

DELHI UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

**THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES**

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

★

THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY
NEW YORK


THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON

THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES



ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
CHARLES E. MERRIAM

EDITED BY LEONARD D. WHITE



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO • ILLINOIS

COPYRIGHT 1942 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ALL
RIGHTS RESERVED. PUBLISHED JUNE 1942 THIRD IM-
PRESSION APRIL 1943. COMPOSED AND PRINTED BY THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U S A

PREFACE



THIS book of essays has been written by a group of former students of Charles E. Merriam in token of the part he played in making them what they are. In this enterprise they perform a symbolic role. They speak for hundreds of men and women drawn in steadily increasing numbers to the University of Chicago by the personality and scholarship of the philosopher-politician who, without interrupting his academic work, once occupied the center of the municipal stage in Chicago and later sat close to the center of national authority. To all these students he gave faith in the capacity of man for a better life through tolerance and reason coupled with a willingness to fight for progressive ideals.

This faith he gave because of what he was and is. The central quality of his contribution to this generation is confidence in the future and certainty of the values of democracy. For forty years of active life, still in full course, he taught and in the dusty alleys of reform helped to achieve the greater fulfilment of what Croly called the "promise of American life."

For this reason his students have called their book *The Future of Government in the United States*. Each of them has taken one of Merriam's many interests and in this volume sought to forecast the kind of governmental problems and solutions that are likely to emerge. The variety of topics still does not represent the full range of his interests or achievements. Two contributors in important fields, indeed, were forced by pressure of official and other responsibilities to abandon their papers, and others might well have found their place here.

In these essays Merriam's students testify to their debt to him. For them he has been an extraordinary—sometimes a baffling—

TABLE OF CONTENTS



CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE EDUCATION OF CHARLES E. MERRIAM <i>By Charles E. Merriam, University of Chicago</i>	1
II. THE DEVELOPING SCIENCE OF DEMOCRACY <i>By Harold D. Lasswell, William A. White Foundation</i>	25
III. THE FUTURE OF URBANISM <i>By Albert Lepawsky, University of Chicago</i>	49
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING <i>By John A. Vieg, Iowa State College</i>	63
V. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE PRESS <i>By Leo C. Rosten</i>	88
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM <i>By Harold F. Gosnell, University of Chicago</i>	101
VII. TRENDS IN PARTY CAMPAIGN FUNDS <i>By Louise Overacker, Wellesley College</i>	119
VIII. POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION <i>By V. O. Key, Jr., Johns Hopkins University</i>	145
IX. THE FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT <i>By Joseph P. Harris, University of California</i>	164
X. THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF THE FUTURE <i>By Leonard D. White, University of Chicago</i>	192
XI. SOVEREIGNTY <i>By Hymen E. Cohen, University of Chicago</i>	218
XII. WORLD-POLITICS AND AMERICA'S DESTINY <i>By Frederick L. Schuman, Williams College</i>	235
NOTES	263
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF CHARLES E. MERRIAM	269

I

THE EDUCATION OF CHARLES E. MERRIAM

CHARLES E. MERRIAM



IT MUST be said, first of all, that these pages are part of a larger project, available in advance through the courtesy of the publisher. The education of Charles E. Merriam—"Silver and gold have I none, but such as I have I give to thee"—is a larger study to be completed at a later date when this education has more nearly run its course—not later than 1944, since this marks the end of the allotted threescore and ten years, stretching a point, at that. This larger inquiry will not be the intellectual vita or autopsy of any personality but will center around the life and times of the last generation as seen through the doubtless somewhat colored glasses of Charles E. Merriam.

PERIOD I. 1874-1905

Even in the more restricted field of this present plan, much must be omitted. It would have been possible to break up the education of Charles E. Merriam into, let us say,

Educational education—before the desk—behind it—from the community of scholars

Noneducational education—family, friends, sports, travel

Political education—in action and reflection, reaction and re-reflection

Areas of invincible ignorance—things that nobody could ever teach him

Then there is also the subconscious life of Charles E. Merriam, the "Book of Carlo." Although doubtless somewhat out of place in this somber obituary, here is a sample of what might have been but is not to be. The writer found in Merriam's yellowing relics the following:

When I was a boy I had a dog named Carlo, who always tagged me to school
No matter how many times I threatened or beat him, he came creeping along
and was waiting when I came out Today my mental Carlo accompanies me to

school, and, bolder than the other, he actually comes into the room with me, my inseparable canine friend—restless, irrepressible, irritating, dogged in his methods and baffling with his irresponsible doggish smile—my Carlo mind.

When I am discussing Hegel, he may blink up at me with a City-Hall smile. When I am speaking of Marx, he may lift his head as if to howl. When I am expounding Pareto, he may put his head upon his paws. When I am talking about the right of revolution, he may look mournfully at his collar.

He looks at Mr. Chute and wonders what will happen if he ever learns to use his head as well as hands—what magic theories he will pull out. He wonders how Ritscher (Beirut) feels commuting back and forth from Occident to Orient. He notices the contrast between Miss Kennedy's Puritan countenance and the toughest town in America, from which she comes. He asks whether Levi will ever be as great a man as his father, and, if so, when.^{1*} He tries to recall whether Miss Fitzgerald is from Smith or Vassar, and I cannot quiet him by saying it doesn't matter—really from River Forest.

Now and then he stops and, contrary to all my strict instructions, he barks. He is allowed, I may say, to yap or yawn but not to bark. But he will insist on barking at those who doze or sleep. He comes back to tell me "they" are tired, or the room is close and hot; or, because he is an old friend, he may say the speaker was dull enough to warrant it. Sometimes he winks.

And, saddest of all, Carlo never laughs at my jokes—even those of less than ten years' vintage. Carlo never rises with me to the heights of theory nor pays attention to my sharpest dissection or most difficult major operation. A sphinx looking over the desert, I can never move his immobility.

He has even had the audacity to say, when rebuked, that perhaps he was only playing with other canines circling about the crowded room, waiting for their respective masters or mistresses to come along.

And will this Carlo ever learn to leave me? Who knows? In our old Fourth Reader there was a story of a faithful dog who lay upon his dead master's grave, refused to move, and perished there. But what complications ensue nowadays. My body goes to the Medical School, sold to Dr. Carlson or his heirs and assigns for \$50, and poor Carlo would have to wait outside of Billings, and who knows, indeed, with all the numerous institutions of the higher healing, the entrances and exits to and from, he might mistake the proper place to lie in his masterpiece of dogged devotion.

After all, are we sure that we know what is education, or what is Charles E. Merriam, or the interrelation between them? These questions give the writer pause. But on his desk calendar this very day are the words, "What is difficulty? A mere notice of the necessity for exertion."

* Footnotes at end of book

In view of all that Merriam has written about the importance of social and economic background in political science, it would be treason to omit some reference to his own origins.

Assume a country town of some six hundred population in a farming center of eastern Iowa. Assume a home in this town just across from the campus of a Presbyterian college—called Lenox, after a manufacturer who never “came through.” Assume Margaret Campbell Kirkwood, a schoolteacher fresh from Scotland. Assume the Yankee, Charles E. Merriam, Sr., from Massachusetts—Corporal Merriam, postmaster Merriam, merchant Merriam, banker Merriam, Presbyterian elder Merriam. Assume John Campbell Merriam, natural scientist, geologist, paleontologist, later to become president of Carnegie Institution, alternately fought and followed by his younger brother. Assume Merriam’s younger sister, the sad-faced Sue, who cared more about poetry than politics. For good measure, assume one year of residence on the campus of Berkeley, California (1888–89), and the hills from which Merriam looked out over the Golden Gate and at dusk sometimes saw the lights come out in San Francisco across the bay or perhaps the fog come rolling in to engulf the region.

The formal education of Charles E. Merriam was prolonged by the insistence of his father on a “sound foundation.” After his arrival in Iowa from Princeton, Massachusetts, Merriam, Sr., enlisted in the army at the ripe age of sixteen and, with four and a half years of service, had no college education. But he was taking no chances on the second generation. Junior must have a classical education and an A.B., even if it took an extra year and a half, filled with Latin and Greek. And before he started on his legal education, Junior must have a degree not merely from a three-year college but from a “regular university,” the State University of Iowa. Furthermore, he must test his learning by teaching one year in the country schools of Iowa at \$22.50 a month. And after the University of Iowa came one year of teaching in Lenox College—classics and mathematics. “God save the mark,” the classicists might say.

The parental plan contemplated the education of Merriam as

a lawyer and his rise to political power under the skilful guidance of his not uninfluential father—an intimate adviser to many who sat in high places, Senator Allison and Speaker Henderson, among others. But by 1895 the legal and the political careers had vanished; the picture long cherished by both Senior and Junior had faded out. The extra year in the state university had been devoted to economics and politics under skilful teachers, and the law school of that day was on a relatively low level. Charles E. Merriam took what seemed to him the high road and, as it turned out, the hard road.

Then came Columbia University, 1896-1900, with time out for one year as lecturer in political theory in the sabbatical absence of Professor Dunning and one year in the universities of Berlin and Paris. In the beginning of this period Merriam's thinking was directed primarily to economics, but political theory emerged triumphant, although not without many a lingering glance at economics, sociology, and history.

This community of scholars unfolded to Merriam a scroll of intellectual adventure that thrilled him through and through. The wisdom and Shakespearean wit of Dunning; the immense erudition of Seligman in public finance; the wide-ranging understanding of Munroe Smith and Kohler in comparative jurisprudence; the majestic personality of Gierke, chairman of the German Imperial Code Commission; the subtleties of Preuss, later draftsman of the Weimar Constitution; the sharp challenges of the rising sociologist, Giddings; the living history portrayed by Robinson and Osgood—all these registered their deep impress on the youthful student. In Paris he learned from the architects and artists who surrounded him—and in the great Bibliothèque Nationale and the Sorbonne. Those familiar with the growth of methods will observe that this community—except the artists—reflected the “historical and comparative” method in its fullest flower.

From all these adventures Merriam emerged with a Doctor's degree and a fat thesis on the *History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau*. Little did he dream that a few years later he was

to be cartooned in his cap and gown with the *Theory of Sovereignty* under one arm and a political boss on the other. What, if anything, had Merriam learned in this quarter of a century of education and what had he failed to learn? "Touching these things we are not careful to answer Thee, oh King." Sitting at the feet of Gamaliel, so to speak, and trained in the very strictest of the schools which award the imposing degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Merriam at least had learned the useful tricks of the trade, the standard skills and techniques of academic research of that day. But his areas of ignorance and of invincible ignorance were still wide-ranging plains, submarginal and otherwise.

His education moves from Columbia to the University of Chicago, in the role of the last of the docents. And here is the beginning of an education behind the desk and within a group of colleagues. Here the shape of Charles E. Merriam was modified by his contacts with the sardonic Veblen, with friendly John Dewey, with helpful Tufts, and with associates such as Wesley C. Mitchell and H. J. Davenport, intent on economic conquests. In his own more intimate field came the broadening influence of Ernst Freund in law and political science and of Edmund J. James, soon to be president of the University of Illinois.

At the end of this period Merriam possessed a standard academic education and a university position in political science. He had written *History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau* (1900) and *A History of American Political Theories* (1903). Thus, he was well on his way toward a five-foot shelf of erudition in political science, "historical and comparative."

PERIOD II. 1905-10

On an evening in the fall of 1905, Merriam was sitting in the Century Club of New York City dining with Professor William A. Dunning, his intellectual mentor and sponsor. Between them lay a manuscript, a much-labored manuscript, containing an outline and many rough notes on the subject of systematic politics. Here was the projected outline of the "Principles of Politics." It was but a short way from the *Theory of Sovereignty* in 1900 to the pro-

jected "Principles of Politics" in 1905; it was to be a much longer and steeper way to *Political Power*, written Unter den Linden in 1932, and an even further and rougher way to the final publication of "Systematic Politics" in 1944.

"Your manuscript, Dr. Merriam," said the learned Professor Dunning, "is very interesting, indeed. It reflects much careful thought, but" (and as Merriam looked into Dunning's keen blue eyes, he instinctively braced himself for an explosion to follow the "but") "but ten years from now you might be sorry you had published this material. You might spend the rest of your life defending it. Perhaps you ought to know more of life and learning and reflect more deeply before you set down your principles of politics." Perhaps he was right. Perhaps he was wrong.

Rightly or wrongly, Merriam was diverted from his purpose. Lord Bryce told him that at least ten years of practical experience in politics was useful for a student of government. Merriam recalled Plato's recommendation of fifteen years in the den for Guardians of the Law. Some might say the tug of early experience and of local appeal swept him away, not, to be sure, from his university but from his design to set down the new version of "Systematic Politics."

Once in the stream, he was swept powerfully along. Merriam's plan to remain some years in the Chicago City Council, to which he was elected, was upset by the insistence of leading citizens, and he found himself a candidate for mayor in 1911 at the age of thirty-six. Merriam was certainly "in the den" for the prescribed period of Bryce and Plato—six years a member of the City Council, many years participating in urban activities of many kinds, and, at the close of this period, a year and a half in World War I. These were the years of "Hinky Dink" and "Bathhouse John," of "Bill the Builder" and his coadjutor, "Sam" Insull; but they were also the years of Rosenwald, Crane, Lawson, Jane Addams, Burnham, and the Chicago Plan. At the end of the period, in the distant city of Rome, enter Orlando, Nitti, Sonnino, D'Annunzio, Benito Mussolini, and Franklin D. Roosevelt and enter Fiorello La Guardia and Walter Wanger as aides of Charles E. Merriam.²

Merriam was not unfamiliar with politics, as many of his colleagues discovered when they presumed upon his innocence. From the ages of ten to twenty he had been intimately associated with the politics of Iowa—"some state" for politics. In Columbia he had studied Tammany Hall and had taken part in one mayoralty campaign, from the rear of a truck. In Berlin, a pupil of Doctor Preuss, then a member of the Berlin City Council, he had organized a club for the study of German politics.

But a great metropolitan community like Chicago is a cross-section of civilization; and participation in its struggles upward opened the way to understanding of many of the persistent problems of political behavior. These experiences were summed up in Merriam's *Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics*, published in 1929. His conclusions as a participant-observer are, in his judgment, best stated in chapter vii, entitled "Actual Government." His more general observations are reflected in the concluding chapter, chapter ix, on "Chicago Emerging." Here he portrayed at the end of a series of material experiences the soul of the city.

And finally arises the question, Is there a Chicago emerging from this confusion of novel, complex and shifting elements, a new interest and a new loyalty to a new center?

Every city must struggle hard to find its own life, its own individuality, its own soul. Time-stained urban centers like London and Paris achieved their personality long ago, and trace their experience back through winding centuries. This is our city, men say, and women and children. Its name and fame are ours. It is ourselves written large, thrown upon the screen; and its heights and depths, its grandeur and its meanness are ours. We begin to assume a proprietary and responsible interest in its conduct. In the old days this interest was a landowners' interest in large part, even in urban centers where the emphasis was less and less on land and more and more upon trade; but now as the number of property owners diminishes year by year enthusiasm and loyalty are transferred and taken up by the citizens who have no land and never will have in most cases. But they too become enthusiasts and bearers of the torch.

In various ways this spirit finds expression. In some song or poem or piece of art; some majestic building, some stately street; some humbler but familiar section of the town, perhaps, entwined with rich experiences; some brilliant personality, illuminating the lives of men; in some great trial or some great triumph

that has been inwrought in the experience of the community, some series of pre-eminences in which the city has a part and of which the citizen becomes a part. These events and experiences may be other than political in nature, some great achievement, some spectacle, demonstration, discovery, the cumulation of which, or the poignancy of which stirs the citizen's interest and allegiance, invests a group situation with an emotional quality and blends it with the deeper aspirations of his nature, with the subtle patterns of his temperament

The city must struggle hard for life and being. . . . Slowly the city must develop those common understandings about common affairs that lie at the basis of government, the sense of individual and group advantage in the city setting, standards of achievement, inventions of common advantage, and some of the great idealisms that sweep men's souls

The satisfaction of substantial interests lies at the center of these urban groups, for they must have some functional value in the lives of men, unless they survive merely as traditions and artistic reminders of experiences now dead. To see and know these interests makes the community of advantage which is the basis of solidarity. As time goes on experience, woven of the stuff of common life, covers these interests with a golden glow of civic feeling that may at times be mightier than gold or steel, for it may direct their course and conduct [pp. 299-300]

During this period the figure of Blackstone rose again, for Merriam was offered important legal positions in important legal firms. "Come with us," they said. "Become a lawyer. In a few years it will be forgotten that you were once a professor, and a political career will be wide open to you." It would have been of little use for Merriam to have said, "I have my eye on 'Systematic Politics.' " But he could and did say, "Get thee behind me, Satan."

But what, if anything, was contributed to the education of Charles E. Merriam in these years of struggle? A compiler of dusty titles will find his *Primary Elections* (1908), the *Chicago Harbor Commission Report*, the Chicago Commission on City Expenditures reports, the *Report of the City Council Committee on Crime of the City of Chicago*, the *Building District (zoning) Report*, the *Public Utilities Report*.³ A friendly critic might rate these as contributions to the political education of Chicago, if not of Merriam. "Big Bill," it is true, found the report of the Crime Commission an abomination, and his Board of Education charged Merriam with conspiracy

(with Professor Charles H. Judd) to "destroy the love of liberty in the hearts of the school children of Chicago." But these types of clowning faded away. This is not the time to recapitulate what Merriam thought he had accomplished then or later in urban affairs.

From 1911 on, Merriam was offered many important posts in Washington under Presidents Taft and Wilson, such as President Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency and a twelve-year term on one of President Wilson's boards—"Just to be around in the center of things where you could be talked to," they said. The master-pedagogy of politics, of which Plato, Dunning, and Bryce discoursed, might have indicated the desirability of federal training in the interest of a rounded education. But there are deeper things in education than the symmetrical form of training. Merriam felt his obligations bound him to the problems of the city of which he seemed to be a part, whether in or out of prestige and power. Perhaps this was error. Perhaps this was a part of his education, who knows? It would have been an easier step from Chicago to Washington than from Chicago to Rome—a roundabout road to the Washington he finally reached.

PERIOD III. 1919-32

The end of World War I marked a new phase in the education of Merriam. He now attacked industriously the materials assembled in the last decade or more. *The American Party System*, in 1922, summed up his political observations in the field of party politics. His conclusions regarding the city were later summed up in *Chicago* in 1929 (written earlier). Reverting to an earlier type, he completed in 1920 *American Political Ideas: 1865-1917*, supplementing the *American Political Theories* of 1903. *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times*, edited in 1924, was another volume falling in the same general category. He was once more headed toward a five-foot shelf of political erudition and might presumably have lived happily ever afterward upon the fruits of such undertakings.

But, alas, by this time he was profoundly dissatisfied with the

basic methods of observation and analysis in political science. Systematic politics was again delayed in the search for firmer ground upon which to proceed. One of Merriam's first efforts was directed toward improvement in the machinery for research. He had gone to a high official of the university and asked for stenographic and other assistance in the conduct of an inquiry. The answer had been, "Come back in a week." At the end of the week the reply was that "the University could not possibly afford to aid all its professors in writing their books." The old methods seemed a little stuffy! The answer was the Social Science Research Building, Eleven Twenty-six, and "1313"—the public administration center.

Merriam approached the problem of research facilities and methods through the American Political Science Association as chairman of a special committee on research. A paper before the Association in January, 1921, on "The Present State of the Study of Politics" and the progress report of the Committee on Political Research in 1923 opened the way to an advance in the direction of more adequate techniques. Among other recommendations was that of the creation of a social science research council to bring about a closer relationship between the several disciplines and to improve their research facilities. The Social Science Research Council was set up in 1923, at first with three and later with seven societies as constituent members. This organization was instrumental in assisting social science workers to find research tools of types theretofore not available.⁴

Meanwhile, with a view to finding sounder methods, Merriam had begun, with the aid of his associates and students and of L.C.R. (Local Community Research via the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation), investigations in various lines of special significance: studies in nonvoting and quantitative methods with Dr. Gosnell and others. There came studies in propaganda and then in political psychology with Dr. Lasswell, leading to more elaborate inquiries in the field of psychoanalysis on the part of Dr. Harold; studies in the field of political leadership, running through a series of special monographs, by Gosnell, Johnson,

Peel, Robertson, Cohen, on down to the present still unfinished study of leadership by Louis Olom.

A milestone in the education of Merriam was *New Aspects of Politics* (1925).⁵ Here he emphasized the foundations of the new politics, the relationship of politics and psychology, politics and numbers, politics in relation to inheritance and environment, political prudence, and the tendency of politics.⁶ Merriam said:

Political maladjustments of the most formidable and menacing type threaten modern civilization at various points, and he would be a rash prophet who should promise the speedy and certain cure of all the ills the body politic is heir to. There are signs of still greater cataclysms than those the race has yet experienced in the economic, the political, the moral order [p xxxi]

Or again:

Jungle politics and laboratory science are incompatible, and they cannot live in the same world. The jungle will seize and use the laboratory, as in the last great war, when the propagandist conscripted the physicist, or the laboratory will master the jungle of human nature and turn its vast, teeming fertility to the higher uses of mankind [p 247].

This was also a travel period for Merriam, particularly from 1924 on. Restlessly he sought in various countries and capitals new light or inspiration on the problems of politics and social science. In London, in Vienna, in Geneva, in Moscow, in Berlin, he sought the counsel of scholars, he scribbled, he struggled hard to catch the inner meaning of a troubled world. Commissioned particularly to organize and edit a series of studies dealing with the making of citizens, he wandered far and wide in the prosecution of this task, searching for some of the secrets of political behavior in a quest that ranged from the Duk-Duks to Moscow and Rome. The results of these inquiries were summed up in a volume called *The Making of Citizens: A Comparative Study of Methods of Civic Training*, published in 1931.⁷ Dealing here with the social composition of civic cohesion, comparing the techniques of civic training, comparing the national systems of civic training, he arrived at various summaries and conclusions constituting a form of approach to a systematic politics. Among the fundamental phases of civic education about which Merriam learned were the

constitutional (physical-mental) bases of citizenship, in which he was able to interest, however, only a scattered few. Another was an integration of different social allegiances and codes—difficult to reconcile with the jurisdictional jealousies of social groups. Again there were the adjustment and balance between tradition and invention, always a sensitive spot in civic organization. His discussion of social symbolisms of various types in relation to civic cohesion was more widely accepted. His conclusion was that it is possible to relate much more closely the hitherto formal civic training with scientific studies of behavior and with the physical and mental constitution of the personality. “The diligent inculcation of proverbs, ideologies, and maxims of behavior may be tied in with the work of the physician, the psychologist, the psychiatrist, the constitutionalist, much more closely than ever before; and this would revolutionize the processes of political and social training” (p. 356).

But now comes a strange stage in the education of the difficult Charles E. Merriam. Overwhelmed, in a way, by the huge mechanism of research he had helped to develop in Chicago and elsewhere, he was impelled to flee from it for a time. His first intention was to go to the Island of Sylt, one side of which is an old Frisian village and the other a modern bathing resort. His plan was to spend the morning working in the old village and the rest of the day basking on the sands. However, arriving en route at Berlin in June, 1932, he found that a Reichstag election had just been called and concluded that the Island of Sylt was no place to write a study of political power while a terrific battle was raging in Berlin, with possibly a revolution as the outcome. Settling in the Hotel Bristol, Unter den Linden, in a room adjoining Professor Samuel Harper's, without a book, in six weeks he pounded out the political essay published under the title of *Political Power: Its Composition and Incidence* (1934). So in the city of Berlin where he once had framed a monograph on the theory of sovereignty, he worked again in the midst of a furious struggle for the possession of the symbols and substance of political power. In the mornings he wrote; in the afternoons he and Professor Harper became ob-

servers and students of Hitler, Bruening, of Reds and Whites from Russia, of all manner of folk who came streaming through the town and stopped for a glass of lemonade with Harper and Merriam. He saw Lasswell, a little pale that night, setting sail for Moscow. He saw President Gideonse roaming the streets in search of data. Most of all he saw the genial and sophisticated Edgar Mowrer, representative of the *Chicago Daily News*. In this volume Merriam undertook to show

the situations in which power comes into being, the plurality of competing loyalties, the shame of power and some of the credenda, miranda, and agenda of authority; some of the techniques of power holders who survive, and some of the defense mechanisms of those upon whom power is exercised, the poverty of power, the disintegration, decline, and overthrow of authority, the emerging trends of power in our time [p. 4]

In this phase of his education Merriam looked forward to a none-too-peaceful world. He anticipated, he said, "fundamental changes in the political, the industrial, the religious, the scientific order, changes that will shatter many of the present-day and historic power structures beyond recognition and remake them in new forms that will be terrifying to those who love the *status quo*" (p. 325). That violence and passion would remake these patterns in the near future he thought seemed likely. There was the alternative, however, of creating new power patterns. The mold in which the modern state was cast a few centuries ago was broken or breaking, but it was still possible to avert the grand catastrophes that from time to time have swept whole civilizations from the face of the earth. Whether or not this was in fact possible, it was not done. And yet Merriam always clung to the validity of the last paragraph of his *Political Power*:

It is a long road out of a slavery to inanimate nature, out of a slavery to human nature, up to the mastery of the dark and fateful forces around us and within, but the race is on its way. The future belongs to those who fuse intelligence with faith, and who with courage and determination grope their way forward from chance to choice, from blind adaptation to creative evolution [p. 326]

PERIOD IV. 1929-40

At this point some lynx-eyed editor may say, "Aha! These periods overlap." Aha! and Oho! But the education of Charles E.

Merriam was never governed by chronology and will not be disturbed or diverted by the technicalities of pettifogging critics more interested in the little niceties of dates than in the broad philosophy of life. The dates do overlap.

In Phase IV of his struggle for political understanding Merriam may be said almost to have put himself "in commission." His personality was, in a sense, swallowed up in an unending series of facts and figures, findings and conclusions, prepared by various boards of which he was usually an unwilling member. Some of these were nongovernmental, and some were creatures of the state. Of the nongovernmental type was the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, projected under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council. Another was the Commission on the Social Studies (American Historical Association), whose report Merriam could not bring himself to sign.

Merriam fell again into the political flood from which he had escaped in 1919 after many years of political abstention, save various municipal activities in the city of Chicago, such as aiding in the election of Mayor Dever and debunking "Bill the Builder" in 1931—his best effort in campaigning. This participation came about through President Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends (1929), of which Merriam was made vice-chairman. This co-operative labor stretched out over a period of four years. Merriam himself contributed a section on "Government and Society." The results of the committee's inquiries, embodied in its report, indicated the urgent need for social change of a type calculated to bring social institutions and practices up to meet the situations precipitated by technological development.

The alternative to constructive social initiative may conceivably be a prolongation of a policy of drift and some readjustment as time goes on. More definite alternatives, however, are urged by dictatorial systems in which the factors of force and violence may loom large. In such cases the basic decisions are frankly imposed by power groups, and violence may subordinate technical intelligence in social guidance.

Unless there can be a more impressive integration of social skills and fusing of social purposes than is revealed by recent trends, there can be no assurance that these alternatives with their accompaniments of violent revolution, dark

periods of serious repression of libertarian and democratic forms, the proscription and loss of many useful elements in the present productive system, can be averted.

Fully realizing its mission, the Committee does not wish to assume an attitude of alarmist irresponsibility, but on the other hand it would be highly negligent to gloss over the stark and bitter realities of the social situation, and to ignore the imminent perils in further advance of our heavy technical machinery over crumbling roads and shaking bridges. There are times when silence is not neutrality, but assent.⁸

Growing out of a suggestion made by the Committee on Social Trends came the National Resources Planning Board in 1933. Set up finally as a part of the Executive Office of the President, this agency was designed to serve as a general staff for the executive in the field of over-all planning. Space does not permit the analysis, or even the listing, here of the elaborate series of inquiries, reports, and recommendations ranging over the field of human and material resources.⁹ In broadest terms the work of the Board represented an organized effort to apply social intelligence to the consideration of planning problems—local, regional, and national. Freed from operational responsibilities, the planning agency devoted itself to wide-ranging consideration of long-time plans for the highest and best use of national resources, both natural and human.¹⁰

Urban planning, likewise, had a continuing appeal to Merriam, but in 1940 he declined an urgent request to assume the responsibilities of chairman of the Chicago Plan Commission.

In all his work of planning Merriam repeatedly pointed out that planning can be carried out most successfully in democratic states, that planning is not fundamentally regimentation but release of human potentialities and opportunities. The essence of the planning program lies in the increasing development of national resources and in the fairest possible participation in the gains of civilization—and this under a system of free enterprise and of free government.

STRANGE INTERLUDE: MERRIAM STUDIES ADMINISTRATION

During this period Merriam entered the School of Public Administration but came out without a degree. In earlier years un-

der Goodnow, in Columbia, and Preuss, in the University of Berlin, he had studied the legal principles underlying administration. While interested in urban affairs, he had been instrumental in setting up the Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency. But now, by a series of accidents, he found himself projected into the center of a series of administrative studies of the most modern type. By accident he collaborated with Dr. Beardsley Ruml, then director of the Spelman Fund, in setting up a plan for practical assistance to administrative agencies. Even yet he recalls many pleasant hours in Geneva, in Berlin, in Cambridge, mulling over this document. By projection of this accident Merriam later became a director and then chairman of the Spelman Fund, which laid the foundations of the "1313" organization in Chicago, with its wide-ranging ramifications through the administrative service of America. Another story, this.

By another accident, too complicated to explain here, Merriam became a member of the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel set up by the Social Science Research Council and was a humble helper in the formulation of what proved to be a not insignificant report.

By a still more notable accident Merriam became a member of President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management. He had suggested to the President the importance of an inquiry into over-all management; but when Governor Lowden found himself unable to serve on the committee, Merriam was shackled between two experts in this field—Louis Brownlow and Luther Gulick. Here he learned something of administration by listening to the intelligent comments of his coadjutors. This was always enlightening but sometimes tough. For example, when King Edward "at long last" made his famous farewell address over the radio, Merriam was frozen between two icy experts at what seemed to him a thrilling moment. Fortunately, he was rescued and thawed out, by courtesy of Dr. Ruml.

Whether he was able to make any important contribution to this important subject of administration is problematical; but, since we are dealing with his education, there can be no question

that he learned about the practices and principles of public administration. He even became so bold as to include some phases of the underlying principles of administration in his *Systematic Politics*. But his study of "Managers as Magicians" was rejected for publication and will probably never see the light of day. *Quelle dommage!* But, whatever happens, Merriam will always look back with keenest pleasure on his "short course" in public administration.

SYSTEMATIC POLITICS AGAIN

During this period, while as heavily besieged by organizational contrivances as was Tobruk, *Systematic Politics* held out gallantly, or, at least, firmly. Political power was further developed in the study of *The Role of Politics in Social Change* (1936). This little book, unfortunately priced at three dollars when it was worth about one, had a small circulation but represented an important phase in the development of Merriam. Here he dealt with boycotting government, putting politics in its place, with pessimism and violence, and particularly with strategic controls. In this little work Merriam undertook to shear through the struggle between individualism and collectivism by attacking the doctrine of economic fatalism upon which both of them rested. In a changing society the regulative system develops in accordance with the ingenuity and skill of the social inventiveness of the times. "The quantity of social control need not change, but its forms, types, lines, are altered to meet new needs in new periods of tension" (p. 121). In all this process social intelligence is of prime importance and cannot in the long run be displaced by pessimism and violence. The "wave of the future" is not living in reality but is a trick of the power-hungry who say "Fate" when they mean their own will. Pointing out that "Marx, the great Undetermined, made Economics King, Freud, the great Unanalyzed, made Libido the King" (p. 76), Merriam repudiated their respective determinisms and insisted upon the prior role of reason.

Likewise, in his *Prologue to Politics* (1939), he scorned the doctrine that reason must yield to force. "No, the answer is that

reason itself is the greatest force, and in the end it will prevail reason must be allied with will, with faith, with hope, with practical judgment, and must be set as the jewel in organization and management" (pp. 99-100). In this little volume Merriam discussed the ideal state (chap. iii), and, cumbersome though it may seem, the reviewer now introduces a long quotation:

We look for an era of abundance, for higher standards of living than mankind has ever known. We know that this is possible if men will adapt their social and political institutions to their technical possibilities. I have elsewhere discussed this possibility at some length. We know a fairyland of achievement lies ahead if we will reach out and take the gifts the gods have given us abundantly.

We know that we enter an era of creative evolution, and we look forward to adventurous participation in the constructive betterment and transformation of life-conditions.

In the day when this new world to which we come is generally seen and understood—in that day, not only the concepts of power, property, and prestige but also the concept of human differences in capacity enter upon a transformation. Just as government ceases to be chiefly repression, as leadership ceases to be crass domination and exploitation, as property ceases to be largely an economic symbol of exclusive possession, and as work ceases to be chiefly long and grinding toil, the whole nature of power is being changed from the negative to the positive and is unfolding in its creative aspects. In these oncoming days we realize that not only may men achieve that personal security and community stability which might mean monotony and boredom but they may look forward to adventurous participation in the process of creative evolution—in the constructive transformation and betterment of life-conditions.

The greatest of all revolutions in the whole history of mankind is the acceptance of creative evolution as the proper role of man, for this will eventually transform the spirit and the institutions of education, of industry, and of government, opening a broad way to the realization of the highest and finest values of human life, in a form of association where leaders no longer scream and curse and threaten and where men no longer shuffle, cringe, and fear but stand erect in dignity and liberty and speak with calm voices of what clear eyes may see.

Free men—in free states—in a free world—these the ideal state may bring [pp. 72-73].

In this same chapter in the *Prologue* on the ideal state the professor said, summing up his view of the future:

But, you ask me: "At the very end, what do you see? You are something of a seer; at least, you have seen and read and thought much of politics and states.

What do you see ahead, dim as your eyes may be, and full of obsessions as your mind may be, and thick as the encircling gloom may be?"

Let me first look backward—then forward. Looking down through the long corridors of human experience—my own experience and that of others in common living in commonwealths—I see the slow emergence of human personality after many bloody and brutal checks—personality set in a framework of justice, order, liberty, reason—and see victories won by those with the courage, faith, and intelligence to struggle onward toward a distant goal. Man is a rational animal; and I observe that the animal rules from time to time, but not forever. I am no more alarmed at the outbursts of the animal than at those of the rational.

No student of government is ignorant of the long years of slavery and caste; of brutality and exploitation, of prisons, dungeons, exiles, beatings, brandings, breakings on the wheel, the screams of tortured men, the cynical gloatings and squeakings of brutal little masters and keepers dressed in a little brief authority; of the annals of weakness, wickedness, vanity, corruption, treason, folly; of incompetence, futility, cowardice, fussiness in politics; of rascality and roguery; of the long series of rows of army trenches that mark for little whiles through unending cemeteries, east and west, the flower of youth and manhood; or of the slow burning hatreds smoldering for centuries in millions of mankind.

But I see also the emergence of law, the rise of order; the organization of justice, of common counsel, of rational discussion, of management, not merely humane, but human. I see the growth of liberty. I see the gleam of the wings of human personality emerging from its chrysalis, the wide-ranging and soaring triumph of the supremacy of the commonweal.

Looking forward, I cannot say, from the ramparts I watch, in reply to the old question you are asking, "Watchman, tell us of the night . . .", I cannot say, "Lo, the dawn is here."

But in a moment when the world rushes forward perhaps to its most terrible, titanic, and destructive war, I see somehow an end of violence. I see an epitaph written large—an epitaph not of civilization but of war.

In a moment when exaggerated tribalism sweeps all before it, I seem to see thrusting upward from below a new world-order.

In a moment of cruel race antipathy and incredible brutality among civilized people, I seem to see the rising figure of the brotherhood of man. I seem to see that love is stronger than hate, strong as that dark passion may be, and that love will create more than hate destroys.

In a moment of widespread treason to reason, I seem to see the inexorable and inevitable triumph of intelligence over ignorance and error.

In a moment of values often measured by the standards of a pecuniary order, I seem to see a rising scale of human values richer than riches in a regime of social justice.

I see the stately structure of the new commonwealth, a temple of our common justice, a center of our common interest, a symbol of our common hope.

I do not know this. But you asked me what I saw, or seemed to see; and I am answering, through the fog and storm, as best I can.

"Brave words, professor!" you may say, if we meet in a concentration camp or an army hospital. But then my answer will be. "Patience" [pp. 74-75].

During this period Merriam faced the storm of attack upon democracy converging from the Right and from the Left. In this struggle he assailed the new despotism, and he also made a defense and development of the theory of the new democracy. He formulated a definite program for democratic action in a new world. A series of "guiding considerations," eight in number, gave the general framework of this study. The assumptions of democracy are outlined in five statements and critically examined.

The principal assumptions of democracy, he held, are as follows:

1. The essential dignity of man, the importance of protecting and cultivating his personality on a fraternal rather than a differential principle, and the elimination of special privileges based upon unwarranted or exaggerated emphasis on the human differentials.
2. Confidence in a constant drive toward the perfectibility of mankind
3. The assumption that the gains of commonwealths are essentially mass gains and should be diffused as promptly as possible throughout the community without too great delay or too wide a spread in differentials.
4. The desirability of popular decision in the last analysis on basic questions of social direction and policy, and of recognized procedures for the expression of such decisions and their validation in policy.
5. Confidence in the possibility of conscious social change accomplished through the process of consent rather than by the methods of violence ¹¹

Most important of all, if we are dealing with the learning processes of Merriam, was a statement of the positive program of democracy based upon its assumptions. There is involved, he declared:

1. A positive social program including the guaranty of full employment, of economic stabilization and security, of increasing productivity with equitable distribution of national gains; and a guaranty of minimum standards of living appropriate to our stage of civilization
2. Adequate machinery to make democracy work, including the sharpening of legislative organization and objectives, the further development of public administration, attention to plan making and planning of national resources

3. The development of a system of jural order in the world, by force if necessary, through which war may be outlawed as an instrument of national policy by some effective form of understanding or association and, in the interim, more intelligent adjustment of the relations between the organization of violence and the organization of consent in commonwealths
4. Faith in democracy's political ideals with (a) greater stress upon human values in the larger sense and (b) greater emphasis on the broad possibilities in the coming era of abundance¹²

PERIOD V. 1940-44

In 1940 the education of Merriam entered upon an entirely new phase. His retirement from the University of Chicago in 1940 naturally afforded him complete leisure for the elaboration of his uncompleted education and the final harvest. This experience presumably would continue until the end of his three-score-and-ten term in 1944.¹³

The key to the education of Charles E. Merriam in this period was given in his farewell talk to the Department of Political Science in the spring of 1940. Called upon to state his plans for the future, the aged professor said, in part,

Since this period of leisure opens out before me, I have considered carefully how it might best be utilized. I have looked at the various values of life. I have concluded that of all the things I most cherish and of which I have had the least, sleep ranks first. I wake in a sleepy frame of mind. I struggle to keep awake through troubled days. I'm happiest when my eyes close in slumber. Beginning June 30th, therefore, my schedule will be as follows, a schedule directed primarily toward the optimum period of sleep

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| 9:30-10:30 | Breakfast in bed; reading the morning journals |
| 10:30-11:30 | Exercise of an undetermined nature (horseshoes, perhaps) |
| 11:30-12:30 | A nap |
| 12:30-1:30 | Luncheon |
| 1:30-3:00 | Reading the world's great masterpieces, my own list, thank you |
| 3:00-4:00 | A nap |
| 4:00-5:00 | Exercise, bowling preferably |
| 5:00-5:30 | A Roman bath, if available |
| 5:30-6:30 | Cocktail hour, and if no friends and cocktails, reading the Scriptures |
| 6:30 | Dinner, followed by pictures and music |
| 9:00 | And so to bed |

In official recognition and definite approval of Merriam's program, he was later presented by the Department with a cocktail shaker and a copy of the Bible—an extra copy. But Merriam's anticipated and cherished leisure was rudely interrupted by the bursting of bombs. The second World War, which he had long anticipated and of which he had warned from 1932 on, broke in upon every way of life.

In these years Merriam published *What Is Democracy?* (1941), being the Walgreen Lectures at the University of Chicago, and *On the Agenda of Democracy* (1941), being the Godkin Lectures at Harvard University. In this period, also, the National Resources Planning Board, of which he was a member, presented as a part of the post-war program a Bill of Rights and a practical program to prevent post-war collapse and to realize a better future. Said the Board:

. . . the Bill of Rights has stood unshaken a hundred and fifty years. And now to the old freedoms we must add new freedoms and restate our objectives in modern terms.

Freedom of speech and expression, freedom to worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear, these are the universals of human life.

Any new declaration of personal rights, any translation of freedom into modern terms applicable to the people of the United States here and now must include:

1. *The right to work*, usefully and creatively through the productive years;
2. *The right to fair pay*, adequate to command the necessities and amenities of life in exchange for work, ideas, thrift, and other socially valuable service;
3. *The right to adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care*,
4. *The right to security*, with freedom from fear of old age, want, dependency, sickness, unemployment, and accident;
5. *The right to live in a system of free enterprise*, free from compulsory labor, irresponsible private power, arbitrary public authority, and unregulated monopolies;
6. *The right to come and go, to speak or to be silent*, free from the spyings of secret political police;
7. *The right to equality before the law*, with equal access to justice in fact,
8. *The right to education*, for work, for citizenship, and for personal growth and happiness; and
9. *The right to rest*, recreation, and adventure; the opportunity to enjoy life and take part in an advancing civilization.¹⁴

These rights and opportunities we in the United States want for ourselves and for our children now and when this war is over. They go beyond the political forms and freedoms for which our ancestors fought and which they handed on to us, because we live in a world, in which the central problems arise from new pressures of power, production, and population which our forefathers did not face.

But beyond these rights, what are the objectives? In part, they are as follows:

We must plan for full employment, for maintaining the national income at 100 billion dollars a year, at least, a point which we shall reach by 1944, rather than to let it slip back to 80, or 70, or 60 billion dollars again. In other words, we shall plan to balance our national production-consumption budget at a high level with full employment, not at a low level with mass unemployment.

We must plan to do this without requiring work from youth who should be in school, the aged who should be relieved if they wish it, and women who choose to make their contribution in the home, and without asking anyone to work regularly in mines, factories, transportation or offices more than 40 hours a week or 50 weeks a year, or to sacrifice the wage standards which have been set

We must plan to enable every human being within our boundaries to realize progressively the promise of American life in food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education, work, rest, home life, opportunity to advance, adventure, and the basic freedoms.

We must plan to make Up-Building America the keynote of the postwar program, including both development of our national resources adding to the National Estate, and service activities, which will increase the vitality, health, skill, productivity, knowledge, and happiness of the American people, and thus together end unemployment and add to our wealth and well-being.

"Star gazing," some said of this. But others, high in station, saw a gleam of hope and, moreover, a practical mode of procedure.

But what of the philosophy of politics? Was this also swept out by the war? No. The "Systematic Politics," deferred in the Century Club meeting of 1905, was pushed forward toward its completion in 1944. At the same time Merriam advanced his unified study of the history of American political ideas, two volumes already published and one unpublished, with the elaboration and

interpretation growing out of a period of teaching and reflection in this field. Finally "Silver and Gold: The Education of Charles E. Merriam" was woven into its final form.

But the querulous reader may say, "After all, this is a fraud. You have not given us much of the education of Charles E. Merriam. What you have presented is more or less a catalogue of his various writings, about which we know or could have known already. What did he learn and how did he learn it, and what did he do with his learning, if any? What was his attitude toward the great political movements of his time, movements in theory and movements of great forces? How did this Middle Westerner out of Scotland, Massachusetts, Iowa, Chicago, find a rapport in the world in which he lived? What part, if any, did he play in the broad political and social-political movements of his day? How did he reconcile Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Darwin, Pareto—the new thrusts of natural sciences—with psychology, with biology, with medicine? What were his relations with leading American scholars? What had he to say in the course of his education about Bryan, Wilson, the Roosevelts; of statesmen, high and low, whom he knew; of universities and educators and the "Higher Pedagogy." "What is going on here?" the reader may ask. "Is someone holding out on us?"

The answer lies in the shortness of time or possibly in the incapacity of the biographer. The world is in flames, and we must save it first. Some more convenient day these scrolls may be unrolled, or possibly they may not be.

II

THE DEVELOPING SCIENCE OF DEMOCRACY

HAROLD D. LASSWELL



THE developing science of democracy is an arsenal of implements for the achievement of democratic ideals. We know enough to know that democracies do not know how to live; they perish through ignorance—ignorance of how to sustain the will to live and of how to discover the means of life. Without knowledge, democracy will surely fall. With knowledge, democracy may succeed.

The significant advances of our time have not been in the discovery of new definitions of moral values or even in the skilful derivation of old definitions from more universal propositions. Our inheritance of brief definitions has been adequate. The advances of our time have been in the technique of relating them to reality.

In the process science has clarified morals. This, indeed, is the distinctive contribution of science to morality. Science can ascertain the means appropriate to the completion of moral impulse—means at once consistent with general definitions of morality and compatible with the fulfilment of moral purpose. The traditional sentences that define and justify morals, in common with all such sentences, use words of ambiguous reference. Each sentence is itself part of reality but refers to a larger reality. Standing alone, however, such a sentence is cryptic and fragmentary. The function of science is to complete it.

General sentences must be made part of a special language composed of postulates, definitions, and operational rules. The rules must specify how the key terms are to be used by observers who may take up various standpoints for the observation of real-

ity. For artistic and propaganda purposes we may tolerate dangling sentences of ambiguous reference. But as students of politics we are seriously concerned with connecting them with the realities of cabinet meetings, congressional inquiries, trade-association conventions, and general-staff conferences; hence it is necessary to participate in a long process of disciplined clarification.

Consider any one-sentence definition of the value that distinguishes democratic societies from other forms of human association. We may affirm that the democratic value is regard for the dignity of man. Hence society is democratic when it puts this value into practice; it is then a commonwealth of mutual deference. Just what do these words mean? How can the observer of political events decide when to use the term "democratic" in a sense consistent with the definition?

Are we to determine the truth about a given community by limiting our attention to the government or by examining the structure of business corporations, ecclesiastical organizations, and fraternal orders as well? Are we to instruct observers to rely upon the clauses of written constitutions or upon official election returns? Are we to instruct them to look beyond the official figures to determine to what extent those who vote feel themselves free of intimidation? Must they go beyond these questions to explore deeper attitudes, such as the degree to which the members of the community have a lively sense of genuine participation in the determination of democracy? Without such accompanying specifications, no definition of democracy that purports to relate to reality can be other than wordmongering.

The friends of democracy who have turned to science have been acutely dissatisfied with the ambiguity of inherited political, social, and philosophical literature. To speak of the movement toward science as a revolt against philosophy is to fall into error. It was not impatience with democratic morals that led to the de-emphasizing of general definitions; it was discontent with the chronic incompleteness of formulation in the traditional literature. The turning to the specific is more properly understood as a

stampede to complete philosophy, to reconsider every generality for the purpose of relating it to observable reality.

The mood of impatience was directed as much against speculative science as against philosophy, whenever speculative science was cultivated far beyond the limits of available data. This attitude is exemplified in what Wesley Mitchell wrote about his student impressions of philosophy and economic theory. "Give me premises and I could spin speculations by the yard. Also I knew my 'deductions' were futile. . . . [Veblen] could do no more than make certain conclusions plausible—like the rest."¹

Mitchell, and his American fellow-exponents of the scientific study of society, lived near the end of a long epoch of cultural optimism, in which democratic values had moved triumphantly toward universal acceptance. Democratic doctrine was affirmed by both the rulers of society and the most powerful exponents of revolutionary change. The Marxists did not reject democracy; on the contrary, they declared that the only path to democracy was the overthrow of capitalism. The Marxists indicted the leaders of Western society for hypocrisy. They acknowledged the historical connection between free enterprise and free society; but they denied that the capitalistic method of organizing the productive forces was any longer widening the area of human freedom. On the contrary, the Marxists suggested that the inexorable march of monopoly spelled the doom of freedom until the inevitable triumph of the revolutionary proletariat.

There were two replies to the Marxist indictment—to ignore the facts or to restudy them. In America the "individualistic" attitude was to deny the facts, to affirm the substantial identity between democratic values and the existing state of affairs. To liberals, and particularly to middle western liberals, certain facts were all too conspicuous. By assembling them, they hoped to bring reality into closer conformity with doctrine. In intellectual circles hope of reform, not certainty of revolution, was the dominant view of the future.² In such a setting democratic values were not in question.

THE ENLARGING FOCUS OF ATTENTION

The urge for relevance has enormously enlarged the permissible focus of attention among professional students of government in America. Most of those who completed their graduate work during the nineties were equipped to study political doctrine, public law, and comparative government (with special reference to Great Britain and the United States). During subsequent decades the leading members of the profession steadily enlarged the scope of their studies to include political parties, pressure groups, and administrative agencies. As they moved from the letter of the law to the significant features of the total context of socio-personal relations, they dealt with progressively more subtle themes connected with public opinion and political leadership, and they enlarged the geographical range of their minds to include the whole panorama of world-events.

The expanding focus of scholarly attention is aptly exemplified in the publications of Charles E. Merriam, who began his career with *History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau* (New York, 1900)—a conventional study of political doctrine. Subsequent books contributed to the discovery of the larger environment; there were studies of parties, public opinion, administration, leadership, world-politics (the last being the "Civic Training Series"). Meanwhile, other colleagues were following similar lines of development. Charles A. Beard began with a study in English institutional history, *The Office of Justice of the Peace* (New York, 1904), and went ahead to explore the total economic and cultural setting of American institutions. He studied administrative processes not only in the United States but in Yugoslavia and Tokyo and in recent years dealt with national policy in the light of world-movements.

NEW PROCEDURES OF OBSERVATION

The expanding focus of attention brought with it the use of new procedures for the observation of reality. By tradition students of government were chiefly collectors, making use of records of events they did not directly see. They depended upon historical

documents and court reports. In the new search for the total relevant context, they relied in greater degree on more direct methods of observation, like the interview or direct participation. Vigorous personalities, like James Bryce and A. Lawrence Lowell, had always kept alive the more active elements of the tradition that made such men as De Tocqueville possible. There has, of course, always been a struggle within the breast of the scholar between to "wait and read" and to "go and see." When the scholar has a lecture-room the temptation is to narrow his orbit between the library and the podium, resisting the centrifugal lure of the great beyond. In recent times the quest of reality has somewhat neutralized the centripetal forces of desk and rostrum, so that procedures of observation have been more widely utilized.

The repertory of procedures has itself expanded to meet new demands. Random personal contact has been supplemented by the use of carefully prepared questionnaires or polls given to representative groups. Time has been devoted to the preparation of forms for entering and tabulating the primary data of observation. In this connection the methods of the social anthropologist have been particularly stimulating; the observer of nonliterate societies has learned to discipline his casual impressions by candid records.³

COLLECTIVE FACT-GATHERING

Significantly enough, fact-gathering operations have become more collective as they became more abundant. Many of the facts contributed to political science have been observed by professors who had the aid of students or research assistants. This is the provenience of most of the material collected under the auspices of the Social Science Research Committee, of the University of Chicago, or the Institute of Human Relations, at Yale. But special research bureaus, often unconnected with universities, have contributed extensively to recent science. These agencies are more free than teaching departments to adopt strict standards with regard to research personnel and to develop a corps of helots to perform routine operations. Teaching departments are more tolerant of "time out" for courses and seminars, less careful of

dead lines, and somewhat more impatient with the deserving "mediocrity" than the more professionalized bureau of investigation. Conspicuous among the private bureaus are the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Brookings Institution. However, the government itself is playing a more prominent role in reporting on reality, notably through such executive agencies as the National Resources Planning Board and such congressional channels as the Temporary National Economic Committee.

It is significant that when Charles E. Merriam surveyed the state of political research at the end of World War I he emphasized the underequipment of the college professors of government, who were supposed to contribute to their subject but who were often driven to thresh over old straw through sheer lack of facilities for harvesting new facts.⁴ Even routine clerical aid was often unavailable. The idea of a permanent corps of research assistants comparable with the laboratory technicians of the physical scientist was all too new. Handicapped by lack of funds for travel and for advanced study, each successive crop of students was thrown back upon its parochial frame of reference, destitute of opportunity to explore the larger world about which they were nominally qualified to speak. Hence the heavy stress by the fact-gatherers upon the need of ample funds for large-scale training programs and upon the advantages of continuous collaboration in the prosecution of research. Hence, too, the institutional form of the Social Science Research Council, the university social science research council, and the National Resources Planning Board of the federal government.

