.

Aristotle, like Plato, distinguished different degrees of being in nature, but he did so for contrary reasons. According to Plato actual things were of different degrees of reality because they conformed more or less approximately to the structural or formal perfection of their ideals. Aristotle, on the other hand, distinguished the various degrees of being empirically and without recourse to any transcendent realm of perfect forms. For example, inanimate matter, vegetable life, animal life, and intellectual activity constitute a scale of being such that the higher form of being always includes the functions of the lower form but has essential functions of its own as well (Aristotle: *De Anima*). Aristotle, however, also acknowledged the intrinsic validity of final causes considered as the objectives of all activity. An idea of the good was for him the final cause of all animal motions.

It is evident from this account that in identifying value or perfection with actual power of being, Spinoza was simply following in the metaphysical tradition of Aristotle and the Scholastics. It is noteworthy in this connection that the Aristotelian and Spinozistic dynamic theory of value finds its

best modern expression in the writings of Whitehead—a fact to which Professor Laird in his *Idea of Value* has previously drawn attention. In his *Religion in the Making* ⁶ Whitehead writes (p. 100) : “Value is inherent in actuality itself. To be an actual entity is to have a self-interest. This self-interest is a feeling of self-valuation, it is an emotional tone. The value of other things not one’s self is the derivative value of being elements contributing to this ultimate self-interest. This self-interest is the interest of what one’s existence as in that epochal occasion comes to. It is the ultimate enjoyment of being actual. . . . But the actuality is the enjoyment and the enjoyment is the experiencing of value.” And again (p. 103) : “There is no such thing as bare value. There is always specific value which is the created unit of feeling, arising out of the specific mode of concretion of the diverse elements. These different specific value-feelings are comparable amid their differences, and the ground for this comparability is what is here termed value. Various occasions are thus comparable in respect of their relative depth of actuality. Occasions differ in importance of actuality.” Here we see that in spite of the radical difference between Whitehead’s process philosophy and Spinoza’s philosophy of being, they are in agreement as to the identity of value and actuality of existence. If one substitutes the term “being” for Whitehead’s term “feeling” his statement becomes equivalent to the dynamic doctrine of Spinoza and Aristotle.

Spinoza’s originality consists in the pantheistic application of this dynamic theory of value. By attributing all or infinite power of being to God, he came to regard all finite things as modes of this absolutely perfect substance. That is to say, Spinoza like Plato came to maintain that actual, finite things lacked in perfection of being as compared with an absolute, a priori ontological standard. They differed only insofar as Spinoza conceived the absolute standard of perfection in dynamic, Aristotelian terms rather than in structural, mathematical terms. Furthermore, God as conceived by Spinoza was absolutely infinite, whereas for Plato (and Aris-

⁶ A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (New York, Macmillan Co., 1926). Reprinted by permission of the Macmillan Company, publishers.

tote) all forms of perfection were finite. Again it is instructive to note that Whitehead in his *Adventures of Ideas*⁷ (pp 330, 375) argues in accord with the Greek tradition and in opposition to Spinoza and the Neo-Platonists when he maintains that "all realization is finite and there is no perfection which is the infinitude of all perfection. . . All realization of the good is finite and necessarily excludes certain other types"

/ Whitehead feels compelled to regard the actual cosmos as finite in order to account for the problem of evil. Evil and imperfection, he insists, are something positive in nature, they are not, as Spinoza holds, mere negations of being. A thing is evil in relation to something else whose power of perfection it destroys (a notion also employed by Spinoza in his definition of the affect of pain, though he did not apply it to his metaphysics), considered by himself as something actual every thing is essentially good. Hence Whitehead concludes that it is impossible even for God to conceive or create an actual cosmos in which all possible forms of being are realized simultaneously—a thesis which is the direct antithesis of Spinoza's (1-append). An infinite cosmos could not possibly constitute a harmony (in the Greek sense) and is therefore incapable of being actually realized. *To be actual or to enjoy value is, Whitehead concludes, to be finite and temporal. For Spinoza, on the other hand, to be actual or to enjoy perfection in the truest sense of the word, is to be infinite and eternal.*

Spinoza's pantheism necessarily led him to deny teleology, in nature as a whole, since the identification of God with the whole of being precluded the notion of a final cause or idea of the good for the sake of which God might be said to act in creating finite things (1-33 schol. 2). If God is the whole of reality and value then it necessarily follows that there can be no transcendent, external good beyond God for the sake of which He acts. Spinoza therefore prefers the attitude of the Voluntarists who maintain that the essence of things

7 A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (Cambridge University Press, 1933). Quotations reprinted by permission of the Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

produced by God depends entirely upon His will and not upon any eternal truths which serve as archetypes.

With reference to finite things, Spinoza denied teleology since he held that each actual mode which followed from the divine perfection was necessarily perfect (1-33 schol 2). He therefore opposed the Aristotelian thesis that there were universal forms or entelechies immanent in natural objects which determined the course of their development toward a given end. Each thing, he argued, was by nature perfect and "to say that nature sometimes fails or commits an error or produces imperfect things" (4-pref) is to confuse a figment of the imagination with the actual nature of things (see chap ix, § 6). Nevertheless, as we have shown throughout the course of this work, he was able to construct a normative ethics only by implicitly reintroducing the principles which he professed to reject.

Strange as it may seem, Spinoza's nominalism and opposition to final causes even led him to the opposite extreme, that is to say, to the exclusion of all values from nature and being (see chap ix, § 6). Perfection and imperfection, he eventually argued, were nothing but constructs of the imagination and did not pertain intrinsically to the actual essence of things—a thesis which undermined his entire dynamic theory of value.