NEW IDEAS OF THE SCOPE OF POLITICS

Sweeping changes in the focus of scholarly effort do not fail to bring about a revision of basic concepts, especially with regard to the scope of political science itself. Many American students had identified their field of investigation with government, but they had failed to distinguish between the meaning of government as a local institution and government as a function of society. As a function of society, government is the making of important deci-

sions. What is locally called government often has very little to do with this function. We know that what is called government in a mill town may have but a modicum of influence on important decisions; they may be made by the board of directors of the mill. If the function of government is the subject of research, the mill directors are the ones to be investigated, not the shadow-men locally called government officials.

As the scope of scholarly attention widened, more students of government became conscious of the difference between government as a social function and government as a locally named institution. They reached out after definitions of political science that would clarify their new feeling for relevance.⁵ Since most teachers of government in colleges work within the strait jacket of conventionally defined courses and examinations, it has often been necessary to bootleg new perspectives into the orthodox curriculum. But the newer course offerings gradually broadened the approved scope of instruction.

It would be idle to assert that a conceptual or a terminological consensus has developed concerning the scope of political science. In terms congenial to the present writer, the function of government is power. (For the moment we will speak of the function of government or politics interchangeably.) Power means the making of important decisions, and the importance of decisions is measured by their effect on the distribution of values. Values are such objects of desire as deference, safety, income. The power of individuals and groups is measured by the degree of their participation in the making of important decisions.

The definition of government and politics varies according to the nature and variety of values taken into consideration. For certain purposes it is convenient to circumscribe the scope of political science to the study of power. For more comprehensive comparisons the scope may be enlarged to include the study of other forms of deference, such as respect and insight. For certain broad problems of comparative politics it is expedient to conceive of the scope of political science as embracing the distribution of safety and income as well as deference. At this point the subject

matter of political science approaches that of the social sciences as a whole and merges with it. The most inclusive definition of political science thus speaks of it as the study of influence and the influential.⁶ Influence refers to the degree of control over values (deference—power, respect, insight—safety, income). Control is measured by the size of the share realized at any given time and by causal effect upon values.

The enlarged view of the scope of political science just referred to is not confined to the limits of the United States. On the contrary, parallel processes of generalization have gone forward throughout western European social science. Never officially recognized as a separate university discipline in Europe, nonetheless the “sociology of politics” has been cultivated by specialists who sought an inclusive frame of reference for their study of changing distributions of value.⁷

THE SCIENCE OF DEMOCRACY

Within the more inclusive science of politics many special sciences are possible. A special science is concerned with the fulfillment and preservation of specific forms of state and society. The science of democracy—one of these special sciences—bears much the same relation to general political science that medicine has to biology. Medicine is a branch of the total field of biology, limiting itself to a single frame of reference, the disease process. Democratic science is restricted to the understanding and possible control of the factors upon which democracy depends.

Suppose we explore in more detail the structure of this developing science of democracy. A democratic government can be defined in terms of shared power; a democratic society in terms of shared deference (power, respect, insight) or shared influence (deference, safety, income). What are the limits within which sharing may vary in a government or in a society that is entitled to be called “democratic”? With respect to power, we may stipulate that a democratic government authorizes majority participation in the making of important decisions. The majority may express itself directly (direct legislation) or indirectly (elected officials). The majority must participate actively (a large majority

—let us specify a two-thirds majority—must qualify to vote and take part in elections). The overwhelming majority must be free of intimidation. Moreover, they must have confidence in their capacity to exert effective control over decisions, whether or not they vote on any given occasion. Communities are democratic if they conform to these specifications, and they are democratic in the degree to which they conform to them.

DEMOCRACY: A PATTERN OF SYMBOL AND PRACTICE

The foregoing definition of democracy refers both to symbol and to practice. The prescription that the majority must be eligible to take part in elections is a reference to symbols—to words combined in sentences accepted as authoritative. A statement is authoritative when it is agreed that it formulates what ought to be done. Whom shall we ask in order to ascertain the state of expectation in a given community? In our society we have authorities, persons who are supposed to know about accepted doctrine. There are lifelong students of constitutional law, and we would not hesitate to include them among our authorities on the state of expectation with regard to “government.” They are not authorities, however, upon all the decision-making rules in our society. We do not expect them to be informed about the rules of trade associations, trade-unions, churches, fraternities, producers’ or consumers’ co-operatives, or monopolistic private business. Hence we must enlarge our jury.

In whatever way we constitute our panel of knowledgeable persons, we must specify the degree of agreement that is necessary to establish a given statement as doctrine. For convenience, let us lay down the rule that eight in ten of our authorities must agree.

What is the degree of conformity between doctrine and practice that is needed before the term “democracy” can be applied? Many clauses in statute books have quietly been allowed to lapse; they are not “law” even though they are in the code. Even if our authorities agree that a given statement is legal doctrine, investigation may reveal that it is largely inoperative. We need to specify a minimum critical frequency of conformity that must be

realized before a given doctrine is a "rule." Thus the term "rule" is defined as "doctrine in practice" (within stipulated limits).

How are data-gatherers to proceed in determining the state of practice in a given situation? Official records may show whether elections are held at the time prescribed in the Constitution, and they may report the number of eligible voters who go to the polls. But even if these statements are accepted at face value, they do not reveal the state of intimidation or the degree of public confidence in the genuineness of democratic processes.⁸

The needed facts can be obtained only by observers who possess skills appropriate to the observation of reality. Such observers must be equipped to establish themselves where they can find out what is said and done. They must make reliable and consistent records of what they see. These records must be properly analyzed. The observations can aim at completeness (census) or at representativeness (sampling).

Mankind has thrown away most of its experience for lack of competent record-making, and successive generations are left with a more meager social inheritance than need be. If mankind is to adapt civilization to the ideal of human dignity, each generation must be in a position to profit from past errors and to improve upon past achievement.

Men have tried to govern themselves and one another for many generations. In the literatures of ancient China, of East India, of the Mediterranean world, there is no dearth of general principles. But general statements of principle do not suffice. By themselves they do not communicate. We need detailed records of how men tried to put principles into practice—and what came of it. We need the bricks of data no less than the blueprints of precept, if we are to build successfully. To improve the social inheritance of the future, we must transmit generalization *plus* data.

Every friend of democracy can specify some records that he wishes had been left by preceding generations. There have been great moments when men have detached themselves to some degree from the polemics of their age and have contributed to the reconstruction of knowledge and the redirection of education and

public policy. They have withdrawn a step from active combat, yet they have not frozen into the mold of ritualistic scholarship. We need to know how such things can be. A few of the facts we know—how the universities of Leyden (1575), Edinburgh (1583), and Strasbourg (1566 and 1621) emancipated themselves from the religious turmoil of their day and cultivated the sciences and the humanities.⁹ But we do not know the process in helpful detail; adequate records were not made.

There have been great programs of training for civic life. The system of training for public service that was instituted in China had its effect upon the level of skill and integrity available to the state. Yet the level fluctuated enormously from time to time. At one period the clash of personal, family, fraternal, and regional ambition spelled demoralization. At other times the mills of central administration ground exceeding fine. Proper records would unquestionably enable us to account for many of the astonishing variations in the course of Chinese history—a history that is changeless only in the eye of the uninformed.

Great collections of invaluable data have perished for lack of appreciation of their cumulative significance. For generations the secret agents of the East Indian princes sedulously collected the most intimate obtainable details of the lives of officials and private subjects. These details were not falsified by the needs of literary style. The intellectuals of India left us no compendium of collected data. They relied on the communicative value of the shrewd remark divorced from data.

We are told by the classical writers that men of honesty should be recruited to perform certain functions of government. We know that spies were used to report upon the conduct of officials, often testing them with bribes. What is lost is the description of who responded how. What were the words or gestures that enabled the skilful observer to predict who would succumb to which appeal?

In our own time the observation of human response has advanced by leaps and bounds. Although we are still in the embryonic stage, it is no exaggeration to assert that more advances

have been made in the last forty years than at any time in the history of mankind.

The discovery of ways of studying human response has opened up new potentialities for the removal of obstacles upon the growth of democratic character and practice. Many of these obstacles have hitherto been unrecognized; one instance is the distortion of human personality during adolescence. We have popularly thought of adolescent "storm and stress" as a necessary phase of growth. However, disciplined observation has shown that our civilization itself imposes suicide, schizophrenia, and malformation of personality upon so many of its adolescents. Not human nature, but specific features of our civilization are responsible—certain ways of rearing children, of incorporating the young into the patterns of a rivalrous civilization. How do we know this to be true? The most convincing demonstration is the discovery of societies that do not sentence their youth to varying degrees of destructiveness.¹⁰

We need skilful observers of the total reality of personal and cultural development, if we are to know the facts about the prevalence of democracy and to uncover the factors that condition the survival of free societies. One long step toward reality is to accept no general sentence as a complete communication until we know how it is related to definite observational standpoints.

OBSERVATIONAL STANDPOINTS

Observational standpoints may be distinguished from one another according to *intensiveness* or *extensiveness*. A standpoint is intensive when the observer focuses his attention upon events for a *prolonged* period and uses a *complex* method of procedure. An extensive standpoint, on the other hand, is *brief* and *simple*. Observational standpoints can also be classified according to the observer's degree of *control over records* and *control over observed events*. A *collector* uses records over which he has no control and has no possibility of modifying the events that he studies. A *spectator* makes his own records but exercises no influence over events. An *interviewer* not only controls his own records but must take into

account the effect of the fact that his subjects are aware that they are being studied. A *participant* shares in the ordinary life-situations of his subjects, who are unaware that they are under observation. The observer may focus his attention upon *individuals* or *procedures*.

Harold J. Laski's summary of the facts about the members of the British Cabinet is an example of a contribution to political science made by a collector of available records.¹¹ Each individual was briefly studied, and the procedure was simple, making use of such elementary categories as age, sex, and years in school. Hence the observational standpoint was extensive not intensive.

Complex procedures may be used by a collector, as when Fritz Giese studied *Who's Who* data about prominent public figures in Germany.¹² He divided them into groups according to field of activity and creativeness. These categories called for more technical skill than was applied to studying the British Cabinet.

Much of the material assembled by Harold F. Gosnell for his study of *Negro Politicians* (Chicago, 1935) came from interviewer-spectators.¹³ Arthur W. Macmahon and John D. Millett were able to collect many existing records of their *Federal Administrators* (New York, 1939), but these data were supplemented by field interviews. The procedure was simple, since the data were gathered according to categories intelligible to a layman.

Brief interviews, however, may occasion complex procedures of observation. Gardner Murphy and Rensis Likert administered a battery of tests to obtain data about subjects whose opinions they studied (*Public Opinion and the Individual* [New York, 1938]).

Some contributions to political science are made by investigators who participate in the life of individuals who do not realize they are being studied. The procedure may be either simple or complex.¹⁴

The collector may use intensive methods to assemble facts about individuals. The method may be intensive only in the sense that the observer focuses his attention for a long time on the career line of his subjects. He may use a very simple procedure for compiling the available material (as when he edits the speeches of

a public figure). But he may also use complex procedures that apply criteria acquired by special training (for example, in the interpretation of Abraham Lincoln by L. Pierce Clark, psychiatrist).¹⁵

Interviewer-spectators may keep in contact with their subjects over long periods. The recording procedure may be simple, noting down incidents and impressions, much as the faithful Boswell reported Dr. Samuel Johnson. Sometimes the interviewer may prevail upon his subject to prepare an autobiography. When the degree of supervision is slight, the observer is more of a collector than an interviewer, even though he instigated the record-making and influenced the situation to that extent (the method of Theodore Abel in obtaining documents from young National Socialists in *Why Hitler Came into Power: An Answer Based on the Original Life Stories of Six Hundred of His Followers* [New York, 1938]). The interviewer's procedure may be complex as well as prolonged. Certain cases summarized in my *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1930) were described on the basis of many hours of interviewing by a procedure of free association closely resembling orthodox psychoanalysis.

A participant observer may keep in touch with his subject over several years and build up a body of records and recollections of great value to students of politics. Such a study as Raymond Moley made of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (*After Seven Years* [New York, 1939]) grew out of quite simple record-making procedures.

Most of the literature of political science is made up of studies that describe other than personalities. These contributions, too, depend upon methods of varying degrees of intensiveness and extensiveness. Charles H. McIlwain was primarily a collector in the execution of *The Growth of Political Thought in the West* (New York, 1932). His method can be described as intensive because of prolonged concentration upon sources and the use of complex considerations in classifying the raw material.

Many of the remarkable contributions to political science by Sidney and Beatrice Webb describe situations on the basis of in-

terview data (supplementing collected sources). *Soviet Communism* (2 vol.; New York, 1936) is a formidable example. The brief poll interview is extensive in terms of time but complex in the choice of sample and the framing of questions.

Participant observers have provided us with many of the facts that we have about political processes. What we know about metropolitan politics depends in part upon such documents as Charles E. Merriam's *Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics* (New York, 1929).

Many, if not most, contributions to political science depend upon facts gathered in more than one observational standpoint. In studying the work of the Department of Agriculture, John Gaus and his associate, Leon Wolcott, were collectors, spectators, interviewers, and even to some extent participants; and their methods ran through various gamuts of intensiveness-extensiveness.¹⁶

Since the world of reality is a manifold of events, any pattern can be observed from several standpoints. The most productive standpoint depends upon the nature of the problem. In practice there is a tendency to supplement any one standpoint by the use of its opposite, passing from extensive to intensive and from intensive to extensive positions.

IDEOLOGICAL AND MATERIAL FACTORS

Modern political science is concerned with the subtle interplay of two broad classes of determinative factors, ideological and material.¹⁷ A political act consistent with democracy is affected by whatever symbols or material factors sustain or weaken democracy.

In formal terms, we explain any human response when we discover the factors in environment or predisposition that affect it. Our scientific hypotheses and laws follow the general form of stating that any *R* (class of response) varies in a specified relationship to *E* (environment) and *P* (predisposition). When such general statements are confirmed by data collected from a given standpoint of observation, they are classifiable as scientific laws.

THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION

Much of the confusion that exists in ascribing relative weight to material or ideological factors arises from failure to account for the focus of attention. Analysts undertake to correlate directly from material features in the *E* or *P* to *R*, and the results are often disappointing.

Common experience shows that the same material changes may take place in the environment, and yet persons with the same predispositions may respond differently. In one factory a 20 per cent wage cut may be met by strike or sabotage; in another the same cut may lead to no slowing of production. On investigation we learn that one change was made abruptly, without notice; in the other case the workers were informed in advance of the serious competitive position of the company. In a word, the focus of attention differed in two situations and explains the difference in response.

The study of the focus of attention has been held back by the failure to perfect categories needed to describe the stream of communication. Today that deficiency has been largely overcome. Symbols and statements can be conveniently classified according to syntactic or semantic categories. Syntactic analysis refers to the internal relationships among statements (such as greater or less generality, consistency-inconsistency, economy). Semantic categories refer to the ego significance of a statement (intention, representation). To classify according to "intention," we ask how the speaker has committed himself. To classify by "representation," we ask whether the statement will be understood to place anybody or anything in a more or less favorable position in relation to the distribution of values in society. "I believe in democracy," in terms of intention, commits the speaker to a preference. In terms of representation, it is a favorable reference to democracy. "Democracy will win," is not, taken literally, a statement of preference; the speaker has committed himself to a factual expectation about future events. It is also a favorable representation of democracy—an "indulgence," not a "deprivation," of the symbol "democracy." We may infer that anybody who expects

democracy to win also prefers democracy to win; but this is an inference calling for more data.¹⁸

These methods of classifying symbols are being applied, or can be applied, to the focus of attention of all members of society or of any individual. It is possible to describe what is brought to the notice of the policy-makers in government, monopoly business, small business, or any sphere of life. The focus of attention of all who advise on policy or of the humblest member of the rank and file can be depicted.

Through any given period the contents of the channels of mass communication come to the notice of millions of people. The political symbols in the leading newspapers and periodicals of the world are being described by the present writer for the period since 1939.¹⁹ The contents of American feature films have been covered in an exploratory study by Edgar Dale.²⁰ Content studies of German broadcasts to foreign countries are being made by Ernst Kris and Hans Speier.²¹ During the election campaign of 1940, a continuing investigation was made of the total flow of political propaganda into an Ohio county.²² Sporadic studies have been made of the socially significant contents of the theater, of novels, of school textbooks, and other publications.²³

The focus of attention of Congressmen can be indexed to some extent by the *Congressional Record*, by reports of committee hearings, by the congressional mailbag.²⁴ The proceedings and resolutions of many national and regional organizations are available in print or in manuscript. Periodicals, information services, and other special channels are also relevant. To some extent the appointment calendar of the President, or any executive, provides a clue to his focus of attention. Correspondence files, records of telephone calls and telegraph messages, reports, speeches prepared or listened to, are all in point. The focus of attention of courts is indicated by published statutes, decisions, appellate-court opinions, and by briefs and transcripts of argument and testimony.

Exploratory studies have been made of the daily calendar of selected groups, and much of the data bears directly upon the

focus of attention, since attention is turned not only to the media of mass communication but to other aspects of the environment.²⁵ Market-research workers have assembled many facts about the reading, listening, looking, buying, and giving habits of people of varying social status in many parts of the world.²⁶ Techniques have been devised to test recall of material and in this way to determine whether the contents of a given medium of communication do, in fact, reach an audience. It is not admissible to speak of any communicated material as having reached the focus of attention until there is some indication that a certain minimum threshold of response has been reached or exceeded. All parts of the response above this minimum may be assigned to "effect."

Spectators, interviewers, and participants have described the flow of speech²⁷ and gesture²⁸—in schools, at congregating centers, at meetings, and in many other situations. These investigations have already demonstrated certain techniques capable of wide application to many of the traditional problems of comparative government and political doctrine. Many of these problems have reached a dead end from which they can be rescued only by the discovery of new paths to reality, new methods of observing the interplay of doctrine and practice.

A typical problem is the scope of law as a means of getting temporary and enduring results. By "law," in this context, is meant statute, ordinance, and other authoritative prescriptions of conduct. They stipulate what is to be done, or left undone, and what follows if instructions are not obeyed.²⁹ Authoritative prescriptions are part of the focus of attention of the judges, administrators, or others who are sworn to abide by them. Students of legislative drafting constantly seek to discover which mode of statement will obtain which results. They know, of course, that judges and administrators are affected by many factors that they are unable to study for lack of technique and of an adequate staff of field observers. It is true that many significant relationships can be disclosed by skilful handling of available records. E. J. Gumbel, for example, demonstrated the effect of class factors on German judges by comparing the sentences inflicted on "Right" and

"Left" offenders.³⁰ But direct observation of the courtroom situation is needed if many significant features of the environment of the judge or administrator are to be described. Aggressive conduct toward administrators can profoundly affect what is done with regard to situations in which exactly the same rule is supposed to apply. There is nothing new about the idea that such factors may operate. But there is something new in a method that can show the relative significance of these factors in various circumstances.³¹

It would be generally agreed that democratic administration is at its best when it combines congeniality with efficiency. What *P* and *E* factors determine congeniality? How can congeniality itself be measured? What can be accomplished by controlling the focus of attention in army camps, rural settlements, defense factories, prisons, committee meetings? Ingenious methods have been developed for the exploration of these relationships.³²

NEEDED: A REALISTIC FOCUS OF ATTENTION

Democracy needs a realistic focus of attention on public questions as a means of reaching wise decisions. Decisions in a democracy are wise where they are compatible with the survival of a free society. Having improved our methods of describing the focus of attention, we can experiment not only on public attention but on the attention of every policy-maker and policy-adviser in modern society.

This is the intelligence function. It has long been axiomatic that sound policy depends on adequate intelligence. Whatever the field of policy—military, economic, diplomatic, ideological—the axiom holds true. Modern policy, whether in a democratic or in a despotic state, whether in war or in peace, has all four fronts and needs realistic intelligence on them all.

Democracy must abide by freely expressed opinion, but democracy will die if opinions are not worth expressing. Within the framework of democratic process, we must be skilful enough to perfect democracy. In practice this calls for a realistic focus of attention as a means to realistic opinion.

Let us lay down certain provisional standards for the proper performance of the intelligence function, whether in the press, film, or radio or in lecture, report, or discussion.³³

Standard 1.—Balanced Presentation of the opinions and attitudes of the component groups of society (e.g., policy-makers of monopolistic and basic business, public officials, competitive businessmen, professionals and skilled labor in industry and commerce, farmers, and unskilled labor).³⁴

Standard 2.—Basic Facts about the basic proportions and their trends (e.g., size of the national income; investment, saving, consumption; military and civilian expenditures; degree of democracy in government, industry, and other fields).

Standard 3.—Basic Alternatives open for the attainment of specific goals.

Standard 4.—Fundamental Purposes of a democratic society (reminders of the "Four Freedoms"—freedom to live, work, speak, worship).

Standard 5.—Skilful Thought and Observation.

Beyond the question of content is the procedure to be utilized in group situations where a common focus of attention includes the possibility of discussion or of auditing discussion. No doubt we need greatly to improve democracy's methods of conducting discussion. One guiding principle is the *nullification of the non-rational*, which means the balancing of such factors as prestige and skill of participants. There is need, too, of maintaining respect for the capacity of talk to achieve results by disciplined progression. To the end of facilitating this process, we may introduce a new role—that of the clarifier—into public discussion and relegate lectures to some classrooms and oratory to the theater.³⁵

When there is no discussion between those who see and those who present intelligence, the clarifying function must be performed by expert editing and by the use of aids to the presentation of a picture that is terse, inclusive, clear, and vivid.³⁶

A further problem connected with democratic realism is *who* needs access to a particular stream of intelligence. How much of

what news and comment shall reach the general public? The chief executive? The intervening policy-makers and advisers?

Intelligence should be available to those who make decisions; and in harmony with democratic principles important decisions are to be made by the community. Decisions vary in importance according to the magnitude of the values they affect. This means that a democratic society will set up standards of power that specify which decisions shall fall within the scope of general participation.

Our own society has not yet worked out clear standards of power in relation to many zones of life, notably the market. Rules of balance might be applied to the market, perhaps a "20-30-40 rule," according to which units controlling 20 per cent of the market are liable to special taxation, units with 30 per cent control are liable to minority participation on their boards of directors by community interests, and units with 40 per cent control are liable to majority participation. Community interests can include the government or various constellations of functional associations (this is the "Public Participation Plan").

In order to guide the focus of public attention toward the most important organizations in society, we may experiment with "Public Attention Days." The most influential agencies of government and the largest private corporations could report to the public on these days. The hearings could be available over a regional chain of stations either supplied by the government or maintained by private interests as a service to democratic citizenship.

As the government expands, its operations need to be organized to facilitate a realistic focus of attention. From this point of view, the independently constituted authority (T.V.A.) is a useful device. Many public operations may be turned over to management corporations on a professional-fee basis of compensation.

Some executors have carefully planned their own focus of attention, determining which trend reports they see daily, weekly, monthly, annually. Ingenious devices have been evolved to maintain a continuing report on sales, inventories, credit, collec-

tions, and many other features of the enterprise. Many executives take pride in the fact that they can get a total picture in a few minutes every day.

By no means all policy-makers or managers in our society have expended much thought on the intelligence function. And when we consider the outflow of intelligence to the rank and file we find a chaotic state of affairs. The public at large depends upon the symbol-manipulators who control the mass media, and the picture is a confused jumble of complacency, exasperation, and recrimination. Despite all difficulties, we may propose—as a goal to strive for—the “Citizen’s Report,” a ten-minute daily summary of what is important to know about society. This is not a summary of “the news”; it is a means of making news of what is important as distinguished from what happens to be arresting. The Citizen’s Report does not need to be as dull as ditchwater; Mickey Mouse can be instructive and amusing.³⁷

So many decisions are to be made in a complex civilization that we must assume the desirability of providing for many different patterns of participation and of intelligence. Two standards of representation are “acceptability” and “relevance.” Relevance calls for the mobilizing at the point of decision of those who have the most thorough command of the facts needed to estimate probable consequences. Acceptance calls for the participation of those members of the community whose assistance is needed for the successful attainment of the goal.

THE DEMOCRATIC VARIABLES

The task of achieving a systematic science of democracy depends upon the choice of key variables and the creation of a hierarchy of propositions capable of being confirmed (or “disconfirmed”) by the data obtained at various observational standpoints. In order to retain perspective over the total task, we may provisionally choose a list of key variables constituting the dynamic equilibrium consistent with democracy and capable of sustaining a democratic order.³⁸ One of our most general definitions of democracy specified three variables: *power, respect, insight*.

Each variable must fluctuate within certain limits, signifying a situation in which they are widely distributed throughout a state. Each variable, of course, interacts with every other.

These variables are dependent upon certain other social variables, with which they also interact. One is *balance*, referring to a social structure in which extremes of riches and poverty are at a minimum. Another is *regularity*, by which is meant the tempo of social change. *Responsiveness* refers to the technical efficiency of the institutional practices through which popular will is expressed. *Realism*, which has been extensively discussed above, means the presentation of events at the focus of attention in a manner that increases the probability that opinions will be compatible with maintaining a democratic order. *Character* refers to the distribution of well-integrated (nondestructive) personalities throughout society.³⁹ *Skill* means the level of intellectual skill.

For formal convenience, we may speak of these nine terms as variables, yet there must be no misunderstanding about the high degree of ambiguity involved. Our discussion of realism has indicated the magnitude of the task of relating such a term to specific standpoints for the observation of reality.

EXACT OBSERVATION YIELDS RESULTS NOW

Many students of politics, confronted by the ambiguity of existing language, grow pessimistic about the possibility of science. Perhaps, therefore, it is worth emphasizing the point that exact methods of observation yield certain advantages now, quite apart from the contribution they may ultimately make to a highly systematic science of democracy.⁴⁰

The democratic ideal includes a decent regard for the opinions and sensibilities of our fellows. The moralists who have championed this ideal in the past have made no progress toward the discovery of methods appropriate to the understanding of the thoughts and feelings of others. The instrumentation of morals has had to await reliable methods of observation.

With the best will in the world, we cannot take the attitudes of our fellows into consideration unless we know what they are, and

this depends upon an adequate staff of skilful observers. Lacking these instruments, good intentions cannot possibly be fulfilled in practice. Knowledge of any kind can be abused by men of ill will, and men of good will must always choose between their present impotence through lack of knowledge and their possible weakness through lack of power. In the present state of the organization of knowledge, the members of the great society cannot live up to democratic morals; with better organization of knowledge, they may achieve power without losing their good intentions in the process.

This much, at least, is clear: Whether or not the methods of scientific observation contribute to the eventual completion of a systematic science of democracy, they are certain to contribute, here and now, to the practice of democratic morals. Without science, democracy is blind and weak. With science, democracy will not be blind and may be strong.

III

THE FUTURE OF URBANISM

ALBERT LEPAWSKY



URBAN institutions are based upon so many forces of prior significance in our society that to inquire now about the future role of urbanism in the government of America is to risk one's life, intellectually speaking. We are at present distracted by the painful agonies of the world-order; we are confronted with the pre-eminent problems of the national economy; we are intimidated by the larger symbols of state sovereignty. How, we ask ourselves, is it possible to discern in the frightful whirlpool of world-events today the lesser eddies of urbanism or ruralism, metropolitanism or regionalism? Those who do hope to grasp the real significance of our cities are likely to find themselves in the position of Joe Astell, the philosophic local councilman of Winifred Holtby's English novel, *South Riding*, who complained bitterly that he started out seeking world-reform and ended by being satisfied with a sewage-disposal plant.

To discover the real role of the urban sewer in the world-order is, as a matter of fact, one way to state the problem of urbanism. More generally, the study of urbanism should help us in the United States to orient ourselves to our cities, and our cities to our world. In its most comprehensive form urbanism is the whole body of knowledge and values about urban life, including the trends of urban society, as well as the tested techniques of urban government.

In the face of so many variables and in the absence of a sufficient body of organized data about urban affairs upon which to rest predictions, we shall have to depend largely upon present

tendencies and probable trends. Among the emerging trends which may be expected to determine the direction of urban development in America during the next decade or so are the following: (1) a continually widening circle of dispersion and migration from established urban centers; (2) an increasing participation by higher levels of government in the affairs of local authorities; (3) an intensification of urban regulation, municipal service, and administrative reform.

To be more precise within these broad trends calls for the application of more hunch and hypothesis than we are accustomed to in the literature of political science. For this reason it will be necessary to employ fewer facts and figures and to let our fancy go about the shape of urban things to come.

I

On the spot map of the mid-decennial Census of the United States in the year 1955, two tendencies apparent in 1941 will have been confirmed. First, the significant concentration of American population will no longer be found merely in the urban agglomerations of the Northeast but will appear more definitely in the newly developing regions of the country, particularly the Southwest, the West, and the Pacific Northwest. Second, the total population of the thousands of suburbs and outlying sections of spreading urban districts will approach the total population of the couple of hundred central cities in the metropolitan areas. We shall no longer be described as primarily an urban or a rural people, or even as a metropolitan people. We shall have become a nation of suburbanites or "rurbanites."

We can, of course, play safe and dream double dreams about the future of our cities. A different result might follow from changed circumstances. We could say that the great cities will retain their population or have it restored to them by a great migration urbanward of millions of farm workers released by improved soil conservation, intensive land use, and more complete mechanization of the agricultural process; by the post-war release of thousands of industrial workers to the task of slum clearance,

urban reconstruction, and mass housing; by better city planning, restoration of property to the urban tax rolls, and improved metropolitan-wide administration.

I have no doubt that all these things will come to pass. Indeed, some of them are already developing, and concrete plans are being drafted to see that they continue. But I predict that these forces, in the next decade or two and perhaps long thereafter, can do little more than slow up the process of decentralization or help cities retain their present population, while other areas will grow faster in absorbing the balance of the nation's inhabitants.

Researchers on urban affairs need not be hesitant about making such predictions. The figures of the 1930's indicated a definite drift toward the newer regions of the country. The 1940 Census has already told us that one out of every six Americans is a suburbanite. In the decade of the 1940's people in rising numbers will commute daily from the separate suburbs where they would rather not work to the central cities where they would rather not live. The city will have a day population far greater than the night population, which will carry the burden of supporting and governing it. The central cities will continue to furnish to many suburbs certain technical services, from police to planning, largely without reimbursement. The adverse effects of the suburban drift will continue cumulating in the next decade as they have in the past: more services for a large day population, greater costs and higher taxes, increased tax delinquencies and revenue shortages, agitation for service reductions, migration to the suburbs as a place to live, continued burdens on the city as a place to work.

Metropolitan life will continue to be essentially parasitic. For the most part the rich suburbs will successfully fight off plans for metropolitan co-ordination, except when the situation becomes intolerable or when the proposal is of distinct benefit to them. Then, as has been the recent tendency, special or *ad hoc* metropolitan authorities will continue to be established in order to restrict the suburbs' contribution to the single function. Rarely will there be created an over-all authority to combine the various

functions and the revenue resources of the metropolitan area. In short, the metropolitan form of government advocated by Merriam and his colleagues since the 1920's will not yet have appeared during the 1940's.

Paradoxically, in the next decade or so, urban centers will not necessarily stop growing. They never have stopped, and it is quite possible they never will, for what is actually happening is that we have ceased to push out urban boundaries to conform with the actual area of daily commutation. This anti-annexation movement is epidemic and is beginning to spread to the suburbs too. Unless we reform the system of bounding local areas, another trend of the times—already apparent in the Census of 1940—may be the establishment of homes just outside the limits not only of cities but of suburbs as well, in order to escape municipal responsibilities altogether while sharing in most of the advantages of urban life. We are indeed passing from the stage of urbanism to suburbanism to rurbanism.

This rurban trend will, however, find its most dramatic expression not in the unincorporated areas but rather in the newer and larger regional developments of the country. The Tennessee Valley Authority, the pending Columbia Valley Authority, and their counterparts may start to canopy the entire country during the next few years. These regional changes in society are the products of one of the irresistible transformations of our times. Arising from the newer transportation and communication and based in part upon inexhaustible power resources, regional government may proceed so rapidly that the metropolitan mechanism will not mature fast enough to keep up with the population pattern. If we do not move more rapidly in integrating and making more workable the government of urban areas, regional and rurban trends will absorb metropolitan problems.

The emerging technology, although adaptable to still greater urban concentration, is on the whole a dispersive one. Prefabricated housing, air-conditioning, the newer alloys, superhighways, superblock planning, and satellite areas will have added to them during the coming decade family planes, superhighway-runways,

the newer plastics and chemurgical creations, wider commercial use of the photoelectric cell, stratospheric supercharging, hydrogenated coal, and long-range transmission of cheap electric power. These developments may not only transform segments of the national economy; they may also be responsible for the cumulative dispersion of the population into newer sections of the country. The newer defense areas may not all turn out to be ghost towns when the war is over, and we may be pleasantly surprised by the regional effects of our technological ability not only to convert peace production into a war machine but to transform war industry back into a peace plant.

The spread of the city into the suburban countryside and the newer regions beyond and, for that matter, the counterspread of rural amenities into a rebuilt and less congested city will be helped along by some psychological predilections of our period. The rural bias and frontier traditions of the nation are always fresh enough to support the movement toward urban decentralization; even those who are sympathetic to urban labor continue to subscribe to the Jeffersonian thesis that the piling-up of people in large cities is undesirable. It is interesting that mass public housing in the cities through the United States Housing Authority was accompanied by a great stimulation of private housing in the suburbs through the Federal Housing Administration. As far as urban labor of the future is concerned, the decentralizing trend may also be encouraged by a shorter workday or work week following the post-war reconstruction. With all our mass urban housing and rehousing, people may still want to putter around in the country. Television may bring the theater into the parlor, strengthen home life, and increase the demand for freer family surroundings. Richer knowledge about personal irritations and psychopathology may prove to be a great boon to mental hygiene and smoother family relations. Young people may decide it is better to play with their babies in the back yard than to curb their dogs in the city gutter. It might even be well to prepare for such surprises as larger families or the renewal of foreign immigra-

tion, upsetting our modest population estimates and further encouraging the dispersion of the population. Increases in economic and social security may play an important role here.

Recalling the brutal bombings in the 1930's and 1940's of Shanghai, Madrid, Warsaw, Helsingfors, Rotterdam, London, Hamburg, Manila, and other cities, people may begin to get anxious about rearing their families in crowded urban centers. The evacuation of women and children from war-torn cities will have effects beyond wartime. Britain, for example, has learned a great deal about the amenities of country life as a result of the regular fare of urban bombing, and year-round or vacation camps for city children are already being planned as recognized parts of the educational system.

Indeed, it is likely to be the integration of local authorities under the dozen British defense regions that may transform the entire post-war map of Britain. This trend may also set the pace for some of the metropolitan and regional reforms at a later date in this country, unless we ourselves come under serious enough attack to warrant swifter action. Already in the more concentrated urban parts of the United States the local defense authorities cover not merely the central city but entire metropolitan areas, disregarding state lines. We shall learn much not only from British regionalism but also from Russia's regions and republics and from its metropolitan areas like Moscow and Leningrad. And for that matter Tokyo's metropolitan government, Greater Berlin, and Nazi-reorganized Hamburg are interesting models which present these trends on a world-wide scale.

In the coming decade, however, it is not likely that we shall seriously copy the newer patterns of metropolitan government, barring, of course, reverses during or after the war so severe that we shall be compelled to undertake immediate and complete regionalization of urban governmental areas. Nor should we forget that regional trends may supersede metropolitan reforms and subordinate them to an even more drastic change in our political geography.

II

A more immediate aspect of our emerging political geography than either the regional or the metropolitan pattern is the process of federal centralization. More and more of the vital decisions affecting industrial and urban life are being made by the nation, not by the city or its sovereign state. During the next decade the state may attempt to recover the opportunities for urban supervision that it has fumbled so long, but the drift of power will continue from the state to the federal government and from the city to the federal government as well.

Drastic national regulations governing urban industry and labor, civilian defense measures supervised by the nation, the planning of post-war public works reserves under federal leadership, growing dependence of both states and cities upon federal grants-in-aid, wide use of federal funds for roads and public works, aid to private housing, subsidies for public housing, national social security and public welfare, and, in the offing, greater federal aid to education—all these combined with a vast machinery of federal standards and supervision operating sometimes through the state but increasingly directly upon cities are the steppingstones to federal centralization, which we have been building up during the past decade and will no doubt continue in the next.

The states in their relations to the cities will also have occasion to revitalize their position, and some states will take advantage of their opportunities. Further and more drastic state financial supervision over cities will be urged to control the impending burden of local debts and expenditures, in spite of the fact that the vast amount of state control and supervision so far imposed upon cities has not produced a well-regulated system of local government. Disappointed in the outcome of their own program of urban regulation, state legislatures will be increasingly reluctant to grant cities powers of their own, and in this resistance they will be encouraged by a combination of artificially large rural majorities and the votes of hostile urban suburbs. On their part the urban communities will continue their demand for freedom from petty state controls; but the expected results of the home-rule move-

ment, now a half-century old, will not materialize. Nor will the plea for more metropolitan independence or separate city-statehood, which was one of Merriam's alternative solutions, come to pass in the next decade.

Indeed, the entire problem of state-local relations, troublesome as it will continue to be, will be overshadowed by problems of federalism and by the nation-wide trend toward centralization. We shall still proclaim municipal home rule, we shall still operate on the principle that we are a federation. But, as a matter of historical fact, local and state governments will tend to become, if they have not in some instances already become, administrative areas of higher levels of authority, not primarily political areas in their own right.

Increasing nationalization of plans and policies will become the order of the day. Local autonomy will become a useful slogan, state sovereignty a usable myth. This trend does not mean the disappearance of the state from the map of American government, in spite of the pressure for this drastic solution by the more doctrinaire members of a democratic society or the more ruthless rationalizers of a Fascist regime. Both cities and states will remain part of the cold reality of American government. State laws supplementing, and in some instances anticipating, federal policies, devolution upon the states of the administration of certain federal functions, federal administrative regionalization still utilizing state units and lines—all suggest that the American state in the next decade and beyond will continue the role of co-actor in the drama of nation-wide governmental programs.

World War II will, nevertheless, hasten the process of centralization which has its roots in a historical and technological evolution that is bigger than the war. It is fallacious to argue that centralization and dictatorship are identical, for our centralizing trends and those of the democracies we are helping to defend are as definite as those of the enemy. Hitler's *Reichsreform* and his *Gleichschaltung* of local authorities were carried out ruthlessly and involved the destruction of democratic procedures.

But the direction of this development is not purely Nazi. Hitler has not yet taken over the local fire departments, but Churchill has. Britain's newer regions of the second World War, originally recommended at the time of the first World War, are not entirely temporary. Will federal operation of state employment exchanges in the United States exist only "for the duration" as announced, or is it a more permanent feature of our national labor policy, along with the possible federalization of the unemployment compensation system? Within a year after the Canadian provinces rejected the report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-provincial Relations, recommending federal absorption of revenue and other functions, the provinces were making individual agreements with the Dominion for this very form of centralization. This arrangement, too, is to be "for the duration," but so was the Dominion's original entry into the income-tax field in World War I. And in Australia and Brazil there has developed a similar centralization of revenue policy, though not necessarily of administration. War or peace, dictatorship or democracy, the arm of administration is a long one, and it is constantly lengthening.

In the United States one of the significant phases of centralization during the next decade may be the development of direct federal-urban administrative relations by-passing the sovereign level of state government. Were it not for the help to cities rendered by the federal government in the past decade, it is possible that the entire system of local revenues and services might have broken down. In the coming decade a growing proportion of these federal activities is likely to be carried on in direct relation with cities. It is possible that the most fertile soil here will be the regionalization of federal administration and the establishment in cities of federal district offices carrying on much federal administrative activity. It is well to remember that most of the vast personnel of the federal government operates not in Washington but in scores of the nation's large cities, which slowly are coming to be little federal capitals in their own right, operating not too distantly from city halls.

In rural communities there has developed a system of federal administrative relations on agricultural matters, partly with the intermediation of the states and partly without. Agriculture may, of course, be regarded as a more unified economic interest than has been produced by the diverse strains of our urban economy, but there are cleavages in the country, too, and they range all the way from the sharecropper to the corporation farmer. Nevertheless, the federal constitution does not mention agriculture any more than it does industry or labor. One explanation for the relative success of ruralism in securing direct federal assistance is the early appearance of the machinery of the Department of Agriculture, researching, recommending, regulating with respect to almost every phase of country livelihood and country life. True, there are some seventy federal agencies, bureaus, and divisions now engaged in various urban services; true also there has recently been a comprehensive report on *Our Cities* by the National Resources Planning Board. But cities are still disfranchised in Washington, administratively speaking, and the nation's first report on its cities came thirty years after the report of its Country Life Commission.

The first step toward administrative recognition of cities in Washington may be taken in the coming decade. It may be the establishment of an integrated agency of urban affairs at least to answer questions for and about cities. And if this agency is not established, perhaps the Department of Agriculture, with its progressive habits of research and planning, may adopt cities and set up its own office for rural-urban research and relations.

More adequate administrative representation at the federal level may be paralleled by the development of political representation for cities. There may emerge a city bloc in Congress comparable to the farm bloc, or perhaps this representative function will be assumed by a labor bloc. In any case the political awakening of masses of people sharing common problems of urban life may not be too long delayed, in spite of their present disfranchisement in the national Congress. And if a politically alert urban population continues to be seriously restricted by the strait jacket

of state legalism, there may be an appeal to the higher politics and the higher constitutionalism of the federal government, which we have already learned to use effectively for national reforms.

The growing power of the federal government in relation to urban society need not be exercised merely to regulate affairs that have outgrown city and state limits or to supplement activities of lesser authorities that have lost their vigor. It can become a positive force for constructive national policies initiated by genuine segments of the national economy—national policies deliberately designed to make city life more livable and urban administration more effective. Governmental centralization need not destroy the higher forms of local initiative or regional interests any more than equality of opportunity need weaken the preservation of true individual liberties.

III

The reconciliation of governmental planning with personal liberty, which America as a nation will achieve or else capitulate to social chaos and individual license, will be resolved in the next decade or two on the urban front as well as in the national and international sphere. Whatever the outcome, I think there will be, as far as cities are concerned, definite gains in terms of more effective urban regulation, municipal service, and administrative reforms. Faced by suburban and regional migration and by state neglect and federal domination, the city will have its greatest opportunity in its own little bailiwick to make its contribution to the urban way of life.

Most significant among urban accomplishments will probably be an intensified form of planning and regulation governing the use of urban land. Negative zoning regulations will be replaced by more positive building requirements that may extend beyond safety and construction to questions of style and architecture. Individual landholding will be supplemented by municipal realty corporations, public or semipublic, to assemble, construct, and maintain property. Stock representing a share of huge super-

blocks may take the place of the deed to a plot and house that can be used or neglected and the neighbors be hanged. There will be opportunities for the most daring and creative administrative, legal, and financial experiments that municipal corporations have ever undertaken. A beginning will be made in squeezing out speculative values by increment or differential taxation, and the municipality may step in and, by excess condemnation, share in land values resulting from public improvements. Subdivisions will be strictly controlled, and suburbs may be forced to pay more of their share of the municipal bill through devices ranging from tolls to service charges. Along with these trends will go an intensification of municipal enforcement in the field of building regulation and smoke abatement.

The realization will grow stronger that city services constitute a big business in their own right, accounting for a large proportion of governmental expenditures and performing functions that are essential to industry, commerce, and daily life. At the same time the potentialities of new mass services may also be realized, and we may accomplish what Merriam envisaged before the first World War when he criticized overemphasis of the mechanism of municipal government and underemphasis of the ends or the social program of American cities. Municipalization of utilities, for example, may experience a new spurt. Here the national power program and newer federal regions will offer considerable encouragement. What could not be accomplished by the municipal-ownership movement of the last generation may come as a result of a wider trend toward governmentalization.

Desirable or undesirable, the inexorable trend is toward more municipal services. Londoners of all shades of opinion assure us that the municipal meal services furnished at cost by the authorities for tens of thousands of blitz-evicted citizens will be a permanent feature of post-war Britain. That the science of applied nutrition may be as much a part of government as is the science of policing need not shock us in America, where during the past decade has come the development of the surplus commodity

stamp plan in collaboration with widely approved school-feeding programs for underprivileged children.

Not only the conflict over more or less municipalization will concern our urban technicians but also the problem of more effective municipal administration. Indeed, the two are related; and, as cities begin to do better the functions now assigned to them, they will be intrusted with more responsibilities and services. The vast strides made in municipal management during the last few decades will undoubtedly be continued in the next. Whether these can be extended from the machinery of budgeting and personnel to a more highly equipped public service and ultimately to a more streamlined and understandable form of municipal organization that will give freer play to citizen control and municipal democracy is the real question. Larger and larger slices of the major professions—the teachers and engineers and even lawyers and physicians—are coming to be identified with the municipal public service, and to these are being added the newer professional categories of social specialists and municipal administrators. The recently developing role of professional associations and the part played by university training in service suggest a new level of capacity and prestige for municipal employment.

On the political front we have made obvious progress from the dark days of municipal corruption. When as a matter of right the government begins to furnish vast social services that were at one time the local politicians' favors and sole stock in trade, a new era of municipal politics is dawning, exceptions though there may be. At this point a more realistic popular conception of urban government will help. In the next decade we should depart once for all from the theory that city government in the United States is on the seamy side. This change can be facilitated by a more responsible type of scholarship in the field of urban affairs.

Adjustment of the tempo of our thinking is the crux of the problem of urbanism. In the past we have demanded metropolitan government but have got little of it. Before we shall see any example worthy of our vast researches on this subject, we may find metropolitan areas engulfed by a more sweeping form of regional-

ism. We have preached municipal home rule, with few results. Before we shall gain freedom for cities from state repression, a new federalism may blanket both states and cities. We have been urging improved municipal administration, but we may find that we have failed to see the steady, though in some cases slow, advance of municipal management. We have neglected the question of what new things the city will have to do in the near future to keep up with the new technology and the new society. It is not asking too much of the study of urbanism in America that it at least help make us more aware during the next decade of the swift drift in the world about us and the potentialities therein for a richer form of urban life.

IV

DEVELOPMENTS IN GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING

JOHN A. VIEG

✱

TO PLAN is to endeavor, within whatever range of choice lies open, to “walk out to meet the future” and mold it to the pattern of our dreams. The purpose is not the forecasting, but the foreshaping, of things to come. After a century and a half of what might be termed “negative planning”—deliberately refraining from public control of more than a few fields of social action in the confident belief that all would then go well in the vast areas left “free”—the American people are today prepared to move forward to what by contrast may be called “positive planning.” They give evidence of wanting to try the experiment of a conscious design for living that, at least in the essentials of existence, will leave less to the play of chance.

Behind this significant change of attitude lies a clear and sober realization that it simply costs too much not to plan. Experience has taught the nation that, by themselves, hopes and dreams will not achieve their own fulfilment. Hence, despite the fact that the planning movement in America is as yet only beginning, it is possible to say with considerable assurance that it is not an artificial development. It has arisen in response to desperate needs. The legend of the inexhaustibility of our wealth and power and resources is a legend. We cannot afford to build roads where they are not going to be used. We cannot stand the expense of reconstructing our utilities every few years to enlarge their capacity. We can no longer underwrite the costs of waiting to design our public works until we urgently need them and then improvising

at the eleventh hour. Above all, we know that we cannot afford to imperil our internal security by continuing to disregard the need of an external "framework for freedom."

Planning is not only here but it is here to stay, for it is a practical necessity. The individual and social costs of not planning are so heavy that they can no longer be borne. We have tried in our cities, in our counties, in our states, in the nation, and in the world the amiable assumption that the good things of life will come of themselves if only government will avoid meddling outside its "proper" realm, and the assumption simply has not worked well enough for enough of our people to justify further trial. The logic of planning, like that of budgeting, is inescapable. There was a time not so long ago when many people regarded budgeting as expensive and impractical; but, as the editors of *Public Management* said recently in discussing "The Common Sense of City Planning," "If someone were to say today that his city cannot yet afford budgeting, he would be laughed at." So, some day, it will be with planning.

But if the winds of adversity have induced a healthy change in the climate of opinion in respect to planning, there has not yet developed a consensus as to the meaning of planning in terms of who does what when a democratic government proceeds to plan. We are at the end of a decade in which planning has been something of a magic word. It has been on everybody's tongue; it has been the fad to use it everywhere; and the result is that the vogue has produced word-magic. Planning has meant a thousand things—including nothing—depending upon who was talking. All the while, however, a small but growing number of persons, in and out of government, have been quietly at work trying to forge a consistent and workable theory. Those efforts have now produced enough suggestions to warrant an attempt at a general formulation.

To state the theory negatively first, planning is not mainly a new orientation for the politicians and administrators to whom the government of America has been intrusted. It is not a "fourth" power, or branch, or function added to the tripartite

system established by our various constitutions and charters. It is not a body of knowledge to be mastered and professed or applied. To describe it positively, planning is, first, an *approach* to the solution of social problems which, to be effective, must be understood and accepted in both the political and the administrative branches of government and, second, a *technique* or *process* which, for its success, not only requires a personnel of its own but a personnel properly trained, adequately financed, boldly imaginative, unfailingly dynamic, genuinely public-minded, and closely related to the executive arm.

THE MEANING OF PLANNING

In detail the theory of planning in a democratic polity is based upon the following assumptions or propositions.

1. It is the first responsibility of those officially engaged in planning—as it is no less of legislators and administrators—to protect and promote the public interest and the general welfare, placing the good of the whole community above that of any of its parts.

2. Planners are in a special sense fiduciaries of posterity and carry a prime obligation to devise ways and means of “building a better future” without asking too many sacrifices from the present or too much repudiation of the past. Planning, that is to say, must embrace the continuum which includes the far future, the near future, the immediate present, and at least the recent past.

3. By themselves, however, planning officials can never usher in the millennium—and they should have their sights set lower than that. The theory of planning calls for strong devotion to the democratic philosophy by lawmakers, executives, judges, and ordinary citizens.

4. Planners will endeavor, before formulating proposals respecting any problem, to obtain and weigh all the relevant facts, and within the limits those facts impose they will use their disciplined imagination. This proposition implies that planners will keep in close touch with all research agencies studying related problems.

5. However meritorious they may be, the proposals offered by planning agencies are recommendations and not orders; planning is, and should remain, advisory and not coercive.

6. Planning and legislating should be continuing processes. The life of a community does not run in neat blocks of time, plans and policies for each of which can be worked out independently. The life of a community is continuous, and planning and legislating for it should also be continuous. It is a corollary of this proposition that there should be in any community only one over-all planning body. Where certain public functions, such as education, are administered by an authority other than the general government, the over-all agency should bring long-range plans for the development of these functions into its program.

7. Following the logic of the executive budget, under the tripartite system of governmental organization the planning agency must be established in the executive department—the branch which takes the initiative in the making of policy. Where the legislative assembly has created a council to assist it in its work, and especially where this council has been given a full-time staff, the planning agency has both an opportunity and an obligation to co-operate with it.

8. To guarantee a wise pursuit of the public interest there is need of planners for the community rather than a single planner; no matter how intelligent or how solicitous of the general welfare a person may be, it is neither safe nor democratic to trust the definition of the commonweal to one individual.

9. If planning is to be based on full acquaintance with and analysis of pertinent facts and if it is to be an ever availing source of aid and counsel to policy-makers, whether executive or legislative, the planning agency must have funds to obtain and examine the facts and must on one basis or another remain in continuous operation.

10. To satisfy the foregoing assumptions, the model planning agency will consist of (a) a small board or commission, paid or unpaid depending on how much time the members are expected to give to their tasks, and (b), in all save the smallest jurisdictions,

a staff gathering information and preparing drafts and reports for the board. In a municipality the mayor and manager may well be made members of the plan commission *ex officio*, as was recommended in 1941 by the Committee on Revision of the Model City Charter.

11. There are levels of planning, but, whatever the level, planning is synthesis more than analysis. The higher the level, the greater the need of the generalist rather than the specialist. At the top, where planning means choosing among ends, the planners are political leaders and philosophers; below this level planning is concerned with choices among means, and there is a place and need for persons who make public planning a profession—for specialists who prefer to specialize in generality.

12. All planning should be pointed toward action, for the only plans worth considering are those which have some reasonable chance of adoption. Accordingly, planning agencies have an obligation to offer to the policy-makers they advise not only what they regard as the most effective plan for attaining a given end but also such other plans as may be reasonably satisfactory.

13. It is presumed that plans soundly conceived and officially adopted will be faithfully executed. They should be neither violated nor discarded except for valid reasons. Planners are entitled to assurance that their labors will be taken seriously, and there are two ways to insure this, both important: (*a*) the planner, whether member of board or staff, should have reasonable security of tenure, and (*b*) departures from a plan adopted by the responsible representatives of the community should be referred to the planning agency for report, should at its request be considered at a public hearing, and should have the approval of not less than a three-fourths majority of the responsible political body.

14. Positive planning is always planning for something for somebody. It is as possible to plan for liberation for the majority as for regimentation for the minority, and the whole plan of democratic governmental planning aims at enlarging the freedom of man.

THE STATUS OF PLANNING TODAY

If all public planning bodies were equally intelligent and energetic, it would be relatively easy to describe with some accuracy the present status of governmental planning in the United States. All that would be required would be to enumerate the official agencies now in existence and to indicate the character of their work. Since, however, they vary greatly both in vigor and in capacity, the best that can be done is to outline the situation generally and hardly at all in terms of the theory just offered.

Of planetary or global planning there is yet very little on the part of the political leadership and the national governments of the great powers—and, *miserabile dictu*, probably more in Berlin and Tokyo than in Washington or London. The only positive step so far (December, 1941) taken by the democratic nations is the embodiment in the "Atlantic Charter" of a minimal set of principles on which America and Britain will endeavor to re-organize the world for peace after the war.

Though the United States lies in the northern no less than in the western hemisphere, in the minds of its citizens the phrase "hemispheric planning" signifies systematic international co-operation only among the countries of North, Central, and South America. To some it includes the Dominion of Canada, to others not. It has been the purpose of the Pan-American conferences (inaugurated 1889), the Pan-American Union (founded 1890), and the Good Neighbor Policy (proclaimed 1933) to foster precisely such co-operation; but effective planning—other than that born of military considerations—will of necessity have to await the achievement of closer governmental relations than exist to-day. Meanwhile, the impact of events in World War II compels the American people to give increasing attention to co-operation between themselves and the three other great peoples of the northern hemisphere—the British, the Russians, and the Chinese. Inasmuch, however, as practically all our present planning relating to the northern hemisphere derives from the problem of winning the war, it is an open question how well established it will prove to be when the time comes for organizing the peace.

National planning, as such, is almost entirely a development of the past decade. There are a number of actions and achievements in the history of the American nation which have in them the germ of planning, but not until the New Deal in 1933 created the National Planning Board of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works (P.W.A.) did the United States government establish an official agency charged with planning under that label. After passing through two intermediate stages, first as the National Resources Board and then as the National Resources Committee, this agency was established on July 1, 1939, in the Executive Office of the President as the National Resources Planning Board. Though continuously limited both in personnel and in funds, it has succeeded in completing notable researches and reports on a wide range of public problems. Now approaching the close of the first decade of its work, it has to its credit a series of publications on land, mineral, water, and energy resources and on problems of scientific research, technological trends, industrial reorganization, improved transportation, population readjustment, urbanism, public works, social relief, and regional, state, and local planning. It is the nation's sole official agency for over-all planning, but there is lacking today the disposition to use it to capacity. The National Resources Planning Board, had it been adequately staffed, might, for instance, have been employed to conduct the recent comprehensive investigation into the American economic system for which the Temporary National Economic Committee was created. Instead, the Congress, following an older pattern, resorted to an *ad hoc* body which, after having made a fine inquiry, is now disbanded. The results are that, on the one hand, the Congress neglected an opportunity to build the National Resources Planning Board into an abler and more useful establishment and that, on the other, the nation lost the advantage of a permanent agency with a continuing responsibility for using the wealth of insight and information gained in such an inquiry.

Aside from general or over-all planning, the national government has made some progress in functional planning. Something

of this nature has been done in both the Hoover and the Roosevelt administrations by survey or study committees on such subjects as recent economic trends, employment stabilization, economic security, education, and medical care. Agriculture, forestry, and public roads are the fields in which planning as such has taken strongest hold.

Since October, 1938, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the Department of Agriculture has been charged by the secretary of agriculture with responsibility for formulating co-ordinated plans and programs relating to agricultural production, distribution, land utilization, and conservation in their broadest aspects and for co-operating with state, county, and community agricultural planning committees. There are many problems yet to be solved before this effort to bring together farmers and officials, laymen and experts, for democratic discussion and decision on governmental aid to agriculture will have proved its worth. But the experiment is a promising one, and it is well under way in most states. Within the department at Washington there has been created an Agricultural Program Board, including representatives from most of the bureaus, to review the plans proposed by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and to make recommendations to the secretary concerning them. A parallel bureau of industrial economics in the Department of Commerce has been suggested, but no action as yet has been taken.

Highway planning has been a principal task of the Public Roads Administration, now in the Federal Works Agency, ever since its creation as the Office of Road Inquiry in 1893. Possibly because the problems involved are considerably simpler than those in other fields, this type of functional planning has proceeded practically without comment by the public save for approbation of its results. Today, as always, it is taken for granted that if vast amounts are to be expended annually for good roads, they should be spent according to some plan. By virtue of the completion recently of the comprehensive national highway survey, data are now available for a new national highway plan.

America is too large for central planning of more than a limited number of matters, and the states are in many cases too small to

accomplish some of the decentralization in planning that is needed. Between the nation and the states, therefore, it has become increasingly necessary and useful to recognize groups of states or regions, usually defined by the watershed of a great river, as planning areas. It was proposed in the Congress several years ago to create seven river valley "authorities" or planning bodies patterned more or less after the Tennessee Valley Authority, which is both a planning *and* an "action" agency, so that systematic studies might be made looking to the development of every major region in the country. As yet, however, the Congress has not acted favorably on the proposal. Meanwhile, the National Resources Planning Board endeavors through its nine regional offices to achieve some regional integration of the work of state planning commissions. Under the stimulation of the Council of State Governments and these regional offices, several groups of states have created interstate planning commissions for investigations of their common problems.

Largely as a result of the encouragement and technical assistance offered by the National Resources Planning Board and the provision of clerical and research personnel by the Work Projects Administration, all but one of the forty-eight states established planning boards or commissions at some time during the 1930's. Several have since been abolished (some were created by legislative enactment, others by executive action) but approximately forty are still in existence. There is considerable variety in the scope and quality of their work, but in a report in 1938 on *The Future of State Planning*, the National Resources Planning Board estimated that in at least a third of the states, these agencies have come to be accepted "as an integral part of the government structure." The others were, at that time, either in a precarious position or simply inactive.

As in the nation, so in the states, agriculture and highways are the main fields in which functional planning is a present reality. Like the president, many governors have appointed *ad hoc* committees to survey particular situations and draft plans concerning them, but of organized planning there has been practically none. By way of exception some states have what undoubtedly deserve

to be called plans for the conservation of some of their natural resources, such as forests and wild life.

On the local level urban governments have had more experience in planning than rural governments, and, typically, they are further advanced. Of some 3,000 American cities, more than 1,300 have been zoned and approximately 1,200 have official planning commissions. Of 3,053 counties in the United States, only 400 have general planning or zoning commissions. The status of planning in the rural areas is, however, undergoing rapid change due to the establishment of county agricultural planning committees which, because they are concerned with everything affecting land use, are obliged to develop a perspective almost as broad as that of an over-all or general planning body.

If it could be assumed that all these local planning agencies were composed of members possessed of a well-rounded conception of planning, that they were all vigorously at work, that they had ample budgets and staffs, and that they were effectively related to the political and administrative branches of their governments—if all these things could be assumed, the situation in local governmental planning would be encouraging, even though the majority of cities and counties (by number of units, not by number of people) have not yet equipped themselves with such bodies. But these assumptions are not warranted by the facts. Most of the members of local planning commissions are only beginning to entertain the concept of planning for the community as an organic whole. Up to now they have confined themselves largely to physical considerations and have neglected those of a social and economic character.

Worse yet, as Robert Walker found in his study of *The Planning Function in Urban Government* (1941), most municipal commissions have not even exploited the full range of physical planning. Practically the only fields in which they have influenced the course of urban development have been zoning, streets, and parks. Only a limited number have had the funds or personnel to secure and analyze the data needed for the drafting of master-plans, and in many of these cases the plans have not really been

used, owing to defects in the working relationships between the commission and either the political or the administrative branch of the government. One glaring shortcoming, for example, has consisted in the failure of the city planning commission to recognize the functional planning carried on within the administrative departments of the municipality. The theory of city planning calls for the co-ordination of such efforts by the general planning agency, but in too many cases these efforts have either been duplicated or ignored. The Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Planning Board put the proposition squarely when it declared that the situation demands a broadening of "the entire scope and conception of local urban planning."

As for functional planning on the local level—that is to say, planning in separate fields like agriculture, education, recreation, housing, or industrial development—conditions and needs vary from function to function. Agricultural planning has received an enormous impetus within the past decade and especially within the past few years. Planning for industrial development, except zoning for industrial uses, has been left largely to chambers of commerce. Currently, however, many cities and states are calling upon existing planning agencies or creating new "developmental" or promotional commissions to help them solve two big problems: how to get a share of the defense business, and how to reduce to a minimum the risk of depression and disruption in the transition from war to peace. Planning for outdoor recreational facilities is a responsibility that has been divided between the planning commission and recreation, park, or playground agencies, just as planning for public works and utilities has been divided between the commission and municipal departments of engineering. Housing has been largely outside the ken of general planning bodies, and little has yet been done concerning the problem. With the creation under federal stimulation in the past few years of a number of municipal housing authorities, functional planning in this sphere has, however, got under way. There has been considerable discussion of the need for improved public health service both for urban and for rural communities, but ade-

quate planning for medical care is a future task rather than a present fact. Schools and libraries are governed independently of cities and counties in most parts of the country, and planning for education and library service has exhibited the same separation. To the extent that it has been performed at all, planning has been done in education by school boards and by school officials and in library service by boards of trustees and by librarians.

Though it hardly falls in the category of functional planning, some recognition should be given finally to the systematic efforts that have been made in many of the great urban centers of the United States in recent years to deal with the special problems of the metropolitan community. There are at present nearly a hundred of these metropolitan areas, and all of them have to wrestle with problems of sheer size, of inadequacy of legal power and financial resources, and of confusion due to excessive numbers and layers of local governmental units. Special metropolitan districts and authorities have been created in some of these areas to handle certain functions, like water supply, sewage disposal, or recreational service, but over-all planning is still largely on a private or at most a semipublic rather than a governmental basis.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE PROJECTION OF TRENDS

Governmental planning activities in America have been surveyed with sufficient care to disclose recent trends with some clarity. From a broad perspective the main developments are (*a*) a disposition at every level of government to begin now to consider social and economic factors and problems in addition to those physical and material in character; (*b*) an insistence that the needs of life be given priority over the dictates of "art"; (*c*) a growing awareness at each level of government of the danger of losing the value of segmental or functional planning through failure to work out an over-all or master-plan by means of which such partial planning may be integrated into a sensible whole; (*d*) an increasing appreciation of the need for co-ordinating local with state planning, state with regional and national, and national with international; (*e*) a decreasing emphasis on mere con-

servation of resources coupled with increasing stress on wisdom in their use; (f) the launching of an association for governmental planners in the American Society of Planning Officials; and (g) a persistence of the philosophy of planning as an advisory function, often so deep-seated as to sustain the patience of planners in the face of virtual disregard of their plans.

To project these trends for ten or twenty years, however, and to estimate where the governmental planning movement will be at the beginning of the sixth or seventh decade of the twentieth century entail both risks and difficulties. Even with a prospect of quiet times it would not be easy to gauge the course of development of this most sensitive and creative field of governmental activity—and the prospect is definitely otherwise. Any sober effort to peer ahead and discern where the frontiers of government are going to be in 1951 or 1961 must be predicated on some estimate as to the outcome of the struggle now absorbing the thoughts and energies of most of the world. Obscurity still hides so many of the elements on which that outcome depends that such an estimate inevitably requires some act either of disbelief or of faith. My own estimate of an ultimate, though costly, victory for the forces of democracy grows out of a faith that men and women who have known the meaning of liberty will pay the price of freedom when they know that price has to be paid in order to keep it.

And this is not the only act of faith on which a prediction of progress in planning depends. It is one thing to believe that men will fight for freedom when it is imperiled and another to believe that, having preserved it, they will use it wisely and generously. Americans have proved handsomely by their industrial success that they know *how* to plan. The question involved in governmental planning is whether they can reach a better consensus for *whom* and *what* to plan. Adversity has taught millions of our people that selfishness is not a very intelligent basis either for individual or for group life—but have we learned the lesson well enough not to forget it? We have gone further than ever before in the twentieth century in accepting the ideal of economic democracy as an essential counterpart to political democracy, but do we

have the will to carry out its implications? What we do in governmental planning and later in governmental action can only reflect the philosophy of the American people and their sense of values. And, though it may be granted that the public is more attached to the philosophy of the decent minimum and more concerned about ethical and spiritual values today than it was not so long ago, it is far too early to say with assurance that the cult of comfort is on its way out.

When the peoples of America and Britain and China and Russia and their allies have regained their freedom, they will have immense productive capacities. These could be turned from making weapons of destruction to satisfying the needs of construction and, in great measure, they doubtless will. But whether first to concentrate on new and shiny motorcars or on houses, and schools, and hospitals is a decision that will not fall to the planners to make. We Americans will be able, within a wide range, to fulfil whatever dreams we have. What will those dreams be like? Will they be like the visions Ambassador Winant evidently had in mind when, speaking of the common people of England, he expressed the conviction that following the war they would build a new Britain more nearly in the image of their dream of peace and plenty than it had ever been before? Or will those dreams be like the ones which led to what Newton Baker called our great "slump in idealism" following victory in 1918?

Great as are all the other difficulties in forecasting the future of planning, predicting the dreams of peoples is the greatest. As A. A. Berle, Jr., declared in *Fortune* (October, 1941), the new era that modern techniques will put within easy reach after the war will be rich beyond question. But whether it is also lasting and strong, beautiful and gracious, brave and kindly, industrious and good-tempered—that depends on forces more fundamental than those manipulated by engineering or finance, by brain trusters or businessmen. Its fate lies in the expressed and unexpressed dreams of many millions: the dreams that mothers build around their children; the vaulting visions in which young men mentally reconstruct the world; the wiser hopes of the unconquered and uncynical older men. These are the things that control desires; and desires, in their turn, make governments, economic systems, and the stuff of daily life. We have to be careful of our dreams now: they are dangerously apt to be fulfilled.

For the longer future it is perhaps mainly on the schools and colleges and universities that America must depend for making the philosophy of the good life—plain living and high thinking—the ideal of the citizen. But in its more immediate need the nation can rely only on the leadership it now has in the home and in the church; in politics, in business, and in the professions; in the arts, within education, and in the press. Fortunately, there are signs that the leaders in these fields are bestirring themselves to encourage such a philosophy.

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING PLANNING AGENCIES

Assuming that the American people will want their planners to help them obtain and secure the values of democracy, there are a number of hard problems ahead. None of them is wholly new, and most of them have bothered the nation for a long time. Though all are of a character calling for governmental concern, many will require for their solution not only the efforts of professional planning officials but also those of political leaders and administrative personnel.

Public problem No. 1 of the present age is to design and devise that wider base which is essential alike to the survival of political freedom and the restoration of economic well-being throughout the world. Neither nationalism, no matter how great the nation, nor imperialism, no matter how vast the empire, are broad enough to supply that base. What is needed is some form of international federation which, while leaving nations free to solve national problems, will provide "overnational" machinery to deal with problems too big for the nations to handle. Federal Union, as proposed by Clarence K. Streit, embodies the best plan yet suggested for creating such machinery, but it has not yet begun to get from leaders of opinion inside and outside the government the high consideration it deserves.

By some regarded only as a scheme for organizing the peace after the victory shall have been won, Federal Union is no less deserving of consideration as a means of winning victory. This point needs emphasis because there is danger that some planners

in America will run ahead of themselves and plan the winning and the using of the peace before the job of planning the winning of the war has been completed. The worst mistake our planners could make would be to underestimate the resources and the resolution of the enemy. Plans for war must take precedence over plans for peace until the defeat of the Axis has been finally assured. There is, in Berle's phrase, "a long, hard, bloody road ahead" for the peoples fighting fascism, and they seem likely to need the greatest possible pooling of their power to reach the end of that road in triumph. Precisely because union promises greater strength than any other kind of combination, it is the one the democracies must be prepared to establish. And once they have built a union, they must keep it and enlarge it so that it grows into a living "federation of the free," embracing all the peoples in the world.

Sooner or later the time will come for organizing the peace. As against that day it behooves every planner to remember that, whatever system of international co-operation may be created, it must, in order to be effective, be able to deal both with the ugly economic realities and with the ugly political realities of the age. For political and economic planners to belittle each other—as some have done recently—would be to indulge in criminal negligence. Both are indispensable.

With regard specifically to their own country, American planners have no end of jobs laid out for them. Before essaying any enumeration of these tasks, however, there is one immediate problem of planners which should be mentioned—that of adjusting their speed and their techniques to the tempo of a government at war. "Administrative normalcy" will impede our war effort, Herbert Emmerich has warned.

Decisions are being made daily in Washington which will affect the country's physical, social, and economic pattern for a century to come. . . . The planner, if his studies are to influence the decisions for the soundest immediate and long-term pattern, must intrude more into the action field than he would in normal times. He must not wait for a perfect study. He must find out where decisions are being formulated and put his suggestions in at the point of origin [*Public Administration Review*, Summer, 1941].

After the problems of war planning have been solved, one of the knottiest tasks of the planners in preparing for peace will be industrial demobilization. It will be up to the planners to chart the transition from a war to a peace economy in such a way as to avoid unemployment and depression. Their problem—and they will almost certainly have to meet it before the end of this decade—will be to determine the new uses to which the vast productive capacity of the nation should be allocated and to demonstrate how the change-over can best be accomplished. One such use is already under investigation, namely, the construction of needed public works. Co-operation between the Federal Works Agency and the National Resources Planning Board in the compilation of a nation-wide shelf of worthy projects known as the Public Works Reserve gives assurance that, in so far as the planning officials of the federal government can guarantee it, the nation, the states, the counties, the cities, and the special districts and authorities will be ready, when demobilization begins, to furnish employment to a maximum of men and dollars on sound capital improvements. The “in so far,” however, is not without significance. So few of these governmental units have worked out master-plans that the director of the American Society of Planning Officials felt constrained in August, 1941, to issue a pointed warning against making the Public Works Reserve “a mere collection of individual projects,” submitted without reference to any general or master-plan for the whole area of the unit and based not on community needs but upon financial capacity or incapacity. If planning bodies which have neglected to draft master-plans are prompted to do so to meet the standards of this national effort, the dark cloud of the emergency will prove to have had at least one bit of silver lining.

An opportunity no less than a problem, one of the tasks which will confront national planning bodies following the war will be the determination of the areas of economic activity to leave under public management and the areas to assign to private control. If the American people are to win their war against scarcity and poverty, they must call off the war between “rugged individual-

ism" and "robust collectivism." This would be the time to do it, and the way to do it would be to follow some such plan as Russell W. Davenport proposed in his celebrated essay "*This Would Be Victory*" (*Fortune*, August, 1941). After recognizing that the achievement of the goals of political security and economic opportunity would involve abandoning "the prejudices and shibboleths of the nineteenth century," Davenport acknowledged the logic of "a certain amount of socialization of the basic economic structure" but declared that "this would not be harmful, provided the limits of socialization were definite and recognizable." Remarking that many cities have socialized their transport facilities (he could have chosen a better illustration) "to the benefit of all concerned," he wrote: "There is no reason why we should not go much further, to the socialization of those industries in which capital growth and scientific invention play a very small role, while service and security play a large one." Ultimately by this process we should build a "true industrial democracy" in which "two areas would emerge: a socialized area, where great growth is not to be expected; and a private area, in which the incentives for expansion would be relieved of all except the most elementary restrictions, with *more* freedom of enterprise than exists today."

Do we now have the planning machinery and personnel to hammer out the details for so gigantic a reconstruction of the American economy? Patently no. With its present staff and budget the National Resources Planning Board could hardly do more than plan how the needed planning body should be organized. The board itself could be *built* into such an establishment, if that were desirable, but the wiser course would probably be to create for this purpose a comprehensive planning agency for industry comparable to the one already functioning in agriculture. By establishing a Bureau of Industrial Economics and setting up the necessary new "action" agencies for carrying out those of its plans accepted and adopted by the Congress and the president, the Department of Commerce could be made to serve business, public and private, no less effectively than the Department of Agriculture serves the American farmer. Indeed, some

of the "action" agencies essential to industrial adjustment are already in existence. The Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Loan Agency are quite as available to help businessmen as the Farm Credit Administration and the Farm Security Administration are to help farmers.

As for fixing the line between capitalism and socialism, as Davenport suggested, the nation by its Post Office Department and government-owned corporations, the states by their highways and educational programs, and the localities by their water-supply and utility systems have gone a long way in charting the perimeter of what he would call the "area of economic activity" to be placed under social management. Yet much remains to be done. The chief handicap is that there is no central planning agency for industry as there is for agriculture. And it will be difficult to establish one, because many corporations are so strong that they are almost able to insist that what planning is done shall be done on their own terms.

It is not intended to suggest that all the problems of agriculture are in the course of solution or, still less, that planning agencies should exhibit a neat and simple symmetry. The plain fact is that this work needs to be done and that the Department of Commerce would be the most logical place to do it. Whatever else the National Resources Planning Board may be asked to do, it should not be asked to take on as a continuing responsibility a task so great as to make it lopsided. Its greatest value consists in being a general, over-all planning agency. It will have an immense job simply to co-ordinate the proposals of the agricultural, industrial, and other "functional" planners and will need additional help, financial and otherwise, for this task alone.

Under no circumstances, however, is it to be supposed that such a grand and rational division of labor in the field of economic activity could be made promptly on the morrow of the collapse of fascism or that, once made, there would never be need of readjustment. Even with the best co-operation and the most favorable conditions, it would require a period of years to make the great transition. And as to readjustment thereafter, that need

will be continuous as long as our economy remains dynamic. Only by keeping careful records of technological trends and projecting them can planners give that farsighted counsel which will enable a society to benefit to the full from its technology. For example, one of the most obvious problems for planners will be to estimate the speed and scope of the development of civil aviation following the war.

If all these difficulties can be solved—and none of them are insoluble—the planners of the United States will have brought the American people a long way toward the fulfilment of one of the main resolutions voted by the planners at their annual conference in 1941: raising the standard of living throughout the country by “full employment and effective use of all our national resources when the energies of the nation are released from the present defense effort.” Translated into the terms of everyday life this means adequate nutrition and decent housing; more hospitals, schools, libraries, parks, playgrounds; more automobiles, radios, refrigerators, and washing machines; more jobs and more security. Knowing that these are the things the people want, the men and women who serve on the planning boards and commissions of the national, state, and local governments have accepted the responsibility of advising and demonstrating to those who formulate public policy how they can best be secured.

It will not be enough, however, for government to be intelligent about helping industry and agriculture and labor and the professions to put themselves in readiness for their new tasks. Government must be equally intelligent about itself. It has already been recognized that new agencies may need to be created at the national level. What remains to be suggested is that new regional instrumentalities will need to be established, that about half of the states must reorganize their executive branches before they will be equipped to handle their responsibilities efficiently, and that most of our local governments have yet to begin seriously to apply the principles of sound management. To put the matter plainly, our federal system itself needs some replanning! The National Resources Planning Board sponsored a preliminary ex-

amination of the problem in 1935; its report on *Regional Factors in National Development* will furnish an excellent point of departure for further study, particularly of the division of labor between the nation and the states.

PLANNING AT MID-CENTURY

The prospects that planning will be able to solve all the problems with which the generation of World War II is confronted are governed in large measure by various influences already known, some favorable, some unfavorable.

It can be said at once that there is no chance of achieving the millennium either in ten or in twenty years even on the possibility of sudden perfection in our planners. There is no such possibility, however, because no one yet knows precisely how to make a perfect planner. It is clear that he ought to be, fundamentally, a "generalist with a disciplined imagination," but what he ought to be besides is not agreed. Most of the planners in government today are specialists who, after attaining that intellectual discipline which only the effort to master a specific subject matter can confer, have deliberately turned generalist, many of them succeeding very well. Another hindrance is a tendency of some planners to identify "planning" with "trending"—to peer into the future to see what is going to happen and then get ready for it to happen, whether it be good or bad, inevitable or preventable.

And there are other obstacles. We have not as a people taken enough time to philosophize to arrive at a clear consensus as to values. Individualism still has a tenacious grip on most of us. There are many influential Americans who even yet think of planners as they do of plagues. And there are still more well-meaning people who are confused by the false and vicious conception that planning means centralization and regimentation and that avoidance of planning means decentralization and freedom. Planning bodies have difficulty in achieving that close tie with the executive branch of the governments they serve which would enable them to be most effective—a situation which can be remedied only over a period of time because of the human

factors involved. Funds for planning agencies are frequently inadequate. Finally, governmental units, mainly at the local level, often lack the legal power to carry out proposals made by the planning agency, and the difficulties of securing new grants of power for local units are so great that political officials are seldom inclined to put up the fight necessary to secure them.

Counterbalancing these impediments and handicaps are several definitely encouraging considerations. First and foremost among the aids to governmental planning is the growing sense of social responsibility in the nation's top-flight business leadership, exhibited most clearly and consistently in the columns of the magazine *Fortune* and in such books as Frank Altschul's *Let No Wave Engulf Us*, in which the well-known New York banker appeals to "the forces of moderation" for "a movement of the Center so radical as to be almost revolutionary" and for the immediate development of plans that will bring "a decent standard of living and a sense of security . . . within the reach of all." Another encouraging consideration is the increasing number of private citizens who are working in an organized and systematic way to win public support for planning. Among them are the members of groups like the American Planning and Civic Association, the National Planning Association, the Urban Land Institute, and the National Policy Committee—to say nothing of the one hundred thousand farmers who have already accepted invitations to serve on some fifteen hundred county planning committees.

And there are other encouraging signs. State and local planning are today receiving aid and assistance that enable them to do in one year what otherwise they could not do in five or ten years. By virtue of membership on planning bodies, more and more people, who heretofore have been engaged in mutual disparagement, are learning to understand one another—for example, long-view university professors and short-view businessmen. Incidentally, the planning movement is bringing institutions of higher learning into closer and more useful relationships with governments on all levels. This co-operation is clearly apparent

in the relationships of the land-grant colleges to agricultural planning. Still another favorable influence is the growing willingness of the citizen to recognize that by consenting to restrictions on the use of his own property or on his own conduct he makes possible the regulation by his government of the property and conduct of all his fellow-citizens in the interest of the general welfare.

Where, then, will governmental planning be at mid-century? On the local level it will still have as its major problem "making the best of that which wasn't planned." It will still be handicapped in many communities by poor records, inadequate funds, separation from the executive, and want of vigor and imagination on the part of its own personnel. But it will have become more practical in its approach and more down-to-earth in its concerns. And a growing number of mayors and councilmen will have learned that the existence of a plan commission intelligently concerned about the public interest can be a real source of strength to them as they endeavor to resist special pleaders and promote that same public interest. Most of our cities will be able to point to something in the nature of a master-plan embodying their needs for capital improvements for from five to ten years. Many will have completed new zoning maps and ordinances reflecting, on the one hand, more sober conceptions of probabilities for commercial growth and, on the other, new conceptions of the fitness of locating high-class apartment buildings in single-family residential districts. Problems of auto-parking and traffic regulation will be more acute than ever, and planning commissions will be devoting major attention to them, to matters of housing, and to the question of airports. There are no signs that any major development will have occurred in metropolitan planning.

Agricultural or land-use planning in the counties will have become firmly established and will cover effectively the field of rural local governmental planning, but the hiatus which now exists between city and county will still be there.

Perhaps a few of the states will have taken advantage of planning to rehabilitate themselves for greater usefulness in the second

half of the century. The others will have followed a policy of drift, shouting about their independence instead of building up their competence. The need for regional planning will have been met more by national action than by interstate co-operation.

The National Resources Planning Board and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics will by mid-century be larger and more influential agencies, and they will have been supplemented by some new body charged with planning for business and industry.

All these developments will mean that planning will be far more firmly established in government than it is today. The majority of planners, however, will continue to be laymen serving without compensation on local commissions, boards, and committees. Finally, on all levels planning will remain advisory in nature; it will not lose its democratic character.

As for governmental planning on an international or world-basis, that is one of the hardest of all to predict. Sharing, however, with Cordell Hull the faith that "there will come a better day," my conviction is that by mid-century peace will have been restored through democratic victory and that the governments of the world's free nations will be at work planning to insure liberty and security for all mankind.

Through planning, American government is making its most creative adjustment to the new conditions facing the people of the United States. Here it has exhibited best of all its great capacity for growth. Charles E. Merriam has made no finer contribution to democratic government in this country than in helping it to develop this capacity. In his career as political scientist, citizen, and public servant—the three strands have been so closely intertwined that they have made one career and not three—Merriam has been of great service in "stepping up" the adaptability of government on each of its levels and in helping government to be prepared to function effectively in every field of its operations.

Keenly aware of the importance both of approach and of technique, he has been fully as much concerned to educate the general public to an appreciation of the necessity and desirability of

planning as to develop the technique and extend its use. Of the two, the task of getting and keeping the public in a genuinely receptive frame of mind has been, and will remain, the more difficult. It has therefore been fortunate that Merriam's talents for public leadership are even greater than his abilities as a professional planner. He has made his greatest contribution to the planning movement through those hundreds of confident, resounding appeals to the American people in which he has measured their accomplishments as challenges against their possibilities. Who could reject a plea for planning, radiating a philosophy and faith like this?

It is the function of the Government to consider maladjustments, whether rural or urban, in the light of the national goal and to aid where possible in the solution of these problems, but not primarily as rural or urban problems, but first and foremost as American problems, as limitations on the attainment of American ideals. It is indeed this community of interest, this common struggle for enduring satisfaction and security under modern conditions, this common adventure in pioneering on the frontiers of a new social world, that makes the bonds that unite the American people in an indissoluble union.

half of the century. The others will have followed a policy of drift, shouting about their independence instead of building up their competence. The need for regional planning will have been met more by national action than by interstate co-operation.

The National Resources Planning Board and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics will by mid-century be larger and more influential agencies, and they will have been supplemented by some new body charged with planning for business and industry.

All these developments will mean that planning will be far more firmly established in government than it is today. The majority of planners, however, will continue to be laymen serving without compensation on local commissions, boards, and committees. Finally, on all levels planning will remain advisory in nature; it will not lose its democratic character.

As for governmental planning on an international or world-basis, that is one of the hardest of all to predict. Sharing, however, with Cordell Hull the faith that "there will come a better day," my conviction is that by mid-century peace will have been restored through democratic victory and that the governments of the world's free nations will be at work planning to insure liberty and security for all mankind.

Through planning, American government is making its most creative adjustment to the new conditions facing the people of the United States. Here it has exhibited best of all its great capacity for growth. Charles E. Merriam has made no finer contribution to democratic government in this country than in helping it to develop this capacity. In his career as political scientist, citizen, and public servant—the three strands have been so closely intertwined that they have made one career and not three—Merriam has been of great service in "stepping up" the adaptability of government on each of its levels and in helping government to be prepared to function effectively in every field of its operations.

Keenly aware of the importance both of approach and of technique, he has been fully as much concerned to educate the general public to an appreciation of the necessity and desirability of

planning as to develop the technique and extend its use. Of the two, the task of getting and keeping the public in a genuinely receptive frame of mind has been, and will remain, the more difficult. It has therefore been fortunate that Merriam's talents for public leadership are even greater than his abilities as a professional planner. He has made his greatest contribution to the planning movement through those hundreds of confident, resounding appeals to the American people in which he has measured their accomplishments as challenges against their possibilities. Who could reject a plea for planning, radiating a philosophy and faith like this?

It is the function of the Government to consider maladjustments, whether rural or urban, in the light of the national goal and to aid where possible in the solution of these problems, but not primarily as rural or urban problems, but first and foremost as American problems, as limitations on the attainment of American ideals. . . . It is indeed this community of interest, this common struggle for enduring satisfaction and security under modern conditions, this common adventure in pioneering on the frontiers of a new social world, that makes the bonds that unite the American people in an indissoluble union.

V

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE PRESS

LEO C. ROSTEN



DEMOCRACY is a system in which government executes the majority will. Democracy is a society in which significant social changes are effected *without violence*. Democracy is a political order in which government reflects the changing needs of the people who, governed, participate in the governing. Democracy rests upon the opinions of the public and the preferences of the majority. The entire democratic structure is built upon the assumption that the people will have access to accurate political facts, that the opinions of the public will spring from an intelligent comprehension of the facts, and that the preferences of the public will revolve around the really relevant and critical issues of political controversy and social change.

A working democracy, therefore, requires continuous vitality in communication between the government and the people. This is a two-way process: the governors must inform the people of their deeds and purposes; the people must keep the governors informed of their needs and choices. Any techniques which implement the two-way exchange of information strengthen the democratic process; any factors which impede the two-way exchange weaken the democratic process. The political leaders of a democracy can communicate with the public through obvious channels: by making statements to the press, by speaking over the radio, by appearing before the newsreels, by addressing public assemblies, by distributing official printed materials. This essay is primarily concerned with the relationship between political leadership and the press.

I

The men who built the political framework of our country knew that a free press is the keystone in the arch of democracy. They knew that opinions and criticism must be free of legal restraint; that political growth is nourished by political discussion; that any agency which conveys information or ideas performs a basic democratic function. George Washington used his Farewell Address to advise the nation to "Promote . . . as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened." The press was so highly valued as an instrument for "public enlightenment" that it was given constitutional status and constitutional prerogatives. Newspapers are the daily civics class of the adult population; or, as Lippmann put it, the newspaper is "the Bible of democracy . . . the only serious book most people read . . . the only book they read every day."

But freedom of the press does not automatically insure the honesty and accuracy of newspapers. It does not have to. There are shocking abuses to the freedom of *laissez faire* in the realm of journalism no less than in the realm of finance. It was but shortly after the formation of the republic that Thomas Jefferson exclaimed that "a suppression of the press could not more completely deprive the nation of its benefits than is done by its abandoned prostitution to falsehood. Nothing can now be believed which is seen in the newspapers." He deplored the "putrid state into which our newspapers have passed, and the malignity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those who write them" (letter to Dr. D. W. Jones, 1814). But Jefferson also knew that any remedy was worse than the disease; in the vein of Voltaire he announced that he would defend to the end the "right of lying and calumniating": "Our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost" (letter to Dr. J. Currie, 1786).

The majority of American newspapers today would not merit Jefferson's comment about a putrid, malignant, mendacious spir-

it, even though the defects and excesses of many newspapers are not inconspicuous. The venality of some papers is obvious; the obscenity of mood and the corruption of thought in some newspapers are indisputable. But today the American press as a whole prints more accurate and reliable news than the press of any other nation has ever printed at any time. There can be no question that the American public at present has easier access to more information, and more authentic information, than any other public has ever had.

There is widespread suspicion of the press and cynicism as to its integrity. Anyone who examines a copy of one of the Hearst papers, for example, or the *Chicago Daily Tribune* must be dismayed by the *treatment* of news in these powerful organs of "public enlightenment": outright distortions of fact, utterly misleading captions, violent cartoons, sensational emphases, the deliberate overplaying of items favored by the publisher and the deliberate underemphasis of items distasteful to the publisher. It is not difficult to collect evidence of the corruption of the news columns by those publishers who make facts jump through the hoop of their conscious bias—or vested interest. Yet even in the least appetizing sectors of the American press there is the purifying influence of the dispatches of the Associated Press and the United Press. The press associations have achieved a remarkable degree of objectivity and authenticity in reporting information, and even the most partisan newspapers rely upon press-association dispatches for a substantial portion of their news.

The public's cynicism about the press arises partly from obvious evidences of news distortion, partly from the blatant crusades which publishers carry on outside their editorial columns, and partly from the failure to distinguish between a newspaper's news columns and its editorial columns. Editorials—the proper place for publishers' opinions—have certainly ceased to be as influential in American politics as they were a decade ago. Editorials have come to be regarded by most readers as the soapbox of the newspaper and are given the passing credence afforded most soapbox performances.

Apropos the news columns, many groups contend that they do not receive adequate reporting. A labor movement which has been growing in self-consciousness and energy complains that labor problems are not treated fairly in the news columns; that news of labor's achievements and labor's co-operation is not considered "news"; that only news of strikes, violence, and discord reaches the front pages. Minority groups complain that newspapers fail to give their views and acts space commensurate with the importance which (the minorities assume) they possess. Consumer groups complain that the press, because of its relationship to advertising and advertisers, has a congenital aversion to news involving the consumer's interest. And political candidates point to the hysteria and partisanship which newspapers inject into their handling of news during political campaigns.

Much of this criticism is misdirected; the very concept of news which is dominant in journalistic circles is melodramatic and may inevitably tend to undermine public respect. Newspapers are supposed to inform. But newspapers are just as often dedicated to the attempt to startle. A crisis is news, a fight is news; and each issue of a newspaper becomes a chronicle of tensions, crises, and political fracas—many of which are inflated into "critical" dimensions under the pressure of competitive sensationalism. Even the most innocent newspaper reader comes to discount this spurious bellicosity as each day's crises recede into the past quite peacefully, as each day's "threats to democracy" or "threats to the American way of life" pass on without a visible change in the life of the reader. To be a gullible reader of the press would mean to live in a state of unrelieved anxiety and incipient self-immolation.

Those who criticize the partisanship of the press must recognize the fact that the entire process of journalism is subjective. From the police reporter to the city desk to the makeup editor to the editorial board, journalism represents a series of selective judgments about what is news—or what aspects of the news are more important than others. No two versions of an event by two different observers can be exactly alike; no two judgments about

the news value of a story need necessarily coincide; no two opinions about the exact nature of a political controversy need necessarily be similar. The deeper fault lies in the fact that neither political leaders nor newspapermen have an objective vocabulary for describing political and social events; there is no quick measuring rod by which to determine truths in the arena of political contention. In so far as the newspapers are provided with symbols which are exact—stock-market reports, tax figures, baseball box scores, election returns—the news record is remarkably free of error. But politics has no numerical equations; social issues cannot be condensed into mathematical symbols. The life and flow of political change must be described in terms which are impressionistic rather than analytical, subjective rather than objectified—and by reporters and editors who have “a nose for news,” which means a hypersensitivity to aberrance and conflict.

Political leaders often complain that the press is biased or that it has done them injustice or that it has failed to present the issues fairly. These complaints will arise as long as journalism is a series of subjective processes, as long as the primary motivation of a newspaper is to attract attention, and as long as publishers possess extra-journalistic interests which are vitally affected by political decisions. But political leaders who complain of misrepresentation in the news columns or prejudice in the editorial columns too often rest their case by lamenting the evils of “the newspapers.” There is another responsibility incumbent upon the political leader: to answer—to answer swiftly, decisively, and explicitly, by naming the newspaper and quoting its misrepresentation. Political leaders, whether they like it or not, must become master-polemicists, just as the eighteenth-century American theorists were polemicists of the most remarkable aptitude.

The political leader today has access to a medium which balances the power of the press and which can be exploited as a channel for informing the public—the radio. The decline in potency of newspaper support in politics is, of course, partly attributable to the new role that radio plays in political campaigns.

The political leaders of a democracy, like the newspapers, are

charged with the responsibility of keeping the public informed. More important, political leaders should *clarify* political issues. But, in this, politicians fail the public more often than newspapers do. Politicians fail to grasp the imperative need for clarity; they lack the skill (or desire) to simplify complex issues; they have not learned to sacrifice oratory to clarity. The confusion of "statesmanship" with orotund language presents a serious danger to the working democratic process. The substitution of lofty phrases for precise and realistic diagnoses represents a cardinal danger to a society that depends upon a popular comprehension of the political issues at stake. The failure to talk clearly *to* the people rather than vaguely *at* an agglomerate something called "the people" is one of the most disturbing defects of political leadership in democracy.

The need for clarification is greater today than it ever has been; and the need will mount in urgency as the affairs of man become more complicated and ominous. The ordinary citizen is required to make decisions upon the most fateful and universal problems, to pass judgment upon matters which involve war, peace, economic policy, public finance, labor problems, social security, the power equilibrium of agriculture, industry, and labor. The citizen of today is unquestionably better informed about his world than any other citizen ever was; but is he better oriented? The ordinary man is bombarded by facts, charges, affirmations; but does this clarify or confuse? In an age when the ordinary citizen has become increasingly aware of the enormity, the interrelationship, and the ramification of political events, our political leaders have not been sufficiently skilful in clarifying complicated questions, in providing the common man with a hard and precise concept of the issues he ponders. It was left for the *New Yorker* (June 7, 1941) to comment upon this shortcoming with characteristic felicity—and slight exaggeration:

The great paradox about this age of perfect communication, of course, is that nobody knows anything about what's going on. We ourselves read six newspapers every day, listen interminably to the radio, and spend a good deal of our time talking to industrious prophets who have just flown in from the warring cities

and the capitals and the battle fronts. Our guess is that we know rather less about the state of the world than an ancestor of ours who lived in Connecticut and depended for his information on old copies of *The Federalist* delivered occasionally by a man on a horse. He got his news late and in fragments, but in the end the picture in his mind was probably clear and sensible; we hear about everything the minute it happens, in staggering detail, and, generally speaking, it just adds up to balderdash.

This is not only because the stage these days is too big for any man to comprehend, or because an event described by ninety-five eyewitnesses is apt to be less satisfactory than the same thing reported on by one, or even because the current government spokesmen are sometimes apt to be rather coy about their facts. It is caused mostly by our own frantic state of continual reception. We are too busy listening to hear anything in particular, too overwhelmed by the parts to see any outline of the whole.

II

The popularization of political issues, and the clarification which this entailed, received historic impetus from Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration. The New Deal depended upon wide mass support, and it carried its appeal across the boundaries of formal party lines. President Roosevelt thrust national politics and policies into the forums of popular discussion; he widened the scale and deepened the content of political debate; he drove politics into the larger arena of social change. The "Roosevelt revolution" also revolutionized the relationship between government and the press.

The New Deal represented a frontal attack upon those institutions which paralyzed the flexibility of our political system; it became, therefore, a frontal attack upon those groups which resisted the redistribution of national income and political power. The New Deal challenged the "vested interests" of American society and, in doing so, provoked the opposition of those newspaper publishers whose vested interests were threatened. For newspaper publishers are more than newspaper publishers: they are employers, property-holders, corporation executives, recipients of large personal incomes and substantial business profits. Newspapers are business properties and business enterprises; their interests often coincide with the interests of other business enter-

prises and other business properties. The American Newspaper Publishers Association admitted this in a memorandum circulated to its members, which stated that "newspaper publishers as employers have interests that are identical and common with all other employers in their respective areas. . . . Newspaper publishers, as employers, are charged with an especial responsibility *to cooperate with other employer groups . . .*" (April 25, 1936; my italics). It was not surprising that a formidable section of the press fought the Wagner Act, the ill-fated Child Labor Amendment, social security legislation, pure food and drug laws, the National Labor Relations Board. The great social conflict which gripped America could not have left newspaper publishers unaffected; some publishers reflected their own interests in both the editorial and the news columns of their papers.

Since the success of the New Deal demanded the widest mass support, its leaders quickly became aware that they would have to launch an aggressive campaign of public information. In overall policy, as in daily tactics, the propelling energy for national reform and reconstruction had to be drawn from consistent, clear-headed public support. The first road to the public was the press—but the press was beholden to conventional political stereotypes; the newspapers interpreted profound philosophical conflicts in terms of cat-and-dog fights between political personalities; the newspapers which were steeped in the traditional cynicism of journalism handled the New Deal "crusade" with anti-septic reservations; the newspapers which clung to rock-bound conservatism swung into open hostility to "Roosevelt reform."

The New Deal administration moved into the sphere of public information by creating large staffs of government press agents, "information specialists," and public relations counsels. The administrators as well as the theorists of the New Deal needed specialists on information, experts on the journalistic repercussions of political acts and the public opinion requirements of political reformation. The New Deal brought experts in politics, economics, and sociology to Washington; it also drafted experts on the

techniques by which information could be best formulated, dramatized, and communicated.

Now government information bureaus were no new phenomenon in Washington; nor were press agents. But the gigantic growth in federal activities after 1933, the sheer magnitude of the issues which confronted the Roosevelt administration, and the increased complexity in political *content* which the New Deal program represented led the administration to enlist the skills of technicians who were no more and no less than experts in publicity. Government bureaus began to print a daily torrent of official reports, statistics, and statements. Government information was proliferated; official information agencies mushroomed; the administrative departments of government poured out a flood of handouts which were compounded of facts, news, rationalizations, or trial balloons.

The historian of the future will probably agree that the government press bureau and the government press agent were necessary and inescapable implementations of working democracy. For "interpreters" had become necessary in the public service—interpreters between political philosophy and popular understanding, interpreters between public administration and public opinion, interpreters in the tripartite interplay of the government, the press, and the people.

The publicity agencies of the government performed another important function. Students of public opinion and observers of the American press had long voiced concern over the fact that in our democracy newspapers are not charged with responsibility commensurate with their power. The press, some commentators warned, was becoming "an irresponsible branch of government." Charles E. Merriam suggested that newspaper proprietors were becoming an informal "House of Lords." It was not proposed that the press should be curbed in its power or restrained in its freedom; yet it had become clear that newspapers *could* weaken the democratic process by obstructing the channels of public information. In one sense, therefore, the publicity bureaus of the government were a counterweight to the newspapers; they were

a mechanism through which official facts and—more important—official *versions* of events could be disseminated.

With some justice the newspapers regarded government press bureaus with alarm, just as political leaders, with equal justice, had regarded many newspapers with alarm. But the magnification of government publicity was a corollary to the expansion of federal power and the widening of governmental action. Whatever the evils and dangers of official publicity services (and they are not to be disregarded), the extension of the avenues of communication between government and the public was evidence of greater clarity and realism about the process of democracy.

III

The need for the intensive communication of information was driven home from another source. The decade 1930–40 was a decade in which the dictators of Europe dramatized themselves and their achievements to the world. They seized upon routine performances and inflated them into national triumphs; they were adept in the arts of ballyhoo and drafted the circus barker and the advertising genius into the service of totalitarian rule. The press in a dictatorship is little more than a conveyor belt for encomiums. This constant drumbeating, this incessant exaltation of the “glorious achievements” of the Nazis or Fascists or Communists, had its influence upon American politics and American opinion. The glory and success which the dictators fabricated was designed to attract both the hope and the envy of citizens in a democracy torn by internal crises. It became apparent that it was necessary for democracy, too, to dramatize itself and publicize its achievements. But politicians have always tried to wrap themselves in togas of majesty, and the American press has perfected techniques for deflating political hoop-la. The real need for a dramatization of democracy ran squarely against the tradition (legitimate in a democracy) of newspaper skepticism about political power.

Those newspapers and publishers which attacked the “shovel-
leaning” and “leaf-raking” of Work Projects Administration

were, whether they understood it or not, undermining democratic morale by heaping scorn upon persons who, through no desire or fault of their own, were forced onto the relief rolls by economic disequilibrium. The publishers and newspapers that attacked the purpose of the Public Works Administration were, in effect, attacking a democratic method of improving the capital plant of democracy; they were opposing the efforts of a democracy to demonstrate to its own citizens that democracy, too, could launch mighty programs for the public good. The newspaper campaigns against the existence (not the operation) of W.P.A. or P.W.A. or the Tennessee Valley Authority were more than expressions of opposition to the New Deal; they were simultaneously an assault upon the devices which democracy was compelled to adopt in the effort to serve the collective welfare. It may be said without animus that the American press was playing into the hands of anti-democratic forces by fighting those aspects of the New Deal which were designed to achieve equity and improvement in the social order.

There was another sense in which the American press unwittingly played the game of the dictators. Newspapers are channels of information; but they may also be used as channels of misinformation. The propaganda of the Nazis and the Communists was given invaluable space and emphasis in American newspapers because it was news. The falsity or demagoguery contained in the news did not detract from its news value—especially to a press as much interested in startling as in informing. The American press has few effective techniques for preventing skilful propagandists from bending the newspapers to the bow of their own strategy. Some editors and publishers recognized the danger and searched for a yardstick with which to exercise discrimination in what was printed—to distinguish the “news value” of a story from its truth, the raw content from the propaganda purpose. The *Los Angeles Daily News*, for example, used captions over the war news (1939–41) in an effort to warn the reader: boldface type identified certain dispatches as “propaganda,” “not verified,” “seems authentic,” or “verified.” This labeling was more

than an ingenious novelty; it represented an effort to assess the authenticity of news stories and called the reader's attention to the probable falsity and the probable intention of those who had released the story.

As the conflict between democracy and dictatorship heightens and as propaganda "news" (real or fabricated) continues to pour into the newspapers, the American press will find it expedient to use identifying labels on the news which is printed. The device, if used with honesty and careful judgment, is one method by which newspapers can fulfil their responsibilities toward "public enlightenment." Jefferson, who was alert to the problem of matching power with responsibility, recommended to the editors of his day that they divide their papers into four sections headed (1) truths, (2) probabilities, (3) possibilities, (4) lies (letter to J. Norvell, 1807). A democratic press may well be obliged to supplement its news service by a continuous appraisal of the news.

IV

Democracy is strengthened to the degree that the people have correct knowledge, clear orientation, and deep conviction. The citizens of a free society must be cognizant of the implications, as well as the importance, of the problems they face. They must know the *alternatives* which are really available to them and the price they must pay for whatever program they select. They must learn to distinguish utopian promises from attainable progress. They must learn to distinguish democratic content from democratic appearances. They must be alert to the premises, the methods, and the purposes of the democratic order and of the orders that oppose it. To accomplish those ends both our political leaders and our newspapers must strive, above all else, to supplement information with clarification.

The leadership of a democracy—political and journalistic—must never fail to make its plans clear and its points clearly; it can never rest in the effort to be intelligible and realistic. The demagogue thrives on deception; the democrat conquers confusion with clarity. The demagogue fattens on contentiousness; the

democrat dispels doubt through a persistent illumination of political and social issues. Of all the forms of society which have been presented to man, democracy demands the most complete degree of what Washington called "public enlightenment." It is the first duty of our political leaders, and of the press which informs the public, to give the people facts plus orientation. A society which rests upon the opinions of the public must make certain that the public comprehends the facts from which opinions are formed; a society which enforces the majority will must make certain that the preferences of the majority are geared to the truly relevant issues of social change.

VI

THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM

HAROLD F. GOSNELL



THE nadir of the democratic party system has come upon the world. Never has factionalism been in such disrepute. Where it has not been rooted out by a painstaking and violent procedure, it has been frowned upon as "a source of national disunity." Crisis is the keynote of our times, and the minds of men do not run in gentle and tolerant channels. Not remotely, one expected that the inevitable political disputes among men would be resolved by means of compromises. Now, in viewing the European scene, political scientists get intellectual lumps in their throats about the days when parties in England and America were meaningless and two.

To rid one's self of reminiscence and wishfulness and to predict a most complex situation in a most complex world are tasks which look insurmountable. The most that can be done is to describe the major alternatives facing the world in the next few years and to depict the party system which is most likely to fit the *Zeitgeist* of each alternative.

I

A large majority of the American people in October, 1941, were committed to a victory for Great Britain, whatever the cost in materials and men. That was the belief of American political leaders for the most part, and that was the record shown by public opinion polls during the year 1941. Out of that sentiment stem these predictions about the future of the American system. The fate of parties in America will depend in large measure upon

whether the war is won in a short time at not too great cost or whether it is won at the end of a long, bloody fight at great cost or is lost through appeasement or defeat on the field of battle.

If the war is not long and costly, we can expect a somewhat accelerated development of the peacetime trend which has been going on now for some years. The loss of men is probably all important in this connection, and, if the war can be won without the loss of many American lives and too great a dislocation of American economic life, so much the better for gradualism in the American political process. The main transformations then will probably be (1) a catalytic effect on the processes of governmental and industrial centralization; (2) the appearance of parties divided more on economic and class lines; (3) the decline of the old type of patronage system with the consequent appearance of the problem of neutralization of the bureaucracy; and (4) a shift in functions of the local civic groups in conjunction with the changing character of municipal politics and the class cleavages mentioned above.