Spinoza's nominalism and exclusion of values from nature also had another cause, namely, the mechanistic physics which he adopted. Like Democritus, Lucretius, and Hobbes, he regarded all finite things as combinations of particles of matter endowed with the so-called primary qualities of figure, size, and motion. According to this mechanistic theory, the values of perfection, goodness, and beauty have no formal status in the nature of things, values are tertiary qualities attributed to things in accordance with their relations to the human body (1-pref.) The relativity of human opinion as to the things deemed good and evil, beautiful and ugly, seemed to establish their general contention. In brief, once all value attributes were excluded from physical nature, the hedonistic, relationistic theory of value was a necessary consequence.

Spinoza's psychobiological theory of value finds its best modern expression in R B Perry's *Theory of Value*⁸ and in J. R Reid's *Value Theory*.⁹ These writers, in agreement with the mechanistic tradition, also define value as a mode of feeling or desire produced in a subject by some external object. Ethical terms, they maintain, are descriptive of human interests or are attempts to direct the interests of others. Both the aforementioned writers quote with approval Spinoza's dictum (3-9 schol) that "we neither strive for, wish, seek nor desire anything because we think it good, but, on the contrary, we adjudge a thing to be good because we strive for, wish, seek or desire it." In the last analysis, the modern naturalists like their predecessors tend to regard value as a kind of tertiary quality conferred upon an object by a subject whose desire it satisfies.

To sum up The foregoing analysis reveals the conflicting nature of Spinoza's theories of value. To begin with, we noted that the ontological proof for the existence of God, which forms the basic premise of the *Ethics*, rests on the postulate that eternity or necessity of existence is an attribute of the essence of an absolutely perfect being. Spinoza, that is to say, argues from the nature of value to existence.¹⁰ This union of absolute value and eternity of existence is, we have seen, directly contrary to the phenomenological theory of Urban and Moore who separate the value category from that of existence and therefore deny the validity of the ontological proof.¹¹

⁸ R B Perry, *General Theory of Value* (New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1926)

⁹ J R Reid, *A Theory of Value* (New York, Scribner's Sons, 1938)

¹⁰ In the last analysis, it may be said, the ontological proof is based on a Platonic metaphysics, since Plato first made the perfection of the forms the source of actuality of existence in things. Perfection of essence is prior to existence and is its formal cause. It is no accident that the Scholastics who followed in the Aristotelian tradition have on the whole opposed the ontological proof and maintained the primacy of actual being to perfection. On this point see E Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, chap. iil, p. 55.

¹¹ I would note in this connection that there is an element of similarity between Spinoza's ontological theory of value and the phenomenological theory of Urban. Both are agreed that value or perfection is, as it were, the cause of existence. They differ insofar as Urban continues to regard value

Secondly, with reference to finite things, Spinoza follows the Scholastic tradition in regarding value or perfection as an attribute of the actual essence or power of things. The degree of value or perfection of essence enjoyed by actual things has no reference to their power of existence or duration in time, though Spinoza argues contrarily insofar as he identifies essence and the conatus to live (see chap. III, § 2). This theory we describe as dynamic in contrast to the normative, structural theory of the Platonists and phenomenologists. Spinoza's dynamic theory, we noted, was quite compatible with his implicit normative theory of value which involves the intrinsic perfection of ideas or modes of thought.

And finally we observed that his mechanical physics, his nominalism, and exclusion of final causes led him to argue for a psychobiological theory of value which undermined his metaphysical, dynamical theory.

The importance of our study of Spinoza's diverse theories of value lies precisely in the evidence it affords as to the relation between one's ontological presuppositions and his ultimate conclusions concerning the significance of moral values.

The validity of our interpretation is corroborated by the diversity of opinion among Spinozistic scholars as well as by the fertility of his influence upon contemporary value theory. Modern naturalists such as Perry and Reid and evolutionary philosophers such as S. Alexander and Lloyd Morgan have seized upon the psychobiological aspect of his thought. Metaphysicians like Whitehead (and formerly Bosanquet) have stressed the dynamic nature of his value theory and the identity of value and actuality. And finally Platonizing philosophers such as Santayana have made much of the eternal validity of conceptual value essences and their independence of existing, physical objects. Our contention throughout this study has been that all these tendencies have a basis in Spi-

as something transcending existence or actual being, whereas Spinoza like St. Anselm maintains that actuality of existence is an intrinsic attribute of ultimate or infinite value. That is why, for Spinoza, value is ultimately definable in terms of powers of existence, but it is not definable at all for Urban. Value, for Spinoza, is not separable from some form of being. For Urban, being is not separable from value but the converse does not hold (see *Intelligible World*, p. 164).

noza's work, though they are not all compatible with one another

Our comparison of Spinoza's theory of value with those of contemporary thinkers has revealed that, contrary to the usual complaint about the utter confusion in current axiology, the major issues are clear and well defined. On the other hand, our survey also shows that modern axiology is, for the most part, but "a new name for some old ways of thinking." The only really original contribution is that of the Neo-Kantians. The others, it seems, are simply using a new terminology to discuss the classical problems of metaphysics and ethics. The issue then narrows down to this: Is one's value theory ultimately inseparable from a specific metaphysics or shall we say that the value category transcends all metaphysical notions and is "beyond realism and idealism"? Our study has shown that if one separates value from essence and existence, then values become purely formal, regulative, and compatible with any conceivable order of nature. The question remains whether such a conception of value really renders the world more intelligible to the human intellect and whether it provides an adequate criterion of human virtue and happiness. Spinoza's answer, we may be sure, would be in the negative, since his *Ethics* is dedicated to the proposition that ideals of value must be in accord with a scientific knowledge of the actual order of nature and that God as the consummation of value and being is the source of all human intelligibility and felicity.

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