The number of those who see doom for democracy in the increased collectivism of the federal government and in the increasing ranks of governmental employees is only equaled by the number who see in this trend the salvation of democracy. Probably the question as to who is right is incidental to the question as to who thinks he is right enough to fight about it. The party in power, if the examples of history serve us right, would not be inclined to use violence instead of the legal means of change within their possession. But the same employers who have used strike-breakers in the past have the psychology necessary for breaking up the legal process of state, and their wrath would feed on the reaction of government and labor to their activities. These men may cause trouble even without war.

Those who view the increasing governmentalization of our life as hostile to democratic institutions are unimpeachably democratic in some cases, outright Fascist in others. Both groups identify democracy with the unrestrained capitalistic era. While Walter Lippmann sees in planning the death of the freedoms and

therefore decries it, Lawrence Dennis sees planning as inevitable and Fascism, therefore, as necessary and desirable. The one writes:

The very essence of the conception of planning is that a design can be adopted to which people will thereafter conform. This is equivalent to saying that a democratic people cannot have a planned economy. . . .¹

The other declares:

Successful technology requires empirical truth. Successful political democracy seemingly requires persuasive lies. Sometimes these lies are called idealism; the most favorable description of them to accord with the facts is to call them utopian fictions or myths. But you cannot run a complex machine by myths and fictions even of the law.²

But, again, we are reminded of the basic sentiment to defeat Hitler, and the conclusion is inescapable that there must be planning in the short run at least. All-out defense production involves huge debts, the regulation of prices, the rationing of some goods; and these controls cannot be relaxed immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. Plans for the immediate future inevitably include the war and reconstruction. Those who see in these measures the decline of democracy must be content with the degree of freedom permitted within this system as compared with other systems. It may help their peace of mind if they are able to see the increase in planning not as a temporary imposition of restraints on the minority by a despotic and transient majority but as a development of the "state ways" (folkways) of a society. Then it would appear clearer to them that a political democracy rests on basic sentiments, that no society is ever completely free, and that freedom exists only within certain areas where choices may still be made without disrupting the fabric of society.

The future of the American party system depends not only on the preservation of the freedoms but also upon the building of national unity. Already the beginnings of a basic and potentially wide cleavage are at hand. They are discernible under peacetime conditions and will be accelerated during a war crisis.

As early as April, 1922, Professor Merriam in the first edition of *The American Party System* wrote:

No one can forecast the process of the development of the economic order, but apparently the tide has turned in the direction of industrial democracy. Apparently the power of concentrated capitalism will be less in the future than in the past. . . . At any time labor may enter the political field here as in England and other modern states, either as a separate political party or as a wing or section of a liberal or progressive movement, and materially modify the tactics of the political parties . . . [pp. 425-26].

When these lines were written, Professor Merriam did not know that there would arise a new and militant rival of the American Federation of Labor and that national legislation would greatly encourage the development of labor organizations.

Material from studies of voting behavior made by psychologists, sociologists, journalists, and political scientists and the public opinion polls all tend to show that the American party system is going through some of the changes which were so clearly foreseen by Professor Merriam.³ While sectional, religious, nationalistic, and traditional influences are still important in American politics and tend to produce political behavior which is independent of economic considerations, the various surveys and analyses show that more and more the two major parties in the United States are dividing on the basis of income groupings. The Democratic party is becoming the party of the lower-income groups, the organized industrial workers, and the beneficiaries of the relief, farm, housing, lending, and other programs of the national government. The Republican party, on the other hand, is tending to become a party of the higher-income groups, the businessmen, the professional classes, the white-collar groups, and the independent farmers who have not felt that they have benefited particularly from the farm programs.

The findings of research workers in the field of American politics show that the trend toward the agreement of political and economic divisions is still offset by many counterinfluences. In the South the Democratic party remains the party of the upper-income groups and the social élite. On the other hand, in the

North there are many people in the lowest-income groups who vote the Republican ticket, in spite of New Deal legislation. Negroes in domestic service or in independent employments,⁴ unskilled laborers whose precarious tenure depends upon business conditions,⁵ small independent farmers situated on poor soil,⁶ and white-collar workers who are poorly paid but take pride in their middle-class standing still support the Republican party in large numbers. Studies of voting behavior which are based on the official election returns do not shed direct light upon the trend toward income-group cleavage. The different income groups within a given county, which is the usual reporting method for election returns, are lumped together, and the variations in their voting habits are concealed. If it happened that the voters tended to concentrate in certain areas within the county on the basis of income and if the voting records for those areas were available, the official election returns could be used to check this hypothesis. Litchfield's study of Detroit and the writer's studies of Chicago show that the relationship of political and economic alignments may be studied in this fashion.⁷ With census-tract data for a larger number of cities, analyses of this sort could be greatly extended. It is worth while mentioning in passing that Professor Merriam played an important role in setting up the social science research programs which paved the way for the improved character of our national Census.

While the trend toward class division in American politics became marked during the thirties, it was not an entirely new phenomenon. In the election of 1896 may be found many antecedents of the 1940 alignment. William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic candidate, appealed to the farmers in the West and the laborers in the cities, while his Republican opponent, William McKinley, had the support of the upper-income groups, the professional classes, and those who thought that their welfare depended upon the success of the wealthy. Under the skilful guidance of his campaign manager, Mark Hanna, a successful businessman, McKinley won a sufficiently large number of the middle- and lower-income groups to carry the election, but it is en-

tirely probable that if Bryan had had the same facilities to carry his message to the lower-income groups that McKinley enjoyed, the results might have been different. In 1896 the country was deluged with printed propaganda for the Republican cause, while Bryan, a tireless speaker, had time to reach but a small fraction of the masses. If the radio had been in as wide use in 1896 as in 1940, Bryan might have had a more even chance.

In this connection it is worthy of note that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's training in national politics came under the Wilson administration. While Wilson barely held the Bryan vote in 1912 and won because of the split in the Republican party, in 1916 Wilson built up a popular constituency on the basis of the farmers of the West and South and the workers in some of the eastern centers which contained some of the Theodore Roosevelt Progressive elements.

The trend toward an income-group cleavage in American politics appeared again in the presidential election of 1924. In that year the influence was marked in the Republican party but not so clearly in the Democratic. La Follette's Progressive party support came from the ranks of organized labor and some of the liberal-minded farmers in the Middle West. Calvin Coolidge received the traditional Republican vote, which included the upper-income level in the North. On the other hand, John W. Davis, who received the lowest vote cast for any Democratic candidate since the Civil War, drew his supporters from the foreign-born elements in the metropolitan centers and the die-hards in the South, the border states, and certain parts in the North. At the time it was prophesied that the Democratic party would disappear.⁸ These prophets failed to see the possibilities of a rejuvenation of the Democratic party by a combination of the Progressive and old-line Democratic elements.

In 1928 Alfred Smith began the process of bringing the labor elements into the Democratic party. In the big cities of the North, particularly in those which had a considerable number of Catholics, he made an excellent showing. If organized labor had been as strong in Pennsylvania and New York, Illinois and Ohio, in

1928 as it was to be in 1940, it is probable that Smith might have come close to winning, in spite of the defection of the traditional Democrats in the South.

In the Franklin Delano Roosevelt elections of 1932, 1936, and 1940, there was a general shift in party alignments. While many wealthy persons who had heavy losses in the downward spiral of the business cycle voted against hard times and Hoover in 1932, they were back in the fold by 1936. That election swept away large portions of the lower-income-strata support which the Republican party had had in the first part of the twentieth century. Gone was the patronage base, gone was the whip hand in the former employer-controlled counties,⁹ gone was the almost universal conviction of the Negroes that they must support the Republican party at all costs, and gone was the widespread belief among many working-class people that their interests were identified with the interests of the wealthy classes.

An examination of the recent party platforms will not reveal any increasing economic-group antagonism in American politics. It might be said that one of the characteristics of the political process in the United States has been the repression of fundamental issues by the major party spokesmen. For instance, in the presidential campaign just eight years before the Civil War, one looks in vain for a stand by a major party leader on the burning issues of slavery and secession. The old Whig party dissolved rather than face this issue. Again in 1916 the United States faced a fundamental issue, namely, what would be the role of this country in world-affairs. During the campaign neither of the major party candidates had the courage to take a definite stand on this question. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt has likewise been unwilling to indicate all the implications of his New Deal program, and his opponents were unwilling to denounce any significant portion of that program. This shadow boxing did not fool the great mass of the voters. Landon and Willkie might give lip service to organized labor, the troubles of the unemployed, the problems of the farmers, but it appeared to these groups that the backers of Landon and Willkie were not sympathetic toward their

cause. A Philadelphia Republican precinct captain has expressed what has taken place in a dramatic fashion: "While the Republican party organization man seems to roost on the voter's doorstep, the amazing Roosevelt has become one of the family."¹⁰

The popular basis of the New Deal victories is not the same as that of the Wilson victories. Roosevelt was able to obtain such strong support in the North and the West that it was not necessary for him to depend so much upon the conservatives of the South as President Wilson was compelled to do. While the southerners undoubtedly have been very powerful in the Democratic Congress of the thirties, nevertheless Robinson with his moderate background was a New Dealer and Senator Glass of Virginia, though irritated, did not walk out of the party. Although a patrician, Franklin Delano Roosevelt has shown a warm sympathy for the underprivileged. While the trend in American politics toward a more sharply defined economic division is unmistakable, this development has not gone far enough to endanger the democratic system from within.

One general proposition which political theorists have agreed upon in connection with the discussion of democratic government is that this system is based upon a consensus of fundamental political ideas, and when this consensus is lacking the democratic process breaks down. In the United States this collapse occurred in the campaign of 1860. Not since the Civil War has there been any American election after which there was not sufficient ground for agreement between the major parties so that economic activities could continue as usual. The existence of this national unity has meant that it has been safe for candidates to talk about fundamental issues even when they realized in their frankest moments that there were no fundamental issues separating them from the opposition. William Jennings Bryan in the Democratic campaign of 1896 talked about the wage-earners, the organized laborers, the farmers and their battle against plutocracy, organized wealth, Wall Street, and the money power, but after the election he did not urge any violent action against the opposing forces. It is significant that the Republican party in this campaign carefully

avoided any explicit references to economic cleavages and stressed the unity of the country behind the existing economic system. On the eve of the election William Allen White said, "There is no great issue before the country to divide the people. Man and man should dwell in unity. . . ."¹¹ Bryan looked upon the election as the process of getting back to the accustomed ways of life, not as a revolutionary appeal. He said, "In times of quiet, abuses spring up. . . . Then the people arouse themselves . . . and put the government on its old foundations."

The New Deal elections were more like the election of 1896 than they were like the election of 1860. Characteristic of American political campaigns has been the emphasis upon personalities. Wendell Willkie recognized this in his article appearing in the magazine *Fortune*. He said: ". . . the American people do not give their vote to policies; they give their vote to *men*. They vote for the man who, in their opinion, will not let them down."¹² Throughout the campaign Willkie tried to identify himself with the common people. He delivered his acceptance speech at Elwood, Indiana, the small town where he was born. In addressing Chicago citizens he referred to himself as one of the "just plain folks." He recounted how he had sold newspapers at nine, worked on the farm, worked in the steel mill, and taught school. At no time did he preach class warfare. His keynote was American unity.

Since 1860 there have been four complete cycles in American politics. At the beginning of each cycle the Democratic party was in power but in a position of declining influence. A cycle was completed when the Democratic party came back to power. The year 1942 finds the United States in the fifth political cycle. The peak of the Democratic strength was probably reached in 1936. Barring an international catastrophe with a resulting economic chaos, it is likely that the fortunes of the opposition party may again rise.

Increased centralization with its problems of freedom and order and the growing rift between the two major American parties are two trends of great significance for the American party

system. A third trend, homologous to these two in large part but with a role of its own, is the decline of the old type of patronage politics. Professor Merriam predicted in 1922 that "notwithstanding the increasing number of governmental functions and the correspondingly larger number of public employees, the influence of 'patronage' tends to decline perhaps more rapidly than is generally perceived."¹³ By the hundreds of thousands, governmental employees have been encompassed by civil service regulations. The federal service is in great part subject to merit considerations and the state and local services increasingly so. The political machines of the future may face a scarcity of patronage to dispense, and the public may face a great body of governmental servants whose participation in politics would be a delicate matter to adjust.

American party organizations have been built in part on the basis of patronage and spoils. The role of patronage is likely to decline in the future. Professional party workers may be fewer, and more and more dependence on voluntary workers and organized groups may result. With an increased class antagonism, the labor unions and the employers' associations may be expected to take an increased amount of the burden of supporting the parties.

But an unheralded and perhaps more significant change in the party structure will come about through the new positions which some party will fill in the bureaucracy. Initially, of course (and this argument has been directed forcibly against the New Deal), the party in power will tend to appoint more men to office who believe in their dogmas. But as soon as they are appointed to office they begin to lose their former specific attachments and become attached to a system—the system which furnishes them a living, a morale, and a role to play in society. Once intrenched in office, they will pursue certain collective goals. These goals would naturally not be the goals of the system which existed before they took office but would be the goals of the system under which they would work or the system toward which their functions would be tending. The road back would be rendered more and more im-

possible politically, unlike former days wherein governmental changes were not far reaching and a party could undo much of the work of its predecessor without much ado. Whatever parties existed would adopt the new goals because of the irresistible pressure of vested interests.¹⁴ Parties might then emphasize their role as critics of management.

Concurrent with the trends in national politics would be the tendency for nonpartisan and civic groups of today to become partisan. Civic organizations today are preponderantly middle class. Their aims are efficiency in government, elimination of corruption (bossism) in politics, and the improvement of middle-class standards. As the national parties become more divided on the basis of income and class, these local groups will also become more and more divided along those lines. When issues become sharp, they would be compelled to take sides.

Not only civic groups but also economic classes would have fewer nonpartisan functions. James Burnham, in his treatise on *The Managerial Revolution*, described this trend well—too well, in fact:

The New Deal has further curbed the masses by tying the popular organizations closer and closer to the state. This development is characteristic of the managerial revolution in all nations. It is strikingly illustrated in the United States by the history of the labor movement during the New Deal period. . . . The A. F. of L., as a result, is abandoning its traditional stand-off policy. Moreover, the history of the New Deal relations with farmers' and consumers' organizations parallels the labor movement tendencies. The examples of Russia and Germany have already taught us that the early forms of managerial society require fusion of the popular organizations with the state. The bureaucrats in charge of the popular mass organizations, in fact, take their place among the managers. This tendency, like the other managerial tendencies, is conspicuous in the New Deal [pp. 259-60].

II

Another set of alternatives is faced when the element of a long war is introduced into the party future. Would such a situation create in this country conditions such as those which prevailed in Germany before the Fascist revolution? What difference in the sequence of events would result from such peculiarities of the American culture as the liberal tradition?

The precarious foundation of American democracy and the two-party system is clearly shown by the events of the last twenty years in the state of Louisiana and the urban community of Jersey City.¹⁵ In these two widely scattered jurisdictions of the United States we have seen the rise of a type of political control which bears some strong resemblances to dictatorship. Huey Long at the peak of his power in 1935 when he was assassinated and Mayor Hague before he suffered some reverses in the courts controlled the political affairs of their respective bailiwicks with blatant demagoguery, ruthlessness, and disregard of the democratic process. Opposition parties were intimidated, freedom of speech was practically suspended, and the full financial powers of the respective governments were used to place the citizens under obligation to men who, in American parlance, would probably be termed "bosses" rather than dictators. The citizens of Louisiana and of Jersey City did not rise up and fight for two of the most essential democratic freedoms—namely, freedom of speech and freedom from fear. They were apparently content to take advantage of the service rendered by the government, expensive as that might be not only in dollars but in human freedom. Upon Long's death, the "Kingfish" became a legendary hero of the voters of his state. "Boss" Hague's power has not been successfully challenged in his own city since the time that he consolidated the various elements of his "bossdom." What happened in these two jurisdictions might happen in the United States as a whole, if the economic system developed more serious maladjustments than are to be found at present and if men arise to exploit them.

One of the principal characteristics of an authoritarian dictatorship is the monopolization of legality by a single party claiming to represent the real will of the nation. Limitations imposed upon freedom of expression and freedom of association may be regarded as measures of totalitarian tendencies. What signs are there of such intolerance in the American scene?

The rise of antidemocratic parties in the United States shows that there are some seeds of totalitarianism in this country, but the plants have not proved to be very flourishing. The Com-

munist party, which in accordance with the dictates of the Third International has been antidemocratic from time to time, has never found particular favor with the American electorate. Even in the crisis election of 1932 its vote (103,152) was insignificant. On the other hand, throughout American history there have been intolerant, strong-armed organizations which have come and gone. The Know-Nothing party of the fifties, the Ku Klux Klan of the Reconstruction days, the Klan of the post-Versailles days, and the various shirt organizations of the thirties, including the Silver Shirts, the Khaki Shirts, the White Shirts, the Black Shirts, the Brown Shirts, the Blue Shirts, and the Night Shirts show that there is an incipient Fascism in the United States ready to flare up when conditions are favorable.¹⁶ While these Fascist-like organizations have not gained any permanent ground—Gerald Winrod of the Defenders of the Christian Faith was defeated in the Kansas election and Fritz J. Kuhn of the American-German Bund was compelled to retire in disgrace—nevertheless, the rapid multiplication of such movements shows that there is here a potential menace to American democracy. It should be remembered that Hitler and the Nazi party were a laughingstock in 1923 and 1924. A turn in the international situation or in the economic cycle for the worse might furnish an opportunity for an American "leader."

If extra-legal organizations which exhibit intolerance and a willingness to use violence are in turn tolerated by the authorities, then democracy is in danger. Such organizations as the Michigan Black Legion and the California Vigilantes are examples of organizations which might challenge the existing order. It is difficult to estimate the strength of these groups, but their presence is periodically brought to the attention of the public in connection with labor and other crises.

Another index of the insecurity of American democracy may be found in repressive legislation affecting informal, unlawful groups. Such legislation has precedents antedating the Civil War. Laws regarding freedom of speech, press, assembly, and the organization of political parties are of importance in this connec-

tion. The anti-Loyalist laws, the Alien and Sedition laws of 1798, the suspension of writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the Federal Espionage Law and the state sedition acts during World War I, and the post-war antimask, criminal syndicalist, anti-anarchists, antisabotage laws, are examples of this type of legislation. Mention should also be made of the growth of laws which exclude the Communist party from the ballot. In this connection it is significant that one of Hitler's first acts was the exclusion of the Communist party. Sometimes old statutory and common-law devices of repression are employed, such as laws against unlawful assembly, riot, breach of peace, disorderly conduct, obstruction of traffic, and the holding of street or park meetings. The highly objectionable teachers'-oath laws, the intensified restriction on freedom of speech in New Jersey, several southern states, and California by the control of street meetings and private halls are developments to be watched.

The present period has raised another series of questions regarding the faith of the American people in the possible solution of their difficulties by the democratic process. Violence and other unlawful conduct have increased. Organized farmers and organized workers, on the one hand, and business organizations, on the other, have used violence to accomplish their purposes. Milo Reno and the Farm Holiday Association defied the regular processes of foreclosure. Potentially the sit-down strikes might have developed violence of the type found in Italy in 1919-22 just prior to Mussolini's coming to power. La Follette's investigation of the strong-arm tactics of business showed the dangers in this direction.¹⁷

An outstanding characteristic of the totalitarianism regime is the use of violence by the government to settle disputes which under a democracy would be decided by the peaceful process of compromise. During the disturbing years of the depression there has been a tendency for state governments to use militia and National Guard, as in Oklahoma, Indiana, Ohio, and Rhode Island. Often the use has been illegal, and on a number of occasions it has been restricted by federal-court injunction. New Deal

legislation has attempted to solve the farm mortgage and labor problems; but, should the danger to national defense become great, it is likely that further repressive measures would be employed to end strikes and industrial sabotage.

These are only threatening signs, it is true, but they do indicate that our democracy has been a matter of fortune as well as a matter of philosophy. We must see what forces are stirring on the American scene today to understand the gathering momentum of Fascist reaction. Once they are seen and understood, it will be clear that only concerted action on behalf of definite international objectives will rescue the rights of 1776 from a torrent of fire.

If Germany wins the war, if there is a negotiated peace after a time, or if we win after a terrible struggle, the results may be similar. The antiliberal, antirevolutionary, and antidemocratic elements in the nation's politics would probably be immeasurably strengthened. The prestige of democracy might be destroyed. The insecurities of the post-war epoch might be unbearable without the great irrational outbursts of which the Fascists are masters. A prolonged and exhausting war is so great a trauma that any system which gets a people into such a war might be liable to disaster afterward.

In October, 1941, in America, the group known as "America First" contained within itself most of the formally overt Fascist organizations in the United States. By specific command the members of the German Bund and other Fascist groups had been joining America First. From it they had been getting respectability, arguments, converts, and protection. In return, they "paled it o'er with a sickly taint" of anti-Semitism and antiliberalism. For the first time in American history they had a potential mass basis for their propaganda and tactics, built around a common dread of war.

Tolerance of political differences in the past has been a product of an indifference typical of the whole of the political process, as well as a consensus to tolerate disagreement. The basis for non-violence in politics (excluding occasional violence at the polls and the Civil War) has been, in part, preoccupation with personal

matters and disregard of and aversion toward politics. The future promises a more highly crystallized public opinion with growing antagonisms. Under these conditions the future of the democratic party system depends on a deliberate attempt to rationalize democracy as based on a consensus to agreement and upon the acceptance of this premise. In addition to acceptance of the "great myth," it is also necessary to preserve a party system which permits opposing views to be presented. Increasing intolerance of extremist groups is justified for self-preservation and will be employed, notwithstanding the complaint that by adopting some of the devil's methods you are becoming the devil himself.

The interrelationship of parties and planning is all important. It is to the interest of politicians of both parties to realize that their freedoms are bound up in a satisfactory solution of the problems of the next peace, and no amount of playing for the short-run circus will avail in the long run. The balance between a democratic party system and a totalitarian state in the post-war crisis may well be changed in favor of the former by steps taken today to plan social change.

The democratic party system, based on a tolerance of conflicting views and interests, faces severe tests in the future. It must maintain and increase a morale which can withstand the emotional strains imposed on the population by continual crisis over a period of years. Traditional middle-class sources of morale are diminishing, and strenuous steps should be taken immediately to recruit the low-income groups on the side of the survival of the two-party system. This end will be difficult to accomplish, but the position of many sections of the middle class is depressing. Their lack of faith in the democratic way of life has been growing during the decade of the thirties. Protestant ministers, whose sermons were printed in the *Christian Pulpit* between the years 1920 and 1941, turned completely around from a confidence in man's powers of reason, need of freedom, and substantially good nature during the twenties to a distrust of the ability of reason, an emphasis on the need and value of faith, a conviction of the necessity of discipline by the state, and a feeling that man is essentially

evil.¹⁸ This was the trend of thought among those who both reflected and led the thought of the class which was formerly the basis for the American democracy.

The future of the American party system depends upon our faith in the efficacy of the democratic process to solve the difficult problems of the defense and post-defense period, upon our willingness to make sacrifices to attain national unity, upon our ability to achieve discipline without going Fascist, and upon our willingness to accept changes in economic and political institutions that seem called for by the times.

The American two-party system based upon the democratic tradition of tolerance of conflicting views and interests faces some severe tests in the near future. Can it build up and maintain the morale necessary for a generation or two of defense activities with all the tremendous sacrifices involved? For such an all-out defense effort it would be necessary to assume heavier and heavier tax burdens, to avoid labor disputes, to accept a lower standard of living, and to permit greater and greater government interference with the industrial system. Should these matters become the bases of political differences as they did in France, then, not so many years hence, the United States might be facing a situation similar to that which confronted the French in 1940.

In an eloquent speech André Maurois laid the collapse of France in 1940 to a lack of unity, strength, discipline, and a common faith. He concluded with a plea that the free nations learn the terrible lessons of that disaster—that they could not fight planes and tanks with words and strikes and that in times of national danger the “commerce and smoothness,” the rivalries and greeds of ordinary life must be laid aside before it was too late. He said:

Perhaps some of you remember Kipling's beautiful poem written after the Boer War, and whose each stanza ends with the refrain:

“Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget, lest we forget”

If all free nations have learnt the terrible lesson of our disaster; if they have learnt that there is no liberty without security and no security without unity; if

they have learnt that freedom, born of discipline and strength, can be saved only by disciplined strength; if they have learnt that a common faith is the condition of a common victory; if they have learnt that you can not fight planes and tanks with words and strikes; if they have learnt to lay aside, in times of national danger, the "comfort and smoothness," the rivalries and greeds of ordinary life; if they have learnt "to fill the unforgiving minute" with sixty seconds of efficient work; if they have learnt the full and sinister meaning of those two words, the most tragic in any language: *too late*, then we have not suffered in vain, then France once more, at the cost of her blood and tears, has saved the world from darkness and servitude, and that is why, however painful the duty was to me, I have accepted to tell you today of our faults, pains, and hopes, lest *you* forget, lest *you* forget.¹⁹

Shall America follow in the footsteps of her unfortunate sister-republic? Will greed, blindness, ignorance, and a lack of faith in the American system pave the way for its collapse? Or will the pioneer spirit of freedom which conquered the wildernesses of this continent once again assert itself to conquer poverty, unemployment, race prejudice, sickness, degradation of the human spirit and war? The future of the American party system rests with the American people.

VII

TRENDS IN PARTY CAMPAIGN FUNDS

LOUISE OVERACKER



IN AGITATING for publicity of campaign funds in national elections at the beginning of the present century, Perry Belmont, William Jennings Bryan, Seth Low, and other crusaders aimed to make impossible the domination of a party by a few generous contributors in their own selfish interests. The legislation which they sponsored may not have eliminated the "power of the purse" from American presidential elections, but unquestionably the publicity laws of 1910 and 1911, supplemented by senatorial investigations, provide important grist for the mill of the political scientist. Trends of great significance are reflected in the detailed reports of contributions and expenditures which these laws require of the national committees.

In the present essay the financing of the campaigns from 1928 to 1940 will be considered in some detail, leading to an analysis of probable future trends in party finance. It is a period in which there are a few important constants and many very important variables. The area in which the presidential election took place remained constant, and the size of the electorate increased but little. Exactly the same legislative requirements were operative in the first three campaigns, but in 1940 the Hatch Act introduced radical changes in rules which had important effects upon the financing of the campaign—although not always in the direction anticipated by its framers. Another important variable factor was the business cycle which, in the period covered, went through the stages of "boom," "bust," and the beginnings of recovery. Issues arising out of the depression were important in all the campaigns. In 1928 the Democratic candidate vainly tried to

convince the American voter that "prosperity" was not a patented Republican product. Responsibility for the depression and programs of reconstruction figured prominently in 1932 and 1936. In 1936 and 1940 the Democrats sought and received a vote of confidence for the New Deal brand of recovery and reconstruction. During the period increased activity in the ranks of organized labor was followed by bitter strife between the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organization. The closing years of the period were clouded by the ugly shadow of World War II, which might have a profound effect upon political alignments in the years to come. In one important respect the period was unique; in three of the four presidential campaigns the successful party was led by the same man. The New Deal which he inaugurated brought about important changes in the financial support of the major parties.

EXPENDITURES IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS, 1928-40

No clearly defined trends appear in the summary of the expenditures of the party national committees presented in Table 1. In both parties amounts have fluctuated, the peaks appearing in 1928 and 1936, the low points in 1932 and 1940. The Republicans have consistently spent more than the Democrats, but the party which spent the most did not always win the election. In 1936 and 1940 many public expenditures for relief and Work Projects Administration projects probably aided the Democratic party. In the campaign of 1932, however, it had no assistance from "Santa Claus."

The reasons for the fluctuations in the expenditures of the national committees are many and varied. The explanation of the 1928 peak was partly prosperity and partly the intense bitterness of the Hoover-Smith contest. Ready funds were available and were generously given to preserve Republican prosperity, continue or end the "noble experiment" of prohibition, keep a Catholic out of the White House, or prevent the Tammany tiger from laying its claws upon Washington. The startling drop in totals in 1932 reflects the acute business depression of that year. With the

downward swing of the business cycle, political parties as well as individuals were forced to cut their expenditures.

Political as well as economic factors explain the sharp increase in expenditures in 1936. There had been some improvement in business conditions, and more was anticipated; but to a large extent the lavish outpouring of funds was the result of the intensity of feeling engendered by the New Deal. The bitterness of the contest is reflected in the words of the Republican who, in explaining his generous contributions, stated that "the American form of government, the fundamentals of our democratic society,

TABLE 1*

EXPENDITURES OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS OF 1928-40

Year	Democratic	Republican	Total
1928	\$3,157,454	\$4,064,518	\$ 7,221,972
1932	1,993,272	2,041,613	4,034,885
1936	4,531,484	6,834,342	11,365,826
1940	2,197,816	2,242,742	4,440,558

* All figures are exclusive of funds returned to the states under agreements with state committees and of advances to state and local committees. They represent, as accurately as possible, the funds expended directly by the national committees for campaign purposes.

the economic system under which our country has become the greatest in the world, are in jeopardy."

In 1940, in spite of improvement in business conditions and an exceptionally bitter contest, the expenditures of the national committees dropped almost as low as in the depression campaign of 1932. The explanation is to be found in a radical change in legislation passed in the summer of 1940. Hatch Act II, designed primarily to extend to certain state and local employees the limitations upon political activities already imposed upon federal officeholders by Hatch Act I, made it illegal for any "political committee" to receive contributions or make expenditures aggregating more than \$3,000,000 during any calendar year. Whatever doubt might exist about other agencies, the national committees

were clearly limited by the law. The drastic change in rules, imposed just as the whistle was about to blow for the presidential campaign, necessitated some rapid changes in financial plans. The loosely drawn provisions of the act made the task not too difficult.

The Republican National Committee was embarrassed for several reasons. It had ended the 1936 campaign with a deficit of \$900,000, most of which was carried over to 1940. In January and February of that year, \$639,000 was disbursed in payment of 1936 bills. If payments on the 1936 bills were included in figuring the \$3,000,000 to which the committee was limited by the Hatch Act, less than \$2,400,000 would be permitted for the running expenses of the campaign. The Republicans argued that the provisions of the act could not be retroactive and omitted the \$639,000 from their expenditures in all reports filed after its passage. This amount is omitted from Table 1.

A second source of embarrassment arose from certain fundraising agreements entered into before the passage of the Hatch Act. In recent years there has been a tendency toward greater centralization of the collection and distribution of Republican campaign funds. Local party committees and nonparty agencies operating in all geographical areas have continued to raise money, but a large proportion of the funds formerly collected by the state committees and by the senatorial and congressional campaign committees have been cleared through the national committee. Early in 1940 the Republican National Committee had organized a series of finance committees and entered into agreements with state committees under which a certain percentage of all funds collected by the finance committee were to be refunded to the states from which they came. Under these arrangements a large part of the funds used by the state committees would have gone through the books of the Republican National Committee. Before the Hatch Act was passed \$569,000 had been refunded to the states. This amount was subtracted from the expenditures of the Republican National Committee in all reports filed after passage of the act and does not appear in Table 1. Of

still greater importance was the cancellation of the fund-raising agreements and the substitution of a series of independent finance committees for the earlier organizations.

The importance of these committees is at once apparent from the size of their collections. The receipts of the United Republican Finance Committee of Metropolitan New York alone totaled close to \$2,000,000, the Pennsylvania committee collected more than \$1,000,000, and the finance committee of Illinois over \$700,000. Exclusive of funds transferred to the national committee, the independent finance committees collected more than \$6,600,000. Some of these funds were distributed to state and local committees, some were spent directly, but all of them aided the presidential candidate of the Republican party. It is evident that Table 1 gives a very incomplete picture of the financing of the Republican campaign of 1940. By little more than a paper reorganization the party brought its money-raising activities within the letter of the Hatch Act, with no financial embarrassment to itself.

The third problem which the Republicans faced after the passage of the Hatch Act related to the status of such nonparty organizations as the Associated Willkie Clubs and the Democrats for Willkie. At first, representatives of the Republican National Committee argued that each nationally organized independent committee might spend \$3,000,000. Senator Hatch maintained that it was the intent of Congress to limit to \$3,000,000 the aggregate expenditures of all national organizations supporting Willkie. Mr. Willkie added to the confusion by announcing from Colorado Springs that he was opposed to an expensive campaign and that the combined total expenditures of the national committee, the Willkie clubs, and the Democrats for Willkie would be kept under \$3,000,000. The Republican candidate proved a poor prophet. At the close of the campaigns the total expenditures of these three organizations, exclusive of amounts the national committee had paid out to meet 1936 campaign bills and had refunded to the states before the passage of the Hatch Act, exceeded \$4,000,000. In addition, more than eighty independent

groups had spent money to preach the Willkie gospel. Again the effect of the \$3,000,000 limitation was not a reduction of expenditures but an unfortunate decentralization of the collection and distribution of funds.

The Democrats were poor but solvent and disposed to make a virtue of necessity. They announced that, although a strict interpretation of the act might not require it, they were prepared to limit to \$3,000,000 the aggregate expenditures of the three nationally organized committees (the Democratic National Committee, the National Committee of Independent Voters for Roosevelt and Wallace, and the National Committee for Agriculture) and would include as 1940 expenditures disbursements on obligations contracted for before the Hatch Act was passed. Their early plans called for no large expenditures of funds, and no changes were made in the organization of fund-raising agencies.

Late in the campaign, however, concerned about Willkie's increasing strength in the Gallup poll, the Democratic National Committee embarked upon an expensive radio campaign which would have raised the aggregate expenditures of the three national agencies to over \$3,000,000. Consequently, a few days before the election, the radio contracts of the national committee were canceled, officials of the committee arranged to have various state committees assume these obligations, and Richard J. Reynolds was asked to lend the funds necessary to finance the program. In this way contracts totaling \$162,674 were transferred to the New York and New Jersey state committees alone. Among the broadcasts paid for by these loans was President Roosevelt's speech the Saturday evening preceding the election. These transactions illustrate how easily a national committee might circumvent the Hatch Act by "farming out" expenditures among state committees not subject to its provisions.

From what has already been said it is evident that the expenditures of the national committees were but a small part of party disbursements in 1940. To determine the relative importance of money in this campaign, we need to know the total expenditures

of all agencies and how they compare with the total expenditures in other campaigns. Fortunately, comparable data, presented in Table 2, are available for the campaigns of 1928 and 1940. Unquestionably there are some duplications in these figures, although the more important transfers have been traced and subtracted. There is every reason to believe, however, that they are as complete for one campaign as for the other, and for one party

TABLE 2

EXPENDITURES IN THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS OF 1928 AND 1940, BY TYPE OF COMMITTEE
OR AGENCY

(In Thousands of Dollars)

COMMITTEE OR AGENCY	DEMOCRATIC		REPUBLICAN		TOTAL	
	1928	1940	1928	1940	1928	1940
National	\$3,157	\$2,198	\$4,065	\$ 2,243	\$ 7,222	\$ 4,441
State *	2,445	2,786	4,762	10,791	7,207	13,577
Independent	1,550	872	607	3,587	2,157	4,459
Total	\$7,152	\$5,856	\$9,434	\$16,621	\$16,586	\$22,477
Transfers				\$ 1,680		\$ 1,680
Net total	\$7,152	\$5,856	\$9,434	\$14,941	\$16,586	\$20,797

* Republican finance committee. as well as all state committees are included in this group

as for the other. They indicate clearly that, although the Democrats spent less in 1940 than in 1928, the Republicans spent much more. The bulk of the latter's funds, however, were distributed through finance committees and nonparty agencies. The Republican total, *minus* transfers, was just under \$15,000,000 as compared to \$9,000,000 in 1928. Such data as are available tend to indicate that expenditures in 1936 were less than in 1940. It is ironical that the first national campaign in which an attempt was made to limit expenditures by legislative fiat should have been one of the most extravagant, if not the most extravagant, in recent times.

SOURCES OF FUNDS

The most significant trends in relation to party campaign funds are found in the sources from which the major parties have drawn their financial support. Since 1936 the Democratic party has depended upon several novel and effective money-raising devices for a large part of its funds. Although the campaigns of 1928 and 1932 were financed almost entirely by cash contributions and loans, in 1936 less than half of the \$5,000,000 campaign fund came from such conventional sources. A new and much-criticized source of revenue was the *Book of the Democratic Convention of 1936*, a volume containing pictures of party leaders, statements about the activities of various departments of the national government, and a variety of miscellaneous information. The book was published in three editions: before the convention a paper-bound edition was sold for \$2.50; a \$5.00 edition published after the convention contained Roosevelt's acceptance speech; and finally a de luxe leather-bound edition, autographed by the President, was sold after the election for \$100. The volume was financed partly by advertisements. Advertising and sales, handled on a percentage basis, netted the committee about \$250,000. The venture was bitterly criticized by the Republicans on two scores. Many of the advertisements were paid for by corporations which, they claimed, violated the law prohibiting contributions from this source. The Democrats insisted that the book was a strictly business venture and that advertisers received full value on their investment. The Republicans charged, also, that corporation executives were bludgeoned into buying copies of the de luxe editions by threats of government investigations. More than half the \$480,000 received from sales of the book came from corporations, including such well-known and varied concerns as Philip Morris, Remington-Rand, Elizabeth Arden, Dun and Bradstreet, Thomas Cook and Sons, F. W. Woolworth, and William Wrigley, Jr.

Another lucrative method of raising funds, used extensively by the Democrats in 1936, was the subscription dinner. "Jackson Day" dinners and "Victory" dinners, ranging in price from \$5.00 to \$100, were held throughout the country. By giving the loyal

party members who participated in these affairs a minimum amount of food and much oratory, \$315,000 was available for the campaign fund from Jackson Day dinners alone. It is estimated that three hundred and fifty thousand persons gave to the party in this way.

In 1936 both parties made strenuous efforts to interest the small contributor in the financing of the campaign. A Roosevelt enthusiast who subscribed \$1.00 to the "Nominators Division" of the Democratic National Committee was entitled to consider himself a "nominator." The net receipts of this division exceeded \$800,000, the bulk of it representing the small gifts of the many, including numerous trade-union contributions. Early in the campaign Henry P. Fletcher, then chairman of the Republican National Committee, announced that his party aimed to raise "\$1,000,000 from 1,000,000 Americans." In return for a contribution of \$1.00, a certificate was issued bearing pictures of Washington and Lincoln and stating that the recipient was "a contributor to and a participant in the work of bringing about a return to the fundamental principles of our government." There was no separate listing of those who contributed in this way, but the large number who gave to the party in this campaign indicates that the appeal was probably very effective, although the ambitious goal of one million contributors was not reached.

In 1940 the Democrats expected to continue the money-raising devices which had proved so effective in 1936. Before the passage of the Hatch Act, plans had been completed for a 1940 *Book*, and advertising had been sold which netted the committee about \$170,000. One provision of the act made illegal the sale to persons or corporations of advertising or articles where the proceeds would benefit candidates for federal elective office, thereby outlawing such ventures. At first the Democrats were disposed to argue that, since plans for the 1940 *Book* had been perfected previous to the passage of the act, they could be carried out; but after some grumbling the plans were abandoned, the sale of advertising ceased, and the *Book* was given away instead of sold. The committee probably realized little or nothing from the ven-

ture as most of the proceeds from the sale of advertising must have been eaten up by publication costs. Jackson Day dinners, however, continued to be an important source of income. The Democratic National Committee received more than \$422,000 from this source.

The distribution by size of cash contributions to the national committees, shown in Table 3, brings out vividly the changes

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY SIZE OF CASH CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEES, 1928-40

SIZE	DEMOCRATIC				REPUBLICAN			
	1928	1932	1936	1940	1928	1932	1936	1940
\$5,000 and over	52.7	43.7	26.0	13.1	45.8	40.1	24.2	3.8
\$1,000-\$4,999	17.0	14.4	19.4	19.6	22.6	24.8	26.8	38.3
\$ 100-\$ 999	16.3	14.5	18.0	17.3	21.9	23.4	23.9	30.7
Less than \$100	12.5	16.0	18.5	23.3	8.2	9.1	13.5	13.4
<i>Impossible to allocate.*</i>								
Labor			5.1	6.2				
Other	1.5	11.4	13.0	20.5	1.5	2.6	11.6	13.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* "Impossible to allocate" includes group contributions remitted to the national committees in lump sums. Contributions from the United Mine Workers and other trade-union groups are classified as "labor", gifts from local party committees and clubs as "other."

which have been taking place in the composition of the campaign funds of the two parties. In both cases there is a decrease in the relative importance of contributions of \$5,000 or more. The trend has been marked in both parties, but the sharpest decrease occurred between 1936 and 1940 in the Republican party, when the percentage dropped from 24.2 to 3.8. In part, no doubt, this decrease reflects the limitation of individual contributions to \$5,000, introduced by the Hatch Act. A more important factor may have been the tax on gifts of \$5,000 or more in effect after 1935. The large number of \$4,000 contributions to the Republican National Committee in 1940 supports this hypothesis. Possibly the two fac-

tors may have operated in combination. Finding himself unable to give more than \$5,000 in any case, a contributor may have cut his gift to \$4,000 to avoid the tax. It is possible, also, that many of the larger Republican gifts went to the independent finance committees.

At the other end of the scale one finds that contributions of less than \$100 have become more important in both parties but that the increase has been more marked and more consistently maintained in the Democratic party. In 1940 almost one-fourth of the Democratic fund came from these small contributors, although they gave less than 15 per cent of the Republican fund. The importance of the two middle brackets has remained relatively constant in the Democratic party but increased sharply in the Republican party in 1940. Taken as a whole, the figures for 1940 indicate that, while in the Democratic party the loss of large contributions was offset by many small gifts, in the case of the Republicans the change was the less radical shift from very large contributions to those of medium size.

It is evident from this analysis that since 1936 radical changes have been taking place in the financial support of the two major parties. In 1928 both raised huge funds, but in spite of urgent appeals for widespread financial support, intense interest in the campaign, and prosperity in most quarters, more than half the Democratic fund and almost half of the Republican fund came from contributions of \$5,000 or more. Both parties leaned heavily upon the "big fellow," financially speaking. Four years later, except for a slight increase in the importance of the small contributor, the pattern of financial support of the two parties was essentially the same. The campaign of 1936, however, initiated a change that was even more marked in 1940. The "little fellow" gave more support to the Democratic party, while the Republicans continued to lean heavily upon larger contributions. The trend becomes even more convincing if one adds to the contributions of less than \$100 the gifts from trade-unions and the proceeds from Jackson Day dinners and the Nominators Division, which were so important to the Democratic party in 1936 and

1940. If that is done, contributions of less than \$100 made up more than 45 per cent of the funds raised in each of these Democratic campaigns.

Further evidence of a shift in the basis of financial support is found in the economic background of the larger contributors. Classification of contributors according to economic interests presents many difficulties: for example, the same individual may be president of a bank, a public utility executive, and heavily interested in steel manufacturing; and corporation executives are frequently lawyers. With due allowance for errors in the disposition of borderline cases, the material presented in Table 4 shows important, not to say startling, changes in the financial support of the major parties.

In 1928 bankers and brokers contributed heavily to both parties. More than one-fourth of all that was received in contributions of \$5,000 or more by each national committee came from this group. Manufacturers were next in importance but gave more generously to the Republicans than to the Democrats. Together these two groups contributed more than half of the larger Republican contributions and over 40 per cent of the Democratic. No other group contributed more than 10 per cent of the fund of either party. It is apparent that in the Hoover-Smith campaign the major parties drew their financial support from much the same sources.

In the "depression" campaign of 1932 the major parties continued to divide the support of the bankers and brokers. A closer examination of the lists of contributors, however, indicates differences in the groups which cannot be brought out statistically. Except for large contributions from the Mellons of Pittsburgh and members of the Union Trust Company of Cleveland, practically all the Republican contributions came from the New York area. In contrast, a very large proportion of the Democratic contributions came from the South and Middle West, suggesting a cleavage on "Wall Street-Main Street" lines. The contributions from manufacturers continued to be important in both parties but were much more important to the Republicans than to the Dem-

ocrats. Many industrialists quite logically paid a debt of gratitude to the Republican party, which had been in office at the time of the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff. In general, however, we find the two major parties again drawing their "sinews of war" from much the same economic interests.

TABLE 4*

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY TYPE OF ECONOMIC INTEREST OF LARGE
CONTRIBUTORS TO THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL COMMITTEES, 1928-40

ECONOMIC INTEREST	DEMOCRATIC				REPUBLICAN			
	1928	1932	1936	1940	1928	1932	1936	1940
Bankers and brokers	25 3	24 2	3 3	3 1	28 2	20 5	14 7	13 7
Manufacturers	16 1	10 5	13 6	7 4	24 4	26 3	29 6	34 0
Mining and oil	4 5	4 4	6 9	5 3	9 0	9 7	5 3	5 9
Public utilities	9 7	6 1	2 5	1 8	4 2	4 1	3 5	1 3
Merchants	2 4	2 4	2 3	1 9	5 0	2 2	1 9	2 6
Newspaper, radio, advertising	†	7 1	2 6	4 5	†	1 4	3 3	1 8
Professions	†	12 2	12 7	8 6	†	7 4	4 4	4 1
Officeholders			12 6	19 3		†		
Organized labor			10 2	15 9				
Other interests	27 5	10 2	13 3	10 7	12 5	8 7	7 9	8 7
Unidentified	14 5	22 9	20 0	21 5	16 7	19 7	29 4	27 9
Total	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0

* In 1928 the analysis covers contributions of \$5,000 or more, the figures for all other campaigns include contributions of \$1,000 or more. Under "organized labor" are included all trade-union contributions, although these are not strictly contributions of \$1,000 or more, since each includes the gifts of many individuals.

† Not classified separately, included under "other interests."

A radical shift appears in 1936, when the percentage of contributions of \$1,000 or more given by bankers and brokers to the Democratic party dropped from 24.2 to 3.3, and the percentage contributed by organized labor amounted to 10.2. In the Republican party, contributions from bankers and brokers were less important in 1936 than in 1932, but the decrease was relatively slight. In 1936 the role of the manufacturers increased in importance in both parties, but contributions from this source were much more important in the Republican party, amounting to almost 30 per cent of the contributions of \$1,000 or more.

Closer examination of the types of manufacturers represented in the two lists brings out interesting differences. Iron and steel, chemicals and explosives, electrical equipment, automobiles, and aluminum were heavily represented on the Republican side. In addition we find the makers of such familiar products as Quaker Oats, Morton's salt, Palmolive soap, Heinz pickles, Pepsodent tooth paste, Wrigley's chewing gum, Burroughs adding machines, and Elgin watches. Cigarette manufacturers, whose gifts to the Republican party were inconsequential, gave liberally to the Democrats. Most of them were representatives of southern concerns, suggesting that the support was determined by geographical location rather than by the character of the business. Except for tobacco manufacturers, few well-known concerns were found in the list of Democratic contributors, and most of them can be identified as "little" rather than "big" business. Brewers and distillers paid their debt of gratitude to the Democratic party by contributing 5.7 per cent of the large contributions. Officeholders were also an important factor in financing the campaign of this party, contributing almost as much as the manufacturers. Many officeholders made additional indirect contributions by attending Jackson Day dinners and buying copies of the famous *Book*. Whether these were voluntary offerings or forced payments is difficult to say, but unquestionably they were an important source of financial support to the party.

In 1936 the Republican party leaned heavily upon the "Haves." Although the Democratic party was less definitely the party of the "Have-nots," small contributors played a much more important role than in 1928 or 1932. Further evidence of a realignment on what might be called "Hamiltonian-Jeffersonian" lines is to be found in the financing of the 1940 campaign. The Democratic party failed to regain the support of the bankers and brokers and lost the support of most of the manufacturers. These two groups contributed only 10.5 per cent of the large contributions. On the other hand, the Republican party received about the same proportion of its large contributions from bankers and brokers and drew much more from manufacturing interests. Al-

most half of all that the Republican party received in contributions of \$1,000 or more came from these two sources. Particularly striking was the way the "giants"—iron and steel—came to the aid of the party. In contrast, the Democratic party drew most of its large contributions from officeholders and organized labor. In 1936 these two groups had given almost one-quarter of the large contributions; in 1940 their share of the campaign fund rose to over one-third.

The role which labor played in the financing of the last two Roosevelt campaigns also points to a realignment on economic lines. In the past, labor's contributions to national campaigns have been small and sporadic and have rarely been given to the national committee of a major party. In 1936, although the A.F. of L. clung to its traditional policy, various groups, most of them with C.I.O. affiliations, contributed to the campaign with enthusiasm and generosity. The three-quarters of a million dollars which they poured into the campaign was divided among the Democratic National Committee, Labor's Nonpartisan League, the American Labor Party, and the Progressive National Committee. The national committees alone received \$250,000 from trade-union groups. The largest contributor was the United Mine Workers of America, which invested more than \$450,000 in the campaign. Of this, \$100,000 was an outright contribution to the Democratic National Committee; an additional \$50,000 was in the form of a loan. To have a trade-union the largest contributor to one of the major parties is in itself a symptom of a profound change in campaign finance.

In 1940, in spite of John L. Lewis' last-minute indorsement of Willkie, 6.2 per cent of all cash contributions to the Democratic National Committee came from trade-unions. These gifts represented almost 16 per cent of the large contributions. These figures do not mean, of course, that labor's total financial stake in the campaign was larger in 1940 than in 1936 or that C.I.O. affiliates gave as generously. Most of the independent organizations which received such generous aid from labor in 1936 were not functioning in 1940. Only one independent organization—

the National Committee of Independent Voters for Roosevelt and Wallace—received substantial support (more than \$50,000) from this quarter in 1940. Most of the financial support which the Democratic National Committee received from labor came from the railway brotherhoods, local brewery workers and teamsters, and unions of workers in the building trades. The International Ladies' Garment Workers and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers contributed most generously to the National Committee of Independent Voters. Conspicuously absent from the list of contributors to the 1940 campaign was the United Mine Workers, although late in October at least one local contributed to the Democratic National Committee. No trade-union gave financial support to the Republican National Committee or to any other Willkie organization. In spite of John L. Lewis' deflection, organized labor continued to give Roosevelt its financial support in 1940.

The disappearance of conspicuously large contributors from the Democratic lists is further evidence that the Haves are withdrawing their support from the Democratic party. In 1928, William F. Kenny, John J. Raskob, and Herbert H. Lehman each contributed \$100,000 or more to the Smith campaign. When contributions to the 1924 and 1928 deficits are included, the gifts of each of these individuals exceeded \$250,000—more than the Standard Oil Company gave the Republican party in 1904 or 1908. The largest individual contribution to the Republican National Committee in 1928 was Julius Rosenwald's gift of \$50,000. The six Fisher brothers, of auto-body fame, gave a total of \$100,000, and more than forty other individuals gave gifts of \$25,000 or over. Many of the individuals who gave so generously to the national committees also contributed to the independent organizations, which were so important in that campaign. Conspicuously generous was Edwin C. Jameson, who contributed \$172,800 to various anti-Smith groups. In spite of the depression each party received very large contributions in 1932. John J. Raskob gave \$125,000 to the Democratic National Committee, partly by canceling earlier loans. William H. Woodin, Bernard Baruch,

Vincent Astor, and William Randolph Hearst each contributed \$25,000 or more to the Democrats. In the same campaign the Republican National Committee received contributions of \$25,000 or more from Eldridge R. Johnson, A. W. Mellon, Ogden L. Mills, the Rockefellers, and the Guggenheims. More than 14 per cent of all contributions to the Democratic National Committee came from the six largest contributors; the six largest contributors to the Republican National Committee gave slightly less than 8 per cent of all contributions received by this agency. In 1928 and 1932 not all the Haves were on the same side of the political fence.

In 1936 one scans the list of Democratic contributors in vain for the names of most of those who gave liberally in 1932. However, there were a few generous new recruits. H. L. Dougherty of the Cities Service Company, New York, contributed \$55,000 to the Roosevelt Nominators Division; Walter A. Jones, with extensive oil interests in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, gave \$52,500 to the national committee and an additional \$50,000 to other committees supporting Roosevelt. Many of the other large contributors to the Democratic National Committee were members of the diplomatic corps. The amounts contributed by members of certain wealthy families to Republican organizations preceding and during the 1936 campaign are staggering. During 1933-36, the Du Ponts contributed \$530,000, the Mellons \$210,000, the Pews \$514,000, and the Rockefellers \$130,000. Two families—the Pews and the Du Ponts—contributed more than \$1,000,000 to this single Republican campaign.

One of the objectives of the Hatch Act was to limit individual contributions to \$5,000. This provision had an important effect upon contributions in 1940, although the results were not always those anticipated by its supporters. The Democratic party seems to have conformed to the spirit as well as the letter of the limitation. No individual contributed more than \$5,000 to a single agency, in only one instance did the aggregate contributions to all agencies exceed that amount,¹ and there were only a few instances in which the contributions of various members of the

same family exceeded \$5,000. With few exceptions those who contributed \$5,000 to the Democratic National Committee held diplomatic or political posts in the Roosevelt administration.

The list of Republican contributors presents a very different story. Although in almost all instances the letter of the law was observed and the contributions of one individual to a single agency were kept within the limit, the contributions of one person to various committees and the aggregate contributions of members of one family frequently exceeded this amount. The impor-

TABLE 5

LARGE CONTRIBUTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES
TO REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATIONS, 1937-40

Name	Amount
Brown, Donaldson	\$ 28,000
Copley, Ira C	32,900
Du Pont	203,780
Pew, J. Howard	164,500
Pitcairn	36,614
Queeny, Edgar M	55,045
Rockefeller	113,000
Sloan, Alfred P , Jr	42,000
Total	\$675,839

tance of the contributions of certain families is brought out in Table 5. More than sixty members of the Du Pont clan gave over \$200,000 to various committees. The Pew contributions were divided among thirteen members of that family. The distribution of Lamont Du Pont's gifts shows how easily the spirit of the \$5,000 limitation could be circumvented. A total of \$49,000 was contributed to fourteen different committees in amounts ranging from \$1,000 to \$4,000. The list of agencies included state committees as far removed from his home state as South Dakota, Wyoming, and Missouri. It seems probable that some guiding genius routed these contributions where they would be most helpful. The \$5,000 limitation exercised some restraining effect indicated by the fact that the Du Ponts and the Pews contributed much less in 1940 than in 1936, but the financial stake which one

individual might have in the campaign was not limited to that amount.

The large number of generous contributors transferring their financial support from the Democratic to the Republican party is further evidence of recent trends. In 1936 the names of less than one-third of those contributing to the Democratic National Committee four years earlier are to be found upon the lists, and a large number had changed their financial support to the Republican party. Pierre S. Du Pont, Edward S. Harkness, William Randolph Hearst, and William K. Vanderbilt were among them. In 1940 the turnover in contributors was much lower, but a number of prominent Democrats appear among the Willkie supporters.

In the Republican party the same names appear upon the lists of large contributors in campaign after campaign. In spite of the depression, more than half of those who gave \$25,000 or more in 1928 reappear upon the lists in 1932. Many of them reduced their contributions, but they did not abandon the party. In 1936 more than two-thirds of those who gave \$25,000 or more in 1932 reappear upon the lists. More than 80 per cent of those who contributed \$10,000 or more in 1936 continued their financial support in 1940.

The changes which have just been pointed out are of great importance. In 1928 the two major parties drew their support from essentially the same sources. No fundamental shift in support took place in 1932 in spite of Roosevelt's promises of a New Deal. In 1936 and 1940, however, a division on economic lines appeared. The flight of bankers and manufacturers from the Democratic party in 1940, the increased support which the Republicans received from this quarter, labor's support of Roosevelt, and the large gifts which certain wealthy families gave to the Republican party, all point in this direction. By 1936 "big business" was more solidly behind the Republican party than at any time since 1896. The Democratic party emerged from the campaign less definitely the party of the Have-nots, although small gifts from officeholders, Jackson Day dinners, and labor played

an important part in the financing of the campaign. By 1940 a still more definite realignment on economic lines is apparent. Big business continued to give generously to the Republicans and to shun the Democratic party. The bulk of the Democratic fund came from officeholders, trade-unions, Jackson Day dinners, and small contributions generally.

The reason for this trend is not difficult to find. Many captains of finance and industry feared that the New Deal would kill the goose that laid the golden egg. In 1936 and 1940 they gave generously to defeat the man whose program seemed to them to threaten the form of government and the economic system under which their fortunes had been made. On the other hand, the Democratic party won the financial support of trade-unionists and others in the smaller-income groups who came to feel that they had a vital stake in the continuation of the New Deal. Without increased support from the "little fellow" and the use of novel money-raising devices the Democratic National Committee might have been seriously handicapped in both of these campaigns. Mr. Farley's assertion that the New Deal dried up many of the usual sources of the party's financial support is borne out by the record. The important trends which we have been discussing antedated the passage of the Hatch Act and were affected by it but little. The act forced modifications in Republican collection techniques and may have accelerated a tendency toward greater dependence upon small contributors already evident in the Democratic party, but it brought about no fundamental changes in the sources from which the two parties drew their support.

Since 1928 both parties have increased the amounts spent between campaigns. The day has passed when national committees hibernate after three or four months of hectic campaigning. The permanent Democratic headquarters in Washington has become a research and publicity agency of considerable importance, with an average annual expenditure of over \$1,000,000. The same trend is found in the Republican party, although it is a more recent development. In the years 1937-39 the annual oper-

ating expenses of the Republican committee averaged over \$900,000.

FUTURE TRENDS

During the next two decades it is probable that American political institutions will continue in the democratic tradition and that elections will be important in the determination of public policy. We may assume, also, that the post-war period will be marked by increasing governmental intervention in the economic order and sharper competition among economic groups. What, then, of the probable future trends in party campaign funds?

No radical changes may be expected in the character of the expenditures of political committees unless science places at their disposal publicity techniques not yet thought of. Television will supplement rather than supplant the radio, and increasing amounts may be used to bring the image as well as the voice of campaign speakers into every radio home. Growing expenditures in this direction may be offset in part by cutting down the sums spent for rallies and speakers.

The amounts expended by party committees between campaigns are likely to continue to increase, for both parties are aware of the importance of continuous publicity and permanent organization. This trend will certainly be accelerated if the limitations of the Hatch Act are continued.

A radical reduction of the amounts expended during campaigns or a radical change in the balance of power between national and local party committees are unlikely occurrences. The amounts spent will continue to fluctuate with the business cycle and the bitterness of the campaign and are not likely to be seriously affected by legislative prohibitions. Continuance of the Hatch Act limitations will decentralize the collection and distribution of funds but will not reduce the total expended during a campaign. Less will be spent by the national committees; more will be spent by state, local, and independent agencies. Decentralization of the collection of funds might be expected to bring about a fundamental shift in the balance of power between national and local party committees, but our experience in 1940 would seem to indicate

otherwise. In that campaign the more important money-raising agencies were the independent finance committees and such non-party groups as the Willkie clubs. Actually the finance committees worked in close co-operation with the national committees and were not subject to the control of the state party committees. In so far as the balance of power was affected at all, it shifted in the direction of independent nonparty agencies—"areas of irresponsibility," which disseminated the more objectionable appeals to prejudice.² Legislation eliminating finance committees and independent money-raising organizations would not necessarily reduce the volume of expenditures, although it might well bring about a decentralization of party control in favor of state and local committees. To effect a real reduction in expenditures by legislative fiat it would be necessary to concentrate all financial control in the national committees and not only eliminate the independent, nonparty agencies entirely but make state and local party committees financial subsidiaries of the national organizations. So complete a centralization would effect a revolution in party control which would win scant support in or out of Congress.

In the future, as in the past, the important question "How much is too much?" is likely to be settled in courts of public opinion rather than in courts of law. The fact that the present Hatch Act limitations lead to circumventions which make it difficult to bring to light facts essential to a true picture of the financing of the campaign and are consequently inconsistent with the publicity attack upon the problem does not necessarily mean that they will be repealed. It would not be the first time that principles essentially inconsistent in aim had been allowed to remain upon our statute books.

Continued improvement in the character and custody of the reports will contribute to the effectiveness of popular checks upon extravagant expenditure. Such improvement is more likely to be the result of increased efficiency on the part of permanent party staffs and more careful scrutiny of the reports than of changes in legislation. Much might be achieved by requiring uniform reports and creating a permanent agency with power to go behind

the face of the returns, but there is little evidence of interest in corrective legislation along these lines.

The significant trends of the future, as of the immediate past, will occur in the sources from which the parties draw their financial support and will be the result of shifting political alignments. The political battles of the post-war era will be dominated by two problems: the demand for more effective governmental control of the economic order and the role of the United States in post-war reconstruction. The effect of the issues arising out of these two problems will be to some extent contradictory.

Differences of opinion over the role of the government in economic affairs will tend to sharpen the cleavages between economic groups already evident. As the competition becomes keener, the Republican party will probably frankly oppose the expansion of social welfare activities and more stringent regulation of business activity and will draw an increasing percentage of its campaign funds from "big business." The Democratic party is too definitely committed to the "social service state" to reverse its position easily. If it pursues this policy, the Haves will continue their flight from the party, and it will be forced to lean more heavily upon other sources. Trade-union funds will be the most available reservoir of supply. Unless it can tap this accumulation of funds, it may be seriously handicapped financially.

Whatever the outcome of the struggles now going on within the labor movement and between John L. Lewis and the present Democratic administration, trade-unions will be more active politically in the future than in the past and will play an increasingly important part in campaign finance. Whether the Democratic party or an independent labor party is to be the recipient of these funds may ultimately be determined by labor's stand on the second set of issues which will dominate the post-war period—the role of the United States in world reconstruction. Shall we assume leadership in building an international organization which may lay claim to universality, or shall we try once again to return to a policy of isolation? That the battle over this issue will be bitter is clear, but how it will affect political alignments and cam-

paign funds is less obvious, since these issues tend to cut across cleavages on domestic problems. Many businessmen who fear President Roosevelt's domestic program applaud his foreign policy; labor's attitude toward the participation of the United States in any plan for collective security after the war is problematical; in 1941 it was not clear whether the Willkies or the Nyes would control the Republican party. A campaign turning on the question of American leadership in world-affairs would probably elicit generous financial support from enthusiasts, not to say fanatics, who usually do not contribute to campaigns. Independent groups rather than political parties would be the recipients of most of these gifts.

The difficulty of forecasting the position of important groups on issues of foreign policy, as well as the tendency of these issues to divide economic groups, complicates the task of charting the political alignments of the future. Either of two patterns may emerge. The two-party alignment may be continued, the Democrats standing for a liberal domestic program and active participation of the United States in post-war reconstruction, the Republicans supporting a more conservative domestic policy and a less active role in international affairs. Extreme isolationists would then organize independent groups and work for the nomination and election of individuals, irrespective of party labels, who would support their cause. If party alignments follow this pattern, the Republicans will continue to draw their support from much the same sources as in 1940. The foreign policy of the Democratic party may win the support of some substantial business interests, but many more will be antagonized by its domestic program. In this event it must have the financial support of the trade-unions to survive. It can hope to win this support only if organized labor is ready to compromise its differences with the Democrats and support American leadership in world-affairs.

The pattern of the future will probably assume the outlines just suggested. But there is a second possibility. The Republicans, while supporting a conservative domestic program, may vigorously champion American leadership in world-affairs. The Dem-

ocratic party, supporting essentially the same foreign policy, and with a domestic program somewhat less liberal than in the past, may lose the support of organized labor and be forced to depend upon much the same sources as the Republicans for financial support. Labor, out of sympathy with both the foreign and the domestic program of the Democrats, may organize a separate party supporting a vigorous program of economic reconstruction at home and a frankly isolationist policy in foreign affairs. In that case the Democratic party might eventually suffer the fate of the Liberal party in England, being practically crushed out of existence between its political opponents. Future developments will take this course only if organized labor disagrees with both the foreign and the domestic program of the Democrats and is convinced that it is sufficiently strong to risk the hazards of independent party action—conditions which are unlikely to be present in the next two decades.

There is one ugly possibility which cannot be ruled out entirely. The economic conflict may become so bitter that parties will arise with fundamentally irreconcilable programs which they will endeavor to promote by anticonstitutional methods. If that disaster is to be avoided, we must take vigorous measures to cushion the shocks of the economic readjustments inevitable in the post-war period.

One result of sharper competition between economic groups will be attempts to enact legislation controlling the sources from which the parties are permitted to draw their campaign funds. When the British Labour Party, drawing its financial support largely from the trade-unions, began to challenge the supremacy of the Liberal and Conservative parties, there was agitation for regulation of contributions from this source.⁸ Proposals to prohibit contributions from trade-unions have already been made in this country and will be pressed as these funds become a more important fact. If such legislation is adopted, it is unlikely to cut off this source of supply, although it may obscure the facts concerning labor's role in the financing of campaigns. If the trade-unions are convinced that their future depends upon political ac-

tion, the ways and means will be found to implement that decision. If large individual and family contributors continue their flight from the Democratic to the Republican party, there may be renewed efforts on the part of the Democrats to deprive their opponents of contributions from this quarter. Experience with the Hatch Act indicates that such legislation is unlikely to solve the problem but that its chief effect would be to hide important facts. The Republicans may continue the legislative battle by endeavoring to outlaw Jackson Day dinners.

Even bolder attacks upon the problem may be made. Senator Hatch has revived the proposal to supply party campaign funds from the public treasury and prohibit contributions from private sources. Such a proposal is likely to win scant support, and its wisdom is highly questionable. It is difficult to formulate any plan of public financing which will be fair to radical minorities and which will adequately provide for new parties. The effect might well be an unfortunate "freezing" of the existing major parties. Although we are unlikely to adopt so radical a solution of the problem in the near future, some experimentation with limited forms of state aid, such as the extension of the franking privilege to candidates and the publication of campaign booklets at public expense, might be both feasible and desirable.⁴

The financing of political campaigns has been called one of democracy's great unsolved problems. It is a problem which cannot be solved by legislation limiting either expenditures or the sources of financial support. Inequalities in the resources at the disposal of political parties are symptomatic of an even more fundamental unsolved problem—economic maladjustment—and no real solution of the former is possible without a solution of the latter. In the meantime, democratic controls may be made more effective by insisting upon real publicity of expenditures and the sources from which the parties draw their support. If the ineffectiveness of the Hatch Act limitations should lead to more emphasis upon publicity and less upon prohibition in our future attacks upon the problem of party campaign funds, the act will have served a very useful purpose.

VIII

POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION

V. O. KEY, JR.



BY HIS distinction between politics and administration President Goodnow deeply influenced the thinking of American political scientists. He pointed out that most American writers on governmental subjects had limited themselves to consideration of the "formal governmental organization." They began and ended their work with the Constitution. He thought that no method of treatment could be "more likely to mislead the student in the formation of his judgment of a nation's real political life." His differentiation and illuminating analysis of politics and administration undoubtedly stimulated approaches that have contributed toward a better understanding of "real political life."

Yet it is possible that Goodnow was too successful in redirecting the focus of interest of "writers on governmental subjects." The necessary compression of his central idea into the convenient phrase, "politics and administration," induced an intellectual compartmentalization not without its deleterious effects. We have our experts on politics and our experts on administration; the very fact of this division of labor tends to make each group unaware that the whole of governance does not always equal, but may be more than, the sum of its parts—politics *plus* administration. Moreover, the idea arose somehow that the dichotomy of politics and administration was paralleled by a division of these functions between "political" and "administrative" organs of the government. In its most extreme form the notion found expression in neat organization charts labeling and sharply differen-

tiating the people who handle the politics from those who do the administering.

Often the concepts through which the world is viewed concentrate attention on those things that happen to fit the conceptual pattern and screen from view those things that do not fall nicely into their logical scheme.¹ By now it is so obvious that habituation to thought in terms of "politics" and of "administration" has had these results that it is unnecessary to argue the proposition. The monographs of a generation have, in general, been designed to fit either the pigeonhole marked "politics" or that labeled "administration." This process of selection has practically excluded from discussion and analysis areas of basic importance. It needs to be said, of course, that such a consequence has involved a perversion of Goodnow's doctrines. He saw that "practical political necessity makes impossible the consideration of the function of politics apart from that of administration."² He titled his work "politics and administration"; not "politics or administration."

Among the consequences of the channelization of observation on politics "or" administration has been the diversion of attention from the relationships of the so-called "political" and "administrative" agencies and from the fusion of policy-forming and policy-executing functions in the same hands. In this essay I propose to touch on the changing significance of the role of administrative agencies in molding public policy and on some of the consequent problems that seem to me to be in the process of emergence.

I

That administrative hierarchies have profound influence on the course of legislative policy is elementary. That they determine, within the limits of their vaguely defined jurisdictions, a broad range of policy questions is equally obvious. That in both these spheres the influence of administrative hierarchies is likely to grow seems plain. Unless our civilization collapses completely this is going to continue to be a bureaucratic world.

But, it may be interposed, administrative agencies have always

been more or less influential in the initiation of public policy; they have always had more or less discretion in the elucidation of the content of broad legislative prescriptions. What is there about the situation into which we are moving that puts a different color on administrative origination and definition of public policy? The new situation is different in degree; but, more important, it is rapidly becoming different in kind. It is different in degree in that there is more delegated legislation and in that in this complex world Congress comes to depend more in its actions on the advice and recommendations of administrative agencies. It is different in kind in that statesmen must now contrive to meet the policy problems of a planned economy. Our economic order is by no means completely planned; but the breadth of public supervision has tremendously expanded, and the current guidance of the industrial system in the interest of defense only makes more obvious tendencies and problems that were already apparent. Nor does it seem that we shall return to "normalcy." All the revolutionary alternatives promise more state intervention than now prevails; it is hardly probable that a democratic order can survive if it ignores those conditions that give revolutionary proposals their attractiveness and their strength.

What are the characteristics of a planned, or a quasi-planned, economy that make the problems of policy origination and definition different in kind? The blueprinters of planned economies, socialist and otherwise, have, on the whole, been quite inarticulate on the subject of the politico-administrative issues of operation of their schemes. Indeed, the more enthusiastic and indiscriminating proponents seem to be usually entirely unaware of these problems. Some of the more basic of these matters may be outlined, postponing for a few paragraphs the analysis of their bearing on the question of the role of administrative agencies in the origination of policy.

The effect of the addition of more and more parts of the economy to the area of public control is to require a tighter articulation or integration of the policies and acts of all agencies of government. The integration of policy becomes something more

than the elimination of petty and ridiculous duplication and conflict which are chiefly significant for the political embarrassment they cause when exposed to public view. On the correct integration and co-ordination of policy comes to depend the degree of success in the maximization of the output of the economic system. Without proper interrelation of the policies of all agencies—whatever their label, legislative, administrative, executive, judicial, or any of the “quasi’s”—the efforts of one agency may nullify those of another. The actions of all are delicately interrelated by the interconnection of their subjects of control through the price system and the sequence of production and distribution.

All these propositions are patent in the observation of the effort to guide the industrial system toward the achievement of the objectives of war and defense. The same observations apply, perhaps in a less vivid and less urgent way, in the achievement of peacetime objectives, such as, let us say, the increase of the national income by five billion dollars per year. The approximation of the goals of peace or of defense necessitates that credit, tax, monetary, stimulative, and regulatory policies all form a battery of instruments with complementary influences directed toward the common end. Moreover, the weaving of individual actions into a grand policy design involves more than the integration of federal efforts. State tax policy, for example, may obstruct, or it may facilitate, federal economic policy.

In the new political economy into which we are edging, the timing and tempo of public action are certain to become more important than they have traditionally been. The problem of timing is partially a matter of policy integration, that is, the timing of the action of one agency in relationship to that of another. It is even more, however, a question of the timing of the actions of all agencies in accordance with the demands of external conditions. The most rudimentary illustration is in the timing of public works outlays. Expansion of this activity at one time, according to one group of economic theorists, may be highly beneficial; at another time, positively injurious. A financing policy, unex-

ceptionable at one time, may, when improperly timed, neutralize the effects of works outlays or of other policies. Timing concerns chiefly the initiation of action; tempo, the rate at which the action is carried on, once it is started. A works program properly timed, for example, may be of no avail unless it is prosecuted at the correct tempo. Problems of timing and tempo in the entire range of public control promise to become more and more pressing. The consequences of imperfect timing become more serious; they may include the lowering of the standard of living of a nation or widespread unemployment. The exigencies of the timetable are likely to make costly the delays of debate and discussion precedent to decision in which the laissez faire state could generally indulge without grave risk.

It follows partly from the foregoing considerations and partly from other factors that the emerging conditions demand increased flexibility and adaptability in public policy. Timing and integration themselves imply malleability in the particularistic aims of individual agencies. Independently, however, other elements in the evolving situation make demands of the same sort. To illustrate: public control seems often to carry with it a large measure of public assumption of risk. That assumption of risk may be through public ownership, through public credit, through guaranteed prices, or, in a veiled form, through "insurance," as in the insurance of mortgages or of deposits in savings and loan institutions. Without the public assumption of risk, vested interests in public policy may arise through fixed prices, through quotas, or through priorities in one form or another.

Public assumption of risk often means a mitigation of the vitalizing effects of the process of bankruptcy, and the threat of bankruptcy, on the economic system; public regulation in other forms often stimulates a diversion of managerial energy from entrepreneurial scheming and contriving to political endeavor as a substitute mode of economic survival. In any case external forces with enormous stakes in public policy are set in motion that drive toward an ossification of the economy through the immobilization of public authority. The consequent inflexible and inadapt-

able policy may result in the wasteful utilization of resources, in their under-utilization, or at least in a static economic order.

II

It should not be supposed that society will necessarily disintegrate if government fails to meet the requisites that have been set forth in the first part of this discussion. In time of war or total defense to ignore these matters may constitute invitation to disaster. In time of peace, barring gross misjudgments, the resulting damage may not be beyond repair. Moreover, in the foregoing discussion there may have been implicit an exaggeration of the degree to which our "normal" arrangements have come to demand consideration by government of the factors suggested in the preceding paragraphs. Nevertheless, the broader governmental responsibility for the functioning of the economic system becomes, the more exigent it is that these considerations be given weight in the direction of public policy.

In the meeting of these problems great reliance must be placed on the inventiveness and creativeness of administrative hierarchies. Whether we like it or whether we even realize it, permanent corps of administrators have great influence either through or around political department heads on the direction of public policy. Bureaucracies are creatures and servants of the state, but they are also a part of the state and influence its course of action. Yet people organized into administrative hierarchies seem to undergo a metamorphosis and take on the habitual characteristics of behavior of their institution. Perhaps the shortcomings of bureaucracy are merely the frailties of man in general, but a thousand men in a hierarchy seem to be transformed into something more or less than a thousand reasonable individuals. In truth, though, the behavior of hierarchies has been so ignored in research and inquiry that much of what I shall have to say is a matter of hypothesis. At the risk of appearing to commit heresy against the cult of adoration of administration, some of the characteristics of hierarchical behavior may be indicated that operate to handicap administrative agencies in policy formation especial-

ly under conditions of governmental monitoring of the economic system. It is not to be supposed that all agencies possess these features at all times, but they seem to be recurring tendencies that make themselves felt if they are not energetically guarded against.

In one respect individual parts of the administration tend to become like private pressure groups in that they have their own particularistic and parochial interests to defend and to promote. Those interests may concern the policy, the jurisdiction, or merely the appropriations of the agency. Generally something more is involved. The association of the agency with its clientele sometimes makes for a "representative bureaucracy." The policy drives of the hierarchy arising from the immediate interests of its members are reinforced and colored by the power and wishes of outside groups concerned with the work of the agency. Through administrative determination of delegated policy questions and through administrative influence on new policy, the desires of private groups may be effectively projected into the governmental machinery. In extreme circumstances something in the nature of a guild may be approached.

Thus it comes about that the policy drives and sublegislative determinations of different agencies are disharmonious. The conflicts of different agencies are likely to reflect the divergent interests of their respective constituencies. On occasion interdepartmental controversy on policy flares up in which the participants manifest the broad-gauged regard for the general welfare that characterizes the jurisdictional disputes of a pair of union business agents in the building trades. But it is not solely hierarchical interests that are at stake in such feuds. Underlying are often the aspirations of interests external to the administration.

The bearing of these particularistic tendencies on the necessity for the integration of policy is obvious. The broadening and intensification of public control make integration more essential. Yet the same process enlarges administrative hierarchies with their peculiar form of particularism and at the same time generates around each agency clusters of private and parochial pres-

tures. The conditions that demand an integrated consistency of policy in government as a whole seem also to create forces driving persistently toward disruption and disintegration. The atomizing influences of economic specialization are likely to press most strongly on government under those conditions that make the function of major policy formation most nearly indivisible.

These atomizing forces are both reflected in and encouraged by the general nature of the organization of responsibility within the federal government. The close communion of pressure group, congressional bloc, and subordinate elements of the administrative hierarchy obstructs central direction in the general interest. The jealously guarded legal autonomy of many administrative units, which, within broad limits, exercise legislative power through judicial forms, creates a situation almost inevitably productive of conflicting application of economic policy. Similarly, the independence of these agencies contributes to unco-ordinated activity in the promotion of new policy.

Timing and co-ordination tend to be hampered by the inertia of administrative hierarchies. This inertia comes in part from the fact that long concentration on a given sort of policy and action seems to instil a curious blindness to alternatives. Preoccupation with what is immediately at hand may give rise to the conviction that there is no route to a given end save through the stone wall immediately ahead. This inertia of particular agencies serves as a stubborn resistance to the short-term reorientations of direction that the broad policy of the government as a whole may necessitate.

Administrative inertia is often associated with and accentuated by the intellectual isolation of professional specialization. Professional doctrines, like hierarchical points of view, have a potent power of self-perpetuation. This is why untutored men and poets so often go unerringly to the meat of issues, while learned men endlessly and solemnly weigh irrelevancies. The inherent tendency of hierarchies to be inhospitable to innovation may thus be reinforced by the discipline of professional conformity. Both characteristics usually reach their finest flower in the armed serv-

ices. So common are they there that only the exception arouses comment. Clarkson has remarked, for example, that

as the representative of the navy on the War Industries Board, Admiral Fletcher was most successful . . . His great value to the War Industries Board was that he was able to rise above his profession and take the broader view. He did not conceive that his duty was to be the protagonist of the navy, but rather to make it a part of an harmonious whole. Through him it was often possible to secure the cooperation of the navy in the general scheme against the opposition of officers who felt that the navy was always competent to pass judgment on all that concerned it without outside suggestion or assistance ³

The civil services are not without their like idiosyncrasies, but they are considerably less serious, in part because of the diversity in training of personnel. We probably do not appreciate our good fortune in not being limited in the recruitment of higher civil servants, as are the armed forces in the selection of their officer personnel, to the uniformly disciplined product of a few educational institutions. (The essentially pernicious nature of the occasional proposal for the establishment of a "West Point" for the civil service is, by analogy, obvious.) Diversity of social origin is perhaps as significant as diversity of training in determining the character of a civil service. We are not restricted, as some other nations have been, in the recruitment of upper personnel to any particular social class—a purely fortuitous precipitate of events but, nevertheless, one that could well be evocative of self-congratulation.

Certain other characteristics of administrative hierarchies contribute, in negative ways, to inflexibility of policy. Officials charged with authority in a defined area acquire, perhaps without warrant, the presage of a monopoly of expertness in that field. By that fact their failure to originate and recommend necessary policy changes carries a great weight with those politically responsible. For the same reason their power to obstruct innovation originating externally (either within or without the government) is formidable. Apart from their discouragement of new policy, once the direction of policy is altered, administrative hierarchies may offer a monolithic resistance to its successful effectua-

tion. This has, for lack of a better word, been called "bureaucratic sabotage." But it is often not deliberate obstruction. It may be merely the friction that habit (on which huge organizations must depend a great deal) offers to readjustment. Or it may be uninspired performance of men of good will who firmly believe that the policy they are called upon to carry out is either undesirable or unworkable. These are some of the reasons why it is often necessary to create entirely new organizations to carry out new policies when at first sight it might appear that an existing service could do the work.

III

The discussion up to this point has been principally diagnostic in character. A few of the administrative demands of the new political economy have been outlined as well as some of the behavior traits of our administrative hierarchy that make difficult the satisfaction of those demands. The next step, in the normal progression of things, would be prescriptive, but it will be the role of wisdom to limit the subsequent analysis to mention of some of the emerging correctives (which are in many instances symptomatic rather than truly corrective) and to an indication of some of the issues that will probably grow in significance.

Under the new conditions it becomes essential that legislative programs welling up from administrative agencies for recommendation to Congress form a more coherent and consistent economic policy. This may require the reconciliation of the particularistic drives of individual agencies. Or in some instances it may demand the suppression of the demands of one agency and the encouragement of those of another. In some situations, circumstances may require that new policy be initiated entirely independently of existing administrative agencies. Reliance on the initiative of operating departments may be inadequate either because of their inertia or because of their particularism. Our problem thus becomes primarily one of leadership and direction.

Our constitutional arrangements do not create conditions favorable to the formulation and enactment of integrated policy

programs. The division of leadership implicit in the separation of powers and the imperfect organization of party direction within the legislative chambers are the principal features of the constitutional system with this effect. Without drastic institutional rearrangements these influences will continue to be felt. Perhaps we could more seriously consider constitutional alternatives if it were not for our irritation at the sublime assurance of many English intellectuals that in the British parliamentary system man's political genius achieved its greatest expression and then died. Speculation about contrivances to cope with many of our more fundamental problems of governmental organization seems almost inevitably to lead around to consideration of the responsible cabinet device. Even if its applicability is conceded, it is plain that the adoption of the system of ministerial responsibility is not in the offing. The problems of policy formation will have to be worked out in other ways through the presidential system.

During the past few years significant developments have occurred in the president's use of the Bureau of the Budget as his agent in the clearance of departmental legislative proposals. By this means proposals not in accordance with the program of the president have been blocked; others have been modified; still others have been dovetailed with one another. Yet this type of clearance, as the budget staff would probably concede, has not achieved perfection. It has not completely checked independent promotion of legislation not in accord with administration policy. It probably has been more effective on minor matters than on broader issues. On these latter questions *ad hoc* interdepartmental committees have wrestled with the elimination of conflicts in policy drives; but a session of an interdepartmental committee tends to be a place where departmental representatives come well prepared to defend their positions and leave more convinced than before of the correctness of their attitudes. At any rate, horse trading among subordinates is not a satisfactory substitute for a clear policy directive from their politically responsible common superior.

These remarks suggest that perhaps less and less can it be pre-

sumed that the negative process of piecemeal review, rejection, and modification of individual proposals flowing up from the administrative units to the office of the chief executive will eventuate in the sort of integrated program of objectives that evolving conditions seem certain to require. Individual administrative agencies are certain not to suggest some things that ought to be recommended. Beyond this the terms of reference and the fixed outlook of the individual agency are such that it is not likely to raise in an effective way the important broad issues that cut across the entire government. Thus it may be expected that the need for positive origination at the center of broad but intelligible objectives will become more pressing. An authoritative expression of broad economic goals would furnish both a framework for the orientation of departmental policy origination and a standard by which auxiliary agencies might judge the individual items in the flow of departmental proposals.

These propositions have found recognition in the work of the National Resources Planning Board and in some of the newer functions of the Bureau of the Budget, but the techniques of integrating into a grand design the policy drives of dispersed administrative units are yet susceptible of further development—a development that seems to be dictated by the logic of events. It is primarily through these and other sorts of leadership by the president as the political chief of the administration that individual administrative agencies (and their outside allies) may be held in check. The formation within the administration of an internally consistent and coherent legislative program leaves unsolved the special problems of congressional-executive relationships under the system of separation of powers. Yet the difficulties of those relationships are reduced when intra-administration conflicts are ironed out antecedent to the stage of congressional action.

This emphasis on the role of administrative agencies in the initiation of policy suggests a parenthetical, hence inadequate, comment about the potential place of the representative body. Some observers see, inherent in the trend toward state control of the economy, the eclipse of parliaments. The necessity of a con-

sistent and properly timed policy, it is said, requires the elimination of the piecemeal and uncertain mode of action characteristic of legislatures. Perhaps it is inevitable that Congress will become less an agency for the origination of policy and more an agency for the registration of assent to or dissent from administrative proposals. Yet there is no inherent necessity that it become impotent. The growth of the bureaucratic structure increases the importance of independent and authoritative criticism that only Congress can furnish. There is as yet no indication of the rise to power of groups unable to tolerate the criticism, both fair and unfair, characteristic of representative bodies.

The administrative initiation of new policy and the administrative interpretation of old policy are almost inseparable. Hence, presidential direction in the two processes cannot be sharply distinguished, but, for purposes of discussion, a division of the two must be made. For the reasons stated in the first part of this essay, the task of overhead management of the administration as a whole seems to be becoming different in character with the assumption of a higher degree of governmental responsibility for the direction of the economic system. Individual administrative agencies tend to be less and less able to operate within a matrix of relatively fixed policy and precedent. With a wider range of departmental discretion in the choice of direction and emphasis within legislative authority, the possibility of interdepartmental conflict grows and the necessity for interdepartmental co-ordination increases. As a consequence more issues require the attention of the chief executive.

The full import of the new demands on overhead direction in the conduct of current administration probably has not been fully appreciated, but several developments are symptomatic. Heretofore students of administration, in so far as overhead control is concerned, have been almost solely concerned with overhead control in the institutional or "housekeeping" activities. The new and more significant requirements of overhead management concern substantive policy; and to meet these requirements interdepartmental arrangements of both a formal and an informal

character have been created in increasing number. The need will doubtless become more exigent, and its fulfilment will encounter resistance at many points. Better policy management at the departmental level can relieve some of the strain at the center, but many broad issues can be settled only at the center. Settlement at the center cannot be assured simply by the clustering of assistants around the president. Rowland Egger comments: "It should be clear at this late date that a general management agency is not *under* the President or *attached* to the President. If it is a management agency it *is* the President, as far as the administrative side of the government is concerned."⁴ The matter is not, as Dr. Egger would agree, so simple as the affirmation that many are one. The problem is to divide an indivisible job; success in that endeavor, in so far as substantive policy is concerned, probably rests ultimately on the presentation of issues in such a form that the chief decisions can actually be made and be those of the chief executive. The work of the agencies auxiliary to the president then may be handled within authoritatively determined policy. The alternatives are congestion of details at the center, the unwitting and irresponsible settlement of broad issues through the determination of individual cases by subordinates, or simply failure to decide questions that should be faced.

How the effective central direction of the economic policy of the administrative machine as a whole can be institutionalized in the Executive Office of the President and at the same time maintain both the actual and the symbolic authority of the president remains to be seen. The experience of the Office for Emergency Management, although occurring under special conditions, will undoubtedly have general instructive value. Eventually it may be necessary to have permanently some sort of economic general staff (without departmental ties) with less of a long-term view than the planners and more of the comprehensive view than the average presidential aide. Meanwhile, there is bitter competition among departments and agencies for the privilege of doing the over-all thinking on economic policy.

The burden of the foregoing argument is essentially that ad-

ministrative form must be determined by function and that the evolving functions of the national government, especially in the economic realm, demand an administrative structure more effectively articulated and directed (both in policy formation and in execution) than was necessary under *laissez faire* conditions. The only point about which the articulation may be organized is the presidency, and the recent evolution of that institution constitutes both a recognition of need and an attempt to meet it.

IV

In considering the effect of the evolving demands that government must meet on the permanent civil service, one approaches closely the substance of the controversy between Professor Carl J. Friedrich and Professor Herman Finer over the nature and significance of administrative responsibility.⁵ The upshot of their interesting dispute, in so far as I can perceive it, is that both have contributed penetrating essays but each has brilliantly succeeded in completely misunderstanding the other. Professor Finer insists that "responsibility" means responsibility by the administrator to political agencies—parliaments and the like. As he puts it: "X is accountable for Y to Z." Professor Friedrich insists that an essential element in the idea of "responsibility" is some understanding about Y, that is, what X is accountable for. Professor Finer emphasizes "accountability"; Professor Friedrich urges that specific mandates are involved in the notion of "responsibility." Professor Finer looks at the retrospective facet of "responsibility"; Professor Friedrich, at the prospective. From their different definitions as starting-points, they depart in different directions to debate adroitly and learnedly about different things.

Their debate, however, poses an important issue about the civil service. With Professor Finer's position that accountability to those politically responsible is of fundamental importance in a democratic regime one can have no quarrel. The same proposition applies in any regime. A consequence of Professor Friedrich's assumption that "responsibility" involves direction or instruction is that an enormous amount of what he calls "irresponsible" ac-

tion must take place, that is, action without specific instructions. Under modern conditions parliaments and presidents cannot issue specific directions about everything to be done. Obviously, with Professor Friedrich one must also agree. How is the "irresponsible" initiative inherent in the great bureaucratic apparatus of modern government to be reconciled with the doctrine and practice of popular control through politically responsible agents?

To approach this question by a devious route, it is well to point out that the political neutrality of civil services is a relative matter. In extreme and unrealistic formulations theorists sometimes picture administrative hierarchies as will-less instruments wielded by politicians, who direct them in accordance with the rapidly changing tones of popular fancy. That view is not now widely held, but the question remains about the nature of civil service neutrality. Neutral with respect to what? Perhaps with reference to the conflicts of similar political parties in a liberal-democratic state, but even that neutrality is difficult to attain. Beyond this, can a civil service be neutral about the job with which it is intrusted? If it is, the task is not likely to be well done. There must be, in fact, a sort of partisanship for the cause of the agency. A utility regulatory commission, for example, staffed by persons sincerely believing regulation futile and undesirable is not likely to turn in a conspicuously effective performance. To broaden the frame of reference, can a civil service be neutral about the predominant values and goals of the society it serves? Could the renowned English administrative class be transplanted and serve the commissars of the U.S.S.R. with enthusiasm and loyalty? Perhaps, but I doubt it.

In the nature of things a civil service shares in the values and goals of the culture of which it is a part. In fact, it could be argued that one of the great functions of bureaucratic institutions is as a conservator of the values of a culture. In the purposes, procedures, ceremonies, outlook, and habits of the bureaucracy are formalized the traditional cultural values. Where the rub comes is when social purpose abruptly changes or becomes unclear or divided. Since administrative hierarchies tend to be in-

stitutional balance wheels with a bias toward the status quo, at such times individual bureaucrats are apt to suffer some personal discomfort. If the change in social purpose is sufficiently gradual, friction between hierarchical inertia and social purpose may not be serious, but seldom is a bureaucracy agile enough to adapt itself to rapid change of social purpose without many accelerated retirements and judicious transfers from key positions as well as considerable "political" dilution.

From what has been said, it could be concluded that the mechanistic notion that the great leviathan is consciously steered by political leaders is often in part an illusion produced by the common subjection of politicians and administrative hierarchies to generally accepted social goals and values. Guided by such influences, "irresponsible" action (in Friedrich's usage) may pose no issue of orthodoxy. Further, it might well be contended that at least a part of the complaint about bureaucratic "obstruction" and "sabotage" current during the past decade has arisen from the effects of this sort of reorientation of social purpose. But the force of a reformulated and accepted set of broad social aims of a modified capitalism is not enough to guide administrative hierarchies. It undoubtedly plays an important part in the fixing of general directives, but in practical governance more specific norms are necessary.

Effective direction from the center, in addition to minimizing arbitrariness and arrogance,⁶ serves to overcome in part the particularism, inflexibility, and inertia of individual administrative units. Overhead policy management that results in a comparatively definite broad program allocates duties to each administrative unit and indicates the sequence and relationships of their respective operations. But it has a further effect. When the administration knows where it is going, it may evoke and harness more fully the energy and ingenuity of the civil servant in the achievement of its broad objectives. When the broad purpose is plain, in a considerable measure co-ordination may follow from self-direction among subordinate units without detailed instruction from the center. On the other hand, a policy of uncertainty,

drift, or confusion may encourage each agency to go its own way or perhaps to stand still. Efficacy of central direction is by no means solely a question of obtaining the co-operation and overcoming the parochialism of the permanent staffs of the various agencies. What I desire to stress is that what passes for bureaucratic obstructionism is often simply caution born of central uncertainty and that systematic formulation and communication of general policy programs may elevate the morale, stimulate the efforts, and guide the actions of the permanent staffs of scattered administrative agencies.

Central guidance must, in our new conditions, be supplemented by better departmental direction: direction that is able to understand and carry out its part in the broad economic program, direction that is able to animate and enlist the best in civil servants. And this is a matter of special importance in view of our traditional offhand fashion of selecting department heads. It is through departmental management that the immediate task of steering and co-ordinating the experts must be accomplished. In some things we can rely, as Professor Friedrich suggests, on the professional standards and canons of the civil servant to guide his actions. But the compulsion of professional group opinion has validity as a social norm only in limited areas. The discerning audacity of lay direction of the expert is of prime importance. An instructive volume could be written on how civilization has been advanced by laymen who overruled the considered judgment of their expert professional subordinates. Probably the true genius of the English administrative class is that to a degree it institutionalizes essentially lay departmental direction and thereby avoids some of the weaknesses of our transiency of departmental management.

The thesis in these paragraphs has been that the problem of assuring that the initiative and momentum of permanent hierarchies are in accord with the requirements of responsible government rests partly in the better organization of direction by those with political responsibility for the conduct of the government. Central direction based on the politically triumphant philosophy

of the general welfare establishes a framework of leadership of the efforts of the civil service both in policy initiation and in operation.

Better organization of administrative leadership is fundamental, but is it enough? Is external direction to be relied on solely? Or can we trust the inner compulsion of civil servants to guide the exercise of their discretion in the necessarily large residue of "irresponsible" (again Friedrich's usage) action? I would suggest the increasing importance of an in-service training that makes at least the upper civil servants in each bureau keenly aware that some of the world lies outside their bureau, those in each department equally aware that there is something outside their department. In this respect there has been indubitably great progress in the civil service during the past decade. John M. Gaus and Leon Wolcott have asked:

At what point in the evolution of policies in the life of the community shall the process take place of transforming a specialist point of view and program, through compromise and adjustment, into a more balanced public program? Much of this process must take place in the administrative agencies through the selection of personnel, their continued in-service training, the content and discipline of their professions, researches, and responsibilities, the attrition of inter-bureau and interdepartment contact and association, and the scrutiny of their work by the over-all administrative staff and auxiliary agencies and by Congress. If there is the proper attention to these matters, the viewpoint of the civil service will differ from the surrogacy that one expects from the officials of a pressure group.⁷

It is precisely this tendency toward particularism in the staffs of individual agencies that is likely to be most harmful in the sort of governmental situation in which we are moving, unless it is curbed. The most ambitious and extensive program of civil service education is no substitute for proper direction. Yet the better the civil service sense of social direction and tendencies and the more complete the civil servant's grasp of the role of his agency in the broad economic objectives of the government, the less difficult will be the task of responsible political guidance.

IX

THE FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT

JOSEPH P. HARRIS



THE future of administrative management in the government of America will depend largely upon the size, number, and complexity of the functions of government. The greater the tasks of government, the more important they are to society; the more baffling the problems of administration, the greater will be the need for able management. In the years ahead, following the termination of the war, it seems certain that the role of government will be far more important than ever before, and that all phases of management will develop rapidly.

By administrative management, as used in this essay, is meant the functions of the chief executive and his staff and the corresponding activities of all executive and administrative officials who plan, co-ordinate, direct, and control the work of the government. Particular attention, however, is directed to the role of the chief executive and of major executive officers of large departments, who will of necessity act as the centers for administrative management within their organizations. Management in government as in business is essentially the function of the executive.

The traditional fear of executive power has long proved to be a stumbling-block to the development of administrative management in American government. Legislatures in this country, except in times of great emergency, have regarded any increase in executive authority, however necessary, with suspicion and distrust. We can be sure that they will continue to do so, and we may even despair that democratic governments will ever be able

to combine democracy and efficiency. In the words of the Chief, Charles E. Merriam, "There are those who still cling to the belief that in order to be democratic we must be inefficient; that a weak government will keep us strong; that incapacity is liberty. These are the slogans that lead to national impotence, to humiliation, and even to annihilation."

But the philosophy of despair overlooks the great strides in public administration which have been made during the last quarter of a century and the genius of the American people for self-government. Advances in administrative management have been made when the requirements of society have forced them, and they will continue to be made in the future. The fear of executive power and the doctrines of checks and balances and the separation of powers are giving way before a rising demand for effective and able administration and recognition not only that executive leadership is essential but also that executives may be trusted with all the authority necessary to discharge the functions of government, as long as they are held to an effective responsibility.

There will be great advances in administrative management in the future, but they will not come without opposition from timid souls or the privileged few who seek to maintain the status quo by keeping government weak and ineffective. Many will still look upon government as essentially corrupt and incompetent, but the voice of the mass of the people will demand with increasing insistence strong and effective government to cope with the problems of society. Outworn political theories, suited to an earlier, agricultural society when the functions of government were few and simple and the prime consideration was to control government and to prevent it from robbing individuals of their liberties, are disappearing under conditions demanding a positive state. The old shibboleths will still be heard, but they will have lost their weight. In their place will rise a new political theory based upon a positive, service state, guided and controlled by democratic processes but unfettered by crippling restrictions which bind it today. No man has seen this trend with greater clarity, in-

sight, and farsighted judgment than Charles E. Merriam. No one has contributed more to the development of modern political theory, choosing from the old all that is wise and sound and appropriate to present-day government, and building a new theory of the positive state, based upon democratic institutions and subject always to the will of the people, strong and powerful as the first and chief instrument of society.

TRENDS IN GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

If we would forecast the future of administrative management in this country, we must first forecast what the tasks of government will be. These tasks will depend in large measure upon the duration of the present conflict. As long as the present war or a period of great military activity continues, ordinary functions of government will suffer. The longer the war, the greater will be the difficulty of holding together governmental organizations performing even the most essential services. At the outset, state and local governments may find themselves in an improved financial position, but this happy situation is likely to be temporary. All peacetime activities of government not essential to the prosecution of the military effort will, like nonessential private activities, be curtailed during the period of emergency. The long continuation of the war would, accordingly, have the most serious effects upon governmental activities and increase the problems of adjustment and restoration at the end of the hostilities. Even in the face of war, however, few governmental services can be discontinued altogether or drastically reduced without serious impairment of the functioning of society, and no sudden or rapid changes in governmental activities may be anticipated.

If it becomes necessary for this country to maintain a large military force following the war, this, too, will have serious consequences for civil functions. Funds that might otherwise be utilized to carry on governmental services will be required for the military arms, and the moral and psychological effects of a huge standing army and navy will be serious. If, however, the conflict is not unduly prolonged, is brought to a successful termination,

and is followed by peace and a jural world-order which makes it possible for states again to eschew huge military armament, the trend of governmental functions will follow quite a different course. The problems of readjustment will be difficult but not insuperable; the public debt will be large but well within the capacity of the nation if income can be maintained at a high level. Governments at all levels will resume activities at least equal to those prevailing before the emergency, and it is probable that pressing demands will be made for new and enlarged public services. This country will be called upon to feed millions of persons starving in Europe and Asia and to aid in the great reconstruction which must come with the peace. Very probably a lease-lend program of mighty proportions will be necessary, and extensive governmental regulation of economic life will have to be continued. The international order following the end of hostilities will probably require very considerable governmental control of economic enterprise throughout the world. Consequently, it appears unlikely that we shall at the termination of war hastily abandon the economic controls which were set up during the period of the emergency.

There will be great demands for new and enlarged governmental services following the end of hostilities, when demands for greater health services, public housing, recreation programs, adult education, social security, conservation of resources, great public works, highways, and increased scientific and many other services will have to be met. Under the leadership of the National Resources Planning Board state and local governments already are planning for large-scale public works programs and are building up reserves of plans and funds for the time when the cessation or reduction of the defense activities throws millions of persons out of work. The problem of absorbing these millions into other occupations will be difficult, and government will contribute to the solution.

There was a great expansion of municipal activities following the first World War, and probably an even greater expansion will follow the present war. The limited financial resources of local

governments will necessitate an increase of federal and state aid, and it would not be surprising to find central aid extended to practically all municipal services as has been done in England for several decades. We may anticipate, then, that joint financing of local activities by the federal government and the local units will be the rule rather than the exception. Such a trend, if it occurs, will have extremely important effects upon administrative management of state and local government.

In the future, federal supervision over state and local agencies receiving federal aid will probably lessen and will change in character. There will be greater insistence upon minimum administrative standards, such as a merit system of personnel administration, but less detailed supervision. There will be greater effort on the part of Washington to build up strong state and local administrations and to protect them from political interference and also to provide extensive technical and scientific service. For each of the aided activities Washington will become the center of research and information. The net effect of federal aid will be to provide greater centralization in one sense, but at the same time the state and local units will be strengthened and maintained as effective agencies for administration.

The trend toward centralization will in all probability continue, despite the diverse effects of federal and state aid. The superior financial position of the federal government, the fact that state and local governments are unable to regulate economic activities which are nation-wide in scope, and the higher national standards of administration will continue to bring about greater centralization. In two fields, particularly, federal expansion may be expected: (1) the regulation of many aspects of our economy and (2) the conservation of great natural resources involving public works beyond the abilities of the state and local governments. Only the federal government will be able to provide the economic regulation which will be necessary at the end of the war or, alternatively, to operate great credit, finance, utility, and other enterprises.

While the trend toward centralization will probably continue, with the federal government undertaking new and enlarged func-

tions, a countermovement of administrative decentralization is already clearly discernible, and every sign points to greater decentralization of administration by federal agencies in the future. Broad policies will originate in Washington, but the planning and administration of activities within a general frame of reference will be a function of the regional and field officers. The advantages of administrative decentralization are substantial. Greater responsibility for results in the field will be assured, and field operations can be co-ordinated more effectively with the programs of other governmental units, federal, state, and local. Federal administration will become more closely attuned to public opinion in each region and locality. Improvement of the quality of administrative personnel will contribute to this decentralizing process. More and more the functions of the bureaus at Washington with respect to field operations will be similar to those of the central office of a great corporation or holding company, providing central financial administration, over-all planning, technical services and research, and in other ways aiding the operating units in the field rather than controlling or supervising them.

We may anticipate, following the war, the rise of new regional governmental units, covering both local areas and, on a larger scale, groups of states. The inadequacies of the existing political units as administrative areas will become increasingly apparent as the war progresses and will result in the creation of *ad hoc* units to perform functions beyond the competence of local authorities. It is unlikely, however, that there will be any substantial consolidation of existing local units. Despite much talk in the past about the need for larger administrative areas, little progress in that direction has been made; and it seems probable that the future will see the creation of new regional authorities, superimposed upon the present structure of local government, to perform functions which cannot be carried on satisfactorily by existing governments. Probably in the majority of cases they will be unfunctional in character. It is unlikely that there will be any simplification of the pattern or reduction of the number of local governmental units.

The future will probably witness a striking growth of large

regions embracing several states. The decentralization of federal administration will contribute to this development. We may look forward also to the growth of planning authorities in all the major regions of the country, and it is not improbable that a number of regional authorities following the general pattern of the Tennessee Valley Authority will be established for large-scale development and conservation of natural resources.

At the close of the war, then, the task of government will be greater and more complex, and the need for able administrative management will be more pressing than ever before. The trends in the development of administrative management which have been present during the last two decades will continue at an accelerated pace. They include (1) the rise of the chief executive as the general manager of administration, (2) the establishment of a more rational organization under the chief executive, bringing numerous scattered agencies into a more integrated structure—the rise of departmental administrative management; (3) the growth of the professional, nonpolitical executive; (4) the staffing of the executive of larger organizations with managerial aides and agencies; (5) the evolution of the budget office as a tool of management; (6) the growth of governmental research as a means for constantly improving administrative organization and management techniques; (7) the development of personnel administration as an aspect of management; and (8) the establishment of planning agencies.

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AS GENERAL MANAGER

During the last fifty years the growth in importance, power, and prestige of the chief executive at all levels of government has been a major development in our governmental institutions. Under Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, we have seen the president emerge as the most powerful figure in our national life, the leader of his party, a legislative leader, and the head of the administration. His administrative functions, though based upon powers granted to him in the Constitution, were the latest to be developed. The enactment of the

Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 gave to the president the function of systematically reviewing the programs of the departments and presenting to Congress a unified national financial program and also provided him with a staff—the Bureau of the Budget—to aid him in his duties. This act increased very greatly the role of the president as the administrative chief, but for nearly two decades the Bureau of the Budget remained undeveloped as a managerial staff agency.

In 1937, the President's Committee on Administrative Management, consisting of Louis Brownlow, Charles E. Merriam, and Luther Gulick, recommended the equipment of the president with staff agencies and assistants to enable him to carry out his administrative duties. The committee proposed that three agencies should be organized to aid him in management: the Bureau of the Budget, a civil service administration with a single executive officer, and a national planning agency. In addition, it recommended that the president be provided with a staff of administrative assistants under his immediate direction.

These recommendations have been substantially carried into effect. Under the authority of the Reorganization Act of 1939, the first plan submitted to Congress strengthened the Executive Office of the President as a central managerial agency, transferring to it the Bureau of the Budget, the National Resources Planning Board, and other agencies. The president is now equipped for the first time with a central staff to aid him in the management of the executive branch of the government. The future will see further development of the central, over-all managerial corps attached to the Office of the President. Central control and supervision will not necessarily be increased thereby, nor will more decisions be made personally by the president; but the character of central management will undergo substantial changes. From a negative, repressive type of control designed primarily to safeguard against unfortunate political reactions to administrative actions, overhead management is already becoming a positive force, "liberating the energies" of the departments and serving as a central focus for the improvement of administrative manage-

ment throughout the government. The strengthening of overhead management in the federal government will relieve the president of many administrative decisions which should be reached by departmental officials and equip him to make the key decisions which must be his. In the future the Office of the President will be looked upon not as an intensely personalized agency but rather as a corporate entity much like the British Treasury.

In the states the authority of the governor as chief executive has been greatly increased as a result of the widespread movement toward administrative consolidation since 1917. In the larger cities during the last several decades there has been a parallel tendency to grant wider administrative authority to the mayor. These increases in the authority of the elective chief executive have, however, seldom produced wholly satisfactory results and have not notably advanced administrative management in government. Mayors and governors have ordinarily not been equipped, either personally or by the use of staff aides, to perform their administrative functions and to provide effective overhead management.

A development of greater significance to management has been the rise of the city-manager plan and the emergence of the city manager as the outstanding example of the professional, non-political executive in local government. The manager as the chief administrative officer, though subject at all times to control by the council, is characteristically stronger than other chief executives in government, and his role compares favorably with that of private executives.

The city-manager plan has usually been adopted by cities facing serious administrative and financial problems whose solution required a high order of management. The results have justified all reasonable expectations. Although the rate of growth of this form of city government slowed down in the early years of the depression, the number of annual accessions has resumed a normal trend. It is probable, when the financial and managerial problems of cities become more pressing in the years ahead, that ultimately this plan will become the prevailing form of local government throughout the country.

These trends in the development of the executive in government have been notable, but, in comparison with business, industry, banking, labor, education, and many other walks of life, the executive in government still lags behind. The great industrial achievements of this country have been due in no small part to vigorous and able executive leadership. The resourcefulness, initiative, imagination, and drive of the American executive are a part of the greatness of our country. "As a people we congratulate ourselves justly on our skills as managers," wrote Charles E. Merriam and his colleagues on the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937, "... and we expect that management in government shall be the best American model." Yet in government the role of the executive remains relatively undeveloped, and management in great areas is ineffective, incompetent, and poorly organized.

The results of increasing the executive authority of public officers who are also political leaders have often been disappointing, and for readily understandable reasons. The qualities which make for political leadership are not necessarily those conducive to executive leadership. Increased authority of the governor as chief executive and the adoption of city charters providing for a strong mayor have often failed to produce substantial improvements in administration. States and cities have only occasionally elected to these high offices men of great executive ability, and there is little prospect that the electorate of the future will be any more successful in choosing public officials with administrative ability. Yet the practice of electing the chief executive of the states and the nation is so firmly entrenched in our political philosophy that any change is highly improbable. The need for political leadership in the states and the nation is as urgent as that for executive leadership. The reconciliation and adjustment of these two needs constitutes one of the most important problems of government in the future.

Though the results of increasing the administrative powers of the politically chosen executive officer have often been disappointing, the movement toward overhead management centered in the office of the chief executive will continue. The political

governor or mayor with strong executive powers has usually provided some improvement over the administrative chaos which formerly prevailed. It is not possible to turn back. The movement toward strengthening the role of the chief executive as administrative officer will continue, because of the necessity for providing some means to co-ordinate and control the vast administrative machine, to establish greater responsibility of administrative officers, and to provide central direction and guidance. The sheer urgency of the need for effective administrative management will force the extension of executive leadership.

THE FUNCTION OF MANAGEMENT

The prime function of executive management is to establish the responsibility of administrative agencies for the faithful and efficient administration of the tasks assigned to them. The legislature cannot hold the numerous administrative officers to an effective responsibility. Its members have neither the time, the qualifications, nor the detailed familiarity with the many governmental agencies sufficient to judge their work. Legislative bodies are notoriously prone to give undue attention to minor infractions and episodes which get into the news to the neglect of the more important aspects of administration. The legislature may see to it that administrative officers are held responsible, but only in exceptional cases is it necessary or wise for the legislature to attempt to exercise this function directly.

Only the executive is able to hold administrative officers to an effective accountability, and this function he may exercise only if he has adequate authority and the necessary staff. Effective responsibility means a great deal more than the appraisal of the administration, judging whether it is being carried on well or not; it must include also the recognition and reward of those who do their work well and the discipline of those whose work is unsatisfactory. Only management has the information, the day-by-day contacts with administration, the ability to judge whether things are going well, and the understanding of the many complex factors involved—all necessary to the continuing direction and su-

pervision involved in the maintenance of effective responsibility. Only management has the proper sense of timing, which is often so important to the success of corrective measures, and the skill in winning the support of the organization, which is even more essential. All these things go to make up constructive administrative leadership—the function of management.

The establishment of effective responsibility of administrative officers and employees, from the highest to the lowest, is essential to success in administration. When an employee feels a keen sense of responsibility, his zest for his work is stimulated by the knowledge that outstanding achievement will be recognized and rewarded and that incompetence and failure will be discovered and punished. *It is the function of management to insure a keen sense of responsibility from top to bottom of an organization.* Persons engaged in professional or scientific work may feel this sense of responsibility to their professional colleagues, but at best it is an uncertain substitute for effective responsibility to their superior officers.

Another function of management is the co-ordination of the activities of the whole administrative organization. Government is notoriously plagued by a rank spirit of departmentalism, which frequently leads to internal squabbles and lack of effective co-operation. Few governmental functions may be performed today by a single department or agency acting alone. More and more it is necessary for several departments or agencies to join in a co-ordinated effort, if the work of government is to be performed effectively and economically. *It is the function of overhead management to secure team work and co-ordination.*

Lack of co-ordination and interdepartmental friction frequently are caused by lack of adequate channels of information and the failure of officials to consult other agencies concerned before taking action. It is the business of the executive to keep open the channels of information and constantly to insist upon interdepartmental consultation and clearance. This function appears deceptively obvious and easy; actually, it is one of the most difficult tasks of management. Only the able executive can recognize the

ramifications of a pending administrative decision, see where it impinges upon the work of the several departments, know those who should be consulted about what features of the proposed action, and remember to consult. And it requires considerable skill to conduct successfully the necessary consultations and to secure the advice or consent that is sought. The art of governmental management is largely the art of conference. In conducting this activity the executive needs staff aid. Conferences require a vast amount of time, and the executive needs help in remembering, insisting upon, and obtaining the clearance which is so essential to management. In this respect public administration differs markedly from private administration, where clearance does not assume such vital importance.

The effective co-ordination of the work of the several departments and agencies has been one of the outstanding achievements of executive management. Where management is strongest, the highest degree of co-ordination has been achieved, internal jealousies and disputes have been composed, excessive departmental spirit has been frowned upon, and a co-operative attitude has been substituted for a spirit of nonco-operation. City managers have been able usually to bring about a high degree of co-ordination of the activities of the several departments and to build up a government-wide loyalty and *esprit de corps*. Able departmental heads have likewise achieved effective and enthusiastic co-ordination within their departments.

The need for effective co-ordination of governmental activities, not only within a single government, but also between governments at various levels, will be greater in the future than in the past. Governmental functions will increase, and no longer will it be possible to tolerate competing and conflicting governmental programs. Informal and unofficial means of co-operation and co-ordination between the local governments, the states, and the federal government will also become more important. Associations of governmental officials will have an expanding role in bringing officials from various governments together and affording unofficial channels of information and advice.

The functions of management include also the fixing of objectives and the winning of enthusiastic co-operation of employees, the determination of important questions of policy, and, in the words of Professor Macmahon, "the liberation of the energies" of the organization. The older functions of management—the negative and repressive activities of control, detailed supervision, and discipline—will give way in the future to positive executive leadership, bringing purpose, direction, tone, and inspiration to administration. In government, executives have usually been ill equipped to provide constructive leadership. Occupied with political and public relations, inadequately staffed, and overburdened by numerous officials reporting to them and by a diffused organization, they have frequently found their whole time occupied with routine activities. They have had little opportunity to think and plan or to exercise a positive and constructive influence on the agencies under their direction. In the future, executives will be relieved of many time-consuming details and will have greater opportunities for constructive leadership. The growth of staff agencies and aides is a sign pointing in this direction.

STAFF AGENCIES AND AIDES

What means does the executive have to carry out these functions of management? What tools does he have at his command? Staff assistance is the most important tool of the executive in the supervision, stimulation, and control of the departments and activities. The hours in the day of the chief executive are no more than those of ordinary men, and most executives are pressed by duties in addition to their administrative responsibilities. The failure of executive management to develop in government on the same scale that it has in business, industry, and other walks of life has been due in large part to the inadequate staffing of executive officers.

The type of staff which the chief executive needs for effective overhead management will vary with the size of the organization, the nature of its work, the ability of the chief executive to utilize staff aides, and other factors; nevertheless, it is possible to

describe certain types of staff assistance which all executives need. Financial planning and control are at the center of management, and staff assistance is required if the organization is of substantial size. Accordingly, the budget officer is frequently a chief managerial aide of the executive. The review of the budget estimates of the departments or bureaus constitutes the most important means by which the executive may pass upon the plans and work programs of the units for which he is responsible. The budget officer, to be of assistance to the executive in the review of the work programs of the departments or bureaus, as well as in the control of expenditures after the appropriations have been passed, must be in close touch with the executive and understand thoroughly his policies and plans.

The tendency for the budget office to become the chief staff agency of the executive is well illustrated in the recent development of the United States Bureau of the Budget—a trend which will probably set the pattern for other governmental units in the future. The bureau was transferred to the Executive Office in 1939 and designated one of three “managerial agencies” of the president. With this change in location and status, it has rapidly become a staff arm of the president and a center of administrative management in the national government. The personnel of the bureau increased from 45 in 1938 to 281 in 1941; and its expenditures increased from \$196,000 to \$971,000.

The activities of the bureau include not only the preparation and administration of the budget, for which it is much more adequately staffed than formerly, but also other executive functions, such as the clearance of departmental legislative proposals, the continual study of organization and management problems and the drafting of the necessary executive orders to deal with these problems, the development of improved accounting and financial practices, the co-ordination of governmental activities on many fronts, the broad study of fiscal and taxation policies in the light of business trends and economic factors, and the investigation of administrative policy problems which constantly arise and require executive decision. In 1939 the Central Statistical Board

was transferred to the Bureau of the Budget, and, as a division of the bureau, it carries on activities co-ordinating the statistical services of the government.

The president has turned increasingly to the bureau, rather than to his administrative assistants, for help on all sorts of administrative problems. This choice is understandable in view of the fact that the Bureau of the Budget is in the direct stream of authority and, by reason of its numerous and continuous contacts with the executive departments, is in a position to see the ramifications of questions that arise, to understand their background, and to tap the information of the departments and bureaus. Since 1940 the bureau has been used for many important assignments relating to national defense. The Bureau of the Budget bids fair to become the counterpart of the British Treasury as the central, overhead management agency of the government. It has assembled a staff of high competence and is filling a long-felt need in the federal government. Budget offices elsewhere are coming to occupy a central position in management concerning not merely fiscal problems but administrative problems generally. This trend, which is distinctly observable in the federal government and in a number of states and cities, will probably spread widely as the activities of governments expand and the solution of administrative problems becomes more urgent.

A number of other central administrative services are important in overhead management. Placing the National Resources Planning Board in the Executive Office of the President is an indication of the growing importance of planning as an aspect of management. A few state planning agencies have operated as staff agencies to the governor, but most of them are outside the regular stream of executive authority and decision and participate little in overhead management. As staff agencies to the chief executive, it is probable that planning agencies will be drawn more closely within the orbit of the chief executive and will affect broad decisions of policy more intimately than heretofore.

Personnel administration is increasingly recognized as an important aspect of management to be organized so that the chief

executive may exert a positive, constructive leadership in personnel matters. This trend has been delayed by reason of the failure of civil service reformers to look upon personnel administration as a function of management, as well as their fear that the executive would use his authority to introduce political patronage. The establishment of the liaison officer for personnel administration in the Executive Office of the President has made it possible for the president to exert a positive influence on personnel matters, and as a result great advances have been made recently in the civil service administration in the federal government. We may anticipate that personnel agencies of the future will be placed with increasing frequency under the immediate direction of executive officers.

There is also an important trend to provide executives with administrative aides in their immediate offices. The outstanding achievements in management have been made by organizations in which the executive is well staffed and thus relieved of much tedious routine. For many years mayors, governors, and presidents have had secretaries drawn from the ranks of newspapermen and persons with political experience who were qualified to aid them in their political and public relations and in their relations with the legislative body, but only recently has there appeared a new type of aide—the administrative assistant, frequently drawn from the civil service.

The development of such aides tends to remove the danger that executive management may become highly personalized. The functions of administrative aides are both advisory and supervisory but without responsibility for decisions. They are the eyes and ears of the executive and carry on for him the exacting work of investigation, consultation, clearance, and the preparation of the letters and documents which must precede or follow executive decisions. They “know the ropes” of government procedures, how to get things done, and the difficulties which must be overcome. They are experts on all administrative problems.

These aides render an equally important service to the executive on policy questions. This observation does not mean, to be

sure, that policies are determined by them; their role is preparatory to determination by the executive. It is, of course, impossible to draw a clear line between policy and administration; all important questions which arise involve both elements. Good practice dictates that the executive should not decide important matters of public policy until they have been given careful preliminary consideration in the light of all available data. In a large organization the executive cannot personally attend to these preparatory steps. The assistance of administrative aides to the executive on policy matters is not primarily or essentially that of advice or opinion but rather the marshaling and synthesizing of the necessary information and advice of those who should be consulted before the decision is made.

The development of staff agencies and the provision of aides to the executive have been among the most significant trends in public management during the last two decades. The development of the Executive Office of the President as a central focus for administrative management of the federal government has been mentioned. Macmahon and Millett have described the important and generally unrecognized development in the federal departments of central managerial corps. Many city-manager cities have well-developed managerial staffs under the managers. These trends will be even more marked in the decades ahead and will have far-reaching effects upon administrative management.

RESEARCH IN ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT

Another important emerging trend is the development of management research within government as a regular, continuing function. Government has long conducted many types of scientific research, but only within the last decade or so has the work of government itself been recognized as worthy of systematic inquiry. Research on governmental problems was first carried on by citizen associations in cities, beginning in New York in 1906, and for several decades remained an outside, unofficial activity. Research under such auspices has been responsible for many important advances in administration. During the last few years

administrative research has emerged as a function of government itself, as a tool of management. In the federal government a number of bureaus and departments now have well-manned research units, usually called planning and procedure units. Frequently, several divisions within a single bureau carry on administrative management studies. They are characteristically engaged in detailed studies of business practices, organization, operational problems, administrative policies; on a broader scale and less frequently they are also engaged on legislative programs and economic and social aspects of the work of the agency. Their job is to seek constantly better ways of carrying on the work of the government. They usually have close relations with operations and report to the executive officer in charge.

An outstanding example of an administrative research agency within government itself is the Division of Administrative Management of the United States Bureau of the Budget. With a staff of sixty persons, it is rapidly becoming the most important center of management research in the country. Since it was created in 1939, it has been occupied primarily with administrative reorganization and organization for emergency defense, but it has also conducted numerous studies concerning business practices in the federal government.

In state and local governments administrative research is less well developed. A very considerable amount is conducted through special investigations and inquiries, frequently by use of outside consultants, but relatively few governments have established formal research organizations. Outstanding examples are found in the city and the county of Los Angeles, where well-staffed research agencies have operated for a number of years. Recently the Budget Division of the state of Virginia has been staffed to carry on administrative research. Although few formal research units exist, many governments and individual departments have personnel engaged from time to time in research studies relating to the conduct of their work.

The trend toward administrative research as a function of government itself is of great significance. In the management of the

future it will become better organized, recognized, and established. It will constitute a continuing and effective tool in the constant search for better organization, procedures, personnel, and policies. At the same time it will of necessity operate within a frame of reference fixed by administrative policy and will be concerned with details and procedures rather than with basic principles of administration. There will still be the need for governmental research by citizen organizations, associations of public officials, universities, and the individual scholar.

TRENDS IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

The trend toward a more rational, integrated administrative organization of government at all levels will continue in the next several decades and probably will make greater progress than in the past. The movement for administrative reorganization in the states continues to spread, taking on new features of civil service reform and developing state planning agencies. With fuller realization that an integrated organization is not enough—that it will yield only disappointing results if patronage and low administrative standards are permitted to persist—there is prospect that more satisfactory results may be achieved in the future.

In the federal government important changes of administrative organization have been made by President Roosevelt within recent years under the Reorganization Act of 1939, now expired. It is quite possible that in the future authority will be granted to the president on a continuing basis to determine the administrative structure, subject to some form of review by Congress. Several of the department heads in the federal government already possess wide authority to make internal changes in administrative organization within their departments. In the future—perhaps in the distant future—administrative organization will be regarded as essentially a function of management and as such will be delegated to the executive, with little reservation or restriction.

Administrative boards and commissions are on their way out, and they won't be missed. Greater attention will be given in the future to the definite fixing of responsibility of all administrative

units. Organization will be more flexible and change more rapid with the decline of constitutional and statutory prescriptions. The prime concern of administrators with organization will not be the overhead structure of departments and bureaus but rather the internal organization of divisions and subdivisions. Study and analysis of organization will continue to be necessary for the most effective use of men and equipment in public administration and will occupy much of the time of administrators and research units. When administrative management is better developed and the entire governmental machine is looked upon as a single organization, with all parts responsible to the chief executive, there will be less occasion for the bitter hostility of bureaus and departments to change.

We may expect that administrative organization in the future will be more symmetrical, unified, and integrated, with few independent agencies standing apart. The increasing interdependence of governmental activities and the necessity for better coordination among all governmental agencies will bring about greater integration. Nevertheless, the future will probably see some governmental agencies having a semiautonomous status. Many important governmental activities must be administered with a degree of independence from the general government. Business enterprises of the government, for example, which are entirely or largely self-supporting need to be conducted as independent entities with separate financial systems and a large degree of freedom from the customary official controls. In some instances the necessary independence has been achieved by the use of the corporate form of organization, but in other instances business enterprises have been operated as ordinary governmental agencies but freed of the ordinary central controls. Pritchett has pointed out a strong tendency to subject government corporations to the same controls as ordinary departments—a trend which if continued will nullify the principal advantages of this form of organization.

A great expansion of government in the field of business enterprises may be anticipated as an alternative to governmental regulation and for other reasons. In many cases the ends of govern-

ment may be accomplished better by direct entry into business than by other means at its disposal. The use of the government corporation will probably increase as government enters new fields of activity. If we could take a long look ahead, we should probably see a great multitude of such enterprises and the gradual disappearance of the dividing-line between public and private administration. The forms of government corporations will be many and varied to fit particular situations. It is unlikely that the government will attempt to limit itself to any single form of organization or policy, though this will be advocated. No simple or universal means of holding government corporations responsible is possible.

There are also many governmental agencies charged with regulatory functions of a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial character, which have a considerable degree of independence from the customary governmental controls. The rise of semi-independent regulatory commissions has coincided with the growth of governmental regulation, though it should be added that many regulatory functions have been intrusted to the regular departments and bureaus and that in the future the trend will probably be in this direction. Neither the legislature nor the courts have been able to cope effectively with the complex and often technical problems involved in the detailed regulation of labor and industry, utilities, trade-practices, communications, banking, securities and exchanges, foods and drugs, aviation, navigation, and other aspects of modern economy. The delegation of sublegislative and quasi-judicial functions was inescapable. It has given rise to a great new field of governmental activity, called by Landis, Gellhorn, and others the "administrative process."

With the increase of economic regulation by government, the organization and administration of regulatory activities promises to be one of the most important and difficult problems of government in the years following the war. The rise of the independent regulatory commission has been somewhat accidental and historical rather than the result of a reasoned policy. During recent years the independent commission has been criticized because of its lack of responsibility to the government of the day and the con-

sequent inability of the executive to co-ordinate its programs and policies with the general program of the administration. The independent commissions have not been without their defenders, including, usually, representatives of the interests regulated. The tendency to create independent commissions for each new field of governmental regulation, had it been continued, would have led eventually to administrative chaos and the loss of any effective means whereby the government in office could adopt and carry through broad economic and social programs. This tendency has been halted, and it is unlikely that there will be a multiplication of independent regulatory commissions in the future. More effective means will be needed, however, for the co-ordination of the programs of these commissions with those of the government of the day, while maintaining the necessary degree of independence of quasi-judicial functions. This objective will probably be accomplished not by any drastic organizational changes, such as placing the regulatory commissions within established executive departments, but rather by the simpler and more effective means of staffing the executive for overhead co-ordination.

CENTRAL LEADERSHIP OR CENTRAL CONTROL

With the enlargement of executive powers, the development of strong central staff and auxiliary agencies, and the staffing of executive offices, is there danger that the trend toward central control may paralyze administration by stifling the initiative and discretion of the departments?

While the development of central managerial and service agencies is essential to effective administrative management, it must also be recognized that too much central control is inimical to administrative efficiency. In general, the operating department or unit should be given as complete control over all aspects of its work as possible, so that responsibility will be clear and undivided. Central auxiliary agencies should be confined to those activities where the advantages of uniformity and a high degree of expertness and specialization clearly outweigh the considerations in favor of intrusting their activities to the departments or operating units. When the operating units provide their

own services, they are conducted with close attention to administrative requirements, and the responsibility for administrative results is definitely fixed. Government uses central service agencies to a greater extent than do business and industry, where more weight is given to the definite fixing of responsibility. Further studies are needed of the proper role of the central service or auxiliary agencies and their relationships to the operating departments.

The development of overhead management by no means necessitates or requires greater centralization of administration. On the contrary, able overhead management may and should facilitate decentralization, which is essential to sound administration. A careful study of those agencies with the most highly developed overhead management would generally show them to possess the largest degree of administrative decentralization. In private administration a deliberate and well-conceived policy of decentralization is usually followed by the best-managed concerns. There is little complaint of too much centralization in city-manager cities, where the authority of the manager is unquestioned, nor is there such criticism of well-managed departments in the federal government and elsewhere.

Administrative management in the future will provide greater executive leadership and authority at the center but probably less detailed control. The central controls over finance, personnel, accounting, materials, printing, space, and other aspects of administration will be relaxed in the interest of greater efficiency and responsibility. Many of these service activities will be assigned to the departments and bureaus, with the central agency performing only those operations which it is better equipped to conduct. This trend will be particularly marked in large governmental organizations, such as the federal departments.

THE LEGISLATURE AND ADMINISTRATION

Will legislative bodies be willing in the future to give executive officers, particularly the chief executive, the authority and discretion essential to able administrative management? What signs are there that the legislature will relax its jealous concern over the

expansion of executive authority or will be willing to forego its detailed control over administration?

The interference of legislative bodies in administration has been notorious and of long standing in this country. It has not been confined to legislative action but frequently takes the form of influence and control by individual legislators to secure patronage and special favors for their constituents. The chairmen of important committees in Congress exert influence over departments and bureaus sometimes almost as great as that of the head of the department but without any responsibility for administrative results. Bureau heads and committee chairmen or other prominent members sometimes connive to secure the enactment of detailed legislation removing the bureau in large measure from control by the chief executive and departmental heads. Much detailed legislation and many itemized appropriation measures are enacted in the name of the legislative prerogative, when, in fact, they provide control not for the legislature as a body but for individual members and serve to defeat responsibility of the administration to the legislative body as a whole.

Is there any prospect that this type of legislative strait jacket will be relaxed in the future, except during periods of emergency? There are some signs pointing in this direction. Legislative interference in administration is usually designed to secure patronage and other forms of spoils with which individual legislators build up their political machines. When patronage and spoils disappear—and they are rapidly on the way out—the incentive for legislative interference will also largely disappear. The proof of this statement is to be observed in city-manager and other governments in which patronage and spoils have largely disappeared. City councils under the manager plan ordinarily do not meddle in administration, not from lack of power but from lack of incentive. The absence of spoils rather than the parliamentary form of government is probably chiefly responsible for the willingness of the British Parliament to grant wide authority to the executive officers. The eventual elimination of political patronage will go far to eliminate the cause of undue legislative interference in ad-

ministration. The next step—and one that will not be long delayed—will be legislative rules preventing individual members from proposing public expenditures for their districts—another form of political spoils.

There is no inherent conflict between legislature and administration. An able administration guided and controlled by effective management is in no way a derogation of legislative prestige and power; it is rather the means by which legislative policies are made effective. It profits little to enact great legislative reforms unless they can be skilfully executed. The prestige of the legislative body is not enhanced by a weak and incompetent administration; rather it is in the true interest of the legislature to insure the existence of a strong administration. In the future there probably will be closer relationships and better understanding between the legislature and the administration. In place of hampering but ineffective detailed controls by the legislative body, greater freedom and discretion will be accorded administrative officers, who, however, will be held to a more effective responsibility for the discharge of their functions.

Administration in the future will be subject to greater internal control, less external control through detailed legislation, and less regulation by agencies such as the comptroller-general in the federal government. Efficiency and economy can then become a prime consideration of administrators rather than strict observance of a vast body of hampering limitations, restrictions, prohibitions, and regulations. Administrators will need to devote less time to finding ways to circumvent these regulations and controls in order to get their work done and will have more time for constructive action in solving the real problems of administration. In the place of uniform, inflexible rules imposed from outside, there will be greater use of departmental and bureau regulations, which can better be adapted to the requirements of administration and altered when conditions change.

If the legislature permits the expansion of the authority of the chief executive and the building-up of administrative management and internal control within administration, what means

does it have at its disposal to hold the administration responsible? Should not the increase in executive power be matched by a more effective responsibility to the legislature? And if a more effective responsibility is to be achieved, are we likely to have fundamental changes in our structure of government, such as a change to the parliamentary form? Aside from the city-manager form of government, the prospect is not bright for growth of an appointive chief executive responsible to the legislative body. It seems unlikely that the practice of popular election of the governor and the president will be changed or even seriously challenged in the near future. The establishment of more effective responsibility of administration to the legislative body will probably have to be achieved within the present constitutional framework of the states and the federal government.

A very considerable degree of executive responsibility has been exacted by the legislatures through legislation, the control of public expenditures, and the conduct of special investigations of administrative agencies. Legislatures have had no serious difficulty in imposing their will upon the executive departments and in securing the faithful execution of legislative policies. Administrators have usually been willing and eager to carry out the wishes of the legislature and frequently of individual members of powerful committees.

Legislative review of the budget constitutes a systematic means by which the legislative body, acting through its committees, passes upon the activities and policies of the departments. Even though changes in items may be relatively small, it should not be thought that this review is ineffective. Departments and budget officers are keenly aware of legislative attitudes and prepare their budgets to meet them.

The threat of a legislative investigation is a constant sanction which the legislature utilizes to hold administration responsible, to safeguard against abuses and malpractices, and to assure conformity to legislative policies. Although legislative investigations are frequently carried on in a spirit of partisanship, the efficacy of the threat of an investigation may not be disputed. Legislative

bodies can, if they will, increase the effectiveness of this weapon by removing it from politics and by assuring impartiality and objectivity in its use.

In the future greater attention will be given to the establishment of definite responsibility of all administrative officers; this responsibility will not run directly to the legislative body but rather to the chief executive, who, in turn, will be held responsible by the legislature. The legislature is not equipped to hold individual officers and agencies to a detailed accountability. That is the function of management. The establishment of able overhead management is not in derogation of the legislative authority but is a means by which the legislature may insure that activities which it authorizes and for which it provides funds are conducted with reasonable efficiency and in accordance with legislative policies and the public interest. The more effectively this function of management is discharged, the more effectively will public officers be held accountable for the faithful discharge of their duties. The responsibility of executive officers for their budget requests, for example, has been greatly increased by the institution of an executive budget. In the future, executive officers will be held to a greater responsibility not only for their budgets and work programs but also for the administrative results and standards of administration. The development of administrative management will not defeat but, on the contrary, will enhance the ultimate responsibility of executive officers and agencies to the legislature. It will enable the legislative body to give its attention to broad legislative policies, secure in the knowledge that these policies when enacted into law will not be nullified by weak and incompetent administration.

X

THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF THE FUTURE

LEONARD D. WHITE



THE administrative framework of the state is a tough and resistant organism. It rides out the storms of national disaster, economic upheavals, and even political revolution. Since time immemorial it has been an inescapable part of the social structure. Since the decline of *laissez faire* it has become progressively a central element in the social structure. In the efforts of man to live and work and prosper, the contribution of the public service grows greater with each recurrent crisis. And, as these essays are written, the central contribution of public administration and of the public service to the perhaps strange new world of the next generation looms large.

To project the public service of 1940 to 1950, or more hazardously to 1960, in the light of tendencies since 1920 or 1930 would not be too difficult a task, if it might be assumed that the formative influences would remain substantially the same. Despite the vast world-explosion, in the midst of which these pages are written, they may remain the same in broad character; but it is a more reasonable hypothesis to suppose that they will change, perhaps fundamentally. Any guess at the nature of the American public service even in 1950—and certainly in 1960—must therefore take into account both normal expectations and the “supernormal” developments which may be surmised by reason of wholly new forces or markedly new emphases.

What is likely to be the nature of these new influences—global or national, economic, political or managerial, racial, community, ideological? Perhaps all and more. How will they impress themselves upon the public service—by reason or by force, by ex-

ample or by education, by evolution or by revolution? No one can be sure. But to forecast the possible future of the public service in this country it is necessary for the purpose of the argument to assume some position with regard to the principal features of the world of tomorrow, especially in the United States of America.

I

For the purposes of this essay, therefore, the following assumptions are made concerning the environment in which the American public service will operate in the foreseeable future.

1. Responsible government in the democratic tradition will continue.
2. The scope of governmental activity will increase in substantial measure and perhaps on a spectacular scale.
 - a) There will be a post-war effort to insure economic stability at a level of full employment through the medium of public expenditures on public enterprises at whatever scale may be necessary.
 - b) There will be a substantial increase of governmental ownership and operation (probably through some form of the government corporation) of certain types of economic enterprises, for example, railroads and municipal utilities, power production, land, both rural and urban, housing, and perhaps banking and broadcasting supplementary to commercial broadcasting
 - c) There will be a trend toward further public control of the economic order to secure greater stability, a better balance between major producing groups and between them and consumers, and the elimination of abuses in business.
 - d) The provision of services by the government will continue to increase in volume and in variety
3. The burden of taxation to provide for interest charges, debt reduction, and current expenditures will be heavy but will be borne in preference to repudiation; and the real income of persons in the middle-income brackets, including most public employees, will be diminished.
4. In consequence of the foregoing considerations, the relative influence and authority of the national government will continue to gain at the expense of the states and their subdivisions; but the form of governmental organization will progressively rest upon the co-ordination of all three levels.
5. At the close of this war there will emerge an important international structure, including an international administrative system, of which some members of the American public service will become a part and to which some branches of our national administration will become in some measure responsible.

These assumptions reveal an expectation that American civil institutions will not be subject to the strain of a revolutionary period following the liquidation of the existing global conflict or to the hazards of any substantial social deterioration. The length of the present war and the character of the eventual world-settlement may, of course, considerably affect the future form of the purely internal agencies of government, but this is too problematical to weigh in the scales of the present and must be disregarded—although not wholly discounted. This essay, then, is written in the belief that an enduring economic order will be devised and sustained and that an accepted world-order will emerge under Anglo-American leadership. If the world should be organized under the leadership of Hitler, this writing will have no meaning; if the task of providing an enduring economic order should prove too great, the course of events may be wholly different from that which can now be hoped for.

II

That some form of world-organization will emerge with the eventual triumph over the totalitarian powers seems inevitable. The cost of past failure is worse than bankruptcy, and the risks of future national complacency are too great to be tolerated. Leadership, fiscal and military support, and general pattern may come largely from Anglo-American sources, although obviously an Anglo-American way of life need not, ought not, and cannot be imposed upon a heterogeneous world.

The form of the future world-order is now invisible, but it is unnecessary even to suggest alternatives to draw out some forecasts of its impact upon the public service. Whatever the nature of its policy agencies and of its judicial authority, any world-organization will need an administrative body whose essential features might well be substantially the same under any one of several responsible types of political world-organization. For administration is less variable in its effective organization and more universally recognized in its central tenets than is the function of policy determination.

On the assumption, then, that some form of international policy authority competent to give direction in the minimum essentials of world-order (and not more) will be established, what administrative organs are needed and how could they be usefully organized? Especially, how would their existence and work affect the national public services of the United States?

Presumably, old established areas of international administration will be quickly restored and amalgamated with a new world-system: the Postal Union, the International Labour Office, and others. But more is needed to make an enduring world-order. The armed force necessary to sustain a world-system will doubtless rest largely on Anglo-American naval and air power and Russian land power, but other elements are needed both as symbols and as essential components. A center of civil control and responsibility and a world-wide network of military inspection (for precautionary, if for no other, purposes) are primary necessities.

In the field of civil administration broad possibilities of international co-ordination open out. An international health service to improve health conditions in relatively backward areas and to safeguard the lines of travel is basic in a world in which the airplane will soon bring every section of the globe within twenty-four hours of every other. Closely allied is the field of nutrition, in which modern medicine and chemistry open up the prospect of enormous improvement in human health and capacity for production—both fundamental under the vast impending demands for repair of damage, physical, physiological, and psychological, incurred since 1939.

An international public works administration is also a probable part of the public service of the future, both as an agent of economic balance and as a means of developing colonial "empires," which will presumably themselves largely pass under international control. Associated with this organization will be the international bodies which will constitute at least an inspectorate, enforcing international management of interstate waterways—the Danube par excellence but, with growing appreciation of a

minimum degree of world-solidarity, the St. Lawrence, the Yangtze, the Amazon, and the Mississippi.

In some measure the radio will also be subjected to international supervision. The agency responsible for supervising this delicate element of world-order will have at least the authority to establish an international "listening post," to allocate wave lengths, to prohibit inflammatory declarations, and to exercise some type of sanction to insure that broadcasting is put to the service of world-peace, not world-anarchy. The cable and postal services will not need so large a measure of international management.

In the interests of world-peace it is also clear, from long and unfortunate experience, that unregulated private investment of capital in great programs of construction in undeveloped areas for private profit can no longer be tolerated. In one way or another the interests of the borrowing country must be safeguarded against the shortsighted rapacity of lenders and exploiters. The investment of capital in such areas should, of course, be encouraged, but it will require either strict public supervision or, alternatively, must be arranged through the instrumentality of a public agency—an example of which is already found in the foreign loans of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. It may even become desirable to organize an international R.F.C. In any case a new and deeply significant task will have to be worked out by some international public service.

The experience of every federal government confirms the necessity for a source of revenue for any superstate authority. A new world-structure dare not depend upon the voluntary contributions of "sovereign" states. It will need its own sources of revenue, independently assessed although perhaps collectable by the national revenue authorities subject to supernational inspection; alternatively, some forms of revenue levied upon commerce between nations might be devised, which could best be collected by an independent customs service. In any event an international fiscal agency is essential, and the experience of the Chinese Customs Service indicates that it is feasible.

These are within the range of the most spectacular probable developments of the public service of the future. They indicate an international public service comprising a civil control of armed power, national and international; an international health and nutrition service; an international colonial administration; a public works administration, including the inspectorate of interstate waterways; a public international investment corporation; an inspectorate of broadcasting; and an inspectorate either to collect, or to account for the collection of, revenue. Not all these services may appear at once, and others may develop in rapid succession, but some must be established if a world-order is to endure—for effective administration is as essential to it as wise direction and firm control.

To such an administrative structure the personnel of the public service of the United States will contribute much; with it some branches of our national administrative system may need coordination; and to it some may be called upon to recognize responsibility.

The selection of personnel for an international administration must be a responsibility of its governing bodies; it would be fatal to renew the tendency toward diplomatic representation which developed within the staff of the League of Nations. The creation of a genuine sense of supernational responsibility and loyalty among nationals selected to administer world-affairs will be close to the heart of administrative success. To find the necessary skill will be relatively easy; to bind it so firmly to a supernational organization that national interests may be considered objectively will be extremely difficult.

The task is not impossible. It can be facilitated by devices in which the United States has pioneered, for we have long been accustomed to the subordination of state loyalties to national. No resident of Virginia, Massachusetts, California, or Texas is less energetic in the performance of his official duties as a national official on account of his geographical origin. More specifically, the various techniques of in-service training are available for adaptation to an international corps of administrative cadets.

The principal American handicap will be a lamentable lack of linguistic ability.

From the American public service, then, will probably be selected responsible members of world-governing bodies, top administrators, business managers, professional, scientific, and technical personnel of many kinds. To the young men and women of this and other countries a new type of government-career service will open up, whose appeal will be very great to those sensitive to the deep issues of human progress. Their motto will not be "We serve the state," but "We serve humanity."

III

With somewhat greater certainty in detail we can foresee that within the United States the public service of the future will fall progressively under the influence of the federal government. For many years the balance of power has shifted away from the localities to the states and thence to the nation; the character of our discernible tasks makes imperative the further development of central responsibility for policy and for standards of administration but firmly coupled with local execution. The means to this end have already been largely devised and are now in process of adjustment and perfection, the conditional grant-in-aid being the central pivot of present and future federal-state administrative relationships.

For the purpose of this analysis the amendments to the Social Security Act of 1939 authorizing the Social Security Board to fix standards for the selection, tenure, and compensation of state and local employees paid in part from federal funds are vital. For the first time in our history the federal government intervened decisively in personnel responsibilities hitherto jealously safeguarded by the states. The precedent is likely to be followed in future grants of federal funds to states and to be extended gradually to existing grants. The net effect will be to set national minimum personnel and operating standards in an increasing sector of state and municipal services.

The sanction for the maintenance of these standards is the

threat to withdraw the grant. The vitality of the sanction rests upon the determination of Congress and the president to sustain federal authority. The adherence of Congress, which represents the states and their subdivisions, to federal supremacy in this respect is far from assured; in 1939, Congress voted to restore to the state of Ohio over a million dollars which had been withheld by the Social Security Board for gross maladministration. President Roosevelt vetoed this easygoing congressional tolerance and thus sustained federal authority at a crucial moment. The issue may arise again, and again the decision may have to be made by the chief executive. The precedent set by Franklin D. Roosevelt is of major significance.

If the precedent prevails—and we expect it to prevail—the American public service, viewed as a whole, will comprise these grand divisions: (1) the federal service, numbering about 1,500,000 on July 1, 1941, and not likely to shrink to less than 1,000,000 after the present crisis; (2) the joint federal-state-local institutions and services, now including such elements as the land-grant colleges and agricultural extension services, highway construction of all major routes, the employment offices, the social security services, soil conservation, agricultural production, the National Guard, and a considerable part of the public health work—all jointly financed and all deeply influenced by national leadership; (3) co-operative services in which there is no conditional fiscal contribution by the federal government but a tendency in many parts of the country to defer to the technical superiority of federal personnel; (4) the services conducted exclusively by the states; (5) services falling wholly within the range of counties, cities, or other subdivisions, but with varying degrees of state supervision.

Relatively, the purely state activities have been diminishing for a quarter-century. They will diminish further, but they and the local functions will remain an invaluable segment of local responsibility and a priceless opportunity for the development of capacity for self-government.

With respect to the services jointly conducted, it is clear that minimum national standards will be a principal objective and

that the preferences of states and localities will have to yield to this minimum common requirement. Beyond this point it is the major strategy of these constantly expanding joint enterprises to foster a sense of state responsibility, co-operation, and pride of accomplishment. The strength of American self-government is in the union of the parts, not their rivalry or subjection one to the other, and in the initiative which springs spontaneously from the far corners of a continent. The achievement of national standards of security, health, opportunity, and protection cannot, however, be frustrated by incompetence or partisanship in the local partners to the common enterprise. The national authorities have been directed by Congress to avoid this hindrance to national progress, and they are rightly taking steps to lay solid foundations for administrative success.

In short, the redistribution of administrative functions and responsibility in the next decades will probably result in some additions to the purely federal tasks, in very substantial additions to the jointly financed and administered activities, and in a corresponding loss among the functions handled exclusively by the states or by their subdivisions. Conversely, the national activities will be administered in increasing measure by the great regional offices; and it is not improbable that a number of regional capitals will emerge with much administrative, if no political, authority.

IV

Apart from these broad developments it is clear that the American public service will continue to be affected by other tendencies which have been at work for many years—tendencies that are largely indigenous and only indirectly related to or affected by the international scene or the shifting balance between the center and the extremities of our federal system. Science, the professions, technology, and management press steadily toward the technical improvement of public administration; localism, humanitarianism, and “politics” tend to delay the emergence of forms of organization which seem technically superior but which run counter to deep-seated American preferences. The effect of

world-competition, military and commercial alike, will be to favor the technicians in the decades to come.

In this section are recounted some of the probable impacts of present forces on the public service of the next ten or twenty years—the further extension of the merit system, the gradual demarcation of broad categories of responsibility, and the proportionate increase in numbers and influence of the scientists, professional men, and managers; the confirmation and progressive acceptance of a career service; and the steady increase in the importance of civil service unions, leading to a re-examination of their place in the administrative system.

1. *Extension and evolution of the merit system.*—The formal acceptance of the doctrines of the merit system will progress against the persistent, if misguided, hostility of most active politicians and with not infrequent local retrogressions. This drive is in full stream, energized by the National League of Women Voters, the Junior Chamber of Commerce, and other groups which have joined their strength to the National Civil Service Reform League and to organized public service employees. New impetus will be given by the exigencies of defense, war, and reconstruction. The goal was set in 1937 in the words of the President's Committee on Administrative Management—to extend the merit system “upward, outward and downward” to cover all but policy-determining positions. By 1941 this goal had been substantially achieved in the national government. By 1950 we may expect that all sections of state and local governments receiving federal funds will also be firmly settled under the aegis of a merit system, required as a condition of federal aid. At least thirty-five states should have adopted state-wide merit systems by 1950, perhaps more; for the states cannot much longer refuse to see the fatal implications to their statehood of incompetence, partisanship, and inertia. Most middle-sized and large cities now have a merit system; by 1950 the exceptions will be rare, and standards of administration will have improved.

By 1960 some backward areas will still cling obstinately to “partisan and personal administration”; they will be enclaves—

objects of curiosity and contempt; and when they have gone, in Merriam's phrase, "they will not be missed. No monuments will be erected to them."

The consequences of this achievement will be great. They will involve the proper recognition of skill and competence; they will create an instrument for the execution of policy ever more adequate to its tasks; they will obviate the dangers of a weak administration, which "can neither advance nor retreat successfully [but] can merely muddle"; they will require new foundations for the political party and a type of political leadership still too uncommon; they will assure to the executive "the chief means by which an intelligent and sustained initiative" can be maintained—"a relatively permanent and experienced corps of administrators associated with the executive."

Along with the extension of the merit system there will be an increasing proportion of scientific, professional, and technical personnel in the public service. Their proportion in the whole mass of public employees was very small in 1900 but has been steadily mounting. We may predict with confidence that it will continue to expand. In the decade 1930-40 the economists were firmly established in the government service; future decades may see rising groups of professional administrators, professional public relations experts, broadcasting technicians, experts in administrative referenda, planning consultants, public opinion poll experts, "personnelists," budgeteers, and others in government service. Some of them may fail to achieve respectability or congressional confidence, but the number, variety, and importance of the professional, scientific, and technical groups are certain to increase disproportionately to the clerical and manipulative corps.

It is to be expected also that new types of organizational lines will be drawn in the large public services of the future, reflecting the major levels of responsibility involved in conducting the public business. These differentials will be of slow growth. The process may be initiated by the recognition of an administrative corps as a functional branch—a corps whose membership will be de-

rived from varied sources but whose responsibilities will be segregated in theory and practice in the interest of effective administration. This evolution may be anticipated with some confidence, although it will not occur at once or rapidly; there may be stubborn opposition. The eventual consequences for the improvement of the managerial corps are great.

The gradual segregation of an administrative corps will set in motion other differentials. The business-administration group (purchasing, printing, contracting for office services, selling, management of real estate, and the like) will be comprehended as performing a special function different from that of overhead management, requiring special skills but different from those of overhead management—or, to use the term coined by Messrs. Brownlow, Gulick, and Merriam, “administrative management.”

The place of the professional group in this gradual clarification of function in the total task of administration is far from clear now, and its future trends are obscure. That each of the professions (excepting perhaps theology) will place its special competence at the service of government in larger measure seems certain. That the tone of the public service will be elevated as the professions impress more and more upon it their professional ideals is clear. But the extent of the contribution of the several groups to overhead management is not clear, and present trends give no conclusive clue to the future.

It is also likely that the function of middle management will be more sharply differentiated in the future public service. The function can be readily identified, midway between the manifold clerical and specialist operations dealing with individual cases, on the one hand, and, on the other, the operations of top management dealing with generalized situations. It is a sector or zone of responsibility well marked in most national public services. Its personnel is often immobilized in other countries but has never been and is unlikely to be in the United States by other than considerations of personal competence and adaptability.

In short, it seems probable that a slow and gradual differentiation of function in the public service may develop, leading to a

clearer recognition of the special tasks of higher administration, of business management, of the professions, of middle management, and possibly of other management zones. This trend will not carry with it any implication of barriers between these respective groups other than those naturally flowing from the nature of the work to be done. Much needless and ill-founded apprehension has been stirred by failure to appreciate that a zone of operations can be specialized and attention given to its improvement without introducing a closed personnel system which smacks of caste or artificiality. In order to keep open the door of opportunity in harmony with cherished American ideals it is not necessary to oppose the effective organization of different governmental tasks.

2. *Development of public service careers.*—Closely related to differentiation of function is the further evolution and general acceptance of a public service career system, eventually on a genuinely national scale and contributory to an international public service. The concept was formulated in 1933 by the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, of which Charles Merriam was an active member: "We recommend . . . that steps shall be taken to make public employment a worthwhile life work, with entrance to the service open and attractive to young men and women of capacity and character, and with opportunity of advancement through service and growth to posts of distinction and honor." Some branches of the service, especially the scientific and professional corps, have already quietly achieved this status and exemplify the rich assets which a responsible career service provides to a democratic government.

Two other branches of the national service are now ripe for action: the higher administrative and the legal. Recommendations of the President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement (1941) for career-service organization at these two vital points drew their inspiration from the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel and the President's Committee on Administrative Management. Top management is especially suited for a career service; its function is essentially the same in headquarters

and field, in federal, state, and metropolitan governments; and, with its outposts in planning, budget, personnel, and procedures, it perhaps might become one of the first truly national career services. It seems likely that great strides will be taken in this direction in the next decade and that the goal might be substantially achieved at the end of two decades. Certain it is that the "forward march of American democracy at this point of our history depends more upon effective management than upon any other single factor"—words written in the Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937, while the world-crisis could still be thought avoidable.

A career service in higher administration will be facilitated by the successful outcome of the experiments now in process under the direction of L. L. Thurstone for the purpose of identifying the mental traits that constitute administrative ability. If it may be assumed that such traits exist, that they can be identified, and that individuals can be tested to discover to what degree they are possessed, the foundation is then laid for the scientific selection of a future administrative corps. To this corps would be admitted at an early age for training and development persons who demonstrably had promise of administrative success; from it would be excluded persons who by claim of seniority or friendship might aspire to middle- and higher-bracket management and directing positions.

With respect to the place of lawyers in the future administrative corps, we cannot speak with confidence. Law and politics have traditionally been close companions, thus bringing lawyers to the very seat of authority. Law and administration are inseparable; the legal adviser must be consulted by the administrator at every important turn. A lawyer's veto of a proposed course of action on grounds of illegality forces fresh consideration by the administrative staff. Both lawyers and administrators find it difficult to put limits to the role of the lawyer in the public service.

The gradual formation of a body of administrators marked by tested native endowment and special training may therefore encounter the contrary tendency (inspired by propinquity, au-

thority, and personal competence) toward the acceptance of the lawyer as a principal source of top administrative personnel. From other professions and from the law many high officials will always be drawn—that is taken for granted. But only the lawyers among the many professions (excluding the special case of public education) seem likely to be able to challenge successfully the gradual establishment of a specialist corps of administrators. Without derogation to the ability, loyalty, and idealism of the legal profession, we may hope that as a group they will not monopolize the top administrative positions in 1950 or 1960.

With respect to both top administrators and high-ranking lawyers the problem of assignment (or disposition) subsequent to a change in administration may become bothersome, unless new ideas are put into circulation. If one party remains steadily in control of national affairs, the problem is minimized; but, if there should occur a rapid alternation of parties or sharp fluctuations in national policy, an intolerable strain may be put on the capacity of administrators and lawyers to adjust. The country ought not to lose the services of these highly trained and experienced experts, but a party bearing contradictory policies to its predecessor is unlikely to accept fully the loyalty and reliability of the principal advisers of its opponents.

The issue has been resolved in England, within the framework of a basically homogenous policy pursued by all parties, by depending upon a long-established tradition of loyal service to the government of the day. It is doubtful whether even in England this tradition could withstand major breaks in policy. In our immediate future, permanence of tenure of these two top-ranking groups should be assured by law and respected by all parties. No party, however, need feel obliged to keep each such official in the identical post which he occupied by appointment under another party. This pool of talent, legal and administrative, is at the disposition of the whole government, not merely a department or other agency; transfer should be easy and flexible, both to conserve the intellectual integrity of individuals and to provide to politically responsible officials advisers with whom they can work effectively.

There may remain instances in which no appropriate use can be made of officials in the highest administrative and legal classifications. To meet this situation we may suggest the usefulness of a legal and administrative group acting in the role of "His Majesty's Opposition," for the time being in a nonactive status known analogously to the French as *en disponibilité*. That they could be useful in an advisory and critical capacity there can be no doubt. They would thus remain in close contact with public affairs and in due course of time would resume an active status—not necessarily only subsequent to a further change of party. The purpose is to conserve an administrative resource in which a substantial investment has been made and to strengthen the career service by emphasizing its continuity of achievement.

3. *Civil service unions*.—Correlative with the augmented importance of the scientific, professional, and administrative corps there will be during the next decade or two a steady increase in the importance of civil service unions. Variouslly looked upon as threats to the sovereignty of the state or as pillars of a new type of social organization, they are not likely in the next twenty years to depart far from their immediate task of conserving the economic status of their members. In this area they will play a considerable, if relatively restricted, role. At times they will speak belligerently, and in some instances they may act belligerently, but in general their influence will be exerted along conservative lines. Most of what they want can be had only from appropriating bodies; these popular assemblies cannot safely be antagonized; and consequently the more extreme types of union pressure on management are unlikely to develop.

Civil service unions are now harassed and weakened by the divisions in the American labor movement and by schisms indigenous to their own ranks. One of their principal problems in the next decade—perhaps much longer—will be to harmonize their internal differences and present a common program backed by the full weight of their members and their affiliations. The history of civil service unions in other countries confirms over a half-century of experience in the United States—that such unity of purpose and organization is a teasing will-o'-the-wisp.

The extension of public ownership and management over utilities already unionized is certain to present perplexing problems, of which the New York subway system is only an early example. We shall probably first attempt to develop the distinction between a governmental and a business enterprise, following the example of France in the decade 1890–1900. The collapse of this solution in France does not presage success among a people less dialectically gifted than the French. Whither the course of events thereafter, no man can now predict.

More imaginative prophets may profess to visualize the day when organized workers in government will seek and receive a formal share in management. I cannot share this expectancy, at least within the next two decades. In settling employment matters, workers will doubtless be consulted in increasing measure, and forms of consultation will become more firmly established. Organized workers may secure representation on the official agencies which administer their conditions of employment and may thus acquire advantageous observation posts from which better to protect their interests; they may be called upon as an interest group to elect their representatives to agencies dealing with their employment problems; but they are unlikely to acquire a controlling voice in the official bodies where they sit.

Less likely is it that organized civil service employees as such will seek for power in the settlement of the great substantive issues of public policy. Peace, war, or neutrality; aid to farmers, business, or exporters; regionalism, nationalism, or state rights; the stabilization of the economic cycle—these are problems which organized public employees are likely to eschew. The risks of embarking upon their public discussion are great: diversion of effort, internal conflict, outside criticism, and waste of resources. The possible gains are correspondingly slender. Such hazardous ventures are usually the outcome of irresistible urges or great ambitions on the part of a few “leaders” and consequently may not be avoided in full. But that organized civil service employees as a group and over the years will seek to determine substantive public policy unconnected with conditions of employment is not to be

anticipated. A consultative voice in management problems, a deep concern with employment conditions, yes; but not more.

V

These considerations imply that the public service will be a more effective instrument for the execution of public policy than that to which we have been accustomed. It is also probable that in its hands will be placed more rather than less authority and power. This consequence follows from the expectation of increased governmental activity in old and new areas, from the progressive willingness of legislative bodies to delegate responsibility for finding and achieving "the public interest," "public convenience and necessity," and "reasonable" limitations upon individual freedom, and from the superior authority of competence which scientific and professional knowledge aligned with administrative skill will progressively vest in administrative bodies. The formal seat of power will remain in representative bodies; but the determination of the necessary or practical modes in which power is brought to bear, the more precise definition of the circumstances under which power shall make itself effective, and the more exact understanding of the purposes which power is intended to achieve are all likely to continue to shift from directly elected representative bodies to authorities chiefly characterized by expertness and official responsibility rather than by representative qualities. The administration, in short, will wield more power over the citizen; but it will remain a responsible and controllable power. Whether organs to enforce responsibility will develop with speed equal to the increase of power is an open question.

Specifically, we may expect more administrative power in the adjustment and adjudication of group conflicts. Individual disputes will probably remain the principal field of judicial adjudication. Mass conflicts of interest are not suited to settlement by judicial process; in the large they are the essence of political compromise—a view brilliantly exposed by the philosopher-politician, Congressman T. V. Smith. But the compromises of the polit-

icos are themselves often couched in the language of compromise—ambiguous, vague, general, needing greater precision for life and usefulness. Conflict of interest continues in a smaller area, perhaps, but still to the disturbance of the public peace and welfare. Adjudicating authorities in part supply the want for further resolution of tension. In their decisions they both conclude the particular dispute and formulate a rule for future guidance. They proceed like judges, but they function like rule-makers within the limits, often generous, allowed by the rule-makers themselves. This exercise of power is not new to administration; it is habitual; its scope steadily expands and may be expected to continue to grow.

The forms of action may be much more carefully fixed by legislation under spur of judicial necessity. Much more care may be taken to insure that the discretion be enlightened, that parties feel content with their opportunity to make their case, and that parties with a secondary interest be heard. Let this lead no one to assume that the essential element of discretionary judgment is likely to be curtailed thereby. There will remain in the end an administrative judgment to be made "in the public interest," the content and direction of which will hardly be controlled by other means than subsequent legislation. Power rests in the hands of those who make such judgments—power in the most formative areas of the future pattern of American life. We may expect it to increase rather than to diminish.

It is also probable, although not inevitable, that the weight of government will continue to be used deliberately to improve the competitive position of various classes or segments of the population. The Wagner Act illustrates a recent attempt to balance more evenly the power of labor and capital in fixing terms of employment; the various agricultural acts since 1933 reflect a desire to bring farm incomes up to parity with industrial incomes; the fair-wage act seeks among other ends to raise the relative income level of the South. Administrative discretion is at the heart of the effective achievement of these objectives—the wisdom of which is beyond the scope of this essay. Discretion in the accom-

plishment of such mass adjustments spells power. The course of this power must flow in the channel marked out by legislative direction, but, despite the guardianship of the Supreme Court, the banks are often far apart, not easily discernible in the early morning mist.

Power will also settle in administrative hands to require disclosure of personal fiscal operations affecting the revenue. Great power is already exercised; it will increase as the urgent need for revenue expands, both by reaching hundreds of thousands in lower-income brackets and by sharpening the inquisition against all and sundry.

Power may flow also in the wake of planning. At this point one cannot forecast—economic pressures, even in an individualist economy, may force measures of official direction and control not now envisaged; or conversely future circumstances may permit our present economy to continue substantially unimpaired. Here lurks the possibility of administrative power on a vast scale.

For the purposes in hand it is unnecessary to go beyond these suggestions and the broad assertion that administrative authority and power are likely to increase in the vital areas of mass adjustment, where an enlightened and, in some measure, protected official discretion makes explicit the relatively vague and uncertain compromises bequeathed by legislators to their agents. If this assumption is correct, the attitude of the agent toward conflicting groups and his concept of the public service are of primary significance. Can we expect, in these controversial sectors of American life, a truly enlightened and an adequately protected official judgment? The analysis of these issues would carry us too far afield. The formation of an enlightened judgment presupposes both an official understanding of immediate objectives and an appreciation of the grand strategy of democratic government—the latter eloquently set forth in early pages of Charles E. Merriam's *The New Democracy and the New Despotism*. A genuinely protected judgment implies one not unexposed to conflict and controversy but rather one which can consider and conclude free from the heat of passion and personal importunity; not a judg-

ment independent and inconsiderate of the prevailing general policy of the government of the day but certainly free from its interference in the particular case. This is a delicate balance, a moving equilibrium rather than a fixed point. It inevitably preserves a wide range of discretionary judgment—which spells power.

VI

If power will thus continue to settle in progressive measure in the hands of officials, the friends of democratic, responsible government may take thought for its public control. It is an arresting fact that the great improvements in government since 1910 have been designed to make the public service more effective in the management and direction of public affairs, not to keep it responsible or make it more amenable to control. The drive for the better achievement of a more genuine democracy, expressing itself in reforms to purify elections, to curb the party machine, to restore its management to party members, to control policy and leadership by direct action of the electorate, had achieved its notable victories by the outbreak of World War I. Since then two branches of government—the legislative and the judicial—have remained relatively static and unchanged in form, in procedure, and in spirit. The third branch—the executive and its administrative agents—has changed deeply in form, in procedure, and in spirit. It is destined to change rapidly in the two decades which we now face. Will its two co-ordinate branches change in response to new needs?

In this form the question is outside the scope of this essay. But the corollary issue—whether legislative and judicial controls of administration will remain adequate to hold an increasingly powerful administration strictly within the framework of a democratic society—may be considered.

“The safeguarding of the citizen from narrow-minded and dictatorial bureaucratic interference and control is one of the primary obligations of democratic government,” wrote Merriam and his colleagues on the President’s Committee on Administra-

tive Management in 1937. A few years earlier in his *Political Power* he sounded the same note:

But in many other cases the bureaucrat seems unnecessarily inflexible and even stupid in his immobility, or worse, he is indifferent, and fails to conceal his inner attitude; or is inept in explanation. . . . Thus the majesty of power may be lost in pomposity; its solidity in petty inflexibility; its broad view of social relations in blindness to personal realities; its human side in the impersonalism of officialdom.

Responsibility of officialdom to legislature and to courts, sometimes to the electorate, is a matter of law; it is one of the essential elements of a democratic system long well established in this country; and it is not likely to change in its forms and procedures in the next decades. *Responsiveness* of officialdom to enacted policies, to broad public purposes, to sentiments and preferences, and to individual needs is not a matter of law but of the spirit. Both are important to the proper administration of laws in a democracy. Neither is achieved with full satisfaction by the formal relationship of dependency of administration on popular assemblies; the full responsiveness of officialdom to citizenry requires other and supplementary institutions of a more intimate nature.

The trends of the next two decades seem likely to produce these supplementary institutions. Indeed, during the last few years movement in this direction has been marked. The invention of producer referendums—vesting producers with a veto on administration action and, conversely, endowing eventual action with the positive consent of those immediately affected—is a notable example. This form of consultation, insuring the responsiveness of official action to the preferences of an important public, is likely to find new applications in various fields. The huge development of the Office of Government Reports (following the recommendations of the Committee on Administrative Management) in order to inform departments and agencies of public attitudes represents another facet of the growing sense of official dependency on public support. The “listening posts” maintained by the Department of Agriculture in the field to collect and submit the opinions of rank-and-file citizens illustrate the same significant movement.

The development of complaint bureaus in cities marks the concern of local officialdom for "consumer" satisfaction.

On a more formal scale the successful attempt to utilize commodity exchanges and later security exchanges as partners in the regulation of members' practices in the sale of commodities and securities suggests a type of co-operation admirably designed to secure responsiveness of administration to the requirements of an exceedingly complex situation, as well as the responsibility of a "private" group for effective self-regulation—under official scrutiny. This pattern of action is ripe for more extensive use. The older forms of representative advisory committees may well play a wider role in the formulation of official policy and its execution—helping, in Lord Baldwin's phrase, to "fit the shoe where it pinches."

Beyond this, important trends are likely to develop so to decentralize "the actual administrative operation that the Government servant remains himself one of the people in touch with the people and does not degenerate into an isolated and arrogant bureaucrat." The growing importance of the field offices of the national government and its reliance in increasing measure upon co-operative work with state and local officials confirm this view.

Something more must also be derived from the attitudes of the public service itself. It is not without significance that officials, sensitive to their obligations to the preferences and sentiments of the people, have raised to new proportions the techniques of public relations. By many devices they seek to identify their responsibilities under the law with public preferences and to convince the public that they understand, sympathize with, and can help achieve these preferences. This objective was doubtless in Merriam's mind when he referred to "the degree of adaptability within the administration itself, the extent to which it is able to comprehend, sympathize with, and incorporate the popular attitudes. . . ."

The techniques of public relations are, however, outward-going. A delicate responsiveness of an organized public service requires, over and above its political leadership, an inward-look-

ing appreciation of "what it is for and for whom it exists." This form of responsiveness is too fragile for formal procedures; it may be embodied in part in codes of ethics or ethical norms; but it lies deep in the spirit of the public service as a social organism. It is immanent in the modes of administration as well as in the decisions, and, although subtle, it can be quickly sensed by those who deal with officials. It is reflected in courtesy, in attentiveness, in co-operation, in an active search for means to adjust law and rule to the individual situation, in equity, in the judicial mind, but also in the impartial and certain administration of the law and rule. It grows and is strengthened by example; hence the invaluable contribution of the wise and tempered deans and guardians of the public service ethos, who are gathering in increasing numbers as the fruits of the merit system and of a career service ripen.

A formal system of responsibility is, nevertheless, essential; it is unsafe to rely wholly on official codes and a sense of inner responsibility; but, on the other hand, a formal system in itself is inadequate. It is too rough a tool for other than rough situations. It could be made a much more polished instrument, but the task of refinement and perfection leads into a reconsideration of the origin, structure, ambitions, and habits of legislative and judicial bodies. This study is increasingly urgent, but it cannot be undertaken here. Suffice it to say that, on the evidence of contemporary trends, it seems unlikely that much progress in the improvement of the forms of legislative or judicial control of administrative action is probable in the next decade or two.

If this conclusion is valid and if administration continues to draw power unto itself and greater capacity into itself, then by 1960 the problem of adjusting the superior authority of the representative assembly to the subordinate but realistic authority of the public service may have become an issue of major significance. If, however, the members of the public service work with a constant appreciation of their relative place in the governmental constellation, the problem will remain, as it is now, of less than primary concern.

VII

Charles Merriam once remarked that there were no utopias of the public service in the literature of public administration. An imaginative construction of the ideal public service would be an interesting contribution—indeed, two or three would be better than one. Nor are there in the English literature on the subject adequate analyses of the public service as a social entity, using the approach of the sociologist or the social psychologist. The form and function of administration and its “public service” in primitive tribes have yet to be adequately described by the anthropologists, some of whom have noted the surprising differentiation of function in primitive societies.

This essay, like others in this volume, is not an essay in the ideal but rather a rational projection of the probable. It is necessarily personal and subjective but is intended to rest on an appreciation of contemporary trends and probable tendencies. Error is bound to enter, both by reason of an imperfect perception of the contemporary world, and by reason of an inadequate grasp of the new forces which will be effective in the years now beyond the horizon. The certainty of change lends interest to speculation.

The most spectacular event affecting the future public service will be the formation of an international administrative system as a part of the eventual world-settlement. Whichever coalition wins, such an organism seems inevitable. The victory of the anti-Axis concert will impose upon this country a large share of the responsibility for the immediate physical, dietary, and administrative rehabilitation of the world and for the continuing work of world-development which awaits the achievement of a solid peace.

The tasks of winning the war and organizing the peace are national and international tasks; their effect will be to underline national policy and national leadership in domestic administration. The characteristic pattern of the future internal system of this country is one, therefore, in which there will be progressive co-ordination of federal, state, and local operations, with national guidance and direction.

The expanding range of governmental functions will be reflected in an expanding public service, in which the groups de-

voted to top management, the professions, and the sciences will become progressively more important. The tasks of the future are on so grand a scale, indeed, that management becomes almost the crux of success or failure. But within the horizons of the next two decades we may expect neither "the managerial revolution" nor the advance of the organized rank and file into the seat of management and control. The influence of civil service unions on conditions of employment, however, will increase, accompanied by many crisis situations and the progressive reformulation of ideas about the role of organized government employees.

Power relations in the future American state do not seem to me to be on the edge of violent or even fundamental redistribution. The balance between representative bodies, courts, and agencies of administration are not likely to be basically disturbed; administration will remain a responsible and, on the whole, a responsive agent of the people, its tasks being redefined by elected representatives from time to time.

It must be agreed, however, that the development of intelligent and delicate controls by representative assemblies has been wanting; and one may scan the horizon in 1942 without convincing promise of their early appearance. The genuine responsiveness of the public service to the policy, sentiments, and preferences of the American people may prove sufficient for a considerable time to obviate the need for more effective forms of official control.

Democratic administrative systems, in any event, face the challenge and opportunity of a major historical turn in the road of human evolution. In 1931 Charles Merriam wrote: "... It would be highly negligent to gloss over the stark and bitter realities of the social situation, and to ignore the imminent perils in further advance of our heavy technical machinery over crumbling roads and shaking bridges." The relatively easygoing, unprofessional, disjunctive, and wasteful scheme of public administration, which we could tolerate in days now irrevocably past, can suffice no longer. The potentially great resources of America need to be geared up to the maintenance of better conditions of life for all the American people and to the achievement through service of a better world.

XI

SOVEREIGNTY

HYMEN E. COHEN



A DOCTRINE of sovereignty is a theory of politics. It is a weapon in the arsenal of power politics. It may be a term in jurisprudence or a concept in political philosophy. It may be a description of status in international relations or a statement of the role of power holders within a state. It may be an attempt to rationalize the functions and acts of a state, to justify its structure and procedures, or it may be an attempt to decry the functions and acts of other groups in the family of power. Criticisms of sovereignty, too, may be open or veiled attacks upon the state power and its prerogatives, or they may be formulations by means of which other (nonstate) groups seek to establish their bids for power or privilege.

The history of political theories contains many formulations of doctrines of sovereignty and many formulations of attacks upon these doctrines. In a work completed at the turn of the century, *History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau* (1900), Professor Charles E. Merriam traced the history of the doctrine through its classical basis and medieval development, through Jean Bodin, Althusius, Grotius, Hobbes, Puffendorf, Locke, and Rousseau. He investigated in detail the history of the concept at the hands of those who, in their reaction against the principles of the French Revolution, rejected the formulation of Rousseau. The Kantian doctrine, the reactionary theory of divine right, the concept of sovereignty as a property right, the sovereignty of reason, popular and state sovereignty—all these doctrines of the nineteenth century were described by his able pen, revealing the manifold mean-

ings of the concept among the many political philosophers and writers who waged ideational war with, for, and against it.

By the turn of the century, Dr. Merriam, in the role of historian, could point out that for some thinkers sovereignty designated the position of privilege held by the monarch of a state; that for others it had reference to the independence or self-sufficiency of a political society as against all other states. Moreover, in referring to the relation of the state to the individuals or associations on its territory, sovereignty had three distinct meanings. In England, for example, referring to Parliament, it meant the supreme constitutional power in a given government. In the United States, referring to the constitutional conventions, it meant the power of government behind any given government. And, in addition to these two meanings, it had reference to the power in a state whose will is obeyed ultimately because of its pressure upon public opinion or because of its capacity with force and revolution.

The process of defining and redefining sovereignty continued during the twentieth century. At the end of the third decade under the guidance of Dr. Merriam, the present writer turned to the scrutiny of the various meanings of sovereignty, new and old, in the present century. To the manifold theories of the past have been added the creations of the dominant schools of the present. There is no need in this essay to make an extensive résumé of the doctrine of national sovereignty as elaborated by the French jurists, led by Aèhar Esmein, or of competence-competence, as expressed, for instance by Georg Jellinek, or of monistic international law, as developed in the pure jurisprudence of Hans Kelsen and his disciples, or of dualist international law, the classic Continental exponent of which was Heinrich Triepel. Nor is there need to do more than mention the recent opposition to the doctrine by the advocates of political pluralism or by the proponents of sociological jurisprudence. Suffice it to say that in the course of time history has written into the term more meanings rather than less.

Some have sought to discard the term in the interest of estab-

lishing one clear, precise terminology in the science of politics. To them the various meanings of sovereignty made for confusion as to its meaning and doubt as to its value. But once the individual jurist had defined sovereignty to his own liking, he almost invariably found the word a useful tool, carrying within itself overtones of a long tradition from which he saw no reason for parting. Perusal of Dr. Merriam's *History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau* and of the writer's *Recent Theories of Sovereignty* confirms the belief that sovereignty has been and still is rooted in social fact or juristic theory.

I

The purpose of our investigation in this essay is not to look backward at the past history of sovereignty but to look forward to its future. It is, indeed, recognized that any prognostication in the present state of uncertainty is fraught with danger. All the world is at war. The basic sociological facts upon which the political philosopher might build his thinking and support his analyses seem shaken. States have disappeared. States have been transformed. Philosophic structures which might have been taken for granted as dominant in the nineteenth century are to-day involved in an ideological struggle which is concomitant to the political one. Statements concerning sovereignty, then, will need to be set in contexts of qualifications and of assumptions made clearly explicit. Their validity will depend upon the correctness of the assumptions.

With these considerations in mind we may proceed to ask the general question: How will the doctrine of sovereignty fare in the decades immediately before us? We may ask even more generally: What will happen to sovereignty—the reality itself—in the decades immediately before us? Both these queries, one juristic and the other political, are legitimately within the range of our speculation. The preceding survey of the history of sovereignty has indicated that certainly from the juristic point of view one cannot lose sight of the plurality of meanings which inhere in the term or of the multiplicity of doctrines to which the word may

have reference. In attempting to answer the questions posed, we must consider doctrines individually and limit our conjectures to specific instances.

Suppose we turn to the doctrine current in England. We find there that sovereignty is divided into "political" and "legal" sovereignty. Political sovereignty is attributed to the people, to the electorate as represented by its majority. Legal sovereignty resides in the Crown, in Parliament. No other authority in the government can bind or restrain or limit the sovereign Parliament. This is the doctrine current before 1900. In spite of changes in certain fundamental British statutes, in spite of changes in the electorate and in the relationships with the dominions and colonies, the doctrine has not changed. In the law courts of Great Britain the legal doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is still upheld, and all indications are that it will be so upheld under the present institutional structure.

In the United States of America the doctrine of sovereignty recognized by our Supreme Court dates back to the decision rendered in *Chisholm v. Georgia* (1793) that "the United States are sovereign as to all powers of government actually surrendered by the states, while each state in the union is sovereign as to all powers reserved." The federal government and the states are recognized as "separate and distinct sovereignties, each acting separately and independently of the other within their respective sphere"; but where there is concurrent jurisdiction and conflict arises, the federal government takes precedence. Legally, this situation still obtains. The rights reserved to the states and the rights delegated to the federal government are recognized as distinct by the courts. This doctrine does not mean that there is no co-operation or influence between the two levels of government; it simply means that the forms of co-operation and influence are not by direct command but rather are based on mutual and voluntary agreement. There has been, as is natural, quite an evolution of our constitutional law, but a survey of recent developments shows no change in doctrinal position by the Supreme Court on the question.

Concerning our general philosophy, we believe that sovereignty inheres in the people, that government rules by consent of the governed as indicated by the expressions of opinion and will of the electorate at the polls. Political theorists have recognized the distinction between external and internal sovereignty. All in all, they have followed the general theory that sovereignty in a federal state means the power to decide, in addition to all else, the form and extent of the government. There would seem to be little likelihood of radical change in our thinking on this score.

In France the dominant doctrine of sovereignty was that of national sovereignty. The state was the juridical personification of the nation. "Sovereignty resides in the nation; it cannot reside elsewhere." The entire republican constitutionalism of France, its system of representative government, and its electoral system rested upon this premise. Until the loss of the Battle of France and invasion by the Germans, it was the accepted doctrine of the state. It had been challenged, true, by extremists on the Right and the Left, by sociological jurists and syndicalists; but their protestations had little weight in the law courts of France. Unfortunately, the war swept away the conditions which were considered the basic sociological facts supporting this doctrine.

National sovereignty had its roots, in France, in the democratic spirit of the nineteenth century. It drew its life-breath from the constitutionalism, liberalism, individualism, and representative character of the government of republican France. But at this writing the nation is no longer the master of its own fate or director of its own destiny. Its territory is divided; its government—at Vichy, not at Paris—is no longer free and no longer draws its authority and direction from the French people. It is, indeed, responsible *for*, but not *to*, the French people. The Constitutional Laws of 1871 have been repealed. France no longer has a president; it has a chief of state. There is no provision for an electorate to express itself or for a senate and a chamber of deputies to meet regularly at stated intervals. Supreme power over persons and property actually resides not with the French people but with the German government. Internally as well as

externally, France is dependent upon, not its own will, but the will of the conqueror. Theoretically, for those who hold that sovereignty is inalienable in the nation, national sovereignty may still exist in France. Practically, however, national sovereignty at the moment does not exist there, and its reappearance is dependent upon the outcome of the war and the nature of the subsequent peace.

This same situation may be true also for the Poles in what was once Poland. It may be true for the Belgians, the Dutch, the Czechs, the Slovaks, and all the other conquered peoples under the domination of Germany. It may be that the sovereignty of their states disappeared with the conquest of their territories and the disruption of the organs which exercised state power. It would be necessary to know the extent of that disruption and the terms of the agreement at the moment of the cessation of fighting, before making definite statements. It might be necessary to take into consideration the "governments in exile." It seems, therefore, the part of wisdom to await the peace before attempting to determine the present status of the sovereignty of states at the moment under the heel of the conqueror. What later may be read back concerning present status will depend in large measure upon the peace plan.

That conquest does not *ipso facto* terminate a nation's sovereignty may be seen from the legal relations between Italy and Albania. Although conquered and subject to the king of Italy, Albania was still considered an international person by both the Italians and the Albanians. The conventions of the peace (April, 1939) referred to the "sovereignty of the respective states." An Italian announcement of April 18, 1939, declared that the new relationship of Italy and Albania was to be based upon the "fact of the independence and sovereignty of Albania." Indeed, juristically the Albanian state may still be sovereign, as long as it has its proper government, territory, population, and the capacity to represent itself in international relations. Practically, however, it is an appendage of Italy; its government is congruent with the government of Italy (one king for both in a real union), and,

further, it has delegated the conduct of its foreign relations to Italy. Should this juristic status be recognized, certain practical advantages would accrue to Italy. It would control the votes of two sovereign states in the family of nations instead of merely its own; it would not be liable for the international debts or deeds of Albania, although this country was its puppet.

In determining, then, any given individual case of sovereignty in the recent instances of conquest by Germany, Italy, or Russia, it would be necessary to have the legal facts relevant to that case. It would be necessary to ascertain what, if anything, the conqueror has left to the vanquished in the way of legal rights to independence externally in the realm of international relations and what internally in the realm of relations between the government and its subjects. Then we could decide whether a given state retains its national sovereignty.

A different juristic doctrine of sovereignty exists with wider applicability than that of the French doctrine, which, indeed, might well be relevant even where the democratic spirit seems for the moment to be crushed and eliminated, in the very countries of the aggressors. The doctrine of state sovereignty as developed by the German *Kompetenz-Kompetenz* school in the late nineteenth century had its roots in the Germany and Austria of that period. Its scope and compass were much wider than the national-sovereignty theory. Whereas the latter limited itself consciously to the countries of modern liberty, the authors of state sovereignty were forced to elaborate a doctrine which would include all kinds of states—authoritarian as well as libertarian. They did, indeed, reflect somewhat the liberalism of the nineteenth century, but they had to face problems of autocratic monarchical control and problems of federalism as well.

The primary problem in federalism was how to satisfy erstwhile sovereign states which desired to retain their character as states. The doctrine of state sovereignty accomplished this for them by divorcing state from sovereignty. It defined sovereignty, not as identical with state power, but as one of its properties. Sovereignty is the power of determining what constitution the state

will assume. It is the ability to decide upon the nature and extent of state action. Any state possessing this capacity of self-limitation and self-determination is sovereign. Lacking it, a state may still be a state as long as it possesses organs of administering state functions; but it is not sovereign.

With the doctrine of state sovereignty it was possible to distinguish between various types of states. It was also possible, juristically, to maintain a sense of statehood in a political entity which had lost its freedom of action in certain political spheres. Where historical memories still were vivid in the members of a newly formed federal state, this doctrine was pre-eminently suitable. It was perfectly adaptable, also, to a unitary state, regardless of whether its structural form was monarchy or democracy, unitary or federal, equalitarian or aristocratic.

Such a doctrine could well serve again as, indeed, it still serves such states as continue to possess the capacity for self-limitation. For Germany, Russia, the United States, Great Britain, China, Italy the doctrine of competence-competence is an adequate juristic theory. All these are states definitely able, by and large, to determine for themselves the nature of their internal affairs and of their external relationships. As far as we know now, all these countries, within the limitations of their own legal frameworks, can determine at this moment the nature and constitution of their own governments. So long, moreover, as they continue to exist as states possessing this power of determining their own competence, so long is this doctrine valid and applicable to them.

Furthermore, should some type of federalism eventuate from the present war for any or for all of them, the doctrine could be useful in securing some type of basic juristic pattern. It might serve in the future, as it did in the nineteenth-century German Empire, as a formulation whereby erstwhile sovereign states would be able to retain the appellation "state" within a larger political framework. They might need to yield the constituent power, the police power, and such other powers as the functioning of the larger association demanded, but they would retain their "statehood," nonetheless.

At this point it must be recognized that much would depend upon whether all formed one federation or whether a number of federations were established. If the present war eventuated in a number of large, federal states which united large territories in federations or confederations, the doctrine of state sovereignty might perpetuate some of the same problems it presents in certain areas today. *Kompetenz-Kompetenz* is and has been a doctrine which, carried to its extreme, is a doctrine of international anarchy. It is a doctrine which nationalistic municipal lawyers have formulated and which posits law as deriving from the state and from the state only. The obligations of so-called international law are unilaterally accepted by the state, borne by it at its pleasure, and dependent upon its will for their validity and compulsory character. International morality may obtain; international law, as a body of rule with an external validity and a coercive binding character, never.

If the result of the war were one universal federation, then, of course, the international phase of the doctrine of state sovereignty would disappear; all parties to the federation would be "member-states," and all the relationships would be included in the concept of internal sovereignty.

However, if the result of the war were some form of united world-order, a third theory, which is already current in contemporary juristic thinking, might emerge as extremely influential. This is the doctrine of pure jurisprudence, envisaging already a monistic international legal order. In this doctrine the modern state is regarded as simply a legal order of a certain type. It is a number of legal relationships or norms of a certain character enveloping the individual. International law, as it has thus far been created and expressed, is simply a number of additional relationships in a different realm also enveloping the individual person. The individual is thus the subject of a number of legal relationships and norms of various kinds and extent. In their totality, his entire world is one legal system, one world-order. In this jurisprudence, if the terms "state" and "sovereignty" are retained, the first would have reference to the legal order and the

second to the supremacy and totality of that order. In a universal state this monistic international theory might serve as a possible framework within which the law of the future might develop.

Irrespective of which doctrine emerges dominant, it may be said in summarizing our review of sovereignty juristically considered that there is little prospect of the elimination of the concept from the sphere of jurisprudence in the near future.

II

Turning now to the second question we suggested, we may ask the political scientists, how practically will the concept of sovereignty fare? Among some the definition of Bodin is still vivid and valid. Discussions still begin with the definition of the *Six Books of the Republic*: sovereignty is supreme power over persons and property. It is no longer an attribute of the monarch; it is now an attribute of the state or of the people. During the early twentieth century, however, political thinkers attacked its implications and claims from several angles. Antistatists, anarchists, syndicalists, pluralists, internationalists, clericals, laborites, pacifists, attacked both the state and its sovereignty. The political power of the state is not supreme, they declared. It has no right to the powers it claims and exercises. Power belongs to God. Power belongs to the church. Power belongs to unions, to syndicates, to the individual. Actually there is no such entity as the state. The state is a group of public services. What does one mean by "the people" or by "the nation"? There is no popular will; there is no public opinion. There are only individual or group wills and public opinions in the plural.

Another threat to the concept came with the newer approach to political science, which viewed sovereignty not as the study of the state and its institutions and role but as a study of "influence and the influential." In the vanguard of those who made the new approach to the study of political science, not as the handmaiden of any specific group or class interest, but as a pure science, stands Dr. Merriam. His *New Aspects of Politics* indicates the direction taken by the newer study of the political in America. The devel-

opment of democratic institutions has made for the constant broadening of the base of political power. The broadening of the electorate has increased the subjects of sovereignty by scores of millions. The extent of political power likewise has expanded. Instead of simply defense, justice, and order as the ancient monarchs knew them, the functions of the political state encompass today social services of great variety. Along with these developments, political science has moved beyond its older conception of political power as merely the right of command and domination in a relationship of superordination and subordination between individuals and between organs of government. Today, the sovereign is "the people," millions of individuals.

The science of politics in a peaceful democracy thus became the study of the individual in his relationships with his fellows—"who gets what, when, where and how?" It became a study of these millions of individuals in their common behavior: "getting out the vote," for instance. Politics became tied up with psychology and with numbers. The problems were problems of understanding and of training millions for their duties as citizens. In all these newer aspects of politics Charles E. Merriam took a leading part. As this point of view became more fully accepted, the political scientist's concern with supreme power over persons and property diminished. In its stead came a growing interest in public administration and how best to serve the community, in propaganda and public opinion, in the nature and reactions of the individual, psychologically, in order better to understand the processes of leadership. The actions and interactions of the electorate and its representatives and administrative agents became the primary concern of politics. In this new development, sovereignty was relegated to the sphere of the history of political theories or to the desk of the international lawyer who looked beyond the environs of American political democracy.

Only when eyes were lifted from the ever present, immediate political phenomena did supreme political power seem to have significance. In this connection, too, Dr. Merriam made a significant contribution to our mental equilibrium. Personally in

the midst of the newer trend of political science, he paused to investigate new aspects of political power in the twentieth-century state. Dr. Merriam's effort in this direction, his work on *Political Power: Its Composition and Incidence*, is an attempt to define the nature of sovereignty in the new political matrix which the evolution of democracy had made by the fourth decade of the twentieth century. It may be significant that he began this study in Berlin at a time when the struggle for power was shortly to result in the successes of Hitler and National Socialism and that his mind ran back to his study of sovereignty thirty years earlier. His attempt to define and to differentiate state power led to the recognition that political power and social power are in the same class of phenomena. There is a fundamental similarity in all power situations; yet there is a fundamental difference. It is not, however, the difference of "supremeness" or of "competence-competence" or of "independence" that Mr. Merriam sees. It is the "generality of purpose," the "residual quality" which is "characteristic and of vital importance." It is the integrating quality, the "characteristics of equilibrator, stabilizer, general director." It is the "monopoly of legality."

The problem of the real nature of sovereignty in the twentieth century is a psychological-sociological study, because the situs of supreme political power is politically and legally vested, in democracies, in certain classes of the total population which together form the electorate. In its own evolution the electorate has developed into parties and groups. This phase of the sovereign electorate's character and nature has been the subject of sociological study by Mr. Merriam and his disciples, particularly Mr. Harold F. Gosnell, in *The American Party System*. In *Political Power*, Mr. Merriam went beyond the institutional forms to consider philosophically the manipulative aspects generally of social and political control. How is power born? In whom may it inhere? How does it express itself? The analysis was not of legal institutional structures as in the traditional approaches of political science. The analysis was of "the power in a state whose will is obeyed ultimately because of its pressure upon public opinion or

because of its capacity with force and revolution." It was of law among the outlaws, of the power of the masses, and of the opponents of leaders. It concerned itself with revolution and the poverty of power, with the survival of the fittest and the techniques of power, with the symbols and beliefs of the powerful and the power-hungry. It was, in short, an analysis of the nature of sovereignty—early twentieth-century model—at the hands of a peace-preferring democratic liberal, who believed in science and human intelligence as constructive forces, who felt that changes in lines of authority and power were due to appear because of new inventions, the growth of communication and transportation, increased leisure, and greater educational facilities.

The new sovereignty Dr. Merriam envisaged may perhaps best be stated in his own words of almost a decade ago:

The emerging power pattern is one that points a way through powerful nationalisms toward (1) a jural order leaving no disputes between political groups unjusticiable and (2) an outline of an economic order systematizing and stabilizing the elements of production. Both these are aimed at the elimination of obvious types of waste and loss for the human race [*Political Power*, p. 285].

He realized, however, that violence and passion might play their role in remaking the actual political patterns of the newer sovereignty. He wrote:

The mold in which the modern state was cast a few centuries ago is broken, or breaking, but the way is open to the creative intelligence of our day to reorganize and reconstruct new forms of political and social life adapted to modern social forces. It may well be that violence will play a role in this remaking of the new world, but fearful periods of tension and suffering will be spared the human race if intelligence can shape forms and general understandings appropriate to the emerging order of things, and avert the grand catastrophes that from time to time have swept whole civilizations from the face of the earth [*ibid.*, p. 326].

The violence whereof he wrote is already with us. The powerful nationalisms are embraced in a death struggle. Time alone will tell how long before the jural order he foresaw will follow. History alone will record the implications of that new jural order for the democracy of America and the future of our institutions generally. In the immediate future the energies of democratic

peoples will be directed toward protecting their highest values from other sovereign states which threaten them with literal and actual destruction. It is not relevant to this essay to go into the details of our present war efforts, but it is important to note that under war conditions American sovereignty has assumed—or reassumed—a different character and state power, a new importance. Millions of citizens have been made to realize the fundamental nature of the ultimate rights that the state possesses both in them and in their possessions. They have been made to recognize to what an extent their rights have been and are contingent upon the tacit or explicit acquiescence of the sovereign state. The political science of the future will reflect this appreciation.

III

Thus far we have glanced at the problem of sovereignty from the points of view of jurists and political scientists. From the points of view of practical statesmen and citizens it seems clear that once again the time has come in the history of mankind when “supreme power over persons and property” has become clearly visible to every person viewing political events. Sovereignty is no longer latent and potential; it is actual and real. In its name, states are taking millions of sons from their parents and sending them forth to strife and death. In its name, states are moving hundreds of thousands of families from their roots in the soil and transplanting them in new areas. In its name, they are levying tremendously on the wealth of their citizens and territories and expending that wealth in directions of their own choosing. The power of life and death, of direction of thought and deed, of taxation, regulation, and confiscation—these are supreme powers whose exercise has become apparent to all. Individual, family, church, club, union, association—all bow before the state will; all recognize the dependent, voluntary nature of their own fellowship and the decisive, ultimate character of state power. Indeed, it has become obvious that the potency of state sovereignty has not been lessened by silence or weakened by lack of exercise.

The wishful thinking of theoreticians and pacifists who sought

to construct their doctrines on the basis of peaceful conditions alone has been rudely shattered by states which, under the impulse of war, played fast and loose with their promises and treaties and international agreements. The independence of states revealed itself when Japan moved against China, and there was none to stop her. Italy moved against Ethiopia and later against Albania, and there was none to gainsay her. Russia moved against Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Poland, and moral force did not translate itself into an obstacle in her path. Hitler had peacefully absorbed Memel and the Sudetenland, Austria and Czechoslovakia before any nation stood up to say "Halt."

Absolute sovereignty stood revealed in these acts of aggression. Against them, all that appeared were imperfect manifestations of international morality. What was condemned in one aggressor was passed over in silence in another because of the demands of expediency. For the calculus of war cannot always afford to take into account the credenda of peace; and sovereignty, in time of war, is apt to underscore the divorce between individual ethics and *raison d'état*.

Once, twice, and three times in the last few years, states have acted upon the right they claimed to declare war, to repudiate their treaties, and to rid themselves of the limitations upon their sovereignty which they themselves have imposed. In the words of a famous German historian, von Treitschke:

As to the limitations imposed by customary international law, they too are merely self-limitations since the voluntary assent of the state is necessary to their binding validity, and that assent once given, can be withdrawn. The subjects of international law being sovereign states, subject to no legal superior, they are the judges in the last analysis of their own rights and of their obligations to other states.

These instances of aggression are proof of the persistence of the doctrine of sovereignty in its rawest form. They testify to the vitality of the concept and to its dangers for humanity. On the other hand, they indicate its usefulness to a nation desirous of sloughing off its obligations and ambitious to try a new gamble with the war gods.

What of the future of sovereignty? The answer, in the last analysis, must at this moment be a purely subjective one. The writer can but summarize his own attitude: sovereignty is political power. It is the capacity to control. It emerges in any given social situation from the conditions of that situation and the interrelationships of individuals, some of whom lead while others are led. It is dependent upon these three factors: the individual, the leaders, the led. There are recurrent situations of superordination and subordination. These situations involve small groups and large ones, few men and many. In general, wherever there is superordination, there is the basis for sovereignty. Wherever there is need for leadership and governors, there is incipient sovereignty, for there will be the need for direction and guidance, for balancing interests and maintaining equilibrium between individuals and groups of individuals. And the entity which can direct and guide and maintain the equilibrium will be the bearer of sovereignty.

We look now upon a battle between states. Millions now living and yet unborn will be affected by its outcome. But, essentially, why the struggle? It is in part a struggle to redetermine and to re-establish sovereignty. Human intelligence and inventive genius have created a situation in which there exists a community larger than any which has thus far been completely organized politically. There is need for unified direction and guidance. The struggle is to determine who shall be the possessors and bearers of sovereignty in the newer, larger, emerging community. If the state system remains as the structural basis for the political organization of the world, it is safe to assume that sovereignty will remain a doctrine of jurisprudence, municipal and international. Its formulation will depend upon the political situations it may be called upon to rationalize and legitimize. If the state system falls and some other form of political organization emerges, there will still be need for some guiding, directing, balancing force or forces to co-ordinate the activities of individuals and groups. Anarchistic, pluralistic, racial, tribal, or international, whatever the apparent form or lack of form, when the person or group is

discovered which can govern a given situation or group of situations by its proper right, without reference to any other human individuals, then that entity will possess practical political sovereignty.

XII

WORLD-POLITICS AND AMERICA'S DESTINY

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

✱

WHAT of the morrow? To this most ancient and most difficult of all riddles, men seldom find satisfying answers. When gods and oracles are silent, mere mortals venture to speak. But they are forever liable to error and to the merited ridicule of their fellows. For the drama of human events cleaves to no dramatist's script. The tale follows no plot save that devised, sometimes wilfully but more often unwittingly, by the players themselves.

THE USES OF PROPHECY

Yet those who venture no solution to the mystery of the future are helpless and self-defeated. Every act of men has irrevocable consequences. And every decision and indecision of every human being flows from claims upon tomorrow and from expectations regarding events as yet unborn. Where guesses as to things to come are out of sight and out of mind, where they spring from intuition or magic or superstition or from hopes without knowledge or wishes without science, the guessers are usually undone by their own ignorance. The human alternatives of days to come are fixed by what is done or left undone today and yesterday. Freedom of choice is possible only to those who comprehend the necessities which limit their choices.

The science of politics, as a sphere of the science of society, must aim, as does all science, at prediction and control, if it is to serve men's needs. This message, among many messages of hope and wisdom, has for thirty years and more been put before successive generations of scholars as an invitation and a challenge by the sagacious philosopher-politician to whom this volume is dedi-

cated. As teacher and counselor, as friend, public servant, and theorist of politics, Charles Edward Merriam—ever respected as “the Chief” by those who love him best—has always inspired his students and colleagues to unfetter their imaginations, to sharpen their weapons of analysis, to project their minds into man’s vast posterity. For he believed that only thus could political science become scientific and help men to become captains of their souls and masters of their fate. In this faith this writer joins the ranks of those who here seek to do honor to their Chief by daring to peer into the decade which lies ahead. May the reader remember that if what is here seen—as through a glass, darkly—never comes to pass, the fault will lie not with the teacher whose vision is always clear but with the pupils who have failed to apply his teaching.

THE BALANCING OF POWER IN ATLANTICA

In the continuum of time, as in the continuum of space, America and Europe are two halves of one whole. For endless ages of geologic time Europe has been warmed by the broad current of water which sweeps northeastward through the Atlantic out of the Gulf of Mexico. Within a few brief centuries of historic time the Americas have been settled by a stream of emigrants flowing westward across the Atlantic from the European continent, extending Western culture to a new world and later carrying back to the old all manner of novelties, from potatoes, maize, and tobacco to democracy, telephones, and aircraft.

In the course of modern man’s ceaseless pursuit of the sunset, the Atlantic Ocean has always been a highway and never a barrier—from the remote time when Columbus required more than two months to traverse it until today when it may be crossed in a score of hours. The civilization of the machine age, which has grown up at both terminals of the highway, is not divided but united by the sea which links the old continent with the new. The ebb and flow of the human adventure throughout the world-wide reaches of that civilization and, indeed, the ultimate fortunes of all its peoples have been inexorably shaped in recent times by the relations between the children of Europeans who

live west of the North Atlantic and those who live in the homelands washed by its easternmost waves.

These relationships have of late been revolutionized by social forces and persistent trends of change which have been fully appreciated by few. The technological transformation of the planet and its resultant integration into a closely knit world-neighborhood are obvious to those who stop to think. The shifts of wealth and power from nation to nation within the area of the new industrialism are less readily perceived by those who believe that what has been must continue to be. By stages slow and half-unseen there has come about in less than a century a vast extension of machine industry from its English birthplace eastward into central Europe and westward into North America. The economic pattern of the entire Western world has been therewith transformed. A concomitant of this change has been a transformation no less striking in the design of the world balance of power.

In population growth, in industrial and commercial expansion, and therefore in potential military strength and political influence, the peoples of the British Isles (and of Spain, France, and the Low Countries) have gradually lost the preponderant positions they enjoyed before the middle of the nineteenth century. Germany to the east and the United States to the west have become, absolutely as well as relatively, the new focal points of industrial productivity and world-leadership in the twentieth century. In terms of technological advance and industrial output, America and the German Reich have long since left the littoral and island communities of western Europe far behind. In terms of *Weltpolitik*, Americans and Germans have become citizens of new "Great Powers," consciously and purposefully in the German case, almost unwittingly in the American case—until new apostles of "manifest destiny" began directing American attention to the fact at the turn of the century.

The wider implications of this change have impressed themselves less upon men's minds than has the fact of the change itself. Men often live in the past long after the future has become the present. Only in great crises do underlying realities become ap-

parent. Twice (thus far) in the twentieth century, German practitioners of *Realpolitik*, employing with deadly efficiency all the vast productive apparatus of the industrialized Reich, have challenged in arms British command of the seas, British control of the great routes of commerce and war over the world, British possessions and British markets in Africa and Asia, and Britain's very existence as the heart of a world-wide empire built upon trade and sea power. Twice, in Canning's famous phrase, the New World has "redressed the balance of the Old" through American intervention in a world war on the side of Britain against Germany—with a clear victory won (and wasted) in the earlier instance and victory still doubtful in the later one.

SHADOW AND SUBSTANCE

Only slowly has the new pattern of world-power impinged upon the American and British public mind. Britons have preferred to believe, almost until the last hour, that their impregnable economic and political position in the world of a hundred years ago must inevitably persist forever, beyond all likelihood of successful challenge. As long as Continental coalitions balanced one another effectively, many "little Englanders" were even able to believe in and practice "splendid isolation." When Germany upset the balance, Britain resorted to alliances with weaker Continental powers or sought to deflect Teutonic ambitions in other directions offering no immediate danger to British interests. Only in the grim ordeals of 1917-18 and 1940-42 has it become clear to most British leaders (and then only temporarily) that the United States and Germany are now the most formidable of the Great Powers; that America or the Reich, rather than Britain, is the only Power capable of maintaining or abolishing the world-balance; and that the center of gravity in the Atlantic world has shifted from the English midlands to Saxony and the Ruhr, on the one hand, and to the northeastern and midwestern regions of the United States, on the other.

Americans themselves have been even more reluctant to recognize their new position. Few have seen that the United States is

by a wide margin the richest and most powerful of the world's national communities; that almost half of the basic raw materials and of the manufactured goods of all the earth come from American farms, mines, and factories; and that the most potent single influence in shaping the future of Europe, Asia, and Africa is the fashion in which American wealth and power are used or abused or left unused. Americans have displayed amazing skill in adapting an eighteenth-century constitution, devised by the leaders of a few million people perched on the edge of the wilderness, to the exigencies of a transcontinental Union, whose myriad millions live no longer by pioneer farming but by machine industry. The same Americans hesitated to concede that the formulas they employed at the end of the eighteenth century to guide their political relations with other powers have little applicability in the world-society of the twentieth.

The relative security and aloofness from world-politics which America enjoyed between 1815 and 1914 were never a product, as many fondly supposed, of the wisdom of Americans in "minding their own business" and "keeping out of Europe's quarrels." They were a product of a specific and transitory design in the world-balance of power, which most Americans, when they were aware of it at all, confused with the unchanging scheme of the cosmos. The determining elements of that design were three: (1) the preponderance of British sea power in the Atlantic and in most of the other great seaways; (2) the maintenance of a stable equipoise among the Powers of Continental Europe; and (3) the inability of any Continental European or Asiatic Powers, alone or together, to extend their political ambitions to the New World.

British power was no threat to America, for Britain's paramount interests in the promotion of free trade, in the maintenance of a balance of rivalries in Europe and Asia, and in the diffusion of exports (and occasionally of democracy) to "backward areas" ran parallel to the American demands and expectations. Following the disastrous failure of the attempt to conquer Canada in 1812, terminated by impressive demonstrations of British sea power and by the Treaty of Ghent, America and Britain ceased

playing the power game against each other. If America enjoyed an invulnerable security from foreign aggression in the nineteenth century, this result was neither a product of British forbearance nor of American wisdom. It was rather a result of the mutuality of Anglo-American interests and of Britain's position as a shield between the Western Hemisphere and the Powers of the Continent.

As long as this design persisted, so long could Americans relish the luxury of spurning "power politics." They could fancy that "avoidance of foreign entanglements" was the formula which assured their safety. They could imagine that their "Monroe Doctrine," rather than the British navy and British commercial aspirations, kept Latin America relatively secure, during the Victorian age, from the vicissitudes of European rivalry and ambition. They could suppose even later that their championship of the "Open Door" in China (a policy which, like Monroe's doctrine, was initially "made in England") would keep Asia's markets open to their merchants and prevent American involvement in the power politics of the Far East. They could even enjoy the avocation of Anglophobia without serious harm to their own interests, so long as Britain's world-position remained unchallenged.

The painful disillusionments which contemporary Americans have experienced with respect to the "fundamentals" of their foreign policy flow from the revolution in the world-balance which made America and Germany, rather than Britain, potential aspirants for world-hegemony. When the Hohenzollern Reich threatened Britain with ruin, Americans responded to the challenge with the formulas of 1793: neutrality, isolation, and insistence on their rights to trade freely with both belligerents. When the British navy cut Germany off from all Atlantic commerce and when German efforts to destroy British trade led to the loss of American lives and menaced Britain with defeat, Americans painfully brought themselves to the pitch of indignation required for war and tipped the scales in favor of the immense coalition which was required to bring the Reich to terms.

In the aftermath Woodrow Wilson pointed the way to an American role of world-leadership in the creation of a new order in the family of nations. Thanks, however, to the doubtful wisdom of the founding fathers in requiring the consent of two-thirds of the Senate for the ratification of treaties, and thanks to the subsequent reversion of many Americans to the comforting illusions of days gone by, the Wilsonian program was defeated. For twenty years thereafter most Americans sought to safeguard their security by combining an attitude of indifference toward the outer world with moral preachments, prohibitive tariffs, and pacifist platitudes, accompanied by firm resolve to avoid all responsibility for the maintenance of world-order or the promotion of world-unity.

The effort was foredoomed to failure by stubborn realities, which remained unaffected by American refusal to face them. An America which refused to support the League of Nations became willy-nilly an America which helped to wreck the League of Nations. So far-reaching and decisive was the impact of America on the world that America's negative refusal to exercise its influence on behalf of international order was equivalent in its practical consequences to positive connivance in the promotion of anarchy. Only in the inner circles of the Tory "National Government" of Britain were there displayed a greater degree of blindness and a larger measure of determination to escape the future by living in the past.

A world-economy and a world-society called insistently for political unification, if its peoples were to escape unending paroxysms of violence and impoverishment. This need could be served on terms compatible with democratic ideals only through a system of collective security in which most of the trappings of national sovereignty would be sacrificed in the interest of the commonweal. An isolated Britain was no longer in a position to assume the role of world-leadership required for the enterprise. Joint action with the United States was precluded by American isolationism. Joint action with France, the Little Entente, and the Soviet Union was precluded by Tory pride and prejudice.

America alone could have remade the world, since, as Henry Luce has so eloquently argued, nothing affects so profoundly the nature of America's international environment as America's own influence upon it. But American leadership faltered, and American opinion insisted upon evading the challenge.

America and Britain alike thus surrendered the world by default during the tragic years of the long retreat between the rape of Manchuria and the Peace of Munich. Even when defeat is self-inflicted, its corollary is victory for others. The new despotisms in Tokyo, Rome, and Berlin stepped into the breach and took unto themselves the tasks which Americans and Britishers had abandoned. Nature abhors a vacuum. A world in need of unity will somehow find those ready to serve this need. If free-men are unwilling to do what must be done through democratic leadership, tyrants will forge weapons with which to unite the world by the sword. Their task was eased at every step by the behavior of Anglo-American isolationists and appeasers. The result was the partial conquest of Asia by Japan and the complete conquest of the European Continent by the Nazi Reich, with the totalitarian allies determined to use the new power at their disposal to bring Britain and America alike to final ruin.

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF FAILURE

In periods of social crisis large numbers of people are victims of frustration and fear. Their frustrations may be a result of circumstances beyond their control or a product of futility induced by stubborn efforts to apply old solutions to new problems. Their fears may be "real" or "imaginary" by some objective standard of judgment. In any event their responses to environmental challenge typically exhibit a retrogression from a rational to a non-rational plane of adjustment. Reflective calculations of self-interest and mature considerations of conscience give way to simple organic tropisms of hostile approach toward, or fearful withdrawal from, the assumed sources of danger.

All organisms confronted with new problems necessarily seek to meet them with the experience required in coping with old

ones. If the lessons formerly learned appear to be applicable, pleasure is experienced from the smooth recapitulation of stereotyped habits. If, however, ancient modes of adaptation produce no "solution"—i.e., no disappearance of the problem or no satisfying adjustment to its presence—the organism is baffled and constrained to resort to trial-and-error fumbling. Where the fumbling is relatively uninhibited by innate rigidities of behavior, a solution is often stumbled upon. Where past habits interfere with free experimentation or leave the organism uneasily balanced between alternative courses of action, the result is further frustration and the final development of acute anxiety.

This process is much the same for mice, monkeys, and men. Rodents in an unfamiliar maze, simians monkeying with puzzle boxes, and human beings facing community crises are, all alike, torn between a disposition to do what they have done in the past, since it is easy and pleasant, and a disposition to do what is necessary, however arduous it may be, in order to attain the coveted cheese, bananas, or social goal. Men as problem-solving animals differ from monkeys and mice chiefly in this—that they possess more prejudices acquired from past learning and more potentialities for future learning. When they grapple with immediate and tangible problems, where culturally inherited habits are visibly workable or unworkable, they seldom permit what they already "know" to interfere with what they are summoned to learn. When problems are out of hand, however, and confused by invisible and impersonal complexities, the stereotyped responses derived from past experience often serve as substitutes (temporarily satisfying) for new perception and as obstacles to experimentation and adaptation.

The dilemma of American foreign policy is but an aspect of a universal organic sequence which is of the essence of the culture crisis of our time. Objective: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Initial problem: how to realize these purposes in an expanding environment characterized by British commercial and naval hegemony and by a Continental balance of power. Solu-

tion: isolationism vis-à-vis Europe, Monroe Doctrine vis-à-vis Latin America, Open Door vis-à-vis Asia. Result: success. Subsequent problem: how to achieve the same objectives in a shrinking environment characterized by British weakness, by the (largely unrecognized) commercial and naval preponderance of the United States, and by the threatened political hegemony of militant aggressors in Europe and Asia. Possible solution: full assumption of American responsibility for reordering and policing the world. Attempted solution: more isolation. Result: frustration.

The major types of mass political behavior in the present-day world are phenomena of frustration and devices to escape anxiety. Frustration begets inner conflict—within individuals and within nations. The frustrated personality, whether a man or a nation of men, is pulled in opposite directions by conflicting desires generated by painful discrepancies between expectation and fulfilment. If the cleavage in motives is not to become permanent through taking the form (in individuals) of a schizoid adjustment or (in nations) of open or latent civil war, it must be resolved through the reintegration of drives to action. Such reintegration is most commonly achieved through aggression—i.e., the resurgence and discharge of deep-seated biological responses of fear and hatred. Aggressions are discharged by becoming either externalized or introverted. Aggressions projected onto the outer environment produce inner peace of soul through paranoia, criminality, or an insatiable thirst for power over others. Aggressions which are inverted produce self-pity, self-accusation, and a painful sense of inadequacy, leading to withdrawal in the face of hostility or to propitiatory efforts to evoke affection from the unfriendly through submissiveness.

The frustrations engendered in a maladjusted and misgoverned world-community are all but universal and are largely identical in type. Only the responses of the victim show marked variations in pattern. In the now “totalitarian” states, power has long since passed to personalities who extrovert their aggressions and those of their followers by destroying democracy, worshiping despot-

ism, persecuting minorities, and waging war on neighboring countries. In the democratic states the typical response has been quite different. Submissive and indecisive personalities have won public approval (until swept away in the end by disaster) and have given expression to mass desires to escape risks and responsibilities through policies of flight, submissiveness, and appeasement. Which type of response is in the long run the more ruinous to personal and social integrity is debatable. In the short run the former response is the road to power and the latter the road to annihilation.

THE CULT OF IRRESPONSIBILITY

In the United States the dominant mood since 1931, and, indeed, since 1919, has been one of fear and flight. "Isolationism" is less a national policy than an attitude of abnegation and a formula to escape the need of having a policy. It is less an expression of the national will in the face of danger than a symptom of collective defeatism and paralysis of will. The America of Woodrow Wilson was presented with the greatest opportunity Americans have ever faced—that of refashioning the lives of all peoples on a millennial scale and of leading the world into a new epoch in the history of the race. But Americans dishonored their own prophet. They acquiesced in the leadership of those who preached fear and withdrawal. They rationalized their panic-stricken flight from responsibility by the slogans of tribal pride, provincial patriotism, and self-righteous xenophobia.

The America of Harding and Coolidge dedicated itself with striking singleness of purpose to amassing material wealth by practices certain to insure the ultimate breakdown of the world-economy and of the fabric of American business. When the America of Herbert Hoover became the first victim of the economic debacle unleashed by its own sins of omission and commission, Americans sought safety, like frightened cattle, by fleeing back into the burning barn of tariff protectionism and political isolationism. Connivance in Fascist aggression against China, Ethiopia, and Spain was accepted by pathetically befuddled mul-

titudes in America no less than in France and Britain as the only road to "peace." Its consequence was to insure war by upsetting the world-balance and aggravating the international anarchy which is the matrix of war. Regression toward infantile evasion of duty was embodied in the new "neutrality," whose proponents sought safety not through the assertion and protection of rights but through their abandonment in the face of challenge. The result was to make the world safe for aggression and to bring the aggressors within striking distance of world-hegemony.

When these seeds of disaster blossomed into flowers of evil and bore bitter fruit of discord and violence, the inner contradiction in the American public mind found fresh expression in incompatible and simultaneous desires to avoid war at (almost) any cost and to contribute to Axis defeat by measures involving no risks or responsibilities. The unworkable formula of "aid to Britain short of war" resolved the dilemma on the plane of temporary political expediency, at the cost of aggravating the disease of the national psyche and rendering the danger from without more acute and inescapable. Pearl Harbor brought temporary "unity" without curing the cleavages which had led to war and might, if uncured, lead to defeat.

THE BORDERLANDS OF MADNESS

The American future depends upon the fashion in which Americans, during the months and years immediately ahead, resolve the "schism in the soul" which has brought them to the miseries and dangers of their present hour. The broad alternatives are starkly simple. Americans will either "go crazy" or "grow up." Americans will either yield to the eternal temptation of the insecure and give themselves over utterly to irrational adjustment to their problems, or they will achieve a reintegration of their personal lives and of their national purposes on a rational, adult level of orientation.

Since only the rashest of prophets, the most confirmed of pessimists, or the most optimistic of wishful thinkers would venture to forecast with certainty in 1941-42 which type of solution will be

achieved, both possibilities deserve consideration. The "solution" of irrationality implies a retrogression to simple and childlike modes of response, wherein frustrated personalities find surcease from worry either through compulsive flight and/or surrender or through a frenzied quest for power over others. Americans may conceivably re-enact the pattern of adjustment exemplified in its purest form in the tragedy of France. They may quarrel ever more violently among themselves, face domestic and foreign foes without faith in their own values, shirk all responsibility until all action is too little and too late, and finally deliver their destiny into the hands of appeasers and defeatists of the Right or of the Left. Or they may re-enact the pattern of adjustment illustrated by the tragedy of Germany. They may repudiate reason and freedom, make a cult of intolerance, perpetuate a spurious "unity" through a native totalitarianism, and embark upon imperialistic aggrandizement as an escape from the painful necessity of coping with their own problems.

Either of these solutions means the loss of the war and the peace and the death of the American dream. In either case American ideals of liberty and individual dignity will perish from the earth. The triumph of defeatism will reduce the United States to the position of a vassal community in a world dominated by ruthless conquerors. The defeat of Russia, the subjugation of China, the surrender of Britain, and the conclusion of a "negotiated" peace between America and the victorious Caesarisms of Europe and Asia will, by all present indications, produce consequences fatal to representative government and civil liberty in the American Republic. These consequences will flow from the peculiar weaknesses of America's position in a world dominated by power-holders who are past masters in the arts of military aggression and of pacific penetration of demoralized victims.

In such a world, Latin America—ever the "Achilles' heel" of the United States—will gravitate into the orbit of the totalitarian New Order. In business and in politics the United States will deal with the peoples of other continents on terms laid down by those to whom the impoverishment and disintegration of the

United States will be prerequisites of their own survival. Within the Republic dunces and dupes will co-operate with agents of the Reich to bring to power an administration committed to "collaboration." Such a regime of Vichymen, whether brought to power in the aftermath of military defeat or in the name of "peace with honor," will find it necessary to suppress dissent by methods copied from the Caesars and dictated by the Caesars. Under such circumstances as these, Americans themselves will carry to the grave what Lincoln called the "last best hope of earth."

Should Americans, on the other hand, face the threat of a totalitarian world, brought into being by their own fecklessness, with a blind and violent reassertion of American power, their ultimate fate can scarcely be happier. A resurgence of militant imperialism may succeed temporarily in subjugating Canada and part of Latin America in the course of a protracted total war with a coalition of European and Asiatic aggressors. But in the end such a war would be lost, even if the North American continent escaped physical invasion. The price of waging it with even a minimum of success would be such a measure of total militarization as would end for a generation or more any hope of freedom, peace, or plenty. A new Yankee imperialism would deliver the Latin republics to the south more swiftly into Nazi hands than passive acquiescence in defeat. At best, such an America would be a new Byzantium, surviving precariously in a world overrun by barbarians. At worst, such an America would be a beaten and broken nation, ruled in the end, instead of in the beginning, by Vichymen, divided and exploited by Quislings and Gauleiters, condemned to penury and impotence, and desperately dedicated to intolerance and tyranny.

WATCHMAN, WHAT OF THE NIGHT?

These anticipated results of any belated American effort to save America by reconquering the world from the triumphant despotisms are predicated upon the assumption that this task would be wholly beyond the capacity of even the greatest of the Great Powers in a world in which Britain, Russia, and China

would no longer be America's allies. They are further predicated upon the assumption that such a militant American imperialism would spring from the same sources of social and psychic insecurity as have already found full expression in totalitarianism and that it would go down to defeat before the hosts of those who first launched the enterprise of conquering the earth by terror.

There is no basis in American experience and tradition for supposing that Americans, once consecrated to a belligerent fanaticism wholly alien to their achievements in the past and their hopes for the future, could outfight, out-trick, and out-terrorize the Nazi and Nipponese masters of the outer world. If the great society is to be unified by the sword and the lash, if social strife and economic instability are to be resolved by megalomaniacs sworn to live and die only for their tribal deities, these tasks will be carried to completion not by Americans but by Germans and Japanese. Even Fascist Americans will retain, beneath all the fury and viciousness they may summon up out of the depths of their tortured souls, certain fatal vestiges of human decency which will put them at a hopeless disadvantage in competing with professional fanatics who have already emancipated themselves from all the decencies.

If it be assumed, moreover, that the masters of other continents might leave an appeasing America or a belligerent America in undisturbed peace, the record of the past here again supplies the answer to the future. By virtue of its inner dynamic, Nazi aggression must cross all barriers, smash all rivals, and transcend all geographic limits. The Fascist New Order does, in truth, serve the needs of men in an epoch of universal insecurity. For it abolishes the ills of international anarchy, economic paralysis, and class conflict, which produce the major insecurities of our time. Anarchy in the family of nations is ended by the forcible abolition of national sovereignty and the violent imposition of the rule of the "master-race" upon the world. Economic maladjustments are resolved by a "planned economy" which remains productive through the dedication of all its resources to war. Social strife is eliminated by the subordination of employers and workers alike

to the will of a political élite of hate-crazed burghers who rule by deflecting mass and class aggressions onto domestic scapegoats and foreign foes.

This design for power generates more insecurities than it cures, and thereby nurtures within itself the seeds of its own destruction only when its beneficiaries have no more minorities to persecute and no more enemies to conquer. For the Nazi rulers of the Reich and for the war lords of Japan, cessation of aggrandizement spells stagnation and death. They have, therefore, no option as to their next step if they should succeed in crushing all organized resistance in Europe, Africa, and Asia. They must undertake the subjugation of the Americas, by intrigue or by arms, as a means of retaining control of those they have already vanquished. They could not, even if they would, offer America a choice between isolation and surrender. They are driven by forces beyond their own control to smash the last democracy and to loot the last great treasurehouse of freemen. The enterprise can scarcely fail if Americans consummate their own encirclement and meet the ultimate challenge with blind fear or unthinking hatred.

THE VOICE OF REASON

The acid test of democracy's fitness to survive and of America's right to a free future is the capacity of American democrats to face the world-environment in which they live with mature wisdom and courage rather than with infantile or neurotic responses of capitulation, escape, or aggression. From the age of Pericles and Demosthenes to the age of Churchill and Roosevelt, the history of the democratic faith is a record of the efforts of freemen to affirm and protect the moral autonomy of the individual and to deal with community problems through the creative use of man's intellect rather than through unreasoning emotion or instinct. To "think with one's blood" is the prerogative of barbarians, tyrants, and slaves. To think with one's head and to harness the motivation of heart and belly (to use Plato's terms) to the dictates of reason is the duty of freemen. Republics perish only when their people grow weary of liberty and intellect and meet their

problems by devices unworthy of free and reasoning men and women.

The challenge to democrats to apply intelligence to the management of public affairs was never better stated, as an imperative and as a prediction, than in the words which Professor Merriam wrote in 1925 at the close of his *New Aspects of Politics*:

It is easy to sneer at the place of "intelligence" in guiding the conduct of our common affairs, . . . but it is within the bounds of possibility to show the significant changes in the modern world, social and intellectual, and to indicate which way these changes seem to be leading our politics. That the modern movement is democratic and scientific, there can be little question; that the new categories of politics and the new institutions of government will be shaped accordingly, there is equally little doubt. Democracy, dictatorship, communism, nationalism and internationalism, systems of representation and administration, problems of liberty and authority must be interpreted in the light of these new social and intellectual changes. The decline of custom, fear, and force as agencies of control, and the rise of political prudence and political science are indicated by these new developments. The world will not put new wine into old bottles, politically or otherwise. Jungle politics and laboratory science are incompatible, and they cannot live in the same world. The jungle will seize and use the laboratory, as in the last great war, when the propagandist conscripted the physicist, or the laboratory will master the jungle of human nature and turn its vast, teeming fertility to the higher uses of mankind.

The elements of a rational American adjustment to the world-crisis of the 1940's can be stated quite briefly and simply. Americans must rest their programs of action not on hope or fear or wishful thinking but on an intelligent analysis of America's place in the world. They must recognize that America is now the most powerful of the world's Great Powers and that the central task of Americans is not to adapt themselves through passive defense or acquiescence to a world-environment created by others but to remake that environment after their heart's desire by the worldwide use of their own power. They must face the painful fact, which all honest and intelligent Englishmen have already taken for granted—that the British Commonwealth of Nations is no longer by itself capable of any role of world-leadership and can have a free future in the face of the German challenge only through close union with the United States.

In the hard school of blood, sweat, and tears, Americans must learn that a world-economy and a world-society require a world-polity for survival. They must perceive that a world-polity requires the end of power politics and of the "balance of power," through the organization of invincible force on a planetary scale in the hands of those determined to unify and govern the world. They must, at long last, grant that this goal is unattainable without the end of national "sovereignty" and the organization of a supersovereign concentration of authority. They must act at once and boldly on the assumption that the great society is destined to be politically unified either by Nazi despotism or by American democracy. These imperatives represent the price of victory, in war and peace alike.

If the people of the United States are to realize their highest hopes and fulfil their historic mission, they must build in the years immediately ahead, on the basis of the loose coalition of the "United Nations," a firm union of free peoples which will at once defeat the Triplice, dominate the world, guarantee equality and autonomy to all its constituent parts, and attract others to collaboration in its purposes. Such a federation must become the nucleus of a free world-order, offering hope and promise not only to the English-speaking peoples but to all the allies, to all the neutrals, to all the conquered peoples, to the stirring masses of Asia and, in the end, to Germans, Italians, and Japanese as well.

The necessary corollary of effective world-government, to the end that violence in the family of nations shall cease, is a reordering of social and economic arrangements on a world-scale, so that chronic class warfare and periodical economic cataclysms may alike be relegated to the unhappy past. The "New Democracy" of tomorrow, whose sources and probable characteristics have been depicted so clearly by Charles E. Merriam, must not only revolutionize and reintegrate the community of nations but must also revolutionize the economic and social order within and among nations. Nothing short of this will remove the major causes of insecurity and prevent a recurrence of the frustrations and aggressions which have brought the twentieth century to disaster.

THE NEW RADICALISM

Today's task and tomorrow's challenge can be envisaged realistically and rationally only in terms of world-revolution. Only those with will and ability to achieve a sweeping transformation of the relations among men as producers and consumers and as citizens of a world-society will conquer the future and inherit the earth. There is no present reason for believing that this task can be carried forward to completion by those who first undertook it in our time in the name of class war and proletarian rebellion. Neither is there any basis for assuming, whatever the fortunes of war may be, that the older landed and moneyed elites of western Europe possess the imagination or the power to undertake such a mission on any scale promising success.

The world-revolution of the days to come will be planned, directed, and carried to victory either by the Nazi leaders of Germany, leagued in greed and hatred with their allies, puppets, and vassals all over the globe, or by the democratic leaders of America, aligned in a common cause by a common faith in reason and freedom with the other free peoples of the earth. Nazi victory is possible only by American default. American victory is possible only by the reforging of a dynamic and revolutionary democracy in the United States and by the full assumption on the part of that democracy of responsibility for leading other peoples to a new birth of freedom.

Only America can bring the Nazi Reich and its allies to ultimate defeat in the Second World War. Only America can formulate democratic war aims and peace aims on terms relevant to the world's needs and capable of winning full support from Russians, Chinese, and Indians, on whose sacrifice and devotion in the months immediately ahead depends the possibility of victory for the United Nations. Only a revolutionary formulation of purposes, coupled with an inflexible determination to carry them to fulfilment at any cost and at any risk, will prove adequate to the task in hand. Without victory there can be no survival for a free America or for the cause of freedom anywhere on earth. Without a firm, wise, and courageous national will to rebuild the temple of

man's hopes according to a new design the moral prerequisites of victory will be lacking. Without a translation of purposes into deeds during the course of the struggle there can be no progress toward victory.

The fight will be long and fiercely contested. Most of the years in the decade ahead will not be years of "post-war reconstruction" but years of bitter battles. There can be no post-war reconstruction unless the pillars and girders of mankind's new home are fused and shaped in the heat of the fray. There can be little hope of victory unless these supports are placed now on firm foundations, four square against all foes, in a great citadel whose walls are spiritually and physically invulnerable and whose defenders will go forth to vanquish the barbarians and to liberate by creative ideas and by invincible arms those who have been enslaved.

This is the mission of America in the 1940's. If Americans evade their duty or embark too late upon the enterprise, they will falter and fail. If they accept the task, millions of freemen yet unborn will give eternal thanks to today's generation for doing what posterity expects of it.

PAX AMERICANA

If this is, indeed, to be the destiny of the United States—and all alternatives now on the horizon threaten the end of everything which America has hitherto meant to Americans and to the world—the major tasks of the years ahead will be, in the broadest sense of the term, political tasks. America has until yesterday been the last stronghold of laissez faire individualism, with governmental functions reduced to the bare essentials needed in an expanding economy, with politics and politicians dishonored more often than honored, and with the scientist, the technician, the entrepreneur, the wage-earner, and the farmer contributing more to the commonwealth than the voter, the legislator, the judge, and the political leader. The Americans of tomorrow will continue to lead their private lives and to conduct their private businesses and professions as of old. In so doing they may well

suffer higher taxes and lower living standards than they have known hitherto, but they will enjoy a greater measure of security and hope, thanks to the more effective performance on a wider stage of the public task of minimizing violence, fostering abundance, and providing for the common defense and the general welfare. The most exciting opportunities and the most creative adventures of the epoch which lies ahead, however, will be found in the realm of government. Americans as citizens, Americans as soldiers, lawgivers, and public leaders, Americans as administrators, as missionaries of democracy, and as builders of a newer and larger New World will find the richest fulfilment of their aspirations and the widest scope for their talents.

To the tasks of fashioning a new democracy and achieving on an intercontinental scale the political unification of the great society, America brings out of her past much experience and wisdom in coping with the eternal problem of government. That problem is one of reconciling liberty and authority in such wise that responsible citizens will serve the community without the sacrifice of their personal freedom, and responsible leaders will rule and administer effectively without being corrupted and changed into tyrants by the intoxicating wine of arbitrary power. By building soundly on British precedents, America has already established on a continental scale a "government of laws and not of men," wherein personal rights are more secure than anywhere else on earth in any other population of comparable size. By facing with imagination and courage the problems posed through the coexistence of a multiplicity of "sovereign" states scattered over a vast expanse, by meeting and resolving in forthright fashion the crises of revolution, confederation, constitution, and secession, America has made of the principles and practices of federalism a living reality, capable of extension and fruitful growth in a larger context. American political experience has built freedom into the very fabric of men's lives—freedom for the individual, for the multitudinous associations of individuals, for church, school, and press, for township, municipality, and state. Americans have reared a far-flung federal republic whose authorities are responsi-

ble to the citizenry of the nation and who administer the national affairs of that citizenry without coercing or destroying the states of the Union.

In the vital reality of constitutional government in America, with its vision of equality and tolerance, its effective safeguards for freedom, and its federal synthesis of the general and the particular, the national and the local, the whole and the parts, are to be found the portent and promise of that democratic world-federation which America must give to mankind. From other peoples will come other contributions to the necessary skills of governance in a world-wide industrial civilization. In the promotion of economic stability and social security; in the conservation of human and material resources; in the prevention of strife among divergent interest groups; in the diminution of tensions in the body politic; in the purposeful planning of abundance and of self-realization for ever larger numbers of men and women, Americans have much to learn from other Western peoples. But it can be safely said, without tribal conceit, that the uniquely American contribution to the world-revolution and to the New Order is the central and indispensable component without which the other skills and achievements of social engineering must in the end prove vain.

TOMORROW'S LEADERSHIP

All that is needful to enrich and perfect the American dream by extending it to all or most of the outer world is that Americans dedicate themselves wholeheartedly and proudly to the task and that they develop from the youth of the Republic a new political élite, well trained, farsighted, imaginative, and courageous, equipped to undertake the manifold missions involved in the redemption of mankind from worry, want, and war in the greater republic of the future. That élite must for many years ahead include within its ranks those whose special skill is the use of arms. The most difficult and dangerous of America's wars is first to be won if the dream is to come true. In the winning of it America

must supply leadership as well as weapons to the vast armies, navies, and air fleets of the coming federation of the free.

Once the foe is vanquished, once the Nazi military and industrial machine is shattered, once the peoples of Germany, Italy, and Japan are sufficiently demoralized to free themselves from their tyrants and from the tyranny of their hateful creeds, once they are sufficiently cured by the surgery of war of their soul-sickness and subsequently invited to join with others in a new adventure in human unity, there will then arise new tasks calling no less imperatively for arms and men than the task of victory itself. For it will be the first mission of the victors, under American leadership and inspiration, to police the world, to enforce by irresistible power the new public law of the great society, to compel observance of new procedures for adjusting controversies and reconciling security with change.

More wars may lie ahead if the politics of prevention does not wholly attain its goal. But if mankind is to have a future, these wars must be civil wars—not of sovereignties against sovereignties but of a world-commonwealth against those who may seek to resist its authority, to defy the common interest in the service of local and selfish ambitions, or to return to the international anarchy and lawlessness of the early twentieth century. Such wars will be brief and painless in proportion as the federal forces of the future, on land, sea, and air, are swift and invincible. To make them so will be America's prime responsibility. To keep them so will require that Americans give more deference to the soldier than they have hitherto done, that more able young Americans pursue the vocation of arms, that more American resources be permanently devoted to armaments than has been the case in past periods of uneasy peace.

Apart from the armed guardians of order and law, the American political élite of the future must contain lawgivers, judges, administrators, and an efficient and incorruptible body of trained public servants, many of whom must serve not only city, state, and nation but the world-government of tomorrow. These chosen

ones, selected for skill and imagination in the handling of human relations, will be responsible to a world-executive and will be charged with carrying out the policies laid down by a democratic and representative world-parliament with limited but adequate authority, not over national states but over all the individuals who reside within the confines of the new union. They will be supported and defended by a world-police force, commanded by duly constituted federal authorities, civil and military. The profession of the diplomat in the old sense will be superseded by the professions of the legislator, the administrator, and the judge, who will play a thousand new roles in the achievement and preservation of order and justice in the world-community and in all its component parts.

Regulatory boards and administrative commissions of types which can now be scarcely foreseen will be required to maintain freedom of trade and travel over the globe, to adjust day by day and year by year the new conception of the public interest with old conceptions of private and local rights, to minimize hardships and maximize opportunities for greater productivity in the vast and fluid economic readjustment which will take place, once national boundaries become highways instead of barriers. "Capitalism" and "socialism" will both become obsolete terms, for it can be predicted with reasonable certainty that out of trial and error, out of innovation and experimentation, there will emerge wholly novel patterns of relationships between business and government. But adequate power to plan and supervise the processes of production and distribution will rest in the hands of the responsible representatives of the public interest, whether they be governmental officials charged with managerial functions formerly regarded as "private," or "private" entrepreneurs, labor leaders, agriculturalists, and financiers charged with new duties of public trust.

No less important will be the new function of the educator, the publicist, and the propagandist. For the new order, precisely because it will constitute a revolutionary break with the old, will require an army of experts in the invention and propagation of

the symbols by which the loyalties of men will be broadened into a new allegiance to the great commonwealth of tomorrow. These will point the way toward translating the past aspirations of the liberal faith into the living realities of the future. These will build and enrich the necessary mass mythology whereby durable political form will be given to the ancient vision of the brotherhood of man.

TOWARD THE NEW DAY

In all these varied adventures in the liberation of mankind through the world-organization of justice and law, Americans will not act alone but in collaboration with other peoples. If the framers of the world-federal constitution display as much wisdom as did the founding fathers of the American Union in 1787, no issue will arise of the "domination" of one member-state by another or of the "hegemony" of one over all. Each member will be equal to all in rights and perhaps to some degree in representation, as in the United States Senate. But the members will not be equal in population, in resources, in power, and these differentials will be recognized both in legislative organization and in the new civil service. And, if the whole enterprise is not to fail, Americans must occupy a position of leadership.

Those who serve, whether as lawmakers, administrators, or soldiers, will require all the skill at their command to avoid two evils, both equally fatal. One will be excessive deference toward the members of older national groups, more particularly the British. The other will be excessive self-confidence or the assumption of a patronizing role in dealing with the members of less-advanced societies, especially those of the vanquished states and of Latin America, eastern Europe, and the Middle East. America cannot and dare not leave leadership to others, for either the adventure will be an American adventure or it will be nothing. But American leadership will prove effective only if others are dealt with as equals in a partnership of honor. Others will gladly follow the American way only if they know that America has at length assumed responsibilities commensurate with her vast power and immense prestige and only if they see that American

influence is being exercised not at the expense of others but for the common good.

In the end and, indeed, even in the beginning the enterprise will succeed or fail only in the measure to which the people of the United States give it united and enthusiastic support. Others will follow where America leads. If Americans choose not to lead, out of ignorance, or apathy, or some tragic reversion to the irresponsibility of the 1920's, there will be neither victory nor peace. Nor will there in this event be any hope of world-unity save under the iron heel of ruthless despots brought to life anew out of the Dark Ages by the unwillingness of freemen to do what is needful for their own salvation. Will Americans catch the vision? Can American imagination be fired by an adventure unprecedented since the law and the legions of ancient Rome brought order and peace to the classical world? Will Americans accept their rendezvous with destiny?

No man can answer these questions now. Should the answers be negative, then all that America is and has been and might be will become but an ephemeral episode in modern man's all-too-brief struggle for liberty, for equality, and for fraternity. History is written by the survivors. If America defaults, the historians of tomorrow will be committed to creeds of tyranny and will dismiss the American dream as an aberration of a degenerate and self-defeated community.

Should the answers be affirmative, then the hopes entertained for the American people a generation ago by Woodrow Wilson will be realized:

In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man, must take that for granted. . . . It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to

liberty. They cannot in honor withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it. That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. . . . No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war. . . . Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. . . . There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection. . . . These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail [address to the Senate, January 22, 1917].

The most urgent task at the present is to prepare for the future. The most urgent aspect of that task now has to do with the labors of those who produce arms and those who use arms for defense against the new barbarians. No less urgent, however, if the war and the peace are to be won, is the task of educating Americans to the nature of the world and to the meaning of a revolutionary democracy in a time of world-revolution. This is a task for all men and women of integrity and foresight who are charged with duties of leadership. It is, above all, a responsibility of those who have devoted themselves to the science of society and the science of politics.

No one has contributed more devotedly and more fruitfully to the fulfilment of this task than Charles Edward Merriam. His contributions in the time to come will be the richer for the years of reflection and experience which lie behind them. In his footsteps his students will carry on. Given, on a nation-wide scale, a modicum of his own good will and imagination, given the discipline of rationality and responsibility, given the courage and wisdom which he himself has ever given so abundantly to others—and the outcome of today's struggle is assured. No compromise is possible between slavery and liberty. No middle ground is

available between utter defeat and an earth-wide triumph, between world-chaos and world-government, between the ruin of America at the hands of tyranny and the leadership of America in uniting mankind. Once this is realized, there can be no final issue of the conflict, however dark and doubtful the battle may at times appear, save victory.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Professor Levi of the University of Chicago Law School, who says (1942) that this goal has been accomplished.

2. See "American Publicity in Italy," *American Political Science Review*, XIII (1919), 541-55.

3 See also "The City as a Problem in Government," in Chester C. Maxey (ed.), *Readings in Municipal Government* (New York, 1924), pp 1-8, Charles E Merriam, Spencer D. Parratt, and Albert Lepawsky, *The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago* (Chicago, 1933), National Resources Committee, *Our Cities—Their Role in the National Economy* (report of the Urbanism Committee of the present National Resources Planning Board [Washington, 1937]); Charles E Merriam, "Urbanism," in Louis Wirth (ed.), *Eleven Twenty-six A Decade of Social Science Research* (Chicago, 1940), pp 28-38, and Bibliography in *Eleven Twenty-six*, pp 373-75.

4 See Social Science Research Council, *Decennial Report 1923-1933*, see also *Eleven Twenty-six*, given in n 3 above, commemorating the tenth anniversary of the dedication of the social science building at the University of Chicago

5 See *New Aspects of Politics* (2d ed., Chicago, 1931), pp 17-32

6. See Preface in *ibid*, pp xxx-xxxı

7 See also *Civic Education in the United States* (New York, 1934).

8 "Committee Findings," *Recent Social Trends in the United States Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends* (New York, 1933), I, lxxiv-lxxv

9 See *Subject Index of Reports* (1940) and latest annual report transmitted to Congress by the President as a companion piece to the budget message in 1942

10. See Charles E Merriam, "Plan Making," *The New Democracy and the New Despotism* (New York, 1939), pp. 145-80.

11. *The New Democracy and the New Despotism* (New York, 1939), pp 11-12.

12 *Ibid*, p 187 See also *What Is Democracy?* (Chicago, 1941) and *On the Agenda of Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941).

13 See Ps. 90 10.

14 National Resources Planning Board, *Report of 1942*, pp 9-10

CHAPTER II

1. Stuart A Rice (ed.), *Methods in Social Science: A Case Book* (Chicago, 1931), pp. 676-77.

2. Academic figures like Daniel DeLeon, Columbia University, were most exceptional.

3. Bronislaw Malinowski wrote forcefully of method in *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London, 1922)

4. *New Aspects of Politics* (Chicago, 1925).

5. See Charles E. Merriam, *Political Power: Its Composition and Incidence* (New York, 1934); G. E. G. Catlin, *The Science and Method of Politics* (New York, 1927).
 6. Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics. Who Gets What, When, How* (New York, 1936).
 7. Distinguished European names include Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Max Weber, Robert Michels.
 8. See Harold D. Lasswell, "Person, Personality, Group Culture," *Psychiatry*, II (1939), 533-61.
 9. On the history of universities see Stephen d'Irsay, *Histoire des universités* (2 vols ; Paris, 1933-35).
 10. Note especially the ethnological works of Margaret Mead, beginning with *Coming of Age in Samoa* (New York, 1928). Among psychiatrists consult Harry Stack Sullivan, "Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry," *Psychiatry*, III (1940), 1-117.
 11. Harold J. Laski, *Studies in Law and Politics* (New Haven, 1932), chap. viii.
 12. "Die öffentliche Persönlichkeit," *Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie*, Beiheft XLIV (Leipzig, 1928).
 13. A good example is J. T. Salter, *Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics* (New York, 1935).
 14. The material on persons and practices in Donald S. Strong, *Organized Anti-Semitism in America* (Washington, D. C., 1941) comes, in part, from participant observers.
 15. *Lincoln: A Psycho-biography* (New York, 1933).
 16. John M. Gaus and Leon O. Wolcott, *Public Administration and the United States Department of Agriculture* (Chicago, 1940).
 17. Suggestive modern statements are found especially in the writings of Karl Mannheim.
 18. E.g., Harold D. Lasswell, "A Provisional Classification of Symbol Data," *Psychiatry*, I (1938), 197-204, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York, 1935), with Dorothy Blumenstock, *World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study* (New York, 1939).
- Statements may be classified by intention into "demand" and "nondemand" categories. Demand statements express preference or determination, the others do not. Nondemand statements may be classed into "identification" and "nonidentification" (or fact) statements. An identification statement delimits the boundaries of the self, specifying what events may be included with the ego. "I am an American" includes the secondary symbol "America" with the primary symbol "I."
19. The scope of the Experimental Division for the Study of War Time Communications, the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. See "The World Attention Survey," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, V (1941), 456-62.
 20. Edgar Dale, *The Content of Motion Pictures* (New York, 1935). Current trends in features and films are being described quantitatively under the auspices of the American Film Center, New York, Donald Slesinger, director. Dorothy B. Jones is in charge of the trend survey in Hollywood.
 21. Research Project on Totalitarian Communication, Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, organized under the New School for Social Research, New York. See also the forthcoming publications of the Princeton Listening Center and the Office of Radio Research, Columbia University, Paul Lazarsfeld, director.
 22. Report forthcoming by Paul Lazarsfeld, Douglas Waples, and others.

23. Douglas Waples, Bernard Berelson, Franklin R. Bradshaw, *What Reading Does to People* (Chicago, 1940).

24. See a forthcoming report in the *Public Opinion Quarterly* by Paul Lazarsfeld and Rowena Wyant, applying content analysis to mail.

25. Pitrim A. Sorokin and Clarence Q. Berger, *Time-Budgets of Human Behavior* (Cambridge, 1939)

26. A guide is Lyndon O. Brown, *Market Research and Analysis* (New York, 1937).

27. Summary in Gardner Murphy, Lois Barclay, Theodore M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology* (New York, 1937), pp. 693-94

28. David Efron, *Gesture and Environment* (New York, 1941)

29. "Laws" are sometimes formulated in "fact statements," sometimes in "preference" terms. They usually refer to future events, if so, they are "predictions" in at least part of the meaning of Hans Kelsen (*Allgemeine Staatslehre* [Berlin, 1925])

30. E. J. Gumbel, "Verräter Verfallen der Feme," *Opfer, Morder, Richter, 1919-1929* (Berlin, 1929)

31. See Gabriel Almond and Harold D. Lasswell, "Aggressive Behavior by Clients toward Public Relief Administrators: A Configurative Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, XXVIII (1934), 643-55, "Twisting Relief Rules," *Personnel Journal*, XIII (1935), 338-43

32. Especially by J. L. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive?* (Washington, D.C., 1934). Consult the magazine *Sociometry* for current results

33. Generalized from Harold D. Lasswell, "The Achievement Standards of a Democratic Press," *Freedom of the Press Today*, assembled by Harold L. Ickes, edited by Saul K. Padover (New York, 1941), pp. 171-78. One of the most valuable studies of the significance of attention in politics is A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion in War and Peace* (Cambridge, Mass., 1923).

34. Bruce Lannes Smith, "Propaganda Analysis and the Science of Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, V (1941), 250-59

35. See Harold D. Lasswell, "Democracy Needs a New Way To Talk," *Democracy through Public Opinion* ("Chi Omega Service Fund Studies" [1941]), pp. 80-95.

36. For the standards that prevail among current symbol-manipulators see Leo C. Rosten, *The Washington Correspondents* (New York, 1937) and *Hollywood The Movie Colony The Movie Makers* (New York, 1941).

37. Herman C. Beyle's *Governmental Reporting in Chicago* (Chicago, 1928) was a valuable impetus to the study of this problem.

38. What is involved in equilibrium analysis is stated explicitly by Elton Mayo in *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (New York, 1933) and partially exemplified in such monographs as T. N. Whitehead, *The Industrial Worker* (2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1938)

39. The fundamental significance of character formation is handled with great penetration in Eric Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York, 1941)

40. Important advances have been made toward a state of scientific procedure that brings the data of the social sciences and of the physical sciences into a common universe of events. We may speak of the manifold of events and classify events into "movements" and "symbols." A symbol refers, a movement does not. For a long time physicalistic survivals limited the operational utility of Rudolf Carnap's logical positivism, but recent formulations have dropped these objectionable features. Even

those who accepted a unified-field theory were reluctant to admit "words about words" as data of the same standing as "words about movements." Hence the shipwreck of many efforts to apply correct general formulations to sociopersonal events, where most of the data sentences are "words about words."

CHAPTER VI

1. Walter Lippmann, *An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society* (Boston, 1937), p. 108.

2. Lawrence Dennis, *The Dynamics of War and Revolution* (New York, 1940), p. xii.

3. See chap. i of the forthcoming book by the writer, entitled "Grass Roots in Politics."

4. Harold F. Gosnell, "The Negro Vote in Northern Cities," *National Municipal Review*, XXX (1941), 264-78; Edward H. Litchfield, "A Case Study of Negro Political Behavior in Detroit," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, V (1941), 267-74.

5. Daniel Katz, "The Public Opinion Polls and the 1940 Election," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, V (1941), 52-78.

6. "Grass Roots in Politics"

7. Edward H. Litchfield, *Voting Behavior in a Metropolitan Area* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1941), p. 7. Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics. Chicago Model* (Chicago, 1937).

8. For a comparison of the Democrats with the Whigs see Silas Bent, "Will the Democrats Follow the Whigs?" *Scribner's Magazine*, LXXXV (1929), 473-79.

9. Pennsylvania furnishes a good example of this change. Until the New Deal it was assumed that the men who paid for the campaigns—the coal, steel, oil, and railroad interests—could run the government (see Walter Davenport, *Power and Glory The Life of Boies Penrose* [New York, 1931]). But in 1938, of the fifteen counties returning the highest percentage vote for Earle, all but one (Greene, a traditionally Democratic county) were industrial and mining counties.

10. J. T. Salter, "Letters from Men in Action. II," *National Municipal Review*, XXX (1941), 471.

11. *Forty Years on Main Street* (New York, 1937), p. 77.

12. "We the People," *Fortune*, XXI (April, 1940), 64.

13. *The American Party System* (1st ed.), pp. 412-13.

14. Cf. M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* (2 vols.; New York, 1902).

15. A study of Louisiana politics during the last twenty years has been made by the writer (see his forthcoming volume entitled "Grass Roots in Politics"). For analysis of New Jersey politics consult D. D. McKean, *The Boss: The Hague Machine in Action* (Boston, 1940).

16. Only a few works describing subversive activities in the United States can be cited here: Donald S. Strong, *Organized Anti-Semitism in America: The Rise of Group Prejudice during the Decade 1930-40* (Washington, D.C., 1941); publications of the Institute of Propaganda Analysis (New York); "The Foreign Language Press," *Fortune*, XXII (November, 1940), 90-93, 102, 104; Harold Lavine and James Wechsler, *War Propaganda and the United States* (New Haven, 1940); Richard Rollins, *I Find Treason* (New York, 1941); G. Salvemini, *Italian Fascist Activities in the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1940).

17. *Hearings of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. Senate* (74th Cong., 2d sess. [1936]).
18. A content analysis of a sample of these sermons was made by one of my students, Mr. Thomas Hamilton.
19. André Maurois, "The Lesson of France," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, VII (1941), 238.

CHAPTER VII

1. A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., contributed \$5,000 to the Pennsylvania State Committee and \$5,000 to the Democratic National Committee.
2. See Hugh A. Bone, "*Smear*" *Politics: An Analysis of 1940 Campaign Literature* (pamphlet). Washington, D C.: American Council of Public Affairs, 1941.
3. A discussion of British experience will be found in the writer's "Labor's Political Contributions," *Political Science Quarterly*, LIV (1939), 56-68.
4. For fuller discussion of these proposals see the writer's *Money in Elections* (New York, 1932), chap. xiv.

CHAPTER VIII

1. Let it be well remembered that Charles E. Merriam has never been one of those whose vision was blurred by the stereotypes of the profession.
2. *Politics and Administration* (New York, 1900), p. 24.
3. Grosvenor B. Clarkson, *Industrial America in the World War* (Boston, 1923), p. 93. For illuminating comment on the military mind see Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis* (New York, 1923) and David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs* (Boston, 1933-37).
4. *Public Administration Review*, I (1941), 395.
5. Their most recent exchange may be found in *Public Policy*, I (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), pp 3-24 and *Public Administration Review*, I (1941), 335-50.
6. For warnings about these matters see Merriam, "Public Administration and Political Theory," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, V (1940), 293-308.
7. *Public Administration and the United States Department of Agriculture* (Chicago, 1940), p. 283.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF CHARLES E. MERRIAM

I. BOOKS

- History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1900
- A History of American Political Theories.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1903.
- Report of an Investigation of the Municipal Revenues of Chicago.* Chicago: City Club of Chicago, 1906
- Primary Elections A Study of the History and Tendencies of Primary Election Legislation.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908; rev. ed. (with Louise Overacker), 1928
- American Political Ideas: Studies in the Development of American Political Thought, 1865-1917* New York: Macmillan Co., 1920.
- The American Party System. An Introduction to the Study of Political Parties in the United States* New York: Macmillan Co., 1922; rev. ed. (with Harold F. Gosnell), 1929, 3d ed. (with Harold F. Gosnell), 1940.
- A History of Political Theories, Recent Times Essays on Contemporary Developments in Political Theory* (editor with Harry E. Barnes). New York: Macmillan Co., 1924.
- Non-voting Causes and Methods of Control* (with Harold F. Gosnell). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924.
- New Aspects of Politics* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925; 2d ed., 1931.
- Four American Party Leaders.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1926.
- Chicago A More Intimate View of Urban Politics.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1929.
- The Making of Citizens: A Comparative Study of Methods of Civic Training.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931.
- The Written Constitution and the Unwritten Attitude.* New York: R. R. Smith, Inc., 1931.
- The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago* (with Spencer D. Parratt and Albert Lepawsky) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933.
- Civic Education in the United States.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934.
- Political Power Its Composition and Incidence* New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill, 1934.
- The Role of Politics in Social Change.* New York: New York University Press, 1936.

The New Democracy and the New Despotism. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill, 1939.

Prologue to Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939.

On the Agenda of Democracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941.

What Is Democracy? Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941.

II. ARTICLES AND OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS

- "Thomas Paine's Political Theories," *Political Science Quarterly*, XIV (1899), 389-403.
- "State Government," *New York State Library Review of Legislation* 1901 (March, 1902), pp. 15-18.
- "Political Theory of Calhoun," *American Journal of Sociology*, VII (1902), 577-94.
- "Political Theory of Jefferson," *Political Science Quarterly*, XVII (1902), 24-45.
- "State Government," *New York State Library Review of Legislation* 1902 (May, 1903), pp. 711-16.
- "State Government," *New York State Library Review of Legislation* 1903 (October, 1904), pp. c1-c9.
- "Sovereignty," *New International Encyclopedia*, XIV (1904), 16-17.
- "The State," *ibid.*, pp. 147-48.
- "State Central Committees," *Political Science Quarterly*, XIX (1904), 224-33.
- "State Government, Lawmaking, and Elections," *New York State Library Review of Legislation* 1904 (October, 1905), pp. c1-c10.
- "The Chicago Primary System," *Publications of the Michigan Political Science Association*, VI (1905), 118-24.
- "State Government, Lawmaking, and Elections," *New York State Library Review of Legislation* 1905 (October, 1906), 143-70.
- "Hobbes' Doctrine of the State of Nature," *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association*, III (1906), 151-57.
- "State Government, Lawmaking, and Elections," *New York State Library Review of Legislation* 1906 (August, 1907), pp. 153-66.
- "The Chicago Charter Convention," *American Political Science Review*, II (1907), 1-14.
- "Substitutes for the Personal Property Tax in Cities," *National Conference on City Government* (1907), pp. 276-79.
- "Revenues and Expenditures of American and European Cities," *University of Chicago Magazine*, II (1910), 141-47.
- "Citizenship," *ibid.*, III (1911), 275-82.
- "People's Primaries in Chicago," *Review of Reviews*, XLIII (1911), 466-68.
- "Work and Accomplishments of Chicago Commission on City Expenditures," *City Club Bulletin*, IV (1911), 195-208.
- "Chicago Commission on City Expenditures: Investigation as a Means of Securing Administrative Efficiency," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XLI (1912), 281-303.

- "Outlook for Social Politics in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XVIII (1913), 676-88.
- "The Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun," in James W. Garner (ed.), *Studies in Southern History and Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1914), chap. xiii, pp. 319-38.
- "Primary," in A. C. McLaughlin and A. B. Hart (eds.), *Cyclopedia of American Government*, III (1914), 49-51.
- "Primary, Direct," *ibid.*, pp. 51-55.
- "The Case for Home Rule," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, LVII (1915), 170-74.
- "Budget Making in Chicago," *ibid.*, LXII (1915), 270-76.
- "Findings and Recommendations of the Chicago Council Committee on Crime," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, VI (1915), 345-62.
- "American Publicity in Italy," *American Political Science Review*, XIII (1919), 541-55.
- "Nomination of Presidential Candidates," *Journal Issued by the American Bar Association*, VII (1921), 79-85.
- "Organize the World for Peace," *American Federationist*, XXVIII (1921), 924-25.
- "The Present State of the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review*, XV (1921), 173-85.
- "Recent Tendencies in Primary Election Systems," *National Municipal Review*, X (1921), 87-94.
- "James Bryce," *Journal of the American Bar Association*, VIII (1922), 87-89.
- "The Next Step in the Organization of Municipal Research," *National Municipal Review*, XI (1922), 274-81.
- "Political Research," *American Political Science Review*, XVI (1922), 315-21.
- "William Archibald Dunning," *American Political Science Review*, XVI (1922), 692-94.
- "Human Nature and Science in City Government," *Journal of Social Forces*, I (1923), 459-64.
- "Nominating Systems," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CVI (1923), 1-10.
- "The Present State of Politics in the United States," *American Review*, I (1923), 269-76.
- "Progress Report of Committee on Political Research, American Political Science Association," *American Political Science Review*, XVII (1923), 274-312.
- "The City as a Problem in Government," in Chester C. Maxey (ed.), *Readings in Municipal Government* (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1924), chap. i, pp. 1-8.
- "Current Public Opinion and the Public Service Commissions" (with Harold Lasswell), in M. L. Cooke (ed.), *Public Utility Regulation* (New York: Ronald Press, 1924), chap. xv, pp. 276-95.

- Introduction to Harold F. Gosnell, *Boss Platt and His New York Machine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), pp. xiii-xxiv.
- "Psychology and Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, XVIII (1924), 122-25.
- "The Significance of Psychology for the Study of Politics," *ibid.*, pp. 469-88.
- "Compulsory Voting in Czechoslovakia," *National Municipal Review*, XIV (1925), 65-68.
- "The Political Situation," *American Review*, III (1925), 264-70.
- "Annual Report of the Social Science Research Council," *American Political Science Review*, XX (1926), 185-89. Also in *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XXI (1926), 68-72.
- "Masters of Social Science. William Archibald Dunning," *Social Forces*, V (1926), 1-8.
- "The Need for Business Executives in City Government," *City Manager Magazine*, VIII (1926), 112-17.
- "Progress in Political Research," *American Political Science Review*, XX (1926), 1-13.
- "The Direct Primary," *American Federationist*, XXXIV (1927), 155-64.
- "Recent Developments in Political Science," in Edward C. Hayes (ed.), *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences* (Philadelphia: Lippincott Co., 1927), chap. vi, pp. 307-27.
- "William Archibald Dunning," in Howard W. Odum (ed.), *American Masters of Social Science* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927), chap. v, pp. 131-45.
- "Metropolitan Regions," *University Record* (University of Chicago), XIV (new ser., 1928), 69-79.
- "The Metropolitan Region of Chicago," in T. V. Smith and L. D. White (eds.), *Chicago: An Experiment in Social Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), chap. vi, pp. 78-90.
- "The Police, Crime, and Politics," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CXLVI (1929), 115-20.
- "Research Problems in the Field of Parties, Elections, and Leadership," *American Political Science Review*, XXIV, Suppl. (1930), 33-38.
- "Administrative Reorganization in German City Government," *Public Management*, XIII (1931), 125-27.
- "How Far Have We Come and Where Do We Go from Here?" *National Municipal Review*, XXI (1931), 7-12.
- "Boycott of Government Costly," *Public Management*, XIV (1932), 115. Also in *American Federationist*, XXXIX (1932), 765.
- "Reducing Government Costs," *Minnesota Municipalities*, XVII (1932), 231-36. Also in *Oklahoma Municipal Review*, VI (1932), 128-30.
- "Government and Business," *Journal of Business of the University of Chicago*, VI (1933), 181-90.

- "Government and Society," in President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933), II, chap. xxix, pp. 1489-1549.
- "Government and Society," *Survey Graphic*, XXII (1933), 33-36.
- "The Federal Government Recognizes the Cities," *National Municipal Review*, XXIII (1934), 107-9.
- "Poverty of Power," *International Journal of Ethics*, XLIV (1934), 185-210.
- "Cities and Federal and State Planning," *Western City*, XI (January, 1935), 10 ff.
- "Governmental Planning in the United States," *Proceedings of the National Education Association of the United States*, LXXII (1935), 501-10.
- "Planning Agencies in America," *American Political Science Review*, XXIX (1935), 197-211.
- "Professor Merriam Addresses Committee" in "The State Senate Investigates University," *Alumni Bulletin* (University of Chicago), I (May, 1935), 9-11.
- "National Planning in Practice," *Planning for the Future of American Cities: Proceedings of the Joint Conference on City, Regional, State and National Planning, May 20, 21, and 22, 1935, Cincinnati, Ohio* (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials), pp. 180-84.
- "A Closer View of the Machinery of Control," *Plan Age*, II (January, 1936), 9-16.
- "The Field of the League of Municipalities," *Proceedings of the American Municipal Association, 1931-1935* (1936), pp. 101-8.
- "As the Cities Go, so Goes the Nation," *ibid.*, pp. 225-33.
- "The Future of the League Movement," *ibid.*, pp. 451-55.
- "Cities and Federal and State Planning," *ibid.*, pp. 610-14.
- "Putting Politics in Its Place," *International Journal of Ethics*, XLVI (1936), 127-50.
- "Spirit and Purpose of Planning," *Planning and Civil Comment*, III (January-March, 1937), 1-3.
- "Some Social Implications of Inventions," *American Institute Monthly*, II (November, 1937), 4-8, 15.
- "The Assumptions of Aristocracy," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIII (1938), 857-77.
- "The Assumptions of Democracy," *Political Science Quarterly*, LIII (1938), 328-49.
- "A Key Point in the Democratic Process," *Chicago Union Teacher*, III (June, 1938), 5-8, 16.
- "Leadership in American Life," *Proceedings of the University of Chicago Alumni School, Social Sciences, Thursday, June 2, 1938*, pp. 14-23. (Mimeographed.)
- "The National Resources Committee of the United States," *American Teacher*, XXIII (February, 1939), 16-19.

- Preface to Clifford J. Hynning, *State Conservation of Resources* (Washington, D.C.: National Resources Committee, 1939), pp. iii-iv.
- "Planning in a Democracy," *Proceedings of the National Conference on Planning, 1940* (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials, 1940), pp. 168-80.
- "Politics and Religion," *Religion in the Making*, I (1940), 204-13.
- "Public Administration and Political Theory," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, V (1940), 293-308. Reprinted under title "The Development of Theory for Administration," *Advanced Management*, V (1940), 130-38.
- "Urbanism," in Louis Wirth (ed.), *Eleven Twenty-Six: A Decade of Social Science Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940), pp. 28-38. Also printed in *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV (1940), 720-30.
- "William E. Dodd as Statesman," *University of Chicago Magazine*, XXXII (May, 1940), 8-9.
- "Democracy," *ibid.* (June, 1940), pp. 14-15, 25-27.
- "The Meaning of Democracy," *Journal of Negro Education*, X (1941), 309-17.
- "The National Resources Planning Board," *Public Administration Review*, I (1941), 116-21.
- "The National Resources Planning Board," in George B. Galloway and Associates, *Planning for America* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1941), chap. xxv, pp. 489-507.

